Slip Op. 07-58

UNI TED STATES COURT OF I NTERNATI ONAL

TRADE

________________________________________ : 

### S AN 

### V I CENTE 

### C AMAL U 

### SPR DE 

### RI ,

: Plain tif

f , v. : 

### U NI T E D 

### S TATES , : Court No. 02-00811 Defendant , and : 

### C AA DES 

### S I NAL OA , 

### A

. 

### C ., et al., :

De fe nd an t- In te rv e no rs . :

________________________________________ [P laintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Ag ency Re c o r d is d e n ie d ; D eter

mination of U.S. Depar

tment of Commerce suspending antidumping investig ation is sustained.] Dated: Apr il 17, 2007

Crowell & Moring L L P (Matthew P. J aff e, Robert A. L ipstein, a

nd Gra ce W. L awson), f

or Plaintiff. Pe te r D. Ke isl e r, As sis tant Att or ne y Ge ne ra l; J e ann e E. Da vid so n, Di re c tor , a

nd Pa tr ic ia M. McCarthy , Assistant Director , Commercial L itigation B ranc h, Civil Division, U.S. Department of J ustice (Ke n t G. Hu ntington); Augusto A. Guerr a and Ca rrie O wens, Of

fice of the Chief Counsel fo r Impo rt

Ad min istratio n, U. S. D e pa

rtme nt o f C omm e rc e , O f C ouns e l; f or De fe nd ant. OP IN ION RI DGWAY, J udg e: I n this action, Plai n t i ff San Vicente Cama lu SP R de RI(“SVC”) contests the 2002 Suspension Agr eeme nt betwee n the U.S

. Depa rtment of Commerce and ce rtain g rowe rs/exporters of fr esh tomatoes fr om Mex ico. See Suspension of Antidumping I nvestig ation: Fr es h Tomatoes Fr om Mex ico, 67 F ed

. R eg. 77,044, 77,045 (De c. 16, 2002) ( “Notice of 2002 SuspensionCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 2

De fe nd ant- I nte rv e no rs Con feder a c ion de As oc ia c ion e s d e l E sta do Sin a loa , A .C. 1 (“CAAD ES”), Consejo Ag ricola de Ba ja California, A .C., Asociacion Me x icana de Productore s de Hortalizas de Inverna dero, A .C., Union Ag ricola Reg ional de Sonora, P ro ductore s de Horta liz as Ag ree ment”). SVC contends that the 2002 Suspension Ag ree ment is unla wful, bec ause the timing of that ag ree ment was not consist ent with the 1997 amendme nts to the Comm erc e De partment regulations gove rning such ag ree ments. Pending be fore the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion fo r J u d gm ent on the Ag ency Record a nd

su pp or tin g br ie fs , w hic h urge that th is m a tte r b e re mand e d to Com me rc e wi th i ns tr uc tio ns to immediately

resci n d the 2002 Suspension Ag ree ment and to issue the F inal Deter mination in the und er l y ing a

ntidumping investig ation forthwith. See ge nerally Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of San Vicente Camalu’s Motion for J udg ment on the Ag ency Record ( “Pl.’s Br ief” ); Reply Memorandum in Response t o Def endant’ s Memorandum in Opposition to P laintiff’s Mo tio n f or Judg me nt o n th e Ag ency Re c or d ( “ Pl. ’s Re ply

B ri e f” ); Pla int if

f’ s Surr e ply

B ri e f i n Response to Def

endant’ s Surreply

(“Pl.’s Surre ply

Br ief” ). The Gove rnment opposes Plaintiff’s motion. The Gover nment disputes SVC’s funda mental premise, the a

pplicability

of the re g ulations as amende d in 1997. Acc ording to the Gover nment, the neg otiation of the 2002 Suspension Ag ree ment was subject to – and complied with – Commerce ’s 19 96 re g ulatio ns , w hic h s e t a more re la xed tim e ta ble fo r s us pe ns ion

a g re e me nts , a

nd re qu ir e d o nly that any such ag ree ment be conc luded bef ore the deadline f

or issuance of the age n cy ’s Fina l Deter mination in the underlying antidumping investigation. See g e ne ra lly Def endant’ s Memorandum in Opposition to Pl aintiff’s M o t i o n for J udg ment on the Ag ency Record ( “De f.’s Br ief” ); Def

endant’ s Surreply

in Response to Plainti ff’ s Reply Br ief (“ Def

.’s Surreply

Br ief” ). 1Court N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 3

Fr ut as y L egu mb re s , an d

C o n fe d er ac i o nNa ci o n al d e P ro d u ct o re s d e H o rt al i z as ar e t rade associa tions and si g natories of the 2002 S uspension Ag ree ment. See Notice of 2002 Suspension Agr eeme nt, 67 Fe d. Reg . at 77,048. De fe nd ant- I nte rv e no rs fi le d n o b ri e fs in thi s mat te r; no r did the y pa rt ic ipate in o ra l argume nt, or otherw ise play

an ac tive role in the litigation. The pre cise nature of the Mexi can g overnme nt’s p ro h i b ition is not detailed in the re cord. 2 Howeve r, the e x istence of the prohibition has been a lluded to by both SVC and the Governme nt, and does not appea

r to be in dispute. I n addition, SVC’s Amended Complaint avers that it was “ notified direc tly by the Gover

nment that SVC will be st opped from exporting fr esh tomatoes to the United States unless it signs the suspension ag ree ment.” See Transc ript of Ora l Arg ument (“Tr .”) at 25-26, 47-48, 83; Amende d Complaint ¶¶ 12-13. For the re asons set for

th below, SVC’s Motion for Judgment on the A g ency Record is de nied,

and the Com me rc e De pa

rtme nt’ s 2 00 2 s us pe ns ion of the re s u m e d a nt i d u mpi nginv e sti g a tio n o f f

re sh tomatoes from Mexico is sustained.

I. Bac kgr ound The g rava

men of SVC’s complaint is that – some eleve n y ear s after the Commerce Depa rtment beg an its a

ntidumping investigation of fre sh tomatoes from Mexico – the ag ency has y et to issue its Final Deter

mination in that investi g ation. The investig ation has been twice put on “ hold” for y ear s, pursuant to suspension ag ree ments betwee n Commerce and growe rs/exporters of Mexican tomatoes, to which SVC has not been a party . Moreove r, bec ause SVC i s n o t a p ar ty to the 2002 Sus pe ns ion

Ag re e me nt n owin p la c e , th e Me xica n g ov e rnme nt wi ll no t pe rm it SV C to e xpor t it s produce to the United States. I f the 2002 Suspension Ag ree ment i s re scinded a nd Commerce’ s 2 F ina l D e te rm inatio n is su e s in the re su me d a

nti dumpi nginv e sti g a tio n (w ith fi nd ing s c omp ara ble to those in the Preliminary

Deter mination), SVC ex pects that it would ben efit from a relatively lowCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 4

dumpi ngmarg in ( a s c omp are d to tho se of oth e r M e xica

n g ro we rs /e xpor

te rs ), and pr e su ma bly wo uld be a ble to c a pit a lize on

that f a c t and e njo y a c omp e tit ive a dv anta g e in t he U. S. m ark e t. Th e anti dumpi nginv e sti g a tio n o f f re shtoma toe s f

ro m Me xico wa s in iti a te d in mid -A pr il 1996. See I n i t i at i o n o f A n t i d u mp i n g Du t y

I n v es t i gat i o n : Fr es h T o m at o es fr o m M ex i co , 6 1 Fe d

. R eg. 18,377 (April 25, 1996). I n mid-May 1996, the I nternational Trade Commi ssion (“I TC”) made an aff irmative preliminary injury deter mination. See Notice of

Preliminary

Deter mination of Sales at L ess Than Fa ir Value and Postponement of Final Deter mination: F resh Tomatoes Fr om Mex ico, 61 Fe d. Reg

. 56,608, 56,608 (Nov. 1, 1996) ( “Notice of AD Pre liminary Deter mination”) (noting I TC aff irmative pre liminary

injury deter mination )

. B ut, s e v e r a l w e e k s befor e Commerce was due to issue its P reliminary

Deter mination in the antidumping investig ation, Commerce a nd cer tain Mexi can tomato gr ower s/ex porters – not includi n g S VC

–initialed a proposed suspe nsion ag ree ment. See Notice of AD Preliminary

Deter mination, 61 Fed. Reg . at 56,608. As the name sugges t s , a suspension ag ree ment is an ag ree ment betwee n Commerce a nd fore ign e x porters a ccountingfor “ substantia lly all” U.S. imports of the subject mer chandise ,

“ su sp e nd ing ” an an tid

ump ingor

c ounte rv a ili ngdu ty

inv e sti g a tio n b a se d o n s pe c if ic c omm itm e nts by the fore ign sig natories. In essenc e, a suspe nsion ag ree ment is “a uniqu e form of settlement ag ree ment: a settlement ag ree ment to which the complainant – that is, the domestic industry – is not a sig natory .” See Be thlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 25 CI T 519, 520 & n.5 , 5 21 -23 , 1 46 F. Supp. 2d 927, 928-29 & n.5, 930-32 (2001) (“B ethlehem Steel I ”) ( citing S en at o r H ei n z , 1 2 5 C o n g. R ec . 2 0 , 1 6 8 (1 9 7 9 ), an d gen er al l y o u t l i n i n g p ro v i s i o n s o f su s p en s i o n agr ee m en ts t at u t e)

. Al t h o u gh they are intended to be use d only rar ely , Congr ess has re cog nized that, i n ap p ro p ri ate c ases, suc hCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 5

Se e als o H. Rep. No. 96-317 at 65 (adva ntag es of suspension a g ree ments i n clude “ the 3 expenses saved be cause of prompt settlement of a case ” and “the cer tainty of prompt re lief”) ; S. R ep. No. 96-249 at 71, reprinted in 19 79 U. S.C. C.A .N

. 38 1, 45 7 (s us pe ns ion a g re e me nts “ pe rm it r a pid and prag matic resolutions of antidumping duty case s”); Statement of Administrative Act i o n for Trade Ag ree ments Act of 1979, H.R. Doc . No. 96-153, Part I Iat 420, reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 665, 689 (su s p e n s ion ag ree ments have “ the value of settling the c ase quic kly ” and “ the cer tainty of prompt re lief”)

