Flooding, Louisiana

© 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing Co., all rights 

reserved. Used with permission of the Times-Picayune.)
211

Chapter 14

Th e Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA)

Assessing FEMA’s status as Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast is fundamental to determining whether the federal government was prepared to respond to a 

catastrophic event.

Th e Committee’s investigation found systemic and leadership failures, displayed in both the 

preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina, at both the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) and FEMA. Th ese failures contributed to human suff ering and the loss of 

life. Th e causes of many of these failures were known long prior to Katrina and had been 

brought repeatedly to the attention of both DHS and FEMA leadership.Despite warnings, 

leadership failed to make vital changes. 

In August 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck Florida as a Category 5 hurricane.1

 Its $43.7 

billion bill of damages (in 2005 purchasing power) was the worst ever recorded in the U.S. 

until Hurricane Katrina.2

 A post-storm study by the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) revealed failures in the response to Andrew that would repeat themselves 

in the response to Katrina, such as the erroneous initial assumption that heavily populated 

areas were spared the brunt of the storm, which delayed response when those assumptions 

turned out to be wrong.3

 In evaluating the response, NAPA concluded that FEMA was “a 

patient in triage,” adding that the “President and Congress must decide whether to treat 

it or let it die ... FEMA has been ill-served by congressional and White House neglect, a 

fragmented statutory charter, irregular funding, and uneven quality of its political executives ... the agency remains an institution not yet built.”4

 Th e report found that FEMA had 

inadequate leadership.5

 It recommended a limit on the number of presidential appointees 

and fi lling leadership positions with the most qualifi ed FEMA employees.6

 Th e report also 

found that FEMA needed to do far more to develop state and local emergency-management 

capacity.7

 If the key changes it recommended were beyond reach, the report added, more 

dramatic action – such as “abolishing FEMA” – should be taken.8

Aft er President Clinton took offi ce, he appointed James Lee Witt as FEMA Director. Witt 

had been the Director of Arkansas’ Offi ce of Emergency Services. In March 1994, NAPA 

reviewed FEMA’s reforms in response to its post-Andrew recommendations. Th e new report opened, “Th e greatest plus for the emergency management function and for FEMA has 

been the appointment of James Lee Witt, an experienced emergency manager, as director 

of FEMA.”9

Following Andrew, FEMA appeared to improve. A study by George Mason University’s 

Mercatus Center found that, since its reorganization in 1993, “FEMA has signifi cantly improved its ability to deal with disasters,” highlighting several improvements to recovery and 

mitigation programs, as well as employee training.10 Th e report concluded that FEMA had 

shown “major improvement in both performance and cost-eff ectiveness” achieved through 

“a collection of management actions that transformed a bureaucratic, process-driven organization into a responsive, results-driven organization.”11 Another study pointed to agency 

leadership: “An example of a best practice in agency transformation is the revitalization of 

... FEMA under the leadership of Director James Lee Witt. FEMA serves as an instructive 

case study of how to transform a troubled organization.”12 Th e report commended the selection of senior offi cials with emergency-management experience and found that the experi-
Chapter 14

212

ence resulted in improvements.13 Th at being said, the report noted that “the agency is still 

not free of problems.”14

In 2001, Joe Allbaugh succeeded Witt as Director and took a diff erent approach to restructuring FEMA. Shortly aft er he became Director, Allbaugh testifi ed to House and Senate 

committees: 

Many are concerned that federal disaster assistance may have evolved into an 

oversized entitlement program. ... Expectations of when the federal government should be involved and the degree of involvement may have ballooned 

beyond what is an appropriate level. We must restore the predominant role of 

state and local response to most disasters. Federal assistance needs to supplement, not supplant, state and local eff orts.15 

Allbaugh acknowledged FEMA’s successful transformation, but off ered a new vision when 

he explained FEMA’s budget in Senate testimony: “Today, FEMA is being called a model of 

government success due to the hard work and dedication of the career employees, ... however, FEMA is not free from problems.”16

In March 2001, the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, a 

congressionally mandated independent commission set up to study our nation’s security 

challenges issued a report (the Hart-Rudman report) that recommended sweeping changes 

in our nation’s approach to securing the homeland. It found that “the United States is today 

very poorly organized to design and implement any comprehensive strategy to protect the 

homeland.”17 Among other things, the Hart-Rudman report recommended that Congress 

create a new homeland-security agency with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and 

integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security.18

Th e report saw a prominent role for FEMA within the new homeland-security agency, and in 

fact proposed building the new agency “upon the capabilities of. ... FEMA.”19 Th e homelandsecurity agency “would be legislatively chartered to provide a focal point for all natural and 

manmade crisis and emergency planning scenarios. It would retain and strengthen FEMA’s 

10 existing regional offi ces as a core element of its organizational structure.”20 Th e report 

considered FEMA to be a “necessary core” of the proposed homeland security-agency.21

Th e Hart-Rudman report envisioned a homeland-security agency that would “employ 

FEMA’s principle of working eff ectively with state and local governments, as well as with 

other federal organizations, stressing interagency coordination.”22 It said that “much of [the 

agency’s] daily work will take place directly supporting state offi cials in its regional offi ces 

around the country.”23

Th e largest terrorist attack on U.S. soil prompted Congress to take the Hart-Rudman report 

to heart: In the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress passed the 

Homeland Security Act, which created the DHS in an eff ort to better organize and coordinate our nation to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, while maintaining the varied 

responsibilities of the 22 agencies merged into the new Department. Th is was the largest 

reorganization of government since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947. Th e 

main objective behind the creation of DHS was to consolidate our assets relevant to homeland security so that our homeland-security eff orts could be more coordinated and effi cient. 

Consistent with the Hart-Rudman recommendations, the Homeland Security Act transferred FEMA, its responsibilities, assets, and liabilities to the Emergency Preparedness and 

Response Directorate of the new Department. FEMA retained its name and its director 

was named Under Secretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response. Th ough formed 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency

213

in the wake of 9/11, DHS’s primary mission included carrying out all functions of entities 

transferred to the Department, “including by acting as a focal point regarding natural and 

manmade crisis and emergency planning.”24

Among other things, the Act makes the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the 

Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, responsible for 

helping to ensure the eff ectiveness of emergency response providers to terrorist 

attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, providing the federal government’s response to terrorist attacks and major disasters, ... aiding in the recovery from terrorist attacks and major disasters, ... building a comprehensive 

national incident management system with federal, state, and local government 

personnel, agencies, and authorities to respond to such attacks and disaster, 

... [and] developing comprehensive programs for developing interoperable 

communications technology, and helping to ensure that emergency response 

providers acquire such technology.25

FEMA, within DHS, was an important part of Congress’s vision to making our nation safe. 

Consistent with the Hart-Rudman report, DHS was to build upon FEMA’s strengths, and 

FEMA, the center of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, could better 

coordinate our nation’s vast assets to be prepared to respond to any disaster, whether natural or manmade. One of the fundamental reasons for bringing together multiple agencies 

was to create synergy, molding individual capabilities into a stronger, more eff ective and 

more coordinated approach to preventing and responding to catastrophes, whether caused 

by terrorism or nature. 

Not long aft er DHS was formed, DHS leadership started taking critical functions from 

FEMA and moving them to other places within DHS. In January 2004, then-Secretary Tom 

Ridge removed numerous preparedness-grant programs from FEMA and placed them in another offi ce within DHS.26 Secretary Chertoff later removed from FEMA all of its preparedness activities – essentially formalizing Ridge’s January 2004 actions27 – and consolidated 

preparedness activities into a single directorate led by an Undersecretary for Preparedness.28

Prior to the January 2004 changes, preparedness was one of FEMA’s essential roles. 

