79984 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 244 / Tuesday, December 21, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

failure or disruption on critical markets 

and financial institutions? For example, 

how might the Council assess potential 

credit and liquidity effects and 

spillovers from a financial market utility 

disruption? 

b. What factors should the Council 

consider when determining whether 

markets served by financial market 

utilities are critical? What qualitative or 

quantitative characteristics might lead 

the Council to scope in or out particular 

markets? 

8. Title VIII of the DFA contains 

distinct provisions with respect to 

financial market utilities and financial 

institutions engaged in payment, 

clearing and settlement activities. What 

factors should the Council consider in 

distinguishing between a systemically 

important financial market utility and a 

financial institution that is very 

substantially engaged in a systemically 

important payment, clearing, or 

settlement activity? 

9. What other types of information 

would be effective in helping the 

Council determine systemic 

importance? What additional factors 

does your organization consider when 

assessing exposure to, or the 

interconnectedness of, financial market 

utilities? 

10. What role should international 

considerations play in designating 

financial market utilities? 

Dated: December 14, 2010. 

Alastair Fitzpayne, 

Deputy Chief of Staff and Executive Secretary, 

Department of the Treasury. 

Statement of CFTC Chairman Gary 

Gensler 

I support the advanced notice of 

proposed rulemaking on the Authority 

to Designate Financial Market Utilities 

as Systematically Important. It is an 

important step in fulfilling the 

requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act to 

ensure that there is robust oversight and 

risk management of financial market 

utilities including clearinghouses. 

Clearinghouses in the futures markets 

have been around since the late-19th 

Century and have functioned both in 

clear skies and during stormy times— 

through the Great Depression, numerous 

bank failures, two world wars and the 

2008 financial crisis—to lower risk to 

the American public. By standing 

between two counterparties, by valuing 

transactions daily, requiring collateral, 

and rigorous risk management 

standards, clearinghouses help ensure 

that the failure of one entity does not 

harm its counterparties and reverberate 

throughout the financial system. 

Comprehensive and robust regulatory 

oversight of clearinghouses, however, is 

essential to our country’s financial 

stability. This is particularly important 

since, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 

Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 

standardized swaps between financial 

entities must be brought to 

clearinghouses. 

The Commodity Futures Trading 

Commission (CFTC) has overseen 

clearinghouses for decades. Currently, it 

oversees 14 clearinghouses and that 

number is expected to increase to 

approximately 20. The Dodd-Frank Act 

provides for enhanced oversight of these 

clearinghouses. In close consultation 

with the Securities and Exchange 

Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, 

other financial regulatory agencies, and 

international regulators, the CFTC is 

currently working to implement a series 

of rulemakings on risk management for 

clearinghouses. These rulemakings will 

take account of relevant international 

standards, particular those developed by 

the Committee on Payment and 

Settlement Systems and the 

International Organization of Securities 

Commissions (CPSS–IOSCO). In some 

instances, these rules also outline 

specific additional requirements for 

systemically important clearinghouses. 

The Dodd-Frank Act gives the 

Financial Stability Oversight Council 

and the Federal Reserve Board 

important roles in clearinghouse 

oversight by authorizing the Council to 

designate certain clearinghouses as 

systemically important and by 

permitting the Federal Reserve to 

recommend heightened prudential 

standards in certain circumstances. 

The advanced notice of proposed 

rulemaking being considered by this 

Council today complements the CFTC’s 

rulemaking efforts. It seeks the public’s 

input on how the Council should apply 

statutory criteria to determine which 

clearinghouses qualify for designation 

as systemically important. 

At the CFTC, we plan on completing 

the rulemaking with regard to 

clearinghouses by the statutory deadline 

of July 15, 2011. Although the effective 

dates of these rules will generally be 

later in 2011, it is my recommendation 

that we as a Council be in position to 

identify systemically important 

clearinghouses by the summer of next 

year. This will provide clarity to 

clearinghouses and market participants 

as to the standards that they will have 

to uphold when the mandatory clearing 

of standardized swaps becomes 

effective. 