. ag ree ments may be im portant t o both importers and the domestic industry as a “ means of a chieving the re medial purposes of

the [antidumpi ng ] law in as short a ti me as possible and with a minimum expenditure of re source s by al l p ar t i es involved.” H . Rep. No. 96-317 at 63 (1979) ( qu ote d in Be thlehem Steel I , 25 CI T at 522, 146 F . Supp. 2d at 931). 3 The c ontroversy

in this case fo cu s es n o t on the 1996 Suspension Ag ree ment, but on the second suspe nsio n agre ement – the 2002 Suspension Ag ree ment – and on the a pplicability

of the 19 96 ve rs ion

of the pe rt ine nt r e g ulatio ns v e rsu s those reg ulati o n s as am ended in 1997. L ike the suspension ag ree ment statute (both then and now ), the re g ul at i o n s in place in 1996 pe rmitted Co mm e r c e to e n te r

in to a s u s p e n s io na g r e e me n t a s late a s th e d e a d li n e f o r is s u an c e o f

it s f inal de te rm inatio n ( pr ov ide d th a t in te re ste d p art ie s h a d 3 0 d ay s’ a dv ance no tic e and an o pp or tun ity to comment on the propose d suspens i o n agr ee ment). See 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(e) ; 19 C.F.R. § 353.18 (1996). B ut the amende d regulations gr eatly acc eler ate the sc hedule f or neg otiation of suspension

a g re e me nts

. As amende d in 1997, Comm erc e’s r eg ulations require that any suspension ag ree ment be conclude d ear ly in an investi g ation, to max imiz e the potential r esourc e saving s associate d with the ag ree ment, and – in par

ticular – to avoid the “enormous burde n on parties a nd on the Depa

rtment [of Com merc e]” inhere nt in the simul taneous c onsideration of a prop o s ed agreement a

nd theCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 6

Commerce’ s Notice of Propose d Rulemaking further noted that adva

ncing the t imeline for 4 consideration of proposed suspension ag ree ments would “re duce bur dens on all par ties by eliminating the ne ed to file c ase br iefs, re buttal briefs, a nd to participate i n a hearing , if a suspension ag ree ment is acc epted.” See Antidumping Duties; Counterva iling Duties : Notice of Proposed Rulemaking , 61 Fe d. Reg . at 7316. prepa ration of a

final dete rmination. See Be thlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 25 CI T 895, 906 n.24, 916 & n.42, 159 F . Supp. 2d 730, 742 n.24, 751 & n.42 (2001) ( quoting An tid ump ingDutie s; Countervailing Duties: Notice of Propose d Rulemaking , 61 Fe d. Reg . 7308, 7316 (F eb. 27, 1996) ; 4 citing Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties: Final Rule, 62 Fe d. Reg . 27,296, 27,312 (May 19, 1 9 9 7 )) ( “B ethlehem Steel I I ”). Spec ifically , the amende d regulations require that Commerce g ive notice of a proposed suspension ag ree ment no later than 30 day s after issuance of

its preliminary deter mination, and that any

such ag ree ment be conc luded no later than 60 day s afte r t he pre liminary deter mination. 19 C.F.R. § 351.208 (1998). On Oc tob e r 2 8, 19 96 , Co mme rc e fi na lize d an d s ig ne d th e 19 96 Sus pe ns ion Ag re e me nt w ith g rowe rs/exporters ac counting for substantially all U.S. imports of fresh tomatoes f rom Mexico. See Suspension of Antidumping Investig ati o n : Fre sh Tomatoes fr om Mex ico, 61 Fe d. Reg . 56,618 (Nov. 1, 1996). SVC was not a pa rty to that ag ree ment. Id

. That same da

y – October

28, 1 9 9 6 – was the de adline for issuance of

Commerce’ s Preliminary

Deter mination in the antidumping investig ation. L ike the I TC before it, Com merc e too

m ad e an af

firmative Pre liminary

Deter mination, concluding that imports of fre sh tomatoes from Mexi co we re be ing sold in the United States at less than f air va lue. See Notice of

AD Preliminary Deter mination, 61 Fed. Reg . at 56,608. I n its Pre lim ina

ry De te rm inatio n, Com me rc e fo un d tha t – o f t he six ma nd a tor y re sp on de ntsCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 7

Th e statut e re qu ir e s th a t anti du mpi ngme a sure s – in c lud ingsu sp e ns ion a g re e me nts , a s w e ll 5 as antidumping order s – be re viewed at l ea s t ev ery five y ear s, to determine whe ther the me asure s sh ou ld be te rm inate d (“ suns e tte d” ). Whe re the me a sure a t iss ue is a su sp e ns io n agre e me nt, Commerce a

nd the I TC use these “sunset” re views to ana ly ze whether

termination of the suspende d investigation “would be likely to lead to continuation or re curr ence of dum ping .

. . and of material injury .” 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(1) (2000). See ge nerally Comm. for Fa irly Trade d Vene zuelan Cement v. United States, 372 F.3d 1284, 1286- 87 (F ed. Cir. 2004). in the antidumping investigation – SVC had the lowe st dumping marg in, by far . SVC’s marg in was calc ulated to be 4.16%

. The marg ins of the other f

ive mandator

y responde nts rang ed fr om 10.26% to a hi gh o f 1 8 8 .45%; and the “ All Others” r ate wa s calc ulated at 17.56%

. See Notice of AD Preliminary

Deter minatio n , 61 Fe d. Reg . at 56,615. B ut the Preliminary Deter mination was

ov e rs ha do we d by the 19 96 Sus pe ns ion Ag re e me nt, wh ic h b ro ug ht t he anti dumpi nginv e sti g a tio n to

an a br up t and pr otr a c te d h a lt. F a st f or wa rd fi ve y e ars , to Oc tob e r 2 00 1, wh e n Co mme rc e pu bli sh e d n oti c e of its int e nt t o conduct a five y ear “sunset” r eview of

the suspended a

ntidumping investig ation. See Not ice of I nitiation of Five- Yea

r R eview [ of S uspended Antidumpi ng I nvestig ation of Fresh Tomatoe s From Mexi co], 66 Fed. Reg . 49,926 (Oc t. 1, 2001). 5 Commer c e p u

b li s h e d it s Pr e li mi n ar

y Re s u lt s in

th e s u n s e t r e v ie w in

late Ja n u ar

y 2 0 0 2,

c on c lud ingthat “ te rm inatio n of the su sp e nd e d anti dumpi ng du ty inv e sti g a tio n . . . w ou ld b e lik e ly to lead to continuation or re curr ence of dumping .” See Preliminary Results of Five- Yea r S u n s et R ev i ew o f S u s p en d edAn t i d u mp i n g Du t y

I n v es t i gat i o n : Fr es h T o m at o es Fr o m M ex i co , 6 7 Fe d

. R eg. 4 2 37, 4237 (Jan. 29, 2002) (“Notice of Sunset Review Preliminary Results”). And, once ag ain, Commerce f

ound that – of the six mandatory responde nts in the antidumping investig ation – SVC had the lowe st dumping marg in, by fa r. S VC ’s marg in was ca lculated to be 4.16% . The otherCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 8

Wit h those withdrawa ls, the 1996 Sus pension Ag ree ment no longe r met the statutory 6 require ment that such ag ree ments cover “substantially

all” U.S. imports of subject mer chandise , requiringtermination of the a g ree ment – which, in turn, re sulted in t h e termination of the sunset revie w as we ll. See No tic e of I nte nt t o T e rm inate Sus pe ns ion Ag re e me nt & Sun se t Re vie w, a nd to Resume AD Investig ation, 67 Fe d. Reg . at 43,279. mandatory

responde nts’ marg ins rang ed fr om 10.26% to 188.45%; and the “ All Others” ra t e wa s calc ulated at 17.56%

. See Notice of Sunset Review Preliminary Results, 67 Fed. Reg . at 4238. As the due date for issuanc e of Commerce’ s Final Results in t he sunset re view appr oache d, Com me rc e ann ounc e d th a t it wa s e xten din g the de a dli ne to l a te A ugus t 20 02 . In tw o s e pa rate

se c tio ns of

the re le va

nt F e de ra l Re g ist e r n oti c e , Co mme rc e a ttr ibute d it s n e e d f or a dd iti on a l ti me to the “ong oing r e-n egoti ation of the [1996] suspension ag ree ment on tomatoes from Mexico.” See Fr esh Tomatoes f

rom M ex ico: Ex tension of Time L imit for Final Results of Five -Ye ar Sunset Review, 67 F ed. Reg . 35,099 (May 17, 2002). S ev er al we ek s l at er , i n

l at e M ay 2 0 0 2 , M ex i c a n g r o w e r s / ex p o rt er s ac co u n t i n g fo r a l ar ge perc entag e of U .S. imports of fresh tomatoes notified Commerc e that they wer e withdra wing from the 1996 Suspension A g ree ment. The eff ect of those withdrawa ls would be to terminate the 1996 Suspension Agr eeme nt (as of July 30, 2002), and – in turn – to terminate the sunset re view of the suspended investig ation (thus avoiding a fin al deter mination in the sunset review)

. See F re sh To ma toe s F ro m Me xico : No tic e of I nte nt to Te rm inate Sus pe ns ion Agre e me nt, I nte nt t o T e rm inate the Five -Year Sunset Review, I ntent to Resume Antidumping Investig ation, and Reque st for Comments on the Use of Updated I nformation, 67 F ed. Reg . 43,278 (June 27, 20 0 2 ) (“ No t i ce of I ntent to Terminate Suspension Ag ree ment & Sunset Revie w, and to Resume AD I nvestig ation”). 6 I n light of the impendi n g terminations of both the 1996 Suspension Ag ree ment and theCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 9

The I TC followed Commerce ’s lead, terminating its sunset review a nd reope ning its injury 7 investigation as part of t he re sumed antidumping inve stigation. See Fr esh Tomatoes F rom Mexico: R es u mp t i o nan d

S ch e d u l i n g o f

t h e F i n al P h as e o f A nAn t i d u mp i n g I n v es t i gat i o n , 6 7 Fe d

. R eg. 56,854 (Sept. 5, 2002). SVC sought judicial re view of the deter minations of Commerce a nd the I TC terminating (or, altern at i v el y , d eclining to reope n) their sunset r eviews. H oweve r, that ac tion was dismissed as untimely

. See San Vicente Camalu SPRde RIv. United States, 29 CI T ____, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1373 (2005). related sunset revie w, Commerce prepa red to r esume the antidumping inve stigation that had been stalled since 1996. B ut, acknowle dg ing “ the sig nificant lapse of time since i n itiation of the investigation,” Commerce invited c omments as to whether it should obt ain “updated information,”

or wh et h er it should complete the investigation based on the re cord that it had compiled in 1996. Id ., 67 F e d. Re g . at 43 ,2 79 -8 0; se e als o id ., 67 Fe d. Reg . at 43,278 (Summary ). And, in a se ction of the F eder al Reg ister notice c aptioned “A pplicable Statute and Re g ulations,” C o m m er ce noted: “[U]nl ess otherw ise indicated, a ll citations to Depa rtment of Commerce (De partment) r eg ulations ref er to the r eg ulations codified at 19 CF R part 353 (1996).” Id ., 67 Fe d. Reg . at 43,278. On July 30 , 2 00 2, the e ff

e c tiv e date of

the te rm inatio n of the 19 96 Sus pe ns ion Ag re e me nt, Commerce of

ficially resumed the antidumping investig ation that it ha d beg un in J anuar y 1996. See Fr esh Tomatoes F rom Mexico: Notice of Ter mination of Suspension Agr eeme nt, Termination of Sunset Review, and Resumption of Anti dumping I nvestig ation, 67 Fe d. Reg

. 50,858 (Aug . 6, 2002) (“N otic e o f

Re s u mp ti o n o f AD Investig ation”). I n acc ordanc e with the re g ulations, the investigation 7

was re sumed as if Commerce had published its a ffirmative Preliminary Deter mination on that date. Id ., 67 Fe d. Reg

. at 50,860. Thus, as Commerce ’s notice indicated, the dea dline for issuanc e of the ag ency ’s Fina l Deter

mination in the resumed investig ation was De cembe r 12, 2002. Id ., 67 Fe d.Court N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 10