FEMA Was Not Prepared to Respond to the Catastrophic Effects of 

Hurricane Katrina

Former FEMA Director Michael Brown has said that he knew the weekend before Katrina’s 

landfall that neither the federal government nor New Orleans was prepared for the “big one.”29 

DHS Secretary Chertoff conceded, 

Although FEMA pre-positioned signifi cant numbers of personnel, assets and 

resources before the hurricane made landfall, ... we now know that [FEMA’s] 

capabilities were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the storm. ... Th e people 

did what they could. It was a question of whether they had the tools and capabilities that they needed in order to do the job properly.30

Brown testifi ed that he repeatedly told White House offi cials that FEMA was not prepared 

to handle a catastrophe. He gave the same warnings to DHS offi cials.31

Th e investigation explored several reasons for FEMA’s lack of preparedness, including 

unqualifi ed political leadership, budget shortages, inadequate workforce, FEMA’s inclusion 

within DHS, and underdeveloped and inadequate response capabilities. 
214

Chapter 14

FEMA’s Senior Leadership

Brown and most of his front-offi ce staff had little or no emergency-management experience 

prior to joining FEMA.32 While it is unclear that emergency-management experience alone 

is the single qualifi er for senior leadership at FEMA, the leadership at the time of Katrina 

also lacked basic management experience and the leadership ability required to coordinate 

the entire federal government’s response to a catastrophic event. Brown advocated to DHS 

and the White House to address FEMA’s needs, but he was generally unsuccessful. He 

presided over the agency as morale plummeted. He refused to operate within the chain of 

command in which FEMA resided. He failed to work collaboratively with state offi cials in 

Louisiana during Hurricane Katrina, the most signifi cant disaster during his tenure. 

Brown became DHS Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, and 

therefore FEMA Director, in early 2003.33 Brown fi rst joined FEMA as General Counsel34 in 

February 2001, and from there progressed quickly to front-offi ce duties. By the fall of 2001, 

then-Director Joseph Allbaugh named him Acting Deputy Director for FEMA.35 Prior to 

joining FEMA, Brown had little to no prior relevant emergency-management experience.36

Early in his career, he had some experience with municipal government, including municipal management,37 and had been a Commissioner for the International Arabian Horse 

Association for about 10 years. 

Patrick Rhode joined FEMA in 2003 as Chief of Staff for Brown.38 Prior to coming to 

FEMA, Rhode had no experience in emergency management.Aft er communications work 

in business and government, Rhode did advance work for George Bush’s 2000 presidential campaign.39 Aft er the election, Rhode did advance work for the White House and then 

briefl y worked as a White House liaison for the Department of Commerce.40 Rhode then 

accepted a position as the Associate Administrator of the Small Business Administration, 

and remained there until his move to FEMA.41 Brown named Rhode Acting DeputyDirector of FEMA in the summer of 2005,42 and Rhode was therefore in charge at headquarters as 

Brown traveled to the Gulf Coast just before Katrina struck. 

Rhode and Brown were not the only FEMA offi cials lacking emergency-management experience. With the exception of a FEMA employee who joined Brown’s front offi ce staff as 

Acting Director of Operations about a year aft er Brown became Under Secretary, none of 

the other individuals in the front offi ce during the entire time he served as Under Secretary 

had any prior emergency-management experience.43 Indeed, several FEMA leaders came 

from campaign rather than emergency-management backgrounds.44 Additionally, a review 

of the biographies by by Committee staff of FEMA regional directors since 2001 show that 

many of them had little or no emergency-management experience as well. 

Eric Tolbert, Director of Response at FEMA until February 2005, said: 

Th e impact of having politicals [appointees] in the high ranks of FEMA ... that’s 

what killed us, was that in the senior ranks of FEMA there was nobody that even 

knew FEMA’s history, much less understood the profession and the dynamics 

and the roles and responsibilities of the states and local governments.45

FEMA’s senior managers did include some experienced emergency-management personnel. For example, Ed Buikema, Acting Director of the Response Division at the time Katrina 

struck, had 26 years of experience with the state police in Michigan, 15 of them in their 

emergency-management division.46 Michael Lowder, Deputy Director for Response, spent 

over 31 years as a fi rst responder or emergency manager.47 Ken Burris, the Acting Director 

of Operations, was a fi refi ghter for 23 years before joining FEMA in 1999.48 Gary Moore, 

FEMA’s Director of Logistics, was a police offi cer for 26 years, fi nishing as second-rank-
The Federal Emergency Management Agency

215

ing member of the Maryland State Police before assuming federal emergency-management 

positions in the Department of Health and Human Services and DHS in 1992.49

In January 2005, MITRE, a non-profi t consulting fi rm, completed an assessment to identify 

problems preventing FEMA from dealing quickly with disasters. Th e assessment was based 

on confi dential interviews of FEMA’s 11 senior executives.50 Key themes that emerged from 

the interviews included the number of, and lack of qualifi cations of, political appointees, the 

number of temporary and acting staff , and frequent lack of operational experience as reasons why FEMA was underperforming.51 A few of the unattributed statements made during 

interviews included:

• “Th e void is in leadership. Th ere’s none. ... It’s reactions to politics and hot 

potatoes.”52

• “None of the senior leadership understand the dynamics of how response and 

recovery actually works. ... Th is administration doesn’t understand the value 

and importance of emergency management.”53

• “Patrick [Rhode] is purely political; he thinks White House.”54

In evaluating the failures in Hurricane Andrew, NAPA had concluded that “FEMA has had 

insuffi cient leadership ... necessary to create a high-performance, high-reliability institution.”55 History seemed to be repeating itself.

Budget Issues

Several witnesses testifi ed that FEMA’s capabilities were harmed by limited funding and resources. For instance, some expressed concern that FEMA’s ability to respond to Hurricane 

Katrina was harmed by fees levied by DHS to cover costs associated with “membership” 

Porter Avenue, Biloxi, MS

Sun Herald news photo, Biloxi/Gulfport, MS
Chapter 14

216

within the Department. Th ese witnesses complained that DHS “taxed” FEMA – essentially 

redirecting funds Congress appropriated to FEMA to DHS. Director Brown testifi ed that 

$77.9 million had been lost in this way between fi scal year 2003 and fi scal year 2005, a 14.8 

percent decrease in FEMA’s discretionary spending account since joining DHS.56

In interviews with Committee staff , DHS Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson and Chief 

Financial Offi cer Andrew Maner disputed the idea that a DHS tax harmed FEMA, though 

Maner conceded DHS had taken a total of $25 million from FEMA’s base.57 Jackson explained that the “taxes” are actually consolidated costs designed to procure services for all 

component agencies at a lower unit cost (e.g., maintenance contracts for copiers or overnight package delivery contracts).58 However, Ken Burris, FEMA’s Acting Chief Operating 

Offi cer, said that in order to pay DHS’s contributions or “taxes,” FEMA could no longer 

aff ord to refi ll personnel positions when they became vacant.59

Regardless of the reason for it, numerous FEMA witnesses testifi ed that because of a lack of 

resources, FEMA simply could not completely perform its mission. Brown and other FEMA 

employees testifi ed that FEMA sought additional funding on several occasions, but that 

generally, DHS or the Offi ce of Management and Budget (OMB) denied his requests. 

One area for which FEMA sought additional funding was catastrophic planning. In fi scal 

year 2004 FEMA sought $100 million for catastrophic planning, and in fi scal year 2005, 

sought $20 million to develop a catastrophic housing plan and $80 million to improve 

FEMA’s national response teams. DHS, however, denied these requests.60 Th en-FEMA 

Director of Response Eric Tolbert believed that planning for New Orleans was important 

enough to set aside funding from other parts of the response budget, though the planning 

was delayed in part by funding shortages.61 FEMA has not done enough planning to be prepared for a catastrophic disaster.

FEMA’s budget shortages manifested themselves in several ways, thus hindering FEMA’s 

ability to be adequately prepared for and respond to a catastrophe. Some of those ways will 

be further discussed below. 

