GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

January 26, 2007 

Congressional Committees 

Subject: Chemical Demilitarization: Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of 

the Army’s Cost Comparison Analysis for Treatment and Disposal Options 

for Newport’s VX Hydrolysate 

The U.S. stockpile of 1,269 tons of VX nerve agent1

 stored at the Newport Chemical 

Depot (Newport), Indiana, is one of nine stockpiles that the Department of Defense 

(DOD) must destroy in response to congressional direction initially provided in 1985. 

In addition, the stockpile must be destroyed to comply with the requirements of the 

Chemical Weapons Convention,2

 which the United States became a party to in 1997. 

The stockpile at Newport is the first U.S. stockpile containing VX that will be 

destroyed by using neutralization—a process that mixes hot water and sodium 

hydroxide (a caustic chemical) with VX to change the chemical composition to a less 

toxic form. The resulting by-product is a liquid wastewater commonly referred to as 

hydrolysate that consists mostly of water but also has a caustic component and 

organic salts that need further treatment to meet Chemical Weapons Convention 

requirements and to meet federal and state environmental requirements for disposal. 

The Army, DOD’s designated executive agent, began neutralizing Newport’s VX 

stockpile on-site in May 2005 and, as of December 1, 2006, reports neutralizing about 

34 percent of the stockpile. 

None of the generated hydrolysate—expected to be about 2 million gallons when the 

neutralization process is completed—has been treated. The hydrolysate is being 

stored on-site until a post-treatment plan can be implemented. The Army has been 

evaluating options for treating the hydrolysate since the mid-1990s. Through these 

evaluations, on-site supercritical water oxidation (SCWO) was initially selected as the 

preferred option in 1999, but the preferred option was subsequently changed in 2002 

to using an off-site commercial treatment facility because of concerns about the 

continued storage of the stockpile after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and 

numerous technical challenges identified during one-tenth scale engineering testing. 

The Army’s plan for the treatment and disposal of the hydrolysate was to transport it 

from Newport to an off-site commercial treatment and disposal facility—the DuPont 

 

1

 VX is a rapid-acting, lethal nerve agent that affects the nervous system by interfering with the signals 

sent from the brain to vital organs. Nerve agents are the most toxic and rapidly acting of known 

chemical warfare agents. 

2

 The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the use of chemical weapons and specifies deadlines 

for signatories, of which the United States is one, to destroy unitary stockpiles. The final deadline to 

destroy existing stockpiles is April 29, 2012. 
Page 2 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

 

Secure Environmental Treatment Facility (DuPont) in Deepwater, New Jersey—

which would use a pretreatment process that would include various chemical 

processes, including oxidation followed by chemical precipitation to further break 

down the hydrolysate. The remaining liquid effluent would be treated in the facility’s 

biodegradation-based waste treatment plant. This plan has generated concerns about 

its safety and cost. However, on January 5, 2007, DuPont announced that it will not 

participate in the treatment of Newport’s hydrolysate, citing a “lengthy and arduous” 

approval process. Army officials stated that the Army will explore all available onsite and off-site options to treat Newport’s hydrolysate. 

The House Committee on Armed Services Report on the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, H.R. Rep. No. 109-89, directed the Secretary of 

the Army not to proceed with any action to transport or relocate hydrolysate from 

Newport until health and environmental concerns raised by the Environmental 

Protection Agency and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention were 

addressed in a manner that would not result in substantial ecological or human heath 

risk. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued its report3

 in July 2006. 

The report concluded, in part, that the Army/DuPont proposal sufficiently addressed 

critical issues related to human toxicity, transportation, and treatment of Newport’s 

hydrolysate. The committee report also required that the Secretary of the Army 

certify to the congressional defense committees that sending the hydrolysate off-site 

for treatment would result in significant cost and schedule savings compared to onsite disposal of the hydrolysate before transport. The report further required that the 

Secretary of the Army conduct and provide the congressional defense committees a 

detailed cost-benefit analysis to include an analysis comparing the proposed off-site 

treatment option with eight on-site options, which are discussed in detail in 

enclosure I. 

In response to the latter requirement, the Army published its cost-benefit report4

 in 

April 2006, which concluded that only chemical oxidation, SCWO, and wet-air 

oxidation technologies were feasible for treating Newport’s hydrolysate. In the costeffectiveness analysis contained in the report, the Army determined that the cost of 

off-site treatment of the hydrolysate at DuPont would be from $146 million (without 

program risk) to $347 million (including program risk) less expensive than the on-site 

options. The Army also concluded that the off-site treatment option would allow the 

disposal of the hydrolysate to be accomplished in the shortest amount of time and 

would minimize the amount of time that Newport’s hydrolysate must be stored at 

Newport. 

3

 Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Review of 

the Revised Plan for Off-Site Treatment of Newport’s Chemical Agent Disposal Facility’s Caustic VX 

Hydrolysate at DuPont Secure Environmental Treatment Facility in Deepwater, New Jersey

(Atlanta. Ga.: July 2006). 

4

 U.S. Army, Project Manager for Alternative Technologies and Approaches, Cost-Benefit Analysis of 

Off-Site Versus On-Site Treatment and Disposal of Newport Caustic Hydrolysate (Aberdeen Proving 

Ground, Edgewood Area, Md.: April 2006). 
Page 3 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

 

The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20075 mandated 

that we review the Army’s Cost-Benefit Analysis of Off-Site Versus On-Site 

Treatment and Disposal of Newport Caustic Hydrolysate. Specifically, we (1) 

assessed the reasonableness of the Army’s rationale to eliminate five of the eight 

technologies for treating Newport’s hydrolysate; (2) determined what other options 

the Army considered, such as incineration; and (3) evaluated the adequacy of the cost 

comparison analysis presented for the three remaining technologies considered as 

alternatives to the Army’s proposed plan. To meet the December 1, 2006, due date, 

we briefed or offered to brief your offices prior to that time. This report provides 

details of our findings and our conclusions and recommendations. We will also issue 

a separate letter on our assessment of the Army’s cost-benefit analysis once DOD has 

completed its sensitivity review of the data in that letter. 

