NIST Special Publication 800-53

Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for

Federal Information Systems

and Organizations

JOINT TASK FORCE

TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE

This publication is available free of charge from:

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r4
NIST Special Publication 800-53

Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for 

Federal Information Systems

and Organizations

JOINT TASK FORCE

TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE

This publication is available free of charge from:

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r4

April 2013

INCLUDES UPDATES AS OF 01-22-2015

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Rebecca M. Blank, Acting Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Patrick D. Gallagher, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director 
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

Authority

This publication has been developed by NIST to further its statutory responsibilities under the 

Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), Public Law (P.L.) 107-347. NIST is 

responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum 

requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to 

national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising 

policy authority over such systems. This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, Section 8b(3), Securing Agency 

Information Systems, as analyzed in Circular A-130, Appendix IV: Analysis of Key Sections. 

Supplemental information is provided in Circular A-130, Appendix III, Security of Federal 

Automated Information Resources.

Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made 

mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory 

authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing 

authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other federal official. 

This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not 

subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4

462 pages (April 2013) 

CODEN: NSPUE2

This publication is available free of charge from: http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r4

 

 

Comments on this publication may be submitted to:

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory

100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930

Electronic Mail: sec-cert@nist.gov

Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order 

to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended 

to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, 

materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. 

There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by 

NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, 

including concepts and methodologies, may be used by Federal agencies even before the 

completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current 

requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and 

transition purposes, Federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new 

publications by NIST. 

Organizations are encouraged to review all draft publications during public comment periods and 

provide feedback to NIST. All NIST Computer Security Division publications, other than the ones 

noted above, are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications.

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Reports on Computer Systems Technology

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical 

leadership for the Nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test 

methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the 

development and productive use of information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the 

development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for 

the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in 

federal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL’s research, 

guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities 

with industry, government, and academic organizations.

Abstract

This publication provides a catalog of security and privacy controls for federal information 

systems and organizations and a process for selecting controls to protect organizational operations 

(including mission, functions, image, and reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other 

organizations, and the Nation from a diverse set of threats including hostile cyber attacks, natural 

disasters, structural failures, and human errors. The controls are customizable and implemented as 

part of an organization-wide process that manages information security and privacy risk. The 

controls address a diverse set of security and privacy requirements across the federal government 

and critical infrastructure, derived from legislation, Executive Orders, policies, directives, 

regulations, standards, and/or mission/business needs. The publication also describes how to 

develop specialized sets of controls, or overlays, tailored for specific types of missions/business 

functions, technologies, or environments of operation. Finally, the catalog of security controls 

addresses security from both a functionality perspective (the strength of security functions and 

mechanisms provided) and an assurance perspective (the measures of confidence in the 

implemented security capability). Addressing both security functionality and security assurance 

ensures that information technology products and the information systems built from those 

products using sound systems and security engineering principles are sufficiently trustworthy.

Keywords

Assurance; computer security; FIPS Publication 199; FIPS Publication 200, FISMA; Privacy Act;

Risk Management Framework; security controls; security requirements.

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Acknowledgements

This publication was developed by the Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative Interagency 

Working Group with representatives from the Civil, Defense, and Intelligence Communities in an 

ongoing effort to produce a unified information security framework for the federal government. 

The National Institute of Standards and Technology wishes to acknowledge and thank the senior 

leaders from the Departments of Commerce and Defense, the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence, the Committee on National Security Systems, and the members of the interagency 

technical working group whose dedicated efforts contributed significantly to the publication. The 

senior leaders, interagency working group members, and their organizational affiliations include:

Department of Defense Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Teresa M. Takai Adolpho Tarasiuk Jr.

DoD Chief Information Officer Assistant DNI and Intelligence Community

Chief Information Officer

Robert J. Carey Charlene Leubecker

Principal Deputy DoD Chief Information Officer Deputy Intelligence Community Chief

Information Officer

Richard Hale Catherine A. Henson

Deputy Chief Information Officer for Cybersecurity Director, Data Management

Dominic Cussatt Greg Hall

Deputy Director, Cybersecurity Policy Chief, Risk Management and Information

Security Programs Division

National Institute of Standards and Technology Committee on National Security Systems

Charles H. Romine Teresa M. Takai

Director, Information Technology Laboratory Chair, CNSS

Donna Dodson Richard Spires

Cybersecurity Advisor, Information Technology Laboratory Co-Chair, CNSS

Donna Dodson Dominic Cussatt

Chief, Computer Security Division CNSS Subcommittee Tri-Chair

Ron Ross Jeffrey Wilk

FISMA Implementation Project Leader CNSS Subcommittee Tri-Chair

Richard Tannich

CNSS Subcommittee Tri-Chair

Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative Interagency Working Group

Ron Ross Gary Stoneburner Richard Graubart Kelley Dempsey

NIST, JTF Leader Johns Hopkins APL The MITRE Corporation NIST

Esten Porter Bennett Hodge Karen Quigg Christian Enloe

The MITRE Corporation Booz Allen Hamilton The MITRE Corporation NIST

Kevin Stine Jennifer Fabius Daniel Faigin Arnold Johnson

NIST The MITRE Corporation The Aerospace Corporation NIST

Lisa Kaiser Pam Miller Sandra Miravalle Victoria Pillitteri

DHS The MITRE Corporation The MITRE Corporation NIST

In addition to the above acknowledgments, a special note of thanks goes to Peggy Himes and 

Elizabeth Lennon of NIST for their superb technical editing and administrative support. The 

authors also wish to recognize Marshall Abrams, Nadya Bartol, Frank Belz, Deb Bodeau, Dawn 

Cappelli, Corinne Castanza, Matt Coose, George Dinolt, Kurt Eleam, Jennifer Guild, Cynthia 

Irvine, Cass Kelly, Steve LaFountain, Steve Lipner, Tom Macklin, Tim McChesney, Michael 

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McEvilley, John Mildner, Joji Montelibano, George Moore, LouAnna Notargiacomo, Dorian 

Pappas, Roger Schell, Carol Woody, and the research staff from the NIST Computer Security 

Division for their exceptional contributions in helping to improve the content of the publication. 

And finally, the authors also gratefully acknowledge and appreciate the significant contributions 

from individuals, working groups, and organizations in the public and private sectors, both 

nationally and internationally, whose thoughtful and constructive comments improved the overall 

quality, thoroughness, and usefulness of this publication.

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FIPS 200 AND SP 800-53

IMPLEMENTING INFORMATION SECURITY STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES

FIPS Publication 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information 

Systems, is a mandatory federal standard developed by NIST in response to FISMA. To comply with 

the federal standard, organizations first determine the security category of their information 

system in accordance with FIPS Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal 

Information and Information Systems, derive the information system impact level from the 

security category in accordance with FIPS 200, and then apply the appropriately tailored set of 

baseline security controls in NIST Special Publication 800-53, Security and Privacy Controls for 

Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Organizations have flexibility in applying the 

baseline security controls in accordance with the guidance provided in Special Publication 800-53. 

This allows organizations to tailor the relevant security control baseline so that it more closely 

aligns with their mission and business requirements and environments of operation.

FIPS 200 and NIST Special Publication 800-53, in combination, ensure that appropriate security 

requirements and security controls are applied to all federal information and information systems. 

An organizational assessment of risk validates the initial security control selection and determines 

if additional controls are needed to protect organizational operations (including mission, 

functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the 

Nation. The resulting set of security controls establishes a level of security due diligence for the 

organization.

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DEVELOPING COMMON INFORMATION SECURITY FOUNDATIONS

COLLABORATION AMONG PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR ENTITIES

In developing standards and guidelines required by FISMA, NIST consults with other federal 

agencies and the private sector to improve information security, avoid unnecessary and costly 

duplication of effort, and ensure that its publications are complementary with the standards and 

guidelines employed for the protection of national security systems. In addition to a 

comprehensive public review and vetting process, NIST is collaborating with the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Committee on 

National Security Systems (CNSS) to establish a unified information security framework for the 

federal government. A common foundation for information security will provide the Civil, 

Defense, and Intelligence sectors of the federal government and their contractors, more costeffective and consistent ways to manage information security-related risk to organizational 

operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. The unified framework will 

also provide a strong basis for reciprocal acceptance of authorization decisions and facilitate 

information sharing. NIST is also working with many public and private sector entities to establish 

mappings and relationships between the security standards and guidelines developed by NIST and 

the International Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission 

(ISO/IEC).

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SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST

The term security requirement is used by different communities and groups in different ways and 

may require additional explanation to establish the particular context for the various use cases. 

Security requirements can be stated at a very high level of abstraction, for example, in legislation, 

Executive Orders, directives, policies, standards, and mission/business needs statements. FISMA 

and FIPS Publication 200 articulate security requirements at such a level.

Acquisition personnel develop security requirements for contracting purposes that address the 

protections necessary to achieve mission/business needs. Systems/security engineers, system 

developers, and systems integrators develop the security design requirements for the information 

system, develop the system security architecture and the architecture-specific derived security 

requirements, and subsequently implement specific security functions at the hardware, software, 

and firmware component level.

Security requirements are also reflected in various nontechnical security controls that address 

such matters as policy and procedures at the management and operational elements within 

organizations, again at differing levels of detail. It is important to define the context for each use of 

the term security requirement so the respective communities (including individuals responsible for 

policy, architecture, acquisition, engineering, and mission/business protection) can clearly 

communicate their intent.

Organizations may define certain security capabilities needed to satisfy security requirements and 

provide appropriate mission and business protection. Security capabilities are typically defined by 

bringing together a specific set of safeguards/countermeasures (i.e., security controls) derived 

from the appropriately tailored baselines that together produce the needed capability.

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TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY NEUTRALITY

CHARACTERISTICS OF SECURITY CONTROLS

The security controls in the catalog with few exceptions, have been designed to be policy- and 

technology-neutral. This means that security controls and control enhancements focus on the 

fundamental safeguards and countermeasures necessary to protect information during 

processing, while in storage, and during transmission. Therefore, it is beyond the scope of this 

publication to provide guidance on the application of security controls to specific technologies, 

environments of operation, communities of interest, or missions/business functions. Applicationspecific areas are addressed by the use of the tailoring process described in Chapter Three and the 

use of overlays described in Appendix I. It should also be noted that while the security controls are 

largely policy- and technology-neutral, that does not imply that the controls are policy- and 

technology-unaware. Understanding policy and technology is necessary so that the controls are 

meaningful and relevant when implemented.

In the few cases where specific technologies are called out in security controls (e.g., mobile, PKI, 

wireless, VOIP), organizations are cautioned that the need to provide adequate security goes well 

beyond the requirements in a single control associated with a particular technology. Many of the 

needed safeguards and countermeasures are obtained from the other security controls in the 

catalog allocated to the initial control baselines as starting points for the development of security 

plans and overlays using the tailoring process. There may also be some overlap in the protections 

articulated by the security controls within the different control families.

In addition to the customer-driven development of specialized security plans and overlays, NIST 

Special Publications and Interagency Reports may provide guidance on recommended security 

controls for specific technologies and sector-specific applications (e.g., Smart Grid, healthcare, 

Industrial Control Systems, and mobile).

Employing a technology- and policy-neutral security control catalog has the following benefits:

• It encourages organizations to focus on the security capabilities required for mission/business 

success and the protection of information, irrespective of the information technologies that are 

employed in organizational information systems.

• It encourages organizations to analyze each security control for its applicability to specific 

technologies, environments of operation, missions/business functions, and communities of 

interest.

• It encourages organizations to specify security policies as part of the tailoring process for security 

controls that have variable parameters.

The specialization of security plans using the tailoring guidance and overlays, together with a robust 

set of technology- and policy-neutral security controls, promotes cost-effective, risk-based 

information security for organizations—in any sector, for any technology, and in any operating 

environment.

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INFORMATION SECURITY DUE DILIGENCE

MANAGING THE RISK TO ORGANIZATIONAL MISSIONS/BUSINESS FUNCTIONS 

The security controls in NIST Special Publication 800-53 are designed to facilitate compliance with 

applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and 

guidance. Compliance is not about adhering to static checklists or generating unnecessary FISMA 

reporting paperwork. Rather, compliance necessitates organizations executing due diligence with 

regard to information security and risk management. Information security due diligence includes 

using all appropriate information as part of an organization-wide risk management program to 

effectively use the tailoring guidance and inherent flexibility in NIST publications so that the 

selected security controls documented in organizational security plans meet the mission and 

business requirements of organizations. Using the risk management tools and techniques that are 

available to organizations is essential in developing, implementing, and maintaining the 

safeguards and countermeasures with the necessary and sufficient strength of mechanism to 

address the current threats to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other 

organizations, and the Nation. Employing effective risk-based processes, procedures, and 

technologies will help ensure that all federal information systems and organizations have the 

necessary resilience to support ongoing federal responsibilities, critical infrastructure applications, 

and continuity of government.

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PRIVACY CONTROLS

PROVIDING PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION

Appendix J, Privacy Control Catalog, is a new addition to NIST Special Publication 800-53. It is 

intended to address the privacy needs of federal agencies. The Privacy Appendix:

• Provides a structured set of privacy controls, based on best practices, that help organizations 

comply with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, instructions, regulations, 

policies, standards, guidance, and organization-specific issuances;

• Establishes a linkage and relationship between privacy and security controls for purposes of 

enforcing respective privacy and security requirements which may overlap in concept and in 

implementation within federal information systems, programs, and organizations;

• Demonstrates the applicability of the NIST Risk Management Framework in the selection, 

implementation, assessment, and ongoing monitoring of privacy controls deployed in federal 

information systems, programs, and organizations; and

• Promotes closer cooperation between privacy and security officials within the federal 

government to help achieve the objectives of senior leaders/executives in enforcing the 

requirements in federal privacy legislation, policies, regulations, directives, standards, and 

guidance.

There is a strong similarity in the structure of the privacy controls in Appendix J and the security 

controls in Appendices F and G. For example, the control AR-1 (Governance and Privacy Program) 

requires organizations to develop privacy plans that can be implemented at the organizational or 

program level. These plans can also be used in conjunction with security plans to provide an 

opportunity for organizations to select the appropriate set of security and privacy controls in 

accordance with organizational mission/business requirements and the environments in which the 

organizations operate. Incorporating the same concepts used in managing information security 

risk, helps organizations implement privacy controls in a more cost-effective, risked-based manner 

while simultaneously protecting individual privacy and meeting compliance requirements. 

Standardized privacy controls provide a more disciplined and structured approach for satisfying 

federal privacy requirements and demonstrating compliance to those requirements.

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CAUTIONARY NOTE

IMPLEMENTING CHANGES BASED ON REVISIONS TO SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-53

When NIST publishes revisions to Special Publication 800-53, there are four primary types of 

changes made to the document: (i) security controls or control enhancements are added to or 

withdrawn from Appendices F and G and/or to the low, moderate, and high baselines; (ii) 

supplemental guidance is modified; (iii) material in the main chapters or appendices is modified; 

and (iv) language is clarified and/or updated throughout the document.

When modifying existing tailored security control baselines at Tier 3 in the risk management 

hierarchy (as described in Special Publication 800-39) and updating security controls at any tier as 

a result of Special Publication 800-53 revisions, organizations should take a measured, risk-based 

approach in accordance with organizational risk tolerance and current risk assessments. Unless 

otherwise directed by OMB policy, the following activities are recommended to implement 

changes to Special Publication 800-53:

• First, organizations determine if any added security controls/control enhancements are 

applicable to organizational information systems or environments of operation following 

tailoring guidelines in this publication.

• Next, organizations review changes to the supplemental guidance, guidance in the main 

chapters and appendices, and updated/clarified language throughout the publication to 

determine if changes apply to any organizational information systems and if any immediate 

actions are required.

• Finally, once organizations have determined the entirety of changes necessitated by the 

revisions to the publication, the changes are integrated into the established continuous 

monitoring process to the greatest extent possible. The implementation of new or modified 

security controls to address specific, active threats is always the highest priority for sequencing 

and implementing changes. Modifications such as changes to templates or minor language 

changes in policy or procedures are generally the lowest priority and are made in conjunction 

with established review cycles. 

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Table of Contents

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................1

1.1 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY .................................................................................................. 2

1.2 TARGET AUDIENCE.................................................................................................................. 3

1.3 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER SECURITY CONTROL PUBLICATIONS.................................................... 3

1.4 ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES ........................................................................................ 4

1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THIS SPECIAL PUBLICATION.......................................................................... 6

CHAPTER TWO THE FUNDAMENTALS..................................................................................7

2.1 MULTITIERED RISK MANAGEMENT............................................................................................. 7

2.2 SECURITY CONTROL STRUCTURE............................................................................................. 9

2.3 SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES............................................................................................. 12

2.4 SECURITY CONTROL DESIGNATIONS....................................................................................... 14

2.5 EXTERNAL SERVICE PROVIDERS ............................................................................................ 17

2.6 ASSURANCE AND TRUSTWORTHINESS .................................................................................... 20

2.7 REVISIONS AND EXTENSIONS................................................................................................. 26

CHAPTER THREE THE PROCESS ......................................................................................28

3.1 SELECTING SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES ........................................................................... 28

3.2 TAILORING BASELINE SECURITY CONTROLS ............................................................................ 30

3.3 CREATING OVERLAYS............................................................................................................ 40

3.4 DOCUMENTING THE CONTROL SELECTION PROCESS ............................................................... 42

3.5 NEW DEVELOPMENT AND LEGACY SYSTEMS ........................................................................... 44

APPENDIX A REFERENCES............................................................................................A-1

APPENDIX B GLOSSARY................................................................................................B-1

APPENDIX C ACRONYMS ...............................................................................................C-1

APPENDIX D SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES – SUMMARY...............................................D-1

APPENDIX E ASSURANCE AND TRUSTWORTHINESS ......................................................... E-1

APPENDIX F SECURITY CONTROL CATALOG.................................................................... F-1

APPENDIX G INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAMS...........................................................G-1

APPENDIX H INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION SECURITY STANDARDS..................................H-1

APPENDIX I OVERLAY TEMPLATE.....................................................................................I-1

APPENDIX J PRIVACY CONTROL CATALOG .......................................................................J-1

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Prologue

“...Through the process of risk management, leaders must consider risk to US interests from 

adversaries using cyberspace to their advantage and from our own efforts to employ the global 

nature of cyberspace to achieve objectives in military, intelligence, and business operations... “

 “...For operational plans development, the combination of threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts 

must be evaluated in order to identify important trends and decide where effort should be applied 

to eliminate or reduce threat capabilities; eliminate or reduce vulnerabilities; and assess, 

coordinate, and deconflict all cyberspace operations...”

“...Leaders at all levels are accountable for ensuring readiness and security to the same degree 

as in any other domain..."

-- THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 

 OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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Foreword

NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4, represents the most comprehensive update to the 

security controls catalog since its inception in 2005. The publication was developed by NIST, the 

Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the Committee on National Security 

Systems as part of the Joint Task Force, an interagency partnership formed in 2009. This update 

was motivated principally by the expanding threat space—characterized by the increasing 

sophistication of cyber attacks and the operations tempo of adversaries (i.e., the frequency of such 

attacks, the professionalism of the attackers, and the persistence of targeting by attackers). Stateof-the-practice security controls and control enhancements have been developed and integrated 

into the catalog addressing such areas as: mobile and cloud computing; applications security; 

trustworthiness, assurance, and resiliency of information systems; insider threat; supply chain 

security; and the advanced persistent threat. In addition, Special Publication 800-53 has been 

expanded to include eight new families of privacy controls based on the internationally accepted 

Fair Information Practice Principles.

Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4, provides a more holistic approach to information security 

and risk management by providing organizations with the breadth and depth of security controls 

necessary to fundamentally strengthen their information systems and the environments in which 

those systems operate—contributing to systems that are more resilient in the face of cyber attacks 

and other threats. This “Build It Right” strategy is coupled with a variety of security controls for 

“Continuous Monitoring” to give organizations near real-time information that is essential for 

senior leaders making ongoing risk-based decisions affecting their critical missions and business 

functions.

To take advantage of the expanded set of security and privacy controls, and to give organizations 

greater flexibility and agility in defending their information systems, the concept of overlays was 

introduced in this revision. Overlays provide a structured approach to help organizations tailor 

security control baselines and develop specialized security plans that can be applied to specific 

missions/business functions, environments of operation, and/or technologies. This specialization 

approach is important as the number of threat-driven controls and control enhancements in the 

catalog increases and organizations develop risk management strategies to address their specific 

protection needs within defined risk tolerances.

Finally, there have been several new features added to this revision to facilitate ease of use by 

organizations. These include: 

• Assumptions relating to security control baseline development;

• Expanded, updated, and streamlined tailoring guidance;

• Additional assignment and selection statement options for security and privacy controls;

• Descriptive names for security and privacy control enhancements;

• Consolidated tables for security controls and control enhancements by family with 

baseline allocations;

• Tables for security controls that support development, evaluation, and operational 

assurance; and

• Mapping tables for international security standard ISO/IEC 15408 (Common Criteria).

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The security and privacy controls in Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4, have been designed 

to be largely policy/technology-neutral to facilitate flexibility in implementation. The controls are 

well positioned to support the integration of information security and privacy into organizational 

processes including enterprise architecture, systems engineering, system development life cycle, 

and acquisition/procurement. Successful integration of security and privacy controls into ongoing 

organizational processes will demonstrate a greater maturity of security and privacy programs and 

provide a tighter coupling of security and privacy investments to core organizational missions and 

business functions.

The Joint Task Force

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Errata

The following changes have been incorporated into Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4.

DATE TYPE CHANGE PAGE

05-07-2013 Editorial Changed CA-9 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2. D-3

05-07-2013 Editorial Changed CM-10 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2. D-4

05-07-2013 Editorial Changed MA-6 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2. D-5

05-07-2013 Editorial Changed MP-3 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2. D-5

05-07-2013 Editorial Changed PE-5 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2. D-5

05-07-2013 Editorial Changed PE-16 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2. D-5

05-07-2013 Editorial Changed PE-17 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2. D-5

05-07-2013 Editorial Changed PE-18 Priority Code from P2 to P3 in Table D-2. D-5

05-07-2013 Editorial Changed PL-4 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2. D-6

05-07-2013 Editorial Changed PS-4 Priority Code from P2 to P1 in Table D-2. D-6

05-07-2013 Editorial Changed SA-11 Priority Code from P2 to P1 in Table D-2. D-6

05-07-2013 Editorial Changed SC-18 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2. D-7

05-07-2013 Editorial Changed SI-8 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2. D-8

05-07-2013 Editorial Deleted reference to SA-5(6) in Table D-17. D-32

05-07-2013 Editorial Deleted CM-4(3) from Table E-2. E-4

05-07-2013 Editorial Deleted CM-4(3) from Table E-3. E-5

05-07-2013 Editorial Deleted reference to SA-5(6). F-161

05-07-2013 Editorial Changed SI-16 Priority Code from P0 to P1. F-233

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted “(both intentional and unintentional)” in line 5 in Abstract. iii

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted “security and privacy” in line 5 in Abstract. iii

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “an initial set of baseline security controls” to “the applicable security 

control baseline” in Section 2.1, RMF Step 2.

9

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted the following paragraph: “The security control enhancements section 

provides...in Appendix F.”

11

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “baseline security controls” to “the security control baselines” in Section 

2.3, 2nd paragraph, line 6.

13

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “an initial set of security controls” to “the applicable security control 

baseline” in Section 3.1, paragraph 2, line 4.

28

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “security control baselines” to “baselines identified in Appendix D” in 

Section 3.1, paragraph 2, line 5.

28

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “an appropriate set of baseline controls” to “the appropriate security 

control baseline” in Section 3.1, paragraph 3, line 3.

29

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted “initial” before “security control baseline” and added “FIPS 200” before 

“impact level” in Section 3.1, paragraph 3, line 4.

29

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “sets of baseline security controls” to “security control baselines” in 

Section 3.1, paragraph 3, line 6.

29

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “initial set of baseline security controls” to “applicable security control 

baseline” in Section 3.2, paragraph 1, line 1.

30

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “initial set of baseline security controls” to “applicable security control 

baseline” in Section 3.2, paragraph 3, line 5.

31

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted “set of” before “security controls” in Section 3.2, Applying Scoping 

Considerations, Mobility paragraph, line 1.

33

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01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted “initial” before “set of” in Section 3.2, Applying Scoping Considerations, 

Mobility paragraph, line 2.

33

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “the baselines” to “each baseline” in Section 3.2, Applying Scoping 

Considerations, Mobility paragraph, line 3.

33

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “initial set of security controls” to “security control baseline” in Section 3.2, 

Applying Scoping Considerations, Mobility paragraph, line 5.

33

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “specific” before “locations” in Section 3.2, Applying Scoping 

Considerations, Mobility paragraph, line 6.

33

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “initial” to “three” in Section 3.2, Applying Scoping Considerations, 

Mobility paragraph, line 8.

33

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “initial set of baseline security controls” to “applicable security control 

baseline” in Section 3.2, Selecting Compensating Security Controls, line 10.

36

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “a set of initial baseline security controls” to “security control baselines” in 

Section 3.3, line 1.

40

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “.” after “C.F.R” in #3, Policies, Directives, Instructions, Regulations, and 

Memoranda.

A-1

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “Revision 1 (Draft)” to NIST Special Publication 800-52 in References. A-7

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “Configuration,” to title of NIST Special Publication 800-52, Revision 1. A-7

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed date for NIST Special Publication 800-52, Revision 1 to September 2013. A-7

01-15-2014 Editorial Moved definition for Information Security Risk after Information Security Program 

Plan in Glossary.

B-11

01-15-2014 Editorial Added AC-2(11) to high baseline in Table D-2. D-2

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed AC-10 Priority Code from P2 to P3 in Table D-2. D-2

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed AC-14 Priority Code from P1 to P3 in Table D-2. D-2

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed AC-22 Priority Code from P2 to P3 in Table D-2. D-2

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed AU-10 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2. D-3

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed CA-6 Priority Code from P3 to P2 in Table D-2. D-3

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed CA-7 Priority Code from P3 to P2 in Table D-2. D-3

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed CA-8 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2. D-3

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed IA-6 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2. D-4

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed IR-7 Priority Code from P3 to P2 in Table D-2. D-5

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed MA-3 Priority Code from P2 to P3 in Table D-2. D-5

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed MA-4 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2. D-5

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed MA-5 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2. D-5

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted Program Management Controls from Table D-2. D-8/9

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted the following sentence at end of paragraph:

“There is no summary table provided for the Program Management (PM) family 

since PM controls are not associated with any particular security control baseline.”