Personnel Shortages

FEMA is a small agency with approximately 2,500 permanent full-time employees. Over the 

last few years, FEMA has suff ered numerous personnel problems, hindering its ability to 

prepare for and respond to a catastrophic event. While it had previously enjoyed a dedicated, Senior Executive Service level of experienced emergency managers, a “brain drain” 

sapped this core expertise.62

Over the last few years, FEMA has operated with a 15 to 20 percent vacancy rate; many 

positions cannot be fi lled because of budget shortages.63 FEMA tried to get additional funding from DHS, but the requests were generally denied. Th e personnel shortages negatively impacted FEMA’s ability to achieve its mission.64 For example, due to staffi ng shortages, William 

Lokey, the Chief of Operations in the Response Division, said that FEMA had not completed 

a fi nal Concept of Operations for its National Emergency Response Teams (ERT-N); the 

Incident Management Handbook, which would explain procedures for managing disasters to 

those working in disasters; or a fi nal Concept of Operations for the 2005 hurricane season.65

Because of personnel needs, FEMA relies heavily on two types of temporary employees 

hired under the Staff ord Act: Disaster Temporary Employees (DTEs), whose one-year 

appointments may be extended an unlimited number of times; and a Cadre of On-Call Response and Recovery Employees (CORE employees), whose four-year appointments may be 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency

217

extended an unlimited number of times, in two-year increments. DTEs are not eligible for 

certain employer-paid benefi ts.66

Initially, FEMA intended that these temporary appointments would provide it with the 

fl exibility needed for readiness during disaster operations.67 However, a July 2004 report 

by the U.S. Offi ce of Personnel Management (OPM) found that under FEMA’s staffi ng 

practices at the time of the report – which still refl ected the agency’s needs in 1996 – some 

DTE and CORE employees appeared to have worked for FEMA continuously for 10 years 

or longer with few, if any, breaks in service.68 Th e report found that FEMA’s extensive use 

of these two categories of temporary employees indicates that such employees are not being 

used for temporary purposes, but rather to fi ll critical needs and provide a stable, baseline 

workforce.69 Th e report criticized FEMA for this practice because, although DTE and CORE 

employees are working side by side with permanent employees, doing the same work, the 

appointments are starkly diff erent, including the provision of benefi ts.70 OPM found that 

these practices had indirectly created a tier-based workforce and had hurt morale.71 OPM 

made several recommendations to remedy these problems.72 To date, FEMA has not implemented OPM’s recommendations.73 

Staffi ng shortages impeded FEMA’s ability to prepare for a catastrophe. Additionally, as will 

be described in several other chapters, FEMA’s inadequate numbers of trained staff also had 

a negative impact on the response to Katrina. 

FEMA’s Response Capabilities

FEMA has responsibilities in both disaster response and recovery. Response includes actions taken during or aft er an emergency. Recovery involves short-term activities to return 

life-support systems aft er an emergency – such as rebuilding and assisting victims in dealing 

with damage caused by a disaster. 

Several FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cers (FCOs) said that FEMA is capable of handling 

small and medium-size disasters, but is not organized for large response operations. As 

FCO Scott Wells said, “FEMA is not trained, FEMA is not equipped, FEMA is not organized to do very large response operations. ... If you want big capability, you got to make a 

big investment. And there is no investment in response operations for a catastrophic disaster.”74 FCO Phil Parr said that FEMA focuses on recovery rather than response.75

FEMA offi cials identifi ed problems with FEMA’s performance during the 2004 hurricane 

season and went to DHS seeking funding to correct the problems. Because of these recognized problems, in January 2005 FEMA began initiatives in seven areas: (1) logistics; (2) 

enhancement of the disaster-workforce surge system; (3) enhancement of National Disaster 

Medical System; (4) enhanced catastrophic-disaster planning and exercises; (5) National 

Emergency Operations Center and Regional Operations Center upgrades; (6) enhanced 

individual-assistance and public-assistance programs to expedite services delivery; and 

(7) disaster-communication upgrades.76 Th e approval process required FEMA to submit 

“business cases” to OMB to obtain funding to undertake the initiative. According to emails, 

revised business cases for four of the initiatives were due on August 26, 2005, but were 

extended a few days because of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall.77

Inadequate Surge Workforce

FEMA must have the ability to quickly expand its staff in order to perform the many tasks 

required for an eff ective disaster response. To fi ll these vital jobs, the agency relies on a cadre of reservists called Disaster Assistance Employees (DAEs). Th e reliance on this temporary 

workforce also severely undermines response capabilities, as these frequently inexperienced 

and untrained individuals usually make up the bulk of FEMA’s workforce in a disaster.
Chapter 14

218

Since 1992, 12 studies have found problems with the DAE system.78 An assessment in early 

2004 found many problems, including a “lack of experienced and well-trained Reservists to 

answer the immediate call” during disasters.”79 It concluded that a need exists to redesign 

the disaster workforce and hire and recruit more people as the “increasing threat of terrorism and other man-made crises along with potential requirements of multiple deployments 

to major disasters necessitates a renewed focus on readiness capabilities.”80 DAEs undergo 

the majority of their training in the fi eld during disaster response.81 Because of funding 

shortages, none of the recommendations in the 2004 study has been implemented.82 A May 

15, 2005, FEMA report also confi rmed the problems with the DAE workforce.83

Additionally, according to Wells, FEMA designates only 8 percent of the reservist cadre 

for response; the rest is devoted to recovery.84 Wells added that most of the reservists were 

simply not cut out for response operations.85 Because many are retirees, Wells said, most 

“don’t belong in response operations where they have to work 18 to 24 hours a day and 

sleep ... on concrete.”86 FEMA’s reliance on this cadre once again during Katrina undermined its response. 

When the storm struck, there were about 4,000 DAEs in FEMA’s cadre.87 As usual, only 40 

to 50 percent were available.88 Prior to Katrina, FEMA had put a hiring freeze on reservists 

and because of budget limits had capped the number of DAEs that could be on the rolls.89

Days aft er Katrina, the hiring freeze was lift ed, and FEMA has since added over 4,000 

DAEs.90 Th is isn’t the fi rst time FEMA has been caught in a big disaster without an adequate 

workforce. Because of the number of individuals needed to respond to 2004 hurricane 

season, when four hurricanes hit Florida, FEMA had to greatly ramp up its workforce and 

hired a lot of new people.91 At the end of the season, FEMA released them.92

Th e DAEs let go aft er the 2004 hurricane season could have been valuable in the Katrina 

response. Wells testifi ed there were not enough people in the reservist cadre to assist 

FEMA in responding to Hurricane Katrina, and those that were present did not have the 

specifi c training necessary for the type of response required on the Gulf Coast.93 Michael 

Hall, Acting Director of Human Resources, agreed with Wells’ assessment. Hall calls the 

DAE system “broken.”94

Having enough qualifi ed people to work in a disaster is a necessity for an eff ective response. 

FEMA’s current surge-workforce system is plagued with problems that impeded the response. 

Emergency Response Teams

FEMA uses emergency-response teams to respond to events. National Emergency Response 

Teams (ERT–Ns) are designed for high-impact events. Th e readiness and strength of these 

teams have declined dramatically since 9/11; at the time of Katrina they were inadequately 

trained, exercised, and equipped. Before 9/11, ERT-Ns had training and leadership meetings at least once a year;95 aft er the attacks, they had three or four major training exercises.96

But starting in 2004, there was no more money forthcoming for the teams and, according 

to a FEMA offi cial in charge of one of the ERT–Ns, the teams could not meet for exercises.97

Moreover, although the NRP calls for having three ERT-Ns and a fourth National Capitol 

Region Team to be able to respond to incidents, DHS currently has only two ERT–Ns.98

Th e National Capitol Region Team does not exist. 

Post-9/11, the ERT–N teams had about 125 to 175 members; now each has about 25.99 Th e 

team deployed to New Orleans was newly formed, had not trained or exercised together as 

a team, and lacked equipment.100 Because of these inadequacies, William Carwile, a FEMA 

FCO and former ERT–N leader, referred to the teams as “theoretical.”101 FEMA’s draft concept of operations states that all ERT–N team members will be fully trained by June 1, 2006. 

Lokey described this goal as nothing more than “wishful thinking.”102
The Federal Emergency Management Agency

219

A June 30, 2004, memo from FEMA’s cadre of FCOs to Brown listed a series of the agency’s 

problems, including inadequate funding for the ERT-Ns. Th e memo stated that FEMA’s 

ERT–Ns were “unprepared” because they had “zero funding for training, exercises, or team 

equipment.”103 It also stated that there was a lack of training and policy guidance and standards for the operations section of the emergency response team.104 It said that resources 

were needed “in order to rebuild the teams to levels appropriate for them to manage the 

next big one.”105 Brown did not respond, and no changes were made.106 Brown said he could 

not obtain funding for the needed changes.107 It was in this sub-par state that an ERT-N 

responded to Katrina. 