[FR Doc. 2010–32005 Filed 12–20–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4810–25–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–1200; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–NM–136–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier, 

Inc. Model BD–100–1A10 (Challenger 

300) Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above that would 

supersede an existing AD. This 

proposed AD results from mandatory 

continuing airworthiness information 

(MCAI) originated by an aviation 

authority of another country to identify 

and correct an unsafe condition on an 

aviation product. The MCAI describes 

the unsafe condition as: 

Investigation of a recent high altitude loss 

of cabin pressurization on a BD–100–1A10 

aircraft determined that it was caused by a 

partial blockage of a safety valve cabin 

pressure-sensing port, in conjunction with a 

dormant failure/leakage of the safety valve 

manometric capsule. The blockage, caused by 

accumulation of lint/dust on the grid of the 

port plug, did not allow sufficient airflow 

through the cabin pressure-sensing port to 

compensate for the rate of leakage from the 

manometric capsule, resulting in the opening 

of the safety valve. It was also determined 

that failure of the manometric capsule alone 

would not result in the opening of the safety 

valve. 

* * * * * 

The unsafe condition is possible loss of 

cabin pressure caused by the opening of 

the safety valve. The proposed AD 

would require actions that are intended 

to address the unsafe condition 

described in the MCAI. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by February 4, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–40, 1200 New Jersey 


jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 244 / Tuesday, December 21, 2010 / Proposed Rules 79985 

Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 

9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this proposed AD, contact Bombardier, 

Inc., 400 Coˆte-Vertu Road West, Dorval, 

Que ́bec H4S 1Y9, Canada; telephone 

514–855–5000; fax 514–855–7401; 

e-mail thd.crj@aero.bombardier.com; 

Internet http://www.bombardier.com. 

You may review copies of the 

referenced service information at the 

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, 

call 425–227–1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this proposed AD, the 

regulatory evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Operations 

office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in 

the ADDRESSES section. Comments will 

be available in the AD docket shortly 

after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Cesar Gomez, Aerospace Engineer, 

Airframe and Mechanical Systems 

Branch, ANE–171, FAA, New York 

Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 1600 

Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, 

New York 11590; telephone (516) 228– 

7318; fax (516) 794–5531. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to send any written 

relevant data, views, or arguments about 

this proposed AD. Send your comments 

to an address listed under the 

ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2010–1200; Directorate Identifier 

2010–NM–136–AD’’ at the beginning of 

your comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of this proposed AD. We will 

consider all comments received by the 

closing date and may amend this 

proposed AD based on those comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this proposed AD. 

Discussion 

On May 3, 2010, we issued AD 2010– 

10–18, Amendment 39–16297 (75 FR 

27406, May 17, 2010). That AD required 

actions intended to address an unsafe 

condition on the products listed above. 

In Note 2 of AD 2010–10–18, we 

explained that the AD did not mandate 

replacement of the cabin pressuresensing port plug in both safety valves, 

with a new gridless plug and that we 

were considering further rulemaking. 

We now have determined that further 

rulemaking is necessary and this NPRM 

follows from that determination. The 

MCAI states: 

Investigation of a recent high altitude loss 

of cabin pressurization on a BD–100–1A10 

aircraft determined that it was caused by a 

partial blockage of a safety valve cabin 

pressure-sensing port, in conjunction with a 

dormant failure/leakage of the safety valve 

manometric capsule. The blockage, caused by 

accumulation of lint/dust on the grid of the 

port plug, did not allow sufficient airflow 

through the cabin pressure-sensing port to 

compensate for the rate of leakage from the 

manometric capsule, resulting in the opening 

of the safety valve. It was also determined 

that failure of the manometric capsule alone 

would not result in the opening of the safety 

valve. 

This directive mandates a revision of the 

maintenance schedule, the [repetitive] 

cleaning of the safety valves, the removal of 

material from the area surrounding the safety 

valves and the modification of the safety 

valves with a gridless cabin pressure-sensing 

port plug. 

