Filed 5/22/14 P. v. Financial Casualty & Surety CA2/1 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Respondent, 

 v. 

FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETY, 

INC., 

 Appellant. 

 B247264 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. BA383044) 

 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Jose I. 

Sandoval, Judge. Affirmed. 

 John M. Rorabaugh for Appellant. 

 John F. Krattli, County Counsel, Ruben Baeza, Jr., Assistant County Counsel, 

Debbie C. Carlos, Associate County Counsel, for Respondent. 

_______________________________ 
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 Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (FCS) appeals from the trial court’s order 

denying its motion to vacate forfeiture and exonerate bail. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

 On or about April 3, 2011, Roderick Lee Govan was arrested for carrying a loaded 

firearm in violation of former Penal Code section 12031, subdivision (a)(1),

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 and placed 

in custody. On April 6, 2011, FCS, through its agent, posted a bail bond in the amount of 

$35,000 to secure Govan’s release from custody. In an information filed in this case on 

May 3, 2011, Govan was charged with one felony count under former section 12031, 

subdivision (a)(1). 

 On August 30, 2011, Govan appeared at a pretrial conference/trial setting hearing. 

The trial court heard and denied his motion to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor under 

section 17, subdivision (b). During a recess, the parties reached a plea deal under which 

Govan would plead no contest to the felony charge, be placed on probation for three 

years with credit for time served, and be required to perform 45 days of community labor 

with the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). As the prosecutor stated on 

the record at the hearing, the parties also agreed to “put sentencing over for 18 months.” 

If, at that time, Govan completed the 45 days of Caltrans and had “not picked up any 

other new offenses,” the charge would be reduced to a misdemeanor at the sentencing 

hearing. The trial court clarified that Govan would “remain on misdemeanor probation 

for the remaining time at that point.” The prosecutor informed Govan on the record: “If 

you have not completed 45 days of Caltrans, or if you have picked up any new cases, 

then you’ll be sentenced on this charge as a felony to three years felony probation with 

credit for time served and 45 days Caltrans.” 

The prosecutor further informed Govan on the record: “If you are sentenced on 

this case as a felony and you violate any of the terms and conditions of your probation, 

then the court will have the option of reinstating you on probation and sentencing you to 

the remainder of time up to a year in county jail or to the state prison for either 16 

 1

Further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
3

months, two or three years. [¶] . . . [¶] If you are sentenced on this case as a 

misdemeanor, and you violate any of the terms and conditions of probation, the 

maximum time the court could sentence you to is a year in the county jail.” 

Govan pleaded no contest to the felony charge at the August 30, 2011 pretrial 

conference/trial setting hearing. He gave up his right to be sentenced within 28 days, and 

agreed the sentencing could be continued for 18 months until February 28, 2013. He also 

waived his rights under People v. Arbunkle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, agreeing he could be 

sentenced on February 28, 2013 by a different judge than the one who took the plea. The 

court ordered Govan to return to court in five months, on January 30, 2012, “with proof 

of enrollment and participation in the Cal trans [sic] program.” The court also ordered 

Govan’s “bail to stand.” 

Govan failed to appear at the hearing on January 30, 2012 to show proof of 

enrollment and participation in the Caltrans program. The trial court commented: “He’s 

not on probation yet because he hasn’t been sentenced.” The trial court issued a bench 

warrant for Govan, ordered bail forfeited, and issued a bail forfeiture notice which the 

court sent to FCS and its agent who posted the bail bond. 

On October 2, 2012, FCS filed a motion to vacate forfeiture and exonerate bail and 

a supporting memorandum of points and authorities. FCS contended the bond was 

exonerated by operation of law on August 30, 2011 because the trial court placed Govan 

on probation on that date. The prosecution did not file a written opposition. 

The trial court held a hearing on FCS’s motion on October 19, 2012. Counsel for 

FCS and the prosecutor appeared. After hearing oral argument, the court took the matter 

under submission. On October 23, 2012, the court issued a minute order denying FCS’s 

motion, stating in pertinent part: “Here, because this court has yet to sentence defendant, 

there can be no statutory exoneration on the bond. Counsel for the moving party [FCS] 

argues that the defendant was effectively on probation given the pre-conditions set by the 

court (45 days Cal trans [sic]) for his sentencing. Moving party cites neither case law nor 

statutory authority in support of that position.” 
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 FCS filed a timely appeal from the order denying its motion to vacate forfeiture 

and exonerate bail. 

 On August 8, 2013, while this appeal was pending, the trial court recalled the 

bench warrant. On August 28, 2013, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence on 

the felony count and placed Govan on probation for three years with terms and 

conditions, including the performance of 45 days of Caltrans. 