According to the NRP, FEMA is also supposed to be able to deploy rapid-response Federal 

Incident Response Support Teams (FIRST) to establish an immediate federal presence at 

the scene of an Incident of National Signifi cance.108 But no FIRST teams existed at landfall.109 Indeed, FEMA did not advertise to hire team members until the summer of 2005.110

Witnesses testifi ed that FIRST teams could have provided helpful assistance had they been 

deployable for Katrina.111

FEMA’s other emergency-response teams are also unprepared. According to Wells, emergency-response teams generally have not planned and worked together.112

National Disaster Medical System

Th e National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) contains a number of specialized emergency medical and response teams, called Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), 

who are the federal government’s fi rst responders in a medical emergency. Prior to Katrina, 

NDMS had signifi cant problems. For example, when Katrina made landfall, the DMATs 

were not fully prepared. Of the 52 teams, FEMA considered only 27 fully operational at 

the time of Katrina and lacked criteria to determine levels of readiness for veterinary and 

mortuary teams.113

FEMA had no centrally managed and integrated NDMS training/exercise program for the 

teams.114 NDMS lacked adequate management support at both the headquarters and fi eld 

levels.115 Funding issues limited FEMA’s ability to bring the teams to full strength and to 

expand the number of teams despite geographic disparities in their availability; in fact, 

NDMS had no long-range strategic plan to develop new teams.116 None of the teams had a 

fully supplied equipment cache when they deployed to Katrina.117 One longstanding team 

member said that he believed that morale among NDMS teams had never been lower than 

it was at the time they mobilized for Katrina.118 Recognizing many of these problems with 

NDMS, FEMA sought to make improvements in January 2005 by naming NDMS as one of 

its Disaster Support Initiatives.

Urban Search and Rescue Team

Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams are another type of team FEMA has available for 

response. USAR teams provide life-saving assistance. Before Katrina, FEMA’s USAR teams 

lacked the plans, funds, personnel, and equipment to respond to a catastrophe. According 

to Eric Tolbert, former FEMA Director of Response, USAR funding was “grossly inadequate and the teams are held together on a shoestring budget.”119 Until 9/11, the USAR program operated disaster-to-disaster, using hand-me-down equipment and oft en purchasing 

equipment and supplies at the time of the disaster.120 Until Congress appropriated funds in 

2004, USAR had no vehicles and had to rent trucks in order to mobilize for emergencies.121

Th e USAR teams also have no water-rescue capabilities, even though urban areas can fl ood. 

Th is translated to a serious lack of USAR capabilities in Hurricane Katrina. 
Chapter 14

220

Lack of Operational Doctrine

FEMA has not developed operational doctrine for responding to disasters in over four 

years. According to Carwile: 

Th ere is no clear understanding of the responsibilities of each level (Washington, the Regions, deployed Emergency Response Teams) and how they are 

to interact. Th is lack of operational doctrine results in unacceptable levels of 

overlap, double, and triple ordering of resources, and interminably long video 

teleconferences and conference calls. While some of these are necessary, they 

can disrupt fi eld operations.122

Th e MITRE study discussed above also found that standard operating procedures were nonexistent, outdated, or inconsistent, and recommended that FEMA develop a clear concept 

of operations and train employees on the procedures.123 Despite the fact that one interviewee said, “Our biggest impediment is lack of command and control, not fully defi ning 

our standard operating procedures so everyone understands and adheres to them,” FEMA 

had not completed a concept of operations by the time Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf 

Coast.124 MITRE also recommended that FEMA establish a full-time planning function.125

Poor Contracting and Procurement Practices 

Long before Katrina even began to develop into a storm, FEMA’s procurement capability 

was stressed beyond its limts. Th ough FEMA’s procurement offi ce was “authorized” to have 

55 full-time employees, it had not been provided funding for that number for several years.126

When Katrina hit, the staff was only 36.127 For the six years before Katrina, FEMA’s Chief 

Ruins of the 9th Ward, 

New Orleans

GAO photo
The Federal Emergency Management Agency

221

Procurement Offi cer, Patricia English, had split her time between two FEMA assignments, 

working as either Acting Chief Financial Offi cer or Deputy Chief Financial Offi cer, in addition to her procurement duties.128 Th is level of staffi ng was inadequate – and known to be so. 

In early 2005, DHS conducted a study of the agency’s procurement capabilities, and concluded that the condition of FEMA’s procurement offi ce was “red” – understaff ed – and that 

a staff of somewhere between 95 and 125 was necessary for the workload in a normal year.129

Th e results of this understaffi ng were predictable. English testifi ed that “Th ere’s not enough 

staffi ng to do the day-to-day activities required by the agency just through our normal appropriation. When disasters hit, it just expands the problem.”130 Major contracts – such as 

for delivering assistance directly to disaster victims – were slow to be fi nalized and were not 

complete as Katrina approached the Gulf Coast.131 In the face of Katrina, FEMA cut short 

the planned procurement process and issued non-competitive contracts to the four primary 

companies it had been interviewing.132 Tolbert testifi ed, “Th at’s the reason all these contracts 

are done as emergency contracts that are never complete because there’s no capability in 

FEMA to do procurement. It is overwhelmed day to day, much less going into a disaster, and 

that’s just the facts. ... We could never get procurement done.”133 His assessment of FEMA’s 

procurement capacity was stark: “Th e procurement capability in FEMA also is dead.”134

English is emphatic that staffi ng has to be improved: “I cannot go through another hurricane season with the limited staff that I have.”135 FEMA’s procurement offi ce is now beginning to look for more staff , but is fi nding it diffi cult to fi nd qualifi ed individuals.136

FEMA in the Department of Homeland Security 

Removing Functions from FEMA

Aft er Congress merged FEMA into DHS, DHS leadership took actions that fundamentally 

changed FEMA’s functions. 

Kathleen Tierney, Director of the Natural Hazards Center at the University of Colorado, 

testifi ed that post 9/11, DHS made some crucial, if understandable, mistakes in its eff orts to 

meet the new threat of terrorism. Th ese include rejecting the principle of “integrated emergency management,” while simultaneously failing to implement an approach commonly 

referred to as “all-hazards” preparedness.137

Th e cycle of emergency management – called “integrated emergency management” – involves four basic phases:

1. Mitigation: activities taken to eliminate or reduce risks to life and property 

from natural and man-made hazards;

2. Preparation or preparedness: activities taken in advance of an emergency 

that develop capabilities for an eff ective response in the event of an emergency;

3. Response: actions taken during or aft er an emergency; and

4. Recovery: a short-term activity to return vital life-support systems aft er an 

emergency.

Th is cycle of integrated emergency management holds that preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation require synergy and must be managed within the same basic structure. 

Traditionally, FEMA has had the responsibility for performing each of these functions – responsibilities that were recognized in the Homeland Security Act.138 However, in January 
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2004, then-Secretary Ridge removed numerous preparedness-grant programs from FEMA 

and placed them in another offi ce within DHS, over Brown’s objections. 139 In July 2005, 

Secretary Chertoff announced that he was stripping from FEMA all preparedness activities – essentially formalizing former Secretary Ridge’s January 2004 action, which removed 

grant programs from FEMA as well as removing any of the other remaining preparedness 

responsibilities from FEMA.140 Th ese changes, part of Secretary Chertoff ’s “Second Stage 

Review,” took eff ect in October 2005.

By removing preparedness functions from FEMA, DHS leadership departed from the concept of integrated emergency management described above. In support of its action, DHS 

argued that the establishment of a Preparedness Directorate was meant to “synthesize the 

functions of state and local liaisons, relationships, grants, training and the like. We expect to 

gain greater synergies through this integration.”141

Several witnesses before the Committee opined that splitting preparedness from response 

was a serious mistake. Bruce Baughman, President of the National Emergency Management 

Association and Director of the Alabama State Emergency Management Agency, testifi ed 

that the ability to make grants provided the mechanism for FEMA to be involved in the development of plans and the exercising of those plans. Otherwise, he added, “Th e only time 

we see the FEMA staff is when we have a disaster. Th ey are not involved.”142 Tolbert agreed 

that preparedness should not be split from response.143

DHS gave the responsibility for FEMA’s preparedness-grant programs to the Offi ce of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) within the Offi ce of State and Local Government Coordination 

and Preparedness, a law-enforcement, terrorism prevention-focused organization formerly 

part of DOJ.144 Ed Buikema, the Acting Director of Response, said FEMA had little visibility 

into the state preparedness activities coordinated by ODP, and that there should have been 

much better communication and coordination between ODP and FEMA.145 Th e Offi ce of 

State and Local Government Coordination also assumed the primary liaison role with the 

states, diminishing the preparedness role of FEMA regions even further.146 Professors Herman Leonard and Arnold Howitt of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, 

believe that this separation 

may hamper necessary alignment between the way in which preparedness has 

been designed and the way in which response needs to operate. At a minimum, it 

makes maintaining alignment diffi cult; at worst, it will result in serious mismatch 

between what has been prepared and the actions the responders want to take.147

Leonard testifi ed that the most critical alignment for high performance is that between “the 

way you prepared to respond and your ability to execute that,” and said it is “very hard to 

understand” why you would separate them.148

A consequence of this separation was that FEMA’s role in preparing for disasters was eliminated. Th e separation also meant that FEMA ceased providing fi nancial assistance to states for 

preparedness activities. Th us, FEMA was no longer able to infl uence activities tied to funding 

the states, including training, planning and exercising, or providing evaluation of such activities. Th is limitation of FEMA’s role has hindered FEMA’s relationship with the states. DHS’s 

decision to separate preparedness from response was a mistake that hampered the alignment 

between the way preparedness is designed and the way response should operate. 

