[Cite as State v. Cross, 2011-Ohio-3250.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

RANDY JAMES CROSS 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 25487 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. CR 10 04 0989 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: June 30, 2011 

 

MOORE, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, Randy James Cross, appeals from the judgment of the Summit County 

Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} Randy James Cross was arrested on April 7, 2010, based on an incident that 

occurred at 738 Hazel Street. As a result of the incident, on April 12, 2010, Cross was indicted 

on one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a felony of the fourth degree, 

one count of aggravated menacing in violation of R.C. 2903.21, a misdemeanor of the first 

degree, and one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(C), a misdemeanor of 

the second degree. On June 14, 2010, a supplemental indictment was filed and Cross was 

charged with one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A)/(B), a felony of the 

fifth degree, and one count of violating a protection order in violation of R.C. 2919.27, a 

misdemeanor of the first degree. 
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{¶3} Cross entered a plea of not guilty on May 5, 2010, and the matter proceeded to a 

jury trial on June 16, 2010. On June 18, 2010, the jury found Cross guilty of all three counts of 

domestic violence and guilty of violating a protection order. The trial court granted his Crim.R. 

29 motion as to the aggravated menacing charge. On June 30, 2010, Cross was sentenced to a 

total of six months in prison. 

{¶4} Cross timely filed a notice of appeal. He raises five assignments of error for our 

review. We have rearranged the assignments of error to facilitate our review. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE CRIMINAL RULE 29 

MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL.” 

{¶5} In his fourth assignment of error, Cross contends that the trial court erred in 

denying his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. We do not agree. 

{¶6} Crim.R. 29(A) provides that a trial court “shall order the entry of a judgment of 

acquittal * * * if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.” 

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must determine 

whether the prosecution has met its burden of production. To determine whether the evidence in 

a criminal case was sufficient to sustain a conviction, an appellate court must view that evidence 

in a light most favorable to the prosecution: 

“An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to 

determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind 

of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is 

whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of crime proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, paragraph 

two of the syllabus. 
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{¶7} In State v. Brewer, “[t]he Ohio Supreme Court emphasized that the interest in the 

administration of justice dictates that the appellate court review the issue of sufficiency in 

consideration of all evidence presented by the state in its case in chief, whether such evidence 

was properly admitted or not.” State v. Freitag, 185 Ohio App.3d 580, 2009-Ohio-6370, at ¶9, 

citing State v. Brewer, 121 Ohio St.3d 202, 2009-Ohio-593, at ¶19. 

Domestic Violence

{¶8} Cross was convicted of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 

2919.25(A)/(B)/(C), which provides: 

“(A) No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a 

family or household member. 

“(B) No person shall recklessly cause serious physical harm to a family or 

household member. 

“(C) No person, by threat of force, shall knowingly cause a family or household 

member to believe that the offender will cause imminent physical harm to the 

family or household member.” 

{¶9} Cross stipulated that, at the time of the alleged violation, he knew that Williams 

was pregnant and that he and Williams had been living together as family or household 

members. In light of the stipulation, he could not challenge those elements. 

{¶10} A neighbor, Brandy Gibbs, testified that on April 7, 2010, she witnessed a verbal 

and physical altercation at around 12:45 a.m. between the neighbors that resided at 738 Hazel 

Street. Gibbs was sitting on her front porch with friends when she heard a female across the 

street yelling “stop hitting me” and things of that nature. She saw a man hitting the woman, and 

the woman trying to get away from him. Specifically, she saw the man hitting the woman in the 

face and head area. The woman then ran down the street to another neighbor’s home. 

{¶11} The woman was using the phone on the front porch of the neighbor’s house when 

the man walked down to the porch as well. He told the woman to come off of the porch, and 
4 

 

when she did so, he grabbed her by the arm and dragged her back down the street. When they 

returned to 738 Hazel Street, the woman tried to walk up the steps to the residence, and the man 

grabbed her by her hair. She then tried to walk down the steps, and the man pulled her by the 

hair, and dragged her up the steps into the house. 

{¶12} Once inside of the house, the front door was left open, so Gibbs could hear yelling 

inside of the house. The woman ran back out of the house again, and again the man pulled her 

back into the house by her hair. Gibbs heard more yelling inside of the house, and the woman 

came back outside and sat on the porch. The man came back outside and was “beating her up” 

and “hitting her everywhere” all while the female was “just sitting there getting beat up.” 