DISCUSSION

 FCS contends the trial court erred in denying its motion to vacate forfeiture and 

exonerate bail. FCS argues the bond was exonerated by operation of law under section 

1195 on August 30, 2011 because Govan “was released on probation” on that date. 

County Counsel responds, arguing the trial court did not err in denying FCS’s motion 

because Govan was not sentenced or placed on probation on August 30, 2011, therefore 

section 1195 was “not triggered,” bail was not exonerated, and the court properly 

forfeited bail on January 30, 2012 when Govan failed to appear. 

 “Ordinarily, appellate courts review an order denying a motion to vacate the 

forfeiture of a bail bond under an abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] When the 

appellate court is deciding only legal issues, however, such as jurisdictional questions and 

matters of statutory interpretation, the abuse of discretion standard does not apply. 

[Citation.] When the facts are undisputed and only legal issues are involved, appellate 

courts conduct an independent review.” (People v. International Fidelity Ins. Co. (2012) 

204 Cal.App.4th 588, 592.) County Counsel, on behalf of the People, asserts the abuse of 

discretion standard applies. FCS argues “[t]here are no disputed factual issues” and 

“[t]herefore the de novo standard of review applies.” We need not decide this issue 

because the outcome would be the same regardless of which standard we apply. 

 Pursuant to the terms of the bail bond at issue here, FCS undertook that Govan 

would appear in court at all times through pronouncement of judgment or grant of 

probation, and if Govan did not appear, FCS would pay the People $35,000. 

 Under section 1305, if a defendant fails to appear on an “occasion prior to the 

pronouncement of judgment” when “the defendant’s presence in court is lawfully 
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required,” the “court shall in open court declare forfeited the undertaking of bail . . . .” (§ 

1305, subd. (a)(4).) Section 1195 provides, in pertinent part, “If the defendant, who is on 

bail, does appear for judgment and judgment is pronounced upon him or probation is 

granted to him, then the bail shall be exonerated . . . .” 

 At the August 30, 2011 hearing during which the trial court took Govan’s no 

contest plea, the court did not pronounce judgment or place Govan on probation within 

the meaning of section 1195. The court ordered Govan to complete 45 days of Caltrans 

service, and continued the sentencing hearing for 18 months. Govan personally waived 

his rights to be sentenced within 28 days and to be sentenced by the same judge who took 

his plea. The court further ordered bail to stand and Govan to appear in five months on 

January 30, 2012 to show proof of enrollment and participation in Caltrans. The court 

did not place Govan under the supervision of a probation officer. 

FCS cites no authority indicating bail is exonerated under the circumstances 

presented in this case at the August 30, 2011 hearing. Instead, FCS cites a case in which 

the defendant failed to surrender after being sentenced to prison and granted a three-day 

stay of execution (see People v. North Beach Bonding Co. (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 663), 

and cases in which the defendants failed to comply with terms and conditions after being 

formally placed on probation (see, e.g., People v. Safety National Casualty Corp. (2007) 

150 Cal.App.4th 11, 13, 17; People v. Doe (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d Supp. 812, 814). 

FCS also compares this case to drug diversion/deferred entry of judgment cases 

under section 1000 et seq., in which criminal proceedings are suspended and bail is 

exonerated when the trial court orders diversion. (See, e.g., People v. Ormiston (2003) 

105 Cal.App.4th 676, 690.) “Diversion, however, does not constitute a special custodial 

status or other form of release of the defendant with a promise to appear at further 

proceedings, but rather a guilty plea and resolution of the case in the nature of ‘“a 

specialized form of probation . . .”’ for a particular class of defendants.” (Id. at p. 692; 

People v. Orihuela (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 70, 73 [same].) The circumstances of this 

case are not analogous to drug diversion/deferred entry of judgment cases. Here, 

criminal proceedings were not suspended on August 30, 2011. The trial court ordered 
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Govan to appear five months later on January 30, 2011, in advance of the sentencing 

hearing, and ordered bail to stand. 

The trial court did not err in denying FCS’s motion to vacate forfeiture and 

exonerate bail. At the August 30, 2011 hearing at which the trial court took Govan’s no 

contest plea, bail was not exonerated under section 1195 because judgment had not been 

pronounced and Govan had not been placed on probation. Criminal proceedings were not 

suspended. The court ordered Govan to appear five months later. Accordingly, the court 

ordered bail to stand. When Govan failed to appear at the January 30, 2012 hearing, the 

court properly ordered bail forfeited. 

DISPOSITION

 The order is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. 

 CHANEY, J. 

We concur: 

 ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J. 

 JOHNSON, J.