Louisiana Wildlife & Fisheries 

team making a rescue 

FEMA photo
331

Search and Rescue

We would put two offi cers in a boat, one guy to operate the boat and another 

guy with a fl ashlight to give him direction. ... Most of our communication at 

this point is by voice. And they would go out and like I said, it wasn’t any problem to fi nd people, there were people everywhere, people were everywhere, 

every house, people on the porches, people on the roofs, people shouting from 

windows and you would just go to it and load up the people that you could 

take and tell them, We’ll be back for the rest of you. ...

We encountered every kind of medical condition that you can just about imagine, we had diabetics, we had bedridden patients, we had some security issues. 

... And it was constant, I mean it was limitless, you never got a break in the 

number of people you were bringing out.1

— Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze

Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries

Search and Rescue

On the day of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, rescuers from Louisiana’s Department of 

Wildlife and Fisheries (W&F) didn’t need their standard grid system for searches. 

From every direction, thousands of people on rooft ops were calling for help in the 

dark – that evening, lights from the search-and-rescue boats and helicopters were the city’s 

only source of illumination.2

W&F would bring the rescuees back to one of three staging areas on highway overpasses. 

By 1 a.m. Tuesday, hundreds were massed at these locations, reaching capacity. By Tuesday 

aft ernoon, W&F alone had rescued 1,500 people.3

Federal, State, and Local Rescuers Saved Thousands of Lives

Federal, state, and local offi cials combined to rescue over 60,000 people aft er landfall.4

Federal

FEMA is the federal government’s lead agency for Emergency Support Function 9 (ESF-9, 

Search and Rescue) under the National Response Plan (NRP),5

 but during Katrina, some 

perceived the Coast Guard to have been the lead federal agency for search and rescue 

(SAR).6

 Th e Coast Guard rescued over 33,000 people.7 Th e U.S. Department of Defense 

(DOD), which deployed in support of the Coast Guard, rescued 2,911 people.8

 FEMA rescued over 6,000 people.9

FEMA’s Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams comprise state and local teams that 

FEMA contracted to assist the federal government during an emergency. In exchange for 

funding from FEMA for training and equipment, state and local search-and-rescue teams 

agree to be deployed by FEMA when needed. Th ere are 28 such teams around the country, 

many associated with local fi re departments. Th e men and women on these teams are themselves the fi rst responders for disasters in their own communities. When FEMA deploys 

them, they become federal assets and, therefore, no longer state or local fi rst responders.10

Chapter 21
Chapter 21

332

State

Th e Louisiana W&F is the state’s lead agency for ESF-9.11 W&F and out-of-state agencies 

rescued about 21,000 people trapped in the greater New Orleans area aft er landfall.12 Th e 

Louisiana National Guard, which supported W&F under ESF-9, rescued another 9,313 

people.13

Local

Th e New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD) and New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) 

offi cers – the exact number is unknown – worked with little rest in the fi rst week aft er landfall, even as their own families remained trapped or were evacuated.14 NOFD is the City of 

New Orleans’ lead agency for SAR; the NOPD supported NOFD.15

Hurricane Katrina Confi rmed What Hurricane Pam Had Predicted: 

Decimated Local Responders

Hurricane Katrina confi rmed what Hurricane Pam predicted: many local fi rst responders had been incapacitated and thrown into disarray by the severe hurricane. Th e section 

on SAR in the plan that grew out of Hurricane Pam stated: “Parish resources in the most 

severely impacted areas will not be available for several weeks or even months, as they were 

not removed from the area prior to the storm.”16 But even if Hurricane Pam predicted 

that Parish resources would not be available, William Lokey, FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO), the organization’s lead offi cer in Louisiana, who was stationed in Baton 

Rouge before landfall, pointed out that Hurricane Pam “did not envision the number of fi rst 

responders in New Orleans that would become disaster victims and would not be available 

to take part in that plan.”17

Pam’s conclusion that parish resources wouldn’t be available for weeks, if not months, may 

have derived from the city’s inadequate preparedness for search and rescue. For example, 

the NOFD owned no boats;18 the NOPD owned only fi ve.19 Although the NOFD was well 

trained in USAR and incident command, it had no training in water SAR.20 Th e NOFD had 

applied in 2005 to DHS for water USAR training, even lining up an instructor, but DHS 

denied its application.21 In the absence of boats and water SAR training, NOFD and NOPD 

offi cers had to commandeer and hot-wire boats to improvise rescue missions.22

Finally, the Hurricane Pam exercise predicted that a similar hurricane in real life would 

“result in fl ooding of many roads, limiting access into many areas until fl ood waters subside.”23 Such a warning required readiness for air and water rescue; specifi cally, Hurricane 

Pam called for 20,000 boat-based rescues and about 1,000 helicopter rescues.24 Emergency 

planners at all levels of government should have realized that large-scale search-and-rescue 

operations would be likely if a major hurricane struck New Orleans.25

Responders Prepare for the Storm

Although the search-and-rescue teams who deployed aft er landfall performed heroically, 

two agencies stand out, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Louisiana W&F.

U.S. Coast Guard

In general, the Coast Guard performed exemplary work in its search-and-rescue missions. 

Several factors may explain why: (1) pre-positioning of assets close enough to be useful 

on Monday, August 29, the day of landfall, but still out of harm’s way;26 (2) training and 

equipment for water missions; (3) an organizational culture that encourages personnel to 
Search and Rescue

333

respond proactively;27 (4) a familiarity with incident response generally and the Incident 

Command System specifi cally throughout the entire organization; 28 and (5) a long-term 

presence in the aff ected areas, promoting familiarity with the region and working relationships with state and local agencies.29

Th e Coast Guard’s Eighth District, which covers 26 states, is headquartered in New Orleans.30 Th e Coast Guard Air Station in New Orleans, like all the Coast Guard units along 

the Gulf Coast, exercises its hurricane plans several times each season.31 In New Orleans, 

the Coast Guard exercises regularly with other state and local agencies and in particular has 

worked closely with the boat forces of the Louisiana W&F.32 Pre-landfall, the Coast Guard 

placed liaisons at both the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge and 

at the New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness.33

A key factor in the Coast Guard’s rapid reaction is that, unlike FEMA, the Coast Guard sees 

itself as a fi rst responder.34 Prior to landfall, based on the forecasted intensity of the storm, 

the Coast Guard decided to move its headquarters to its alternate site in St. Louis, Missouri,35 and to use its alternate incident-command post in Alexandria, Louisiana,36 approximately 200 miles away. Th e Coast Guard evacuated personnel and their family members37

from the direct path of the storm and pre-positioned personnel and assets north, east, and 

west of the predicted track, but close enough to maintain its ability to return them to the 

aff ected area.38

As a result, the Coast Guard was able to begin search-and-rescue missions by 2:50 p.m. on 

the day of landfall. Th e winds were still consistently 45-50 knots (about 52 to 58 m.p.h.) 

strong39 when a rescue swimmer named Laurence Nettles was lowered by helicopter and 

navigated his way through tree limbs to rescue a four-month-old infant, her mother and 

grandmother, and their pet dog in Plaquemines Parish.40 Of the more than 33,000 rescues the 

Coast Guard completed, 12,500 made use of helicopters.41 Th is was far more than the Hurricane Pam prediction of 21,000 total rescues, of which 1,000 would be helicopter rescues.42

Within the fi rst few days, about 40 percent of the Coast Guard’s national helicopter fl eet converged on the Gulf Coast to assist in search and rescue and air delivery of food and water.43

Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries

While the Coast Guard served as the primary source of air SAR, the Louisiana W&F was 

the primary source of water SAR, and performed equally admirably. Like the Coast Guard, 

W&F offi cers, trained for water-rescue missions, were adequately equipped, had pre-positioned search-and-rescue assets close enough to be useful on the day of landfall, and were 

composed of men and women familiar with the aff ected area and other federal, state, and 

local agencies involved. 

On Monday, W&F transported 60 boats to New Orleans from their pre-staged areas, and by 

4 p.m. that day launched the boats from one of three staging areas strategically located on 

high ground throughout the city.44 W&F also received assistance from the Louisiana National 

Guard, which had pre-deployed boats and helicopters in and outside of New Orleans.45

Shortcomings in the Preparation and Support for the SAR Missions

All levels of government could have provided far better support for these heroes and the 

people they rescued. Inadequate planning, preparation, and support compromised the SAR 

missions, and should be drastically improved for future catastrophes. 

Prior to Katrina, the NRP considered SAR to focus primarily, if not entirely, on SAR in collapsed structures.46 Th e NRP refl ects this belief by titling the mission as Urban Search and 

Rescue (USAR) and by requiring FEMA, rather than some other agency, to act as the lead 

agency for ESF-9. However, Katrina required search-and-rescue eff orts not only in urban 
Chapter 21

334

collapsed structures but also in a water environment. U.S. Coast Guard Vice Admiral Vivean Crea acknowledged that the federal response plan should be capable of covering more 

than one type of search and rescue.47

Pre-positioning of Search-and-Rescue Assets: Local and State 

Despite the success of the U.S. Coast Guard and the W&F in pre-positioning search-andrescue assets, similar eff orts by other agencies at the state and local levels failed in very 

basic ways. 

Because New Orleans lacked enough boats, complying with the NOFD Emergency Operations Plan required many NOFD offi cers to pre-position their personal boats.48

Although W&F pre-positioned search-and-rescue assets both within and on the outskirts 

of the aff ected areas, the Louisiana National Guard pre-positioned its boats and high water 

vehicles primarily at Jackson Barracks, which fl ooded when the Industrial Canal levee broke 

and fl ooded the Lower Ninth Ward. Th e fl oodwaters rendered many of the boats and high 

water vehicles unusable on the day of landfall.49 As many witnesses said, a hurricane’s precise landfall and impact are diffi cult to predict.50 Nonetheless, placing a key element of local 

fi rst response at Jackson Barracks, one of the lowest points in the city, was not an exercise in 

prudent planning.

Pre-positioning of Search-and-Rescue Assets: Federal

Although the Coast Guard successfully pre-staged search-and-rescue assets, FEMA did 

not.51 FEMA pre-staged only three search-and-rescue teams in Shreveport, LA, and only 

two in Meridian, MS.52

FEMA offi cials point out that FEMA is not a fi rst responder for disasters,53 but its modest 

pre-landfall deployment is still hard to understand, considering that the Pam exercise had 

revealed a critical need for immediate search-and-rescue capability. FEMA did activate 16 

additional search-and-rescue teams, but not until Tuesday, August 30, the day aft er landfall. 

(It activated 10 more the following day.)54 FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) William Lokey told the Committee that FEMA did not pre-stage more search-and-rescue teams 

because the state did not request additional teams before landfall.55 But Lokey reasonably 

should have known, from FEMA’s participation in the Hurricane Pam exercise, that the 

state and locals’ search-and-rescue capabilities would need to be supplemented in the event 

of a catastrophic storm – which Lokey recognized Katrina to be.56 Th e state did not request 

additional search-and-rescue teams, and FEMA failed to off er them.

