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" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 109TH CONGRESS

2d Session

S. PRT.

2006

109–73

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

‘‘GIVING VOICE TO THE PEOPLE’’

A Report to Members

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

Richard G. Lugar, Chairman

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 22, 2006

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

Available via World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/

index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v

The Problem ............................................................................................................. 1

Guiding Principles ................................................................................................... 2

Regional Overviews and Recommendations .......................................................... 3

Africa ................................................................................................................. 3

Asia .................................................................................................................... 4

Central Europe ................................................................................................. 5

Latin America ................................................................................................... 6

APPENDIXES

Appendix I. Complete List of Meetings .................................................................. 9

Appendix II. Democracy Survey ............................................................................. 19

Appendix III. Regional Notes .................................................................................. 25

Appendix IV. National Endowment for Democracy (NED) Report Entitled

‘‘The Backlash Against Democracy Assistance’’ ................................................. 45

Appendix V. Idea to Reality: A Brief History of the National Endowment

for Democracy (NED) ........................................................................................... 110

(III)

(V)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

UNITED STATES SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC, December 22, 2006.

DEAR COLLEAGUES: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recently sent Carl Meacham, Keith Luse, Jay Branegan, Paul Foldi,

and Michael Phelan of the professional staff to selected countries

in Africa, Asia, Central Europe, and Latin America to examine the

state of democracy, with particular emphasis on programs supported with United States Government (USG) funding, either directly through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), or

other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Increasingly, governments around the world have tightened their

controls on foreign NGOs by passing laws to restrict their ability

to work independently from government approval. In extreme

cases, democracy promoters are being harassed by authorities. In

some nations governments have been able to persuade their citizens that the work of NGOs and the financial assistance provided

to them by the USG, is a form of American interventionism. Thus,

in some countries opposition to prodemocracy NGOs is cast as a reaffirmation of sovereignty.

I am pleased to share with you this very timely report. I believe

it provides significant insight and a number of important recommendations on how NGOs can operate effectively abroad—while

respecting the laws and customs of the host countries—to strengthen civil society and promote democracy under challenging conditions.

I hope you find this helpful as the Committee on Foreign Relations considers its continued support for democracy promotion programs funded by the U.S. Congress. We look forward to working

with you on these issues and welcome any comments you may have

on this report.

Sincerely,

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Chairman.

(1)

1 Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Cambodia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Poland, Czech

Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. 2 Civil society can be defined as the area of legally protected, nongovernmental, self-organizing

associative activities, institutions, and groups outside the realms of family, private for-profit sector, and the state in modern societies. Thus the concept civil society itself lies in the intersection

of several spheres including the social, historical, legal, political, economic, ideological, and cultural.

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

‘‘GIVING VOICE TO THE PEOPLE’’

Between October and November, 2006, members of the professional staff of the United States Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations traveled to 161 countries on four continents to assess the

state of democracy promotion as practiced by American-supported

NGOs. During these trips staff visited with government officials of

host countries, relevant U.S. Embassy officials and United States

Agency for International Development (USAID) officials, members

of civil society 2, as well as other independent, voluntary, nonprofit

actors (See Appendix I for complete list of meetings). In addition

to many organizations, Human Rights Watch (HRW) lent invaluable assistance through their thorough in-country contact base in

suggesting and coordinating various meetings. In some of the countries visited, staff used a survey provided mostly to host country

NGOs, which was developed with the assistance of the International Republican Institute (IRI), to assess the environment in

which NGOs operate (See Appendix II for ‘‘Democracy Survey’’).

At the request of the Chairman, the purpose of the trip was to

examine:

• The challenges that U.S.-funded NGOs face in implementing

democracy promotion projects; • The effectiveness of indirect USG support for democracy promotion projects; and • The degree to which host governments allow for the development of independent civil society organizations.

From these findings, staff has developed a series of principles

and recommendations for Congress, executive branch policymakers,

and NGOs to guide the design, funding, and implementation of

America’s democracy-promotion programs.

THE PROBLEM

Support for democratic, grassroots organizations has become a

centerpiece of America’s international outreach. The American people see this most clearly in USG efforts to lay the foundation for

democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Less well-known is our nation’s broader push for democracy around the globe. Within the

past 3 years, the so-called Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange

2

Revolution in Ukraine, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan

have opened new space for democracy in those nations, thanks primarily to the efforts of civil society members and organizations.

Unfortunately, the success of these generally peaceful ‘‘color revolutions’’ has prompted a counteroffensive by some governments

against prodemocracy groups. A June 8, 2006, report by the NED

[see appendix V for the history of the NED], commissioned by

Chairman Lugar, notes: ‘‘Representatives of democracy assistance

NGOs have been harassed, offices closed, and staff expelled. Even

more vulnerable are local grantees and project partners who have

been threatened, assaulted, prosecuted, imprisoned, and even

killed.’’ (See Appendix IV for NED report entitled ‘‘The Backlash

against Democracy Assistance.’’) The implications of the report

were examined in a June 8, 2006, hearing chaired by Senator

Lugar to examine the role of NGOs in the promotion of democracy.

A number of governments are passing laws to constrain democracy assistance. In January 2006, Russian President Vladimir

Putin signed a controversial new law imposing heightened controls

on local and foreign NGOs operating in Russia. Outside the former

Soviet states, USG-funded NGOs operating in Thailand reported

instances of harassment, including surveillance by authorities, during the tenure of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatara, who

was ousted in a military coup in September. In Latin America, the

Congress in Peru passed, and its counterpart in Venezuela proposed, laws imposing heavy restrictions on the work of NGOs. And

in Africa, the work of NGOs is severely limited by a series of factors, chiefly the lack of resources.

Staff set out to develop guiding principles for relevant USG agencies that fund NGOs implementing democracy promotion projects,

recognizing that situations vary considerably from region to region

and country to country. These general recommendations are aimed

at protecting and improving the NGOs’ effectiveness. In devising

these principles, the staff was guided by information gathered from

visits abroad and counsel from groups that focus on democracy

issues, particularly the staff of the American Center for International Labor Solidarity. These recommendations are based on the

principle that United States policy should encourage legitimate activities that improve the ability of citizens to exercise their will

over their communities and the actions of their Government.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Democracy backsliding anywhere is a threat to democracy promotion everywhere: Failure to check democracy backsliding in any

given country harms democracy promotion efforts worldwide. Because democracy underpins global political stability, economic

growth and international security, lack of will to challenge instances of the erosion of democracy sends mixed signals to our

partners abroad who share our goals. In repressive and backsliding

systems, the importance of democracy programs is magnified. They

serve as a needed counterweight to forces of repression, corruption,

and disenfranchisement.

Democracy promotion is a long-term process: Because democratic

transitions are rooted in people and movements, sustainable democracy programs cannot be delivered in a top-down, one-off, shortVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:59 Dec 22, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 NGOS.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
3

term manner. To achieve sustainable change, democracy promotion

must be a long-range exercise. Rule of law programs are a prime

example; it takes years for legal precedents to take root and legal

systems to change in a sustainable way.

Democracy promotion must be seen in a regional, cross-border

context: Because no country or political development or movement

takes place in isolation, democracy promotion must be pursued in

a cross-border, regional, and even cross-regional context.

Economic factors affect democracy promotion: Globalization and

its economic effects impact significantly the ability of civil society

and government institutions to respond to the needs of citizens.

The impact of macroeconomic policy and global trade, particularly

where they lead to increased inequality, can impede the success of

democracy promotion and impair society’s ability to address corruption, rule of law, and accountability. The economic marginalization

or exclusion of vast segments of populations provides political space

for authoritarian and nondemocratic forces to capture the public

dialogue and weaken democratic development.

Democracy promotion is as much about what happens before and

after elections, as the elections themselves: Without the creation of

at least the beginnings of independent civil society prior to an election, the elections themselves may bring about no real or lasting

change. If a vibrant civil society is to help establish the foundation

for any future political change, it needs to be fostered and promoted after and between election cycles. Civic education, informed

citizen participation, transparency, and accountability are key determinants as to whether an elected government will actually survive and govern justly in response to its constituents.

Democracy promotion is about aiming for high standards, but

having realistic expectations: The combination of corruption, disregard for human rights, suppression of media freedoms, and regulation of independent civil society, along with a weak or nonexistent rule of law, unenforceable labor standards, and the absence of corporate accountability can all hamper democracy promotion efforts and create an unstable environment in which to implement projects. These factors must be considered when setting

expectations and benchmarks for success.

REGIONAL OVERVIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(See Appendix III for region specific notes.)

AFRICA

Staff visited Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria. Although each

country is labeled a democracy, they differ regarding the level and

strength of democratic institutions, and the quality of electoral

processes. The ability of nongovernmental organizations in each

country to work on democracy and governance issues is determined

by a number of factors:

• Restrictions and regulations on such programs in each country

• Institutional capacity and willingness to enable such development

4

• Resources available within each country, including effective

media and organizations or structures to disseminate information

• Willingness of bilateral donors and international organizations

to provide resources for such programs (including the World

Bank, United Nations, African Development Bank, African

Union, European Union)

In reality, a free, liberal democracy remains a distant goal for all

the countries visited, but more effective governance is both achievable and important to their populations. The violence, political instability, and poverty endemic to much of the continent hobble each

country’s individual efforts at democratic development or reform. In

Chad, for instance, the government can conveniently ignore internal and international calls for reform while it ‘‘confronts’’ the internal battles of its own political actors and the external threat of its

neighbor, Sudan. In Kenya, counterterrorism measures encouraged

by the international community have been criticized for encroaching upon civil liberties and democratic rights. In Ethiopia, the government cites the crisis in neighboring Somalia, as well as the

standing tensions with Eritrea, as a rationale to delay progress toward pluralism. In Nigeria, corruption, crime and political violence

imperil the Presidential elections scheduled for 2007. Nonetheless,

each of these countries, if not the specific governing administrations, could well weather such internal and external crises more capably with well established and functioning democratic institutions.

Africa region recommendations

1. U.S.-funded NGOs must ensure that their presence is legal

prior to their deployment. Such NGOs’ ties to local actors must also

be independent and transparent.

2. To the greatest extent possible, foreign NGOs should work

with organizations across the political spectrum and ensure primarily local control.

3. Because poverty and corruption are often the over-riding facts

of political life in most African countries, democracy promotion programs in Africa should place special emphasis in building local capacity to scrutinize government spending and programs.

4. USG funding for democracy promotion must be steady and

long term. A fickle commitment will lead to missed opportunities

and disappointment.

5. USG efforts in democracy promotion must be politically and

culturally sensitive to host country complexities. Democratization

will succeed only if it reflects the expectations of the society in

which it develops.

6. Democracy exchanges should be increased. Exchanges and visits of parliamentarians and other government officials to the

United States provide an incomparable education on the nature of

democratic institutions.

7. The professionalization of police forces rather than military

forces should be made a priority in order to minimize human rights

abuses and corruption that is at the root of popular discontent with

the government.

5

ASIA

Staff visited Cambodia, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

In Thailand, conditions in which NGOs operate have improved

since the ouster of the Thaksin Shinawatara government by the

Thai military in September, 2006. However, the full limits of freedom in operation will not be fully known until martial law is lifted.

In Cambodia, still in the early stages of nominal democracy carefully guided by Prime Minister Hun Sen, NGOs are positioned to

assist in building important foundations which will lead to a more

democratic and responsive government. While Cambodia has the

benefit of a large number of NGOs operating on a wide range of

prodemocracy and good governance issues, there are questions

about the degree of coordination among the NGOs and whether the

full scope and effectiveness of the massive NGO presence in Cambodia has been evaluated.

Although Sri Lanka weathers an ongoing insurgency by the

Tamil Tigers, or LTTE, the country has managed to maintain

democratic institutions and an environment conducive to free and

open political activity. However, as the country may be edging closer to outright civil war, it is not possible to determine if NGOs promoting democracy and good governance will continue to be provided space to operate by the Sri Lankan civilian and military leaders.

The people of Indonesia embrace democracy and an open electoral process. Given the relatively young Indonesian democracy,

and the diversity of the 17,000 island archipelago, construction of

democratic institutions is proceeding with remarkable speed. While

the Government of Indonesia often embraces the presence of U.S.-

funded NGOs promoting good governance issues, there are occasional pockets of resistance. However, overall receptivity to NGO

activity is good.

Asia region recommendations

1. U.S.-funded NGOs in Thailand should work with prodemocracy leaders across party lines to assess how democratic institutions may be strengthened to ensure stronger checks and balances

within the Thai government and political system.

2. In Indonesia, the U.S. Government should increase funding

levels for NGOs working on building political parties and election

preparation issues.

3. U.S.-funded democracy promotion efforts should continue to

focus on building democratic institutions and avoid the occasional

perception of targeting or promoting political personalities.

4. The United States Ambassador to Cambodia has been encouraged to conduct a historical and current review of the scope and effectiveness of U.S.-funded NGO work, pertaining to democracy and

good governance issues.

5. USG officials should recognize that effective promotion of democracy and good governance in Asia requires acknowledgement of

cultural and national sensitivities. Definitions of democracy may

vary.

6

CENTRAL EUROPE

In order to gain an appreciation of past U.S. efforts at democracy

promotion, staff visited the so-call ‘‘Visegrad Four’’ countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, and also visited

Moldova. Each of the V4 is a member of NATO and well on its way

to cementing democratic and pluralistic governmental traditions in

spite of recent internal political difficulties. While staff met with no

one who expected or could even contemplate these polities sliding

back to Soviet-style single party rule, genuine concern abounds regarding the pace and scope of their democratization. But, as one

interlocutor told staff regarding the current political turmoil in his

country, ‘‘Having just held our breaths while we completed a marathon [by suppressing interparty squabbling in order to join the EU

in 2004], we need a little time to exhale.’’ Now is indeed the time

for consolidation of the democratic reforms made since the fall of

the Berlin Wall, and the administration must keep a vigilant eye

on each of the four to prevent any backsliding and ensure forward

movement.

To gain a different perspective, staff had intended to visit

Belarus, labeled by Secretary of State Rice in 2005 as the ‘‘last dictatorship in the center of Europe.’’ And so it remains in 2006. Apparently afraid of outside attention to its affairs, Belarus denied

staff a visa—the only visa denied in the entire scope of the committee’s project. Such actions only reinforce the conclusions that have

been drawn regarding Alexander Lukashenko’s iron-fisted regime.

Much more fruitful was a trip to Moldova, where a Communist

Party candidate, freely elected in 2001, won re-election in 2005.

Central Europe region recommendations

1. The USG should work with Central European NGOs to provide technical assistance regarding alternative funding sources

readily available. As one example, few of the NGOs were aware of,

or had thought to apply to the $43 million United Nations Democracy Fund, to which the United States has donated some $18 million to date.