The unsafe condition is possible loss of 

cabin pressure caused by the opening of 

the safety valve. The required actions 

also include a detailed visual inspection 

of the safety valves and surrounding 

areas for discrepant material (e.g., 

foreign material surrounding the safety 

valves, room temperature vulcanizing 

(RTV) sealant on safety valves, RTV 

excess on the bulkhead, tape near the 

safety valve opening, and, on certain 

airplanes, insulation near the safety 

valve opening, and foam in the area 

surrounding the safety valves), and for 

contamination found in the safety valve 

pressure ports. If contamination is 

found on the safety valve pressure ports, 

a detailed visual inspection for the 

presence of RTV on the outside and 

inside diameter of the pressure sensing 

port conduit is required. If discrepant 

materials are found, removing 

discrepant material, cleaning the 

surfaces of the valves, and securing 

insulation are required, as applicable. If 

the presence of RTV is detected, 

cleaning the surfaces of the valves and 

installing a new safety valve are 

required, as applicable. You may obtain 

further information by examining the 

MCAI in the AD docket. 

FAA’s Determination and Requirements 

of This Proposed AD 

This product has been approved by 

the aviation authority of another 

country, and is approved for operation 

in the United States. Pursuant to our 

bilateral agreement with the State of 

Design Authority, we have been notified 

of the unsafe condition described in the 

MCAI and service information 

referenced above. We are proposing this 

AD because we evaluated all pertinent 

information and determined an unsafe 

condition exists and is likely to exist or 

develop on other products of the same 

type design. 

Differences Between This AD and the 

MCAI or Service Information 

We have reviewed the MCAI and 

related service information and, in 

general, agree with their substance. But 

we might have found it necessary to use 

different words from those in the MCAI 

to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. 

operators and is enforceable. In making 

these changes, we do not intend to differ 

substantively from the information 

provided in the MCAI and related 

service information. 

We might also have proposed 

different actions in this AD from those 

in the MCAI in order to follow FAA 

policies. Any such differences are 

highlighted in a Note within the 

proposed AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

Based on the service information, we 

estimate that this proposed AD would 

affect about 67 products of U.S. registry. 

The actions that are required by AD 

2010–10–18 and retained in this 

proposed AD take about 9 work-hours 

per product, at an average labor rate of 

$85 per work hour. Required parts cost 

about $0 per product. Based on these 

figures, the estimated cost of the 

currently required actions is $765 per 

product. 

We estimate that it would take about 

1 work-hour per product to comply with 

the new basic requirements of this 

proposed AD. The average labor rate is 

$85 per work-hour. Required parts 

would cost about $0 per product. Where 

the service information lists required 

parts costs that are covered under 

warranty, we have assumed that there 

will be no charge for these costs. As we 

do not control warranty coverage for 

affected parties, some parties may incur 

costs higher than estimated here. Based 

on these figures, we estimate the cost of 

the proposed AD on U.S. operators to be 

$5,695, or $85 per product. 


jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
79986 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 244 / Tuesday, December 21, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this proposed AD 

would not have federalism implications 

under Executive Order 13132. This 

proposed AD would not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

Government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this proposed regulation: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this proposed AD and placed it in the 

AD docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Proposed Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 

39 as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by 

removing Amendment 39–16297 (75 FR 

27406, May 17, 2010) and adding the 

following new AD: 

Bombardier, Inc.: Docket No. FAA–2010– 

1200; Directorate Identifier 2010–NM– 

136–AD. 

Comments Due Date 

(a) We must receive comments by February 

4, 2011. 

Affected ADs 

(b) This AD supersedes AD 2010–10–18, 

Amendment 39–16297. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to Bombardier, Inc. 

Model BD–100–1A10 (Challenger 300) 

airplanes, having serial numbers (S/Ns) 

20001 through 20274 inclusive, certificated 

in any category. 

