### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT J uly 09, 20 04 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

N o. 04- 1098 6 D . C. D oc ke t N o. 94- 0049 2- CV -J -2 0 ETHERIA VERDEL JACKS ON, Pe tit ion er -Appe llant, ve rs us J A M ES C R O S B Y , S e c r e t ary, Fl or ida D ep ar tm en t of Co rr ec tio ns, Respondent -Appellee. Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida (J ul y 9, 200 4) Be fo re T JO FL A T , BL A CK and C A RN E S, Ci rc uit

Jud ge s, TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e:Rule 59 authorizes motions for new trials and to a lter or amend the judg ment. Part (a) 1 of Rul e 59 sp e c if

ie s th e g ro un ds fo r m oti on s f or a ne w tri a l. T he po rt ion

of pa rt (a ) p e rt a ini ngto be nc h tr ia ls, su c h a s e vid e nti ary he ari ng s in

ha be a s c or pu s a c tio ns br ou g ht i n th e dis tr ic t c ourt s, state s: A new tr ial may

be grante d . . . in an ac tion tried without a jury , for a ny of the re asons for which re hear ings ha

ve her etofore been grante d in suits i n equity in the courts of the United States. On a motion for a new tria l in an action tried w ithout a jury , the cour t may open the judg ment if one ha s been e ntere d, take a dditional testim ony , amend f indings of fac t and conc lusions of law or make new f indings a nd conclusions, and dire ct the entr y of a new judgme nt. Part (e) of the rule , relating to motions to alter or amend judg ment, states: “Any motion to alter or ame nd a judg ment shall be filed no late r than 10 da y s after entry of the judg ment.” Attorney s Eric C. Pinkard and D avid R. Gemmer f iled the Rule 59(e) motion on petitioner’s be half. In addition to requestingRule 59(e) relief , the motion asked the district cour t to hold the habea s proce edingin abeyance pendingthe Supreme Court' s decision in Summerlin v. Ste wa rt , 3 41 F .3 d 1 08 2 ( 9th

Cir . 2 00 3) , c e rt . gra

nte d s ub no m Sc hr ir o v . Summe rl in, 12 4 S. Ct. 833, 157 L . Ed. 2d 692 (De c. 1, 2003), a nd to gr ant petitioner lea

ve to amend his sec ond amende d petition for a wr it of habea s corpus so that he c ould present se vera l substantive constitutional claims (which the district cour t’s judgme nt had denied) as aspe cts of a ne w ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l c la im. Ac c or din gto p e tit ion e r, his atto rn e y , in a pp e a lin ghis conviction and se ntence to the Florida Supreme Court, depr ived him of his rig ht to the effe ctive a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l whe n h e fa ile d to pr e se nt t he se su bs tanti ve c on sti tut ion a l c la ims in petitioner’s brie f. These issues are not before us beca use we are revie wingonly the question of our jurisdiction nece ssitated by the untimely

filing of the motion. See infra, pa rt I I . For ease of discussion, we re fer

to the motion in i ts entirety as petitioner’ s “Rule 59(e )” motion. 2 I. O n D ec em

be r 15, 200 3, the dis tr ic t c ourt e nte re d af ina l j udgm en t i n th is
ca se de ny ing pe tit ion er

ha be as c or pus re lie f fr om

his c onvi ct ionand s en te nc e fo r ca pit al m ur de r. O n January

5, 200 4, pe tit ion er

f ile d am oti on t o a lte r or

a m en d j udgm ent pursuant to Feder al Rule of Civil Pr ocedure 59(e). T he m otion wa s 1 untim ely because petitioner failed to file it w ithin ten day s of the entry of final j udgm en t a s R

ule 59( e) r eq

uir es . O n January

29, 200 4, the dis tr ic t c ourt e nte re d aT h e o rd er co n s i s t edo f o n e s en t en ce . T h e s en t en ce co n t ai n edn o re as o nfo r t h e r u l i n g. 2 Our A pr il 7 or de r s tate d th at pe tit ion e r’ s n oti c e of a pp e a l w a s: 3 timely to appea l the district court’s January 29, 2004, order

denying the Rule 59(e) motion, construed as a

motion under Fe d. R. Civ. P . 60(b), f or re lief and the appea l MAY PROCEED from that order . Rice v. F ord Motor Co., 88 F.3d 914 918- 19 (11th Cir. 1996); Cavalier e v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 1111, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). The appea l sh a ll b e lim ite d to a

de te rm inatio n o f whe the r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in denying the motion for relief and to set aside the judgme nt, and shall not ext end to the validity of the unde rlying or der pe r se. Eric C. Pinkard, one of

the lawyers who f

iled petitioner’s Rule 59(e ) motion in the 4 district court, filed pe titioner’s motion for rec onsideration. 3 w ri tte n or de r statin g th at

the m oti on w as “ D EN IE D . ” O n F eb ru ar y 27, 200 4, 2 petition er f

iled a notice of appeal in the district court; the noti ce stated that he w as ap pe al ing the f

ina l j udgm en t of

D ec em be r 15, 200 3 and the or de r of January 29, 2004
. On April 7, 2004, this panel dis m issed petiti oner’ s appeal of the D ecem ber 15, 200 3 j udgm en t i n an or de r co nta ini ng the f oll ow ing langua ge : Appellant’ s m otion to alter or am end, m ade pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P . 59(e) w as not f ile d w ith in t enbus ine ss d ay s of and d id n ot t oll the appe al pe ri od for the D ecem

ber 15, 2003, j udgm ent. F ed. R . App. P. 4(a)( 4)(A ); Fed. R. Civ. P . 6(a ), 58, 60(b). T herefor e the appeal is D ISMI SSE D a s to that order. 3 O n Apr il 20, 200 4, pe tit ion er m ove d th is c ourt t o r ec onsi de r its Apr il 7
or de r dis m iss ing his appe al of the D ec em

