United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

TERRORIST WATCH 

LIST SCREENING 

Efforts to Help 

Reduce Adverse 

Effects on the Public 

September 2006 

 

GAO-06-1031 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2006

TERRORIST WATCH LIST SCREENING

Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects 

Highlights of GAO-06-1031, a report to on the Public 

congressional requesters 

A consolidated watch list managed 

by the FBI’s Terrorist Screening 

Center (TSC) contains the names 

of known or suspected terrorists, 

both international and domestic. 

Various agencies whose missions 

require screening for links to 

terrorism use watch list records.

For example, U.S. Customs and

Border Protection (CBP) screens 

travelers at ports of entry. Because

screening is based on names, it can 

result in misidentifications when

persons not on the list have a name 

that resembles one on the list. Also,

some names may be mistakenly

included on the watch list. In either

case, individuals can be negatively

affected and may express concerns

or seek agency action, or redress,

to prevent future occurrences. This 

report addresses: (1) the extent to

which the numbers of misidentified 

persons are known and how they 

could be affected, (2) the major 

reasons misidentifications occur

and the actions agencies are taking

to reduce them or minimize their 

effects, and (3) the opportunities

for redress available to individuals 

with watch list-related concerns. In 

conducting work at TSC and the 

principal federal agencies that use 

watch list data, GAO reviewed

standard operating procedures and 

other relevant documentation and 

interviewed responsible officials. 

GAO makes no recommendations 

at this time because the agencies 

have ongoing initiatives to improve 

data quality, reduce the number of

misidentifications or mitigate their 

effects, and enhance redress 

efforts. 

Annually, millions of individuals—from international travelers to visa 

applicants—are screened for terrorism links against the watch list. At times, 

a person is misidentified because of name similarities, although the exact 

number is unknown. In some cases, agencies can verify the person is not a 

match by comparing birth dates or other data with watch list records, but 

agencies do not track the number. In other cases, they ask TSC for help. 

From December 2003 (when TSC began operations) to January 2006, 

agencies sent tens of thousands of names to TSC, and about half were 

misidentifications, according to TSC. While the total number of people 

misidentified may be substantial, it likely represents a fraction of all people 

screened. Even so, misidentifications can lead to delays, intensive 

questioning and searches, missed flights, or denied entry at the border. 

Misidentifications most commonly occur with names that are identical or 

similar to names on the watch list. To rapidly screen names against the 

watch list, agencies use computerized programs that account for differences 

due to misspellings and other variations. TSC has ongoing initiatives to 

improve computerized matching programs and the quality of watch list 

records. Also, CBP and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

have established procedures designed to expedite frequently misidentified 

persons through screening, after confirming they are not on the watch list. 

Because security measures regrettably may cause personal inconveniences,

TSA and CBP, with the support of TSC, provide opportunities for people 

who have been misidentified or mistakenly included on the watch list to 

seek redress. Most of these are misidentified persons who are not on the 

watch list but have a similar name and, therefore, may be repeatedly 

misidentified. Thus, TSA, for example, provides redress that relies heavily on 

efforts to expedite frequently misidentified persons through screening by 

allowing them to submit personal information that helps airlines more 

quickly determine that they are not on the watch list. If TSA and CBP cannot 

resolve questions from the public, they ask TSC for help. For 2005, TSC 

reported that it processed to completion 112 redress referrals and removed 

the names of 31 mistakenly listed persons from the watch list. To ensure that

opportunities for redress are formally documented across agencies and that 

responsibilities are clear, the Justice Department is leading an effort to 

develop an interagency memorandum of understanding and expects a final 

draft to be ready for approval by fall 2006. TSC and frontline-screeningagency officials recognize that, after the agreement is finalized, the public 

needs to clearly understand how to express concerns and seek relief if 

negatively affected by screening. So, these officials have committed to 

making updated information on redress publicly available. 

GAO provided a draft copy of this report to the departments of Justice, 

Homeland Security, and State. They provided technical clarifications that 

GAO incorporated where appropriate. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1031.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Eileen Larence 

at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4 

Background 6

Although Likely a Small Percentage of All People Screened, the 

Thousands of Persons Misidentified to the Terrorist Watch List 

Can Experience Additional Questioning, Delays, and Other 

Effects 12

Most Misidentifications Occur Because of Similarities to Names on 

the Terrorist Watch List; Agencies Are Attempting to Reduce the 

Incidence of Misidentifications or Otherwise Facilitate 

Individuals through the Screening Process 19 

The Terrorist Screening Center and Frontline-Screening Agencies 

Are Addressing Concerns Related to Watch List Screening, and 

an Interagency Agreement Is Being Developed to Further Ensure 

an Effective Means for Seeking Redress 27 

Concluding Observations 42 

Agency Comments 44 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 47 

Objectives 47

Scope and Methodology 47 

Data Reliability 54 

Appendix II Terrorist Screening Center Terrorist-Watch-List 

Redress Process 55 

Appendix III Transportation Security Administration Traveler 

Identity Verification Program 61 

Exhibit A: “Our Traveler Identity Verification Program” 61 

Exhibit B: Traveler Identity Verification (TSA Form 2301, May 

2006) 64

Appendix IV U.S. Customs and Border Protection Online 

Information 66 

Background and Preliminary Observation 66 

Interagency Border Inspection System Fact Sheet 66 

Page i GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix V Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 68 

Appendix VI Comments from the State Department 71 

Tables 

Table 1: Number and Disposition of Redress Queries Referred to 

the Terrorist Screening Center, Calendar Year 2005 32 

Table 2: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Ports of Entry Visited 

by GAO 48 

Figures 

Figure 1: General Overview of the Name-Matching Process Used to 

Screen Individuals against the Terrorist Watch List 11 

Figure 2: General Overview of the Terrorist Screening Center’s

Process for Handling Concerns Involving Watch-ListRelated Screening 30 

Page ii GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Abbreviations 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

IAFIS Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System 

IDENT Automated Biometrics Identification System 

IBIS Interagency Border Inspection System

RFID radio frequency identification 

SENTRI Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

TSC Terrorist Screening Center 

US-VISIT U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 

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Page iii GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 29, 2006 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. 

Chairman 

Committee on the Judiciary 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

To identify individuals with known or potential links to terrorism, since 

the tragedies of September 11, 2001, agencies such as the departments of 

State, Justice, and Homeland Security have implemented enhanced 

procedures to screen international travelers, airline passengers, and visa 

applicants. One important homeland security tool used by these federal 

frontline-screening agencies is the terrorist-screening database, otherwise 

known as the consolidated watch list, containing the names of individuals

with known and suspected links to terrorism. The database, which 

contains names of foreign and U.S. citizens, is maintained by the Terrorist 

Screening Center, an entity that has been operational since December 2003

under the administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 

Based upon agency-specific policies and criteria, relevant portions of the 

Terrorist Screening Center’s consolidated watch list can be used in a wide 

range of security-related screening procedures. For instance, the 

Transportation Security Administration’s No Fly and Selectee lists—used 

by airlines to screen passengers prior to boarding—are portions of the 

Terrorist Screening Center’s consolidated watch list.1

 Also, to help ensure 

that known or suspected terrorists do not enter the United States, 

applicable portions of the watch list are to be checked by Department of 

State consular officers before issuing U.S. visas and by U.S. Customs and 

 1

According to the Transportation Security Administration, persons on the No Fly list should 

be precluded from boarding an aircraft bound for, or departing from, the United States. In 

contrast, being on the Selectee list does not mean that the individual will be precluded 

from boarding a plane or entering the United States. Instead, any person on the Selectee list 

is to receive additional screening, which may involve a physical inspection of the person 

and a hand-search of luggage. 

Page 1 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Border Protection officers before admitting persons at air, land, and sea 

ports of entry. 

Because terrorist watch list screening involves comparisons based on 

personal-identifying information such as names and dates of birth, there is

potential to generate misidentifications—given that two or more persons, 

for example, may have the same or similar names.2

 As such, the screening 

inevitably can raise concerns from individuals who assert that they are

being misidentified because of a name similarity to some other person 

whose name is on the watch list. Misidentifications can result in travel 

delays and other inconveniences for the respective individuals. Specific 

instances have been widely reported in newspapers and other media, 

including cases involving members of Congress and other high-profile 

individuals. Misidentifications highlight the importance of having a 

process—often referred to as redress—for affected persons to express 

their concerns, seek correction of any inaccurate data, and request other 

actions to reduce or eliminate future inconveniences.3

 Similarly, such a 

process would apply to other persons affected by the maintenance of 

watch list data, including persons whose names are actually on the watch 

list but should not be (“mistakenly listed persons”) as well as persons who 

are properly listed.4

 Accordingly, in reference to terrorist watch list 

screening, this report addresses the following questions: 

• To what extent are the numbers of terrorist watch list misidentifications 

known, and generally, how could misidentified persons be affected? 

• What are the major reasons that misidentifications occur, and what 

actions are the Terrorist Screening Center and frontline-screening 

 2

The term “misidentification” refers to a person initially matched by a screening agency to a

name on the watch list, but upon closer examination, the person is found to not match any

watch list record. 

3

As used in this report, the term “redress” generally refers to an agency’s complaintresolution process, whereby individuals may seek resolution of their concerns about an

agency action. In the report, we describe elements of the opportunities for redress offered

by several agencies, and we generally analyze their respective policies and procedures. 

However, we do not address the relation between agency redress and other possible 

remedies, such as judicial review. 

4

For purposes of this report, the term “mistakenly listed persons” includes two categories

of individuals—(1) persons who never should have been included on the watch list but 

were due to some type of error and (2) persons who were appropriately included on the

watch list at one time but no longer warrant inclusion on the terrorist watch list due to

subsequent events. 

Page 2 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
agencies taking to reduce the number of misidentified persons or expedite

them through the screening process? 

• To address concerns from misidentified and mistakenly listed persons, 

what opportunities for redress have the Terrorist Screening Center and 

frontline-screening agencies established? 

In answering these questions, we reviewed the Terrorist Screening 

Center’s standard operating procedures, statistics on watch-list-related 

screening encounters that resulted in referrals to the center, and other 

relevant documentation; and we interviewed Terrorist Screening Center 

officials, including the director, principal deputy director, chief 

information officer, and privacy officer. Similarly, we interviewed officials 

at and reviewed documentation obtained from the principal frontlinescreening agencies—Transportation Security Administration, U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection, and the Department of State—whose 

missions most frequently and directly involve interactions with travelers.5

Regarding the screening of air passengers, in addition to contacting the 

Transportation Security Administration to broadly discuss the procedures 

of air carriers, we interviewed security officials at five major, domestic air 

carriers. Also, we visited various land and air ports of entry in four 

states—California, Michigan, New York, and Texas. Collectively, these 

states have ports of entry on both the northern and southern borders of 

the United States. Regarding statistical data we obtained from the 

Terrorist Screening Center—such as the number of misidentifications and 

the results of the redress process, particularly the number of mistakenly 

listed persons whose names have been removed from the watch list—we 

discussed the sources of the data with center officials, including the chief 

information officer, and we reviewed documentation regarding the 

compilation of the statistics. We determined that the statistics were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of presenting overall patterns and 

trends. We performed our work from April 2005 through August 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Appendix I presents more details about our objectives, scope, and 

methodology. 

 5

Although the terrorist watch list is used for a variety of screening purposes, such as

conducting background checks of workers who have access to secure areas of the national

transportation system, our work generally focused on the screening of travelers. At the

Transportation Security Administration, we examined the screening of air passengers prior 

to their boarding a flight; at U.S. Customs and Border Protection, we examined the

screening of travelers entering the United States through ports of entry; and at the

Department of State, we examined the screening of nonimmigrant visa applicants. 

Page 3 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Results in Brief Although the total number of misidentifications that have occurred as a 

result of watch-list-related screening conducted by all frontline-screening 

agencies and airlines is unknown, Terrorist Screening Center data indicate 

that about half of the tens of thousands of potential matches sent to the 

center between December 2003 and January 2006 for further research 

turned out to be misidentifications.6

 The frontline-screening agencies and,

in the case of air travel, airlines are able use other identifying information 

to resolve some possible matches without Terrorist Screening Center 

involvement, but when the agencies are unable to do so, they are to refer 

the information to the center for clarification and resolution. Frontlinescreening agencies and airlines generally do not have readily available 

statistics quantifying the number of potential matches they have been able

to resolve without consulting the Terrorist Screening Center. Although the 

total number of misidentified persons may be substantial in absolute 

terms, it likely represents a small fraction of the hundreds of millions of 

individuals screened each year. For example, in fiscal year 2005, U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection alone reported that its officers managed

about 431 million border crossings into the United States at land, air, and 

sea ports of entry. Nonetheless, misidentifications resulting from terrorist 

watch list screening can affect the respective individuals by, for example, 

delaying their travel, subjecting them to more intensive questioning and 

searches, and denying them conveniences such as self-serve check-in at

airports. Also, in some cases, travelers have missed flights. 

Misidentifications most commonly occur because the names of some 

persons being screened are similar to those on the terrorist watch list. The 

federal screening agencies we studied and most airlines use computerdriven algorithms to rapidly compare the names of individuals against the

terrorist watch list.7

 Generally, these name-recognition technologies may 

be designed to balance minimizing the possibility of false negatives—that 

is, failing to identify an individual whose name is on the terrorist watch 

list—while not generating an unacceptable number of false positives 

(misidentifications). Thus, the computerized algorithms may be configured 

to return a broad set of possible matches based on the name input in order 

 6

According to the FBI, the specific number of potential matches sent to the Terrorist

Screening Center that turned out to be misidentifications is sensitive information; however,

the total is substantially less than 100,000. 

7

An algorithm is a prescribed set of well-defined, unambiguous rules or processes for the 

solution of a problem in a finite number of steps. Pursuant to Transportation Security 

Administration security directives and implementing guidance, airlines are to prescreen 

passengers by matching their names against the No Fly and Selectee lists. 

Page 4 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
to account, for example, for differences in names due to misspellings or 

transcription errors. The Terrorist Screening Center has formed an 

interagency working group to improve the effectiveness of identity 

matching across agencies, and the group’s efforts were ongoing the time of 

our review. The center also has ongoing quality-assurance initiatives to 

identify and correct incomplete or inaccurate records that contribute to 

misidentifications. Further, agencies are taking actions to expedite 

frequently misidentified persons through the screening process. For 

example, in February 2006, U.S. Customs and Border Protection began

annotating its database to help ensure that travelers who have been 

inadvertently stopped in the past—because they have the same or similar 

name as a watch list record—are no longer subjected to intensive 

screening, unless warranted by new data. As a future enhancement, the 

Terrorist Screening Center is planning to have links to other agencies’ 

biometric data, such as fingerprints. According to center officials, the 

capability to link biometric data to supplement name-based screening may 

be more relevant for confirming the identities of known terrorists than 

minimizing misidentifications or false positives. 

The Terrorist Screening Center, the Transportation Security 

Administration, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have processes 

in place to help resolve concerns or complaints submitted by persons 

adversely affected by terrorist watch list screening.