D-9

01-15-2014 Editorial Added AC-2(12) and AC-2(13) to high baseline in Table D-3. D-10

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed AC-17(5) incorporated into reference from AC-17 to SI-4 in Table D-3. D-12

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed AC-17(7) incorporated into reference from AC-3 to AC-3(10) in Table D-3. D-12

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed AC-6 to AC-6(9) in AU-2(4) withdrawal notice in Table D-5. D-15

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “Training” to “Scanning” in SA-19(4) title in Table D-17. D-34

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted SC-9(1), SC-9(2), SC-9(3), and SC-9(4) from Table D-18. D-37

01-15-2014 Editorial Added AC-2 and AC-5 to SC-14 and deleted SI-9 from SC-14 in Table D-18. D-37

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DATE TYPE CHANGE PAGE

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted CA-3(5) from Table E-2. E-4

01-15-2014 Editorial Added CM-3(2) to Table E-2. E-4

01-15-2014 Editorial Added RA-5(2) and RA-5(5) to Table E-2. E-4

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted CA-3(5) from Table E-3. E-5

01-15-2014 Editorial Added CM-3(2) to Table E-3. E-5

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted bold text from RA-5(2) and RA-5(5) in Table E-3. E-5

01-15-2014 Editorial Added CM-8(9) to Table E-4. E-7

01-15-2014 Editorial Added CP-4(4) to Table E-4. E-7

01-15-2014 Editorial Added IR-3(1) to Table E-4. E-7

01-15-2014 Editorial Added RA-5(3) to Table E-4. E-7

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted SA-4(4) from Table E-4. E-7

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed SA-21(1) from “enhancements” to “enhancement” in Table E-4. E-7

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted SI-4(8) from Table E-4. E-7

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “risk management process” to “RMF” in Using the Catalog, line 4. F-6

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “an appropriate set of security controls” to “the appropriate security 

control baselines” in Using the Catalog, line 5.

F-6

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted extraneous “,” from AC-2 g. F-7

01-15-2014 Editorial Added AC-2(11) to high baseline. F-10

01-15-2014 Substantive Added the following text to AC-3(2) Supplemental Guidance: 

“Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control.”

F-11

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “ucdmo.gov” to “None” in AC-4 References. F-18

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “.” after “C.F.R” in AT-2 References. F-38

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed AC-6 to AC-6(9) in AU-2(4) withdrawal notice. F-42

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted “csrc.nist.gov/pcig/cig.html” and added “http://” to URL in AU-2 References. F-42

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “identify” to “identity” in AU-6(6) Supplemental Guidance. F-46

01-15-2014 Substantive Added the following text to AU-9(5) Supplemental Guidance: 

“Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control.”

F-49

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “Control Enhancements: None.” to AU-15. F-53

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted extraneous “.” from CM-2(7) Supplemental Guidance. F-66

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “)” after “board” in CM-3 g. F-66

01-15-2014 Substantive Added CA-7 to related controls list in CM-3. F-66

01-15-2014 Substantive Added the following text to CM-5(4) Supplemental Guidance: 

“Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control.”

F-69

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “http://” to URLs in CM-6 References. F-71

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “component” before “inventories” in CM-8(5). F-74

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “tsp.ncs.gov” to “http://www.dhs.gov/telecommunications-service-prioritytsp” in CP-8 References.F-86

01-15-2014 Substantive Added the following text to CP-9(7) Supplemental Guidance: 

“Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control.”

F-87

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “HSPD 12” to “HSPD-12” and added “http://” to URL in IA-2 References. F-93

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “encrypted representations of” to “cryptographically-protected” in IA-5(1) 

(c).

F-96

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “Encrypted representations of” to “Cryptographically-protected” in IA-5(1) 

Supplemental Guidance.

F-97

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01-15-2014 Substantive Added the following text to IA-5(1) Supplemental Guidance: 

“To mitigate certain brute force attacks against passwords, organizations may also 

consider salting passwords.”

F-97

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “http://” to URL in IA-5 References. F-99

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “http://” to URL in IA-7 References. F-99

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “http://” to URL in IA-8 References. F-101

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “:” to “;” after “800-61” and added “http://” to URL in IR-6 References. F-108

01-15-2014 Substantive Added the following text to MP-6(7) Supplemental Guidance: 

“Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control.”

F-124

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “http://” to URL in MP-6 References. F-124

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “DoDI” to “DoD Instruction” and added “http://” to URLs in PE-3 

References.

F-130

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted “and supplementation” after “tailoring” in PL-2 a. 8. F-140

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “Special” before “Publication” in PL-4 References. F-141

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “Control Enhancements: None.” to PL-7. F-142

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted AT-5, AC-19(6), AC-19(8), and AC-19(9) from PL-9 Supplemental 

Guidance.

F-144

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “Control Enhancements: None.” to PL-9. F-144

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “Special” before “Publication” in PL-9 References. F-144

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “731.106(a)” to “731.106” in PS-2 References. F-145

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “Publication” to “Publications” and added “http://” to URL in RA-3 

References.

F-153

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “http://” to URLs in RA-5 References. F-155

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “http://” to URLs in SA-4 References. F-160

01-15-2014 Substantive Added the following text to SA-11(8) Supplemental Guidance:

“To understand the scope of dynamic code analysis and hence the assurance

provided, organizations may also consider conducting code coverage analysis 

(checking the degree to which the code has been tested using metrics such as 

percent of subroutines tested or percent of program statements called during 

execution of the test suite) and/or concordance analysis (checking for words that 

are out of place in software code such as non-English language words or 

derogatory terms).”

F-169

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “http://” to URLs in SA-11 References. F-169

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “Control Enhancements: None.” to SA-16. F-177

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “Training” to “Scanning” in SA-19(4) title. F-181

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “physical” to “protected” in SC-8 Supplemental Guidance. F-193

01-15-2014 Editorial Changed “140-2” to “140” and added “http://” to URLs in SC-13 References. F-196

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “authentication” after “data origin” in SC-20, Part a. F-199

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “verification” after “integrity” in SC-20, Part a. F-199

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “Control Enhancements: None.” to SC-35. F-209

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted extraneous “References: None” from SI-7. F-228

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DATE TYPE CHANGE PAGE

01-15-2014 Substantive Added the following text as new third paragraph in Appendix G::

“Table G-1 provides a summary of the security controls in the program 

management family from Appendix G. Organizations can use the recommended 

priority code designation associated with each program management control to 

assist in making sequencing decisions for implementation (i.e., a Priority Code 1 

[P1] control has a higher priority for implementation than a Priority Code 2 [P2] 

control; and a Priority Code 2 [P2] control has a higher priority for implementation 

than a Priority Code 3 [P3] control.”

G-1/2

01-15-2014 Editorial Added Table G-1 to Appendix G. G-2

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “http://” to URL in PM-5 References. G-5

01-15-2014 Editorial Deleted “Web: www.fsam.gov” from PM-7 References. G-5

01-15-2014 Editorial Added “http://” to URL in Footnote 124. J-22

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed security control enhancement naming convention (i.e., format) by deleting 

space between base security control and numbered enhancement designation.

Global

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “(iv) and” to “and (iv)” in Glossary definition for Developer. B-6

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “an IR-2 (1) in the high baseline entry for the IR-2 security control” to “the 

IR-2 (1) (2) entry in the high baseline for IR-2” in Appendix D, paragraph 1, line 8.

D-1

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “enhancement (1)” to “enhancements (1) and (2)” in Appendix D, 

paragraph 1, line 10.

D-1

01-22-2015 Editorial Deleted “in the security control catalog“ in Appendix D, paragraph 1, line 10. D-1

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “SHARED GROUPS / ACCOUNTS“ to “SHARED / GROUP ACCOUNTS” in 

Table D-3, AC-2(9) title.

D-10

01-22-2015 Editorial Added “ROLE-BASED“ before “SECURITY TRAINING” in Table D-4, AT-3(1) title. D-14

01-22-2015 Editorial Added “ROLE-BASED“ before “SECURITY TRAINING” in Table D-4, AT-3(2) title. D-14

01-22-2015 Editorial Added “ROLE-BASED“ before “SECURITY TRAINING” in Table D-4, AT-3(3) title. D-14

01-22-2015 Editorial Added “ROLE-BASED“ before “SECURITY TRAINING” in Table D-4, AT-3(4) title. D-14

01-22-2015 Editorial Added “-BASED“ to “BIOMETRIC” in Table D-9, IA-5(12) title. D-23

01-22-2015 Editorial Deleted “/ ANALYSIS“ after “PENETRATION TESTING” in Table D-17, SA-11(5) title. D-33

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “(1)” from normal font to bold font in Table E-4, SI-4(1). E-7

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “SHARED GROUPS / ACCOUNTS“ to “SHARED / GROUP ACCOUNTS” in AC2(9) title.F-10

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “use“ to “usage” in AC-2(12) part (a). F-10

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “policies“ to “policy” in AC-3(3). F-11

01-22-2015 Editorial Deleted “specifies that” in AC-3(3). F-11

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “The policy is“ to “Is” in AC-3(3) part (a). F-11

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “A“ to “Specifies that a” in AC-3(3) part (b). F-11

01-22-2015 Editorial Added “Specifies that“ to AC-3(3) part (c). F-11

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “Organized-defined“ to “organization-defined” in AC-3(3) part (c). F-11

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “policies“ to “policy” in AC-3(4). F-12

01-22-2015 Editorial Added “information“ before “flows” in AC-4(7). F-15

01-22-2015 Editorial Added “ROLE-BASED“ before “SECURITY TRAINING” in AT-3(1) title. F-39

01-22-2015 Editorial Added “ROLE-BASED“ before “SECURITY TRAINING” in AT-3(2) title. F-39

01-22-2015 Editorial Added “ROLE-BASED“ before “SECURITY TRAINING” in AT-3(3) title. F-39

01-22-2015 Editorial Added “ROLE-BASED“ before “SECURITY TRAINING” in AT-3(4) title. F-39

01-22-2015 Editorial Added “the” before “relationship” in AU-12(1). F-52

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01-22-2015 Editorial Moved “.” outside of closing bracket in Withdrawn section. F-61

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “that“ to “those” in CP-7 part c. F-84

01-22-2015 Editorial Deleted “list of“ in IA-2(10). F-92

01-22-2015 Editorial Deleted “such as documentary evidence or a combination of documents and 

biometrics“ in IA-4(3).

F-95

01-22-2015 Editorial Added “, such as documentary evidence or a combination of documents and 

biometrics,“ in IA-4(3) Supplemental Guidance.

F-95

01-22-2015 Editorial Added “-BASED“ to “BIOMETRIC” in IA-5(12) title. F-98

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “testing/exercises“ to “testing” in IR-4 part c. F-105

01-22-2015 Editorial Deleted “and“ before “prior” in MA-4(3) part (b). F-115

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “Sanitation“ to “Sanitization” in MP-7(2) Supplemental Guidance (two 

instances).

F-125

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “resign“ to “re-sign” in PL-4 part d. F-141

01-22-2015 Editorial Deleted “security categorization decision is reviewed and approved by the“ before 

“authorizing” (first instance) in RA-2 part c.

F-151

01-22-2015 Editorial Added “reviews and approves the security categorization decision“ after 

“representative” RA-2 part c.

F-151

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “;“ to “,” after IA-2 in SA-4(10) Supplemental Guidance. F-160

01-22-2015 Editorial Added “takes“ before assignment statement in SA-5 part c. F-161

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “either is“ to “is either” in SA-11(3) part (b). F-167

01-22-2015 Editorial Deleted “has been“ before “granted” in SA-11(3) part (b). F-167

01-22-2015 Editorial Deleted “/ ANALYSIS“ after “PENETRATION TESTING” in SA-11(5) title. F-168

01-22-2015 Editorial Deleted “enhancement“ after “control” in SA-12 Supplemental Guidance. F-169

01-22-2015 Editorial Deleted “Related control: PE-21.” from SA-12(9) Supplemental Guidance. F-171

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “reference to source“ to “references to sources” in SC-5. F-187

01-22-2015 Editorial Added “to be“ before “routed to” in SC-7(11). F-190

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “i“ to “1” and “ii” to “2” in SI-4 part c. F-219

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “USER“ to “USERS” in SI-4(20) title. F-223

01-22-2015 Editorial Deleted “for“ in SI-6(2). F-225

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “interfaces” to “interactions” in SI-10(4) Supplemental Guidance. F-229

01-22-2015 Editorial Changed “-“ to “,” after AU-7 in PM-12 Supplemental Guidance. G-8

01-22-2015 Substantive Updated the introduction to Appendix H and Tables H-1 and H-2 in accordance 

with the 2013 version of ISO/IEC 27001 and revised security control mapping 

methodology.

H-1 

through 

H-12

01-22-2015 Editorial Deleted UL-3 from related controls list in SE-1. J-20

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

THE NEED TO PROTECT INFORMATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

he selection and implementation of security controls for information systems1 and 

organizations are important tasks that can have major implications on the operations2 and 

assets of organizations3 as well as the welfare of individuals and the Nation. Security 

controls are the safeguards/countermeasures prescribed for information systems or organizations

that are designed to: (i) protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information that is

processed, stored, and transmitted by those systems/organizations; and (ii) satisfy a set of defined 

security requirements.

4 There are several key questions that should be answered by organizations

when addressing the information security considerations for information systems:

• What security controls are needed to satisfy the security requirements and to adequately 

mitigate risk incurred by using information and information systems in the execution of 

organizational missions and business functions?

• Have the security controls been implemented, or is there an implementation plan in place?

• What is the desired or required level of assurance that the selected security controls, as 

implemented, are effective in their application? 5

The answers to these questions are not given in isolation but rather in the context of an effective 

risk management process for the organization that identifies, mitigates as deemed necessary, and 

monitors on an ongoing basis, risks6 arising from its information and information systems. NIST 

Special Publication 800-39 provides guidance on managing information security risk at three 

distinct tiers—the organization level, mission/business process level, and information system 

level. The security controls defined in this publication and recommended for use by organizations 

to satisfy their information security requirements should be employed as part of a well-defined 

risk management process that supports organizational information security programs.

7

1 An information system is a discrete set of information resources organized expressly for the collection, processing, 

maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information. Information systems also include specialized 

systems such as industrial/process controls systems, telephone switching/private branch exchange (PBX) systems, and 

environmental control systems.

2 Organizational operations include mission, functions, image, and reputation.

3 The term organization describes an entity of any size, complexity, or positioning within an organizational structure 

(e.g., a federal agency or, as appropriate, any of its operational elements).

4 Security requirements are derived from mission/business needs, laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, instructions, standards, guidance, and/or procedures to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 

the information being processed, stored, or transmitted by organizational information systems.

5 Security control effectiveness addresses the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as 

intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements for the information 

system in its operational environment or enforcing/mediating established security policies.

6 Information security-related risks are those risks that arise from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 

information or information systems and consider the potential adverse impacts to organizational operations and assets, 

individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

7 The program management controls (Appendix G) complement the security controls for an information system 

(Appendix F) by focusing on the organization-wide information security requirements that are independent of any 

particular information system and are essential for managing information security programs.

T

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It is of paramount importance that responsible officials understand the risks and other factors that 

could adversely affect organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and 

the Nation.

8 These officials must also understand the current status of their security programs and 

the security controls planned or in place to protect their information and information systems in 

order to make informed judgments and investments that mitigate risks to an acceptable level. The 

ultimate objective is to conduct the day-to-day operations of the organization and accomplish the 

organization’s stated missions and business functions with what the OMB Circular A-130 defines 

as adequate security, or security commensurate with risk resulting from the unauthorized access, 

use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information.

1.1 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY

The purpose of this publication is to provide guidelines for selecting and specifying security 

controls for organizations and information systems supporting the executive agencies of the 

federal government to meet the requirements of FIPS Publication 200, Minimum Security 

Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems. The guidelines apply to all 

components9 of an information system that process, store, or transmit federal information. The 

guidelines have been developed to achieve more secure information systems and effective risk 

management within the federal government by:

• Facilitating a more consistent, comparable, and repeatable approach for selecting and 

specifying security controls for information systems and organizations;

• Providing a stable, yet flexible catalog of security controls to meet current information 

protection needs and the demands of future protection needs based on changing threats, 

requirements, and technologies;

• Providing a recommendation for security controls for information systems categorized in 

accordance with FIPS Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal 

Information and Information Systems;

• Creating a foundation for the development of assessment methods and procedures for 

determining security control effectiveness; and

• Improving communication among organizations by providing a common lexicon that 

supports discussion of risk management concepts.

In addition to the security controls described above, this publication: (i) provides a set of 

information security program management (PM) controls that are typically implemented at the 

organization level and not directed at individual organizational information systems; (ii) 

provides a set of privacy controls based on international standards and best practices that help 

organizations enforce privacy requirements derived from federal legislation, directives, policies, 

regulations, and standards; and (iii) establishes a linkage and relationship between privacy and 

security controls for purposes of enforcing respective privacy and security requirements which 

may overlap in concept and in implementation within federal information systems, programs, 

and organizations. Standardized privacy controls provide a more disciplined and structured 

approach for satisfying federal privacy requirements and demonstrating compliance to those 

8 This includes risk to critical infrastructure/key resources described in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7.

9 Information system components include, for example, mainframes, workstations, servers (e.g., database, electronic 

mail, authentication, web, proxy, file, domain name), input/output devices (e.g., scanners, copiers, printers), network 

components (e.g., firewalls, routers, gateways, voice and data switches, process controllers, wireless access points, 

network appliances, sensors), operating systems, virtual machines, middleware, and applications.

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requirements. Incorporating the same concepts used in managing information security risk, 

helps organizations implement privacy controls in a more cost-effective, risked-based manner.

The guidelines in this special publication are applicable to all federal information systems10

other than those systems designated as national security systems as defined in 44 U.S.C., 

Section 3542.

11 The guidelines have been broadly developed from a technical perspective to 

complement similar guidelines for national security systems and may be used for such systems 

with the approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such 

systems.

12 State, local, and tribal governments, as well as private sector organizations are 

encouraged to consider using these guidelines, as appropriate.

1.2 TARGET AUDIENCE

This publication is intended to serve a diverse audience of information system and information 

security professionals including:

• Individuals with information system, security, and/or risk management and oversight 

responsibilities (e.g., authorizing officials, chief information officers, senior information 

security officers,13 information system managers, information security managers);

• Individuals with information system development responsibilities (e.g., program managers, 

system designers and developers, information security engineers, systems integrators);

• Individuals with information security implementation and operational responsibilities (e.g., 

mission/business owners, information system owners, common control providers, information 

owners/stewards, system administrators, information system security officers);

• Individuals with information security assessment and monitoring responsibilities (e.g., 

auditors, Inspectors General, system evaluators, assessors, independent verifiers/validators, 

analysts, information system owners); and

• Commercial companies producing information technology products and systems, creating 

information security-related technologies, or providing information security services.

1.3 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER SECURITY CONTROL PUBLICATIONS

To create a technically sound and broadly applicable set of security controls for information 

systems and organizations, a variety of sources were considered during the development of this 

special publication. The sources included security controls from the defense, audit, financial, 

healthcare, industrial/process control, and intelligence communities as well as controls defined by 

10 A federal information system is an information system used or operated by an executive agency, by a contractor of an 

executive agency, or by another organization on behalf of an executive agency.

11 A national security system is any information system (including any telecommunications system) used or operated by 

an agency or by a contractor of an agency, or other organization on behalf of an agency: (i) the function, operation, or 

use of which involves intelligence activities; involves cryptologic activities related to national security; involves 

command and control of military forces; involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system; or 

is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions (excluding a system that is to be used for routine

administrative and business applications, e.g., payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel management applications); or 

(ii) is protected at all times by procedures established for information that have been specifically authorized under 

criteria established by an Executive Order or an Act of Congress to be kept classified in the interest of national defense 

or foreign policy.

12 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides implementing guidance for national security systems.

13 At the agency level, this position is known as the Senior Agency Information Security Officer. Organizations may 

also refer to this position as the Senior Information Security Officer or the Chief Information Security Officer.

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national and international standards organizations. The objective of NIST Special Publication 

800-53 is to provide a set of security controls that can satisfy the breadth and depth of security 

requirements14 levied on organizations, mission/business processes, and information systems and 

that is consistent with and complementary to other established information security standards.

The catalog of security controls in Special Publication 800-53 can be effectively used to protect 

information and information systems from traditional and advanced persistent threats in varied 

operational, environmental, and technical scenarios. The controls can also be used to demonstrate 

compliance with a variety of governmental, organizational, or institutional security requirements.

Organizations have the responsibility to select the appropriate security controls, to implement the 

controls correctly, and to demonstrate the effectiveness of the controls in satisfying established 

security requirements.15 The security controls facilitate the development of assessment methods 

and proceduresthat can be used to demonstrate control effectiveness in a consistent/repeatable 

manner—thus contributing to the organization’s confidence that security requirements continue to 

be satisfied on an ongoing basis. In addition, security controls can be used in developing overlays

for specialized information systems, information technologies, environments of operation, or 

communities of interest (see Appendix I).

1.4 ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Organizations use FIPS Publication 199 to categorize their information and information systems.

Security categorization is accomplished as an organization-wide activity16 with the involvement 

of senior-level organizational personnel including, for example, authorizing officials, chief 

information officers, senior information security officers, information owners and/or stewards, 

information system owners, and risk executive (function).

17 Information is categorized at Tier 1 

(organization level) and at Tier 2 (mission/business process level). In accordance with FIPS 

Publication 200, organizations use the security categorization results from Tiers 1 and 2 to 

designate organizational information systems at Tier 3 (information system level) as low-impact, 

moderate-impact, or high-impact systems. For each organizational information system at Tier 3, 

the recommendation for security controls from the baseline controls defined in Appendix D is the

starting point for the security control tailoring process. While the security control selection 

process is generally focused on information systems at Tier 3, the process is generally applicable 

across all three tiers of risk management.

FIPS Publication 199 security categorization associates information and the operation and use of 

information systems with the potential worst-case adverse impact on organizational operations

and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

18 Organizational assessments of risk,

including the use of specific and credible threat information, vulnerability information, and the 

likelihood of such threats exploiting vulnerabilities to cause adverse impacts, guide and inform 

14 Security requirements are those requirements levied on an information system that are derived from laws, Executive 

Orders, directives, policies, instructions, regulations, standards, guidelines, or organizational (mission) needs to ensure 

the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information being processed, stored, or transmitted.

15 NIST Special Publication 800-53A provides guidance on assessing the effectiveness of security controls.

16 See FIPS Publication 200, Footnote 7.

17 Organizations typically exercise managerial, operational, and financial control over their information systems and the 

security provided to those systems, including the authority and capability to implement or require the security controls 

deemed necessary to protect organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

18 Considerations for potential national-level impacts and impacts to other organizations in categorizing organizational 

information systems derive from the USA PATRIOT Act and Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs).

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the tailoring process and the final selection of security controls.19 The final, agreed-upon set of 

security controls addressing specific organizational mission/business needs and tolerance for risk

is documented with appropriate rationale in the security plan for the information system.20 The 

use of security controls from Special Publication 800-53 (including the baseline controls as a 

starting point in the control selection process), facilitates a more consistent level of security for 

federal information systems and organizations, while simultaneously preserving the flexibility 

and agility organizations need to address an increasingly sophisticated and hostile threat space, 

specific organizational missions/business functions, rapidly changing technologies, and in some 

cases, unique environments of operation.

Achieving adequate information security for organizations, mission/business processes, and 

information systems is a multifaceted undertaking that requires:

• Clearly articulated security requirements and security specifications;

• Well-designed and well-built information technology products based on state-of-the-practice 

hardware, firmware, and software development processes;

• Sound systems/security engineering principles and practices to effectively integrate 

information technology products into organizational information systems;

• Sound security practices that are well documented and seamlessly integrated into the training 

requirements and daily routines of organizational personnel with security responsibilities;

• Continuous monitoring of organizations and information systems to determine the ongoing 

effectiveness of deployed security controls, changes in information systems and environments 

of operation, and compliance with legislation, directives, policies, and standards;21 and

• Information security planning and system development life cycle management.22

From an engineering viewpoint, information security is just one of many required operational 

capabilities for information systems that support organizational mission/business processes—

capabilities that must be funded by organizations throughout the system development life cycle in 

order to achieve mission/business success. It is important that organizations realistically assess

the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation 

arising from mission/business processes and by placing information systems into operation or 

continuing operations. Realistic assessment of risk requires an understanding of threats to and 

vulnerabilities within organizations and the likelihood and potential adverse impacts of successful 

exploitations of such vulnerabilities by those threats.

23 Finally, information security requirements 

must be satisfied with the full knowledge and consideration of the risk management strategy of 

19 Risk assessments can be accomplished in a variety of ways depending on the specific needs of organizations. NIST 

Special Publication 800-30 provides guidance on the assessment of risk as part of an overall risk management process.

20 Authorizing officials or designated representatives, by accepting the completed security plans, agree to the set of 

security controls proposed to meet the security requirements for organizations (including mission/business processes) 

and/or designated information systems.

21 NIST Special Publication 800-137 provides guidance on continuous monitoring of organizational information 

systems and environments of operation.

22 NIST Special Publication 800-64 provides guidance on the information security considerations in the system 

development life cycle.

23 NIST Special Publication 800-30 provides guidance on the risk assessment process.

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the organization, in light of the potential cost, schedule, and performance issues associated with 

the acquisition, deployment, and operation of organizational information systems.

24

1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THIS SPECIAL PUBLICATION

The remainder of this special publication is organized as follows:

• Chapter Two describes the fundamental concepts associated with security control selection 

and specification including: (i) multitiered risk management; (ii) the structure of security 

controls and how the controls are organized into families; (iii) security control baselines as 

starting points for the tailoring process; (iv) the use of common controls and inheritance of 

security capabilities; (v) external environments and service providers; (vi) assurance and 

trustworthiness; and (vii) revisions and extensions to security controls and control baselines.

• Chapter Three describes the process of selecting and specifying security controls for

organizational information systems including: (i) selecting appropriate security control 

baselines; (ii) tailoring the baseline controls including developing specialized overlays; (iii) 

documenting the security control selection process; and (iv) applying the selection process to 

new and legacy systems.