be r 15, 200 3 j udgm en t. I n hi s m oti on, 4 pe tit ion er c onc ed ed

that the Ru le 59( e) m oti on h e fi le d inthe dis tr ic t c ourt on January 5, 200 4 m igh t be unt im el y . I f unt im el y , he a sks that w e tr eat the m oti onIn ref err ing to Rule 6, Ge mmer wa s appar ently focusingon the provisions of par t (e) of 5 the ru le , whic h s tate s: W h en ev er

a p arty h as th e r i gh to r i s re qu i re d t o d o s o m e a cto r t ak e s o m e p ro ce ed i n gs within a presc ribed pe riod afte r the ser vice of a notice or

other pa per upon the party

and th e n o t i c e o r

p a p e r i s s e r v e d u p o nth e p arty un d e r

R u l e 5 ( b ) ( 2 ) ( B ) , ( C ) , o r

( D ) , 3 d ays shall be adde d to the presc ribed pe riod. Rule 5 g overns “ Servingand F iling Pleading s and Other Papers.” Part (a) , speaks, in per tinent part, to “Ser

vice: When Required.” Ex cept a s otherwise pr ovided in these rule s, ever y order require d by

its terms to be se rv e d, e ve ry

ple a din gsu

bs e qu e nt t o th e or ig ina l c omp la int un le ss t he c ourt oth e rw ise order s beca

use of numer ous defe ndants, eve ry paper relating to discove ry

require d to be serve d upon a par

ty unless the cour

t otherwise or ders, e very

written motion other than one which ma

y be hea rd ex parte, a

nd ever y written notice, a

ppear ance , demand, of

fer of judgme nt, desig nation of re cord on a ppeal, a nd simil ar pa

per sha ll be serve d upon eac h of the par ties. No servic e nee d be made on parties in def ault for f ailure to a ppear except that 4 as tim ely under the “ uniq ue circum stances” doctrine. He cites W illis v. New som e, 747 F. 2d 6 05 ( 11th C ir
. 198 4) , in w hic h w e gr an te d r el ie f unde r that do ctri ne , and state s th at the uni que c ir cum stanc es sur ro undi ng the f

ili ng o f pe tit ion er ’ s R

ule 59(e) m otion “ fall[] squarely within the situatio n com pelling relief

in W illis.” T he “ uni que c ir cum stanc es ” pe tit ion er r el ie s onare se t out i n th e af fi davit of
one of the a tto rn ey s who f

ile d hi s R ule 59( e) m oti on, D av id R
. G em m er . I n hi s af fi davit , G em

m er state s th at

“ [o ] ne of m y ta sks [ in f

ili ng the Ru le 59( e) m oti on]
w as to de te rm ine the de ad lin e fo r fi lin g th e m oti on. ” T o th is e nd, he r ev ie w ed the Federa l Rules of Civil Procedure and the district court’s loca l rules. He unde rs too d f

ro m that r ev ie wthat the Mo tio n ha d to be ti m el y f ile d w ith in te n day s f ro m the da te of

e ntr y of the or de r in que sti on. H ow ev er , [ he ] a lso w as aw ar e of

F ed
. R. Ci v. P [. ] 6 and L oc al Ru le 4. 20, w hic h pr ovi de d f or three additional day s to file when there had been service of a notice or paper by m ail.[ ] While the

5pleading s assertingnew or additional claims for r elief a g ainst them shall be serve d upon them in the manner

provided for

service of summons in Rul e 4. (empha sis added). Subpar ts (b)(2) (B ), (C), a

nd (D), r espec tively , authorize servic e [under par t (a) ], by mail, by leavinga copy

with the cler

k of the c ourt “if the pe rson serve d has no known addre ss,” and by

“other means, includingelec tronic mea ns.” Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r d e nyingpe tit ion e r h a be a s c or pu s r e lie f d id n ot r e qu ir e “ by its terms” that it be “ serve d” on the pa rties. The f

inal judgme nt entere d pursuant to that orde r on De c e mbe r 1 5, 20 03 wa s “ se t f or th o n a se pa rate do c ume nt, ” a s r e qu ir e d b y F e de ra l Ru le of

Civ il Procedur e 58. The cler

k there afte r ser

ved copie s of the orde r and f inal judgme nt on the parties a s require d by

Rule 77(d). It is important to note that the c lerk’s f ailure to notify

a par ty of the issuance of

an orde r or the e ntry

of final judg ment “does not a ffe ct the time to appea l or relieve or authorize the c ourt to relieve a par ty for f ailure to a ppeal within the time allowed, e x cept a s perm it tedinRu le 4 (a) o f the Fed eral Ru les of A pp ell ate P roce du re.” Fed. R. Ci v. P . 7 7(d ). By the same toke n, the fa ct that the cle rk ser ves the pa rties by mail with notice of the e ntry of jud g me nt d oe s n ot e xten d th e tim e fo r f ili nga no tic e of a pp e a l by thr e e da y s p ur su ant t o Ru le 6(e)
. For

purposes of Rule 59(b) and ( e)’ s ten-day limit ations periods, we focus on whe n the judgme nt is entered, not whe n it is served. F ed. R. Civ. P. 59(b), (e) ( stating that such motions “shall be f

iled no later tha

n 10 day s after

entry of the judg ment” (e mphasis added) ). Rule 58 g ov e rn s e ntr

y of jud g me nt. Part

(a )( 1) re qu ir e s, “ Ev e ry

jud g me nt a

nd ame nd e d ju dgme nt m

us t be se t f or th o n a se pa rate do c ume nt . . . .” Part (a )( 1) the n li sts e xce pti on s to the se pa rate do c ume nt r e qu ir e me nt t

