a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on National Security, Emerging Threats 

and International Relations, Committee 

on Government Reform, House of 

Representatives

July 2006 SPECIAL 

OPERATIONS 

FORCES

Several Human Capital 

Challenges Must Be 

Addressed to Meet 

Expanded Role

GAO-06-812
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 2006

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Several Human Capital Challenges Must 

Highlights of GAO-06-812, a report to the Be Addressed to Meet Expanded Role 

Chairman, Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

Since the Global War on Terrorism, 

the Department of Defense (DOD)

has taken steps to expand the role

of the United States Special

Operations Command (Command) 

and its forces. In response, the 

Command has transformed its 

headquarters to coordinate

counterterrorism activities, and 

DOD has increased funding and the 

number of special operations 

forces positions. Given the 

expanded mission, it is critical that

the Command has personnel with

the right knowledge and skill sets. 

GAO was asked to assess: (1) 

whether the Command has 

determined all of the personnel 

requirements needed to meet its 

expanded role; (2) the progress and 

challenges in meeting growth goals; 

and (3) any effect of deployments 

on the Command’s ability to 

provide trained forces, and the 

progress made in managing 

deployments. GAO performed its 

work at the Special Operations 

Command and its service 

components, analyzed personnel

data against requirements, and

examined policies and directives. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making recommendations 

to improve the information 

available to the Special Operations

Command to manage special 

operations forces personnel. 

In commenting on a draft of this 

report, DOD concurred or partially 

concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations. 

Although DOD plans to significantly increase the number of special 

operations forces personnel, the Special Operations Command has not yet 

fully determined all of the personnel requirements needed to meet its 

expanded mission. While it has determined the number of personnel needed 

to increase its number of warfighter units, it has not completed analyses to 

determine (a) how many headquarters staff are needed to train and equip 

these additional warfighters or (b) how many headquarters staff are needed 

to plan and synchronize global actions against terrorist networks—a new 

mission for the Command. DOD plans to begin increasing the number of 

headquarters positions and has requested funds for these positions in its 

fiscal year 2007 budget request. Until these analyses are completed, the 

Special Operations Command cannot provide assurances to the Secretary of 

Defense and the Congress that currently planned growth in the number of 

personnel for the Command’s headquarters will meet, exceed, or fall short of

the requirements needed to address the Command’s expanded mission. 

The military services and the Special Operations Command have made 

progress since fiscal year 2000 in recruiting, training, and retaining special 

operations forces personnel, but they must overcome persistently low 

personnel inventory levels and insufficient numbers of newly trained 

personnel, in certain specialties, to meet DOD’s plan to increase the number 

of special operations forces. In addition, GAO’s review of the service 

components’ annual reports required by the Special Operations Command 

shows that the reports have not provided the information needed to 

determine whether they have enough personnel to meet current and future 

requirements. Without such information, the Command will be unable to 

determine whether the service components’ human capital management 

approaches, including recruiting, training, and retention strategies, will be 

effective in meeting the planned growth targets. 

Since fiscal year 2000, the number of special operations forces personnel 

deployed for operations has greatly increased, and the number deployed for 

training has simultaneously decreased. The Special Operations Command 

has taken action to manage the challenge of increased deployments; in 

August 2005, it began requiring active duty personnel to remain at least an 

equal amount of time at home as deployed. But the Command’s service 

components have not consistently or fully implemented this policy. This is 

because the policy lacks clear guidance on the length of time that the 

components must ensure that personnel remain within the deployment 

policy guidelines. In addition, officials with the Command’s Army and Navy

service components expressed concerns regarding the reliability of their 

information required to track the deployments of their personnel. Without 

consistent and reliable data, the Special Operations Command does not have 

the information it needs to effectively manage the personnel deployments of 

special operations forces, which affects its ability to maintain the readiness, 

retention, and training of these personnel. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-812.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Sharon Pickup 

at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 7

Analyses to Ensure That Special Operations Command Personnel 

Requirements Are Linked with Expanded Mission Are Still in 

Progress 13

Despite Progress, the Military Services and the Special Operations 

Command Face Challenges to Meet Planned Growth Goals 17 

More Deployments for Operations Mean Fewer Deployments for 

Training; Special Operations Command Has Sought to Manage 

This Effect 29 

Conclusions 37

Recommendations for Executive Action 38 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 42

Appendix II: Description of Activities Assigned to the Special 

Operations Command 45

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 46

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 49

Tables 

Table 1: Overview of Special Operations Forces within the Army, 

Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps 11 

Table 2: Examples of Increases in the Number of Active Duty 

Special Operations Forces Warfighter Units from Fiscal 

Year 2001 through Fiscal Year 2011 15 

Table 3: Number and Percentage of Active Component Special 

Operations Forces Occupational Specialties Underfilled 

for Fiscal Years 2000 through 2005 22 

Page i GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Table 4: Percentage of Special Operations Forces Personnel 

Deployed for Training, Operations, and Other, Fiscal Year 

2000 through Fiscal Year 2005 31 

Table 5: Description of Activities Assigned to the Special 

Operations Command 45 

Figures 

Figure 1: Fiscal Year 2005 Military Positions for Special Operations 

Forces Personnel in the Active Component and Reserve 

Component 10

Figure 2: Average Weekly Number of Special Operations Forces 

Deployed Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2005 30 

Figure 3: Percentage of Special Operations Forces Personnel 

Deployed to the Unified Combatant Commands, Fiscal 

Year 2000 and Fiscal Year 2005 31 

Figure 4: Joint Combined Exchange Training Events Scheduled and 

Completed, Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2005 34 

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Page ii GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

July 31, 2006

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats 

 and International Relations 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats 

 and International Relations 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Department of Defense (DOD) established the United States Special 

Operations Command (Command) in 1987 with the primary purpose to 

train and equip special operations forces and provide these forces to the 

department’s geographic combatant commands.1

 Since 2003, DOD has 

taken several steps to expand the role of the Special Operations Command 

to lead the department’s efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. 

Specifically, the Command has been given the responsibility for planning 

and synchronizing DOD activities in support of this war. To meet this 

expanded mission, the Command has transformed its headquarters to 

improve the coordination of counterterrorism activities, and DOD has 

increased the number of military positions for special operations forces 

personnel by 12 percent since fiscal year 2001. Moreover, the February 

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states that the department 

intends to further increase these forces through fiscal year 2011.2

 At DOD’s 

request, the Congress has provided the Special Operations Command with 

considerable increases in funding to support its expanded mission and 

increase the size of its forces. Specifically, from fiscal year 2001 through 

fiscal year 2005, funding for the Command increased from more than $3.8 

billion to more than $6.4 billion. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) established the United States Special 

Operations Command (Command) in 1987 with the primary purpose to 

train and equip special operations forces and provide these forces to the 

department’s geographic combatant commands.1

 Since 2003, DOD has 

taken several steps to expand the role of the Special Operations Command 

to lead the department’s efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. 

Specifically, the Command has been given the responsibility for planning 

and synchronizing DOD activities in support of this war. To meet this 

expanded mission, the Command has transformed its headquarters to 

improve the coordination of counterterrorism activities, and DOD has 

increased the number of military positions for special operations forces 

personnel by 12 percent since fiscal year 2001. Moreover, the February 

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states that the department 

intends to further increase these forces through fiscal year 2011.2

 At DOD’s 

request, the Congress has provided the Special Operations Command with 

considerable increases in funding to support its expanded mission and 

increase the size of its forces. Specifically, from fiscal year 2001 through 

fiscal year 2005, funding for the Command increased from more than $3.8 

billion to more than $6.4 billion. 

Special operations forces differ from conventional forces in that they are 

specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations in 

hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments. These operations are 

intended to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, or economic 

objectives by employing military capabilities for which there is no 

Special operations forces differ from conventional forces in that they are 

specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations in 

hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments. These operations are 

intended to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, or economic 

objectives by employing military capabilities for which there is no 

Special Operation Operations Forces

 

-812

 1

 The five geographic combatant commands—U.S. Central Command, U.S. European

Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern 

Command—are responsible for U.S. military operations within their areas. 

2

 DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2006). 

Page 1 GAO-06-812
conventional force requirement, and they often require covert, clandestine,

or low-visibility capabilities. Each of the military services provides special 

operations forces to the Special Operations Command, and thus the 

military services and the Special Operations Command have a shared 

responsibility to ensure that a sufficient number of special operations 

forces personnel are available. For example, the military services recruit 

new candidates for special operations training, while, in general, the 

Special Operations Command provides the combat specialty training for 

these forces.

Since the onset of the Global War on Terrorism, DOD has deployed 

substantial numbers of special operations forces to conduct a range of 

military operations. These forces have conducted combat missions in 

Afghanistan and Iraq and, in addition, have helped train indigenous 

military personnel in these countries and in other parts of the world, 

including countries in Asia and Africa, to build the capabilities of partner 

nations to combat terrorists more effectively within their own countries. 

Several documents published by DOD, including the National Defense 

Strategy and the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on

Terrorism,

3

 emphasize the capabilities provided by special operations 

forces. As a result, the increased pace of deployments for these forces is 

likely to continue in the near term. Recently, the Special Operations 

Command has taken steps to manage the impact of deployments, which 

has included establishing policy guidelines for the frequency of personnel 

deployments. 

This report responds to your request and addresses the following 

questions: (1) the extent to which the Special Operations Command has 

determined personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded mission; 

(2) what progress the military services and the Special Operations 

Command have made since fiscal year 2000 in recruiting, training, and

retaining special operations forces personnel, and what challenges they 

face to meet future growth; and (3) the effect that deployments since fiscal 

year 2000 have had on the Special Operations Command’s ability to 

provide an adequate number of trained forces for the full range of its 

worldwide missions, and what progress the Command has made in 

managing personnel deployments. 

 3

 See DOD, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (March 2005), 

and DOD, The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (February

2006). 

Page 2 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
To assess the extent to which the Special Operations Command has 

identified all of the personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded 

mission, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials involved with 

determining personnel requirements with the Special Operations 

Command, and with the Army, Navy, and Air Force service components. 

