1

Filed 4/29 /14 Certified for publication 5/28/14 (order att a ched )

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

SPRAWLDEF et al., P laintiffs and Respondents,

v. SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATIO N AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION et al. , Defendants and Appellants, WASTE CONNECTIONS, INC., Real Party in Interest and Appellant

. A137619
(Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCS039863 )

Solano County and the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development
Commission approved permits to allow real party in interest Waste Connections, Inc. to expand the Potrero Hills Landfill , which is situated wit hin the secondary management
area of the Suisun Marsh. The permits were issued after years of environmental review and litigation under the California Environmental Quality Act (C EQA ; Pub. Resource Code, § 2100 et seq. )

. In th e instant writ proceeding , p etitioners contend the permit approvals violate the Sonoma County L ocal P rotection P lan and, specifically, a county ordinance , because the expansion will entail some rechannel ing of an ephemeral watercourse called Spring
Branch. Under that ordinance, mo dification of a marsh watercourse is allowed only if no2

“ reasonable alternative ” exist s . Petitioners claim the Commission could have, and should
have , approved a smaller expansion that would not imping e on the intermittent

watercourse

. The trial court ag reed, rul ing no substantial evidence support s the Commission’s determination that a smaller alternative is not economically reasonable

. T he Commission and real party have appeal ed

. We reverse.

F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND The Potrero Hills Landfill is located in the upl and, grassland area

— or “secondary management area”

— of the Suisu n Marsh. The landfill site is currently 320 acres in size

. The expansion , as proposed in 2003 , would allow an increase in fill height and also add
260 acres of adjoining property to the site

— extending the life of the landfill another 35
years. T he p roposed expansion w ould also have a number of environmental impacts, including impinging on and requiring the alteration of a portion of an intermittent

waterc ourse , Spring Br anch. Decades ago, relocation of another portion of Spring
Branch was deemed consistent with applicable laws, and permitted in connection with the
landfill

. County’s Approval of Permits
In early 2003, the county gave notice it would prepare an environm ental impact report (EIR) for the proposed landfill expansion. The draft EIR, published later that year,
concluded relocating a portion of the Spring Branch watercourse would not have a significant environmental impact if certain mitigation measures were adopted. 1 In part,
this conclusion was based on a finding the watercourse was then “devoid of riparian vegetation. ” The draft EIR also concluded the project was consistent with the Suisun

1 The draft EIR described Spring Branch as “[a]n ephemeral surface water runoff channel.”3

Marsh Preservation Act of 1977 (Pub. Res. Code , § 29000 et seq.) 2 and the Solano County Local Protection Plan.
The draft EIR evaluated one alternative to the proposed expansion project : increasing the height of the landfill , without increas ing the footprint

. This alternative was rejected because it would still requir e excavation of the adjacent land, would not appreciably reduce environmental impacts, and would, with a significantly reduced fill capacity, undermine the project goals. O ffsite alternatives were not considered in detail,
since any new site was l ikely to raise issues similar to those facing the proposed expansion

. Two years later, in September 2005, a fter receiving and responding to comments, the county certified a final EIR and issued a use permit and marsh development permit
for the proposed expansion (N os. U

- 88

- 33 and MD

- 88

- 09)

. Under the Suisun Marsh Preservation Act, a decision by a local government to issue a marsh development permit can be challenged in two ways

. One provides for
tiered agency , and then court review

. The challenger first appe al s to the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission , the body with ultimate responsibility for implementing the Act. ( §§ 29106, 29504 , subd. (a).) If the challenger remains aggrieved after the Commission’s decision on appeal , the challen ger “ may seek judicial
review

. . . by filing a petition for a writ of mandate in accordance with the provisions of Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure within 60 days after such decision or
action has become final. ” ( § 29602 .) The other avenue allows for direct review by the

courts. The challenger may seek “ judicial review of any decision made or any action taken pursuant to this division by a local government that is implementing the certified local protection program, or any component thereof , whether or not such decision or

2 All further statutory references are to the Public Resources Code unless indicated.4

action has been appealed to the commission, by filing a petition for writ of mandate in accordance with the provisions of Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure within 60 days after the decision or action has become final. ” (§ 29603.)
Petitioner David Tam took both paths.
The Prior “Protect the Marsh” Writ Proceeding In October 2005, Tam and others filed a writ proceeding in Solano County Superior Court , Protect the Marsh v. County of Solano (case N o. FCS026839)

