UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JOSE L. RENTERIA, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

JASON BRYANT, Warden, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 18-6042 

(D.C. No. 5:16-CV-01333-D) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, MATHESON, and EID, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Pro se state prisoner Jose L. Renteria1

 seeks a certificate of appealability 

(COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his federal habeas petition pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we deny 

Renteria’s request for a COA and dismiss the appeal because Renteria cannot 

 * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Because Renteria is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 

1198, 1201 n.2 (10th Cir. 2010). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 22, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of his 

constitutional claims debatable or wrong. 

I. 

On March 16, 2011, Renteria entered a guilty plea to the crimes of FirstDegree Rape and Sexual Battery. He had previously been convicted of two felonies. 

Renteria was sentenced to thirty-two years’ imprisonment. His conviction became 

final on March 28, 2011. 

On July 22, 2011, Renteria filed a petition for judicial review in Oklahoma 

district court. On December 11, 2013, he filed an application for post-conviction 

relief in Oklahoma district court. The district court denied Renteria’s request for 

post-conviction relief, and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the 

district court. On January 25, 2016, Renteria filed a second application for postconviction relief in Oklahoma district court. The district court denied the request, 

and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the district court. 

On November 21, 2016, Renteria filed the § 2254 habeas petition underlying 

this appeal. Respondent-Appellee, Warden Jason Bryant, moved to dismiss the 

petition on the grounds that the petition was barred by the one-year statute of 

limitations contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge, 

who issued a report and recommendation recommending that the district court grant 

Bryant’s motion and dismiss the petition as untimely. 
3 

The report and recommendation concluded that Renteria’s July 2011 state 

court petition for judicial review was not “properly filed” under Oklahoma law and 

therefore did not statutorily toll the federal habeas limitations period. ROA at 164. 

The report and recommendation also concluded that Renteria’s December 2013 and 

January 2016 applications for state post-conviction relief did not toll the AEDPA 

limitations period because they were filed after the limitations period had expired. 

Id. Lastly, the report and recommendation concluded that Renteria did not prove that 

“extraordinary circumstances” existed to warrant equitable tolling, nor did he satisfy 

his burden to prove actual innocence. Id. at 169. Without any basis for statutory or 

equitable tolling, Renteria’s deadline for filing his habeas petition was March 28, 

2012. Id. Because Renteria did not file his petition until November 21, 2016, the 

Magistrate Judge recommended that dismissal of his petition was appropriate. Id.

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, 

dismissed the petition, and denied Renteria a COA. Id. at 211–12. The district court 

entered judgment against Renteria by separate order. Id. at 214. 

II. 

A state prisoner’s right to appeal a denial of habeas relief is conditioned on the 

grant of a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A COA may issue only if the prisoner 

has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2). Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the 

merits, “the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 
4 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “Where a plain procedural bar is present and 

the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist 

could not conclude that either the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that 

the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further.” Id. 

 In this appeal, Renteria contends that the district court below: (1) erred in 

concluding that his state application for judicial review was not “properly filed” and 

denying statutory tolling on that basis; (2) erred in denying equitable tolling of his 

petition based on attorney misconduct, actual innocence, and failure to waive the 

one-year limitation period pursuant to the Oklahoma Post Conviction DNA Act; and 

(3) erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding further DNA testing that 

would allow Renteria to develop facts to support his claim of actual innocence. 

Pursuant to AEDPA, petitions for writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody 

are governed by a one-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Section 

2244(d)(1)(A), the only subsection at issue here, states: “A 1-year period of 

limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run 

from . . . the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review 

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 

A. Statutory Tolling 

The AEDPA one-year limitations period is tolled while “a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). To satisfy the 
5 

tolling requirements, a petitioner’s application must be “properly filed,” meaning “its 

delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules 

governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). This court has held that “a 

‘properly filed’ application is one filed according to the filing requirements for a 

motion for state post-conviction relief,” including “the obtaining of any necessary 

judicial authorizations that are conditions precedent to filing . . . [and] other 

conditions precedent that the state may impose upon the filing of a post-conviction 

motion.” Habteselassie v. Novak, 209 F.3d 1208, 1210–11 (10th Cir. 2000) (footnote 

omitted). 