I nr e s p o n s e to Co mm e r c e ’ s r e qu e s t f o r c o mm e n ts a s to w h e th e r it s h o u ld o b ta in u p d a te d 8 information to complete the a ntidumping investigat ion, SVC st rong ly urg ed the a g ency

to rely on the exist ing a dminist rative r ecor d. See C o m m er ce Memorandum re : Resumed Antidumping I nvestig ation on Fr esh Tomatoes f rom Mexic o; Respondent Selection and Per iod of I nvestig ation (Jul y 30, 2002) (attached to Pl.’s Surreply Br ief); Tr . at 32-33, 35, 37, 55-56, 79, 95- 96. Reg . at 50,860. Even as the antidum ping investigation was b eing resumed, howeve r, t here wer e si g ns that – at least in some quar

ters – h o p e fo r a suspension ag ree ment had not fa ded. F or example, the No tic e of Re su mpt ion

of the An tid ump ing I nv e sti g a tio n a dv ise d: “ On July 3, 20 02 , th e Ca lif

or nia Tomato Commis sion filed letters of acc ession from twenty -four Ba ja California g rowe rs/exporters of fr esh tomatoes, asse rting that these grow ers/exporters re prese nt new sig natories a nd, when a dded to the exis ting Baja California signatorie s, repr esent 94.8 perc ent of exports of fresh tomatoes fr om Ba ja California to the United States.” Id ., 67 Fe d. Reg . at 50,859. Ultimately , howeve r, Commerce

c on c lud e d tha t, wit

ho ut the pa

rt ic ipatio n of the sig nator ie s tha t ha d g ive n n oti c e of the ir wi thd ra wa l, the 1996 Suspension Ag ree ment wo u l d n o l ong er satisfy the statutory

require ment that it cover “substantially

all” imports of subject mer chandise

. Id

. I n a vict o ry fo r S VC , t h e N o t i ce o f R es u mp t i o no f t h e A n t i d u mp i n g I n v es t i gat i o nan n ounced 8 that – rathe r than soliciting updated infor mation for use in the r esumed investig ation – Commerce had d e c id e d to r e ly o n “ th e o r ig in a l in f o r mati o n s u

b mi tt e d b y th e o r ig in a l r e s p o n d e n ts for the orig inal period of inve stigation.” Id ., 67 Fe d. Reg . at 50,858-59. Commerce s i milarly confirme d that the Period o f I n v es tigation for the re sumed antidumping inve stigation was Marc h 1, 1995 throug h Fe bruar

y 29, 19 96. Id . F ina lly , li ke the la te June 20 02 no tic e of Com me rc e ’s int e nt t o

re su me the inv e sti g a tio n, the se c tio n o f t he F eder al Re g ist e r n oti c e c a pti on e d “ Ap pli c a

ble Statut eCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 11

and Regul ations” noted: “[U]nless otherwise indicate d, all citations to Depar tment of Commerce (De partment) regulations ref er to the r eg ulations codified at 19 CF R part 353 (1996).” Id ., 67 Fe d. Reg . at 50,858. As amende d in 1997 , C o m m er ce’ s regulations would require that the Mexican g rowe rs/exporters submit a proposed suspension ag ree ment to Commerce no later than 15 day s after the J uly 30, 2002 deeme d date of issuance of

Commerce’ s Preliminary Deter minati o n (that is, by Aug ust 14, 2002); that Commerc e and the Mexi can g rowe rs/exporters initial a proposed suspension ag ree ment and g ive notice to all intere sted par t i es n o later tha n 30 day s after

the Preliminary Deter mination (by

Aug ust 29, 2002); and that a suspe nsion ag ree ment be fina liz ed and sig ned no later tha n 60 day s afte r the Preliminary Deter mination ( by September 29, 2002). See ge nerally 19 C.F.R. § 351.208 (1998). But, a s the resumed antidumping investigation g ained momentum in the day s and we e k s f

o ll o w in g Ju ly

3 0 , 2 0 0 2 , th o s e d a te s f

le w b y w it h n o s ig no f

a n e w s u s p ension

a g re e me nt. Acc ording to SVC, “absent notice of a possible suspension on Au g ust 29 or notice of a n

a c tua l su sp e ns ion

on Se pte mbe r 2 9, [the c omp any ] proc e e de d to de fe nd its e lf vig or ou sly

a g a ins t

an t i d u mp i n g c h ar g e s a tane n o r m o u s c o s t

. . . i nb o t h t i m e a n d m o n e y . ” P l

. ’ s B r i e f

a t5

. In pa rt ic ula r, SVC e mph a size s th a t it “ de dic a te d sig nif ic ant re so ur c e s, and inc ur

re d c on sid e ra

ble c os ts to defe nd its questionnaire responses during three Commerce- order ed verifications.” Pl.’s Brief at 16 (f oo tno te omi tte d) ; se e als o id . at 5-6 (f ootnotes with citations omit ted). On Novembe r 12, 2002, SVC learne d for the f irst time that a new proposed suspension

a g r e e m e n th a d

b e e ni n i t i a l e d

b y C o m m e r c e an d

c e rt a i nM e x i c ang r o w e r s / e x p o rt e r s a f e w d a ysCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 12

ear lier, on Nove mber 8, 2002. See Pl.’s Br ief at 4 (footnote with citation omitted); Suspension of Antidumping Investig ation: Fre sh Tomatoes Fr om Me x ico, 67 Fe d. Reg . 77,044, 77,045 (De c. 16, 2002) (“ Notice of

2002 Suspensi o n Agr ee ment”) ( noting date on which pr oposed ag ree ment was initialed); Commerce Me morandum to All I ntere sted Parties (Nov. 12, 2002) (A.R. Pub. Doc. 30A ), and attac hed Ag ree ment P roposal – 11/08/ 2002. The fir st pag e of the proposed suspension ag ree ment stated that Commerce and the sig natory produce rs/exporters wer e entering into the suspension ag ree ment p u rs uant to the 1996 re g ulations (specific ally , 19 C.F.R. § 353.18 – “Suspension of Investig ation”). Id

. Acc ording t o S VC , C ommerce should have take n action at the time the ne w proposed suspension ag ree ment was initialed “to re duce the burdens imposed on SVC by the ong oing antidumping investig ation.” See Pl.’s B rief at 16. SVC e mphasizes that – even af ter the pr oposed suspension ag ree ment was announced – the m eter kept running, as its costs “continued to gr ow as SVC ha d to fi le fi rs t a c a se br ie f, the n a re bu tta l br ie f a t Com me rc e ; and g ro w, a s SV C ha d to fi le first questionnaire response s, then a prehe aring brief, at the U.S. I nternational Trade Commi ssion.” Id . at 16-17 (f

ootnote omitted). The 2002 Suspension Ag ree ment was fi n al i z ed an d signe d on Dec ember 4, 2002 – eig ht day s b e f o r e th e d e a d li n e f

o r is s u an c e o f

Co mm e r c e ’ s F in a l D e te r mi n a ti o nin

th e r e s u me d antidump i n g i n v est igation. See Notice of 2002 Suspension Agr eeme nt, 67 Fed. Re g . at 77,045 (stating date that ag ree ment was signe d). Commerce’ s notice of the suspension issued on Dec ember 10, 2002, and wa s rec eived by SVC on Dec ember 11, 2002. Id ., 67 Fe d. Reg . at 77,046 (indicating date of notice); Pl.’s Br ief at 4 & n.10 ( noting date of SVC’s re ceipt of notice ). The notice wasCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 13

published in the Fe dera l Reg ister – tog ether with the text of the 2002 Suspension Ag ree ment – on Dec ember 16, 2002. Both wer e stated to be ef fec tive as of that date. See Notice of 2002 Suspension Ag ree ment, 67 Fe d. Reg

. at 77,044 (noting eff ective da te of suspension), 77,048 ( noting e ffe ctive date of 2002 Suspension Agr eeme nt). L ike Commerce ’s two prior notice s in the resumed investigation, the Fe dera l Reg ister notice

ann ounc ingthe 20 02 Sus pe ns ion Ag re e me nt n ote d th a t, “ un le ss o the rw ise ind ic a te d, a ll c itatio ns to Depa rtment of Commerce (De partment) regulations r efe r to the regulations codified at 19 CF R part 353 (1996).” See No tic e of I nte nt t o T e rm inate Sus pe ns ion Agreem ent & Sun se t Re vie w, a nd to Resume AD Investig ation, 67 Fe d. Reg . at 43,278; Notice of Resumption of AD I nvestig ation, 67 Fe d. Reg . at 50,858; Notice of 2002 Suspension Agr eeme nt, 67 Fed. Re g . at 77,045. The Notice of the 2002 Suspension Ag ree ment further explained that – as a result of the new suspension ag ree ment – Commerce was “adjusting the security require d from sig natories to zero.” Se e id ., 67 Fe d. Reg . at 77,046. Howe ver, f or non-sig natories like SVC , “[t] he sec urity rate s in effe ct

. . . rema in as published in the Preliminary Deter mination.” Id ., 67 Fe d. Reg . at 77,046, 77,048.

II. Ana lys is As a thr e sh old

ma tte r, the Go ve rnme nt i nv ok e s ju sti c ia bil ity and re la te d p ri nc ipl e s, a s w e ll as the doc trine of e x haustion of a d m i n istrative re medies, and a rg ues that this action must be dismiss ed. See ge nerally Def .’s Br ief at 5-6, 9-11; Def .’s Surreply Br ief at 2-4, 5-14. But see Pl.’s Reply Br ief at 11-14; Pl.’s S urre ply Br ief at 11-21. The p ar t i es’ dispute on the me rits focuses on w hether Commerce’ s Dec ember 2002 suspension of the re sumed investigation was i n ac co rd an ce with law. As noted a bove, theCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 14

Gover nment maintains that – like other aspec ts of the re sumed investigation – Com merc e’s de cision to suspend that i n v estig ation was prope rly subject to the 1996 re g ulations, and the timetable for suspension ag ree ments specifie d there in. See ge nerally De f. ’s B ri e f at 6- 7, 12 -1 7; D e f. ’s Sur re ply B ri e f at 4- 5, 14 -2 6. I n c on tr a st, SVC a sse rt s tha t the su sp e ns ion wa s unla wf ul. Ac c or din g to S VC , any suspension of the res umed investig ation should have be en pursua nt to the regulations as amende d in 1997, wh i ch sig nificantly advanc ed the de adlines for the neg otiation of suspension ag ree ments for the ve ry

purpose of

sparingparties the kind of t ime and money that SVC ex pended in the course of the re sumed investigation here. See ge nerally Pl. ’s B ri e f at 1- 2, 9, 15 -2 1; P l.’ s Re ply Br ief at 2-11, 14-15; Pl.’s Surreply Br ief at 2-11, 21-23. The pa rties’ re spective a

rg uments are detailed a

nd analy zed below.

A. J usticiability

and Relate d Threshold I ssues I n it s su rr e ply br ie f, the Go ve rnme nt ra ise s for the fi rs t ti me va ri ou s th re sh old

c ha lle ng e s to SVC ’s pr os e c uti on

of thi s a c tio n. Th e Go ve rnme nt a rgue s th a t th e c a se mus t be dis mis se d b e c a us e it presents no “justiciable c ase or controve rsy ”; bec ause SVC lacks “a rea l inter est” or “stake in the outcome of this litigation”; a nd beca use SVC’s “cha lleng e is now m o o t ” s i n ce “the Court ca nnot g rant a ny relief or provide a

ny redr ess.” See De f. ’s Sur

re ply B ri e f at 5- 7; se e als o id . at 2. But see Pl.’s Surreply

Br ief at 11-16. The Gove rnment fur ther c laims that “SVC has failed to es tablish a harm or injury

for whic h the Court may

g rant re lief.” See De f. ’s Sur re ply B ri e f at

7- 8; se e als o id

. at 2-3. But see Pl.’s Surreply Br ief at 17. Specifica lly , the Government emphasizes that “SVC argues that, had Commerc e used the shorter de adlines [for neg otiation and completion of a suspension ag ree ment] prescribed by the 1997Court N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 15

regulations, SVC would have been provided the opportuni ty to cea se participation in the resumed investigation [ by

late September

2002, at the latest], saving it . . . tim e an d re s o urce s.” De f.’s Sur re ply B ri e f a t 5. Th e Go ve rn me nt a sse rt s that th is a c tio n is the re fo re moo t, b e c a us e “ [r]e g ard le ss of

. . . th e fi na l ru lin g up on the me ri ts of thi s c a se , SVC ha s a lr e a dy un de rg on e the ‘a lle g e d h a rm ’ at issue by

participatin g in the resumed inve stigation. OrderingCommerce to ter minate the Suspension Agr eeme nt and issue a F inal Deter mination will not reme dy

this ‘alleg ed har

m.’” De f.’s Surreply Br ief at 6. Th e Go ve rnme nt f

urt her c on te nd s th a t “ the ha rm a lle g e d b y

SVC is t he a lle g e d b ur de n it incurre d by

having to file ca se brief

s and to respond to other

parts of the resumed inve stigation.” Def .’s Surreply Br ief at 8. Acc ording to the Gover nment, that burden “ fail[s] to establish a har m or injur y for whic h the Court may g rant re lief,” be cause “the a dditional business ex penses of having to participate in an ag ency proce eding is not harm, and thus cannot be reme died by the Court.” Id