. The first amended petition not only challenged the adequacy of the county’s EIR (first cause of action) it , in separate causes of action, sought to invalidate the marsh development permit as noncompliant with the county’ s general plan (second cause of act ion) and zoning regulations (third cause of action) , and the Suisun Marsh Preservation Act, Suisun Marsh
Protection Plan , and Solano County L ocal Protection Plan (fourth cause of acti on). Among other things, t he amended petition specifically alleged the a lteration of Spring
Branch was inconsistent with the l ocal p rotection p lan

. As required by section 29603 ( authoriz ing direct judicial review of a marsh permitting decision ) , Tam and the other
p etitioners in Protect the Marsh gave the Commission notice of the writ proceeding

. The
Commission could have sought to intervene (§ 29603) , but apparently did not.
The trial court issued its decision in the prior Protect the Marsh writ proceeding

on February 26, 2007. It ruled two findings in the EIR, unrelated to Spring Branch, were
not supported by subs tantia l evidence. It also faulted the EIR for not considering
alternat ive landfill sites outsi de of the marsh. The court rejected the remainder of the petitioners’ claims, also ruling that the modification of t he Spring Branch watercourse

was not inconsistent with any governing plan or regulatory requirement

. Th is writ decision was not appealed. During 2007 and 2008, the county revised, re

- circulated, and re

- certified the EIR.
T he revised EIR included a 50

- pa ge discussi on of, and reasons for rejecting, 20 non

marsh locations for a new landfill in lieu of expanding the existing landfill . The trial5

court determined the discussion and rejection of one of the locations was inadequate and
therefore refused to appr ove the county’s return to the writ

. T he county spent another year ma king additional revisions, and on November 3, 2009, the trial court approved its return to the writ. SPRAWLDEF , which had not been a party to the writ proceeding , purported to appeal th is order, but its appeal (N o. A127688)
was di s missed for lack of standing.
The Appeal to the Commission
The same month Tam and others filed the Protect the Marsh writ proceeding, he

a nd others also filed administrative appeal s of the marsh development p ermit with the
Commission. Although Tam did not contend the relocation of the Spring Branch

watercourse w as inconsistent with applicable state and local laws , other appe l l ant s did. In December 2005, the Commission concluded the appeals raised substanti al issues, triggering de novo review of the county’s approval of the marsh development permit . (See §§ 29523, 2952 4.) Accordingly, in addition to considering the existing
administrative permit record and a wide range of documents related to other agencie s’ analy sis and approval of the project , 3 the Commission undertook its own investigation of the project and retained a panel of scientists to prepare a report on ecological impacts to
the marsh . The nearly 200

- page report was completed in 2007

. Assessin g Spring Branch, the 2007 scientists’ report found the intermittent

watercourse had a bed and banks . It also found wetland vegetation within the watercourse, differing from the 2005 hydrology report prepared in connection with the

3 The Commission received copies of reports and analyses submitted to and generated by numerous governmental bodies related to the expansion project, including: the county’s EIR and related documents; reports to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on project alternatives, impacts, and mitigation measures; and voluminous materia ls from the Bay Area Quality Management District, California Department of Fish and Game, California Integrated Waste Management Board, California Regional Water Quality Control Board, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.6

county’s EIR and other r eports submitted to the Commission by real party

. The scientists’ report , which the Commission ultimately credited, recommend ed modified mitigation measures, including having the rechanneled watercourse more closely mimic the native one, employing better monitoring of water quality, and seeking preservation of similar areas within the Spring B ranch watershed. In light of the new information and proposals in connection with Spring Branch , the Commission asked real party to explore reducing the size of the expansion

. Th e size of the landfill was addressed in a 2009 report on alternatives real party prepared and submitted to the Army Corps of Engineers, whose approval was also required for the proposed e xpansion. The report was eventually filed with the
Co mmission and part of the universe of materials referenced by staff during t he administrative proceeding.
The 2009 report analyzed 16 off

- site alternatives and four on

- site alternatives and compared them to the proposed expansion which would increase the capacity of the landfill by about 41.43 million tons (61.6 million cubic yards) , at a unit cost of $2.66 per

ton ($110 million) , and extend the life of the landfill by 35 years. The first on

