SN

ZAIRCRAFTN,
~LNOSE |

\ OF]O=] [Or] Or] Or \
Ad. |35yr| 25yr| ¥. Ad! Y. Ad!
‘ EXIT n4i{nt3 n. 5} nt jn42
BLOCKED

Or! Or Or | OF | Or
tByr|1Sye| — |4Syr|23yr|22yr1
EXIT n.22|n.35] — [n.43|n. 25]n.40

O+ | O+ O+ | O+ | OF EXIT ATTEMPTED

' 29yr|lOyr 64yr/58yr/28yr|[7/ BUT NOT OPENED.
n.9 [n.7 a. 31[n.10|n.32)

CARRIED
13 LB DOLL “NTO=TOr] [OF] OFTO=
(INFANT) 42yr|20yr 40 |ilyr| Ad.

0.63[n.59}  [n.54|n.55|n.44] CARRIED ‘
so LB. DOLL
e+ |e (2 YR. OLD)

'9yr}20yr| | 27yr| 24yrl¥ Ad
ats|n3 n14|n.60|n34

eo @ | @ | O-
SOyr| Ad. 18yr| 2hyr|23yr.
n19[n.26 n. 45). 21)n 30

Or MALE

@- 1O+ @-| G+ |e
Y. Ad]22yr| 32 yr] 50 ib} 43yr] Ot FEMALE
7.53 $9.50) 6 | Doli n.4

7 Tm Te

DOOR NOT USED
FOR EXIT

=,

PASSENGERS LOADED
THROUGH THIS DOOR

] INJURED

GALLEY

BREAK IN FUSELAGE

Freure 9.—The general seating configuration and exit usage diagram is shown for Test I. Each seat block contains
the age and jacket number worn by the occupant. Where age is not known, adult (Ad) or young adult (Y.Ad)
is used. The small circle of the sex symbol also designates the exit used by relating to the appropriate circle
in the exit arrows.

16


going to take out arm-rest, but couldn’t get
to it. Started to be eased out. Fell against
Kay. Told men to grab him under shoulders.
Slant of floor knocked Kay into door.

Fourth Event: Heard Bea up forward once—

Directing people aft. Couldn’t see beyond

two rows. Could see exit area. Light on
ground. Door was clear. Dead man got
outside. Pulled to door by Kay. He got

out. Another injured (girl) being brought
back. “I'll take her.” Had her. She was
fairly heavy. Nobody at door to help. A
shadowy figure came from outside to help
her. Elderly couple in buffet area. Took
his hand and led hand in hand. He went
out and helped her. Last helped out getting
pretty empty.

Bea was back aft. “Is everyone off?”
“Yes—let’s go.” Bea followed Kay out.
Sounds seemed consistent throughout. No
changes.

Clearer outside.

First man outside misunderstood and came
back in.

39

belts.” No problem getting to forward cabin.
One box fell into aisle. Put it back. People
in aisle. No problem getting forward. Don’t
remember siren sound. Forward—flashlights
at impact. Don’t remember any other flash-
ing light. Gunshots. Heard siren—When
outside door—Couldn’t see other than people
lining at exits. Couldn’t see or tell what was
going on elsewhere. Heard no commands.
Couldn't tell if man on wing was helping.
Incapacitated man—Pax said, “Do you want
help?” “Yes.” Two men helped remove in-
jured man from second or third row on left—
forward window.

Checked with flashlight in seats plus feeling
seats to see if everybody out. Smoke not so
bad on floor.

Fourth Event: To aft of galley. Injured man

in aisle. Being taken out by another man.
Kay was in lead_out back door. Kay asked,
“Everyone out from front?” “Yes.” When
got to door no one was outside. Shouted
loudly for help from outside to get injured
man out. Seemed like could see better in
back—less smoke. Told Kay to jump. Kay
went behind helper for injured. Then I
jumped out. Heard sirens at time jumped
out. Aware of lights outside? “No.”
Determine what was holding up second aft
overwing exit? “Pax were wrestling for this
exit. Seat back was blocking it. Told boy
to open, but seat back blocked. Emergency
exit between seats resist exit? Not that I
could tell. Smoke blocked vision of exit.



APPENDIX 3

STEWARDESS COMMENTS

TEST I

Aft Stewardess

First Indication:
alarm—Yes.

Noise. Captain announces

First Event: First moved when noise stopped.
Open rear door. No trouble. People were
up. Grabbed man—white short. Out. Old
Lady. Moving pretty well. Don’t recall
pile-up. Pax self-motivated. Anyone try to
open main door?—“No.” Incapacitated pax
seen. Pulled forward people to rear because
of pile-up in front. Two into buffet—2 more
to rear.

Second Event: Returned to rear. Pax helped
incapacitated out.

Third Event: Went forward to see if any left.
Double. No one left. Out back door. Mega-
phone help—No.

Forward Stewardess

First Indication: Captain announces—Emer-
gency Equipment. Talking stopped. In-
structed belts fastened and seats forward.
“Buddy system instructions.”

Shouted, Spoke Loudly: Heard responsive
Comments.

First Event:
1. Unfasten belts.
2. Tried to open buffet door.
Removed clutter.
3. Aft pax—“Go back” (first 3 rows forward.
of galley) in forward section.
Pax separated — Opening of exits: “Open
exits.” No activity to open second exit. For-
ward right side seat backs pushed over exit.
“Push seat forward.”

Second Event: People not all going out “leg-
body-leg.” Located aisle and seat space area.
Fairly calm. Lot of smoke coming from
rear. Forward was clear. Ordered to bend
down. People bending low. Last people
going out. Re-checked cabin.

Third Event: Buffet-—PAX (2) men carrying
girl. They fell—3-4 times, then tried to lift
her out. Other stewardess forward. AU
Clear.

TEST It

Aft Stewardess

First Event: Captain announcement.

Not clear on role to be played in test.
Discussed with Ed Burggraf. Would have
yelled at pax to put head down and take care
of child because no instructions came from
flight deck. Remained at station. So unreal
re: gear trouble. Assumed we weren’t to say
anything.

35

Forward Stewardess

First Event: Bump/crackling sound. Captain
on P.A. Thought first—Try to get up and do
something, but not enough time. Didn’t
want to get caught up. Thought about
mother and girl on left about three rows
forward of galley. Told her to follow others
and take girl out forward exit. (Pointed
forward.)



window seat back which was abreast of the for-
ward portion of the window. The exit was re-
moved between seat rows 1 and 2 with the row 1
seat back pulled forward by the occupant. A
female passenger from the center seat, first row,
was seen to step over the window seat back into
row 2 and out of the forward window exit. This
passenger stated she was the second person out.
The other passengers from the first row, except
the “injured” man in the right aisle seat, also
climbed over the front row seat back and ap-
proached the forward window from row 2. (In
Test I, the front row passengers walked around
the seat to go out.) Although many noticed the
“Gnjured” man slumped over in his seat no-one
stopped to assist him in getting out. It was
difficult to determine details of this exit from
the film taken under the .05 foot-candle illumina-
tion, but the seat back obstruction was confirmed
by observing this window after tests.

There was less difficulty in getting to the aft
window exit between rows 2 and 8, once the exit
was removed. However, it was opened approxi-
mately 32 seconds after the forward exit and
evacuation flow was constant. There was a wait-
ing line of passengers for both exits until all
were out.

When the forward stewardess re-entered the
forward cabin, heavy smoke had filled the area,
making it necessary for her to feel her way.
Most passengers were outside by this time. The
stewardess then found an “injured” man in the
front right aisle seat and shouted for the aft
stewardess to help. Because of the heavy smoke
and lack of visibility, the forward stewardess
found the loose end of the seat belt and thought
it was unfastened. ‘She attempted lifting the
man but realized the belt was still fastened. It
took both hands to unfasten the belt, “...while I
needed one hand free to hold him back from
slumping over it,” she stated. The aft stewardess
arrived quickly and the two struggled with the
man for approximately 22 seconds. The steward-
essess felt that his weight (210 pounds) was the
prime reason they could not move him. They
left him and went out the forward window exit.
The stewardesses were last out of the aircraft
except the “dead man” in three minutes and 614
seconds.

The dependence of passengers on the action of
the stewardesses is noteworthy in this test. Aisle
debris was quickly kicked out of the way and

10

seemed to cause very little trouble to passengers
on their way out.

The outside emergency lights suddenly went
out just before the aft door was opened and
evacuation started. In spite of power failure the
evacuation was successfully completed using the
rotating beacon ‘from the fire truck and flash-
lights.

The only injury experienced was one bruised
and scraped left hand by a male passenger who
helped remove two “injured” and assisted with a
third. This passenger scraped his hand on the
door sill or floor in the scurry.

A high-speed, infra-red, sensitive film (HIR)
was used for documenting the night tests (II and
IV) and was run at approximately five frames
per second. Camera locations for this test are
shown in Figure 3.

Analysis and further details are included in
Test Results Section.

CRITIQUE SESSION

On Wednesday, April 7, 1964, a session was
held to discuss Tests I and II. It was agreed
that five items could be changed or included in
Tests III and IV which would add to informa-
tion gained from the tests. These changes were:

1. Obstacles placed in the aisles before tests
were being observed by the passengers and
plans were apparently made to get them out
of the way. Therefore, the stewardess re-
sponsible for aisle debris was asked to delay
placing these obstacles in the aisle until just
before the starting signal.

. The Captain’s announcement on the sound
tape was revised to provide a five-minute
interval between his announcement and the
crash sounds. The comments were also
changed to delete remarks relative to nose
gear trouble. A regular landing announce-
ment was substituted and referred to local
weather conditions and five-minutes until
landing. The one minute interval previously
used created some confusion among the
stewardesses whether the emergency was con-
sidered to be a planned or unplanned event.
Also, one minute did not allow stewardesses
sufficient time to brief the passengers and be
in their seats at “impact.”

. The cruising engine sound time was de-
creased from 15 minutes to about ten minutes
or less.


w~N
ZN
AIRCRAFT,
LNOSE )
' Ot |O~
lyr] 1
' EXIT m3 [nce
BLOCKED
OF
41 ye
EXIT O n5
BLOCKED On ler
12 yr| l6yr
n42|n. 7
' Stlo= Tes CARRIED
‘
CARRIED ae cn Ad. | 19yr | 18 yr} te ye ocDL
13 LB. OOLL: n.53|n40 n.102] n. 62] 0. 10) . °
(INFANT ) \
Soyriye] | Sox wre| Soe '
19 ye] 1] 1Oyr
n.idtnio3} [nS |n36|n-26 |
Or |Or Or | @ |@+
Szyr|26yr| | S5yr] 6Oyr| 6Oyr|
n32|nio4] [a 31]n.15|n.45
O+|O* Or | @ | Oe
Zi yr|22ye] — |22yr|22yr] 19 yr
n34fn.6]  [n.39]n35|n25 Oe MALE
SE l8r! SFIS) ot remace
n.46|n60}  [/n.5[n22)n.36
Tess,
Uo
DOOR NOT USED: INuURED
FOR EXIT.
om
<= GALLEY

PASSENGERS LOADED
THROUGH THIS DOOR.

ON
CRUTCHES

@+ |er
2ay20yr
n.48)n.59

BREAK IN FUSELAGE

CARRIED
13 LB. DOLL
(INFANT)

NIGHT 4-8-65

Fieure 12,—The general seating configuration and exit usage di:
tains the age, sex and jacket number worn by the occupant.

iagram is shown for Test IV. Hach seat block con-
Where age is not known, adult (Ad) or young

adult (¥.Ad) is used. The small circle of the sex symbol also designates the exit used by relating to the appro-

priate circle in the exit arrows.

20


APPENDIX 4

PASSENGER RECOMMENDATIONS OF PROCEDURES
AND EQUIPMENT

TEST I

Ewits:

1.
2.

8.

9.
10.

Larger exits.
Stewardess should have space to direct exit
activity.

. Escape windows should be more clearly

marked.

. More escape hatches and cut out third seat.
. Exits should not be directly behind seats.
. Exiting should be staggered instead of

everyone being told to get out at once.

. Parallel handles at the door inside of the

aircraft.

Dip in center of exit (or some other
method) to get leg out.

Open door prior to impact.

Automatic opening exits upon impact.

Instructions :

1

2.

3.

4,

5.

Better instructions on use of exits prior to
impact.

Better all-around instructions on emergency
evacuation.

More than one announcement of crash and
instructions as to what to do by the captain.
Megaphones or PA systems to aid steward-
esses in giving instructions.

Instructions for emergency should be given
before impact.

Lighting:

1.
2.
3.

Flashing lights over exits.
Have a visual guide.
Stewardesses should have a light.

Equipment:

1
2.
3.

Metal to metal safety belt locks, seat belts.
Wider aisles.
Better place to keep packages.

Miscellaneous :

1
2.
3.

