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| 29.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 229/33 |

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Resolution on supporting the path of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia towards EU membership

(2023/C 229/07)

THE EURONEST PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY,

Having regard to the European Council’s decision of 23 June 2022 to grant EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova and recognise Georgia’s European perspective, while confirming its readiness to grant the country candidate status once the priorities specified in the Commission’s opinion on its membership application have been addressed,

Having regard to the EU General Affairs Council conclusions of 13 December 2022 on enlargement and the stabilisation and association process, which reaffirm that the future of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia and of their citizens lies within the EU,

Having regard to the European Parliament recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement [(1)](#ntr1-C_2023229EN.01003301-E0001),

Having regard to the Constituent Act of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly of 3 May 2011 [(2)](#ntr2-C_2023229EN.01003301-E0002), the joint declaration from the Eastern Partnership Summit of 15 December 2021, as well as the declarations from all previous Eastern Partnership Summits, and the Association Agreements between the EU and Ukraine [(3)](#ntr3-C_2023229EN.01003301-E0003), Moldova [(4)](#ntr4-C_2023229EN.01003301-E0004) and Georgia [(5)](#ntr5-C_2023229EN.01003301-E0005) respectively,

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| A. | whereas Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia remain unwaveringly committed to EU membership; |

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| B. | whereas the Eastern Partnership countries that wish to join the EU face significant challenges, especially as a result of Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, as well as the other acts of aggression (including occupation) that Russia has perpetrated in the region and the hybrid threats that it poses, which are all part of its attempt to keep those countries in its sphere of influence and impede their integration with the EU; |

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| C. | whereas the EU’s continued support for associated countries is vital to their reform efforts; |

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| D. | whereas the EU’s enlargement policy has transformative power and plays an important role as a strategic investment in peace, democracy, prosperity, security and stability in Europe; |

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| | 1. | Emphasises that the EU and the Eastern Partnership countries find themselves at a critical juncture for the European security architecture and the international rules-based order; |

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| | 2. | Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine and reaffirms its unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine, who have continued to demonstrate extraordinary courage and resilience in the face of unabated threats and attacks since 24 February 2022; |

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| | 3. | Reiterates its deep concern over Russia’s occupation of the regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali / South Ossetia, which are indivisible parts of Georgia, and its intensified annexation process, which together represent the first modern attempt to forcibly change the borders of a sovereign state in Europe; |

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| | 4. | Reiterates its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia within their internationally recognised borders and supports their efforts to fully enforce those principles; |

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| | 5. | Demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces, proxies and military equipment from the internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and refrain from further threatening or violating its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; |

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| | 6. | Calls on the EU and its Member States, as well as on the Eastern Partnership countries, to cooperate as closely as possible to stop Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, deter any further Russian aggression and uphold peace and security in Europe; |

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| | 7. | Calls on all relevant parties to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, deter Russian aggression and protect European security; |

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| | 8. | Recognises the Ukrainian, Moldovan and Georgian people’s commitment to their European future and their contributions to stability and security in the region; |

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| | 9. | Commends Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia’s efforts in implementing reforms and encourages them to continue on this path; |

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| | 10. | Urges their governments to continue their efforts to fight corruption and ensure the independence of the judiciary; |

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| | 11. | Underlines the importance of fostering a culture of political pluralism and inclusion, as well as constructive political dialogue and parliamentary functions with regard to legislation, scrutiny and oversight; |

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| | 12. | Stresses that good governance, the rule of law, a strong civil society and media freedom are essential elements for the EU accession process; |

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| | 13. | Expresses its strong support for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia’s applications to join the EU, and their right to determine their own future through democratic processes; |

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| | 14. | Underlines that the key priorities indicated by the Commission in its opinions on Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia’s applications for membership of the EU, and endorsed by the European Council, must be implemented in full; |

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| | 15. | Encourages the Commission and the EU Member States to grant Georgia candidate country status and launch accession negotiations with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia; |

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| | 16. | Calls for meaningful and structured dialogue with these countries on the EU accession process, taking into account the particular merits and specificities of each country; |

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| | 17. | Encourages the peaceful resolution of unresolved conflicts through diplomatic engagement, support for reforms, democratisation and economic cooperation; |

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| | 18. | Supports the role of solidarity lanes in promoting the integration of these countries into the European family and helping them to overcome the obstacles and challenges that may arise on their road to EU membership; |

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| | 19. | Calls on the governments of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to implement the EU human rights sanctions regime (the ‘European Magnitsky Act’), and extend it to include sanctions for corruption crimes; |

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| | 20. | Invites the Commission to ensure Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia’s orderly transition from being EU neighbours and associated countries to becoming EU accession countries; |

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| | 21. | Invites the Commission to prepare tailored roadmaps laying solid foundations for the gradual accession of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to the EU single market, by enhancing the implementation of the Association Agreements and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas between the EU and these countries; |

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| | 22. | Calls, in line with the recommendations that arose from the Conference on the Future of Europe, for democracy-based partnerships to be established with the aim of helping Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to adapt to the fully fledged, plural democracy and values that characterise the EU and to pave the way for their citizens’ broad and deep participation in the democratic life of the EU at European, national and local levels; stresses that such partnerships should entail the multinational exchange of best practice and serve to foster and strengthen sustainable, inclusive and participatory democracies in current and future EU Member States; calls on the Commission to provide adequate financing for such partnerships; |

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| | 23. | Invites the Commission to further explore making existing EU financial instruments available to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, bearing in mind their new status in relation to the EU, including the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance to help them meet EU standards and fulfil the criteria for EU accession; |

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| | 24. | Emphasises that the EU’s enlargement policy is one of the most effective mechanisms to bring peace and stability to the region; |

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| | 25. | Encourages investments in energy, transport and digital interconnectivity between the three countries and the EU in order to enhance energy security, boost trade, investment opportunities and economic growth, increase people-to-people contact and ensure greater regional stability and security; |

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| | 26. | Advocates the exchange of ideas, increased cultural understanding, and greater economic cooperation and integration both among Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia and between them and the EU, by removing the financial barrier of roaming charges; |

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| | 27. | Emphasises the importance of continued cooperation between the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly and the parliaments of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, in support of the countries’ EU membership goals. |

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[(1)](#ntc1-C_2023229EN.01003301-E0001)  Texts adopted, P9\_TA(2022)0406.

[(2)](#ntc2-C_2023229EN.01003301-E0002)  [OJ C 198, 6.7.2011, p. 4](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOC_2011_198_R_TOC).

[(3)](#ntc3-C_2023229EN.01003301-E0003)  [OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOL_2014_161_R_TOC).

[(4)](#ntc4-C_2023229EN.01003301-E0004)  [OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOL_2014_260_R_TOC).

[(5)](#ntc5-C_2023229EN.01003301-E0005)  [OJ L 261, 30.8.2014, p. 4](http://publications.europa.eu/resource/oj/JOL_2014_261_R_TOC).

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