We also met with Marine Corps officials to discuss plans for growth in 

Marine Corps special operations forces. We analyzed the plans for growth 

in these personnel through fiscal year 2011. To assess the progress the 

military services and the Special Operations Command have made since 

fiscal year 2000 in increasing the number of special operations forces 

personnel, we discussed the processes used by the Army, Navy, and Air 

Force to recruit, train, and retain these forces with officials from the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Special Operations Command, and 

the military services. We focused on these processes for the active 

components of the military services. To determine what challenges the 

military services and the Special Operations Command face to meet future 

growth, we analyzed personnel inventory levels for special operations 

forces in the active component military services for fiscal years 2000 

through 2005, and we collected and analyzed data from the schools that 

train new special operations forces personnel. In addition, we reviewed 

relevant Special Operations Command directives and analyzed the annual 

reports prepared by the service components to determine the extent to 

which the information in these reports met reporting requirements. To 

assess the effect of increased special operations forces deployments, we 

analyzed the trends in the deployment of special operations forces for 

fiscal years 2000 through 2005, and we discussed the impact of 

deployments with officials from the Special Operations Command and the 

military services. We reviewed available data for inconsistencies and 

discussed the data with DOD officials. Our assessments of data reliability 

revealed some concerns that are discussed in this report; however, we 

concluded the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We 

conducted our review from April 2005 through June 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. A more detailed

discussion of our scope and methodology is contained in appendix I. 

The Special Operations Command has not yet fully determined all of the 

personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded mission. While the 

Command has determined how many special operations forces personnel 

it needs to meet increases in its warfighter units, it has not completed 

analyses to determine (a) the number of headquarters staff needed to train 

and equip these additional warfighters or (b) the number of headquarters 

staff needed to plan and synchronize global actions against terrorist 

Results in Brief 

Page 3 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
networks. Nevertheless, the department has already made the decision to 

increase the number of positions for the Command’s headquarters, 

beginning with the fiscal year 2007 budget request, by more than 75 

percent. However, this increase is not based on a comprehensive analysis 

of personnel requirements, given that the Command’s analyses were 

ongoing at the time of our review. We have previously reported that 

strategic workforce planning is essential in that it aligns an organization’s 

human capital program with its current and emerging mission.4

 Until these 

analyses are completed, the Special Operations Command cannot provide 

assurances to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress that currently 

planned growth in the number of personnel for the Command’s 

headquarters will meet, exceed, or fall short of the requirements needed to 

address the Command’s expanded mission. To address this challenge, 

GAO is recommending that the Special Operations Command establish 

specific milestones for completing its ongoing analyses of personnel 

requirements and, once completed, make any needed adjustments to the 

current plans for personnel increases for the Command’s headquarters and 

related future funding requests. 

The military services and the Special Operations Command have made 

progress from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005 in recruiting, 

training, and retaining special operations forces personnel; however, the 

military services and the Special Operations Command must overcome 

persistently low personnel inventory levels and insufficient numbers of 

newly trained special operations forces personnel for some specialties to 

meet DOD’s plan to increase the number of special operations forces. In 

addition, the Special Operations Command does not have complete 

information on the human capital challenges it is facing, including low 

personnel inventory levels and training limitations, and the planned 

corrective actions it needs to evaluate the success of its service 

components’ human capital approaches in meeting their growth targets. 

The military services and the Special Operations Command have achieved 

progress by increasing recruiting goals, training greater numbers of new 

personnel, and using financial incentives to retain experienced personnel. 

However, the military services and the Command face several challenges 

in meeting future growth goals. For example, since fiscal year 2000, well 

over half of the special operations forces specialties have been underfilled 

each year, by an amount ranging from less than 5 percent to more than 86 

 4

 GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, 

GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003).

Page 4 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
percent. As a result, hundreds of authorized positions have been unfilled 

each year. Further, our analysis of data reported by the Army, Navy, and 

Air Force schools that train new special operations forces personnel 

shows the number of personnel who are graduating from these schools is 

insufficient in some cases to meet current authorized personnel levels or 

planned growth targets. The schools have been unable to graduate a 

sufficient number of new special operations forces personnel for several 

reasons, including recruiting an inadequate number of servicemembers 

who attended the schools each year. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal 

year 2005, for example, the Naval Special Warfare Command did not 

produce a sufficient number of enlisted Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) personnel to 

meet authorized personnel levels or future growth targets. In addition, our 

review of the service components’ annual reports required by the Special

Operations Command shows that the reports do not provide information 

the Command needs to determine if the services have enough personnel to

meet current and future requirements. Without this information, the 

Special Operations Command will be unable to evaluate whether the 

service components’ human capital management approaches, including 

their recruiting, training, and retention strategies, will be effective in 

meeting the planned growth targets. To address this challenge, GAO is 

recommending that the Special Operations Command revise its directive 

for its program to monitor the status of special operations forces to 

include performance objectives, goals, and measures of progress for 

achieving planned growth, and enforce all of the directive’s reporting 

requirements. 

Since fiscal year 2000, special operations forces have experienced a 

substantial increase in the number of personnel deployed for operations 

and a simultaneous decrease in the number of personnel deployed for 

training. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the average 

weekly number of special operations forces personnel who deployed to

the geographic combatant commands increased by 64 percent, or about 

3,100 personnel. The majority have been deployed for operations in the 

U.S. Central Command, which accounted for 85 percent of total overseas 

deployments in fiscal year 2005. Our analysis also shows that from fiscal 

year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, special operations forces deployed less 

frequently for training. As a result of this decrease, special operations 

forces personnel participated in fewer types of training events, including 

Page 5 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
theater engagement activities such as joint combined exchange training.5

As we have previously reported, training overseas with foreign forces is 

important, as it enables special operations forces personnel to maintain 

language proficiency and familiarity with local geography and cultures.6

Moreover, DOD documents regarding the department’s strategy for the 

Global War on Terrorism identify combined training, such as joint 

combined exchange training, as an important element for strengthening 

partner nations’ counterterrorism capabilities. To its credit, the Special 

Operations Command has taken action to manage the challenge of 

increased deployments. In August 2005, the Command established a policy 

that requires active duty personnel to remain at least an equal amount of 

time at home as deployed. However, the Command’s service components 

have not consistently or fully implemented this policy. This is because the 

policy lacks clear guidance on the length of time that the components 

must ensure that personnel remain within the deployment policy 

guidelines. In addition, officials with the Command’s Army and Navy 

service components expressed concerns regarding the reliability of 

information required to track the deployments of their personnel. Without

consistent and reliable data, the Special Operations Command does not 

have the information it needs to effectively manage the personnel 

deployments of special operations forces, which affects the Command’s 

ability to maintain the readiness, retention, and training of special 

operations forces personnel. To address this challenge, GAO is 

recommending that the Special Operations Command clarify the 

methodology that the Command’s service components use for enforcing 

the deployment policy, and take steps to ensure that the service 

components have tracking systems in place that utilize reliable data to

meet the requirements of the policy. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially 

concurred with GAO’s recommendations. 

 5

 Joint combined exchange training is a program conducted overseas to fulfill U.S. forces 

training requirements and at the same time exchange the sharing of skills between U.S. 

forces and host nation counterparts. Training activities are designed to improve U.S. and 

host nation capabilities.

6

 GAO, Military Training: Management and Oversight of Joint Combined Exchange 

Training, GAO/NSIAD-99-173 (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1999). 

Page 6 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
In 1986, the Congress called for the establishment of a joint service special 

operations capability under a single command.7

 In April 1987, the 

Secretary of Defense established the Special Operations Command with 

the mission to provide trained and combat-ready special operations forces

to DOD’s geographic combatant commands. Section 167(e) of Title 10, U.S. 

Code8

 directs that the Commander of the Special Operations Command be 

responsible for and have the authority to conduct all affairs of such 

command related to special operations activities. Under this section, the 

Commander is also responsible for and has the authority to conduct 

certain functions relating to special operations activities whether or not 

they relate to the Special Operations Command, including: preparing and 

submitting to the Secretary of Defense program recommendations and 

budget proposals for special operations forces and for other forces 

assigned to the Special Operations Command; exercising authority, 

direction, and control over the expenditure of funds; training assigned 

forces; and monitoring the promotions, assignments, retention, training, 

and professional military education of special operations forces officers. 

In addition, Section 167 directs the Special Operations Command to be 

responsible for the following activities as they relate to special operations: 

(1) direct action, (2) strategic reconnaissance, (3) unconventional warfare, 

(4) foreign internal defense, (5) civil affairs, (6) psychological operations, 

(7) counterterrorism, (8) humanitarian assistance, (9) theater search and

rescue, and (10) other activities such as may be specified by the President 

or the Secretary of Defense.9

 Appendix II defines these activities assigned 

to the Special Operations Command. DOD has also assigned additional 

activities to the Special Operations Command. 

Over the past 3 years, DOD has expanded the role of the Special 

Operations Command to include responsibility for planning and leading 

the department’s efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. In addition to 

training, organizing, equipping, and deploying combat-ready special 

Background 

Special Operations 

Command Legislative 

Responsibilities 

Expanded Special 

Operations Command 

Mission 

 7

 Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 9115 (1986) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 167). 

8

 10 U.S.C. § 167(e). 

9

 10 U.S.C. § 167(j). 

Page 7 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
operations forces to the geographic combatant commanders, the 

Command has the mission to lead, plan, synchronize, and, as directed, 

execute global operations against terrorist networks. The specific 

responsibilities assigned to the Special Operations Command include: 

• integrating DOD strategy, plans, intelligence priorities, and operations 

against terrorist networks designated by the Secretary of Defense; 

• planning campaigns against designated terrorist networks; 

• prioritizing and synchronizing theater security cooperation activities, 

deployments, and capabilities that support campaigns against designated 

terrorist networks in coordination with the geographic combatant 

commanders; 

• exercising command and control of operations in support of selected 

campaigns, as directed; and 

• providing military representation to U.S. national and international 

agencies for matters related to U.S. and multinational campaigns against 

designated terrorist networks, as directed by the Secretary of Defense. 

In addition, the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism10

establishes the approach DOD will take in fulfilling its role within the 

larger national strategy for combating terrorism. The strategy provides 

guidance on the department’s military objectives and their relative priority

in the allocation of resources. In addition, this strategy implements the 

designation of the Special Operations Command as the supported 

combatant command for planning, synchronizing, and, as directed, 

executing global operations against terrorist networks.11

The Special Operations Command has received considerable increases in

funding to meet its expanded responsibilities in the Global War on 

Terrorism. Specifically, funding for the Command has increased from 

more than $3.8 billion in fiscal year 2001 to more than $6.4 billion in fiscal

year 2005. In addition, the Command received more than $5 billion in 

supplemental funds from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2005. During 

Increased Funding for 

Expanded Responsibilities 

 10 DOD, The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (February 2006). 

11 In the context of joint operation planning, the supported commander refers to a 

commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements

of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the context of a support-command 

relationship, the supported commander receives assistance from another commander’s

force or capabilities, and is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander

understands what assistance is required. 