{¶13} Gibbs further testified that at one point she witnessed two black men walking 

down the street. She recognized them from the neighborhood, but did not know them personally. 

The men asked her if they should help the woman. Gibbs responded that she wouldn’t help them 

because the woman had run down to the other porch and had the opportunity to get help if she 

had wanted it. The men decided to go across the street and ask the man on the porch to borrow a 

lighter. The man began yelling at the two men and telling them to get away from his yard. The 

man showed them he had a knife and at one point chased the men down the street with the knife. 

Eventually the man stopped chasing them and returned to the house. He and the woman were 

walking back into the house and he was hitting her again. 

{¶14} Gibbs testified that the man was hitting the woman “everywhere.” She further 

testified that the man was wearing shorts, and that he had taken off his shirt when he began 

chasing the two men. Gibbs further testified that the woman was white and that she believed that 

the woman was wearing a hoodie and pants such that her flesh was covered by the sleeves and 

the pants. The man and the woman were inside of the residence when the police arrived. She 
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saw the police knocking on the door and walking around the perimeter of the house. The man 

was shining a flashlight out of the windows at the police. Eventually, someone opened the door 

and the police apprehended a man. Gibbs further testified that she had not seen any other people 

enter or exit the house that night. 

{¶15} Wayne Andrews, the sergeant assigned to communications with the Akron Police 

Department, testified regarding a 911 call on April 7, 2010, concerning 738 Hazel Street. In the 

call, a woman reported a domestic dispute between a man and his girlfriend at the address. The 

woman identified herself only as a “concerned neighbor.” She mentioned that the girlfriend 

looked pregnant and that both the man and the woman were white. She further stated that it 

looked like the woman was trying to leave and the man would not let her. In addition, it looked 

like the man was shoving the woman around. 

{¶16} Michael Koubek, a patrolman with the Akron Police Department, responded to a 

dispatch call on April 7, 2010, regarding a domestic fight at 738 Hazel Street. He and his 

partner, Officer Christopher Lepa, arrived on scene within a couple minutes of the 911 call. 

They had been told that a male and female were outside fighting, and that the male had dragged 

the female back into the house. After checking out the area, the officers knocked on the door to 

the residence. A man, later identified as Cross, answered the door shirtless and said, “No, thank 

you,” and walked back into the house. Cross then turned off all of the lights in the house. The 

officers proceeded to knock on the door five to six times. They also began shining their 

flashlights into the house to see if they could see him, and Cross began shining a flashlight back 

at them. 

{¶17} Officer Koubek spoke with the neighbor across the street, Gibbs, and learned that 

weapons were involved. At that point, the officers called for another unit as backup. Once 
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additional officers arrived, they advised Cross that they were going to have to kick in the door if 

someone did not answer. A female subsequently came to the door and let the officers in. The 

officers placed Cross in handcuffs. Another officer, Sergeant Boal, took the female outside to 

get her statement. Officer Koubek testified that Cross appeared to be intoxicated because he had 

slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and smelled like alcohol. Officer Koubek further testified that 

the officers found a large knife upstairs on the landing of the steps. 

{¶18} Brian J. Curtin, a patrol officer with the Akron Police Department, testified that 

on April 7, 2010, he responded to a call for a backup unit at 738 Hazel Street. When he arrived, 

the officers were trying to make contact at the front door. Officer Curtin and his partner set up a 

perimeter around the house. He observed someone flashing a flashlight out toward his face. The 

officers eventually made entry into the house, and by the time Officer Curtin was inside the 

suspect was already in handcuffs. He observed a large sheath sitting on the couch. Once the 

suspect was taken out of the house, he did a protective sweep and found a large knife on the floor 

of the hallway at the top of the stairs. It was near a window where someone had been shining a 

flashlight. 

{¶19} Christopher Lepa, a patrol officer with the Akron Police Department, testified that 

on April 7, 2010, he, along with his partner, Officer Koubek, responded to a dispatch call for a 

domestic fight at 738 Hazel Street. He and Officer Koubek knocked on the front door when they 

arrived on the scene. When the suspect turned the lights off inside the house, Officer Lepa went 

to the rear of the house to set up a perimeter while Officer Koubek stayed on the front porch. He 

stood at the rear of the house when officers went to the front door. When the other officers made 

entry, he ran to the front and entered the house. By the time he entered the house, Cross was 

already in handcuffs. Officer Lepa testified that Cross had his shirt off and seemed very agitated 
7 

 

and intoxicated. There was a strong odor of alcohol and his eyes were glassy. He obtained a 

shirt for Cross and walked him to the police cruiser. 

