No. 2-- 06--1134 Fil ed: 10-25-07

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPL

E OF TH E STATE ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court OF ILLINOIS, ) o f D u P ag e C o un t y. ) Plai ntif f-A ppel le e, ) ) v. ) No. 06-- DT--4395 ) RONALD M. MIZAUR, ) Ho no r ab le ) Br uc e R . Ke lse y, De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. ) Judge, Presi din g.

______________________________________________________________________________ JU STI CEBY

RNE de l i v er ed th e op i n i on of th e c our t: The iss ue r ais ed in t his a pp ea l is w he t he rt he he ar ing da t e d eline at ed o n a ba il bo nd is considered

the sam e as "the f

irst appearan

ce da t e o n t he Un

i f orm Tra f f i c Ti cket," f or pu rpos esof
se cti on 2- -1 18. 1( b) o f the Il l i

noi s Ve hi cle Code (Code) (6 25 IL CS 5/2 --118.1 (b) (W est 200 6)). We det er mine t hat t he da t e liste d o n a bail bond is synonymou s wit h "t he fir st app ear ance dat e o n t he Uni f orm T raf f i c Ticket." On Septem b er 27 , 20 06 , de f

en da n t, Ron al d M . M iza

ur , w as ch arge d b y com pl ai n t wi th dr iving whi le under the i

nf lue nce of a lc ohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11--501( a) (2) (West 200 6)). Defend ant was al so ticketedfor spe eding ( 625 ILC S 5 /1 1- -6 01( b) ( West 200 6) ) a nd impro per lane usage (6 25 I LCS 5/ 11- -7 09 ( West 200 6) ). The t icket s pr ovid ed t hat t he cler k o f the cir cu it court
wo uld n oti f

y de f en da n t ab out hi s c ourt dat e. The bail bond iss ued t o d efenda nt for all of t heNo. 2-- 06--1134

-2-

violat ions in

dic ated that defen

dant was requi

redto appear i

n court o n Novem

ber 1, 2006, and answer t he ch ar ge s a ga inst him. Because de f

en da nt ref us ed to su bm i t to chem i cal tes ti ng to de term

i ne hi s b l ood al coh

ol
co ncent ra t ion, his dr iving pr ivileg es we r e s umma r ily suspended (625 ILCS 5 /11--5 01.1( d), ( e) (West 2006) ). De f

en da nt p eti ti one d to re sc i

nd hi s s um mary su sp en si on on Septembe

r28, 200 6. A hear ing on d efenda nt 's petition wa s not conducted withi n the n ext 30 day s. Rather, on Novemb er 1, 2006, 34 days a fte r d efenda nt filed his peti tion to resci nd, d ef endan t oral l y moved to resci nd h i s su m mary su sp ensi on because he was n ot aff orded a hearin

g withi n 30 day s af ter he fi le d hi s petiti on to resci

nd. The t r ial c o ur t de nie d t he mo t io n, find ing t ha t t he No ve mbe r 1, 20 06 , he ar ing da t e w as t imely pur sua nt to sec t ion 2
-- 118 .1 (b) of t he Code, because Novem ber 1, 2006, was the f

irst appearan

ce date. Afte r a hear ing o n t he merit s, t he t rial co ur t denied defend ant 's pe t itio n t o r esc ind his su m mary suspen si on, and def

endan t t im el y a ppeal ed. Reso lving th e iss ue ra i se d on appe al n ec es sa ri l y b eg i n s wi th examining sect ion 2
-- 118 .1 (b) of the Code. Section 2-- 118.1( b) of the Code pr ovides:

"Wit hin 90 day s af

ter t he n ot ic e of statuto ry s

um ma ry s uspe nsi

on served un

der Sec ti on 11--50 1.1 [62 5 ILC S 5/11 --501.1 (We st 2006 )], t he person m ay ma ke a written request fo ra ju dic ial he ar ing in the c i rcui t court of v

en ue. Th e requ est to the c i

rcui t court sha ll sta te th e groun dsupon whi ch

the p erson

see ks to ha ve the statutory s

um mary su sp ensi on resc i nde d. Within 3 0 days af ter r eceipt of the writt en request o r the first appearance

da t e o n t he Un ifo r m Tr affic Ticket iss ue d p ur suan

t to a vi ola

tion of Se cti on 11-
- 501 [625 ILCS 5/11--501 (West 2006) ], or a simil ar pr ovisio n of a loca l or dinance , t he hear ingshal