Stewardess should be calmer.
Women should not wear tight skirts.
No packages should be permitted.

41

SOMDIAMP wD

e

11.
12.

TEST II

. Instructions to open exits should be screwed

to the back of seats—You can’t miss read-
ing them.

. Better working of exits.

. More and larger exits.

. Exits should go out, not in.

. Exit locator sign should be larger.

. Eliminate seats that block exits.

. All windows available for exits.

. Lights on exit seat corners.

. Stronger exit lights.

. Seats that will fold out of the way at exit

points.
Widen seat spacing at exit.
Have exits on side with double seats.

Instrugtions :

1

2.

‘ore instructions maybe more info on use
of emergency exits.
“J should think stewardesses would be
trained enough to help passengers get out
or make people aware of how to get out.”

. Tell people about light over window if you

want them to notice it.

. Instructions as to how for to ground.
. Instructions to open exits should be serewed

to the back of seats—You can’t miss read-
ing them.

Lighting:
1. Lighting—night emergency not inertia

OID TP wt

lights—good emergency lighting system
need—strobe light would be helpful if stew-
ardess would let you know it was there
(Frank Malone—CAB).

. Permanent lighting.
. Flashlights available for emergencies.
. Smoke elimination.

Need emergency lights inside of aircraft.

. More light.
. Lights on exit seat corners.
. Stronger exit lights.



EMERGENCY EVACUATION TESTS OF A CRASHED L-1649

I, Introduction.

The full-scale crash test of the Lockheed Con-
stellation L-1649 aircraft was made on September
3, 1964. Upon post-crash inspection of the fuse-
lage, it was apparent that many of the occupants
might have survived the impact forces. The effect
of post-crash fire on survivability was neglected
for test reasons. However, it was evident that
there would have been some injuries. A study
of these probable injuries is included in the re-
port No. ADS-48, “Evacuation Tests of a
Crashed L-1649.”

Subsequently, a working group decided to use
the crashed aircraft and site for evacuation tests
as a continuing phase of the over-all safety re-
search program.

The test was planned by representatives of the
Air Transport Association, Aviation Safety En-
gineering Research, Civil Aeronautics Board, and
the Federal Aviation Agency. Four basic tests,
two day and two night, were programmed.

Since the L-1649 crash was considered surviv-
able, the fuselage presented an excellent oppor-
tunity for evacuation testing of an aircraft in a
crashed condition. Due to costs of removing the
heavy cargo installation forward of the wing,
only the pasensger cabin aft of the cargo struc-
ture was used. This allowed the use of about
forty to fifty passengers with two stewardesses
acting as crew members, using a new group for
each evacuation test.

A contract for preparation of the aircraft to a
passenger configuration was awarded to AVSER
in February 1965. Work began on the aircraft
shortly thereafter with a test schedule of Test I
(Day) and Test II (Night) on April 6, 1965;
Test III (Day) and Test IV (Night) on April
8, 1965.

Restoration of the crashed aircraft to a prac-
tical and safe specimen was accomplished as de-
scribed in Report ADS-48. A summation and
analysis of passenger comments are included in
Appendix 1. Stewardess questionnaire response

is given in Appendix 2 of this report. The
stewardesses were interviewed further on events
of the evacuation and the notes taken during the
interviews are reported in Appendix 8. Although
the comments are short, the stewardesses’ re-
actions are evident.

‘Two stewardesses each were furnished through
the cooperation of ALPA, Steward and Stew-
ardess Division; American Airlines, Trans World
Airlines; and United Air Lines. These crew-
members conducted their respective evacuations
according to emergency procedures recommended
by their organizations.

II. Aims and Purposes.

In the four basic tests outlined, difficulties,
handicaps, and obstructions and other observa-
tions were to be documented so the data and
findings could be used as needed for other air
transport safety programs. The general purpose
of the tests was to observe the reactions of unin-
doctrinated passenger populations under different
test conditions rather than to compare one test
with another. Included in the tests for evalu-
ation were:

1. Interior minimum emergency lighting of
.05 foot-candles.

2. Exterior emergency lighting of 2 foot-
candles for aid in escape.

3, A flashing strobe light in the overwing exit
for passenger reaction and visibility.

4, Exit signs over doors and exit windows.

5. Passenger response to stewardess commands.

6. Debris strewn in the aisles,

7. Smoke to assess passengers’ ability to loeate
exits with partially-obscured visibility.

8. Effects of unnautral floor angles on passen-
ger and crew egress.

9. Rescue of injured passengers from the air-
craft.

10. Rescue of infants and children (anthropo-

metric dolls representing a 2-months-old
and 2-years-old).



Question

Test NR

AFT Stewardess

Forward Stewardess

16. As a result of this experience,
what do you think about the
advisability of people taking
carry-on baggage or packages
with them on an actual flight?

17. Did you hear passengers give
commands or try helping peo-
ple out?

18. (If Yes) Can you recall any
commands other than those
of the stewardesses?

19, Which exit did you use?

20, Was there a closer exit than
the one you used?

21, Did you try to leave the same
way you came in?

22. Did you start toward an exit
that turned out not to be use-
able?

23, Did you find the light level
adequate after the fluorescent
lights went out?

24, Would you say much confu-
sion was apparent?

I

sees

Iv

IL

Iil

Iv

Il
seen
Iv
I

Til
Iv

Il

it
Iv
II

Ul
Iv

Il
Til

Iv
Ill

Iv

“Didn't present too many prob-
lems.”

“Each pax should be allowed to
carry one package which will fit,
under seat.”

“Not advisable.”

“It this test—no problems. If too
much could be problems.””

“No commands Too much help

in assisting incap pax.”

“One man asked if help needed.”

“Saw pax helping each other
(Didn’t hear anyone giving
commands).”

“Yes, help guide people out—No
commands heard.”

“No others.”

“Didn't hear any.”

NO ANSWER
NO ANSWER

“Rear door.”

“OQverwing.”

“Right aft door.”

“Right aft door.”

“No—ran forward and back to
exit rear was down-hill.”

“Could have used aft door but
went forward (Couldn't tell
where Linda. was).”

“No.”

“No.”

“No.”

“Galley door not attempted for
use due to precondition.”

NO ANSWER
NO ANSWER
“NO.”
“Only used aft door.”

“No—My door worked OK right
away and people were moving
OK.”

“No.”

“No Because of the smoke.”

“Not very good—disturbed—
couldn't see door handle from
beginning.”

“Confused—later aft group out.”

“Dead set against it. (heavy
articles) had to move buffet
clutter helped by volunteer pax.”

“Don't think they should be on,
but not because of what hap-
pened tonight—TEST: People
took care of obstacles.”

“No—If A*C were tilted these
might tend to block exits.”

“Yes—if they were in aisle defi
nitely hinder evacuation.”

“No—pax helping each other.”

“No commands heard—One man

helped both man and woman in last
right forward seat cabin.”

“Saw people helping each other
(Didn’t hear anyone giving com-
mands).”

“Yes (Command man to stop on
wing)—No”

“yo”

“No!

NO ANSWER

“No.”

“Aft door.”

“Overwing.”

“Right aft overwing.”

“Right aft door.”

“Yes—decided when assured all
out.””

“No—Could have taken another
but as long as she was there she
went.”

“Could have taken either over

wing exit.”
NO ANSWER
“Yes—Tried to open—Stuck.”
NO ANSWER
“yo.”
“No.”

“People in front all moving fast—
Seat back blocked.”

“Galley door.”
“Galley exit unusable.”

“No—Knew galley door not to be
used—ignored.””
“Yes "

“Yes—before smoke —hit—then
couldn't see except for forms.”

“Where injured pax was on way
out (Forward by window took
(TIME).”

33



aN
ZN
ZAIRCRAFT\
LNOSE | LEFT FOR DEAD
\
\ Or] O- > [Ot | O- ‘
\ EXIT 20yr|22yr @3ycd2 lye |2lyr
n.43 [0.47 In. 324.40 ]0.55)
BLOCKED Th
O+] OF Or] O+ | O+
l6yr| 15 yr I9ye] i tye [2ZOye| 1
EXIT n.5|n.48|  [n.59|n.50|n63 1
BLOCKED
Or} Ow Ot | Or | Oe
18 yr] 1B yr 25 yr] 20yr) 2tyr
\ n.3 [n.53 n.22] 0. 419.6
AS CARRIED
Ble] [eles] eee
| 67ye | tyr | ISye
130. a3? 146 n.tojn.3t (INFANT) \
O+| ee Ot
23yr BOyr|24y¢
n.60|n.45
Or
1B yr |19ye
9.21 )n.25)
O* MALE
85.1%, O+ FEMALE
in. 429 ot
cr?
parainerel USED oO INJURED
. thy.
GALLEY
PASSENGERS LOADED
THROUGH THIS DOOR.

BREAK IN FUSELAGE

CARRIED
50 LB. DOLL
(2 YR. OLD)

NIGHT 4-6-65

Fieure 10.—The general seating configuration and exit usage diagram is shown for Test II, Each seat block con-
tains the age, sex and jacket number worn by the occupant. Where age is not known, adult (Ad) or young
adult (Y.Ad) is used. The small circle of the sex symbol also designates the exit used by relating to the appro-
priate circle in the exit arrows,

Ww



VII. Recommendations.
1. Further investigations of the efficiency of lights
(exit) in smoke are recommended as follows:

a, Exterior emergency lighting: spot type or
flood type, optimize intensity.

Install markers or identifying objects which
locate the seat rows leading to emergency
window exits under low visibility conditions.
c. Mounting locations on aircraft of high in-
tensity strobe type light if they are con-
sidered as a locator device for rescue per-
sonnel. The strobe light is not recommended
for cabin interior illumination as a result of
these tests.

Optimum aisle width to best facilitate the
removal of injured.

2, A study is recommended which would compare
evacuations in actual emergencies with simulated
tests of this kind, including experience derived
from evacuation demonstrations.

b.

d.

28

3. A suggested study would be to explore the
illumination at or over all exits. The .05 foot-
candle emergency lighting is considered an ade-
quate minimum for intra-cabin illumination, but
the value decreases to around .02 foot-candle at
the sides. Whether or not more lighting directly
on exits would enhance evacuations in poor visi-
bility conditions significantly beyond present pro-
visions is the question proposed. Other devices
such as sound are suggested to be explored for
drawing attention to location of exits.

4. Escape chutes were not used in these tests due
to the aircraft resting on the ground with rela-
tively short step-down distances. With the cur-
rent use of door-mounted chutes, trials should be
made with inflatable escape chutes deployed in
gear-up conditions. One actual aircraft incident
is known in which this condition was used suc-
cessfully when fire was not involved.



w~
SN
AIRCRAFT,
LNOSE_)
\ eo Or | O+.) Or
\ EXIT Ad. 18 yr| 19 yr| 22 yr
. 57) 5

BLOCKED a5 1.38|n.60| 0.12

Or e@- |e
10 yr] 18 yr 26 yr}22 yr] 32yr]
EXIT n.13in.59 n40\n.42| 0.7
BLOCKED Oo lee
16 yr| 7 yr BOyr] Tyr | yr
1 n 4} nt In. 25] n.15 |n. 35
‘ Or OF] Or] O-
22yr IS yr| 1Syrh 43yr
0.48] — |[n.43|n.47)0.63
Ot Or | O~ | OF
3Byr|25 yr 2lyr|3lyr|24yr|
n.26[n.39} [n.53|n. 9/0. 6
eo oe
|GOyr|62yr W9yr
n.44io. 14 n.32:
@+ | Oo @ | @+
Myr] 2lye 19 yr] 19yr| 18yr
n.50|n. 45) n. 4 [n.36[n.54
et | eo ole
16 yr 18 yr 19yr | 22yrf 32yr4
n.34{n10]  [o.19)n46)n.37|
TiN

DOOR NOT USED

C= GALLEY

CARRIED
13 LB. DOLL
(INFANT)

-

O» MALE

O+ FEMALE

| INJURED

TH

CARRIED
50 LB. DOLL
(2 YR. OLD)

BREAK IN FUSELAGE

CARRIED
13 LB. DOLL
(INFANT)

PASSENGERS LOADED
THROUGH THIS DOOR.

a a

Fyeure 11.—The general seating configuration and exit usage diagram is shown for Test IL. Each seat block con-

tains the age, sex and jacket number worn by the occupant.
adult (Y..
priate circle in the exit arrows.

19

Where age is not known adult (Ad) or young

Ad) is used. The small circle of the sex symbol also disignates the exit used by relating to the appro-



Question

Test NR

AFT Stewardess

Forward Stewardess

25 What changes in procedures
and equipmant would you
recommend to help speed es-
cape of passengers?

Il
ur

Iv

s4

Ul

Iv

“Not in rear.”
“No, I thought it was good.”