{¶20} Williams testified that on April 7, 2010, she lived at 738 Hazel Street along with 

her boyfriend, Cross. She testified that on the date in question she was pregnant with his child. 

That evening, she arrived home from work and found Cross on the front porch with his uncle. 

She testified that she was upset that the uncle was there because she believed he was a bad 

influence. She and Cross began arguing on the front porch, and he began calling her names. At 

one point, she went down to her neighbor’s house, Wanda Sams, to use her phone. Williams 

testified that her cell phone was not working, but that she did have a functioning landline in her 

home. Williams testified that Cross came down to the neighbor’s house and walked her home. 

She denied that Cross struck her. The neighbor that testified did not directly identify Cross in 

her testimony in court. 

{¶21} While the evidence of domestic violence is circumstantial in that no one directly 

identified Cross as the individual causing harm, and no one directly identified Williams as the 

victim, circumstantial and direct evidence “possess the same probative value[.]” Jenks, 61 Ohio 

St.3d at paragraph one of the syllabus. “Furthermore, if the State relies on circumstantial 

evidence to prove any essential element of an offense, it is not necessary for ‘such evidence to be 

irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of innocence in order to support a conviction.’” 

(Internal quotations omitted.) State v. Tran, 9th Dist. No. 22911, 2006-Ohio-4349, at ¶13, 

quoting State v. Daniels (June 3, 1998), 9th Dist. No. 18761, at *2. 

{¶22} Gibbs, a disinterested bystander, heard the yelling at 738 Hazel Street, observed a 

man striking a woman repeatedly, saw the victim leave the porch and walk to the neighbor’s 

house and observed the man pursue her. He removed his shirt while chasing off two interlopers. 
8 

 

That same man pulled the victim into the home by her hair. Gibbs saw no one else enter or leave 

the home. The police responded within minutes of the anonymous 911 call and found Cross in 

the house without a shirt. The 911 caller also identified the victim as being a pregnant woman. 

Cross was reported to have chased two men with a knife. When the police apprehended him, 

they observed a sheath and a large knife near a window where a flashlight had been shone on 

them. No other person was found in the home. 

{¶23} After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude 

that the trier of fact could reasonably find that the State met its burden of production and 

presented sufficient evidence to establish Cross’ identity and to prove that Cross knowingly 

caused or attempted to cause Williams harm. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at paragraph two of the 

syllabus. Accordingly, this portion of Cross’ fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

Protection Order

{¶24} Cross was convicted of violating a protection order in violation of R.C. 2919.27, 

which provides, in pertinent part: 

“(A) No person shall recklessly violate the terms of any of the following: 

“(1) A protection order issued or consent agreement approved pursuant to section 

2919.26 or 3113.31 of the Revised Code; 

“(2) A protection order issued pursuant to section 2151.34, 2903.213, or 2903.214 

of the Revised Code[.]” 

{¶25} Cross contends that there is insufficient evidence to sustain this conviction 

because there was no testimony as to the terms of the protection order. We do not agree. 

{¶26} A copy of the temporary protection order was admitted in the trial court. In 

addition, Officer Lepa testified regarding the protection order. The officer averred that a 

protection order was issued on April 8, 2010, which prohibited Cross from having any contact, 

including phone contact, with Williams. He further averred that Cross had signed the document. 
9 

 

Additionally, Officer Lepa averred that he heard a recording of a jail call where Cross contacted 

Williams after the protection order was issued. The recording was then played for the jury. 

Finally, Williams testified that in one of the jail calls, Cross told her he was aware that there was 

a temporary protection order, and admitted that the two had telephone contact. 

{¶27} After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude 

that the trier of fact could reasonably find that the State met its burden of production and 

presented sufficient evidence that Cross violated a temporary protection order which prohibited 

contact with Williams. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at paragraph two of the syllabus. Accordingly, this 

portion of Cross’ fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

“THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST 

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE 

EVIDENCE.” 

{¶28} In his first assignment of error, Cross contends that the trial court’s judgment is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. We do not agree. 

{¶29} When a defendant asserts that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, 

“an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine 

whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way 

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be 

reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Otten (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 

340. 

This discretionary power should be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances when the 

evidence presented weighs heavily in favor of the defendant. Id. 
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Domestic Violence

{¶30} In addition to the previously discussed testimony, Williams testified that on the 

evening in question, she returned home from work and found Cross on the porch with his uncle. 