2. The USG should promote more productive working relationships between NGOs and Central European governments by facilitating greater interactions between the two, whether at official embassy functions or, better yet, through the State Department’s excellent International Visitor Program. Such programs, geared toward interactions with our own NGOs and government, will aid in

cementing this critical relationship in these countries.

3. Lawmakers and the administration need to recognize that the

‘‘War of Ideas’’ was not won with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Rather, only one chapter was closed as the world still confronts dangerous ideologies antagonistic to free, democratic and open societies

and economies. In order to foster the growth of these ideas, we

must revisit the concept of U.S. government-staffed libraries and

centers. In the view of staff, the current American Corners and Information Resource Centers fail to assist sufficiently in this effort.

7

LATIN AMERICA

Staff visited Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. These three countries

vary considerably regarding the strength of democratic institutions,

separation of powers between branches of government and the approach taken by their governments to encourage or discourage the

independent development of an active civil society.

Since the return to democratic rule in 1990, Chile has made significant progress toward rebuilding the institutions of democratic

government, but more is possible. In particular, Chile’s legislature

lacks the capacity and resources to represent fully the interests of

its people. Currently, elected officials rely heavily on think tanks

and foundations for technical and political advice. Development of

civil society and independent organizations is hampered by a law

which requires that 30 percent of a private donation go to a government common fund, and not the intended recipient. This law has

had the effect of discouraging private donations to nonprofit organizations.

In Peru, civil society is threatened through a law passed in December, 2006, to strengthen government regulation of civil society

groups. Despite public statements by President Alan Garcia that

the NGO law would be ‘‘improved,’’ Garcia approved the law without significant changes only two days after congressional passage.

The passage of this law could damage perceptions of Garcia’s commitment to democratic progress in Peru. In the U.S. Congress, it

could affect the fate of the pending Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

But most disturbing are problems in Venezuela, which has taken

a turn for the worse under the leadership of President Hugo Chavez, particularly regarding the separation of powers between the

legislative, judicial, and executive branches. Pending legislation by

the Venezuelan National Assembly to regulate and control the ability and work of NGOs is worrisome. Under Chavez, who was reelected December 3, 2006, Venezuela has demonstrated a blatant

disregard for independent civil society actors, any form of political

dissent, and frowns on even the limited participation of civil society

groups through organizations like the Organization of American

States (OAS).

In all three countries to varying degrees, political parties are

somewhat distant from the people they represent. Throughout

Latin America, the executive dominates over all other branches of

government. In this regard, especially, NGOs would benefit from

working together across borders on strengthening the ability of citizens to influence local governments and the legislative branch. This

inability to adequately convert constituents’ concerns into responsive laws and policies is one important factor driving the poor and

the politically marginalized toward leaders who promise popular

but often shortsighted solutions.

While stronger and more active NGOs will not replace the need

for purposeful and concerned political parties, it is important to encourage a climate of strong independent civic activism, which could

force party activists toward more effective objectives and practices.

8

Latin America region recommendations

1. The OAS should establish a separate channel for accredited

civil society organizations to present issues of grave concern directly to the Permanent Council. A simple majority should be required to approve introduction by those accredited NGOs of any

topic into the agenda of the Permanent Council.

2. USAID and the NED should give greater emphasis to working

in partnership with Latin American NGOs, European governments,

and international organizations, especially as it relates to developing cross-border agreements and coordination between Latin

American NGOs.

3. Staff strongly encourages the Department of State and USAID

to develop a mechanism for periodically evaluating democracy promotion projects in key Latin countries. Given the very real efforts

by some governments in the region to persuade their citizens that

the assistance provided to them by USG-funded NGOS is a form

of American interventionism, policies toward these countries must

be continually evaluated.

(9)

APPENDIX I

COMPLETE LIST OF MEETINGS

AFRICA

CHAD

U.S. Embassy:

Ambassador Marc Wall

John O’Neil—Political Officer

USAID Les McBride, Contractor

Chad Officials and Opposition:

Saindidi Mahamat, Secretary General of the National Assembly

and ruling MPS party Nassingar Rimtebaye—Permanent Petroleum Committee

Yoronjar N’Njarlugy Kodji, Action Front for the Republic, Opposition Leader

Journalist and other Chadians:

Nguemadji Djimasngar, Reporter and Editor, Notre Temps

Delphine Djiraibe, National Coordinator, Committee for Peace and

National Reconciliation

U.S. NGOs:

No presence due to lack of NGO interest rather than U.S. Government emphasis which is focused on education and grassroots efforts as well as support for international community efforts in political and institutional capacity building.

World Bank:

Marie Francoise Marie-Nelly, Sr. Program Manager, Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Cluster, DC

Mamadou Deme, Sr. Public Sector Specialist, Governance Unit,

Chad

ETHIOPIA

U.S. Embassy:

Charge ́ d’Affaires—Amb. Vicki Huddleston

Kevin Sullivan—Pol-Econ Officer

Anthony Fisher—Public Affairs

USAID Kevin Rushing, Deputy Mission Director

USAID John Graham, Senior Policy Advisor

USAID Mike McCord, Project Development Officer

Ethiopian Executive Branch:

Prime Minister Meles

Ato Bereket Simon—Senior Advisor to President Meles with rank

of Minister

10

Ambassador to the U.S. Samuel Asseffa

Ethiopian opposition political officials included:

Merera Gudina, MP, UEDF Vice-Chairperson

Temesgen Zewdie, MP, CUD Whip

Ayele Chamisso, Addis Ababa City Council, CUDP

Bulcha Demeska, MP, OFDM Chairperson

Lidetu Ayalew, MP UEDP Secretary General

Journalists and other Ethiopians:

Three Ethiopian journalists

A University professor

A World Bank representative

US NGOs:

NDI and IRI and IFES were expelled from the country last year,

thus unavailable and environment very dangerous for such work.

KENYA

U.S. Embassy:

Ambassador Michael Ranneberger

Deputy Political Counselor Craig White

USAID Stephen Haykin, Mission Director

USAID Jaidev ‘‘Jay’’ Singh, Sr. Regional Conflict, Democracy and

Governance Advisor

Kenyan Officials and Opposition:

Unavailable

Journalists:

2 locally based foreign correspondents

Kenyan Community Leaders:

Mohamed ‘‘D’’ and Juma Khamis, Mombasa youth leaders

Hussein Khalid Muhuri, Muslims For Human Rights (MuHuRi)

Mary Kavoo, MuHuRi, Finance and Administration Officer

Murad Saad and Taib Abdul Rahman, Drug Rehabilitation Reach

Out Trust

Khalid Shapi, Managing Director, Muslim Education Welfare Association

Fr. Wilbert Lagho, Islamic Scholar (Vatican trained)

Kaari Murungi, Director, Urgent Action Fund for Women’s Human

Rights

U.S. NGOs:

Peter Meechem, Director, IRI

Sioghan Guiney, Resident Program Officer, IRI, Parliamentary

Strengthening and Reform

Moses Owuor, IFES, Program Officer—Capacity building programs

with the Electoral Commission

Fred Matiangi, Country Director, State University of New York,

Parliamentary Strengthening and Reform

NIGERIA

U.S. Embassy:

Russell Hanks—Political Counselor

NGOs:

11

Two U.S.-based democracy promotion groups

ASIA

Following are U.S. officials interviewed, and nongovernmental organizations whose representatives were either interviewed, or received a survey for this project.

CAMBODIA

U.S. Embassy:

Ambassador Joseph Mussomeli

Margaret McKean, First Secretary,

USAID Reed J. Aeschliman, Director, Office of General Development

NGOs:

American Center for International Labor Solidarity

American Institute for Research/World Education

Development Alternatives, Inc.

Documentation Center of Cambodia

East West Management Institute

International Justice Mission

International Republican Institute

International Labor Organization

NATHAN—MSI Group

National Democratic Institute

PACT Cambodia

Research Triangle Institute

The Asia Foundation

WildAid

Economic Institute of Cambodia

AMARA

Village Support Group

Community Economic Development

Community Legal Education Center

Women and Children’s Rights Action Committee

Cambodia Human Rights and Development Association

Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human

Rights

Human Rights Organization for Transparency and Peace

Legal Aid of Cambodia

Legal Support for Children and Women

Cambodia Center for Human Rights

Cambodian Women’s Crisis Center

Major General Chap Pheakday, 911 Brigade Commander

SRI LANKA

U.S. Embassy:

Deputy Chief of Mission James Moore

Michael R. DeTar, First Secretary, Political Section

Helaena W. Rathore, Political Officer

Sri Lankan Government Officials:

Chrishanthe de Silva, Brigadier

Geeta DeSilva, Ministry of Foreign Affairs official

12

NGOs:

Amnesty International

Foundation for Co-Existence

Human Rights Watch

The Asia Foundation

The Halo Trust

RONCO Consulting Corporation

Academy for Educational Development

National Peace Council

National Anti War Front

Bandaranaike Center for International Studies

Associates in Rural Development

Transparency International

Lawyers for Human Rights and Development

Free Media Movement

Institute of Policy Studies

INDONESIA

U.S. Embassy:

Ambassador Lynn Pascoe

Deputy Chief of Mission John A. Heffern

Eric Kneedler, Political Officer,

USAID William M. Frej, Mission Director

USAID Larry Meserve, Director, Office of Democratic and Decentralized Governance

USAID Kelley Strickland, Deputy Director, Office of Democratic

and Decentralized Governance

Indonesian Government Officials:

Dino Djalal, Spokesperson to the President of Indonesia

NGOs:

American Center for International Labor Solidarity

International Republican Institute

National Democratic Institute Human Rights Watch

The Asia Foundation

Triangle Institute

PERUDEM

Pusat Studi Hukum & Kebijakan Indonesia

The Indonesian Institute Center for Public Policy Research

Yappika—Civil Society and Ethnic Relations

Bandung Institute of Governance Studies

Lembaga Studi Advokasi Masyarakat—Criminal Code/Human

Rights

Indonesia Corruption Watch

Institute for Rural Empowerment

Yayasan Visi Anak Bangsa—Media/Press Freedom

Thailand

For the purpose of protection from possible reprisal, no names of

persons/organizations contacted in Thailand will be provided.

CENTRAL EUROPE

POLAND

U.S. Embassy:

13

Ambassador Victor Ashe

Polish Government Officials:

Krzysztof Wieckiewicz, Director of the Department of Public Gain

in the Ministry of Social Policy

NGOs:

Justyna Janiszewska, Program Coordinator, Education for Democracy Foundation

Maciej Tanski, Director, Partners Poland

Tomasz Schimanek, Director, Polish Charity Organization

Krzysztof Filcek, Deputy Director, Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation

Foundations (PAUCI)

Jakub Michalowski, Jan Kecik and Ignacy Niemczycki, Members

Free Belarus

Eugeniusz Smolar, President of the Center for International Relations

CZECH REPUBLIC

U.S Embassy:

Ambassador Richard Graber

Deputy Chief of Mission Cameron Munter

Jim Davison—former Peace Corps official

Political, Public Affairs and Consular Officers

Czech Officials:

Vaclav Bartuska, Czech Ambassador on Energy Security

Gabriela Dlouha ́, Director of MFA’s Transition Cooperation Unit

(TRANS)

Petr Fleischmann, staffer of Senate Foreign Relations Committee

NGOs:

Tomas Kraus, Executive Director Federation of Jewish Communities

Toma ́sˇ Habart, Program Manager of PartnersCzech

Jan Marian, Consultant, Prague Security Studies Institute

Jiri Kozak, Project Manager of CEVRO-Liberal Conservative Academy

Assistant Professor Lubomı ́r Lı ́zal, Director of CERGE-EI

Assistant Professor Libor Dusˇek, Deputy Director for Development

and Public Relations

Beth Portale, Chief of Staff of RFE/RL

David Stulnik, Senior Program Director for Eastern Europe, People

in Need (PIN)

Nikola Horejs, Program Director for Cuba, PIN

Megan King, Senior Program Director for Middle East, PIN

SLOVAKIA

U.S. Embassy:

Deputy Chief of Mission Lawrence R. Silverman

Economic, Political, and Public Diplomacy Officers

Public Affairs and Consular Officers

U.S. NGOs:

Jan Surotchak, Resident Director, International Republican Institute

14

Patrick Egan, Director Regional Program for Central and Eastern

Europe

NGOs:

Boris Strecansky, Ekopolis

Lota Pufflerova, Citizens and Democracy

Dusan Ondrusek, Partners for Democratic Change

Alena Panikova, Open Society Foundation

Journalists and other Slovaks:

Pavol Demes, German Marshall Fund

Ms. Emilia Beblava, President, Transparency International Slovakia

HUNGARY

U.S. Embassy:

Ambassador April Foley

Deputy Chief Phil Reeker

USAID Regional Director Ray Kirkland

Political, Public Affairs and Consular Officers

NGOs:

Anita Orban, International Center for Democratic Transition

Peter Akos Bod, Hungarian-American Enterprise Fund

Annama ́ ria Ke ́kesi, Executive Director, Foundation for Development of Democratic Rights

Katerina Hadzi-Miceva, Legal Advisor at European Center for Not

for Profit Law

Kristie Evenson, Director, Freedom House Europe

Balazs Kovacs, Program Director of Freedom House

MOLDOVA

U.S. Embassy:

Ambassador Michael Kirby

Deputy Chief of Mission Kelly Keiderling

USAID, Peace Corps, PAO, CONS, ECON, RLA, POL, Officers

U.S. NGOs:

Michael Getto, Country Project Manager, International Republican

Institute

Alex Grigorievs, Country Project Manager, National Democracy Initiative

NGOs:

Roman Purici, Information Resource Center Director

Viorel Margineanu, Director, IMPACT

Ala Mindicanu, Professor of Journalism, ULIM

Olga Manole, Promo-Lex

Vitalie Nagacevschi, Lawyers for Human Rights

Igor Botan, Director, Association for Participatory Democracy

(ADEPT)

Paul Strutescu, Executive Director, League for Defense of Human

Rights in Moldova (LADOM)

Stefan Uritu, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights

Sorin Mereacre, Country Director, Eurasia Foundation

Ludmila Bilevschi, Director, Alumni Resource Center USG

15

Journalists and other Moldavians:

Petru Macovei, Executive Director, Independent Newspaper Association (API)

Petru Macovei, Executive Director, Independent Newspaper Association

Dumitru Ciorici, Director, Young Journalist Center

Corina Cepoi, Executive Director, Independent Journalism Center

(IJC)

Nicole Negru, Media Analyst, Independent Journalism Center

Cornelia Cozonac, Director, Investigative Journalism Center

Alexandru Dorogan, Director, Association of Electronic Media

LATIN AMERICA

CHILE

U.S. Embassy:

Ambassador Craig A. Kelly

Deputy Chief of Mission Emi Yamauchi

Juan Alsace—Econ-Pol Counselor

Harry Kamian—Econ-Pol Officer

Vince Campos—Consular Officer

Jeremiah Knight—Consular Officer

Tim Strater—Information Officer

Michael Orlansky, Cultural Affairs Officer

Monica Alcalde

Jessica Patterson

Chilean Officials:

Minister Alejandro Foxley, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Marcos Robledo, International Affairs Advisor to President

Michelle Bachelet

Francisco Estevez, Director, Division of Social Organizations, Ministry Secretary General of the Government

Diputado Marcelo Forni Union Democrata Independiente (UDI),

Member of the House of Representatives, Foreign Relations

Committee

Sergio Bitar, President of Partido Por La democracia (PPD) Party

Carlos Larrain, President, Renovacion Nacional (RN) Party

Sebastia ́n Pin ̃ era, Renovacion Nacional (RN) Party

Carlos Tudela, Christian Democrat International Relations Committee (DC)

Esteban Tomic, Christian Democrat International Relations Committee (DC)

Fancisco Cruz, Christian Democrat International Relations Committee (DC)

NGOs:

Jose Antonio Viera Gallo, President, Corporacio ́n Proyectame ́rica

Ricardo Brodsky, Executive Secretary, Corporacio ́n Proyectame ́rica

Claudio Store, Head of Program, ‘‘Joevenes al Servicio de Chile,’’

Fundacion Jaime Guzman

Batrice Corbo, Public Policy Advisor, ‘‘Joevenes al Servicio de

Chile,’’ Fundacion Jaime Guzman

Nicolas Figari, Legislative Advisor, ‘‘Joevenes al Servicio de Chile,’’

Fundacion Jaime Guzman

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Martita Fresno Mackenna, Public Relations, ‘‘Joevenes al Servicio

de Chile,’’ Fundacion Jaime Guzman

Maria de los Angeles Fernandez, Acting Director, Fundacio ́n 21

Gonzalo Vargas, General Manager, Fundacio ́n Paz Ciudadana

Andrea Sanhueza, Executive Director, Participa

Silavana Lauzan, Project Coordinator

Acting Director of the Center of Strategic Leadership, University

Juan Enrique Vargas, Center for Justice Studies of the Americas

(CEJA)

Other Chileans:

Lecture to 30–40 young leaders, who were identified as the 100 Top

Young Leaders in Chile. Adolfo Iban ̃ ez University

Fifteen Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLASCO)-

affiliated analysts; political scientists; and two congressional

staffers.

Jorge Schaulson

General Juan Emilio Cheyre (Retired)

Raul Sohr

Felipe Edwards

Christian Maquiera

PERU

U.S. Embassy:

Ambassador J. Curtis Struble

Deputy Chief of Mission Phyllis Powers

Alexis Ludwig—Political Officer

David Boyle—Political Officer

Kenny Jackman, Political Officer

Adam Shub—Economic Officer

Dan Martinez—Public Affairs

Garace Reynard—Narcotics Affairs Section

Commander Dominic Dixon—Military Assistance and Advisory

Mission

USAID Paul Weisenfeld, Director

USAID Susan Brems, Deputy Director

USAID Larry Sacks, Control Officer

Catie Lott

Claudia Rohrhirsh

Sobeida Gonzales

Peruvian Officials:

Luis Giampietri, First Vice-President

Ambassador Nestor Popolizio, Under Secretary of the Americas,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Maria Euguenia Chiozza, Director General, North America Affairs,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Carols Bricen ̊ o, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Beatriz Merino

Juan Carlos Eguren

Jorge Avendan ̊ o

Rosa Urbina

Juan Manuel Chau

NGOs:

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Ambassador Jorge Valdez, Institute for Liberty and Democracy

Dr. Jose ́ Miguel Morales, President, Confederacio ́n Nacional de

Instituciones Empresariales Privadas (CONFIEP)

Ricardo Vega Llona, former President, CONFIEP

Wilson Gomez Barrios, Securities Expert

Pepi Patron, President, Asociacio ́n Civil Transparencia

Hans Landolt, Director, Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL)

Ernesto de la Jara, Director, Justicia Viva

David Lovato ́n, Project Director, IDL

Sofı ́a Macher, Responsible for Governance and Human Rights area,

IDL

Alfredo Villavicencio, Coordinator, Justicia Viva

Ana Marı ́a Tamayo, Responsible for Defense and Military Reform

area

Thomas K. Reilly, Chief of Project, Pro-Decentralization Program

(PRODES)

Elena Conterno, Institutional Strengthening Expert, PRODES

Pablo Valdez, PRODES

Percy Medina, General Secretariat, Asociacio ́n Civil Transparencia

Kristen Simple, Program Officer for the Andean Region, IDEA

International

Diego Garcı ́a Saya ́n, General Director, Comisio ́n Andina de

Juristas (CAJ)

Enrique Bernales, Executive Director, CAJ

Journalists and other Peruvians:

Enrique Zileri, Director, Carteras magazine

Bernardo Roca Rey, Director, El Comercio

Bruno Rivas, Internacional Reporter, El Comercio

Dr. Lourdes Flores Nano, Dr. Lourdes Flores Nano (Law firm

Dianne Vazquez)

VENEZUELA

U.S. Embassy:

Ambassador William Brownfield

Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin Whitaker

Ben Ziff—Public Affairs

Brian Penn—Public Affairs

Robert Downes—Political Officer

Dan Lawton—Political Officer

Adam Center—Political Officer

Melissa Rhodes—Political Officer

Andy Bowen—Economic Officer

Colonel Passmore—U.S. Military Group

Colonel Bauer—Defense Attache ́ Officer

USAID Miguel Reabold

Venezuelan Officials:

Jorge Valero, Vice Foreign Minister for North America

Sau ́l Ortega, Deputy of the National Assembly (meeting requested

and confirmed)

NGOs:

Humberto Prado, Observatorio Venezolano de Prisiones

Carlos Correa, Espacio Pu ́ blico

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Ewald Sharfenerg, Instituto Prensa y Sociedad

Maria Corina Machado, SUMATE

Marino Alvarado, El Programa Venezolano de Educacio ́n-Accio ́n en

Derechos Humanos (PROVEA)

Liliana Ortega, COFAVIC

Journalist and other Venezuelans

Pedro Pablo Penaloza, El Universal

Maria Gabriela Ponce, Universidad Cato ́lica Andre ́s Bello

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APPENDIX II

DEMOCRACY SURVEY

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APPENDIX III

REGIONAL NOTES

AFRICA

The Republic of Chad: Chad gained its independence from France

in 1960 but then suffered three decades of civil warfare as well as

invasions by Libya before finally achieving a measure of peace in

1990. Following the drafting of a democratic constitution, Chad

held flawed Presidential elections in 1996 and 2001, both won by

Lieutenant General Idriss Deby. In 1998, a rebellion broke out in

northern Chad, which sporadically flares up despite several peace

agreements between the government and the rebels. But a more serious threat to the governing regime now emanates from the east.

Following Chadian support for Sudanese rebels in the Darfur region of Sudan, new rebel groups emerged to threaten President

Deby in 2005 and continue to threaten his tenure. For instance,

rebels launched an assault on the capital, N’djamena, in the weeks

prior to the May 2006 Presidential election. France, as a former colonial power, exerts considerable influence and is reported to sustain the Deby regime with the rationale that there is no better alternative available.

The President was elected to serve a 5-year term in an election

held May 3, 2006, after getting term limits removed from the constitution. Deby was reelected President with 64.7 percent of the

vote against no true opposition due to a boycott by most major opposition parties. The opposition rejects the result, raising the prospect of future instability. A largely powerless legislature is only

partially constituted: The National Assembly, whose 155 members

are elected by popular vote to serve 4-year terms, most recently

held an election in 2002, with another scheduled for 2007, but the

Senate has yet to be created.

There are more than 200 ethnic groups among Chad’s 9 million

people, with those in the north and east being primarily Muslim,

and southerners comprising the majority of animist and Christians.

There has been a long religious and commercial relationship with

Chad’s northern and eastern neighbors bringing an Arabized culture to Chad’s eastern and central regions where Arabic is spoken

and the people engage in many other Arab cultural practices. The

French colonial influence is felt most in the south and continues to

ebb.

Beyond the rebellions and wars, refugees and poverty, Chad suffers from the common malaise of resource-rich African countries:

Incredible potential without optimism. Chad is manipulated by its

own repressive leadership, which is in full control of its vast mineral wealth. The international community is not, in Chad’s case, a

26

bystander. The World Bank supervised the financing of the ChadCameroon pipeline, which carries oil from Chad’s land-locked fields

to the sea, to try to ensure that the economic gain would flow toward development. Instead, once the oil began to flow, President

Deby began to dismantle the international revenue agreement.

Civil society representatives expressed great frustration with the

lack of development in Chad—slipping from 8th to 3rd to last in

poverty—despite the proceeds from oil since 2003.

Such a problematic landscape makes it difficult to pursue genuine civil society capacity-building and democratic reforms. Since

USAID departed the country in 1995, the United States has limited

development assistance. Most U.S. assistance today is humanitarian and goes to assist over 200,000 refugees of the Darfur crisis

in eastern Chad. Additional U.S. assistance is being directed toward counterterrorism efforts through training and equipping

Chadian forces. The only USAID effort now consists of an individual contractor, well informed and experienced, working to harmonize limited resources in a very unsettled situation.

U.S. NGOs concentrating on democracy building overseas have

not prioritized Chad nor pursued US government resources to support programming there. Nonetheless, the Embassy country team

has tried to sustain what small efforts are possible given available

resources. The emphasis has been on democracy skills at the village level and human rights. For example, the passage of legislation critical of female genital mutilation was an instructive exercise

in the democratic process. Education is also considered an effective

arena. Funding is available for textbooks, which enables training

and builds some measure of trust at the grass roots.

Embassy personnel report that there is limited civil society and

parliamentary training due to the limited resources, but, that the

government of Chad does not appear averse to greater democracy

capacity-building. The French are perceived as ambivalent to reform in Chad; in fact, they have publicly scolded independent

media, which has further alienated the local population. The

United States continues to seek opportunities but has not devoted

the resources to effect much positive change. There is a risk, however, that the emphasis now being placed on military training and

an increased U.S. military presence will gradually diminish current

popular support for the United States in Chad.

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: In 1991, the Derg military junta, ruling Ethiopia as a socialist state, was toppled by a coalition of rebel forces, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). A constitution was adopted in 1994, and

Ethiopia’s first multiparty elections were held in 1995. A border

war with Eritrea late in the 1990’s ended with a peace treaty in

December 2000, though final demarcation of the boundary is currently on hold due to Ethiopian objections to an international commission’s finding requiring it to surrender sensitive territory and

Eritrea’s refusal to negotiate further.

Following the adoption of its constitution in 1994, Ethiopia is ostensibly a democracy. It is ruled by a Prime Minister, Meles

Zenawi, who is selected by the party in power following legislative

elections. The most recent elections occurred in May 2005 and were

marked by an encouraging early phase, only to devolve into violent

27

protest during which security forces used excessive force to quell

demonstrations. Further, Prime Minister Meles has influenced the

‘‘independent’’ commission looking into the violence, and has imprisoned many of the opposition without due process and with little

concern over international discontent.

The bicameral Parliament consists of the House of Federation

(Upper Chamber) with 108 seats whose members are chosen by

state assemblies to 5-year terms and the House of People’s Representatives (lower chamber) with 547 seats and whose members

are directly elected by popular vote to 5-year terms. The next election is to be held in 2010. In the most recent election, the ruling

EPRDF won 327 seats to the CUD with 109. This was a dramatic

increase for the opposition from the previous election. Nonetheless,

irregularities and subsequent violent assaults by security forces

and arrests by the government have tainted the outcome.

Opposition parties had been split on whether to contest the election and subsequently those that did win seats in the National Assembly rejected taking their seats to protest the alleged massive

fraud by Meles’ government. This was compounded by the violent

response taken by security forces against protesters supporting the

opposition. Many opposition candidates wound up in jail amidst reports of abuse and one elected member was killed in the violence.

Violence erupted in June and again in November 2005. A supposedly independent Commission of Inquiry looking into the election violence identified triple the number of fatalities originally reported to have been inflicted by police and military forces.

U.S. democracy programs in Ethiopia are rather new thanks to

a shift in focus from emergency humanitarian relief to root causes

and strategic interests. The needs are daunting: Free media, political party finance which is nonexistent, parliamentary law which is

very slow to develop, as well as electoral board reform and

strengthening. It is also seen as essential that some points of mediation are settled upon so that the recent confrontation does not

lead to civil war. The Meles government also has its own internal

enemies to contend with, some due to the marginalization of segments of the population by the ruling minority Tigray ethnic group.

The northern border tension with Eritrea has political overtones

and ethnic undertones as well.

Prior to the May, 2005, election, three U.S. NGOs working on democracy and governance were ordered out of the country and have

not been allowed back. This expulsion was apparently legally

based. Although the NGOs were tolerated and permitted to operate

for several months, none had received appropriate registration to

work in Ethiopia, due to a reported lack of responsiveness by the

Ethiopian bureaucracy. Nonetheless the expulsions were suspect,

coming immediately prior to the elections. According to one group,

this was the first-ever expulsion of these organizations under such

circumstances. Though not saying so explicitly, the government has

implied that one of the three was working too closely with an opposition party. When the Meles regime felt that particular group had

gone too far, all three organizations were expelled. The incident

places a more difficult burden on the USAID mission in Addis

Ababa to work with others in a constrained environment.

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3 International Republican Institute poll conducted on behalf of IRI by Strategic Public Relations and Research, a survey firm based in Nairobi, Kenya. From November 3–7, 2006, 3,008

people were interviewed in all regions of Kenya. The margin of error does not exceed +/¥ 2

percent. 4 Ibid.

Ethiopia presents a typical set of diplomatic difficulties. It has

proven to be a reliable partner in the Global War on Terror, yet

the last election cycle showed that the country does not appear prepared to continue moving toward democracy. U.S. foreign policy

must grapple with this apparent contradiction.

The Republic of Kenya: The President is elected by popular vote

for a 5-year term and is eligible for a second term. The Presidential

candidate must win 25 percent or more of the vote in at least five

of Kenya’s seven provinces and one area to avoid a runoff as well

as receiving the largest number of votes in absolute terms. The

Vice President is appointed by the President. The last election was

held December 2002. President Mwai Kibaki was elected in 2002

with 63 percent of the vote while his prime challenger Uhuru

Kenyatta received 30 percent.

The legislative branch consists of a unicameral National Assembly or Bunge with 224 seats—210 members are elected by popular

vote to serve 5-year terms, while 12 ‘‘nominated’’ members are appointed by the President (but selected by the parties in proportion

to their parliamentary vote totals), and 2 ex-officio members. The

last elections were held in December 2002.