FEMA’s Placement in DHS 

Th e Committee found no evidence that the placement of FEMA into DHS itself was a problem. Indeed, the Committee found that the placement of FEMA’s functions within DHS can 

enhance our nation’s emergency-management system. 
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As explained more thoroughly above, DHS was created to bring together federal assets 

relevant to defending our homeland. Preparing for and responding to disasters – either 

manmade or natural – is an important part of this function. Some of the assets brought 

into DHS included elements of Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, Coast Guard, and substantial communications assets.149 Th ere is a synergy 

created by bringing together these assets within the Department that can be brought to 

bear under DHS leadership in the event of a disaster. Th e Committee agrees that if FEMA 

were moved out of the Department, we would lose that synergy.150 Taking FEMA back out 

of DHS would move it further away from the substantial assets within DHS that can be 

brought to bear in responding to catastrophes.

Th e additional resources within DHS that can be applied to emergency management are a 

major advantage. What was formerly the responsibility of a small, 2,500-person independent agency is now the responsibility of a large department. DHS has more internal resources than FEMA had when it was an independent agency. With these additional resources, 

more responsibilities in a response to an emergency are housed under one department. For 

example, when FEMA was an individual agency, under the Federal Response Plan, the plan 

that existed before the NRP became eff ective in 2005, FEMA was the lead for only two of the 

12 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), the incident-specifi c response processes.151 Under 

the NRP, DHS is either the coordinator or has lead responsibility for nine of the 15 ESFs.152

DHS also houses the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), which is designed to 

continually monitor potential emergencies and incidents.153 Additionally, DHS’s employees 

off er a pool of potential employees for deployment to disasters. Indeed, DHS employees 

were called to support some of FEMA’s functions during Katrina. 

Taking FEMA out of DHS would also “stovepipe” preparedness activities. It makes no 

sense to have one agency doing preparedness for terrorist attacks and another agency doing preparedness for natural disasters, as many of the required steps are the same.154 Th is 

bifurcation would lead to ineffi ciencies and duplication of eff ort. Bifurcated, competing preparedness systems could also confuse state and local offi cials, who would have to hook into 

one system to prepare natural disasters and another system to prepare for terrorists. Frank 

Cilluff o, Associate Vice President for Homeland Security and Director of the Homeland 

Security Policy Institute at George Washington University, agreed and testifi ed that moving 

FEMA out of DHS would simply obscure the real issues: 

In my opinion, to re-create FEMA as an independent agency further obfuscates 

and bifurcates an already too complex systems-to-systems approach. ... To have 

state and local government and fi rst responders plug into one system to respond 

to bad weather and another system to respond to bad people is unrealistic. 

Th ere is no reason to have competing systems in an environment of limited 

resources. Th e problem is not really one of organizational design. Th e requisite 

policy in law exists. Th e challenge is one of management and leadership.155

While pulling FEMA out of DHS might be a politically expedient quick fi x – a reshuffl ing 

of the boxes to suggest the problem is being fi xed – this would simply not get to the core of 

problems of the federal government response in Katrina. Although FEMA certainly is an 

agency that has problems, DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner correctly observed that 

“transferring FEMA out of the department, in my opinion, would be a major mistake. We 

[would be] simply transferring the problem.”156

Others agreed that FEMA’s problem was not a rsult of its placement in DHS. For example, 

David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, testifi ed: 
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I would respectfully suggest that the quality of FEMA’s leadership – and that 

is more than one person, I might add – as well as the adequacy of FEMA’s resources will probably have more to do with their ultimate success than whether 

or not they are in the Department of Homeland Security. Let us keep in mind 

that the Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security. And so 

merely because one is or is not in the Department of Homeland Security is not, 

in and of itself, I would respectfully suggest, dispositive.157

Professors Leonard and Howitt also testifi ed that preparedness and response need not be 

separated from DHS. In written testimony to the Committee, they state:

Th e task of preparation against disasters seems a natural fi t with the overall 

mission of DHS. If the Department is to be held accountable for enhancing 

security for Americans and the American way of life, and takes seriously the 

broad array of possible threats, then preparing against natural disasters (and 

operating the response mechanisms in the event of a crisis) should fi t as well as 

preparation against and response to other threats.158

Professors Leonard and Howitt contend that preparing for and responding to natural disasters like Katrina can be handled either well or poorly either inside or outside of DHS. Th ey 

write: “Provide leadership that understands and assesses the full range of threats to security 

and that knows how to help its constituent organizations develop excellence, and there is no 

reason why preparation for and response to disasters needs to be in its own enclave (or in a 

diff erent agency).”159

In short, the problems in DHS’s response to Katrina must be fi xed, not transferred. Th e 

benefi ts of the placement of FEMA’s functions in DHS must be realized, not undermined. 

Our nation’s emergency-management system will benefi t the most if FEMA’s functions 

remain within DHS.

Discussions Regarding FEMA’s Capabilities

Brown testifi ed that within the Administration, he repeatedly made his views known that 

FEMA had problems. Brown stated that he had alerted DHS offi cials that FEMA did not 

have the capability to respond to a catastrophe,160 telling DHS offi cials that “FEMA’s on the 

verge of failures; we’re stretching personnel.”161 Brown said he discussed his concerns about 

FEMA’s capabilities with various DHS offi cials: Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson, thenSecretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge, then Deputy Secretary Admiral James Loy, 

Under Secretary for Management Janet Hale, and Chief Financial Offi cer Andy Maner. 162

Brown testifi ed that at the end of a meeting on another subject, he informed President Bush 

that FEMA did not have the ability to respond to a catastrophe like the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 that hit Asia.163 Th e conversation occurred at a “100,000-foot level,” 

telling the President that we are not prepared, that we are not doing the kind of planning 

and exercises that we need to do for housing, response, and medical care in this country 

if we have that kind of natural disaster. In a subsequent media interview, Brown said the 

President responded “Well, go get ready.”164

Brown also testifi ed he repeatedly told Andy Card, White House Chief of Staff , Joe Hagin, 

Deputy Chief of Staff , and Josh Bolten, then Deputy Chief of Staff , that FEMA did not have 

the capabilities to respond adequately to a catastrophe, and sought additional resources.165

Brown said that he told these offi cials several times that “DHS was not really following the 

Homeland Security Act and giving [FEMA] the muscle that it was supposed to have.”166 It is 
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225

diffi cult to fully assess Brown’s testimony: despite requests from the Committee, the White 

House has not provided information regarding Brown’s allegations.

Conclusion

Prior to Katrina’s landfall, FEMA suff ered from a number of problems: unqualifi ed senior 

political leadership, budget shortages, personnel shortages, and inadequate response capabilities. FEMA simply was not prepared. Although some have argued that FEMA’s merger 

into the DHS weakened FEMA, there is no evidence that the merger itself was indeed the 

problem. Instead, decisions made by DHS leadership weakened FEMA and impeded its 

ability to respond to disasters. 

Th ese weaknesses notwithstanding, Brown testifi ed on September 24, 2003, before a Senate 

Environmental and Public Works subcommittee, that FEMA was taking steps to reduce 

disaster- response times so that “disaster teams will be able to respond anywhere in the 

country within 12 hours and disaster logistics packages, commodities, and equipment can 

be delivered anywhere within 24 hours.”167 By any measure, FEMA’s response capabilities 

fell short of this goal when Hurricane Katrina made landfall. 