Page 8 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
this time, funding for military personnel costs for the Special Operations 

Command increased by more than $800 million, representing a 53 percent 

increase. DOD plans further increases in funding for the Command. The 

President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request for the Special Operations 

Command is $8 billion, and the department plans additional increases for 

the Command through fiscal year 2011. 

The Special Operations Command is comprised of special operations 

forces from each of the military services. In fiscal year 2005, personnel 

authorizations for Army special operations forces military personnel 

totaled more than 30,000, the Air Force 11,501, the Navy 6,255, and the 

Marine Corps 79.12 Roughly one-third of special operations forces military 

personnel were in DOD’s reserve components,13 including the Army, Navy, 

and Air Force Reserve, and the Army and Air National Guard.14 Figure 1 

provides a summary of DOD’s special operations forces military 

authorizations in the active component and reserve component. 

Organization of Special 

Operations Forces 

 12 In October 2005, the Secretary of Defense approved the establishment of a Marine Corps

component to the Special Operations Command. Current DOD plans call for Marine Corps

special operations forces personnel to total about 2,500 personnel by fiscal year 2011. 

13 DOD’s military forces consist of the active components (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and

Air Force) and the reserve and National Guard components (Army National Guard, Army

Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve). 

14 DOD plans call for the Special Operations Command to transfer all reserve component 

Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations personnel to the U.S. Army Reserve Command 

by fiscal year 2007. Currently, all active component and reserve component Civil Affairs 

and Psychological Operations forces are assigned to the Special Operations Command, 

even though the reserve component forces primarily support conventional Army forces. 

The Special Operations Command believes that reassigning the operational control of these 

forces to the Army will enable conventional Army units to train with their full complement 

of capabilities, including Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, prior to a deployment, 

thereby enhancing combat readiness. The active component Civil Affairs and Psychological

Operations forces, who support special operations forces, will continue to be assigned to 

the Special Operations Command. In addition, the Command will retain the responsibility

for training reserve component Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations personnel and

the research and development responsibility for Psychological Operations equipment. 

Page 9 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Figure 1: Fiscal Year 2005 Military Positions for Special Operations Forces 

Personnel in the Active Component and Reserve Component 

Special operations forces are organized into several types of units. For 

example, Army special operations forces are organized into Special 

Forces, Rangers, Aviation, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and 

support units. Air Force special operations forces are organized into fixed

and rotary wing aviation squadrons, special tactics squadrons, a combat 

aviation advisor squadron, and an unmanned aerial vehicle squadron. 

Naval Special Warfare forces include SEAL Teams and SEAL Delivery 

Vehicle Teams and Special Boat Teams. When fully operational, Marine 

Corps special operations forces will include foreign military training units 

and marine special operations companies. Table 1 provides an overview 

and description of DOD’s special operations forces. 

Page 10 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Table 1: Overview of Special Operations Forces within the Army, Air Force, Navy, 

and Marine Corps 

Service

component Type of unit Description 

Special Forces Perform foreign internal defense, unconventional 

warfare, special reconnaissance, direct action, and 

counterterrorism operations 

Rangers Light infantry units specializing in a range of 

missions, including direct action and personnel 

recovery 

Rotary Wing 

Aviation 

Provide aviation support to special operations 

forces 

Civil Affairs Provide civil-military operations support to general 

purpose forces and special operations forces at the 

tactical, operational, and strategic levels 

Psychological 

Operations 

Plan and execute psychological operations at the 

tactical, operational, and strategic levels 

Army 

Support and 

Communication

Units 

Provide combat service support to Army special 

operations forces or forces supporting the 

geographic combatant commander 

Fixed Wing Aviation 

Squadrons 

Multiple variants of the C-130 modified for refueling, 

mobility, psychological operations, and precision 

strike 

Rotary Wing 

Aviation Squadrons 

Provide mobility for special operations forces and 

combat search and rescue

Special Tactics

Squadrons 

Combat controllers, pararescue, and combat 

weather personnel capable of controlling fire 

support and providing medical and weather support

Combat Aviation 

Advisor Squadron 

Assess, train, advise, and assist foreign aviation 

forces in airpower employment, sustainment, and 

force integration 

Air Force 

Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicle Squadron 

Provide unmanned aerial vehicle support to special 

operations forces 

Sea, Air, Land 

(SEAL) Teams 

Multipurpose units trained and equipped to conduct 

a variety of missions in all operational environments

SEAL Delivery 

Vehicle Teams

Specially trained personnel who operate and 

maintain various systems, including dry dock 

shelters and SEAL delivery vehicles 

Navy 

Special Boat Teams Special warfare combatant crewmen who operate 

and maintain various naval special warfare boats 

Foreign Military 

Training Units 

Provide tailored military, combat skills training, and 

advisor support for identified foreign forces 

Marine Corps

Special Operations 

Companies 

Perform special reconnaissance, direct action, and 

foreign internal defense operations 

Page 11 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Service

component Type of unit Description 

Special Operations

Support Group

Provide specific support capabilities for worldwide 

special operations missions, including combined 

arms, K-9 support, communications support, and 

combat service support 

Source: GAO.

Special operations forces personnel possess highly specialized skill sets 

including cultural and regional awareness. Duty in special operations is 

undertaken on a voluntary basis, and many personnel volunteering for 

special operations, particularly those in Army Special Forces and Air 

Force flight crews, have already served for some time in the military 

before becoming qualified for special operations forces. In order to 

become qualified, military personnel must complete a rigorous 

assessment, selection, and initial training process that, on average, takes 

between 12 and 24 months. This difficult training regime causes high 

attrition, and often over 70 percent who start special operations training 

do not finish. In general, servicemembers who are unable to complete the 

special operations training return to their previously held specialty or are 

retrained into another specialty, depending on the needs of their military 

service. 

The Special Operations Command’s Army, Air Force, and Navy service 

components have schools to train and develop special operations forces. 

For example: 

• The U.S. Army Special Operations Command, located at Ft. Bragg, North 

Carolina, operates the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 

School. This school assesses, selects, and trains Special Forces soldiers, 

and trains civil affairs and psychological operations soldiers. In addition, 

the school provides advanced special operations training courses. 

• The Air Force Special Operations Command, located at Hurlburt Field, 

Florida, has several subordinate training squadrons that provide initial and 

advanced training for Air Force rotary and fixed wing special operations 

pilots, special tactics personnel, combat aviation advisors, and unmanned 

aerial vehicle personnel.

• The Naval Special Warfare Command, located on the Naval Amphibious 

Base Coronado, California, operates the Naval Special Warfare Center. 

This school trains SEAL candidates through the Basic Underwater 

Demolition SEAL course and the SEAL Qualification Course, and trains 

special warfare combatant crewmen through the Special Warfare 

Combatant Crewmen course. In addition, the school provides advanced 

special operations training courses. 

Page 12 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
The Special Operations Command has not yet fully determined all of the 

personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded mission. While the 

Command has determined the number of special operations forces 

personnel who are needed to increase the number of its warfighter units, it 

has not completed analyses to determine (a) the number of headquarters 

staff needed to train and equip these additional warfighters or (b) the 

number of headquarters staff needed to plan and synchronize global 

actions against terrorist networks—a new mission for the Command. 

Although the Command’s analyses for these determinations were in 

progress at the time of our review, DOD has nonetheless planned to 

increase the number of positions for the Command’s headquarters, and 

has requested related funds beginning in fiscal year 2007. 

Several recent DOD studies have concluded that additional special 

operations forces warfighters are needed in order for the Special 

Operations Command to achieve the national military objectives in the 

Global War on Terrorism. A December 2002 report conducted by the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and 

Low Intensity Conflict15 found that efforts should be made to expand the 

size of special operations forces and institute a more sustainable rotational 

base of forces, while realigning the force to meet current and future 

challenges.16 Furthermore, the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense 

Review Report stated that one of the key programmatic decisions the 

department proposes to launch in fiscal year 2007 is to increase special 

operations forces to defeat terrorist networks.17

The Special Operations Command has determined the number of special

operations forces personnel needed to meet increases in its warfighter 

units. To determine the requirements for special operations forces 

warfighter units, the Command uses its Joint Mission Analysis process. 

Based on planning scenarios provided by DOD that special operations 

forces will be needed to support, the Command determines the minimum 

number of warfighters necessary to achieve its military objectives with the 

least amount of risk to mission success. This level of special operations 

Analyses to Ensure 

That Special 

Operations Command 

Personnel 

Requirements Are 

Linked with 

Expanded Mission 

Are Still in Progress 

DOD and the Special 

Operations Command 

Have Determined 

Requirements for 

Additional Special 

Operations Forces 

Warfighters

 15 The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity 

Conflict is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters involving 

special operations. 

16 DOD, Special Operations Forces Realignment Study (December 2002). 

17 DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2006). 

Page 13 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
forces is the baseline force used to measure risk, and is the starting point 

for developing a more attainable force based on fiscal constraints. 

Beginning in fiscal year 2002, DOD increased the number of positions for 

the Special Operations Command to augment the increase in the number 

of its warfighter units. Specifically, from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal 

year 2005, DOD increased the number of military positions for special 

operations forces by more than 5,000 positions, or about 12 percent. With

these increases in military positions, the Special Operations Command has 

also increased the number of special operations forces units, including 

Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units. DOD plans to 

further increase the number of military positions for the Command 

through fiscal year 2011, and the Command plans to increase other special 

operations forces units such as Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and Air 

Force unmanned aerial vehicle and intelligence squadrons.18 The increase 

in military positions will also support the establishment of a Marine Corps 

component to the Special Operations Command, which was approved in 

October 2005. Table 2 provides examples of increases in the number of 

active duty special operations forces warfighter units from fiscal year 2001

through fiscal year 2011.

 18 In addition to the increases in the number of new units, the Air Force plans to increase

the number of personnel in existing special tactics and combat aviation advisor squadrons.

Page 14 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Table 2: Examples of Increases in the Number of Active Duty Special Operations

Forces Warfighter Units from Fiscal Year 2001 through Fiscal Year 2011 

Number of warfighter units Service

component Type of unit Fiscal year 2001 Fiscal year 2011

Special Forces Battalions 15 19a

Aviation Battalions 3 4

Ranger Companies 12 15

Civil Affairs Companies 5 16

Army 

Psychological Operations 

Companies 

12 17

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Squadron 

Air Force 0 1

Intelligence Squadron 0 1

Navy SEAL Team Equivalents 8 10

Foreign Military Training 

Companies 

Marine Corps 0 2

Marine Special Operations 

Companies 

0 9

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

a

DOD plans call for the addition of four Special Forces battalions during the fiscal year 2007 to fiscal 

year 2011 Future Years Defense Program, with a fifth Special Forces battalion to be added during the 

fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2013 Future Years Defense Program.