Kenya is one of the most democratically developed countries in

Africa and certainly the most democratic of the four African countries discussed here. It has shown the ability to establish institutions run by civilians and conduct national elections that are considered relatively free and fair by the international community. A

recent poll initiated by the International Republican Institute (IRI)

indicated that the majority of Kenyans (67 percent) polled expressed approval of their government’s performance. On the other

hand when queried about their confidence in the Parliament they

were split at 49 percent approving 3. Democracy NGOs are prevalent and are not hampered significantly by government regulation

or restrictions. Local and national media is apparently open and

free, and has proved an effective tool in exposing graft.

The real measure of Kenya’s continued success in democratic reform and good governance will be its ability to curtail rampant corruption, both in government ministries and in day-to-day interactions of the police and other civil servants. A Kenyan reported

that ‘‘the most feared and loathed threat to civilians is the police

force, whose harassment and extortion abuses the people at every

opportunity.’’ The same November IRI-sponsored poll showed ‘‘a

majority of respondents (56.8 percent) believed that corruption had

increased or remained the same since the 2002 elections, yet a

slight majority, 52.1 percent, believes that the government is committed to the fight against corruption.’’ 4

The President, Mwai Kibake, sets the tone in Kenya, given the

very strong position granted by the constitution. Kibake won election over the hand-picked successor to former President, Daniel

Arap Moi, in 2002, to a great extent by promising reform of systemic corrupt practices. With his election in 2002, the expectations

29

5 Upward of 60 percent of all incumbents are replaced each election according to local reports.

for reform were significant but President Kibake has proven unable

or unwilling to sustain sufficient pressure to build anticorruption

momentum.

The majority of U.S.-funded democracy efforts are coordinated

through the USAID office in Nairobi. They are considered by local

media and other observers to be part of a coherent overall program

that has shown more success than those of other donors. USAID

ensures their partners work with multiple organizations and is consistent across them. They are also well coordinated with the many

other international efforts. U.S. programs partner with local organizations, which also lends a positive perception of independence.

Political regression or back-sliding has been avoided by democracy

advocates by ensuring clear and practical association with Kenyans

in control of the programs.

Civil society in Kenya appears to be a viable, if still underdeveloped, means by which the people can identify and hold accountable their government officials. Although Kenya appears to be

in transition, the advance toward sustainable democracy could go

either way. Each election, Kenyans are more inclined to ‘‘throw the

bums out,’’ all of them.5 Thus, efforts at reform must be sustained

with each new crop of parliamentarians who have not yet realized

their responsibility to the constituencies from which they hail. Exchanges of officials and visits to the United States have been of

considerable value in the effort to educate and build a broader institutional understanding. Broadening exchanges to include parliamentary staff and political party representatives was thought to

be of value by those interviewed.

U.S. democracy promotion programs work to a great degree in

building political party capacity. Within the political party realm,

ethnic coalitions rather than ideological conviction appear to dominate. Rather than highlighting and competing between ethnic

groups, the embassy team tries to build confidence in broader platforms and then to translate such policy positions into effective communication to the constituency. There is a notable lack of legislative activity to support such platforms, however: There are only

three or four bills introduced per session of Parliament.

Embassy efforts are focused on capacity building in the capital,

Nairobi. Limited efforts to ensure that democracy and governance

programs reach populations further a field are now being pursued.

Such programming appears essential for the coast region of Kenya,

a primarily Muslim area. Coast region believes itself marginalized

despite its important economic role as the location of the key East

Africa trading port of Mombasa. This small city has also been the

target of terror attacks in recent years and is just down the coast

from Somalia’s chaotic southern regions. Several NGOs in

Mombasa complained that ‘‘MPs do not work with local communities, they consider the state money as their own to use as they

see fit.’’ In fact, they point out that in one study, fully 95 percent

of coast funds that were monitored did not end up being used as

originally intended. Efforts to effectively engage all Kenyan groups

in U.S. Government democracy-building will better ensure sustainability and support for U.S. efforts in Kenya and the region.

30

Nigeria: Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa (with a

population of about 140 million, one in five Africans is Nigerian),

about evenly split between Muslim and non-Muslim, giving it the

largest Muslim population of any country outside Asia. It is a

major oil producer and one of the most important oil suppliers to

the United States. Despite its oil wealth, Nigeria has a per capita

GDP of less than $2 a day, and the country has suffered the classic

‘‘resource curse’’—per capita income today is a quarter what it was

30 years ago, infrastructure and social services have collapsed since

the 1980s, and corruption and crime are rampant. Much of the economic collapse can be laid at the feet of the authoritarian, usually

military, governments that have run the country for much of its

post-independence history. The most notorious recent example was

Gen. Sani Abacha, who after his ill-explained death in 1998, reportedly by heart attack, was accused of looting some $4 billion from

government coffers.

Since 1999, the country has been led by Olusegun Obasanjo, a

former general and one-time coup leader who became a reformer

and the first democratically elected President in 16 years. He was

re-elected in 2003, in an election marred by violence and numerous

irregularities, and this year he was blocked in an attempt to

change the constitution so he could run for a third term. Although

he is viewed by many outsiders as a leading African statesman,

thanks to his efforts at promoting democracy and peacekeeping

through the African Union and economic progress through

ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), within

Nigeria he has come to be regarded as ineffectual and unable to

combat corruption, and his popularity is low. While Obasanjo has

improved human rights and democratic institutions, democracy’s

roots are considered shallow, and in light of persistent ethnic, communal and political violence in various regions of the country, few

observers are convinced that elections will take place as scheduled

next spring.

Representatives of two U.S.-based NGOs who have been operating in the country since the restoration of democracy agreed that

in general the country has a relatively free press, relatively open

political debate, and that their work is openly embraced and encouraged by the elected members of the legislative branch, the National Assembly. They could point to examples of where legislative

hearings have been held as a result of NGO efforts, where NGO

representatives have been invited to attend important political, cultural and social events, and where NGOs have received awards

from the National Assembly. At the same time, both said their relationship with the bureaucracy is more strained, and while neither

feels they are being targeted specifically, both are being harassed

by the government for infractions of regulations, which in one case

could result in the bank account of the organization being closed.

Details below.

Nigeria is a generally pro-American country, and the representatives said work of the NGOs is welcomed by the public and by civil

society organizations. ‘‘We’re not seen as an irritant,’’ one said.

‘‘The National Assembly seeks our imprimatur.’’ The other added,

‘‘Being American is not a problem, often it’s a positive. Most Nigerians look at the United States with admiration.’’ Both groups work

31

to build the capacity of all the political parties, including

Obasanjo’s People’s Democratic Party, and unlike in some countries, are not seen as working with opposition groups against the

ruling party. ‘‘The ruling party has always been part and parcel of

our program,’’ one said. At the same time, they do feel the scrutiny

of the Independent National Electoral Commission, which runs the

elections (and not always well, according to outside observers) and

does not have a good relationship with the political parties. Despite

its name, INEC has been accused of being too close to the executive

branch. One group characterized INEC’s hostility as typical of ‘‘a

part of the government that has something to hide.’’ They also said

that they’ve been the subject of disparaging comments from the Nigerian diasporas in the States, members of which have written letters to the INEC. Both representatives said that many of their

training sessions are monitored by agents of the State Security

Service (SSS). But they’ve faced no direct interference from the security forces, and the greatest obstacle to doing their work is simply the widespread crime that makes it dangerous to travel anywhere in the country, and the frequent roadblocks that are used to

harass everyone in Nigeria.

Both said their organizations generally work well with local civil

society groups. The United States NGOs have been criticized, however, for taking money away from indigenous prodemocracy groups.

This is especially true in some of the northern Muslim areas. ‘‘They

say, ‘Why is the U.S. Government funding these U.S. groups if

you’re trying to build Nigerian democracy?’ ’’ one said. By the same

token, they have found that they cannot push an aggressive branding strategy as some in the U.S. aid community would like. ‘‘In

some of our work in democracy promotion, it just doesn’t work to

advertise, ‘This law brought to you by the United States.’ We don’t

want to claim U.S. ownership; we want to promote Nigerian ownership.’ ’’

Ultimately, the two groups’ effectiveness, and their ability to operate freely, turns on whether Nigeria is truly a nascent democracy, or instead an essentially authoritarian regime seeking to gain

legitimacy through a democratic facade, what the recent NED report prepared for Chairman Lugar called a ‘‘hybrid regime.’’ One of

the representatives who had read the report said, ‘‘I don’t think Nigeria is a hybrid regime.’’ The other representative was slightly

more skeptical: ‘‘I’d say it is more a democracy with an asterisk.’’

However, in sharp contrast to this generally rosy picture of a relatively benign working environment, both representatives said

their organizations are currently in some kind of trouble with the

government. In the more serious case, the organization is in danger

of having its bank account closed down because it is in violation

of the registration laws. The case is complex, but in a nutshell, as

it was understood by staff, thanks to a bank consolidation and a

tightening of laws for antimoney-laundering purposes, the organization is in danger of losing the resident permit it needs to maintain a bank account because it does not have an independent local

board, as the law requires. Apparently, this organization’s policy is

not to have independent local boards. The representative reluctantly agreed that technically speaking, they were therefore in violation of the law. (Later, the Embassy political counselor said that

32

he expected that this problem would quietly go away in a few

months, as things often do in Nigeria, and that it appeared to be

an instance of low-level harassment). When asked whether he felt

this was simply the bureaucratic machinery at work, or whether

his organization was being specifically targeted, he said he did not

feel that the registration law was being misused to block the work

of the NGO, nor did he say that he felt they were being specifically

targeted because of their prodemocracy work. (SFRC staff is skeptical). The other organization had a more arcane—and more easily

fixed—problem: Some words in its name are not permitted for general use in Nigeria because they have specific meanings in public

life for which they are not appropriate in this context. He expects

the solution will be simply to use the group’s acronym as the official name, and call themselves XXXX-Nigeria. He believes they are

not being targeted.

ASIA

Thailand: Thailand is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of government. The King is Chief of State, and the

Prime Minister serves as head of government. King Bhumipol commands enormous respect and loyalty from the Thai people, and continues to influence Thai politics.

Now that the democratically elected government of Thaksin

Shinawatara has been overthrown by the September 2006, Thai

military coup, (with the reported acquiescence of the King), U.S.-

funded NGOs promoting democracy are once again able to operate

freely and without intimidation or harassment. However, the full

limits of freedom in operation may not be fully actualized until

martial law is lifted. Challenges to the work of NGOs are bureaucratic, as opposed to the interim (military-installed) government

seeking to subvert or impede their work.

One U.S.-funded NGO representative informed staff that his colleagues’ phones were tapped, and that they were ‘‘under constant

surveillance by Thai police authorities,’’ under the Thaksin regime.

Another NGO official stated that his staff was followed by police,

and phones tapped as well during the Thaksin administration.

As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) reported, the coup

followed 8 months of political turmoil. Widespread protests against

Thaksin, (mostly focused on the tax-free sale of his family’s telecommunications firm to a Singaporean government holding company), led the Prime Minister to call for a new round of parliamentary elections in April of this year. After a less-than-convincing victory by his Thai Rak Thai party, Thaksin resigned; however he

quickly assumed the position of ‘‘caretaker’’ Prime Minister. (The

opposition boycotted the election). After King Bhumipol asked that

the courts resolve the crisis, the Constitutional Court ruled the

elections invalid. New elections were set for this November. In the

months leading up to the coup, the uncertainty of the future of

Thai politics impacted the confidence of foreign investors and

raised doubts about the durability of Thailand’s democratic institutions. Military leaders took special notice as the Prime Minister reportedly considered intervening with the selection of persons for

key military positions.

33

According to Human Rights Watch, a ‘‘steady erosion of respect

for human rights . . . characterized the administration . . .’’ of the

former Prime Minister. In a letter to Mr. Thaksin, which summarizes some of the key concerns on the part of many human rights

advocates and organizations, Human Rights Watch Executive Director Brad Adams wrote,

Since your government assumed power, Thai security

forces have increasingly used excessive force and operated

with impunity, particularly in southern Thailand. There

has been no accountability for over two thousand

extrajudicial executions carried out by security forces in

the ‘‘war on drugs’’ launched by your government; there

has been no accountability for the unnecessary use of lethal force by security forces who killed some 110 militants

armed only with machetes, most aged between 15 and 20,

in Kruesi Mosque in southern Thailand; and there has

been no accountability for the March 18 ‘‘disappearance’’ of

Somchai Neelapajit, a prominent human rights lawyer representing two Thai Muslims facing terrorism charges, who

is strongly suspected of having been abducted and killed

by security forces.

Amnesty International reports that ‘‘almost 20 (human rights defenders), were killed or disappeared,’’ during the Thaksin administration, and ‘‘the authorities have not properly investigated these

abuses.’’

According to the CRS, ‘‘During Thaksin’s rule, detractors consistently voiced concern that his strongman style threatened Thailand’s democratic institutions. Charges of cronyism and creeping

authoritarianism grew increasingly louder as his political power

strengthened. Previously independent watchdog agencies reportedly

weakened under his watch, and some commentators alleged that

Thaksin undermined anticorruption agencies by installing political

loyalists to protect the business interests of his family and members of his cabinet—sometimes one and the same, as Thaksin has

a record of appointing relatives and friends to prominent posts.’’

The military coup and suspension of U.S. military aid may impact the traditionally strong bilateral relationship with Thailand.

During staff’s visit with Lieutenant General Naraset Israngkura,

Deputy Director General for the Office of Planning and Development, Ministry of Defense, in Bangkok, staff questioned the General as to the timetable for lifting martial law, and stressed that

members of the Foreign Relations Committee were looking for positive benchmarks from the military, toward restoration of democracy in Thailand.

Thai military officials have committed to a process that will

produce a new constitution for the country. There is concern that

the final product may be drafted with intent to exclude certain persons or parties from being eligible or qualified to participate in the

future political process in Thailand.

U.S. officials in Bangkok report that the political party processes

continue to be reasonably strong in Thailand. One official stated,

‘‘When the coup leaders took over, they issued a proclamation that

the law on political parties remains in effect, although political

34

party activities were also restricted by martial law and associated

measures. There is widespread expectation that political parties

will be able to resume regular activities soon. There’s also a definite expectation that parties will play the leading role when the

next round of elections are held.’’

The interim government is allowing for the development and

preservation of independent civil society actors.

Cambodia: A constitutional monarchy, Cambodia’s Constitution

provides for a multiparty democracy. The executive branch includes

the King, as head of state, an appointed Prime Minister, dozens of

Deputy Prime Ministers, senior Ministers and Ministers, as well as

numerous ‘‘Secretaries of State and Under Secretaries of State.’’

Political parties remain very weak, despite years of effort by IRI

and NDI toward capacity-building

Political activists and parties work in an environment permeated

by corruption at various levels of government and society. However,

as one NGO leader commented, ‘‘. . . as the middle class is developed; people will expect more from their government.’’ The good

news is that U.S.-funded NGOs are working a variety of projects

to empower Cambodian citizens at the grassroots level. From utilization of radio broadcasts, to developing women’s multiparty leadership caucus, to encouraging citizen participation at the village

level, a comprehensive approach of promoting democracy and good

governance is clearly underway.