hat are no t a

pp lic a ble he re . Pa

rt (b ) s tate s, in p e rt ine nt p art : J udg ment is entere d for pur poses of these rules: . . . (2) if Rule 58( a)( 1) re quires a se parate document, whe n it is entered in the c ivil docket un de r R ule 79 (a ) a

nd wh e n th e e arl ie r o f t

he se e ve nts oc c ur s: (A) when it is set forth on a se parate document, or (B ) whe n 150 day s have r un from the e ntry

in the civil docket under

Rule 79(a)
. In this case, Rule 58(a )(1) require d a sepa rate document for

the Dec ember

15, 2003 judgme nt. Th e jud g me nt s atis fi e d b oth pr on g s o f R

ule 58 (a )( 2) on

De c e mbe r 1 5, 20 03 , whe n it wa s b oth e nte re d o n th e do c ke t and se t f or th i n a se pa ra te do c ume nt. De c e mbe r 1 5 w a s th e re fo re the date the judg ment was e ntere d under Rule 58, a nd the date f

rom which the Rule 59( e) limitations pe ri od ra n. B e c a us e Rul e 6( e ) o nly

a pp lie s whe n a

pa rt y “ ha s th e ri g ht o r i s r e qu ir e d to do so me act or take some pr ocee dings w ithin a prescr ibed per iod after the servic e” ( emphasis adde d), while Rule 59(b) a

nd (e) require action to be take n within “10 day s after entry of the judg ment,” (empha sis added) Rule 6( e) c an neve r extend the time for filinga Rule 59(b) or (e ) motion. L oc a l Ru le 4. 20 pr ov ide s: (a) Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a) a nd (e) , whene ver a

period of time pr escr ibed or allowed by

the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e or the Rules of the District Court of the United States for the Middle District of Flor ida, or by any applicable statute is less than eleve n (11) da

y s and there has bee n service of a notice or other pa per upon a

party by ma il, the n th e pe ri od

of tim e wh ic h th at pa

rt y ha s to a c t sh a ll b e c omp ute d a s f oll ow s: (1) B y first ca lculatingthe orig inal presc ribed pe riod pursuant to F ed.R.Civ.P. 6(a); and 5(2 ) B y the n a dd ingthr e e (3 ) d ay s to the or ig ina l pr e sc ri be d p e ri od purs ua nt t o Fe d.R.Civ.P . 6(e) . The thre e (3) day s shall be ca lculated be g inning with the da y following the la st d ay

of the or ig ina l pr e sc ri be d p e ri od , a nd sh a ll b e c ounte d c on se c uti ve ly reg ardle ss of whethe r any day of this three ( 3) day

period is a Saturda

y , Sunday , or leg al holiday as def ined in Fe d.R.Civ.P . 6(a) . The third day shall be treated as the la st day of the per iod unless it is a Saturda y , Sunday , or leg al holiday in which eve nt the period runs un t i l th e e n d

o f th e n e x td ay w h i c hi s n o ta S atur d ay, S un d ay, o r

l e g a l h o l i d ay. M.D. Fla . L ocal R. 4.20. Gemmer “did not obtain or re call the name of the c lerk [he] spoke with.” 6 6 [D ec em be r 15, 200 3 j udgm en t] ha d be enm ai le d to [ his of fi ce , he ] w as not sur e w he the r the loc al r

ule appl ie d to the Mo tio n. [ H e] e ith er ha d no know le dge or

ha d no r ec oll ec tio n of Cav al ie re v . All st at e In su ran ce Co ., 99 6 F .2d11 11 (11 th Cir . 19 93 ).” [Se e in fra p artII.] A ft er r ev ie w ing the above r

ule s, G em

m er te le phon ed

“ the of fi ce of the Cl erkin th e Fed eral Dis tri ctCo ur t . . . sev eral da y s b efo re Dece m be r 31 , 20 03 .” 6 D ur ing his c onve rs at ionw iththe w om anw ho answ er ed the te le phon e, he
m en tio ne d L oc al Ru le 4. 20 and a ske d whe the r L oc al Ru le 4. 20 “ ap pli ed
. S he affir m atively told [him ] that Loca l Rule 4.20 applied to [his] situation.” Re spon din g to his state m en t tha t he w as havin g “pr obl em s w ithc ount ing the hol iday s, ” she sa id tha t “ D ec em be r 25 and 2 6thw er e of

fi ci al c ourt ho lid ay s, the extra day being establis hed by

the Pre sident in a special order .” H e then “ counted off the day s accounting for the holiday s and Rule 4.20 and determ ined that Monday , January

5, 2004, w ouldbe the deadline for filing the [m ] otion .” “ Ha d the c le rk e xpr es se d any

doubt .
. . about

the appl ic at ionof

Ru le 4. 20, [ he ] w oul dIf p e t i t i o n e r

i s c o r r e c tth atun d e r

L o c a l R u l e 4
. 2 0 , h i s R

u l e 5 9 ( e ) m o t i o nw a s t i m e l y, 7 a pp lic atio n o f t

he un iqu e c ir c ums tanc e s d oc tr ine is unn e c e ssa ry . H e inv ok e s th e do c tr ine a s a cautionar y measure , rea liz ing that L ocal Rule 4.20’s a pplication is problematic. 7 have c ondu ct ed

a ddi tio na l r es earc h, but

he r an sw er

w as c le ar , e m

phatic , and
unr es er ve d, a s w as he r af

fi rm at ionthat, a cc ount ing f or hol iday s, w ee ke nds, and Ru le 4. 20, January