To meet our objectives, we reviewed documentation and interviewed officials in the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); 

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Elimination of Chemical 

Weapons); U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA), Aberdeen, Maryland; the 

Newport Chemical Depot, Newport, Indiana; DuPont’s Secure Environmental 

Treatment Facility, Deepwater, New Jersey; Parsons Infrastructure and Technology 

Group, Inc. (Parsons); and Shaw Environmental Group, Inc. (Shaw)—the contractor 

that assisted the Army in performing the analysis for the Army’s report. To assess the 

Army’s methods of evaluating various options for treating hydrolysate, we relied on a 

review of CMA’s Newport On-Site Hydrolysate Post Treatment Estimate report 

(post-treatment estimate report), which was prepared by Shaw,6

 National Research 

Council (NRC) reports, and other referenced documents and supporting 

documentation. We did not conduct an independent evaluation of these technologies. 

To assess the adequacy of the Army’s cost comparison analysis, we compared the 

Army’s methods and approaches with the guidance contained in Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) and DOD instructions and Cost Estimating 

Standards and Practices developed by the Society of Cost Estimating and Analysis, 

and assessed the reliability of the cost estimates.7

 We reviewed and evaluated the 

cost analyses the Army used in preparing its cost-benefit report and interviewed 

Army and contractor officials regarding the data and assumptions they used in 

preparing their analyses. To determine the accuracy of underlying data, we 

independently calculated values based on provided assumptions to compare against 

values contained in supporting spreadsheets. We also compared values from the 

supporting spreadsheets to summary data provided in the supporting post-treatment 

estimate report prepared for CMA by Shaw. Also, we made use of information that 

we obtained during our ongoing review of DOD’s Chemical Demilitarization Program 

to assess the reasonableness of certain assumptions. We conducted our review from 

August 2006 through November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

5

 Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 922 (2006). 

6

 Shaw Environmental, Inc., Newport Chemical Disposal Facility On-Site Hydrolysate Post 

Treatment Estimate (Edgewood, Maryland: April 2006). 7

 The Department of the Army Cost Analysis Manual contains criteria and a checklist that are similar 

to the OMB and best practices guidance. See Department of the Army, U.S. Army Cost and Economic 

Analysis Center, Cost Analysis Manual (Washington, D.C.: May 2002). 
Page 4 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

 

Results in Brief 

The rationale that the Army used to eliminate five of the eight technologies for 

treating Newport hydrolysate appears reasonable. Based on our review of the 

supporting post-treatment estimate report and key NRC reports referenced by the 

Army, there was evidence of significant difficulties associated with the five 

eliminated options that would make them less promising than the three others that 

were evaluated against the proposed DuPont option in the Army’s cost comparisons. 

For example, the Army report’s finding that one alternative technology would not be 

well suited to treat large volumes of wastes with high concentrations of water, such 

as Newport’s hydrolysate, was consistent with determinations made in the posttreatment estimate report and was supported by findings in a 2001 NRC report. Also, 

for another alternative, the Army determined that the vendor with the rights to the 

technology was no longer in business and further development of this alternative 

would call for a company to acquire the rights and start development work, creating a 

large cost and schedule risk. 

In addition to evaluating the eight alternatives discussed in its 2006 cost-benefit 

report, the Army previously evaluated off-site and on-site technical solutions for 

treating the hydrolysate, including incineration. The Army’s evaluations concluded 

for various reasons that these alternatives would also be difficult to implement or not 

viable at this time. For example, of the more than 100 commercial disposal firms that 

were initially considered as candidates to treat Newport’s hydrolysate off-site in 2002, 

only 7 firms (not including DuPont) that have been determined to be qualified by the 

Army’s contractor have provided price information through either the Army’s 2002 

request for proposals or a subsequent market survey. However, 5 of the 7 firms 

would use either of two methods: incineration or deep-well injection. Army officials 

believe that these two methods would garner higher levels of public concern than 

other methods. Moreover, while other on-site technologies were evaluated, those 

that were considered to be the most promising technologies in the 2001 and 2002 

reports are very similar to the technologies identified in the Army’s 2006 cost-benefit 

report. The use of any of the Army’s four incinerators at its stockpile sites, while 

potentially technically feasible, has not been evaluated because it also has the 

potential for high levels of public concern, but could be evaluated if other options are 

no longer available. 

Based on our assessment of supporting documentation and analyses, we determined 

that the underlying cost estimates used in the Army’s report were not reliable, and the 

impact of this on the Army’s report finding that the DuPont plan had “significant cost 

savings” over the three considered alternatives is uncertain. Using OMB criteria and 

criteria approved by the cost estimating community,8

 we determined that the 

estimates were unreliable because of (1) the quantity and magnitude of errors, 

8

 The Society of Cost Estimating and Analysis (SCEA) is an organization dedicated to improving cost 

estimating and analysis and to furthering the effectiveness and efficiency of cost estimating and 

analysis. The characteristics of a high-quality estimate are contained in SCEA’s Cost Programmed 

Review of Fundamentals © 2003 SCEA. 
Page 5 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

(2) quality control weaknesses, (3) questionable or inadequate supporting source data 

and documentation, and (4) the undetermined sensitivity of key assumptions. 

Neither the Army nor the contractor has a system in place to perform cross-checks of 

the costs, underlying assumptions, or the technical parameters that went into the 

estimates. Moreover, we have determined that the results from the Army’s 

programmatic risk analysis are unreliable because they were generated from the 

previously discussed unreliable cost estimates and because the Army attributed no 

risk to potential permitting, legal, or other challenges to the DuPont plan. It was 

unclear to us whether the programmatic risks of other alternatives were understated 

or overstated. Overall, we could not determine the cumulative effect of these 

problems on the outcome or results of the Army’s analysis, in large part because we 

did not have confidence in much of the supporting data because of the problems that 

we have noted. Nevertheless, without reliable underlying cost estimates, the Army, 

the Congress, and the public cannot have confidence that the most cost-effective 

solution has been selected. We are making recommendations that the Army conduct 

its cost-benefit analysis again using best practices so that its data and conclusions are 

comprehensive, traceable, accurate, and credible; correct any technical and 

mathematical errors in the cost estimate; establish quality control and independent 

review processes that check data sources, calculations, and assumptions; and 

perform a sensitivity analysis of key assumptions. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our findings and 

recommendations, and stated that the Army will be preparing a new cost-benefit 

analysis based on a revised cost estimate, which will be independently reviewed and 

verified. DOD comments are discussed in more detail at the end of this 

correspondence and are reproduced in full in enclosure II. DOD also provided 

technical comments, which have been incorporated where appropriate.