“No, except for first man out.
Smelled smoke right away.”
NO ANSWER

“Wider aisles mainly (re: injured
pax removal) Aft door sharp
edge”

“More important to get help to
get injured pax out and equally
important to keep moving pax
moving”

“Needed more light)( More light
would have helped Biggest
problem Tilted floor gave some
problem Stewardesses are not
generelly strong enough to carry
adult (Dead Weight)-Help is
needed ”

“Very calm.”

“Yes, when they didn’t move at
first; moving injured main con
fusion.”

“Only in trying to get aft overwing
exit open.”

“Seat backs—Some people said
couldn’t hear” Larger exit would
have helped—Space to direct
exit activity might help—may
have slowed people by virtue of
own presence ’””

“Didn't see any emergency evacu-
ation lights Try to know names
of pax by emergency instruc-
tions ”

“Could have used more aisle space
restriction to movement ”

“Placement of seat back*exit loca-
tion”



exit and ushering passengers out. There was a
crippled man in the aisle seat, left side, first row,
aft cabin, who made his way without aid, on
crutches, with slight difficulty. When the aft
cabin was empty, the stewardess went forward
through the galley where she met a man with an
“injured” girl. The stewardess said, “I'll take
her,” and dragged her by an underarm hold to
the aft cabin door. A passenger outside took the
“injured” and laid her on the ground. The
stewardess moved back up the aisle and led an
elderly couple from the rear of the forward
cabin. She was followed by a man dragging an
“injured” man who was pushed out of the door
to a helper outside. The two stewardesses fol-
lowed the “injured” and helper out of the exit.
The last person was out of the aft door in three
minutes and 7.6 seconds.

The excitement in the cabin during the test
was intensified by noises of a log chain thrown
on top of the aircraft, a gun fired from the flight
deck area, pounding on the fuselage from outside,
gelled fuel set on fire on the left side, dense
theatrical smoke in the cabin, the fire truck siren,
wailing whistle and the low-level lighting.

Camera locations for Test IV are shown in
Figure 4. Tape recordings of the cabin activity
were obtained.

V. Test Results.

QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY

A basic questionnaire was prepared for the
tests to gather information from passengers but
was slightly revised for the last two tests to
clarify some of the questions and include emer-
gency lighting. A detailed summation of pas-
senger comments is presented in Appendix 1.
Answers to these forms revealed that approxi-
mately half the passengers felt the tests to be
realistic; an average of 27.6% felt realism to
some extent. The two night tests apparently
created more apprehension than the day evacua-
tions, the smoke, lighting and noises being the
greatest contributing factors.

The slope of the floor did not cause as much
difficulty as predicted. More than one-third
(40%) stated that they had no trouble with the
floor angles. The 18% who noted “much” diffi-
culty were primarily those assisting the “injured.”
There were at least four groups who fell or ended
up against the aft bulkhead in the aft cabin, all

14

helping “injured.” Getting out of the seats was
another problem noted by about 10% of the pas-
sengers. Approximately half stated they devel-
oped panic feelings at different stages of the
evacuation, Smoke, siren and low illumination
were the main causes of these feelings.

Of the total 132 passengers, excluding the
“injured” seated in the forward cabin during the
four tests, 65 (49%) stated they were aware of
the strobe light in the right aft window exit. It
must be kept in mind that a few may have inter-
preted this as meaning the photo-flash bulb set off
with the starting signal. There were no com-
ments indicating objections to the brilliant flash
emitted by the strobe. The exit windows con-
taining the strobe lights were removed and either
placed in seats or on the floor of the cabin, and
the flashing was not noted as being in these posi-
tions, probably because of attention toward get-
ting out of the aircraft.

Some passengers stated they did not know the
purpose of the strobe light. Approximately 18%
on the day tests and 30% on the night tests stated
they thought the strobe light would aid them in
escape.

Seventy-five per cent of the passengers stated,
in the questionnaire, that aisle obstacles did not
handicap them in escape. Many comments noted
“people” got in the way; as well as the seat backs
in line with the window exits. Aisle debris in
Test IV was “rained” down from hat racks into
the cabin, but did not hadicap passengers any
more than in Tests I and II wherein the debris
was pre-placed in the aisle. However, one adult
male stated he felt panic when struck by one of
the falling articles.

There was interest in whether passengers
sought their route of entry for escape. Of the
subjects in the two day tests, 20.5% (Tests I) and
34% (Test III) stated they sought to evacuate
via the door through which they had entered.
During the night tests, 5% (Test II) and 7%
(Test IV) sought their route of entry.

The question concerning the adequacy of the .05
foot-candle interior emergency lighting was ex-
cluded in the questionnaire for Test II (Night),
but it was agreed among the coordinators that the
question should be added for the next night test.
However, of the passengers in Test IV (Night),
53% responded that lighting was adequate and
45% said that lighting was inadquate for escape.
Smoke was introduced in these tests, obscuring


for use inside the aircraft for color photography
during the two day tests. A multi-outlet power
station supplied electrical power for cameras and
instrumentation.

Test No.1

Test No. II

Fieure 8.—Camera positions and viewing angles for
Tests I and II.

SEAT BELTS

All seat belts were the web-through-buckle or
slip-through type with varying anchor-to-buckle
distances. The buckle segment was fastened to
the left anchor of each seat. A few belt buckles,
on small individuals, ended up on their far right
side and were more difficult to release.

OTHER ITEMS

Placards—Radioactive type exit signs or pla-
cards were installed over the galley and right
aft exits. One placard which had arrows pointing
to the overwing exit was hung from the ceiling
in line with these exits. One other placard, also
with arrows, was mounted between the two adja-
cent right overwing exits with an arrow pointing
toward each exit.

FWD.

tp UeSeeee
BEEEEE

Test No.Ill

Test No.IV

Ficure 4.—Camera positions and viewing angles for
Tests III and IV.

These placards were similar to those currently
in use aboard some commercial transports. The
Society of Automotive Engineers, A-20C Sub-
committee, was interested in an evaluation of
these placards and supplied them.

Smoke—A smoke generator was operated from
the aft left lavatory area and produced a dense
whitish cloud of non-toxic smoke. Because of the
pitch of the fuselage, the smoke moved forward
through the galley into the forward cabin at a
fairly constant rate, especially after the aft door
was opened which caused a chimney type draft.

Seats—Used double and triple L-1649 seats
were installed for the test. Thirty-five passen-
gers in seven rows (5 seats per row) in the for-
ward cabin, with 89-inch fore-aft spacing, were
used for Tests I and II. Two and one-half rows
(double seats) spaced 39 inches provided ten
seats in the aft cabin for all four tests. In Tests
III and IV eight rows (5 seats per row) were
installed, providing forty seats with 32-inch fore-
aft spacing in the forward cabin.


APPENDIX 2

SUMMATION OF STEWARDESSES’ RESPONSE TO QUESTIONNAIRES

Question Test NR AFT Stewardess Forward Stewardess
1. Did you have much of the feel- I “After it got started—quite a bit.” | “Close as you can come—not as
feeling of a real emergency? much noise as expected—heard
siren near back at galley.”

I “Yes—at times. (2) times. “Yes—sort of a battle—vascillating

(1)thought girl was hurt; emergency test, etc.’”
(2) when couldn’t see.””

It “Not until smoke started.” “When people-appeared hurt.”

Iv “Yes,” “Yes.”

2. How much difficulty did you I “None.” “Not too aware except carrying
have with the sloping floor? girl out.”

Il “Very much—particularly injured “Didn’t notice any—(always for-
removal.” ward).”

Til “Some—if anyone had fallen there | ‘“None—Trouble in directing pax-
may have been a pile-up. to watch sloping floor.”

Iv “Very definitely—fell at least | “Not that I remember.”
twice (backwards).””

3a. Do you think you would have | I “No.” “May have screamed louder.”
acted any differently had you | II “Yes—probably been nore ener- | “Probably—might not have tried
been aboard this aircraft when getic in moving people—prob- | harder—reality arrested from
it crashed? ably by hair.” time to time.”

ur “No.” “Yes—Might have tried longer to

to open door (galley).”

Iv “Probably would have done more | “If had one minute—might have
briefing and considered slide given more instruction in use of
use.” exits and maybe have reseated

pax.”
3b. In what way? (Reference Ques- Ill NO COMMENT “Was aware that aviation people
tion 3) aboard and hesirated to recruit
their assistance—getting majority
out who looked like they were
moving fairly well.”
Iv NO COMMENT “Put more able-bodied into stra-
tegic locations.”
4 Did you experience panic feel- | 1 “Wanted to get out.” “Didn't see any—No.”
ings at anytime? Il “Yes—more of frustration trying | “No.”
to move man.”

I “No—No time to.” “Yes—At first when the lady col-

lapsed—boy was frightened.”

Iv “At time door was an foot—when | “No.”
fell back with one injured pax.”

5 Did you observe evidence of It “No—Except maybe for little | ‘Not real panic—disturbed by not
panie in others? girls” getting injured out.”

Iv “Yes—concerned—for—elderly | “No.”
couple—appear frightened.”

6. Have you ever been in a real I “No.” “No.”
emergency situation? It “No.” “No,”

Ill “No.” “(Auto Accident)” “No.”

31



i.

12.

138.

14,

15.

16.

17.

Did you expect more instructions in this case from crew members?

Test T Test IT
56.0% 45.0%
44.0 50.0
Don’t Know _ 5.0

Were you aware of the flashing lights in the overwing exits?

Test I Test IT
Yes 51.0% 60.0%
No —- 49.0 40.0
No Answer -~. _ _

Do you think these flashing lights would aid in your escape?

Test T Test I
18.0% 30.0%
23.0 22.5
26.0 175
No Answer — 28.0 30.0
Confuse More -_-------------------------- 5.0 _

Did the aisle obstacles handicap you in your escape?

Test I Test IT
Yes ~ 23.0% 25.0%
No -- 74.5 75.0
People 2.5 —
No Answer ---------- _ _
Seat in Way of Hatch — _
To what extent? (Reference Question 14)

Test I Test IT
None -_---------------------------------- 79.5% 15.0%
Little 18.0 20.0
Much 25 5.0

No Answer -

Test III

80.0%

18.0
2.0

Test LIT

42.0%
58.0

Test IIT
18.5%
21.0
2.5
58.0

Test IIT
2.6%

79.0
53
2.6
10.5

Test IIT

76.5%
21.0

2.5

Test IV
47.0%

51.0
2.0

Test IV
44.0%
47.0

Test IV

81.0%
9.0

60.0

Test IV
20.0%

73.0
7.0

Test IV
73.0%
27.0

‘As a result of this experience, what do you think about the advisability of people taking carry-

on baggage or packages with them on an actual flight?

Test I Test IT
No Packages - 49.0% 35.0%
Packages O.K 5.0 20.0
Better Place for Packages, Limited,

Small Secured, No O/H 33.0 80.0
Handbag, Brief Cases, Wraps, Pillows Only 8.0 2.5
No Opinion .----------------------------- 5.0 12.5
Did you hear passengers give commands or try helping guide people out?

Test I Test IT
Yes -_ 49.0% 75.0%
No --- 51.0 25.0

Don’t Remember ----- — —

27

Test IIL
50.0%

Test Tit
63.0%
37.0

Test IV
53.0%
16.0

22.0
2.0
7.0

Test IV

40.0%

58.0
2.0



‘adoTS 03 01 oLT OU} UO ABVYVoIM OY} JO Mara TR1gUas V—T FUND



The data and observations were intended to:

1. Provide additional knowledge and experi-
ence useful for crew training in emergency
procedures.

2. Supplement government-industry studies on
emergency lighting for emergency evacua-
tions at night.

8. Support accident investigation activities,
regulatory functions and _ specification
guidelines.

4. Provide additional information to those in
aviation with related functions pertinent to
emergency egress from aircraft such as
manufacturers, designers, operators.

5. Point out parameters of the evacuation
which need further study under more con-
trolled laboratory conditions.

III. Facilities and Equipment.

AIRCRAFT

The crashed L-1649 came to rest-on a twenty-
degree hill and the fuselage broke into three
separate sections—nose, center and tail. The nose
section broke at the top about two and one-half
feet aft of the left main cabin door. This section
rested at about six degrees downward pitch. It
was connected to the center section by floor and
sub-structure. The second break occurred just
aft of the galley. This break at the top of the
fuselage left the tail section connected to the
center cabin by floor beams, however, with less
upward deformation of the floor than at the
forward break. The center portion of the fuse-
lage was resting at about twenty degrees upward
pitch. The aft section rested at a thirty-two
degree upward pitch. The cabin floors in the
tail and center sections were practically free of
distortion, allowing the flooring in the area to be
restored except for the angle change at the aft
break (See Figure 1).

All exits in the test area of the cabin were
operable after the crash. These exits were the
two right and two left overwing window exits,
the left galley door and the aft right exit. The
window exits on the left side of the fuselage were
made inoperable because of the ragged, torn and
shredder metal outside each exit. The left for-
ward main door and right crew door near the
flight deck were damaged in the crash and ex-
cluded from the test.

