4356343306 

Todd C. Emerson, #817 5 

SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC. 

444 South River Road 

St. George, Utah, 84790 

Telephone: (435) 634-3530 

Facsimile: (435) 634-3505 

18:08:18 02-22-2013 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

In the Matter of: DMS No. FAA-2011-0782 

FAA Case No.: 2010NM060081 

SkyWest Airlines, Inc. RESPONDENT'S POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Judge: Richard C. Goodwin 

Introduction 

This case involves the inspection of an airplane that was not broken. Indeed, the entire 

basis for this matter is far removed from any determination of"airworthiness"- whether the 

airplane met its type certificate and was in a condition for safe operation. Instead, it is focused 

on semantics and the unsupported opinion of a lone FAA inspector. 

The factual details are not complex. The SkyWest CRJ 200 is equipped with several 

redundant systems, including dual air conditioning packs. On May 30, 2010, aircraft N948SW 

was legally operating on a single pack. However, the flight crew failed to account for the single 

pack configuration and advanced the engine throttles too quickly when initiating the takeoff roll. 

That rapid throttle movement temporarily caused a "spike" in pressure which "latched" an overpressure message in the cockpit. Although the pressure regulated a moment later, the crew 

decided to abort the takeoff attempt due to presence of the latched fault message. 

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The overpressure was not a surprise, considering that in the aircraft's configuration, twice 

the nonnal pressure was suddenly going through a single pack. In fact, it was anticipated and 

SkyWest pilots have long been instructed, when operating on a single pack, to advance the 

engine throttle levers gradually to avoid a spike in pressure. The approved minimum equipment 

list (MEL) notes that such gradual movement is required. Therefore, when the throttles are 

moved quickly, the overpressure is a known condition·- and the aircraft functioned precisely as 

expected. 

Since the reason for the fault message was readily apparent, the flight crew could have 

simply reset the system to clear the latched fault message, per the operating manual, and 

continued on their way. No maintenance was needed. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of 

caution, the flight crew called maintenance control for additional advice, and the maintenance 

controller summoned a line mechanic to the aircraft. In short, SkyWest took extra steps after the 

source of the fault- operational error- was determined, to make certain a malfunction had not 

occurred. This permissive delay belies the FAA's contention that "time is money and (Sk.yWest) 

wanted to get this aircraft back into the air as quickly as possible. "2 Sky West finds itself·' · 

ironically penalized for its extra efforts in this instance. As lamented by Elphaba, "no good deed 

goes unpunished. "3 

After being notified by maintenance control, the Sky West mechanic met the plane at the 

gate and confinned the crew had not gradually advanced the throttles when the takeoff attempt 

was initiated, despite the single pack configuration. After performing the reset procedure for the 

flight crew, the mechanic ran the aircraft engines and advanced the throttles fo verify the system 

was operating within nmmal parameters and that the fault had been cleared. He then signed the 

logbook, noting the information referenced for the reset procedure and describing the standard 

engine run he performed to inspect the system, and returned the aircraft to service. The aircraft 

was subsequently operated on multiple flights without any similar fault, further evidencing that.' 

this particular event was an operational error by the flight crew and not mechanical failure of an 

aircraft system. As with the maintenance controller, the prudent actions ofthe mechanic, which 

resulted in additional aircraft delay, disprove the FAA's contention that Sky West took a slapdash 

approach. 

2 Complainant's Brief at p. 7, line 30. 3 When dealing with an overzealous regulator, perhaps it is best to remember Lazarus Long's advice, "Good 

intentions are no substitute for knowing how the buzzsaw works." 

2 

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The episode is unremarkable, but for three letters that have given the FAA dyspepsia: 

QRH. The mere presence of these letters in the maintenance record has driven the FAA to the 

untenable position that a mechanic may not ever utilize an operational manual as he interacts 

with an airplane. 5 Indeed, the FAA's rationale in this case is that, no matter how useful in 

operating or determining the proper operation of an aircraft system, a mechanic is narrowly 

limited to referencing documents specifically developed for a mechanic's eyes only. Except for 

the personal opinion of Skeeter Ghering, this extreme position is unsupported by any FAA 

authority, and is contrary to decades of industry practice. 