Th at FEMA pre-staged three teams in Shreveport, approximately 340 miles away from New 

Orleans, contributed to the delay.57 Th e teams left Shreveport for Baton Rouge on Monday, 

August 29, moving to the greater New Orleans area only late that night.58 As a result, they 

were not able to begin rescuing people until Tuesday morning,59 whereas the other federal, 

state, and local operations began search and rescue Monday aft ernoon, as soon as the storm 

died down.60

FEMA Lacked Water-Rescue Capabilities

“Water rescue is not part of the USAR mission,” Lokey testifi ed before the Committee.61

Indeed, when FEMA search-and-rescue teams arrived in New Orleans, they did not have 

boats.62 Instead, the FEMA teams joined boats operated by volunteers or other agencies.63

Although most of the 28 teams FEMA could tap for search and rescue lacked a water-rescue 

capability,64 FEMA was able to acquire eight teams in California that did possess that training.65 FEMA should have pre-staged teams trained in water rescue given that catastrophic 

post-storm fl ooding was anticipated. Some have argued that FEMA should have search-
Search and Rescue

335

and-rescue teams designed for a water environment, as drowning accounts for 90 percent 

of deaths in hurricanes.66 However, Lokey said that FEMA teams do not arrive on the scene 

quickly enough for it to make sense to equip and train them for those kinds of searches,67

even though long-term planning and training for water rescue would have obviated the 

need for on-the-scene equipping and training. Some have suggested that it might be worthwhile for FEMA teams to have some basic training and equipment for working in a fl ooded 

environment (e.g., life jackets), while more serious water rescue should be left to the states 

and the Coast Guard.68 Some have said FEMA cannot support water rescue under the current budget and would require additional funding.69 FEMA was ill-equipped to carry out its 

ESF-9 obligation in a setting that was anything but a surprise. 

Beyond an initial training course in 2000, FEMA’s Red, White, and Blue Incident Support 

Teams (ISTs), which coordinate and manage the search-and-rescue missions, received no 

training.70

Communications Failures 

Almost immediately aft er landfall, communications for the SAR personnel at all levels of 

government failed to one degree or another. Storm damage rendered many communications systems inoperable while heavy traffi c stalled others. Each agency had unique challenges, suff ering from communications that were neither operable nor interoperable. 

Indeed, these widespread communications failures contributed mightily to the failures of 

coordination among search-and-rescue agencies, which we address below.71

Communications Failures: Local

Th e fi re and police departments’ communications suff ered from both inoperability and lack 

of interoperability. 

Th e NOFD and NOPD were supposed to operate on an 800 megahertz system, but storm 

damage forced them to switch to their contingency plan: the mutual-aid channel, used by all 

fi rst responders in the area. Th e mutual-aid channel required each offi cer to wait his or her 

turn, sometimes for 20 minutes, before speaking. NOFD used the mutual-aid channel until 

Th ursday, September 1. NOPD used it until Saturday, September 3.72

Although the mutual-aid channel was operational, NOFD offi cers could not transmit to certain parts of the city because of its limited range. As a result, NOFD offi cers essentially had 

to play the children’s game “Operator”: An NOFD offi cer would hear offi cer A trying to talk 

to offi cer B, and would relay A’s message to B, if B was within the eavesdropper’s range.73

Communications Failures: State

Th e Department of Wildlife and Fisheries also suff ered from unique communications failures. W&F set up three operations centers strategically located around New Orleans. However, its offi cers could not communicate by radio with the boats carrying out SAR missions, 

requiring the operations centers to dispatch “runners” to deliver messages.74 (Th e boats, 

in turn, had trouble communicating with National Guard and Coast Guard helicopters.) 

Ultimately, the operations centers were able to make contact using walkie-talkies purchased 

from a local sporting-goods store.75

Aft er years of research, a Deputy Superintendent of Louisiana State Police in 2004, and 

again in January 2005, presented to the state and federal governments a detailed, $105 million proposal for interoperability infrastructure.76 According to W&F witnesses, the plan 

might well have avoided the communications failures between offi cials in Baton Rouge and 

New Orleans, as well as the communications among agencies, by bringing all state and local 

offi cials’ radio communications onto the same network.77
Chapter 21

336

Communications Failures: Federal

Communication capabilities for the Coast Guard varied, both by time and by unit. Although the UHF radio frequency used by Coast Guard helicopters to communicate at a 

local and unit level continued to work well aft er Katrina, VHF frequencies typically used 

to communicate with the Coast Guard and other emergency responders by outside entities 

(boaters, hospitals, etc.) were cluttered, and frequently overloaded.78

Coast Guard pilots also reported diffi culty communicating with their bases, including the 

Coast Guard Air Station in New Orleans, which returned to limited operational status on 

Monday aft ernoon, August 29. Th ey estimated that only 40 percent of their communication attempts with bases were successful.79 Th ey were attempting to reach the Coast Guard 

Air Station in New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and other bases by using other aircraft , including 

a Coast Guard C-130 surveying oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico and a Customs and Border 

Protection P-3 AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), as mobile communications-relay platforms. Th ese planes would patch calls through to Coast Guard bases, since 

most ground infrastructure was not operational. 

Some Coast Guard personnel were able to use personal cell phones to relay information to 

other Coast Guard offi ces, at least initially. But as the infrastructure for cell phone service 

began failing, this means of communication had to be abandoned.80

Th e Coast Guard should have been better prepared for an anticipated breakdown in communications infrastructure. While not initially deployed for that purpose, aircraft such 

as the C-130 and P-3 AWACS proved useful in relaying communications. More thought 

should be given to determining whether this or other temporary means of communication 

should be used in other large-scale incidents like Katrina. 

Unifi ed Command – Coordination of Search-and-Rescue Missions

While many individuals went to heroic lengths to rescue victims, their eff orts would have 

been far more eff ective if agency eff orts were better coordinated. Offi cials from nearly every 

search-and-rescue agency told Committee staff that they lacked basic maps of the area.81

At one point, state and local offi cials tore maps out of telephone books, so that out-of-state 

search-and-rescue teams could have some sense of where they were going.82 However, high 

fl oodwaters in New Orleans hid street signs from view,83 complicating their eff orts.

Eff orts by DOD and the National Guard to coordinate the airborne search-and-rescue mission by dividing up the city84 are discussed below.

Th e lack of coordination had several signifi cant consequences. Agencies searched areas 

without knowing whether those areas already had been searched by others.85 Th e agencies 

in boats were mostly unable to coordinate with the National Guard or the Coast Guard 

to request helicopters if victims needed to be airlift ed.86 Finally, the lack of coordination 

prevented food, water, and other critical needs from reaching the rescuees gathered at the 

search-and-rescue collection sites.87

According to Captain Tim Bayard, the lack of coordination at the local level, resulted 

from a lack of planning, direction, and leadership from the City of New Orleans’ Offi ce of 

Emergency Preparedness (OEP) and inoperable communications.88 For example, the NOPD 

decided the day before landfall to set up a command post from the trunk of a car and at picnic tables outside of Harrah’s Casino, but Captain Bayard did not know where the mobile 

command center for the city’s OEP was.89

Although W&F was the lead state agency for the search-and-rescue mission, it failed to 

establish itself as a leader for other state and local agencies involved in search and rescue.90
Search and Rescue

337

Th is is likely due in part to the lack of communications capability and how overwhelmed 

W&F offi cials were.

At the federal level, FEMA did not establish a local command site for search and rescue 

either before or on the day of landfall.91 On Monday, the FEMA teams had no plan for a 

base of operations in the greater New Orleans area. Th ey ultimately settled on the parking 

lot at a Sam’s Club in Jeff erson Parish.92 On Tuesday, FEMA moved its command to Zephyr 

Field, the New Orleans Saints’ practice fi eld in Jeff erson Parish,93 but by this time both W&F 

and the Louisiana National Guard had already established their own local command posts 

elsewhere.94 Under the NRP, federal and state governments were supposed to establish a 

unifi ed command for search and rescue,95 but both levels of government failed to achieve 

that objective.96 Poor communications capabilities aft er landfall exacerbated the challenge of 

coordination between state and federal agencies. W&F and FEMA did not establish a unifi ed 

command for search and rescue until Wednesday, two days aft er landfall, at Zephyr Field.97

Although there was no unifi ed command for search and rescue in New Orleans, there is 

some evidence of a stronger coordination eff ort made for federal, state, and local searchRescue boats, New Orleans 

U.S.Coast Guard photo
Chapter 21

338

and-rescue resources at the EOC in Baton Rouge, according to the U.S. Coast Guard Search 

and Rescue Controller Valerie Boyd assigned to Baton Rouge. She said that the Coast 

Guard, FEMA, W&F, the Louisiana National Guard and others formed a joint search-andrescue task force at the state EOC on Sunday, August 28.98 Th e task force met twice a day 

over the next two weeks, to try to coordinate the joint search-and-rescue response. Agencies 

there would update surface and aviation asset spreadsheets on a daily basis, and the Louisiana State Police would provide search-and-rescue case information coming into the EOC 

via the 911 system to the Coast Guard, who would triage cases to the extent practicable, and 

convert street addresses to latitude and longitude coordinates.99 Th e Coast Guard would 

then pass along the triaged cases and coordinate, but not direct, any other search-and-rescue assets.100

No Plan for Ground Transportation to Evacuate People from USAR Collection Points

As noted earlier, ground transportation arrived in the greater New Orleans area unnecessarily late. Th e absence of planning for ground transportation by the federal and state governments contributed to the appalling conditions at the Superdome, the Convention Center, 

the I-10 overpasses, and other search-and-rescue collection sites. 

Inadequate Resources

Louisiana National Guard Brigadier General Brod Veillon testifi ed: “We are a force of 

11,000 people, and so ... you can’t handle this size of a catastrophe. ... [Th e Emergency 

Mutual Assistance Compact (EMAC)] is designed to compensate for that,”101 and “parallel 

to [her use of EMAC] the Governor made the call to the President for DOD assets.”102

As described earlier, the NOFD and NOPD lacked critical watercraft . For nearly a decade, 

successive New Orleans mayors have imprudently denied NOFD funding requests for 

watercraft .103

Aft er landfall, bureaucracy continued to impede essential relief.104

W&F pre-staged the roughly 200 boats at its disposal and deployed them in staggered 

phases throughout the storm. But many of those boats were small; FEMA denied requests 

for larger rubber raft s105 because, according to FEMA’s lead offi cial in Louisiana, the rubber 

raft s would not have been strong enough to maneuver in water fi lled with debris.106 Lieutenant Colonel Keith LaCaze with W&F disagreed, claiming that the raft s would have been 

valuable – particularly in the early days – either for maneuvering in very shallow water near 

doors and windows or in saving additional trips to collection sites by collecting rescuees in 

rubber raft s that could be towed behind regular boats.107 At a minimum, FEMA’s denial of 

the request is an example of the organization’s failure to follow its own principle of letting 

those closest to the situation determine how best to meet needs. 