. ( citing National Ha

nd Tool Corp. v. Uni t ed S tates, 14 CI T 61, 66-68 (1990) ; Nissan Motor Corp. v. United States, 10 CI T 820, 823-24, 651 F . Supp. 1450, 1454 (1986)). The Gove rnment’s a

rg uments are cloake d in the lang uag e of justiciabili ty and re lated doctrines, but they

are predic ated on a mischara cter ization or oversimplification of SVC’s case and the re lie f that SVC se e ks . T ru e , SV C argue s th a t “ a bs e nt n oti c e of

a po ssi ble su sp e ns ion

[in A ug us t and September 2002], [i t] proce eded to defe nd itself vigor ously ag ainst antidumping c harg es at a n enormous cost to itself in both time and money ” throug h the autumn of that y ear . See Pl. ’s Sur re ply B ri e f at 13 . H ow e ve r, c on tr ary to t he Go ve rnme nt’ s im

pli c ati on , S VC is n ot t

ry ingto r e c ou

p it s

sunk c os ts i nc ur

re d in the c ours e of the re su me d a nti dumpi nginv e sti g a tio n. No r a re tho se sunk

c os tsCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 16

the so le (m

uc h le ss t he pr ima ry ) i nju ry of wh ic h SV C c omp la ins

. A s s e c ti o n I a

b o v e n o te s , th e g r a v a me n o f SV C’ s c a s e is th a t

– s ome eleve n y ear s after Commerce be g an its antidumping investig ation of fr esh tomatoes fr om Mex ico – the ag ency has y et to issue its Final Deter

mination. See , e.g. , Tr. at 15-16; Pl.’s Brief at 1; Amended Complaint ¶¶ 24- 28 & Pray e r f

or Re lie f ¶ 4. An d th e re me dy

that SV C se e ks is a

ru lin g re mand ingthi s matte r t o Commerce w ith inst ructions to immediately resc ind the 2002 Suspension Agr eeme nt and to issue its Final Determination in the under ly ing a ntidumping investig ation “for thwith.” See , e.g. , Pl.’s Br ief at 9, 11, 17-21 & n.59; Pl.’s R eply Br ief at 14-15; Pl.’s Surre ply Br ief at 14-17, 22-23; Tr. at 15-16; Amende d Complaint at P ray er f or Relief. The re scission of t he 2002 Suspension Ag ree ment appar ently would open the door for SVC to export i ts tomatoes to the Unite d S t at es; and Commerce ’s issuance of an a ffirmative Final Deter mination would, in turn, “require the completio n o f t he [I TC’s] final injury investigation.” Pl. ’s Sur re ply B ri e f a t 16 ; see also Pl.’s Brief

at 8 (“ Commerce’ s actions cost SVC its right to a timely injury deter mination”); Tr. at 15-16 (issuance of Commerce ’s Fina l Deter mination is “very important” to SVC, because SVC seeks “a final deter mination by the [ I TC] as to whethe r or not ther e is inju ry ” ; “th e re ha s n e ve r b e e n . . . [a] f ina l in jur y de te rm inatio n” in t

his c a se ); No tic e of

I nte nt t o T er m i n at e S u s p en s i o nAgr ee m en t& S u n s et R ev i ew , an d t o R es u m e AD I n v es t i gat i o n , 6 7 Fe d

. R eg.

a t 43 ,2 80 (n oti ngtha

t “ I f t he De pa rtme nt m a ke s a

fi na l a ff ir ma tiv e de te rm inatio n, the n th e I TC i s schedule d to make its final deter mination conce rning injury within 45 day s after

publication of the Depa rtment’s final de termination”); Notice of Resumption of AD Invest i gat i o n, 67 Fe d. Reg . at 50,860 (same) ; Tr. at 25-26, 47- 48, 83 (discussing Mexi can g overnme nt’s prohibition on ex port ofCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 17

tomatoes by

non-sig natories o f t h e 2 0 02 Suspension Agr eeme nt); Amended Complaint ¶¶ 12- 13 (same)

. F ina lly , if

the I TC mad e an a ff

ir ma tiv e F ina l Inju

ry De te rm inatio n, an a

nti dumpi ngdu ty order would issue. See Notice of I ntent to Terminate Suspension Ag ree ment & Sunset Review , and to Re sume AD I nvestig ation, 67 Fe d. Reg

. at 43,280 (noting that, “[i] f both the De partment’s a nd the I TC’ s f

ina l d e te rm inatio ns are a ff ir ma tiv e , th e De pa

rtme nt w ill iss ue an a

nti dumpi ngdu ty order ”); Notice of Resumption of AD Investig ation, 67 Fe d. Reg . at 50,860 (same ). I n s ho rt , th e re is nothin g tha t is the le a st b it “ a

bs tr a c t” a bo ut t his a c tio n. As SVC blu

ntl y pu ts it, g ra nti ngSVC the re lie f t

hat it se e ks he re ult imate ly “ may or may no t re su lt i n a n a nti dumpi ngdu ty order ”; but, at a minimum, in the near te rm, it would “ce rtainly result in something .” Pl. ’s Sur re ply Br ief at 16 (empha sis added) . The Gove rnment’s a rg uments as to justiciabilit y and re lated doctr ines

are thus lacking in merit.

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies I n the alter

native, the Gover

nment argues that this a ction should be dismiss ed bec ause SVC did not object to Comm erc e’s application of the 1996 re g ulations at the ag ency level, and thus fa iled to e x haust its a dminist rative reme dies. See ge nerally Def .’s B rief at 5-6, 9-11; Def .’s Surreply

Br

. at 3-4, 8-14. Requiring exhaustion even in a discretionar y , non-jurisdictional context is g ener ally sound po lic y , b e c a

us e it a llo ws the a g e nc y to a pp ly its e xpe rt ise , to c or

re c t its ow n mi sta

ke s, and to c omp ile an ade quate r ecor d to support judicial review , advanc in g t h e d u al purposes of pr otecting ag ency authority and promoting judicial eff iciency

. See Woodford v. Ng o, ____ U. S. _

__ _, __ __ , 1 26 S.Court N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 18

Ct. 2378, 2384-86 (2006) ( discussing two ma in purposes of doc trin e o f exhaustion); Richey v. United States, 322 F.3d 1317, 1326 ( Fe d. Cir. 2003) (exhaustion “serve s ‘the twin purposes . . . of protec ting a dminist rative a g ency authority and promoting judicial eff iciency ’”) ( qu o t i ng Sandvik Steel Co. v. United States, 164 F.3d 596, 600 (F ed. C ir. 1998)). Acc ording ly , in actions revie wing de te rm inatio ns in a

nti dumpi nginv e sti g a tio ns , th e Cou rt of I nte rn a tio na l Tr a de re qu ir e s li tig a nts to exhaust administ rative r emedies “ wher e appr opriate.” 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d) (2000). A s d i s c u s s e d i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l b e l o w , S V C c o n t e n d s t h a t i t c o u l d n o t h a v e o b j e c te d to Commerce’ s application of the 1996 regulations at t he age ncy level, because it had no timely notice that the ag ency

was a pply ing those regulations. Thus, acc ording to SVC, t he doctr ine of e x haustion has no re levanc e her e. See Pl.’s Reply Br ief at 11-12; Pl.’s Surre ply Br ief at 17-20. S VC further

argue s th a t, e ve n if

is c ha rg e d w ithno tic e of

Com me rc e ’s a

pp lic ati on of

the 19 96 re g ulatio ns , it s failure t o exhaust it s administrative reme dies is excusable under two e x ceptions. See Pl. ’s Re ply Br ief at 12-14; Pl.’s S urre ply Br ief at 20-21.

i. Notice Poi nti ngto C omm e rc e ’s June 20 02 and Au g us t 20 02 F e de ra l Re g ist e r no tic e s, a s w e ll a s to Commerce’ s November

12, 2002 Memorandum ( and the attached pr oposed suspension ag ree ment), the Gover nment argues that “SVC was not only place d on notice of Commerce’ s use of the [1996]

re g ulatio ns . . . , it a lso wa s a ff or ded a ful l oppo rt

un ity to c omm e nt” on

the ir a pp lic a bil ity . T hu s,

a c c or din g to the Go ve rnme nt, a lth ou g h “ SVC wa s pr ov ide d mul tip le op po rt un iti e s to rai se i ts

conce rns re g ardingthe use of the [1996] regulations” at the ag ency level, SVC failed to do so. Def.’ s Br ief at 5-6, 10-11; Def

.’s S urre ply

Br ief at 3, 9-11; Tr. at 31 (a rg uing that SVC was put on noticeCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 19

I n addition, the final sentenc es of both the June 2002 and the August 2002 Fede ral Reg ister 9 no tic e s st a te d th a t Comme rc e ’s de te rm inatio ns we re be ing “ iss ue d an d p ub lis he d in a c c or da nc e wi th . . . 19 CFR 353.15 (1996)” – a provision of the 1996 r eg ulations. See No tic e of I nte nt t o T e rm inate Suspension Agr eeme nt & Suns et R eview, and t o Resume AD I nvestig ation, 67 Fe d. Reg . at 43,280; Notice of Resumption of AD I nvestig ation, 67 Fe d. Reg . at 50,860 (c iting same provision of 1996 regulations, and using vir tually identical languag e). by F e de ral Re gist e r n oti c e s in June 20 02 and

Au g us t 20 02 ), 43 (d isc us sin g “ the se tw o n oti c e s in August and J un e” 2 00 2) , 4 9 ( a sse rt ingtha t SV C w a s g ive n n oti c e of us e of 19 96 re g ulatio ns in

“ June , July

and Au g us t” 20 02 ); see Notice of I ntent to Terminate Suspension Ag ree ment & Sunset Review, an d to Re s u me A D I n v e s ti g a ti o n , 6 7 F e d

. Re g . a t 4 3 , 2 7 8 ; N o ti c e o f Re s u mp ti o n o f AD I nvestig ation, 67 Fe d. Reg

. at 50,858; Commerce Memorandum to All I ntere sted Parties (Nov. 12, 2002) and attached A g ree ment Proposal – 11/08/2002 (A.R. Pub. Doc. 30A). I n particula

r, the Gove rnment empha siz es that both the June 2002 and the Aug ust 2002 Fe dera l Reg ister notices e x pressly stated, under the unambig uous caption “Applica ble Statute and Re g ulatio ns ” : “ [U]nl e ss o the rw ise ind ic a te d a ll c itatio ns to De pa rtme nt of Com me rc e (D e pa

rtme nt)

re g ulatio ns re fe r t o th e re g ulatio ns c od if ie d at 19 CF R part 353 ( 1996 ).” Tr. at 31; De f.’s B rief at 1 0

- 1 1 ; D e f

. ’ s S u r r e p l y B r i e f a t9

- 1 1 ; s ee No tic e of

I nte nt t o T e rm inate Sus pe ns ion Ag re e me nt & Sunset Review, and to Resume AD I nvestig ation, 67 Fe d. Reg

. at 43, 278; Notice of Resumption of AD Investig ation, 67 Fe d. Reg . at 50,858 (e mphases adde d). 9 SVC ma int a ins that th e langua g e of the F e de ra l Re g ist e r n oti c e s w a s in su ff ic ie nt t o c on s t i tut e notice. See Pl.’s Reply Br ief at 11-12; Pl.’s Surre ply Br ief at 17-19; Tr. at 16-17, 19-20, 23- 24, 28- 30, 96-97. SVC argues, in essenc e, t hat – abse nt a spec ific and une quivocal stateme nt that any potential future suspe nsion ag ree ments would be g overne d by the 1 9 9 6 r e g

u la ti o n s – th e G o vernme ntCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 20

SVC contrasts the lang uag e of Commerc e’s Aug ust 2002 Notice of the Resumption of the 10 Antidumping Investig ation wi th a sentenc e in Commerce ’s notice of the initiation of its s unset revie w of t h e suspende d investigation, which stated that “[t] he De partment’s pr ocedur es for the conduct of

sunset revie ws are set forth in [the regulations as amende d in 1997] .” See Pl. ’s Sur re ply Br ief at 18 ( quoting Notice of I nitiation of Five-Y ear

