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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 11-3303

A NTH O NY W E D D I N GT O N , Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

D US HAN Z AT E C K

Y , Superintendent, Responden t-Appellee.

Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the So uthern Distri ct o f Indi ana , Indi ana pol i s Divisi on. No. 1: 11 -cv-00 18 4- TWP-TA B — Tanya Wal ton P ratt, Judg e.

A RGU E D F E B R

UAR Y 12, 2013

— D E C I D E D A UGUS T 1, 2013

Before R I P PL E and T I ND E R , Circ uit Ju dges, and Z A G E L, District Judge. *

The Hono rab l e James B. Za gel , of the Uni ted States Distri ct Co urt fo r the * (co ntinued. ..)2 No. 11-3303

T I ND E R , Cir cui t Judge. Anthony W eddingto n w as convic ted in Indi ana state court in tw o separate tr ia ls of a tot al of four counts of rape, tw o counts of cri minal confinement, one count of cri minal deviate conduc t, and one count of ro bbery

. He w as sentenced to a tot al of 133 y ears’ i mpri sonment. He petiti oned for a wri t of habeas corpus, clai ming tha t he w as deni ed effecti v e assi stance of tr i al and appellate couns el in hi s second tr i al. The di stric t court conclu ded that the petiti on w as barred by the statute of li mi ta t ions, that W eddingto n procedurally defaulted hi s clai ms, and th a t he w a s not entitled to relief; there fore, the court deni ed hi s pet it io n. For the reasons that follow , w e v acate the di smi ssal of the petiti on and remand to the di stric t courtfor furt her pro ceedings. I. Background
In 2002, the St ate of Indi ana charged W eddingto n wi th four counts of rape, four counts of cri minal deviate conduc t, and tw o counts of cri minal confinement. The charges w ere sev ered into t w o separate tr i als. The Honor able T any a W alton Pratt (then a Mar i on Superior Court Judge) presi ded ov er W eddingto n’s fi rst trial in Sept ember 2003 (Caus e No. 49G 01- 0202-FB-029155). A jury found hi m gui lty of rape, ro bbery , and criminal confinement, and Judge Pratt sentenced hi m to 73 ye a rs ’ i m p ri s onm e n t. W eddingto n appealed; the Indi ana C ou rt of Appeals affi rmed.

( ...c onti nued) * Nor thern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, si tting by desi gna tio n.No. 11-3303 3
The remain ing charges again st W eddingto n w ere tr i ed in a Mar ch 4, 2005 bench tr i al before Mar i on Superior Court Judge Rober t Altic e (Caus e No. 49G02-0202- FB- 23310). Pri or to late Februar y of that y ear

, W eddingto n had been proceeding pro se wi th stand-b y couns el. At the end of that month, how e ver , W eddingto n sought appoi ntment of couns el and, on Mar ch 2, 2 0 0 5 , s tan d

-b y couns el w as appoi nted de fe n s e c oun s e l

. D e fe n s e
counse l called no wi tnesses at tr i al. Judge Altic e found W eddingto n gui lty of three counts of r a pe, one count of cri minal deviate conduc t, and one count of cri minal confinement, and sente nced hi m to 60 y ears’ i mpri sonment to run
consecuti v e to the sentence i mposed in the 2 0 0 3 case. W eddingto n appealed hi s 2005 convic tions and the Indi ana Court of Appe als affi rmed. He sought tr ansfer to the Indi ana Supreme Co urt, whi ch w as deni ed. In 2007, W

eddingto n file d a state petiti on for post-convic

tion relief rais ing clai ms challen gin g hi s 20 0 5 co nvic tions, clai ming, inter a lia , ineffec tiv e assi stance of tr i al and appellate
couns el. The state tr i al court held evidenti ary hearin gs on the petiti on and on May 12, 2009, the court deni ed post-convic tion relief. W eddingto n di d not appeal. On Februar y 4, 2011, W eddingto n fi led a pro se habeas petiti on under 28 U.S.C. § 2 2 5 4 , challenging hi s 2005 convic