DHS was slow to deploy equipment pods that contained standardized equipment to sustain 

or replenish up to 150 fi rst responders. DHS pre-positions these pods at strategic locations 

nationwide in order that they can arrive at a disaster site within 4 to 12 hours.108 However, 

DHS waited until at least two days aft er landfall to advise either Mississippi or Louisiana 

of their availability.109 Th us, nearly a week aft er landfall, the equipment pods were still en 

route.110 DHS offi cial Matt Mayer, who was in charge of these pods,111 acknowledged that 

DHS “made a mistake” and should have deployed these pods earlier.112 Captain Fincher of 

the NOFD bemoaned the fact that he and other fi rst responders did not have these equipment pods earlier since they contained assets that would have been very useful to the NOFD 

offi cers: an 18-wheeler full of “turn-out clothes, breathing apparatus, search and rescue 

cameras, ... hazardous material equipment, ... communications system, [and] ... decontamination set-ups.”113
Search and Rescue

339

On the day before landfall, the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) off ered two teams 

of law-enforcement offi cers to FEMA. Th ese offi cers would have proved highly valuable, 

when security concerns later in the week undermined FEMA’s search-and-rescue eff ort. But 

FEMA did not make use of those teams,114 and Lokey, FEMA’s FCO in Louisiana, testifi ed 

that he was unaware of the off er.115

In its response to the Committee’s interrogatories, DOI stated that “In the immediate aft ermath of the hurricane, DOI delivered to FEMA a comprehensive list of its deployable assets 

that were immediately available for humanitarian and emergency assistance,” including 300 

boats and 400 law-enforcement offi cers.116 However, DOI’s Emergency Coordinator, Laurence Broun, later told the Committee that DOI, in fact, did not send the list to FEMA and 

instead sent the list to the White House Homeland Security Council, not “in the immediate 

aft ermath of the hurricane,” but on Saturday, September 3, fi ve days aft er landfall. Broun 

does not know if the White House ever sent the list to FEMA,117 and Lokey was unaware of 

the off er.118

Emergency Mutual Assistance Compact 

In addition to designating the W&F as the lead state agency for search and rescue, the Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan specifi es that W&F is to seek assistance through EMAC, 

if W&F’s capabilities are overwhelmed.119 W&F witnesses testifi ed that the agency would 

have benefi ted from a request for additional SAR resources from other state governments 

through the EMAC process before, rather than aft er, landfall. Lokey specifi cally advised 

Colonel Jeff Smith, the Acting Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness at LOHSEP, to 

use EMAC to get swift -water rescue teams from California because Lokey knew that California had robust water-rescue capabilities.120 Neither Lokey nor Col. Smith realized until 

Louisiana couple and dog rescued

Photo © 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 

all rights reserved. Used with permission of the 

Times-Picayune
Chapter 21

340

the day of landfall or just the day before that California was not a signatory to EMAC.121

Ultimately, FEMA and W&F operated outside the EMAC channels to request this assistance. FEMA was able to bring in eight California swift -water teams on August 30, because 

they happened to be embedded in an organization with which FEMA had contracts for its 

USAR program.122

In contrast to W&F, the Louisiana National Guard placed EMAC requests pre-landfall. Th e 

National Guard asked for helicopters from Arkansas, which approved the request before 

landfall.123 Moreover, Bennett Landreneau, the Adjutant General of Louisiana, testifi ed 

before the House Select Bipartisan Katrina Committee that the Louisiana National Guard 

knew “immediately” that its resources would be overwhelmed and consequently sought 

other assistance through EMAC.124 Forty-eight states and four territories provided requested assistance.

W&F also encountered bureaucratic diffi culties in making EMAC requests. Some states 

could not comply immediately because they were uncertain whether they had proper authorization.125 W&F Secretary Dwight Landreneau testifi ed that it would be helpful to have 

a list of all assets available from each state so that states in need could call on that help more 

effi ciently.126 Notably, it was by chance that Lokey was able to advise Louisiana about which 

states had water rescue teams that it could request through EMAC. Lokey, due to his prior 

experience with the National Urban Search and Rescue Program,127 advised Col. Smith to 

reach out to California and a few other states that he knew had water–rescue capabilities.128

No standardized list of such teams exists for state emergency managers.

Managing and Utilizing Volunteers 

Volunteers, who started to arrive as early as Monday evening, proved a great benefi t to the 

search-and-rescue mission in its fi rst days. Many provided boats to transport FEMA and 

other personnel to conduct search-and-rescue missions129 when only other agencies’ boats 

were available. 

At the same time, some volunteers were not well-prepared for water search and rescue. For 

instance, some of the boats were too big to navigate fl ooded streets in New Orleans. Moreover, the Louisiana W&F required volunteers to have food, water, fuel, and life jackets; many 

didn’t and were turned away.130 Several volunteers – as well as some out of state offi cers 

– were unfamiliar with the city.131 Finally, the Department could not handle the numbers of 

volunteers: one day as many as 200 volunteers showed up but could not be eff ectively used 

because “about half of them did not have the equipment that was necessary to help.”132

Security Risks

On Monday evening, aft er W&F offi cers reported sounds of gunfi re, one NOFD team 

aborted its SAR mission, though it eventually returned to its post.133 Tensions continued to 

run high in the area, but did not escalate until Th ursday, when media – at times incorrectly 

– reported widespread looting and violence.134

On Th ursday, FEMA ordered its search-and-rescue missions in New Orleans to stop for 

the entire day and pull back to Zephyr Field until more security arrived.135 Captain Patrick 

Lampard of the NOFD recalled that as these teams began to pull back, they recommended 

that the NOFD also withdraw due to the security concerns. Based on this recommendation, 

Capt. Lampard decided to pull back his NOFD teams that day as well,136 although some 

NOFD offi cers ignored the command.137

Although no other search-and-rescue witnesses have said that conditions on Th ursday were 

such that they would have stopped their mission,138 the need for security might very well 

have been legitimate,139 and the rapid deployment of additional law-enforcement offi cers 
Search and Rescue

341

would have been helpful, as shown in Chapter 25 on Public Safety and Security. Also, at 

least one FEMA search-and-rescue team member has recommended that FEMA searchand-rescue teams might have been able to continue their work if they deployed with force 

protection.140

Also, in some cases, search-and-rescue teams met resistance from residents who refused to 

leave their homes, despite the devastation.141 It was only on September 10 that the Department of Justice gave federal agents permission to use force to enter buildings to rescue 

remaining victims.142

Mississippi

Pre-Storm Planning

In Mississippi, the state emergency plan puts SAR operations in the hands of the Mississippi 

Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), with support from other state agencies.143 Hurricane Katrina SAR operations were conducted along the Mississippi Gulf Coast by local 

fi rst responders, state-sourced SAR personnel, the Coast Guard, rescue teams provided by 

FEMA, and teams from other states. Jim Brinson of the State Offi ce of Homeland Security 

directed SAR operations from the State Emergency Operations Center in Jackson and, later, 

from the Gulf Coast.144

Mississippi planning provides that local fi rst responders – especially fi re-department 

personnel and sheriff s (who are the presumptive incident commanders for their respective counties under the state plan) – have initial responsibility for SAR operations.145 For 

large-scale disasters requiring outside resources, the plan points to four sources: (1) Mississippi personnel and equipment secured by MEMA from other areas of the state; (2) federal 

assets sourced by FEMA; (3) resources from other states via the EMAC; and (4) Mississippi 

National Guard support.146 Brinson did not consult the state emergency plan to review these 

options, but the SAR response to Katrina involved signifi cant aid from each source, and appeared consistent with the plan. 

Th e identifi cation and staging of SAR assets began on August 27, before landfall. Within 

two days, MEMA had identifi ed 19 teams consisting of rescue personnel from throughout 

the state.147 In addition, FEMA pre-deployed USAR teams on August 27 to the Meridian 

Naval Air Station in east-central Mississippi, near the Alabama border, approximately 140 

miles from the Gulf Coast; fi rst to arrive were task forces from Ohio and Indiana, later 

augmented by teams from other states and additional FEMA USAR teams.148 Meanwhile, 

local fi rst responders had pre-positioned equipment like fi re trucks and rescue vehicles in 

anticipation of the storm.

On August 28 and 29, SAR teams and equipment continued to arrive. Th ese included 

FEMA teams, which were staged in Meridian, Mississippi, and in Florida before landfall.149

Fire fi ghters and fi rst responders from other Mississippi counties awaited the storm at the 

State Fire Academy in Pearl, near the state capital of Jackson.150 EMAC teams from Florida 

formed up and awaited direction from MEMA.151 In addition, Mississippi National Guard 

elements staged at Camp Shelby, near Hattiesburg, approximately 65 miles north of Gulfport and, to a lesser degree, along the three coastal counties. 

Search-and-Rescue Operations Post-Landfall 

Hurricane Katrina overwhelmed local SAR responders, who faced fl ooding, impassable 

debris fi elds, obliterated roads, and vast areas requiring searches.152 Personnel and equip-
Chapter 21

342

ment converged on the Gulf Coast late Monday, August 29, and early Tuesday. Coast Guard 

teams began air and water SAR missions on August 29. 

Th e level of devastation Katrina infl icted on the Gulf Coast posed a huge challenge for 

rescuers. Oft en, roads were impassable and had to be cleared before rescuers were able to 

start SAR operations. Rescuers sometimes could not wait for the roads to be cleared. For 

example, the White Cypress subdivision in northern Hancock County, the westernmost 

county on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, and its 200 residents were completely cut off by fallen 

trees. Rescuers had to be airlift ed into the area while forestry teams were still working to 

reopen roads.153

Rescuers faced debris piles that were oft en two to three stories high and as many as four 

blocks wide. Th e debris extended all along the Mississippi Gulf Coast and stretched inland 

several hundred yards in some places, to four miles in others. Th e debris fi eld itself was 

extraordinarily hazardous. It contained not only the remains of houses, buildings, and 

automobiles, but also hazards such as chemical spills and gas leaks. In Gulfport, the hurricane had destroyed a number of containers at the port holding chicken carcasses and pork 

bellies intended for export, and scattered the contents along the coast. Th is put thousands 

of decomposing chickens where SAR operations were later to take place. As Pat Sullivan, 

Gulfport’s Fire Chief, aptly summarized, it was “an impossible situation.”154

In part because communication was so diffi cult along the Gulf Coast, MEMA decided to 

headquarter state, federal, and EMAC search-and-rescue operations in Harrison County, 

the geographically central and most populous coastal county, while local responders 

remained deployed along the coast.155 For SAR purposes, the Mississippi Gulf Coast was 

divided into three areas: Jackson/George Counties, with Jackson County easternmost on the 

coast and George to its north; Harrison/Stone Counties, with Harrison central on the coast 

and Stone to its north; and Hancock/Pearl River Counties, with Hancock County westernmost on the coast and Pearl River to its north. Maps and grids helped ensure that areas were 

searched in a coordinated, methodical manner.156

Various offi cials in Mississippi reported good coordination among local, state, federal, and 

EMAC resources.157

Rescue teams combined Mississippi and out-of-state personnel to mix local knowledge with 

the specialized equipment and training available to federal and state teams, as Jim Brinson, 

the SAR coordinator, described: 

You know, somebody from New York isn’t real sure what water moccasins and 

alligators do in a severe storm. Th ey get very nasty. My [Mississippi] guys understand this, they live here, they hunt here. And on the fl ip side USAR teams 

are trained to do specifi c things and have specifi c equipment to do search and 

rescue in that type of urban environment that many guys don’t have: robots, 

acoustic mics, fi ber-optic cameras, things like that.158

Offi cials estimate that the teams assisting local fi rst responders consisted of approximately 

550 SAR personnel159 including Mississippi fi rst responders sent by MEMA, 17 FEMA 

rescue and incident-management teams,160 and rescuers from Florida and other states 

sent though the EMAC. Th ese fi gures do not include personnel from the Coast Guard and 

Mississippi National Guard, who fi gured importantly in search-and-rescue operations. For 

example, the Coast Guard rescued and airlift ed 1,700 stranded residents.161 Th e Mississippi 

National Guard provided manpower and engineering support along the Gulf Coast,162 and 

conducted SAR in devastated Hancock County on Mississippi’s western Gulf Coast.163
Search and Rescue

343

Search-and-rescue operations continued for about a week before moving into recovery 

phase.164 

Despite the many challenges SAR teams faced, Mississippi offi cials were generally pleased 

with search-and-rescue eff orts. Th ey praised the hard work and professionalism of the 

FEMA and EMAC teams, and of Mississippi fi rst responders.165

Gulfport Fire Chief Pat Sullivan was eff usive in his praise:

If everything went like the FEMA USAR teams, FEMA would get the academy 

award. ... [Th e] FEMA USAR [urban search and rescue] teams, you can’t say 

enough about what they did and how they did it and [the] equipment they 

brought in and the way that they were here to help you.166

Department of Defense and National Guard Air Search and Rescue

Accumulation of Aircraft

Despite the increased number of military helicopters in the Gulf Coast by the end of the fi rst 

week, the number of helicopters capable of performing search and rescue – the most critical 

of all missions – was still inadequate for the number of victims in need of rescue, leading to 

delays in saving lives and reducing suff ering. 

