Filed 3/30/21 In re L.L. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re L.L. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B307013

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E.L. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct.

Nos. 20CCJP03062A, 

19CCJP03062B)

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Annabelle G. Cortez, Judge. Affirmed.

Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant E.L.

Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant R.L.
2

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jane Kwon, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

——————————

E.L. (mother) and R.L. (father) appeal from the orders of 

the juvenile court asserting dependency jurisdiction over their 

two daughters, removing the children from father’s custody, and 

ordering father to complete a drug and alcohol program. We 

affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The family came to the attention of the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in May 

2020, after the parents’ 10-year-old daughter, L.L., told law 

enforcement that father touched her inappropriately while they 

were lying on a bed together.

The incident occurred in the family’s home while mother 

was at work and L.L.’s 22-month-old sister, K.L., was asleep in 

the back bedroom. L.L. told police and, later, a DCFS social 

worker, that on the evening of May 18, 2020, father entered the 

main bedroom where she was sitting and closed the blinds. L.L. 

thought father’s behavior was strange, so she went to the back 

bedroom to wake up K.L. Father went to the back bedroom, 

picked L.L. up by the waist, carried her to the main bedroom, sat 

her on the bed, and told her to stay there. He then moved L.L. to 

the center of the bed, laid her down, and got on the bed next to 

her. Father pulled L.L. by the shoulder to face him and began 

rubbing her thigh. L.L. told a police officer that father wrapped 

her legs around one of his legs. Father then touched L.L.’s 
3

buttocks three times; L.L. said father “grabbed her butt and 

caressed her thighs” during the incident. 

L.L. knew the difference between a bad touch and a good 

touch and stated that it was common for her family to pat each 

other on the buttocks. However, on this occasion, L.L. was 

uncomfortable because she thought father was going to “do 

something” when he closed the blinds and mother was not home. 

L.L. was scared and felt her heart beating faster than usual as 

she and father were lying on the bed. When father got up and 

went into the kitchen, L.L. closed herself in the bathroom. She 

text messaged her mother, “mami,” about five times. When 

mother did not respond, L.L. called 911 but was unable to get 

through. She next sent a message to a friend who called police 

for her. 

Father was arrested for sexual battery pursuant to Penal 

Code section 243.4, subdivision (e)(1). He was released the next 

day and not charged with a crime. After father returned home 

the family resumed their normal routines. Father continued to 

care for the children alone while mother was not home. 

DCFS received a referral on May 19, 2020, and opened an

investigation. Social workers interviewed L.L., mother, and 

father on May 21, 2020, and again in June 2020. L.L. told a 

social worker father had touched her in a similar manner by 

patting her buttocks on two other occasions during an out-of-state 

trip when she was sharing a bed with him. L.L. did not tell 

anyone about these prior incidents. After father’s arrest, L.L. 

told mother about the most recent incident. She was sad because 

mother did not believe her, even though mother had previously 

told her to speak up if anything ever made her feel 

uncomfortable. 
4

According to L.L., her parents frequently argued. 

Sometimes the arguments became physical and mother and 

father pushed each other. L.L. said, “What I am living is not 

safe.” She once heard mother slap father during an argument. 

Another time, she heard mother and father arguing about an 

incident where father threw keys at mother’s stomach, causing 

mother pain. L.L. stated that father usually drank alcohol on 

weekends and her parents argued when father was drinking. 

L.L. felt uncomfortable when her father drank because he used 

“bad words” and talked to the family like he was “crazy.” 

Mother told DCFS she was shocked by the sexual abuse 

allegations and did not believe father was abusing the children. 

She confirmed that L.L. had text messaged her multiple times on 

the day of the incident. She did not respond because she was not 

allowed to use her cellphone at work. Mother interpreted father’s 

conduct toward L.L. as a show of affection, not sexual abuse. 