DOD’s budget request for fiscal year 2007 includes increases in the number 

of personnel for the Special Operations Command’s headquarters, even 

though the Command had not completed studies for headquarters’ 

personnel requirements in two key areas. First, the Commander of the 

Special Operations Command is responsible for training assigned special

operations forces, and developing and acquiring special operationspeculiar equipment.19 Accordingly, the Command believes that it has a 

commensurate need for additional headquarters staff to perform these 

responsibilities to support the increased number of warfighters necessary 

to win the Global War on Terrorism. Second, DOD’s decision to expand 

the mission of the Special Operations Command calls for the Command to 

be responsible for planning and synchronizing global actions against 

terrorist networks. The Command further believes that it needs additional 

headquarters personnel to fulfill this responsibility. 

DOD Plans Personnel 

Increases for the 

Command’s Headquarters 

to Meet Expanded Mission, 

Although Analyses Are Still 

in Progress 

 19 10 U.S.C. §167(e). 

Page 15 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
The Special Operations Command determines personnel requirements for 

its headquarters by conducting formal personnel studies. These studies are 

directed and approved by the Special Operations Command’s leadership. 

The study teams conduct a variety of analyses to determine personnel 

requirements and interview individuals within the reviewed organization 

to determine the tasks they perform and the level of effort necessary to 

fulfill the workload requirements. The studies are used to validate the 

personnel requirements and support data-based decisions for allocating 

additional resources during the Special Operations Command’s planning, 

programming, and budgeting processes. The Command is currently 

conducting studies to determine the number of military and civilian 

personnel who are needed at its headquarters to meet the Command’s 

expanded responsibilities. 

Although these studies were in progress at the time of our review, DOD 

has already made the decision to increase the number of military and 

civilian positions for the Command’s headquarters, beginning with its 

fiscal year 2007 budget request. According to currently approved plans, 

DOD will increase the number of military and civilian positions for the 

Special Operations Command headquarters by more than 75 percent 

between fiscal years 2007 and 2011. These increases include more than 700 

additional positions for the Command’s Center for Special Operations, 

which combines the intelligence, operations, and planning functions at the 

headquarters to plan and direct the Global War on Terrorism. However, 

given the fact that the Command’s internal analyses of personnel 

requirements were ongoing at the time of our review, the intended 

increase is not based on a comprehensive analysis of personnel 

requirements. 

Our prior work has shown that strategic workforce planning addresses 

two critical needs for an organization. First, strategic workforce planning

aligns an organization’s human capital program with its current and 

emerging mission and programmatic goals. Second, such planning 

develops long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining the

staff needed to achieve programmatic goals. A key principle in strategic 

workforce planning calls for determining the critical skills and 

competencies that will be needed to achieve current and future 

programmatic results.20 However, until the Special Operations Command 

fully completes its analyses of the personnel requirements needed to carry 

 20 GAO-04-39. 

Page 16 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
out its Title 10 responsibilities and its expanded mission, it cannot provide 

assurances to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress that currently 

planned growth in the number of personnel for the Command’s 

headquarters will meet, exceed, or fall short of the requirements needed to 

address the Command’s expanded mission. 

The military services and the Special Operations Command have made 

progress since fiscal year 2000 in recruiting, training, and retaining special

operations forces personnel; however, the military services and the 

Special Operations Command must overcome persistently low personnel 

inventory levels and insufficient numbers of newly trained special 

operations forces personnel in some cases to meet DOD’s plan to increase 

the number of special operations forces personnel through fiscal year 

2011. In addition, the Special Operations Command does not have 

complete information from its service components on human capital 

challenges, including low personnel inventory levels and training 

limitations, and planned corrective actions, which it needs to evaluate the

success of its service components’ human capital approaches. 

The military services and the Special Operations Command have taken 

measures to recruit and train greater numbers of special operations forces 

personnel. In addition, DOD has implemented a set of initiatives intended 

to retain greater numbers of experienced special operations forces 

personnel. 

The Army and Navy have increased the recruiting goals for several of their 

special operations forces occupational specialties.21 These goals are set by

the military services to determine the number of accessions, or new 

recruits, who will enter training each year. From fiscal year 2000 to fiscal 

year 2005, the Army increased the recruiting goal for active duty enlisted 

Despite Progress, the

Military Services and 

the Special 

Operations Command 

Face Challenges to 

Meet Planned Growth 

Goals 

The Military Services and 

the Special Operations 

Command Have Taken 

Measures to Recruit, Train, 

and Retain Greater

Numbers of Special

Operations Forces 

Personnel 

Increased Recruiting Goals 

 21 The military services delineate their force structure through occupational specialties, 

which represent the jobs that are necessary to meet their specific missions. 

Page 17 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Special Forces soldiers by 72 percent, or 1,300 recruits.22 Similarly, the 

Navy increased its annual goal for enlisted SEAL recruits from 900 in fiscal 

year 2004 to 1,100 in fiscal year 2005. In addition, the Navy established an 

annual goal for enlisted special warfare combatant crewman recruits for 

the first time in fiscal year 2005. 

To meet these recruiting goals, the military services have offered 

enlistment bonuses to enlist a sufficient number of new recruits. 

Collectively, the military services paid more than $28 million in these 

bonuses during fiscal year 2005 to enlist servicemembers in their special

operations forces occupational specialties. Beginning in fiscal year 2003, 

the Army offered these bonuses to its initial accession Special Forces 

recruits and in fiscal year 2005 the Army paid up to $20,000 per soldier. 

Similarly, in fiscal year 2005, the Air Force offered enlistment bonuses of 

up to $10,000 to recruits in the combat controller and pararescue 

occupational specialties. In fiscal year 2005, the Navy paid enlistment 

bonuses for enlisted SEAL and special warfare combatant crewman 

recruits up to a maximum of $15,000. The Army met or exceeded its 

recruiting goals for active duty enlisted Special Forces soldiers in 5 out of 

the 6 years between fiscal years 2000 and 2005. From fiscal year 2000 

through fiscal year 2005, the Air Force increased the number of enlisted 

airmen recruits for the combat controller and pararescue occupational 

specialties by about 400 percent and 60 percent, respectively. In fiscal year 

2005, the Navy exceeded its recruiting goal for enlisted special warfare 

combatant crewmen. However, while the Navy met its recruiting goal for 

enlisted SEALs for fiscal year 2004, it met 80 percent of its recruiting goal

in fiscal year 2005. 

The Special Operations Command and the service components have taken 

several actions to train greater numbers of special operations forces 

recruits. For instance, the Command and the service components have 

increased the number of instructors at several special operations forces 

schools to produce a larger number of newly trained personnel, with 

additional increases in the number of instructors planned through fiscal 

year 2011. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command, for example, 

hired 45 additional civilian instructors in fiscal year 2004 as part of its 

Expanded Training Capacity

 22 From fiscal years 2000 through 2001, all of the recruits for Army Special Forces training 

were serving in the military. In fiscal year 2002, the Army established a goal of 400 

accessions for an initial accessions program, which brings new Army recruits directly into

Special Forces training. The Army increased the goal for these recruits from 400 in fiscal 

year 2002 to 1,500 in fiscal year 2005. 

Page 18 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Institutional Training Expansion program, and plans to add more than 300 

additional civilian instructors through fiscal year 2011. Similarly, beginning

in fiscal year 2006, the Naval Special Warfare Command plans to add 145 

military and civilian instructors through fiscal year 2008. 

The Special Operations Command’s service components have also 

expanded the capacity of some schools to train more students and have 

reorganized some of their curricula so that their recruits move through the 

training programs more efficiently. Beginning in fiscal year 2006, the U.S. 

Army Special Operations Command increased the frequency of a phase of

its Special Forces qualification training that is focused on core battle 

skills. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command plans to increase the 

frequency of this phase from starting four courses per year, to starting a 

new course approximately every 2 weeks. This increase in frequency will 

expand the capacity of the training course from 1,800 student spaces to 

about 2,300 per year. 

The Air Force Special Operations Command established a training 

program in fiscal year 2001 to provide advanced skills training for combat 

controllers. In addition, the training program was intended to provide 

standardized training for special operations pararescue personnel, special 

operations combat weathermen,23 and special tactics officers. Since its 

inception, the program has increased the graduation rate of combat 

controllers, and in addition, the training program has provided special 

operations pararescue airmen, combat weathermen, and special tactics 

officers with advanced special operations training. 

In fiscal year 2005, the Naval Special Warfare Command reorganized the 

training course for SEALs intended to reduce student attrition. 

Specifically, the Naval Special Warfare Command eliminated the class 

administered during the winter months, which historically had the highest 

attrition, while increasing the class sizes for the remaining classes. In 

addition, the Naval Special Warfare Command has begun providing 

focused training for those students who have completed the most 

physically challenging portion of the training but who require additional 

practice in specific skills, rather than requiring students to begin the 

training from the start. 

 23 The Air Force trains pararescue and combat weather personnel for conventional units

and special operations forces units. In order to be fully qualified for special operations 

missions, these personnel undergo additional special tactics training. 

Page 19 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
In some cases, the Special Operations Command and the service 

components have increased the number of newly trained special 

operations forces personnel. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 

2005, for example, the school that trains new Special Forces soldiers 

increased the number of active duty enlisted graduates by 138 percent, or 

458 additional Special Forces soldiers. 

DOD has also taken action to retain experienced special operations forces 

personnel in order to meet the planned growth in these forces. According 

to the Special Operations Command, it cannot accomplish planned growth 

solely by adding new special operations forces personnel. Rather, the 

growth must be accomplished by balancing an increase in the number of 

new personnel with the retention of experienced special operations forces 

servicemembers. In 2004, DOD authorized a set of financial incentives to 

retain experienced special operations forces personnel. These incentives 

include reenlistment bonuses of up to $150,000 for personnel in several 

special operations forces occupational specialties with 19 or more years of 

experience who reenlist for an additional 6 years. The military services 

spent more than $41 million in fiscal year 2005 to retain 688 special 

operations forces servicemembers with this reenlistment bonus, according 

to data provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel 

and Readiness. Additionally, DOD authorized increases in special pays for 

warfighters assigned to the Special Operations Command, for some special 

operations forces personnel who remain on active duty with more than 25 

years of experience, and bonuses for new Special Forces and Naval 

Special Warfare warrant officers. 