Background 

In 1994, the Army, in response to continued public and congressional concerns about 

the use of incineration as a destruction method, established the Alternative 

Technologies and Approaches Project under the Program Manager for Chemical 

Demilitarization, which became CMA in 2003. The project was tasked with 

investigating alternatives to incineration for the stockpiles that were located at 

Aberdeen Proving Ground (Aberdeen), Maryland, and Newport. These two sites were 

unique in that they consisted solely of chemical agent stored in bulk containers, 

without explosives or other munitions components. 

In February 1999, the Army announced that it would establish a pilot program to 

destroy Newport’s stockpile of VX. The treatment and disposal method chosen to be 

pilot tested was neutralization followed by SCWO. In making its decision, the Army 

considered evaluations made by the NRC and independent Army reviews of 

alternatives to incineration and for treating hydrolysate. Another key factor in the 

Army’s decision was a recommendation made by the Indiana Citizens Advisory 

Commission that the Army consider technologies other than incineration. 
Page 6 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

In 2002, in response to heightened concerns about the storage of chemical weapons 

after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Army adopted “an accelerated 

approach” at both its Newport and Aberdeen stockpile locations in order to eliminate 

the stockpiles faster. A key change resulting from this accelerated approach is that 

the Army would not treat the hydrolysate on-site, but would transport it off-site to 

commercial facilities that had the necessary environmental permits to treat and 

dispose of the hydrolysate. In the case of Newport, Parsons, the government’s site 

contractor, awarded a contract to Perma-Fix of Dayton, Inc., Dayton, Ohio, through a 

2002 request for proposals, to demonstrate that it could treat the hydrolysate. 

However, this plan generated considerable public concern, and the contract was 

subsequently terminated when a discharge permit could not be obtained. The Army 

and its contractor at Newport then began pursuing efforts to transport the 

hydrolysate to DuPont, which also responded to the 2002 request for proposals. 

Methodology Used to Develop the Army’s Cost-Benefit Analysis

In response to the committee report,9

 the Army tasked Shaw with developing 

technical schedule and cost information comparing the eight on-site technologies 

cited in the committee report to the Army’s proposed off-site transportation of the 

hydrolysate to DuPont. A post-treatment estimate report was prepared to document 

the methodology, assumptions, and findings used in the analysis. In conducting its 

analysis, each of the eight technologies was initially evaluated to determine its 

applicability to process Newport hydrolysate. The Army determined that the eight 

cited treatment and disposal methods were the eight methods evaluated by the NRC 

in an assessment it prepared for the Project Manager for the Non-Stockpile Chemical 

Materiel Project10 in 2001. The analysis used the evaluation criteria in the NRC report 

to assess benefits and risks of each method, updating information when necessary to 

reflect events subsequent to the report’s publishing. The post-treatment estimate 

report also noted that the Army has been monitoring for years the development of 

emerging technologies for the potential application to chemical demilitarization. 

Schedules and cost estimates were only developed for technologies that were 

determined to be applicable to the volume and characteristics of the Newport 

hydrolysate. 

Army officials stated that they selected Shaw because of its experience with various 

aspects of the DOD’s Chemical Demilitarization Program and its familiarity with 

treatment methods, which provides it with the expertise to make reasoned judgments 

about the treatment methods contained in the Army’s cost-benefit report. Shaw has 

supported CMA and its predecessor for more than 15 years. For example, Shaw 

supported the Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project by participating in the 

identification, evaluation, and testing of methods for treating waste streams from the 

neutralization of recovered chemical materials and binary chemical agents. 

According to the Army, Shaw evaluated over 140 technologies, including all eight 

cited in the committee report. Moreover, Shaw was responsible for a program that 

 

9

 H.R. Rep. No. 109-89 (2005). 

10 Non-stockpile chemical materiel are items not included as part of the nation’s unitary chemical 

stockpile, including buried munitions and binary munitions.
Page 7 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

monitors the development of new technologies for potential application to CMA’s 

mission. In addition, Shaw participated in the study and testing of various candidate 

processes for post-treatment of Newport’s hydrolysate, including SCWO. 

 

The Rationale Used for Eliminating Technologies from Further 

Consideration Appears Reasonable 

Although the Army’s cost-benefit report did not provide specific details on the 

process it used to make its determination to eliminate five of the eight 

congressionally specified treatment technologies from further consideration, the 

Army’s rationale for eliminating these methods appears reasonable based on our 

review of the findings in the post-treatment estimate report prepared by Shaw. The 

report’s evaluations were supported by past NRC reports, past program studies, and 

experience that Shaw has gained through its work with the Non-Stockpile Chemical 

Materiel Project and its role in evaluating emerging technologies. 

 

Army Eliminated Five Treatment Methods It Determined to Be Unsuitable for 

Newport Hydrolysate

The Army’s cost-benefit report stated that based on a technical review conducted by 

Shaw’s professional engineers with extensive experience in these treatment methods, 

five treatment methods specifically referenced in H.R. Rep. No. 109-89 were not 

viable because the methods were not well suited for the known properties and 

volumes of Newport hydrolysate. The five methods eliminated from further study 

were (1) electrochemical oxidation, (2) solvated-electron technology, (3) gas-phase 

chemical reduction, (4) plasma-arc technology, and (5) stand-alone biodegradation. 

Table 1 lists the five eliminated treatment methods and the factors the Army report 

cited as leading to their elimination. 
Page 8 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

Table 1: Rationale for the Elimination of Five Technologies from the Army’s CostBenefit Report for Hydrolysate Treatment 

Technology Factors leading to elimination 

Electrochemical 

oxidation 

• Not appropriate for aqueous wastes. 

• Concern about scale-up issues and risks. 

• Generates large volumes of waste streams needing additional 

treatment. 

Solvated-electron 

technology 

• Not appropriate for aqueous wastes. 

• Generates hydrogen. 

• Uses difficult-to-handle reagents. 

Gas-phase 

chemical reduction 

• Company no longer exists. 

• Generates high volumes of gaseous waste. 

• Hydrogen reagent considered a safety risk. 

Plasma-arc 

technology 

• Not appropriate for large quantities of aqueous wastes. 

• Considered similar to incineration. 

• Limited experience with both hazardous and aqueous 

 solutions. 