The aft right exit sill height varied from 32
inches to 33 inches from the ground. The exit
was a plug type, so that when the latch pins were
retracted, the stewardess lifted or dragged it out
of the way for evacuations. The door weighed
46-14 pounds. The window exits were also plug
type. The forward overwing exit weighed 40
pounds; the aft overwing exit window weighed
36 pounds. Window exits measured 19 x 26
inches; the door exit was 24 x 65-14 inches.

EMERGENCY LIGHTING

Installations for the emergency lighting were
included in aircraft preparation. The .05 foot-
candle interior lighting was accurately set by a
Pritchard Spectrophotometer furnished and oper-
ated by a representative of the Photo Research
Corporation. This emergency cabin light level is
a current requirement for air carrier aircraft.
Measurements were taken at 40-inch intervals at
arm rest height in the cabin aisle, starting 40
inches aft of the forward temporary bulkhead
separating passenger cabin from the cargo area
and moving rearward,

Distance from Forward Bulkhead Meter Reading

40 inches .085 foot-candle

80 inches 042 foot-candle
120 inches .047 foot-candle
160 inches .050 foot-inches
200 inches .048 foot-candle
240 inches .050 foot-candle
280 inches .052 foot-candle
320 inches .048 foot-candle
360 inches .048 foot-candle
400 inches .051 foot-candle
440 inches .051 foot-candle
480 inches 052 foot-candle
520 inches

.050 foot-candle
Average Level— .048 foot-candle

The first three readings were lower due to a
lack of available overlapping lights forward of
the first meter reading. Illumination levels were
checked toward the sides and were found to fall
off progressively as the meter was moved side-
ward from the center of the cabin as follows:
Right Side (Triple Seate) Left Side (Double Seats)

In Aisle Seat Aisle Seat

.044 foot-candle .082 foot-candle
In Middle Seat Middle Arm Rest
029 foot-candle .023 foot-candle

In Window Seat

021 foot-candle

Outside emergency lights were mounted over

the aft right door and one over the two overwing


vision and overall illumination. Consequently,
many passengers commented further on the lack
of adequate exit markers over windows and doors.
A study of light penetration-in smoke is found
in recommendations.

In answer to what changes in procedures and
equipment would be recommended, passengers
listed many items. In most cases, however, no
specific suggestion or clarification of their recom-
mendation was noted in detail. A listing of
these comments by tests is found in Appendix 4.
Items receiving the most response are noted
below:

1. Larger and more exits.

2. Exit-opening instructions placed on back of
seats in exit area; ie, how they operate—
pull inward or push outward, and more
pre-crash crew instructions on how exits
operate and how to get out.

. Larger exit markers and more light near
exit areas.

. Remove seats in front of exits.

. More space between seats at exits,

6. A public address system or megaphone for
crew to instruct passengers.

. Wider aisles, galley forms obstacle in this
aircraft.

. Stewardess should point out strobe lights
and explain their purpose.

. Automatic exit opening, but no specific sug-

gestion as to how it might be accomplished.

Flashlights furnished for passengers to use

near exits.

10.

STEWARDESS QUESTIONNAIRES

Although the questionnaire was designed for
passengers, the stewardesses were asked to fill out
the questionnaire form. Appendix 2 lists the
detailed answers of the eight stewardesses.

Their genera] reactions indicated that the tests
were realistic. The introduction of “injured” pas-
sengers and the smoke aboard provided the feel-
ing of a real emergency. Most stewardesses com-
mented they did not know whether to consider the
emergency as a planned or unplanned condition.
This caused them to hesitate making seat checks
and giving pre-crash instructions for fear of
being out of their seats at the time of impact.
On Test IIT, however, the emergency was un-
planned with no indication of difficulty. Emer-
gency lighting seemed adequate to them until

15

smoke obscured visibility. One aft stewardess
had difficulty with the 32° slope of the floor and
fell against the aft bulkhead “at least twice.”
Others had little or no trouble in the aft cabin.

The stewardesses were debriefed more thor-
oughly than were the passengers after each test
and elaborated more on events which occurred
during their respective tests. A verbatum listing
of events in Appendix 3 documents the appre-
hension, excitement and conditions which were
encountered. The aft stewardess had to cope with
smoke from the start, stating they “could not see
two-rows.” In the forward cabin, the general
concern was for the “injured” forward of the
galley. The comments also demonstrate control
of evacuations by shouting or normal voice com-
munication.

PASSENGER REACTION

The introduction of smoke, sound effects and
stewardess commands were motivating factors to
the passengers. Most of the children from seven
to thirteen years of age were apparently “shaken”
by the realism. Test film, sound recordings, and
questionnaires showed that passengers performed
in a calm manner generally, some more appre-
hensively than others, some stating that motion or
vibration would have caused more concern to get
out.

From the overwing exit area, once on the wing,
there was a tendency for evacuees to follow the
people in front of them. When the first man out
of an exit went forward over the leading edge
of the wing, others followed. This same tendency
was evident inside the cabin. People with poor
visibility conditions depended on the persons in
front of them for directional guidance, and were
able to follow those passengers making sounds or
talking.

Results of Test II in which the starting signal
was delayed, and of Test III in which no emer-
gency was expected showed that passengers
waited clues from the crew. Passengers anti-
cipated and expected more guidance, and were
vehement in their stating that more instructions
should have been given. This was evident in
Test III, for while the forward stewardess was
trying to open the galley door, 12.5 seconds
elapsed before any attempts were made by the
passengers to open the overwing exits.



TAPE
RECORDER

Ampex

(mod. 1260)

R ty

TAPE
RECORDER

Ampex
(mod. 970)

@
Ampex Speakers—f

icrophones

Fraure 2.—Microphone and speaker positions for all tests.

Actual camera locations for the tests are shown
in Figures 3 (Tests I and II) and 4 (Tests IIT

and IV).
All possible prefabrication and construction

ox

was done at the FAA Oklahoma City Base and
transported to the test site. This included the
remote camera control system and outside plat-
forms. Flourescent light units were assembled



Test 4

(NIGHT)

ae start
SIGNAL

Test 2 Test 3
i (oayy

tt

to
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90

Completed

100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
190

att Door
Completed

Complated

TIME IN SECONDS

Qverwing
exite
Completed

|

Ed att Door
Completed

Att Door

y Completed
Overwing
Exits

Completed

Fieure 13.—A general time summary chart of the four
evacuation tests.

ESCAPE ROPES

Escape ropes were installed in the spaces pro-
vided in a compartment above each right over-
wing exit. The end of each rope protruded
through a hole in the top of each exit window
frame.

During Test IV a “deadheading” stewardess
pulled the escape rope in the forward overwing
exit. She stated she had difficulty finding the
rope and was delayed in pulling it out. As she
cleared the wing, the rope was left trailing aft
and at first no one used it. The fourth passenger
from the forward exit slipped and rolled off the
wing onto the ground. All of the rest of the
participants from this exit then used the rope.
As a result, they were closely grouped in single
file and slowly moved off the wing. The rope
blocked the aft window exit and seriously delayed
evacuation through both overwing exits. During
the action the aft exit rope was never deployed.

Four comments concerning the rope were ob-
tained from persons aboard

1. “Climbed out window, held on to frame,

then used rope.”

2. “Hurry up, hang on to the rope.” (This was

a command heard by one passenger.)

8. “Rope good idea.” (This man was carrying
a 50-pound doll.)

4, “Knew where it was but was delayed trying
to find it and pull it out.” (Deadheading
stewardess who deployed the rope.)

EXIT SIGNS

During these tests, exit placards were not avail-
able for the left overwing exits. Since smoke was
introduced in all tests, visibility of all placards
was diminished quite soon, reaching the overwing
exits last.

In the forward cabin, two exit placards with
two arrows each pointing 45° downward were
mounted, one in the ceiling and one midway
between the two right overwing window exits.
Usually an exit sign is mounted over each window
exit. However, a shortage of available placards
necessitated use of a double-arrow placard which
pointed to each exit. Since smoke reached the
forward area last, effectiveness of these placards
was sought before smoke obscured them. Al-
though the questionnaires did not include ques-
tions on the placard, thirty-three persons from
the four tests in the forward cabin were queried
about placards. Sixteen of them noticed the pla-
cards but were guided by the persons in front
of them to a greater extent. Three responded
they were more conscious of the exit itself than
they were of the placards, and two stated they
glanced at the placard which directed their at-
tention to the exit.

The galley and right aft cabin doors each had
an exit placard (without arrows) over the top
door frames. The galley door placard was visible
to the forward stewardess and passengers using
the aisle in this area, This door was obscured by
smoke eight to twelve seconds after the start
signal. None, other than the forward stewardess,
is known to have used the galley placard during
tests. The aft door placard was obscured quickly
by smoke and two aft stewardesses had to feel for
the door handle.

CARRYING OF INJURED

Many methods were used to deliver the “in-
jured” to the exits. Time loss, especially in Test
I, very vividly pointed out the effect of random
time-consuming ways of removing “injured” pas-
sengers.



AM 6642

EMERGENCY EVACUATION TESTS OF A CRASHED
L-1649

J. D. Garner
John G. Blethrow

Approved by Released by
J. Rosert Diniz, M.D. P. V. Srecen, M.D.
Cuter, Crvin AEROMEDICAL Feprrat Arr SurcEON
InstITUTE

August 1966

FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY
Office of Aviation Medicine



The forward microphone recorded these com-
mands throughout the test. She then moved for-
ward through the passenger-filled aisle and ar-
rived at the overwing exit area about twelve
seconds from the start as the second person went
out. She shouted instructions as she moved.
Two male passengers and the stewardess tried the
left forward overwing exit without success. The
stewardess remained between the left first and
second seat rows while shouting “leg-body-leg”
and “keep moving.” “Help each other when out
on the wing,” and when the smoke arrived, “get
down low so the smoke won't get you.” She went
to the right aft window exit when she realized it
was unused, but noticed the cabin was almost,
empty (1 minute, 10 seconds from test start) and
abandoned the effort. The passenger flow was
steady from the right forward window exit
throughout the test (Figure 5). The first man

START SIGNAL

OWA
rl
fn FORWARD OVERWING EXIT OPENED |

104

204

3044
2 :
z 4044
° iS
o |
i iE
Ee

504
z
Ww
2
b

i ni ni i i
I 5 10 15 20
NUMBER OF EVACUEES

Figure 5.—Individual evacuation flow from the right

forward overwing exit in Test I, The rectangular
blocks represent each of the 21 persons and show the
time the exit was in use by each individual.

(22-year-old) came out head first in a “dive”
fashion while all others used leg-body-leg motions
with either right or left foot first on the wing.
The stewardess checked seats on her way aft and
went out the aft door. Step-up distance between
cabin floor and exit sill for the overwing was 2314
inches and step-down to the wing was 27 and 32
inches for the forward and aft overwing exits re-
spectively. These step distances prolonged in-
dividual exit usage times which averaged 3.78
seconds per person for Test I from the start sig-
nal until all were clear of the exit.

Twenty-one passengers and a 13-pound doll
were clear of the window in one minute and 19.4
seconds, and clear of the wing in one minute and

START SIGNAL

AFT CABIN DOOR OPENED
im
Se
2
SS
=a

a
oa
Zz
fe}
oS
o
o
Zz
w
2
i

[Jo

Two men‘re-entered

to assist injured ———»

b
WE OOENOTES INuURED | |
i=)
[=]
3
n n rn n r L
t 5 10 15 20 25

NUMBER OF EVACUEES

Fievre 6,—Individual evacuation flow from the right aft
door exit in Test I. The rectangular blocks repre-
sent each of the persons and show the time the
exit was in use by each individual.



Clocks—Precision clocks were used to time
events. The Number 1 camera (forward inside)
had one clock in view, and camera Number 5
(outside overwing) had another clock in view.
The master control switch which set off flash
bulbs and the bell also started the clocks.

Strobe Light—A flashing light in the aft right
window exit between panes was manually turned
on from outside for each test. The Fire and
Rescue Committee of ALPA was interested in an
evaluation of the light and provided a second
flashing component for Tests III and IV which
was installed in the forward right overwing exit.
These lights flash fifty times per minute with a
two-million lumen point source. They are capac-
itor discharge type through a xenon gas-filled
tube. The filaments were imbedded in solid
plastic for impact protection.

IV. Test Description

TEST I

The two stewardesses acting as crewmembers were
made familiar with the window and door exit
operations on the aircraft before the test. Essen-
tially, the only other instruction given was for
them to perform their normal functions for evac-
uating the aircraft, consistent with their training,
as signalled by the end of the crashing sounds
and light flash.