The district court held that Renteria’s petition for judicial review was not 

“properly filed” because it was filed in violation of 22 Okla. Stat. § 982a. ROA at 

207. Section 982a excludes the statutory remedy of judicial review from (1) 

sentences of convicted felons who have been in confinement for a felony conviction 

during the ten-year period preceding the date of their sentence, and (2) sentences 

imposed pursuant to a plea agreement unless consent from the district attorney is 

obtained. 22 Okla. Stat. § 982a(A)(3). Renteria was convicted of felony driving 

under the influence on September 19, 2005. See ROA at 112, 206. Further, Renteria 

entered a plea of guilty for the underlying offenses in this matter, and there is no 

indication in the record that the district attorney consented to Renteria filing the 

petition. Id. Renteria does not challenge these facts on appeal. Renteria’s petition 

for judicial review did not satisfy the standard imposed by 22 Okla. Stat. § 982a; 

therefore, he has not shown that his petition was “properly filed.” 
6 

 The two applications for post-conviction relief filed by Renteria in December 

2013 and January 2016, respectively, were filed outside of the one-year statute of 

limitations and do not qualify for statutory tolling. 

No reasonable jurist would find the district court’s assessment that Renteria is 

not entitled to statutory tolling debatable or wrong. 

B. Equitable Tolling 

The limitations period may also be equitably tolled in “rare and exceptional 

circumstances.” Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation 

omitted). Equitable tolling is warranted when, for example, “a constitutional 

violation has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent or 

incompetent,” Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998), or “when an 

adversary’s conduct—or other uncontrollable circumstances—prevents a prisoner 

from timely filing, or when a prisoner actively pursues judicial remedies but files a 

defective pleading during the statutory period,” Gibson, 232 F.3d at 808. 

To avail himself of equitable tolling, Renteria must show “(1) that he has been 

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 

his way and prevented timely filing” of his federal habeas petition. Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quotation omitted). Renteria makes three 

arguments as to why equitable tolling should apply: (1) his trial attorney failed to 

communicate with him, and, as a result, his guilty plea was never withdrawn; (2) he 

is actually innocent of the rape charge; and (3) Oklahoma’s Postconviction DNA Act, 

22 Okla. Stat. § 1373, waives the one-year limitation period because he has requested 
7 

Touch DNA Testing. Aplt. Br. at 9–11. The district court rejected each of these 

bases for applying equitable tolling. ROA at 208–11. We address each argument 

below. 

 As to Renteria’s claim of attorney misconduct, this court has held that 

“sufficiently egregious misconduct on the part of a habeas petitioner’s counsel may 

justify equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitations period.” Fleming v. Evans, 481 

F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that an attorney’s negligence or 

mistake is not generally a basis for equitable tolling). 

Renteria had ten days from March 16, 2011 to file a motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea. Clayton v. Jones, 700 F.3d 435, 441 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Rule 4.2, 

Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2011)). 

As the basis for his ineffective assistance of counsel argument, Renteria asserts that, 

after he entered a guilty plea, his family contacted his attorney and asked him to visit 

Renteria because he wanted to withdraw his plea, but the attorney failed to 

communicate with Renteria and did not withdraw his plea. Aplt. Br. at 9. 

The district court noted its doubt that Renteria had diligently pursued this 

argument, given that he waited nearly four years to argue that his trial counsel had 

been ineffective in failing to withdraw his plea. ROA at 208 n.3. Assuming that the 

diligent pursuit requirement was met, however, the district court held that Renteria 

had not shown that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a timely 

habeas petition because he knew of the circumstances underlying the alleged attorney 

misconduct shortly after his conviction but did not file the habeas petition for four 
8 

years. Id. at 208. Given these circumstances, we conclude that reasonable jurists 

would not find the district court’s determination erroneous or debatable. 