• Supporting appendices provide essential security control selection and specification-related 

information including: (i) general references; 25 (ii) definitions and terms; (iii) acronyms; (iv) 

baseline security controls for low-impact, moderate-impact, and high-impact information 

systems; (v) guidance on assurance and trustworthiness in information systems; (vi) a catalog 

of security controls;26 (vii) a catalog of information security program management controls; 

(viii) mappings to international information security standards; (ix) guidance for developing 

overlays by organizations or communities of interest; and (x) a catalog of privacy controls.

24 In addition to information security requirements, organizations must also address privacy requirements that derive 

from federal legislation and policies. Organizations can employ the privacy controls in Appendix J in conjunction with 

the security controls in Appendix F to achieve comprehensive security and privacy protection.

25 Unless otherwise stated, all references to NIST publications in this document (i.e., Federal Information Processing 

Standards and Special Publications) are to the most recent version of the publication.

26 The security controls in Special Publication 800-53 are available online and can be downloaded in various formats 

from the NIST web site at: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/800-53/home.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE FUNDAMENTALS

SECURITY CONTROL STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION, BASELINES, AND ASSURANCE

his chapter presents the fundamental concepts associated with security control selection 

and specification including: (i) three-tiered risk management; (ii) the structure of security 

controls and the organization of the controls in the control catalog; (iii) security control 

baselines; (iv) the identification and use of common security controls; (v) security controls in 

external environments; (vi) security control assurance; and (vii) future revisions to the security 

controls, the control catalog, and baseline controls.

2.1 MULTITIERED RISK MANAGEMENT

The selection and specification of security controls for an information system is accomplished as 

part of an organization-wide information security program for the management of risk—that is, 

the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation 

associated with the operation of information systems. Risk-based approaches to security control 

selection and specification consider effectiveness, efficiency, and constraints due to applicable 

federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines. To

integrate the risk management process throughout the organization and more effectively address 

mission/business concerns, a three-tiered approach is employed that addresses risk at the: (i) 

organization level; (ii) mission/business process level; and (iii) information system level. The risk 

management process is carried out across the three tiers with the overall objective of continuous 

improvement in the organization’s risk-related activities and effective inter-tier and intra-tier 

communication among all stakeholders having a shared interest in the mission/business success of 

the organization. Figure 1 illustrates the three-tiered approach to risk management.

FIGURE 1: THREE-TIERED RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH

T

TIER 1

ORGANIZATION

TIER 2

MISSION / BUSINESS PROCESSES

TIER 3

INFORMATION SYSTEMS

- Inter-Tier and Intra-Tier 

Communications

- Feedback Loop for 

Continuous Improvement

TACTICAL RISK

STRATEGIC RISK

- Traceability and Transparency of 

Risk-Based Decisions

- Organization-Wide 

Risk Awareness

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Tier 1 provides a prioritization of organizational missions/business functions which in turn drives 

investment strategies and funding decisions—promoting cost-effective, efficient information 

technology solutions consistent with the strategic goals and objectives of the organization and 

measures of performance. Tier 2 includes: (i) defining the mission/business processes needed to 

support the organizational missions/business functions; (ii) determining the security categories of 

the information systems needed to execute the mission/business processes; (iii) incorporating 

information security requirements into the mission/business processes; and (iv) establishing an 

enterprise architecture (including an embedded information security architecture) to facilitate the 

allocation of security controls to organizational information systems and the environments in 

which those systems operate. The Risk Management Framework (RMF), depicted in Figure 2, is 

the primary means for addressing risk at Tier 3.27 This publication focuses on Step 2 of the RMF, 

the security control selection process, in the context of the three tiers in the organizational risk 

management hierarchy.

FIGURE 2: RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

The RMF addresses the security concerns of organizations related to the design, development, 

implementation, operation, and disposal of information systems and the environments in which 

those systems operate. The RMF consists of the following six steps:

27 NIST Special Publication 800-37 provides guidance on the implementation of the Risk Management Framework. A 

complete listing of all publications supporting the RMF and referenced in Figure 2 is provided in Appendix A.

RISK

MANAGEMENT

FRAMEWORK

Security Life Cycle

Repeat as necessary

Step 1

CATEGORIZE

Information Systems

Step 6 FIPS 199 / SP 800-60

MONITOR

Security Controls

SP 800-137

Step 3

IMPLEMENT

Security Controls

SP 800-160

Step 2

SELECT

Security Controls

FIPS 200 / SP 800-53

Step 5

AUTHORIZE

Information Systems

SP 800-37

Step 4

ASSESS

Security Controls

SP 800-53A

Organizational Inputs

• Laws, Directives, Policy, Guidance

• Strategic Goals and Objectives

• Information Security Requirements

• Priorities and Resource Availability

Architecture Description

• Mission/Business Processes

• FEA Reference Models

• Segment and Solution Architectures 

• Information System Boundaries

Starting 

Point

Note: CNSS Instruction 1253 provides guidance for RMF Steps 1 and 2 for National Security Systems (NSS).

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Step 1: Categorize the information system based on a FIPS Publication 199 impact assessment;

28

Step 2: Select the applicable security control baseline based on the results of the security 

categorization and apply tailoring guidance (including the potential use of overlays);

Step 3: Implement the security controls and document the design, development, and 

implementation details for the controls;

Step 4: Assess the security controls to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented 

correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the 

security requirements for the system;

29

Step 5: Authorize information system operation based on a determination of risk to organizational 

operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting from the 

operation and use of the information system and the decision that this risk is acceptable; and

Step 6: Monitor the security controls in the information system and environment of operation on 

an ongoing basis to determine control effectiveness, changes to the system/environment, and 

compliance to legislation, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.

2.2 SECURITY CONTROL STRUCTURE

Security controls described in this publication have a well-defined organization and structure. For 

ease of use in the security control selection and specification process, controls are organized into 

eighteen families.

30 Each family contains security controls related to the general security topic of 

the family. A two-character identifier uniquely identifies security control families, for example, 

PS (Personnel Security). Security controls may involve aspects of policy, oversight, supervision, 

manual processes, actions by individuals, or automated mechanisms implemented by information 

systems/devices. Table 1 lists the security control families and the associated family identifiers in 

the security control catalog.

31

TABLE 1: SECURITY CONTROL IDENTIFIERS AND FAMILY NAMES

ID FAMILY ID FAMILY

AC Access Control MP Media Protection

AT Awareness and Training PE Physical and Environmental Protection

AU Audit and Accountability PL Planning

CA Security Assessment and Authorization PS Personnel Security

CM Configuration Management RA Risk Assessment

CP Contingency Planning SA System and Services Acquisition

IA Identification and Authentication SC System and Communications Protection

IR Incident Response SI System and Information Integrity

MA Maintenance PM Program Management

28 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides security categorization guidance for national security systems.

29 NIST Special Publication 800-53A provides guidance on assessing the effectiveness of security controls.

30 Of the eighteen security control families in NIST Special Publication 800-53, seventeen families are described in the 

security control catalog in Appendix F, and are closely aligned with the seventeen minimum security requirements for 

federal information and information systems in FIPS Publication 200. One additional family (Program Management 

[PM] family) provides controls for information security programs required by FISMA. This family, while not 

specifically referenced in FIPS Publication 200, provides security controls at the organization level rather than the 

information system level. See Appendix G for a description of and implementation guidance for the PM controls.

31 Privacy controls listed in Appendix J, have an organization and structure similar to security controls, including the 

use of two-character identifiers for the eight privacy families.

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The security control structure consists of the following components: (i) a control section; (ii) a 

supplemental guidance section; (iii) a control enhancements section; (iv) a references section; 

and (v) a priority and baseline allocation section. The following example from the Auditing and 

Accountability family illustrates the structure of a typical security control.

AU-3 CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS

Control: The information system generates audit records containing information that establishes 

what type of event occurred, when the event occurred, where the event occurred, the source of the 

event, the outcome of the event, and the identity of any individuals or subjects associated with the 

event.

Supplemental Guidance: Audit record content that may be necessary to satisfy the requirement of 

this control includes, for example, time stamps, source and destination addresses, user/process 

identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, filenames involved, and access control or 

flow control rules invoked. Event outcomes can include indicators of event success or failure and 

event-specific results (e.g., the security state of the information system after the event occurred). 

Related controls: AU-2, AU-8, AU-12, SI-11.

Control Enhancements:

(1) CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | ADDITIONAL AUDIT INFORMATION 

The information system generates audit records containing the following additional information: 

[Assignment: organization-defined additional, more detailed information].

Supplemental Guidance: Detailed information that organizations may consider in audit records 

includes, for example, full-text recording of privileged commands or the individual identities 

of group account users. Organizations consider limiting the additional audit information to 

only that information explicitly needed for specific audit requirements. This facilitates the use 

of audit trails and audit logs by not including information that could potentially be misleading 

or could make it more difficult to locate information of interest.

(2) CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF PLANNED AUDIT RECORD CONTENT 

The information system provides centralized management and configuration of the content to be 

captured in audit records generated by [Assignment: organization-defined information system 

components].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires that the content to be captured in 

audit records be configured from a central location (necessitating automation). Organizations 

coordinate the selection of required audit content to support the centralized management and 

configuration capability provided by the information system. Related controls: AU-6, AU-7.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-3 MOD AU-3 (1) HIGH AU-3 (1) (2)

The control section prescribes specific security-related activities or actions to be carried out by 

organizations or by information systems. The term information system refers to those functions

that generally involve the implementation of information technology (e.g., hardware, software, 

and firmware). Conversely, the term organization refers to activities that are generally processdriven or entity-driven—that is, the security control is generally implemented through human or 

procedural-based actions. Security controls that use the term organization may still require some 

degree of automation to be fulfilled. Similarly, security controls that use the term information 

system may have some elements that are process-driven or entity-driven. Using the terms 

organization and/or information system does not preclude the application of security controls at 

any of the tiers in the risk management hierarchy (i.e., organization level, mission/business 

process level, information system level), as appropriate. 

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For some security controls in the control catalog, a degree of flexibility is provided by allowing 

organizations to define values for certain parameters associated with the controls. This flexibility 

is achieved through the use of assignment and selection statements embedded within the security 

controls and control enhancements. Assignment and selection statements provide organizations 

with the capability to tailor security controls and control enhancements based on: (i) security 

requirements to support organizational missions/business functions and operational needs; (ii)

risk assessments and organizational risk tolerance; and (iii) security requirements originating in 

federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, or guidelines.32

For example, organizations can specify additional information needed for audit records to support 

audit event processing. See the AU-3(1) example above (i.e., [Assignment: organization-defined 

additional, more detailed information]). These assignments may include particular actions to be 

taken by information systems in the event of audit failures, the frequency of conducting system 

backups, restrictions on password use, or the distribution list for organizational policies and 

procedures.

33 Once specified,34 the organization-defined values for assignment and selection 

statements become part of the security control, and the control implementation is assessed against 

the completed control statement. Assignment statements offer a high degree of flexibility by 

allowing organizations to specify parameter values, without requiring those values to be one of 

two or more specific predefined choices. In contrast, selection statements narrow the potential 

input values by providing a specific list of items from which organizations must choose.35

The supplemental guidance section provides non-prescriptive, additional information for a 

specific security control. Organizations can apply the supplemental guidance as appropriate, 

when defining, developing, and/or implementing security controls. The supplemental guidance 

can provide important considerations for implementing security controls in the context of 

operational environments, mission/business requirements, or assessments of risk and can also 

explain the purpose or meaning of particular controls. Security control enhancements may also 

contain supplemental guidance when the guidance is not applicable to the entire control but 

instead focused on a particular control enhancement. The supplemental guidance sections for 

security controls and control enhancements may contain a list of related controls. Related 

controls: (i) directly impact or support the implementation of a particular security control or 

control enhancement; (ii) address a closely related security capability; or (iii) are referenced in 

the supplemental guidance. Security control enhancements are by definition related to the base 

control. Related controls that are listed in the supplemental guidance for the base controls are not 

repeated in the supplemental guidance for the control enhancements. However, there may be 

related controls identified for control enhancements that are not listed in the base control.

The security control enhancements section provides statements of security capability to: (i) add

functionality/specificity to a control; and/or (ii) increase the strength of a control. In both cases, 

control enhancements are used in information systems and environments of operation requiring 

32 In general, organization-defined parameters used in assignment and selection statements in the basic security 

controls apply also to all control enhancements associated with those controls.

33 Organizations determine whether specific assignment or selection statements are completed at Tier 1 (organization 

level), Tier 2 (mission/business process level), Tier 3 (information system level), or a combination thereof.

34 Organizations may choose to define specific values for security control parameters in policies, procedures, or 

guidance (which may be applicable to more than one information system) referencing the source documents in the 

security plan in lieu of explicitly completing the assignment/selection statements within the control as part of the plan.

35 Security controls are generally designed to be technology- and implementation-independent, and therefore do not 

contain specific requirements in these areas. Organizations provide such requirements as deemed necessary in the 

security plan for the information system.

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greater protection than provided by the base control due to the potential adverse organizational 

impacts or when organizations seek additions to the base control functionality/specificity based 

on organizational assessments of risk. Security control enhancements are numbered sequentially 

within each control so that the enhancements can be easily identified when selected to supplement 

the base control. Each security control enhancement has a short subtitle to indicate the intended 

security capability provided by the control enhancement. In the AU-3 example, if the first control 

enhancement is selected, the control designation becomes AU-3(1). The numerical designation of 

a control enhancement is used only to identify the particular enhancement within the control. The 

designation is not indicative of either the strength of the control enhancement or any hierarchical 

relationship among the enhancements. Control enhancements are not intended to be selected 

independently (i.e., if a control enhancement is selected, then the corresponding base security 

control must also be selected). This intent is reflected in the baseline specifications in Appendix 

D and in the baseline allocation section under each control in Appendix F.

The references section includes a list of applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, 

policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines (e.g., OMB Circulars/Memoranda, Homeland 

Security Presidential Directives, FIPS Publications, and NIST Special Publications) that are 

relevant to a particular security control.36 The references provide federal legislative and policy 

mandates as well as supporting information for the implementation of security controls and 

control enhancements. The references section also contains pertinent websites for organizations to 

use in obtaining additional information for security control implementation and assessment.

The priority and security control baseline allocation section provides: (i) the recommended 

priority codes used for sequencing decisions during security control implementation; and (ii) the 

initial allocation of security controls and control enhancements to the baselines. Organizations 

can use the priority code designation associated with each security control to assist in making 

sequencing decisions for control implementation (i.e., a Priority Code 1 [P1] control has a higher 

priority for implementation than a Priority Code 2 [P2] control, a Priority Code 2 [P2] control has

a higher priority for implementation than a Priority Code 3 [P3] control, and a Priority Code 0 

[P0] indicates the security control is not selected in any baseline). This recommended sequencing 

prioritization helps to ensure that the foundational security controls upon which other controls 

depend are implemented first, thus enabling organizations to deploy controls in a more structured 

and timely manner in accordance with available resources. The implementation of security 

controls by sequence priority code does not imply the achievement of any defined level of risk 

mitigation until all of the security controls in the security plan have been implemented. The 

priority codes are intended only for implementation sequencing, not for making security control 

selection decisions. 

2.3 SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES

Organizations are required to adequately mitigate the risk arising from use of information and 

information systems in the execution of missions and business functions. A significant challenge 

for organizations is to determine the most cost-effective, appropriate set of security controls, 

which if implemented and determined to be effective, would mitigate risk while complying with 

security requirements defined by applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, regulations, policies, 

directives, or standards (e.g., FISMA, OMB Circular A-130, HSPD-12, FIPS Publication 200).

There is no one correct set of security controls that addresses all organizational security concerns

in all situations. Selecting the most appropriate set of security controls for a specific situation or 

36 Publications listed in the references section refer to the most recent versions of the publications. References are 

provided to assist organizations in applying the security controls and are not intended to be inclusive or complete.

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information system to adequately mitigate risk is an important task that requires a fundamental 

understanding of organizational mission/business priorities, the mission and business functions 

the information systems will support, and the environments of operation where the systems will 

reside. With that understanding, organizations can demonstrate how to most effectively assure the 

confidentiality, integrity, and availability of organizational information and information systems

in a manner that supports mission/business needs while demonstrating due diligence. Selecting, 

implementing, and maintaining an appropriate set of security controls to adequately protect the 

information systems employed by organizations requires strong collaboration with system owners 

to understand ongoing changes to missions/business functions, environments of operation, and 

how the systems are used.

To assist organizations in making the appropriate selection of security controls for information 

systems, the concept of baseline controls is introduced. Baseline controls are the starting point for 

the security control selection process described in this document and are chosen based on the 

security category and associated impact level of information systems determined in accordance 

with FIPS Publication 199 and FIPS Publication 200, respectively.

37 Appendix D provides a 

listing of the security control baselines. Three security control baselines have been identified 

corresponding to the low-impact, moderate-impact, and high-impact information systems using 

the high water mark defined in FIPS Publication 200 and used in Section 3.1 of this document to 

provide an initial set of security controls for each impact level.38

Appendix F provides a comprehensive catalog of security controls for information systems and 

organizations, arranged by control families. Chapter Three provides additional information on 

how to use FIPS Publication 199 security categories and FIPS Publication 200 system impact 

levels in applying the tailoring guidance to the baseline security controls to achieve adequate risk 

mitigation.Tailoring guidance, described in Section 3.2, helps organizations to customize the 

security control baselines selected using the results from organizational assessments of risk. 

Baseline tailoring actions include: (i) identifying and designating common controls; (ii) applying 

scoping considerations; (iii) selecting compensating controls; (iv) assigning specific values to 

security control parameters; (v) supplementing initial baselines with additional security controls 

or control enhancements; and (vi) providing additional information for control implementation.

37 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides guidance on security control baselines for national security systems.

38 The baseline security controls contained in Appendix D are not necessarily absolutes in that the guidance described 

in Section 3.2 provides organizations with the ability to tailor controls in accordance with the terms and conditions

established by their authorizing officials and documented in their respective security plans.

Implementation Tip

There are security controls and control enhancements that appear in the security control catalog 

(Appendix F) that are found in only higher-impact baselines or are not used in any of the baselines. 

These additional security controls and control enhancements for information systems are available to 

organizations and can be used in tailoring security control baselines to achieve the needed level of 

protection in accordance with organizational assessments of risk. The set of security controls in the 

security plan must be sufficient to adequately mitigate risks to organizational operations and assets, 

individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based on the organizational risk tolerance.

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2.4 SECURITY CONTROL DESIGNATIONS

There are three distinct types of designations related to the security controls in Appendix F that 

define: (i) the scope of applicability for the control; (ii) the shared nature of the control; and (iii)

the responsibility for control development, implementation, assessment, and authorization. These 

designations include common controls, system-specific controls, and hybrid controls.

Common controls are security controls whose implementation results in a security capability that 

is inheritable by one or more organizational information systems. Security controls are deemed 

inheritable by information systems or information system components when the systems or 

components receive protection from the implemented controls but the controls are developed, 

implemented, assessed, authorized, and monitored by entities other than those responsible for the 

systems or components—entities internal or external to the organizations where the systems or 

components reside. Security capabilities provided by common controls can be inherited from 

many sources including, for example, organizations, organizational mission/business lines, sites, 

enclaves, environments of operation, or other information systems. Many of the controls needed 

to protect organizational information systems (e.g., security awareness training, incident response 

plans, physical access to facilities, rules of behavior) are excellent candidates for common control 

status. In addition, there can also be a variety of technology-based common controls (e.g., Public 

Key Infrastructure [PKI], authorized secure standard configurations for clients/servers, access 

control systems, boundary protection, cross-domain solutions). By centrally managing and

documenting the development, implementation, assessment, authorization, and monitoring of 

common controls, security costs can be amortized across multiple information systems.

The organization assigns responsibility for common controls to appropriate organizational 

officials (i.e., common control providers) and coordinates the development, implementation, 

assessment, authorization, and monitoring of the controls.

39 The identification of common 

controls is most effectively accomplished as an organization-wide exercise with the active 

involvement of chief information officers, senior information security officers, the risk executive 

(function), authorizing officials, information owners/stewards, information system owners, and 

information system security officers. The organization-wide exercise considers the security 

categories of the information systems within the organization and the security controls necessary 

to adequately mitigate the risks arising from the use of those systems (see baseline security 

controls in Section 2.3).

40 Common control identification for the controls that impact multiple 

information systems, but not all systems across the organization could benefit from taking a 

similar approach. Key stakeholders collaborate to identify opportunities to effectively employ 

common controls at the mission/business line, site, or enclave level.

When common controls protect multiple organizational information systems of differing impact 

levels, the controls are implemented with regard to the highest impact level among the systems. If 

the common controls are not implemented at the highest impact level of the information systems, 

system owners will need to factor this situation into their assessments of risk and take appropriate 

risk mitigation actions (e.g., adding security controls or control enhancements, changing assigned 

values of security control parameters, implementing compensating controls, or changing certain 

aspects of mission/business processes). Implementing common controls that are less than 

39 The Chief Information Officer, Senior Information Security Officer, or other designated organizational officials at 

the senior leadership level assign responsibility for the development, implementation, assessment, authorization, and 

monitoring of common controls to appropriate entities (either internal or external to the organization).

40 Each common control identified by the organization is reviewed for applicability to each specific organizational 

information system, typically by information system owners and authorizing officials.

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effective or that provide insufficient security capability for higher-impact information systems 

can have a significant adverse impact on organizational missions or business functions.

Common controls are generally documented in the organization-wide information security 

program plan unless implemented as part of a specific information system, in which case the 

controls are documented in the security plan for that system.41 Organizations have the flexibility 

to describe common controls in a single document or in multiple documents with references or 

pointers, as appropriate. In the case of multiple documents, the documents describing common 

controls are included as attachments to the information security program plan. If the information 

security program plan contains multiple documents, organizations specify in each document the 

organizational officials responsible for development, implementation, assessment, authorization, 

and monitoring of the respective common controls. For example, the organization may require 

that the Facilities Management Office develop, implement, assess, authorize, and continuously 

monitor physical and environmental protection controls from the PE family when such controls 

are not associated with a particular information system but instead, support multiple systems. 

When common controls are included in a separate security plan for an information system (e.g., 

security controls employed as part of an intrusion detection system providing boundary protection 

inherited by one or more organizational information systems), the information security program 

plan indicates which separate security plan contains a description of the common controls.

Common controls, whether employed in organizational information systems or environments of 

operation, are authorized by senior officials with at least the same level of authority/responsibility 

for managing risk as the authorization officials for information systems inheriting the controls. 

Authorization results for common controls are shared with the appropriate information system 

owners and authorizing officials. A plan of action and milestones is developed and maintained for 

common controls that have been determined through independent assessments, to be less than 

effective. Information system owners dependent on common controls that are less than effective 

consider whether they are willing to accept the associated risk or if additional tailoring is required 

to address the weaknesses or deficiencies in the controls. Such risk-based decisions are influenced 

by available resources, the trust models employed by the organization, and the risk tolerance of 

authorizing officials and the organization.42

41 Information security program plans are described in Appendix G. Organizations ensure that any security capabilities 

provided by common controls (i.e., security capabilities inheritable by other organizational entities) are described in 

sufficient detail to facilitate adequate understanding of the control implementation by inheriting entities.

42 NIST Special Publication 800-39 provides guidance on trust models, including validated, direct historical, mediated,

and mandated trust models.

Implementation Tip

The selection of common controls is most effectively accomplished on an organization-wide basis 

with the involvement of senior leadership (i.e., mission/business owners, authorizing officials, chief 

information officers, senior information security officers, information system owners, information 

owners/stewards, risk executives). These individuals have the collective knowledge to understand 

organizational priorities, the importance of organizational operations and assets, and the importance 

of the information systems that support those operations/assets. The senior leaders are also in the 

best position to select the common controls for each security control baseline and assign specific 

responsibilities for developing, implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring those controls.

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Common controls are subject to the same assessment and monitoring requirements as systemspecific controls employed in individual organizational information systems. Because common 

controls impact more than one system, a higher degree of confidence regarding the effectiveness 

of those controls may be required.

Security controls not designated as common controls are considered system-specific or hybrid

controls. System-specific controls are the primary responsibility of information system owners 

and their respective authorizing officials. Organizations assign a hybrid status to security controls

when one part of the control is common and another part of the control is system-specific. For 

example, an organization may choose to implement the Incident Response Policy and Procedures 

security control (IR-1) as a hybrid control with the policy portion of the control designated as 

common and the procedures portion of the control designated as system-specific. Hybrid controls 

may also serve as predefined templates for further control refinement. Organizations may choose, 

for example, to implement the Contingency Planning security control (CP-2) as a predefined 

template for a generalized contingency plan for all organizational information systems with 

information system owners tailoring the plan, where appropriate, for system-specific uses.

Partitioning security controls into common, hybrid, and system-specific controls can result in 

significant savings to organizations in implementation and assessment costs as well as a more 

consistent application of security controls organization-wide. While security control partitioning 

into common, hybrid, and system-specific controls is straightforward and intuitive conceptually, 

the actual application takes a significant amount of planning and coordination. At the information 

system level, determination of common, hybrid, or system-specific security controls follows the 

development of a tailored baseline. It is necessary to first determine what security capability is 

needed before organizations assign responsibility for how security controls are implemented, 

operated, and maintained.

Security plans for individual information systems identify which security controls required for 

those systems have been designated by organizations as common controls and which controls 

have been designated as system-specific or hybrid controls. Information system owners are 

responsible for any system-specific implementation details associated with common controls.

These implementation details are identified and described in the security plans for the individual 

information systems. Senior information security officers for organizations coordinate with 

common control providers (e.g., facility/site managers, human resources managers, intrusion 

detection system owners) to ensure that the required controls are developed, implemented, and 

assessed for effectiveness. Collectively, the security plans for individual information systems and 

the organization-wide information security program plans provide complete coverage for all 

security controls employed within organizations. 

The determination as to whether a security control is a common, hybrid, or system-specific is 

context-based. Security controls cannot be determined to be common, hybrid, or system-specific

simply based on reviewing the language of the control. For example, a control may be systemspecific for a particular information system, but at the same time that control could be a common 

control for another system, which would inherit the control from the first system. One indicator of 

whether a system-specific control may also be a common control for other information systems is 

to consider who or what depends on the functionality of that particular control. If a certain part of 

an information system or solution external to the system boundary depends on the control, then 

that control may be a candidate for common control identification.