The first test occurred in the mid-afternoon of
April 6, 1965. Forward of the galley, seven rows
of five-abreast seats were available with 39-inch
fore-aft spacing. In the aft portion of the cabin
ten passenger seats were available with the same
89-inch spacing. Forty-four passengers were
boarded in a population distribution as required
for air carrier demonstrations, ie, 57% male
adults, 30% female adults, 8% children and 5%
over sixty years of age. Two dolls were placed
randomly aboard, one simulating a two-year-old
child (50 pounds) and the other designed to
represent a 95th percentile (by weight) two-
months-old infant (13 pounds). Three anony-
mous “injured” passengers were placed in the last
row of the forward cabin, and a fourth in the
last aft left window seat in the rear cabin.

Two light-weight cardboard packages of about
one cubic foot each, three briefcases and two
small wrapped packages were scattered’ in the
aisles before the test started.

A fire truck started from about 1,000 yards

away at the signal and rolled up within 35 feet
of the aft right exit with its siren going. The
siren added materially to the realism of the tests.

Slip-over numbered jackets were used in all
tests for identification of passengers.

Neither the crew nor passengers knew which
exits were operable. The left galley door (route
of entry) was de-activated and the left overwing
exits previously bolted shut. Following the meal
serving, the music tape was removed and the
cruising engine sound-effects tape put on. Limited
instructions were given to the passengers for their
imaginary flight from Los Angeles to Phoenix,
Arizona. The Captain’s statement followed fif-
teen minutes of the cruising engine sounds:

Ladies and Gentlemen, this is your Cap-
tain speaking. We are about to land at
the Sky Harbor Airport in Phoenix in
approximately one minute. You may
notice some emergency vehicles on the
field. This is a precautionary measure
due to the fact that we cannot be sure
that our nose gear is fully extended. We
believe that it is extended. Please do
not be alarmed. We expect a normal
landing. If there is any difficulty, follow
the instructions of your stewardess.

As soon as the Captain finished,the forward
stewardess gave continuous instructions from her
seat area in the galley for preparation for the
landing. At impact, passengers were in impact
position with their heads down.

The crashing sounds ended with the flash and
the bell. The aft stewardess had the door, five
feet from her, open within 3.6 seconds. The
forward overwing exit, after some difficulty was
opened in 6.5 seconds by a man sitting next to it.
He passed the exit to another man who leaned it
against the forward wall. Smoke filled the aft
cabin very quickly and moved forward through
the main cabin by the time ten people had gone
out the forward exit (49 seconds from test start).
The aft right overwing exit was never opened;
however, a passenger was heard stating that he
had attempted to open it.

The forward stewardess first attempted to
open the left galley door directly to her left, but
could not open it. She then “gathered up clutter”
in the galley aisle between the fore and aft cabins.
She began shouting, “Get those doors open” to
prompt those by the window exits to open them.



*COMMANDS RECALLED

TEST I

“Help that man out, will you?” “Take care of
him.” (Command) “I'll take care of you.” (Reply
to previous command) “Keep it moving.” Some-
one said, “Go out this door,” but the door was
locked. “Leave the dead ones behind,” and how
do you know they were dead? “Let’s go; let’s
go.” Someone pulled on scuff of neck. “Leave
him alone.” Directions to exits. Request for
help to carry out an injured. Indirect urging
from other passengers. Direction giving (in
general). Guy in front seat said to hand him the
door up and another said to push out on an exit.
Instructions to go out back door.

TEST II

“Turn right.” (This led to window, not exit and
delayed us—turned between two exits.) “This
way to window.” “Don’t push and help a girl.”
“Don’t shove.” “You hold the seat while I pull.”
“Turn right.” Yank on window.” Get seat for-
ward.” Cried for help in back, Person in front
told me to move seat forward because of exit.
Commands from people on ground to watch step
off wing. Directions to get out of window. Di-
rections to door. Directions on how forward and
how far to come.

29

TEST III

“Use the window.” “Push window out, not pull
it inside.” “Get out,” “Don’t bother injured man.”
“Hand me that door.” “Here, this way.” “This
way.” “Hurry, hurry.” “Come towards window.”
“Get out as quickly as possible.” “Let the women
go first.” Told to get out window. Instructions
as to which exit to take. Instructions to children
to get out open exit. Instructions between two
passengers helping injured man out. Boy next
to girl said, “Come on,” “Follow me,” and then
let her evacuate first.

TEST IV

“I should go back.” “Hurry up; hang on to
rope.” “Open second window.” “Go this way;
it’s closer.” “There’s an unconsious man in cor-
ner; get him.” Instructions to man carrying
baby. Commands to help evacuate injured. Man
at door said, “Hurry up; get out.” Instructions
to use other exits. Father instructing mother
(Child) Father’s instructions. (Child) Stew-
ardesses asked for help to handle someone, telling
which way to go. We started front; were told
to come out front. Heard everybody saying,
“Hurry up.”



18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24,

Can you recall commands other than those of the stewardess ?*

Test I Test IT Test IIT
36.0% 45.0% 42.0%
64.0 55.0 53.0
_ _ 5.0
Which exit did you use?
Test I Test II Test IIT
Forward Overwing - 49.0% 55.0% 89.5%

Rear Cabin Door --- 17.5 39.5
_ 12.5, 21.0
—_ _ 15.0
‘Was there a closer exit than the one you used?
Test I Test IT Test IIT
23.0% 17.5% 18.0%
77.0 82.5 82.0
Did you try to leave the same way you came in?
Test I Test IT Test IIT
- 20.5% 5.0% 34.0%
77.0 95.0 63.0
2.5 _ —
Not at Start ----------------------------- - _ 3.0
Did you start toward an exit that turned out not to be useable?
Test I Test IT Test III
23.0% 20.0% 10.5%
17.0 TT5 87.0
_ 2.5 2.5
Did you find the light level adequate after the flourescent lights went out?
Test I Test IT Test TI
_ - 21.0%
_- _ 2.0
_ _ 74.0
Don’t Remember _ _— _ 3.0

Comments:
Test III—“Foggy, smoky, not good.”
Test [V—Smoke 11%.

Would you say much confusion was apparent?

Test I Test II Test LIT
Yes __ 33.0% 35.0% 31.5%
No -- 36.0 27.5 37.0
No Answer —_ _ —~ 25
Somewhat Part Time - 31.0 30.0 29.0
Don’t Know _ 15 _
Contributing Factors:
Smoke ~. — 5.0% _—
“Caused by Stewardess” -- 5.0% — —

*See “Commands Recalled” at end of Appendix 1,

28

Test IV
27.0%
11.0
62.0

Test IV

49.0%

40.0
9.0
2.0

Test IV

22.0%

73.0
5.0

Test IV
7.0%
91.0
2.0

Test IV
7.0%
91.0
2.0

Test IV

53.0%
47.0

Test IV
36.0%
33.0
2.0
29.0


exits and set at 2 foot-candles on the ground for
the aft right exit and at both the leading and
trailing edges of the right wing for the overwing
exits. This exterior lighting had been considered
by the SAE A~-20 Aircraft Lighting Committee
in their preliminary draft revision of ARP 503A
as an aid to evacuees outside the aircraft in night
emergencies. Near the windows and on the wing
surface, the intensity was higher (but not meas-
ured) in order to achieve the 2 foot-candle level
set at both leading and trailing edges. These
were aircraft spot type bulbs adjusted by reduced
voltage taps from wet cell batteries.

TAPE RECORDING EQUIPMENT

Three microphones were placed in the passen-
ger areas on the left hat rack shelf. Number 1
was forward (over seat rows 1 and 2). Number
2 microphone was placed in front of the galley,
forward cabin, and Number 3 in the aft cabin
area about three feet aft of the galley. Number 1
microphone (forward) was recorded on the right
channel of an Ampex dual channel recorder;
Number 2 (center) and Number 3 (aft) micro-
phones were recorded on the left and right chan-
nels respectively of a second Ampex recorder.
Thus, during the tests, three microphones were
recorded simultaneously on three channels of two
stereo recorders as shown in Figure 2.

In-flight sound effects were played over two
speakers from one recorder. One speaker was
placed forward of the low wall separating the
front passenger cabin and cargo section; the
other was in the upper open storage (or baggage
compartment) built in the left aft portion of the
galley, so it was heard in the aft cabin. While
the passengers were waiting for the test to start,
music was played through the two speakers. At
the beginning of the test, the music tape was
removed and replaced by the sound effects tape
containing cruising engine sounds. Near the end
of the engine sounds came an announcement by
the Captain of an impending “belly landing” and
crash-landing noise. The end of the crash sound
was the signal for the test operator to turn on a
switch which triggered a series of flash bulbs,
both inside and outside the cabin, and a bell.
The bell and the bulbs identified the start of the
test on motion pictures and tape recordings. The
recorder with the forward microphone was turned
on before the crash sounds occurred. The other
recorder playing the sound effects tape was

quickly switched to “Record” at the end of the
crash sounds and documented cabin activity
through the center and aft microphones.

FILM COVERAGE AND CAMERA
LOCATIONS

The two day tests were photographed with 16
mm color motion picture film at 24 frames/second.
inside and outside of the aircraft. For night
tests, infra-red sensitive film was used and run at
4 frames/second because of existing low-level
illumination. Numerous still photographs were
taken of events and facilities in color and black
and white.

The overall motion picture coverage was in-
terrupted by a number of electrical and mechan-
ical malfunctions of cameras and associated
equipment. Cameras were positioned inside the
fuselage as follows:

1. Camera Number 1 was mounted forward of
the passenger area to view the cabin looking
aft. This camera functioned during all tests.

2. Cameras Number 2 and 3 were mounted in

the hat rack over the forward right over-
wing and aft right overwing window exits
respectively. Camera Number 2 ran on Test
IV only and Camera Number 3 ran on Test
TII only, due to defective switches and cir-
cuitry.
Camera Number 4 was mounted in the aft
right lavatory viewing the general area in
the cabin and looking forward. This
camera ran on Tests II and IV but failed
on Tests I and IIT.

Two camera positions were set up outside on

the right side of the aircraft as follows:

1. Camera Number 5 was placed 38 feet from
the fuselage over the right wing on a six-
foot-high platform for coverage of the over-
wing exits. This camera ran on Test I only
and became inoperable due to a short circuit.

2. Camera Number 6 was positioned 25 feet
directly abreast of the aft right exit on an
adjustable tripod. Following the failure of
Number 5 camera, this camera was moved to
a position 15 feet from the fuselage and
eight feet aft of the right exit as Camera
Number 6A. Both aft exit and overwing
were included in the view. Tests II, III and
IV were photographed from the outside by
this camera.

ad


There was no attempt by passengers to take
command of the evacuations from the crews in
these tests. We especially looked for this in tests
in which the stewardesses were busy with the “in-
jured” or instructions were made in voices that
did not penetrate through the cabin.

FLOW PATTERNS

Exits used by persons aboard the aircraft in
Test I are shown in Figure 9. Figures 5 and 6
show times and flow through the forward over-
wing exit and aft right door respectively.

The aft door in Test I was in constant use only
46% of the time from appearance of the first
person until the last person was out of the door
(Figure 6). Inefficient use of this exit was mostly
the result of exit and aisle blockage by removal
of an “injured” causing a lapse of twenty-seven
seconds. Three other “injured” were brought out
this same door with very little time loss. When
the aisle and exit were clear, flow continued at a
steady pace. The forward overwing exit was in
use 82% of the time from the first. person’s ap-
pearance until the last person was out of the exit,
not including exit opening time, averaging three
seconds per person. These exit percentages pro<
vide a general analysis of the total time an exit
is being occupied by a person in the process of
escaping from an aircraft beginning with the
first person to appear. Percentage time losses,
therefore, indicate intervals between evacuees
when the exit was empty and available for escape.

In Test II, which was filmed in low-level light-
ing, it was not possible to determine exit usage
for each individual. From questionnaires and
with the help of film coverage, the exits used, as
well as the number of passengers moving through
each exit, could be established. Figure 10 shows
the seating and exits used for this evacuation.
The heaviest blanket of smoke of all the tests
filled the aircraft during this test.. Comments
from the stewardesses pointed out how important
it was for people to keep talking or making
sounds so others could follow and be guided to
exits.

For Test III (Day), the evacuation pattern is
presented in Figure 11. Generally, passengers
went to the nearest available exit unless they were
guided to another by a stewardess. In this test,
one passenger from the front row decided to go
all the way aft to get out. Figure 7 presents the
individual time plots of evacuation through the

18

right aft door in Test III. This exit was in use
54.5% of the total time it was available. Flow
was interrupted because of two “injured” being
transported through the galley and the “injured”
in the aft cabin. The forward overwing exit was
in use 85% of the total time, including an “in-
jury” carry-out. The aft overwing, once opened,
was also in use 85% of the time although it took
longer for each individual to go through the
window. This is attributed to the greater step-
down distance outside. A chart of the two over-
wing exits shows individual escape times in
Figure 8.