8

 The processes are 

interdependent in that the frontline-screening agencies are to receive all 

redress queries, resolve those that, based on other identifying information, 

clearly involve misidentified persons, and refer the other queries to the 

Terrorist Screening Center—particularly queries submitted by persons 

whose names are actually contained on the watch list. For calendar year 

2005, the center reported that it processed to completion 112 redress 

referrals and removed the names of 31mistakenly listed individuals from 

the watch list. In contrast, the frontline-screening agencies processed 

thousands of redress queries. Most redress queries are submitted by 

misidentified persons, and their names cannot be removed from the watch 

list because they are not the persons on the list. Instead, some frontlinescreening agencies have undertaken initiatives to expedite the future 

 8

Any such concern or complaint raised formally by an affected individual is what the

Terrorist Screening Center calls a redress query. Specifically, the Terrorist Screening 

Center defines a “redress query” as communication from individuals or their 

representatives inquiring or complaining about an adverse experience during a terrorist 

watch-list-related-screening process conducted or sponsored by a federal agency, including

congressional inquiries to federal agencies on behalf of their constituents. 

Page 5 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
processing of persons who are frequently misidentified. For example, 

under the Transportation Security Administration’s process, affected 

individuals can voluntarily provide additional personal-identifying 

information as a basis for the agency to determine whether their names 

can be put on a cleared list. Airlines are to use the cleared list to more 

quickly distinguish these individuals from persons who are on the No Fly 

and the Selectee lists. This procedure is intended to reduce delays in 

obtaining airline-boarding passes. The Terrorist Screening Center, from its 

unique position as administrator of the consolidated terrorist watch list, 

has noted significant differences among agencies in providing watch-listrelated redress. For instance, whereas the Transportation Security 

Administration has designated an official accountable specifically for 

redress, U.S. Customs and Border Protection does not and also has not 

followed consistent procedures in referring appropriate redress queries to 

the Terrorist Screening Center. Thus, at the Terrorist Screening Center’s 

request, the Department of Justice is leading an effort to develop an 

interagency memorandum of understanding to ensure that opportunities 

for redress are formally documented and that agency responsibilities are 

clear, with designated officials specifically accountable for supporting the 

continued success of watch-list-related redress. This effort, according to 

the Terrorist Screening Center, has been ongoing since fall 2005, and a 

final draft of the memorandum of understanding is expected to be ready 

for interagency clearances by fall 2006. The Department of Justice and the 

Terrorist Screening Center have acknowledged that, upon finalization of 

an interagency agreement that documents the redress opportunities and 

designates agencies’ responsibilities, it is important that appropriately 

updated information on redress and points of contact be made available to 

the public, including updates of Web-based guidance. 

We are not making recommendations at this time because the agencies 

have ongoing efforts to improve data quality and otherwise either reduce 

the number of misidentifications or mitigate their effects and to provide 

more effective redress. 

In April 2003, we reported that watch lists were maintained by numerous 

federal agencies and that the agencies did not have a consistent and 

uniform approach to sharing information on individuals with possible links 

to terrorism.9

 Our report recommended that the Department of Homeland 

Background 

 9

GAO, Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote

Better Integration and Sharing, GAO-03-322 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2003). 

Page 6 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Security’s Secretary, in collaboration with the heads of the departments 

and agencies that have and use watch lists, lead an effort to consolidate 

and standardize the federal government’s watch list structures and 

policies. Subsequently, pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive 6, dated September 16, 2003, the Terrorist Screening Center was 

established to consolidate the government’s approach to terrorism 

screening and provide for the appropriate and lawful use of terrorist 

information in screening processes. The center began “24/7” operations on 

December 1, 2003, and, about 3 months later, on March 12, 2004, 

announced that watch list consolidation was completed with 

establishment of the terrorist-screening database. This consolidated 

database is the U.S. government’s master repository for all known and 

suspected international and domestic terrorist records used for watch-listrelated screening. Records for inclusion in the consolidated database are 

submitted to the Terrorist Screening Center from the following two 

sources: 

• Identifying information on individuals with possible international 

terrorism ties is provided through the National Counterterrorism Center, 

which is managed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

• Identifying information on individuals with ties to purely domestic 

terrorism, such as Ted Kaczynski (the “Unabomber”), is provided by the 

FBI. 

In their terrorist-screening processes, the three federal frontline-screening 

agencies that we reviewed use records exported by the Terrorist 

Screening Center. That is, the applicable exported records are 

incorporated, respectively, into the Transportation Security 

Administration’s No Fly and Selectee lists, U.S. Customs and Border 

Inspection’s Interagency Border Inspection System, and the State 

Department’s Consular Lookout and Support System. The following listing 

discusses the frontline-screening agencies’ use of watch list records more 

specifically:

• Transportation Security Administration’s No Fly and Selectee 

Lists: As needed, the Transportation Security Administration provides 

updated No Fly and Selectee lists to airlines for use in prescreening 

passengers. Through the issuance of security directives, the agency

requires that airlines use these lists to screen passengers prior to boarding. 

The agency’s Office of Intelligence (formerly called the Transportation 

Page 7 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Security Intelligence Service) provides assistance to airlines in 

determining whether passengers are a match with persons on the lists.10

• U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Interagency Border 

Inspection System: U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers use the 

Interagency Border Inspection System to screen travelers entering the 

United States at ports of entry, which include land border crossings along 

the Canadian and Mexican borders, sea ports, and U.S. airports for 

international flight arrivals. This system includes not only the applicable

records exported by the Terrorist Screening Center, but also additional 

information on people with prior criminal histories, immigration 

violations, or other activities of concern that U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection wants to identify and screen at ports of entry. 

• State Department’s Consular Lookout and Support System: This 

system is the primary sensitive but unclassified database used by consular 

officers abroad to screen the names of visa applicants to identify terrorists 

and other aliens who are potentially ineligible for visas based on criminal 

histories or other reasons specified by federal statute. According to the 

State Department, all visa-issuing posts have direct access to the system 

and must use it to check each applicant’s name before issuing a visa.

Also, the Terrorist Screening Center makes applicable records in the 

consolidated database available to support the terrorist-screening 

activities of other federal agencies—such as U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, which is the largest investigative component of the 

Department of Homeland Security—as well as state and local law 

enforcement agencies. For example, the FBI’s National Crime Information 

Center has a file—the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File—

which is accessible by federal, state, and local law enforcement officers 

for screening in conjunction with arrests, detentions, or other criminal 

 10The Transportation Security Administration is developing a new passenger prescreening

program, known as Secure Flight. Under the Secure Flight program, the agency plans to

take over, from commercial airlines, the responsibility to compare identifying information 

on airline passengers against information on known or suspected terrorists. The agency 

expects that Secure Flight will improve passenger prescreening as compared with the

current airline-operated process. In June 2006, we reported that the Transportation

Security Administration still faces significant challenges in developing and implementing 

the Secure Flight program. See, GAO, Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain

for the Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-864T 

(Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006). 

Page 8 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
justice purposes.11 A subset of this file consists of the Terrorist Screening 

Center’s records to be used to screen for possible terrorist links. 

Figure 1 presents a general overview of the name-matching process 

typically used by frontline-screening agencies and airlines to screen 

individuals against applicable records exported by the Terrorist Screening 

Center, which has an important role in verifying identities. When the 

computerized name-matching system of a frontline-screening agency or, in 

the case of air travel, an airline generates a “hit” (a potential name match) 

against a terrorist database record, the agency or airline is to review each

potential name-match. Any obvious mismatches (misidentifications) are to 

be resolved by the frontline agency or airline. 

Conversely, clearly positive or exact matches generally are to be referred 

to the applicable screening agency’s intelligence center and to the 

Terrorist Screening Center to provide law enforcement an opportunity for 

a counterterrorism response.12 Similarly, hits involving inconclusive 

matches—that is, uncertain and other hard-to-verify potential matches—

typically are to be referred to the applicable screening agency’s 

intelligence center. In turn, if the intelligence center cannot conclusively 

determine whether a hit is an exact match, the Terrorist Screening Center 

is to be contacted.13 Referring inconclusive matches to the Terrorist 

Screening Center for resolution or confirmation is important because the 

possible consequences of not identifying a known or suspected terrorist 

could be worse than the inconveniences associated with 

 11Also, the FBI and designated state and local criminal justice agencies access the Violent 

Gang and Terrorist Organization File in conducting background checks on individuals

seeking to purchase firearms or obtain permits to possess, acquire, or carry firearms. See

GAO, Gun Control and Terrorism: FBI Could Better Manage Firearm-Related

Background Checks Involving Terrorist Watch List Records, GAO-05-127 (Washington, 

D.C.: Jan. 19, 2005). 

12Airlines are to contact the Transportation Security Administration, which may then

contact the Terrorist Screening Center, as necessary. 

13In commenting on a draft of this report, the State Department noted that the general 

overview presented in figure 1 is not fully reflective of the process for screening 

nonimmigrant visa applicants against the terrorist watch list. Specifically, the department 

emphasized that for any hit that clearly is not a mismatch, consular officers are required to 

obtain a security advisory opinion. That is, the consular post must ask Department of State

headquarters to initiate a process of requesting that the Terrorist Screening Center and 

other relevant agencies check their respective databases or systems for the existence of

any investigative or intelligence information regarding the individual and pass the results 

back to the department for use in recommending a course of action to the post. 

Page 9 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
misidentifications. In conducting its research, the Terrorist Screening 

Center has access to classified data systems that may contain additional 

information not available to the referring agency. Once the Terrorist 

Screening Center has confirmed the individual as either a positive match 

or a misidentification, the frontline-screening agency is to be informed. 

Page 10 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Figure 1: General Overview of the Name-Matching Process Used to Screen Individuals against the Terrorist Watch List 

Source: GAO. 

Individual applies for a U.S. visa, makes 

an airline reservation, arrives at a 

U.S. port of entry (land/sea/air), or is 

stopped by state or local police in the 

interior of the United States 

Frontline screening agency or airline 

conducts a name-match search of 

the individual against applicable 

terrorist watch list records

Potential match to terrorist watch list record 

YES

NO

Exact matches and uncertain or 

difficult-to-verify matches are 

referred to intelligence centers for 

closer examination. State or local 

police contact the Terrorist Screening 

Center directly

Obvious mismatches of individuals 

to terrorist watch list records are 

resolved by the frontline screening 

agency or airline

Airline contacts the Transportation 

Security Administration’s Office of 

Intelligence, State Department consular 

officer submits a request for a security 

advisory opinion on the visa applicant, or 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

contacts National Targeting Center

To, within, or from the United States

Exact matches and uncertain or 

difficult-to-verify matches are 

referred by intelligence centers to 

the Terrorist Screening Center

Terrorist Screening Center checks its 

database and other sources and 

confirms match or mismatch

Positive matches are referred 

for counterterrorism response

Misidentifications are referred 

back to the frontline screening 

agency or airline through the 

intelligence center

Page 11 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Homeland security-related screening processes entail some level of 

inconvenience for all travelers. Also, in an operational context, people can 

be and frequently are screened for reasons not related to the terrorist 

watch list but rather for reasons related to an agency’s mission. For 

example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection screens travelers for any 

conditions that may make them inadmissible to the country, including past 

violations of immigration, drug, customs, or other laws. The agency also 

randomly selects certain individuals for more thorough screening. 

Similarly, prospective airline passengers may be randomly selected for 

additional screening, and others may be selected if they exhibit unusual 

behavior.14 Generally, screening agencies and airlines are not to disclose 

the reason they select an individual for more thorough screening 

measures, so persons may mistakenly assume it is because they are on a 

terrorist watch list. 

Annually, hundreds of millions of individuals—international travelers, 

airline passengers, and visa applicants—are screened against relevant 

portions of the Terrorist Screening Center’s consolidated watch list. The 

number of persons misidentified during terrorist watch list screening may

be substantial in absolute terms but likely represents a small fraction of 

the total screenings. Nonetheless, misidentifications resulting from 

terrorist watch list screening can affect the respective individuals in 

various ways, with perhaps the most common situation involving delays 

and related inconveniences experienced by travelers. 

Although Likely a 

Small Percentage of 

All People Screened, 

the Thousands of 

Persons Misidentified 

to the Terrorist Watch 

List Can Experience 

Additional 

Questioning, Delays, 

and Other Effects 

 14Since the late 1990s, airline passenger prescreening has been conducted using the 

Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS I)—in which data related to a

passenger’s reservation and travel itinerary are compared against characteristics (known 

as CAPPS I rules) used to select passengers who require additional scrutiny—and through

the matching of passenger names to terrorist watch lists. See, GAO, Aviation Security: 

Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as

System Is Further Developed, GAO-05-356 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2005), which

reported that approximately 99 percent of all passengers on domestic flights are screened

under the air carrier-operated, automated CAPPS I system, and the remaining 1 percent of

passengers are screened by air carriers who do not have an automated system. 

Page 12 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Although a Substantial 

Number, Misidentified 

Persons Likely Constitute 

a Small Percentage of All 

People Screened 

Although the full universe of persons misidentified by terrorist watch list 

screening may be substantial in absolute terms, the total number likely 

represents a small fraction of all persons who are screened. During the 26-

month period we studied—from December 2003 (when the Terrorist 

Screening Center began operations) to January 2006—the center received

tens of thousands of screening-encounter referrals from frontlinescreening agencies and determined that approximately half involved 

misidentified persons with names the same as or similar to someone 

whose name was contained on the terrorist watch list. The number of 

referrals to the Terrorist Screening Center does not constitute the universe 

of all persons initially misidentified by terrorist watch list screening 

because the names of many persons initially misidentified are not 

forwarded to the Terrorist Screening Center. Rather, by comparing birth 

dates or other data, the frontline- screening agencies (e.g., U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection) are able to resolve many initial misidentifications

without contacting the Terrorist Screening Center. Additionally, for air 

passengers, the airlines often are able to resolve initial misidentifications

without contacting the Transportation Security Administration.

15 The 

screening agencies and airlines generally do not maintain readily available 

statistics on these resolutions. 

Nonetheless, although the full universe of such misidentifications may be 

substantial in absolute terms, the total number likely represents a small 

fraction of all persons who are subject to terrorist watch list screening 

procedures, as in the following examples: 

• U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported that its officers managed a 

total of 431 million border crossings into the United States at land, air, and 

sea ports of entry in fiscal year 2005.

• Domestic airline flights—flights within the United States—carried 658

million passengers during the 12 months ending January 2006, according 

to Department of Transportation statistics.16

 15The Transportation Security Administration provides security directives and 

implementing guidance to foreign and domestic aircraft operators for use in ensuring that

individuals who pose a threat to civil aviation are denied boarding passes or are subjected 

to additional screening, as appropriate. 

16Also, terrorist-watch-list-screening procedures are applicable to international flights—of 

foreign and domestic air carriers—into or from the United States. 

Page 13 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
• The State Department reported that it processed about 7.4 million 

nonimmigrant visa applications in fiscal year 2005.17

In addition to these international travelers, domestic flight passengers, and

visa applicants, any other person can be subject to terrorist watch list 

screening in conjunction with routine law enforcement activities. For 

instance, in stopping a motorist for a traffic violation, a state or local law

enforcement officer can check the motorist’s name against the National 

Crime Information Center’s various files, which include terrorist watch list 

records exported by the Terrorist Screening Center. The National Crime 

Information Center, according to the FBI, is available to virtually every law 

enforcement agency nationwide, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. 