Stand-alone 

biodegradation 

• Primary reaction products in Newport caustic hydrolysate 

are not amenable to direct treatment by biodegradation. 

• Not efficient for on-site waste volumes; cannot obtain 

economies of scale available at commercial large-scale 

treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. 

Source: U.S. Army.

Army’s Eliminations Appear Reasonable Based on Our Review of Supporting 

Documents

Our review of the Army’s rationale for dismissing five of the eight alternative 

technologies found that the findings contained in the Army’s report appear to be 

reasonable and are supported by documentation from the post-treatment estimate 

report prepared for CMA by Shaw and NRC reports. The evaluation of the benefits 

and risks of each technology was largely based on criteria developed by the NRC in 

its 2001 report.11 The NRC cited four areas as “top priority” criteria: relative process 

safety (low risk), technical effectiveness, permit status, and pollution prevention. 

Additionally, another six categories were designated “important” criteria: robustness, 

cost, practical operability, continuity, space efficiency, and materials efficiency. 

When necessary, the findings of the NRC neutralent waste report were updated 

within these criteria based on more recent technological developments, experience 

 

11 National Research Council, Review and Evaluation of the Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel 

Disposal Program: Disposal of Neutralent Wastes (Washington, D.C.: 2001). 
Page 9 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

Shaw has gained working with the Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project, and 

Shaw’s role in evaluating emerging technologies. Our review of the post-treatment 

estimate report and key NRC reports referenced by the Army provided evidence of 

likely significant difficulties associated with the five eliminated options that would 

make them less promising than the three options that were evaluated against the 

proposed DuPont option in the Army’s cost comparisons. Evidence used by the Army 

to support its rationale for eliminating each treatment method is discussed below. 

Electrochemical Oxidation 

• The Army report’s finding that electrochemical oxidation would generate large 

volumes of waste is supported by findings in the NRC neutralent wastes 

report. In its report, the NRC noted that electrochemical oxidation generates 

large amounts of gaseous effluents, particularly chlorine gas, which needs to 

be scrubbed. The report also noted that those effluents would be corrosive 

and could cause operating problems. Shaw’s evaluation determined that the 

amount of water present in Newport’s hydrolysate would be too large for the 

electrochemical oxidation technology to process, requiring either the 

hydrolysate to be concentrated or the electrochemical system to be 

redesigned. The NRC neutralent wastes report also noted that treating large 

quantities of water would be an issue for this treatment method. 

• The finding that an electrochemical oxidation system would require a 

significant scale-up is also supported by findings in the NRC neutralent wastes 

report. The report also stated that the one existing CerOx facility (the type of 

electrochemical oxidation proposed for use by the Army) could process only 

one 35-gallon barrel at a time. In Shaw’s evaluation, it noted concerns about 

whether the manufacturer could easily scale up production for the 200 

electrochemical cells necessary to operate at Newport, as their systems were 

only accustomed to handling laboratory-scale amounts of waste. 

Solvated-Electron Technology 

• The Army report’s finding that the solvated-electron technology is not 

appropriate for Newport hydrolysate is supported by the NRC neutralent 

wastes report findings as well. The NRC determined that the solvated-electron 

technology process’ efficiency is poor when treating aqueous waste streams, 

and its advantages may be outweighed by the difficulty of handling its 

reagents, which are toxic and have been known to cause fires. The NRC also 

was concerned that the solvated-electron process was less mature than some 

of the other treatment technologies. Shaw determined that solvated-electron 
Page 10 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

 

technology was evaluated by the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives12

program but that it could not successfully complete demonstration testing. 

Gas-Phase Chemical Reduction 

• The Army report’s finding that the gas-phase chemical reduction technology is 

not appropriate for Newport hydrolysate is supported by Shaw’s findings, 

which noted that the vendor who had the rights to this technology, ELI Eco 

Logic, went out of business in 2004. Shaw noted that further development of 

gas-phase chemical reduction as an option would “require finding a company 

to acquire the rights and start development work” and that process “would be 

a large risk to cost and schedule.” 

• The NRC’s neutralent wastes report notes that gas-phase chemical reduction is 

a complex process that requires the management of hot hydrogen gas, which 

presents unique safety concerns. The NRC report cited the need to manage 

gases both in the reactor and as effluents and the potential for the buildup of 

carbon soot. The report also stated that no commercial-scale reactor of this 

type has received a permit to operate in the United States, which could lead to 

delays. 

 

Plasma-Arc Technology 

• The NRC neutralent wastes report notes concerns about the prospects for 

plasma-arc technology to get a permit since it has not operated in the United 

States and regulators may consider it to be incineration. Also, the NRC noted 

that tests of the technology conducted by the Army’s Assembled Chemical 

Weapons Alternatives program on VX hydrolysate generated products of 

environmental concern. The NRC report also stated that this process is less 

efficient with wastes that contain large amounts of water. 

• The post-treatment estimate report states that regulatory hurdles would need 

to be overcome and then technology development would need to be 

accomplished. 

Stand-alone Biodegradation 

• The NRC has repeatedly noted its concerns related to the ability of stand-alone 

biodegradation to treat hydrolysate from VX. For example, in its 1996 Review 

12 The Congress established the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment program in 1996 to identify 

and demonstrate at least two alternative technologies to baseline incineration. Omnibus Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208 (1996). In 2002, the program was assigned responsibility 

for full-scale pilot testing of neutralization technologies to destroy the chemical weapons stockpiles at 

the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado and Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky. Department of 

Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-248 (2002). In 2003, the program’s name was 

changed to Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives. 
Page 11 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

and Evaluation of Alternative Chemical Disposal Technologies,13 its 2000 

Integrated Design of Alternative Technologies for Bulk-Only Chemical Agent 

Disposal Facilities,

14 and its neutralent wastes reports, the NRC noted that the 

primary reaction products of VX hydrolysate are not readily amenable to direct 

treatment by biodegradation, since they cannot be easily broken down by the 

microorganisms used in this process. Additionally, Shaw cited an Assembled 

Chemical Weapons Assessment evaluation that found biodegradation to be 

“inadequate for complete destruction” of VX hydrolysate. 

• The Army report’s finding that biodegradation could not achieve the 

economies of scale needed to make biodegradation efficient is supported by 

the findings of the NRC. In its 1996 study, the NRC found that because 

hydrolysate cannot serve as the primary substrate for the microorganisms in 

this process, substantial quantities of co-substrate need to be added to co-feed 

the process, making it inefficient. 

