This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 CITY OF BELEN, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 31,964 4 AKER AMEN RA EL-BEY 5 a/k/a LONNIE JOHNS, 6 Defendant-Appellant. 7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF VALENCIA COUNTY 8 William A. Sanchez, District Judge 9 Robles, Rael & Anaya, P.C. 10 Marcus Rael, Jr. 11 Albuquerque, NM 12 for Appellee 13 Aker Amen Ra El-Bey 14 Belen, NM 15 Pro Se Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 VIGIL, Judge. 182 Defendant, pro se, appeals from the district court’s order finding him guilty of 1 the following traffic offenses: failure to show financial respons ibility and display a 2 current valid registration plate. This case was a de novo proceeding inthe district 3 court, which was appealed from the municipal court, and the district court remanded 4 to the municipal court for imposition of the same fines and fees set forth in the lower 5 court’s order. We issued a notice of proposed summary disposition, proposing to 6 affirm the district court’s order. Defendant has filed a response to our notice. We 7 have considered Defendant’s response and remain unpersuaded that he has 8 demonstrated error. We, therefore, affirm his convictions. 9 On appeal, Defendant claims status as an “Indigenous Aboriginal American 10 Moor,” specifically a “Washita Moor of th e Royal House of Tunic.” [DS unpaginated 11 3-6] Defendant seems to contend that this status should exempt him from the 12 enforcement of state traffic la ws. [Id.] He states that he“rejects contracts entered into 13 through coercion,” which seems to include st ate laws. [MIO 1] Defendant believes 14 that he has an absolute right to travel without state regulation. 15 As we stated in our notice, clearly, it is within the constitutionally ordained 16 police power of the State Le gislature to regulate public roads and highways and travel 17 thereon. See, e.g. , Otto v. Buck , 61 N.M. 123, 130, 295 P. 2d 1028, 1033 (1956) (“To 18 state that the subject of regulation of vehicular traffic upon public highways properly 193 comes within exercise of the police poweris but to announce a common-place, against 1 which no one would seriously contend. ”). This constitutional power undoubtedly 2 includes the Legislative mandate that driver s be licensed, insured, and carry evidence 3 of registration. We continueto point out that these are public documents in which one 4 has no privacy interest and must produce upon the demand of a police officer. See 5 State v. Reynolds , 119 N.M. 383, 386, 890 P.2d 1315, 1318 (1995). Again, it is not 6 open for sincere debate that operating a motor vehicle in New Mexico “is a privilege, 7 and not a right.” ACLU v. City of Albuquerque , 2007-NMCA-092, ¶ 17, 142 N.M. 8 259, 164 P.3d 958; In re Suazo , 117 N.M. 785, 794, 877 P.2d 1088, 1097 (1994) 9 (Baca, J., specially concurring). 10 Our notice explained the requirements of the New Mexico Traffic Code, which 11 Defendant was found to have violated, and st ated that there was no indication that the 12 Volvo Defendant was driving at the time he was issued a traffic citation is among 13 those vehicles exempted and there was no indication that Defendant was specifically 14 exempted from the provisions of the Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act. See 15 NMSA 1978, § 66-3-1(A) (2007); NMSA 1978, § 66-3-14(A) (1995); NMSA 1978, 16 § 66-5-205(B) (1998). 17 Defendant claims an exemption under NMSA 1978, Section 66-5-207(C) 18 (1998) (for “a motor vehicl e operated upon a highway only for the purpose of crossing 194 such highway from one property to another. ” [MIO 5] Defendant did not raise this 1 exemption in his docketing statement and there is no indication that he raised this 2 matter below or presented any evidence to support the application of that exemption. 3 Also, we see no facts in the recordto support such an exemption. See State v. Silver, 4 83 N.M. 1, 2, 487 P.2d 910, 912 (Ct. App. 1971) (stating that where the record does 5 not show that the appellant’s contention was presented to the trial court, it will not be 6 considered on appeal). 7 In addition, Defendant attaches se veral documents to his memorandum in 8 opposition to our notice, which he represents that he filed in district court and made 9 part of that record and which he purports exempt him from the governance of the New 10 Mexico Traffic Code. [MIO 2] Even assu ming that these documents were filed in the 11 district court, Defendant does not refer us to controlling authority that recognizes 12 those documents as providing exemption from the New Mexico Traffic Code. See In 13 re Adoption of Doe , 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984) (stating that an 14 appellate court will not consid er an issue if no authority is cited in support of the 15 issue, as absent cited authority to support an argument, we assume no such authority 16 exists). Defendant’s personal rejection of the laws is insufficient. We are not 17 persuaded that Defendant has esta blished that he is not subject to the laws of this state. 185 We do not understand Defendant’s remaini ng contentions and, therefore, do not 1 address them in this opinion. See Clayton v. Trotter, 110 N.M. 369, 373, 796 P.2d 2 262, 266 (Ct. App. 1990) (stating that we will review pro searguments to the best of 3 our ability, but cannot respond to unintelligible arguments). 4 For the reasons stated above and in our notice, we affirm the district court’s 5 order. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7

__________________________________ 8 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 9 WE CONCUR: 10

_________________________________ 11 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge 12

_________________________________ 13 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 14