While the military services and the Special Operations Command have

taken steps to increase the number of newly trained special operations 

forces personnel and to retain its experienced operators, the military 

services and the Special Operations Command face several human capital 

challenges in fully meeting planned growth in special operations forces. 

These challenges include persistently low personnel inventory levels for 

many special operations forces occupational specialties and insufficient 

numbers of new graduates in some cases to meet current authorized 

personnel levels or planned growth targets. 

Retention Incentives for 

Experienced Personnel 

Personnel Inventory Levels 

and Insufficient Numbers 

of Some Special 

Operations Forces 

Training Graduates May 

Limit the Special 

Operations Command’s 

Ability to Meet Future 

Growth Targets 

Page 20 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
We reported in November 2005 that DOD faced significant challenges in 

recruiting and retaining servicemembers, and that the military services 

were unable to meet authorized personnel levels for certain occupational 

specialties, including several special operations forces occupational 

specialties.24 At that time, we reported that several of these specialties in 

the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps were underfilled for 5 out of 

the previous 6 fiscal years. Such occupational specialties included active 

duty enlisted Army Special Forces assistant operations and intelligence 

sergeants and Special Forces medical sergeants, enlisted Navy SEALs and 

special warfare combatant crewmen, and enlisted Air Force combat 

controllers and pararescue personnel. According to DOD officials, the 

special operations forces occupational specialties were underfilled for 

several reasons, including extensive training or qualification requirements 

and recent increases in the number of authorized personnel positions. 

Our analysis of the personnel inventory levels for the special operations 

forces active component occupational specialties identified by the Special 

Operations Command’s Directive 600-725 shows that hundreds of 

authorized positions for special operations forces personnel within each of 

the Command’s service components have been persistently unfilled. As 

shown in table 3, from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, 74 percent 

to 87 percent of the active component occupational specialties in this 

directive were underfilled, each year, by an amount ranging from less than 

5 percent to more than 86 percent.26

Low Personnel Inventory 

Levels in Some Special 

Operations Forces 

Occupational Specialties May 

Limit Future Growth 

 24 GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted Personnel 

Recruitment and Retention Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005). 

25 Special Operations Command Directive 600-7 identifies the occupational specialties on 

which the Command’s service components report personnel data. The service components

report these data to the Special Operations Command on an annual basis.

26 Our analysis also shows that to a lesser extent, some active component occupational 

specialties in the Command’s directive were overfilled. For example, from fiscal year 2000 

through fiscal year 2005, 9 percent to 21 percent of these specialties were overfilled each 

year by an amount ranging from less than 5 percent to 80 percent. Except in a few cases, 

these specialties were overfilled by less than 30 personnel.

Page 21 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Table 3: Number and Percentage of Active Component Special Operations Forces 

Occupational Specialties Underfilled for Fiscal Years 2000 through 2005 

Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Number of occupational specialties 33 34 37 38 38 38

Number of occupational specialties 

underfilled 

27 27 31 28 33 31

Percentage of occupational specialties 

underfilled 

82% 79% 84% 74% 87% 82%

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The increase in the number of active component occupational specialties from fiscal years 2000 

through 2005 is due to the fact that U.S. Army data were unavailable for two specialties prior to fiscal 

year 2002, and the military services introduced three new specialties during this period. 

In fiscal year 2005, more than 50 percent of these specialties were 

underfilled by at least 10 percent. For example:

• personnel authorizations for active duty enlisted Special Forces assistant 

operations and intelligence sergeants were underfilled by 58 percent, 

• personnel authorizations for active duty enlisted pararescue airmen were 

underfilled by 27 percent, and 

• personnel authorizations for active duty enlisted SEALs were underfilled 

by 14 percent. 

Given the military services’ inability to fill current and past positions in 

their special operations forces specialties, it may be increasingly difficult

to meet DOD’s plan to increase the number of special operations forces 

through fiscal year 2011. During our review, the Special Operations 

Command’s service components provided data indicating that, in several

cases, the measures the military services and the Special Operations 

Command are taking to recruit and train greater numbers of special 

operations forces personnel may enable the military services and the 

Command to meet the increases in the numbers of authorized positions. 

However, the data also show that some of the special operations forces 

specialties that are currently underfilled are likely to remain so after 

additional authorizations have been added. For example, Navy officials 

told us that although additional authorizations for enlisted SEALs will be 

added by fiscal year 2008, it will not be able to fill all of these positions 

until at least 2011, at the earliest. Similarly, the Air Force projects that the

additional active duty enlisted combat controller positions that have been 

added in fiscal year 2006 will remain underfilled through at least fiscal 

year 2008. 

Page 22 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Not only do current low personnel inventory levels suggest that the 

military services and the Special Operations Command will be challenged 

to meet planned growth goals, but officials told us that low personnel 

levels in certain occupational specialties have created challenges at the 

unit level as well. For example, officials from the U.S. Army Special 

Operations Command told us that low personnel inventories of Special 

Forces warrant officers and medical sergeants have resulted in their 

having fewer numbers of these personnel per unit, which has limited the 

manner in which some Special Forces units have deployed on the 

battlefield. Similarly, the low personnel inventory levels in the Air Force 

combat controller and pararescue occupational specialties have resulted 

in the Air Force’s special tactics squadrons being underfilled. According to

Air Force officials, the low personnel inventory levels in these units have 

increased the frequency of personnel deployments, which has had an 

impact on the amount of time available to conduct training and has 

adversely affected retention. 

One reason that personnel inventory levels have been low in several 

special operations forces occupational specialties is the schools that train 

new special operations forces personnel have not graduated a sufficient 

number of these personnel, in some cases, to meet authorized personnel 

levels. Furthermore, the number of newly trained personnel in several 

special operations forces specialties has been insufficient to meet planned 

growth targets. For example: 

Insufficient Numbers of Some 

Special Operations Forces 

Personnel Graduates 

• The U.S. Army Special Operations Command is not graduating enough 

new pilots for the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment to meet 

future growth targets. In fiscal year 2005, the Command graduated only 58

percent of the MH-47 Chinook helicopter pilots and 47 percent of the MH60 Blackhawk helicopter pilots that the Army determined were needed to

meet planned growth for this unit. According to Army officials, the 

capacity of the school that trains new pilots has been insufficient to meet 

the requirements for future personnel levels. Officials stated that the 

Special Operations Command has provided additional funding beginning 

in fiscal year 2006 for the school to hire a greater number of instructors, 

which will increase the capacity of the school to train these pilots. 

• The Air Force has not produced a sufficient number of active duty enlisted 

special tactics personnel, such as combat controllers and pararescue 

personnel. For example, from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the 

Air Force trained only 53 percent of the active duty enlisted combat 

controllers and 40 percent of the active duty enlisted pararescue airmen 

needed to meet authorized personnel levels. Air Force officials stated that 

several constraints have limited the number of students who could attend 

Page 23 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
the schools that train these personnel. Officials explained the Air Force 

has taken steps to increase the number of personnel that will graduate 

from its special tactics training programs. For example, in August 2005, the 

Air Force began construction on a new classroom and aquatic facility to 

train greater numbers of combat controllers, and it recently opened a new 

combat dive course to meet both combat controller and pararescue 

training requirements. Such measures are intended to reduce the 

constraints on the ability of the Air Force to train new special tactics 

personnel. 

• From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the Naval Special Warfare 

Command did not produce an adequate number of enlisted SEALs to 

sustain authorized personnel levels. While the Naval Special Warfare 

Command needed to graduate 200 new enlisted SEALs each year to meet 

authorized personnel levels, only about 150 new enlisted personnel 

graduated each year during this period. In addition, Navy officials stated 

that to meet the planned growth for SEALs, the Naval Special Warfare 

Command must produce 250 enlisted SEALs annually. According to Navy 

officials, it has recruited an insufficient number of enlisted candidates who 

could successfully pass the physical test to qualify for SEAL training. As a

result, the Navy has not filled the SEAL school to capacity each year, and 

this in turn has resulted in insufficient numbers of graduates to fill the 

requirements for enlisted SEALs. According to officials, the Navy began to 

implement several measures in January 2006 that, in part, are intended to

increase the quantity and quality of enlisted recruits entering SEAL 

training, thereby improving the chances that more of these recruits will 

successfully graduate from the training.27

The Special Operations Command does not have complete information, 

including measurable performance objectives and goals, to evaluate the 

progress that the Command’s service components have made in meeting 

the human capital challenges that could impede the Command’s ability to 

achieve planned growth. 

The Special Operations Command has an established program through 

which it monitors the status of its personnel. The goal of the program is to 

Special Operations 

Command Lacks Key 

Information Needed to 

Evaluate Human Capital 

Initiatives 

 27 These measures include requiring SEAL candidates to pass a physical screening test prior 

to the issuance of a SEAL enlistment contract and prior to shipping to Recruit Training 

Command; hiring former special operations forces personnel at each Naval Recruiting 

District to test, screen, and mentor SEAL candidates; increasing the initial enlistment 

bonus for SEAL recruits to the maximum authorized level of $40,000; and improving the

amount of physical training time at basic training by 300 percent, among other initiatives. 

Page 24 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
ensure there are sufficient numbers of special operations forces personnel 

to meet current and future mission requirements. The implementing 

directive28 requires the special operations component commanders to 

provide the Special Operations Command with annual reports that contain 

data on several topics related to the human capital management of special

operations forces, including personnel inventory levels, accession plans, 

reenlistments and loss management programs, and military education 

opportunities for special operations forces officers. Command officials 

told us they use these reports to monitor the status of special operations 

forces. 

Our analysis of the service components’ annual reports for fiscal years 

2000 through 2005 shows that the reports provide some of the information 

required by the directive, such as information on personnel inventory 

levels and professional military education opportunities. However, the 

reports have not provided information for several key requirements called

for by the directive that would provide information on the service 

components’ progress in meeting the planned growth targets. For 

example, the service components are required to provide accession plans 

for several of the special operations occupational specialties, including 

Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and Air Force special tactics personnel. 

The accession plans should provide detailed information on the number of 

new accessions for initial training and projections for the following year. 

Our review of the annual reports shows that since fiscal year 2003, none of

the service components’ submissions contained this information. 