She averred that she and Cross got into a verbal argument. The dispute was over the fact that she 

asked the uncle to leave. She testified that she noticed Cross had a couple of drinks and that she 

observed two beer cans. 

{¶31} At some point, two men approached the house and were allegedly bothering 

Williams and Cross, making comments, yelling, and throwing rocks at the house. Williams 

contended that she went to the neighbor’s house to call Cross’ father to seek help with the two 

men. She stated that she went to the neighbor’s house because her cell phone was not working, 

and she reacted instinctively after seeing the neighbor outside. She admitted that she did have an 

operational landline in the home. 

{¶32} During her testimony, she asserted that she was not testifying on Cross’ behalf, 

but was instead testifying “to tell the truth.” She averred that Cross walked down to the 

neighbor’s house, took her by the arm and “gestured” her home. She denied that Cross ever hurt 

her. When the police arrived, they examined her for injuries, and did not take any pictures. She 

maintained that she had no injuries or marks. 

{¶33} Wanda Sams, a neighbor residing at 730 Hazel Street, testified to the events in 

question. On April 7, 2010, she was sitting outside on her porch. She testified that she is 

familiar with Cross and Williams because they live near her. She testified that she did not notice 

anything unusual. She further testified that Williams and Cross may have had a verbal 

confrontation, but that it was not loud. Williams came to her house, stated that she had a 

disagreement with Cross, used the phone and sat with her for 15 to 20 minutes. During the call, 
11 

 

Williams did not ask for help. At one point, Cross came over to the house and got Williams off 

the porch and they walked back home together. 

{¶34} Sams further testified that she never had drinks with Williams and Cross, and that 

it would surprise her to learn that Williams testified differently. She said it would also surprise 

her to learn that Williams referred to her as a friend, because she considers them only associates. 

She maintained that she did not see two black men outside, nor did she witness Cross with a 

knife. She stated that it would surprise her to learn that Williams testified that she came down to 

the house to call for help because Williams was not in distress when she came to her porch. She 

averred that Williams was wearing a hoodie, and possibly jeans, and that she could not see her 

arms or legs. 

{¶35} The evidence essentially created a question of credibility between Gibbs and the 

anonymous 911 caller’s testimony and that of Williams and Sams. This Court has held that, “in 

reaching its verdict, the jury is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness.” 

Prince v. Jordan, 9th Dist. No. 04CA008423, 2004-Ohio-7184, ¶35, citing State v. Jackson

(1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 29, 33. Furthermore, “[t]he weight to be given the evidence and the 

credibility of the witness[es] are primarily for the trier of the facts”; in this case, the jury. Id., 

citing State v. Richey (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 363. The jury had the opportunity to weigh the 

testimony, and listen to the 911 tape, and “did not lose its way simply because it chose to believe 

the State’s version of the events, which it had a right to do.’” State v. Feliciano, 9th Dist. No. 

09CA009595, 2010-Ohio-2809, at ¶50, quoting, State v. Morten, 2d Dist. No. 23103, 2010-Ohio117, at ¶28. 

{¶36} After reviewing the entire record, weighing the inferences and examining the 

credibility of the witnesses, we cannot say that the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest 
12 

 

miscarriage of justice. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d at 340. Accordingly, this portion of Cross’ first 

assignment of error is overruled. 

Protection Order 

{¶37} Cross argues that his conviction for violating a protection order is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. He asserts the same arguments as his fourth assignment of 

error, that there was no testimony as to the terms of the protection order and that there was no 

testimony that Williams did not wish to speak with Cross. These arguments are without merit. 

{¶38} A copy of the temporary protection order was admitted in the trial court. Officer 

Lepa testified that a protection order was issued on April 8, 2010, which prohibited Cross from 

having any contact, including phone contact, with Williams. He further averred that he had 

heard a recording of a jail call where Cross contacted Williams after the protection order was 

issued. The recording was then played for the jury. Finally, Williams testified that in one of the 

jail calls, Cross told her he was aware that there was a temporary protection order, and admitted 

that the two had telephone contact. 

{¶39} Accordingly, upon review of the record, we do not conclude that “in resolving 

conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Otten, 33 

Ohio App.3d at 340. Cross’ first assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VIOLATING SEPARATION OF POWERS.” 