After the initial delay while the stewardess re-
leased the seat belt of an elderly lady sitting in
the exit window seat, escape continued at a steady
pace from the overwing exits until passengers
started using the escape rope from the forward
exit. This rope was pulled across the aft exit
partially blocking escape. The aft right door
evacuation flow was steady except for slight inter-
ruptions when “injured” were removed. The exit
pattern of Test IV is shown in Figure 12.

TOTAL TEST TIMES

The total elapsed times of these tests were of
secondary importance. Some results gained, how-
ever, indicate the effects on evacuation of night-
time environmental conditions with the addition
of smoke. Other specific events during the evacu-
ations were observed for time losses or efficiency
of operation, such as exit usage and various
methods of removal of “injured.” Figure 13
presents the four tests for a general survey of
times involved on the evacuations.

SEAT SPACING -

The two different fore-aft seat spacings used in
the four tests did not have significantly different
effects on the evacuation flow. This effect of seat
spacing on evacuation flow and time should be
studied further on a statistical design basis,

Aisle widths in the aircraft with five-abreast
seating in the forward cabin (two left side, three
right side) were measured between arm rests as
follows:

Forward Cabin

Row 1 — 16 inches
Row 2 — 16 inches
Row 3 — 18 inches
Row 4 — 17 inches
Row 5 — 16 inches
Row 6 — 16 inches
Row 7 — 18 inches

Aft Cabin
Row 1 — 17 inches
Row 2 — 12% inches
(aircraft taper
effect)


TEST IIT

Aft Stewardess

First Event: Announcement. In back section.
Checked seat belts. Routine. Thought more
information would come. Very realistic w/o.

Second Event: Screeching sound and silence.
Smoke started. Couldn’t see past galley
bulkhead.

37

window exit by feel. Got to front row and
found man. Right side aisle seat. (Carol
shouting, “Everybody out?”) Checked other
seats. Nobody. Called for help from Carol
right behind tugged (had already taken seat
belt off). Couldn’t lift a man (by arms).
Seemed like awful long time. Carol said,
“He’s dead.” “We're going to have to leave
him.” “Let’s get out.” Pushed Carol. Could
see wing. Lights outside no problem out exit.
Notice any fire? Out galley door. (Seemed
like reddish glow sometime). Heard man on
wing, “Do you need any help?” “No.” Went
out. Didn’t hear siren at that time or after
got out.

Forward Stewardess

First Event: No activity. All seated after an-

nouncement. Noise. Loud bang. Lights
went off. Silence. Tried to open galley door.
Looked to see back door open. When open—
Yelled (to pax forward): “Unfasten seat
belts and go out back and watch incline.”
Didn't unfasten belts right away—just sat
there. Didn’t see too much in aft because of
smoke.

Forward—Right side aft row of forward
cabin woman and man. Woman was helped
out—Two fellows carrying her. (1 seated
next to her voluntarily.)

Boy handed man to Bobbie, “I can’t hold
him—too heavy—You take him.” Went for-
ward. No one in back of me then. Up for-
ward— Dragging a man over the seat to the
aisle over man’s back.

Second Event: Both exits were opened on own

initiative by pax. Telling pax to hurry up—
Shouting: “Go this way,’—“Come on.”—
“Over here.” Never went aft of galley.
“Leg-body-leg,” two or three times. Visi-
bility fairly good. Would never have sent
anybody back except Mary was talking in
back as though everything was good in aft
cabin. Mary came forward to see if every-
one out. “We're out back here.”

Man was pushed out window. Another pax
and I went out. Pax—forward overwing
exit; self—aft door.

Had been over every inch— assumed every-
one out.



First Event:

Second Event:

Third Event: Opened door—Trouble lifting it

up. Was previously instructed. Nobody
seemed overly excited—Went to get two men
out. One wouldn’t move. Went to get two
other men to help. Told them to “Help
him.”—No shouting needed. They did. Man
with baby near rear. Two men on ground
helped him, No screaming—Heard sirens
almost immediately upon opening door.
Wasn’t too concerned about siren. Pushing
people out door. Didn't slow up. Pax were
coming from forward. Two men and girl
came by—Slowed up exit. Couldn’t see any
more people—“What do I do now?” Went
forward through smoke up to front. Could
see seats. Asked Bobbie if she had everyone
out. Last one going out. Came all way back
and out aft door.

(Was standing aft of cabin door.)

TEST IV

Aft Stewardess

Announce. Checked last two rows
forward cabin and aft cabin for seat belts.
Took position at aft bulkhead. “Don’t
worry,” to a girl in aft cabin. “Dead man”—
asked if there would be any briefing. “No.”
One minute— couldn’t see pax. Quiet except
for outside noise.

Lights out. Difficult to see door
handle. Went for door. By feel. Opened
door. Landed on top of left foot. Hollered
for people to “Come out this way.” (Door
was on foot. Facing aft. Then lifted door
off.) Cabin was reasonably quite.

First man out. Asked him to stay. Shadowy
figure. He came back on aircraft.

Then saw dead man. Last row left side in-
capacitated man came out. Helped by pax.
Visibility—Poor. Restricted by smoke/light
level.

Third Event: Sounds—Aware but only nose.

Heard siren but not at that time. Think
more were still in aft cabin. Conscious of
more people around in area. Crippled man
came out and held up evacuation a bit. Using
crutches. “Doing alright?” “Yes,”

Delay in approaching door. Crippled man.
Attention on “Dead Man.” Two pax having
difficulties getting him out of seat. Were

38

Second Event:

After Crash: Silence—aft—saw smoke. Noises

of people. Heard siren. Don’t remember
when—Prior to time reached forward cabin.
Don’t remember when siren stopped—Except
it was after getting out.

Lights—Don’t remember especially, but if
there were any, it seems they were red.

Forward Stewardess

First Event: Started up aisle. Seat belts. No

smoking. Very calm. No alarm. No ap-
prehension. Anticipated. Came back.
Normally in brace position.

Sound of crash. No one seemed
to move. Started for exit. Overwing exits
were responsibility. Elderly lady at exit on
right side forward. She couldn't get seat
belt open. Two people went over to her.
Believe TWA girl opened exit. Don’t know
for sure. Knew galley exit wasn’t to be used.
Weren’t checked out on it.

Third Event: Unfastened elderly lady’s seat

belt. Out exit. Her husband went out behind
her. Asked that he stay there to help. He
said, “okay.” Looking at exit behind it to
see if it was open and being used. It was.
Location—In front aisle waving 2 penlites—
leg first.

Sounds—Yelling so loud didn’t notice any
sounds. “Move—Let’s go—Unfasten seat


APPENDIX 1

SUMMARY OF PASSENGER COMMENTS

1. Did you have much of the feeling of a real emergency?

Test I Test IT Test IIT Test IV
Yes - 46.0% 60.0% 52.5% 62.0%
No -- 23.0 12.5 26.5 7.0
To Some Extent 31.0 27.5 21.0 31.0
Contributing Factors:
Smoke -- 8.0% 12.5% 18.0% 6.6%
After Lights Out _ 5.0 5.0 88
Sirens ~~ - _ 2.6 2.2
Noise -. _— _— 5.0 _
Debris --. - _ _ _ 44

Two passengers noted that lack of vibration caused an unreal condition.

2. How much difficulty did you have with the sloping floor?

Test I Test II Test III Test IV
31.0% 87.5% 89.5% 51.0%
46.0 82.5 39.5 47.0*
23.0 30.0 16.0 2.0
Unknown -- _ _ 5.0 _
* One man carrying 50-1b, doll.
Contributing Factors:
Getting Out of Seat — 8.0% 7.5% - _-
Helping Others Out --------------------- 5.0 _ - _-
High-Heeled Shoes — 2.5 _ — —
Slipped Upon Standing - - _ 2.5% —

3. Do you think you would have acted any differently had you been aboard this aircraft when it
crashed ?

Test I Test II Test III Test IV
40.0% 45.0% 47.0%
. 40.0 87.0 24.0
Not Much -- 10.0 10.0 3.0 _
Possibly or Probably 75 15 15.0 22.0
Don’t Know 2.5 2.5 — 7.0
4. Were there panic feelings at anytime?
Test I Test IT Test III Test IV
50.0% 47.5% 46.79%
50.0 52.5 53.8
Contributing Factors:
Light .---------------------------------- 2.5% 10.0% 5.0% 2.0%



Figure

1

ah wh

10

11

12

13

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

A general view of the wreckage on the 17° to 20° slope-.
Microphone and speaker positions for all tests...
Camera positions and viewing angles for Tests I and II.
Camera positions and viewing angles for Tests III and IV_-.
Individual evacuation flow from the right forward overwing exit in Test
I. The rectangular blocks represent each of the 21 persons and show the
time the exit was in use by each individual.
Individual evacuation flow from the right aft door exit in Test I. The
rectangular blocks represent each of the 25 persons and show the time the
exit was in use by each individual. a
Individual evacuation flow from the right aft door in Test III. Rectan-
gular blocks represent each of the 21 persons and show the time the exit
was in use by each individual.
Individual evacuation flow from the right forward and aft overwing exits
in Test ITI. Rectangles represent each person and the time the exit was
in use by them.
The general seating configuration and exit usage diagram is shown for
Test I. Each seat block contains the age and jacket number worn by the
occupant. Where age is not known, adult (Ad) or young adult (Y.Ad)
is used. The small. circle of the sex symbol also designates the exit used
by relating to the appropriate circle in the exit arrows___
The general seating configuration and exit usage diagram is shown for
Test II. Hach seat block contains the age, sex and jacket number worn by
the occupant. Where age is not known, adult (Ad) or young adult (Y.Ad)
is used The small circle of the sex symbol also designates the exit used
by relating to the appropriate circle in the exit arrows.
The general seating configuration and exit usage diagram is shown for
Test III. Each seat block contains the age, sex and jacket number worn
by the occupant Where age is not known adult (Ad) or young adult
(¥.Ad) is used. The small circle of the sex symbol also designates the
exit used by relating to the appropriate circle in the exit arrows___.
The general seating configuration and exit usage diagram is shown for
Test IV, Each seat block contains the age, sex and jacket number worn by
the occupant. Where age is not known, adult (Ad) or young adult (Y.Ad)
is used, The small circle of the sex symbol also designates the exit used
by relating to the appropriate circle in the exit arrows.

A general time summary chart of the four evacuation tests.

Page

Rane

12

16

1

19

21



4, More stewardess instruction time was pro-
vided, especially for procedural seat belt
checks and passenger briefing.

5. Ropes were installed in the overwing exits
to obtain additional evaluations on the use
of the ropes.

TEST III

Stewardesses for the test were shown how to
open the aft door, the galley door and the over-
wing exits. Similar to the instructions given the
stewardesses in the previous tests, they were told
to evacuate the aircraft as quickly as possible at
the end of the crash sounds. They were instructed
to direct passengers to use the ropes at the over-
wing exits. They were also asked to make a
regular seat, belt check before landing.

Fore-aft seat spacing was 82 inches, providing
eight rows of five-abreast seats forward. There
were five double seats aft of the galley with 32-
inch spacing.

The change in the Captain’s announcement
gave this crew no warning of an impending
crash. When crash sounds came, there was no
advice from the flight deck to help the steward-
esses in their decisions.

Forty-five passengers were boarded through the
aft right door and were seated. Two infant dolls
(18 pounds) were also boarded, one in the aft
cabin, first row, right window seat and one in the
forward cabin, fifth row, right window seat. A
fifty-pound doll was placed in the second row,
left aisle seat in the aft cabin. The same four
“injured” passengers were anonymously boarded,
one in the aft cabin in the last row window seat,
two side-by-side in the two seats just forward of
the galley on the right side, and the fourth in a
window seat on the right side, fourth row.
Representatives of the news media were invited
aboard before test time and were allowed about
twenty minutes for their interviews and pictures.

Following the meal, the sound-effects tape was
played through an outside speaker additionally
mounted on top of the fuselage for observers out-
side the aircraft. Since the Captain’s announce-
ment had been changed for this test, the steward-
esses did not at first associate the crash sounds
with an emergency. However, the aft stewardess
opened the aft exit in 2.9 seconds. The first
passenger was on the ground in eleven seconds.
Smoke was introduced into the cabin almost im-
mediately, but the evacuation continued with a

li

reasonably steady flow (Figure 7). The aft stew-
ardess guided the evacuation quite efficiently, Her
requests to passengers for help with “injured”
and “come this way” were made in a controlled
voice which was recorded over the unexpected
low noise level by the aft microphone on the left
hat rack. Most of the time she stood back of the
aft exit giving passengers directions. Twenty-
one persons, including three “injured” and two
dolls, cleared the aft exit in one minute, 35.9
seconds.