• Chemical oxidation, followed by chemical precipitation in conjunction with 

biodegradation, is the process proposed for use in both the off-site DuPont 

option and the on-site chemical oxidation option. 

The Army Has Evaluated Other Technical Solutions for Treating Newport’s 

Hydrolysate 

Although the Army did not discuss them in its cost-benefit report, it has evaluated 

other technical solutions for treating Newport’s hydrolysate since its 1999 decision to 

use SCWO. These solutions include both off-site commercial treatment facilities and 

treatment technologies that would be used on-site. In general, the evaluations of offsite options have determined that there are only a few commercial treatment facilities 

that are qualified and interested in treating Newport’s hydrolysate, but addressing 

public comments and concerns could be challenging. Evaluations of on-site options 

have determined that the most promising options are similar to those included in the 

Army’s 2006 report, but concerns were raised about development costs and 

operational risks. Other solutions, such as using one of the Army’s four incineration 

facilities, may be technically feasible but not viable at this time. 

Army’s Evaluation of Off-Site Commercial Treatment Facilities Found Few That Are 

Potentially Qualified and Interested

While there may be numerous facilities that could treat the Newport hydrolysate, only 

a small number have actually responded to requests for proposals. The Army began 

evaluating commercial treatment facilities that use various treatment methods, 

including those using incineration, biodegradation, and deep-well injection options 

subsequent to a 2001 NRC report that expressed concerns about the reliability of 

 

13 National Research Council, Review and Evaluation of Alternative Chemical Disposal Technologies

(Washington, D.C.: 1996). 

14 National Research Council, Integrated Design of Alternative Technologies for Bulk-Only Chemical 

Agent Disposal Facilities (Washington, D.C.: 2000). 
Page 12 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

 

SCWO reactors during engineering tests. An earlier NRC report in 2000 

recommended that the Army evaluate the potential off-site treatment of Newport 

hydrolysate both for potential costs and schedule benefits as well as a contingency in 

the case of start-up problems implementing SCWO. 

The Army adopted an accelerated approach in 2002 that changed the planned 

treatment method for hydrolysate from on-site to an off-site commercial treatment 

facility. The Army’s contractor at Newport—Parsons—conducted industry surveys to 

identify facilities that could transport, treat, and dispose of Newport’s hydrolysate. 

Parsons conducted a nationwide survey and identified over 100 commercial 

treatment and disposal facilities in the United States as capable of handling 

hazardous waste. However, after considering the facilities’ technology, 

environmental permits, safety and environmental records, and outreach initiatives, 

Parsons determined that only 45 of the facilities should be considered to determine 

their qualifications to treat and dispose of the Newport hydrolysate. These 45 

facilities were sent a qualification survey by Parsons; however, only 14 firms 

completed and returned the survey. After a review of the responses to determine if 

they met minimum specified requirements, Parsons provided requests for proposals 

to 10 of these facilities. Ultimately, 4 facilities responded: 2 incineration-based 

facilities and 2 biodegradation treatment-based facilities (Perma-Fix and DuPont). 

None of the facilities that use deep-well injection responded to Parson’s request. The 

range of proposed prices varied significantly with a fourfold difference in price from 

the least expensive to the most expensive of the four facilities. 

According to the Army, during the evaluation process for the four proposals, the two 

commercial incineration facilities were eliminated: one withdrew its proposal and the 

other was deemed to be too high of a risk because of concerns about public 

opposition. Parsons, in its capacity as the government’s contractor, awarded PermaFix a contract in December 2002 to demonstrate its ability to successfully treat the 

hydrolysate. However, before any hydrolysate could be shipped, Parsons terminated 

the contract for convenience of the government. This cancellation was caused by the 

determination that an environmental permit would not be issued to Perma-Fix by the 

local county government. 

As part of this continuing procurement in 2005, Parsons conducted a market survey 

to establish an updated range of hazardous waste treatment and disposal prices at the 

commercial treatment facilities. The 10 commercial facilities that were surveyed 

were the same facilities that were provided proposal requests in 2002. In this 

instance, 7 of the 10 commercial facilities provided price data for processing generic 

hazardous waste material.15 Of the 7 facilities that provided price data, 2 use 

incineration, 2 use deep-well injection, 2 use biodegradation, and 1 uses both 

biodegradation and deep-well injection. Program officials stated that the prices for 

these firms represented a broad range of pricing for hazardous waste treatment based 

on a range of treatment technologies, locations, and marketplace factors, such as 

financial risks and regulatory and environmental liabilities. The price for treating and 

15 Price data for DuPont were not included as part of Parsons’ 2005 market research pricing for 

hazardous waste treatment. 
Page 13 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

disposing of any waste depends on the facilities’ capabilities, regulatory restrictions, 

and permit requirements. 

Past Evaluations of On-Site Technologies Yielded Similar Results regarding the Most 

Promising Technologies

 

Although the Army selected SCWO as its planned on-site treatment and disposal 

method for Newport’s hydrolysate in 1999, the Army and its contractors conducted 

several more evaluations in 2001 and 2002 to consider other on-site approaches 

because of Army and NRC concerns about the reliability of SCWO. These evaluations 

included technologies other than those that were considered in the Army’s recent 

cost-benefit report, but the technologies deemed most promising were similar to the 

technologies that survived elimination in the Army’s 2006 report. Earlier study 

findings included the following. 

• A 2001 Parsons report identified and assessed 8 potential on-site technologies 

that were capable of processing the Newport hydrolysate. Initially, more than 

100 technologies were identified in literature and database searches. After 

screening based on several criteria, including process efficiency, technology 

maturity, and the extent that they were considered low pressure or 

temperature, 8 technologies met the criteria: two types of SCWO, 

electrochemical oxidation, wet-air oxidation, two types of chemical oxidation, 

ozone (with and without peroxide), and bleach treatment with biodegradation. 

Two additional technologies were added—gas phase chemical reduction and 

plasma arc—although they did not meet the criteria for being low-temperature 

processes. This report found that the two types of SCWO, wet-air oxidation, 

and chemical oxidation, were the most promising technologies for further 

consideration; these are the same three technologies that were identified in 

the Army’s cost-benefit report. 