- site
alternative increase d only the height of the landfill. Th is would increase the capacity by only 8.04 million tons (12 million cubic yards) , at a unit cost of $3.04 per ton ($24 .7 million) , and add only seven years to the life of the landfill . A s had been noted in the EIR, this alternative would likely require e xcavation of soil surrounding the Spring
Branch watercourse, creating some environment al impacts in the area. The second on

site alternative called for a 112

- acre (rather than 167

- acre) expansion of the landfill footprint , without additional height. Th is would increase the landfill capacity by 10.08
million tons (15 million cubic yards) , at a cost of $8.54 per ton ($86 .1 million) , and add

a bout 8.7 years of life. It would avoid 0.2 acres of the Spring Branch watercourse , in addition to preserving other w etlands. A third on

- site alternative was similar , add ing 105 acres to the landfill footprint

. This would increase capacity by 6.8 million tons ( 10.17

million cubic yards) , at a cost of $1 1 .53 per ton ( $ 77 .2 million) , and extend the life of the landfill by a pproximately 5.9 years. It would not impact the Spring Branch watercourse.
A fourth on

- site alternative moved the expansion some 3 , 500 feet from the existing
landfill , resulting in two fill mounds, rather than one expanded mound. T his would
increase t he landfill capacity by 9.9 million tons (15 million cubic yards) , at a cost of $9.82 per ton ($97 million) and extend the life of the landfill by 8.6 years

. T his
alternative would not impact Spring Branch, but would impact other wetlands. The report rej ected each of these alternatives as too costly on a per unit basis , concluding any
alternative costing 50 percent more per ton than the proposed expansion was not

ec onomically practicable.
T he Commission , itself, engaged in direct dialogue , through nume rous e

- mail exchanges, with real party about a nother alternative that would not encroach on Spring
Branch

. This alternative would add 127 (rather than 167) acres to the landfill site, all north of Spring Branch

. 4 It would reduce expansion capacity by abo ut 30 percent , shorten the life span of the landfill by 10 years , and reduce overall gross revenues by 45 percent. There would not, however, be a commensurate reduction in investment costs

. B ecause such costs are largely fixed, there would only be a 10 pe rcent reduction in costs

. Nor was there a direct correlation between the percentage re duction in the acreage (24 %) and reduction in capacity ( 30%) due to “the nature of landfill engineering” and, specifically, that the land around Spring Branch is capable of supporting a greater volume
of landfill t han other areas. Real party therefore advised the Commission the economic
consequences of the 1 27

- acre alternative will be “ ‘ of such a magnitude that the business decision to expand cannot be justified. ’ ” 5

4 The Commission’s report mistak enly refer s to th is alternative as involving 117
acres . It is clear from the record, however, the alternative involved adding 127 acres to the landfill footprint.

5 Given the discussion of this 127

- acre alternative, petitioners are incorrect in assertin g “ [ t ] here was no specific alternative described” by the Commission.8

In answer to further Commission inquiries, real party explained its profit margins were typically around 9 percent , giving it only a small margin of error for operating new

or expanded sites. Accordingly, without capacity for 54 to 59 million cubic yard s of fill in the expansion area, the project would not be “finan cially viable.” Real party declined

to provid e further financial detail, viewing the information as confidential.
The Commission concluded the 127

- acre alternative was not economically

rea listic

. Its rejection of this reduced

- sized alternative , however, was not based solely on economics

. The Commission also pointed out : (1) even with a smaller expansion plan, Spring Branch would need a number of man

- made modifications to protect it from natural erosion and landfill impacts; and (2) rechanneling the watercourse would actually improve water quality at the marsh. The Commission c oncluded: “Based upon the information available to the Commission, the information and statements made by [ real party ] in response to staff requests to evaluate the feasibility of a smaller landfill expansion project, and the information provided in the [draft EIR] that with mitigation measures, diverting Spring Branch . . . would not have a significant environmenta l impact on surface water quality, the Commission finds that restricting the project to avoid Spring
Branch . . . is not a reasonable alternative

. . . .”
T he Commission did , however, on the basis of community input and for aesthetic

reasons , reject the i ncreased landfill height the county had allowed. Accordingly, t he height, in both the new and old portions of the landfill , would remain capped at 220 feet above sea level, unless real party could demonstrate the fill w ill not be visible from preset

vanta g e points. This modification reduce d the capacity of the planned expansion by approximately 10 percent