Review, 66 F ed. Reg . at 49,926); Tr. at 20-22. Howeve r, S VC is compar ing apples and orang es. The c ompara ble provision of Commerce ’s Notice of I nitiation of Five-Y ear

Review a ctually

para llels the lang uag e of Comme r c e ’ s Au g u s t 2002 notice: “[U]nless otherwise indicated, a ll citations to th e D e p a r tm e nt o f Co mm e r c e ’ s ( “De partment” ) regulations are to 19 CF R part 351 (2001).” See Notice of I nitiation of F ive-Ye ar Revie w, 66 Fe d. Reg . at 49,926. Moreove r, eve n if SVC were to prove that Commerc e could have draf ted the notice mor e c le arl y , th a t w ou ld n ot ipso facto rende r the lang uag e of the Commerce’ s Aug ust 2002 notice ins uf fi c ie nt. Al tho ug h SV C a damantl y ma int a ins that th e langua g e of the F e de ra l Re g ist e r n oti c e s did 11 not constitute notice that neg otiation of any potential future suspe nsion ag ree ment woul d be g overne d by

the 1996 r egu l ati ons, SVC has never r eally staked out a position as to what that lang uag e does mean. W h en p re s s edo n

t h e m at t er

at o ra l ar gu m en t , S VC at o n e p o i n tal l o we d t h a t t h e l an gu age at issue might mea

n that the resumed investigation – althoug h not the negotiation of the suspension ag ree ment – was subjec t to the 1996 regulations. Tr. at 17. B ut SVC t hen quickly backpe daled. Tr

. at 20, 23. I n the end, SVC simply declined to take a position a s to w hether the lang uag e spec ified the ver sion of the re g ulations applicable to the r esumed investig ation. Tr. at 28- 29. cannot c laim that notice was suf ficient. To be sure, the lang uag e of the Fe dera l Reg ister notices (quote d above) can be rea d to refe r only to the citations in the n o t i ce s t h emselves. I t is not a direct stateme nt that the ag ency pr oc e e din g s th a t are the su bje c t of the no tic e are g ov e rn e d b y a pa rt ic ula r ve rs ion of the re g ulatio ns . 10 B u t t h e l an g u a g e e mp l o y e d i n t h e Jun e 2 0 0 2 an d A u g u s t 2 0 0 2 F e d e r a l R e g i s t e r n o t i c e s is Commerce’ s standard ve rbiag e, the sig nificanc e of w hich is presumably well known t o al l i n the international tra de community

. I n any event, SVC’s principa l arguments conce rning the suffic iency of no tic e do no t turn

on nu anc e s o f l inguis tic s. 11Court N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 21

At other points in oral ar gu m en t , S VC surmised that the lang uag e re fer red only to the citations to reg ulations in the Feder al R eg ister notices themselve s (thoug h SVC never e x plained why a notice w ould cite to a version of the re g ulations other than the ve rsion applicable to the proce eding which wa s the subject of the notice). See Tr. at 19- 20, 23-24. In an y ev ent, as noted above, the langua g e in the F e de ra l Re g ist e r no tic e s is Com me rc e ’s sta nd ard ve rb ia g e . I t se e ms r a the r u nli ke ly that SVC and its counsel – as experienc ed and sophisticate d m em b ers of the international tra de community

– would attach so littl e signific ance to the lang uag e at issue, just as it seems unlikely that the y wo uld thi nk it r e a so na ble fo r C omm e rc e to b e sil e nt a s to the statut e s and re g ulatio ns a

pp lic a ble to the proce eding s that were the subject of the notice. See also Tr. at 17 ( “The re’ s nothing in this [ Aug ust 2002] notice that talks about a new 12 suspension ag ree ment – a re quest for a suspension ag ree ment.”). SVC fi rs t ar g ue s tha t the langua g e of the F e de ra l Reg ist e r not ic e s w a s n ot s uf fi c ie nt b e c a

us e Com me rc e the re did no t “ e xpre ssl y stipulate that . . . a possible re- suspension would be g overne d by [t he 1996] reg ulations.” See Pl. ’s Sur re ply B r. a t 18 -1 9. Ho we ve r, SVC c ite s no a uth or ity to 12

s u p p o rti t s c l a i m t h a ts u c h s p e c i f i c i t y w a s r e qu i r e d ; n o r

c ani td o s o . It w o u l d

b e – f r an k l y – impractica

ble and unr easona

ble to require that an ag ency fore see a nd expressly

rec ite in its Feder al Reg ister notices ea ch and e very conce ivable future development or event in a pr ocee ding, a

nd then separ ately state the version of the ag ency ’s regulations applicable to e ach suc h individual potential future de velopment or e vent. To the c o n t ra ry , an agenc y is entitled to give g ener al notice of the

a pp lic a ble ve rs ion

of the re g ulatio ns (a s Co mme rc e did he re ). Th e re a ft e r, the pa rt ie s are e nti tle d to rely o n t h at gen er al statement by the ag ency ; and, if a pa

rty has a spe cific que stion in l ight of the

a g e nc y ’s g e ne ra l noti c e , the pa rt y mus t time ly ra ise that que sti on wi th the a g e nc y . I nd e e d, a pa rt y ig no re s su c h “ bo ile rp la te ” a t it s p e ri l. Equally unavailing is SVC’s arg ument that the Fe dera l Reg ister notices “ addre ss[ ] t opic s th at

ar e d e f i n i t e l y no t subject to [the 1996 regulations] ” – spec ifically , the termination of the sunse tCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 22

revie w. See Pl.’s Surreply Br ief at 18-19; Tr. at 20. That argument i m p l i ci tly assumes that SVC took actual notice of C ommerce ’s gene ral refe renc e to the 1996 re g ulations in the Fede ral Reg ister notices at the time, but then observe d that the Fe dera l Reg ister notices a ddresse d the sunset re view (which w as not g overne d by the 1996 re g ulations), and ther efor e discounted Commerc e’s g ener al ref ere nce. H oweve r, there is no indication in the record that, in fac t, SVC took actua l notice of the g ener al re fer ence to the 1996 regulations when it rea d either of the Fe dera l Reg ister notices – much less that SVC was misled by rea ding the g ener al re fer ence in tandem wi t h the Fe dera l Reg ister

no tic e ’s dis c us sio n of the te rm inatio n of the suns e t re vie w. I n a ny e ve nt, a s d isc us se d im me diate ly ab o v e, i f S VC ac tu al l y

d i d p ar s e t h e Fed er al R egi s t er n o t i ce s at t h e ti m e an d fo u n d t h em co n fu s i n g, SVC was obligated to seek c larifica tion from the ag ency

in a timely

fashion. SVC’s arg ument that “the [Aug ust 2002 Fede ral Reg ister] noti ce ’s refere nce to, a nd discussion of, the re sumed inve s ti g a ti o n c o nta in e d n o c it a ti o n to a g ency regulations” similarly

misses the mark. See Pl.’s Surreply Br . at 18-19. Commerc e’s g ener al re fer ence to the 1996 regul ati ons would have been no less e ffe ctive if the entire F e de ra l Re g ist e r no tic e ha d be e n d e vo id o f s pe c if ic citations to ag ency

regulations. And, once ag ain (a nd in any event) , any

party confuse d by

such a

n o t i c e i s r e qu i r e d

t o r a i s e t h e i s s u e w i t h t h e a g e n c y p r o mp t l y. I n addition to the J une 2002 and Au g u s t 2002 F eder al Reg ister notices, the G overnme nt notes that the proposed suspe nsion ag ree ment attache d to Comm erc e’s Nove mber 12, 2002 Memorandum to All I ntere sted Parties “a lso ref err ed to, and cited to, the [ 1996] reg ulation[ s] and articulated that the re levant dea dlines codified in [the 1996 regulations] would be used.” See Def .’s Surreply

Br ief at 11; Commerce Memorandum to All I ntere sted Parties (Nov. 12, 2002) (A.R. Pub. Doc. 30A) , andCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 23

Subsection (g ), in particula r, is captioned “ Procedur e for Suspension of I nvestig ation,” and 13 specifie s the deadlines for exporters’ submissi on of a proposed suspension ag ree ment to Comm erc e, and for Commerce’ s notification to interested parties concer ning a proposed a g ree ment that has bee n initialed. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.18(g ) (1996). Simi larly , subsection (a ) provides that Comm erc e “ma y suspend an investig ation at any time be fore [C ommerce ’s] final determination.” See 19 C.F.R. § 353.18(a) (1996). The 1996 re g ulations are a lso cited elsewhe re in the pr oposed suspension ag ree ment. See 14 Ag ree ment Proposal – 11/08/2002 (attache d to Comm erc e Memora ndum to All I ntere sted Parties (Nov. 12, 2002) A g re ement P roposal – 11/08/2002 (A.R. Pub. Doc. 30A) ) at I V.D (“ Rejection of Submis sions,” citing 19 C.F .R. §§ 35 3. 31 & 35 3. 32 ), Ap p. C ( citing 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.31 & 353.32) , attache d Agr ee m en t Proposal – 11/08/2002. The Governme nt thus cites the November 12, 2002 Memorandum a s a third occa sion on which SVC wa s put on notice of Commerce’ s relianc e on the 1996 regulations, and y et fa iled to raise a ny conce rns with the ag ency . See Tr. at 44- 45, 50, 57. SVC dism isses the notion that Comm erc e’s Nove mber 12, 2002 Memorandum constituted noti c e , a s s e rti n g th a t t

h e p r o p o s e d

s u s p e n s io na g r e e me n t att a c h e d to th e me mo r an d

u m “ d id n ot addre ss the proce dures involved in the possible suspen s ion of the investig ation, but rather the proce dures that the ag ency and ce rtain re spondents had ag ree d to follow if ag ree ment on suspension

was e ventually

rea ched.” Pl.’s Surreply Br ief at 19-20; Tr. at 97. SVC furth er ar gu es that “the November

12 document issued we ll after the applicable law had been violated by the ag ency .” Pl.’s th Surreply Br ief at 19. Howe v er , co n t rar

y to SVC’s claim, the first pag e of the proposed suspension a g ree ment expressly stated that Commerce and the signa t o ry produce rs/exporters wer e ente ring into the suspension ag reem en t pursuant to the 1996 re g ulations (specific ally , 19 C.F.R. § 353.18 – “Suspension of Investig ation”). See Ag ree ment Proposal – 11/08/2002 (attache d to Comm erc e 13 Memorandum to All I ntere sted Parties (Nov. 12, 2002) (A.R. Pub. Doc. 30A) ). 14Court N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 24

App. H ( citing 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.31 & 353.32) . As SVC indicates, howeve r, those re fer ence s “dea l wi th t he pr oc e dure s th a t th e a g e nc y and [the Me xica n g ro we rs /e xpor

te rs ] .