1 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Climactic Data Center, “Hurricane Katrina, A Climatological Perspective,” Oct. 2005, p. 21. http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/tech-report-200501z.pdf. Accessed Mar. 20, 

2006.

2 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Climactic Data Center, “Hurricane Katrina, A Climatological Perspective,” Oct. 2005, p. 21. http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/tech-report-200501z.pdf. Accessed Mar. 20, 

2006.

3 Coping with Catastrophe: Building an Emergency Management System to Meet People’s Needs in Natural and Manmade 

Disasters, prepared by National Academy of Public Administration for U.S. Congress and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Feb. 1993, pp. vii, 1 [hereinaft er Coping with Catastrophe].

4 Coping with Catastrophe, p. ix. 

5 Coping with Catastrophe, pp. 50-51.

6 Coping with Catastrophe, pp. 64-66.

7 Coping with Catastrophe, p. 88.

8 Coping with Catastrophe, p. x.

9 Review of Actions Taken To Strengthen the Nation’s Emergency Management System, prepared by National Academy of 

Public Administration for U.S. Congress and FEMA, Mar. 1994, p. 3. 

10 Jerry Ellig, “Learning From the Leaders: Results-Based Management at the Federal Management Agency,” 

Mar. 29, 2000, pp. 2, 5. 

11 Jerry Ellig, “Learning From the Leaders: Results-Based Management at the Federal Management Agency,” 

Mar. 29, 2000, p. 33.

12 R. Steven Daniels and Carolyn L. Clark-Daniels, “Transforming Government: Th e Renewal and Revitalization of 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency,” Apr. 2000, p. 6 [hereinaft er Daniels and Clark-Daniels, “Transforming 

Government”].

13 Daniels and Clark-Daniels, “Transforming Government,” p. 7.

14 Daniels and Clark-Daniels, “Transforming Government,” p. 18.

15 Written Statement of Joe M. Allbaugh, then Director, FEMA, for the U.S. House, Committee on Appropriations, 

Subcommittee on Veterans Aff airs, Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies, hearing on VA and 

HUD Appropriations, May 17, 2001. 

16 Written Statement of Allbaugh, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Veterans Aff airs, Housing 

and Urban Development and Independent Agencies hearing, May 17, 2001. 

17 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, “Road Map for National Security, Imperative for 

Change,” Mar. 15, 2001, p. 10 [hereinaft er “Road Map for National Security”].
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18 “Road Map for National Security,” pp. 14-15.

19 “Road Map for National Security,” p. 14.

20 “Road Map for National Security,” p. 14.

21 “Road Map for National Security,” p. 14.

22 “Road Map for National Security,” p. 17.

23 “Road Map for National Security,” p. 17.

24 “Th e Homeland Security Act of 2002.” (P.L. 107-296) 6 U.S.C. § 101.

25 “Th e Homeland Security Act of 2002.” (P.L. 107-296) 6 U.S.C. § 502.

26 Ridge transferred the following programs in this action: Assistance to Firefi ghters program, Emergency Management 

Performance Grant program, fi rst responder counter-terrorism training assistance, state and local all-hazards emergency 

operations planning, Citizens Corps, interoperable communications equipment, Community Emergency Response 

Teams, and Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS). 

27 Besides formalizing what had already been transferred, Chertoff transferred the U.S. Fire Administration, hazardous 

material training, the chemical stockpile, the radiological emergency preparedness programs, and Bioshield. 

28 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Secretary Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security Second 

Stage Review Remarks,” July 13, 2005, p. 7.

29 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006, transcript p. 99.

30 Written Statement of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

Th e Role of the Department of Homeland Security, Oct. 19, 2005, p. 3. See also: Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 

for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Department of Homeland Security, 

Oct. 19, 2005.

31 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 137-138, 141, 143, 145. 

32 Remarkably, two FEMA witnesses, Patrick Rhode and Brooks Altshuler, pointed to experience on a presidential advance team as relevant training to manage a disaster. Committee staff interview of Patrick Rhode, former Acting Deputy 

Director, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 22, 2005, transcript p. 74; Committee staff interview of Brooks Altshuler, former 

Acting Deputy Chief of Staff and Policy Director, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 15, 2005, transcript pp. 27-30.

33 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 23, 2006, transcript p. 7. 

Since the fall of 2001, Brown had been serving as the Acting Deputy Director of FEMA. In Aug. 2002, President Bush 

appointed him to the Transition Planning Offi ce for the newly established DHS, to serve as the transition leader for the 

Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Division. Brown resigned from FEMA on Sept. 12, 2005.

34 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 7. Brown received his JD from Oklahoma City University School of Law. See also: 

Th e White House, “President Bush Announced his Intention to Nominate,” press release, Jan. 10, 2003. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030110-6.html. Accessed on Oct. 15, 2005.

35 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 7.

36 On the biography provided to the Committee during his confi rmation to be Deputy Director of FEMA, Brown listed 

that from 1975 to 1978 he was “Assistant City Manager, Police, Fire & Emergency Services for the City of Edmond, 

Oklahoma.” See: U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Aff airs, Hearing to Consider the Nomination of Michael D. 

Brown to be Deputy Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, June 19, 2002. Brown’s attorney described 

this as a “distinction without a diff erence” and points to an affi davit from the former City attorney for the City of 

Edmond stating that Brown’s job as Assistant to the City Manager included responsibility for several emergency management related activities. Th e White House never sent Brown’s nomination to be Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response to the Senate. Instead, the White House simply elevated Brown from the Deputy Director to the 

Under Secretary position. Th e White House asserted it had the authority to do so under Section 1511 of the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002. Th e Committee disputes the appropriateness of this action.

37 Brown has a degree in public administration and political science from Central State University, now called University of Central Oklahoma. While still in college, in 1977 Brown began an internship with the planning department of the 

City of Edmond, a suburb of Oklahoma City. Upon completion of his internship, Brown became a full-time employee of 

the City of Edmond, serving as an assistant to the city manager. Late in his tenure with the City of Edmond, Brown assisted in the development of an emergency operations center for the city. Brown left the City of Edmond to join the Senate Finance Committee for the Oklahoma Legislature. Brown entered the private practice of law in which he represented 

municipalities in various matters. Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, pp. 5-6. 

38 Rhode interview, Dec. 22, 2005, p. 7. Rhode left FEMA in Jan. 2006.

39 Rhode interview, Dec. 22, 2005, pp. 6-7.

40 Rhode interview, Dec. 22, 2005, pp. 6-7.

41 Rhode interview, Dec. 22, 2005, pp. 6-7.

42 Rhode interview, Dec. 22, 2005, pp. 10-11.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency

227

43 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, pp. 119-220.

44 For example, Brooks Altshuler, former FEMA Policy Director and former Acting Deputy Chief of Staff , did not have 

any emergency-management experience prior to working at FEMA but had worked on the Bush-Cheney 2000 presidential campaign. Source: Altshuler interview, Dec. 15, 2005, pp. 6-7. Scott Morris, Director, Florida Long Term Recovery 

Offi ce and Former Chief of Staff , had no known emergency-management experience prior to working at FEMA, but 

had worked for Maverick Media as a media strategist for the Bush-Cheney 2000 presidential campaign. Source: FEMA, 

“About FEMA, Scott R. Morris, Deputy Chief of Staff .” http://www.fema.gov/txt/pao/impact/2004_july_Aug.txt (website 

no longer available).

45 Committee staff interview of Eric Tolbert, former Director of Response, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, transcript 

p. 33.

46 Committee staff interview of Edward Buikema, Acting Director of Response Division and Regional Director, Region V, 

FEMA, conducted on Nov. 21, 2005, transcript pp. 4-7.

47 Committee staff interview of Michael Lowder, Deputy Director of Response, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 10, 2005, 

transcript pp. 4-5. 

48 Committee staff interview of Ken Burris, former Acting Director of Operations, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 29, 2005, 

transcript pp. 5-7.

49 Committee staff interview of Gary Moore, Director, Logistics Branch, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, transcript 

pp. 3-5.

50 Th e 11 executives interviewed were: Brooks Altshuler, Director of Policy; Michael Brown, Under Secretary; Ed Buikema, Regional Director/Acting Director of Response; Ken Burris, Director of Operations; William Carwile III, Federal 

Coordinating Offi cer; Dan Craig, Director of Recovery; Mike Lowder, Supervisory Program Specialist; Gary Moore, 

Logistics Branch Chief; Patrick Rhode, Chief of Staff ; Eric Tolbert, Director of Response and Scott Morris, Deputy Chief 

of Staff . Source: MITRE Corp., Center for Enterprise Modernization, Initial Assessment of EP&R. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 000194.

