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Additional Views 

Senator John Warner

Th e investigation conducted by this Committee represents a remarkable undertaking 

in contemporary Senate history – 22 investigative hearings calling 85 witnesses, formal 

interviews of 325 witnesses, and nearly 1 million pages of documentation have led to the 

Committee report. Th e enormity of this task cannot be overstated and I wish to applaud the 

tireless work of Chairman Collins, Senator Lieberman, and their staff on their eff orts. All 

Americans share the same goal to prepare for the future and respond when called upon to 

help our fellow citizens. It is the responsibility of all levels of government to serve its people. 

Department of Defense Response

Aft er these investigative hearings and extensive additional interviews, it is my personal view 

that the Department of Defense (DOD) active-duty personnel, National Guard, and Reserves performed with professional distinction in the days and weeks following the landfall 

of Hurricane Katrina. Th ere are many stories of individual service, persons or small groups 

accepting personal risks in helping the victims of this tragic natural disaster. 

Th e Department of Defense response to Hurricane Katrina represents the largest and most 

rapid “domestic” deployment of the military in contemporary military history. Even while 

over 75,000 National Guard and Reserves were deployed overseas fi ghting for freedom in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, an additional 50,000 troops were deployed in response to Hurricane 

Katrina. 

At the peak of the Department of Defense deployment there were 20 ships; 346 helicopters; 

68 fi xed-wing aircraft ; and 72,614 Active Duty, Reserves, and National Guardsmen assisting 

the recovery eff ort. In addition, the DOD delivered 26.6 million Meals Ready to Eat, treated 

26,304 patients, and fl ew 16,525 sorties.1

 While the Committee report deservedly singles out 

the contributions of the Coast Guard in performing 33,000 rescues, it bears mentioning that 

the National Guard and Reserve saved 11,000 people from their rooft ops.2

Th e Department takes seriously its civil-support mission and provided unprecedented support to the response to Hurricane Katrina, as noted by the testimony of Assistant Secretary 

Paul McHale February 9, 2006:

Th e Department of Defense’s deployment of military resources in support of 

civil authorities aft er Hurricane Katrina exceeded, in speed and size, any other 

domestic disaster relief mission in the history of the United States. Th e ability 

of our military forces – Active Duty, Reserves, and the National Guard – to 

respond quickly and eff ectively to an event of this magnitude is a testament 

to their readiness, agility, and professionalism. It is also a refl ection of the 

resources provided by Congress that enable them to organize, train, and equip 

to meet the full range of DOD’s missions.3

Over 72,000 Federal military and National Guard personnel were deployed in response to 

Hurricane Katrina, more than twice the number deployed in response to Hurricane Andrew 

in 1992 (over 29,000).4

As President Bush,5

 DHS Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson,6 LTG General Russel Honoré,7

former FEMA Director Michael Brown,8

 and FEMA federal coordinating offi cer William 

Lokey9

 stated in their public statements, interviews, and testimony, the Department of 

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Defense performed commendably and responded eff ectively to every request made by 

FEMA for assistance to the Department. As a personal observation, Lieutenant General 

Honoré served with great distinction. 

On the whole, the performance of the individual soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen 

– active, Guard, and Reserve – was in keeping with the high professional standards of the 

United States Military, and these men and women are proud of their service to help the 

victims of this natural disaster. 

Th e Senate as a whole should be proud of these men and women in uniform who responded 

with courage and untiring professionalism on behalf of their fellow citizens who fell victim 

to the destruction of Hurricane Katrina.

National Preparedness and Response Authority and Organizational Recommendations

Th e movement of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with its creation in 2003 has led to criticism that this 

organizational structure impedes the ability of FEMA to adequately prepare for and respond to incidents. Th e Senate Katrina Report calls for the reorganization of FEMA into a 

quasi-independent agency that would combine preparedness and response functions under 

a “National Preparedness Response Authority” (NPRA) with direct reporting to the President during national emergencies. 

It is my belief that the combination of preparedness and response functions can lead to a 

potential for focus on one of the two missions, leaving the other neglected. Certainly both 

missions are of extreme importance, as adequate preparedness eff orts can contribute signifi cantly to our ability to respond when emergencies take place. Th e current separation of 

these duties in the Department’s framework enables the Department of Homeland Security 

to provide signifi cant resources and attention to both functions without leading to a situation choosing one over the other. 

In addition, my experience in government has shown that a strong reporting structure can 

only serve to strengthen the ability of any organization to work eff ectively in times of crisis. 

Certainly the FEMA Director has the authority to execute his or her mission during national emergencies as granted by the Staff ord Act.10 A dual reporting structure where the FEMA 

or NPRA Director reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the President simultaneously would inject confusion into the chain of command. However, as with all chains 

of command, should the President call on the Director, he or she is responsible to act. Th e 

most important factor in the success or failure of any organization rests on the shoulders of 

the individuals in that organization. Experienced leaders and talented staff are essential to 

the ability of FEMA to execute its mission. 

For these reasons, I believe that the creation of the NPRA and elevation of the Director 

position above the Under Secretary level would not provide a more eff ective organizational 

structure for the Department of Homeland Security.

1 Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Aft er Action Report.

2 Testimony of Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, before the House Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense, Sept. 28, 2005.

3 Testimony of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Feb. 9, 2006, p. 2.

4 Testimony of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Feb. 9, 2006, p. 4. 

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5 Statement of President George W. Bush, Aug. 31, 2005.

6 Interview of Michael Jackson, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 27-28.

7 Testimony of Lieutenant General Russel Honoré, Commander, First U.S. Army, Feb. 9, 2006, pp. 5-9.

8 Interview of former FEMA Director Michael Brown, Jan. 23, 2006, pp. 206-207.

9 Interview of William Lokey, FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 80-87, 136.

10 Robert T. Staff ord Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5143. 

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