However, prior to police and DCFS involvement, mother had 

considered telling father that they should stop patting each other 

on the buttocks because someone could perceive it negatively as

L.L. was getting older. Mother said that L.L. had never appeared

distressed around father and had a strong bond with him. 

Mother initially denied any domestic violence, but then

admitted she had once slapped father about two or three years 

earlier. Mother claimed the incident with the keys was an 

accident, stating that father threw the keys, but she failed to 

catch them and they hit her in the stomach. She denied that she 

and father pushed each other. However, she admitted that while 

the family was living in Guatemala, she and father argued more,

and father drank excessively. According to mother, in 

Guatemala, the parents argued two to three times per week, 
5

usually over money, and they called each other derogatory 

names, but never in L.L.’s presence. Mother insisted “Guatemala 

is separate.” 

Still, mother said her recent arguments with father 

stemmed from his drinking and she did not like it when father 

drank. She reported that on the weekends, father typically drank 

a six-pack of beer alone in his car. Mother asked father to stop 

drinking alcohol so that he could spend more time with the 

family. She denied that father’s drinking impacted his parenting 

and said she cared for the children when father was drinking. 

Father told a social worker that on the day of the May 2020 

incident, L.L. had been watching television and playing on the 

floor in the back bedroom where K.L. was sleeping. Father was 

concerned that L.L. was making too much noise and would wake 

K.L. so he moved L.L. to the main bedroom. He admitted that he 

got on the bed next to L.L., kissed her three times on the cheek,

and said, “I love you daughter.” Father then spanked L.L. three 

times on her buttocks, with an open hand and over her clothes. 

Father confirmed that he and L.L. travelled out-of-state 

together and slept in the same bed throughout the trip. He said 

that on two separate nights, he hugged L.L. and told her, “I love 

you momma,” before he spanked her three times, lightly, on her 

buttocks, over her clothes. Father described his actions as 

playful and innocent in nature. He never sensed that L.L. was 

uncomfortable. Father had noticed, however, that L.L. was 

moodier lately and appeared self-conscious that her body was 

maturing. Father observed L.L. trying to hide her developing 

breasts by hunching her back. 

Father denied any domestic violence with mother, but 

admitted the slapping incident had occurred. He also said that 
6

the incident with the car keys was an accident. Father confirmed 

that he and mother pushed each other and argued weekly over 

money while the family lived in Guatemala. According to father, 

he and mother yelled or called each other names, but if their 

verbal disagreements escalated, father would leave the home and 

go for a walk. 

DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300 

petition on behalf of L.L. and K.L., under subdivisions (a), (b), (d), 

and (j), alleging that the children were at serious risk of harm

from the parents’ domestic violence, father’s alcohol abuse, and 

father’s sexual abuse of L.L. The juvenile court found prima facie 

evidence that L.L. and K.L. were persons described by section 

300 and detained them from father. It released the children to 

mother and granted father monitored visits. The juvenile court 

also ordered random alcohol testing for father.2 

At the jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court admitted 

DCFS’s combined jurisdiction and disposition report, evidence 

that father arrived for drug testing but could not test because his 

name was not on the list, and a sign-in sheet showing father had 

attended eight alcoholics anonymous sessions. After hearing 

argument, the juvenile court sustained all counts of the petition. 

The court found the domestic violence was unresolved, recurring, 

and not a one-time incident. The court also found a nexus 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.

2 At some point before the jurisdictional hearing the 

parents indicated they were willing to participate in a contract 

for informal supervision, but only if father was allowed to return 

to the family home.
7

between father’s ongoing alcohol consumption and the parents’ 

domestic violence, noting the parents’ arguments stemmed from 

father’s alcohol use, mother became upset when father drank, 

and the issue remained unresolved. 

In sustaining the sexual abuse counts, the juvenile court 

noted the record included multiple incidents of a sexual nature. 