• A 2002 Parsons report prepared for the Army compared various on-site and 

off-site disposal options for consideration as a potential backup plan for 

treating Newport hydrolysate. In its evaluation, the contractor determined 

that the two on-site treatment options—SCWO and the pretreatment/biological 

treatment option—would rate more favorably for public acceptance, but not as 

favorably for cost and schedule, primarily because of development and testing 

costs and operational risks. The evaluation also determined that pretreating 

the hydrolysate on-site before transporting it off-site would offer no advantage. 

The evaluation concluded that off-site options had more favorable ratings 

because of advantages in cost, schedule, and environmental compliance, but 

would likely be at higher risk for lack of public acceptance. Figure 1 compares 

the 2002 evaluation of various on-site and off-site treatment options by cost, 

schedule, public acceptance, and environmental compliance. 
Page 14 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

Figure 1: Comparison of 2002 Evaluation of the On-site, Off-site, and Combination 

Treatment Options for Newport’s Hydrolysate 

Cost

On-site

pretreatment

on-site

biological

treatment

On-site

speedy

SCWO

On-site

pretreatment

off-site

deep-well

injection

On-site

pretreatment

off-site

biological

treatment

Off-site

deep-well

injection

Off-site

biological

treatment

Off-site

incineration

Environmental

compliance

Public 

acceptance

Schedule

Favorable Neutral Unfavorable 

Source: U.S. Army.

Using Existing Army Incineration Sites Is Not Considered a Viable Option at This 

Time 

CMA officials acknowledged that using one of the four operating chemical agent 

disposal facility incinerators to process the hydrolysate is considered a technically 

feasible option; however, CMA has not formally assessed all its advantages and 

disadvantages because CMA officials do not believe incineration to be viable at this 

time. These officials told us that from a technical standpoint, incineration could be 

used to dispose of Newport’s hydrolysate, and as discussed above, the Army has 

considered commercial facilities that use incineration. However, it is not an ideal 

solution for treating hydrolysate, which is primarily water (85 percent), thus leading 

to greater energy consumption. These officials also stated that because of the 

opposition to incineration of hydrolysate, both locally in Indiana and nationally, the 

Army has committed to pursuing nonincineration options first. However, should 

there be no permitted commercial treatment facility reasonably available, the Army 

would once again evaluate the viability/acceptability of using incineration for 

disposing of Newport’s hydrolysate, including evaluating the potential legal and

regulatory barriers. 

Army’s Cost Estimates and Programmatic Risk Analysis Were Not Reliable, 

and Impact on Results Is Uncertain 

The Army’s report found that the DuPont plan was significantly more cost-effective 

than the three considered on-site alternatives, but based on our assessment of 

supporting documentation and analyses, we determined that the underlying cost 

estimates used in the Army’s report were not adequate or reliable, making the costeffectiveness determination among options uncertain. Using OMB criteria and 

criteria approved by the cost estimating community to assess the methodology, key 

assumptions, and data used to develop cost estimates in the Army’s cost-benefit 

report, we determined that the estimates were unreliable for reasons related to 

(1) the quantity and magnitude of errors, (2) quality control weaknesses, 
Page 15 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

(3) questionable or inadequate supporting source data and documentation, and 

(4) the undetermined sensitivity of key assumptions. Further, neither the Army nor 

the contractor had a system of cross-checking in place to verify computations or to 

substantiate the basis for some assumptions. Moreover, we determined that the 

results from the Army’s programmatic risk analysis are unreliable because they were 

generated from the previously discussed unreliable cost estimates and because the 

Army attributed no risk to potential permitting, legal, or other challenges to the 

DuPont plan. It was unclear to us whether the programmatic risks of other 

alternatives were understated or overstated. Overall, we could not determine the 

cumulative effect of these problems on the outcome or results of the Army’s analysis, 

in large part because we did not have confidence in much of the supporting data 

because of the stated problems and the limited time available to further test these 

data. 

Cost Estimating Community Has Best Practices Criteria for Reliability

Guidance provided in OMB Circular A-94 and best practices established by 

professional cost analysts, such as those identified by the Society of Cost Estimating 

and Analysis, have identified characteristics of a high-quality, reliable cost estimate. 

These characteristics include the following. 

• Comprehensive. The estimate should be at a level of detail appropriate to 

ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor double counted. All costinfluencing ground rules and assumptions are detailed in the documentation of 

the cost estimate. 

• Traceable. The estimate is thoroughly documented, including source data and 

significance, clearly detailed calculations and results, and explanations for 

why a particular method or reference was chosen. Data can be traced back to 

the source documentation. 

• Accurate. The estimate should be unbiased, not overly conservative or overly 

optimistic, and based on an assessment of most likely costs. Few, if any, 

mathematical mistakes are present and are minor in nature. 

• Credible. Any limitations of the analysis because of uncertainty or biases 

surrounding data or assumptions should be discussed. Major assumptions 

should be varied and other outcomes recomputed to determine how sensitive 

outcomes are to changes in the assumptions. In addition, the results of an 

estimate should be cross-checked with an independent cost estimate and a 

level of risk associated with the estimate should be identified. 

Engineering Buildup Approach Was Used to Develop the Technical Cost Estimate 

In developing the cost comparisons that were cited in the post-treatment estimate 

report, an engineering buildup approach was used, which can be an appropriate 

methodology for construction projects. The approach was based on conceptual 

design data for manpower estimates, facility sizing, construction, equipment costs, 

and throughput estimates for the on-site options. Cost estimates for categories, such 

as utilities, processing materials, and storage costs, for the accumulating hydrolysate 
Page 16 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

were also developed. For the DuPont off-site option, DuPont’s past estimate was 

updated based on an assessment of the impacts of program changes since the 

estimate was originally provided in 2002. For all options, costs were grouped by the 

following major categories: (1) project services; (2) engineering, design, and 

permitting; (3) process equipment and systems; (4) facilities construction; 

(5) systemization; (6) operations and pilot test; (7) hydrolysate storage; and 

(8) closure. A contingency factor was added to each estimate to account for 

estimating, commercial, and technical risks. 