. On October 21, 2010, the Commission voted 15

- 4 to reject the administrative appeals , and determined that the landfill expansion, as modified by the Commission, wa s consistent with the Suisun Marsh Preservation Act and the Solano County Local
Protection Plan. Pertinent here, t he modified marsh development permit allow ed for9

replacement of portions of the Spring Branch watercourse with a 6,500

- foot und erground pipeline and a five

- foot deep, 30

- foot wide surf ace channel.
This Writ Proceeding Two months later, on December 17, 2010, Tam and SPRAWLDEF filed the
instant writ p roceeding

— separate from the , by then , already resolved Protect the Marsh proceed ing

— in San Francisco Superior Court pursuant to section 29602 , challenging the Commission’s approval of the marsh development permit and, specifically, its decision to
allow alteration of the Spring Branch watercourse. Petitioners c laim no substantial
evi dence supports the Commission’s determination there are no reasonable alternatives
that would preserve Spring Branch and the Commission thereby violated Solano Co unty Ordinance section 31

- 300, which prohibit ed filling natural channels in the marsh unless

t here are no reasonable alte rnatives. Four months later, the San Francisco Superior Court transferred the case to Solano County

. O n No vember 29, 2012 , the same court that decided the P rotect the Marsh writ proceeding ( and ultimately approv ed the EIR and reject ed claims about the modification of Spring Branch) issued a writ of mandate on the sole ground the Commission’s
determination that the 127

- acre , reduced

- size alternative wa s not economically
reasonable wa s not supported by substantial evidence

. The court did not address any other issue, including whether there wa s evidence in the record the alternative wa s unreasonable for other reasons. D ISCUSSION The Suisun Marsh Act and Standard of Review The Legislature created the San Francisco Bay Conservat ion and Development Commission in 1965 and gave it planning and permitting autho rity over projects affecting the San Francisco Bay. ( People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Development Commission v. Town of Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533, 539 ; Me in v. San Francisco Bay Conservation etc. Com. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 727, 732 .) The Commission ’s10

jurisdiction over the bay includes “all sloughs; ‘marshlands’ extending from a seaward line of ‘mean high tide’ of the bay to a landward line five feet above mean sea level; ‘tidelands’ lying between mean high tide and mean low tide; and ‘submerged lands’ lying below mean low tide.” ( Littoral Development Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation
etc. Com. (19 94) 24 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1053; Gov. Code §§ 66604, 6 6610 .)
The Suisun Marsh Preservation Act is intended to protect valuable natural
resources within the marsh and invests the Commission with ultimate authority over its implementation . (See §§ 29002, 29003, 29005, 29106, 29200, 29504, subd. (a).) Under
the a ct, t he marsh consists of “primary” water

- covered areas and lowland grasslands , and upland “secondary” areas. (§§ 29101

– 29103.) For developments i n secondary areas

— such as the landfill expansion at issue here

— a marsh development permit must be obtained “ from the local government having jurisdiction over the land in which the proposed development is to occur.” (§ 29502 , subd. (a) .)
A local government may issue a marsh development permit “ only if it finds that the proposed development ” is consistent with or “in conformity with” the ad opted “local protection program

. ” (§ 29503 , subd. (a) .) The local protection program is define d as “those provisions of general or specific plans; ordinances; zoning district maps; land use regulations, procedures, or contro ls; or any other programs, procedures, standards, or controls that are adopted, undertaken, or carried out by local governments, districts, or the Solano County Local Agency Formation Commission in and adjacent to the marsh, are submitted by the county to the commission . . . , and meet the requirements of, and implement, this division and the Suisun Marsh Protectio n Plan at the local level.” (§ 29111.) As we have discussed, the act permits challenges to permitting decisions to be brought b y way of a “ a p etition for a writ of mandate in accordance with the provisions of
Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure .” (§ 29602.) “Under subdivision (b) of
Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, an abuse of discretion is established and a writ11

of mandate sh ould issue if an agency either failed to proceed in the manner required by law, did not support its decision with adequate findings, or if its findings are not supported by the record.” ( Save San Francisco Bay Assn. v. San Francisco Bay
Conservation etc. Com. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 908, 919 ( Save San Francisco Bay ) .) The scope of our review of a challenged permitting decision is the same as that of the trial court. ( See Ross v. California Coastal Com. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 900, 921