NGO survey responses are mixed on the points as to whether the

government allows NGOs to participate freely in society and

whether NGOs face many bureaucratic obstacles that deliberately

prevent NGOs from functioning. Government officials have been

discussing the possibility of legislation to regulate NGOs. While

NGOs do not object to registering with the government, the possibility of a law has raised concerns.

The majority of survey respondents agreed that corruption is not

taken seriously as an issue in government, and that citizens are

afraid to report corrupt businessmen, government officials and politicians.

The sustainability of the present level of U.S. funding for NGOs

in Cambodia is unknown. It is also unclear that other donors would

match U.S. contributions in the event the U.S. funding level is diminished in the future. One U.S. official stated that in the event

the U.S. Government withdrew a large share of its funding, a ‘‘consolidation of NGOs’’ and ‘‘shrinking of civil society’’ might occur.

Indonesia: Containing the world’s largest Muslim population, Indonesia continues down the relatively new road to democracy. The

President and Vice President were elected by popular vote for the

first time in 2004.

The U.S. funds a wide array of democracy promotion and democracy support/good governance projects, including antitrafficking in

persons; justice sector reforms; legislative strengthening; mitigation

of conflict and support for peace; local reform and good governance

support; and media development.

U.S.-funded NGOs promoting democracy report they face few or

no obstacles with their work, and often operate with full support

of the Indonesian Government. One U.S. official noted, however,

‘‘When we’ve worked on some sensitive issues, such as human

35

rights or special autonomy for Aceh or Papua, some parts of the

Government of Indonesia always seem to have suspicions, but such

work has usually been done through local NGOs.’’

Others report that, ‘‘the government has clearly indicated particular areas which it considers to be ‘out of bounds,’ for attention

by international NGOs. The frequent use of libel suits reduces options available for many organizations conducting anticorruption

campaigns in both the public and private sectors.’’ There is also

‘‘occasional harassment by local police who continue to enforce old

regulations no longer on the books, which until eight years ago required obtaining local police permission for all organizational meetings.’’

IRI and NDI are able to register under the USAID umbrella

rather than filing individually, which would subject the NGOs to

financial disclosure requirements, including salary levels of all domestic/foreign staff.

The Government of Indonesia takes an active role in soliciting

assistance and facilitating some NGO programs. As one example,

an NGO official reports that the National Chief of Police recently

hosted a dinner, to which he gathered all main international donors to police reform efforts, thanked the donors for their assistance, and presented an outline of what all the police needed and

how they can further integrate international development assistance into the police reform program.

It is often more effective for the U.S. Government to work indirectly in Indonesia. As one NGO official stated, ‘‘. . . unfortunately

in the current environment, direct U.S. assistance is sometimes

viewed through a lens of concern related to a range of international

affairs issues of immense concern to Indonesians. Indonesian recipients are pragmatic in that they know and acknowledge the

source of funding, for example, but prefer the intense programmatic interaction, planning and implementation, to be with familiar and nonpolitical organizations and NGOs. Then there is the

question of aid effectiveness, and from my perspective, it appears

much easier for the USG to administer programs via U.S.-funded

NGO partners, as opposed to their own bureaucracy.’’

Increased anti-American sentiment is now being realized in Indonesia. As one U.S. official noted, ‘‘. . . more recently, one almost

gets the sense that the amount of anti-American sentiment among

some Indonesian officials has increased, which seems related to

Middle East issues. Local civil society partners, political parties

and government institutions, do not want to openly acknowledge

U.S. Government assistance.’’

In addition to U.S. funding of NGOs promoting democracy/good

governance, it should be noted that the U.S. Government provides

approximately $3 million in assistance to the DPR. The United

States is also working with the DPR to identify future opportunities for further assistance. For example, DPR Members insist they

need more staff and research assistance.

Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka’s multiparty democracy has been largely

stable despite high levels of violence; however, the ongoing conflict

between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri

Lankan Government is now a situation on the verge of civil war.

36

As the State Department reports, Sri Lanka’s two major political

parties—the UNP and the SFLP—‘‘embrace democratic values,

international nonalignment, and encouragement of Sinhalese culture. Past differences between the two on foreign and economic policy have narrowed.’’

A U.S. official working in Sri Lanka noted, ‘‘Political parties are

well-entrenched, have adequate bureaucratic capacity, and engage

in a variety of activities without undue obstacles. There is strong

awareness of the role of a robust opposition party in parliament.

Most major elections in Sri Lanka have been broadly free and fair,

with wide participation by political parties with freedom to campaign. Parliament encompasses a broad spectrum of opinions, from

Sinhalese nationalists and Muslim parties, to Tamil Tiger sympathizers.’’

The LTTE continues to engage in terrorist activity, intended to

destabilize Sri Lanka. While staff was meeting with a U.S.-funded

NGO representative, a Tamil Member of Parliament was assassinated a few miles from the meeting location. Weeks earlier, he

had met with the President to express concern about abductions

and extrajudicial killings, some of which fall under the category of

political assassinations. Some insist that the Government of Sri

Lanka, through elements of the military, is engaging in acts of

state terrorism against Tamil and other representatives of the population; and that the government is sponsoring paramilitary operations. Abductions of persons are increasing. Some are killed.

If the overall human rights situation continues to deteriorate,

and pressure mounts on media freedom, ‘‘these trends . . . will

eventually have an impact on political parties’ ability to organize

and express themselves freely.’’ according to a U.S. official.

NGOs surveyed were not in agreement that the Sri Lankan Government provides ample space in which they can operate within

the country. In addition, there was not shared consensus that

‘‘Watchdog organizations fear being coerced politically, economically, or physically.’’ There was agreement that the government

does not take corruption seriously as an issue.

CENTRAL EUROPE

Visegrad Four: Most of the USG funding for democracy promotion in the countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia,

and Hungary (the ‘‘Visegrad Four’’—V4) has, rightly and understandably, been shifted to more pressing U.S. priorities in the Caucuses, Central Asia, and the Middle East. However, while there has

not been the same backlash against civil society NGOs as is currently ongoing in Russia, it is clear that the governments of Central Europe remain skeptical regarding the positive role such

NGOs provide democracies. This tradition, long since deeply rooted

in our political consciousness, has yet to take hold in ‘‘new Europe.’’

NGOs are viewed either, at best, as nuisances to be tolerated because of current or past U.S./EU support or, at worst, as singleissue campaigns conducted by disgruntled and marginalized malcontents.

In addition to trying to solidify their role in society, NGOs in

Central Europe must also expend tremendous energy and hours on

funding. Having graduated from USAID assistance [Czech Republic

37

(1997), Hungary (1999), Poland (2000) and Slovakia (2000)], selfsustainability is now one of their most pressing concerns. While the

European Union has filled in somewhat on this issue, NGOs reported to staff that EU funding regulations, restrictions and effectiveness are such that most NGO staff encountered longed for the

‘‘good old days’’ of USAID assistance. EU funding is generally only

provided for the first 25 percent of any grant, with the remaining

75 percent to be remitted once costs have been vouchered back by

the NGO to EU headquarters. Thus many NGOs now find themselves having to borrow to cover costs until repaid by the European

Union, turning NGOs, in essence though not fact, into for-profit operations in order to cover these borrowing and interest costs. While

financial transparency must remain one of the cornerstones of any

NGO-donor relationship, these EU funding mechanisms are burdensome and time-consuming, sucking resources away from core

operations and objectives.

It is in our own interest to assist many of these NGOs in their

quests for funding as they not only seek to promote like-minded

civil society goals in their own countries, but often do so in third

countries as well. Staff met with numerous dedicated V4 NGOs

who conduct significant work in countries where we are neither

welcome nor often able to conduct much activity beyond our Embassy compounds. Such countries include Belarus, Burma, and

Cuba. Activities vary from raising money for dissidents forcibly dismissed by governments for their prodemocracy activities to providing activists with organizational and information dissemination

advice and equipment.

V4 NGOs not only help move those societies closer to joining the

world’s democracies, they provide perspectives that U.S.-based

NGOs cannot. Having survived themselves for years under repressive and undemocratic rule and then been integral to the transformation of their governments to democracy, they have a historical

perspective and moral voice that gives them added credibility. As

one V4 NGO representative told staff, ‘‘When we bring people from

these dictatorships to our country, they can’t believe the transformation, especially those who visited Central Europe during the

1980s. Mind you, because they have been fed so many lies by their

leaders, they still think of us in those terms—that our societies and

our economies haven’t progressed since the end of the cold war.

Then, when they get here, they can’t believe the changes, and I’m

not just talking about the types of cars we can now drive, but the

political and press freedoms that we enjoy, as well.’’

The passion for freedom and democracy these dedicated NGOs

bring to democracy promotion deserve greater USG support. Clearly, such support must be calculated so as not to draw too much attention as in some circumstances this would greatly decrease their

effectiveness. Nonetheless, the additional leverage they provide to

our own foreign policy efforts in these countries should be recognized, particularly in their home countries. Such appreciation, recognition, thanks and respect for their efforts would provide easy

public diplomacy opportunities in countries that have traditionally

been supportive of the United States, but who in recent times have

begun to gravitate more and more to the European Union.

38

Moldova: Moldova remains on the front line of Russian attempts

to return to the days of the Soviet Empire, of which Moldova was

once a part, particularly through its meddling in the eastern region

of Transnestria where a vocal Russian minority has cowed and coerced the rest of the Romanian and Moldovan population into

adopting a resolution calling for independence and union with Russia. Given this and Moldova’s status as the poorest nation in Europe, the decision to cut U.S. assistance this year by some 10 percent from the previous year (FY06 $17.82M; FY07 $16) is troubling. Any reduction in assistance will only likely contribute to the

worsening of her economic situation.

Moldova’s high poverty rate is the single biggest contributing factor to the country’s human trafficking crisis. Staff heard from trafficking officials that many villages are over-run with children

whose grandparents attempt to provide a stable home environment

when their fathers leave for construction jobs in Western Europe

and whose mothers are lured away by bogus offers of domestic employment overseas. These victims are trafficked throughout Europe

and the Middle East, increasingly to Turkey, Israel, the U.A.E.,

and Russia.

Additionally, this reduction in U.S. aid sends the signal that we

are abandoning Moldova to Russia and its desire to recreate its

spheres of influence through outright aggression and intimidation

via its agents in Transnestria, or through its economic embargoing

of Moldovan wine (the country’s single largest export) and other agricultural products.

Some argue the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC) re- cent award of some $25M to Moldova will more than make up for

this shortfall. However, this funding is targeted at supporting

anticorruption activities in order to make Moldova fully eligible for

inclusion in the Millennium Challenge Account Compact, not to improve the economic situation. While possible future funding offered

by the MCC would provide long-term benefits to the country, there

is a more immediate need for economic assistance through USAID.

Likewise, the announcement of the anticorruption funding award

was met with much skepticism inside the country and must be

carefully monitored in order to ensure it is transparently apportioned. The administration would clearly gain easy public diplomacy credits for maximizing the exposure involved in the auditing

and overseeing of the expenditure of these funds, and would demonstrate to the average citizen that the United States remains committed to Moldova’s future and to her eventual full integration into

Europe.

That said, Moldova and the rest of the GUAM nations (Georgia,

Ukraine, Armenia, and Moldova) are clearly eager for EU membership and the concomitant economic and political benefits. However,

recent statements by the European Union that further expansion

is ‘‘on hold’’ sends a dangerous message to these fledgling democracies and will only slow the pace of further democratic and economic reform in them. Without the hope of EU accession, GUAM

governments will be under little pressure both from within their

own societies and from Western democracies to continue down the

democratic road. The administration needs to pressure EU member

states to reverse this ‘‘closed door’’ policy.

39

6The Concertacio ́n de Partidos por la Democracia (Spanish ‘‘Coalition of Parties for Democracy’’) is an alliance of center-left political parties in Chile. The coalition (in various forms) has

held the Chilean Presidency since military rule ended in 1990; the elected Presidents have been

Patricio Aylwin, Eduardo Frei, and Ricardo Lagos. Michelle Bachelet from the PS/PPD was the

candidate for the 2005 Presidential election.

LATIN AMERICA

Chile: NGOs agree that progress has been made regarding developing stronger institutions of democracy since the return to democracy (1990). While the Government of Chile (GOC) is seeking to

broaden citizen input, NGO leaders feel the effort is too top-down,

without sufficient dialogue with civil society. Many argue that the

Chilean Congress’s over-reliance on party-affiliated foundations

and think tanks limits Members’ ability to respond to constituent

wishes (Congressmen and Senators have few advisors and personal

staff). Moreover, donations to nonprofit organizations have been on

the decline since a new law that increased government’s role in distributing charitable contributions (30 percent of a tax deductible

donation goes to a government-controlled common fund that is distributed to other charities.)

A former Senator from Chile’s center left government coalition

(Concertacio ́n6) who now heads an NGO said that NGOs function

freely in Chile. While there are some conflicts between the government and environmental NGOs, there is no persecution of NGOs

that hold views different from those of the government. The former

Senator acknowledged that many think tanks and foundations

have ties to political parties, but this support is not automatic and

that such NGOs do criticize the government. It was also noted that

NGOs can register as nonprofit ‘‘foundations’’ or ‘‘corporations’’ and

receive tax exempt status. The most pressing issue for many NGOs

is financing, in part because there is no culture of philanthropy in

Chile.

Many NGOs depend on foreign funding or private contributions.

Following the end of the government of Augusto Pinochet, millions

of dollars in funding from the United States and Europe dried up.

The former Senator explained that many NGOs also rely on government contracts to provide products or services.

This former Senator argued that despite broad participation in

civic organizations and volunteer groups, civil society is weak because of the excessive reliance on a strong executive branch, the

Catholic Church and private companies. ‘‘NGOs are an AngloSaxon phenomenon,’’ he said.

Representatives from a think tank on the right expressed concerns about the independence of NGOs affiliated with the ruling

Concertacio ́n government. The two representatives stated that

NGOs on the left are well organized and receive financing from Europe, notably France and Belgium, and to a lesser extent Mexico.

They noted that Members of the Chilean Congress have limited

staff, which has increased their reliance on party-affiliated think

tanks and foundations for information and analyses. They claim

that while Concertacio ́n-affiliated NGOs are often invited to comment on the GOC’s legislation at Congressional hearings, think

tanks and foundations from the right are not.

While there is more transparency than 10 years ago, representatives cautioned that there is a perception of widespread corruption,

40

7 Hogar de Cristo is the largest nongovernmental, nonprofit social organization, working with

over 4,000 volunteers to serve 70,000 people throughout Chile. They are dedicated to serving

and caring for ‘‘the poorest of the poor’’ with dignity and compassion. They have many sites

throughout Santiago (and the rest of the country) with numerous programs. Possibilities for

projects are endless. It is easiest to imagine students integrating themselves into the direct services of the sites and complementing the services with educational workshops and activities.