Cost Estimates Were Unreliable Because of Inadequate Supporting Documentation

and Numerous Computational Errors

The technical cost analysis that the Army used in estimating the costs of the 

proposed off-site option and the three on-site options contained in its cost-benefit 

report did not follow all applicable guidance from OMB and best practices for a costeffectiveness analysis. Specifically, the quality of some of the underlying estimates in 

the technical report was affected because the supporting analysis was not 

comprehensive nor traceable in that data sources were frequently not provided 

throughout the analysis nor was it accurate because of the numerous computational 

errors. Neither the Army nor the contractor performed independent cross-checks of 

the costs or the technical parameters that went into the estimates. 

Our analysis revealed numerous instances where the data were not comprehensive or 

traceable. We determined that the documentation provided was not detailed enough 

to provide an accurate assessment of the quality of each alternative’s cost estimate. 

For example, neither the technical report nor the supporting documentation 

referenced the source for numerous data inputs, such as the sources for equipment 

installation labor hour per unit parameters or chemical reagent unit costs. 

Additionally, the basis of estimate documented for some data inputs were found to be 

inadequate for assessing estimate credibility, such as staffing estimates, labor rates, 

and other direct costs. 

Our analysis also revealed many computation errors that affect the accuracy of the 

cost estimates, including an incorrect rate being applied to all labor categories for 

5 years, leading to costs for one category of one option being overstated by about 

$34 million and another option’s solid waste disposal costs being understated by 

approximately $3.5 million. CMA officials acknowledged that there was no system in 

place to independently verify the accuracy of the data. In total, the errors affected all 

options and led to both over- and underestimating of costs. However, to the extent 

that we could correct identified inaccuracies, our recalculations just for computation 

errors did not result in a significant variance from the Army’s analysis. The estimated 

costs would fall in the same order that the Army had originally computed, although 

the net difference in costs between the DuPont option and each on-site option was 

reduced. Table 2 shows the relative comparison of the corrected costs versus the 

reported cost estimates. 
Page 17 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

Table 2: Comparison of Reported and Corrected Cost Estimates for the Three On-Site 

Options Relative to DuPont’s Cost Estimates (without Programmatic Risk) 

Treatment 

option 

Reported cost 

estimates relative 

to DuPont’s cost 

estimate 

Corrected cost 

estimates relative 

to DuPont’s 

corrected cost 

estimate 

Change in relative 

costs of reported 

and corrected cost 

estimates 

Chemical 

oxidation 

$145,900,000 $130,625,000 ($15,275,000)

Wet-air oxidation $148,900,000 $133,525,000 ($15,375,000)

Supercritical 

water oxidation 

$200,500,000 $178,125,000 ($22,375,000)

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data. 

Note: In the Army’s cost-benefit report, to protect proprietary information generated 

by DuPont, the estimated costs for implementation of each on-site option was 

reported relative to the estimated cost for the DuPont option (considered the base 

cost) without disclosing the actual value of the DuPont cost estimate. 

Our estimate corrects only for obvious mathematical and spreadsheet errors and 

does not account for unsubstantiated input parameters or parameters used in the 

spreadsheets that are in conflict with the documentation. For example, there were 

differences between consumption levels used in the spreadsheet model versus the 

level documented in the post-treatment estimate report. These discrepancies could 

potentially translate to an underestimate of nearly $15 million. This discrepancy and 

others like it are not reflected in our estimate because it is not obvious which 

consumption level is correct. To resolve discrepancies like these, an independent 

technical assessment would need to be conducted to verify the validity of inputs and 

assumptions used to prepare the estimates. 

Uncertainty of Cost Estimate Is Not Adequately Addressed 

The Army’s cost analysis does not sufficiently address the uncertainty of its cost 

estimates, which affects the credibility of its conclusions. First, the technical report 

does note that the estimate is a rough order of magnitude estimate for cost and 

schedule that can be used to provide a basis for evaluating probable life cycle costs. 

CMA officials stated that the Association for the Advancement of Cost Engineering 

International’s Cost Engineers’ Notebook was used to develop the order of magnitude 

estimate. According to the technical report, the cost estimates are based on 

conceptual design data, and because of the breadth of technological alternatives 

considered, relative unique processes, and lack of processing data for Newport 

hydrolysate, the technical cost estimate should be considered in the range of plus 

30 percent and minus 15 percent. However, neither the Army’s cost-benefit report 

nor the supporting post-treatment estimate report provided estimates that reflect 

these ranges of outcomes. For example, applying the worst case to DuPont (plus 30 
Page 18 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

percent) and the best case (minus 15 percent) to one or more of the on-site options 

could significantly reduce the cost difference, although DuPont would still be more 

cost-effective. Second, the Army did not perform a sensitivity analysis to assess how 

variations in certain key assumptions could affect its cost estimates although there 

can be imprecision in both underlying data and modeling assumptions. For example, 

the cost estimates were based on the DuPont off-site option having about 2.5 times 

greater throughput capacity than each of the on-site treatment technologies. This 

assumption leads to a greater disparity between the on-site and off-site operation 

costs since the operation period, and its associated costs, would be longer for the onsite options. However, it is possible that the actual throughput could increase or 

decrease based on design and operational considerations. Because such uncertainty 

is basic to many analyses, its effects should be analyzed and reported. There was no 

analysis done to determine the effects of varying this assumption on the cost 

estimate. Third, the cost estimates also do not address the uncertainty associated 

with impacts that environmental permitting activities, actions of public or 

government agencies, or public opinion could have on program execution. This 

uncertainty is particularly relevant since these impacts have greatly affected the 

program in the past, delaying the Army’s proposed plan for over 2 years. 

Army’s Programmatic Risk Analysis Was Not Reliable Because It Used Unreliable 

Technical Cost Estimates and Understated Risks

We determined that the Army’s programmatic risk analysis that added additional 

costs to each option is also unreliable because the analysis was generated from the 

previously discussed unreliable technical cost estimates and because the Army 

attributed no risk to potential permitting, legal, or other challenges to the DuPont 

plan. The programmatic risk analysis is used to account for unknown risks that could 

affect the cost or schedule of given options. This analysis uses a statistical 

distribution model that typically extends the schedule durations by a scaled amount 

based on the level of risk (none, low, medium, and high) assigned to each of three 

phases: design/construction, operations, and closure. 

Based on this programmatic risk analysis, the Army added additional costs to each 

option. The proposed DuPont plan had the least additional costs added during the 

programmatic analysis, while the net additional cost (total additional costs minus 

additional costs for DuPont) for the three options ranged from $84 million to 

$146 million. 