Even ifthe FAA's stricture is applied, it still cannot escape the discretion that SkyWest 

has, under applicable regulations 11 and its General Maintenance Manual (GMM) 12, for 

determining or developing methods, techniques or practices, so long as it returns the article to its 

original or properly altered condition. In addition to not having shown how a system reset 

procedure fits the regulatory definition of maintenance, 15 the FAA has failed to show how use of 

the QRH was unacceptable to the Administrator. As stated by the FAA Office of Chief Counsel, 

"the agency would have to show how the method, technique, or practice used was unacceptable" 

(emphasis in original) to prove a violation of the maintenance performance rule. 16 

Statement of Facts 

1. On May 30, 2010, SkyWest mechanic Joshua Harmon was notified that aircraft 948SW 

had aborted takeoff. 17 

2. He spoke with SkyWest maintenance control and learned the aircraft was operating on 

one air conditioning pack 18 

3. He also learned the pi1othad not followed the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) 

instruction to "advance the thrust levers slowly to prevent an overpressure of the operating 

pack."19 

5 Skeeter Ghering testimony, Transcript at 106-107. 11 See, for example, 14 CFR §§ 43.!3(c) and 121.367(a). 12 Ex. C-1. GMM page 4, section l(A)2(a). 15 See 14 CFR § 1.1. 16 See FAA legal interpretation to Albert T. MacMillan dated April22, 2011. 17 Joshua Harmon interview, Ex. C-5 

18 Steve Smith interview, Ex. C-5 19 Id. See Exhibit R-2 

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4. When he spoke to the flight crew, they "stated that they had not followed an SOP for a 

single pack takeoff and advanced the throttle too rapidly."20 

5. He reset the system and performed several static throttle ups without spiking the system 

or indicating a fault. 2 l 

6. He tested the pressure sensor and saw that it did not latch an overpressure fault. 22 

7. He accessed the aircraft computer to evaluate any stored fault data. 23 

8. He then demonstrated to the flight crew that "the system would not over-pressurize as 

long as the throttle is advanced slowly which prevents a spike in pressure."24 

9. The aircraft was not malfunctioning. The fault had been induced by improper operation. 

"Based on the discussion with the flight crew I knew they had advanced the throttles too fast and 

not used the APU on takeoff, so it was an induced failure."25 

10. After carrying the cabin pressure burden on its own for two days and eight flights, the 

right air conditioning pack finally failed for the first time on June 1.26 

ARGUMENT 

A. The Aircraft Was Properly Inspected and Returned to Service. 

1. The Quick Reference Handbook ("QRH") Was Not Used To Perform 

Maintenance. 

Although the aircraft returned to the gate, it was actually operating within expected 

parameters. As noted by two different Sky West mechanics, the flight crew induced the fault by 

not following the aircraft operating procedures when one "pack" is deferred per the SkyWest 

minimum equipment list (MEL). 27 With the source ofthe.fault identified as crew operating error 

(after conferring with the maintenance controller), the captain could have reasonably decided to 

20 Harmon interview, Ex. C-5 

zt Id. 

22 Id. 

23 Id. 

24 Id. 

25 Id. 26 Ex. R-1. 

27 Ex. C-5. 

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simply reset the system as provided in the QRH for the aircraft. That is, since the flight crew did 

not account for the aircraft configuration with the left pack on MEL, the right pack overpressure 

condition was expected, and a maintenance discrepancy did not exist. Indeed, without contacting 

any SkyWest maintenance personnel, the flight crew could have reviewed the MEL procedure, 

realized its error, reset the system, and taxied the aircraft for another takeoff attempt. If they 

had, we would not be here. 

Nevertheless, the maintenance controller approached the issue cautiously and suggested 

to the flight crew that they return to the gate for inspection by maintenance personnel. 28 The 

"maintenance" performed after the aircraft returned to the gate was an inspection conducted by 

Joshua Harmon operating the system and verifying that faults did not exist. The discrepancy in 

the aircraft maintenance log was cleared after that inspection was accomplished.29 The right 

pack reset procedure in the QRH simply ensured the message was properly cleared so the 

inspection could take place. Mr. Harmon inspected the system by observing for an overpressure 

fault during system operation. As such, the QRH was not used to correct the discrepancy. 

Rather, the maintenance action of inspecting the system verified that a discrepancy did not exist. 

2. , The "Discrepancy" Was Not a Malfunction. 