People who are misidentified to the terrorist watch list can be affected in

various ways, most commonly experiencing delays and related 

inconveniences, including being subjected to more intensive questioning 

and searches. Generally, the extent of the effects of terrorist watch-listrelated misidentification can vary by individual circumstances and the 

operational nature of the screening agency’s mission. For example, an 

individual with a name similar to someone who is on the Transportation 

Security Administration’s No Fly list likely will be unable to utilize the 

convenience of Internet, curbside, and airport kiosk check-in options. This 

effect of misidentifications is reflected in a sample of 24 complaint letters

to the Transportation Security Administration that we reviewed.18 Many of 

the complainants described their frustrations with not being able to use 

alternative check-in options such as the Internet or airport kiosks. 

Similarly, in a survey conducted in June 2006 by the National Business 

Travel Association, many companies’ travel managers responded that their 

Misidentified Individuals 

Can Experience Delays 

and Other Effects 

 17A nonimmigrant is a person, not a citizen or national of the United States, seeking to enter 

the United States temporarily for a specific purpose, such as business or pleasure. 

18As discussed in appendix I, the Transportation Security Administration provided us a 

selection of 24 terrorist watch-list-related complaint letters that the agency received from

December 1, 2003 (when the Terrorist Screening Center became operational) to April 20, 

2006. The agency attempted to select letters from different weeks throughout this time 

period; however, because a statistically projectable methodology was not used for the

selections, the 24 letters are not representative of all complaints or inquiries (an 

unspecified total) that the Transportation Security Administration received during this time 

period. 

Page 14 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
employees have expressed frustration about repeatedly having to go to the 

airline ticket counter to obtain a boarding pass.19

Also, misidentifications can cause other effects, such as missed airline 

flights by either leisure travelers or business travelers, which could have 

economic and other consequences, although we found no readily available 

data on how frequently these effects occurred. However, according to 

Transportation Security Administration data, two international flights—

one in December 2004 and another in May 2005—were diverted from 

landing at their scheduled destinations in the United States due to 

potential matches to the No Fly list. In each instance, following the 

diversions of the flights and further investigation after the airplanes 

landed, federal authorities determined that the respective passengers were 

misidentified and not true matches to the No Fly list. Nonetheless, the 

diversions resulted in delays and related inconveniences for all passengers 

on these flights. 

The Transportation Security Administration has acknowledged that 

misidentifications can be embarrassing and time consuming for 

individuals and also potentially can erode the public’s confidence in the 

agency’s security efforts. Similarly, a recent Department of Homeland 

Security report recognized that “individuals who are mistakenly put on 

watch lists or who are misidentified as being on these lists can potentially

face consequences ranging from inconvenience and delay to loss of 

liberty.”20

Also, an individual can experience an immediate delay at a port of entry 

when U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s automated search of the 

Interagency Border Inspection System database returns a potential match 

to a terrorist watch list record. For such potential matches, U.S. Customs 

 19According to its Web site (www.nbta.org), the National Business Travel Association 

represents over 2,500 corporate travel managers and travel service providers who 

collectively manage and direct more than $170 billion of expenditures within the business 

travel industry, primarily for Fortune 1,000 companies. In June 2006, the association 

conducted a survey of 1,316 corporate travel managers, and 444 responded to the survey. 

Of the responding travel managers, 107 reported that they have employees who repeatedly

have had to go to the airline ticket counter to obtain a boarding pass. (Accessed August 

2006.) 

20Department of Homeland Security, Report on Effects on Privacy & Civil Liberties—DHS

Privacy Office Report Assessing the Impact of the Automatic Selectee and No Fly Lists on

Privacy and Civil Liberties as Required under Section 4012(b) of the Intelligence Reform

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2006). 

Page 15 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
and Border Protection’s operating protocol is to escort the person to 

another screening area for further questioning and inspection (a process 

referred to as secondary screening). The length of time the person spends 

in secondary screening can be several hours, depending partly on the 

difficulty or ease of verifying whether the person is or is not the individual 

on the watch list. In the four states we visited—California, Michigan, New 

York, and Texas—U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers told us 

that given the importance of the homeland security mission, their practice

is to err on the side of caution by conducting very thorough screenings.21

The effects of such misidentifications and the related secondary 

screenings can be emotional as well as physical, as reflected in complaint 

letters to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. A sample of 28 complaint 

letters to U.S. Customs and Border Protection that we reviewed alleged a 

range of effects, such as experiencing travel delays, which resulted in 

missing airline flights and incurring additional travel costs; being 

subjected to extensive questioning and searches, while not being allowed

to contact family members, friends, or business associates to inform them 

about the delays; and feeling embarrassed and frustrated.22

The State Department’s screening of nonimmigrant visa applicants against 

the terrorist watch list may not affect individuals in the same way as does 

screening by the Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection. Generally, the State Department’s screening differs 

from other screening agencies because there is more time to search 

records and make decisions. According to State Department officials, the

average time for processing a nonimmigrant visa application is about 2 

days. However, additional processing time may be needed if initial 

screening of the applicant shows a possible link to terrorism—that is, the 

 21As discussed in appendix I, besides conducting work at U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection headquarters in Washington, D.C., we visited various land and air ports of entry 

in four states—California, Michigan, New York, and Texas. We judgmentally selected these 

four states because each has major land and air ports of entry, and the states collectively 

have ports of entry on both the northern and southern borders of the United States. 

22As discussed in appendix I, U.S. Customs and Border Protection provided us a selection 

of complaint letters submitted by 28 individuals. The dates of the 28 complaint letters 

encompassed an 11-month period, ranging from June 2005 to April 2006. The 28 letters 

were not selected based on a statistically projectable methodology. Thus, the 28 letters are

not representative of the approximately 220 complaints or inquiries—regarding watch-listrelated secondary screening at ports of entry—that U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s 

Customer Satisfaction Unit received during the 11-month time period and forwarded for 

research to the agency’s National Targeting Center. 

Page 16 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
applicant’s name possibly matches that of a person whose name is on the 

terrorist watch list. The officials explained that this additional processing 

time is needed because a decision on the visa applicant cannot be made 

until a security advisory opinion is obtained. That is, the consular post 

must ask the Department of State headquarters in Washington, D.C., to 

initiate a process of requesting that various agencies check their 

respective databases or systems for the existence of any investigative or 

intelligence information regarding the individual and pass the results back 

to a central point. This interagency review process includes the FBI, the 

Drug Enforcement Administration, the Central Intelligence Agency, and

others. According to State Department officials, visa applicants are 

routinely told not to buy tickets or incur other travel-related expenses 

until the clearance process has been completed and the application 

approved. 

In acknowledging that the interagency review process may extend the 

processing time for a visa decision, the State Department provided us (in 

June 2006) the following contextual perspectives: 

• In the last 2 years, the department and its interagency partners have 

worked to decrease the processing time in order to reduce the impact on 

the traveling public. 

• Nevertheless, the department’s position is that the time it takes to screen a 

visa applicant is a necessary part of the application procedure and, 

therefore, is not an adverse governmental action. At times, additional 

processing must be done in order to determine whether a visa applicant is 

eligible for a visa under the law, including for national security reasons. 

The additional processing is the inconvenient consequence of the proper 

functioning of the visa screening system. 

• Moreover, the extended processing time generally is a one-time 

occurrence. Once an alien is cleared through the process, the clearance is 

noted in the department’s consular visa database. Thus, this person may 

not be subject to the same processing delay when applying for another 

visa in the future, unless additional investigative or intelligence 

information arises after issuance of the first visa.23

 23The extended or additional processing time is not always a one-time occurrence. In

processing visa applications, consular posts may request security advisory opinions for a 

variety of reasons. Thus, even though an individual previously has been the subject of a 

security advisory opinion, a new visa application may present facts and circumstances that 

lead the consular post to request another security advisory opinion. 

Page 17 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Screening by state and local law enforcement also differs from screening 

by the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, and the State Department. Essentially, federal agencies (or air 

carriers, as applicable) initiate screening when individuals make an airline

reservation, arrive at a port of entry, or apply for a visa. In contrast, a state 

or local law enforcement agency may initiate screening by, for example, 

pulling over a motorist for speeding. Generally, a routine procedure for the 

law enforcement officer is to query the motorist’s name against records in 

the National Crime Information Center, which contains criminal history 

records as well as terrorist watch list records. According to congressional 

testimony presented in March 2004 by the Director of Public Security for 

the State of New York, it takes about 12 to 15 minutes, on average, for a 

New York patrol officer to contact the Terrorist Screening Center and 

resolve a potential name match.24 More recently, in July 2006, the Director 

of the Terrorist Screening Center told us that the average time nationally is 

now down to about 5 minutes—that is, the time period beginning with the 

center’s receipt of the call from a state or local law enforcement officer 

and ending with the response to the officer regarding the potential name 

match.25

 24Testimony of Mr. James W. McMahon, Director, Office of Public Security, State of New 

York, at a hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 

Committee on the Judiciary, and the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism 

of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives (Mar. 25, 2004). 

25The response to the state or local law enforcement officer may be provided by the

Terrorist Screening Center or by the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division (Terrorist Screening

Operations Unit), as applicable. 

Page 18 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
The most common cause of misidentifications is similarity of the names of 

persons being checked to names on the Terrorist Screening Center’s 

consolidated watch list, for which there is no complete remedy, but 

agencies are taking actions to minimize the effect on frequently 

misidentified persons. The Terrorist Screening Center has formed an 

interagency group to improve the effectiveness of identity matching across 

agencies and also has ongoing initiatives regarding data quality. As a 

future enhancement, the Terrorist Screening Center’s strategy is to 

develop the capability to link name-based watch list searches to relevant 

biometric systems maintained by other agencies, although this capability 

may be more useful for confirming positive matches than for reducing the 

incidence of misidentifications. 

Misidentifications occur most often because the names of some persons 

being screened are the same or similar to those in the consolidated 

terrorist watch list. To handle the large volumes of travelers and others 

who must be screened, federal agencies and most airlines use computerdriven algorithms to rapidly compare the names of individuals against the

applicable terrorist watch list records. A primary factor in designing a

computerized name-matching process is the need to minimize the 

possibility of generating false negatives—that is, failing to identify an 

individual whose name is on the terrorist watch list—without generating 

an unacceptable number of false positives (misidentifications). To help 

ensure that name-based screening does not miss detecting someone who is 

on the watch list, agencies and airlines may configure their algorithms in 

such a way that they return a broad set of possible matches for any given 

name input. For instance, the computerized algorithms may account for 

differences in names due to misspellings or transcription errors. 

Operationally, for each name that is screened against the watch list, the 

computerized algorithm may return a list of possible matches. If 

applicable, screening agency or airline security personnel then review 

these results of possible matching records arrayed by probability scores to 

determine which, if any, is a positive match with the person being 

screened. To help ensure awareness of best practices among agencies, the 

Terrorist Screening Center has formed and chairs a working group—the 

Most 

Misidentifications 

Occur Because of 

Similarities to Names 

on the Terrorist Watch 

List; Agencies Are 

Attempting to Reduce 

the Incidence of 

Misidentifications or 

Otherwise Facilitate 

Individuals through 

the Screening Process 

Misidentifications Result 

Because a Traveler’s Name 

Is Similar to Someone with 

a Terrorist Watch List 

Record 

Page 19 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Federal Identity Match Search Engine Performance Standards Working 

Group—which met initially in December 2005.26 An objective of the 

working group is to provide voluntary guidance for federal agencies that 

use identity-matching search engine technology. Essentially, the 

prospective guidance is intended to improve the effectiveness of identity 

matching across agencies by, among other means, assessing which 

algorithms or search engines are the most effective for screening specific

types or categories of names. At the time of our review, a target date for 

completing the initiative to develop and provide voluntary guidance to

screening agencies had not been set.

Some misidentifications can result from inaccurate or incomplete data in 

the consolidated terrorist watch list. Generally, the FBI and intelligence 

agencies are the original collectors of the information used to determine 

whether a given individual should be added to the terrorist watch list. The 

Terrorist Screening Center, in turn, is responsible for ensuring that 

information received from the intelligence community is accurately 

maintained in the consolidated watch list. One of the Terrorist Screening

Center’s primary goals is to maintain accurate and complete information. 

In June 2005, the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General

reported that its review of the Terrorist Screening Center’s consolidated 

watch list found several problems—such as inconsistent record counts 

and duplicate records, lack of data fields for some records, and unclear 

sources for some records.27 Among other things, the Inspector General 

recommended that the Terrorist Screening Center develop procedures to 

regularly review and test the information contained in the consolidated 

terrorist watch list to ensure that the data are complete, accurate, and nonduplicative. The Terrorist Screening Center agreed and noted that it was 

taking steps to implement the recommendation. Also, the Terrorist 

Screening Center has quality-assurance initiatives ongoing to identify and

correct troublesome records related to misidentifications. 

Some Misidentifications 

Can Result from 

Inaccurate or Incomplete 

Data 

 26The working group’s membership includes representatives from the departments of 

Homeland Security (including Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection), State, and Defense; FBI; and the intelligence community (including 

the National Counterterrorism Center, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security 

Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency). Also, the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology acts as a special advisor to the working group.

27Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Terrorist 

Screening Center, Audit Report 05-27 (June 2005). 

Page 20 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Moreover, the Terrorist Screening Center’s director and principal deputy 

director stressed to us that quality of data is a high priority for the center 

and also is a continuing challenge, particularly given that the database is 

dynamic, changing frequently with additions, deletions, and modifications. 

The officials noted the equal importance of ensuring that (1) the names of 

known and appropriately suspected terrorists are included in the watch 

list and (2) the names of any mistakenly listed individuals are removed. In

this regard, the officials explained that the center’s standard operating 

practices include at least two opportunities to review records. First, 

Terrorist Screening Center staff—including subject matter experts 

detailed to the center from other agencies—review each incoming record 

submitted (nominated) to the center for inclusion in the consolidated 

watch list. Also, every time there is a screening encounter—for example, a 

port-of-entry screening of an individual that generates an actual or a 

potential match with a watch list record—that record is reviewed again. 

In addition to the Terrorist Screening Center’s quality-assurance 

initiatives, screening agencies also have been looking at ways to reduce 

misidentifications. One way that holds promise, where applicable, is to use 

additional personal-identifying information to enhance name-based 

searching. For example, as part of its efforts to develop the Secure Flight 

program, the Transportation Security Administration conducted tests 

between November 2004 and April 2005 to determine what combinations 

of names and associated personal-identifying attributes were most 

effective in matching airline passenger data against terrorist watch list 

records. According to the Transportation Security Administration, the 

testing indicated that searches using additional personal-identifying 

attributes could potentially result in decreasing the number of 

misidentifications. However, the Transportation Security Administration 

concluded that more testing was needed to determine, among other things, 

the point of diminishing returns in using combinations of personalidentifying information to enhance name-based watch list searches. 

In addition to initiatives aimed at reducing the number of 

misidentifications, screening agencies also are taking actions to expedite

the screening of frequently misidentified persons. 

Agencies Are Taking a 

Number of Actions to 

Expedite Frequently 

Misidentified Persons 

through the Screening 

Process 

Page 21 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
The Transportation Security Administration has instituted a process 

designed to help frequently misidentified air passengers obtain boarding 

passes more quickly and avoid prolonged delays. Under this process, an 

individual can voluntarily provide the Transportation Security 

Administration with additional personal-identifying information. Then, the 

Transportation Security Administration will use this information to decide 

whether the person’s name should be put on a cleared list—that is, a list 

that contains the names and other personal-identifying information of 

individuals who have been checked and cleared as being persons not on 

the No Fly and Selectee lists. Airlines are to use the cleared list to more 

quickly determine that these passengers are not the persons whose names 

are on the No Fly and Selectee lists. As needed, the Transportation 

Security Administration provides the airlines with updates of the No Fly 

and Selectee lists and the cleared list. As discussed later in this report, the 

cleared list is integral to the Transportation Security Administration’s 

redress process for watch-list-related complaints. 