Other alternatives, including needs assessment and program planning or evaluation, tend to be

developed when the possibility of carrying them out becomes a reality.

as demonstrated by the recent government scandals in which administrators allegedly funneled funds to Concertacio ́n electoral

campaigns. They likewise expressed disappointment over the new

Donations Law, with its 30-percent cut for the government, which

has hurt private giving and in their view affects more NGOs on the

right than the left.

Government officials noted that President Bachelet wants to expand the participation of civil society in decisionmaking—one of

her top campaign promises. As part of this effort, officials highlighted a $1.8 million fund for strengthening social development organizations. The GOC assigns sums of money to NGOs involved in

development projects based on a competitive bid process.

Government officials cautioned that reforms aimed at increasing

citizen participation take time and are difficult to implement and

stated that Chile has a strong executive with a top-down framework emanating from Pinochet’s 1980 Constitution. Compared to

other countries, Chile is behind in revising its Constitution, the official said. The official said Chileans do not have the right to hold

plebiscites or referendums, and there is no ombudsman, but this

could change under the Bachelet administration.

With regard to declining donations to nonprofit organizations,

Concertacio ́n officials defended the government’s new law on donations. They argued that it is not fair, for example, that a company

makes a tax-deduction donation that benefits only one entity when

there are more needy recipients. The 30-percent allocation to a

common fund and distribution by the government is more beneficial to society, they claimed. The majority of think tanks and

foundations, on both the left and the right, criticized the new Donation Law, arguing it hurts well-known organizations such as Chile’s

Municipal Theatre and the Catholic Church-affiliated NGO ‘‘Hogar

de Cristo’’ 7. Most NGO representatives supported the idea that donors should be able to provide full funding to the NGO of their

choice without government direction.

Peru: Peru is a multiparty republic that recently emerged from

more than a decade of authoritarian rule and is undergoing a process of economic and democratic transformation.

Over the last decade, the Government transformed a heavily regulated economy into a market-oriented one. The country’s population was approximately 27 million. Gross domestic product grew

4.8 percent during the year, compared with only 0.2 percent growth

in 2001. Inflation, which was 0.1 percent in 2001, stayed under 1.5

percent during the year. Major exports include copper, gold, and

other minerals, fishmeal, textiles, and agricultural products. Close

to 54 percent of the population lives in poverty, earning less than

$1.25 per day; about 15 percent of the population lives in extreme

poverty, unable to meet the most basic food, shelter, and clothing

requirements.

41

8 Agencia Peruana de Corporacion Internacional.

The government of President Alan Garcia is perceived as respectful of the human rights of its citizens; however, in the past there

were serious problems in some areas, particularly regarding allegations of unlawful or unwarranted killings by police.

Staff’s visit was heavily focused on proposed legislation that

would give the Government of Peru (GOP) authority to control

NGO activity, particularly those working on human rights issues

and receiving international assistance.

The law would force nongovernmental organizations and their

international donors to register with Peru’s Agency for International Cooperation (known for its acronym in Spanish, APCI 8),

the state watchdog, and give details of their funding and activities.

APCI would also have responsibility for ‘‘harmonizing’’ the groups’

activities ‘‘in line with national development policy and the public

interest.’’

More than 3,000 NGOs operate in Peru, with a total annual income estimated at $500m for the sector.

APCI—whose board of directors is presided over by the Prime

Minister and includes the Foreign and Finance Ministers—would

be able to punish groups it judges to have acted not in the national

interest.

The proposed NGO law has generated an enormous amount of

controversy, with front-page articles and a host of almost unanimously critical editorials. Peruvian NGOs have threatened to take

the matter to the Constitutional Tribunal. Peru’s Ombudsman

called into question the law’s constitutionality. The overwhelming

response highlights the strength of Peru’s democracy, particularly

the civil society sector.

In a late October 2006 vote, the Peruvian Congress voted in favor

of the legislation, which needs to be approved in a second congressional vote before being sent to the President for consideration

(which had not occurred at the time of staff travel to Peru). In

many of the meetings NGO representatives focused on proposed

legislation which would give the government authority to, in effect,

direct foreign assistance. NGO representatives worried that the

government was attempting to exert greater control over civil society and to curtail freedom of expression.

There was widespread speculation as to hidden motives behind

the proposed legislation. Some suspected an alliance of expediency

between the APRA (the government party) and Fujimorista parties,

arguing that the law sought to curtail NGOs that were seeking the

extradition of former President Alberto Fujimori from Chile and

that also hounded President Garcia for alleged human rights violations during his first term. Others saw an effort to limit the activities of groups that are critical of the operations of Peru’s powerful

mining and gas interests and to target environmental NGOs suspected of deliberately exacerbating mining conflicts.

The GOP defended the proposed law. In addition to assuring

transparency, officials argued, the proposed legislation targets illicit groups, such as narco-traffickers and terrorist organizations.

One official claimed the bill was not put forward by the governVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:59 Dec 22, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 NGOS.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
42

ment party (APRA), but said it sought to ensure the activities of

NGOs in Peru did not harm national interests.

Venezuela: Venezuela has between 4,000 and 5,000 NGOs, including President Chavez’ own partisan support groups. All foreign

donations are disclosed on annual tax statements to the Government of Venezuela (GOV). Though aware of all activities, personnel

and funding sources, the GOV claims that NGOs which receive

American financial assistance have a clandestine purpose to advance the interests of the USG. Government efforts to interfere

with NGO donations or limit their freedom to communicate or receive funding hurts the NGOs’ ability to educate voters, promote

balanced, nonpartisan institutions and services, conduct advocacy

for special-interest groups, and enrich public discourse.

In today’s Venezuela, media outlets self-censor to keep their licenses from being revoked. Meanwhile, a rubber-stamp National

Assembly bows to Chavez’s wishes.

Staff visit was heavily focused on deep concern regarding the

proposed International Cooperation Law and harassment facing

certain NGOs.

The proposed law could increase existing regulation of NGOs,

both local and international. Civil society would be subject to considerable restrictions, with government allowed to interfere in their

activities and funding sources.

While the GOV has the right to regulate institutions operating

within its country, the text of the proposed bill is ambiguous, leaving ample room for further restrictions at the government’s discretion.

An alarming aspect of the bill is the proposal for a Fund for

International Cooperation and Assistance. It is unclear whether

funds received by civil society would end up being managed by the

government through this fund. The bill also requires all organizations to register with the government, and its scope would be defined directly by the Presidency under a regulation outside of legislative procedure.

In meetings with human rights NGOs, staff primarily discussed

the obstacles the proposed International Cooperation Law would

present to the NGOs’ continued operation. The proposed international cooperation agency, whose ostensible purpose would be to

catalog foreign investment in NGO operations, would, in fact, be

able to regulate and exercise decisionmaking authority, staff was

told. One NGO representative said that most NGOs would not be

opposed in principle to some sort of government clearinghouse requiring disclosure of finances. What was objectionable was the concept of having to reregister with the GOV as a civil society entity

and be subjected to programmatic scrutiny. Efforts to force NGOs

to ‘‘reregister’’ their existence would likely lead to GOV stalling tactics, forcing extant NGOs to operate underground. This eventuality

would provide the GOV a pretext to say certain NGOs are operating illegally, since they were not properly registered.

Regarding foreign assistance, NGO representatives stated that

the current regime has made receiving any assistance very difficult. ‘‘They either physically harass you or accuse you of treason.’’

Representatives agreed that the best form of assistance would be

to help push other diplomatic missions to become more involved.

43

9Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR—Fifth Republic Movement) is the political party founded by President Chavez.

One representative emphasized that a regional (Latin America

wide) effort was needed.

In meetings with an academic who is in the spotlight due to opposition to many government policy initiatives, notably changes to

the law on higher education, staff learned that the original impetus

for the NGO law was the elimination of electoral NGO Su ́mate, the

election watchdog which led an unsuccessful recall drive against

Chavez. He has called the group’s leaders ‘‘conspirators, coup plotters and lackeys of the U.S. Government.’’ The professor said,

‘‘With Chavez, if one NGO is bad, all are bad. There is no gray, everything is black or white.’’ When staff asked NGO representatives

to describe their current standing in front of the Chavez administration, one representative answered, ‘‘endangered’’; another replied, ‘‘threatened.’’

Another prominent human rights NGO representative told staff

about the ongoing personal harassment members of his organization face at the hands of the GOV, including threats of bodily

harm. He explained that the GOV is accusing them of fabricating

the threats and is trying to get Venezuelan courts to overturn the

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) ruling that

the GOV must provide protective detail for them.

Staff was scheduled to meet with the Movimiento Quinta

Revolucion (MVR) 9 National Assembly Deputy Saul Ortega, Chair

of the Assembly’s Foreign Relations Committee, to discuss the proposed ‘‘international cooperation’’ law. Ortega arrived late for the

meeting due to traffic issues, just as staff and Ambassador were departing. In the interim, staff had a productive discussion with senior National Assembly staffers involved in the drafting and floor

management of the draft law. The Assembly staffers indicated that

the bill would not be passed until after the December 3 Presidential elections.

Ortega’s staff said that the government was concerned that it did

not know what NGOs were doing and emphasized the need for the

government to ‘‘control and monitor’’ NGO activities. They indicated the law was modeled after a Spanish NGO law and was intended to improve international cooperation, not to attack NGOs.

The Ortega staffer claimed that elements of the bill had been

misinterpreted. One of the bill’s articles (article 10), creating a government fund to aid cooperation that organizations could contribute

to, would not, as the press had reported, require all funds to pass

through it, he said. Ortega staff again emphasized the importance

of having a registry so that NGOs can be tracked and monitored.

The government would not control the transfers of money to registered NGOs, he said, but the process of moving money would be

transparent and reported.

(44)

APPENDIX IV

45

46

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APPENDIX V

Idea to Reality: A Brief History of the National Endowment

for Democracy (NED)

BY DAVID LOWE (1)

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was launched in

the early 1980s, premised on the idea that American assistance on

behalf of democracy efforts abroad would be good both for the U.S.

and for those struggling around the world for freedom and self-government. This paper offers a brief history of the Endowment, including the events and circumstances that led to its creation, its

early legislative battles, more recent legislative success, institutional growth and innovation, and its efforts to help bring democracy foundations into existence in other countries. Although the

U.S. experience is undoubtedly unique, the model of a non-governmental organization that receives public funding to carry out democracy initiatives should be considered by other countries that appreciate the benefits of participating in this significant worldwide

movement.

The desire of Americans to share with other countries the ideas

that helped bring about their own successful democratic transition

dates almost as far back as the country’s founding over two centuries ago. As Seymour Martin Lipset has pointed out, throughout

American history democratic activists abroad as diverse as Lafayette, Kossuth, Garibaldi and Sun Yat Sen have looked to the U.S.

as a source of both ideological and material assistance. (2) Much

of the pioneering work in the area of political assistance has been

carried out by the American labor movement, which was active in

international affairs before the turn of the 20th century.

Origins

In the aftermath of World War II, faced with threats to our

democratic allies and without any mechanism to channel political

assistance, U.S. policy makers resorted to covert means, secretly

sending advisers, equipment, and funds to support newspapers and

parties under siege in Europe. When it was revealed in the late

1960’s that some American PVO’s were receiving covert funding

from the CIA to wage the battle of ideas at international forums,

the Johnson Administration concluded that such funding should

cease, recommending establishment of ‘‘a public-private mechanism’’ to fund overseas activities openly.

On Capitol Hill, Congressman Dante Fascell (D, FL) introduced

a bill in April, 1967 to create an Institute of International Affairs,

an initiative that would authorize overt funding for programs to

promote democratic values. Although the bill did not succeed, it

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helped lead to discussions within the Administration and on Capitol Hill concerning how to develop new approaches to the ideological competition then taking place between the U.S. and the Soviet

Union.

Interest in American involvement in the promotion of human

rights was intensified during the Administration of President

Jimmy Carter, who made it a central component of American foreign policy. In the late 1970’s America became committed to the

process of monitoring the Helsinki accords, especially that ‘‘basket’’

dealing with human rights. In 1978 Congressmen Fascell and Donald Fraser (D, MN) proposed a ‘‘QUANGO’’ (i.e, quasi-autonomous

non-governmental organization) whose mission would be the advancement of human rights. The bill they introduced would have

created an Institute for Human Rights and Freedom to furnish

technical and financial assistance to nongovernmental organizations that promote human rights abroad.

By the late 70’s, there was an important model for democracy assistance: the German Federal Republic’s party foundations, created

after World War II to help rebuild Germany’s democratic institutions destroyed a generation earlier by the Nazis. These foundations (known as ‘‘Stiftungen’’), each aligned with one of the four

German political parties, received funding from the West German

treasury. In the 1960’s they began assisting their ideological counterparts abroad, and by the mid-70’s were playing an important

role in both of the democratic transitions taking place on the Iberian Peninsula.

Late in 1977, Washington political consultant George Agree, citing the important work being carried out by the Stiftungen, proposed creation of a foundation to promote communication and understanding between the two major U.S. political parties and other

parties around the world. Headed by U.S. Trade Representative

William Brock, a former Republican National Committee Chairman, and Charles Manatt, then serving as Democratic National

Committee Chairman, by 1980 the American Political Foundation

had established an office in Washington, D.C. from which it provided briefings, appointments, and other assistance to foreign

party, parliamentary, and academic visitors to the U.S.

Two years later, in one of his major foreign policy addresses,

President Reagan proposed an initiative ‘‘to foster the infrastructure of democracy—the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities—which allows a people to choose their own way,

to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences

through peaceful means.’’ He noted that the American Political

Foundation would soon begin a study ‘‘to determine how the U.S.

can best contribute—as a nation—to the global campaign for democracy now gathering force.’’ Delivered to a packed Parliamentary

chamber in Britain’s Westminster Palace, the Reagan speech would

prove to be one of the central contributions to the establishment of

a U.S. democracy foundation.

The American Political Foundation’s study was funded by a

$300,000 grant from the Agency for International Development(AID) and it became known as ‘‘The Democracy Program.’’ Its

executive board consisted of a broad cross-section of participants in

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gram recommended establishment of a bipartisan, private, nonprofit corporation to be known as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The Endowment, though non-governmental, would

be funded primarily through annual appropriations and subject to

congressional oversight. NED, in turn, would act as a grant-making

foundation, distributing funds to private organizations for the purpose of promoting democracy abroad. These private organizations

would include those created by the two political parties and the

business community, which would join the regional international

institutes of the labor movement already in existence.