Additionally, the directive requires the service components to provide 

detailed analyses to support each category discussed in the annual report,

including trends developed over recent years and predictions for the 

future. Further, the annual reports should fully discuss any concerns by 

describing the concern in context, providing past actions taken to resolve 

the concern, and presenting recommendations to address the concern in 

the future. However, our analysis of the components’ annual submissions 

shows that the reports have often failed to provide detailed analyses of 

their human capital challenges and the corrective actions that should be 

taken to address these challenges. For instance:

 28 Special Operations Command Directive 600-7, Monitorship Program Policy and 

Procedures (April 2003). 

Page 25 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
• The U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s annual report for fiscal year 

2005 did not identify a 79 percent personnel fill rate for the Special Forces 

medical sergeant occupational specialty as a challenge. However, officials

with whom we spoke indicated that insufficient numbers of these 

personnel have limited both the operational capabilities of some deployed 

Special Forces units and the ability to provide medical life-support to 

personnel in these units. In other cases, the U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command’s annual reports identified challenges but did not propose 

corrective actions. For example, the report for fiscal year 2005 states a 

concern that, because the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment had 

insufficient training resources, it produced only 50 percent of the 

requirement for MH-47 Chinook helicopter pilots. However, the report did 

not discuss in detail what actions should be taken to address this 

challenge. 

• Since its fiscal year 2000 annual report, the Air Force Special Operations 

Command has identified a concern that the experience level of its rated 

pilots has been decreasing. As a result, there have been an insufficient 

number of aircraft commanders and instructor pilots within several of the

special operations squadrons. However, the Air Force Special Operations 

Command’s annual reports do not contain any information to support the 

specific decrease in the number of experienced pilots in its special 

operations forces units. Moreover, the reports do not specify how the 

actions taken to address the issue have impacted the level of experience of 

pilots, or what further actions are needed to address this challenge. In

addition, although the combat controller and pararescue occupational 

specialties have been underfilled since at least fiscal year 2000, the Air 

Force’s annual reports have not provided detailed information on the 

specific actions that should be taken to overcome the challenges of low 

personnel inventory levels in these specialties. 

• The Naval Special Warfare Command’s annual reports have consistently 

identified a critical challenge regarding the insufficient number of new 

enlisted Navy SEALs who have graduated from the school each year. 

Further, the reports provide some information on the actions taken in the 

previous fiscal year to address this concern. However, the annual reports

have not included detailed information on the Naval Special Warfare 

Command’s accession plans, or the effects that recruit shortfalls have had 

on personnel inventory levels, which are specifically required by the 

directive. 

Furthermore, the service components’ annual reports lack performance 

objectives and goals that link key personnel data with future growth plans 

and assessments of personnel needs. Our prior work has shown that highperforming organizations use relevant and reliable data to determine 

performance objectives and goals that enable them to evaluate the success 

Page 26 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
of their human capital approaches. These organizations identify current 

and future human capital needs, including the appropriate number of 

employees, the key competencies and skills mix for mission 

accomplishment, and the appropriate deployment of staff across the 

organization, and then create strategies for identifying and filling gaps.29

However, our analysis of the Command’s Directive 600-7 shows that the 

requirements for the annual reports do not include instructions for the 

service components to develop performance objectives, goals, and 

measures of progress for achieving planned growth. As an example, the 

Command requires the service components to provide personnel 

reenlistment data within these reports. Specifically, the Command requires

information and analysis on the number of eligible special operations 

forces personnel who chose to reenlist and comparative information on 

the number of personnel reenlistments in each military service. However, 

the service components’ annual reports do not clearly link the number of 

experienced warfighters who have been retained with the number who are 

needed to meet planned growth. This is particularly important because the

parent military services have not set goals for the reenlistments of their 

special operations forces personnel in a way that is clearly linked with the 

planned growth in these forces. Each of the active component military 

services tracks retention according to years of service and whether a 

servicemember is on a first, second, or subsequent enlistment.30

Moreover, the Special Operations Command has not established specific 

performance objectives or goals for the special operations forces retention 

initiative that DOD authorized in December 2004. As a result, it is difficult 

to assess the progress that DOD has had with this initiative in retaining a 

sufficient number of experienced personnel to meet planned growth—a 

key rationale for the initiative. Many of the special operations forces 

servicemembers who were eligible for the bonuses offered as part of this 

 29 GAO, Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed to Help Maintain Momentum of 

DOD’s Strategic Human Capital Planning, GAO-03-237 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 5, 2002).

30 The Army tracks retention rates by initial term (first enlistment, regardless of length), 

midcareer (second or subsequent enlistment with up to 10 years of service), and career 

(second or subsequent enlistment with 10 or more years of service). The Navy’s retention 

categories are Zone A (up to 6 years of service), Zone B (6 years to 10 years of service), 

Zone C (10 to 14 years of service), Zone D (14 to 19 years of service), and Zone E (20 or

more years of service). Through June 2005, the Air Force tracked retention by first term

(first enlistment, regardless of length), second term (second enlistment), and career (third 

or subsequent enlistment). Beginning in July 2005, the Air Force changed from reporting 

reenlistment rates as the primary retention measure to calculating a retention metric, 

Average Career Length, which factors in losses that occur at all years of service. 

Page 27 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
initiative did reenlist, as shown by information provided to us. However, 

Special Operations Command officials were unable to provide specific 

goals to measure the effectiveness of the retention initiatives because they

lacked clear performance objectives that are linked to comprehensive 

analyses of personnel needs. 

Special Operations Command officials stated the Command had not fully 

enforced the reporting requirements in its directive because it is outdated 

and some of the information required in the annual reports is less relevant, 

given the Command’s expanded role in the Global War on Terrorism. 

However, the Command most recently updated this directive in April 2003,

and at that time, it maintained the annual reporting requirements. In 

addition, officials stated that data and information on the status of special

operations forces personnel are available to the Special Operations 

Command through other processes, including monthly and quarterly 

readiness reports, monthly personnel status summaries, and annual 

conferences hosted by the Command to discuss personnel issues. The 

Defense Manpower Data Center also provides the Command with analyses 

on the trends in the continuation rates of special operations forces 

personnel.31 While these processes may provide information on the status

of special operations forces, they do not provide detailed analyses and 

discussions of concerns and corrective actions that are required by the 

Command’s directive. In addition, the annual reports are a means by which 

the Command has provided information to stakeholders within the 

department—including the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the 

military services—on the status of special operations forces. Without 

complete information on human capital challenges, the Special Operations 

Command will be unable to determine whether the service components’ 

human capital management approaches, including their recruiting, 

training, and retention strategies, will be effective in meeting the planned 

growth targets. 

 31 Continuation rates are calculated by determining the number of personnel who remain 

on active duty from one year to the next, and are an alternative method to track retention. 

Page 28 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Since fiscal year 2000, special operations forces have experienced a 

substantial increase in the deployment of personnel for operations and a 

simultaneous decrease in the deployment of personnel for training. To its 

credit, the Special Operations Command has taken action to manage the 

challenge of increased deployments by establishing a policy intended to 

maintain the readiness, retention, and training of special operations forces 

personnel. However, the Command’s service components have not yet

consistently or fully implemented this policy. 

The Special Operations Command Directive 525-132 establishes the 

Command’s policy to collect and monitor information on the deployments 

of special operations forces personnel. Accordingly, the Command gathers

deployment information on a weekly basis from the service components 

and the geographic combatant commands. These reports include 

information on the number of special operations forces personnel and 

special operations forces units that are deployed around the world. In 

addition, the components report the type of the deployment, such as 

deployments for operations or for training. From these weekly updates, 

the Special Operations Command develops a comprehensive deployed 

forces report, which is presented to the Commander of the Special 

Operations Command and included in updates for the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Our review of Special Operations Command data shows that since fiscal 

year 2000, deployments of special operations forces personnel have 

substantially increased. Specifically, as shown in figure 2, the average

weekly number of deployed special operations forces personnel was 64 

percent, or about 3,100 personnel, greater in fiscal year 2005 than in fiscal 

year 2000. 

More Deployments 

for Operations Mean 

Fewer Deployments 

for Training; Special 

Operations Command 

Has Sought to Manage 

This Effect 

Data Trends Show 

Increase in Deployments 

for Operations and 

Decrease in Training 

 32 Special Operations Command Directive 525-1, Deployed Forces Report (March 2004). 

Page 29 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Figure 2: Average Weekly Number of Special Operations Forces Deployed Fiscal 

Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2005 

Our analysis also shows that the vast majority of recent deployments 

outside of the United States were to the Central Command area of 

responsibility, which accounted for 85 percent of deployed special 

operations forces in fiscal year 2005. Significantly, more than 99 percent of 

these deployments supported ongoing combat operations. In contrast, in 

fiscal year 2000, only 20 percent of special operations forces deployments 

were to the Central Command. As shown in figure 3, the percentage of 

special operations forces personnel deployed to the European Command, 

the Pacific Command, and the Southern Command decreased between 

fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2005.

Page 30 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Figure 3: Percentage of Special Operations Forces Personnel Deployed to the Unified Combatant Commands, Fiscal Year 

2000 and Fiscal Year 2005 

While special operations forces have experienced a substantial increase in 

deployments for operations, there has been a simultaneous decrease in 

deployments for training. As shown in table 4, from fiscal year 2000 

through fiscal year 2005, the percentage of special operations forces 

personnel deployed for operations increased, while the percentage of 

personnel deployed for training decreased. 

Table 4: Percentage of Special Operations Forces Personnel Deployed for Training, 

Operations, and Other, Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2005 

Deployment 

category 

Fiscal 

year 2000

Fiscal 

year 2001

Fiscal 

year 2002

Fiscal 

year 2003 

Fiscal 

year 2004

Fiscal 

year 2005

Training 61% 58% 30% 16% 17% 17%

Operations 31% 31% 65% 81% 80% 80%

Other 8% 11% 5% 3% 3% 4%

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding. 

Page 31 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
The decrease in deployments for training appears to have had at least two 

effects. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, for example, the 

amount of time for which special operations forces deployed for training 

to maintain proficiency in battle skills33 decreased by 50 percent. Officials 

with the Army, Navy, and Air Force service components told us that since 

many of their units have been deployed to the Central Command area of 

responsibility, they have had fewer opportunities to conduct proficiency 

training for all mission tasks. As a result, special operations forces units 

are focusing their training on the tasks that are required for operations in 

the Central Command and are assuming some risk by not training for 

other mission tasks. For example, officials with the U.S. Army Special 

Operations Command told us that specialized training such as military free 

fall and underwater combat operations have been reduced to a minimum, 

since these skills are not required to support ongoing operations. 