According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials, the agency has 

implemented procedures designed to help frequently misidentified 

travelers avoid additional screening and delays. Specifically, in February 

2006, the agency began annotating its database regarding travelers who 

were inadvertently stopped because they have the same or similar name as 

a watch list record but are not the actual subject of the record. The 

officials explained that the agency uses the data routinely collected on a 

traveler during the initial inspection process, and no further action is 

necessary by the traveler. The officials noted that these travelers should 

no longer be stopped on subsequent visits because of the records in 

question. As of September 2006, according to U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection officials, the agency had annotated more than 10,300 such 

instances and had prevented more than 7,200 unnecessary inspections 

from occurring. 28

As mentioned previously, the State Department’s processing of a visa 

application takes additional time if initial screening shows a possible link 

to terrorism, because a decision on the visa applicant cannot be made until 

a security advisory opinion request is forwarded to Washington, D.C., and 

a response is received. However, the State Department has taken steps to

Transportation Security 

Administration Maintains a 

Cleared List of Individuals to 

Expedite Screening and 

Mitigate Negative Effects 

U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection Is Annotating Its 

Database to Help Frequently 

Misidentified Travelers Avoid 

Additional Screening and 

Delays 

The Department of State Is 

Annotating Its Database to 

Avoid Future Delays for Visa 

Applicants 

 28Although a purpose is to expedite frequently misidentified persons through the screening 

process, the database-annotation initiative is not a “redress” process as defined in this 

report. Under the initiative, the agency is taking action proactively rather than responding 

to specific complaints or redress queries submitted by individuals. 

Page 22 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
help minimize visa-processing delays for any subsequent application filed 

by a previously screened person. Specifically, according to State 

Department officials, when a visa applicant is screened through the 

security advisory opinion process and is found to be a person who is not 

on the terrorist watch list, the State Department enters clarifying 

comments in its database or even on the visa itself. This information is 

available for review by consular officers in processing any subsequent visa

applications filed by the individual. Thus, according to State Department 

officials, the individual’s future applications should not incur any 

additional processing times, unless new information has been acquired in

the interim period that would cast doubt on the applicant’s eligibility for a 

visa. 

Within the law enforcement community, fingerprint identification has been 

used and accepted for decades and is the de facto international standard

for positively identifying individuals. Thus, as is widely recognized 

throughout government, the use of biometric technologies based on 

fingerprint recognition, facial recognition, or other physiological 

characteristics offer opportunities for enhancing the key homeland 

security objective of preventing known or suspected terrorists from 

entering the country.29

Conceptually, biometrics can be used to screen a traveler against a 

consolidated database, such as the terrorist watch list—a screening of one 

record against many records. However, the Terrorist Screening Center 

presently does not have this capability, although use of biometric 

information to supplement name-based screening is planned as a future 

enhancement. Specifically, the Terrorist Screening Center’s strategy is not

to replicate existing biometric data systems. Rather, the center’s strategy,

according to the director and principal deputy director, is to develop a 

“pointer” capability to facilitate the online linking of name-based searches 

to relevant biometric systems, such as the FBI’s Integrated Automated 

Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)—a computerized system for 

storing, comparing, and exchanging fingerprint data in a digital format, 

which contains the largest criminal biometric database in the world. 

Center officials recognize that even biometric systems have screening 

As a Future Enhancement, 

the Terrorist Screening 

Center Plans to Have Links 

to Biometric Data; Various 

Traveler-Screening 

Programs Already Use 

Biometric Data 

 29In an earlier report, we assessed various biometric technologies. See, GAO, Technology

Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security, GAO-03-174 (Washington, D.C.: Nov.

15, 2002). 

Page 23 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
limitations, such as relevant federal agencies may have no fingerprints or 

other biometrics to correlate with many of the biographical records in the 

center’s consolidated database. For instance, watch list records may be 

based on intelligence gathered by electronic wire taps or other methods 

that involve no opportunity to obtain biometric data. Also, the availability 

of interoperable technology to facilitate online linking among agencies is a 

long-standing issue that presents challenges. Nonetheless, center officials

anticipate that biometric information, if available, can be especially useful

for confirming matches to watch list records when individuals use false 

identities or aliases. 

On the other hand, the Terrorist Screening Center has no plans for trying 

to reduce the incidence of misidentifications by collecting or maintaining 

biometric information on persons who are not on the watch list. Center 

officials noted that collecting and using biometric information on innocent

persons would raise significant privacy concerns, which would have to be 

thoroughly considered in interagency discussions and weighed against the

possible benefits. 

Presently, the Department of Homeland Security uses biometric data for 

operating various programs to screen travelers, one of which is a requiredenrollment program for selected foreign nationals who travel to the United 

States and others are voluntary-enrollment or trusted-traveler programs. 

However, enrollment in these programs, whether required or voluntary, 

does not exempt individuals from being screened against the terrorist 

watch list. As mentioned previously, for instance, the watch list is 

dynamic, changing frequently with additions, deletions, and modifications. 

The required-enrollment program that uses biometric data is the U.S. 

Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program, 

which is an entry/exit tracking system designed to collect, maintain, and 

share information on selected foreign nationals who travel to the United

States. The program uses a related system—the Automated Biometrics 

Identification System (IDENT), developed by the former Immigration and 

Naturalization Service—to collect two fingerprints (right and left index

fingers) and a digital photograph to provide for the biometric 

identification of visitors.30 Required enrollment in the US-VISIT program is 

conducted by the Department of State at visa-issuing consulates before the 

 30In July 2005, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced that US-VISIT would be 

enhanced to collect 10-finger scans. 

Page 24 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
visitors depart or by U.S. Customs and Border Protection at ports of entry 

when the visitors arrive. American citizens, permanent legal residents, 

Canadian nationals, and Mexican nationals with border-crossing cards are 

not required to submit to US-VISIT screening at ports of entry. In July 

2006, the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General provided

an update on progress toward achieving biometric interoperability 

between IDENT and IAFIS.31 The Inspector General’s progress report 

noted that the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security have formed 

a working group to make US-VISIT, IDENT, and IAFIS interoperable by 

December 2009. 

Under the US-VISIT program, at each subsequent reentry into the United 

States, applicable individuals are biometrically screened against the 

fingerprints collected during the initial enrollment. Such biometric 

screening is for identity verification purposes—screening that involves a

one-to-one matching of fingerprints to determine if the traveler is the 

person enrolled in the program. Enrollment in the U.S.-VISIT program 

does not exempt individuals from being screened against the terrorist 

watch list and generally may not reduce the possibility of the individuals 

being misidentified based on name similarities. As such, when there are 

potential matches to a name on the watch list, the individuals may still be 

subject to more extensive screening at ports of entry. 

Another biometrics-based program—Registered Traveler—is being pilot 

tested by the Transportation Security Administration.32 The program, 

commonly categorized as a trusted-traveler program, collects biographical

information and biometric data from airline passengers who volunteer to 

undergo a security threat assessment. The pilot program is being tested in 

partnership with selected airlines and airports across the country. Under 

the program, prior to boarding at airports, participants are to be screened

using the biometric data. 

 31U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspection 

Division, Follow-up Review of the FBI’s Progress Toward Biometric Interoperability

between IAFIS and IDENT (Washington, D.C.: July 2006). 

32The Transportation Security Administration is authorized to “establish requirements to 

implement trusted passenger programs and use available technologies to expedite security 

screening of passengers who participate in such programs, thereby allowing security 

screening personnel to focus on those passengers who should be subject to more extensive 

screening.” See Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 109(a)(3), 115 Stat. 597, 613 (2001). 

Page 25 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
In addition, U.S. Customs and Border Protection operates various trustedtraveler programs, which are intended to provide expedited processing for 

pre-approved, low risk travelers who frequently cross U.S. borders. For 

instance, a commuter program on the southern border is known as Secure 

Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) and on the 

northern border as “NEXUS.” For these voluntary programs, the biometric 

component generally involves only the enrollment process, such as 

conducting fingerprint-based background checks using IDENT or IAFIS to 

ensure that applicants are eligible for expedited processing before 

allowing their participation.33 Thereafter, cross-border commuting is 

facilitated by use of radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, 

whereby an embedded chip in each membership card transmits the 

person’s arrival to a reader-antenna at the port of entry.34

While trusted-traveler programs are most commonly applicable to crossborder commuters, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials told us 

that all persons who believe they are frequently misidentified with similar 

names on the terrorist watch list can apply and will be accepted if they are 

found to meet program requirements. Also, a benefit of these programs 

from a watch list perspective is that U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

has greater assurance of the identity of the enrollees and that these 

individuals are not persons on the watch list. Enrollment in a trustedtraveler program does not exempt individuals from being screened against

the terrorist watch list; although, according to U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection officials, enrollment does mitigate the possibility of the 

individuals being misidentified and selected for more extensive screening 

at ports of entry. The officials also noted that the trusted-trusted traveler 

programs are not widely applicable to all ports of entry. Rather, the 

programs are helpful only to individuals eligible to use trusted-traveler 

lanes at the border, not at airports or seaports. 

 33In the SENTRI program, for example, applicants must volunteer for (1) a biographical 

background check against criminal, law enforcement, customs, immigration, and terrorist 

databases; (2) a 10-fingerprint law enforcement check; and (3) a personal interview with a 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection officer.

34RFID is a wireless technology that stores and retrieves data remotely from devices. For 

instance, the technology allows information to be written to tags, which can be scanned or

read from a distance. See, GAO, Information Security: Radio Frequency Identification 

Technology in the Federal Government, GAO-05-551 (Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2005). 

Page 26 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
It is important that individuals who are inadvertently and adversely 

affected by watch list screening be provided an opportunity to seek 

redress. The Terrorist Screening Center, the Transportation Security 

Administration, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have processes 

in place to address individuals’ concerns involving watch-list-related 

screening and have reported some successes, such as removing from the 

watch list the names of several mistakenly listed persons. Most watch-listrelated redress concerns usually involve misidentified persons—

individuals who are not on the watch list but have name similarities with 

known or suspected terrorists. To help ensure that opportunities for 

redress are formally documented and that agency responsibilities are 

clear, the Department of Justice is leading an effort to develop an 

interagency memorandum of understanding. A final draft of the 

memorandum of understanding is expected to be ready for interagency 

clearances by fall 2006, according to Terrorist Screening Center officials.

The Terrorist Screening Center, the Transportation Security 

Administration, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have important 

responsibilities in providing individuals who are inadvertently and 

adversely affected by watch list screening with opportunities to seek 

redress. As mentioned previously, all aggrieved individuals may seek 

redress, including persons who express concerns or complaints that they

are being misidentified and adversely affected because they have a name 

similar to someone whose name is on the terrorist watch list and persons 

who actually are on the terrorist watch list. Any such concern or 

complaint raised formally by an affected individual is what the Terrorist 

Screening Center calls a redress query. Specifically, the Terrorist 

Screening Center defines a “redress query” as communication from 

individuals or their representatives inquiring or complaining about an 

adverse experience during a terrorist watch-list-related-screening process 

conducted or sponsored by a federal agency, including congressional 

inquiries to federal agencies on behalf of constituents. 

According to the Terrorist Screening Center’s standard operating 

procedures for redress matters, frontline-screening agencies, such as the 

Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, have a key role in handling redress queries. Significantly, for 

example, the frontline-screening agencies—and not the Terrorist 

The Terrorist 

Screening Center and 

Frontline-Screening 

Agencies Are 

Addressing Concerns 

Related to Watch List 

Screening, and an 

Interagency 

Agreement Is Being 

Developed to Further 

Ensure an Effective 

Means for Seeking 

Redress 

The Terrorist Screening 

Center and the Federal 

Frontline-Screening 

Agencies Have a Role in 

Addressing the Concerns 

of Individuals Who are 

Adversely Affected by 

Watch List Screening 

Page 27 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Screening Center—are to receive and initially handle redress queries from 

the public. The operating procedure of having frontline agencies receive 

redress queries serves at least two purposes, according to the Terrorist 

Screening Center. First, the applicable frontline-screening agency is better

positioned to know the details of the screening encounters and to respond 

appropriately. Second, many screening encounters may be based on 

factors other than terrorism—factors such as narcotics trafficking or 

incomplete currency or customs declarations—which are not within the 

mission of the Terrorist Screening Center and must be resolved by the 

frontline agencies. Also, as a practical matter, the frontline agencies are 

the entities visible to complainants or inconvenienced persons. 

Further, after a frontline-screening agency receives a complaint or 

concern from an individual, the agency is to begin its internal complaintresolution or redress process. As part of this process, the agency is to 

determine whether the person’s complaint is related to a potential match 

to a terrorist watch list record. If the determination is “no”—that is, the 

person is not actually on the watch list but was misidentified because of a

name similarity to someone who is on the terrorist watch list—the 

frontline-screening agency is responsible for resolving the complaint and 

responding to the misidentified individual. 

If the frontline-screening agency’s determination is “yes”—which includes 

not only definite matches but also any potential or “maybe” matches that 

require additional research to confirm—the frontline agency is to refer the 

redress query to the Terrorist Screening Center. Then, the center is to 

check its database to determine whether the individual is indeed on the 

terrorist watch list or whether the person is misidentified with someone 

on the watch list. If the person is actually on the terrorist watch list, the 

Terrorist Screening Center is to consult with applicable intelligence

community and law enforcement agencies to assess whether the person is

appropriately listed and should remain on the watch list or is mistakenly 

listed and should be removed from the list. In either instance, the center is

to inform the applicable frontline-screening agency, which is responsible 

for responding to the individual. If the complainant is a misidentified 

person, the Terrorist Screening Center is to send the redress query back to 

the applicable frontline-screening agency for that agency to resolve. Also, 

as part of its quality-assurance efforts, the center is to review the 

underlying watch list record that caused the person’s adverse experience 

to determine, for example, the record’s validity or whether a modification 

is needed, including possible removal of the record. Finally, any referrals 

received by the Terrorist Screening Center not related to its mission—that 

is, “other issues” with no nexus to terrorism such as complaints involving 

Page 28 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
employee misconduct or random screening—are to be sent back to the 

applicable frontline-screening agency, which is to provide a response to 

the individual. 

In January 2005, the Terrorist Screening Center established its formal 

redress process. An overview of the redress process, including interaction

between the center and the frontline-screening agencies, is illustrated in 

figure 2. 

Page 29 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Figure 2: General Overview of the Terrorist Screening Center’s Process for Handling Concerns Involving Watch-List-Related

Screening

Source: GAO. 

YES NO Frontline screening agency 

is responsible for resolving 

and responding to the

individual

Positive match 

Misidentification 

(false positive) 

Other 

Positive matches are resolved in one of three 

ways: (a) the name of a mistakenly listed person 

is removed from the watch list; (b) no change to 

the watch list record is needed; or (c) the record 

is changed or updated, if appropriate, but is not 

removed from the watch list. The frontline 

screening agency is responsible for responding 

to the individual.