Note 1: This AD requires revisions to 

certain operator maintenance documents to 

include new inspections. Compliance with 

these inspections is required by 14 CFR 

91.403(c). For airplanes that have been 

previously modified, altered, or repaired in 

the areas addressed by these inspections, the 

operator may not be able to accomplish the 

inspections described in the revisions. In this 

situation, to comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c), 

the operator must request approval for an 

alternative method of compliance according 

to paragraph (l) of this AD. The request 

should include a description of changes to 

the required inspections that will ensure the 

continued operational safety of the airplane. 

Subject 

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 21: Air conditioning. 

Reason 

(e) The mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) states: 

Investigation of a recent high altitude loss 

of cabin pressurization on a BD–100–1A10 

aircraft determined that it was caused by a 

partial blockage of a safety valve cabin 

pressure-sensing port, in conjunction with a 

dormant failure/leakage of the safety valve 

manometric capsule. The blockage, caused by 

accumulation of lint/dust on the grid of the 

port plug, did not allow sufficient airflow 

through the cabin pressure-sensing port to 

compensate for the rate of leakage from the 

manometric capsule, resulting in the opening 

of the safety valve. It was also determined 

that failure of the manometric capsule alone 

would not result in the opening of the safety 

valve. 

* * * * * 

The unsafe condition is possible loss of cabin 

pressure caused by the opening of the safety 

valve. 

Compliance 

(f) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Restatement of Requirements of AD 2010– 

10–18, With No New Service Information 

Actions 

(g) For all airplanes: Within 30 days after 

June 1, 2010 (the effective date of AD 2010– 

10–18, Amendment 39–16297) revise the 

Airworthiness Limitations section of the 

Instructions for Continued Airworthiness by 

incorporating Tasks 21–31–09–101 and 21– 

31–09–102 in the Bombardier Temporary 

Revision (TR) 5–2–53, dated October 1, 2009, 

to Section 5–10–40, ‘‘Certification 

Maintenance Requirements,’’ in Part 2 of 

Chapter 5 of Bombardier Challenger 300 BD– 

100 Time Limits/Maintenance Checks. 

(1) For the new tasks identified in 

Bombardier TR 5–2–53, dated October 1, 

2009: For airplanes identified in the ‘‘Phasein’’ section of Bombardier TR 5–2–53, dated 

October 1, 2009, the initial compliance with 

the new tasks must be carried out in 

accordance with the phase-in schedule 

detailed in Bombardier TR 5–2–53, dated 

October 1, 2009, except where that TR 

specifies a compliance time from the date of 

the TR, this AD requires compliance within 

the specified time after June 1, 2010. 

Thereafter, except as provided by paragraph 

(l)(1) of this AD, no alternative to the task 

intervals may be used. 

(2) When information in Bombardier TR 

5–2–53, dated October 1, 2009, has been 

included in the general revisions of the 

applicable Airworthiness Limitations section, 

that TR may be removed from that 

Airworthiness Limitations section of the 

Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. 

(h) For airplanes having S/Ns 20003 

through 20173 inclusive, 20176, and 20177: 

Within 50 flight hours after June 1, 2010, do 

a detailed visual inspection of the safety 

valves and surrounding areas for discrepant 

material (e.g., foreign material surrounding 

the safety valves, room temperature 

vulcanizing (RTV) sealant on safety valves, 

RTV excess on the bulkhead, tape near the 

safety valve opening, and, on certain 

airplanes, insulation near the safety valve 

opening, and foam in the area surrounding 

the safety valves) and a detailed visual 

inspection for contamination (e.g., RTV, dust, 

or lint) in the safety valve pressure ports, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 

100–25–14, dated June 30, 2008 (for airplanes 

having S/Ns 20124, 20125, 20128, 20134, 

20139, 20143, 20146, 20148 to 20173 

inclusive, 20176, and 20177); or Bombardier 

Service Bulletin 100–25–21, dated June 30, 

2008 (for airplanes having S/Ns 20003 

through 20123 inclusive, 20126, 20127, 

20129 to 20133 inclusive, 20135 to 20138 

inclusive, 20140 to 20142 inclusive, 20144, 

20145, and 20147). 