On Saturday, August 27, two days before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the Louisiana 

National Guard began to supplement its state inventory of helicopters, requesting four 

CH-47 and two UH-60 helicopters from the National Guard Bureau. Th e helicopters were 

sent from neighboring states through the EMAC system, beginning with two UH-60s from 

Oklahoma, which arrived on Monday.167 By Monday, Army National Guard helicopters 

totaled 15 in Louisiana and 13 in Mississippi.168 As soon as gale-force winds subsided below 

fl ight-restriction levels, on Monday aft ernoon, the helicopters commenced SAR missions, 

continuing through the evening.169 Louisiana and Mississippi had 60 helicopters available 

for this initial response. Th e aircraft and crew fl ew around-the-clock due to the overwhelming number of emergency missions facing them. Additional National Guard aircraft did 

not begin to arrive in numbers until fi ve days aft er landfall.170 By September 8, however, 150 

Army National Guard aircraft were operating in the Joint Operating Area.171

Th e active-duty (Title 10) military involvement in Air SAR began Tuesday evening, with the 

arrival of the amphibious-warfare helicopter carrier USS Bataan (see Chapter 26, Military Operations) carrying three MH-60s and two MH-53s, and continuing with a steady 

buildup of assets through September 8, when the total number of active-duty helicopters 

peaked at 143.172 Th e Bataan had been positioned in the Gulf of Mexico at the conclusion 

of an exercise and, on the orders of the Second Fleet commander, had steamed northward 

toward New Orleans following the storm’s passage. Th e fi rst helicopters launched at 5 p.m. 

CT, once the Bataan was in range of the coast.173 Upon landing in New Orleans Tuesday 

evening, the pilots reported to the Coast Guard Air Station commander, who as the designated On-Scene Commander, coordinated all air assets then engaged in search-and-rescue 

missions.174

Aircraft began arriving in greater numbers on Wednesday, August 31, when six Army 

helicopters – three UH-60s and three CH-47s – reported to the Louisiana National Guard 

at the Superdome. Six additional Army helicopters arrived in Baton Rouge from Fort Benning, GA, on Th ursday, September 1, and performed medical evacuation missions in New 

Orleans.175 Five Air Force helicopters from Patrick and Moody Air Force Bases deployed on 

their own authority to Mississippi on Wednesday, performing SAR missions in Hawkins, 
Chapter 21

344

and Gulfport-Biloxi.176 By Friday, 21 Air Force HH-60 helicopters were operating from 

Jackson, MS.177

By the latter half of the week, helicopters from all services had joined the eff orts, including 

Marine utility and heavy lift aircraft from New River, NC; Air Force UH-60s from various 

locations; and Navy SH-60 helicopters from Jacksonville, FL. Many of the Jacksonvillebased aircraft were delayed for several days, however, as the Navy planned to transport 

them aboard ships which would pick them up in Florida on Friday and arrive in the region 

on Sunday. Friday, however, they were ordered to fl y over land to the region, and operate from one of the military bases ashore,178 and were joined by 13 additional Navy aircraft 

fl own in from Naval Air Station North Island in San Diego, CA.179

Th ough FEMA requested at least 45 helicopters from DOD between the day before landfall 

and the day aft er landfall180 – two on Sunday,181 fi ve just past midnight Monday,182 and 38 on 

Tuesday183 – DOD deployed far more, exceeding 45 by Wednesday. Still, according to Army 

personnel, there were no superfl uous aircraft in the fi eld.184 Vice Admiral Vivien Crea, 

Commander of the Coast Guard Atlantic Area, described her visit on “Saturday talking to 

the rescue swimmers, who were talking to me with tears in their eyes and the frustration 

and the fear that they weren’t going to get to everybody on time.” As late as Saturday, she 

said, there were “absolutely not enough assets.”185

And although the total number of military helicopters – active-duty and National Guard 

– reached 293 on September 8, the number does not accurately refl ect the number of assets 

devoted to SAR. Many of the helicopters in the region were not equipped with the hoist 

necessary for SAR, and many were light utility helicopters, without the necessary lift capacity. Others, such as the MH-53s from USS Bataan, are so large that the down-wash from 

their rotors would push a victim underwater, and thus cannot be used for SAR. While these 

aircraft served essential roles in medical evacuation, personnel transport, and logistical missions, hoist-equipped aircraft were a highly valuable asset, and far less numerous. Furthermore, the available SAR-capable aircraft were, at times, tasked with support missions more 

appropriate to the utility aircraft , detracting from the more urgent life-saving mission.186

Lack of Search-and-Rescue Coordination

Although the National Search and Rescue Plan (1999) covers conduct and interagency 

coordination in small-scale SAR operations, no plan exists for large-scale SAR operations 

during a declared disaster. 

Agencies and individuals performed heroically under exhausting, hazardous, and unprecedented circumstances. Yet the lack of an interagency plan to address search strategy, 

planning, and organization, communications, a centralized command structure, air-traffi c 

control, and reception of victims led to hazardous fl ight conditions, ineffi cient employment 

of resources, and protracted waits by victims in need of rescue.

Th e hundreds of aircraft that arrived on the Gulf Coast faced an overwhelming task. From 

throughout the miles upon miles of destruction, the number of distress calls mounted by 

the day, and as SAR crews would fl y to respond to calls, they would oft en pass over many 

more victims in need of rescue.187 Th e aircraft and crews fl ew long and diffi cult hours to the 

point of exhaustion, and at the same time, fl ew in extraordinarily dangerous and confusing 

conditions in congested skies, rescuing thousands of victims from rooft ops, attics, apartments, and overpasses. Th e participants included not just the DOD, National Guard, and 

Coast Guard, but numerous civilian elements such as the DOI, state and local law-enforcement agencies, and commercial entities. Yet in the chaos of Katrina’s aft ermath, no network 
Search and Rescue

345

of coordination linked these resources; even the DOD assets remained under separate and 

changing commands for many days. No common strategy to a thorough and expeditious 

search existed, and no unifi ed air-traffi c control system ensured safety of fl ight. At the root 

of these problems is the fact that the United States lacks an appropriate national plan for 

SAR in large-scale disasters.

Th e National Search and Rescue Plan is a multi-agency plan, agreed to by the DOD, DOI, 

and the Department of Transportation, among other federal agencies, providing guidance “for coordinating civil search-and-rescue (SAR) services to meet domestic needs and 

international commitments.”188 It outlines the roles and responsibilities of various agencies 

in establishing an integrated structure for SAR missions. Although the plan refl ects a consensus rather than doctrine, its intent is to achieve “the eff ective use of all available facilities 

in all types of SAR missions.”189 Perplexingly, however, it expressly does not apply during 

declared emergencies and disasters:

Civil SAR does not include operations such as ... overall response to natural or 

man-made disasters or terrorist incidents; and typical disaster response operations, such as: locating and rescuing victims trapped in collapsed structures or 

other assistance provided under the scope of the Federal Response Plan.190

In a catastrophic disaster, then, there is currently no mechanism for planning SAR operations over extensive areas in both maritime and overland environments, or establishing 

a suffi ciently broad command and control structure to encompass all agencies and assets 

involved. 

Although ESF-9 under the NRP covers USAR – “locating, extricating, and providing onsite 

medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures”191 – it does not address such 

massive eff orts as Katrina, involving the combination of air, surface, and ground eff orts. According to Admiral Crea:

I was surprised by the nebulous nature of the National SAR Plan once I started 

looking at it from the post-Katrina perspective, because as a Coast Guard 

aviator and operator, I had always ... assumed that I could do any search and 

rescue, and certainly in the maritime environment, and I would do it in any 

inland environment if somebody asked me to do it. ... I was surprised when I 

read that it’s more of a not-to-interfere type of a basis. ... I think the maritime 

piece is pretty clear, but I think the inland piece needs a little more structure, 

perhaps.192

Th e lack of an adequate plan for large-scale SAR led to two major shortcomings in DOD’s 

air search-and-rescue missions: inadequate air-traffi c control and poor coordination of 

deployed aircraft .

Rear Admiral Joseph Kilkenny, who reported to Joint Task Force Katrina as the commander of maritime forces, agreed. Considering that an easily imaginable attack with a weapon of 

mass destruction would require a similarly complex SAR response, standardization of SAR 

procedures must become a priority, he said.193 As Second Fleet’s “Lessons Learned” Report 

observed, “An ad hoc grid reference system was established due to lack of awareness of the 

common grid reference system already designed by the U.S. National Search and Rescue 

Supplement.”194 Some regions were missed while others remained unsearched for long periods of time,195 and stranded citizens were still being rescued on September 8, 11 days aft er 

landfall.196
Chapter 21

346

Because the storm had incapacitated military and civilian air-traffi c control radar systems 

throughout the Gulf Coast, much of the airspace was uncontrolled,197 creating a hazardous 

and ineffi cient situation, with pilots relying simply on a “see-and-avoid” system, without 

the essential tracking or separation normally provided by an Air Traffi c Controller.198 “I am 

amazed at the volume of traffi c that was in that [Area of Responsibility] and there was not a 

mid-air collision,” Rear Admiral Dan Lloyd, a Coast Guard representative at U.S. Northern 

Command (NORTHCOM) said. 199

Coordination was poor because no overarching command existed to assign search sectors, 

communicate with all assets, or direct aircraft to respond to distress calls. Second Fleet 

recommended, “Centralized Command and Control, with subordinate sector command 

and control of air, land, and water-borne assets, in place as soon as possible, will maximize 

safety and capabilities.”200 Th e diff erent services each directed their own aircraft , with the 

structure changing continuously due to the rapid buildup of assets in the operating area 

throughout the fi rst week.

From Tuesday, August 30, to Wednesday, August 31, DOD air assets operated with Coast 

Guard aircraft under the coordination of Coast Guard District Eight.201 Beginning Wednesday, August 31, all DOD air assets were controlled by Admiral Kilkenny, based on USS 

Bataan.

202 Beginning Wednesday, August 31, Army SAR assets reported to the Louisiana 

National Guard, stationed at Eagle Base at the Superdome.203 Beginning late in the week, Air 

Force and other shore-based SAR assets reported to the Joint Force Air Component Commander, who arrived at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, on Th ursday, September 1.204 On SaturSafe on an Interstate island

Photo © 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 

all rights reserved. Used with permission of the 

Times-Picayune
Search and Rescue

347

day, September 3, Air Force Brigadier General Harold Moulton arrived from NORTHCOM 

to consolidate command and control of all Title 10 SAR units from a mobile headquarters 

unit at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base in Belle Chasse.205 Meanwhile, the National 

Guard established their SAR coordination headquarters at Zephyr Field, the New Orleans 

Saints’ practice fi eld in Jeff erson Parish.206

According to the Lessons Learned Report from USS Bataan, the lack of a unifi ed communications system among these numerous authorities further complicated the SAR mission. 