– 9 22 ( Ro ss ); Advanced C hoices, Inc. v. State Dept. of Health Services (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1661, 1669.)
An “agency’ s findings and actions are presumed to be supported by substantial
evidence. [Citation s .] A person challenging an administrative determination bears the
burd en of showing the agency’ s findings are not supported by substantial evidence. [Citatio ns.] When reviewing the agency’ s determination, the court examines the whole record and considers all relevant evidence, including that which detracts from the
adminis trative decision.” ( Ross , supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p

. 921.) “ ‘Although this task involves some weighing to fairly estimate the worth of the evidence, that limited weighing does not constitute independent review where the court substitutes its own
findi ngs and inferences for that of the Commission. Rather, it is for the Commission to weigh the preponderance of conflicting evidence, as [the court] may reverse its decision only if, based on the evidence before it, a reasonable person could not have reache d the conclusion reached by it.’ ” ( Id. at p. 922 ; see also Save San Francisco Bay , supra , 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 930 , fn. 7 [substantial evidence test generally applies to Commission’s findings on challenge under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 ].) 6

6 As a preliminary matter, the county, which filed an amicus brief in support of the Commission, asserts SPRAWLDEF lacks standing to challenge the Commission’s approval of the modified marsh development permit. While SPRAWLDEF did not appeal the county’s approval of the permit to the Commission, it nevertheless participated in the administrative proceeding by filing a letter in support of the appeals. It subsequently joined with Tam t o challenge the permit in the instant writ proceeding, and no party has ever challenged its standing to do so. Given SPRAWLDEF’s participation12

Substantial Evidence Supports the Commission’s Action
While petitioners have cite d to a variety of provisions of the Suisun Marsh
Preservation Act and the county’s L ocal P rotection P rogram, at the end of the day, their challenge to the Commission’s a pprov al of a marsh development permit is grounded on

one Solano County ordinance, section 31

- 300. 7 Under s ection 31

- 300 , a grading
ordinance , “every effort must be made to preserve natural channels and drain a ge ways” ( § 31

- 300, subd

. (n)) and, more concretely, that filling, grading, or excavating watercourses “shall be allowed only where no reasonable alternative is available, and where allowed, shall be limited to the minimum amount necessary” ( id. , subd

. (o)).
Petitioners claim no substantial evidence suppor t s the Commission’s finding that the 127

-

acre alternative is not economically reasonable

. In arguing whether, from an economic perspective, there wa s “no reasonable alternative” under section 31

- 300, petitioners and respondents alike invoke CEQA and its

c oncept of whether an alternative is or is not feasible. 8 “ F easible” is defined in CEQA
as “ capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into account economic, environmental, social, and technological fa c tors

. ” (See § 21061.1 .) Under CEQA, governments are to choose “feasible” alternatives and “feasible” mitigation measures to lessen the significant environmental impacts of

in the administrative proceeding and the language and context of section 29602, we conclude it has standing. No question has been raised as to Tam’s standing.

7 At oral argument, the Commission suggested petitioners did not invoke this ordinance in the trial court. That is incorrect. Petitioners expressly cited the ordinance in their trial court memorandum of p oints and authorities, and the Commission, in turn, addressed the ordinance in its opposition memorandum. The Commission had cited and applied the ordinance during the administrative proceedings and referenced it in the marsh development permit.

8 Befor e the Commission, as well, real party cited to CEQA’s feasibility language in discussing the proposed expansion and the 127

- acre alternative. No party offered an alternative method of analysis in either the administrative proceedings or the trial court. Nor have they done so on appeal.13

projects. ( §§ 21002, 21081. ) While t he Marsh Preservation Act defines “feasible ” identically to CEQA (§ 29115) , it does not , itself, appear to employ the term in any substantive way

. We conclude employing CEQA’s definition of “feasible , ” and the CEQA case law concerning economic infeasibility, is an appropriate approach since the te rm embraces the concept of reasonableness. (See Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 565, 574 [ under CEQA, “ ‘ [t]he statutory requirements for
consideration of alternatives must be judged against a rule of reason ’ ” ]; Ca lifornia
Native Plant Soc iety v. City of Santa Cruz (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 957, 1001 [ “ feasibility ” under CEQA encompasses “ ‘ “ desirability ” to the extent that desirability is based on a reasonable balancing of the relevant economic, environmental, so cia l, and technological factors ’ ” ].) “The ‘feasibility of