(1) If any discrepant material is found 

during the detailed visual inspection, before 

further flight, remove the discrepant material, 

clean the surfaces of the valves, and secure 

the insulation, as applicable, in accordance 

with the Accomplishment Instructions of 

Bombardier Service Bulletin 100–25–14, 

dated June 30, 2008 (for airplanes having S/ 

Ns 20124, 20125, 20128, 20134, 20139, 

20143, 20146, 20148 to 20173 inclusive, 

20176, and 20177); or Bombardier Service 


jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 244 / Tuesday, December 21, 2010 / Proposed Rules 79987 

Bulletin 100–25–21, dated June 30, 2008 (for 

airplanes having S/Ns 20003 through 20123 

inclusive, 20126, 20127, 20129 to 20133 

inclusive, 20135 to 20138 inclusive, 20140 to 

20142 inclusive, 20144, 20145, and 20147). 

(2) If contamination (e.g., RTV, dust, or 

lint) is found on the safety valve pressure 

sensing ports, before further flight, do a 

detailed visual inspection of the outside and 

inside diameters of the pressure sensing port 

conduit for the presence of RTV; and do the 

actions specified in paragraph (h)(2)(i) and 

(h)(2)(ii) of this AD, as applicable; in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 

100–25–14, dated June 30, 2008 (for airplanes 

having S/Ns 20124, 20125, 20128, 20134, 

20139, 20143, 20146, 20148 to 20173 

inclusive, 20176, and 20177); or Bombardier 

Service Bulletin 100–25–21, dated June 30, 

2008 (for airplanes having S/Ns 20003 

through 20123 inclusive, 20126, 20127, 

20129 to 20133 inclusive, 20135 to 20138 

inclusive, 20140 to 20142 inclusive, 20144, 

20145, and 20147). 

(i) If no RTV is found, clean the plug of the 

sensing port. 

(ii) If any RTV is found, install a new safety 

valve. 

(i) For airplanes having S/Ns 20174, 20175, 

20178 through 20189 inclusive, 20191 

through 20228 inclusive, 20230 through 

20232 inclusive, 20235, 20237, 20238, 20241, 

20244, 20247, 20249 through 20251 

inclusive, 20254, 20256 and 20259: Within 

50 flight hours after June 1, 2010, clean the 

cabin pressure-sensing port plug in both 

safety valves, in accordance with Paragraph 

2.B., ‘‘Part A—Modification—Cleaning,’’ of 

the Accomplishment Instructions of 

Bombardier Service Bulletin A100–21–08, 

dated June 18, 2009. 

(j) For airplanes having S/Ns 20003 

through 20189 inclusive, 20191 through 

20228 inclusive, 20230 through 20232 

inclusive, 20235, 20237, 20238, 20241, 

20244, 20247, 20249 through 20251 

inclusive, 20254, 20256, and 20259: Within 

50 flight hours after June 1, 2010, clean the 

cabin pressure-sensing port plug in both 

safety valves, in accordance with Paragraph 

2.B., ‘‘Part A—Modification—Cleaning,’’ of 

the Accomplishment Instructions of 

Bombardier Service Bulletin A100–21–08, 

dated June 18, 2009. Repeat the cleaning 

thereafter at intervals not to exceed 50 flight 

hours until the actions specified by 

paragraph (k) of this AD are completed. 

New Requirements of This AD 

(k) For airplanes, having S/Ns 20003 

through 20189 inclusive, 20191 through 

20228 inclusive, 20230 through 20232 

inclusive, 20235, 20237, 20238, 20241, 

20244, 20247, 20249 through 20251 

inclusive, 20254, 20256, and 20259: Within 

12 months after the effective date of this AD, 

replace the cabin pressure-sensing port plug 

having part number (P/N) 2844–060 in both 

safety valves with a new gridless plug having 

P/N 2844–19 and re-identify the safety 

valves, in accordance with Paragraph 2.C., 

‘‘Part B—Modification—Replacement,’’ of the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier 

Service Bulletin A100–21–08, dated June 18, 

2009. Doing the actions in paragraph (k) of 

this AD terminates the repetitive cleanings 

required by paragraph (j) of this AD. 