Misidentifications (false positives) are returned 

by the Terrorist Screening Center to the frontline 

screening agency, which is responsible for

responding to the individual and taking 

appropriate action, such as annotating the 

agency's database, that would assist the 

person in the future. 

Other issues usually should not have been 

referred to the Terrorist Screening Center 

because the issues have no nexus to terrorism 

and, thus, are sent back to the frontline screening 

agency, which is responsible for responding 

to the individual.

Frontline screening agency initiates

its internal complaint-resolution

(redress) process 

Individual submits complaint or

concern to frontline screening agency 

Potential match to terrorist watch list record 

Issue is to be referred 

to the Terrorist Screening 

Center 

Terrorist Screening 

Center checks database

and determines type 

of issue

Page 30 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Note: As a general overview, the figure does not reflect all ways that complaints or concerns can be 

resolved. For instance, regarding clearance difficulties experienced by an individual at a port of entry,

U.S. Customs and Border Protection may determine that the person was selected for intensive 

screening based on information provided by another federal law enforcement agency. If so, U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection may refer the complainant’s query to the applicable agency—which, 

in turn, would reply directly to the individual. 

The Terrorist Screening Center does not directly provide final disposition 

letters to individuals who have submitted redress queries. Rather, the 

center works with the frontline-screening agencies—and, as applicable, 

any relevant intelligence or law enforcement agencies—to develop a 

written response. In providing a final response to an individual who 

submits a redress query, the frontline-screening agencies use a response 

letter that neither confirms nor denies the existence of any terrorist watch 

list records relating to the individual. For example, one of the

Transportation Security Administration’s standardized response letters 

states, in part, “Where it has been determined that a correction to records 

is warranted, these records have been modified to address any delay or 

denial of boarding that you may have experienced as a result of the watch

list screening process.” 

Generally, this type of language reflects the Terrorist Screening Center’s 

policy of neither confirming nor denying whether an individual is on the 

consolidated terrorist watch list because this information is derived from 

classified and sensitive law enforcement and intelligence sources. The 

policy of nondisclosure to the public is intended to protect the operational 

counterterrorism and intelligence collection objectives of the government 

and the personal safety of those involved in counterterrorism 

investigations. 

The Terrorist Screening 

Center’s Handling of 

Redress Referrals Has 

Resulted in Removing the 

Names of Several 

Mistakenly Listed Persons 

from the Terrorist Watch 

List 

During calendar year 2005, the Terrorist Screening Center processed to 

completion 112 redress queries referred by frontline-screening agencies. 

Of this total, according to the Terrorist Screening Center, 31 were 

determined to be mistakenly listed individuals and their names were 

removed from the watch list (see table 1). The center reported that for 

another 54 queries the individuals were on the terrorist watch list and the 

center either did not change the watch list records (48) or made some 

updates (6).

Page 31 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Table 1: Number and Disposition of Redress Queries Referred to the Terrorist 

Screening Center, Calendar Year 2005 

Disposition of redress query Number

Positive match: The name of the mistakenly listed person was removed from 

the watch list 31a

Positive match: No change to the watch list record was needed 48

Positive match: The record was changed or updated but not removed from the 

watch list 6

Misidentification: The redress query was referred back to the frontlinescreening agency to process and provide a response to the individual 19

Other: These queries involved issues not relevant to the terrorist watch list 

and should not have been referred to the Terrorist Screening Center 8

Total 112

Source: Terrorist Screening Center data. 

a

According to Terrorist Screening Center officials, the center was already in the process of removing a 

few of these names before the center received the respective redress queries. The officials explained 

that although the names were properly included on the watch list initially, subsequent events 

warranted removing the names. 

Also, as table 1 indicates, 19 of the 112 referrals in calendar year 2005 

involved misidentified persons—that is, the Terrorist Screening Center 

determined that these individuals were not on the terrorist watch list but 

have names similar to someone who is a known or suspected terrorist. The 

center referred each of these queries back to the applicable frontlinescreening agency for processing under the respective agency’s redress 

procedures. These 19 misidentifications do not constitute the annual 

universe of all redress queries involving misidentifications. Rather, 

thousands of such queries from misidentified persons are handled by the 

frontline-screening agencies and are not referred to the Terrorist 

Screening Center. 

To enhance public awareness of redress availability, the Web site of the 

FBI—the Terrorist Screening Center’s administering agency—presents an 

overview of applicable policy and procedures, provides answers to 

frequently asked questions, and gives contact information for three 

frontline-screening agencies—the Transportation Security Administration, 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the State Department. This 

information is also presented in appendix II of this report. 

Page 32 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Most redress queries involve misidentified rather than mistakenly listed 

individuals. Therefore, inherently the disposition or resolution of a redress 

query involving a misidentification cannot be removal of the individual’s 

name from a watch list because the individual is not the person on the list. 

Instead, an objective of the frontline-screening agencies is to address 

complaints of misidentified individuals by providing alternative relief—

that is, by developing procedures and having sufficient information in 

screening databases to expedite the processing of frequently misidentified 

persons. 

The Transportation Security Administration has a contact center that 

centrally receives nonmedia public inquiries and complaints. According to 

the agency, the contact center’s customer service representatives and 

contact security specialists are trained to handle and analyze incoming 

calls, e-mails, correspondence, and facsimiles from the public, the 

Congress, and private industry. The functions of these representatives and 

specialists, as specified in the contact center’s operating procedures, are 

to analyze letters and electronic messages, sort them by subject matter, 

and confer with appropriate offices throughout the agency (including field 

staff) to provide responses. 

Most Redress Queries 

Involve Misidentified 

Persons and Are Handled 

by Frontline-Screening 

Agencies

Transportation Security 

Administration: For 

Individuals Who Are 

Frequently Misidentified 

Due to Name Similarities 

with Known or Suspected 

Terrorists, the Agency Has 

Compiled a Cleared List 

Generally, any inquiries and complaints regarding watch-list-related 

screening—that is, screening against the No Fly and Selectee lists—are to 

be handled by the agency’s Office of Transportation Security Redress, 

which was established in November 2004.35 As part of the redress process, 

an individual can voluntarily provide additional personal-identifying 

information to the Office of Transportation Security Redress. Specifically, 

the individual can submit a completed Traveler Identity Verification Form

(reproduced in app. III), along with a copy of a U.S. passport or copies of 

three types of other identification documents, such as birth certificate,

driver’s license, military identification card, military discharge paper, voter 

registration card, and naturalization certificate or certificate of 

citizenship.36 Then, the agency will use this information in deciding 

 35Previously, the agency’s Office of the Ombudsman handled all inquiries and complaints,

including those regarding watch-list-related screening. 

36The Traveler Identity Verification Form (May 2006) replaced an earlier form, the 

Passenger Identity Verification Form. Regarding the latter, the Transportation Security 

Administration’s instructions required the submission of notarized copies of three 

identification documents. Instructions for the new form do not require that the submitted 

documents be notarized. 

Page 33 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
whether the person’s name should be put on a cleared list—which airlines 

are to use for distinguishing the individual from persons who are in fact on

the No Fly or Selectee lists.37 Along with as-needed updates of the No Fly 

and Selectee lists, the Transportation Security Administration transmits 

updated cleared list information to the airlines for the purpose of enabling 

the airlines to more quickly determine that these passengers are not the 

persons who are on the No Fly and Selectee lists. The purpose of the 

cleared list is to mitigate or minimize delays or other inconveniences by

facilitating the check-in process for passengers who have names similar to 

known or suspected terrorists. An individual on the cleared list may still 

have to obtain a boarding pass at the ticket counter rather than using 

Internet, curbside, or airport kiosk check-in options. Nonetheless, the 

intent of the cleared list is to reduce the delay or wait time for applicable

air passengers in obtaining a boarding pass at the ticket counter. 

According to the Director of the Office of Transportation Security Redress, 

over 30,000 individuals had submitted identify verification forms and 

supporting documentation to the agency, as of December 2005, and the 

names of the overwhelming majority of these individuals were added to

the cleared list. The director explained that although the agency requires 

air carriers to use the cleared list, responsibility for utilizing the list rests 

with the air carriers, and all carriers do not operate in the same way or 

have equal capabilities. Further, according to the director, some customers 

(air passengers) call and complain about having problems even though 

they have taken the necessary steps to be placed on the cleared list. The 

director said that his office forwards information regarding these 

complaints to another component of the agency—the Office of 

Transportation Sector Network Management—which is responsible for 

contacting the respective air carriers to address relevant issues. 

According to Transportation Security Administration officials, the Secure

Flight program is a prospective solution to current issues regarding 

inconsistent use of the cleared list by air carriers—as well as any 

inconsistent use of the No Fly and Selectee lists. Under the Secure Flight

program, the Transportation Security Administration plans to take over, 

from commercial airlines, the responsibility for comparing identifying 

information of airline passengers against information on known or 

 37The cleared list procedure began in May 2003 under the agency’s Office of the 

Ombudsman. 

Page 34 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
suspected terrorists.38 We note, however, that the Transportation Security 

Administration has been in the process of developing a passenger 

prescreening system, presently known as the Secure Flight program, for 

more than 3 years. We have reported and the Transportation Security 

Administration has acknowledged significant challenges in developing and 

implementing the Secure Flight program.39 Earlier this year, the 

Transportation Security Administration suspended Secure Flight’s 

development to reassess, or rebaseline, the program. The rebaselining 

effort includes reassessing the program goals to be achieved, the expected

benefits and capabilities, and the estimated schedules and costs. As of July 

2006, the Transportation Security Administration had not publicly 

announced any decisions regarding the future of the Secure Flight 

program, although the agency anticipates that the rebaselining effort will 

be completed by the end of September 2006. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection headquarters has a Customer 

Satisfaction Unit that functions as a centralized source for recording, 

tracking, and reviewing all complaint information related to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection interactions with travelers, the general public,

industry, and government entities. This unit is responsible for responding 

to customer complaints, irrespective of the subject matter—that is, the 

unit focuses on all complaint topics, not just complaints involving terrorist 

watch-list-related screening. For instance, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection routinely uses a comment card that allows travelers to express 

any complaint regarding the port-of-entry processing experience. U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection policy is to provide a comment card to (1) 

all air and sea travelers who are subjected to a secondary examination and 

(2) all air, land, and sea travelers who undergo a personal search. 

U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection Is Considering 

Realigning Its Watch-ListRelated Redress 

Responsibilities and Is 

Updating Its Procedures 

 38In March 2003, the Transportation Security Administration began developing CAPPS II, a 

second-generation computer-assisted passenger prescreening program, to provide 

improvements over CAPPS I and to screen all passengers flying into, out of, and within the 

United States. CAPPS II was to perform different analyses and access more diverse data, 

including data from government and commercial databases, to classify passengers 

according to their level of risk (i.e., acceptable risk, unknown risk, or unacceptable risk),

which would in turn be used to determine the level of security screening each passenger 

would receive. Because of a variety of challenges, the Department of Homeland Security

cancelled the development of CAPPS II in August 2004 and announced that a new 

prescreening program, called Secure Flight, would be developed. 

39GAO, Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation 

Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-864T (Washington, D.C.: June 

14, 2006). 

Page 35 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
In June 2006, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials explained that 

the agency was actively considering ways to enhance the capability of the 

Customer Satisfaction Unit to support redress efforts regarding terrorist 

watch-list-related concerns or complaints. For instance, a realignment 

being considered is to move the responsibility for handling certain 

categories of complaints—those not involving terrorist watch list 

screening—from the Customer Satisfaction Unit to the Office of Public 

Affairs. Also, the officials further noted that the agency’s Office of 

Regulations and Rulings was updating the Customer Satisfaction Unit’s 

standard operating procedures, including redress procedures regarding 

terrorist watch-list-related concerns or complaints. 

Further, in commenting on a draft of this report in September 2006, U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection officials said that the agency is working 

with the Terrorist Screening Center to ensure that its process aligns with 

the center’s process. Also, another Department of Homeland Security 

component—U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement—commented 

that its Office of Intelligence serves as a point of contact and works 

closely with the Terrorist Screening Center’s redress team to ensure the 

removal or modification of records, as appropriate, from the terroristscreening database and the Treasury Enforcement Communications 

System/Interagency Border Inspection System. For instance, U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement noted that if the Terrorist 

Screening Center determines that an individual should no longer be listed 

in the terrorist-screening database, the Office of Intelligence coordinates 

with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to have the record expunged 

from the Treasury Enforcement Communications System/Interagency

Border Inspection System. 

As part of our study, we reviewed the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

Web site for the Terrorist Screening Center to determine what overview 

information regarding watch-list-related redress was publicly available 

(see app. II). In turn, from the FBI’s overview Web site, we followed up on 

any references or online links to the redress processes of key frontlinescreening agencies—the Transportation Security Administration and U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection. 

In contrast to the online link to the Transportation Security 

Administration’s redress guidance (see app. III), we found limited 

usefulness in the online link to U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s 

redress guidance. The FBI’s overview Web site lists the Customer 

Satisfaction Unit as the redress-related contact point for U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection. Also, the overview Web site provides an online link to a 

Page 36 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
fact sheet describing the Interagency Border Inspection System—a system

that provides U.S. Customs and Border Protection and other law 

enforcement entities with access to computer-based information. 

However, the fact sheet (reproduced in app. IV) has no specific guidance 

regarding terrorist-watch-list-related redress. Rather, the fact sheet 

answers basic questions regarding the Interagency Border Inspection 

System, such as who uses the system and what information is in the 

system. Moreover, the overview Web site provides no references or online 

links to U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s trusted-traveler programs—

such as SENTRI and NEXUS. As mentioned previously, agency officials 

told us that persons who believe they are frequently misidentified with the 

terrorist watch list or who continuously experience delays and other 

inconveniences during screening could apply to one of these programs 

and, if accepted, receive expedited processing at applicable ports of entry. 

Based on our observations regarding the limited usefulness of the online 

links from the FBI’s overview Web site, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection officials acknowledged a need to coordinate with the FBI and 

the Terrorist Screening Center to provide more appropriate online links 

regarding redress guidance. The officials noted, for example, that U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection’s Web site does provide information 

regarding the Customer Satisfaction Unit and how complaints are handled

as well as information on trusted-traveler programs. 

The term “redress,” according to the State Department, is not applicable to

complaints about visa denials, which are final decisions not subject to 

appeal or judicial review. However, the State Department has an agencyinitiated process for removing erroneous or outdated entries from the 

Consular Lookout and Support System, which contains applicable terrorist 

watch list records. As mentioned previously, the system is used by 

consular officers abroad to screen the names of visa applicants to identify 

terrorists and other aliens who are potentially ineligible for visas based on 

criminal histories or other reasons specified by federal statute. All visaissuing posts have direct access to the system and are required to use it to

check each applicant’s name before issuing a visa, according to the State

Department. 

Department of State: 

Applicants Who Are Denied a 

Visa Have No Legal Basis to 

Appeal, but an Agency-Initiated 

Process Is Used to Remove 

Erroneous or Outdated Entries 

from the Consular Lookout and 

Support System 

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended, gives 

Department of State consular officers at overseas posts exclusive 

authority for adjudicating applications submitted by foreign citizens for 

Page 37 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
visas to enter the United States.40 The process for determining who will be 

issued or refused a visa consists of several steps—including checking or 

cross-referencing each applicant’s name against the Consular Lookout and

Support System, which contains applicable names and biographical data 

exported from the Terrorist Screening Center’s database. According to the 

State Department, no applicant is denied a visa simply because the 

person’s name appears in the Consular Lookout and Support System, 

which is only a flag or tool to help the consular officer know if further 

screening may be required. Rather, visa denials are by law based either on

statutory grounds of ineligibility, which are specifically set out in the 

Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended,41 or on the applicant’s 

failure to present evidence to establish eligibility for the type of visa 

requested. In addition to security and terrorism concerns, statutory 

grounds of ineligibility include, for example, criminal history reasons, 

previous violations of immigration law, and health-related grounds. 