. . . alternatives must be evaluated within the context of the proposed project. “The fact that an alternative may be more expensive or less profitable
is not sufficient to show that the alternativ e is financially infeasible. What is required is
evidence that the additional costs or lost profitability are sufficiently severe as to render it impractical t o proceed with the project.” ’ [Citations.] Thus, when the cost of an
alternative exceeds the cost of the proposed project, ‘it is the magnitude of the difference that will determine the feasibility of this alternative.’ ” ( Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 866, 883.) Ultimately, “ the question is

. . . whether the marginal costs of the alternative as compared to the cost of the proposed project are so great that a reasonably prudent [person] would not proceed
with the [altered project].” ( Uphold Our Heritage v. Town of Woodside (2007)
147 Cal.App.4 th 587, 600 ( Woodside ).) For example, in Woodside the proposed project was replacing an old , historic
residence with a new one. ( Woodside , supra , 147 Cal.App.4th at p p. 5 91, 5 98.) The town rejected two rehabilitation alternatives as infeasible based on their cost

— between14

$4.9 million and $10 million

— without obtaining any evidence about the cost of constructing the proposed new home. Without any comparative numbers , it was not possible to determine the feasibility of the rehabilitation alternatives . ( Id

. at p. 599.) However, t he conclusion was different for two other alternatives calling for relocation
and renovation of the old residence in addition to building a new home. T he appellate court held a $5 million price tag for relocation and renovation , a part from the cost of the
new home , “supports a reasonable inference that these alternatives are not economically feasible.” ( Id. at p. 599 , fn. 6.)
Woodside does not require an y particular economic analysis or any particular kind of economic data, but r equires generally “some context” t hat allows for economic comparison

. ( Woodside , supra , 147 Cal.App.4th at p p

. 600

– 601 .) The appellate court suggested that t o reject the rehabilitation

- only alternative, for example, it m ight have been “ sufficient to show that the cost of rehabilitating the existing house would be significantly more than the cost of building a new home of a quality appropriate to the area, or that the cost of the proposed alternative is so great that the property owner could never expect t o recover the investment on resale. ” ( Id. at pp. 600

– 601.) The court declined to limit the ways in which economic infeasibility could be shown, noting they
could be numerous and var y depending on the circumstances. ( Id. at p. 601 [“ It is not necessary t o identify every conceivable means of establishing the lack of feasibility

. . . . ”].)
In Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1167,
1180 ( Goleta Valley ) , the county agency approv ed a 400

- room hotel over an alternative

c alling for a reduced

- size, 340

- room hotel. Although the administrative record contained estimates of annual revenue, infrastructure costs, and overall costs for the proposed 400

-

room project , it did not contain these figures for the 340

- room alternative. ( Id. at
pp. 1180

– 1181 & fn. 3.) Thus, a s in Woodside , meaningful comparison was not possible

. The appellate court held the approving authority could not simply surmise that project15

costs per room would increase to the point that proceeding with the alte rnative would be economically impractical . ( Goleta Valley , at p. 1181.)
In contrast , Sierra Club v. County of Napa ( 2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1490 ( Sierra
Club ) , concluded the approving authority had substantial evidence to reject alternatives as
economicall y infeasible. In Sierra Club , a winemaker’s letter explaining the “ ‘ project is the only place on the property to construct a facility of the size and layout that we must have to meet our fundamental business needs of operational efficiency and consolidat ion, which is the justification for t his large and expensive project ’ ” was a “persuasive argument” a reduced development alternative was not feasible. ( Sierra Club , supra , 121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1506 , 1508.) “ Although the record certainly could have inc luded more evidence on the point, ” the court concluded there was sufficient evidence to support rejection of smaller alternatives . ( Id. at p. 1 508 .) “ It is of no matter that the evidence of economic infeasibility here was far less detailed than [in other cases]” as “[t] he questi on is simply whether the agency’ s finding was su pported by substantial evidence

. ” ( Ibid. )
The record before the Commission here is at least commensurate with that in
Sierra Club

. With respect to the 127

- acre alternative the Com mission identified in 2010 , real party submitted a chart comparing salient data both for the landfill expansion as proposed and the posited alternative . This showed the alternative would result in a 30 percent reduction in capacity and a 45 percent reduct ion in revenue. Real party also explained why the reduction in capacity figure w as not, as a matter of perce ntages, commensurate with the 24 percent reduction in acreage