5, 200 4 w as [ his ] de ad lin e. ” N one the le ss, “ [b ] oththe c le rk and [G em m er] acknowledged that the clerk’ s representations wer e not bind ing.” G em m er goe s onto state that hi s confidence that the m otion had passed m uster as tim ely

wa s increased when the state and the c ourt a ddr es se d th e Appl ic at ionf or Ce rt if ic at e of Appealability

subst antively

[i. e. , f or the purpose of identify ing claim s that sa tis fi ed the c ri te ri on o f 28 U
. S. C. § 22 53( c) (3 )] , r athe r than di sm iss ive ly as ba se d onavoi d no tic e of appe al
. T his buttr es se d [ his ] be lie f that the de nia l of the Mo tio n to A lte r or

A m en d w as ba se d onthe m er its
. Inthe body

of his m oti on f

or r ec onsi de ratio n, pe tit ion er ur ge s th at , in de te rm ini ng whe the r the uni que c ir cum stanc es doc tr ine appl ie s, w e shou ld t ak e int o a cc ount , in ad dit ionto w ha t G em m er say s inhis a ff

idavit , the f

oll ow ing fa ct or s. F ir st, the S tate , in re spon din g to his Ru le 59( e) m oti on, did not c ont en d 7 that i t w as unt im el y . “ H ad it don e so i n ati m el y

f as hio n . . . , [ pe tit ion er ] c oul d ha ve fil edth e Not ic e o f App eal in a ti m el y fas hi on .” Seco nd , [h ] ad the tr ia l j udge de nie d th e Mot ionf or unt im el ine ss J anuary

27, 200 4, [p et iti one r] w oul d have ha d m or e than tw o w ee ks t o se ek r el ie f fo r ex cu sa ble ne gle ct

und er F ed
. R. App. P . 4( a) (5 ). I nst ea d, the la ck of any obj ec tio n or

not ic e of the iss ue in thi s c as e lul le d c ouns el int o pr oc ee din g onFe dera l Rule of Appellate Proc edure 4(a) (4)( A) a lso toll s the time for filinga notice of 8 a pp e a l whe n th e a

pp e lla nt m ov e s th e dis tr ic t c ourt fo r t he e ntr y of jud g me nt u

nd e r R ule 50 (b ), to amend or make a dditional factua l findings unde r Rule 52(b), f or attorne y ’s fe es under

Rule 54, for a new tria l under Rule 59, or f or re lief under

Rule 60 “if the motion is filed no later tha n 10 day s after the judg ment is entere d.” When one of these motions is filed, the time for filingan appea l challeng ing the final judg ment runs “f rom the entry

of the orde r disposing of the last such rema ining motion.” F ed. R. App. P. 4(a) (4)( A). 8 th e sc he du le ba se d o n t he ass um pt io n t he Ru le 59 (e) m ot io n was ti m el y . II. Anot ic e of

appe al c ha lle ngi ng the f

ina l j udgm en t i n ac ivi l a ct ionm ust be fi le d no late r than th irty

day s a ft er

the j udgm en t i s e nte re d onthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s doc ke t. F ed
. R. App. P . 4( a) (1 )( A ). Ati m el y Ru le 59( e) m oti on t o a lte r or a m en d the j udgm en t auto m at ic al ly tol ls this thi rty -d ay

pe ri od, so tha t i t be gin s to r un f ro m the da te of

the or de r de ny ing the m oti on. F ed
. R. App. P . 4( a) (4 )( A ). T he 8
m otion to alter or am end the judgm ent is tim ely if filed “ no later than 10 day s after
en tr y of j udgm en t. ” F ed
. R. Ci v. P . 59( e) ; se e A dvanc ed E sti m at ing S y s. , I nc . v. Ri ne y , 77 F . 3d 1 322, 132 3 ( 11th C ir
. 199 6) ( “ U nti m el y m oti ons unde r Ru le [] 59
. . . w il l n otto ll th e ti m e fo r fi li ng an ap pe al .”). Be ca use the ti m e pe ri od f

or f ili ng a m oti on t o a lte r or

a m en d th e j udgm en t is less than eleven day s, interm ediate Saturday s, S unday s, and legal holiday s are not in cluded in th e com

putatio n. F ed. R . C iv. P. 6(a). L egal holiday s include, int er a lia , Ch ri stm as D ay , N ewY ear’ s D ay , and “ any oth er day appoi nte d a s aA c c o r d i n gt o p e t i t i o n e r , th e m o t i o nw a s t i m e l y i f o n e t ak e s i n t o a c c o un tth r e e d ays 9 under L ocal Rule 4.20 a

nd Dec ember

26 as a “ day

appointed as a

holiday by the President.” See Fe d. R. Civ. P . 6(a) . In his affidavit, Gemmer states that the cler k’s offic e employee w ith whom he spoke ove r the tele phone told him that the President had appointed D ece mber 26 a holiday
. Th e re c or d d oe s n ot i nd ic ate wh e the r D e c e mbe r 2 6 w a s in fa c t su c h a

ho lid ay , a

nd we de c lin e to take judicial notice of the matter on our own initiative. Whether De cembe r 26 wa s a dec lare d holiday is of no moment, however . Petitioner fails to convince us that L ocal Rule 4.20 provide d him three e x tra da

y s to file his Rule 59(e) motion. In short, even if Dec ember

26 was a holiday order ed by

the President, petitioner ha d to file his motion no l ater than Wednesday , Dec ember 31, 2003. 9 hol iday by the P re sid en t or

the Co ngr es s of

the U nit ed

S tate s . . . . ” I d. In th is cas e, th e jud gm en t was en te redon Mo nd ay , Decem be r 15 , 20 03 . To tol l the ti m e fo r fi lin g an a ppe al , pe tit ion er ’ s m oti on t o a lte r or a m en d th e ju d g men th a dt o h a v e b e e nf i l e db y Tu e s d ay, D e c e mb e r 3 0 , wh i c h wa s t e nd ays late r, not c ount ing tw o w ee ke nds an d C hr istm as D ay . T he m oti on w as a ct ua lly fi le d onJanuary