{¶40} In his second assignment of error, Cross contends that the trial court erred in 

violating separation of powers. Because he failed to preserve any objection based on the 
13 

 

separation of powers doctrine, Cross has forfeited this issue and we do not reach the merits of his 

contentions. 

{¶41} “The failure to raise a constitutional issue at the trial level [forfeits] the right to 

advance a constitutional argument at the appellate level.” State v. McGinnis, 9th Dist. No. 

05CA0061-M, 2006-Ohio-2281, at ¶29, citing, e.g., State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 

syllabus. While a defendant who forfeits such an argument still may argue plain error on appeal, 

this court will not sua sponte undertake a plain-error analysis if a defendant fails to do so. See 

State v. Hairston, 9th Dist. No. 05CA008768, 2006-Ohio-4925, at ¶11. Cross has not argued 

plain error and we will not create a plain-error argument on his behalf. Id. 

{¶42} At trial, Cross argued that the court could not impose a mandatory prison term in 

accordance with R.C. 2919.25(D)(5) due to an error in the statute. At the time, the section stated 

that “the court shall impose a mandatory prison term on the offender pursuant to division (A)(6) 

of this section[.]” The statute, however, had no section (A)(6). The State argued that the 

applicable section was instead (D)(6). Cross’ counsel argued that the “offenses shall be strictly 

construed against the state, and liberally construed in favor of the accused.” He further argued 

that “[w]here there is ambiguity in criminal statutes, doubts must be resolved in favor of the 

Defendant.” Counsel sought to have Count 4 dismissed from the indictment. The State argued 

that the court has the power to correct the one-character typographical error in the statute. The 

trial court denied the defense motion and said that it would “amend” the statute. Counsel made 

no objections and made no reference to the doctrine of separation of powers. Because Cross 

forfeited this issue on appeal and has not argued plain error, we must conclude that his second 

assignment of error lacks merit. Cross’ second assignment of error is overruled. 
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT [CROSS] HAD TO 

SERVE A MANDATORY PRISON SENTENCE.” 

{¶43} In his third assignment of error, Cross reiterates his argument from the second 

assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred when it interpreted R.C. 2919.25(D)(5) to read 

“(D)(6)” as opposed to “(A)(6).” We do not agree. 

{¶44} At the time, R.C. 2919.25(D)(5) stated, in pertinent part: “if the offender knew 

that the victim of the violation was pregnant at the time of the violation, a violation of division 

(A) or (B) of this section is a felony of the fifth degree, and the court shall impose a mandatory 

prison term on the offender pursuant to division (A)(6) of this section.” It is clear that the statute 

does not contain a section (A)(6), thus, the reference is obviously in error. It was the clear intent 

of the General Assembly to impose a mandatory prison term if the offender knew that the victim 

was pregnant. In addition, the plain language of the statute states that it is a felony of the fifth 

degree. The General Assembly delineated mandatory prison terms in section (D)(6) of the 

statute. The only applicable provision of that section is (D)(6)(a), which states: “if the violation 

of division (A) or (B) of this section is a felony of the fourth or fifth degree, except as otherwise 

provided in division (A)(6)(b) or (c) of this section, the court shall impose a mandatory prison on 

the offender of at least six months.” (Emphasis added.) Again, the General Assembly 

erroneously referred to “this section” as “(A)(6)” where it was in fact a part of section “(D)(6).” 

{¶45} Ordinarily, courts “must presume the legislature means what it says; we cannot 

amend statutes to provide what we consider a more logical result.” State v. Virasayachack 

(2000), 138 Ohio App.3d 570, 574. However, as courts have noted, “when the terms of the 

statute, as written, would never be applicable, and the simple substitution of one character would 

result in a term that would always be applicable, we must conclude that the statute contains an 
15 

 

obviously typographical error, and we may correct the error and give effect to the obvious intent 

of the statue.” Id., citing Brim v. Rice (1969), 20 Ohio App.2d 293. See also State v. Reineke 

(1986), 27 Ohio App.3d 282; State v. O’Bryan, 181 Ohio App.3d 247, 2009-Ohio-753. 

{¶46} A court should only undertake the extraordinary task of correcting the express 

language of a statute if both the error and the correct result are obvious. Here, it is clear that the 

legislature intended that the statute refer to section (D)(6) as opposed to (A)(6). It is noted that 

R.C. 2919.25(D)(5) has been amended effective September 17, 2010, to replace “(A)(6)” with 

reference to “(D)(6).” While the choice of language by the trial judge was unfortunate, we do 

not conclude that it was an attempt to “amend” the statute or overstep judicial powers. The trial 

court in effect corrected a typographical error in the statute in order to give effect to the clear 

legislative intent. In the case at hand, the trial court correctly imposed the mandatory prison 

sentence articulated in section (D)(6). Accordingly, Cross’ third assignment of error is 

overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

ADMITTING THE 911 ANONYMOUS CALL.” 