According to State Department instructions provided to consular offices 

worldwide, visa denials are to be reviewed by the consular officer’s 

supervisor. If an error has been made or a question exists about 

interpreting immigration law in reference to the facts surrounding the 

applicant, the consular officer can request a legal advisory opinion. Also, if 

there are misunderstandings about the application process, individuals can 

correspond with the overseas consular section and the Public Inquiries 

Division of the Visa Office in Washington, D.C. 

However, federal courts have consistently held that a consular officer’s 

final decision to issue or deny a visa is not subject to a formal appeal or to 

judicial review.42 That is, there is no way to directly appeal the visa denial, 

 40Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 182 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq.). However,

obtaining a visa from an American consul does not guarantee an alien’s entry into the

United States. Rather, a visa authorizes the alien to arrive at a port of entry, at which point 

a U.S. Customs and Border Protection officer will independently examine the alien’s 

eligibility for admission. 

41See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). 

42Courts have long held that a consular officer’s decision to grant or deny a visa is not 

subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 

1999); Centeno v. Schultz, 817 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1987); Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v.

Levin, 800 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1986); Ventura-Escamilla v. I.N.S., 647 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1981); 

Rivera de Gomez v. Kissinger, 534 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1976); U.S. ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 

F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929). See also, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 752 (1972) (holding that 

courts may not look behind the exercise of an official’s discretionary authority to deny

admission to an alien). 

Page 38 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
nor is there a way to directly overturn the consular officer’s denial 

decision because it is not subject to judicial review. Thus, in explaining 

why it would be incorrect and legally misleading to use the term “redress” 

in reference to any complaint about a visa denial, officials in the State 

Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs commented that a visa refusal 

(denial) is a final decision in which the consular officer makes a legal

determination that the applicant is not eligible for a visa based on a 

statutory ground. The State Department officials reiterated that the 

consular officer’s decision is a final governmental adjudication, for which 

there is no appeal or judicial review, and the only recourse for the person 

is to submit a new application with sufficient information to “overcome” 

the grounds for ineligibility. 

Consular officers are required to provide each applicant an explanation of

the legal basis for denying the visa.

43 However, if the basis for ineligibility 

is terrorism—under section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act, as amended44—the consular officer normally would not be 

able to explain the reasons behind the denial because of national security

grounds. 

According to Bureau of Consular Affairs officials, the State Department 

does have an agency-initiated process for removing erroneous or outdated 

information from the Consular Lookout and Support System. In explaining

why the correction-of-records process is initiated by the agency and not 

the visa applicant, the officials commented substantially as follows: 

• Visa applicants usually would not even know whether their names are on 

the terrorist watch list. If a visa application results in the overseas post’s 

requesting a security advisory opinion and additional screening, the 

applicant might think that any processing delay is due to a record entry in 

the Consular Lookout and Support System. However, the additional 

screening could be due to reasons other than terrorism, such as a criminal 

record, a contagious disease, or simply an overstay on a previous visa. 

• Thus, any deletion of entries from the Consular Lookout and Support 

System normally would be initiated by the consular officer in the field. 

That is, if the consular officer determines—based on evidence presented 

 43Secretary of State cable to all diplomatic and consular posts, Subject: Reminder 

Regarding Visa Refusal Procedures (June 12, 2001). 

44See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B). 

Page 39 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
during the course of a visa application—that an entry in the Consular 

Lookout and Support System is incorrect or has been overtaken by events, 

the officer is to initiate action to have the entry deleted from the system. 

Also, the Bureau of Consular Affairs officials noted that there has been an

occasional complaint that despite the issuance of a visa, the alien 

experienced difficulties at a U.S. port of entry because, for example, 

screening by U.S. Customs and Border Protection showed a potential 

match with a terrorist watch list record. Regarding these instances, the

officials said that based on an interest in data integrity and customer 

service, the department works with the Terrorist Screening Center to 

review relevant records and determine an appropriate course of action, 

which could consist of a watch list message or annotation specifying that 

the alien is not a person on the watch list. In addition, as discussed 

previously, the State Department is taking steps to annotate its database 

when it screens individuals and finds that they are not on the watch list. 

Such annotations are intended to expedite visa processing in the future 

and limit the incidence of misidentifications. 

The Terrorist Screening Center and the frontline-screening agencies have 

interdependent responsibilities in providing redress for individuals who 

are inadvertently and adversely affected by watch list screening. The 

availability of redress is important for all affected persons, including 

persons who are misidentified because of name similarities and to persons 

who contend that they are mistakenly included on the terrorist watch list. 

For any given watch-list-related complaint or redress query, providing 

relief can necessitate interaction among several governmental agencies. 

For instance, if the query involves a person who is mistakenly listed, 

relevant redress participants could include the Terrorist Screening Center

and a frontline-screening agency as well as the agency that originally 

submitted or nominated the person’s name for inclusion in the 

consolidated terrorist watch list. Nominating agencies include the FBI and 

various agencies within the intelligence community, such as the Central 

Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National 

Security Agency. 

To help ensure that opportunities for terrorist-watch-list-related redress 

are implemented effectively, the Department of Justice is leading an 

effort—which has been ongoing since fall 2005—to develop and finalize an 

interagency memorandum of understanding. Key purposes of the final 

memorandum of understanding include ensuring that opportunities for 

redress are formally documented and that agency responsibilities are 

The Department of Justice 

Is Leading an Effort to 

Finalize an Interagency 

Agreement to Help Ensure 

That Effective Redress Is 

Available 

Page 40 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
clear, with designated officials accountable for supporting the continued 

success of the processes. The Department of Justice has a lead role in 

developing the memorandum of understanding because the Terrorist 

Screening Center has primary responsibility for the consolidated terroristscreening database. Interagency partners in the effort to develop the 

memorandum of understanding include the Department of Homeland 

Security, the Department of State, and the National Counterterrorism 

Center. 

Also, another entity involved in developing the memorandum of 

understanding is the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, which is 

part of the Executive Office of the President and consists of five members 

appointed by the president.45 According to the board’s executive director, 

the terrorist watch list redress process is a top priority for the board. The 

executive director noted that since June 2006 board staff have attended all 

meetings of the interagency partners engaged in developing the 

memorandum of understanding. This official opined that the board’s 

participation has helped reprioritize this matter among the constituent 

agencies and that the board is committed to continuing its involvement. 

According to Department of Justice officials, a final draft of the 

memorandum of understanding is expected to be ready for interagency 

clearances by fall 2006. Terrorist Screening Center officials emphasized 

that the interagency memorandum of understanding was definitely 

needed, particularly as a mechanism for ensuring the accuracy of the 

watch list. The center officials noted, for instance, that there have been 

disagreements at times between agencies over nominations to the watch 

list. Thus, in handling watch-list-related complaints, the center officials 

explained that the interagency memorandum of understanding could help

by clearly outlining a process for coordinating with the National 

Counterterrorism Center and nominating agencies to validate the accuracy 

and appropriateness of watch list records. 

 45The board was established by section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004. Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, 3684-88. The board advises the

president and other senior executive branch officials as to whether privacy and civil 

liberties protections are appropriately considered in the development and implementation 

of laws, regulations, and executive branch policies related to efforts to protect the nation 

against terrorism. The five board members were sworn in and had their first meeting on 

March 15, 2006. Additional information about the role of the board and its operations is 

available at www.privacyboard.gov. 

Page 41 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Moreover, the Terrorist Screening Center officials explained that the 

interagency memorandum of understanding could help resolve significant 

watch-list-related redress differences among the frontline-screening 

agencies. Examples regarding Department of Homeland Security 

components are as follows: 

• The Transportation Security Administration has an office specifically 

designated for redress issues, with an accountable official—the Director, 

Office of Transportation Security Redress. Also, the office has followed 

consistent procedures in referring appropriate watch-list-related 

complaints to the Terrorist Screening Center. 

• In contrast, U.S. Customs and Border Protection does not have a clearly 

designated official accountable for redress, and the agency has not always

followed consistent procedures in referring appropriate watch-list-related 

complaints to the Terrorist Screening Center. 

Additionally, regarding the State Department, the Terrorist Screening 

Center officials stressed the importance of having clearly established 

procedures and responsibilities. The center officials noted that even 

though the State Department’s operational context is somewhat different 

than that of other frontline-screening agencies, the department

nonetheless has a substantial volume of interactions with the Terrorist 

Screening Center. State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs officials 

acknowledged to us the value of having an interagency memorandum of 

understanding that specifies standard operating procedures for redress 

and designates points of contact. In this regard, the State Department 

officials commented that they have been participating in meetings with the 

Terrorist Screening Center and other interagency partners to discuss the 

proposed memorandum of understanding. According to the officials, a 

benefit to the State Department expected from the interagency agreement 

would be clearly established and coordinated procedures for removing—

from the department’s Consular Lookout and Support System and the 

Terrorist Screening Center’s consolidated watch list—any name that is 

mistakenly listed or has been overtaken by subsequent events. 

Homeland security measures affect all travelers to some extent. Thus, it 

may be argued that travel delays and other inconveniencies resulting from 

terrorist watch-list-related screening can be viewed as regrettable but 

inevitable consequences of enhanced security. However, name-based 

screening and its inherent limitations—even full names, in most cases, are 

hardly unique identifiers—may result in disproportionate impact on 

Concluding 

Observations 

Page 42 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
individuals who repeatedly are singled out for additional screening for no

other reason than the similarity of their names to someone on the watch 

list. 

The Terrorist Screening Center and its interagency partners are 

undertaking a number of efforts, including data-quality initiatives, to 

reduce the occurrence and/or impact of watch list screening on U.S. 

citizens and visitors who do not necessarily merit additional scrutiny and 

the associated inconveniences. A continuing challenge for the center will 

be ensuring that the consolidated watch list contains accurate data,

particularly given that the database is dynamic, changing frequently with 

additions, deletions, and modifications. The efforts of an interagency

working group to improve the effectiveness of name-matching computer 

algorithms may offer some promise for reducing the number of people 

who experience unintended, adverse effects. However, any policy trade-off 

considerations regarding use of algorithms likely will favor ensuring 

homeland security over minimizing inconveniences to travelers. Regarding 

future operations, the Terrorist Screening Center is actively considering 

approaches for using biometric data to supplement name-based searches,

although the availability of appropriate technology is an issue that has long

confronted the interagency screening community. 

In any event, despite the best efforts of the interagency community to 

maintain a fully accurate watch list and to conduct screening efficiently,

there likely will be continuing unintended consequences. Thus, it is 

appropriate for the Terrorist Screening Center and its interagency partners 

to continue their efforts to provide effective redress for both mistakenly 

listed persons and misidentified persons. Indeed, redress queries have 

already resulted in the removal of several mistakenly listed names from 

the watch list. Comparatively, however, the issue of redress arises more 

commonly regarding the thousands of persons who are not on the watch 

list but are misidentified and adversely affected because of a name 

similarity. Whether appropriate relief is being afforded these individuals is

still an open question, for several reasons. For example, although a core 

element of the redress provided by the Transportation Security 

Administration is the maintenance of a cleared list, there are some 

indications that the cleared list is not working as intended to reduce 

delays for air passengers in obtaining boarding passes. Prospectively, the 

Transportation Security Administration expects that development and 

implementation of the Secure Flight program will help ensure consistent 

and effective use of the cleared list among air carriers, although the 

agency has not publicly disclosed its future plans for the program. 

Page 43 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Another frontline-screening agency’s initiative, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s database-annotation initiative, may prove to be an even more

efficient approach for assisting frequently misidentified individuals. Unlike 

the Transportation Security Administration’s cleared list procedures, the 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s initiative is based on records in the 

agency’s database and does not necessitate any filing of forms and other 

documentation by travelers. At the time of our review, U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection was planning to develop a capability to monitor the 

effectiveness of the initiative. This planning effort is particularly 

important, given that the initiative may eventually prove to be a model for 

a proactive solution if it functions as intended. 

Finally, an overarching factor regarding whether appropriate relief is being 

afforded to persons inadvertently and adversely affected by terrorist 

watch-list-related screening is the absence of an interagency agreement to

help ensure that, among other matters, redress procedures and 

responsibilities are clearly documented and implemented effectively. The 

Terrorist Screening Center and its interagency partners are working to 

address this fundamental deficiency and have indicated their intent to 

provide the public with updated information on the availability of redress, 

after finalization of an agreement. 

We are not making recommendations at this time because the agencies 

have ongoing efforts to improve data quality and otherwise either reduce 

the number of misidentifications or mitigate their effects and to provide 

more effective redress. 

We provided a draft of this report for comments to the departments of 

Homeland Security, State, and Justice. We received written responses 

from each agency. 

In its response, the Department of Homeland Security acknowledged that 

it currently is undertaking actions to enhance terrorist-screening and 

redress efforts. Also, the response noted that in January 2006, the 

departments of State and Homeland Security announced an initiative on 

“Secure Borders and Open Doors in the Information Age,” otherwise 

known as the Rice-Chertoff Initiative. One purpose of the initiative is to 

establish a governmentwide redress process to address perceived 

problems in international and domestic traveler prescreening. According 

to the Department of Homeland Security, a goal is to establish a one-stop

redress process for travelers by the end of calendar year 2006. The 

department explained that this initiative, which will supplement terrorist 

Agency Comments 

Page 44 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
watch-list-related redress, focuses on a larger set of travel-screening 

redress issues. The full text of the Department of Homeland Security’s 

written comments is reprinted in appendix V. The department also 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated in this report where 

appropriate.

The Department of State commented that the report accurately describes 

the visa process and the department’s position that the administrative 

processing time required to screen a visa applicant—including, if required, 

the processing of a security advisory opinion review—is a necessary part 

of the visa application procedure rather than an adverse governmental 

action. Also, the department noted that—in its use of the terrorist watch 

list as a screening tool for visa adjudication—a “misidentification” is not 

an adverse result for the visa applicant. Rather, according to the 

department, this type of response helps to determine that the visa 

applicant is not associated with terrorism. In its written response, the 

department also provided a technical comment regarding the security 

advisory opinion process, which we incorporated in this report where 

appropriate. The full text of the Department of State’s written comments is 

reprinted in appendix VI.

The Department of Justice provided technical comments only, which we 

incorporated in this report where appropriate. 

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 

of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after the 

date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to 

interested congressional committees and subcommittees. We will also 

make copies available to others on request. In addition, this report will be 

available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 45 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish to discuss 

the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or 

larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Other key contributors to this report were Ronald J. Salo, Eric W. 

Clemons, R. Eric Erdman, Susan L. Conlon, Michele C. Fejfar, Kathryn E. 

Godfrey, Richard B. Hung, Thomas F. Lombardi, Jan B. Montgomery, and

Danny R. Burton. 