While aircraft communicated with their respective commanders while on the ground, “once 

airborne ... aircraft from all services and the local authorities took tasking via radio calls 

from one another,” rather than from their operating bases.207 Th is ad-hoc tasking system led 

to a lack of an overall strategy, in which victims were oft en deposited at intermediary locations, requiring further transport. Admiral Crea elaborated:

We would take somebody for a Medevac to the airport where they were supposed to be triaged and further evacuated, and that place got saturated. So my 

helicopter would come in ... with a medical patient and be told to hold for a 

half-hour until they could fi t them in. Or in some cases, they were told to fl y to 

Baton Rouge, which is like a 2-hour fl ight. So there we were wasting one helicopter taking one patient all the way to Baton Rouge to drop them off before 

he’d get back. So I think, clearly, with better organization and planning, that 

things could have been divided up into missions and sectors and so forth. Th at 

was just understandably due to the terrible communications and the chaos and 

trying to fi gure out who’s in charge initially, and so forth.208

General Moulton, tasked with instituting a centralized SAR plan, described the “crisis 

mode” of operations he found upon his arrival: 

If you had a helicopter, you fl ew it in, you found somebody on the top of the 

roof, you grabbed them, and you took them to safety. And it appeared from 

our perspective that the procedures for doing that were not developed, were 

not organized. ... And I think sort of by – by routine they started ending up 

dropping people off at certain places.209

With his headquarters at NORTHCOM, and with leaders and representatives of the forces 

already engaged in SAR, he developed a plan to integrate the numerous agencies and their 

hundreds of assets, operating across the air, ground, littoral, and urban environments. Th e 

team assembled on September 5, and the overall intent was to achieve a thorough search of the 

disaster area with all agencies operating on a common strategy and using a common communications network. As described in Chapter 26, large numbers of active-duty military ground 

troops had then arrived, and together with the thousands of National Guard troops, were able 

to conduct the thorough door-to-door searches to ensure that all areas had been covered.

Katrina exposed a signifi cant gap in our nation’s plans for SAR in a catastrophe. Th ousands 

of lives were saved by the heroic eff orts of the pilots, aircrew, and swimmers, together with 

the thousands of personnel operating in boats and on land. From the moment Katrina 

cleared the Gulf Coast, SAR was the primary mission, as decreed by leaders of the response, 

and as refl ected by the actions of the Coast Guard and the National Guard as soon as the 

winds would permit safe fl ight. But it is necessary to harness these eff orts and this heroism 

in a single cohesive plan that would provide all agencies a centralized coordination structure, a unifi ed communications network, restorable air-traffi c control system, and a common search-and-evacuation strategy in order to ensure that in the next large disaster, which 

may occur in an entirely diff erent environment, this primary mission is a collaborative and 

effi cient success. 
Chapter 21

348

1 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze, Assistant Administrator, Law Enforcement Division, Louisiana 

Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted on Nov. 30, 2005, transcript pp. 51-53.

2 Committee staff interview of Sec. Dwight Landreneau, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted on 

Nov. 30, 2005, transcript pp. 44-45.

3 Testimony of Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze, Assistant Administrator, Law Enforcement Division, Louisiana Department of 

Wildlife and Fisheries, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search and Rescue in a Catastrophe, Jan. 30, 2006 (“Th e number of people evacuated during 

that 36 hour period, in my estimate, would be approximately 1,500 people at the three sites we performed evacuations.”).

4 Testimony of Jeff Smith, Acting Deputy Director, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 

Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, Dec. 14, 2005 

(estimating 60,000 people were rescued); Lt. Col. LaCaze, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006 (estimating 60,000 

people were rescued); Testimony of Madhu Beriwal, President and Chief Executive Offi cer, IEM, Inc., before the U.S. 

Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Preparing for a Catastrophe: Th e Hurricane Pam Exercise, Jan. 24, 2006 (estimating between 60,000 and 100,000 people were rescued.).

5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 2004, 

Emergency Support Function Annex, p. ESF #9–1 [hereinaft er NRP].

6 See e.g.: Committee staff interview of James Strickland, Team Member, Urban Search and Rescue, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA), conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript p. 42 (stating that the Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Plan listed the U.S. Coast Guard as the lead federal agency for search and rescue and then relied on that information).

7 Written Statement of Madhu Beriwal, President and Chief Executive Offi cer, IEM, Inc., for the U.S. Senate, Committee 

on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Preparing for a Catastrophe: Th e Hurricane Pam Exercise, 

Jan. 24, 2006, p. 6. In all, the Coast Guard completed over 12,500 air rescues, 11,500 surface (boat) rescues and 9,400 

hospital evacuations during Katrina. While its air missions garnered much media coverage, it conducted almost half its 

rescues and evacuations by boats. U.S. Coast Guard, Factcard, “Coast Guard Response to Hurricane Katrina.” http://

www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfi le/index.htm. Accessed on Apr. 6, 2006.

8 Written Statement of Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 6. 

9 Testimony of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, before the U.S. 

Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search and 

Rescue in a Catastrophe, Jan. 30, 2006 (stating that FEMA rescued 6,582 people); Strickland, interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 

86-87 (stating that FEMA rescued around 6,000 people). See also: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Emergencies 

& Disasters, “Hurricane Katrina: What Is Government Doing.” http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Katrina.htm. 

Accessed on Apr. 11, 2006.

10 Written Statement of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, for the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search 

and Rescue in a Catastrophe, Jan. 30, 2006, pp. 2-3. 

11 LOHSEP, Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, p. ESF-9–2 [hereinaft er Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 

2005]; Committee staff interview of Maj. Jeff Mayne, Supervisor, Special Investigator Section, and Legislative Liaison, 

Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted on Nov. 30, 2005, transcript p. 10.

12 Lt. Col. LaCaze interview, Nov. 30, 2005, pp. 134-136; Lt. Col. LaCaze, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006.

13 Written Statement of Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 6 .

14 Committee staff interview of Capt. Paul Hellmers, Engine 18, Second Platoon, Fift h District, New Orleans Fire 

Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 7, 2005, transcript p. 137 (“from our perspective, we were going to stay there for 

weeks or as long as it took, you know? We had no intention of leaving until we were told it’s time to go.”); Capt. Hellmers interview, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 220 (“And by Saturday evening it was painfully clear that this was not going to be like one 

[these] small storms. So, me, I wasn’t the only one. Th ere were other people who were pretty much sure it was going to 

fl ood. I moved as much of my belongings to my second fl oor as I could, tried to save what I could before I went to work. 

Obviously, had I not gone to work, well, I could have saved a lot more of my belongings, but me and most other fi remen 

went to work.”); Testimony of Capt. Timothy Bayard, Commander, Vice Crimes and Narcotics Section, New Orleans 

Police Department, LA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search and Rescue in a Catastrophe, Jan. 30, 2006. 

15 New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, May 2005, Appendix 

– Emergency Support Functions, p. 7 (assigning the primary responsibility for Emergency Support Function 9 – search 

and rescue – to the New Orleans Fire Department, and assigning the New Orleans Police Department as a supporting 

agency for search and rescue).

16 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, prepared by IEM, Inc. for LOHSEP and FEMA, Jan. 2005, p. 65 

[hereinaft er, Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Jan. 2005].

17 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Nov. 4, 2005, transcript p. 113.
Search and Rescue

349

18 Committee staff interview of Charles Parent, Superintendent, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 

10, 2005, transcript pp. 9-10, 33-38; Capt. Hellmers interview, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 18-19 (stating that the NOFD “does not 

own any boats other than a ... deep-water boat”); Capt. Hellmers interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 192-193 (preferring “one 

boat for every two rescuers”).

19 Capt. Bayard, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006.

20 Parent interview, Nov. 10, 2005, pp. 39-40; Capt. Bayard, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006 (stating that 

NOPD and NOFD are working on “cross-training police offi cers and fi remen in water and urban rescue procedures”).

21 Mike Joseph, the New Orleans Fire Department Liaison to the New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland Security and Public 

Safety who was responsible for that offi ce’s applications to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Offi ce for 

Domestic Preparedness (ODP) grants, said that ODP denied his request for water rescue training that would have been 

held just days before Katrina hit. Source: Committee staff interview of Michael Joseph, Liaison to New Orleans Offi ce of 

Homeland Security, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 8, 2005, transcript pp. 18-20. 

I mean just Friday before the hurricane I was denied – I had written a proposal about two months before or a month and a half before. We wanted to have awareness and operational level training to water 

rescue. Th e Friday before the storm, request denied, does not meet the parameters of ODP. ... Just the 

irony is just unbelievable, because this training was scheduled for that Saturday and Sunday before 

landfall of Katrina. ... And that’s just total coincidence because we had been trying to get this water 

training for over a year as part of our new USAR Team, Urban Search and Rescue, which we formed 

over a year ago. Th e committee was formed probably in April or May of ’04, which I serve on that committee, and that’s always something that we wanted to have as part of our USAR was some type of water 

capability. And we probably found the appropriate and aff ordable instructor, and you know, as I said, I 

wrote a little proposal and sent it out through the process to ODP, and it was denied. 

Th e record does not indicate why DHS denied the application. 

22 Committee staff interview of Capt. Joseph Fincher, Engine 18, Th ird Platoon, Fift h District, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 11, 2005, transcript p. 97. 

23 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Jan. 2005, p. 65.

24 Written Statement of Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 6. Additionally, the January 2005 plan that 

came out of the Hurricane Pam exercise predicted that hundreds of thousands would need to be evacuated aft er landfall 

of a catastrophic storm in New Orleans. Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Jan. 2005, p. 30.

25 Two days before landfall, many FEMA offi cials, including the FCO, received via e-mail, the plan that came out of the 

Hurricane Pam exercise, including the section on search and rescue. Source: Sharon Blades, e-mail to Michel Pawlowski, 

Linda Hammett Morgan, Pete Jensen, Robert Jevec, Cassandra Ward, Debra Clark, William Lokey, Michael Lowder, 

Rick Tinker, Pleasant Mann, Richard Brown, Jr., Richard Gray, Vanessa Quinn, Ronald Goins, Bill Zellars, Ted Lift y, 

Shauna M. Blanchard-Mbangah, Gerilee Bennett, Pat Bowman, Tony Robinson, Gary Jones, Joe Bearden, Wayne 

Fairley, Chris Riley, and Kara Satra, “Sela Plan,” Aug. 27, 2005, 10:35 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA-0028-0000455. However, FEMA search and rescue Incident Support Team member James Strickland said 

he did not receive the plan, and that it would have been very helpful to have been briefed on the Southeast Louisiana 

Catastrophic Hurricane Plan and the Hurricane Pam exercise before Katrina made landfall. Source: Strickland interview, 

Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 70-71.

26 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Robert F. Duncan, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District, 

for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast 

Guard’s Response to Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 1.

27 Testimony of Capt. Frank M. Paskewich, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Sector New Orleans, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast 

Guard’s Response to Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005 (“We simply would not dream of not responding. If there is a possibility to use a Coast Guard asset or Coast Guard people to help out when people need assistance, we are going to fi nd a 

way to do it. We are not going to wonder whether we have the authority to do it, we are just going to take action.”). 