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2.5 EXTERNAL SERVICE PROVIDERS

Organizations are becoming increasingly reliant on information system services provided by 

external providers to conduct important missions and business functions. External information 

system services are computing and information technology services implemented outside of the 

traditional security authorization boundaries established by organizations for their information 

systems. Those traditional authorization boundaries linked to physical space and control of assets, 

are being extended (both physically and logically) with the growing use of external services. In

this context, external services can be provided by: (i) entities within the organization but outside 

of the security authorization boundaries established for organizational information systems; (ii) 

entities outside of the organization either in the public sector (e.g., federal agencies) or private 

sector (e.g., commercial service providers); or (iii) some combination of the public and private 

sector options. External information system services include, for example, the use of serviceoriented architectures (SOAs), cloud-based services (infrastructure, platform, software), or data 

center operations. External information system services may be used by, but are typically not part 

of, organizational information systems. In some situations, external information system services 

may completely replace or heavily augment the routine functionality of internal organizational

information systems.

FISMA and OMB policies require that federal agencies using external service providers to 

process, store, or transmit federal information or operate information systems on behalf of the 

Implementation Tip

• Organizations consider the inherited risk from the use of common controls. Security plans, 

security assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones for common controls (or a 

summary of such information) are made available to information system owners (for systems 

inheriting the controls) after the information is reviewed and approved by the senior official or 

executive responsible and accountable for the controls.

• Organizations ensure that common control providers keep control status information current 

since the controls typically support multiple organizational information systems. Security plans, 

security assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones for common controls are used 

by authorizing officials to make risk-based decisions in the security authorization process for 

their information systems and therefore, inherited risk from common controls is a significant 

factor in such risk-based decisions.

• Organizations ensure that common control providers have the capability to rapidly broadcast 

changes in the status of common controls that adversely affect the protections being provided by 

and expected of the common controls. Common control providers inform system owners when 

problems arise in the inherited common controls (e.g., when an assessment or reassessment of 

a common control indicates the control is flawed or deficient in some manner, or when a new 

threat or attack method arises that renders the common control less than effective in protecting 

against the new threat or attack method).

• Organizations are encouraged to employ automated management systems to maintain records 

of the specific common controls employed in each organizational information system to enhance 

the ability of common control providers to rapidly communicate with system owners.

• If common controls are provided to organizations by entities external to the organization (e.g., 

shared and/or external service providers), arrangements are made with the external/shared 

service providers by the organization to obtain information on the effectiveness of the deployed 

controls. Information obtained from external organizations regarding effectiveness of common 

controls is factored into authorization decisions.

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federal government, assure that such use meets the same security requirements that federal 

agencies are required to meet. Security requirements for external service providers including the 

security controls for external information systems are expressed in contracts or other formal 

agreements.43 Organizations are responsible and accountable for the information security risk 

incurred by the use of information system services provided by external providers. Such risk is 

addressed by incorporating the Risk Management Framework (RMF) as part of the terms and 

conditions of the contracts with external providers. Organizations can require external providers 

to implement all steps in the RMF except the security authorization step, which remains an 

inherent federal responsibility directly linked to managing the information security risk related to 

the use of external information system services.44 Organizations can also require external 

providers to provide appropriate evidence to demonstrate that they have complied with the RMF 

in protecting federal information. However, federal agencies take direct responsibility for the 

overall security of such services by authorizing the information systems providing the services.

Relationships with external service providers are established in a variety of ways, for example, 

through joint ventures, business partnerships, outsourcing arrangements (i.e., through contracts, 

interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements, service-level agreements), licensing 

agreements, and/or supply chain exchanges. The growing use of external service providers and 

new relationships being forged with those providers present new and difficult challenges for 

organizations, especially in the area of information system security. These challenges include:

• Defining the types of external information system services provided to organizations;

• Describing how those external services are protected in accordance with the information 

security requirements of organizations; and

• Obtaining the necessary assurances that the risk to organizational operations and assets, 

individuals, other organizations, and the Nation arising from the use of the external services

is acceptable.

The degree of confidence that the risk from using external services is at an acceptable level 

depends on the trust that organizations place in external service providers. In some cases, the 

level of trust is based on the amount of direct control organizations are able to exert on external 

service providers with regard to employment of security controls necessary for the protection of 

the service/information and the evidence brought forth as to the effectiveness of those controls.45

The level of control is usually established by the terms and conditions of the contracts or servicelevel agreements with the external service providers and can range from extensive control (e.g., 

negotiating contracts or agreements that specify detailed security requirements for the providers) 

to very limited control (e.g., using contracts or service-level agreements to obtain commodity 

43 Organizations consult the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) when acquiring cloud 

services from external providers. FedRAMP addresses required security controls and independent assessments for a 

variety of cloud services. Additional information is available at http://www.fedramp.gov.

44 To effectively manage information security risk, organizations authorize information systems of external providers 

that are part of the information technologies or services (e.g., infrastructure, platform, or software) provided to the 

federal government. Security authorization requirements are expressed in the terms and conditions of contracts with 

external providers of those information technologies and services.

45 The level of trust that organizations place in external service providers can vary widely, ranging from those who are 

highly trusted (e.g., business partners in a joint venture that share a common business model and common goals) to 

those who are less trusted and represent greater sources of risk (e.g., business partners in one endeavor who are also 

competitors in another market sector). NIST Special Publication 800-39 describes different trust models that can be 

employed by organizations when establishing relationships with external service providers.

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services such as commercial telecommunications services).46 In other cases, levels of trust are

based on factors that convince organizations that required security controls have been employed 

and that determinations of control effectiveness exist. For example, separately authorized external 

information system services provided to organizations through well-established lines of business 

relationships may provide degrees of trust in such services within the tolerable risk range of the 

authorizing officials and organizations using the services.

The provision of services by external providers may result in certain services without explicit 

agreements between organizations and the providers. Whenever explicit agreements are feasible 

and practical (e.g., through contracts, service-level agreements), organizations develop such 

agreements and require the use of the security controls in Appendix F of this publication. When 

organizations are not in a position to require explicit agreements with external service providers 

(e.g., services are imposed on organizations, services are commodity services), organizations

establish and document explicit assumptions about service capabilities with regard to security. In 

situations where organizations are procuring information system services through centralized 

acquisition vehicles (e.g., governmentwide contracts by the General Services Administration or 

other preferred and/or mandatory acquisition organizations), it may be more efficient and costeffective for contract originators to establish and maintain stated levels of trust with external 

service providers (including the definition of required security controls and level of assurance 

with regard to the provision of such controls). Organizations subsequently acquiring information 

system services from centralized contracts can take advantage of the negotiated levels of trust 

established by the procurement originators and thus avoid costly repetition of activities necessary 

to establish such trust.47 Centralized acquisition vehicles (e.g., contracts) may also require the 

active participation of organizations. For example, organizations may be required by provisions in 

contracts or agreements to install public key encryption-enabled client software recommended by 

external service providers.

Ultimately, the responsibility for adequately mitigating unacceptable risks arising from the use of 

external information system services remains with authorizing officials. Organizations require 

that appropriate chains of trust be established with external service providers when dealing with 

the many issues associated with information system security. Organizations establish and retain a 

level of trust that participating service providers in the potentially complex consumer-provider 

relationship provide adequate protection for the services rendered to organizations. The chain of 

trust can be complicated due to the number of entities participating in the consumer-provider 

relationship and the types of relationships between the parties. External service providers may 

also outsource selected services to other external entities, making the chain of trust more difficult 

and complicated to manage. Depending on the nature of the services, organizations may find it 

impossible to place significant trust in external providers. This situation is due not to any inherent 

untrustworthiness on the part of providers, but to the intrinsic level of risk in the services.

48

46 Commercial providers of commodity-type services typically organize their business models and services around the 

concept of shared resources and devices for a broad and diverse customer base. Therefore, unless organizations obtain 

fully dedicated services from commercial service providers, there may be a need for greater reliance on compensating 

security controls to provide the necessary protections for the information system that relies on those external services. 

Organizational assessments of risk and risk mitigation activities reflect this situation.

47 For example, procurement originators could authorize information systems providing external services to the federal 

government under the specific terms and conditions of the contracts. Federal agencies requesting such services under 

the terms of the contracts would not be required to reauthorize the information systems when acquiring such services 

(unless the request included services outside the scope of the original contracts).

48 There may also be risk in disallowing certain functionality because of security concerns. Security is merely one of 

multiple considerations in an overall risk determination.

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Where a sufficient level of trust cannot be established in the external services and/or providers, 

organizations can: (i) mitigate the risk by employing compensating controls; (ii) accept the risk

within the level of organizational risk tolerance; (iii) transfer risk by obtaining insurance to cover 

potential losses; or (iv) avoid risk by choosing not to obtain the services from certain providers 

(resulting in performance of missions/business operations with reduced levels of functionality or 

possibly no functionality at all).

49 For example, in the case of cloud-based information systems 

and/or services, organizations might require as a compensating control, that all information stored 

in the cloud be encrypted for added security of the information. Alternatively, organizations may 

require encrypting some of the information stored in the cloud (depending on the criticality or 

sensitivity of such information)—accepting additional risk but limiting the risk of not storing all 

information in an unencrypted form.

2.6 ASSURANCE AND TRUSTWORTHINESS

Assurance and trustworthiness of information systems, system components, and information 

system services are becoming an increasingly important part of the risk management strategies 

developed by organizations. Whether information systems are deployed to support, for example, 

the operations of the national air traffic control system, a major financial institution, a nuclear 

power plant providing electricity for a large city, or the military services and warfighters, the 

systems must be reliable, trustworthy, and resilient in the face of increasingly sophisticated and 

pervasive threats. To understand how organizations achieve trustworthy systems and the role 

assurance plays in the trustworthiness factor, it is important to first define the term trust. Trust, in 

general, is the belief that an entity will behave in a predictable manner while performing specific 

functions, in specific environments, and under specified conditions or circumstances. The entity 

may be a person, process, information system, system component, system-of-systems, or any 

combination thereof.

From an information security perspective, trust is the belief that a security-relevant entity will 

behave in a predictable manner when satisfying a defined set of security requirements under 

specified conditions/circumstances and while subjected to disruptions, human errors, component 

faults and failures, and purposeful attacks that may occur in the environment of operation. Trust 

is usually determined relative to a specific security capability50 and can be decided relative to an 

individual system component or the entire information system. However, trust at the information 

system level is not achieved as a result of composing a security capability from a set of trusted 

system components—rather, trust at the system level is an inherently subjective determination 

that is derived from the complex interactions among entities (i.e., technical components, physical 

components, and individuals), taking into account the life cycle activities that govern, develop, 

operate, and sustain the system. In essence, to have trust in a security capability requires that 

there is a sufficient basis for trust, or trustworthiness, in the set of security-relevant entities that 

are to be composed to provide such capability.

Trustworthiness with respect to information systems, expresses the degree to which the systems 

can be expected to preserve with some degree of confidence, the confidentiality, integrity, and 

availability of the information that is being processed, stored, or transmitted by the systems across 

a range of threats. Trustworthy information systems are systems that are believed to be capable of 

operating within a defined risk tolerance despite the environmental disruptions, human errors, 

49 Alternative providers offering a higher basis for trust, usually at a higher cost, may be available.

50 A security capability is a combination of mutually reinforcing security controls (i.e., safeguards/countermeasures) 

implemented by technical means (i.e., functionality in hardware, software, and firmware), physical means (i.e., physical 

devices and protective measures), and/or procedural means (i.e., procedures performed by individuals).

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structural failures, and purposeful attacks that are expected to occur in the environments in which 

the systems operate—systems that have the trustworthiness to successfully carry out assigned 

missions/business functions under conditions of stress and uncertainty.51

Two fundamental components affecting the trustworthiness of information systems are security 

functionality and security assurance. Security functionality is typically defined in terms of the 

security features, functions, mechanisms, services, procedures, and architectures implemented 

within organizational information systems or the environments in which those systems operate. 

Security assurance is the measure of confidence that the security functionality is implemented 

correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the 

security requirements for the system—thus possessing the capability to accurately mediate and 

enforce established security policies. Security controls address both security functionality and 

51 While information is the primary area of concern, trustworthiness applies to the protections for all assets deemed 

critical by organizations. Furthermore, protections are provided by technology (i.e., hardware, software, firmware), 

physical elements (i.e., doors, locks, surveillance), and human elements (i.e., people, processes, procedures).

Security Capability

Organizations can consider defining a set of security capabilities as a precursor to the security 

control selection process. The concept of security capability is a construct that recognizes that the 

protection of information being processed, stored, or transmitted by information systems, seldom 

derives from a single safeguard or countermeasure (i.e., security control). In most cases, such 

protection results from the selection and implementation of a set of mutually reinforcing security 

controls. For example, organizations may wish to define a security capability for secure remote 

authentication. This capability can be achieved by the selection and implementation of a set of 

security controls from Appendix F (e.g., IA-2[1], IA-2[2], IA-2[8], IA-2[9], and SC-8[1]). Moreover, 

security capabilities can address a variety of areas that can include, for example, technical means, 

physical means, procedural means, or any combination thereof. Thus, in addition to the above 

functional capability for secure remote access, organizations may also need security capabilities that 

address physical means such as tamper detection on a cryptographic module or anomaly 

detection/analysis on an orbiting spacecraft.

As the number of security controls in Appendix F grows over time in response to an increasingly 

sophisticated threat space, it is important for organizations to have the ability to describe key security 

capabilities needed to protect core organizational missions/business functions, and to subsequently 

define a set of security controls that if properly designed, developed, and implemented, produce 

such capabilities. This simplifies how the protection problem is viewed conceptually. In essence, 

using the construct of security capability provides a shorthand method of grouping security controls 

that are employed for a common purpose or to achieve a common objective. This becomes an 

important consideration, for example, when assessing security controls for effectiveness.

Traditionally, assessments have been conducted on a control-by-control basis producing results that 

are characterized as pass (i.e., control satisfied) or fail (i.e., control not satisfied). However, the 

failure of a single control or in some cases, the failure of multiple controls, may not affect the overall 

security capability needed by an organization. Moreover, employing the broader construct of security 

capability allows an organization to assess the severity of vulnerabilities discovered in its information 

systems and determine if the failure of a particular security control (associated with a vulnerability) or 

the decision not to deploy a certain control, affects the overall capability needed for mission/business 

protection. It also facilitates conducting root cause analyses to determine if the failure of one security 

control can be traced to the failure of other controls based on the established relationships among 

controls. Ultimately, authorization decisions (i.e., risk acceptance decisions) are made based on the 

degree to which the desired security capabilities have been effectively achieved and are meeting the 

security requirements defined by an organization. These risk-based decisions are directly related to 

organizational risk tolerance that is defined as part of an organization’s risk management strategy.

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security assurance. Some controls focus primarily on security functionality (e.g., PE-3, Physical 

Access Control; IA-2, Identification and Authentication; SC-13, Cryptographic Protection; AC-2, 

Account Management). Other controls focus primarily on security assurance (e.g., CA-2, Security 

Assessment; SA-17, Developer Security Architecture and Design; CM-3, Configuration Change 

Control). Finally, certain security controls can support security functionality and assurance (e.g., 

RA-5, Vulnerability Scanning; SC-3, Security Function Isolation; AC-25, Reference Monitor). 

Security controls related to functionality are combined to develop a security capability with the

assurance-related controls implemented to provide a degree of confidence in the capability within 

the organizational risk tolerance.

Assurance Evidence—From Developmental and Operational Activities

Organizations obtain security assurance by the actions taken by information system developers, 

implementers, operators, maintainers, and assessors. Actions by individuals and/or groups during 

the development/operation of information systems produce security evidence that contributes to 

the assurance, or measures of confidence, in the security functionality needed to deliver the 

security capability. The depth and coverage of these actions (as described in Appendix E) also 

contribute to the efficacy of the evidence and measures of confidence. The evidence produced by 

developers, implementers, operators, assessors, and maintainers during the system development 

life cycle (e.g., design/development artifacts, assessment results, warranties, and certificates of 

evaluation/validation) contributes to the understanding of the security controls implemented by 

organizations.

The strength of security functionality52 plays an important part in being able to achieve the 

needed security capability and subsequently satisfying the security requirements of organizations. 

Information system developers can increase the strength of security functionality by employing as 

part of the hardware/software/firmware development process: (i) well-defined security policies 

and policy models; (ii) structured/rigorous design and development techniques; and (iii) sound 

system/security engineering principles. The artifacts generated by these development activities 

(e.g., functional specifications, high-level/low-level designs, implementation representations 

[source code and hardware schematics], the results from static/dynamic testing and code analysis) 

can provide important evidence that the information systems (including the components that 

compose those systems) will be more reliable and trustworthy. Security evidence can also be 

generated from security testing conducted by independent, accredited, third-party assessment 

organizations (e.g., Common Criteria Testing Laboratories, Cryptographic/Security Testing 

Laboratories, and other assessment activities by government and private sector organizations).53

In addition to the evidence produced in the development environment, organizations can produce 

evidence from the operational environment that contributes to the assurance of functionality and 

ultimately, security capability. Operational evidence includes, for example, flaw reports, records 

of remediation actions, the results of security incident reporting, and the results of organizational 

continuous monitoring activities. Such evidence helps to determine the effectiveness of deployed 

security controls, changes to information systems and environments of operation, and compliance 

with federal legislation, policies, directives, regulations, and standards. Security evidence, 

52 The security strength of an information system component (i.e., hardware, software, or firmware) is determined by 

the degree to which the security functionality implemented within that component is correct, complete, resistant to 

direct attacks (strength of mechanism), and resistant to bypass or tampering.

53 For example, third-party assessment organizations assess cloud services and service providers in support of the

Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP). Common Criteria Testing Laboratories test and 

evaluate information technology products using ISO/IEC standard 15408. Cryptographic/Security Testing Laboratories 

test cryptographic modules using the FIPS 140-2 standard.

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whether obtained from development or operational activities, provides a better understanding of 

security controls implemented and used by organizations. Together, the actions taken during the 

system development life cycle by developers, implementers, operators, maintainers, and assessors 

and the evidence produced as part of those actions, help organizations to determine the extent to 

which the security functionality within their information systems is implemented correctly, 

operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting stated security 

requirements and enforcing or mediating established security policies—thus providing greater 

confidence in the security capability.

With regard to the security evidence produced, the depth and coverage of such evidence can 

affect the level of assurance in the functionality implemented. Depth and coverage are attributes 

associated with assessment methods and the generation of security evidence. Assessment methods 

can be applied to developmental and operational assurance. For developmental assurance, depth 

is associated with the rigor, level of detail, and formality of the artifacts produced during the 

design and development of the hardware, software, and firmware components of information 

systems (e.g., functional specifications, high-level design, low-level design, source code). The 

level of detail available in development artifacts can affect the type of testing, evaluation, and 

analysis conducted during the system development life cycle (e.g., black-box testing, gray-box

testing, white-box testing, static/dynamic analysis). For operational assurance, the depth attribute 

addresses the number and types of assurance-related security controls selected and implemented. 

In contrast, the coverage attribute is associated with the assessment methods employed during 

development and operations, addressing the scope and breadth of assessment objects included in 

the assessments (e.g., number/types of tests conducted on source code, number of software 

modules reviewed, number of network nodes/mobile devices scanned for vulnerabilities, number 

of individuals interviewed to check basic understanding of contingency responsibilities).54

Addressing assurance-related controls during acquisition and system development can help 

organizations to obtain sufficiently trustworthy information systems and components that are 

more reliable and less likely to fail. These controls include ensuring that developers employ 

sound systems security engineering principles and processes including, for example, providing a 

comprehensive security architecture, and enforcing strict configuration management and control 

of information system and software changes. Once information systems are deployed, assurancerelated controls can help organizations to continue to have confidence in the trustworthiness of 

the systems. These controls include, for example, conducting integrity checks on software and 

firmware components, conducting penetration testing to find vulnerabilities in organizational

54 NIST Special Publication 800-53A provides guidance on the generation of security evidence related to security 

assessments conducted during the system development life cycle.

The Compelling Argument for Assurance

Organizations specify assurance-related controls to define activities performed to generate relevant 

and credible evidence about the functionality and behavior of organizational information systems and 

to trace the evidence to the elements that provide such functionality/behavior. This evidence is used 

to obtain a degree of confidence that the systems satisfy stated security requirements—and do so 

while effectively supporting the organizational missions/business functions while being subjected to 

threats in the intended environments of operation.

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information systems, monitoring established secure configuration settings, and developing 

policies/procedures that support the operation and use of the systems.

The concepts described above, including security requirements, security capability, security 

controls, security functionality, and security assurance, are brought together in a model for 

trustworthiness for information systems and system components. Figure 3 illustrates the key 

components in the model and the relationship among the components.

FIGURE 3: TRUSTWORTHINESS MODEL

Facilitates risk response to a variety of threats, including 

hostile cyber attacks, natural disasters, structural failures, 

and human errors, both intentional and unintentional.

TRUSTWORTHINESS

(Systems and Components)

Security Capability

Mutually Reinforcing Security Controls

(Technical, Physical, Procedural Means)

Security Requirements

Derived from Mission/Business Needs, Laws, E.O., 

Policies, Directives, Instructions, Standards

Security Functionality

Features, Functions, Services, 

Mechanisms, Processes, Procedures 

(Functionality-Related Controls)

Enables

Satisfies

Produces

Generates

Provides 

Confidence 

In

Promotes Traceability from 

Requirements to Capability to 

Functionality with Degree of 

Assurance

Security Evidence

Development Artifacts, Flaw Reports, 

Assessment Results, Scan Results, 

Integrity Checks, Configuration Settings

Security Assurance

Developmental/Operational Actions 

(Assurance-Related Controls)

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Developmental and Operational Activities to Achieve High Assurance

Raising the bar on assurance can be difficult and costly for organizations—but sometimes 

essential for critical applications, missions, or business functions. Determining what parts of the 

organization’s information technology infrastructure demand higher assurance of implemented 

security functionality is a Tier 1/Tier 2 risk management activity (see Figure 1 in Chapter Two). 

This type of activity occurs when organizations determine the security requirements necessary to 

protect organizational operations (i.e., mission, functions, image, and reputation), organizational 

assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. Determining security requirements and 

the associated security capabilities needed to generate the appropriate protection is an integral 

part of the organizational risk management process described in NIST Special Publication 800-

39—specifically, in the development of the risk response strategy following the risk framing and 

risk assessment steps (where organizations establish priorities, assumptions, constraints, risk 

tolerance and assess threats, vulnerabilities, mission/business impacts, and likelihood of threat 

occurrence). After the security requirements and security capabilities are determined at Tiers 1 

and 2 (including the necessary assurance requirements to provide measures of confidence in the 

desired capabilities), those requirements/capabilities are reflected in the design of the enterprise 

architecture, the associated mission/business processes, and the organizational information 

systems that are needed to support those processes. Organizations can use the Risk Management 

Framework (RMF), described in NIST Special Publication 800-37, to ensure that the appropriate 

assurance levels are achieved for the information systems and system components deployed to 

carry out core missions and business functions. This is primarily a Tier 3 activity but can have 

some overlap with Tiers 1 and 2, for example, in the area of common control selection.

Trustworthy information systems are difficult to build from a software and systems development 

perspective. However, there are a number of design, architectural, and implementation principles 

that, if used, can result in more trustworthy systems. These core security principles include, for 

example, simplicity, modularity, layering, domain isolation, least privilege, least functionality, 

and resource isolation/encapsulation. Information technology products and systems exhibiting a 

higher degree of trustworthiness (i.e., products/systems having the requisite security functionality 

and security assurance) are expected to exhibit a lower rate of latent design/implementation flaws 

and a higher degree of penetration resistance against a range of threats including, for example,

sophisticated cyber attacks, natural disasters, accidents, and intentional/unintentional errors.55 The 

vulnerability and susceptibility of organizational missions/business functions and supporting 

information systems to known threats, the environments of operation where those systems are 

deployed, and the maximum acceptable level of information security risk, guide the degree of 

trustworthiness needed.

Appendix E describes the minimum assurance requirements for federal information systems and 

organizations and highlights the assurance-related controls in the security control baselines in 

Appendix D needed to ensure that the requirements are satisfied.56

55 Organizations also rely to a great extent on security assurance from an operational perspective as illustrated by the 

assurance-related controls in Tables E-1 through E-3. Operational assurance is obtained by other than developmental 

actions including for example, defining and applying security configuration settings on information technology 

products, establishing policies and procedures, assessing security controls, and conducting a rigorous continuous 

monitoring program. In some situations, to achieve the necessary security capability with weak or deficient information 

technology, organizations compensate by increasing their operational assurance.

56 CNSS Instruction 1253 designates security control baselines for national security systems. Therefore, the assurancerelated controls in the baselines established for the national security community, if so designated, may differ from those 

controls designated for non-national security systems.

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2.7 REVISIONS AND EXTENSIONS

The security controls listed in this publication represent the state-of-the-practice safeguards and 

countermeasures for federal information systems and organizations. The security controls57 will 

be carefully reviewed and revised periodically to reflect:

• Experience gained from using the controls;

• New federal legislation, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, or policies;

• Changing security requirements;

• Emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and attack methods; and

• Availability of new technologies.

The security controls in the security control catalog are expected to change over time, as controls 

are withdrawn, revised, and added. The security controls defined in the low, moderate, and high 

baselines are also expected to change over time as the level of security and due diligence for 

mitigating risks within organizations changes. In addition to the need for change, the need for 

stability is addressed by requiring that proposed modifications to security controls go through a 

57 The privacy controls listed in Appendix J will also be updated on a regular basis using similar criteria.

Why Assurance Matters

The importance of security assurance can be described by using the example of a light switch on a 

wall in the living room of your house. Individuals can observe that by simply turning the switch on and 

off, the switch appears to be performing according to its functional specification. This is analogous to 

conducting black-box testing of security functionality in an information system or system component. 

However, the more important questions might be—

• Does the light switch do anything else besides what it is supposed to do?

• What does the light switch look like from behind the wall?

• What types of components were used to construct the light switch and how was the switch 

assembled?

• Did the switch manufacturer follow industry best practices in the development process?

This example is analogous to the many developmental activities that address the quality of the 

security functionality in an information system or system component including, for example, design 

principles, coding techniques, code analysis, testing, and evaluation.