The court found L.L.’s statements to police officers and DCFS 

were consistent and she demonstrated fear and discomfort with 

father’s actions. She tried to awaken K.L. after the incident, 

texted mother six times, and when mother did not respond, she 

told her friend that she was uncomfortable with father’s actions, 

and asked the friend to call the police. The juvenile court 

disagreed with father that his behavior with L.L. was merely an 

appropriate display of love and affection. It also found that the 

conduct was escalating and inferred the requisite intent for 

sexual abuse from the totality of the circumstances. The court

agreed with the children’s counsel that father’s behavior with the 

children appeared to constitute grooming for more egregious

sexual behavior. 

The juvenile court proceeded to disposition. It found clear 

and convincing evidence that there was a substantial danger and 

risk of detriment to the children and declared them dependents of 

the juvenile court. The court removed the children from father 

and released them to mother, finding that it was premature to 

release the children to father and that a substantial risk of harm 

still existed. The juvenile court ordered mother to complete 

individual counseling to address sexual abuse awareness and 

appropriate sexual boundaries. It also ordered father to complete 

a parenting program; individual counseling, including domestic 

violence for perpetrators and appropriate sexual boundaries; and 
8

joint counseling with L.L., contingent on her therapist’s advice 

and recommendations. The juvenile court also ordered father to 

complete a full drug and alcohol program with aftercare, 

including testing every other week. 

Mother and father appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Mother’s Appeal

Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that substantial 

evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding that she 

failed to protect the children from father’s sexual abuse. She 

does not contest the court’s other jurisdictional findings related to 

her, or those based on father’s conduct. She therefore concedes 

that the juvenile court will retain jurisdiction regardless of the 

outcome of her appeal. However, mother urges this court to 

consider the merits of her appeal.

“When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its 

assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s 

jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s 

finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory 

bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is 

supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing 

court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged 

statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.” 

(In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) Nonetheless, a 

reviewing court may consider the merits of a parent’s challenge 

when it serves as the basis for dispositional orders that are also 

challenged on appeal, could be prejudicial to the appellant or 

could potentially impact the current or future dependency 

proceedings, or could have consequences for the parent beyond 
9

jurisdiction. (In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762–

763.) 

We exercise our discretion here to consider mother’s appeal. 

We note that although the juvenile court did not remove the 

children from mother’s custody, it ordered her to complete 

individual counseling to address sexual abuse awareness and 

appropriate sexual boundaries. The juvenile court could have 

ordered mother to participate in this form of counseling based on 

the jurisdictional finding that the children were abused or at risk 

of sexual abuse because of father’s conduct. (In re Briana V.

(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311–312 [juvenile court not limited 

to content of sustained petition when making dispositional 

orders; there need not be a jurisdictional finding as to the 

particular parent upon whom the court imposes a dispositional 

order]; In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492.) Yet, this 

dispositional order may also have flowed from the jurisdictional 

findings based on mother’s failure to protect the children from 

father’s sexual abuse. Under these circumstances, the 

jurisdictional finding as to mother “ ‘could potentially impact the 

current or future dependency proceedings.’ ” (In re M.W. (2015) 

238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452.) We thus consider mother’s 

arguments. 

A. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s 

jurisdictional findings as to mother

The juvenile court may assume jurisdiction over a child 

when a child “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the 

child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of 

the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to 

adequately supervise or protect the child.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) 

The juvenile court may also assume jurisdiction over a child 
10

when the child has been sexually abused or there is a substantial 

risk the child will be sexually abused. (§ 300, subd. (d).) This 

includes when a parent fails to protect a child from sexual abuse 

and the parent knew or reasonably should have known that the 

child was in danger of sexual abuse. (Ibid.) 

“ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the 

disposition, we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or 

uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this 

determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the 

evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency 

court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the 

court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and 

credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (In re R.T. (2017) 

3 Cal.5th 622, 633.)

Here, mother knew that father had inappropriately touched 

L.L. after police confronted mother and L.L. told her about the 

May 2020 incident. Mother acknowledged that even she had 

begun to feel that father patting L.L. on the buttocks was not 

appropriate. Nevertheless, mother did not believe L.L.’s 

disclosures. She repeatedly defended father’s actions as playful 

or innocent displays of affection. After father was released from 

police custody, mother welcomed him back into the home and 

took no steps to protect the children from him. Father continued 

caring for the children alone.