Similarly, officials with the Air Force Special Operations Command stated 

that increased deployments for operations had affected the ability of its air 

crews and special tactics squadrons to achieve all required missionessential training. However, officials stated that this has not degraded 

overall readiness, because not all of these training tasks are currently 

being performed in the Central Command. In addition, officials stated that 

if mission priorities were to shift away from the Central Command and 

different missions needed to be performed, not all of its special operations 

forces personnel would be required to have achieved those training tasks 

in order for a mission to be successfully carried out. 

Additionally, although our analysis shows that special operations forces 

deployed less frequently for skills proficiency training from fiscal year 

2000 through fiscal year 2005, we were told that the amount of training 

that special operations forces accomplished may not have been greatly 

affected. In particular, we were told that Army special operations forces 

units do not necessarily have to deploy in order to accomplish training 

that can be done at their home station. In addition, the fact that many 

special operations forces units are deploying for combat operations results 

in ample opportunities to maintain proficiency in essential skills. Officials 

with the U.S. Army Special Operations Command explained that special 

operations forces no longer train to fight because they are training as they

 33 Battle skills proficiency training includes the deployment of individuals or units for a

range of purposes, such as advanced occupational specialty training, language training, or 

unit battle drills.

Page 32 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
fight. However, not all special operations forces can accomplish training 

tasks at their home station. According to Naval Special Warfare Command 

officials, Naval Special Warfare units do not have adequate home station 

training ranges and are required to deploy in order achieve most training

tasks. Yet, from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2005, the amount of time that 

Naval Special Warfare personnel deployed for skills proficiency training 

decreased by more than 30 percent. 

Special operations forces have also deployed less frequently to train with 

foreign military forces overseas. As we have previously reported, this type

of training is important because it enables special operations forces to 

practice mission skills such as providing military instruction in a foreign 

language and maintaining language proficiency and familiarity with local 

geography and cultures, which are essential in the foreign internal defense 

and unconventional warfare missions.34 These deployments of special 

operations forces to train with the armed forces and other security forces

of friendly foreign countries are commonly referred to as joint combined 

exchange training. Between fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2005, however, 

the amount of time in which special operations forces personnel deployed 

for joint combined exchange training decreased by 53 percent. 

Our analysis of DOD data reported to the Congress35 also shows the 

participation of special operations forces in joint combined exchange 

training events decreased since fiscal year 2000. As shown in figure 4, from

fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the number of these events that

special operations forces completed decreased by about 50 percent. 

Further analysis shows that the number of events conducted in most of the 

geographic combatant command areas of responsibility decreased from 

fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005. Specifically, joint combined 

exchange training events conducted in the European Command decreased 

by about 75 percent, while events conducted in the Southern Command 

and Pacific Command also decreased during this time. Conversely, the 

number of such training events conducted in the Central Command 

 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-173. 

35 Section 2011 of Title 10, U.S. Code requires the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual 

report to the Congress regarding training for which expenses are paid under this section.

The report is to include the type and location of training conducted, the extent of

participation by foreign military forces, the relationship of that training to other overseas 

training programs, a summary of expenditures under this section, and a discussion of the 

unique military training benefit derived from the training activities. 

Page 33 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
increased from 7 exercises in fiscal year 2000 to 14 exercises in fiscal year 

2005.

36

Figure 4: Joint Combined Exchange Training Events Scheduled and Completed,

Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2005 

The increase in the amount of time that special operations forces have 

deployed to support operations in the Central Command has, to some 

extent, resulted in an increase in the number of cancelled joint combined 

exchange training events. Officials with the Special Operations Command, 

European Command, Pacific Command, and Southern Command with 

whom we spoke stated that joint combined exchange training can be 

cancelled for various reasons, including the availability of funding for the 

training, the availability of host nation forces, or the operations tempo37 of 

U.S. special operations forces. Officials stated, however, that due to the

 36 The Northern Command was established on October 1, 2002, to provide command and 

control of DOD homeland defense efforts and to coordinate military assistance to civil 

authorities. Special operations forces conducted one joint combined exchange training

event in the Northern Command in fiscal year 2005. 

37 Operations tempo is a measure of the frequency of the deployment of a unit or platform. 

Page 34 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
increased requirement for special operations forces deployments to 

support operations in the Central Command, there has been a 

corresponding increase in the number of cancelled joint combined 

exchange training events. Our analysis shows that from fiscal year 2000

through fiscal year 2005, the percentage of cancelled training events due to

the operations tempo of special operations forces increased from 0 

percent to more than 60 percent. 

While the primary purpose of joint combined exchange training is to train 

U.S. forces, this training can also have an ancillary benefit in that it can be 

used by the geographic combatant commanders and ambassadors to fulfill 

regional and country engagement objectives. For instance, the geographic 

combatant commands use joint combined exchange training to help 

achieve foreign engagement objectives in their designated areas of 

responsibility. DOD documents regarding the department’s strategy for the 

Global War on Terrorism identify combined training, such as joint 

combined exchange training, as an important element to strengthen 

partner nations’ counterterrorism capabilities. However, with continuing 

support being required for operations in the Central Command’s area of 

responsibility, there have been fewer special operations forces available to 

execute these types of training activities. 

Special Operations 

Command Has Established 

a Policy to Manage 

Increased Deployments, 

but the Policy Has Not 

Been Consistently or Fully 

Implemented 

The Special Operations Command has taken action to manage the 

challenge of increased personnel deployments. Monitoring the status of 

personnel deployments has been an area of congressional and DOD 

concern. The management of personnel tempo38 is important to the quality 

of life and retention of military personnel. Section 991 of Title 10 of the 

U.S. Code states that the deployment (or potential deployment) of a 

member of the Armed Forces shall be managed. Moreover, DOD has 

recognized that failure to effectively manage personnel tempo can result in 

the continued loss of trained personnel, a consequent loss of readiness 

capability, and an increased recruiting challenge. In addition, we have 

previously reported that high personnel tempo for special operations 

forces can affect readiness, retention, and morale.

39

 38 Personnel tempo is a measure of the frequency of the deployment of any one person. 

39 GAO, Special Operations Forces: Opportunities to Preclude Overuse and Misuse, 

GAO/NSIAD-97-85 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 1997). 

Page 35 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
In August 2005, the Special Operations Command established a policy

intended to maintain the readiness, retention, and training of active duty 

special operations forces personnel.40 The policy requires the Command’s 

active duty personnel to remain at least an equal amount of time at their 

home station as they do deployed for operations and training. The policy 

also requires that the Special Operations Command’s service components 

develop internal tracking mechanisms to ensure that their active duty 

special operations forces personnel remain within the policy’s deployment 

requirements.41 However, the Command’s service components have not 

consistently or fully implemented the deployment policy. 

One challenge lies in the fact that the policy’s guidelines are not clear. 

Officials with the Command’s service components noted a lack of clear 

guidance regarding how the components should implement the 

deployment guidelines, and consequently they were implementing it 

differently from one another. For example, the policy does not identify the 

length of time for which the components must ensure that personnel 

remain within the deployment guidelines. In addition, it does not state 

whether a servicemember must remain at a home station immediately

following one deployment for an equal amount of time before a next 

deployment. Because of the lack of clear guidance, the Special Operations 

Command’s service components have had to interpret the intent of the 

policy’s requirements to ensure that their personnel remain in compliance.

A second challenge lies in the difficulty of achieving full implementation. 

Officials with the Naval Special Warfare Command stated that they have

been unable to comply with the deployment guidelines because personnel 

lack adequate home station training ranges. Specifically, Naval Special

Warfare personnel must deploy for both unit training and operations. This

combination of deployments has resulted in personnel having exceeded

the policy’s requirement. Naval Special Warfare Command officials 

indicated that they were working with the Special Operations Command 

and the Navy to implement the deployment policy. According to Navy

officials, the Navy plans to provide the Naval Special Warfare Command 

with additional funds to improve the home station ranges used to train the 

 40 United States Special Operations Command Deployment Red Line Policy (August 2, 

2005). 

41 According to the policy, a servicemember can volunteer for an exception to the policy’s 

requirement by signing a volunteer statement and having it endorsed by his chain-ofcommand. 

Page 36 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
SEAL force, which is anticipated to reduce the current pace of operations 

tempo due to deployments for training. However, because these personnel 

have been required to deploy for most unit training, they have been unable 

to comply with the policy’s requirement. 

To determine whether special operations forces are meeting the intent of

the policy requires the service components to maintain internal tracking

systems with complete, valid, and reliable data on their personnel 

deployments. However, officials with the Command’s Army and Navy 

components expressed concerns regarding the reliability of the 

information they use to track the individual deployments of their 

personnel. 

While we did not independently validate the reliability of the data for 

personnel deployments, an official with the U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command stated the Army did not have a high level of confidence in the 

data recorded by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s units in 

the Army’s system on personnel deployments. Officials told us that they 

are developing a separate internal management tool in order to fully 

comply with the deployment policy; however, that tool will not be ready 

until July 2006. 

Naval Special Warfare Command officials told us that comprehensive 

reporting of personnel tempo information was suspended after the onset 

of the Global War on Terrorism. The reporting of this information was 

suspended because the Naval Special Warfare Command could not meet

the Navy’s personnel tempo standards due to an increase in the pace of 

deployments in support of ongoing operations. As a result, the Naval 

Special Warfare Command does not have comprehensive and reliable data 

on Naval Special Warfare personnel deployments. Officials stated that the 

Naval Special Warfare Command was in the process of reestablishing 

personnel tempo reporting with a goal of full reporting for all units by the 

end of April 2006. 

Without consistent and reliable data, the Special Operations Command 

does not have the information it needs to effectively manage the personnel 

deployments of special operations forces, which affects the Command’s 

ability to maintain the readiness, retention, and training of special 

operations forces personnel. 

The decision by DOD to expand the responsibilities of the Special 

Operations Command in the Global War on Terrorism has created new 

Conclusions 

Page 37 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
challenges to determine personnel requirements and acquire, train, and 

equip a greater number of warfighters to support ongoing military 

operations. The Congress and DOD have provided resources to enable the 

Command to augment its personnel. Given the Command’s expanded 

mission, however, it is critical that the Command complete its analyses of

personnel requirements and fully determine the number of personnel, who 

possess the right knowledge and skill sets, for the Command to meet its 

new role. Without this information, the Command cannot reasonably 

assure the Secretary of Defense and the Congress that the currently 

planned growth in the number of personnel for the Command will meet, 

exceed, or fall short of the requirements necessary to carry out its 

expanded mission. 