The security assurance requirements and associated assurance-related controls in Appendix E 

address the light switch problem from the front of the wall perspective, and potentially from the 

behind the wall perspective, depending on the measure of confidence needed about the component 

in question. For organizational missions/business functions that are less critical (i.e., low impact), 

lower levels of assurance might be appropriate. However, as missions/business functions become 

more important (i.e., moderate or high impact) and information systems and organizations become 

susceptible to advanced persistent threats by high-end adversaries, increased levels of assurance 

may be required. In addition, as organizations become more dependent on external information 

system services and providers, assurance becomes more important—providing greater insight and 

measures of confidence to organizations in understanding and verifying the security capability of 

external providers and the services provided to the federal government. Thus, when the potential 

impact to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation is 

great, an increasing level of effort must be directed at what is happening behind the wall.

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rigorous public review process to obtain both public and private sector feedback and to build 

consensus for such change. This provides over time, a stable, flexible, and technically sound set 

of security controls for the federal government, contractors, and any other organizations using the 

security control catalog.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE PROCESS

SELECTION AND SPECIFICATION OF SECURITY CONTROLS

his chapter describes the process of selecting and specifying security controls and control 

enhancements for organizational information systems to include: (i) selecting appropriate 

security control baselines; (ii) tailoring the baselines; (iii) documenting the security control 

selection process; and (iv) applying the control selection process to new development and legacy 

systems.

3.1 SELECTING SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES

In preparation for selecting and specifying the appropriate security controls for organizational 

information systems and their respective environments of operation, organizations first determine 

the criticality and sensitivity of the information to be processed, stored, or transmitted by those 

systems. This process, known as security categorization, is described in FIPS Publication 199.

58

The security categorization standard is based on a simple and well-established concept—that is, 

determining the potential adverse impact for organizational information systems. The results of 

security categorization help guide and inform the selection of appropriate security controls (i.e., 

safeguards and countermeasures) to adequately protect those information systems. The security 

controls selected for information systems are commensurate with the potential adverse impact on 

organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation if there is a 

loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. FIPS Publication 199 requires organizations to 

categorize information systems as low-impact, moderate-impact, or high-impact for the stated 

security objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (RMF Step 1). The potential 

impact values assigned to the security objectives are the highest values (i.e., high water mark) 

from the security categories that have been determined for each type of information processed, 

stored, or transmitted by those information systems.59 The generalized format for expressing the 

security category (SC) of an information system is:

SC information system = {(confidentiality, impact), (integrity, impact), (availability, impact)},

where the acceptable values for potential impact are low, moderate, or high.

Since the potential impact values for confidentiality, integrity, and availability may not always be 

the same for a particular information system, the high water mark concept (introduced in FIPS 

Publication 199) is used in FIPS Publication 200 to determine the impact level of the information 

system for the express purpose of selecting the applicable security control baseline from one of 

the three baselines identified in Appendix D.

60 Thus, a low-impact system is defined as an 

information system in which all three of the security objectives are low. A moderate-impact

system is an information system in which at least one of the security objectives is moderate and 

58 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides security categorization guidance for national security systems.

59 NIST Special Publication 800-60, Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security 

Categories, provides guidance on the assignment of security categories to information systems.

60 The high water mark concept is employed because there are significant dependencies among the security objectives 

of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In most cases, a compromise in one security objective ultimately affects 

the other security objectives as well. Accordingly, security controls are not categorized by security objective. Rather, 

the security controls are grouped into baselines to provide a general protection capability for classes of information 

systems based on impact level.

T

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no security objective is greater than moderate. Finally, a high-impact system is an information 

system in which at least one security objective is high.

Once the impact level of the information system is determined, organizations begin the security 

control selection process (RMF Step 2). The first step in selecting and specifying security controls 

for the information system is to choose the appropriate security control baseline.61 The selection 

of the security control baseline is based on the FIPS 200 impact level of the information system 

as determined by the security categorization process described above. The organization selects 

one of three security control baselines from Appendix D corresponding to the low-impact, 

moderate-impact, or high-impact rating of the information system.62 Note that not all security 

controls are assigned to baselines, as indicated in Table D-2 by the phrase not selected. Similarly, 

as illustrated in Tables D-3 through D-19, not all control enhancements are assigned to baselines.

Those control enhancements that are assigned to baselines are so indicated by an “x” in the low, 

moderate, or high columns. The use of the term baseline is intentional. The security controls and 

control enhancements in the baselines are a starting point from which controls/enhancements may 

be removed, added, or specialized based on the tailoring guidance in Section 3.2.

The security control baselines in Appendix D address the security needs of a broad and diverse 

set of constituencies (including individual users and organizations). Some assumptions that 

generally underlie the baselines in Appendix D include, for example: (i) the environments in 

which organizational information systems operate; (ii) the nature of operations conducted by 

organizations; (iii) the functionality employed within information systems; (iv) the types of 

threats facing organizations, missions/business processes, and information systems; and (v) the 

type of information processed, stored, or transmitted by information systems. Articulating the 

underlying assumptions is a key element in the initial risk framing step of the risk management

process described in NIST Special Publication 800-39. Some of the assumptions that underlie the 

baselines in Appendix D include:

61 The general security control selection process may be augmented or further detailed by additional sector-specific 

guidance as described in Section 3.3, Creating Overlays, and Appendix I, template for developing overlays.

62 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides security control baselines for national security systems.

Implementation Tip

To determine the impact level of an information system:

• First, determine the different types of information that are processed, stored, or transmitted by the 

information system. NIST Special Publication 800-60 provides common information types.

• Second, using the impact values in FIPS Publication 199 and the recommendations of NIST 

Special Publication 800-60, categorize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of each 

information type. 

• Third, determine the information system security categorization, that is, the highest impact value

for each security objective (confidentiality, integrity, availability) from among the categorizations 

for the information types associated with the information system.

• Fourth, determine the overall impact level of the information system from the highest impact value

among the three security objectives in the system security categorization.

Note: For national security systems, organizations use CNSSI 1253 for security categorization.

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• Information systems are located in physical facilities;

• User data/information in organizational information systems is relatively persistent;63

• Information systems are multi-user (either serially or concurrently) in operation;

• Some user data/information in organizational information systems is not shareable with other 

users who have authorized access to the same systems;

• Information systems exist in networked environments;

• Information systems are general purpose in nature; and

• Organizations have the necessary structure, resources, and infrastructure to implement the 

controls.

64

If one or more of these assumptions is not valid, then some of the security controls assigned to the 

initial baselines in Appendix D may not be applicable—a situation that can be readily addressed 

by applying the tailoring guidance in Section 3.2 and the results of organizational assessments of 

risk. Conversely, there are also some possible situations that are specifically not addressed in the 

baselines. These include:

• Insider threats exist within organizations;

• Classified data/information is processed, stored, or transmitted by information systems;

• Advanced persistent threats (APTs) exist within organizations;

• Selected data/information requires specialized protection based on federal legislation, 

directives, regulations, or policies; and

• Information systems need to communicate with other systems across different security 

domains.

If any of the above assumptions apply, then additional security controls from Appendix F would 

likely be needed to ensure adequate protection—a situation that can also be effectively addressed 

by applying the tailoring guidance in Section 3.2 (specifically, security control supplementation)

and the results of organizational assessments of risk.

3.2 TAILORING BASELINE SECURITY CONTROLS

After selecting the applicable security control baseline from Appendix D, organizations initiate 

the tailoring process to modify appropriately and align the controls more closely with the specific 

conditions within the organization (i.e., conditions related to organizational missions/business 

functions, information systems, or environments of operation). The tailoring process includes:

• Identifying and designating common controls in initial security control baselines;

• Applying scoping considerations to the remaining baseline security controls;

• Selecting compensating security controls, if needed;

63 Persistent data/information refers to data/information with utility for a relatively long duration (e.g., days, weeks).

64 In general, federal departments and agencies will satisfy this assumption. The assumption becomes more of an issue 

for nonfederal entities such as municipalities, first responders, and small (business) contractors. Such entities may not 

be large enough or sufficiently resourced to have elements dedicated to providing the range of security capabilities that 

are assumed by the baselines. Organizations consider such factors in their risk-based decisions.

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• Assigning specific values to organization-defined security control parameters via explicit 

assignment and selection statements;

• Supplementing baselines with additional security controls and control enhancements, if 

needed; and

• Providing additional specification information for control implementation, if needed.

The tailoring process, as an integral part of security control selection and specification, is part of a

comprehensive organizational risk management process—framing, assessing, responding to, and 

monitoring information security risk. Organizations use risk management guidance to facilitate 

risk-based decision making regarding the applicability of security controls in the security control 

baselines. Ultimately, organizations use the tailoring process to achieve cost-effective, risk-based 

security that supports organizational mission/business needs. Tailoring activities are approved by 

authorizing officials in coordination with selected organizational officials (e.g., risk executive 

[function], chief information officers, senior information security officers, information system 

owners, common control providers) prior to implementing the security controls. Organizations 

have the flexibility to perform the tailoring process at the organization level for all information 

systems (either as a required tailored baseline or as the starting point for system-specific tailoring

activities), in support of a particular line of business or mission/business process, at the individual 

information system level, or by using a combination of the above.

65 

Conversely, organizations do not remove security controls for operational convenience. Tailoring

decisions regarding security controls should be defensible based on mission/business needs and 

accompanied by explicit risk-based determinations.

66 Tailoring decisions, including the specific 

rationale for those decisions, are documented in the security plans for organizational information 

systems. Every security control from the applicable security control baseline is accounted for 

either by the organization (e.g., common control provider) or by the information system owner. If 

certain security controls are tailored out, then the associated rationale is recorded in security plans 

(or references/pointers to other relevant documentation are provided) for the information systems

and approved by the responsible organizational officials as part of the security plan approval 

process.67 

Documenting significant risk management decisions in the security control selection process is 

imperative in order for authorizing officials to have the necessary information to make credible, 

risk-based decisions with regard to the authorization of information systems. Since information 

systems, environments of operation, and personnel associated with the system development life

cycle are subject to change, providing the assumptions, constraints, and rationale supporting those 

important risk decisions allows for a better understanding in the future of the security state of the 

information systems or environments of operation at the time the original risk decisions were 

made and facilitates identifying changes, when previous risk decisions are revisited.

65 See also Section 3.3, Creating Overlays, and Appendix I, template for developing overlays.

66 Tailoring decisions can also be based on timing and applicability of selected security controls under certain defined 

conditions. That is, security controls may not apply in every situation or the parameter values for assignment statements 

may change under certain circumstances. Overlays can define these special situations, conditions, or timing-related 

considerations.

67 The level of detail required in documenting tailoring decisions in the security control selection process is at the 

discretion of organizations and reflects the impact levels of the respective information systems implementing or 

inheriting the controls.

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Identifying and Designating Common Controls

Common controls are controls that may be inherited by one or more organizational information 

systems. If an information system inherits a common control, then that system does not need to 

explicitly implement that control—that is, the security capability is being provided by another 

entity. Therefore, when the security controls in Appendix F call for an information system to 

implement or perform a particular security function, it should not be interpreted to mean that all 

systems that are part of larger, more complex systems or all components of a particular system 

need to implement the control or function. Organizational decisions on which security controls 

are designated as common controls may greatly affect the responsibilities of individual system 

owners with regard to the implementation of controls in a particular baseline. Common control 

selection can also affect the overall resource expenditures by organizations (i.e., the greater the 

number of common controls implemented, the greater potential cost savings).

Applying Scoping Considerations

Scoping considerations, when applied in conjunction with risk management guidance, provide 

organizations with a more granular foundation with which to make risk-based decisions.68 The 

application of scoping considerations can eliminate unnecessary security controls from the initial 

security control baselines and help to ensure that organizations select only those controls that are 

needed to provide the appropriate level of protection for organizational information systems—

protection based on the missions and business functions being supported by those systems and the 

environments in which the systems operate. Organizations may apply the scoping considerations 

described below to assist with making risk-based decisions regarding security control selection 

and specification—decisions that can potentially affect how the baseline security controls are 

applied and implemented by organizations:

• CONTROL ALLOCATION AND PLACEMENT CONSIDERATIONS—

The term information system can refer to systems at multiple levels of abstraction ranging 

from system-of-systems to individual single-user systems. The growing complexity of many

information systems requires careful analysis in the allocation/placement of security controls 

within the three tiers in the risk management hierarchy (organization level, mission/business 

process level, and information system level) without imposing any specific architectural 

views or solutions.69 Security controls in the initial baselines represent an information 

system-wide set of controls that may not be applicable to every component in the system. 

Security controls are applicable only to information system components that provide or 

support the information security capability addressed by the controls.70 Organizations make 

explicit risk-based decisions about where to apply or allocate specific security controls in 

organizational information systems in order to achieve the needed security capability and to 

satisfy security requirements.71 An example of this type of allocation is applying the 

68 The scoping considerations listed in this section are exemplary and not intended to limit organizations in rendering 

risk-based decisions based on other organization-defined considerations with appropriate rationale.

69 This is especially true with the advent of service-oriented architectures where specific services are provided to 

implement a single function.

70 For example, auditing controls are typically applied to components of an information system that provide auditing 

capability (e.g., servers, etc.) and are not necessarily applied to every user-level workstation within the organization. 

Organizations should carefully assess the inventory of components that compose their information systems to 

determine which security controls are applicable to the various components.

71 As information technology advances, more powerful and diverse functionality can be found in smart phones, tablets, 

and other types of mobile devices. While tailor guidance may support not allocating a particular security control to a 

specific technology or device, any residual risk associated with the absence of that control must be addressed in risk 

assessments to adequately protect organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

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requirement from AC-18(1) (i.e., protecting wireless access to information systems using 

authentication/encryption) to all wireless access except for wireless access to visitor 

subnetworks which are not connected to other system components.

• OPERATIONAL/ENVIRONMENTAL-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS—

Several of the security controls in the baselines are based on the assumption of the existence 

of certain operational/environmental factors. Where these factors are absent or significantly 

diverge from the baseline assumptions, it is justifiable to tailor the baseline. Some of the more 

common operational/environmental factors include:

- Mobility

The mobility of physical hosting environments can impact the security controls selected 

for organizational information systems. As noted above, the set of security controls 

assigned to each baseline in Appendix D assumes the operation of information systems in 

fixed facilities and nonmobile locations. If those information systems operate primarily in

mobile environments, the security control baseline should be tailored appropriately to 

account for the differences in mobility and accessibility of the specific locations where 

the systems reside. For example, many of the security controls in the Physical and 

Environmental Protection (PE) family that are selected in all three baselines reflect the 

assumption that the information systems reside in physical facilities/complexes that 

require appropriate physical protections. Such controls would likely not provide added 

value for mobile environments such as ships, aircraft, automobiles, vans, or space-based 

systems.72

- Single-User Systems and Operations

For information systems that are designed to operate as single-user systems (e.g., smart 

phones), several of the security controls that address sharing among users may not be 

needed. A single-user system or device refers to a system/device that is only intended to 

be used by a single individual over time (i.e., exclusive use). Systems or devices that are 

shared by multiple users over time are not considered single-user. Security controls such 

as AC-10, Concurrent Session Control, SC-4, Information in Shared Resources, and AC3, Access Enforcement73 may not be required in single-user systems/operations and could 

reasonably be tailored out of the baseline at the discretion of organizations.

- Data Connectivity and Bandwidth

While many information systems are interconnected, there are some systems which for 

security or operational reasons, lack networking capabilities—that is, the systems are air 

gapped from the network. For nonnetworked systems, security controls such as AC-17, 

Remote Access, SC-8, Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity, and SC-7, Boundary 

Protection, are not applicable and may be tailored out of the security control baselines at 

the discretion of organizations. In addition to nonnetworked information systems, there 

are systems that have very limited or sporadic bandwidth (e.g., tactical systems that 

support warfighter or law enforcement missions). For such systems, the application of 

security controls would need to be examined carefully as the limited and/or sporadic 

bandwidth could impact the practicality of implementing those controls and the viability 

of adversaries staging cyber attacks over the limited bandwidth.

72 The mobile nature of devices means that it is possible that, for some period of time, the devices may reside in fixed 

facilities or complexes in fixed locations. During that time, the PE controls would likely apply.

73 Organizations consider whether individual users have administrator privileges before removing AC-3 from security 

control baselines.

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- Limited Functionality Systems or System Components

What constitutes an information system under the E-Government Act of 2002 is quite 

broad. Fax machines, printers, scanners, pagers, smart phones, tablets, E-readers, and 

digital cameras can all be categorized as information systems (or system components). 

These types of systems and components may lack the general processing capabilities 

assumed in the security control baselines. The nature of these constraints may limit the 

types of threats that these systems face, and hence the appropriateness of some of the 

security controls. Thus, a control such as SI-3, Malicious Code Protection (required in all 

control baselines) may not be practical for information systems or components that are

not capable of executing code (e.g., text-only pagers). However, because there is often no 

clear delineation between these types of information systems or components (e.g., smart

phones combine the digital capabilities of telephones, cameras, and computers), it is 

important that the application of security controls to limited functionality systems or 

components be done judiciously and always take into account the intended use of the 

systems, system capabilities, and the risk of compromise.

- Information and System Non-Persistence

There is often an assumption that user information within organizational information 

systems is persistent for a considerable period of time. However, for some applications 

and environments of operation (e.g., tactical systems, industrial control systems), the 

persistence of user information is often very limited in duration. For information systems 

processing, storing, or transmitting such non-persistent information, several security 

controls in the Contingency Planning (CP) family such as CP-6, Alternate Storage Site, 

CP-7, Alternate Processing Site, and CP-9, Information System Backup, may not be 

practical and can be tailored out at the discretion of organizations. For similar reasons, 

controls such as MP-6, Media Sanitization, and SC-28, Protection of Information at Rest,

are good candidates for removal through tailoring.

74 In addition to the non-persistence of 

information, the information systems/services may be non-persistent as well. This can be 

achieved by the use of virtualization techniques to establish non-persistent instantiations 

of operating systems and applications. Depending on the duration of the instantiations, 

some baseline controls might not be applicable.

- Public Access

When public access to organizational information systems is allowed, security controls 

should be applied with discretion since some security controls from the specified control 

baselines (e.g., identification and authentication, personnel security controls) may not be 

applicable for public access. Thus, in the case of the general public accessing federal 

government websites (e.g., to download publically accessible information such as forms, 

emergency preparedness information), security controls such as AC-7, Unsuccessful 

Logon Attempts, AC-17, Remote Access, IA-2, Identification and Authentication, IA-4, 

Identifier Management, and IA-5, Authenticator Management, typically would not be 

relevant for validating access authorizations or privileges. However, many of these 

controls would still be needed for identifying and authenticating organizational personnel 

that maintain and support information systems providing such public access websites and 

services. Similarly, many of the security controls may still be required for users accessing 

nonpublic information systems through such public interfaces, for example, to access or 

change personal information.

74 Organizations balance information persistence with the sensitivity of the information. Non-persistent information 

may still require sanitization after deletion. In addition, organizations consider the duration of information sensitivity—

some information may be persistent, but only be sensitive for a limited time.

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• SECURITY OBJECTIVE-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS—

Security controls that support only one or two of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability 

security objectives may be downgraded to the corresponding control in a lower baseline (or 

modified or eliminated if not defined in a lower baseline) only if the downgrading action: (i) 

reflects the FIPS Publication 199 security category for the supported security objective(s)

before moving to the FIPS Publication 200 impact level (i.e., high water mark);

75 (ii) is 

supported by an organizational assessment of risk; and (iii) does not adversely affect the level 

of protection for the security-relevant information within the information system.

76 For 

example, if an information system is categorized as moderate impact using the high water 

mark concept because confidentiality and/or integrity are moderate but availability is low, 

there are several controls that only support the availability security objective and that 

potentially could be downgraded to low baseline requirements—that is, it may be appropriate 

not to implement CP-2(1) because the control enhancement supports only availability and is 

selected in the moderate baseline but not in the low baseline. The following security controls 

and control enhancements are potential candidates for downgrading:77

- Confidentiality: AC-21, MA-3(3), MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-5(4), MP-6(1), MP-6(2), PE4, PE-5, SC-4, SC-8, SC-8(1);

- Integrity: CM-5, CM-5(1), CM-5(3), SC-8, SC-8(1), SI-7, SI-7(1), SI-7(5), SI-10; and

- Availability: CP-2(1), CP-2(2), CP-2(3), CP-2(4), CP-2(5), CP-2(8), CP-3(1), CP-4(1), 

CP-4(2), CP-6, CP-6(1), CP-6(2), CP-6(3), CP-7, CP-7(1), CP-7(2), CP-7(3), CP-7(4), 

CP-8, CP-8(1), CP-8(2), CP-8(3), CP-8(4), CP-9(1), CP-9(2), CP-9(3), CP-9(5), CP10(2), CP-10(4), MA-6, PE-9, PE-10, PE-11, PE-11(1), PE-13(1), PE-13(2), PE-13(3), 

PE-15(1).

• TECHNOLOGY-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS—

Security controls that refer to specific technologies (e.g., wireless, cryptography, public key 

infrastructure) are applicable only if those technologies are employed or are required to be 

employed within organizational information systems. Security controls that can be explicitly 

or implicitly supported by automated mechanisms do not require the development of such 

mechanisms if the mechanisms do not already exist or are not readily available in commercial 

or government off-the-shelf products. If automated mechanisms are not readily available, 

75 When applying the high water mark in Section 3.1, some of the original FIPS Publication 199 confidentiality, 

integrity, or availability security objectives may have been upgraded to a higher security control baseline. As part of 

this process, security controls that uniquely support the confidentiality, integrity, or availability security objectives may

have been upgraded unnecessarily. Consequently, it is recommended that organizations consider appropriate and 

allowable downgrading actions to ensure cost-effective, risk-based application of security controls.

76 Information that is security-relevant at the information system level (e.g., password files, network routing tables, 

cryptographic key management information) is distinguished from user-level information within the same system. 

Certain security controls are used to support the security objectives of confidentiality and integrity for both user-level 

and system-level information. Caution should be exercised in downgrading confidentiality or integrity-related security 

controls to ensure that downgrading actions do not result in insufficient protection for the security-relevant information 

within the information system. Security-relevant information must be protected at the high water mark in order to 

achieve a similar level of protection for any of the security objectives related to user-level information.

77 Downgrading actions apply only to the moderate and high baselines. Security controls that are uniquely attributable 

to confidentiality, integrity, or availability that would ordinarily be considered as potential candidates for downgrading 

(e.g., AC-16, AU-10, IA-7, PE-12, PE-14, SC-5, SC-13, SC-16) are eliminated from consideration because the controls 

are either selected for use in all baselines and have no enhancements that could be downgraded, or the controls are 

optional and not selected for use in any baseline. Organizations should exercise caution when downgrading security 

controls that do not appear in the list in Section 3.2 to ensure that downgrading actions do not affect security objectives 

other than the objectives targeted for downgrading.

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cost-effective, or technically feasible, compensating security controls, implemented through 

nonautomated mechanisms or procedures, are used to satisfy specified security controls or 

control enhancements (see terms and conditions for applying compensating controls below).

• MISSION REQUIREMENTS-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS—

Some security controls may not be applicable (or appropriate) if implementing those controls 

has the potential to degrade, debilitate, or otherwise hamper critical organizational missions 

and/or business functions. For example, if the mission requires that an uninterrupted display 

of mission-critical information be available at an operator console (e.g., air traffic controller 

console), the implementation of AC-11, Session Lock, or SC-10, Network Disconnect, may 

not be appropriate.

Selecting Compensating Security Controls

Organizations may find it necessary on occasion to employ compensating security controls. 

Compensating controls are alternative security controls employed by organizations in lieu of 

specific controls in the low, moderate, or high baselines described in Appendix D—controls that 

provide equivalent or comparable protection for organizational information systems and the 

information processed, stored, or transmitted by those systems.

78 This may occur, for example, 

when organizations are unable to effectively implement specific security controls in the baselines

or when, due to the specific nature of the information systems or environments of operation, the 

controls in the baselines are not a cost-effective means of obtaining the needed risk mitigation.

Compensating controls are typically selected after applying the scoping considerations in the 

tailoring guidance to the applicable security control baseline. Compensating controls may be 

employed by organizations under the following conditions:

• Organizations select compensating controls from Appendix F; if appropriate compensating 

controls are not available, organizations adopt suitable compensating controls from other

sources;

79

• Organizations provide supporting rationale for how compensating controls provide equivalent 

security capabilities for organizational information systems and why the baseline security 

controls could not be employed; and

• Organizations assess and accept the risk associated with implementing compensating controls

in organizational information systems.

Assigning Security Control Parameter Values

Security controls and control enhancements containing embedded parameters (i.e., assignment 

and selection statements) give organizations the flexibility to define certain portions of controls 

and enhancements to support specific organizational requirements. After the initial application of 

scoping considerations and the selection of compensating controls, organizations review the 

security controls and control enhancements for assignment/selection statements and determine 

appropriate organization-defined values for the identified parameters. Parameter values may be 

prescribed by applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, or 

standards. Once organizations define the parameter values for security controls and control 

78 More than one compensating control may be required to provide the equivalent protection for a particular security 

control in Appendix F. For example, organizations with significant staff limitations may compensate for the separation 

of duty security control by strengthening the audit, accountability, and personnel security controls.

79 Organizations should make every attempt to select compensating controls from the security control catalog in 

Appendix F. Organization-defined compensating controls are employed only when organizations determine that the 

security control catalog does not contain suitable compensating controls.

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enhancements, the assignments and selections become a part of the control and enhancement.80

Organizations may choose to specify the values for security control parameters before selecting 

compensating controls since the specification of the parameters completes the control definitions

and may affect compensating control requirements. There can also be significant benefits in 

collaborating on the development of parameter values. For organizations that work together on a 

frequent basis, it may be useful for those organizations to develop a mutually agreeable set of 

uniform values for security control parameters. Doing so may assist organizations in achieving a 

greater degree of reciprocity when depending upon the information systems and/or services 

offered by other organizations.

Supplementing Security Control Baselines

The final determination of the appropriate set of security controls necessary to provide adequate 

security for organizational information systems and the environments in which those systems 

operate is a function of the assessment of risk and what is required to sufficiently mitigate the 

risks to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

81

In many cases, additional security controls or control enhancements (beyond those controls and 

enhancements contained in the baselines in Appendix D) will be required to address specific

threats to and vulnerabilities in organizations, mission/business processes, and/or information 

systems and to satisfy the requirements of applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, 

policies, standards, or regulations.82 The risk assessment in the security control selection process 

provides essential information in determining the necessity and sufficiency of the security 

controls and control enhancements in the initial baselines. Organizations are encouraged to make 

maximum use of Appendix F to facilitate the process of supplementing the initial baselines with 

additional security controls and/or control enhancements.