— because, given “the nature of landfill engineering , ” the land around Spring Branch is capable of supporting a greater
volume of landfill than other areas. Real party also explained why ther e would not be a correlative 45 percent reduction in costs , but only a 10 percent reduction

— because many capital costs would remain fixed or vary only slightly with the size change, and, further,
there would be a significantly reduce d time period to recover costs given the reduced life
of the landfill.16

Accordingly, real party did not simply baldly assert the 127

- acre alternative was not economically f

easible. It provided comparative figures and explained why an expansion that did not have 54 to 59 million cubic yards of capacity w as not fi nancially
viable. Thus, real party provided the Commission with “some context” to permit the
Commission to assess the economic feasibility of the 127

- acre alternative. ( Woodside , supra , 147 Cal.App.4th at p p

. 600

– 601.) In addition, t he 2009 report real party prepared for the Army Corps of Engineers was part of the administrative record. While the Commission did not specifically refer to the 2009 report in its decision rejecting the appeals and approving a modified marsh development permit, there is no dispute the report was part of the record and included within the materials referenced by staff

. We must therefo re assume it was within the universe of information the Commission considered. ( See Environmental Protection Information Center v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection (2008) 44 Cal.4th 459, 517 .) As we have discussed, this report examined , i n considerable detail, four other on

site alternatives involving lesser changes to the Spring Branch watercourse

. The report
compare d , side by side, the per unit cost, capacity, and l ife of the landfill , for the proposed expansion and the alternatives. T he costs per ton of the alt ernatives ranged from $3.04 to $11.53 , compared to $2.66 for the project as proposed. The capacities
range d from 10.1 million cubic yards to 15 million cubic yards, compared to 61 million cubic yards for the project as proposed. And the lif e of the landfill ranged from 5.9 to 8.7 years, compared to 35 years for the project as proposed. The disparit y in these figures is

so great it amply supports the conclusion a reduced

- size alternative of the magnitude necessary to a void impli cating Spring Branch wa s not economically feasible. Thus, the record in this case is not close to that in Woodside and Goleta Valley in
which the financial data was so l acking no economic comparison at all could be ma d e between the project as propose d and the alternatives. Such comparison is possible here,17

and a reasonable person could have reached the conclusion the Commission reached

. That effectively ends our inquiry. ( See Ross , supra , 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 922 [we

“ ‘ may reverse [the Commission ’s] decision only if, based on the evidence before it, a reasonable person could not have reached t he conclusion reached by it’ ”].) There is no basis for the trial court’s view that real party had to produce significantly more detailed
economic data show ing net profit figures. As we have discussed, the courts have eschewed requiring any particular economic showing, and have, instead, recognized that what is sufficient will depend on the particular context. In this case, t he Commission had an adequate re cord before it to fairly determine the smaller alternatives were not economically reasonable. There is no merit to petitioners’ assertion the economic information in the record about the landfill expansion as proposed and the alternatives, should be disco unted or ignored because it was provided by real party. The Commission could have, of course, rejected the evidence, had it found it not credible. I t was also within the province of the
Commission , however, to accept the information as accurate and relev ant

. (See San Franciscans Uphol ding the Downtown Plan v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 656, 684 [agency may rely on allegedly “self

- serving” study]; Mahdavi v. Fair Employment Practice Com. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 326, 340 [“self

- se rving statements by University employees” were evidence].) Furthermore, despite petitioners’ contrary assertion, the Commission did not reject
the reduced

- size alternative on economic grounds alone. If an al ternative is infeasible for

non economic reason s, such as a failure to achieve project goals, it can be rejected on that basis without any economic feasibility analysis. (See Save Round Valley Alliance v. County of Inyo ( 2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1462 , fn

. 13 .) All of the on

- site
alternatives exami ned in the 2009 report prepared for the Army Corp of Engineers would18

reduce future capacity below that required by state regulations

. 9 T he 127

- acre alternative, in turn, also involved a significant reduction in capacity , shortening the anticipated lifespa n of the landfill by a decade , and would still have require d a number of
modifications to the Spring Branch watercourse. Ultimately, the Commission stated it
had reviewed all the “ information available to [it] , the information and statements made by [ real party ] in response to staff requests to evaluate the feasibility of a smaller landfill expansion project, and the information provided in the [draft EIR] that with mitigation measures, diverting Spring Branch . . . would not have a significant environment al impact on surface water quality” and concluded “ restricting the pro ject to avoid Spring Branch

