COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Bray and Bumgardner 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

GREGORY JUDE DeVEAU 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2481-99-4 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 JULY 25, 2000 

MUTSUMI AZEMOTO-DeVEAU 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Jane Marum Roush, Judge 

 Ted Kavrukov (Kavrukov, Mehrotra & DiJoseph, 

on briefs), for appellant. 

 Richard F. MacDowell, Jr. (MacDowell & 

Associates, P.C., on brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

 The trial judge modified a prior visitation order changing 

from supervised to unsupervised the visitation of Mutsumi 

Azemoto-DeVeau with her children. In this appeal, Gregory Jude 

DeVeau, the children's father and custodian, contends the trial 

judge erred because no motion requesting unsupervised visitation 

had been filed. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the 

order. 

I. 

 The record establishes that the mother and father were 

divorced by decree entered in the circuit court on August 10, 

1995. While the divorce suit was pending, the mother fled the 
jurisdiction of the court with one of their two children in 

violation of a court order and was detained while attempting to 

leave the country with the child. Following an evidentiary 

hearing, a trial judge entered an order on May 1, 1995, finding 

"that the evidence is overwhelming that [the mother] abduct[ed] 

. . . the child [, which] was a premeditated, willful, deliberate 

taking, despite a court order." The judge granted the father sole 

custody of the two children, granted the mother supervised 

visitation with the children, ordered the mother to surrender her 

passport, and granted other relief. By order of July 28, 1995, 

nunc pro tunc to June 8, 1995, that same judge continued unchanged 

the supervised visitation. Various judges have entered other 

orders since that time, including a ruling that the parties could 

not file motions in the circuit court without advance permission. 

 On August 6, 1999, the mother filed in the circuit court a 

motion to modify visitation. At that time, the visitations were 

to be determined in accordance with an order dated December 20, 

1995, which specified a schedule and procedures for the mother's 

supervised visitation with the children. In her motion to modify 

visitation, the mother alleged a series of difficulties with the 

supervised visitations, including refusal of the supervisor to "do 

Wednesday evening visitation," the availability of other competent 

and less expensive supervisors, whom the father would not approve, 

for Wednesday evening visitation, and various other matters 

concerning disagreements with the father. As relief, the mother 

- 2 -
requested that the "Court designate another supervisor to 

facilitate the Wednesday evening visitation, and to reinforce 

weekend visitation and to give access to school events and contact 

with the children's teacher, so the [mother] will be able to [be] 

involved in the school education of her minor children." 

 Following a hearing in which the mother and father appeared 

pro se, the trial judge entered an order suspending the 

requirement for supervised visitation, requiring strict compliance 

with the visitation schedule set by the December 20, 1995 order, 

setting a hearing six months in the future "to review the parties' 

compliance . . . and to determine whether supervised visitation 

should be reinstated or discontinued," and granting other relief. 

The father filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the 

mother's motion only "request[ed] to change the agreed upon 

supervisor," that the father was not given notice "that suspension 

of supervised visitation would be considered," that 

"[u]nsupervised visitation was never mentioned at the hearing," 

and that, consequently, he was denied the opportunity to present 

evidence that the mother had recently threatened to take the 

children to Japan. The trial judge denied the motion for 

reconsideration. This appeal followed. 

II. 

 As a preliminary matter, we address the mother's contention 

that this appeal rises from a non-final, interlocutory order. 

This Court has jurisdiction over "[a]ny final judgment, order, or 

- 3 -
decree of the circuit court involving: . . . custody; . . . 

[a]ny other domestic relations matter arising under . . . Title 

20; . . . [and any] interlocutory . . . order entered in any of 

the cases listed in this section . . . adjudicating the 

principles of a cause." Code § 17.1-405. 

 In pertinent part the order recites as follows: 

ADJUDGED, ORDERED, and DECREED as follows: 

1) that Mr. DeVeau shall not take any of 

his vacation when it conflicts with Ms. 

Azemoto's visitation; 

2) that the requirement for supervised 

visitation shall be suspended; 

3) that Ms. Azemoto shall pay child support 

on a weekly basis in the amount of $86.53; 

4) that the parties shall strictly adhere 

to the visitation schedule set forth in the 

Consent Order that Judge Jamborsky entered 

on December 20, 1995; 

5) that the parties shall share 

responsibility for the transportation of the 

children to visitation and shall cooperate 

in transporting the children between Ms. 

Azemoto's home in Alexandria, Virginia, and 

Mr. DeVeau's home in Annapolis, Maryland; 

and 

6) that Ms. Azemoto shall not take the 

children out of a fifty-mile radius of the 

Washington, D.C. metropolitan area or 

Annapolis, Maryland area without prior leave 

of Court. 

 THIS MATTER IS CONTINUED to Judge Roush's 

docket on April 7, 2000, for the Court to 

review the parties' compliance with this 

Order and to determine whether supervised 

visitation should be reinstated or 

discontinued. 