Only when DCFS became involved and the juvenile court 

ordered the children detained, and then removed them from 

father’s custody, did mother agree to measures intended to 

protect the children from father. Substantial evidence supported

the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that mother failed to 

protect the children from father’s sexual abuse. (See In re D.G.
11

(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1572–1573 [substantial risk of 

harm established where mother did not believe father sexually 

abused daughter, mother refused to address allegations until 

after DCFS detained the children, and mother would not agree 

not to allow father unmonitored visits]; In re S.C. (2006) 138 

Cal.App.4th 396, 415–416 [jurisdiction appropriate where mother 

did not believe stepfather molested minor and mother allowed 

stepfather to remain in the home where he could have continued 

unsupervised access to minor]; In re Katrina W. (1994) 31 

Cal.App.4th 441, 447 [mother’s past conduct in disbelieving 

father physically abused minor was evidence of risk of future 

harm to minor].) 

II. Father’s Appeal

Father asserts two arguments on appeal.

3 First, father 

contends the juvenile court’s order removing the children from 

his custody was not supported by substantial evidence and there 

were reasonable means short of removal to protect the children. 

Second, father asserts that the disposition order directing him to 

engage in a full drug and alcohol program was an abuse of 

discretion. We find no error.

3 Father initially also challenged the juvenile court order 

granting him monitored visitation without specifying the 

duration and frequency of the visits. On January 27, 2021, DCFS 

requested that we take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s 

minute orders entered on January 21, 2021, granting father a 

minimum of three visits per week for three hours per visit. The 

request for judicial notice is granted. In his reply brief, father 

concedes his challenge to the juvenile court’s visitation order is 

now moot.
12

A. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s 

removal order

The juvenile court may remove a child from a parent’s 

custody only upon a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, 

that there “is or would be a substantial danger to the physical 

health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of 

the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no 

reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be 

protected without removing the minor from the minor’s 

parent[ ].” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) When we are “reviewing a 

finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing 

evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the 

record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a 

reasonable factfinder could have found it highly probable that the 

fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 

995–996; see In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 155 [same 

standard applies in dependency cases].)

Father contends the evidence was insufficient for removal 

because his physical confrontations with mother were minor, 

sporadic, and historical, and neither child was actually harmed or 

endangered. He minimizes his alcohol consumption and any risk 

of harm posed by his drinking. Father also asserts that removal 

was inappropriate because the sexual abuse of L.L. was relatively 

minor and did not endanger K.L. He further argues that there 

were services available to prevent removal of the children from 

his custody because he acknowledged his mistakes and 

communicated his willingness to change. Father’s arguments are 

unavailing.

The evidence before the juvenile court established the 

parents’ domestic violence was recurring, unresolved, and had
13

occurred in L.L.’s presence. L.L. reported that she saw or heard

mother slap father only two months prior to DCFS’s involvement. 

She also stated that father and mother argued a lot and pushed 

each other. That other physical confrontations happened in 

Guatemala several years earlier, and that such incidents 

continued to occur, reflected a long history of unresolved domestic 

violence. When describing the parents’ confrontations, L.L. told 

the social worker her living situation was not safe. At least some 

of the parents’ conflict was due to father’s regular drinking, 

which caused the parents to argue, and led father to curse and 

act “crazy.” The juvenile court could reasonably infer that the 

parents were minimizing the severity of the altercations between 

them, and the impact father’s drinking had on the family.

We further disagree with father’s characterization of the 

sexual abuse as relatively minor and thus insufficient to support 

the removal of both children. Father had engaged in the same

inappropriate behavior with L.L. multiple times. On at least two 

occasions, he touched L.L.’s buttocks while lying in bed with her. 