. . a g re e d to fo llo w” in t h e i mp l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e s u s p e n s i o n a g re e me nt “ if a g re e me nt o n s us pe ns ion wa s e ve ntu a lly rea ched.” See Pl.’s Surreply Br ief at 19-20. I n o the r w or ds , e ve n if

the pr op os e d s us pen si on a g re e me nt h a d ma de no re fe re nc e to 15 Commerce’ s 1996 regulations, the timi ng of the proposa l itself suf fice d to put SVC on notice that Commerce w as not applying the regulations as amende d in 1997. Even more to the point, without reg ard to the spe cific la ng uag e of the proposed suspension ag ree ment, the very

fac t that SVC was served w ith a copy of a pr oposed suspension ag ree ment on 15 or about No v em b er 12, 2002 suffice d to put SVC on notice that Commerce was not applying the regulations as amende d in 1997. See Tr. at 97 ( counsel for SVC concede s that , cer

tainly as of November

12, 2002, SVC would have known that “[s] omething was up,” since – absent e x tension – proposed suspension a g ree ment was patently un t i m el y under r eg ulations as amende d in 1997). SVC ne ve rt

he le ss f ile d n o c omm e nts on

the pr op os e d s us pe ns ion a g reement ; no r d id i t ot

he rw ise take ex ception to Commerce’ s relianc e on the 1996 r eg ulations. See Tr. at 44-45, 50, 57, 60-61, 67; Commerce Me morandum to File r e: Comments on t h e P roposed Ag ree ment Suspending the Antidumping Duty

I nvestig ation – Fr esh Tomatoes from Mex ico (De c. 12, 2002) ( A.R. Pub. Doc. 32) (identify

ing pa rties that filed c omments on proposed suspension ag ree ment). As discussed above , the Government makes a compelling case that, as ea rly as June 2002, SVC was on constructive ( if not actua l) n o t i ce that Comm erc e wa s applying the 1996 regulations to the resumed inve stigation. But, in any event, SVC was on notice by November 12, 2002 at the very latest that Commerce was not applying the regulations as amende d in 1997 to the ag ency ’s thenong oing ne g otiation of a propose d suspension ag ree ment. And, contra ry to SVC’s claims, raisingCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 25

SVC th u s ap pare ntly

assumes that it could not be re quired to objec t to application of the 16 1996 regulations until it was o n n o t i ce that a proposed suspe nsion ag ree ment was unde r consideration. As discussed above, howeve r, there is a strong argument that SVC need only have been on notice that the 1996 re g ulations were being applied in the resumed investigation – and that SVC should have been on notice of that fa ct as e arly as June 2002. See section I I .B.i, su pra . its concer ns with Commerc e even at that late date would not ne cessa rily have been a

n empty g esture or a pointless for

mality

. See section I I .B.ii, infra (discussing futility ex ce ption to doctrine of exhaustion). ii. Ex ceptions to the Doc trine of Exhaustion SVC arg ues that, eve n if it had actua l or constructive notice that Commerc e wa s applying the 1996 regulations, any

failure to exhaust its administrative remedies neve rtheless should be e x cused under two e stablished exceptions to the doctrine of e x haustion – the “futilit y ” ex ception, and the exception for “pur e questions of law.” See ge nerally Pl.’s Reply Br ief at 12-14; Pl.’s S urre ply Br ief at 20-21. The Court of Appe als has re cog nized that “[a] party need not e x haust [it s] a d m i n i s t rative

reme dies wher e invoking such reme dies would be futile.” Asociac ion Colom biana de Ex portadore s de F lor e s v . United

State s, 91 6 F .2 d 1 57 1, 15 75 (F e d. Cir . 1 99 0) (c itatio n o mit te d) ; se e als o McCarthy

v. Madigan , 5 0 3 U.S. 140, 148 (1992) (r ecog nizi ng futility exception to doctrine of exhaustion, where ag ency was powe rless to g rant re lief soug ht) (citation omitted). Emphasizing that it f ir s t l e ar n e d o f th e p r o p o s e d

s u s p e n s io na g r e e me n t o nN o v e mb e r 1 2 , 2 0 0 2 , SV C a s s e rts th a t “ [i ]t would have be en futile . . . at that late date to argue with Commerce that notification of the pr oposed

a g re e me nt s ho uld

have be e n f

or thc omi ngon

Au g us t 29 , 2 00 2. ” Pl. ’s Re ply B ri e f at 12 -1 4; se e als o Pl.’s Surreply

Br ief at 20-21. But see Def .’s Surreply

Br ief at 3-4, 11, 13-14. 16Court N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 26

See also Antidumping Duties; Counterva iling Duties: F inal Rule, 62 Fe d. Reg . at 27,312 17 (n oti ngthat in te nt o f 1 9 C.F .R. § 3 51 .3 02 (b ) ( 19 98 ) i s f or “ the De pa

rtme nt [t o] g ive its e lf

a uth or ity t o ex t en d t h e [ re gu l at o ry ] d ea d l i n es wh er e n ec es s ary ”) ; T r. at 5 3 (G o v ern m en td i s cu s s i n g l an gu age of pre amble to 19 C.F.R. § 351.302(b) ( 1998), in Fina l Rule, 62 Fed. Reg . at 27,312). Ho we ve r, a s SV C ob se rv e s e lse wh e re , th e reg ulatio ns a s ame nd e d in 19 97 e xpre ssl y authorize Commerce to ex tend the re g ulatory deadlines f

or g ood cause

. See Pl.’s B rief at 5 ( citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.302(b) ( 1998), and e mphasizi ng that “C o mmerce had the a uthority to ext end the rele vant re g ulatory

deadlines but fa iled to do so”); Pl.’s Reply Br ief at 10 n.10 (same) ; 19 C.F .R. § 351.302(b) ( 1998) (“Ex tension of t ime limit s. Unless ex pressly prec luded by statute, the Secr etar

y may , for g ood cause , extend any time limi t established by this pa rt.”). And SVC give s no rea son 17 why Commerce could not ha

ve extended the r eleva

nt regulatory

deadlines r etroa ctively

(or nu nc pr o tunc ), if SVC ha d r e g ist e re d it s o bje c tio n w ithCom me rc e pr omp tly in mid -N ov e mbe r 200 2 a nd if Commerce ha d been pe rsuade d that the 1997 re g ulations should apply

. See Tr. at 35, 52- 54, 72-73, 97-99 (Gove rnment co u n s el noting that Comm erc e could have exerc ised option of extending deadlines) ; Birt v. Surfa ce T ranspor tatio n Bo ar d , 90 F.3d 580, 589 ( D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald, J .) (s us ta ini ngre tr oa c tiv e e xten sio n b y a g e nc y ); cf

. S i e r r a C l u b v . E n v i r o n m e n t a l P r o t e c t i o nA g e n c y, 356 F.3d 296, 309- 10 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Ga rland, J.). I t is thus far from c lear that it would have bee n futile for SVC to make its conc erns known to Commerc e even a s late as mid-Nove mber 2002, a fter SVC re c e ive d n oti c e of

the pr op os e d s us pe ns ion a g re e me nt. SVC stands on firmer g round in seekingto ex cu s e i ts failure to e x haust its administ rative

reme dies by invoking the exception for “pur e questions of law .” See ge nerally Pl.’s Reply Br ief at 12-14; Pl.’s Surreply

Br ief at 20-21. But see De f. ’s Sur re ply B ri e f at 3- 4, 11 -1 3. As the Sup re meCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 27

Structurally , the 1997 amen d m en t s t o t h e r egu l at i o n s “c o n s o l i d at e[ d ] t h e [ an t i d u mp ing] and 18 [countervailing duty ] reg ulations into a new par t 351, a nd

. . . remove [d] parts 353 and 355.” See Antidumping Duties; Counterva iling Duties: F inal Rule, 62 Fe d. Reg . at 27,296. Court e xp la in e d in M c K art v . U n it e d St a te s , e xh a u s ti o n g e n e r a ll y is n o t r e qu ir e d w h e r e the issue befor e the c ourt is a pure question of law, since resolution of such a n is s u e “d o es not require any pa rt ic ula r e xpe rt ise on

the pa rt of t he [ agency ],” and

“ jud ic ia l r e vie w w ou ld n ot b e sig nif ic a ntl y aided by an additional administrative de cision.” McK ar t v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 198-99 (1 96 9) ; see also Consol. Be ar i n gs C o . v. United States, 348 F.3d 997, 1003 ( Fe d. Cir. 2003) (re cog nizi ng , but finding ina pplicable, “pure question of law” exception to doctrine of e x haustion). SVC corre ctly

n otes that “the issue of whether Commerce should have followe d the proce dures se t forth in [t he re g ulation s as amende d in 1997] with respec t to the suspension of the antidumping investigation i nvolves strictly questions of l aw.” See Pl. ’s Re ply B ri e f at 13 ; se e als o Pl.’s Surreply

Br ief a t 20. Accor dingly , SVC’s failure to r aise that issue at the ag ency level does not prec lude SVC from litigating it here. C. The Applicable Reg ulations At the he art of

the pa rt ie s’ dis pu te ov e r t

he a pp lic a bil ity of the 19 96 re g ulatio ns v e rsu s the regulations as amende d in 1997 is 19 C.F.R. § 351.701, which is c aptioned “Applica bility Dates.” See 19 C.F.R. § 351.701 (1998). That regulation sets for th, in three sente nces, the eff ective dates for the new part 351 of C ommerce ’s re g ulations, which includes the 1997 regulations on the timi ng 18 of suspension ag ree ments that SVC claims Com merc e violated in this case

. T h e f i r s tt w o s e n t e n c e s o f

§ 3 5 1

. 7 0 1 s p e c i f

y:Court N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 28

The r e g u lati o n s [a s a me n d e d in 1 9 9 7 ] .

. . a

p p ly

. . . to a ll inv e s ti g a ti o n s an d o th er se gm e nts of p ro c e e din gs initiated on the basis of pe titions filed or r equests made afte r J une 18, 1997 and to se g ments of proc eedings self-initiated by [C ommerce ] after J un e 1 8 , 1 997. Se

gm e nts of p ro c e e din gs to w hic h p art 35 1 d o[e s] no t a

pp ly wi ll co n t i n u e to be gove rned by the re g ulations in effe ct on the date the petitions were filed or r equests we re ma de for those seg ments, to the extent that those reg ulations wer e not invalidated by the URAA [Urugua y Round Ag ree ments Act] or replac ed by the interim final re g ulations published on May 11, 1995 (60 F R 25130 (1995)). 1 9 C

. F. R

. § 3 5 1

. 7 0 1 (1 9 9 8 ) ( em p h as i s ad d ed ). T h e re gu l at i o n s d ef i n e a “[ s ] egm en t o f a p ro ce ed i n g” as “a portion of the proc eedingthat is reviewa ble under [19 U.S .C. § 15 16a].” See 19 C.F.R. § 35 1. 10 2 ( 19 98 ). An d it is und isp ute d th a t “ [a] d e te rm inatio n . . . to s us pe nd an a nti dumpi ngdu ty . . . investigation” is reviewa ble under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a. See 19 U. S

. C

. § 1 5 1 6 a(a )(2) (B )(iv) (2000). SVC’s principal ar g ument is that the events surr oun d i n g t h e 2002 S uspension Ag ree ment constituted a separate “seg ment” of the antidumping pr ocee ding, a nd – pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 351.701 – should have be en g overne d by the dea dlines in the regulations as amende d in 1997. See generally Pl.’s Reply

Br ief at 3-5; Pl.’s S urre ply Br ief at 2-6; Pl.’s Brief

at 2-5, 9. Foc using on the phrase “seg ments of proc eeding s initi ated on the basis of petit ions filed or reque sts made after June 18, 1997,” SVC has proff ere d two slightly

differ ent interpre tations of § 351.701. I nitially , SVC a sserted that, when the a ntidumping investig ation resumed on July 30, 2002, “C o mmerce . . . beg an a se parate and distinct ‘seg ment of proc eeding ’ . . . [which] ended on Dec ember

16, 2002, wi t h a notice r e-suspe nding the investigation.” See Pl. ’s Re ply B ri e f at 4 (citations omitted). SVC arg ued that “[i]t is ev ents during this dist inct ‘seg ment of proc eeding ,’ which extends fr om July 30-De cembe r 16, 2002, that are the subject of this litigation.” Id . ( fo otn ote omitted). SVC concluded that “sinc e the ‘seg ment of proceeding ’ at issue beg an af ter June 18, 1997,Court N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 29