Eileen Larence 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

Page 46 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix I: 

Methodology 

Objectives, Scope, and 

Page 47 GAO-06-1031

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

In response to a request from the Chairman of the House Judiciary 

Committee and the Ranking Member of the House Committee on 

Homeland Security, we addressed the following questions: 

• To what extent are the numbers of terrorist watch list misidentifications 

known, and generally, how could misidentified persons be affected?1

• What are the major reasons that misidentifications occur, and what 

actions are the Terrorist Screening Center and frontline-screening 

agencies taking to reduce the number of misidentified persons or expedite

them through the screening process? 

• To address concerns from misidentified and mistakenly listed persons, 

what opportunities for redress have the Terrorist Screening Center and 

frontline-screening agencies established?2

Our work generally focused on the screening of travelers, although the 

terrorist watch list is used for a variety of other screening purposes, such 

as conducting background checks of workers who have access to secure 

areas of the national transportation system. In performing our work, we 

focused on the Terrorist Screening Center and three frontline-screening 

agencies—the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection, and the Department of State—whose missions most 

frequently and directly involve interactions with travelers. At the Terrorist 

Screening Center, we interviewed key officials—including the director, 

principal deputy director, chief information officer, and privacy officer—

and reviewed standard operating procedures and other relevant 

documentation. 

Regarding the screening of air passengers against the No Fly and Selectee

lists prior to boarding, in addition to contacting the Transportation 

Security Administration to broadly discuss the procedures of air carriers, 

Objectives 

Scope and 

Methodology 

 1

For purposes of this report, the term “misidentification” refers to a person initially 

matched by a screening agency to a name on the watch list, but upon closer examination, 

the person is found to not match any watch list record. 

2

As used in this report, the term “mistakenly listed persons” includes two categories of 

individuals—(1) persons who never should have been included on the watch list but were

due to some type of error and (2) persons who were appropriately included on the watch 

list at one time but no longer warrant inclusion on the terrorist watch list due to

subsequent events. 

 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

we interviewed security officials at five major, domestic air carriers. At 

their request, the air carriers are not identified in this report. Regarding 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s screening of travelers entering the

United States, besides conducting work at the agency’s headquarters in 

Washington, D.C., we visited various land and air ports of entry in four 

states—California, Michigan, New York, and Texas (see table 2). We 

judgmentally selected these four states because each has major land and 

air ports of entry. Also, the four states are geographically dispersed and 

collectively have ports of entry on both the northern and southern borders 

of the United States. 

Table 2: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Ports of Entry Visited by GAO 

State Land ports of entry Air ports of entry 

California San Ysidro Los Angeles International 

Airport 

Michigan Detroit

Port Huron Detroit Metropolitan Airport 

New York Niagara Falls John F. Kennedy 

International Airport 

Texas Laredo Dallas/Fort Worth

International Airport 

Source: GAO.

Regarding the State Department, we focused on screening of applicants 

for nonimmigrant visas.3

 We performed our work at State Department 

headquarters in Washington, D.C, and did not visit consular offices abroad. 

More details about the scope and methodology of our work regarding each 

of the objectives are presented in the following sections, respectively.

From the Terrorist Screening Center, we obtained statistical information 

on misidentifications covering a 26-month time period—December 2003 

(when the center began operations) to January 2006. These statistics are 

based on screening encounters that were referred for identity verification 

to the center by the frontline-screening agencies, particularly U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection, which conducts screening at ports of entry, and the 

Transportation Security Administration, which provides guidance to air 

Extent That the Numbers 

of Terrorist Watch List 

Misidentifications Are 

Known, and Generally, 

How Misidentified Persons 

Could Be Affected 

 3

A nonimmigrant is a person, not a citizen or national of the United States, seeking to enter 

the United States temporarily for a specific purpose, such as business or pleasure. 

Page 48 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

carriers, receives encounter inquiries from them, and makes applicable

referrals to the center. Frontline-screening agencies are able to resolve 

some misidentifications on their own without having to refer them to the 

center. Similarly, in following federal guidance, airlines may also resolve 

some misidentifications without involving the Transportation Security 

Administration or necessitating subsequent referrals to the Terrorist 

Screening Center. However, the agencies and airlines generally do not 

maintain readily available statistics on how often they do so. Thus, we 

were unable to quantify the universe of terrorist watch-list-related 

misidentifications. However, to provide a contextual perspective, we 

obtained national statistics on the numbers of persons who were subject 

to terrorist watch list screening procedures conducted, for example, in 

fiscal year 2005 at ports of entry. 

To determine how misidentified persons could be affected, we interviewed

officials at the principal frontline-screening agencies—the Transportation 

Security Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the 

Department of State—whose missions most frequently and directly involve 

interactions with travelers. Also, as indicated in table 2, we made on-site 

observations of U.S. Customs and Border Protection screening operations

at various ports of entry in California, Michigan, New York, and Texas. Our 

observations at these locations helped us better understand how the 

name-match screening process can affect misidentified persons, but these

observations are not projectable to other locations. 

To obtain additional information on ways that misidentified individuals 

could be affected by terrorist-watch-list-related screening, we asked the 

Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection to provide us examples of actual complaint letters to review: 

• The Transportation Security Administration provided us a selection of 24 

terrorist watch-list-related complaint letters that the agency received 

during December 1, 2003 (when the Terrorist Screening Center became 

operational) to April 20, 2006. The agency attempted to select letters from 

different weeks throughout this time period; however, because a 

statistically projectable methodology was not used for the selections, the 

24 letters are not representative of all complaints or inquiries (an 

unspecified total) that the Transportation Security Administration 

received during this time period. 

• U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s National Targeting Center provided

us a selection of complaint letters submitted by 28 individuals. The dates 

of the 28 complaint letters encompassed an 11-month period, ranging from

Page 49 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

June 2005 to April 2006. The 28 letters were not selected based on a 

statistically projectable methodology. Thus, the 28 letters are not 

representative of all complaints or inquiries—regarding watch-list-related 

secondary screening at ports of entry—that U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s Customer Satisfaction Unit received during the 11-month time 

period and forwarded for research to the agency’s National Targeting 

Center.4

The scope of our work did not include contacting or interviewing any of 

the individuals who submitted complaint letters to the Transportation 

Security Administration or U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 

To further identify ways that misidentified persons could be affected by

watch-list-related screening, we contacted various associations that 

represent air carriers, travel agencies, and business travelers. Specifically, 

we contacted (1) the Air Transport Association, a trade organization of the

principal U.S. airlines; (2) the American Society of Travel Agents; and (3)

the National Business Travel Association, which represents corporate 

travel management professionals and the travel industry. 

Also, we reviewed the results of a survey that the National Business Travel 

Association conducted in June 2006. According to its Web site 

(www.nbta.org), the association represents over 2,500 corporate travel 

managers and travel service providers who collectively manage and direct 

more than $170 billion of expenditures within the business travel industry, 

primarily for Fortune 1,000 companies. In June 2006, the association 

conducted a survey of 1,316 corporate travel managers; the survey posed a 

range of questions that addressed how terrorist watch list screening by the 

Transportation Security Administration and air carriers affected travelers. 

A total of 444 corporate travel managers responded to the survey. The 

responses may not be representative of all of the association’s corporate 

travel managers. 

 4

According to Customer Satisfaction Unit managers, all complaints regarding the terrorist

watch list are forwarded to the agency’s National Targeting Center, which has access to 

classified information that may be needed to determine if the incidents cited by

complainants involved individuals who either are on the watch list or were misidentified. 

National Targeting Center managers told us that if research indicates that the substance of 

the complaint does involve watch-list-related screening conducted by U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection, the National Targeting Center will draft a response letter, which is to be

signed by the Customer Satisfaction Unit and mailed to the individual. 

Page 50 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Regarding why misidentifications occur, our work focused on interviewing 

officials at and reviewing documentation obtained from the Terrorist 

Screening Center and three frontline-screening agencies—the

Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, and the Department of State. We also interviewed security 

officers at five major domestic air carriers about their role in name-match 

screening against the No Fly and Selectee lists and obtained their views on 

the causes of misidentifications. Further, we reviewed the work of two 

groups regarding factors they have identified that contribute to

misidentifications—the Terrorist Screening Center’s Search Engine 

Standardization Working Group5

 and the Department of Homeland 

Security’s Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee.6

At the Terrorist Screening Center, we interviewed the director, principal 

deputy director, chief information officer, and other senior managers and 

staff regarding data-quality initiatives, including efforts to identify and

correct troublesome records related to misidentifications. Additionally, we

inquired about the status of the center’s efforts to implement 

recommendations made by the Department of Justice’s Office of the 

Major Reasons That 

Misidentifications Occur,

and Actions the Terrorist 

Screening Center and 

Frontline-Screening 

Agencies Are Taking to 

Reduce the Number of 

Misidentified Persons or 

Expedite Them through 

the Screening Process 

Major Reasons That 

Misidentifications Occur 

Actions to Reduce the Number 

of Misidentified Persons or 

Expedite Them through the 

Screening Process 

 5

The working group’s membership includes representatives from the departments of 

Homeland Security (including Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection), State, and Defense; FBI; and the intelligence community (e.g., the 

National Counterterrorism Center, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, 

and Defense Intelligence Agency). Also, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 

acts as a special advisor to the working group. 

6

The charter of the committee is to advise the Secretary of Homeland Security and the

Department of Homeland Security’s chief privacy officer on programmatic, policy, 

operational, administrative, and technological issues within the department’s areas of 

responsibility that affect individual privacy, data integrity, data interoperability, and other 

privacy-related matters. 

Page 51 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Inspector General in its June 2005 report.7 Among other things, the 

Inspector General recommended that the Terrorist Screening Center 

develop procedures to regularly review and test the information contained 

in the consolidated terrorist watch list to ensure that the data are 

complete, accurate, and nonduplicative. 

At the three frontline-screening agencies, we interviewed applicable 

program managers regarding initiatives being taken to expedite frequently

misidentified persons through the screening process. We inquired 

particularly about any computer-based initiatives that use applicable 

databases to help ensure that travelers who have been frequently 

misidentified in the past are no longer subjected to intensive screening, 

unless warranted by new data. 

In further reference to potential initiatives for minimizing 

misidentifications as well as better confirming the identities of terrorists,

we reviewed the Terrorist Screening Center’s strategic plan and discussed 

with center officials the outlook for using biometric data—such as 

fingerprints—to supplement name-based screening. Similarly, in our 

interviews with officials of the frontline-screening agencies, we discussed 

programs that currently use biometric data, such as the U.S. Visitor and 

Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program, which is an 

entry-exit tracking system designed to collect, maintain, and share 

information on selected foreign nationals who travel to the United States.

As used in this report, the term “redress” generally refers to an agency’s 

complaint-resolution process, whereby individuals may seek resolution of 

their concerns about an agency action. We identified elements of the 

opportunities for redress offered by the Terrorist Screening Center and the 

three frontline-screening agencies, and we generally analyzed their 

respective policies and procedures. However, we did not address the 

relation between agency redress and other possible remedies, such as 

judicial review, which involves invoking the legal system through a civil 

action. Rather, the scope of our work focused on means for redress made 

available by agencies for inconvenienced persons.

Redress Opportunities 

Established by the 

Terrorist Screening Center 

and Frontline-Screening 

Agencies to Address 

Concerns from 

Misidentified and 

Mistakenly Listed Persons 

 7

Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Terrorist Screening

Center, Audit Report 05-27 (June 2005). 

Page 52 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

We reviewed the Terrorist Screening Center’s standard operating 

procedures for redress and interviewed the center official (privacy officer)

principally responsible for watch-list-related redress. Also, we obtained 

and reviewed statistics and general disposition or outcome information 

regarding redress queries that the center received and processed to 

completion in calendar year 2005.8

Further, at the three frontline-screening agencies, we reviewed redressrelated documentation, including standard operating procedures and 

training materials, and we interviewed the officials responsible for redress. 

Specifically, we interviewed the Director of the Transportation Security 

Administration’s Office of Transportation Security Redress, the head of 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Customer Satisfaction Unit, and 

program managers at the State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs 

responsible for processing nonimmigrant visa applications. 

Also, to generally determine what watch-list-related redress information 

was publicly available, we reviewed the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

Web site for the Terrorist Screening Center. In turn, from that overview 

Web site (see app. II), we followed up on any online links or references to

the redress processes of the Transportation Security Administration (see 

app. III), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (see app. IV), and the State 

Department. 

In addition, we contacted the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal 

Policy, which has a lead role in ongoing efforts to develop an interagency

memorandum of understanding to help ensure that redress processes are 

formally documented, with clearly established responsibilities for the 

Terrorist Screening Center and all interagency partners. Also, we 

contacted the executive director of the Privacy and Civil Liberties 

Oversight Board to discuss its role in facilitating development of the 

 8

The Terrorist Screening Center defines a “redress query” as communication from 

individuals or their representatives inquiring or complaining about an adverse experience

during a terrorist watch-list-related-screening process conducted or sponsored by a federal

agency, including congressional inquiries to federal agencies on behalf of their 

constituents. 

Page 53 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

interagency memorandum of understanding.9 However, because the 

memorandum of understanding was in draft form at the time of our study, 

we have not had an opportunity to review it. 

In addressing our objectives, we obtained the following statistics from the 

Terrorist Screening Center: Data Reliability 

• The number of watch-list-related screening encounters referred to the 

center by frontline-screening agencies during the period December 

2003 to January 2006. 

• The number and general dispositions of redress queries that the center 

received and processed to completion in calendar year 2005.

We discussed the sources of the data with Terrorist Screening Center 

officials, including the chief information officer, and we reviewed 

documentation regarding the compilation of the statistics. We determined 

that the statistics were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of presenting 

overall patterns and trends. 

 9

The five-member board, which is part of the Executive Office of the President, was 

established by section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2004. Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, 3684-88. The board advises the president and other 

senior executive branch officials as to whether privacy and civil liberties protections are 

appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws, regulations, and

executive branch policies related to efforts to protect the nation against terrorism. The five 

board members were sworn in and had their first meeting on March 15, 2006. Additional 

information about the role of the board and its operations is available at 

www.privacyboard.gov. 

Page 54 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix II: Terrorist Screening Center: Appendix II: TeTerrorist-Watch-List Redress rrorist Screening Center: Process 

Terrorist-Watch-List Redress Process 

This appendix, which consists of two sections, presents publicly available 

information that we copied from the Web site of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation: 

• The first section of the appendix is an overview of the Terrorist Screening 

Center’s watch-list-related redress process and also presents contact 

information for three frontline-screening agencies—the Transportation 

Security Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the 

Department of State. 

• The second section covers frequently asked questions. 

Overview and Contact Information 

[Copied from the FBI’s Web site, www.fbi.gov. Accessed August 2006.]

“The Terrorist Screening Center cannot confirm or deny whether an 

individual is on the consolidated terrorist watch list, because this 

information is derived from classified and sensitive law enforcement and 

intelligence. The nondisclosure of the contents of the watch list protects 

the operational counterterrorism and intelligence collection objectives of 

the government, as well as the personal safety of those involved in 

counterterrorism investigations. The watch list remains an effective tool in

the government’s counterterrorism efforts because its contents are not 

disclosed. 

“The Terrorist Screening Center works with other agencies on a daily basis 

to resolve complaints from individuals who are experiencing repeated 

delays or difficulties during a screening process that may be related to the

terrorist watch list. Because individuals may experience problems during 

screening for any number of reasons, and not just because of the terrorist 

watch list, individuals should contact the agency that is conducting the 

screening process in question. The screening agency is in the best position 

to resolve issues. 