83

Situations Requiring Potential Baseline Supplementation

Organizations may be subject to conditions that, from an operational, environmental, or threat 

perspective, warrant the selection and implementation of additional (supplemental) controls to 

achieve adequate protection of organizational missions/business functions and the information 

systems supporting those missions/functions. Examples of conditions and additional controls that 

might be required are provided below.

• ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREAT

Security control baselines do not assume that the current threat environment is one where

adversaries have achieved a significant foothold and presence within organizations and

organizational information systems—that is, organizations are dealing with an advanced 

persistent threat (APT). Adversaries continue to attack organizational information systems 

and the information technology infrastructure and are successful in some aspects of such 

attacks. To more fully address the advanced persistent threat, concepts such as insider threat 

80 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides assignment of minimum values for organization-defined variables applicable to 

national security systems. Parameter values can also be defined as part of overlays described in Section 3.4.

81 Considerations for potential national-level impacts and impacts to other organizations in categorizing organizational 

information systems derive from the USA PATRIOT Act and Homeland Security Presidential Directives.

82 In previous versions of Special Publication 800-53, tailoring referred only to the removal of security controls from 

baselines and supplementation referred only to the addition of controls to baselines. In this document, the term tailoring 

has been redefined to include both the addition of security controls to baselines (i.e., tailoring up) and the removal of 

controls from baselines (i.e., tailoring down).

83 Security controls and control enhancements selected to supplement baselines are allocated to appropriate information 

system components in the same manner as the control allocations carried out by organizations in the initial baselines.

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protection (CM-5(4)), heterogeneity (SC-29), deception (SC-26 and SC-30), non-persistence 

(SC-25 and SC-34), and segmentation (SC-7(13)) can be considered.

• CROSS-DOMAIN SERVICES

Security control baselines do not assume that information systems have to operate across 

multiple security domains. The baselines assume a flat view of information flows (i.e., the 

same security policies in different domains when information moves across authorization 

boundaries). To address cross-domain services and transactions, some subset of the AC-4 

security control enhancements can be considered to ensure adequate protection of information 

when transferred between information systems with different security policies. 

• MOBILITY

The use of mobile devices might result in the need for additional security controls and control 

enhancements not selected in the initial baselines. For example, AC-7(2), which requires the 

purging/wiping of information after an organization-defined number of unsuccessful logon 

attempts, or MP-6 (8), which requires the capability for remote purging/wiping, could be 

selected in order to address the threat of theft or loss of mobile devices.

• CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

In some environments, classified and sensitive information84 may be resident on national 

security systems without all users having the necessary authorizations to access all of the 

information. In those situations, additional security controls are required to ensure that 

information requiring strict separation is not accessed by unauthorized users. More stringent 

access controls include, for example, AC-3(3) and AC-16. When classified information is 

being processed, stored, or transmitted on information systems that are jointly owned by 

multiple entities (e.g., coalition partners in military alliances), more restrictive controls for 

maintenance personnel may be required including, for example, MA-5(4).

Processes for Identifying Additional Needed Security Controls

Organizations can employ a requirements definition approach or a gap analysis approach in 

selecting security controls and control enhancements to supplement initial baselines. In the 

requirements definition approach, organizations obtain specific and credible threat85 information 

(or make reasonable assumptions) about the activities of adversaries with certain capabilities or 

attack potential (e.g., skill levels, expertise, available resources). To effectively withstand cyber 

attacks from adversaries with the stated capabilities or attack potential, organizations strive to 

achieve a certain level of defensive capability or cyber preparedness. Organizations can select

additional security controls and control enhancements from Appendix F to obtain such defensive 

capability or level of preparedness. In contrast to the requirements definition approach, the gap 

analysis approach begins with an organizational assessment of its current defensive capability or 

level of cyber preparedness. From that initial capability assessment, organizations determine the 

types of threats they can reasonably expect to counter. If the current organizational defensive 

capabilities or levels of cyber preparedness are insufficient, the gap analysis determines the 

required capabilities and levels of preparedness. Organizations subsequently define the security 

controls and control enhancements from Appendix F needed to achieve the desired capabilities or 

cyber-preparedness levels. Both of the approaches described above require timely and accurate 

84 The example is illustrative only. CNSS Instruction 1253 provides specific guidance regarding security controls 

required for national security systems. 

85 While this example focuses on threats to information systems from purposeful attacks, the threat space of concern to 

organizations also includes environmental disruptions and human errors. 

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threat information. It is essential that organizations work with the appropriate threat identification 

component to obtain such information.

During the tailoring process, organizations consider reevaluating the priority codes from the 

security control baselines to determine if any changes to those priorities are appropriate. This is 

especially important when adding security controls that are not included in any of the baselines, 

because those controls have priority codes of P0. The reevaluation of priority codes can be based 

on organizational assessments of risk or design/developmental decisions related to the security 

architecture or the systems and security engineering process that may require certain sequencing 

in security control implementation.

Enhancing Information Security without Changing Control Selection

There may be situations in which organizations cannot apply sufficient security controls within

their information systems to adequately reduce or mitigate risk (e.g., when using certain types of 

information technologies or employing certain computing paradigms). Therefore, alternative 

strategies are needed to prevent organizational missions/business functions from being adversely 

affected— strategies that consider the mission and business risks resulting from an aggressive use 

of information technology. Restrictions on the types of technologies used and how organizational 

information systems are employed provide an alternative method to reduce or mitigate risk that 

may be used in conjunction with, or instead of, supplemental security controls. Restrictions on the 

use of information systems and specific information technologies may be, in some situations, the 

only practical or reasonable actions organizations can take in order to have the capability to carry 

out assigned missions/business functions in the face of determined adversaries. Examples of use 

restrictions include:

• Limiting the information that information systems can process, store, or transmit or the 

manner in which organizational missions/business functions are automated;

• Prohibiting external access to organizational information by removing selected information 

system components from networks (i.e., air gapping); and

• Prohibiting moderate- or high-impact information on organizational information system 

components to which the public has access, unless an explicit risk determination is made 

authorizing such access.

Providing Additional Specification Information for Control Implementation

Since security controls are statements of security capability at higher levels of abstraction, the 

controls may lack sufficient information for successful implementation. Therefore, additional 

detail may be necessary to fully define the intent of a given security control for implementation 

purposes and to ensure that the security requirements related to that control are satisfied. For 

example, additional information may be provided as part of the process of moving from control to 

specification requirement, and may involve refinement of implementation details, refinement of 

scope, or iteration to apply the same control differently to different scopes. Organizations ensure 

that if existing security control information (e.g., selection and assignment statements) is not 

sufficient to fully define the intended application of the control, such information is provided. 

Organizations have the flexibility to determine whether additional detail is included as a part of 

the control statement, in supplemental guidance, or in a separate control addendum section. When

providing additional detail, organizations are cautioned not to change the intent of the security 

control or modify the original language in the control. The additional implementation information 

can be documented either in security plans or systems and security engineering plans. The type of 

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additional detail that might be necessary to fully specify a security control for implementation

purposes is provided in the SI-7(6) example below:

SI-7 SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

(6) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to detect unauthorized changes to 

software, firmware, and information.

Supplemental Guidance: Cryptographic mechanisms used for the protection of integrity include, 

for example, digital signatures and the computation and application of signed hashes using 

asymmetric cryptography, protecting the confidentiality of the key used to generate the hash, 

and using the public key to verify the hash information. Related control: SC-13.

Additional implementation detail for SI-7(6):

Digital signatures are applied to all traffic for which non-repudiation is required employing 

SHA-256 or another approved NIST algorithm demonstrably of at least the same strength of 

mechanism.

3.3 CREATING OVERLAYS

The previous sections described the process of tailoring security control baselines to achieve a 

more focused and relevant security capability for organizations. In certain situations, it may be 

beneficial for organizations to apply tailoring guidance to the baselines to develop a set of 

security controls for community-wide use or to address specialized requirements, technologies, or 

unique missions/environments of operation.86 For example, the federal government may decide to 

establish a governmentwide set of security controls and implementation guidance for: (i) public 

key infrastructure (PKI) systems that could be uniformly applied to all PKI systems implemented 

within federal agencies; (ii) cloud-based information systems that are uniformly applied to all 

federal agencies procuring or implementing cloud services; or (iii) industrial control systems 

(ICSs) at federal facilities producing electric power or controlling environmental systems in 

federal facilities. Alternatively, to address particular communities of interest with specialized 

requirements, the Department of Defense, for example, may decide to establish a set of security 

controls and implementation guidance for its tactical operations and environments by applying 

the tailoring guidance to the standard security control baselines for national security systems to 

achieve more specialized solutions. In each of the above examples, tailored baselines can be 

developed for each information technology area or for the unique circumstances/environments 

and promulgated to large communities of interest—thus achieving standardized security 

capabilities, consistency of implementation, and cost-effective security solutions.

To address the need for developing community-wide and specialized sets of security controls for 

information systems and organizations, the concept of overlay is introduced. An overlay is a fully 

specified set of security controls, control enhancements, and supplemental guidance derived from 

the application of tailoring guidance in Section 3.2 to security control baselines in Appendix D.87

Overlays complement the initial security control baselines by: (i) providing the opportunity to add 

or eliminate controls; (ii) providing security control applicability and interpretations for specific 

information technologies, computing paradigms, environments of operation, types of information 

systems, types of missions/operations, operating modes, industry sectors, and statutory/regulatory 

requirements; (iii) establishing community-wide parameter values for assignment and/or selection 

statements in security controls and control enhancements; and (iv) extending the supplemental 

guidance for security controls, where necessary. Organizations typically use the overlay concept 

86 This type of tailoring can be conducted at the federal level or by individual organizations.

87 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides tailoring guidance and security control baselines for national security systems.

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when there is divergence from the basic assumptions used to create the initial security control 

baselines (see Section 3.1). If organizations are not divergent from the basic assumptions for the 

initial baselines, there is likely no need to create an overlay. Alternatively, the baselines may be 

missing key assumptions which would justify creating an overlay with additional assumptions.

The full range of tailoring activities can be employed by organizations to provide a disciplined 

and structured approach for developing tailored baselines supporting the areas described above. 

Overlays provide an opportunity to build consensus across communities of interest and develop 

security plans for organizational information systems that have broad-based support for very 

specific circumstances, situations, and/or conditions. Categories of overlays that may be useful 

include, for example:

• Communities of interest, industry sectors, or coalitions/partnerships (e.g., healthcare, law 

enforcement, intelligence, financial, transportation, energy, allied collaboration/sharing);

• Information technologies/computing paradigms (e.g., cloud/mobile, PKI, Smart Grid, crossdomain solutions);

• Environments of operation (e.g., space, tactical);

• Types of information systems and operating modes (e.g., industrial/process control systems, 

weapons systems, single-user systems, standalone systems);

• Types of missions/operations (e.g., counterterrorism, first responders, research, development, 

test, and evaluation); and

• Statutory/regulatory requirements (e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Health 

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Privacy Act).

Organizations can effectively use the risk management concepts defined in NIST Special 

Publication 800-39 when developing overlays. The successful development of overlays requires 

the involvement of: (i) information security professionals who understand the specific subject 

area that is the focus of the overlay development effort; and (ii) subject matter experts in the 

overlay area who understand the security controls in Appendix F and the initial baselines in 

Appendix D. The format and structure for developing overlays is provided in Appendix I.

Multiple overlays can be applied to a single security control baseline. The tailored baselines that 

result from the overlay development process may be more or less stringent than the original 

security control baselines. Risk assessments provide information necessary to determine if the 

risk from implementing the tailored baselines falls within the risk tolerance of the organizations

or communities of interest developing the overlays. If multiple overlays are employed, it is 

possible that there could be a conflict between the overlays. If the use of multiple overlays results 

in conflicts between the application or removal of security controls, the authorizing official (or 

designee), in coordination with the mission/business owner and/or information owner/steward, 

can resolve the conflict. In general, overlays are intended to reduce the need for ad hoc tailoring 

of baselines by organizations through the selection of a set of controls and control enhancements 

that more closely correspond to common circumstances, situations, and/or conditions. However, 

the use of overlays does not preclude organizations from performing further tailoring to reflect 

organization-specific needs, assumptions, or constraints. Tailoring of overlays is accomplished 

within the constraints defined within the overlay and may require the concurrence/approval of the 

authorizing official or other organization-designated individuals. For example, an overlay created 

for an industrial control system (ICS) may require tailoring for applicability to a specific type of 

ICS and its environment of operation. But it is anticipated that the use of overlays would greatly 

reduce the number and extent of organization-specific ad hoc tailoring.

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3.4 DOCUMENTING THE CONTROL SELECTION PROCESS

Organizations document the relevant decisions taken during the security control selection process, 

providing a sound rationale for those decisions. This documentation is essential when examining 

the security considerations for organizational information systems with respect to the potential 

mission/business impact. The resulting set of security controls and the supporting rationale for the

selection decisions (including any information system use restrictions required by organizations)

are documented in the security plans. Documenting significant risk management decisions in the 

security control selection process is imperative so that authorizing officials can have access to the 

necessary information to make informed authorization decisions for organizational information 

systems.88 Without such information, the understanding, assumptions, constraints, and rationale 

supporting those risk management decisions will, in all likelihood, not be available when the state 

of the information systems or environments of operation change, and the original risk decisions 

are revisited. Figure 4 summarizes the security control selection process, including the selection 

of initial baselines and the tailoring of the baselines by applying the guidance in Section 3.2.

FIGURE 4: SECURITY CONTROL SELECTION PROCESS

Iterative and Dynamic Nature of Security Control Tailoring

The security control tailoring process described above, while appearing to be sequential in nature, 

can also have an iterative aspect. Organizations may choose to execute the tailoring steps in any 

order based on organizational needs and the information generated from risk assessments. For 

example, some organizations may establish the parameter values for security controls in the initial 

baselines prior to selecting compensating controls. Other organizations may delay completing 

assignment and selection statements in the controls until after the supplementation activities have 

been completed. Organizations may also discover that when fully specifying security controls for 

the intended environments of operation, there may be difficulties that arise which may trigger the 

need for additional (supplemental) controls. Finally, the security control tailoring process is not 

static—that is, organizations revisit the tailoring step as often as needed based on ongoing 

organizational assessments of risk.

88 The security control selection process also applies to common control providers and the authorizing officials 

rendering authorization decisions for common controls deployed within organizations.

 

TAILORED

SECURITY 

CONTROL 

BASELINE

(Low, Mod, High)

After Tailoring

Tailoring Guidance

• Identifying and Designating Common Controls

• Applying Scoping Considerations

• Selecting Compensating Controls

• Assigning Security Control Parameter Values

• Supplementing Baseline Security Controls

• Providing Additional Specification Information 

for Implementation

 Creating Overlays

Assessment of Organizational Risk 

 

DOCUMENT SECURITY CONTROL DECISIONS

Rationale that the agreed-upon set of security controls for the information system provide adequate 

protection of organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

INITIAL

SECURITY 

CONTROL 

BASELINE

(Low, Mod, High)

Before Tailoring

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In addition to the iterative and dynamic nature of the security control tailoring process, there may 

also be side effects as controls are added and removed from the baselines. Security controls in 

Appendix F can have some degree of dependency and functional overlap with other controls. In 

many cases, security controls work together to achieve a security capability. Thus, removing a 

particular security control from a baseline during the tailoring process may have unintended side 

effects (and potentially adverse impacts) on the remaining controls. Alternatively, adding a new 

security control to a baseline during the tailoring process may eliminate or reduce the need for

certain specific controls because the new control provides a better security capability than the 

capability provided by other controls. For example, if organizations implement SC-30(2) using 

virtualization techniques to randomly/frequently deploy diverse and changing operating systems 

and applications, this approach could potentially limit the requirement to update the security 

configurations in CM-2(2). Therefore, the addition or removal of security controls is viewed with 

regard to the totality of the information security needs of the organization and its information 

systems, and not simply with regard to the controls being added or removed.

Other Considerations

Organizational tailoring decisions are not carried out in a vacuum. While such decisions are 

rightly focused on information security considerations, it is important that the decisions be 

aligned with other risk factors that organizations address routinely. Risk factors such as cost, 

schedule, and performance are considered in the overall determination of which security controls 

to employ in organizational information systems and environments of operation. For example, in 

military command and control systems in which lives may be at stake, the adoption of security 

controls is balanced with operational necessity. With respect to the air traffic control system and 

consoles used by air traffic controllers, the need to access the consoles in real time to control the 

air space outweighs the security need for an AC-11, Session Lock. In short, the security control 

selection process (to include tailoring activities described in Section 3.2) should be integrated into 

the overall risk management process as described in NIST Special Publication 800-39.

Finally, organizations factor scalability into the security control selection process—that is, 

controls are scalable with regard to the extent/rigor of the implementation. Scalability is guided 

by the FIPS Publication 199 security categorizations and the associated FIPS Publication 200 

impact levels of the information systems where the controls are to be applied. For example,

contingency plans for high-impact information systems may contain significant amounts of 

Implementation Tip

In diverging from the security control baselines during the tailoring process, organizations consider 

some very important linkages between various controls and control enhancements. These linkages 

are captured in the selection of controls and enhancements in the baselines and are especially 

significant when developing overlays (described in Section 3.3 and Appendix I). In some instances,

the linkages are such that it is not meaningful to include a security control or control enhancement 

without some other control or enhancement. The totality of the controls and enhancements provide a 

required security capability. Some linkages are obvious such as the linkage between Mandatory 

Access Control enhancement (AC-3(3)) and Security Attributes (AC-16). But other linkages may be 

more subtle. This is especially true in the case where the linkage is between security functionalityrelated controls and security assurance-related controls as described in Appendix E. For example, it 

is not particularly meaningful to implement AC-3(3) without also implementing a Reference Monitor 

(AC-25). Organizations are encouraged to pay careful attention to the related controls section of the 

Supplemental Guidance for the security controls to help in identifying such linkages.

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implementation detail and be quite lengthy. In contrast, contingency plans for low-impact systems

may contain considerably less detail and be quite succinct. Organizations use discretion in 

applying the security controls to organizational information systems, giving consideration to the 

scalability factors in particular operational environments. Scaling controls to the appropriate 

system impact level facilitates a more cost-effective, risk-based approach to security control 

implementation—expending only the level of resources necessary to achieve sufficient risk 

mitigation and adequate security.

3.5 NEW DEVELOPMENT AND LEGACY SYSTEMS

The security control selection process described in this section can be applied to organizational 

information systems from two different perspectives: (i) new development; and (ii) legacy. For

new development systems, the security control selection process is applied from a requirements 

definition perspective since the systems do not yet exist and organizations are conducting initial 

security categorizations. The security controls included in the security plans for the information 

systems serve as a security specification and are expected to be incorporated into the systems

during the development and implementation phases of the system development life cycle. In 

contrast, for legacy information systems, the security control selection process is applied from a 

gap analysis perspective when organizations are anticipating significant changes to the systems

(e.g., during major upgrades, modifications, or outsourcing). Since the information systems

already exist, organizations in all likelihood have completed the security categorization and 

security control selection processes resulting in the establishment of previously agreed-upon 

security controls in the respective security plans and the implementation of those controls within 

the information systems. Therefore, the gap analysis can be applied in the following manner:

• First, reconfirm or update as necessary, the security category and impact level for the 

information system based on the types of information that are currently being processed, 

stored, or transmitted by the system.

• Second, review the existing security plan that describes the security controls that are currently 

employed considering any updates to the security category and information system impact 

level as well as any changes to the organization, mission/business processes, the system, or 

the operational environment. Reassess the risk and revise the security plan as necessary, 

including documenting any additional security controls that would be needed by the system to 

ensure that the risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other 

organizations, and the Nation, remains at an acceptable level.

• Third, implement the security controls described in the updated security plan, document in the 

plan of action and milestones any controls not implemented, and continue with the remaining 

steps in the Risk Management Framework in the same manner as a new development system.

Implementation Tip

Maintaining a record of security control selection and control status can be addressed in one or 

multiple documents or security plans. If using multiple documents, consider providing references to 

the necessary information in the relevant documents rather than requiring duplication of information. 

Using references to relevant documentation reduces the amount of time and resources needed by 

organizations to generate such information. Other benefits include greater security awareness and 

understanding of the information system capabilities. Increased security awareness/understanding 

supports more effective integration of information security into organizational information systems.

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Applying Gap Analyses to External Service Providers

The gap analysis perspective is also applied when interacting with external service providers. As 

described in Section 2.5, organizations are becoming increasingly reliant on external providers for 

information system services. Using the steps in the gap analysis described above, organizations

can effectively use the acquisition process and appropriate contractual vehicles to require external 

providers to carry out the security categorization and security control selection steps in the RMF. 

The resulting information can help determine what security controls the external provider either 

has in place or intends to implement for the information system services that are to be provided. 

If a security control deficit exists, the responsibility for adequately mitigating unacceptable risks 

arising from the use of external information system services remains with authorizing officials. In 

such situations, organizations can reduce the organizational risk to an acceptable level by:

• Using the existing contractual vehicle to require the external provider to meet the additional 

security control requirements established by the organization;

• Negotiating with the provider for additional security controls if the existing contractual 

vehicle does not provide for such added requirements;

• Approving the use of compensating controls by the provider; or

• Employing alternative risk mitigation actions89 within the organizational information system

when a contract either does not exist or the contract does not provide the necessary leverage 

for organizations to obtain the needed security controls.

89 For example, local policies, procedures, and/or compensating controls could be established by organizations to serve 

as alternative mitigation actions for risks identified in a gap analysis.

Implementation Tip

Many organizations operate and maintain complex information systems, often referred to as a 

system-of-systems. Enterprise architecture plays a key part in the security control selection process 

for these types of information systems. Organizations can address the complex system problem by 

dividing the system into two or more subsystems and applying the FIPS 199 security categorization 

and FIPS 200 impact level determination to each subsystem. Applying separate impact levels to 

each subsystem does not change the overall impact level of the information system; rather, it allows 

constituent subsystems to receive a separate allocation of security controls instead of deploying 

higher-impact controls across every subsystem. It is not valid to treat the subsystems as entirely 

independent entities, however, since the subsystems are interdependent and interconnected. 

Organizations develop security architectures to allocate security controls among subsystems

including monitoring and controlling communications at key internal boundaries within the system 

and provide system-wide controls that meet or exceed the highest information system impact level of 

the constituent subsystems inheriting security capabilities from those controls. Organizations also 

consider that replicated subsystems within complex systems may exhibit common vulnerabilities that 

can be exploited by common threat sources—thereby negating the redundancy that might be relied 

upon as a risk mitigation measure. The impact due to a security incident against one constituent 

subsystem might cascade and impact many subsystems at the same time.

CHAPTER 3 PAGE 45

 
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 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

LAWS, POLICIES, DIRECTIVES, REGULATIONS, MEMORANDA, STANDARDS, AND GUIDELINES

LEGISLATION AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS

1. E-Government Act [includes FISMA] (P.L. 107-347), December 2002.

2. Federal Information Security Management Act (P.L. 107-347, Title III), December 2002. 

3. Paperwork Reduction Act (P.L. 104-13), May 1995.

4. USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56), October 2001.

5. Privacy Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-579), December 1974.

6. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, As Amended By Public Law No. 

104-231, 110 Stat. 3048, Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996.

7. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (P.L. 104-191), August 1996.

8. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-703), August 1954.

9. Executive Order 13556, Controlled Unclassified Information, November 2010.

10. Executive Order 13587, Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified 

Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information, 

October 2011.

POLICIES, DIRECTIVES, INSTRUCTIONS, REGULATIONS, AND MEMORANDA

1. Presidential Memorandum, National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for 

Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs, November 2012.

2. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 5, Administrative Personnel, Section 731.106, 

Designation of Public Trust Positions and Investigative Requirements (5 C.F.R. 731.106).

3. Code of Federal Regulations, Part 5 Administrative Personnel, Subpart C—Employees 

Responsible for the Management or Use of Federal Computer Systems, Section 930.301 

through 930.305 (5 C.F.R. 930.301-305).

4. Committee on National Security Systems Policy (CNSSP) No. 11, National Policy 

Governing the Acquisition of Information Assurance (IA) and IA-Enabled Information 

Technology (IT) Products, July 2003.

5. Committee on National Security Systems Policy (CNSSP) No. 12, National Information 

Assurance Policy for Space Systems Used to Support National Security Missions, March 

2007.

6. Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Instruction 4009, National Information 

Assurance Glossary, April 2010.

7. Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Instruction 1253, Version 2, Security 

Categorization and Control Selection for National Security Systems, March 2012.

8. Committee on National Security Systems Directive (CNSSD) No. 504, Directive on 

Protecting National Security Systems from Insider Threat, January 2012.

9. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), 2009.

APPENDIX A PAGE A-1
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________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 705, Sensitive Compartmented Information 

Facilities, May 2010.

11. Federal Continuity Directive 1 (FCD 1), Federal Executive Branch National Continuity 

Program and Requirements, February 2008.

12. Executive Office of the President of the United States and Federal CIO Council, Federal 

Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) Roadmap and Implementation 

Guidance, December 2011.

13. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, 

Prioritization, and Protection, December 2003.

14. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, Policy for a Common Identification 

Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, August 2004.

15. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 20 (National Security Presidential Directive 51), 

National Continuity Policy, May 2007.

16. Intelligence Community Directive Number 704, Personnel Security Standards and 

Procedures Governing Eligibility For Access To Sensitive Compartmented Information 

And Other Controlled Access Program Information, October 2008.

17. National Communications System (NCS) Directive 3-10, Minimum Requirements for 

Continuity Communications Capabilities, July 2007.

18. National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Instruction 

(NSTISSI) 7003, Protective Distribution Systems (PDS), December 1996.

19. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-130, Appendix III, Transmittal 

Memorandum #4, Management of Federal Information Resources, November 2000.

20. Office of Management and Budget, Federal Enterprise Architecture Program Management 

Office, FEA Consolidated Reference Model Document, Version 2.3, October 2007.

21. Office of Management and Budget, Federal Segment Architecture Methodology (FSAM), 

January 2009.

22. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 01-05, Guidance on Inter-Agency 

Sharing of Personal Data - Protecting Personal Privacy, December 2000.

23. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 02-01, Guidance for Preparing and 

Submitting Security Plans of Action and Milestones, October 2001.

24. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 03-19, Reporting Instructions for the 

Federal Information Security Management Act and Updated Guidance on Quarterly IT 

Security Reporting, August 2003.

25. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 03-22, OMB Guidance for Implementing 

the Privacy Provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002, September 2003.

26. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for 

Federal Agencies, December 2003.

27. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 04-26, Personal Use Policies and File 

Sharing Technology, September 2004.

28. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 05-08, Designation of Senior Agency 

Officials for Privacy, February 2005.

APPENDIX A PAGE A-2
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________________________________________________________________________________________________

29. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 05-24, Implementation of Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12—Policy for a Common Identification Standard 

for Federal Employees and Contractors, August 2005.

30. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 06-15, Safeguarding Personally 

Identifiable Information, May 2006.

31. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 06-16, Protection of Sensitive 

Information, June 2006.

32. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 06-19, Reporting Incidents Involving 

Personally Identifiable Information and Incorporating the Cost for Security in Agency 

Information Technology Investments, July 2006.

33. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum, Recommendations for Identity Theft 

Related Data Breach Notification Guidance, September 2006.

34. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 07-11, Implementation of Commonly 

Accepted Security Configurations for Windows Operating Systems, March 2007.

35. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 07-16, Safeguarding Against and 

Responding to the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information, May 2007.

36. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 07-18, Ensuring New Acquisitions 

Include Common Security Configurations, June 2007.

37. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 08-22, Guidance on the Federal Desktop 

Core Configuration (FDCC), August 2008.

38. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 08-23, Securing the Federal 

Government’s Domain Name System Infrastructure, August 2008.

39. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Designation and Sharing of Controlled 

Unclassified Information (CUI), May 2008.

40. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Classified Information and Controlled 

Unclassified Information, May 2009.

41. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 11-11, Continued Implementation of 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12– Policy for a Common 

Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, February 2011.

42. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum, Requirements for Accepting ExternallyIssued Identity Credentials, October 2011.

43. Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 11-33, FY 2011 Reporting Instructions 

for the Federal Information Security Management Act and Agency Privacy Management, 

September 2011.

STANDARDS

1. International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission 

27001:2005, Security techniques -- Information security management systems --

Requirements.

2. International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission 

15408-1:2009, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Evaluation criteria for IT 

security -- Part 1: Introduction and general model.

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________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission 

15408-2:2008, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Evaluation criteria for IT 

security -- Part 2: Security functional requirements.

4. International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission 

15408-3:2008, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Evaluation criteria for IT 

security -- Part 3: Security assurance requirements.

5. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards 

Publication 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 2001. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards

Publication 140-3 (Draft), Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, December

2009.

6. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards 

Publication 180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), March 2012.

7. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards

Publication 186-3, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), June 2009.

8. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards 

Publication 188, Standard Security Label for Information Transfer, September 1994.

9. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards 

Publication 190, Guideline for the Use of Advanced Authentication Technology 

Alternatives, September 1994.

10. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards 

Publication 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), November 2001.

11. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards 

Publication 198-1, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), July 2008.

12. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards 

Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and 

Information Systems, February 2004.

13. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards 

Publication 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and 

Information Systems, March 2006.

14. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards 

Publication 201-1, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and 

Contractors, March 2006.

GUIDELINES AND INTERAGENCY REPORTS

1. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-12, An 

Introduction to Computer Security: The NIST Handbook, October 1995.

2. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-13, 

Telecommunications Security Guidelines for Telecommunications Management Network, 

October 1995.

3. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-14, Generally 

Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information Technology Systems, 

September 1996.

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4. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-15, Minimum 

Interoperability Specification for PKI Components (MISPC), Version 1, January 1998.

5. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-16, Information 

Security Training Requirements: A Role- and Performance-Based Model, April 1998.

6. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-17, Modes of 

Operation Validation System (MOVS): Requirements and Procedures, February 1998.

7. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-18, Revision 1, 

Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information Systems, February 2006.

8. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-19, Mobile Agent 

Security, October 1999.

9. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-20, Modes of 

Operation Validation System for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TMOVS): 

Requirements and Procedures, October 1999.

10. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-21-1, Second 

Edition, Guideline for Implementing Cryptography in the Federal Government, December 

2005.

11. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-22, Revision 1a, A 

Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudorandom Number Generators for 

Cryptographic Applications, April 2010.

12. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-23, Guidelines to 

Federal Organizations on Security Assurance and Acquisition/Use of Tested/Evaluated 

Products, August 2000.

13. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-24, PBX 

Vulnerability Analysis: Finding Holes in Your PBX Before Someone Else Does, August 

2000.

14. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-25, Federal 

Agency Use of Public Key Technology for Digital Signatures and Authentication, October 

2000.

15. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-27, Revision A, 

Engineering Principles for Information Technology Security (A Baseline for Achieving 

Security), June 2004.

16. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-28, Version 2, 

Guidelines on Active Content and Mobile Code, March 2008.

17. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-29, A Comparison 

of the Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules in FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2, 

June 2001.

18. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-30, Revision 1, 

Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments, September 2012.

19. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-32, Introduction 

to Public Key Technology and the Federal PKI Infrastructure, February 2001.

20. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-33, Underlying 

Technical Models for Information Technology Security, December 2001.

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21. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-34, Revision 1, 

Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems, May 2010.

22. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-35, Guide to 

Information Technology Security Services, October 2003.

23. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-36, Guide to 

Selecting Information Security Products, October 2003.

24. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-37, Revision 1, 

Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems: A 

Security Life Cycle Approach, February 2010.

25. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-38A—Addendum, 

Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext 

Stealing for CBC Mode, October 2010.

26. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-38B, 

Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for

Authentication, May 2005.

27. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-38C, 

Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for 

Authentication and Confidentiality, May 2004.

28. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-38D, 

Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and 

GMAC, November 2007.

29. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-38E, 

Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for 

Confidentiality on Storage Devices, January 2010.

30. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-38F, 

Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, 

December 2012.

31. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-39, Managing 

Information Security Risk: Organization, Mission, and Information System View, March 

2011.

32. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-40, Version 2, 

Creating a Patch and Vulnerability Management Program, November 2005.

33. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-41, Revision 1, 

Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy, September 2009.

34. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-43, Systems 

Administration Guidance for Windows 2000 Professional System, November 2002.

35. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-44, Version 2, 

Guidelines on Securing Public Web Servers, September 2007.

36. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-45, Version 2, 

Guidelines on Electronic Mail Security, February 2007.

37. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-46, Revision 1, 

Guide to Enterprise Telework and Remote Access Security, June 2009.

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38. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-47, Security 

Guide for Interconnecting Information Technology Systems, August 2002.

39. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-48, Revision 1, 

Guide to Securing Legacy IEEE 802.11 Wireless Networks, July 2008.

40. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-49, Federal 

S/MIME V3 Client Profile, November 2002.

41. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-50, Building an 

Information Technology Security Awareness and Training Program, October 2003.

42. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-51, Revision 1,

Guide to Using Vulnerability Naming Schemes, February 2011.

43. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-52, Revision 1

(Draft), Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security 

(TLS) Implementations, September 2013.

44. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-53A, Revision 1,

Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and 

Organizations: Building Effective Security Assessment Plans, June 2010.

45. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-54, Border 

Gateway Protocol Security, July 2007.

46. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-55, Revision 1, 

Performance Measurement Guide for Information Security, July 2008.

47. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-56A (Revised), 

Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm 

Cryptography, March 2007.

48. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-57 Revision 3, 

Recommendation for Key Management, July 2012.

49. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-58, Security 

Considerations for Voice Over IP Systems, January 2005.

50. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-59, Guideline for 

Identifying an Information System as a National Security System, August 2003.

51. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-60, Revision 1, 

Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories, 

August 2008.

52. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-61, Revision 2, 

Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, August 2012.

53. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-63-1, Electronic 

Authentication Guideline, December 2011.

54. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-64, Revision 2, 

Security Considerations in the System Development Life Cycle, October 2008.

55. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-65, Integrating IT 

Security into the Capital Planning and Investment Control Process, January 2005.

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56. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-66, Revision 1, An 

Introductory Resource Guide for Implementing the Health Insurance Portability and 

Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule, October 2008.

57. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-67, Revision 1, 

Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, January 

2012.

58. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-68, Revision 1, 

Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows XP Systems for IT Professionals: A NIST Security 

Configuration Checklist, October 2008.

59. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-69, Guidance for 

Securing Microsoft Windows XP Home Edition: A NIST Security Configuration Checklist, 

September 2006.

60. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-70, Revision 2, 

National Checklist Program for IT Products--Guidelines for Checklist Users and 

Developers, February 2011.

61. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-72, Guidelines on 

PDA Forensics, November 2004.

62. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-73-3, Interfaces 

for Personal Identity Verification, February 2010.

63. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-76-1, Biometric 

Data Specification for Personal Identity Verification, January 2007.

64. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-77, Guide to 

IPsec VPNs, December 2005.

65. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-78-3,

Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification (PIV), 

December 2010.

66. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-79-1, Guidelines 

for the Accreditation of Personal Identity Verification Card Issuers, June 2008.

67. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-81, Secure

Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide, Revision 1, April 2010.

68. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-82, Revision 1, 

Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security, April 2013.

69. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-83, Guide to

Malware Incident Prevention and Handling, November 2005.

70. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-84, Guide to Test, 

Training, and Exercise Programs for IT Plans and Capabilities, September 2006.

71. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-85A-2, PIV Card 

Application and Middleware Interface Test Guidelines (SP 800-73-3 Compliance), July 

2010.

72. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-85B-1, (Draft)

PIV Data Model Test Guidelines, September 2009.

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73. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-86, Guide to

Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, August 2006.

74. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-87, Revision 1, 

Codes for the Identification of Federal and Federally-Assisted Organizations, April 2008.

75. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-88, Guidelines for 

Media Sanitization, September 2006.

76. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-89, 

Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications, November 

2006.

77. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-90A, 

Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit

Generators, January 2012.

78. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-92, Guide to

Computer Security Log Management, September 2006.

79. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-94, Guide to

Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS), February 2007.

80. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-95, Guide to

Secure Web Services, August 2007.

81. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-96, PIV Card /

Reader Interoperability Guidelines, September 2006.

82. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-97, Establishing 

Robust Security Networks: A Guide to IEEE 802.11i, February 2007.

83. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-98, Guidelines for 

Securing Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Systems, April 2007.

84. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-100, Information 

Security Handbook: A Guide for Managers, October 2006.

85. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-101, Guidelines 

on Cell Phone Forensics, May 2007.

86. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-103 (Draft), An

Ontology of Identity Credentials, Part I: Background and Formulation, October 2006.

87. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-104, A Scheme for 

PIV Visual Card Topography, June 2007.

88. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-106, Randomized 

Hashing Digital Signatures, February 2009.

89. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-107, 

Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithms, August 2012.

90. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-108, 

Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions, October 2009.

91. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-111, Guide to

Storage Encryption Technologies for End User Devices, November 2007.

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92. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-113, Guide to SSL 

VPNs, July 2008.

93. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-114, User's Guide 

to Securing External Devices for Telework and Remote Access, November 2007.

94. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-115, Technical 

Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, September 2008.

95. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-116, A 

Recommendation for the Use of PIV Credentials in Physical Access Control Systems 

(PACS), November 2008.

96. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-117, Version 

1.0, Guide to Adopting and Using the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP), July 

2010.

97. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-118 

(Draft), Guide to Enterprise Password Management, April 2009.

98. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-121, Revision 1,

Guide to Bluetooth Security, June 2012.

99. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-122, Guide to 

Protecting the Confidentiality of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), April 2010.

100. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-123, Guide to 

General Server Security, July 2008.

101. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-124, Guidelines 

on Cell Phone and PDA Security, October 2008.

102. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-125, Guide to 

Security for Full Virtualization Technologies, January 2011.

103. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-126, Revision 2, 

The Technical Specification for the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP): SCAP 

Version 1.2, September 2011.

104. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-127, Guide to 

Securing WiMAX Wireless Communications, September 2010.

105. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-128, Guide for 

Security-Focused Configuration Management of Information Systems, August 2011.

106. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-133, 

Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, December 2012.

107. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-137, Information 

Security Continuous Monitoring for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, 

September 2011.

108. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-142, Practical 

Combinatorial Testing, October 2010.

109. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-144, Guidelines 

for Security and Privacy in Public Cloud Computing, December 2011.

110. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-145, The NIST 

Definition of Cloud Computing, September 2011.

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111. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-146, Cloud 

Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, May 2012.

112. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-147, Basic 

Input/Output System (BIOS) Protection Guidelines, April 2011.

113. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-153, Guidelines 

for Securing Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs), September 2011.

114. National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency Report 7622, Notional Supply 

Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems, October 2012.

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APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

COMMON TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Appendix B provides definitions for security terminology used within Special Publication 800-53. 

Unless specifically defined in this glossary, all terms used in this publication are consistent with 

the definitions contained in CNSS Instruction 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary.

Adequate Security 

[OMB Circular A-130, 

Appendix III, Adapted]

Security commensurate with the risk resulting from the loss, 

misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of information.

Advanced Persistent 

Threat

An adversary that possesses sophisticated levels of expertise and 

significant resources which allow it to create opportunities to 

achieve its objectives by using multiple attack vectors (e.g., 

cyber, physical, and deception). These objectives typically 

include establishing and extending footholds within the 

information technology infrastructure of the targeted 

organizations for purposes of exfiltrating information, 

undermining or impeding critical aspects of a mission, program, 

or organization; or positioning itself to carry out these objectives 

in the future. The advanced persistent threat: (i) pursues its 

objectives repeatedly over an extended period of time; (ii) adapts 

to defenders’ efforts to resist it; and (iii) is determined to maintain 

the level of interaction needed to execute its objectives.

Agency See Executive Agency.

All Source Intelligence

[Department of Defense, 

Joint Publication 1-02]

Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that 

incorporate all sources of information, most frequently including 

human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement 

and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open source 

data in the production of finished intelligence.

Assessment See Security Control Assessment.

Assessor See Security Control Assessor.

Assurance

[CNSSI 4009]

Measure of confidence that the security features, practices, 

procedures, and architecture of an information system accurately 

mediates and enforces the security policy.

Assurance Case

[Software Engineering 

Institute, Carnegie Mellon 

University]

A structured set of arguments and a body of evidence showing 

that an information system satisfies specific claims with respect 

to a given quality attribute.

Audit Log

[CNSSI 4009]

A chronological record of information system activities, including 

records of system accesses and operations performed in a given 

period. 

Audit Record An individual entry in an audit log related to an audited event.

APPENDIX B PAGE B-1
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Audit Reduction Tools

[CNSSI 4009]

Preprocessors designed to reduce the volume of audit records to 

facilitate manual review. Before a security review, these tools can 

remove many audit records known to have little security 

significance. These tools generally remove records generated by 

specified classes of events, such as records generated by nightly 

backups.

Audit Trail

[CNSSI 4009]

A chronological record that reconstructs and examines the 

sequence of activities surrounding or leading to a specific 

operation, procedure, or event in a security-relevant transaction 

from inception to final result.

Authentication

[FIPS 200]

Verifying the identity of a user, process, or device, often as a 

prerequisite to allowing access to resources in an information 

system.

Authenticator The means used to confirm the identity of a user, processor, or 

device (e.g., user password or token).

Authenticity The property of being genuine and being able to be verified and 

trusted; confidence in the validity of a transmission, a message, or 

message originator. See Authentication.

Authorization

(to operate)

The official management decision given by a senior 

organizational official to authorize operation of an information 

system and to explicitly accept the risk to organizational 

operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), 

organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the 

Nation based on the implementation of an agreed-upon set of 

security controls.

Authorization Boundary All components of an information system to be authorized for 

operation by an authorizing official and excludes separately 

authorized systems, to which the information system is 

connected.

Authorize Processing See Authorization.

Authorizing Official A senior (federal) official or executive with the authority to 

formally assume responsibility for operating an information 

system at an acceptable level of risk to organizational operations 

(including mission, functions, image, or reputation), 

organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the 

Nation.

Availability

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]

Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information. 

Baseline Configuration A documented set of specifications for an information system, or 

a configuration item within a system, that has been formally 

reviewed and agreed on at a given point in time, and which can be 

changed only through change control procedures.

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Blacklisting The process used to identify: (i) software programs that are not 

authorized to execute on an information system; or (ii) prohibited 

Universal Resource Locators (URL)/websites.

Boundary Protection Monitoring and control of communications at the external 

boundary of an information system to prevent and detect 

malicious and other unauthorized communications, through the 

use of boundary protection devices (e.g., gateways, routers, 

firewalls, guards, encrypted tunnels).

Boundary Protection 

Device

A device with appropriate mechanisms that: (i) facilitates the 

adjudication of different interconnected system security policies 

(e.g., controlling the flow of information into or out of an 

interconnected system); and/or (ii) provides information system 

boundary protection.

Central Management The organization-wide management and implementation of selected 

security controls and related processes. Central management includes 

planning, implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the 

organization-defined, centrally managed security controls and processes.

Chief Information Officer

[PL 104-106, Sec. 5125(b)]

Agency official responsible for:

(i) Providing advice and other assistance to the head of the 

executive agency and other senior management personnel of the 

agency to ensure that information technology is acquired and 

information resources are managed in a manner that is consistent 

with laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and 

priorities established by the head of the agency;

(ii) Developing, maintaining, and facilitating the implementation 

of a sound and integrated information technology architecture for 

the agency; and 

(iii) Promoting the effective and efficient design and operation of 

all major information resources management processes for the 

agency, including improvements to work processes of the agency.

Note: Organizations subordinate to federal agencies may use the term Chief 

Information Officer to denote individuals filling positions with similar security 

responsibilities to agency-level Chief Information Officers.

Chief Information Security 

Officer

See Senior Agency Information Security Officer.

Chief Privacy Officer See Senior Agency Official for Privacy.

Classified Information Information that has been determined: (i) pursuant to Executive 

Order 12958 as amended by Executive Order 13526, or any 

predecessor Order, to be classified national security information;

or (ii) pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to 

be Restricted Data (RD).

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Commodity Service An information system service (e.g., telecommunications service) 

provided by a commercial service provider typically to a large 

and diverse set of consumers. The organization acquiring and/or 

receiving the commodity service possesses limited visibility into 

the management structure and operations of the provider, and 

while the organization may be able to negotiate service-level 

agreements, the organization is typically not in a position to 

require that the provider implement specific security controls. 

Common Carrier In a telecommunications context, a telecommunications company 

that holds itself out to the public for hire to provide 

communications transmission services.

Note: In the United States, such companies are usually subject to regulation by 

federal and state regulatory commissions.

Common Control

[NIST SP 800-37; CNSSI 

4009]

A security control that is inheritable by one or more 

organizational information systems. See Security Control 

Inheritance.

Common Control Provider

[NIST SP 800-37]

An organizational official responsible for the development, 

implementation, assessment, and monitoring of common controls 

(i.e., security controls inheritable by information systems).

Common Criteria

[CNSSI 4009]

Governing document that provides a comprehensive, rigorous 

method for specifying security function and assurance 

requirements for products and systems. 

Common Secure 

Configuration

A recognized standardized and established benchmark that 

stipulates specific secure configuration settings for a given 

information technology platform.

Compensating Security 

Controls

[CNSSI 4009, Adapted]

The security controls employed in lieu of the recommended 

controls in the security control baselines described in NIST 

Special Publication 800-53 and CNSS Instruction 1253 that

provide equivalent or comparable protection for an information 

system or organization.

Computer Matching 

Agreement

An agreement entered into by an organization in connection with 

a computer matching program to which the organization is a 

party, as required by the Computer Matching and Privacy 

Protection Act of 1988. With certain exceptions, a computer 

matching program is any computerized comparison of two or 

more automated systems of records or a system of records with 

nonfederal records for the purpose of establishing or verifying the 

eligibility of, or continuing compliance with, statutory and 

regulatory requirements by, applicants for, recipients or 

beneficiaries of, participants in, or providers of services with 

respect to cash or in-kind assistance or payments under federal 

benefit programs or computerized comparisons of two or more 

automated federal personnel or payroll systems of records or a 

system of federal personnel or payroll records with non-federal 

records.

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Confidentiality

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]

Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and 

disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and 

proprietary information.

Configuration Control

[CNSSI 4009]

Process for controlling modifications to hardware, firmware, 

software, and documentation to protect the information system 

against improper modifications before, during, and after system 

implementation.

Configuration Item An aggregation of information system components that is 

designated for configuration management and treated as a single 

entity in the configuration management process. 

Configuration 

Management

A collection of activities focused on establishing and maintaining 

the integrity of information technology products and information 

systems, through control of processes for initializing, changing, 

and monitoring the configurations of those products and systems 

throughout the system development life cycle.

Configuration Settings The set of parameters that can be changed in hardware, software, 

or firmware that affect the security posture and/or functionality of 

the information system.

Controlled Area Any area or space for which an organization has confidence that 

the physical and procedural protections provided are sufficient to 

meet the requirements established for protecting the information 

and/or information system.

Controlled Interface

[CNSSI 4009]

A boundary with a set of mechanisms that enforces the security 

policies and controls the flow of information between 

interconnected information systems. 

Controlled Unclassified 

Information

[E.O. 13556]

A categorical designation that refers to unclassified information 

that does not meet the standards for National Security 

Classification under Executive Order 12958, as amended, but is 

(i) pertinent to the national interests of the United States or to the 

important interests of entities outside the federal government, and 

(ii) under law or policy requires protection from unauthorized 

disclosure, special handling safeguards, or prescribed limits on 

exchange or dissemination.

Countermeasures

[CNSSI 4009]

Actions, devices, procedures, techniques, or other measures that 

reduce the vulnerability of an information system. Synonymous 

with security controls and safeguards.

Covert Channel Analysis

[CNSSI 4009]

Determination of the extent to which the security policy model 

and subsequent lower-level program descriptions may allow 

unauthorized access to information.

Covert Storage Channel

[CNSSI 4009]

Covert channel involving the direct or indirect writing to a 

storage location by one process and the direct or indirect reading 

of the storage location by another process. Covert storage 

channels typically involve a finite resource (e.g., sectors on a 

disk) that is shared by two subjects at different security levels. 

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Covert Timing Channel

[CNSSI 4009]

Covert channel in which one process signals information to 

another process by modulating its own use of system resources 

(e.g., central processing unit time) in such a way that this 

manipulation affects the real response time observed by the 

second process. 

Cross Domain Solution

[CNSSI 4009]

A form of controlled interface that provides the ability to 

manually and/or automatically access and/or transfer information 

between different security domains.

Cyber Attack

[CNSSI 4009]

An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise’s use of 

cyberspace for the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or 

maliciously controlling a computing environment/infrastructure; 

or destroying the integrity of the data or stealing controlled 

information.

Cyber Security

[CNSSI 4009]

The ability to protect or defend the use of cyberspace from cyber 

attacks.

Cyberspace

[CNSSI 4009]

A global domain within the information environment consisting 

of the interdependent network of information systems 

infrastructures including the Internet, telecommunications 

networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 

controllers.

Data Mining/Harvesting An analytical process that attempts to find correlations or patterns 

in large data sets for the purpose of data or knowledge discovery.

Defense-in-Breadth

[CNSSI 4009]

A planned, systematic set of multidisciplinary activities that seek 

to identify, manage, and reduce risk of exploitable vulnerabilities 

at every stage of the system, network, or subcomponent life cycle 

(system, network, or product design and development; 

manufacturing; packaging; assembly; system integration; 

distribution; operations; maintenance; and retirement).

Defense-in-Depth Information security strategy integrating people, technology, and 

operations capabilities to establish variable barriers across 

multiple layers and missions of the organization.

Developer A general term that includes: (i) developers or manufacturers of 

information systems, system components, or information system 

services; (ii) systems integrators; (iii) vendors; and (iv) product 

resellers. Development of systems, components, or services can 

occur internally within organizations (i.e., in-house development) 

or through external entities.

Digital Media A form of electronic media where data are stored in digital (as 

opposed to analog) form.

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Discretionary Access 

Control

[CNSSI 4009]

An access control policy that is enforced over all subjects and 

objects in an information system where the policy specifies that a 

subject that has been granted access to information can do one or 

more of the following: (i) pass the information to other subjects 

or objects; (ii) grant its privileges to other subjects; (iii) change

security attributes on subjects, objects, information systems, or 

system components; (iv) choose the security attributes to be 

associated with newly-created or revised objects; or (v) change 

the rules governing access control. Mandatory access controls 

restrict this capability.

A means of restricting access to objects (e.g., files, data entities) 

based on the identity and need-to-know of subjects (e.g., users, 

processes) and/or groups to which the object belongs. The 

controls are discretionary in the sense that a subject with a certain 

access permission is capable of passing that permission (perhaps 

indirectly) on to any other subject (unless restrained by 

mandatory access control).

Domain

[CNSSI 4009]

An environment or context that includes a set of system resources 

and a set of system entities that have the right to access the 

resources as defined by a common security policy, security 

model, or security architecture. See Security Domain.

Enterprise

[CNSSI 4009]

An organization with a defined mission/goal and a defined 

boundary, using information systems to execute that mission, and 

with responsibility for managing its own risks and performance. 

An enterprise may consist of all or some of the following 

business aspects: acquisition, program management, financial 

management (e.g., budgets), human resources, security, and 

information systems, information and mission management. See 

Organization.

Enterprise Architecture

[44 U.S.C. Sec. 3601]

A strategic information asset base, which defines the mission; the 

information necessary to perform the mission; the technologies 

necessary to perform the mission; and the transitional processes 

for implementing new technologies in response to changing 

mission needs; and includes a baseline architecture; a target 

architecture; and a sequencing plan.

Environment of Operation

[NIST SP 800-37]

The physical surroundings in which an information system 

processes, stores, and transmits information.

Event

[CNSSI 4009, Adapted]

Any observable occurrence in an information system.

Executive Agency

[41 U.S.C., Sec. 403]

An executive department specified in 5 U.S.C., Sec. 101; a 

military department specified in 5 U.S.C., Sec. 102; an 

independent establishment as defined in 5 U.S.C., Sec. 104(1); 

and a wholly owned Government corporation fully subject to the 

provisions of 31 U.S.C., Chapter 91.

Exfiltration The unauthorized transfer of information from an information 

system.

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External Information 

System (or Component)

An information system or component of an information system 

that is outside of the authorization boundary established by the 

organization and for which the organization typically has no 

direct control over the application of required security controls or 

the assessment of security control effectiveness.