l b e conduc te d by

the ci rcuit court havi

ng j urisdi ction. Thi s j udic ia

l h earin g,No. 2-- 06--1134

-3-

r eq ue st , o rpr o ce ss sha ll

not stay or del ay

the statut ory sum

ma ry s uspens ion. The

heari ngs sha ll pr o ce ed in

t he co ur t in the sam

e m an ner as i n othe r ci vi l procee di ngs ." 625 ILCS 5/2-- 118.1( b) (W est 200 6). In in terpret in g section 2--118.1(b) of the Code, we m ust ascertain a

nd gi ve ef fect to t he le g islatu re 's i

nten t. People v . Bywa

ter , 2 23 I ll. 2d 4 77, 481 (2 006 ). The best indicat ion o f the le gislat ur e's int en t is t he lan gu ag e u se d in t he st at ut e, wh ich mus t be giv en it s p lain a nd o r din ar y me ani ng. People v . McC l

ure , 218 Ill . 2d375, 38 2 (200 6). Ordin aril y, wh en the statuto ry l

anguage is unam bi guou s, cou

rts m us t con stru

e the s tatute

aswri tten , wi thou t res orti ng to othe r ai dsof
constructi on. By

water , 223 Ill. 2d at 481 . H ow ever , " t he co ur t s must co nst ru e t he acts to refl ect t he obv i ous i nten t of the l egi slature ev en if

the words of a particul

ar section m

ust be read as m

odif ie d
or al tered so as to com

por t wi th the l egi slati ve i nten t." Peo ple v. Ring , 41 Il

l . 2d 305 , 313 (1 968). Court s m ust construe t he statute as a whol e, beari ng i n m in d the subj ect that t he statute addresses
and the l egi slature' s ap

paren t obj ecti ve i n enacti ng i t. By water , 223 Ill . 2d at 481-82. "The ov eral

l pu rp ose of th e l eg i sl atu rei n en ac ti n g th e s um mar y su sp ensi on sch em e w as to prot ect thos e w

ho tr avel on o ur hig hw ays an d a ss ist in t he de t er minat io n [ o f] wh et he rmo t o rve hic le dri vers suspected of i

ntoxica tion are i n f act under the i

nf lue nce of alcohol." Pe opl

e v . D oty , 16 4 I ll. App. 3d 53, 56 (1987) . In ord er to me et that pur pose, "Ill in ois courts have c onsi stently hel d that
se cti on 11--50 1.1 [and related pro vi sions] should b e li berall y construed." Doty

, 16 4 I ll. App. 3d at 56. We revi

ew the construction of a statute de no vo . P eo pl e v . Mo nt o ya , 373 Ill . App. 3d78, 81 (2007 ). Here, altho ugh t he pla in la nguage of s ection 2--118.1(b) of the Code speci fi cally provides that
a defen dant is aff orded a t imely

hear ing if he is given a hea ring on th e f i rs t appe ara

nc e d atel i ste d onNo. 2-- 06--1134

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t he Un ifo r m Tr affic T ick et , we ca nno t co nc lud e t ha t t he firs t ap pe ar an ce da t e ma y ap pe ar o nly on t he traffi c ticket. As n

ot ed , the legisl ature en acted sect i on 2- -1 18 .1(

b ) of th e C ode

to prom ote hi ghway saf ety . People v . Domi

nguez , 36 7 I ll. A pp . 3d 17 1, 17 4- 75 ( 20 06 )
. T ha t o bje ct ive wo uld be thwa rted i f we we re to construe se cti on 2--1 18.1(b) as provi di ng th at the f i rs t appe aran

ce da te
ma y appe ar on

l y on th e d ef en da nt' s tra f f i c ti cket. Ind ee d, a de f en da nt c oul d e sc ap e re sp ons i

bi l i ty f or dr unk dri vi ng m erel y be caus e hi s f

i rs t appearan ce date appears onl y on h is bai l b ond. See Domi nguez , 367 Ill . App. 3d at 175. Cour ts have repeatedl y c riti cized resci ssions bas ed on such technical ities , especial ly

because court s are to li

beral ly construe section

2--118 .1(b ). See Domi

nguez , 367 Ill . App. 3d at 174-75. We add re ssed t he sa me issue in People v . Grange , 181 Ill . App. 3d 981 (1989 ), ove rrul ed on ot her gr ou nds by People v . Schaef er , 1 54 I ll. 2d 2 50 ( 199 3) . I n Grange , t he de fendant was arrested for DUI on January

28, 1988, and charged

by verifi ed com pl ai nt. Grange , 181 Ill . App. 3d at 982. The defen

dant 's dr iving privileges w er e su bseq uent ly suspend ed, and he pet itio ned t o r esc ind t he
su sp ensi on on February