The military services and the Special Operations Command have faced 

human capital challenges in recruiting, training, and retaining a sufficient 

number of these forces, and many of these challenges continue. In large 

part, these challenges are attributable to the rigorous selection and 

training processes set for these personnel. Nonetheless, we believe the 

Command would be better able to address these challenges if it had a 

clearer understanding of the progress its service components have made in

achieving planned growth, which is clearly linked with appropriate goals 

and measures. Furthermore, the Command is attempting to meet its 

growth goals at a time of heightened personnel deployments. However, the 

Command is managing these deployments without reliable data. Such 

information would further enable the Command to meet the full range of 

its missions while maintaining the readiness, retention, and training of its 

personnel. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, U.S. 

Special Operations Command, to 

1. establish specific milestones for completing the Command’s ongoing 

analyses of personnel requirements and, once completed, make any 

needed adjustments to the current plans for personnel increases for 

the Command’s headquarters and related future funding requests; 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

2. revise the Command’s directive for its program to monitor the status of 

special operations forces to include performance objectives, goals, and

measures of progress for achieving planned growth; and enforce all of

the directive’s reporting requirements; and 

Page 38 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
3. clarify the methodology that the Command’s service components 

should use for enforcing the deployment policy, and take steps to 

ensure that the service components have tracking systems in place 

that utilize reliable data to meet the requirements of the policy. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with one 

recommendation and partially concurred with our two remaining 

recommendations. DOD’s comments are included in appendix III. DOD 

also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report,

as appropriate. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the Special 

Operations Command to establish specific milestones for completing its 

ongoing analyses of personnel requirements and, once completed, make 

any needed adjustments to the current plans for personnel increases for 

the Command’s headquarters in related future funding requests. DOD 

stated that the personnel requirements for the Command’s headquarters 

are being determined by an extensive study scheduled for completion in 

March 2007. DOD stated that it will monitor the progress and validate the 

results of this study, which we believe to be important steps. However, as 

we noted in this report, DOD has already requested funding to

substantially increase the number of military and civilian positions at the 

Command’s headquarters beginning in fiscal year 2007, without the benefit

of the results from the Command’s study of personnel needs. As a result, 

we would expect DOD to re-evaluate its funding needs upon completion of 

the Command’s study, and adjust its requests accordingly. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation to require the Special 

Operations Command to revise the Command’s directive for its program to 

monitor the status of special operations forces, to include performance 

objectives, goals, and measures of progress for achieving planned growth, 

and enforce all of the directive’s reporting requirements. DOD stated that 

the Special Operations Command is updating the directive for its program 

to monitor the status of special operations forces, and that the department 

and the Command are continuously developing new tools and metrics to 

more accurately measure the actual health of special operations forces. 

DOD further stated that it is difficult to compare personnel data across the 

services because each of the Command’s service components presents 

data using the metrics of its parent service, adding that it is highly 

desirable to have each component format its service-derived data in a 

common database. While we recognize the military services have different

metrics, the intent of our recommendation is that the Special Operations 

Page 39 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Command develop a set of reporting metrics that would give the 

Command the data it needs to monitor progress in meeting growth goals. 

Finally, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the 

Special Operations Command to clarify the methodology that its service 

components use for enforcing the Command’s deployment policy, and 

take steps to ensure that the service components have tracking systems in 

place that utilize reliable data to meet the requirements of the policy. DOD 

stated that the Special Operations Command leadership and all of its 

service components have implemented the Command’s deployment policy, 

which is in compliance with the department’s force deployment rules for 

Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. In addition, DOD stated 

that the department will work toward developing a multi-service database

and metrics to standardize deployment and other metrics across the joint 

community to overcome the challenge associated with the fact that each 

service uses different metrics for calculating deployment time. While we 

recognize the use of different metrics presents a challenge, our point, as 

we state in this report, is that the Command’s policy is unclear concerning

the length of time for which the components must ensure that personnel

remain within the deployment guidelines, and whether a servicemember 

must remain at a home station immediately following one deployment for 

an equal amount of time prior to a subsequent deployment. As a result, the 

Command’s service components have interpreted the intent of the policy’s 

requirements inconsistently. We continue to believe that additional 

clarification to the Command’s deployment policy is warranted to assist its 

service components in ensuring that special operations forces personnel 

remain in compliance with this policy. We also believe that the planned 

actions to standardize deployment and other metrics should include 

establishing procedures for recording reliable and relevant data on 

personnel deployments since, as we reported, officials with two of the 

Special Operations Command’s service components did not have 

confidence in the reliability of the information that was used to track the 

individual deployments of their special operations forces personnel. Such

data are an important tool to enable the Command to maintain the 

readiness, retention, and training of special operations forces personnel. 

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the 

date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the 

Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air 

Force, the Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, 

and the Commander, United States Special Operations Command. We will

Page 40 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will 

be made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this 

report, please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 

listed in appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

Sharon L. Pickup, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 41 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the extent to which the Special Operations Command 

(Command) has identified all of the personnel requirements needed to

meet its expanded mission, we identified the Joint Mission Analysis 

process and the Command’s formal manpower studies as the primary 

processes in which the Command develops its force structure and 

personnel requirements. To assess the plans to increase the number of 

special operations forces units and personnel requirements for the 

Command’s headquarters, we conducted site visits and interviewed 

officials involved with determining personnel requirements with the 

Special Operations Command, and the Army, Navy, and Air Force service 

components. We also met with Marine Corps officials to discuss plans for 

growth in Marine Corps special operations forces. We analyzed the plans 

for growth in these personnel through fiscal year 2011. We reviewed 

Department of Defense (DOD) documents identifying the increases in the 

Special Operations Command’s military authorizations and funding since 

fiscal year 2000 and its plans for personnel growth through fiscal year 

2011. We reviewed past reports prepared by GAO that discuss effective 

strategies for workforce planning. However, we were unable to determine 

whether all of the Special Operations Command’s personnel requirements 

had been identified because, at the time of our review, the Command had 

not completed all of its analyses of the personnel requirements needed for

its expanded mission responsibilities. 

To assess the progress the military services and the Special Operations 

Command have made since fiscal year 2000 in increasing the number of 

special operations forces personnel, we discussed the processes used by 

the military services and DOD to recruit, train, and retain these forces with 

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Special 

Operations Command, and the military services. We focused on these 

processes for the active components of the military services. To determine 

what challenges the military services and the Special Operations 

Command face to meet future growth, we analyzed personnel inventory 

levels for special operations forces in the active component military 

services for fiscal years 2000 through 2005. We collected and analyzed data 

to determine whether the schools that train new special operations 

personnel are producing enough newly trained personnel in order to meet 

current authorized personnel levels or planned growth targets. We 

reviewed relevant Special Operations Command directives and analyzed

annual reports prepared by the service components to determine the 

extent to which the information in these reports met reporting 

requirements. 

Page 42 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the effect of increased special operations forces deployments, 

we analyzed deployment data from the Special Operations Command for 

fiscal years 2000 through 2005. We analyzed the trends in deployments for 

operations, training, and administrative activities and the trends in 

deployments by geographic region. We discussed the impact of decreased 

deployments for training and increased deployments for operations with 

officials from the military services and the Special Operations Command. 

We reviewed the Special Operations Command’s policy to manage special 

operations forces personnel deployments and conducted interviews with 

component command officials to determine their ability to implement and 

fully comply with this policy. We reviewed available data for 

inconsistencies. Our assessments of data reliability revealed some 

concerns which are discussed in this report. Specifically, some of the 

personnel inventory data provided by the military service headquarters 

were incomplete. To overcome this challenge, we gathered additional 

information from the Special Operations Command’s service components. 

In addition, we interviewed officials with the service headquarters and the 

Special Operations Command’s service components who were 

knowledgeable about the data to discuss the validity of the information 

provided to us. We concluded the data were sufficiently reliable to answer

our objectives. We conducted our review from April 2005 through June 

2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

We interviewed officials and obtained documentation at the following 

locations: 

Army 

• U.S. Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

• U.S. Army Reserve Command, Ft. McPherson, Georgia 

• U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 

Navy 

• Chief of Naval Operations, Arlington, Virginia 

• Naval Recruiting Command, Millington, Tennessee 

• Naval Special Warfare Command, Coronado, California 

Marine Corps 

• U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

Page 43 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Air Force 

• U.S. Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

• Air Education and Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas 

• Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

• Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Washington, D.C. 

• Office of the Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), 

Washington, D.C. 

• Office of the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity 

Conflict), Washington, D.C. 

Unified Commands 

• U.S. European Command, Patch Barracks, Germany 

• U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia 

• U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii 

• U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 

• U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida 

Page 44 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Appendix II: Description of Activities Appendix II: Description of Activities Assigned to the Special Operations Command

Assigned to the Special Operations Command

Section 167(j) of Title 10, U.S. Code lists 10 activities over which the 

Special Operations Command exercises authority insofar as they relate to

special operations. Table 5 defines these activities. 

Table 5: Description of Activities Assigned to the Special Operations Command

Activity Description

Direct Action Short duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions undertaken to seize, destroy, capture, 

recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materials. 

Strategic ReconnaissanceaReconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted to obtain or verify, by visual observation or 

other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an 

actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or 

geographic characteristics of a particular area. 

Unconventional Warfare A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominately 

conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and 

directed in varying degrees by an external source. 

Foreign Internal Defense Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken 

by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and 

insurgency. 

Civil Affairs Operations that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, 

government and nongovernment civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in

friendly, neutral, or hostile areas of operations in order to facilitate military operations and

consolidate and achieve U.S. national objectives. 

Psychological Operations Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence 

their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 

organizations, groups, and individuals. 

Counterterrorism Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. 

Humanitarian Assistance Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other 

endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or deprivation that might present a 

serious threat to life or loss of property. This assistance supplements or complements the efforts of 

host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing this 

assistance. 

Theater Search and Rescue Actions performed to recover distressed personnel during wartime or contingency operations. 

Other Activities Specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense. 

Source: GAO.

a

Strategic reconnaissance is commonly referred to as special reconnaissance by DOD. 

Page 45 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 46 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 47 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 48 GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 49 GAO-06-812 Special Operation Operations Forces

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 49 GAO-06-812

Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 

In addition to the contact named above, David Moser, Assistant Director; 

John Pendleton, Assistant Director; Colin Chambers, Jeremy Manion, 

Stephanie Moriarty, Joseph Rutecki, Christopher Turner, Matthew 

Ullengren, Cheryl Weissman, and Gerald Winterlin also made key 

contributions to this report. 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(350695) 
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