Renteria also argues that he is actually innocent of rape. “[A] sufficiently 

supported claim of actual innocence creates an exception to procedural barriers for 

bringing constitutional claims, regardless of whether the petitioner demonstrated 

cause for the failure to bring these claims forward earlier.” Lopez v. Trani, 628 F.3d 

1228, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2010). Equitable tolling is warranted when the petitioner 

can show that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of 

one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (quotation 

omitted). “To establish actual innocence, petitioner must demonstrate that, in light of 

all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (quotations omitted). 

To be credible, a claim of actual innocence “requires petitioner to support his 

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence . . . that was not 

presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

Renteria claims that his innocence is established by a forensic report that 

excluded him as a contributing source of DNA on the victim. Assuming that the 

forensic report is “new reliable evidence,” the district court found that Renteria 

cannot show that no reasonable juror would have convicted him based on the DNA 

evidence because “neither of the crimes for which Petitioner was convicted required 

the presence of seminal fluid.” ROA at 210. Furthermore, the DNA evidence does 

not establish that Renteria did not “(1) engage in an act of sexual intercourse with 
9 

someone incapable of giving legal consent through mental illness, in violation of 

Oklahoma’s rape statute, . . . or (2) touch, maul or feel the victim’s body or private 

parts in a lewd and lascivious manner, in violation of the sexual battery statute.” Id. 

Renteria failed to show that it was more likely than not that no reasonable juror 

would have convicted him of the crimes for which he was convicted. For the reasons 

addressed by the magistrate judge and district court, we hold that no reasonable jurist 

would find the district court’s conclusion debatable or wrong. 

Lastly, to support his claim of actual innocence, Renteria asserts that his 

request for “Touch” DNA testing under Oklahoma’s Postconviction DNA Act waives 

the AEDPA limitations period. To toll the one-year limitations period, a properly 

filed application for state post-conviction or collateral review must be pending. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Renteria did not request DNA testing until several years after 

the limitations period had expired. Furthermore, claims of actual innocence must be 

supported by “new reliable evidence,” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, and a request for 

DNA testing does not qualify, see Chavez v. Trani, 534 F. App’x 799, 801 (10th Cir. 

2013) (unpublished) (recognizing that a “blanket assertion that DNA testing would 

exonerate [petitioner] of his crimes” is not sufficient evidence to support a claim of 

actual innocence). Renteria has not provided “new reliable evidence” sufficient to 

waive the AEDPA limitations period. 

After carefully reviewing Renteria’s brief, the district court order, and the 

record on appeal, we conclude that Renteria has not raised an issue that warrants 

granting a COA. For substantially the same reasons discussed in the magistrate 
10 

judge’s report and recommendation and the district court’s order, we conclude that 

reasonable jurists would not debate “whether the district court was correct in its 

procedural ruling” that Renteria’s petition is barred by the AEDPA limitations 

period. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. 

C. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

Renteria sought permission from the district court to proceed on his appeal in 

forma pauperis. The district court denied Renteria’s application for leave to proceed 

in forma pauperis, finding that Renteria’s appeal of his § 2254 petition was not taken 

in good faith. Renteria renewed his motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal 

with this court. A showing of good faith requires “the existence of a reasoned, 

nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” 

McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing 

DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991)). Because Renteria did 

not identify a reasoned, nonfrivolous issue or supporting argument to present on 

appeal we deny his application to proceed in forma pauperis. See Coppedge v. 

United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446 (1962). 
11 

III. 

 Based on the foregoing, we DENY Renteria’s request for a certificate of 

appealability, DENY his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and DISMISS the 

appeal. 

Entered for the Court 

Allison H. Eid 

Circuit Judge