28 Testimony of Rear Adm. Robert F. Duncan, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District, before the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast Guard’s 

Response to Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005; Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005 (“I am not sure 

I can recall in the last two years actually making it through a night without getting a phone call about responding to a 

particular incident. We are trained to do that, and I think that is our strength. We respond, and it is ingrained in our 

culture.”).

29 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 2.

30 Committee staff interview of Rear Adm. Robert F. Duncan, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Eighth Coast Guard 

District, conducted on Oct. 18, 2005, transcript pp. 7-8.

31 Testimony of Capt. Bruce C. Jones, U.S. Coast Guard, Commanding Offi cer, Air Station New Orleans, LA, before the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast Guard’s 

Response to Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005. 

32 Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

33 Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005. 
Chapter 21

350

34 “Th e Coast Guard success in completing all of our assigned missions aft er one of the most devastating storms in the 

Nation’s history was a result of well-honed fi rst responder skills, our ability to pre-plan and our multi-mission nature.” 

Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005. Th e Coast Guard also executed its other missions – containing or remediating hundreds of oil spills; clearing the waterways for navigation; delivering critical supplies by air – in 

addition to search and rescue in the aft ermath of Katrina. 

35 Rear Adm. Duncan interview, Oct. 18, 2005, pp. 9-10.

36 Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

37 To minimize the direct impact on Coast Guard personnel, which would have adversely aff ected response eff orts, the 

Coast Guard evacuated (non-essential) personnel and their family members from the Gulf Coast region. “We exercise 

before every hurricane season. ... It is a good opportunity for us to bring people into the culture, to understand what the 

threats are in the Gulf Coast, how we would deal with that, make sure they have their own plans for their families, to talk 

about those things. ... We did that this time. We actually left the area.” Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, 

Nov. 9, 2005.

38 Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

39 Committee staff interview of Lt. Cmdr. Tom Cooper, U.S. Coast Guard, Helicopter Pilot and Engineering Offi cer, Air 

Station New Orleans, LA, conducted on Oct. 18, 2005, transcript pp. 11-12.

40 Capt. Jones, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005 (“Laurence Nettles was lowered from an H65 and threaded his 

way between tree limbs to reach a four-month old infant, her mother and grandmother stranded in deep fl ood waters in 

lower Plaquemines Parish at 2:50 that day.”).

41 U.S. Coast Guard, Factcard, “Coast Guard Response to Hurricane Katrina.” http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/

factfi le/index.htm. Accessed on Apr. 11, 2006.

42 Written Statement of Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 6. However, a FEMA PowerPoint presentation dated Aug. 27, 2005, two days before Katrina made landfall in the Gulf, noted that there were likely to be “incredible 

search and rescue needs (60,000+).” FEMA, “Tropical Storm Katrina: 0900 August 27, 2005,” PowerPoint presentation. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0055-0002142.

43 Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

44 Lt. Col. LaCaze interview, Nov. 30, 2005, p. 46.

45 Testimony of Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General, Louisiana Air National Guard, before the U.S. 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search and 

Rescue in a Catastrophe, Jan. 30, 2006; Committee staff interview of Col. Th omas Beron, Commander, 61st Troop Command, Louisiana Army National Guard, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, transcript pp. 104-105; Committee staff interview 

of Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to Civilian Authorities, Louisiana National Guard, 

conducted on December 9, 2005, transcript pp. 151-153, 157-161. 

46 “See, Urban Search and Rescue Teams, this was the fi rst time they’d ever actively done water rescues. Th ey carry water equipment to work around in a water environment, but FEMA policy had been that we don’t do water rescue. We do 

structural collapse rescue assets. ... Well, in hindsight, what I would have done, since Urban Search and Rescue Teams 

aren’t water rescue teams, I would have worked more with the State through EMAC and whatnot.” Lokey interview, 

Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 66-67. 

47 Committee staff interview of Vice Adm. Vivean Crea, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic Area 

and Commander, Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic, conducted on Jan. 3, 2006, transcript p. 76 (“Q: Do you think that’s 

a change that needs to be made to the National SAR Plan, or does there need to be something in the National Response 

Plan which addresses – A: It would be nice to think that that was an all-hazards, all-encompassing plan, at least a reference to a relevant document that would go into more depth.”).

48 New Orleans Fire Department, 2005 Hurricane Guidelines, 2005, p. 2–4; Committee staff interview of Capt. Fincher, 

Engine 18, Th ird Platoon, Fift h District, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, and Capt. Hellmers, Engine 18, Second 

Platoon, Fift h District, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, interview, conducted on Nov. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 171-173.

49 Th e National Guard’s decision to keep its assets at Jackson Barracks is particularly puzzling given that it could have 

stationed at least some of the assets at New Orleans police stations throughout the city instead. According to New Orleans 

Police Department (NOPD) Superintendent Warren Riley (then Deputy Chief) the NOPD had asked the Louisiana National Guard to station some of its high-water vehicles (that can drive through fl ooded areas) and boats at eight police stations pre-landfall. However, the Guard told him that they would supply vehicles to only three or four NOPD stations, but 

would not be able to supply them with boats at that time. Source: Committee staff interview of Warren Riley, Superintendent of Police, New Orleans Police Department, LA, conducted on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript pp. 121-122. But LANG Brig. 

Gen. Veillon was not aware of the NOPD request. Source: Brig. Gen. Veillon, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006.

50 Th e offi cer in command of the Louisiana National Guard forces in New Orleans before and aft er landfall, General Gary 

Jones said that deciding whether to pre-position equipment at Jackson Barracks in the future would be a “tough call.” 

Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, Assistant Joint Forces Commander, Louisiana Army National Guard, 

conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 79-80 (“We pre-position as much of the stuff as we can. For example, the aviation support; we typically move out, get it right on the edge. Th e engineer teams, we do that, so forth. But if you’re going 

to be missioned at Jackson Barracks – which, obviously, that’s some of the most vulnerable part of the area – you have to 

take some risk. And, you know – I guess the question is, it kind of becomes a damned if you do, damned if you don’t. If 
Search and Rescue

351

we had not positioned some of the trucks and stuff there that ultimately got lost, and the water had not gotten up as high 

as it was, then we would have faced criticism for the slowness of response for doing that. Historically we’ve always prepositioned things there. Th is storm was of a magnitude that far surpassed anything that we previously had to deal with.”); 

Col. Beron interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 29-30 (“[I]f the industrial canal had broken on the west side instead of the east side,

Jackson Barracks would have been high and dry and those vehicles would have been fi ne. As to places to move to higher 

ground, overpasses, bridges, they have inherent problems with vulnerability to wind and other things. So you maybe take 

them out of the water risk and put them in another risk. I’ll tell you that nowhere really comes to mind. You think of an 

elevated parking garage maybe would be good. You can’t exactly drive an 18-wheeler into something like that. I’ll tell you 

that I’ve thought and nothing comes immediately to mind that would lead me to believe that’s a better place because it 

off ers this. Everything that I’ve thought of so far has pros and cons, frankly.”); Committee staff interview of Col. Glenn 

Curtis, Chief of Staff , Louisiana Army National Guard and Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to 

Civilian Authorities, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 46-57.

51 Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006 (stating that in retrospect, he would have activated more search and 

rescue teams before landfall). 

52 Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006; Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 31-32.

53 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript p. 184. Moreover, Lokey stated that he made a conscious decision to station the USAR teams in Shreveport rather than Baton Rouge. At the time, he explained, Baton Rouge was expected to be 

in the path of the storm and he wanted the USAR teams out of harm’s way. Source: Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 

88-90. According to Lokey, FEMA is now considering a fi ve-year plan that would revise its practices and budget to ensure that its search–and–rescue teams arrive within 12 hours aft er landfall. Source: Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 153.

54 Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006.

55 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 81-82.

56 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 82.

57 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 33-34 (“I would have preferred being slightly closer.”).

58 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 35-37, 42-48.

59 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 82-83.

60 Although it is generally not advisable for even fi rst responders to begin search–and–rescue missions when the winds 

are above 40 mph, some of the NOFD offi cers literally threw caution to the wind. Fincher interview, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 93 

(“Personally, I guess I didn’t have good communications with me because I wasn’t aware and I really didn’t give a damn 

about what anybody else wanted. I knew there were people dying. I was pretty sure I could get out safely and get the boat 

back so we could get our rescue operations underway.”).

61 Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan 30, 2006; Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 15 (“I don’t deem we were in 

the water rescue business.”).

62 Committee staff interview of Eric Tolbert, former Director, Response Division, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, 

transcript, p. 40 (stating that FEMA lacks any water rescue capability); Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 21 (“We 

don’t own boats.”).

63 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 15, 83, 21-22 (stating that the FEMA search–and–rescue teams “were at the 

mercy of the people who showed up with the boats.”).

64 Th e teams are trained and equipped to rescue people from collapsed structures, as aft er an earthquake. Th e team 

members are not trained or equipped for a fl ooded environment. Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 66, 70. 

65 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 29-30; Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan 30, 2006.

66 Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2006 (“As you might know, nine of ten deaths that occur in a hurricane 

are due to storm surge and due to drowning from rain and storm surge. So we wanted to create ten to 20 feet of water in 

the City of New Orleans, which would constitute a catastrophic scenario for Southeast Louisiana.”).

67 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 79.

68 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 17 (“FEMA Urban Search and Rescue does not need to get into the water rescue 

business....But in any event, yeah, there is probably a little bit higher level of training that the USAR system needs to 

have in order to safely operate in a water environment.”); Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 18 (stating that the mission to do water rescue is that of the “Coast Guard and the federal, local and state.”); Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, 

Jan. 30, 2006. 

69 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 19 (explaining that FEMA lacks boats and does not have the funding to support 

water rescue); Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 27 (“But that’s not to say that if they plan this out, and they fund it 

correctly, and they hit every step, and they connected all their dots, maybe we could get into the water rescue business.”); 

Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006.

70 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 12-13 (“It’s kind of irritating to me, but they don’t [provide additional training 

for IST teams]. Th ey haven’t in fi ve years.”); Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 14 (stating that with additional training, the IST teams “would have had a little bit smoother response ... when you only see people [when] ... we go out on a 

disaster ... it’s kind of hard; that’s not the optimum time to do training, when you’re up to your elbows in some kind of 
Chapter 21

352

an incident.”); Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 20 (explaining that “when you show up for something like Katrina 

... there’s no time to be trying to get our act together then.”); Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 22 (“When you’re in 

and around polluted, contaminated water like that, there’s a health and safety issue that we would have to prepare for. 

Th ere’s that higher level of training that they need to have.”).

71 Capt. Bayard, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006; Lt. Col. LaCaze, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006.

72 Capt. Fincher and Capt. Hellmers interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 105-110, 113, 115-116 (stating that the “Fire Alarm,” 

the NOFD main communications center, fl ooded and went down around 6:20p or 7:20p on Monday, August 29, 2005, 

forcing prompting NOFD to follow its contingency plan and use the National Mutual Aid Channel); New Orleans Fire 

Department, 2005 Hurricane Guidelines, 2005, pp. 3–2 through 3–7. 

73 Capt. Hellmers interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 111-112 (stating “that happened many times with not just me, but other 

people doing the same thing, relaying messages between people when it was clear they couldn’t hear each other.”).