In a line maintenance environment, mechanics are often called to address purported 

"discrepancies" that, after inspection, do not exist. For example, a pilot may describe in the 

aircraft maintenance log what he perceived to be an overly aggressive connection of the 'jet· 

bridge" to the aircraft. Of course, the discrepancy must be addressed, and the norn1al course of 

action would involve a visual inspection by a mechanic to see ifthere was any evidence of 

28 Smith interview, Ex. C-5 29 Harmon interview, Ex. C-5. 

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aircraft damage. If no damage was observed, the mechanic could properly clear the discrepancy 

by noting the visual inspection- since it was verified that a discrepancy did not exist. 

Likewise, the overpressure message in this case was initially perceived by the flight crew 

as a system fault. After realizing the fault was induced by not following the MEL procedure, the 

flight crew- at the behest of maintenance control- decided to return to the gate instead of 

simply resetting the system, which the flight crew was fully capable of doing. Once at the gate, 

after resetting the system for the flight crew, the mechanic ran the aircraft engines to inspect the 

system, and operations were normal; no discrepancies existed. 

3. Operational Manuals Are Appropriately Utilized to Troubleshoot System · Faults. 

Although Mr. Ghering didn't know it,30 the QRH is manufacturer data derived from the 

Aircraft Flight Manual. 31 It appears inSkyWest's FAA approved Maintenance Control Manual 

(MCM) as a reference document for troubleshooting the aircraft.32 The MCM is part of 

SkyWest's required maintenance and inspection program,33 commonly referred to as a 

continuous airworthiness maintenance program (CAMP) as listed on its operations 

' ,· ' . <.· ' 

specifications. 34 It is absurd for the FAA to object to citing the QRH when the MCM instructs 

the maintenance controller to walk through the applicable QRH procedure with the crew as part 

of inspecting and troubleshooting the aircraft. This practice ensures that an accurate assessment 

of the aircraft operation is accomplished. 

30 Tr. 77:12-13 31 Tr. 139:7-11 32 Ex. R-4 3 

Such programs are required by Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) §§ 12 1;367 and 121.369(b). 

A Specifically, paragraph D072 of Sky West's operations specifications identifies the .Sky West General M11intenance 

Manual (GMM) as the source document for the CAMP and the GMM incorporates the MCM. 

6 

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The FAA's position that a mechanic is "prohibited" from referencing any document not 

authored exclusively for maintenance personnel is impractical and contrary to industry practice. 35 

That is especially true in a flight line environment, where proper aircraft operation is essential for 

identifying problems so that appropriate corrective actions can be accomplished. Stated 

differently, the procedures in an FAA-approved aircraft flight manual (AFM) or QRH aid in 

proper troubleshooting·· which includes determining if a problem even exists. 36 

As a policy matter, promoting sole reliance on "maintenance" manuals does not serve the 

safety interest, instead, it decreases technical understanding of maintenance personnel. Again, 

this is especially true in a line environment. A manufacturer's maintenance manual cannot 

envision every potential malfunction or scenario that will occur to the aircraft during operation, 

and it takes some time before "common" problems that develop after a new aircraft operates in 

service are addressed in those manuals. 37 Therefore, mechanics must use their skill, and all 

pertinent Hacceptable" data available regarding aircraft operation, to understand why and how 

such defects occurred, in order to determine necessary corrective actions. 38 

The FAA's contention that the reset procedure is acceptable only ifperfmmed by the 

flight crew, but not when performed by a mechanic, promotes the exclusion of skilled 

maintenance personnel from analyzing aircraft operational faults. That position is hardly worthy 

of a safety regulator. Instead, as in this case, flight crews should be encouraged to contact 

35 Tr. 179-180. 

36 Ex. R-4. 

37 Tr. 186. 

38 

In pa'r1ticu1ai, aircraft "operating'' manuals are helpful when troubleshooting reported system faults. For example, 

flight attendant manuals often contain operating procedures for cabin systems (e.g., galley elevators, cabin callchime and button/light) that are helpful to maintenance personnel involved in verifying proper system operation. 

The information for such complete system operation is seldom found in "maintenance" manuals which normally 

focus on part replacement and system self-tests. 

7 

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maintenance personnel for advice when operational glitches are encountered so that accurate 

assessments are made, operational checks can be perfonned at the gate, and repairs can be made 

if necessary. All pertinent data, especially aircraft operating manuals from the manufacturer, are 

relevant to this activity. The FAA position would have a chilling effect on pilot I mechanic 

communication, incentivizing them to contact maintenance only when they want a mechanic to 

"throw parts" at the airplane. That is the result of a rigid belief that "mechanics can only look at 

mechanic books and only pilots can look at pilot books" without regard for gaining system 

understanding necessary to effect proper repair. It is astonishing the FAA would suggest 

"dumbing down" air carrier operations in this way. 