The Gove rnment cor

rec tly observe s that, when a suspension ag ree ment that was sig ned at 19 the pre liminary

deter mination stage is terminated, the sta t u t e re q u ires Commerce to resume the underlying antidumping investi g ation that was unde rwa y prior to the suspension. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(i)( 1)(B ) (2000) ; Def.’ s Surreply Br ief at 18. The Gove rnment furt h er notes that “[t] he regulations dictate t hat C ommerce does not issue a new preliminary deter mination [ upon resuming the i nvestig ation], but continues t he investi g ation based upon the findi ng s in the orig inal preliminary deter mination.” Id . (citation omitted). SVC log ic a lly

re a so ns that th e Me xica

n g ro we rs /e xpor

te rs “ ha d to h a ve fi le d th e ir re qu e st 20 to suspend betwee n J uly

30, 2002 [t he ef

fective date of

the termination of the 1996 Suspension Ag ree ment, and the date on which the a ntidumping i nvestig ation resumed] and Nove mber 8, 2002 (the date Commerce initialed a proposed a g ree ment).” See Pl.’s Surreply Br ief at 3-4; Tr. at 5- 6. the p la in la n g uag e of r ule 351.701 stipulates that the 1997 re g ulations applied to Commerce’ s actions during the 2002 seg ment.” Id . at 4-5. B ut S VC ’s fu

nd a me nta l pr e mis e wa s mi sta ke n. As the Go ve rnme nt no te s, July 30 , 2 00 2 d id not mark the be g inning of a new “seg ment” of a

proceed i n g. I t was simply the resumption of the “investig ation” that had be g un in 1996. T hat investig ation was, by definition, based on a

petition filed before June 18 , 1 99 7 – an inve sti g a tio n tha t ha d n ot b e e n c omp le te d ( and thu s h a d n ot b e c ome revie wable) , beca

use i t had been “suspended” by the 1996 Suspension Ag ree ment for a number of y ear s, until that ag ree ment was terminated eff ective July

30, 2002. See Def

.’s B rief at 13-14; Def.’ s Surreply Br ief at 4-5, 17-19; Tr. at 31-32, 73. 19 SVC switched tacks its fina l br ief, and in or al argument. SVC sti ll contends that “the 2002

su sp e ns ion c on sti tut e s a dis tin c t se g me nt of the pr oc e e din g .” Pl. ’s Sur re ply B ri e f at 2; see also Tr. at 5, 17, 85-87, 90-91. H oweve r, SVC now asser ts that the new “ seg ment” beg an not on J u l y 3 0, 2002, but – rather

– on the date on w hich t h e M ex ican g rowe rs/exporters submitted a proposed suspension ag ree ment to Comm erc e. See Pl. ’s Sur re ply B ri e f a t 3- 4; see also Tr. at 5- 6, 17, 85-87, 20Court N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 30

Compare Tr. at 6 ( SVC arg ues that “the Commerce Depar tment can decide whether or not 21 to suspend [t he investig ation] and that suspension ag ree ment, whether or not it goes i nto place , is

. . . revie wable by

this Court under [19 U.S .C. § 1516a]”) (empha sis added). 90-91. Although its sec ond theory has some superf

icial appea l, the folly

of SVC’s interpre tation of 19 C.F.R. § 351.701 is ill ustrated by the anomalous results that it would y ield. SVC emphasizes that the re g ulatio ns de fi ne a

“ [s]e g me nt of

a pr oc e e din g ” a s “ a

po rt ion of the pr oc e e din g that is revie wable unde r [19 U.S.C. § 1516a],” and that “[a] determination . . . to suspend an a ntidumping duty . . . investigation” is reviewa ble under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.102 (1998); 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a )(2) (B )(iv) (2000). What SVC fails t o consider is that Commerce’ s ref usal to enter int o a su sp e ns ion

a g re e me nt i s no t revie wable unde r 19 U.S.C. § 1 5 1 6 a. See 19 U.S.C. § 15 1 6 a ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( i v ) ( 2 0 0 0 ) ( o n l y a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o s u s p e n d an an t i d u mp i n g d u t y i n v e s t i g a t i o n is revie wable; a rejec tion of a pr op os e d s us pe ns ion

a g re e me nt i s no t li st e d a s a re vie wa ble deter mination). 21 Under SVC’s interpreta

tion of § 351.701, if negot i at i o n s b et we en fo re i gn p ro d u ce rs /exporters and Com me rc e we re su c c e ssf ul a nd le d to a su sp e ns ion

a g re e me nt, the n th e ne g oti a tio ns wo uld

c on sti tut e a

se pa ra te “ se g me nt” and wo uld

be g ov e rn e d b y

the su sp e ns ion

a g re e me nt r e g ulatio ns in place at the time of the ne g oti at ions (including the 1997 amendments). B ut SVC’s int erpr etation

wo u l d al s o m ea nt h at , i f n ego t i at i o n s b et we en fo re i gnp ro d ucer s/ex porters a

nd Commerce f

ailed ( i.e. , if the neg otiations did not lead to the sig ning of a suspension ag ree ment), then those ne g otiationsCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 31

See Tr

. a t 10 2 (G ov e rnme nt e xpla ins that negotiations conce rning a po te nti al suspension 22 ag ree ment are not separate “se g ment,” bec ause “ if Commerce does not enter into the su s p ensi on ag r e e me n t t

h e inv e s ti g a ti o nw o u ld

c o n ti n u e ” ) , 1 0 4 ( G o v e r

n me n t e xp la in s th a t “ w h e ny o u sign a suspension ag ree ment . . . [y ]ou shi ft from a n investigation seg ment t o a suspension ag ree ment seg ment”) ( emphasis adde d). would no t constitute a separate “seg ment.” And t he fa iled neg otiations would be g overne d no t by 22 the re g ulations in plac e at the time of the neg otiations (inc luding the 1997 amendments), but – r ather – by the re g ulations in force when the inve stigation at issue was commenc ed. I n short, under SVC’s interpr etation of 19 C.F.R. § 351.701, it would only be possible af

ter the fa c t ( i.e. , aft e r neg otiations were c omp l et e and after a suspension ag ree ment had bee n either

a c c e pte d or re

je c te d by Com me rc e ) to kn owwh e the r o r n ot t ho se ne g oti a tio ns c on sti tut e d a se pa rate

“ se g me nt” of

the pr oc e e din gand , thus , whi c h ve rs ion of the re g ulatio ns a pp lie d to the ne g oti a tio ns . Such an absurd result cannot have been intended. See , e.g. , Americ an Toba cco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71 (1982) (“ Statutes should be interprete d to avoid . . . unrea sonable re sults whenever possible.”); R oberto v. Dep’t of the N avy , 440 F.3d 1341, 1350 ( Fe d. Cir. 2006) (rule s of statutory

con s tr u c ti o nan d

in te r p r e tati o na

p p ly w it h e qu a l f o r c e to a d mi n is tr a ti v e r e g u lati o n s ) ( c itation omi tte d) ; see also Tr

. a t 33 -3 5 (G ov e rnme nt argue s a bs ur dit y of SVC ’s int e rp re ta tio n a s a pp lie d to 1996 Suspension Agr eeme nt). Contrary to SVC’s claims, the neg otiations leading up to the suspension of the investig ation in Dece mber 2002 a ctually wer e par

t of ( i.e. , wer e subsumed in) the re s u m ed antidumping investigation, as the Gover nment explains. As discussed above , the antidumping inve stigation was initiated on the basis of a petition filed i n 1996 ( i.e. , before J une 18, 1997). Thus, the neg otiations leadingto the suspension of the investig ation – as par t of the resumed investigation – were g overne dCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 32

Al tho ug h th e Go ve rnme nt he re us e s the te rm “ e nd e d, ” it wa s no t a stu die d c ho ic e of wo rd s. 23 Th e Go ve rnme nt d oe s n ot b e lie ve that th e un de rl y in g anti dumpi nginv e sti g a tio n, wh ic h b e g a n in April 1996, “ende d” in Dec ember 2002. The investigation was simply suspended y et aga in, just as it had been pr eviously

suspended in 1996. Simi larly , notwithstanding the G overnme nt’s statement, i t i s not entirely clea r what event actua lly had the e ffe ct of suspending the re sumed antidumping inve stigation – the finalization and signingof the 2002 Suspension Ag ree ment on Dec ember 4, 2002; t h e i s s u ance of Commerce ’s notice of the suspension and its notification to interested pa rties on or a

bout Dece mber 10, 2002; or t h e D ec em b er

1 6 , 2 0 0 2 Fe d er al R egi s t er p u b l i ca t i o no f b o t h t h e n o t i ce o f C o m m er ce ’s d et er m ination to suspe nd the investigation a nd the text of the 2002 Suspension Ag ree ment itse l f ( b o t h o f w hich ref lect an “ef

fec tive” date of

Dec ember

16, 2002). See section I , su pra . I t is clear that the resumed inv e sti g a tio n w a s su sp e nd e d s ome tim e in D e c e mbe r 2 00 2; f or pr e se nt pur

po se s, the pr e c ise date is imm a te ri a l. by the 1996 re g ulations. See De f. ’s Sur re ply B ri e f a

t 16 -1 9; T r. a t 31 -3 2, 73 , 1 04 ; see also Def .’s B ri e f at 12 -1 5. Th e Go ve rnme nt r e a so ns : Although the neg otiation of the new suspe nsion ag ree ment occur red in 2002, the regulations indicate that these e vents [surrounding the suspension of the inv e s ti g a ti o n ] ar e c le ar ly ti e d to th e r e s u me d

inv e s ti g a ti o n . T h e r e g u lations [concerningthe suspension of an i n vestig ation] i n both part 353 [the 1996 re gulat io ns ] and

pa rt 35 1 [th e re g ulatio ns a s ame nd e d in 19 97 ] ind ic a te tha

t a ll deadlines f

or the ne g otiation of a susp en s i o n ag ree ment are tied to either the p relim inary

or final de termination of an inve stigation. . . . Thus, the regulatory scheme clea

rly envisions that the even t s l ea d i n g up to the signingof a suspe nsion ag ree ment occur

within the confines of

the investig ation. Def .’s Surreply

Br ief at 19. The Gove rnment concludes that “[t] he re sumed investigation, which subsumed the suspension ag ree ment neg otiations, ended when the new suspension ag ree ment was published and

tha t su sp e ns ion

a g re e me nt b e c a me the ne w s e g me nt r e vie wa ble un de r [1 9 U .S. C. 23 § 1516a].” Id . (empha ses adde d) (c itation omit ted); Tr. at 104 (Gover nment explains t hat “whe n y ou sign a suspension ag ree ment . . . [y ]ou shi ft from an investigation seg ment to a suspension ag ree ment seg ment”).Court N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 33

I nth e a lt e r

n a ti v e , SV C a

r g u e s th a t –

e v e nif th e n e g o ti a ti o n s c u lm in a ti n g in th e 2 0 02 Suspension Agr eeme nt did not constitute a separate “seg ment” of the proce eding – the third sentenc e of 19 C.F.R. § 351.701 established a n administrative p ra ct i ce which “dictate[d] that Commerce nonetheless should have followed the 1 997 regulations during the events that led to the 2002

su sp e ns ion .” Pl. ’s Sur

re ply B ri e f at 6; se e ge ne ra lly

19 C.F.R. § 351.701 (1998); Pl.’s Reply Br ief at 5-6; Pl.’s Surreply

Br ief at 6-7. Th e thi rd (a nd fi na l) se nte nc e of

§ 3 51 .7 01 state s: For seg ments of proc eeding s initi ated on the ba sis of petitions filed . . . af ter January 1, 1995, but bef

o re [ the 1997 amendme nts to the reg ulations] appl[y ], [ the re g ulati on s a s ame nd e d in 19 97 ] wil l se rv e a s a

re state me nt o f [Co mme rc e ’s ] interpre tation of the re quirements of the [Trade Ac t of 1930] as amended by the URAA. 19 C.F .R. § 3 51 .7 01 (1 99 8) . SV C a pp are ntl y re ads that se nte nc e a s ma nd a tin g , in

e sse nc e , th a t – in all case s commence d afte r January 1, 1995 – the re g ulations as amende d in 1997 must be applied. B ut if Com me rc e ha d int e nd e d that se nte nc e of the re g ulatio n to state wh a t SVC a sse rt s i t d oes, C o m m e r c e c o u l d