tions . The peti tion c lai ms that the tr i al court err ed in denying
a motion to supp ress all evidenc e from a Ja nuary 29, 2002 tr affi c stop. It also rais es ineffec tiv e-ass i stance-of- couns el

c l a i m s d i re c te d a t tr i al couns el and appellate couns el, inclu d in g
one relat ed to a fourth amendmen t clai m. And W e d d ingto n maintai ns that his wi fe w ould hav e testifi ed at trial and giv en hi m an alibi to the cri mes charged, y et tr i al couns el fai led to4 No. 11-3303

contact her or any other wi tness, ev en though couns el w as told that she w ant e d to testif y
. In hi s pet i tion, W

eddingto n assert s that he w as prev ented from appealing the deni al of hi s postconvic tion mot i on becau se t he pris on admini strat i on “ co nfi scated all of hi s legal w o r k , l e g al book s, and pens and penci ls for ov er a y ear .” Petiti on 8. He asserts that the one-y ear li mi tations period i s no b ar to h i s petiti on “b ecaus e all of [hi s] l egal paper w or k, legal book s, and ev en hi s legal ma il w a s confi scated by the offi ci als at the pris on...; for w ell ov er a y ear these i tems w ere take n. Ev en [hi s] pens and pencils w ere take n.” Id. at 14. W

eddingto n decl a red under penalty of perj ury t hat the assertions in hi s peti tion are true an d corr ect, and he si gned hi s peti tion February 2, 2011. In a n a ttachment to hi s federal habeas petiti on, W ed d in gt on further states that when he w as sent to segreg ation, “all of hi s personal p r oper ty and belongin gs w ere take n from hi m and placed insi de of a plasti c gr ay b ox by the insti tution offi ci als.” Id. at 17-18. He also clai ms that “[he] w as not allow e d to ret riev e any of hi s legal paperw or k...for w ell ov er a y ear ,” id. at 18, and that ev en though he w as released fro m di sci plinary segreg ation in June 2010, the proper ty that had been put in the gr ay b ox w as not returned to him unti l August 2010. Furt her

more, when the p r o pert y w as ret urned, “basi cally all” of hi s legal book s and paperw or k, in c lu d in g hi s h abeas petiti on, w ere mi ssing. Id. at 19. W

eddingto n separately si gned and dated the attachment, but wi thout a separate indi cati on that t he attachment, too , w as si gned under penalty o f perjur y
. W eddingto n’s federal habeas case w as assi gned to distri ct judge T any a W alton Pr a t t (who had been appoi nted to the Uni ted St ates D i s tr i c t Court for the So uthern Di stric t of Indi anaNo. 11-3303 5

as of June 2010). On Sept ember 19, 2011, Judge Pratt, as a federal di stric t judge, d e nie d t he petiti on as barred by the statute of li mi tations and procedural default wi thout addressing the merits of the clai ms. W edding t o n d id not rais e any i ssu e i n the di stric t courtwi th respect to Judge Pratt ’s partic i

pation in hi s federal habeas case. Thi s court gr a nte d W

e d d in gt on a certifi cate of appealabi li ty upon finding a sub stanti al showing of the deni al of the right to effecti v e assi stance of tr i al and appellate couns el. W e di rected the parties to br ie f t he tim eliness of the petiti on and whether W eddingto n procedurally defaulted on hi s feder al habeas clai ms. W

e also instructed them to address whether recusal of the di stric t j udge w as requi red. II. Disc uss ion
A federal court can gr ant a wr it o f ha beas corpus i f a petiti oner demonstrate s that he i s in cus t o dy in violati on of clearly establi shed federal law

. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). W

e rev i ew
a di stric t court ’s deni al of a habeas p etiti on de nov o. Resen dez

v
. Smith , 692 F .3d 623, 626 (7th Ci r
. 201 2 ). I n t hi s case, w e fi rst consi der whether a di stric t cour t judge mus t recuse herself from part i ci patin g in a § 2254 petiti on where the judge, in her former capac i ty as a state court judge, presi ded ov er the defendant’s convic tion fo r state cri minal charges that w ere cl o sely relat ed to the state cri minal charges underlyin g t he federal habeas acti on. Then w e consi der the state’s arg uments that W eddingto n fai led to clear procedural hurdles erected by the Antiterr o r ism and Effec tiv e Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDP A): the one-y ear sta t ut e of li mi tations and the exhausti on-of-state-remedi es requi rement.6 No. 11-3303
A. Recu sal Our fi rst task i s to deci de whether the di stric t judge should hav e recused herself. Feder al law prov i des that “[a]ny...judge ...shall di squali fy hi mself in any proceeding in whi ch hi s i mpartiali ty mi ght reasonably be questi oned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The purpose of t he statute “i s to preserve the appear ance of i mpartiali ty

.” United States v
. Johnson , 680 F .3d 966, 979 (7th Ci r .), cert. deni ed, 133 S. Ct. 672 (2012). It is i mport ant to a li tigant and to the fai rness and publi c reputat i on of judicial proceedings that rev i ew of a case be conduc ted by “a judge other than the judge who presi ded ov er the ca se a t tr i al.” Clemm ons v
. W

olfe, 377 F

. 3 d 322, 325 (3d Cir

. 2004). I ndeed, 28 U.S.C. § 47 prov i des: “N o judge shall hear or deter mine an appeal from the deci si on of a case or i ssu e tr i ed by hi m.” Thi s statute is no t stric tly appli cable here becau se i t appli es to appeals, not federal habeas petiti ons. But the habeas petiti on i s si mi lar to appellate rev i ew
. In a federal habeas act io n, t he petiti oner has “the oppor tuni ty to hav e a federal court rev i ew t he state proceedings for consti tutional infi rmi ties

. In t his respect, there i s no reason why the same rules g o ver ning independence, confli ct of intere st, or appearance of partiali ty should not apply

.” Clemm ons , 377 F .3d at 325-26; see also Russ ell

v
. La n e , 8 9 0 F .2d 947, 948 (7th Ci r
. 1989) (notin g that a federal habeas proceeding “i s addressed to a judge...who had no emotional commi tment to vind i cating state justic e as admini ster ed in the petiti oner’ s cas e”). The state arg ues t ha t a § 455(a) clai m of bi as i s not preserv ed for appeal unles s the complaining party seeks a wri t of mandam us. See, e.g. , Johnson , 680 F .3d at 980 (“Becau se a partyNo. 11-3303 7

w ai v es his § 455(a) r ecus al arg ument by fai ling to petiti on for

a wri t of mandam us, i t follows that he also w ai v es i t by fai ling altog ether to rais e i t at the di stric t court lev el.” (quotation and ci tation omi tte d)); United S tat es v
. Diekemper, 604 F .3d 345, 351 (7th Ci r
. 2010) (“[R]ecusal under § 455(a) mus t be soug ht i mmedi ately thro ug h a wri t of mandam us or i t i s w ai v ed.”). Y et, at the same tim e and not as an alter na t ive arg ument, the st a te also asserts that w e rev i ew W eddingto n’s clai m that Judge Pr att should hav e recused herself for plain e rr or
. Thus, the state may hav e w ai v ed the w a iver arg ument. But reg ardless of whether W

eddingto n w ai v ed thi s clai m for purposes of the pri or proceedings b elow , as we shall see, further proceedings in the di stric t court are necess ary
. W e rev i ew his cl a i m wi th that in mind. C lemmons i s a closely analogo us case. There, the di stric t judge di smi ssed the habeas petiti on as unti mely , and that same judge had been the state court judg e wh o had presi ded ov er the petiti oner’ s cri minal tr i al. 377 F .3d at 324. The Thi rd Ci rcui t
rev i ew ed for plain e rr or becau se t he p e titi oner di d not object to t he judge’s fai lure to r ecus e i n the habeas ac tion. Th e court stated that “the e r r o r complained of in thi s case—a federal judge si tting in rev i ew of the propr i ety of the state proceedings conduc ted by that judge—ser io usly affec ts the fai rness and p ubli c reputat i on of the judi ci al proceedings.” Id. at 3 2 5