74 Lt. Col. LaCaze interview, Nov. 30, 2005, pp. 62-63.

75 Sec. Landreneau interview, Nov. 30, 2005, p. 16.

76 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Joseph Booth, Deputy Superintendent, Crisis Response and Special Operations, 

Louisiana State Police, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, transcript pp. 47-49. Th e record does not reveal why the proposal was 

not accepted. 

77 Sec. Landreneau, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, explained that he would have diffi culty communicating from Baton Rouge at the state’s Emergency Operations Center to his offi cers operating in New Orleans, such 

as Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze. Sec. Landreneau interview, Nov. 30, 2005, p. 1. See also: Lt. Col. LaCaze interview, Nov. 30, 

2005, pp. 15-17 (“If we were in Baton Rouge and Keith was on Clearview Avenue in Metairie, [Department of Wildlife 

& Fisheries Major] Jeff [Mayne] would get a call and sometimes when we were lucky we could communicate from Baton 

Rouge to New Orleans, but then the next link is to be able to communicate from our operations center to the boats, that 

was virtually impossible and some of it because [we were] overwhelmed by traffi c, you’re in between big buildings. So we 

tried regular cell phones, we tried satellite phones, we ended up going to the local Academy Sports stores and we bought 

the little hand-held walkie-talkies. At least people in the boats could talk but it still didn’t assist us in getting communications from New Orleans to Baton Rouge and back. ... Is your communications with other agencies good or bad, and we 

would say we can’t communicate with them. Well, it wasn’t that we had a misunderstanding between the agencies, we 

just couldn’t talk to them.”); Brig. Gen. Veillon, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006; Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 

2006, pp. 123-124.

78 Capt. Jones, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005; Lt. Cmdr. Cooper interview, Oct. 18, 2005, pp. 19-20; Committee staff interview of Lt. Cmdr. Mark Vislay, U.S. Coast Guard, HH-60J Instructor Pilot, Training Division, Aviation 

Training Center Mobile, AL, conducted on Oct. 26, 2005, transcript pp. 18-19.

79 Lt. Cmdr. Vislay interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 17.

80 Lt. Cmdr. Cooper interview, Oct. 18, 2005, pp. 50-52.

81 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 124; Lt. Col. LaCaze interview, Nov. 30, 2005, p. 189.

82 Sec. Landreneau interview, Nov. 30, 2005, pp. 189-190.

83 Lt. Col. LaCaze interview, Nov. 30, 2005, p. 49 (“As the water began to rise too it would have been extremely diffi cult 

for us to identify streets and addresses, so once the address on the side of the house or that little mark is under water, 

it’s kind of hard to go to a certain physical address. Th e same thing with street signs. Already some of the guys were not 

familiar with the city of New Orleans and then I guess even an added diffi culty with the street signs being covered by 

water, so it was diffi cult.”).

84 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General, Louisiana Air National Guard,

conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 101-103.

85 Committee staff interview of Capt. Timothy Bayard, Commander, Vice Crimes and Narcotics Section, New Orleans 

Police Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 21, 2005, transcript p. 165.

86 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 95 (“We couldn’t buy a ride on a DoD helicopter.”).

87 According to Sheriff Harris Lee for Jeff erson Parish, it is only by chance that he learned that thousands of people were 

sitting on I-10 in need of food and water. As a result, the people lacked food and water for as long as a full day. Committee staff interview of Harry Lee, Sheriff , Jeff erson Parish, LA, conducted on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript pp. 34-37. 

88 Capt. Bayard, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006. See also: New Orleans Police Department, Initial (30-day) 

Aft er Action Report, Report of Captain Timothy Bayard, Oct. 16, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee (“Th e Offi ce of 

Emergency Preparedness needs to be revamped. If their role is to have us prepared to handle a disaster such as this they 

FAILED. [emphasis in original] Th ey lacked a plan, did not provide the necessary equipment, provided no direction or 

leadership, did not coordinate or attempt to have commanders of fi eld operations coordinate with any state, or federal 

agency etc.”).

89 Capt. Bayard interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 33; Capt. Bayard, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006. 

90 Capt. Bayard interview, Nov. 21, 2005, pp. 83-84.

91 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 56.
Search and Rescue

353

92 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 42-48. 

93 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 60.

94 Maj. Sandy Dares, Enforcement Division, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, Hurricane Katrina Activity 

Report (discussing Wildlife and Fisheries command post at Causeway and I-10 on Aug. 30, 2005); Brig. Gen. Veillon 

interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 30-31.

95 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 54-55; NRP, p. 39.

96 For example, one FEMA search and rescue team member testifi ed that W&F failed to keep a representative at Zephyr 

Field, where FEMA and the Coast Guard had set up “on the fl y” a local unifi ed command for search and rescue on 

Wednesday, August 31, 2005. Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 58; Capt. Fincher interview, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 226 

(“We kind of stumbled into FEMA. It wasn’t planned.”).

97 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 56 (“the fi rst time we got all of the unifi ed commanders ... was 48 hours aft er 

the hurricane made landfall, and that’s not good.”).

98 Committee staff interview of Lt. Valerie Boyd, U.S. Coast Guard, Command Center Watch Offi cer, Eighth District 

Offi ce Headquarters, New Orleans, LA, conducted on Nov. 7, 2005, transcript p. 20.

99 Lt. Boyd interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 15-16.

100 Lt. Boyd interview, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 23.

101 Brig. Gen. Veillon interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 188.

102 Brig. Gen. Veillon interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 153.

103 Parent interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 9. With such a signifi cant need for water search and rescue, it is inexcusable that 

no level of government provided New Orleans’ fi rst responders with more boats. Fincher interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 

120-121 (requesting assistance for search and rescue at 3 p.m., on Monday, August 29, 2005); Capt. Hellmers interview, 

Nov. 7, 2005, p. 121 (“I assume when I tell people that the water is up to the roofs of houses that the people above me are 

going to do everything within their power to send help. I mean, it’s pretty clear there’s [sic] people drowning.”).

104 Capt. Hellmers interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 205-207 (“If you call and say your house is on fi re, you don’t have to do 

any more. Th e fi re department is coming. You don’t have to sign a piece of paper to let them in you door, you know, 

they come.”). 

105 Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, E-Resource Request, Res-113736-911082805, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:39 

p.m. CT. Provided to Committee (including a handwritten remark above the request for rubber raft s that reads “Request 

Denied.”). 

106 Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006.

107 Lt. Col. LaCaze, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006. 

108 Jeff rey Hall, e-mail to Marc Short, Sept. 2, 2005, 10:04 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FRNT0010-0000294. See also: Committee staff interview of Matt Mayer, former Chief of Staff and Senior Policy Advisor, Offi ce of Domestic Preparedness Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 26, 2006, transcript 

pp. 24-25. It appears that FEMA offi cials were unaware of, or forgot about, the pods that DHS held. Currently, DHS is 

reevaluating whether this program should come under FEMA control. Mayer interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 26-27.

109 Mayer interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 26-27; Jeff rey Hall, e-mail to Marc Short, Sept. 2, 2005, 10:04 p.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FRNT-0010-0000294.

110 Capt. Fincher interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 193-196.

111 Mayer interview, Jan. 26, 2006, p. 37.

112 Mayer interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 37, 143 (“[B]ottom line is, hindsight, we would have deployed the PODS much 

sooner than when we did. We didn’t. We made a mistake.”). 

113 Fincher interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 193-196. 

114 Committee staff interview of Laurence Broun, Emergency Coordinator, U.S. Department of the Interior, conducted 

on Mar. 21, 2006, transcript pp. 9-12. Broun stated that although a DOI representative had conversations with some 

FEMA personnel about the law enforcement personnel, but ultimately, FEMA did not follow through on the DOI off er. 

115 Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006; Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 50-51.

116 U.S. Department of the Interior, Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary, Police, Management and Budget, Response to the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, Document and Information Request Dated 

Oct. 7, 2005, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 20.

117 Broun interview, Mar. 21, 2006, pp. 15-19.

118 Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006; Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 50-51.

119 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. l, 2005, pp. 14-15 (“Th e State of Louisiana is a signatory to the Emergency 

Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), as stated in the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and 

Disaster Act of 1993 as amended. If an emergency becomes too widespread or serious for parish and state resources, the 

Director LOHSEP will process a request for assistance through EMAC.”).
Chapter 21

354

120 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 73. See also: Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 152-153. 

121 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 74.

122 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 152-153. On Saturday, Aug. 27, 2005, Gov. Blanco also facilitated the request by 

calling Gov. Schwarzenegger. California offi cially became a signatory to EMAC on September 13, 2005. California, Offi ce 

of the Governor, “Governor Schwarzenegger Signs Emergency Management Assistance Compact Legislation,” press 

release, Sept. 13, 2005. 

123 Brig. Gen. Veillon interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 152; Brig. Gen. Veillon, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006.

124 Testimony of Maj. Gen. Bennett C. Landreneau, Adjutant General, Louisiana, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, Oct. 7, 2005.

125 Lt. Col. LaCaze, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006 (“requests were bogged down in the process, in the pipe, so 

to speak”); Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006 (recalling “delays of people not wanting to respon[d] because 

they didn’t have the right signature to assure they were covered under the EMAC compact”).

126 Sec. Landreneau interview, Nov. 30, 2005, pp. 116-117 (“South Carolina couldn’t leave the state until they could call 

a FEMA number. And we talked about this as a way to improve this, if FEMA or whoever is in charge of this would give 

us a list of approved department agencies. ... It would have been great because South Carolina took us basically a day 

from the time they got word that they ... were packed up and ready to come, they were stationed up in a convoy ready to 

go but they couldn’t move. And I don’t blame them, they couldn’t leave because the proper paperwork wasn’t done.”). 

127 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 8.

128 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 152.

129 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 117-118.

130 Sec. Landreneau interview, Nov. 30, 2005, pp. 169-174.

131 Capt. Fincher interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 153-154; Sec. Landreneau interview, Nov. 30, 2005, pp. 189-190.

132 Sec. Landreneau interview, Nov. 30, 2005, p. 70; Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 169-170.

133 Lt. Col. LaCaze interview, Nov. 30, 2005, pp. 48-49, 66-69.

134 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 66 (recalling that “Th ursday ... is when it seemed like the whole thing, New 

Orleans, was imploding”); Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 91-93 (stating that “on the 1st, ... there were all these 

reports ... that there was shooting, ... that they were rioting in the streets and all this.”).

135 FEMA-NRCC, e-mail to Clair Blong and others, “HSOC SPOT REP #53,” Sept. 1, 2005, 8:31 p.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0051-0000193 (“Status of US&R Task Force in LA. ... All assets have ceased 

operations until National Guard can assist TF’s with security.”); Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2005, pp. 66, 91; Lokey 

interview, Jan. 20, 2005, pp. 148-149.

136 Committee staff interview of Capt. Patrick Lampard, Fift h District, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, conducted 

on Jan. 11, 2006, transcript pp. 76-78.

137 Capt. Hellmers interview, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 170 (stating that some NOFD offi cers “said no, we’re not stopping” and 

turned their radios off ).

138 Capt. Hellmers interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 162-163 (“And our area wasn’t really that dangerous....for one thing, we 

were armed, but there was the potential of criminals getting into our area, but I didn’t see it as a big problem. We go into 

burning buildings for a living, and I’m not really that worried about running into a criminal. Not that I don’t value my 

own life, I do, ... I’m not particularly afraid of some possible danger.”).

139 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 91-92.

140 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 94-95.

141 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 209-211.