Legislative Action

The House Foreign Affairs Committee included a two-year authorization for the proposed National Endowment for Democracy at

an annual level of $31.3 million as part of the FY 84/85 State Department Authorization Act (H.R. 2915). The Reagan Administration had originally proposed a larger ($65 million) democracy promotion initiative to be known as ‘‘Project Democracy’’ and coordinated directly by the United States Information Agency (USIA).

When the Foreign Affairs Committee reported out H.R. 2915, it did

not include funding for ‘‘Project Democracy,’’ making clear its preference for the non-governmental Endowment concept. The Administration then voiced support for the creation of NED.

The legislation, which was included in the authorization bill for

the State Department and USIA, spelled out the following six purposes of the proposed Endowment: encouraging democratic institutions through private sector initiatives; facilitating exchanges between private sector groups (particularly the four proposed Institutes) and democratic groups abroad; promoting nongovernmental

participation in democratic training programs; strengthening democratic electoral processes abroad in cooperation with indigenous

democratic forces; fostering cooperation between American private

sector groups and those abroad ‘‘dedicated to the cultural values,

institutions, and organizations of democratic pluralism’’; and encouraging democratic development consistent with the interests of

both the U.S. and the groups receiving assistance. The bill spelled

out the procedures by which the funding would flow from USIA to

NED and the mechanisms for insuring financial accountability. (3)

Included in the legislation were earmarks of $13.8 million for the

Free Trade Union Institute, an affiliate of the AFL-CIO incorporated in 1978 that would serve as an umbrella for labor’s regional bodies operating in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Eastern

Europe; $2.5 million for the proposed affiliate of the National U.S.

Chamber Foundation; and $5 million for each of the two proposed

party institutes.

When the authorizing legislation for the Endowment reached the

floor of the House, an effort to eliminate all of its funding as proposed by the Foreign Affairs Committee failed by a small margin.

Nonetheless, the idea of providing funding for party entities remained a concern for many members. Congressman Hank Brown

(R, CO), who had sponsored the earlier amendment, was able to exploit those concerns by proposing that the section of Title VI providing earmarked funding for these party institutes be eliminated.

This amendment was passed by a vote of 267–136.

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Describing the proposed Endowment as ‘‘an idea whose time has

come,’’ the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Charles Percy (R,IL), introduced NED’s authorization on the floor

of the Senate three months after the House vote. Percy, who had

participated in some of the discussions of the ‘‘Democracy Program,’’ expressed his conviction that the legislation was ‘‘arguably

the most important single U.S. foreign policy initiative of this generation.’’ On September 22, 1983, the Senate rejected by a vote of

42–49 an amendment by Senators Zorinsky (D, NE) and Helms (R,

NC) to strike the authorization for the Endowment. (4)

The conference report on H.R. 2915 was adopted by the House

on November 17, 1983 and the Senate the following day. On the

one major substantive issue on which the two Houses differed, the

conferees agreed to maintain the House’s deletion of the earmarks

for the party institutes, but pointed out that this was ‘‘without

prejudice to their receipt of funds from the Endowment.’’

Getting Organized

On the day the Senate approved the conference report, articles

of incorporation were filed in the District of Columbia on behalf of

the National Endowment for Democracy. The Endowment was established as a nonprofit organization under section 501c (3) of the

Internal Revenue Service Code.

NED’s original Board of Directors, limited to three three-year

terms of service, included party activists, representatives of the

U.S. labor, business and education communities, foreign policy specialists, and two members of Congress. Following a brief stint by

Congressman Fascell as acting chairman, the Endowment appointed as its first permanent Chairman John Richardson, a former

Assistant Secretary of State with many years of involvement in private organizations involved in international affairs. For President,

the Board chose Carl Gershman, previously the Senior Counselor

to the U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

NED’s creation was soon followed by establishment of the Center

for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), and the National

Republican Institute for International Affairs (later renamed the

International Republican Institute or ‘‘IRI’’), which joined the Free

Trade Union Institute (FTUI) as the four affiliated institutions of

the Endowment. (FTUI was later reorganized as the American

Center for International Labor Solidarity, also known as the ‘‘Solidarity Center.’’) This structure had been recommended by the Democracy Program for three basic reasons: first, because of the wide

recognition of the parent bodies of these new entities as national

institutions with a public character, an important asset for this

non-governmental foundation; second, because they represent sectors of political life fundamental to any strong democracy; and

third, to insure political balance. The Endowment would serve as

the umbrella organization through which these four groups and an

expanding number of other private sector groups would receive

funding to carry out programs abroad.

Although the original authorized level for NED was $31.3 million, its appropriation was later set well below this level at $18

million, reflecting in part the fact that the new institution would

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not be fully organized until well into the year. As President

Gershman would later point out in congressional testimony, the

Endowment devoted considerable attention in its early months to

the task of putting into place ‘‘sound administrative, financial, and

reporting procedures.’’ A procedures manual that included grant

guidelines and selection criteria for grants was approved, and a

Statement of Principles and Objectives adopted. Because the Endowment had been funded at less than 60 percent of the authorized

level, the Board decided to allocate less than the full earmarked

amounts to the labor and business Institutes. This would enable it

to fulfill that part of the NED Act mandating that grants be made

to other private sector groups as well. (5)

During the consideration of the appropriation for NED’s second

year held in May, 1984, the Endowment’s opponents went on the

offensive and persuaded the House to eliminate all funding for it.

(6) A similar effort failed in the Senate, which then voted to reduce

the proposed $31.3 million level by $10 million and to explicitly

prohibit the party Institutes from receiving any of this amount.

The conference committee agreed to a funding level of $18.5 million

and maintained the ban on funding the party Institutes. NED’s appropriation was not to reach the original authorized level for another 10 years.

Reauthorization

The second NED authorization for FY 86 and 87 set a ceiling of $18.4 million and the final version contained neither earmarks nor

prohibition on funding the party Institutes. Additional language

was added to the NED Act that: 1) codified the Board’s prohibition

on the use of funds for partisan political purposes, including funding for national party operations; 2) mandated that NED grantees

consult with the State Department (which would continue to have

no veto over grants) prior to commencement of program activities;

3) moved the required date of reporting to the Congress on all

grants from December 31 to February 1; 4) required that the Endowment, despite its nongovernmental status, comply fully with

the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act; and 5) made

all financial transactions of the Endowment for each fiscal year

subject to a possible USIA audit. (This section was amended in a

subsequent authorization to require such audits.)

Since the issuing of the conference report for the second reauthorization covering FY 86 and 87, Congress has not included earmarks in any NED-related legislation. A provision in the Foreign

Relations Act of 1995 recommended equal funding of the four institutes and a capping of the total amount reserved for them at 55%

of the appropriated amount. (7)

At several points in NED’s budget process, legislative report language has recognized the importance of the Endowment’s discretionary program of grants to indigenous groups working in such

areas as human rights, independent media, civic education, and

strengthening democratic culture and values. For example, the

FY87 conference report on NED’s appropriation directed that not

less than 25% of the program dollars (i.e., the total appropriation

less the amount spent on administration) be used for discretionary

grants. And when Congress appropriated a $5 million increase in

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FY 94, conference report language instructed the Board to use the

increment to enhance the discretionary program. (8)

From time to time Congress has provided special appropriations

to the Endowment to carry out specific democratic initiatives in

countries of special interest, including Poland (through the trade

union Solidarity), Chile, Nicaragua, Eastern Europe (to aid in the

democratic transition following the demise of the Soviet bloc),

South Africa, Burma, China, Tibet, North Korea and the Balkans.

With the latter, NED supported a number of civic groups, including

those that played a key role in Serbia’s electoral breakthrough in

the fall of 2000. More recently, following 9/11 and the NED Board’s

adoption of its third strategic document, special funding has been

provided for countries with substantial Muslim populations in the

Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

Although the Foreign Relations Act of 1992 declared it to be the

sense of the Congress that the Endowment supplement its congressional appropriation with funding from the private sector, Congress

has rejected any requirement that NED’s grantees raise matching

funds. It did, in the FY 93/94 authorization, ask the Administration

to study the desirability of such a requirement, a notion that was

strongly rejected. The argument made by Hank Brown (who had

moved from the House to the Senate) that NED’s founders intended for its original funding to serve as ‘‘seed money’’ that would

enable it to become fully privatized was researched by the Congressional Research Service and found to be without any foundation. (9)

In FY93, the Endowment began compiling an annual report of cash

and in-kind contributions raised by all of its grantees to supplement their NED funding. The report for FY 99 indicated that for

every program dollar spent from NED’s congressional appropriation, its grantees raised over $.65 in ‘‘counterpart resources.’’

Congressional Support

NED’s congressional support has grown steadily during its first

twenty years. From the early days of close and frequent votes on

its authorizing and appropriating legislation, it has moved beyond

survival to widespread bipartisan endorsement on the Hill. In fact,

identical Senate and House resolutions (S. Con Res 66; H. Con Res

274) commending the National Endowment for Democracy ‘‘for its

major contributions to the strengthening of democracy around the

world on the occasion of the 20th anniversary’’ of its establishment,

and endeavoring ‘‘to continue to support [its] vital work’’ were

passed in October, 2003. The Senate resolution was passed by

unanimous voice vote; the House resolution sailed through on a roll

call vote of 391–1. Both resolutions had strong, bipartisan co-sponsorship. (10) These votes were a reflection of how far the Endowment had come over the years in establishing not only its legitimacy but also the widespread bipartisan approval of its work. But

the road had not always been a smooth one.

Apart from the tenuous situation the Endowment faced following

the successful floor amendment by its House opponents in 1984, its

closest call came in the summer of 1993. Responding to a recommendation of the new (Clinton) Administration, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved an increase in NED’s authorized

level from $30 to $48 million. But the relatively large percentage

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increase, combined with the infusion of large numbers of freshmen

in both parties committed to deficit reduction, put the Endowment’s supporters on the defensive.

On June 20, 1993, an amendment to kill the authorization sponsored by Congressman Paul Kanjorski (D, PA) succeeded by a vote

of 243–181. However, the following month the Senate voted by a

solid 74–23 margin for a somewhat scaled down increase (to $35

million), a vote that was later affirmed by the House (259–172),

thereby reversing its earlier position.

The most recent vote on the Endowment’s appropriation in the

House came in June, 1994 after the Appropriations Committee had

recommended—for budgetary reasons—a slight decrease in NED’s

budget to $33 million. An amendment by Congressman Joel Hefly

(R, CO) to eliminate all funding was defeated by a vote of 89–317.

(11)

In July, 1997, the Senate overwhelmingly repudiated the recommendation of its Appropriations Committee that NED not be

funded in FY 98. The Appropriations Committee was following the

lead of Senator Judd Gregg (R, NH), one of the early critics of NED

when he was in the House, who had ascended to the chairmanship

of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over the Endowment at the

end of 1995. On a vote of 72–27, NED supporters overcame a number of procedural obstacles that face any effort by supporters on the

Senate floor to restore a funding cut in committee.

Two years later, when the subcommittee tried again to eliminate

NED’s funding, the action was reversed on a voice vote on the Senate floor. This followed a spirited defense of the Endowment’s work

by Senator Richard Lugar (R, IN), a member of the NED Board,

who appealed to his colleagues ‘‘to stand up and be counted on

whether they feel passionately, as I do, and I think many of us do,

about democracy and human rights and what can be done about it

effectively.’’ Prior to the vote, a ‘‘Dear Colleague’’ letter calling for

a restoration of funding had been signed by nearly half the Senate.

The vote in 1999 marked the last time the Endowment’s appropriation was debated on the Senate floor. Since 9/11, previous critics, including Senator Gregg, have come to understand the Endowment’s work in the context of critical national security issues, a

topic that forms the basis of the Board’s third strategic plan adopted at the end of 2001. In 2003, the core appropriation exceeded $40

million for the first time. In addition, special funding for congressionally mandated countries and regions (see above) totaled over

$10 million.

The early opposition to the Endowment on the Hill tended to

focus on four basic factors: 1) its structure; 2) its independence; 3)

its purported redundancy, and 4) its mission. (12)

Structure

From the original congressional consideration of NED, the Endowment’s relationship with the four core groups that played a role

in its founding became a central focus of the funding debate. Even

some who favored the Endowment’s program questioned why—contrary to American political tradition—organizations affiliated with

America’s two political parties should receive federal funding. And

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ideological opponents of labor and business also weighed in against

the funding arrangement. (13)

Some of the debate over NED’s structure in the beginning related

to the composition of the Endowment’s Board of Directors, which

originally included representatives of the four Institutes. But this

argument became moot by the beginning of 1993, at which time an

entirely new set of directors had replaced the original Board as the

result of the term limits provision written into the Endowment’s

by-laws. (Because the turnover was staggered, new Board members

began taking their seats in FY 1990.) The new group of Board

members was carefully balanced in terms of party and ideology, but

they were not representing the Institutes and, except in a few

cases, were not closely linked to any of them. Indeed, by the time

Congress amended the NED Act in 1992 to preclude anyone from

serving on the NED Board who was in the leadership of any organization receiving more than five percent of the Endowment’s program funds, the provision no longer had any particular relevance.

Two other arguments related to the Institutes have been advanced: first, that these are ‘‘special interests’’ that can and should

be funded privately, and second, that they receive Endowment

funding on a ‘‘non-competitive’’ basis. The first argument tends to

ignore the independence of these groups from their better known

parent organizations and the fact that, like the Endowment itself,

their work serves America’s national interest.

The charge about the lack of competitiveness is based upon a

fundamental misunderstanding about how the Endowment operates. It is true that the Institutes are given target allocations to

help them plan a worldwide program on an annual basis. But the

criticism often overlooks the fact that the Endowment’s independent Board has to review and vote on all Institute projects,

which are subject to the same oversight procedures as those that

affect all other grantees. In fact, the entire concept of ‘‘competitiveness,’’ as applied to NED’s relationship with the Institutes, is misguided. The Endowment does not operate by deciding what democracy projects should be funded and then sending out requests for

proposals. Rather, it responds to the needs of democratic groups

abroad and funds those requests that fit into its program priorities.

Surely it is difficult to quarrel with the strong track record established by Institute programs in countries as diverse as Poland,

Peru, Bulgaria, the Philippines, Chile, South Africa, Mexico, and

the former Yugoslavia.

Independence

NED’s authorizing legislation spells out its non-governmental

status, namely that ‘‘Nothing in this title shall be construed to

make the Endowment an agency or establishment of the United

States Government.’’ (14) Board members are not selected by the

President and those who are appointed to serve in the Executive

Branch relinquish their Board membership.