Conducting a programmatic risk analysis is an acceptable method for applying 

unknown risk; however, it depends heavily on the judgment used when assigning 

risks. For example, Army officials assigned no programmatic risk to DuPont’s 

design/construction phase because the process would use commercially available 

facilities and personnel. Another reason cited for not assigning risk was that the 

technical cost estimates contained sufficient known risk for the limited scope and 

design that would be needed at DuPont. However, this risk determination does not 

take into account the potential permitting, legal, or other challenges that may arise, 

which could delay construction, transport of the hydrolysate to New Jersey, or start 

of operations. Based on the history of delays associated with implementing the 
Page 19 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

proposed plan, it would be prudent to account for these risks. It was unclear to us 

whether the programmatic risks of other alternatives were understated or overstated. 

Conclusions 

The Army has been pursuing the off-site treatment of Newport’s hydrolysate at a 

commercial treatment, storage, and disposal facility since it adopted an accelerated 

disposal approach in 2002. One of the reasons that has been frequently cited for 

adopting this approach is that it would provide substantial cost savings over 

designing, constructing, and operating an on-site treatment and disposal method. 

However, from the time that the accelerated approach was adopted, the Army faced 

resistance on many fronts because of skepticism concerning advantages attributable 

to the off-site treatment option. If the Army is to be successful in garnering support 

for its plan, then it is imperative that the Army use a transparent process to develop 

cost estimates that are comprehensive, traceable, accurate, and credible. Without 

reliable underlying cost estimates, the Army, the Congress, and the public cannot 

have confidence that the most cost-effective solution for the treatment and disposal 

of Newport’s hydrolysate has been selected. 

Recommendations for Executive Action

To ensure confidence in the reliability of the underlying cost estimates for the Army’s 

decision to send hydrolysate from the Newport Chemical Depot, Indiana, off-site for 

treatment, which indicate significant cost and schedule savings compared to on-site 

disposal of the hydrolysate, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Secretary of the Army to take the following four actions. 

• Conduct the Army’s cost-benefit analysis again using best practices so that its 

data and conclusions are comprehensive, traceable, accurate, and credible. 

• Correct any technical and mathematical errors in the cost estimate. 

• Establish quality control and independent review processes that check data 

sources, calculations, and assumptions. 

• Perform a sensitivity analysis of key assumptions, including, at a minimum, 

(1) variations in the throughput rates for various options; (2) the technological 

uncertainty of options; and (3) for off-site treatment and disposal options, the 

risks associated with potential permitting, legal, and other challenges. 

Agency Comments 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 

recommendations and stated that it fully supports the use of best practices for the 

development and preparation of cost estimates. DOD stated that the Army will be 

preparing a new cost-benefit analysis based on a revised cost estimate, which will be 

independently reviewed and verified, and will contain an analysis of assumptions. 

DOD estimated that the revised cost estimate will be available by the third quarter of 

fiscal year 2007 and the new cost-benefit analysis will be available by the fourth 

quarter of fiscal year 2007. DOD’s comments are reproduced in full in enclosure II. 
Page 20 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

DOD also provided us with technical comments, which have been incorporated 

where appropriate. Finally, we adjusted our fourth recommendation in the draft 

report in light of DuPont’s January 5, 2007, announcement that it was no longer 

interested in being considered as a potential treatment site. 

_ _ _ _ _ 

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional parties. We 

also are sending copies to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; and 

the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies available to 

others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-5431 or by e-mail at dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 

report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in 

enclosure III. 

Davi M. D’Agostino 

Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Enclosures – 3 
Page 21 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Daniel Inouye 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Chairman 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 
Page 22 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

Enclosure I Enclosure I 

Description of Eight Congressionally Specified Disposal and 

Treatment Options for Newport’s Hydrolysate 

• Chemical oxidation. Organic wastes are mixed with an oxidizing agent 

(such as hydrogen peroxide) and water at low temperatures and low pressure. 

This process breaks down the organic components of the waste into either 

benign compounds or compounds that can be more easily treated by other 

means. 

• Electrochemical oxidation. A similar chemical process to chemical 

oxidation, electrochemical oxidation uses a metallic element as an oxidizing 

agent within an electrochemical cell. This also is a low-temperature, lowpressure process. 

• Biodegradation. This process uses microorganisms to destroy certain 

organic compounds in dilute aqueous (water) solutions. This lowtemperature, low-pressure process is often used to treat sewage. Some 

organic compounds can be readily broken down by biotreatment, while the 

structure of other compounds makes them highly resistant. 

• Solvated-electron technology. This process involves the reaction of organic 

waste materials with solutions of metallic sodium in anhydrous liquid 

ammonia. In contrast to most of the other technologies considered by the 

Department of Defense’s Chemical Demilitarization Program, this is a 

reduction rather than an oxidation reaction. Solvated-electron technology is a 

low-temperature, low-pressure process. 

• Wet-air oxidation. This process oxidizes organic compounds in water using 

dissolved oxygen and air. It operates at relatively higher temperatures and 

pressures than chemical oxidation. Wet-air oxidation is commercially in use 

worldwide to treat industrial wastes. 

• Supercritical water oxidation. This process destroys organic compounds 

through oxidation by introducing air to water that has been superheated 

beyond its critical point (374°C). This is a high-temperature, high-pressure 

process. 

• Gas-phase chemical reduction. This process uses hydrogen and steam at 

high temperatures to break down organic compounds into more easily treated 

chemicals. Like solvated-electron technology, gas-phase chemical reduction is 

a reduction reaction. This is a high-temperature but low-pressure process. 

• Plasma-arc technology. This process uses electrical discharges through 

gases to produce intense radiant energy and high-temperatures to break down 
Page 23 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

organic compounds in a containment chamber. This is an extremely hightemperature but low-pressure process. 
Page 24 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

Enclosure II Enclosure II 

Comments from the Department of Defense 
Page 25 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 
Page 26 GAO-07-240R Chemical Demilitarization 

Enclosure III Enclosure III 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Davi M. D’Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Mark A. Pross, Assistant Director; Bonita 

Anderson; Rodell Anderson; Susan Ditto; Jennifer Echard; Neil Feldman; James 

Lawson; Brian Octeau; Charles Perdue; and Karen Richey made key contributions to 

this report.

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