FAA AD Differences 

Note 2: This AD differs from the MCAI 

and/or service information as follows: No 

differences. 

Other FAA AD Provisions 

(l) The following provisions also apply to 

this AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, New York Aircraft 

Certification Office, ANE–170, FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: 

Program Manager, Continuing Operational 

Safety, FAA, New York ACO, 1600 Stewart 

Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York 

11590; telephone 516–228–7300; fax 516– 

794–5531. Before using any approved AMOC 

on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your principal maintenance inspector 

(PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), 

as appropriate, or lacking a principal 

inspector, your local Flight Standards District 

Office. The AMOC approval letter must 

specifically reference this AD. 

(2) Airworthy Product: For any 

requirement in this AD to obtain corrective 

actions from a manufacturer or other source, 

use these actions if they are FAA-approved. 

Corrective actions are considered FAAapproved if they are approved by the State 

of Design Authority (or their delegated 

agent). You are required to assure the product 

is airworthy before it is returned to service. 

(3) Reporting Requirements: A Federal 

agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a 

person is not required to respond to, nor 

shall a person be subject to a penalty for 

failure to comply with a collection of 

information subject to the requirements of 

the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that 

collection of information displays a current 

valid OMB Control Number. The OMB 

Control Number for this information 

collection is 2120–0056. Public reporting for 

this collection of information is estimated to 

be approximately 5 minutes per response, 

including the time for reviewing instructions, 

completing and reviewing the collection of 

information. All responses to this collection 

of information are mandatory. Comments 

concerning the accuracy of this burden and 

suggestions for reducing the burden should 

be directed to the FAA at: 800 Independence 

Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20591, Attn: 

Information Collection Clearance Officer, 

AES–200. 

Related Information 

(m) Refer to MCAI Canadian Airworthiness 

Directive CF–2010–06, dated February 24, 

2010; and the service information specified 

in Table 1 of this AD; as applicable; for 

related information. 

TABLE 1—SERVICE INFORMATION

Document Date 

Bombardier Service Bulletin A100–21–08 ............................................................................................................................... June 18, 2009. 

Bombardier Service Bulletin 100–25–14 ................................................................................................................................. June 30, 2008. 

Bombardier Service Bulletin 100–25–21 ................................................................................................................................. June 30, 2008. 

Bombardier Temporary Revision 5–2–53, dated October 1, 2009, to Section 5–10–40, ‘‘Certification Maintenance Requirements,’’ in Part 2 of Chapter 5 of Bombardier Challenger 300 BD–100 Time Limits/Maintenance Checks.October 1, 2009. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

December 14, 2010. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2010–31972 Filed 12–20–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 


jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
79988 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 244 / Tuesday, December 21, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–1228; Directorate 

Identifier 2009–SW–12–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Eurocopter 

France Model AS350B, B1, B2, B3, BA, 

and EC130 B4 Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

specified Eurocopter France (ECF) 

helicopters. This proposed AD results 

from a mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) AD 

issued by the European Aviation Safety 

Agency (EASA), which is the Technical 

Agent for the Member States of the 

European Community. The superseding 

MCAI AD states that several engine 

flameouts have involved failure of the 

41-tooth pinion in the engine accessory 

gearbox. Each affected helicopter had a 

starter-generator manufactured by one 

company. Investigation revealed the 

torque damping system of the startergenerator was inoperative due to 

incorrect adjustment and caused 

bending stresses on the 41-tooth pinion. 

Failure of the pinion causes the engine 

fuel pump to stop operating and results 

in an engine flameout. The EASA AD 

requires a new adjustment procedure to 

optimize the performance of the 

specified starter-generator damping 

assembly. These proposed AD actions 

are intended to prevent failure of a 

pinion and a fuel pump, engine 

flameout, and subsequent loss of control 

of the helicopter. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by January 20, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

You may get the service information 

identified in this proposed AD from 

American Eurocopter Corporation, 2701 

Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75053– 

4005, telephone (972) 641–3460, fax 

(972) 641–3527, or at http:// 

www.eurocopter.com. 