START SIGNAL
(AFT DOOR OPENED

o
oa
no
2 b
é
3
8 oO
on i=]
o
z
oa
wu
= -
F Qo
o
[5
[HM DENOTES invURED
a
o
n n n r f
| 5 10 15 20

NUMBER OF EVACUEES

Ficure 7.—Individual evacuation flow from the right aft
door in Test IIT. Rectangular blocks represent each
of the 21 persons and show the time the exit was in
use by each individual,

The forward stewardess at the start of the test
first tried opening the galley door, then gave the
command to “Unfasten seat belts. Go out back.



Minor bruises were incurred by three persons,
including two of the “injured.”

The camera coverage was in color, tken from
locations shown in Figure 4, Tape recordings
were obtained from the three microphones in the
cabin.

TEST IV

The two stewardesses for this test were shown
how to operate the exits soon after Test III was
completed. They were instructed “to perform
the evacuation consistent with their training as
the crash sounds stopped, check that seat belts
were fastened before landing and unfastened
after the crash, have deadheading stewardess get
the exit ropes out and the window exits open.”
The stewardesses were standing by during Test
III and were aware that “injured” would be
aboard and that the galley door was not operable.

Aisle obstacles were placed on the hat racks
and discharged into the cabin at random by pull-
strings when the evacuation began. Two blankets,
five pillows, three small boxes and two briefcases
were ejected into the aisle and onto passengers
to effect realism as compared to other tests,

Forty-nine passengers were boarded through
the galley door. Two infant dolls and a fifty-
pound doll were randomly placed among the
passengers. One infant doll was held by a lady
in the right window seat, first row, aft cabin.
The other infant was held by a man in the left
window seat, fifth row, forward cabin. The fifty-
pound doll occupied the right aisle seat, third
row in the forward cabin.

The passenger instructions and Captain’s an-
nouncement used in Tests I and II were used in
this test because of volume discrepancies in the
revised tape announcement used for Test III.
The engine cruise sound was run for eight
minutes.

At the end of the crash sounds, the cabin lights
were turned out. The .05 foot-candle emergency
lights remained on. The flash bulbs were set off,
the bell rang, and the aisle debris tumbled from
the hat racks. The deadheading stewardess in
the fourth row, right aisle seat, darted toward
the forward overwing exit, opened it, set the
window on the floor, and was on the wing in
approximately twenty-one seconds. She groped
for the rope and had difficulty in getting the rope
in position for use. The forward stewardess
moved quickly to the forward overwing exit be-

13

fore the second person was out, giving commands
to “get those exits open.” She helped an elderly
lady sitting next to the right forward exit who
had difficulty with her seat belt. ‘This delayed
passenger flow through this exit. This elderly
lady went out, followed by her husband and the
line of waiting passengers. Three persons were
out of the aft door as the first person was on the
wing from the forward overwing exit. Observa-
tions on the use of the rope will be described later
under Test Results.

Heavy smoke penetrated the cabin from aft
forward in approximately 1.75 minutes.

Removal of the aft right overwing exit was
delayed. The second row seat back was positioned
in the center of the exit as in Test III. Once
this exit was opened, there was a back and forth
pushing on the seat back as passengers fought to
obtain exit clearance from one row, then the
other. Flow was continuous, but could have been
faster had all the passengers used the same seat
row to approach the exit opening. The emergency
rope in this exit was never deployed.

The forward stewardess remained in the for-
ward exit area and gave continuous commands,
“move-move,” “leg-body-leg.” The passengers
pushed each other in eagerness to get out while
in line. The forward stewardess also shouted for
those in the rear of the cabin to use the back door.
The two male passengers in the right third row
reported difficulty in releasing the seat belt on the
fifty-pound doll in the aisle seat to their left
because the doll’s seat back was pushed forward
on the doll. The “injured” male in the left second
row window seat was helped by direction of the
stewardess and was taken out very efficiently by
a man who reached in the forward exit from out-
side, taking him out feet first. The inside helper
then left the cabin and was followed by one other
person. Evacuation time for the forward over-
wing exit was two minutes and 89 seconds. ‘The
stewardess monitored the exits until all the pas-
sengers were out, then checked all seats with her
pen light and by feel on her way aft because the
smoke had obscured almost all visibility.

In the aft cabin, the stewardess had the door
started open in seven seconds, having to feel for
the handle when the lights went out, and acci-
dentally set the 4614 pound door on her left foot.
She continuously commanded “Come, this way,”
etc. Directions were also given to help the “in-
jured” in the aft cabin while standing aft of the



TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
AIMS AND PURPOSES
FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT
Aircraft —
Emergency Lighting
‘Tape Recording Equipment
Film Coverage and Camera Locations -
Seat Belts -.
Other Items -.

TEST DESCRIPTION

TEST RESULTS
Questionnaire Summary
Stewardess Questionnaires _.
Passenger Reaction ~.
Flow Patterns
Total Test Times __
Seat Spacing
Escape Ropes
Exit Signs
Carrying of Injured _
Seat Belts -.
Child Carry -.

CONCLUSIONS -.

RECOMMENDATIONS .-.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..

APPENDIX 1 Summary of Passenger Comments

APPENDIX 2 Summation of Stewardesses’ Response to Questionnaires

APPENDIX 3 Stewardesses’ Comments -..--_.--_---.--.

APPENDIX 4 Passenger Recommendations of Procedures and Equipment ____.. 4



Something wrong. Sirens sounding. On ap-
proach, Theri scraping sound. All lights on.
Think smoke started about that time. Metal
scraping stopped. Lights still on. Confused.
Assumed stopped.

“Unfasten seat belt and come to rear,” yelled
while opening door. When door was at wall
one pax at door jumped, “Come to rear—
Come back here.” Aft cabin cleared out
about 6 or 8—8 at most. Couldn’t see up
forward. Went to galley. Called. Some-
body being carried. Man carrying girl.
Started falling aft of galley in aisle. Few
helped. Ended up at aft bulkhead and Don
Carroll showed up.

Second Event: Girl pinned in doorway. About

38 or 4 pax and self got Don and girl out.
Other man reached back in to help. Could
see only at doorway. Incapacitated pax in
last left window seat was then helped out.
Could see only red lights—pink glow. Not
aware of other aircraft activity. Started
forward front again. Aft cabin clear. All
debris in aisle still there. Wo one would
answer. “People here? Answer me!”
Called for Linda, She said, “There are
people up here.” Went forward. Couldn’t
see. Only shadow of obstacle 2-3” only.
Could see outline of the exit. Darkness of
seats. Think could see pax outline silhouette
in first two rows. She had found somebody.
Someone came in from back (Joe Haley?)
asked if help needed.

Third Event: Linda called, “Another one up

here.” Man in seat—discussing inability to
move pax. Have to let him die. (Never
thought of seat belt). Had to leave man in
seat. Call from outside, “Anyone in here?”
Then got out window followed by Linda.
Could see exit outline.

36

Third Event:

Sat down—Kept thinking should get in crash
position, but because test didn’t. Indecision
because of siren (possibly after P.A. an-
nouncement).
Lights all on,

Second Event: Heard crashing—Expected lights

to go out. They didn’t. Got up and yelled,
“Young and Bird—Open those windows next
to you.” “Put windows in seat.” They
started opening. Everybody up. “Out win-
dow foot first then head then foot.” Told
people in front of me to “Go to the back.”
(In galley area.)

Lights went out. (Women there
in front of me) told everyone (shouting) to
hurry up. Smoke just coming from behind—
Moving forward. Man asked shouldn’t we
open this door (galley). He was going aft.
Not aware of aft section. (Prior arrange-
ment to handle areas—forward/aft—looked
out window. No fire out there.) Another
man asked same question: “No.” Repeated
forward move. Foot first (etc.) (in here).
Heard woman moaning. Turned around.
Pulled out armrest to get to seat belt. Man
behind me said, “Can I help you?” Picked
her up—gave her to man. He took her.
Couldn't see. No light. Lifted a man (Don
Carroll) from seat and dragged him aft be-
hind galley in aisle. Asked Carol if anyone
could get him out. Went up forward. Feel-
ing in seats. Boxes in aisle. Recognized


A good technique inside the aircraft for carry-
ing the “injured” seemed to be the fireman’s
carry, above seats, providing the person carrying
the “injured” was physically capable. Another
more practical method was catching an “injured”
under the arms from behind and dragging or
carrying. These methods facilitate movement
through aisles and through the exit opening with-
out prolonged interruption of continuous motion.
The most efficient “injury” removals were accom-
plished by the underarm drag with the helper
walking backwards to the aft exit and then
stepping out on the ground (a 32-inch drop).

SEAT BELTS

Friction-snubbing type seat belts were used
aboard this aircraft. In many instances the
buckle, with the belt tightened, ended up too far
on the right side to be easily released. Passen-
gers, who were holding the dolls and had only one
free hand, particularly noted difficulty in releas-
ing their seat belts, Belt buckle design and
engagement should not confront passengers with
belt release problems.

In general, the most optimum belt buckle loca-
tion laterally was found to be over the center of
the lower abdomen with the belt snug.

CHILD CARRY

Passengers carrying dolls simulating small
children seemed to have only slight difficulties in
evacuating the aircraft. The only comments ap-
parently were the one-handed release of safety
belts noted previously and the additional weight
of the dolls combined with the one-hand opera-
tion of getting out of seats on the floor incline of
the aircraft.

VI. Conclusions.

1. Unindoctrinated passengers looked for and
expected instructions from crew members
before they took action on their own to
escape.

2. In smoke-filled cabins, crew commands or
other audible sounds aided passengers in
finding exit locations.

3. Floor slopes of up to 32° did not cause a
great deal of difficulty except to those hand-
ling incapacitated passengers.

22

10.

i.

12.

18.

14.

15.

. Crewmembers can maintain command of an

evacuation by using a wide range of voice
volumes, but the voices should be loud
enough for passengers to recognize them
over the ambient noise. It is also possible
to creat a great deal of anxiety and moti-
vation in passengers by appropriate exiting
type commands.

. Seat backs located in line with overwing

exits impede removal and use of these exits.
Current requirements for emergency exit
access are considered in FAR 25.813, but
the condition is reiterated here for em-
phasis.

. The brilliant flash of the strobe light was

not objectionable, but an explanation to
passengers of its purpose would be required.
The strobe light did not furnish significant
illumination to aid in passenger escape.

. Pre-placed aisle debris caused minimum

difficulty in evacuations, although the rain-
ing down of articles caused panic feelings
for an instant.

. Exits should be well-marked and should in-

clude brief and conspicuous operating in-
structions.

. Emergency evacuations at night will take

longer than evacuations under similar con-
ditions in the daytime.

Seating of an elderly or incapacitated per-
son directly adjacent to an exit could delay
use of the exit for a few seconds while help
is rendered.

The effect on evacuation speed of the two
seat spacings of 32 and 389 inches used in
these four tests were not conclusive. Speed
through the exits was the determining
factor.

Elderly passengers may require aid in re-
lease of seat belts.

Belt buckle design and engagement should
not confront passengers with seat belt re-
lease problems.

The post crash site, as prepared, did not
cause significant delays in escape time.
Time-consuming handling of incapacitated
persons can be minimized if crews are
shown the most practical “carry-out”
methods by which to direct help when
necessary.


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We wish to express our gratitude to the Airline Transport Association
which was represented by the following airlines in planning of the tests:
Eastern Air Lines, American Airlines, Trans World Airlines and United Air
Lines, and to the Airlines Pilots Association (Steward and Stewardess Divi-
sion), as well as to the latter three airlines and the ALPA for professional
stewardess contributions; to the Society of Automotive Engineers A20C Sub-
committee; Aviation Safety Engineering Research personnel and the Civil
Aeronautics Board for their assistance, loan of equipment or active participa-
tion during the test program.

Qualified requestors may obtain Aviation Medical Reports from Defense Documentation
Center. The general public may purchase from Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and
Technical Information, U.S, Dept. of Commerce, Springfield, Va. 22151


Question Test NR AFT Stewardess Forward Stewardess
Iv “No—Sailboat—Atlantic “No.”

7. (If Yes) How did you react as I NO ANSWER NO ANSWER
compared to your reactions in| II NO ANSWER “No problem until it was over—

this test? (Reference Question then shaken.”
6) ul “Didn’t panic in auto crash— NO ANSWER
windshield knocked out down
hill, rocks, dirt.”
Iv “Very quiet—busy in this experi- | “About same.”
ment.””

8 What is your estimate of your | I “Would react same way’.”” “May be more aware—Looking for
probable reactions under an second exit ” Forgot ‘heels off’.”
emergency condition similar to Ir “Too hard to answer—re: frustra- NO ANSWER
this test? tion—not being able to see—no

answers from pax—might have
had to leave them.”

9 Were the instructions of the I “Other girl’s voice came through | “At beginning—she took on where
stewardess clear? loud and clear.” T left off.”

II “In aft cabin, Yes—No response | “Heard her telling people to come
in forward cabin.” back.”