. Th e court found that the di stric t judge’ s fai lur e t o recuse “has created an appearance of i mpropr i ety that runs the ris k of undermining the publi c’s confide nce in the judi ci al process.” Id. at 328 (quotation and cit ation omi tte d). Clemm ons establi shed a broa d rule requiring that each federal di stric t judge “recuse hi mself or hers e lf from partici patin g in a 28 U.S.C. §8 No. 11-3303
2254 habeas corpus petiti on of a defendant rais ing any i ssu e concerning the tr i al or convic tion ov er whi ch the judge presi ded in hi s or her former capac i ty as a state court judge.” Id. at 329. Sim i larly

, in Russ ell , w e conclu ded that the petiti oner “w a s e nt it led to hav e hi s habeas corpus petiti on heard by a judge wh o had not partici pated in hi s convic tion.” 890 F .2d at 948 (judge who di smi ssed habeas petiti on had been a member of the state court of appeals panel that had affi rm e d p e t i

tioner’s convi cti on on direct appeal). In arg uing t ha t Judge Pratt w as not required to recuse herself, the state relies on Daniels v
. W ilson , No. 10-4562, 2012 WL 6176999 (3d Ci r
. Dec. 12, 2012) (unp ubli shed)

. In that case, the st a t e co ur t judge who had i ssu ed a w arr ant for Dani els’

a r r est when he fai led to appear for a prelim inary hearin g ended up being the di stric t judge who deni ed Dani els’ federal habeas petiti on. In deci ding that the judge w as not required to
recuse hi mself based on hi s inv olv e me nt in the state court proceedings, the c ourtconsi dered Clemm ons ’s broad rule and the Supreme Court ’s instructi on that when consid e r ing the need for recusal under § 455(a), co urts “cannot i gnor e the factual realiti es” of the case under rev i ew
. Id. at *3. The co ur t
conc l uded that the di stric t judge w as not required to recuse hi mself becau se he “di d not presi de ov er any tr i al or convic tion of Dani els” and only i ssu ed an arr est w arr ant when Dani els fai led to appear at a prelim inary hearin g. Id. Furt her , the court reasoned that the w arr ant “did not concern the sub stanti v e charges” but w as nondi screti onary and mini steria l , and the habeas petiti on rais ed no i ssu e r egar ding the w arr ant or any conduc t by that judge. Id. Thus, t he d ist ric t judge w as not “tasked wi th rev i ewing hi s past state court rulings in a federalNo. 11-3303 9
habeas case.” Id. at *4 (quoti ng Clemm ons, 377 F .3d at 328). The court conclu ded that a reasonable person w ould not doubt the ju d ge ’s i m p a rti a l i ty in deci ding the habeas petiti on, and recu s a l

w as not required. Id. Although Clemm ons i s not di rectly on poin t, W eddingto n’s case i s closer to Clemm ons than to Daniels . Judge Pratt did not presi de ov er the tr i al and convic tion in the 2005 case, but she di d presi de ov er the tr i al and convic tion in the 20 0 3 ca se
. In that capac i ty

, she deni ed a motion to supp ress reg ardin g the tr affi c s t op that led to W eddingto n’s ar rest and t he inv esti gation that led to both cri minal cases
. That same tr affi c stop w as also challen ged in a motion to supp ress in the 2005 case. Thus, the same facts and ci rcums tances, and perh a ps legal arg ume nt s, w ere inv olv ed in Judge Altic e’s deni al of the supp re ssio n motion in the 2005 case as in Judge Pratt ’s deni al of t he supp ressi on motion in the 2003 case. Indeed, the state court of appeals’ deci si on on appeal of the 2005 ca se refer s to i ts affi rmance of W

eddingto n’s convic tion in the 2003 case, noting that the latter “challen ged the propr i ety of the same tr affi c stop and sub sequent detention.” W eddington v
. State of Indiana, Mem. Deci si on 9 n.9 (Ind. Ct. App. April 18, 2006) (Shor t App. 124 n.9). Furt hermor e, one of the ineffec tiv e-ass i stance clai ms rais ed in the habeas petiti on inv olv es tr i al and appellat e couns els’ alleged fai lures wi th respect to a fourth amendmen t clai m
co nc e rnin g the tr affi c stop that underli es both cases
. Thus, in presi ding ov er the habeas petiti on, Judge Pratt eff e ct iv ely