5, 200 4. T he m oti on w as the re fo re unt im el y and d id n ot t oll the 9 t i me f o r f i l i n g an o t i c e o f

ap p e a l f r o m th e De c e mb e r

1 5 ju d g men t . Ac c o r d i n g l y, the not ic e of

appe al w as due , a s pr es cr ibe d by F ed er al Ru le of

Appe llate Pr oc ed ur e 4( a) (4 )( A ), on J anuary 14, 200 4, w hic h w as thi rty day s a ft er

the e ntr y of the D ec em

be r 15 j udgm en t. T he not ic e of appe al pe tit ion er

f ile d onF eb ru ar

y 27, 2 0 0 4 wa s th e r e f

o r e u n t i mel y. A cc or din g to his a ff

idavit , G em

m er be lie ve d th at

“ Fe d. R. Ci v. P [. ] 6 and Loca l Rule 4.20 .
. . provided for three additional day s to file when there had been
se rv ic e of anot ic e or

pa pe r by m ai l. ” H e ha d r ec ei ve d th e D ec em be r 15, 200 3The pa nel’s opinion in Cavaliere does not indicate whether Cavaliere contende d that 10 he re c e ive d th e fi na l ju dgme nt b y ma il. Ac c or din gto t

he op ini on , h is a

rgume nt w a s “ a s f

oll ow s: Un de r R ule 77 (d ), the c ourt

c le rk wa s r e qu ir e d to se rv e the jud g me nt o n Ca va lie re by ma il; Cavaliere had the ‘ rig ht’ to file his motion for a newtrial ‘within a pre scribed pe riod’; there fore , Cavaliere was e ntitled to three extra day s.” 996 F .2d at 1113. The f act that Rule 77(d) require s th e c l erk t o n o t i fy th e p art i es o f t h e e n try

o f f i n al j u d gm en td o es n o tex t en d th e t i m e f

o r f i l i n g a notice of a

ppeal a nd, thus, the time for filinga Rule 59 motion. See supra note 5. 10 j udgm en t by

m ai l; ne ve rthe le ss, he w as “ not sur e w he the r the loc al r

ule appl ie d to [his Rule 59(e)] Motion.” T he Ru le 6 pr ovi sio n G em m er w as r ef er ri ng t o is part

( e) , w hic h w e quot e in the m ar gin
. S ee sup ra

not e 5. G em

m er w as unf am ili ar w ithour de ci sio n in Cava lie re v. A lls tate I ns. Co
. , 996 F . 2d 1 111 (1 1thCi r. 199 3)
. H ad he r ea d it , he
w o u l dh a v e d i s c o v e r e dth a tth e ap p e l l an tth e r e , C a v a l i e r e , ma d e th e s a me argum ent about Rule 6(e) that he and his co-counsel advance here. Cavalier e ar gue d th at

be ca use the f ina l j udgm en t w as “ se rv ed ” by the c le rk of the c ourt by
m ai l, Ru le 6( e) pr ovi de d hi m w iththr ee e xtr a day s to f ile his Ru le 50( b) m oti on 10 for newtrial. W e re

j ected Caviliere’ s argum ent. W e held that Rule 6(b), which bars the district court from “ extend[ing] the tim e for taking any action under Rules 50( b)
. . . and [ 59] (e ), ” re nde rs Ru le 6( e) ine ff ec tiv e w ithr es pe ct

to the ti m e fo r filing Rule 59 m otion s. G iven this holdi ng, is petition er’ s argum ent that Local Ru le 4. 20 p ro vid ed

him w iththr ee e xtr a day s f

or f ili ng h is R

ule 59( e) m oti on va li d? The an swe r ha s t o b e n o.11

The district court prom

ulgated Local Rule 4. 20 un der the authority provided by 28 U
. S. C. § 20 71( a) , w hic h st at es : T he S upr em e Co urt and a ll co urts e sta bli she d by

A ct of Co ngr es s m ay f ro m ti m e to t im e pr es cr ibe r

ule s f or the c ondu ct

of the ir busi ne ss. S uc h r

ule s sh al l be c onsi ste nt w ithA ct s of Co ngr es s and ru le s o f pr act ic e an d p ro cedur e p res cri be d u nd er [2 8 U.S.C. § 20 72 ]. (e m pha sis a dde d. ). F ed er al Ru le of Ci vil P ro ce dur e 6 ( an d e ac h of it s su bpart s)
w as pr es cr ibe d un de r § 20 72. R ule 83 s tate s inpart

( a) that “ [a ] loc al r

ule sha ll be consist ent with—but no t dupl icative of—A cts of Congress and rules adopted unde r 28 U
. S. C. §20 72 .
. . . ” L oc al Ru le 4. 20, to the e xte nt i t i s in co nsi ste nt w ith Ru le 6( e) , is the re fo re inv al id. L oc al Ru le 4. 20’ s a llo w an ce of thr ee e xtr a day s f

or fi l i n g Ru l e 5 9 m o t i o n s i s i n co n s i s t en twi th Ru l e 6 (b )’s b an o nex t en d i n g th e ru l e’s te n- day li m itatio ns p er iod

and i s th er ef

or e a nul lity . I n sum , pe tit ion er ’ s R ule 5 9 ( e ) mo t i o nwa s u n t i mel y. III . Pe tit ion er a sks that w e tr eat hi s m oti on a s ti m el y und er the “ uni que ci rc u m s t an ce s ” d o ct ri n e. Th e u n i qu e c i rc u m s t an ce s d o ct ri n e e x cu s es a l i t i g an t ’s failure to abide by

the j urisdictio nal tim e lim itations established bythe rules, such as the ten-day

lim itations period prescribed by Rule 59, when the failure is caused by the li ti ga nt ’s reas on ab le rel ia nc e o n asp eci fic ass ur an ce b y a jud ic ia l o ffi cer.12