. . . is not a reaso nable alternative.” Substantial record evidence supports this manifestly
multi

- faceted de termination.
Given our conclusion that substan tial evidence supports the Commission’s decision and the trial court’s judgment invalidating it must therefore be reversed, we do not address other arguments made by the Commission, real party , and amici , or the responses to those arguments by petitioners. This includes the real party’s assertion
section 29409 exclusively governs the proposed expansion. This statute provides: “Notwithstanding the policies of the protection plan, the local protection program may not preclude the future development of a new solid waste disposal site in the Potrero Hills if it can be demonstrated that the construction and operation of solid waste facilities at that site would not have significant, adverse ecological or aesthetic impacts on the marsh.” (§ 29409.) We likewise do not address petitioners ’ newly fashioned response to this argument

— that “alternatives or no alternatives, the ‘substantial adverse ecological

9 Under applicable regulations, a county’s waste management plan “shall demonstrate that there is a countywide or regionwide minimum of 15 years of combined permitted disposal capacity through existing or planned solid was te disposal and transformation facilities or through additional strategies.” (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 18755(a).) The greatest lifespan of any of the alternatives addressed in the 2009 report was 8.7 years.19

impacts’ to Spring Branch Creek prohibit[] the current project

. ” Petitioners never
advanced such a claim in t he trial court ( their petition focused on the allegedly flawed alternatives analysis) , and to the extent they may be assert ing it now as a n independent ground for invalidating the Commission’s decision they have forfeited it. ( See Today’ s Fresh Start, Inc . v. Los Angeles County Office of Educ ation (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 211,
215 [ such an “omission” by a petitioner attempting to support a trial court ’s issuance of a writ “would be grounds to consider the issue forfeited”]; A Local & Regional Monitor v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 630, 648.) In any event, the Commission ’s finding of no substantial adverse impact s, as mitigated and modified after input from scientists and the community , is supported by substantial evidence. We also do not
addre ss whether the instant writ proceeding is barred by the doctrine of res judicata based on the trial court’s unappealed judgment in the Protect the Marsh w rit p roceeding . We
note, however, that while Tam was a party to that proceeding, SPRAWLDEF was not an d thus would not be subject to this preclusion doctrine

. Finally, we do not address the County of Solano’s argument , in its amicus brief, that Ordinance section 31

- 300 has been misinterpreted by the parties and trial court and, as a mere grading ordinance , does not
authorize or contemplate consideration of project alternatives, but only alternative
construction methods in constructing an already

- ap proved project.20 D ISPOSITION The judgment of the trial court is reversed , and the court is directed on remand to

enter a judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate. Appellants to recover costs on appeal.

_________________________ Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________ Margulies, Acting P. J.

_________________________ Becton, J. 

 Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.1

Filed 5/28/14 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

SPRAWLDEF et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v. SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION et al., Defend ants and Appellants, WASTE CONNECTIONS, INC., Real Party in Interest and Appellant. A137619 (Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCS039863)

ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT: The opinion in t he above

- entitled matter filed on April 29 , 2014, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. After the court’s review of requests under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120, and good cause established under rule 8.1105, it is hereby orde red that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports.

Dated:

___________________________ Margulies, J.2

Trial Judge: Honorable Paul Lloyd Beeman

Trial Court: S o lano County Superior Court

The Smith Firm and Kelly T. Smith for Plaintiff s and Respondents

. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, John A. Saurenman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christiana Tiedemann , Supervising Deputy Attorney General for Defendant s and Appellant s

. Beveridge & Diamond, Lily Chinn , Gar y J. Smith, Zachary M. Norris, and James B. Slaughter and Law Offices of Scott W. Gordon and Scott W. Gordon for Real Party in Interest Waste Connections, Inc.
Somach Simmons & Dunn, Richard S. Deitchman and Nicholas A. Jacobs for Suisun Resource Conserva tion District as Amicus Curiae on behalf Defendants and Appellant s

. Astor & Kingsland and John Kelly Astor for California Refuse Recycling Council as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellant s

. Robert Paul for Napa

- Vallejo Waste Management Auth ority as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellant s

. Dennis Bunting, County Counsel, Azniv Darbinian, Assistant County Counsel and James W. Laughlin, Deputy County Counsel for the County of Solano as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and App ellants.