4. Even ifthe QRH Was Used to Perfonn "Maintenance" the FAA has not 

Shown How the Method was Unacceptable to the Administrator. 

a. The CFR 's provide for alternative methods. 

The maintenance regulations do not limit maintenance personnel to using only a 

manufacturer's maintenance manual when performing work. Instead, the rules clearly allow for 

the use of other methods, techniques and practices so long as they are "acceptable to" the FAA.39 

The maintenance performance rule in 14 CFR § 43.13(a)40 states that: 

Each person performing maintenance, alteration, or preventive maintenance on an 

aircraft, engine, propeller, or appliance shall use the methods, techniques, and practices 

prescribed in the current manufacturer's maintenance manual or Instructions for 

Continued Airworthiness prepared by its manufacturer, m: other methods, techniques, 

and practices acceptable to the Administrator, except as noted in §43.16. (Emphasis added.) 

39 

Acceptable to the FAA does not infer FAA approval prior to use; FAA regulations clearly state where such 

''approved" data is required. 40 All references in this section are to 14 CFR. 

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The meaning of"other methods, techniques, and practices acceptable to the 

administrator" was discussed at length by the FAA Office of the ChiefCounse1.41 In pertinent 

part, the FAA noted: 

Though the regulation provides that the person performing the maintenance 

'shall' use the maintenance manual, an alternative is provided in the same 

sentence ... by virtue of the 'or,' the person may use "other methods, techniques, 

and practices acceptable to the Administrator ... The key here is if other methods, 

techniques, and practices are used, they must be acceptable to the FAA. .. .If a 

maintenance provider performed maintenance on a product and deviated from the 

methods, techniques, and practices in the applicable maintenance manual, in order 

for the FAA to sustain a violation of§ 43.13 (a), the agency would have to show 

how the method, technique, or practice used was unacceptable." 

Similarly, that point is contained in an internal memorandUD;l from the FAA Office of the 

ChiefCounsel42 stating that under§ 43.13(a): 

Thus, if a person performs aircraft maintenance and uses a method, technique, or 

practice that differs from those specified in the applicable manufacturer's 

maintenance manual or Instructions for Continued Airworthines.s,. the F AAwould 

have to show that the maintenance done, even though different from the steps 

outlined in the manual, was not acceptable in order to prove a viqlation .of the 

regulation. 

Therefore, even if it were assumed the QRH was used to inspect the s.yrstem after the. ' . 

overpressure indication, there is no evidence to suggest use of that information was 

unacceptable. By the FAA's own interpretations, to support a finding that the reset and 

operation methods in the QRH were not acceptable to the Administrator, the agency would have 

to show how the method, technique, or practice used was unacceptable. 

It has not. The FAA's opposition comes by way of the unsupported .belief of a single 

inspector, based solely upon the title of the document. This is not enough. The FAA has failed to 

show how the QRH reset procedure was unacceptable. 

41 FAA legal interpretation to Albert T. MacMillan, supra note 14. 42 FAA Legal Interpretation to the Manager of the FAA Flight Standards Division, AEA-200, fro.m Rebecca 

MacPherson, FAA Assistant Chief Counsel for Regulations, dated January 10, 2010. 

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b. SkyWest's GMM also sanctions the use of other methods. 

The performance requirement in § 43.13(a) is a rule of general applicability, but it also 

appears in SkyWest's GMM: 

Qualified mechanics have knowledge based on training or experience and can determine 

or develop the method. technique or practice to return the component or aircraft to its 

original or properly altered condition. 43 (Emphasis added.) 

Much like§ 43.13(a), the SkyWest CAMP, through its GMM as cited above, clearly 

sanctions the use of other methods, techniques and practices that would be acceptable to the 

Administrator, as determined by its qualified mechanics - so long as the component or aircraft is 

returned to its original or properly altered condition, as required by§ 43,13. Therefore, even if 

the QRH was used to perform maintenance in this matter, its use was not improper under the 

Sky West .CAMP. Indeed, all evidence points to the fact that the aircraft was airworthy when the 

work was signed off on May 30, as it operated for numerous flight legs without .the.same fault. 

As before, the FAA has not explained how the use of other methods, techniques and 

practices was unacceptable to the Administrator. Instead, their argument runs in a tight little 

circle: you didn't reference an approved maintenance manual, ergo, it is not acceptable. 