51 MITRE Corp., Center for Enterprise Modernization, Initial Assessment of EP&R. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. 000172.

52 MITRE Corp., Interviews conducted at EP&R/FEMA, Jan. 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 000246.

53 MITRE Corp., Interviews conducted at EP&R/FEMA, Jan. 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 000242.

54 MITRE Corp., Interviews conducted at EP&R/FEMA, Jan. 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 000220. 

Other statements made during interviews conducted for the MITRE study include: “OK to have political appointees but 

there should be criteria. Th ey are well meaning but they are clueless.” Source: MITRE Corp. Interviews conducted at 

EP&R/FEMA, Jan. 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 000193; “You’ve got a bunch of amateurs that don’t 

understand the seriousness of their decisions. Th ey’re more into the politics and culture of FEMA than the outcome of 

the response capability. ... Th e entire senior management is political. Subject to the whims every four years. If FEMA 

is to survive, must do a better job of recruiting, supporting, developing and moving them, an investment in people.” 

Source: MITRE Corp., Interviews conducted at EP&R/FEMA, Jan. 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

000243; “[Political appointees] don’t have the skills, and haven’t been trained [...] true also for career employees, they 

aren’t trained.” Source: MITRE Corp., Interviews conducted at EP&R/FEMA, Jan. 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. 000216.

55 Coping with Catastrophe, p. 48. 

56 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, Sept. 27, 2005. 

57 Brown produced some documents related to FEMA budget issues that DHS did not produce. To the extent DHS did 

not provide all documents requested by the Committee, the Committee does not have a complete picture on budget issues. Committee staff interview of Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript pp. 109-110. Committee staff interview of Andrew Maner, Acting Chief Financial 

Offi cer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Feb. 2, 2006, transcript p. 46. 

58 Jackson interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 109-110. 

59 Burris interview, Dec. 29, 2005, pp. 195-196.

60 Ron Castleman, e-mail to Patrick Rhode, Michael Brown and others, Dec. 30, 2003, 11:07 a.m. Provided to Committee.

61 Ron Castleman, e-mail to Patrick Rhode, Michael Brown and others, Dec. 30, 2003, 11:07 a.m. Provided to Committee.

62 MITRE Corp., Center for Enterprise Modernization, Initial Assessment of EP&R. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. 000146. See also: Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 96 (mentioning the brain drain).

63 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, pp. 125-127 (stating that at one time, FEMA had 500 positions that could not be 

fi lled because of funding shortages); Committee staff interview of Michael Hall, Acting Director of Human Resources, 

FEMA, conducted on Nov. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 71-78. Th is vacancy rate is compounded by the fact that 50 percent 
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228

of FEMA’s current workforce is eligible for retirement within the next fi ve years. See also: FEMA, Administration and 

Regional Operations, Fiscal Year 2007, Congressional Justifi cation, p. 9.

64 Hall interview, Nov. 28, 2005, pp. 71-78. Hall testifi ed that for the last 11⁄2 years, FEMA had run a 17 percent vacancy 

rate: “You know, now when you run a 15% vacancy rate and every person you detail means one more against that talent 

pool that you’ve got there, so a 2,300 person staff , when you slice that, that’s already sliced pretty thin. It obviously has 

an impact . . . instead of doing the top seven things, you’re only going to get to do the top four things or fi ve things right 

now.” Region VI was also greatly in need of staff . Th e investigation revealed memos written by Region VI Acting Director Gary Jones seeking to fi ll vacancy positions. In each of those memos, Jones wrote: “Region VI is one of the busiest 

Regions in the country with regard to disaster activity and has the potential for a number of catastrophic events including catastrophic hurricane along the Louisiana and Texas Coast, with southeast Louisiana being our biggest concern.” 

Several of these positions were for the response division. Gary Jones, memorandum to Ron Castleman, May 7, 2003. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0074-0000007 through 0000008; Gary Jones, memorandum to 

Ron Castleman, May 8, 2003. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0074-0000009 through 0000010.

65 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript pp. 58-59, 188-190.

66 U.S. Offi ce of Personnel Management (OPM), Report of the 2004 Disaster Temporary Employees Review, July 2004, 

p. 1. 

67 OPM, Report of the 2004 Disaster Temporary Employees Review, July 2004, p. 2. 

68 OPM, Report of the 2004 Disaster Temporary Employees Review, July 2004, p. 2. 

69 OPM, Report of the 2004 Disaster Temporary Employees Review, July 2004, p. 2. 

70 OPM, Report of the 2004 Disaster Temporary Employees Review, July 2004, p. 2. 

71 OPM, Report of the 2004 Disaster Temporary Employees Review, July 2004, p. 2. 

72 OPM, Report of the 2004 Disaster Temporary Employees Review, July 2004, p. 3. 

73 Hall interview, Nov. 28, 2005, pp. 70-71. Indeed, it is unclear if FEMA is working to implement such recommendations as Michael Hall, Acting Director of Human Resources suggested that implementation was not being handled by his 

offi ce, but instead through some disaster support initiatives, which are being led by Marie Sloan. Marie Sloan, however, 

said that the Human Resources Division was handling the recommendations. See also: Committee staff interview of 

Marie Sloan, Section Chief, Disaster Workforce, Response Division, FEMA, conducted on Mar. 1, 2006, transcript, p. 65.

74 Committee staff interview of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript p. 58.

75 Committee staff interview of Phil Parr, Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Region I, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005, 

transcript pp. 145-146.

76 Michael Brown, memorandum to various FEMA offi cials, Jan. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

DHS-FEMA-0079-0000093 through 0000094.

77 Patricia Stahlschmidt, e-mail to Edward Buikema and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 4:49 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0068-0000009 through 0000010. 

78 Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, p. 56. Some of the problems found in a 2002 assessment included: (1) the means to 

keep DAE’s informed on general information, training opportunities, policy and procedure updates is “spotty at best 

and nonexistent at worst”; (2) problems with the capabilities of the technology for the deployment system; and (3) issues 

with the training of the DAE’s. See also: Maj. Gen. John R. D’Araujo, Jr., “Disaster Workforce Assessment, 7 Jan 02 

through 8 Feb 02.” Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0095-0000287 through 0000291.

79 FEMA, Response Division/Recovery Division, “Disaster Workforce Redesign,” Apr. 10, 2004, p. 31. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0095-0000063.

80 FEMA, Response Division/Recovery Division, “Disaster Workforce Redesign,” Apr. 10, 2004, pp. 3, 31. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0095-0000035, 0000063.

81 Hall interview, Nov. 28, 2005, pp. 44-45.

82 Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, pp. 65-66. 

83 FEMA, “Monthly RAMP Report: Remedial Action Management Program,” May 15, 2005. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0095-0000590.

84 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 59.

85 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 59. 

86 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 59.

87 Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, p. 51.

88 FEMA, DAE Availability Report. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0055-0000210. See also: 

Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, p. 9; Hall interview, Nov. 28, 2005, p. 22; Hall interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 173.

89 Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, pp. 57-58; Hall interview, Nov. 28, 2005, pp. 24-25. 
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90 Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, pp. 8, 25, 61. 

91 Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, pp. 60-61. 

92 Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, pp. 60-61.

93 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 60-63 (explaining that response operations were a “diff erent animal . . . [T]hat 

takes special training. Th at takes teamwork ... [DAEs] only come on for actual disasters. I can’t bring them on just to do 

training and stuff ; or if they can, it’s hard to get them.”).

94 In an e-mail message to Michael Hall, Acting Director of Human Resources, on Aug. 31, 2005, Justin DeMello, 

FEMA FCO, writes, “Th e whole DAE system is broken ... we need to abandon it and move to something better . . . Hall 

responds “You are preaching to the choir my friend!!” Michael Hall, e-mail to Justin DeMello, Aug. 31, 2005, 10:50 a.m. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0069-0001283.

95 Committee staff interview of William Carwile III, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, 

FEMA, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript p. 59.

96 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 46.

97 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 59.

98 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 

2004, p. 40 [hereinaft er NRP]. See also: Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 11.

99 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 77; Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 11.

100 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 47-48, 111-112; Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 197-198. 

101 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 22-23.