w ould be rev i ewing an i ssu e and matter ov er whi ch she had already pass ed judgment as a state court judge. In addi tion, w e note that whi le st ill on the state tr i al court in 2005, after the10 No. 11-3303
2003 convic tion w as affi rmed on appeal, see W eddington v
. St ate, No. 49A02-0311-CR-1004, 815 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), Judge Pratt recused herself from further proceedings in the 2003 case. Though the reason for the state court recusal is not di scl osed in the recor d, W eddingto n does not suggest that there i s a basi s for recusal in thi s habeas case other than the fact that Judge Pratt ruled on hi s fourth amendmen t clai m whi le on the state court. (As an asi de, w e also note that following Judge Pratt ’s state recusal, W

eddingto n’s 2003 case w as reassi gned to the Honor able Jane E

. Ma gnu s - Stinson, then a Mar i on Superior CourtJudge. Jud ge Magnus-Stins on becam e a federal di stric t j udg e in 2010 and, li ke Judge Pratt, now si ts on the Unit e d St ates Di stric t Co urt for the So uthern Di stric t of Indiana.) Ev en though the federal habeas petit io n d oes not di rectly inv olv e the 2003 cri minal tr i al and convic tions before Judge Pratt, the cri minal charges tr i ed in the 2003 case w e r e cl osely relat ed to the charges in th e 2005 case underlyin g the habeas petiti on. The state suggests that Judge Prat t’s di smi ssalof the petiti on on procedural gr ounds makes a di fference. I t is tr ue that one has to di g pret ty deeply into a long petiti on (169 gr ounds) to find t he few refer ences to the supp ressi on ruling in the 2003 case. So , too , t he t ime liness and exhausti on concerns are much more apparent from a qui ck look at the petiti on and the relev ant da t e s. I t i s certainly conceiv able that Judge Pratt ’s di smi ssalof the petiti on w as done wi thout any aw areness that the clai ms being asserted rais ed any i ssu e concerning
a tr i al ov er whi ch she had presi ded in her capac it y as a state court judge. It i s also tr ue that W eddingto n di d nothin g to call the pot entialrecusal i ssu e to Judge Pratt’ s attention.No. 11-3303 11
How ev er

, § 455(a) requires a judge to di squali fy herself “in any proceeding in whi ch [her] i mpartiali ty mi ght reasonably be questi oned” (emphas i s added); thi s requirement i s not li mi ted to particu lar i ssu es wi thi n that proceeding. The statute ai ms to
av oid the appeara nce of i mpartiali ty , whi ch does not necess arily depend on the particu lar i ssu es on whi ch a deci si on turns. Review of the habeas petiti on on the merits may require Judge Pratt to rev i ew the 2005 proceedings wi th respect to a supp ressi on motion ai med at the same st op and search as the one inv olv ed in the s uppressi on m otion on whi ch she ruled in the 2003 case. In our view

, this could seri ously affec t the fai rness and publi c reputat i on of the judi ci al proceedings and create an appearance of i mpropr i ety

. As explain ed below

, th i s case has to be remanded for further proceedings. Thus, unli ke our cases in whi ch i t w as too late to remedy an appearance of bi as becau se the di stric t judge

w as done wi th the case, see, e.g. , In re Ber geron , 6 3 6 F .3d 882, 883-84 (7th Ci r
. 2011) (conc luding that a party w as not entitled to wri t of mandam us or dering the judge’ s remov al where “i t’s too late fo r us to or der the judge removed from the case, becau se she’s thro ugh wit h it”); Diekemper, 604 F .3d at 352 (observing that “[o]nce the proceedings at i ssu e are conclu ded,