5. The Aircraft Was Airworthy Between May 30 and June 1, 2010. 

From the final NPCP, and Skeeter Ghering's testimony, it is clear that the "violations" 

are based entirely on the presence of a mechanic's reference to an aircraft operating manual in 

his aircraft maintenance log "sign-off' coupled with the occurrence of the a problem eight (S) 

flights later. However, Mr. Ghering's assumption that the aircraft was unairworthy until June I 

when "[t]he right pack discrepancy was corrected by replacing the right pack pressure regulating 

and shut offvalve"44 is wrong for several reasons. 

43 Ex. C-1, GMM page 4. 44 As stated in item 11 ofthe final NPCP. 

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18:09:57 02-22.,-2013 

First, the Aircraft Maintenance Log shows that both the overpressure switch and right 

pressure regulating and shut off valve were replaced on June 1, 201 0, and the crew aborted take· 

off again with the same problem from the previous jlight.45 That is, replacing the right pack 

pressure regulating and shut off valve did not fix the June 1 problem. The aircraft was placed 

out-of-service while a new pack was sent from Salt Lake City in .order to fix· the left pack, and 

clear the MEL deferral. The problem that developed on June 1 was obviously persistent, because 

aborted take·offs occurred before and after maintenance action. If the same problem had existed 

on May 30, the subsequent eight (8) flight cycles could not have occurred. There is no proof that 

the aircraft was unairworthy when operated between May 30 and June 1, 2010. 

Second, there is no evidence that the fault on May 30 is directly related to thefault,:and 

related maintenance actions, on June 1, 2010. In a case involving initial and subsequent 

discrepancies with an aircraft cabin door, and an alleged violation of§ 121.605,46 the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) stated that: 

... repairs ultimately conducted on the aircraft are of little or no use in proving the door 

(and thus the aircraft) unairworthy, as they do not reliably confirm either that there was a 

problem with the door at the time respondent checked it or that, ifthere was a problem, it 

was the problem noted by the January 27 crew. 

In this case, the repairs ultimately conducted on June 1 are oflittle or no use in proving 

the aircraft unairworthy for eight (8) flights between May 30 and June 1, as they do notreliably 

confim1 that there was a problem when the system was inspected on May 30. That is especially 

true since it was confirmed on May 30 that the fault was induced by the flight crew's rapid 

advance of the throttle levers, despite the operating limitation stated in the approved MEL. 

45 Ex. R-1, p.2. . 46 NTSB Order No. EA-4213. 

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B. Inspector Ghering's Testimony Was Not Credible. 

The only evidence in support of liability came by way of Skeeter Ghering. It became 

clear during Mr. Ghering's examination that he believed SkyWest was wrong to release the 

aircraft with a deferred pack and instead should have stopped the aircraft in San Francisco to 

replace the right pack pressure valve. However, Mr. Ghering has no experience repairing the 

CRJ 200

47 

and demonstrated little knowledge of how it operates in its properly altered 

conditions. 

I. The Pressure Spike was a Known Condition on the CRJ200 Operating on a 

Single NC Pack. 

Despite being told by every highly experienced mechanic he interviewed, Mr. Ghering 

simply refuses to believe that it is a known condition of the CRJ200 to latch an overpressure 

fault when the throttles are advanced too rapidly in a single pack configuration:is SkyWe~t's 

Director of Quality, Darrel Cook, has been maintaining CRJ's for more than 20 years and 

testified that it has "absolutely" been a known condition to mechanics and maintenance 

controllers for more than 15 years.

49 SkyWest mechanics know this through experience and 

recurrent training, as well as from the MEL. 5° However, none ofthis could dissuade Mr. Ghering 

from his opinion that it is not a commonly known occurrence, despite him having zero 

experience repairing the CRJ 200: 

Q. Is this a common problem with this aircraft? You made it sound like in your earlier 

testimony it shouldn't do that, it should operate just fine on one pack. 

A. It should. 

Q. So you disagree that it's a common problem for the airplane to do that? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Great. Keep going. 

47 Tr. at 73, lines 3-5. 48 Tr. at pp. 82-85 49 Tr. at pp. 157-161 

5o Id. 