Examining the Docket: You may 

examine the AD docket on the Internet 

at http://www.regulations.gov or in 

person at the Docket Operations office 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

The AD docket contains this proposed 

AD, the economic evaluation, any 

comments received, and other 

information. The street address for the 

Docket Operations Office (telephone 

(800) 647–5527) is stated in the 

ADDRESSES section of this proposal. 

Comments will be available in the AD 

docket shortly after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

DOT/FAA Southwest Region, Ed 

Cuevas, ASW–112, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, Rotorcraft Directorate, Safety 

Management Group, 2601 Meacham 

Blvd. Fort Worth, Texas 76137, 

telephone (817) 222–5355, fax (817) 

222–5961. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to send any written 

data, views, or arguments about this 

proposed AD. Send your comments to 

an address listed in the ADDRESSES

section of this proposal. Include ‘‘Docket 

No. FAA–2010–1228; Directorate 

Identifier 2009–SW–12–AD’’ at the 

beginning of your comments. We 

specifically invite comments on the 

overall regulatory, economic, 

environmental, and energy aspects of 

this proposed AD. We will consider all 

comments received by the closing date 

and may amend this proposed AD based 

on those comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this proposed AD. 

Discussion 

The EASA, which is the Technical 

Agent for the Member States of the 

European Community, has issued EASA 

AD No. 2009–0027, dated February 18, 

2009, which supersedes and cancels 

EASA AD No. 2009–0004, dated January 

12, 2009, to correct an unsafe condition 

for the specified ECF model helicopters. 

Pending additional investigations, 

EASA AD No. 2009–0004, dated January 

12, 2009, required an inspection of the 

alignment and torque of the Aircraft 

Parts Corporation (APC) (currently 

UNISON) starter-generator damping 

assembly and, in case of discrepancies, 

conducting corrective actions. The 

MCAI AD states that failure of the 41- 

tooth pinion in the engine accessory 

gearbox resulted in engine flameouts. 

Each affected helicopter was equipped 

with starter-generators manufactured by 

APC. The additional investigations 

revealed the torque damping system of 

the starter-generator was inoperative 

due to incorrect adjustment. EASA AD 

No. 2009–0004 required a check of the 

tightness of the starter-generator 

damping system and angle 

measurements. 

After further investigation, EASA 

issued AD 2009–0027, dated February 

18, 2009, to require disassembling the 

damping system, replacing the cup 

springs and self-locking nut, and 

reassembling by following a new 

procedure, which has proven to be more 

reliable and optimizes the performance 

of the APC starter-generator damping 

assembly. The proposed actions are 

intended to prevent failure of a pinion 

and a fuel pump, engine flameout, and 

subsequent loss of control of the 

helicopter. 

You may obtain further information 

by examining the MCAI AD and any 

related service information in the AD 

docket. 

Related Service Information 

ECF has issued Alert Service Bulletin 

(ASB) No. 80.00.07, Revision 1, dated 

February 6, 2009, for the Model AS350 

B, BA, BB, B1, B2, and B3 helicopters 

(ASB 80.00.07); and ASB No. 80A003, 

Revision 1, dated February 6, 2009, for 

the Model EC130 B4 helicopter 

(80A003). The Model AS350 BB 

helicopter is not type certificated in the 

United States. ECF has received reports 

of ARRIEL engine flameouts due to 

failure of the 41-tooth pinion in the 

engine accessory gearbox. The failure of 

this pinion causes the fuel pump to stop 

and results in engine flameout. The 

affected helicopters had an APC startergenerator installed. Investigation 

revealed the torque damping system of 

the starter-generator to be inoperative 

due to incorrect adjustment. These 

ASBs specify disassembly of the 

damping system, replacing the 


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