3, 1988. In hi s petiti on, the defen dant requesteda h

ea ri n g date of March 4, 1988, whic h t he d efe nda nt belie ved wa s his ar ra ignme nt da t e. In ac t ua lity, t he d efe n da n t' s ar ra ignment da t e w as Ma r ch 7, 19 88
. On Ma r ch 7, 19 88 , t he de fen da nt mo ve d t o dis miss his
sus pens ion, claiming that he wa s no t giv en a h ea r ing wit hin 30 day s of f

il in g hi s petiti on. The trial courtgr ant ed t he de fendant 's moti on to dism i ss , a n d th e S tate appe aled. Grange , 181 Ill . App. 3d at 982-83. We rev erse d. Grange , 181 Ill . App. 3d at 98 3. W e dete rm i n ed th at, because

the Stat e was ready to proceed on the defen

dant's p etition to resci

nd on the f

irst appearan

ce date--t he March

7, 1988, ar ra ignment dat e- -t he de fendant was af forded a ti mel y h ea ri n g, as a h ea ri n g on a p eti ti on toNo. 2-- 06--1134

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re scind mus t t ake place wit hin 30 d ays o f eithe r t he fili ng o f a pet itio n orthe fi

rst appearance date. Grange , 18 1 I ll. App. 3d a t 984 -8 5. In r eac hingt hat co nclusio n, w e o bser ved t hat t he de fendant 's fi rst app ear ance dat e did no t app ear on a ny of t he t ra ffi c t icket s t hat t he defen

dant was i ssued. Grange , 18 1 I ll. App. 3d a t 985 . R at her , t he first app ear ance dat e wa s liste d o n t he de fendant 's ba il bon d. Grange , 181 Ill . App. 3d at 985. That fact did n ot chan ge our holdi

ng, beca use the i ssuan

ce of a traf f i c ti cket i s discre

tion ary, no t man da t o ry, a nd t he mer e r efe r en ce t o a " Un ifo r m Tr affic Ticket" in section 2--118.1(b) of the Code does not " req ui re th at the f i rs t ap pe ara

nc e d ateappe ar on a uniform traffi c ticket bef ore t he [trial

] court is al lowed the di scretion to conduct a r esc ission he ar ing on the first appearance dat e." Grange , 181 Ill . App. 3d at 985. Defend ant argues th at Grangei s n ot contro ll

in g because our supreme court o verrul ed Grange in Schaef er . Howev

er, as the State obse rve s, Schaef

er overruled Grangeon a poi n t i rre l ev an t to t his app eal. In Grange , we

exerc i se d our

di screti on t o ad dr es s a n iss ue t ha t t he St at e d id not ra ise and concl uded that, as an additional ground t o reverse t he t rial co ur t , r equ est inga h ea ri ng on a pe ti ti on to re scindrequi

res th e def endan t to do more tha

n j ust f i l e the peti tion
. Grange , 181 Ill . App. 3d at 986. Our sup re me co ur t ove rr uled o n t his gro und in Schaef er , hol di n g th at, to req ue st a he ari ng on a petition to resci

nd, a def endan t need not do anythi

ng m ore t han f i l e the p eti

ti on w i th th e c l erk of the c i rcui t court and

serv e notice of the peti

tion on the State. Schaef

er , 154 Ill . 2d at 264. Citing People v . Rodriguez , 251 Il l . Ap p. 3d 52 1 (199 3), and Pe o ple v. Ha rr is , 222 Ill . App. 3d 10 89 (1 99 1) , de f

en da n t also c on ten dsth at Grangesho uld no t be fo llo wed becaus e " [c ]ou rts sho uld no t r ea d a st at ut e a s t o en co mpa ss o t he rfo r ms o f ch ar gin g in st rume nt s w hic h a r e s pe cific ally excl uded." To be sure, the statut e at issue in Rodriguez and Ha rr is , section 114--4(e) of the Code of Cr im ina l Pr o ce du r e o f 19 63 ( I ll. R ev . St at . 19 91 , ch
. 38 , pa r . 11 4-
- 4( e) ) , men t io ns o nlyNo. 2-- 06--1134

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i n di ctm en ts an d i n f orm ati on s, an d c our ts h av e dete rm i n ed th at th e statu te excl udes otherchar ging instruments. See, e.g. , Rodriguez , 251 Ill . App. 3d at 523 (section 114- -4( e) appl i es onl y to i n di ctm en ts and info rmat ions, not t o c riminal complaint s and uni f orm traf f i c ti ckets ). Here , however, se cti on 2--118 .1(b ) of th

e Code can not be constru ed so technically . In li ght of the l

ib eral
constru cti on that we must gi

ve to that sect ion, we dee

m irre levant any

constructi on of

section 114-- 4(e). For these reasons, the j udgme nt of the ci

rcuit court o f Du Page C ounty i s af fi rmed. Af fi rmed. O' MA LL EY an d GILLERA

N JO HNSO

N, JJ ., conc

ur.