“Contact information: 

“The Terrorist Screening Center does not accept redress inquiries directly 

from the public. Members of the public should contact the relevant 

screening agency with complaints about a negative screening experience.

“Please direct the public to contact the following screening agencies to 

submit a complaint about a negative screening experience. 

Page 55 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix II: Terrorist Screening Center: 

Terrorist-Watch-List Redress Process 

For air passenger screening: 

Transportation Security Administration Ombudsman 

Phone: (866) 289-9673 

Email: tsa-contactcenter@dhs.gov 

Online: TSA Traveler Identity Verification Program1

For U.S. borders and ports of entry: 

Customs and Border Protection 

Customer Satisfaction Unit2

 

1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Room 5.5C 

Washington, DC 20229 

Phone: (202) 344-1968 

Fax: (202) 344-2791 

Online: Interagency Border Inspection System Fact Sheet3

For visas: 

Director, Information Management Liaison (CA/VO/I) 

Bureau of Consular Affairs, SA-1 

U.S. Department of State 

Washington, D.C. 20520

FAX: (202) 663-3535 

Online: Bureau of Consular Affairs” 

“Frequently Asked Questions” 

[Copied from the FBI’s Web site, www.fbi.gov. Accessed August 2006.]

 1

See appendix III. 

2

On September 12, 2006, in providing technical comments on a draft of this report, U.S.

Customs and Border Protection officials noted that the contact information given on the 

FBI’s Web site should be as follows: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Freedom of 

Information Act/Privacy Act Branch. Also, the comments noted that the telephone number

should be removed. We suggested to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials that 

they coordinate with the FBI to ensure that appropriate contact information is available to 

the public. 

3

See appendix IV for a copy of the fact sheet. 

Page 56 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix II: Terrorist Screening Center: 

Terrorist-Watch-List Redress Process 

“Why was the Terrorist Screening Database created? 

Prior to the creation of the terrorist-screening database, information about 

known or suspected terrorists was dispersed throughout the U.S. 

government and no one agency was charged with consolidating it and 

making it available for use in terrorist screening. Under Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive-6, the Terrorist Screening Center now 

provides “one-stop shopping” so that every government screener is using 

the same terrorist watch list—whether it is an airport screener, an 

embassy official issuing visas overseas, or a state or local law enforcement 

officer on the street. The Terrorist Screening Center allows government 

agencies to run name checks against the same comprehensive list with the 

most accurate, up-to-date information about known and suspected 

terrorists. 

Who gets included in the terrorist-screening database? 

Per Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6, only individuals who are 

known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct

constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism are 

included in the terrorist-screening database. 

Does the terrorist screening database contain information on 

domestic terrorists, like Timothy McVeigh? 

Yes. The terrorist-screening database contains information on both 

international and domestic terrorists. 

Does the terrorist-screening database contain information on 

people who have been convicted of a crime? 

The purpose of the terrorist-screening database is not to hold information 

on individuals who have been convicted of a crime; however, an individual

appropriately included in the terrorist-screening database may also have a 

criminal history. None of the information pertaining to the criminal history 

is contained or referenced in the terrorist-screening database. 

Are there U.S. citizens in the terrorist-screening database? 

Yes, U.S. citizens are included in terrorist-screening database if they meet 

the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 terrorism nexus criteria.

Page 57 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix II: Terrorist Screening Center: 

Terrorist-Watch-List Redress Process 

Can I find out if I am in the terrorism screening database? 

The Terrorist Screening Center cannot reveal whether a particular person 

is in the terrorist-screening database. The terrorist-screening database 

remains an effective tool in the government’s counterterrorism efforts 

because its contents are not disclosed. If the Terrorist Screening Center 

revealed who was in the terrorist-screening database, terrorist 

organizations would be able to circumvent the purpose of the terrorist 

watch list by determining in advance which of their members are likely to 

be questioned or detained. 

I am having trouble when I try to fly or cross the border into the 

United States. Does this mean I am in the terrorist-screening 

database? 

No. At security checkpoints like our nation’s borders, there are many law 

enforcement or security reasons that an individual may be singled out for 

additional screening. Most agencies have redress offices (e.g., 

Ombudsman) where individuals who are experiencing repeated problems 

can seek help. If an individual is experiencing these kinds of difficulties, 

he/she should cooperate with the agency screeners and explain the 

recurring problems. The screeners can supply instructions on how to raise 

concerns to the appropriate agency redress office. 

I have been told that I am on a terrorist watch list by an airline 

employee and I frequently have difficulty when I fly. Does this 

mean I am in the terrorist-screening database? 

No; however, an individual may be a “misidentified person.” A 

misidentified person is someone who is experiencing a delay during 

screening because they have a similar name to a person in the terroristscreening database. Misidentified persons are sometimes delayed while 

the government works to distinguish them from the terrorist in the 

terrorist-screening database. Because these delays are frustrating and 

inconvenient, there are several initiatives in progress to help streamline 

the clearance process for misidentified persons. If an individual believes 

he/she is having a misidentification problem, he/she should contact the 

screening agency’s redress office for assistance. 

Page 58 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix II: Terrorist Screening Center: 

Terrorist-Watch-List Redress Process 

Are individuals removed from the terrorist-screening database? 

Yes. The Terrorist Screening Center works with partner agencies through

a formal process to remove individuals who no longer meet the Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive-6 terrorism criteria. 

How does the Terrorist Screening Center ensure that the terroristscreening database is accurate? 

The Terrorist Screening Center has a staff dedicated to redress and quality 

assurance that conducts comprehensive as well as case-specific reviews of 

terrorist-screening database records to ensure they are current, accurate, 

and thorough. The Terrorist Screening Center conducts research and 

coordinates with other federal agencies to ensure the terrorist record is as 

complete, accurate, and thorough as possible. The Terrorist Screening 

Center’s redress and quality assurance process has resulted in the 

correction or removal of hundreds of records in the terrorist-screening 

database. 

What are the Terrorist Screening Center’s redress procedures? 

See the TSC Redress Procedures webpage for details. [GAO note: The 

procedures are copied in the first section of this appendix.] 

Does the Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight 

program have anything to do with the terrorist-screening database? 

Secure Flight is a congressionally mandated program that will check the 

names and dates of birth of passengers on domestic flights against the 

terrorist-screening database. As with all government programs that screen 

for terrorists, the Terrorist Screening Center provides this program 

support to ensure that terrorist identity matches are correct. 

What prevents the Terrorist Screening Center from violating the 

civil liberties of Americans? 

The Terrorist Screening Center only receives information collected by

other government entities with pre-existing authority to do so. Each 

agency that contributes data to the Terrorist Screening Center must 

comply with legislation, as well as its own policies and procedures to 

protect privacy rights and civil liberties. The handling and use of 

information, including information about U.S. citizens and legal 

immigrants, is governed by the same statutory, regulatory, and 

Page 59 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix II: Terrorist Screening Center: 

Terrorist-Watch-List Redress Process 

constitutional requirements as if the information was not to be included in

a Terrorist Screening Center managed database.”

Page 60 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix III: Transportation S

Admin

Program 

ecurity

istration: Traveler Identity Verification

Page 61 GAO-06-1031

Appendix III: Transportation Security 

Administration: Traveler Identity Verification 

Program 

This appendix presents an overview of the Transportation Security 

Administration’s (TSA) traveler identify verification program for air 

passengers who are affected by terrorist watch list screening. An 

individual can voluntarily provide TSA with additional personal-identifying 

information, which the agency will use to decide whether the person’s 

name should be put on a cleared list—that is, a list that contains the names 

and other personal-identifying information of individuals who have been 

checked and cleared as being persons not on the No Fly and Selectee lists. 

Airlines are to use the cleared list to more quickly determine that these 

passengers are not the persons whose names are on the No Fly and 

Selectee lists. As needed, TSA provides the airlines with updates of the No

Fly and Selectee lists and the cleared list. 

Specific information about TSA’s traveler identity verification program is 

publicly available on the agency’s Web site (www.tsa.gov). The following 

sections of this appendix reproduce—as exhibits A and B—relevant

information from TSA’s Web site (accessed August 2006): 

• Exhibit A: Our Traveler Identity Verification Program. 

• Exhibit B: Traveler Identity Verification (TSA Form 2301, May 2006). 

Generally, to participate in the program, an individual must complete a 

traveler identity verification form and return the form and copies of 

specified identity documents to TSA. 

“Told that you are on a Federal Government Watch List? 

Problems printing your boarding pass at the kiosk or from home? 

Experience other delays while checking-in for flights? 

Our Office of Transportation Security Redress is here to help with our new 

Traveler Identity Verification Program. 

Why am I having these problems? 

TSA and the airlines are required to check and confirm that you are 

properly identified prior to your flight for safety and security. You may 

experience inconveniences when you present your identification during 

check-in due to mistaken identity or incorrect information. Our Traveler 

Identity Verification Program works with the relevant parties (including 

airlines) to resolve any inaccuracies or inconsistencies that may have 

resulted in misidentifications. 

Exhibit A: “Our 

Traveler Identity 

Verification Program” 

 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix III: Transportation Security

Administration: Traveler Identity Verification

Program 

Am I on the No-Fly List?! 

If you receive a boarding pass, you are not on the No-Fly List. Most 

commonly, passengers who are told that they are on the No-Fly List have, 

in fact, a similar name to an individual on the Watch Lists. 

What do I need to do? 

You are invited to participate in the TSA Traveler Identity Verification 

Program by completing and returning the following information to TSA: 

• Traveler Identity Verification Form (WORD 145 KB) 

• A copy of your U.S. passport OR 

• Copies of three of the following: 

• Driver’s License 

• Birth Certificate 

• Voter Registration 

• Military ID Card 

• Visa 

• Naturalization Card 

• Government ID Card 

How does TSA review my information? 

Your submission is reviewed to determine if the delays are caused by 

mistaken identity or incorrect information. TSA will respond to you in 

writing and provide air carriers with your identifying information to help 

properly identify you at check-in and expedite your future travel. 

I participated in the Traveler Identity Verification Program, but 

I’m still experiencing problems. 

Airline check-in procedures must still be followed. We currently 

distribute the Watch Lists to the airlines, who compare your reservation 

information to the Watch Lists prior to your flight. The airlines use varying

procedures and technology to conduct this comparison, which could 

inadvertently lead to continued delays. 

We are developing a program called Secure Flight to enhance the security

of air travel in the U.S. while reducing security-related delays for the 

traveling public. It will allow the federal government, instead of individual 

airlines, to compare passenger data against the Watch Lists prior to checkin at the airport, while fully protecting privacy and civil liberties. 

Page 62 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix III: Transportation Security

Administration: Traveler Identity Verification

Program 

Our goal going forward is to ensure travelers’ security with 

minimal disruptions. 

Please note that you will be subject to screening procedures at the 

checkpoint. Every passenger will still walk through a metal detector, their 

carry-on bags will still be X-rayed, and every checked bag will still be 

screened for explosives. Additionally, you may be randomly selected at the 

airline counter or upon arrival at the checkpoint for secondary screening.

We will continue to work with travelers to minimize any unnecessary 

delays. We will continue to look at process and technology improvements 

to ensure a safe and efficient travel experience.” 

Page 63 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix III: Transportation Security

Administration: Traveler Identity Verification

Program 

Exhibit B: Traveler 

Identity Verification 

(TSA Form 2301, May 

2006) 

Page 64 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix III: Transportation Security

Administration: Traveler Identity Verification

Program 

Page 65 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix IV: U

Protection: Online 

.S. Customs and Border 

Information 

Page 66 GAO-06-1031

Appendix IV: U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection: Online Information 

Background and 

Preliminary 

Observation 

Appendix II provides an overview of the redress process used by the 

Terrorist Screening Center for addressing complaints or concerns 

resulting from the use of terrorist watch lists to screen individuals. As 

stated in appendix II, the Terrorist Screening Center is to work with 

frontline-screening agencies to resolve complaints from individuals who 

are experiencing repeated delays or difficulties during a screening process 

that may be related to a terrorist watch list. For instance, the Terrorist 

Screening Center’s overview guidance notes that complainants 

experiencing such problems at U.S. borders and ports of entry should 

contact U.S. Customs and Border Protection. In further reference to the 

redress process for misidentifications of these individuals, the overview 

guidance provides an online link to the U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s Interagency Border Inspection System Fact Sheet

(reproduced below). The fact sheet does not specifically mention terrorist 

watch lists and the redress process. 

However, U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Web site (www.cbp.gov), 

which can be directly accessed by the public, does provide information 

regarding the agency’s Customer Satisfaction Unit and how complaints are 

handled as well as information on trusted-traveler programs. 

GAO note: The fact sheet consists solely of the following six questions and 

answers, which we copied from the Web site of U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (accessed August 2006). 

“IBIS is the acronym for the Interagency Border Inspection System.” 

“In addition to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, law enforcement and

regulatory personnel from 20 other federal agencies or bureaus use IBIS. 

Some of these agencies are the Federal Bureau of Investigation; U.S. 

National Central Bureau of the International Criminal Police Organization; 

the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives; the Internal Revenue Service; the Coast Guard; 

the Federal Aviation Administration; the Secret Service; and the Animal 

and Plant Health Inspection Service, just to name a few. Also, information 

from IBIS is shared with the Department of State for use by Consular 

Officers at U.S. Embassies and Consulates.” 

Interagency Border 

Inspection System 

Fact Sheet 

“What Is IBIS?” 

“Who Uses IBIS?” 

Terrorist Watch List and Redr
Appendix IV: U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection: Online Information 

“IBIS assists the majority of the traveling public with the expeditious 

clearance at ports of entry while allowing the border enforcement 

agencies to focus their limited resources on those potential non-compliant 

travelers. IBIS provides the law enforcement community with access to 

computer-based enforcement files of common interest. It also provides 

access to the FBI’s National Crime Information Center and allows its users 

to interface with all fifty states via the National Law Enforcement 

Telecommunications Systems.” 

“IBIS resides on the Treasury Enforcement Communications System at the 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Data Center. Field level access is 

provided by an IBIS network with more than 24,000 computer terminals. 

These terminals are located at air, land, and sea ports of entry.” 

“IBIS keeps track of information on suspect individuals, businesses, 

vehicles, aircraft, and vessels. IBIS terminals can also be used to access 

National Crime Information Center records on wanted persons, stolen 

vehicles, vessels or firearms, license information, criminal histories, and 

previous Federal inspections. The information is used to assist law 

enforcement and regulatory personnel.” 

“Any concerns you may have as an international traveler or importer about 

the use or application of IBIS may be addressed to: 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Freedom of Information Act/ 

Customer Satisfaction Unit 

Room 5.5 C 

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20229” 

“What Does IBIS Provide?” 

“Where Is IBIS?” 

“What Information Is in 

IBIS?” 

“Additional Questions?” 

Page 67 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redr
Appendix V: Comments from the Department Appendix V of Homeland Security : Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 68 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 69 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 70 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix VI: Comments from the State Appendix VI: Comments from the State Department 

Department 

Page 71 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix VI: Comments from the State 

Department 

Page 72 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
Appendix VI: Comments from the State 

Department 

(440374) Page 73 GAO-06-1031 Terrorist Watch List and Redress
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