142 On September 10, 2005, the Department of Justice ruled: “Federal agents may pursue house-to-house forced entry 

rescue attempts where deemed appropriate.” Th e ruling was interpreted as allowing federal agents to force entry into a 

house to rescue someone trapped or injured in a building, but not to take part in a forced evacuation. Linda Bizzarro, 

e-mail to James A. McAtamney and others, “Legal Opinion on entry into homes,” Sept. 13, 2005, 3:26 p.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000107.

143 Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), Mississippi Emergency Operations Plan, Volume II: Mississippi Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP), May 14, 1999, section ESF-9, p. 9-1 [hereinaft er Mississippi 

CEMP, May 14, 1999].

144 Committee staff interview of Jim Brinson, Response Coordinator, Offi ce of Homeland Security, Mississippi Department of Public Safety, conducted on Dec. 14, 2005, transcript p. 12. 

145 Mississippi CEMP May, 14, 1999, section ESF-9, pp. 2-3.

146 Mississippi CEMP, May, 14, 1999, section ESF-9, pp. 9-5, 9-8 through 9-9. 
Search and Rescue

355

147 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #11, Hurricane Katrina. Aug. 29, 2005, 9 a.m., p. 8. Provided to Committee; 

fi led at Bates no. MEMA-0010905.

148 FEMA, Urban Search and Rescue National Response System, Incident Support Team (White) Transition Team, 

Executive Summary, Sept. 11, 2005. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er USAR, Executive Summary].

149 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 18. Aft er the storm, additional FEMA teams were staged in Texas and sent to 

Mississippi. USAR, Executive Summary. 

150 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 24-26.

151 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 23-24.

152 For example, Paul Bennett of the Gulfport Police Department recounted what search-and-rescue responders encountered in Harrison County immediately aft er the storm: 

And in some of the areas that we could not get to – and I very distinctly remember one of the fi rst units 

that had gone out, he had gotten as close as he could to a particular neighborhood and he couldn’t get 

in because you couldn’t fi nd the road. And residents were actually swimming out to the vehicle trying to 

get – because they saw the vehicle. Th ey saw the fl ashing blue lights. But they were swimming out to the 

vehicle trying to get to it. And that’s when it really started – we started getting our feedback from the 

fi eld, Hey, this is very, very bad.

Committee staff interview of Paul Bennett, Deputy Chief of Police, Gulfport Police Department, MS, conducted on Dec. 

7, 2005, pp. 33-34. 

153 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 63-64.

154 Committee staff interview of Pat Sullivan, Fire Chief, Gulfport Fire Department, MS, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 

127-144.

155 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 16-17.

156 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 39-69.

157 See e.g., Committee staff interview of Michael Beeman, Director, National Preparedness Division, Region II, FEMA, 

conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript p. 161-162. 

158 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 40.

159 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 50.

160 USAR, Executive Summary. Th e FEMA teams deployed were a mix of larger, approximately 80 person “Type I” 

teams and smaller “Type III” teams consisting of 20-30 people. 

161 Written statement of Gov. Haley Barbour, Mississippi, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of Governors in Managing Catastrophe, Feb. 2, 2006, p. 3. 

162 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Lee Smithson, Director of Military Support, Mississippi Army National Guard, 

conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript pp. 30-31.

163 Lt. Col. Smithson interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 28, 42. 

164 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 36. A FEMA report on search and rescue in Mississippi indicates that fi eld 

operations for FEMA teams ended a couple of days later, on September 10, 2005. USAR, Executive Summary. 

165 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 62. Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour, among others, has noted the eff orts of 

Coast Guard personnel in particular in conducting rescue eff orts. Written statement of Gov. Barbour, Senate Committee 

hearing, Feb. 2, 2006, p. 3. 

166 Sullivan interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 104-105. 

167 National Guard Bureau, National Guard Aft er Action Review: Hurricane Response, “National Guard Timeline,” Dec. 

21, 2005, pp. 10-12. Provided to Committee.

168 National Guard Bureau, “Current Intelligence,” briefi ng slide, Aug. 29, 2005, 2 a.m. Provided to Committee.

169 Written Statement of Maj. Gen. Bennett C. Landreneau, Adjutant General, Louisiana, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane: Katrina: Th e Defense Department’s Role in 

the Response, Feb. 9, 2006, p. 4.

170 National Guard Bureau, National Guard Aft er Action Review: Hurricane Response, “Army National Guard.” Dec. 21, 

2005, p. 72. 

171 Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, “Katrina Helicopter Flow into JOA.” Provided to 

Committee. 

172 Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, “Katrina Helicopter Flow into JOA.” Provided to 

Committee.

173 Committee staff interview of Capt. Rick Snyder, U.S. Navy, Executive Offi cer, USS Bataan, conducted on Nov. 14, 

2005 (untranscribed). Th e “Lessons Learned” inputs from USS Bataan state that although the three MH-60 aircraft were 

employed in SAR missions, the two heavy-lift MH-53 helicopters could not be used for Search and Rescue “due to their 

inability to provide direct support of hoisting survivors from rooft ops or out of the water.” USS Bataan, Combined 
Chapter 21

356

Bataan Lessons Learned Form, “Airborne Communications.” Provided to Committee.

174 Committee staff interview of Capt. Bruce Jones, U.S. Coast Guard, Commanding Offi cer, Air Station New Orleans, 

LA conducted on Nov. 9, 2005 (untranscribed). 

175 Committee staff interview of Col. Daniel Shanahan, U.S. Army, Commander, 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry 

Division, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006 (untranscribed).

176 Insung Lee, e-mail to HSOC.SWO and others, “HSOC #4317-05 HC Katrina – DoD Update 311145 Aug 05m,” Aug. 

31, 2005, 11:50 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. WHK-12712.

177 JTF-Katrina, Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee.

178 Committee staff interview of Cmdr. Th omas Quinn, U.S. Navy, Director of Operations, Commander Naval Air 

Forces, Atlantic, conducted Nov. 15, 2005 (untranscribed). 

179 U.S. Northern Command, “USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline,” draft , p. 16; JTF-Katrina, Commander’s 

Assessment, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee.

180 Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, “Hurricane Katrina Mission Assignments 

(MA’s) Recap,” Dec. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee.

181 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 3212EM-LA-DOD-01, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee.

182 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1604DR-MS-DOD-01, Aug. 30, 2005, 12:16 a.m.; FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1604-

DR-MS-DOD-02, Aug. 30, 2005, 12:43 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 0000803.

183 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1604DR-MS-DOD-07, Aug. 30, 2005, 10:03 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS 0000848.

184 Col. Shanahan interview, Feb. 3, 2006.

185 Vice Adm. Crea interview, Jan. 3, 2006, p. 52.

186 USS Bataan, Combined Bataan Lessons Learned Form, “Aircraft Support Eff ectiveness.” Provided to Committee 

(“BATAAN’s MH-60Ss were tasked with providing direct support for the transportation of Task Force Offi cials underutilizing the capability of a SAR capable aircraft complete with rescue swimmers. ... Th e New Orleans area contained 

many land based helicopter assets with no hoist capability that could have carried out this tasking thus freeing up 

BATAAN’s hoist capable H-60s to provide rescue assistance when the need was at its greatest.”). National Guard Bureau, 

National Guard Aft er Action Review: Hurricane Response, pp. 67-68 (elaborates on the importance of the availability and 

readiness of hoist-equipped aircraft .).

187 USS Bataan, Combined Bataan Lessons Learned Form, “Coordination of Rescue Aircraft .” Provided to Committee. 

188 National Search and Rescue Committee, United States National Search and Rescue Plan, 1999, Nov. 2, 2000. http://

www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opr/nsarc/nsp.htm. Accessed on Feb. 27, 2006 [hereinaft er United States National Search and 

Rescue Plan, 1999].

189 United States National Search and Rescue Plan, 1999.

190 United States National Search and Rescue Plan, 1999 (emphasis added).

191 NRP, Urban Search and Rescue Annex, p. ESF #9–1.

192 Vice Adm. Crea interview, Jan. 3, 2006, pp. 75-76. “Th eoretically, you’d want to have diff erent sectors or search areas, but the magnitude of the people popping up, my guys would say they would fl y in – they’d see one person on a roof, 

they’d fl y in to get them, and the noise of the helicopter, all of a sudden other people would start poking their heads out, 

you know? So instead of having one person, now they had 50 people, or they’d, you know, break a hole through the roof, 

get that one guy out, and he’d say, ‘I’ve got ten more people inside the house,’ which, you know, would clearly exceed the 

capability of that – you know, particularly if it was one of our smaller helicopters. So then you’d have to draw in more.” 

Vice Adm. Crea interview, Jan. 3, 2006, p. 57.

193 Committee staff interview of Rear Adm. Joseph Kilkenny, U.S. Navy, former Joint Force Maritime Component 

Commander, Joint Task Force Katrina, conducted on Nov. 30, 2005 (untranscribed). 

194 U.S. Second Fleet, Fleet-14, Katrina Lessons Learned, “JTF Katrina Search and Rescue,” p. 27. Provided to Committee.

195 U.S. Second Fleet, Fleet-05, Katrina Lessons Learned, “JTF Katrina Air Command and Control,” p. 13. Provided to 

Committee. (“Inadequate Command and control allowed some search areas to be missed while others were searched 

multiple times.”).

196 Col. Shanahan interview, Feb. 23, 2006.

197 National Guard Bureau, National Guard Aft er Action Review: Hurricane Response, “Army National Guard,” Dec. 21, 

2005, p. 90 (“All FAA and Military air traffi c control and air command and control systems were rendered inoperable as 

Katrina passed. ... Th ere was no known preplanning for the Command and Control of ... diversifi ed participants each 

having diff erent radios, frequencies and some with little or no ... rescue training.”). 

198 National Guard Bureau, National Guard Aft er Action Review: Hurricane Response, “Army National Guard,” Dec. 21, 

2005, p. 73 (“Th ere was no overall control, fl ight following, or separation of the many agency aircraft engaged around 

New Orleans, LA and Gulfport, MS creating potentially unsafe condition. A plan is required to facilitate the employment 

of military ATC assets in such cases.”).
Search and Rescue

357

199 Committee staff interview of Rear Adm. Dan Lloyd, U.S. Coast Guard, former Chief, Interagency Coordination 

Group, U.S. Northern Command, conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, transcript pp. 116-117.

200 U.S. Second Fleet, Fleet-05, Katrina Lessons Learned, “JTF Katrina Air Command and Control,” p. 13. Provided to 

Committee.

201 Vice Adm. Crea interview, Jan. 3, 2006, pp. 43-44.

202 Joint Task Force Katrina, Message to USS Bataan, “JTF Katrina FRAGO-2 to Hurricane Katrina EXORD,” Aug. 31, 

2005, 1634Z. Provided to Committee.

203 Col. Shanahan interview, Feb. 23, 2006.

204 Capt. Robert Reininger, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, “Re: Bataan,” Sept. 1, 2005, 10:54 a.m. Provided to Committee.

205 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Harold Moulton, Director, Standing Joint Headquarters-North, U.S. Northern Command, conducted on Dec. 5, 2005, transcript pp. 25-26, 55-56.

206 Brig. Gen. Moulton, Dec. 5, 2005, p. 58.

207 USS Bataan, Combined Bataan Lessons Learned Form, “Airborne Communications.” Provided to Committee. 

208 Vice Adm. Crea, Jan. 3, 2006, pp. 54-55.

209 Brig. Gen. Moulton, Dec. 5, 2005, p. 56.