H oll ins v. D ep ’ t of

Co rr . , 191 F . 3d 1 324, 132 7 ( 11th C ir
. 199 9)
. I n de te rm ini ng w he the r the doc tr ine sho uld be inv oke d, w e fo cu s on“ the r ea sona ble ne ss o f the ap pe ll an t’s re li an ce o n t he act io n o f th e d is tri ctco ur t.” Pi ni on v. Do w Che m ., U . S. A
. , 928 F . 2d 1 522, 153 2 ( 11th C ir
. 199 1)
. “ [A ] ny j udi ci al a ct ionpr ior

to the
expir at ionof

the r el ev an t t im e pe ri od f or a ppe al that c oul d have lul le d th e ap pe llant i nto ina ct ivi ty

m ay pe rm it our

appl ic at ionof

the doc tr ine
. ” H oll ins , 191 F.3 d a t 1 32 7 (c it in g P in io n, 9 28 F.2dat 1 52 9) (m ark s an d c it at io ns om it te d)
. T he uni que c ir cum stanc es pe tit ion er c ite s are se t out i n G em

m er ’ s a ff idavit
an d th e body

of pe tit ion er ’ s m oti on f

or r ec onsi de ratio n. R ed

uc ed to the ir
es se nti al s, the y

are : ( 1) that G em

m er obt ai ne d th e as sis tanc e of som eo ne in the cl erk ’s o ff

i ce t o ca l cu l at e t h e n u m

b ero f d ays h e h adi nwh i ch t o fi l e p et i t i o n er ’s Rule 59(e) m otion ; specifically , the holiday s that wer e to be counted and whether, under Rule 6(e) and Local Rule 4. 20, he had three e xtra day s, in addition to the ten day s pr ovi de d by

the r ule , to fi le the m oti on; ( 2) that the S tate did not obj ec t t o th e m oti on a s un tim el y ; and ( 3) that the dis tr ic t c ourt, in de ny ing the m oti on, did not do so on th e g ro un d t ha t i t was un ti m el y fil ed
. The f acts petitioner relies upon to s atisfy the uniqu e circ um stances inqui ry m ir ro r tho se r el ie d up on b y

appe llant D owCh em ic al in Pi nio n. I f anythi ng, D ow Chem ical presented a stronger c ase for the application o f the doctrine thanTh e no tic e of a pp e a l w a s so late that any e xten sio n F e de ra l Ru le of Ap pe llate 11 Procedur e 4(a )(5) may

have pr ovided was una

vailable. 13 pe tit ion er ha s. I n P ini on, the dis tr ic t c ourt, giv ing e ff ec t t o th e j ur

y ’ s ve rd ic t, en te reda $2 ,45 0,0 00 jud gm en t ag ai ns t Do w Che m ic al . 92 8 F .2dat 1 52 4. Two day s late r, D owCh em ic al pr es en te d th e co urt w ithac onse nt o rd er ( sig ne d by
co unse l f or D owCh em ic al and the pla int if fs ) pur portin g to giv e D owCh em ic al a thi rty -d ay e xte nsi on t o f

ile pos t- tr ia l m oti ons. I d. T he c ourt si gne d th at c onse nt order and another consent order several w eeks later. Id. W ithin the tim e provided by the se co nd e xte nsi on, D owCh em ic al f ile d am oti on f

or j udgm en t notw ith standi ng the ve rd ic t purs uant t o R ule 50( b) of

the F ed er al Ru le s of

Ci vil Pr oc ed ur e an d, a lte rn at ive ly , am oti on f or ne wtr ia l purs uant t o R

ule 59. I d. T he
co urt de nie d bo th m oti ons, and D owCh em ic al appe al ed
. I d. D owCh em ic al f

ile d it s no tic e of

appe al nin ety -s ix d ay s a ft er the e ntr y of final j udgm ent, long after the thirty -day appeal period Rule 4(a) of the Feder al Ru le s of Appe llate P ro ce dur e pr ovi de s. A lth oughthe pla int if fs did not que sti on 11
our j ur isd ic tio n to e nte rt ai n th e ap pe al , w e did so o w n our ow n in iti at ive
. I d. A ft er c onc lud ing that D owCh em ic al ’ s po st- tr ia l m oti ons w er e unt im el y and thu s di d no t t oll the ti m e fo r takin g an a ppe al und er

Ru le 4( a) , w e launc he d in to the uni que c ir cum stanc es inquir y , a sse ssi ng the “ re as ona

ble ne ss o f [D ow14

C h e mi c a l ’s ] r e l i an c e o nth e a c t i o no f th e d i s tr i c tc o urt . ” Id
. a t1 5 3 2
. S p e c i f i c a l l y,

“ [w ] as it r ea sona ble f or D owto re ly

upo n th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s im pr ope r ex te nsi on of the ti m e fo r fi lin g po st- tr ia l m oti ons, in spi te of the e xpl ic it langua ge of

Ru le 6( b) pr ohi bit ing the dis tr ic t c ourt f ro m gr an tin g su chan e xte nsi on?” I d. O ur answer wa s clear: “ When the problem is fram ed in this m anner, we m ust answer