a post hoc motion for recusal will d o li ttle to remedy any appearance of bi as t hat w as present” and “any remedy t o the appearance of bi as that may hav e exis ted has long since
ev aporat ed”), the appearance of bi as can be remedied here before further proceedings are conduc ted in the di stric t court. A si mple appli cati on of our Ci rcui t Rule 36 wi ll assu re that thi s
case w i ll be ass i gned to a di fferent di stric t j udge on re mand.12 No. 11-3303
B. Procedural Hurdl es 1. Limitati ons Period The state arg ues, and the di strict co urt found, that W eddingto n’s federal habeas petiti on i s barred becau se i t w as fi led outsi de the li mi tations period. A petiti oner mus t seek a feder al wri t of habeas corpus wi thi n one y ear of the date on whi ch the state court judgmen t becomes final, though the li mi tations period i s tolled whi le a “proper ly fi led” appli cati on for p os t- convic tion rev i ew i s “pending” in state court. 2 8 U. S. C

. § 2244(d)( 1)(A), (d)( 2); V illanu eva v
. Anglin , Nos. 12-1559 & 12- 2177, 2013 WL 2992119, at *3 (7th Ci r
. June 17, 2013). An

un t i mely petiti on “foreclose[s] habeas relief.” Id. at * 5

. AEDP A’s li mi tations period, how ev er , i s subject to equi table tolling, i f the peti tioner shows “‘(1) that he has been pursuing hi s rights di li gently

, and (2) that some ext r a o rdin ary ci rcumstance stood in hi s w ay .’” Holland v
. Florid a , 1 3 0 S

. Ct. 2549, 2563 (201 0 ) (quoti ng Pace v
. DiGugli elmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005))

. W eddingto n’s convic tions w e r e final Sept ember 7, 2006, when the tim e to seek certiorar i in the Supreme Court expired. On February 12, 2007, 158 days later , he fi led a pro se petiti on for post-convic tion relief in state court. (The di stric t court and respondent erred in finding that he fi led hi s peti tion 127 days later .) The li mi tations period w as tolled whi le that petiti on w as pending. On May 12, 2009, the tr i al court deni ed hi s p ostconvic tion pet i tion, an d t he federal habeas li mi tations per i od

ran on Monday

, December 9, 2009. S ee Fed. R. Ci v
. P

. 6(a). W eddingto n’s petiti on w as si gned and deemed fi led onNo. 11-3303 13
Februar y 2, 2011. Thus, hi s federal habeas petiti on w as untim ely

. A cc o r ding to W

eddingto n, the di stric t court err ed in di smi ssing hi s petiti on becau se the li mi tations period sh ould hav e be e n equi tably tolled by the state’s confi scati on of hi s legal papers. The state responds that the recor d fai ls to supp or t hi s contention. Its arg ument again st equi table tolling, on
a ppeal as in the di stric t court, i s based solely on i ts challen g e
a s to whether W

eddingto n w as prohibi ted acces s to hi s le g a l materials whi le he w a s housed in di sci plinary segreg ation. “The intentional confi scati on of a pris oner’ s habeas corpus petiti on and relat ed legal p a p e r s by a corr ecti ons offi cer i s ‘ext rao rdin ary ’ as a matter of law .” V alverde v
. Stinson , 224 F .3d 129, 133 (2d Ci r
. 2000) (holding that a corr ecti ons o ff icer’s confi scati on of a pris oner’ s draft habeas petiti on and r elated legal papers can j usti fy equi table tolling of the one-y ear li mi tations period); see also United St at e s v
. Gab aldon , 522 F .3d 1121, 1124–27 (10th Ci r . 2008) (holding that pr i son’s compl ete confi scati on of petiti oner' s legal materials si x w eeks before fi ling deadline and i ts holding of papers unti l after li mi tations period expi red constituted an extr aor dinary circu mstanc e for purposes of equi table to lling). The state maintai ns that W edd ingto n offers only bald asserti ons in hi s petiti on to supp or t hi s clai m, ci tes no evidenc e, and di sregar ds contrar y evidenc e. How ev er , in hi s habeas p e t it ion, W

eddingto n asserts that when he w as placed in di sci plinary segreg ation the pris on offi ci al confi scated all of hi s l e gal paperw or k (inclu ding hi s petiti on for habeas corpus), legal book s, pens and penci ls and he w as not allow ed to ret riev e them for ov er one y ear
. The petiti on i s decla r e d and14 No. 11-3303
stated under penalty of perj ur y and thus i s consi dered an affi davit. See Lafuen te v
. United States , 617 F .3d 944, 946 (7th Ci r
. 2010) (conc luding that a § 2255 motion sw or n under penalty of perj ury w as cons i dered an affi davit); Kafo v
. United Stat es , 467 F .3d 1063, 1 068 (7th Ci r
. 2006) (the allegations in a motion si gned under penalty o f perjur y “ become evidenc e”); Paters v