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18:10:16 02-22-2013 

A. I disagree that it's a common problem for the airplane to do that. 

Q. No, I mean keep reading. 

A. Okay. "Bombardier has a procedure in the MEL appendix for such an event." 

Q. Let's stop right there. Do you know whether or not Bombardier has a procedure in 

the MEL appendix? 

A. Yeah. As I previously stated, if you go- because there's an MEL on it, when the 

flight crew picks up the airplane they look at the requirements of that MEL and it tells 

them to go to this appendix. And that appendix reads that they do an open bleed takeoff 

that they should do a normal static takeoff. They should advance the throttle slowly and 

then it gives them the sequence of events of things to do. 

Q. Why advance the throttle slowly, Mr. Gehring? It's in its normal condition. You 

should be able to advance that throttle as-- per normal, shouldn't you? 

A. Yeah, ifthis guy did--

. Q. So why are the instructions on the MEL to advance the throttle slowly? 

A To not spike the system. 

Q. Exactly. Because it's a known condition ofthe aircraft that will happen if you 

advance the throttle too quickly. Isn't that true? 

A. No. 51 

Mr. Ghering cannot admit the known condition; else his theoryofviolation falls apart. If 

the over-pressurization is not a known condition, then yes, this aircraft would have needed , 

further inspection and repair per the fault isolation manual (FIM). But the evidence is 

overwhelming that everyone, except Mr. Ghering, knew that the CRJ 200 operating on a single 

pack is expected to over-pressurize when the throttles are advanced too rapidly. 

He also testified the aircraft didn't meet type design because it gave the pilot an 

indication message when he moved the throttle up. 5

4 Again, he must remain deliberately 

oblivious to the MEL, which anticipates an overpressure on a rapid throttle up, in order to 

support his theory ofunairworthiness. But the aircraft was airworthy and conforming to its 

altered type design -- it simply was not operated correctly. The maintenance .controller spotted it 

31 Tr. 82-83 

s

4 Transcript at 66, Line 12 - 19 

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immediately. So did Joshua Hannon. Only Mr. Ghering refuses to see it. As stated by the FAA 

Chief Counsel's Office:55 

... an air carrier airplane may operate legally with certain instruments and equipment 

inoperative if they are included on an approved Minimum Equipment List (MEL), and 

the air carrier operates the airplane under all applicable conditions and limitations 

contained in the approved MEL. .. The approved MEL is considered to be either a 

supplemental type certificate (STC) ... or an approved change to the type design without 

requiring recertification ... Accordingly, an aircraft operating under the conditions and 

limitations of an approved MEL would, with respect to the inoperative item, by 

definition, conform to its type certificate. 

In this case, the approved MEL for operating the aircraft in a single pack condition 

contains a limitation on rapid throttle movement. When the aircraft was operated within that 

limitation, the aircraft conformed to its type certificate. 

2. Joshua Harmon's Actions Were Appropriate. 

Mr. Ghering next claimed that Mr. Harmon used an alternate method to perform 

maintenance on this aircraft and that method did not address the mechanical irregularity the pilot 

entered in the aircraft logbook. 5

6 He also claimed the static check was performed at the gate and 

the mechanic did not run the engine high enough to check whether the warning would latch. 5

7 

There is absolutely no evidence to support this statement. Mr. Ghering has no idea how high the 

mechanic ran the engine, what engine power level was required to check if the warning would 

latch, or even whether the test occurred at the gate ·- or out at the fence. He was not there and he 

did not ask the question in his interview. Further, the QRH does not contain a run·up procedure, 

it only resets the system. The engine run·up pressurized the system to thelevel necessary to 

verify if a fault existed and the successful operation on eight (8) subsequent flights confirms that 

the system was operating normally. Clearly the discrepancy noted by the pilot was addressed. 

55 FAA legal interpretation to Christopher Witkowski, dated March 26, 2008. 56 Transcript at 61 57 Transcript at 63, Line 9- 12; Complainant's briefp.3, lines 3-8 

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3. The Discrepancy Was Not "Fixed" by Replacing the Right Pack Pressure 

Valve. 