- 4 -
 When an order grants all the relief that was sought and 

leaves only ministerial execution to insure compliance with the 

order, it is a final decree. See Feldman v. Rucker, 201 Va. 11, 

17, 109 S.E.2d 379, 384 (1959). The recitals of the relief 

decreed in the above order clearly indicate that the order 

disposes of the issue raised by the motion, gives all the relief 

contemplated, and sets a date certain, six months from its 

entry, to review the parties' compliance. The fact that the 

trial judge reserves the right to revisit the issue if there is 

non-compliance does not mean that the order is not final. The 

order clearly suspended the requirement that visitation be 

unsupervised upon entry of the order. See Newsome v. Newsome, 

18 Va. App. 22, 25-27, 441 S.E.2d 346, 348-49 (1994). 

 Even if we assume, however, that review six months later to 

determine compliance makes the order non-final, the order 

adjudicates the principles of the cause. The principle is well 

established that to adjudicate the principles of the cause, the 

order must determine that "the rules or methods by which the 

rights of the parties are to be finally worked out have been so 

far determined that it is only necessary to apply those rules or 

methods to the facts of the case in order to ascertain the 

relative rights of the parties, with regard to the subject 

matter of the suit." Lee v. Lee, 142 Va. 244, 252-53, 128 S.E. 

524, 527 (1925). Thus, "[a]n interlocutory order . . . that 

adjudicates the principles of a cause is one which must 

- 5 -
'determine the rights of the parties' and 'would of necessity 

affect the final order in the case.'" Erikson v. Erikson, 19 

Va. App. 389, 391, 451 S.E.2d 711, 713 (1994) (citation 

omitted). It is an order that "respond[s] to the chief object 

of the suit." Pinkard v. Pinkard, 12 Va. App. 848, 852, 407 

S.E.2d 339, 341-42 (1991). Thus, the Supreme Court has held 

that an order that did not end the cause by striking it from the 

docket may nonetheless adjudicate the principles of the cause. 

See Crestar Bank v. Williams, 250 Va. 198, 208, 462 S.E.2d 333, 

337 (1995); Snidow v. Snidow, 192 Va. 60, 61, 63 S.E.2d 620, 620 

(1951). 

 The trial judge did nothing more than retain the matter on 

the docket so that she could more easily review the parties' 

compliance with the order. The order was final when entered 

because it "dispose[d] of the whole subject, [gave] all the 

relief contemplated, provide[d] . . . reasonable completeness 

for giving effect to [its terms], and [left] nothing to be done 

in the cause save to superintend ministerially the execution of 

the order." Newsome, 18 Va. App. at 26, 441 S.E.2d at 348 

(citation omitted); see also Weizenbaum v. Weizenbaum, 12 Va. 

App. 899, 901, 407 S.E.2d 37, 38 (1991) (holding that an order 

granting a divorce and denying periodic spousal support but 

taking under advisement a motion for lump sum alimony was a 

final, appealable order as to the divorce on the date of entry). 

Accordingly, we hold that the order is appealable. 

- 6 -
III. 

 "Fundamental rules of pleading provide that no court can 

base its judgment or decree upon a right which has not been 

pleaded and claimed." Boyd v. Boyd, 2 Va. App. 16, 18, 340 

S.E.2d 578, 580 (1986). The purpose in requiring "pleadings is 

to give notice to the opposing party of the nature and character 

of the claim, without which the most rudimentary due process 

safeguards would be denied." Id. at 19, 340 S.E.2d at 580. 

"The basis of every right of recovery under 

our system of jurisprudence is a pleading 

setting forth facts warranting the granting 

of the relief sought. It is the sine qua

non of every judgment or decree. No court 

can base its decree upon facts not alleged, 

nor render its judgment upon a right, 

however meritorious, which has not been 

pleaded and claimed. . . . Pleadings are as 

essential as proof, the one being unavailing 

without the other. A decree cannot be 

entered in the absence of pleadings upon 

which to found the same, and if so entered 

it is void. . . . Every litigant is 

entitled to be told by his adversary in 

plain and explicit language what is his 

ground of complaint or defense. . . . The 

issues in a case are made by the pleadings, 

and not by the testimony of witnesses or 

other evidence." 

Gologanoff v. Gologanoff, 6 Va. App. 340, 346, 369 S.E.2d 446, 

449 (1988) (citations omitted). 

 The record undisputedly establishes that the mother's 

motion for modification of visitation contained no suggestion, 

explicit or implicit, that she sought to remove the requirement 

for supervised visitations. In this regard, the motion 

- 7 -
specifically requested only that the "Court designate another

supervisor to facilitate the Wednesday evening visitation." 

(Emphasis added). Moreover, the statement of facts also 

indicates that the mother "testified . . . that the current 

supervisor was too expensive, which was causing the inconsistent 

visitation." The mother also presented testimony of a witness 

who "stated that she would be willing to supervise visitation at 

a less expensive rate than that charged by [the current 

supervisor]." 

 Neither the motion nor any other pleading gave the father 

notice that he would be subject to the relief that the trial 

judge ordered. In view of the incident that gave rise to the 

condition of supervised visitation, the best interest of the 

children and the due process rights of the father were not 

safeguarded by ordering relief that significantly departed from 

the tenor of the pleadings on the relief requested. Thus, we 

hold that the trial judge erred in removing the requirement of 

supervised visitation without prior notice to the father. 

 In view of this Court's previous order staying the effect 

of the trial judge's order and the passage of nine months since 

the entry of the trial judge's order, we reverse that portion of 

the trial judge's October 6, 1999 order granting the mother 

unsupervised visitation, and we remand this matter to the 

- 8 -
circuit court for further proceedings upon proper notice if the 

parties be so advised. 

 Reversed and remanded. 

- 9 -