. United States , 159 F .3d 1043, 1052 (7th C ir

. 1998) (“wh en a p e titi on contai ns language to the effect of...‘I declare (or certify , v e r ify , or state) under penalty of perj ury that the foreg oin g i s tr ue and co r r e ct,’ such petiti on, and the declaration(s ) submi tte d along wi th i t, ar e tantamount t o affi davits.” (footnot e omi tte d)). T o be sure, the state has presented the affid avit of T om Ri chardson, Cor rectional Ca se Manager at Pendleton where W eddingto n w as housed, contradic tin g W eddingto n’s assertions

. Ri chardson state s th a t W e ddingto n w as nev er prohibi ted from acces sing hi s legal materials or the fa cil ity’ s legal refer

e n c e materials whi le he w as in di sci plinary segreg ation. Bu t the competi ng evidenc e si mply creates a factual di spute. As for the faci li ty’ s oper ational procedures whi ch prov i de for acces s to legal materia l s b y inm a tes in di sci plinary segreg ation, the mere existence of these procedures does not compel a finding that they w ere follow ed in thi s case. Giv en W eddingto n’s statements to the cont r ary , the procedures themselv es cannot establi sh that he w as in fac t pro vided h i s legal materials

. The recor d presents factual i ssu es that must be resolv ed before a deci si on can be made reg ardin g equi table tolling, and i t appears that an evidenti ary hearin g i s necess ary t o r e so lv e the fact i ssu es. The di stric t court err ed in fail ing to consi derNo. 11-3303 15
whether the li mi tations period w as equi ta bly tolled by the state’s alleged confi scati on of W eddingto n’s legal papers.

2. Exhaustion The state arg ues that W eddingto n has procedurally d e fa ulted hi s habeas clai ms and that he cannot ov ercome hi s default. A petiti oner mus t rais e hi s consti tutional clai ms in state court “to alert fai rly the state court to the federal nature of the clai m and to permi t that court to adjudi cate squarely that feder al i ssu e.” V

illanu eva , 2013 WL 2992119, at *5 (quot a t io n and ci tation omi tte d). The fai lure to present fai rly each habeas clai m in state cour t “ l eads to a default of the clai m[s ]” and “bar[s] the federal court from rev i ewing the c lai m[s ’] merits.” Smith v . McKee, 598 F .3d 374, 382 (7th Ci r . 2010). The di stric t judge deter mined that W eddingto n procedur

ally defaulted hi s federal habeas clai ms by fai ling to appeal the state tr i al court’s deni al of post-convic tion relief. The state tr i al court i ssu ed i ts findings of fact and conclu si ons of law on May 12, 2009, when W

eddingto n already w as in di sci plinary segreg ation. W

eddingto n di d not appeal from the tr i al court’s deni a l of hi s petiti on for post-convic tion relief and there fore defaulted the clai ms rai sed therein. How ev er

, a di stric t court may excuse procedural default i f the petiti oner “can demonstrate ei ther (a) caus e for the default and prej udi ce (i .e., the err or s w or ked to the petiti oner’ s ‘ actual and sub stanti al di sadv antage,’ ); or (b) that fai lure to consi der hi s clai m w ould result in a fund amental mi scarri age of justic e (i .e., a clai m of actual innocenc e).” Conner v. McBride, 375 F .3d 643, 648 (7th Ci r
. 2004) (quoti ng United States v
. Frady, 456 U.S.16 No. 11-3303 152, 170 (1982)) (emphas i s added). Cause i s defined as “an objectiv e fac t or