‘ No. ’ ” I d. “ [T ] he m ore appare nt it becom es that the party ’ s filing error stem s as m uc h f ro m the party ’ s own ne gli ge nc e in s im ply not r ea din g or

inquir ing about

the Ru le s, a s it

doe s f ro m a ct ua l r el ianc e on s om e ac tio n by the dis tr ic t c ourt, the ci rcu m st an ces be co m e farles s ‘un iq ue .’ ” Id . at 1 53 3. InP ini on, c ouns el a dm itt ed that the y “ ‘ ina dve rt en tly

ove rl ooke d th e Ru le 6( b) pr ohi bit ion
. ’ ” I d. I n th e ca se a t hand, pe tit ion er ’ s c ouns el w as sim ilarl y neglectful, overlooking Rul e(6)( b)’ s prohib ition and our decision in Cavaliere
. In Pinion, we cited the T hird Circuit’ s com m ents in a case prese nting a sim ilar
sc en ar io: The unique circum stances doctrine has never been extended to an attor ne y ’ s m isc al cu latio n of

the appl ic ab le ti m e lim its , and w e se e no reason to do so here e ven if the trial j udge also sh ared that incorre ct as sum pti on. Id. ( quot ing Kraus v. Consol idated Rail Corp., 899 F.2d 1360 , 1365-66 (3d Cir. 1990 )). W e also cited a T enth Circuit case f or the proposi tion th at an attorney15

cannot r ea sona bly r el y on an im pr ope r en larg em en t of

the ti m e to f

ile anot ic e of appeal “ in ligh t of his ‘ dutyto fam iliarize him self w ith the appellate rules.’ ” Se e id. ( quot ing C er

ta in Unde rwri te rs a t L loy ds o f L ondo n v. E vans, 895 F . 2d 1 255, 1257 -5 8 ( 10th C ir
. 199 0) ). I n r ej ec tin g th e ar gum en t tha t c ouns el w er e j ust if ie d in
re ly ing on the dis tr ic t c our t’ s un law fu l r

uli ng, the Ce rt ai n U nde rwri te rs c ourt sa id: counsel either “ knew or should have kn own” that the district court had exceeded the m ax im

um a llo w ab le e xte nsi on unde r App. Ru le 4( a) (5 ). 896 F . 2d at 12 58. S o, too, in Pinion: counsel wer e not entitled to rely on the dist rict court entry of an
or de r ex te ndi ng the te n- day pe ri od f or f ili ng p ost -tri al m oti ons unde r Ru le s 50 (b )
an d 59
. T o th is e ff

ec t w e ci te d aS ev en th C ir cu it obse rv at ionin “ U nit ed S tate s v. Hill, 826 F.2d 507, 508 (7th Cir. 1987 ) (‘ The S uprem e Court has not held or even hin te d th at

ade fe ndant’ s own ne gle ct , or that of his law y er , e xte nds a juri sd ic ti on al ti m e li m it .’ ).” Pi ni on , 92 8 F .2dat 1 53 3. P i n i o nmak e s c l e ar

th a ti twa s u n r e a s o n ab l e f o r p e t i t i o n e r ’s c o u n s e l t o r e l y on the S tate ’ s f

ai lur e to o ppos e pe tit ion er ’ s R ule 59( e) m oti on a s ti m e- barr ed or to re ad the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of the m oti on a s ar

uli ng o n it s m er its
. A nd, if
co unse l i n P ini on c oul d no t r el y on the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e xte nsi on o rd er s, c er ta inl y co u n s el i nth i s ca s e c o u l dn o tre l y o nan un kn o wn cl erk ’s o ff i ce empl o yee’s
s t at emen tth atLo ca l Ru l e 4 .2 0 g av e c o u n s el th re e e x trad ays t o fi l e p et i t i o n er ’sPetitioner argues that Will is v. Newsome, 747 F .2d 605 (11th Cir. 1984), in which we 12 provided re lief under

the unique cir cumstance s doctrine, dictates our dec ision. W e disagree . The circ umstances in that ca se and the circ umstances he re c annot re asonably be conside red analog ous. There , “the district cour t’s filing c lerk” told appellant’s attorne y that appellant’ s notice of a

ppeal would be stamped filed on the date he plac ed the notice in the United States ma ils . I d. at 60 6. In e sse nc e , what th e fi lin gc le rk tol d c ouns e l w a s th at th e po st o ff ic e wa s a repository

of the c lerk’s of

fice , a re prese ntation that counsel could ne ither af firm nor re fute by consulting the Fe dera l Rules of Procedur e or the case law. 16 m otion , e specially

after the em ploy ee told counsel, in Gem m er’ s words, that her

“ rep res en ta ti on s wer e n otbi nd in g.” 12 Prec edent requires that we deny petition er’ s m otion for r econsideration. It i s , a c c o r d i n g l y, DENIED.17

BL A CK , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , spe ci al ly

c onc ur ri ng: Bec au se th is is a cap it al cas e, I fi ndth e res ul t re ach edto da y ve ry tro ub li ng . U lti m at el y , how ev er , the f ac ts i n th is c as e do n ot p er m it us t o a

ppl y the “ uni que ci rcu m st an ces ” d oc tri ne . The re was no rel ia nc e upo n arep res en ta ti on or o rd er fro m th e d is tri ctco ur t. See Butler v. Coral Volkswagen, Inc. , 804 F . 2d 6 12, 613 ( 11th C ir
. 198 6) (d isc uss ing pe tit ion er ’ s r el ianc e on the dis tr ic t c our t’ s e xte nsi on o f the ti m e in
w hic h ane wtr ia l m oti on c oul d be a m en de d) ; In glese v . W arde n, U
. S. P en ite nti ary , 6 8 7 F. 2 d3 6 2 , 3 6 2