{¶47} In his fifth assignment of error, Cross contends that the trial court erred in 

admitting the 911 call. We do not agree. 

{¶48} This Court reviews evidentiary rulings for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. 

State v. Patel, 9th Dist. No. 24030, 2008-Ohio-4693, at ¶8. Cross argues that the call was not 

relevant, that its prejudicial value substantially outweighed its probative value, and that it was 

hearsay in nature. We do not address the merits of these contentions, however, because he has 

forfeited the argument based upon Evid.R. 403(A) and did not argue plain error on appeal. 
16 

 

{¶49} The law is well settled that failure to contemporaneously object during the 

identification of a document and testimony regarding it forfeits appellate review. State v. Gray, 

9th Dist. No. 08CA0057, 2009-Ohio-3165, at ¶7 (challenge to admission of photographs was 

forfeited where defendant “filed a pre-trial motion in limine, but failed to contemporaneously 

object during the presentation of and testimony about the photographs[,]” but waited until the 

close of the State’s case to object to the admission of documents.) Here, Cross failed to 

contemporaneously object during the identification of the 911 tape, the publishing of the tape 

before the jury, and testimony regarding it. Instead Cross waited until the close of the State’s 

case to raise an objection. Thus, the jury heard both the 911 tape and the testimony concerning 

the call. 

“[A] motion in limine does not preserve the record on appeal [;] * * * [a]n 

appellate court need not review the propriety of such an order unless the claimed 

error is preserved by an objection * * * when the issue is actually reached * * * at 

trial. The failure to timely advise a trial court of possible error, by objection or 

otherwise, results in a [forfeiture] of the issue for purposes of appeal.” (Internal 

citations and quotations omitted.) Id. 

{¶50} See, also, State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, at ¶59; State v. 

Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416, 2006-Ohio-4853, at ¶92 (forfeiture declared where State called a 

witness who identified photographs of witness and the defendant together flashing gang signs; 

photo was published to the jury, with no objection by defense until the close of the case when 

exhibits were offered into evidence). Cross’ challenge occurred at the close of the State’s case, 

when the State moved to have its evidence admitted. 

{¶51} “By forfeiting the issue for appeal, [Cross] has confined our analysis to an 

assertion of plain error.” Gray at ¶7, citing State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 

at ¶23; Crim.R. 52(B). “While a defendant who forfeits such an argument still may argue plain 

error on appeal, this court will not sua sponte undertake a plain-error analysis if a defendant fails 
17 

 

to do so.” (Citation omitted.) Akron v. Lewis, 179 Ohio App.3d 649, 2008-Ohio-6256, at ¶22; 

App.R. 16(A)(7); App.R. 12(A)(2); Loc.R. 7(B)(7). As Cross did not assert plain error, we will 

not undertake such analysis. Accordingly, his fifth assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶52} Cross’ assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County 

Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 CARLA MOORE 

 FOR THE COURT 

WHITMORE, J. 

CONCURS
18 

 

BELFANCE, P. J. 

CONCURS IN PART, AND DISSENTS IN PART, SAYING:

{¶53} I concur in the majority’s resolution of Mr. Cross’ first, second, fourth, and fifth 

assignments of error. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s resolution of Mr. 

Cross’ third assignment of error. 

{¶54} At the time of Mr. Cross’ trial and sentencing, R.C. 2919.25(D)(5) provided that 

if the victim was pregnant at the time of the violation, the violation required the imposition of a 

mandatory prison term pursuant to (A)(6) of R.C. 2919.25. As noted by the majority, the section 

does not contain an (A)(6) subsection. The trial court concluded in light of the intent of the 

legislature to impose a mandatory prison term, that the trial court would “amend” the section to 

read (D)(6) and would impose the prison term that accompanied that subsection. Such action is 

not within the power of the courts. Therefore, I would sustain the assignment of error and 

remand the matter for the trial court to sentence Mr. Cross under the general felony sentencing 

guidelines for a fifth-degree felony. 

APPEARANCES:

THOMAS C. LOEPP, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN R. DIMARTINO, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.