Mr. Gehring also mistakenly claimed that replacing the right pack pressure valve "fixed" 

the aircraft. 5

8 

Although the maintenance log clearly shows the aircraft immediately failed with 

the same problem after this repair was made on June 1, Mr. Ghering could not bring himselfto 

admit his mistake. 59 

The FAA argues "with a degree of emphasis" that the correct maintenance procedure is 

significantly more detailed and time consuming that the mere use of a QRH flight operations 

procedure. (Complainant's Brief at 5.) But the fault isolation manual (FIM) procedure for this 

fault is not detailed. It is very limited and unnecessarily replaced an overpressure switch, as 

demonstrated on June 1. In sum, the FAA's "preferred" remedy was to ignore the obvious 

operational error and simply replace a part for no reason. Such practice of blindly replacing 

parts without identifying true aircraft operation and operating conditions- referred to in the 

industry as simply ''shot-gunning" parts- is universally discouraged as it has the potential of 

introducing additional faults into a system already identified in a mechanical discrepancy report. 

That is especially true when, as in this case, a root cause has been identified and the system is 

inspected to verify operation within parameters. Quite simply, the FAA's suggestion is not in 

line with good maintenance practices and is contrary to safety interests. 

C. The Case Cited by the FAA is Not Applicable to this Matter 

In its post-hearing brief, the FAA claims the aircraft was unairworthy because a "required 

inspection" was not performed. This matter did not involve any required inspection items (RII) 

58 

Transcript at 56, Line 3 - 16; Tr. at 108, line 22. 59 

See 17 tortured pages of testimony at Tr. 108-125. 

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which are defined in FAA regulations as air carrier designated items of maintenance and 

·alteration that must be inspected, including at least those that could result in a failure, 

malfunction, or defect endangering the safe operation of the aircraft, if not performed properly or 

if improper materials are used. 60 The SkyW est RII list for the aircraft at issue does not include 

air conditioning packs. 

Further, the case cited in support of its position involved an inspection for physical 

damage which was not accomplished. That is completely unlike this case, involving the 

operational check of an aircraft system which was accomplished. Although failure to perform 

the physical damage inspection in the case cited by the FAA could go undetected, the continued 

existence of the overpressure message involved in this matter would have been immediately 

apparent to the flight crew. Stated differently, had the pack system been improperly inspected on 

the aircraft at issue in this case, the message would have simply, and immediately, reappeared 

when engine thrust was advanced. 

In addition, the FAA failed to mention the following quote- which clearly supports 

SkyWest's position- from the case it cited: 61 

Absent the performance of other methods, techniques, or practices acceptable to the 

Administrator, USAir is required to follow the manufacturer's maintenance manual in 

performing maintenance. (Emphasis added) 

Again, even if it were assumed the QRH was relied upon for performing maintenance, the 

reset procedure used was an acceptable method, technique, or practice to allow inspection of the 

system by functional test. The FAA has not provided any evidence of unacceptabiljJy. 

60 14 CFR § 12l.369(b)(2). 61 FAA Order No. 96-25. 

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Conclusion 

By the definition of maintenance found in its own regulations, the reset task perfonned in 

this case was not maintenance, and the QRH was only used for that task. As a result, the basic 

premise of the FAA's position in this matter is groundless. Nevertheless, even if Mr. Harmon 

did refer to the QRH to perform maintenance, FAA regulations and SkyWest's CAMP provide 

for the use of such material by maintenance personnel -- and the FAA has not shown in any way 

how the use of the QRH was unacceptable. 

Finally, there is absolutely no support for the FAA's allegation that use of the QRH reset 

procedure resulted in an unairworthy aircraft. Indeed, the reason for the May 30 fault was 

clearly identified in the approved MEL and had that fault existed (therefore making the aircraft 

unairworthy) subsequent to maintenance on May 30, it would have been readily apparent to the 

flight crew. From the successful completion of eight (8) flights, the system was clearly working 

properly. The Administrator has simply not met its burden of proving that the aircraft was 

unairworthy. 

The FAA has not met its burden of showing that any violation has occurred. Along the 

way, it makes arguments, which if accepted, would tum every air carrier maintenance program 

on its head .. Longstanding use of aircraft operation manuals for understanding system 

functionality and, ultimately, competent troubleshooting and best maintenance. practices would 

be replaced by mindless adherence to flow charts and the resulting shot-gun approach to 

replacement of parts. That represents a significant backwards step for the entire industry, as it 

works decidedly against the safety interest. Instead of placing form over function by simply 

relying on the title of a document cited in a maintenance record, the FAA should have centered 

upon the facts. 

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18:11:05 02-22-2013 

For these reasons, Your Honor should find that no regulatory violation occurred, and 

deny Complainant's request to impose a civil penalty. 

DATED this 22nd day of February, 2013. 

~ 

Todd C. Emerson 

Counsel for Sky West Airlines 

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