, ext ernal to the defense, that i mpeded the defendant’s effor ts to rais e the c lai m in an earli er pr oceedi ng. Prejudic e means an err or whi ch so infected the entire tr i al that the resulting convic tion violates due process.” McKee, 598 F .3d at 382 ( qu ot a ti on and ci tation omi tte d). Procedural default i s an affi rmativ e defense and can be w ai v ed. Eich we d e l v
. Chandler, 696 F .3d 660, 669 (7th Ci r . 2012). If W eddingto n’s clai ms are beli ev ed, by t he tim e the state tr i al court e n te re d ju d gm e n t on hi s post-convic tion petiti on, hi s habeas petiti on and legal papers had been take n from hi m and he had no acces s to them. Thi s lack of acces s he alleges conti nued for more than one y ear—w ell bey ond the 30 days allow ed for appea l

. S e e Ind. R. App. P

. 9(A)(1)

. And i f W

eddingto n’s clai ms are credi ted, the confi scati on o f his legal materials can establi sh caus e for hi s procedural default. Cf. V alverde, 224 F .3d at 134 (“[A] person i s plainly ‘preven ted’ from fi ling a pleading for some period of tim e i f he i s deprived of t he sole copy of that pleadin g.”). In arg uing t ha t the procedural default could not be excus ed, the state ass ert s that W eddingto n has not sh own caus e
or a fu nd a me ntal mi scarri age of justic e; the state has not addressed prejudic e. See Resp’t’s Br . 24 (“W eddingto n cann ot
excuse hi s pr o cedural default. W eddingto n does not show
caus e for the procedural default or that the fai lure to consi der the clai ms wi ll result in a fund amental mi scarri age of justic e.”); id. at 28 (notin g that defaulted habeas clai ms may be rev i ew ed i f a petiti oner establi shes caus e and prej udi ce and arg uing that

“ W e d d ing t o n ha s no t sh o wn ca [ u ] s e ” )

. H o weve r ,No. 11-3303 17
W eddingto n’s procedural default may be excused i f he shows either “caus e and prej udi ce” or a “fund amental mi scarri age of justic e” i f hi s clai ms are not c onsi dered. (On appeal he arg ues that he can av ai l hi mself of both means of excusing hi s default.) Li k ewi se, the state fai led to rais e or dev elop any arg ument about the prej udi ce part of the “caus e and prej udi ce” standard in the di stric t court. Instead, i t arg ued only t ha t W eddingto n had not shown caus e: It atte mpted to refute hi s claim s a bo ut the confi scati on of and acces s to hi s leg al materials

. It may be that W eddingto n can show prej udi ce giv en hi s allegations of
couns el’s ineffec tiv eness in fai ling to inv esti gate and call hi s wi fe as an al ibiwi tness. W e are, of cour se , a w a r e that in thi s court the state has arg ued that W

eddingto n’s clai ms of ineffec tiv e assi stance of

couns el lack merit. A nd w e are w ell aw are that Strickland clai ms hav e a prej udi ce component. See Strickland v
. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 694-95 (1984). But the state also has arg ued tha t t he “merits of W eddingto n’s clai ms are not proper ly before the Court .” Resp’t’s Br

. 29. And more i mport antly , the state nev er arg ued in the di stric t court that W eddingto n could not show prej udi ce. Thus, thi s i s not a case in whi ch w e could affi rm on the gr ound that prej udi ce has not been shown. Cf. Thayer v
. Chiczewski, 705 F .3 d 237, 247 (7th Ci r
. 2012) (stati ng that “w e can affi rm on any gr ound supp or ted in the recor d, so long as that gr ound w as adequately addressed in t he di stric t court and the nonmoving party had an oppor tuni ty to contest the i ssu e” (quotation and ci tation omi tte d)). As wi th equi table tolling, further findings are ne ce ss ary to deter mine whether W eddingto n can ov ercome hi s pr ocedural default. There fore,18 No. 11-3303

w e mus t remand for further findings, inclu ding an evidenti ary hearin g, if

necess ary

. III. Conclus ion W e accordingly V A CA T E the deni al of W

eddingto n’s habeas petiti on and remand for further proceedings co nsi stent wi th thi s opini on. Circu i t Rule 36 shall apply on remand.