It is sometimes contended that without this official status, the

Endowment lacks accountability. This charge overlooks the fact

that NED is answerable to a wide array of overseers in both the

Executive and Legislative Branches. As Senator Percy remarked

when introducing the original NED legislation in the Senate, ‘‘The

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Endowment will come under continuous and extensive scrutiny in

the appropriate committees of both Houses of Congress. The additional provisions for GAO oversight, as well as the terms of the

USIA grant agreement under which it will function, assure a convergence of oversight procedures virtually unique among grantees

of federal funds.’’ (15)

NED’s non-governmental status has a number of advantages (see

below) that are recognized by those institutions that really do carry

out American foreign policy. As pointed out in a letter signed by

seven former Secretaries of State in 1995, ‘‘We consider the nongovernmental character of the NED even more relevant than it was

at NED’s founding twelve years ago.’’ (16)

NED frequently consults with relevant policy makers about its

work, going well beyond the level of contact required by its authorizing legislation.

Redundancy

The charge that NED is no longer needed since the American

government has its own democracy promoting capability through

AID and other agencies ignores the reality that its work is of a

vastly different character from these official institutions. Much of

this difference stems from NED’s independence, which gives it an

ability to work in situations that official bodies (justifiably) avoid,

but also its non-bureaucratic character, which enables it to move

quickly in rapidly changing situations. A good example is the West

Bank, where both Institute and discretionary programs were on the

ground shortly following the signing of the Middle East peace accords in Washington in 1993.

A number of studies have shown the redundancy argument to be

without merit. One was commissioned by Congress in the FY 94/95

State/USIA authorization, which requested the Administration to

conduct an inventory of democracy funded programs and to identify

areas of duplication. The resulting report to the Foreign Relations

Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee submitted by

the State Department highlighted the comparative advantages to

the different approaches and orientations of those agencies and organizations receiving federal funding. (17)

A similar request to GAO by members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in April 1992 led to a long review process that

ended in June, 1996, when the leadership of GAO concluded that

it was not necessary to make any recommendations to the Hill visa-vis the current structure of democracy-funded programs. GAO’s

conclusion was based in part on the results of a study by AID and

NED staff of every democracy-related grant awarded by each institution in FY 1994. The review indicated that the programs of NED

and AID are not duplicative but complementary, and spelled out

various procedures that have been implemented to insure that the

two organizations continue to share information about their

projects. (18)

Left/Right Opposition

NED’s very mission, particularly in its early days, was challenged on ideological grounds. Opponents on the far left believed

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ternal affairs of other countries in the service of U.S. foreign policy

interests. Although a few antagonists continue on occasion to voice

opposition, their numbers have dwindled, particularly with changes

after the Cold War in attitudes on the left toward U.S. internationalism.

More significant opposition to the Endowment was voiced in the

early years by some elements of the human rights community, who

occasionally mischaracterized NED’s natural interest in free and

fair elections as its sole focus, while arguing that such elections do

not necessarily guarantee the protection of basic rights. NED’s programmatic emphasis on long-term democratic development, the

building of civil society, and funding indigenous human rights

groups has won over many of these early critics, and in fact has

led to a substantial coalescence of interest between NED and the

human rights community.

Within certain elements of the right, there have been allegations

from time to time that the Endowment is promoting a ‘‘social democratic’’ agenda. These are based largely upon the prominent role

played by the labor movement, as well as the social democratic

background of NED’s President. (19) Nonetheless, over the years

mainstream conservative activists and thinkers have been among

the most outspoken advocates on behalf of the Endowment. Endorsements of NED have been offered by the leadership of such

stalwart conservative organizations as the Heritage Foundation

and Empower America, and favorable editorials have appeared in

the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Times and National Review.

Strategic Planning

A 1991 GAO report recommended that the Endowment adopt a

more systematic approach to planning program objectives and assessing program results by identifying more specific and measurable goals and priorities. In response, the Endowment’s Board

adopted a number of new procedures, including the development of

target funding goals for each country in its annual planning document; the hiring of an evaluation specialist to work with grantees

in drawing up evaluation plans for each project and to commission

independent evaluations by outside experts; and the drafting of

strategic plans to focus on long range goals and objectives.

The first strategic plan, drafted by the Board in 1992, was designed as a blueprint for program activity over the next five years.

In it the Board sought to address two key issues: first, what role

the Endowment should play in a post-Cold War world, and second,

how to address the fact that the U.S. Government, primarily

through AID, had entered the field of democracy promotion.

The Board recommended that the Endowment play to its

strengths, i.e. take advantage of those institutional features that

set it apart from others moving into the democracy field: its status

as a non-governmental organization, its ‘‘multi-sectoral’’ character;

and its role as an organization whose sole mission is to promote democracy. As a non-governmental organization, it could provide political assistance to democratic forces in repressive or other sensitive political situations where U.S. Government support, even

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governmental, would be diplomatically or politically unfeasible.

With its special relationship with the four Institutes and its discretionary grants, it could provide a ‘‘full package’’ response to the

complex needs of emerging democracies. And as an institution

whose sole mission is to promote democracy, the Endowment could

serve as a center of democratic activity, bridging the gap between

activists and students of democracy. (20)

The latter role had been served by a biennial global conference

of democratic activists, many of them Endowment grantees, which

was begun in 1987. It was also highlighted by publication of the

quarterly Journal of Democracy, whose first issue appeared in January 1990. The Journal’s editorial Board consisted of the leading

thinkers on democracy in the world, and it quickly established

itself as the major publication for examining the central issues related to democratic ideas and institutions. From the outset, the

Journal’s funding came primarily from private sources.

In implementing the third pillar of the strategy document, a subcommittee of the Board (which included both NED and Journal

Board members) proposed establishment of a forum for bringing together scholars and practitioners on a regular basis and for developing a data base for democratic projects around the world. The

plan received a strong endorsement from USIA as well as approval

from GAO, which noted in a ruling that the forum idea was fully

consistent with the Endowment’s authorizing legislation inasmuch

as it would serve not as a ‘‘program’’ but rather an important function that would ultimately strengthen the grants program. (21)

Since its creation in 1994, the International Forum for Democratic Studies has become an important center for analysis of the

theory and practice of democratic development worldwide. Although it is part of the Endowment structure and receives some

funding from the NED appropriation, most of its budget has been

provided by private foundations, which have helped fund the Democracy Resource Center, a variety of research conferences on

democratic themes, and a small fellowship program. The Forum

also encompasses the Journal of Democracy, now published by

Johns Hopkins University Press, and has produced a diverse array

of democracy-related books based upon Journal articles and the papers presented at the Forum’s research conferences. In 2001, the

Endowment, with funds authorized by Congress and provided by

the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and

Labor, established the Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows Program,

which provides support annually for a dozen or so democracy activists, practitioners, scholars and journalists from around the world

to deepen their understanding of democracy and to enhance their

ability to promote democratic change.

The Endowment’s Board of Directors adopted a second strategic

plan at the beginning of 1997. With its federally funded budget

dropping in FY 96 to $30 million and frozen for the foreseeable future, the Board chose to emphasize how the Endowment could

maximize its impact during a time of fiscal austerity: first, by expanding programs that promote cross-border and intra-regional activity among grantees (such as the highly successful NED-funded

‘‘East to East’’ programs in the former Soviet Bloc); second, by integrating networks of grantees to maximize their impact within counVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:59 Dec 22, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00126 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 NGOS.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
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tries such as China and Burma, and third, by encouraging the

growth of new counterpart organizations. (22)

Counterpart Institutions

Five years after the creation of NED, the Canadian Parliament

established the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, which became operational two years later from

its headquarters in Montreal. During the planning phase for the

new Centre, members of a Parliamentary task force consulted with

the leadership of NED.

In 1992, the Westminster Foundation was established in Great

Britain. More than the Canadian Centre, it used NED as a model,

with a portion of its grants set aside for programs administered by

party affiliated organizations. (23) But there are differences with

NED as well, since the Foundation does not fund programs that

have a business orientation (such as those operated by the Center

for International Enterprise) and has more of a quasi-governmental

character through its relationship with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Foundation’s grants have been heavily concentrated in Eastern Europe (where Canada’s Centre does not operate) and former Commonwealth countries.

In report language accompanying the Endowment’s FY 93 appropriation, the Appropriations Committee recognized the existence of

democracy promotion foundations in Germany, Canada, and Great

Britain and recommended that NED consider convening a ‘‘democracy summit’’ to review issues of mutual concern. The Endowment

took up the suggestion, convening a group of foundation representatives in February, 1993 at Airlie House outside of Washington,

D.C. The group has expanded since that time to include foundations in other European countries (several related to political parties) and Australia. Since the initial meeting convened by NED, the

group has met subsequently in Germany, England, Canada, and,

most recently (2003), in France.

Working with Taiwan’s Institute for National Policy Research,

with whom the International Forum co-sponsored a research conference in 1995 on ‘‘Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies,’’

NED convened a meeting in Taipei in October, 1997 to promote the

concept of establishing new democracy foundations. Some twenty

countries were represented at the meeting.

In November, 2002, the Endowment was invited by a consortium

of three Japanese organizations, the Committee to Aid Democracy

for Peacebuilding (ADP), the Diet League to Aid Democracy for

Peacebuilding, and the Ozaki Yukio Memorial Foundation to participate with other democracy foundations and local NGOs in a

two-day conference seminar in the Diet on establishing a Japanese

foundation. And, in June, 2003, following a period of consultation

with NED, Taiwan launched the Taiwan Democracy Foundation,

which has the strong endorsement of President Chen Shui Bien.

A related development that emerged from NED’s efforts to stimulate international cooperation in the promotion of democracy has

been the creation of the World Movement for Democracy. The

Movement is a ‘‘network of networks’’ that connects and unites people and organizations around the world who are working on a daily

basis to promote democratic values and build and strengthen demoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:59 Dec 22, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00127 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 NGOS.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
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cratic institutions in their respective countries. The Movement, for

which NED serves as the secretariat, is directed by an international Steering Committee of distinguished democratic activists

and thinkers. It has held four World Assemblies funded largely outside of NED’s congressional appropriation: New Delhi, India in

1999; Sao Paulo, Brazil in 2000; Durban, South Africa in 2004; and

Istanbul, Turkey in April, 2006.

Conclusion

To commemorate the twentieth anniversary of NED’s establishment, the Board of Directors issued an invitation to President

George W. Bush to make a major statement about democracy. In

his address, one of the most significant of his Presidency, he articulated his vision of a more democratic Middle East, the one region

of the world where democracy has failed to take hold. Much of his

speech echoed one of the major themes of the Endowment’s third

strategy document, which calls for promoting democratic institutions and values in the Muslim World, while maintaining NED’s

global grants program.

The National Endowment for Democracy has grown from a simple but powerful idea into a multi-faceted institution with a wideranging program, solid bipartisan support, and an ambitious agenda. In the President’s 20th anniversary address, he paused to pay

tribute to the Endowment, its staff, directors, and global program:

By spending for and standing for freedom, you’ve lifted

the hopes of people around the world, and you’ve brought

great credit to America.

NOTES

1. Vice President, Government and External Relations, National Endowment for

Democracy

2. Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘‘Democratic Linkage and American Aid,’’ The Washington Times, June 11, 1995.

3. The question of whether NED was financially accountable to USIA was not resolved until 1985, when the GAO ruled that the agency did have financial (but

not programmatic) oversight over the Endowment.

4. Congressional Record, September 22, 1983, pp. 12703-22. Interestingly, a number of those Senators voting for the amendment would eventually become strong

supporters: Biden, Domenici, Kassebaum, Murkowski, Roth, Rudman, Simpson

and Wallop.

5. The General Accounting Office, while finding this action ‘‘understandable,’’ subsequently ruled that the earmarks should nonetheless have been followed. It

recommended no retroactive corrective measures.

6. The vote was influenced by a New York Times article published three days before the vote reporting that some funding from the labor institute had been

used in the Presidential election in Panama. NED’s Statement of Principles and

Objectives, adopted later that year, asserts that ‘‘No Endowment funds may be

used to finance the campaigns of candidates for public office.’’

7. Although the bill was vetoed by President Clinton (for reasons unrelated to

NED) and did not become law, the Board decided to follow its provision regarding equalization of the target figures for the four Institutes. This policy has

been maintained since then.The proportion of funding reserved for Institute

projects is currently at the 55% maximum contained in both the 1995 and 1997

State Department authorization bills.

8. In doing so, the committee cited the fact that some of the Institutes had begun

to receive substantial amounts of funding from AID. See Conference Report to

accompany H.R. 2519, October 14, 1996, p. 105.

123

9. ‘‘National Endowment for Democracy: Policy and Funding Issues,’’ Congressional

Research Service, August 2, 1996, p. 5.

10. In the Senate: Frist, Daschle, Lugar, Biden, Graham, Bayh, Kyl, Hatch, Leahy,

Hagel, Levin, McCain, McConnell, and Sarbanes; In the House: Hyde, Lantos,

Cox, Payne, Berman, Bereuter, Cardin, Chabot, Crowley, Diaz-Balart, Dreier,

Engel, Gallegly, (Mark) Green, Houghton, (Patrick) Kennedy, Kingston, Kirk,

Lowey, Meeks, Menendez, Napolitano, Pitts, Rohrabacher, Ros-Lehtinen, Royce,

(Christopher) Smith, and Ackerman.

11. A conference committee restored $1 million of the $2 million cut from the appropriation.

12. A fifth issue that is often raised when the Endowment is debated is the cost

to the U.S. treasury. Given the modest size of the NED budget, it is clear that

this ‘‘issue’’ is used tactically by critics to increase support among so-called ‘‘deficit hawks’’ and is not what stimulates them to take up the cause.

13. This has been mitigated somewhat on the right by the AFL-CIO’s strong antiCommunist orientation in its international work. The other aspect of the early

criticism of the Endowment’s funding of the labor institute was its disproportionate allocation vis-a-vis the other core grantees prior to 1995. Many of those

making this criticism were unaware of the fact that it was a congressional earmark that created the original imbalance.

14. 22 USC 4412, Sec. 503 (c).

15. Congressional Record, September 22, 1983. P. 12714.

16. The seven were James Baker, Laurence Eagleburger, George Shultz, Alexander

Haig, Henry Kissenger, Edmund Muskie and Cyrus Vance.

17. See ‘‘Democracy Promotion Programs Funded by the U.S. Government,’’ A Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs

Committee of the U.S. Congress, as requested in P.L. 103-236, Section 534.

18. See ‘‘A Review of Democracy Programs Funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the National Endowment for Democracy,’’ March 1,

1996.

19. See ‘‘Paying Big Labor to Export its Agenda,’’ Insight, July 12, 1992.

20. National Endowment for Democracy, ‘‘Strategy Document,’’ January 1992, pp.6-

12.

21. General Accounting Office, Decision B-248111, September 9, 1992.

22. National Endowment for Democracy, ‘‘Promoting Democracy in a Time of Austerity: NED’s Strategy for 1997 and Beyond.’’

23. Before the Foundation became fully operational, NED hosted a series of meetings for its acting Executive Director and a founding Board member in Washington, where they were familiarized with the Endowment’s structure and procedures. The two organizations have maintained a close relationship since that

time.

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