( an d , p r e s u m a

b l y, w o u l d ) h a v e s t a t e d

i tm u c h m o r e s i mp l y. J ust as SVC misint erpr ets the first two sentenc es of 19 C.F.R. § 351.701, it mis interpre ts the la st s e nte nc e a s w e ll. As the Go ve rnme nt expl a ins , the la st se nte nc e of § 3 51 .7 01 is a dd re sse d to those situations where the applicable regulation would otherwise be a regulation that pre-dates the 19 97 a me ndme nts ( i.e. , a “pr e-U RAA regulation”), ex cept that the pr e-U RAA regulation in question was – in effec t – invalidated by the URAA. To avoid Comm erc e’s a pplication of a pr e-U RAA regulation that is aff

irmatively inconsistent w ith the URAA, the third sentenc e of § 351.701 pr ovides that – in such si tuations – Commerce will treat the reg ulations as amended in 1997 “a s a re statementCourt N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 34

As the Government explained at ora l argument, the last sentenc e of 19 C.F .R. § 351.701 24 “only deals with si tuations where the URAA invalidate d a prior r eg [ul ation] which isn’t the case he re

. . . . That last sentenc e has to be taken in [the] c ontext of the prea mble

. . . [wh i ch ] ex p l ai n s t he purpose of

that last sentenc e. I t states t hat t he langua g e was added be cause seg ments ‘initiated on the ba sis of

pe tit ion s f

ile d o r r e qu e sts ma de a ft e r Janu a ry 1, 19 95 ’ a

re su bje c t to th e UR

AAbe c a us e the URAA is ena cted. In other wor ds, the URAA wa s alread y i n effect a nd the Depa

rtment of Com me rc e c ou ld not fo llo w a re g ulatio n tha t wa s in c on sis te nt w iththe statut e [.] [A]n d in on ly tho se situations shoul d Commerce apply [t he regulation a s amende d in 1997] that is consistent with the statut e , th e UR

AA .” Tr . at 75 -7 6; see also Tr. at 101. Unlike SVC’s interpre tation of the last sentenc e of § 351.701, the Gover nment’s interpre tation of that sentenc e is ea sily rea d in p ar i m ate ria wi th t he se nte nc e that pr e c e de s it

. Spe c if ic a lly , the se c on d sen te nc e of the re g ulatio n expr e ssl y a c kn ow le dg e s tha t, in s ome sit uatio ns , “the [otherwise a

pplicable] regulations in effe ct on the date the p etitions were f iled” we re “invalidated by

the URAA.” See 19 C.F.R. § 351.701 (1998). As the Gover nment explains i t, the t h ird sentenc e provide s that – in such situations, and only in s u c h s it u a ti o n s

– the post-URAA re g ulatio ns ( i.e. , the re g ulations as amende d in 1997) serve as URAA- compliant authority , even though the y

would otherwise be inapplicable. Se e id .; Tr. at 75-77, 101. Only some of the 1997 amendments to Commerce’ s regulations were desig ned to conf orm 25 the anti d u m p i n g and counte rvailingduty regulations to be consistent with the URAA. Other o f [C o mm e r c e ’ s ] in te r

p r e tati o n o f th e r e qu ir e me n ts o f th e [T r a d e A c t o f 1 9 3 0 ] as amende d by the URAA .” See 19 C.F.R. § 351.701 (1998) ( emphasis adde d); Tr. at 75-77, 101. 24 As the Gove rnment cor

rec tly points out, t he URAA was silent on the subject addr essed by the pre -UR AA re gu lation at issue here , 19 C.F.R. § 353.18 (1996) – that is, the de adlines for neg otiating a

nd signinga suspension ag ree ment. The pre-URAA regulation thus is not i nconsistent with th e U RA A in

a n y w ay . N o r

w e r e th e 1 9 9 7 a me n d me n ts r e f le c te d in 1 9 C. F

. R. § 3 51.208 adopted by

Commerce to impl ement the URAA. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.208 (1998). The new, more str ing e nt d e a dli ne s f

or su sp e ns ion a g re e me nts e sta bli sh e d in § 3 51 .2 08 the re fo re c ann ot b e sa id t o b e “ a r e s tate me n t o f

[C o mm e r c e ’ s ] in te r

p r e tati o n o f th e r e qu ir e me n ts o f th e [s tatute ] as amende d by the URAA .” See 19 C.F.R. § 351.701 (1998) ( emphasis adde d); Def .’s Surreply

Br ief at 20-23; Tr. 25Court N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 35

amendments wer e desig ned to, int e r a lia , “simplify and strea mline [ Commerce’ s] admini stration of an t i d u mp i n g an d

co u n t er v ai l i n g

duty proce eding s.” See A nt i d

u m p i n g D u t i e s ; C o u nt e r v a ili ngDutie s: Final Rule, 62 F ed. Reg . at 27,296. SVC tri e s to ma

k e mu c h o f c e rta in la

n g u a g e in th e r e g u lato r

y h is to r y o f 1 9 C. F.R. § 26 351.701 (1998). See ge nerally Pl.’s Reply Br ief at 6; Pl .’s Surreply

Br ief at 6-7. I n particula

r, SVC re lie s he a vil y on a se nte nc e wh ic h s ta te s th a t “ the ne w r e g ulatio ns [ i.e. , the re g ulations as amende d in 1997] descr ibe the administrative prac tice that [C ommerce ] wil l follow, unless there is a rea son consistent with the amende d Act to de part from that prac tice.” Pl.’s B rief at 6; Pl .’s Surreply Br ief at 7 ( quoting

A n t i d u mp i n g D u t i e s ; C o u n t e r

v a i l i n g D u t i e s : F i n a l R

u l e , 6 2 F e d

. R e g . a t2 7 , 3 7 8 )

. It is difficult to reconc ile the sentenc e that SVC cites wit h the actual text of § 351.701. But, whatever that sentenc e means, it is only regulatory history and cannot trump the plain l an gu age o f t he regulation itself. I n addition, g iving the third sentenc e of § 351.701 the broad me aning and sig nificanc e that SVC attaches to it would be at odds with the languag e in the pre amble of tha t regulation, which e xp la in s th a t t

h e th ir d s e n te n c e is in te n d e d

to “ e xp la in [] the limited role of [the regulations as amended in 1997] in proce eding s to which they do not apply .” See A n t i d u mp i n g D u t i e s; Countervailing Duties: Final Rule, 62 F ed. Reg . at 27,378 (e mphasis added)

. at 7 6 ( G o v e r

n me n t e xp la in s th a t “ b e c a u s e th e U r

u g u ay Ro u n d d id n o t s p e a k to th is proce dural deadline [ i.e. , the spec ific deta ils of the timing of th e negotiation and c ompletion of a suspension ag ree ment], t he [releva

nt provisions of the 1996 reg ulations w ere ] not in conflict with the URAA” ; thus , Comme rc e pr op e rl y a pp lie d th e 19 96 re g ulatio ns in t his c a se ), 10 1 ( “ I f t

he re ’s so me thi ngin the [URAA] which nullifies the [pre-U RAA] reg ulation, we have to c omply with w hat the law [ i.e. , the URAA] is[ ,] but the URAA does not spe ak to this proce dural de adline with re g ard to suspension ag ree ments.”). 26 The Supreme Court has admonished: We must give substantial def ere nce t o an agency ' s interpre tations of its own regulations. . . . Our task i s not to decide whic h among sever al competing interpre tations best serves the re g ulatory purpose. Rathe r, the a g ency ' s interpre tation mus t be g ive n ‘“ c on tr oll ing we ig ht u nle ss i t is pla inl y

e rr on e ou s o r i nc on sis te nt w ith the re g ulation.’”Court N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 36

See also Asociac ion Colom biana de Ex portadore s de F lores v. United States, 903 F .2d 27 15 55 , 155 9- 60 (F e d. Cir .1 99 0) (atta c hin g “ su bs tanti a l w e ig ht” to C omm e rc e ' s in te rp re ta tio n o f i ts own regulation, a

nd explaining that “[w]hen the construction of an administrative re g ulation rather than a statute is in issue, defe renc e is even more clearly in order” ) (c itations and internal quotation marks omitted); Carolina Toba cco v. B urea u of Cu s t o m s and B order Protection, 402 F.3d 1345, 1349 (F ed

. C i r. 2005) (noting that “ ‘it is well settled that an ag ency ’s interpre tation of its own regulations is entitled to br oad defe renc e from the courts’” ) ( quoting Ca the dr a l Ca nd le Co. v. U. S. I nt’l Trade Comm’n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1363 (F ed. Cir. 2005) (c itation omit ted)). This fundame ntal leg al principle applies wit h particula r for ce in a

case such as this, which inv o l v es C ommerce ’s administration of the a ntidumping re g ime. The Court of Appe als has emphasized: Com me rc e is th e acknow le dg e d ‘ ma ste r’ of the anti dumpi nglaws , a nd its interpre tatio n s of the per tinent statutes are ‘worthy of consider able de fer ence .’ Z e nit h E le c s. Cor

p. v. Un ite d St a te s, 77 F .3 d 4 26 , 43 0 (Fed. C ir . 1 99 6) ; se e als o M i c r o nT e c h

. , In c . v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 1 1 7 F

. 3 d

1 3 8 6 , 1 3 9 4 ( F e d

. C i r . 1 9 9 7 ) ( ‘ In antidumping c ases, we ackno wledg e Commerce ’s spec ial expertise and ac cord substantial defe renc e to its construction of per tinent statutes.’). Micron Te ch., Inc. v. United States, 243 F .3d 1301, 1312 (F ed. Cir. 2001). Th oma s Jef

fe rs on Un iv. v. S hal ala , 5 12 U. S. 5 04 , 5 12 (1 99 4) (c itatio ns omi tte d) . Co mme rc e , in particula r, is entitled to “substantial defe renc e . . . whe n interpre ting an d apply ing its own regulations.” Torring ton Co. v. United St ates, 156 F .3d 1361, 1363 (F ed. Cir. 1998). 27 As discussed above , Commerce’ s interpre tation of 19 C.F.R. § 351.701 is in no way either “plainly err oneous or inconsistent with t he re g ulation” itself. I ndeed, it is SVC’s interpretation that would be unworka

ble and would lead to a

bsurd results. SVC’s c laim that the even t s s u rrounding the 20 02 Sus pe ns ion Agreem ent we re su bje c t to the mor e str ing e nt d e a dli ne s e sta bli sh e d in Commerce’ s regulations as amende d in 1997 must t here fore be re jected.Court N o. 02- 0081 1 Pag e 37

III . C onc lusi on F or the re a so ns se t for

th ab ov e , Plai nti ff

’s Mo tio n for Judg me nt on the Ag e nc y Re c or d mu st be denie d, and the Commerc e De partment’s 2002 de termination sus p en ding the resumed antidumping investig ation of fr esh tomatoes fr om Mex ico i s s u stained. See Suspension of Antidumping Investig ation: Fre sh Tomatoes F rom Mexico, 67 Fed. Reg . 77,044 (De c. 16, 2002). J u d g m e n tw i l l e n t e r

a c c o r d i n g l y.

__________________________________ Delissa A. Ridg way J u d ge Dec ided: April 17, 2007 New Y ork, Ne w YorkUNI TED STATES COURT OF I NTERNATI ONAL

TRADE

________________________________________ : 

### S AN 

### V I CENTE 

### C AMAL U 

### SPR DE 

### RI ,

: Plain tif

f , v. : 

### U NI T E D 

### S TATES , Court No. 02-00811 : Defendant , and : 

### C AA DES 

### S I NAL OA , 

### A

. 

### C ., et al ., :

De fe nd an t- In te rv e no rs . :

________________________________________ J UDGM EN T Up on consid e ratio n o f P la int if f’ s Mo tio n f

or Judg me nt o n th e Ag e nc y Re c or d, a nd

in

acc ordanc e with the Court’s opinion of this date, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion is denied; and it is further ORDERED that the U.S. Depa rtment of Commerce ’s deter mination suspending the r esumed antidumping investigation of fre sh tomatoes from Mexi co, published at Suspension of Antidumping I nvestig ation: Fr esh Tomatoes Fr om Mexi co, 67 Fe d. Reg . 77,044 (De c. 16, 2002), is sustained; and it is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and D ECREED that this action be, and he reby is, dismi ssed.

__________________________________ Delissa A. Ridg way J u d ge Dated: April 17, 2007 New Y ork, Ne w York