U1 “None heard—didn’t have to “Could not hear.”
yell.””

Iv “Sending people back—clear— | “None heard.”
loud voice.”

10 Could you hear the instrue| 1 “and interefered with separate in- | “Yes—belts—backs up—grab
tions of the stewardess? I structions from flight deck.” ankles.”

Il NO ANSWER NO ANSWER
Ill SEE ANSWER 9 SEE ANSWER 9
Iv SEE ANSWER 9 SEE ANSWER 9

11 Did you expect more Instruc- rT “No—trained.” “No”
tions from crew members than Il “Yes” “No —not with the time involved.”
you received in this case? pene “No—confused by not making | “Yes.”

ing earlier instructed announce-
ment.””
Iv NO ANSWER NO ANSWER

12 Were you aware of the flash- I ‘No.” “No.”
ing light in the right overwing rr “No” “No.”
exit? 1 “No—Knew there were lights to | ‘Flash bulbs at impact only.”

start cameras, etc.”
Iv “Never—saw—any—something | “No.”
flashed at very beginning.”

13 Do you think they were there I NO ANSWER “Unknown—Trail edge of wing—
to aid in your escape? might if drawn to.” -
(Reference Question 12) Il NO ANSWER NO ANSWER

Ill NO ANSWER NO ANSWER
Iv NO ANSWER NO ANSWER
14 Did the aisle obstacles handi- I “No.” “No.”
cap you in your escape? IL “Yes—in moving injured people | “When dragging Don out—on
out.” hangar bag.”
Ti “No—Just the two men and girl | “Just people.”
(injured).”
Iv “Saw them come down—not into | “One box fell—No.”
doorway area.”

15 To what extent did the aisle I “Didn’t even know they were NO ANSWER
obstacles handicap you in there—kicked door,”
your escape? Il “Pillows and blankets moved OK, NO ANSWER

OK, but not boxes’’.
UI NO ANSWER “None found,”
Iv “No bother after that.” NO ANSWER

32


Equipment:

1. Seat belt took too long to separate—strap
too long.

2. Something to push seat up and tunnel
people through one channel rather than
present seat pattern.

8. Galley forms an obstacle if going out the
rear—eliminate?

4, Better padding of back of seat to prevent
injury during crash.

5. Eliminate three-abreast seating.

6. Make it easier to shove seats forward.

7. Improve seat backs.

Miscellaneous :
1, Tell women to take off high-heeled shoes.
2. Difficulty with tight skirts—no tight skirts
aboard aircraft?
3. Place stewardesses in front of exits to assist
people to move faster.
4. Eliminate baggage where it is loose.

TEST III
Ewits:
1, Nine (9) exits—More exits.
2. Move all seats clear of hatches.
8. Directions to pull hatch in.
4. Larger exits.
5. Exit windows need to be easier to get off.
6. Windows should open out, not in.

Instructions :
1. More instructions and information from
stewardesses and crew.
2, Passengers should be informed of emer-
gency procedures.

. Better PA systems to transmit instructions.

. More instructions before takeoff.

. Crew members or stewardesses up front to
direct exit and procedures for opening
exits.

6. Exit lights should be bigger.

Lighting:

No comments concerning lights.

SU oo

Equipment:
No comments concerning equipment.
Miscellaneous :

1. Ground emergency crew available and in-
formed at actual emergency.

42

TEST IV

Ewits:

WAM op w POP

. More space between seats at exit.

. Eliminate seats obstructing exits.

. Bigger exits.

. Exits should be marked.

. Larger emergency exits.

. More exits.

. Openings larger and lower.

. Light over escape hatches and information
in advance about them.

9. Should have lighter exits.
10. Exit sign lights should be on at all times.

. Exits easier to open.

12. More exits—split them up.
Instructions :

1

More instructions from stewardesses.

2. More explicit instructions from steward-

3.

esses,
More knowledge of exit locations very im-
portant—Instructions from persons in com-
mand are very important since people will
follow in emergency.

4. More adequate instructions from stewardess

before take-off.
. Light over escape hatches and information
in advance about them.

6. Stewardess instructions louder.
7. Stewardess—explain opening operation of

window exits prior to take-off.

Lighting:

L

2.
3.

4
5.
6.

. Better emergency lighting.

More lighting.

Light over escape hatches and information
in advance about them.

Need more flood lights leading to exits.
Exit sign lights should be on at all times.
Better smoke elimination.

Equipment:

1
2.
3.

. More space needed between seats.
. Inflatable restraint in front of seats,
. Seat belt should open when you hit it.

4, Wider aisles.

5, Seat belts metal to metal.
Miscellaneous :

1. Debris hampered evacuation.

2
3.

. Someone to aid in evacuating.
. Stewardess in way.

# U.S, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE ; 1967 © - 257-802


10.

Did you observe evidence of panic in others?
Test I

Have you ever been in a real emergency situation?
Test I
41.0%
59.0

What were your reactions in this test as compared to a real emergency ?

Test I
Same/Similar ___. 18.5%
Greater Fear Here - 80
Greater Fear in Emergency 13.0

60.5

Test IT

40.0%
60.0

Test IT
23.7%
2.5
10.5
63.5

Test III
44.5%
38.0
15.5
2.0

Test TT

31.6%
68.4

8.0%

2.6
2.6
2.6

Test IIT
10.6%
2.6
58
78.9
2.6

11.0
13.0

Test IV
39.5%
39.5
18.0
8.0

Test IV
85.5%
64.5

8.8%

Test IV

13.3%
4.5
6.7

69.0
6.5

What is your estimate of your probable reactions under an emergency situation similar to this

test?

Test I
Same/Similar _ 74.5%
More Panic ~__-. - 13.0
Would Move Faster - 10.0
Wonldn’t Panic So Soon - ———
Don’t Know/No Answer _-.---..--.---.--- 25
Were the stewardesses instructions clear?

Test I

69.0%

31.0
Could you hear them? (Reference Question 9)

Test I

72.0%

18.0
No Answer. __.----------------------- 10.0

Test IT
50.0%
82.5
5.0
2.5
10.0

Test IT

75.0%
25.0

Test II
92.5%

Test IIT

Test IIT
39.5%
47.5
13.0

Test LIT
52.6%
ATA

Test IV

Test IV

62.0%
38.0

Test IV
71.0%
29.0


21 seconds. Four males and two females went off
the leading edge of the wing. Eight males and
seven females went off the training edge. Women
with tight skirts had difficulty clearing the win-
dow sill, All except three women who went aft
off the wing removed their shoes after getting out
on the wing. Most women sat and slid to the
ground.

The flow from the right aft door was fairly
steady with slight delays after the third and
eleventh persons out. An “unconscious” man
from the rear left window seat was the fourteenth
person out. The first two men out of the door
re-entered to get this “injured” passenger. The
group fell against the aft bulkhead, then the
“injured” man was placed in the doorway with
his head hanging over the sill face down. These
actions blocked the exit for almost half a minute
(27 seconds). The aft stewardess directed pas-
sengers from a position back of the door generally
moving only to direct help for the “injured.”
Nine passengers, including three “injured” from
the forward cabin, and the stewardesses evacuated
the aircraft within the next 26 seconds. The
total time was one minute and 47.8 seconds. No
major accidental injuries were incurred during
the test. The evacuation flow is shown in
Figure 6.

‘A sketch of camera coverage is shown in Figure
8. Tape recordings were obtained of the test
from the three microphones inside.

TEST II

The two stewardesses scheduled for Test IT
were taken aboard the aircraft about an hour
following Test I. They were shown the operation
of the exits. Instructions were similar to those
for the previous crewmembers, ie., “At the end
of the crash sounds and flash, evacuate the air-
craft as fast as you can in accordance with your
training.” Additionally, they were asked to make
a, seat, belt check for the landing and to make sure
everyone was out after the evacuation, consistent
with their training.

The seating arrangement was the same as for
Test I (45 available seats). A different group of
forty-four passengers boarded after dark through
the left galley door. Flood lights provided
lighting outside and two rows of fluorescent lights
brightened the interior of the aircraft.

After the box meal, the two briefcases, three

cardboard boxes, one blanket and six aircraft
pillows were randomly placed in the aisle. In-
structions to the passengers were completed; the
music tape was changed to the sound effects tape,
and cruising engine sounds played for about
twelve minutes. The Captain’s announcement of
nose gear trouble was heard as in Test I, A small
fire from gelled fuel had been set outside on the
left of the fuselage and was glowing.

Although the two stewardesses had observed
the afternoon evacuation from outside and were
aware of the “injured” aboard and of the exits
used, a premature starting signal created an un-
planned situation.

Both stewardesses were distracted by the fire
truck siren from outside and the premature flash.
However, at the end of the crash sounds, the aft
stewardess quickly was at the aft door, got it
open, and one person was out on the ground
before the main cabin lights were turned off eight
seconds after start of the test.

The stewardess shouted, “Unfasten seat belts—
Come to rear,” ‘while opening the door. A man
carrying an “injured woman” aft tripped on the
sloped floor. The aft stewardess tried to help
and all three of them fell against the aft bulk-
head. The “injured” women was “pinned” in the
doorway for a short while. The forward stew-
ardess brought an “injured” man rearward, di-
rected help and returned to the forward cabin.
Another “injured” male in the rear left window
seat was helped to the door without difficulty and
aided by a man standing outside on the ground.
The aft cabin was emptied in two minutes and 53
seconds,

In the forward cabin at the end of the crash
sounds, the forward stewardess shouted to the
men beside each of the overwing exits to open
them. She had moved about two rows forward
of her seat when she heard cries for help and
found an “injured” couple in the row of seats
just forward of the galley on the right side. A
man behind her from the aft cabin offered to
help. This man took the women to the aft exit.
The stewardess then dragged the man to the aft
cabin where she directed the evacuation as noted
above.

While the forward stewardess was occupied
with the “injured,” the right overwing exits were
opened and evacuation began. Some difficulty
was encountered in getting to the forward win-
dow exit because of the location of the first row



Watch incline.” She discovered the “injured”
promptly after she saw passengers opening the
right overwing exits. At the direction of this
stewardess, two men helped evacuate the “in-
jured” female through the aft door from the
right seat, first row, in front of the galley.
Another man evacuated the “injured” man who
was sitting to the woman’s right through the aft
door. The forward stewardess then moved to-
ward the overwing exits giving commands to
“hurry,” “go this way,” and “leg-body-leg.”
Smoke then began filling the forward cabin while
only eight or nine passengers still remained. The
stewardess requested help for an “injured” man
in the fourth row. The helper used a fireman’s
carry and quickly delivered him to the forward
exit feet first. The help of a male passenger
from outside on the wing enhanced removal of
the injured. The forward stewardess called for
the aft stewardess to come forward and check
the seats to assure that all passengers were out.
After this check the aft stewardess quickly went
out the aft door.

In the forward cabin, there was a period of
121% seconds after the test started before the first
attempt was made to open either overwing exit.
The forward exit was opened and the first person
was on the wing in 23.75 seconds. The first
person was on the wing from the aft overwing
exit at 41.75 seconds from the start.

The 82-inch seat spacing provided two con-
ditions to be evaluated during Tests III and IV.
One condition was the minimum spacing for
effects on the passenger flow to the exits. The
second condition was the placement of a passen-
ger seat back, when in the upright position,
abreast of the center of the aft overwing exit
window. This condition caused delays by par-
tially blocking removal of the inward opening
plug type exit by the passengers.

Following removal of the exit, at first there
was a vying for approach to the exit opening
from both the second and third rows. Two men
were first out from the second row, followed by
a women and two children (seven and nine years
old) from the third row. Another female pas-
senger and three males continued steadily from
the third row followed by the forward stewardess
who was last out of this exit. Individual escape
times from both overwing exits are shown in
Figure 8.

12

START SIGNAL
m

ith
a
tt
ut
ut
i

IN SECONDS

TIME

OVERWING EXITS
] Forwaro

Barr

HE DENOTES iNuvuRED
(FWO. EXIT)

70

80

90

100

n L n
10 15 20
NUMBER OF EVACUEES
Ficre 8.—Individual evacuation flow from the right for-
ward and aft overwing exits in Test III. Rectangles

represent each person and the time the exit was in
use by them,

The forward stewardess didn’t remember seeing
strobe lights except that “it seemed red’—this
probably being the strobe light installation in
the forward right exit window. An adult male
from the front-row, left aisle seat waited for a
time, observing the overwing exits, and finally
decided to leave by way of the aft exit door in
the rear cabin,

The “injured” man, who was “fireman-carried,”
and his benefactor were on the wing as the stew-
ardess stepped out of the aft window exit. The
stewardess cleared the window in one minute
and 42.7 seconds and was last to clear the air-
craft wing in one minute and 45.8 seconds. The
right overwing exit ropes were never pulled out
during the action.