On both occasions, father acted while he and L.L. were alone. 

During the May 2020 incident, L.L. became very uncomfortable 

when, while mother was not home and K.L. was asleep, father 

closed the bedroom blinds and placed L.L. on the bed. Viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s findings, 

father’s touching on that occasion was decidedly sexual. Father 

placed L.L. on a bed, rubbed her thigh, wrapped her legs around 

his, and squeezed her buttocks repeatedly. Despite father’s 

claims that this was normal behavior, L.L. said father’s actions 

were odd and frightening, leading her to take refuge in a 

bathroom where she first texted mother, then confided in a friend

who called the police for her. 
14

The juvenile court disbelieved father, finding L.L.’s 

statements consistent and credible. The pattern of incidents 

supported the juvenile court finding that father’s behavior was 

escalating and could properly be characterized as grooming for 

further abuse. Moreover, the evidence supported an inference 

that father’s sexualized conduct toward L.L. began with him 

routinely patting her on the buttocks, that this was couched as a 

family practice, and that the practice was likely to include K.L. 

On this record, a reasonable trier of fact could have found it 

highly probable that returning the children to father would pose 

a substantial risk of them being harmed by exposure to future 

domestic violence, father’s abuse of alcohol, and sexual abuse, 

and also that there were no reasonable means to protect the 

children without removal from father’s custody. (§ 361, 

subd. (c)(1).) “The parent need not be dangerous and the minor 

need not have been actually harmed before removal is 

appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the 

child.” (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 135–136.)

Throughout the case, father minimized his role in the 

domestic violence, denied that it had occurred, or claimed it was 

limited to the family’s distant past. Similarly, father minimized

the effects his alcohol consumption had on the family and failed 

to recognize its connection to his confrontations with mother. He 

also minimized his conduct with L.L., denying its sexual nature 

and downplaying it as merely acts of affection. Father denied

negative consequences of his behavior and refused to participate 

in programs such as domestic violence counseling without court 

intervention. Despite father’s insistence that he was willing to 

change, he also stated there was no need to participate in 

programs to address domestic violence and sexual abuse before 
15

ordered to do so. By the time of the disposition hearing, he had 

only minimally engaged in services to address any of the case

issues. (In re V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 157–158

[willingness to participate in services is conflicting evidence 

regarding risk parent posed to children; under substantial 

evidence test it must be disregarded].)

Accordingly, we find substantial evidence supported the 

juvenile court’s removal order.

B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering 

father to participate in a drug and alcohol program

Next, father argues that the juvenile court’s order directing 

him to engage in a full drug and alcohol treatment program was 

an abuse of discretion. We disagree.

A juvenile court may make any reasonable order “to 

ameliorate the conditions that made the child subject to the 

court’s jurisdiction.” (In re Neil D. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 219, 

224.) The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what 

would serve a child’s interest and to issue dispositional orders 

accordingly. (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 

1006.) We will not disturb a discretionary decision unless it was 

arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. (In re Raymundo B.

(1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1447, 1456.)

Here, the juvenile court’s order requiring father to 

participate in a full drug and alcohol treatment program was well 

within its discretion. Father had a history of alcohol abuse that 

preceded K.L.’s birth in Guatemala and continued after the

family moved to the United States. Although mother claimed 

father no longer drank to excess, she admitted he regularly 

consumed a six-pack of beer while sitting alone in his car. 

Father’s alcohol consumption caused arguments between the 
16

parents, which led to physical confrontations. Prior to DCFS 

intervention, father made no effort to stop drinking despite 

mother asking him to stop. As the juvenile court noted, the drug 

and alcohol program would teach father how to identify signs of 

alcohol abuse and the effects of his drinking on the children and 

family. Contrary to father’s assertion, random or on-demand 

alcohol testing alone would not accomplish those results. 

The order for a full drug and alcohol program was within 

the juvenile court’s broad discretion.

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ADAMS, J.*

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.