– 6 3 (1 1 th Ci r. 1 9 8 2 ) ( d i s cu s s i n g p et i t i o n er ’s reliance on the dis trict court’ s order extending th e tim e in which a R ule 59(e)
m oti on c oul d be f

ile d)
. N or

w as the re r el ianc e on a ssuranc es r ec ei ve d f ro m the cl er k’ s of fi ce pe rt ai nin g to the a dm ini str at ive f unc tio ns o f the c le rk ’ s of fi ce , about whi ch att orne y

fam il ia rit y

co ul d n otbe pre su m ed
. Se e H oll ins v . D ep art

m en t of Co rre ct ion s , 191 F. 3d 13 24, 1326 (11t h Cir. 1999 ) (observing that the dis trict court’ s PAC ER

sy stem failed to show the district court’ s entry of a f inal order); W il lis v. N ews ome , 7 4 7 F. 2 d6 0 5 , 6 0 6 (1 1 th Ci r. 1 9 8 4 ) ( n o t i n g th atth e c l erk ’s office gave assurances regar ding “ local custom ” and practice for stam ping notices of ap pe al ). He re, Petitioner’ s counsel called and asked the clerk for le gal18

advice—sp ec if

ic al ly , howto int er

pr et the pr oc ed

ur al r ule s r eg ar din g th e tim e fo r fi lin g aRu le 59( e) m oti on. P et iti one r thu s di d no t r el y on e ith er r ep re se ntatio ns m ade by the district court or assurances fr om the clerk’ s office per

taining to an adm ini str at ive f

unc tio n. T he “ uni que c ir cum stanc es ” doc tr ine doe s no t pe rm it us t o r ea ssi gn the law y er ’ s ob lig at ionto re ad the r el ev an t r

ule s and c as e law . I n othe r w or ds, it is
no t t he res po ns ib il it y

of t he cle rk ’s off

ic e to in fo rm

th e la wy er o f th e la w. See Re zzon ico v. H & R Block, Inc. , 182 F . 3d 1 44, 152 ( 2d C ir
. 199 9) ( fi ndi ng n o u n i qu e c i rc u m s t an ce s wh er e ap p el l an t s re l i edo nre p re s en t at i o n s fr o m th e c l erk ’s office involving legal m atters). A s we have previouslynoted, even in a ca se as gr av e as thi s, an e qui ta

ble r em edy

suc h a s th e “ uni que c ir cum stanc es ” doc tr ine does “ not exist m erely

to rehabilitate attorney

oversight o r inadvertence. ” P ini on v. Dow Ch emic al

, U.S.A. , 928 F . 2d 1 522, 153 4 ( 11th C ir
. 199 1)
. T he re fo re , I m ust ve ry r el uc tantl y

j oinin the opi nio n.19

CA RN E S, Ci rc uit

Jud ge , spe ci al ly

c onc ur ri ng: Like Judge Black, I’ m

not fond o f the re sult in this case but recognize that th e la w andth e fac ts wit h wh ic h we a re p res en te d re qu ire it
. This w ould -be appellant has an experienced attorney who serves a s Ass is ta ntCap it al Co ll at eral Reg io na l Co un se l-M id dl e Reg io n o f Fl or id a. Experience d as this coun sel is, he scr ew ed up. If one credits his affidavit, which given th e present posture of the case w e m ust, he unjustifiably

sough t and relied uponthe a dvi ce of

an un ide nti fi ed

pe rs on i n th e loc al c le rk ’ s of fi ce w he n he c oul d
an d sh oul d have f

ound the answ er

to his le ga l qu es tio n hi m se lf
. N ot o nly

that, but his affidavit disclos es that both th e person in the clerk’ s office and coun sel
ac know le dge d duri ng the ir te le phon e co nve rs at ion“ that the c le rk ’ s r ep re se ntatio ns we re not bindin g.” In these circ um stances, r eliance upon that advice was unreasonable to say the least, and m ore to the point, it is ou tside our un ique circum stances doctrine. Se e Pi nio n v. D owCh em . U . S. A
. , 928 F . 2d 1 522 (1 1thCi r. 199 1) ; W ill is v
. N ew som e, 747 F . 2d 6 05, 606 ( 11th C ir
. 198 4)
. I f co unse l ha d su ff ic ie ntl y re se ar ch ed

the m atte r ab out

w hic h he ha d aque sti on, a s he sho uld have , he w oul d have turn ed

up o ur de ci sio n inCava lie re v. A lls tate I ns. Co
. , 996 F . 2d 1 111 (1 1th Ci r. 199 3) , and F ed
. R. Ci v. P. 83( a) (1 ). I nst ea d, he put a t r isk his c lie nt’ s r igh t t o20

ap pe al the j udgm en t a ga ins t hi m in re tur n f or the pr ospe ct

of ga ini ng a f ewday s ex tra ti m e fo r fi li ng a Ru le 59 (e) m ot io n. If thi s w er e a ca se inv olv ing tw o c or por at ion s, w e w oul d a

ppl y the
es ta bli she d r ule s, w hic h r equir e that w e dis m iss the appe al , and w oul d do that w ith little or no d isc uss ion
. Wha t ha s br ough t f orth m or e in r es pons e to the m oti on f or re co nsi de ratio n inthi s c as e is the f ac t tha t the party

w hose appe al is be ing dis m iss ed is on d eath r ow , and the j udgm en t he is se ek ing to ap pe al is one de ny ing him f ed er al ha be as r el ie f. T ha t m ak es us a s j udge s w an t t o he ar and d ec ide the appeal instead of dism iss it for lack of j urisdictio n because of an untim ely notice of appeal. H owever , the r ules relating to tim eliness of filing and app ellate court j ur isd ic tio n a

ppl y w ith out r es pe ct to the ide nti ty

of the part ie s or

the na tur e of

the
case. W e do not have on e set of r ules for petitioners and their attorney s in capital
cas es an d a no th er s etforev eryone els e. As jud ge s we a re o bl ig at edto fol lo w th e la w, reg ard le ss of wh et he r we pe rs on al ly lik e th e res ul t o f do in g s o. We hav e d on e th at .