102 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 191-192.

103 Federal Coordinating Offi cers, memorandum to Michael Brown, Jun. 30, 2004, p. 3. Provided to Committee.

104 Federal Coordinating Offi cers, memorandum to Michael Brown, Jun. 30, 2004, p. 3. Provided to Committee.

105 Federal Coordinating Offi cers, memorandum to Michael Brown, Jun. 30, 2004, p. 3. Provided to Committee.

106 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, pp. 151-152. Testimony of William Carwile III, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for 

Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005.

107 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 150.

108 NRP, p. 41.

109 Hall interview, Nov. 28, 2005, p. 76.

110 Hall interview, Nov. 28, 2005, p. 76.

111 Buikema interview, p. 113. Committee staff interview of Eric Tolbert, former Director, Response Division, FEMA, 

conducted on Dec. 1, 2006, pp. 53-54, 115. 

112 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 55-56.

113 FEMA, “Business Case, NDMS Section/Operations Branch/Response Division.” Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0098-0004751.

114 FEMA. “Business Case, NDMS Section/Operations Branch Response Division.” Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0098-0004751.

115 FEMA. “Business Case, NDMS Section/Operations Branch/Response Division.” Provided to Committee, fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0098-0004768. Committee staff interview of Jack Beall, Chief, National Disaster Medical System, 

FEMA, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript p. 7.

116 FEMA, “Business Case, NDMS Section/Operations Branch/Response Division.” Provided to Committee, fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0098-0004759.

117 Beall interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 11.

118 Committee staff interview of Capt. Art French, Deputy Chief Medical Offi cer, Disaster Medical Assistance Team 

PHS-1, National Disaster Medical System, FEMA, conducted on Mar. 2, 2006, p. 104.

119 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 40-41.

120 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 40.

121 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 40-41.

122 Written Statement of William Carwile III, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, 

FEMA, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 9.

123 MITRE Corp., Center for Enterprise Modernization, Initial Assessment of EP&R, Mar. 7, 2005, p. 3. Provided to 

Committee. Th e assessment stated “When the next terrorist events happen, ER&R will be called on operationally. Th e 
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[concept of operations] would be designed for this realize and put the elements in place for EP&R to be better positioned 

to carry the day.”

124 MITRE Corp., Center for Enterprise Modernization, Initial Assessment of EP&R, Mar. 7, 2005, p. 9. Provided to 

Committee; Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 189-90. 

125 MITRE Corp., Center for Enterprise Modernization, Initial Assessment of EP&R, Mar. 7, 2005, p. 12. Provided to 

Committee. 

126 Committee staff interview of Pat English, Chief of Procurement and former Acting CFO, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 

5, 2006, transcript pp. 17-18.

127 English interview, Jan. 5, 2006, pp. 17-18.

128 English interview, Jan. 5, 2006, p. 75.

129 English interview, Jan. 5, 2006, pp. 64, 81-84. Senior DHS leaders were briefed about this. “I know he [DHS Chief 

Procurement Offi cer Greg Rothwell] briefed senior management in DHS, the Under Secretary, the DepSec, and on that 

scorecard.”

130 English interview, Jan. 5, 2006, p. 18.

131 English interview, Jan. 5, 2006, pp. 31-33, 44-46.

132 English interview, Jan. 5, 2006, pp. 34-39, 43-44.

133 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 130. 

134 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 130. 

135 English interview, Jan. 5, 2006, p. 29.

136 English interview, Jan. 5, 2006, pp. 86-87.

137 Written Statement of Kathleen J. Tierney, Director, Natural Hazards Center, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, Mar. 8, 

2006, p. 5.

138 6 U.S.C. § 317.

139 Brown argued that the removal of preparedness functions from FEMA was a mistake and wrote then-DHS Secretary 

Tom Ridge in September 2003 that the shift left the agency without fi rst-responder or emergency-management funding 

to distribute – a factor Brown believes hurt FEMA’s ability to fulfi ll its responsibilities to help state and locals prepare for 

disasters. Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 80-81. 

140 Sec. Chertoff , letter to Congress, July 8, 2005 (as required by Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act).

141 Questions for the Record of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security 

Department’s Response, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 14.

142 Testimony of Bruce P. Baughman, President, National Emergency Management Association and Director, Alabama 

State Emergency Management Agency, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, Mar. 8, 2006.

143 Baughman, Senate Committee hearing Mar. 8, 2006. Eric Tolbert, Former Director of Response, agreed that splitting preparedness from response was a mistake. Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 49-50 (People observed that FEMA 

should have been better prepared, should have had a higher level of readiness, but then you strip the very people out 

who were responsible for conducting and planning exercises and establishing national standards. You strip them out 

and put them in another directorate that doesn’t even have accountability to the FEMA director or the undersecretary. 

In my opinion, it’s a huge mistake. You have to defi ne preparedness. Th at’s the problem. In my mind, preparedness is 

readiness, could be better defi ned as readiness. Th at’s investment in capability that’s going to respond to an event. Th e 

department’s defi nition of preparedness includes that but it’s also prevention. So a lot of the money in the homeland 

security funding programs, the grant funding, has shift ed from the initial two years of being almost exclusively the consequence capability over to preventing. So now there are huge investments in the prevention and the readiness posture 

funding has gone signifi cantly down.).

144 Dr. John Harrald, e-mail to Michael Alexander, Senate Committee staff member, Mar. 28, 2006.

145 Buikema interview, pp. 61, 68. 

146 Dr. John Harrald, e-mail to Michael Alexander, Senate Committee staff member, Mar. 28, 2006.

147 Questions for the Record of Herman B. Leonard, Ph.D., Professor of Public Management, John F. Kennedy School 

of Government and Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School, Harvard University and Arnold M. 

Howitt, Ph.D., Executive Director, Taubman Center for State and Local Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing 

on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, Mar. 8, 2006, p. 2.

148 Testimony of Herman B. Leonard, Ph.D., Professor of Public Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government 

and Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School, Harvard University, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, 
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Mar. 8, 2006.

149 “The Homeland Security Act of 2002.” (P.L. 107-296).

150 Testimony of Richard Skinner, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for 

Reform, Mar. 8, 2006.

151 FEMA, Federal Response Plan, Apr. 1999, p. 14.

152 NRP, ESF Annexes, ESF–v through ESF–vi.

153 NRP, p. 24.

154 Skinner, Senate Committee hearing, Mar. 8, 2006.

155 Testimony of Frank J. Cilluff o, Associate Vice President for Homeland Security and Director of the Homeland 

Security Policy Institute, George Washington University, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, Mar. 8, 2006.

156 Skinner, Senate Committee hearing, Mar. 8, 2006.

157 Testimony of David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, Mar. 8, 

2006.

158 Written Statement of Herman B. Leonard, Ph.D., Professor of Public Management, John F. Kennedy School of 

Government and Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School, Harvard University, before the U.S. 

Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations 

for Reform, Mar. 8, 2006.

159 Written Statement of Leonard, Senate Committee hearing, Mar. 8, 2006. 

160 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 137. 

161 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 145. 

162 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 144-146. For example, Former Under Secretary Brown produced a Mar. 16, 2004 

letter to DHS Deputy Secretary Admiral Loy where he stated that FEMA was struggling because of serious budget shortages. Brown wrote that “preparations for the future are being mortgaged or deferred indefi nitely.” Th e letter explained 

that OMB had designated two-thirds of FEMA’s budget as “non-homeland security” funds and that “non-homeland 

security funds” would be held to zero budget growth beginning in FY 2006. Th is paints a grim picture for FEMA’s future. 

Although solid targets have not yet been released by CFO’s shop, we have been told to expect to reprogram our FY 2006 

budget plans to absorb a cut of $100 million. ... It is quite clear that many if not most of our current un-funded requirements and shortfalls will have to be deferred in favor of more Homeland Security (terrorism) priorities.

163 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 141.

164 Paul Singer, “Brown’s Flood of Criticism,” National Journal, Mar. 10, 2006. 

165 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 143. 

166 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 138. Brown testifi ed that he had so many conversations with White House offi cials telling them that FEMA was not prepared for a catastrophe that it reached a point that his staff had to tell him to 

back off . 

167 Written Statement of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Environment and 

Public Works, Subcommittee on Clean Air, Climate Change and Nuclear Safety, hearing on FEMA Oversight, Sept. 24, 

2003, p. 4.