External Information 

System Service

An information system service that is implemented outside of the 

authorization boundary of the organizational information system 

(i.e., a service that is used by, but not a part of, the organizational 

information system) and for which the organization typically has 

no direct control over the application of required security controls 

or the assessment of security control effectiveness.

External Information 

System Service Provider 

A provider of external information system services to an 

organization through a variety of consumer-producer 

relationships including but not limited to: joint ventures; business 

partnerships; outsourcing arrangements (i.e., through contracts, 

interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements); 

licensing agreements; and/or supply chain exchanges.

External Network A network not controlled by the organization.

Failover The capability to switch over automatically (typically without 

human intervention or warning) to a redundant or standby 

information system upon the failure or abnormal termination of

the previously active system.

Fair Information Practice 

Principles

Principles that are widely accepted in the United States and 

internationally as a general framework for privacy and that are 

reflected in various federal and international laws and policies. In 

a number of organizations, the principles serve as the basis for 

analyzing privacy risks and determining appropriate mitigation 

strategies.

Federal Agency See Executive Agency.

Federal Enterprise 

Architecture

[FEA Program Management 

Office]

A business-based framework for governmentwide improvement 

developed by the Office of Management and Budget that is 

intended to facilitate efforts to transform the federal government 

to one that is citizen-centered, results-oriented, and market-based.

Federal Information

System

[40 U.S.C., Sec. 11331]

An information system used or operated by an executive agency, 

by a contractor of an executive agency, or by another 

organization on behalf of an executive agency.

FIPS-Validated 

Cryptography

A cryptographic module validated by the Cryptographic Module 

Validation Program (CMVP) to meet requirements specified in 

FIPS Publication 140-2 (as amended). As a prerequisite to CMVP 

validation, the cryptographic module is required to employ a 

cryptographic algorithm implementation that has successfully 

passed validation testing by the Cryptographic Algorithm 

Validation Program (CAVP). See NSA-Approved Cryptography.

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Firmware

[CNSSI 4009]

Computer programs and data stored in hardware - typically in 

read-only memory (ROM) or programmable read-only memory 

(PROM) - such that the programs and data cannot be dynamically 

written or modified during execution of the programs.

Guard (System)

[CNSSI 4009, Adapted]

A mechanism limiting the exchange of information between 

information systems or subsystems.

Hardware

[CNSSI 4009]

The physical components of an information system. See Software

and Firmware.

High-Impact System

[FIPS 200]

An information system in which at least one security objective 

(i.e., confidentiality, integrity, or availability) is assigned a FIPS

Publication 199 potential impact value of high.

Hybrid Security Control

[CNSSI 4009]

A security control that is implemented in an information system 

in part as a common control and in part as a system-specific 

control. See Common Control and System-Specific Security 

Control.

Impact The effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, 

individuals, other organizations, or the Nation (including the 

national security interests of the United States) of a loss of 

confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or an 

information system.

Impact Value The assessed potential impact resulting from a compromise of the 

confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information expressed 

as a value of low, moderate or high.

Incident

[FIPS 200]

An occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the 

confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system 

or the information the system processes, stores, or transmits or 

that constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of 

security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies.

Industrial Control System An information system used to control industrial processes such 

as manufacturing, product handling, production, and distribution. 

Industrial control systems include supervisory control and data 

acquisition (SCADA) systems used to control geographically 

dispersed assets, as well as distributed control systems (DCSs) 

and smaller control systems using programmable logic controllers 

to control localized processes.

Information

[CNSSI 4009]

[FIPS 199]

Any communication or representation of knowledge such as facts, 

data, or opinions in any medium or form, including textual, 

numerical, graphic, cartographic, narrative, or audiovisual. 

An instance of an information type.

Information Leakage The intentional or unintentional release of information to an 

untrusted environment.

Information Owner

[CNSSI 4009]

Official with statutory or operational authority for specified 

information and responsibility for establishing the controls for its 

generation, collection, processing, dissemination, and disposal.

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Information Resources

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3502]

Information and related resources, such as personnel, equipment, 

funds, and information technology.

Information Security

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]

The protection of information and information systems from 

unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or 

destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and 

availability.

Information Security 

Architecture

An embedded, integral part of the enterprise architecture that 

describes the structure and behavior for an enterprise’s security 

processes, information security systems, personnel and 

organizational subunits, showing their alignment with the 

enterprise’s mission and strategic plans.

Information Security

Policy

[CNSSI 4009]

Aggregate of directives, regulations, rules, and practices that 

prescribes how an organization manages, protects, and distributes 

information.

Information Security 

Program Plan

Formal document that provides an overview of the security 

requirements for an organization-wide information security 

program and describes the program management controls and 

common controls in place or planned for meeting those 

requirements.

Information Security Risk The risk to organizational operations (including mission, 

functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals, 

other organizations, and the Nation due to the potential for 

unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or 

destruction of information and/or information systems.

Information Steward

[CNSSI 4009]

An agency official with statutory or operational authority for 

specified information and responsibility for establishing the 

controls for its generation, collection, processing, dissemination, 

and disposal.

Information System

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3502]

A discrete set of information resources organized for the 

collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, 

or disposition of information.

Note: Information systems also include specialized systems such as 

industrial/process controls systems, telephone switching and private branch 

exchange (PBX) systems, and environmental control systems.

Information System 

Boundary

See Authorization Boundary.

Information System 

Component

[NIST SP 800-128, Adapted]

A discrete, identifiable information technology asset (e.g., 

hardware, software, firmware) that represents a building block of 

an information system. Information system components include 

commercial information technology products.

Information System Owner

(or Program Manager)

Official responsible for the overall procurement, development, 

integration, modification, or operation and maintenance of an 

information system.

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Information System 

Resilience

The ability of an information system to continue to: (i) operate 

under adverse conditions or stress, even if in a degraded or 

debilitated state, while maintaining essential operational 

capabilities; and (ii) recover to an effective operational posture in 

a time frame consistent with mission needs.

Information System

Security Officer

[CNSSI 4009]

Individual with assigned responsibility for maintaining the 

appropriate operational security posture for an information 

system or program.

Information System 

Service

A capability provided by an information system that facilitates 

information processing, storage, or transmission.

Information SystemRelated Security Risks

Risks that arise through the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or 

availability of information or information systems and that 

considers impacts to the organization (including assets, mission, 

functions, image, or reputation), individuals, other organizations, 

and the Nation. See Risk.

Information Technology

[40 U.S.C., Sec. 1401]

Any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of 

equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, 

manipulation, management, movement, control, display, 

switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or 

information by the executive agency. For purposes of the 

preceding sentence, equipment is used by an executive agency if 

the equipment is used by the executive agency directly or is used 

by a contractor under a contract with the executive agency which: 

(i) requires the use of such equipment; or (ii) requires the use, to a 

significant extent, of such equipment in the performance of a 

service or the furnishing of a product. The term information 

technology includes computers, ancillary equipment, software, 

firmware, and similar procedures, services (including support 

services), and related resources.

Information Technology 

Product

See Information System Component.

Information Type

[FIPS 199]

A specific category of information (e.g., privacy, medical, 

proprietary, financial, investigative, contractor-sensitive, security 

management) defined by an organization or in some instances, by 

a specific law, Executive Order, directive, policy, or regulation.

Insider

[Presidential Memorandum, 

National Insider Threat 

Policy and Minimum 

Standards for Executive 

Branch Insider Threat 

Programs]

Any person with authorized access to any U.S. Government 

resource, to include personnel, facilities, information, equipment, 

networks, or systems.

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Insider Threat

[Presidential Memorandum, 

National Insider Threat 

Policy and Minimum 

Standards for Executive 

Branch Insider Threat 

Programs]

The threat that an insider will use her/his authorized access, 

wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security of United 

States. This threat can include damage to the United States 

through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of national 

security information, or through the loss or degradation of 

departmental resources or capabilities.

[CNSSI 4009] An entity with authorized access (i.e., within the security domain) 

that has the potential to harm an information system or enterprise 

through destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or 

denial of service. 

Insider Threat Program

[Presidential Memorandum, 

National Insider Threat 

Policy and Minimum 

Standards for Executive 

Branch Insider Threat 

Programs]

A coordinated group of capabilities under centralized 

management that is organized to detect and prevent the 

unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information. At a minimum, 

for departments and agencies that handle classified information, 

an insider threat program shall consist of capabilities that provide 

access to information; centralized information integration, 

analysis, and response; employee insider threat awareness 

training; and the monitoring of user activity on government 

computers. For department and agencies that do not handle 

classified information, these can be employed effectively for 

safeguarding information that is unclassified but sensitive.

Integrity

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]

Guarding against improper information modification or 

destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation 

and authenticity.

Internal Network A network where: (i) the establishment, maintenance, and 

provisioning of security controls are under the direct control of 

organizational employees or contractors; or (ii) cryptographic 

encapsulation or similar security technology implemented 

between organization-controlled endpoints, provides the same 

effect (at least with regard to confidentiality and integrity). An 

internal network is typically organization-owned, yet may be 

organization-controlled while not being organization-owned.

Label See Security Label.

Line of Business The following OMB-defined process areas common to virtually 

all federal agencies: Case Management, Financial Management, 

Grants Management, Human Resources Management, Federal 

Health Architecture, Information Systems Security, Budget 

Formulation and Execution, Geospatial, and IT Infrastructure.

Local Access Access to an organizational information system by a user (or 

process acting on behalf of a user) communicating through a 

direct connection without the use of a network.

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Logical Access Control 

System

[FICAM Roadmap and 

Implementation Guidance]

An automated system that controls an individual’s ability to 

access one or more computer system resources such as a 

workstation, network, application, or database. A logical access 

control system requires validation of an individual’s identity 

through some mechanism such as a PIN, card, biometric, or other 

token. It has the capability to assign different access privileges to 

different persons depending on their roles and responsibilities in 

an organization.

Low-Impact System

[FIPS 200]

An information system in which all three security objectives (i.e., 

confidentiality, integrity, and availability) are assigned a FIPS

Publication 199 potential impact value of low.

Malicious Code Software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorized 

process that will have adverse impact on the confidentiality, 

integrity, or availability of an information system. A virus, worm, 

Trojan horse, or other code-based entity that infects a host.

Spyware and some forms of adware are also examples of 

malicious code.

Malware See Malicious Code.

Managed Interface An interface within an information system that provides boundary 

protection capability using automated mechanisms or devices.

Mandatory Access Control

[CNSSI 4009]

An access control policy that is uniformly enforced across all 

subjects and objects within the boundary of an information 

system. A subject that has been granted access to information is 

constrained from doing any of the following: (i) passing the 

information to unauthorized subjects or objects; (ii) granting its 

privileges to other subjects; (iii) changing one or more security 

attributes on subjects, objects, the information system, or system 

components; (iv) choosing the security attributes to be associated 

with newly-created or modified objects; or (v) changing the rules 

governing access control. Organization-defined subjects may 

explicitly be granted organization-defined privileges (i.e., they are 

trusted subjects) such that they are not limited by some or all of 

the above constraints.

A means of restricting access to objects based on the sensitivity 

(as represented by a security label) of the information contained 

in the objects and the formal authorization (i.e., clearance, formal 

access approvals, and need-to-know) of subjects to access 

information of such sensitivity. Mandatory Access Control is a 

type of nondiscretionary access control.

Marking See Security Marking.

Media

[FIPS 200]

Physical devices or writing surfaces including, but not limited to, 

magnetic tapes, optical disks, magnetic disks, Large-Scale 

Integration (LSI) memory chips, and printouts (but not including 

display media) onto which information is recorded, stored, or 

printed within an information system.

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Metadata Information describing the characteristics of data including, for 

example, structural metadata describing data structures (e.g., data 

format, syntax, and semantics) and descriptive metadata

describing data contents (e.g., information security labels).

Mobile Code Software programs or parts of programs obtained from remote 

information systems, transmitted across a network, and executed 

on a local information system without explicit installation or 

execution by the recipient.

Mobile Code Technologies Software technologies that provide the mechanisms for the 

production and use of mobile code (e.g., Java, JavaScript, 

ActiveX, VBScript).

Mobile Device A portable computing device that: (i) has a small form factor such 

that it can easily be carried by a single individual; (ii) is designed 

to operate without a physical connection (e.g., wirelessly transmit 

or receive information); (iii) possesses local, non-removable or 

removable data storage; and (iv) includes a self-contained power 

source. Mobile devices may also include voice communication 

capabilities, on-board sensors that allow the devices to capture 

information, and/or built-in features for synchronizing local data 

with remote locations. Examples include smart phones, tablets, 

and E-readers.

Moderate-Impact System

[FIPS 200]

An information system in which at least one security objective 

(i.e., confidentiality, integrity, or availability) is assigned a FIPS 

Publication 199 potential impact value of moderate and no 

security objective is assigned a FIPS Publication 199 potential 

impact value of high.

Multifactor Authentication Authentication using two or more different factors to achieve 

authentication. Factors include: (i) something you know (e.g.,

password/PIN); (ii) something you have (e.g., cryptographic 

identification device, token); or (iii) something you are (e.g., 

biometric). See Authenticator.

Multilevel Security

[CNSSI 4009]

Concept of processing information with different classifications 

and categories that simultaneously permits access by users with 

different security clearances and denies access to users who lack 

authorization.

Multiple Security Levels

[CNSSI 4009]

Capability of an information system that is trusted to contain, and 

maintain separation between, resources (particularly stored data) 

of different security domains.

National Security 

Emergency Preparedness 

Telecommunications 

Services

[47 C.F.R., Part 64, App A]

Telecommunications services that are used to maintain a state of 

readiness or to respond to and manage any event or crisis (local, 

national, or international) that causes or could cause injury or 

harm to the population, damage to or loss of property, or degrade 

or threaten the national security or emergency preparedness 

posture of the United States.

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National Security System

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]

Any information system (including any telecommunications 

system) used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an 

agency, or other organization on behalf of an agency—(i) the 

function, operation, or use of which involves intelligence 

activities; involves cryptologic activities related to national 

security; involves command and control of military forces; 

involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or 

weapons system; or is critical to the direct fulfillment of military 

or intelligence missions (excluding a system that is to be used for 

routine administrative and business applications, for example, 

payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel management 

applications); or (ii) is protected at all times by procedures 

established for information that have been specifically authorized 

under criteria established by an Executive Order or an Act of 

Congress to be kept classified in the interest of national defense

or foreign policy.

Network

[CNSSI 4009]

Information system(s) implemented with a collection of 

interconnected components. Such components may include 

routers, hubs, cabling, telecommunications controllers, key 

distribution centers, and technical control devices.

Network Access Access to an information system by a user (or a process acting on 

behalf of a user) communicating through a network (e.g., local 

area network, wide area network, Internet).

Nondiscretionary Access 

Control

See Mandatory Access Control.

Nonlocal Maintenance Maintenance activities conducted by individuals communicating 

through a network, either an external network (e.g., the Internet)

or an internal network.

Non-Organizational User A user who is not an organizational user (including public users).

Non-repudiation Protection against an individual falsely denying having performed 

a particular action. Provides the capability to determine whether a 

given individual took a particular action such as creating 

information, sending a message, approving information, and 

receiving a message.

NSA-Approved 

Cryptography

Cryptography that consists of: (i) an approved algorithm; (ii) an 

implementation that has been approved for the protection of 

classified information and/or controlled unclassified information 

in a particular environment; and (iii) a supporting key 

management infrastructure.

Object Passive information system-related entity (e.g., devices, files, 

records, tables, processes, programs, domains) containing or 

receiving information. Access to an object (by a subject) implies 

access to the information it contains. See Subject.

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Operations Security

[CNSSI 4009]

Systematic and proven process by which potential adversaries can 

be denied information about capabilities and intentions by 

identifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified 

evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive activities. The 

process involves five steps: identification of critical information, 

analysis of threats, analysis of vulnerabilities, assessment of risks, 

and application of appropriate countermeasures.

Organization

[FIPS 200, Adapted]

An entity of any size, complexity, or positioning within an 

organizational structure (e.g., a federal agency or, as appropriate, 

any of its operational elements).

Organizational User An organizational employee or an individual the organization 

deems to have equivalent status of an employee including, for 

example, contractor, guest researcher, individual detailed from 

another organization. Policy and procedures for granting 

equivalent status of employees to individuals may include needto-know, relationship to the organization, and citizenship.

Overlay A specification of security controls, control enhancements, 

supplemental guidance, and other supporting information 

employed during the tailoring process, that is intended to 

complement (and further refine) security control baselines. The 

overlay specification may be more stringent or less stringent than 

the original security control baseline specification and can be 

applied to multiple information systems.

Penetration Testing A test methodology in which assessors, typically working under 

specific constraints, attempt to circumvent or defeat the security 

features of an information system.

Personally Identifiable 

Information

[OMB Memorandum 07-16]

Information which can be used to distinguish or trace the identity 

of an individual (e.g., name, social security number, biometric 

records, etc.) alone, or when combined with other personal or 

identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific 

individual (e.g., date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, 

etc.).

Physical Access Control 

System

[FICAM Roadmap and 

Implementation Guidance]

An automated system that manages the passage of people or 

assets through an opening(s) in a secure perimeter(s) based on a 

set of authorization rules.

Plan of Action and

Milestones

[OMB Memorandum 02-01]

A document that identifies tasks needing to be accomplished. It 

details resources required to accomplish the elements of the plan, 

any milestones in meeting the tasks, and scheduled completion 

dates for the milestones.

Portable Storage Device An information system component that can be inserted into and 

removed from an information system, and that is used to store

data or information (e.g., text, video, audio, and/or image data). 

Such components are typically implemented on magnetic, optical, 

or solid state devices (e.g., floppy disks, compact/digital video 

disks, flash/thumb drives, external hard disk drives, and flash 

memory cards/drives that contain non-volatile memory).

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Potential Impact

[FIPS 199]

The loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could be 

expected to have: (i) a limited adverse effect (FIPS Publication 

199 low); (ii) a serious adverse effect (FIPS Publication 199 

moderate); or (iii) a severe or catastrophic adverse effect (FIPS

Publication 199 high) on organizational operations, 

organizational assets, or individuals.

Privacy Act Statement A disclosure statement required by Section (e)(3) of the Privacy 

Act of 1974, as amended, to appear on documents used by 

organizations to collect personally identifiable information from 

individuals to be maintained in a Privacy Act System of Records 

(SORN).

Privacy Impact 

Assessment

[OMB Memorandum 03-22]

An analysis of how information is handled: (i) to ensure handling 

conforms to applicable legal, regulatory, and policy requirements 

regarding privacy; (ii) to determine the risks and effects of 

collecting, maintaining, and disseminating information in 

identifiable form in an electronic information system; and (iii) to 

examine and evaluate protections and alternative processes for 

handling information to mitigate potential privacy risks.

Privileged Account An information system account with authorizations of a 

privileged user.

Privileged Command A human-initiated command executed on an information system 

involving the control, monitoring, or administration of the system 

including security functions and associated security-relevant 

information.

Privileged User

[CNSSI 4009]

A user that is authorized (and therefore, trusted) to perform 

security-relevant functions that ordinary users are not authorized 

to perform.

Protective Distribution 

System

Wire line or fiber optic system that includes adequate safeguards 

and/or countermeasures (e.g., acoustic, electric, electromagnetic, 

and physical) to permit its use for the transmission of unencrypted 

information.

Provenance The records describing the possession of, and changes to, 

components, component processes, information, systems, 

organization, and organizational processes. Provenance enables 

all changes to the baselines of components, component processes, 

information, systems, organizations, and organizational 

processes, to be reported to specific actors, functions, locales, or 

activities.

Public Key Infrastructure

[CNSSI 4009]

The framework and services that provide for the generation, 

production, distribution, control, accounting, and destruction of 

public key certificates. Components include the personnel, 

policies, processes, server platforms, software, and workstations 

used for the purpose of administering certificates and publicprivate key pairs, including the ability to issue, maintain, recover, 

and revoke public key certificates.

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Purge Rendering sanitized data unrecoverable by laboratory attack 

methods.

Reciprocity

[CNSSI 4009]

Mutual agreement among participating organizations to accept 

each other’s security assessments in order to reuse information 

system resources and/or to accept each other’s assessed security 

posture in order to share information.

Records The recordings (automated and/or manual) of evidence of 

activities performed or results achieved (e.g., forms, reports, test 

results), which serve as a basis for verifying that the organization 

and the information system are performing as intended. Also used 

to refer to units of related data fields (i.e., groups of data fields 

that can be accessed by a program and that contain the complete 

set of information on particular items).

Red Team Exercise An exercise, reflecting real-world conditions, that is conducted as 

a simulated adversarial attempt to compromise organizational 

missions and/or business processes to provide a comprehensive 

assessment of the security capability of the information system 

and organization.

Reference Monitor A set of design requirements on a reference validation mechanism

which as key component of an operating system, enforces an 

access control policy over all subjects and objects. A reference 

validation mechanism must be: (i) always invoked (i.e., complete 

mediation); (ii) tamperproof; and (iii) small enough to be subject 

to analysis and tests, the completeness of which can be assured 

(i.e., verifiable).

Remote Access Access to an organizational information system by a user (or a 

process acting on behalf of a user) communicating through an 

external network (e.g., the Internet).

Remote Maintenance Maintenance activities conducted by individuals communicating 

through an external network (e.g., the Internet).

Resilience See Information System Resilience.

Restricted Data

[Atomic Energy Act of 1954]

All data concerning (i) design, manufacture, or utilization of 

atomic weapons; (ii) the production of special nuclear material; or 

(iii) the use of special nuclear material in the production of 

energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from 

the Restricted Data category pursuant to Section 142 [of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954].

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Risk

[FIPS 200, Adapted]

A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a 

potential circumstance or event, and typically a function of: (i) 

the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event 

occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence.

Information system-related security risks are those risks that arise 

from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 

information or information systems and reflect the potential 

adverse impacts to organizational operations (including mission, 

functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, 

individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

Risk Assessment The process of identifying risks to organizational operations 

(including mission, functions, image, reputation), organizational 

assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, resulting 

from the operation of an information system.

Part of risk management, incorporates threat and vulnerability 

analyses, and considers mitigations provided by security controls 

planned or in place. Synonymous with risk analysis.

Risk Executive (Function)

[CNSSI 4009]

An individual or group within an organization that helps to ensure 

that: (i) security risk-related considerations for individual 

information systems, to include the authorization decisions for 

those systems, are viewed from an organization-wide perspective 

with regard to the overall strategic goals and objectives of the 

organization in carrying out its missions and business functions; 

and (ii) managing risk from individual information systems is 

consistent across the organization, reflects organizational risk 

tolerance, and is considered along with other organizational risks 

affecting mission/business success.

Risk Management

[CNSSI 4009, adapted]

The program and supporting processes to manage information 

security risk to organizational operations (including mission, 

functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals, 

other organizations, and the Nation, and includes: (i) establishing 

the context for risk-related activities; (ii) assessing risk; (iii) 

responding to risk once determined; and (iv) monitoring risk over 

time.

Risk Mitigation

[CNSSI 4009]

Prioritizing, evaluating, and implementing the appropriate riskreducing controls/countermeasures recommended from the risk 

management process.

Risk Monitoring Maintaining ongoing awareness of an organization’s risk 

environment, risk management program, and associated activities 

to support risk decisions.

Risk Response Accepting, avoiding, mitigating, sharing, or transferring risk to 

organizational operations (i.e., mission, functions, image, or 

reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other 

organizations, or the Nation.

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Role-Based Access 

Control

Access control based on user roles (i.e., a collection of access 

authorizations a user receives based on an explicit or implicit 

assumption of a given role). Role permissions may be inherited 

through a role hierarchy and typically reflect the permissions 

needed to perform defined functions within an organization. A 

given role may apply to a single individual or to several 

individuals.

Safeguards

[CNSSI 4009]

Protective measures prescribed to meet the security requirements 

(i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) specified for an 

information system. Safeguards may include security features, 

management constraints, personnel security, and security of 

physical structures, areas, and devices. Synonymous with security 

controls and countermeasures.

Sanitization Actions taken to render data written on media unrecoverable by 

both ordinary and, for some forms of sanitization, extraordinary 

means.

Process to remove information from media such that data 

recovery is not possible. It includes removing all classified labels, 

markings, and activity logs.

Scoping Considerations A part of tailoring guidance providing organizations with specific 

considerations on the applicability and implementation of security 

controls in the security control baseline. Areas of consideration 

include policy/regulatory, technology, physical infrastructure, 

system component allocation, operational/environmental, public 

access, scalability, common control, and security objective.

Security

[CNSSI 4009]

A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance 

of protective measures that enable an enterprise to perform its 

mission or critical functions despite risks posed by threats to its 

use of information systems. Protective measures may involve a 

combination of deterrence, avoidance, prevention, detection, 

recovery, and correction that should form part of the enterprise’s 

risk management approach.

Security Assessment See Security Control Assessment.

Security Assessment Plan The objectives for the security control assessment and a detailed 

roadmap of how to conduct such an assessment.

Security Assurance See Assurance.

Security Attribute An abstraction representing the basic properties or characteristics 

of an entity with respect to safeguarding information; typically 

associated with internal data structures (e.g., records, buffers, 

files) within the information system and used to enable the 

implementation of access control and flow control policies, 

reflect special dissemination, handling or distribution instructions, 

or support other aspects of the information security policy.

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Security Authorization See Authorization. 

Security Authorization 

Boundary

See Authorization Boundary.

Security Capability A combination of mutually-reinforcing security controls (i.e., 

safeguards and countermeasures) implemented by technical 

means (i.e., functionality in hardware, software, and firmware), 

physical means (i.e., physical devices and protective measures), 

and procedural means (i.e., procedures performed by individuals).

Security Categorization The process of determining the security category for information 

or an information system. Security categorization methodologies 

are described in CNSS Instruction 1253 for national security 

systems and in FIPS Publication 199 for other than national 

security systems. See Security Category.

Security Category

[FIPS 199, Adapted; CNSSI 

4009]

The characterization of information or an information system 

based on an assessment of the potential impact that a loss of 

confidentiality, integrity, or availability of such information or 

information system would have on organizational operations, 

organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the 

Nation.

Security Control

[FIPS 199, Adapted]

A safeguard or countermeasure prescribed for an information 

system or an organization designed to protect the confidentiality, 

integrity, and availability of its information and to meet a set of 

defined security requirements.

Security Control 

Assessment

[CNSSI 4009, Adapted]

The testing or evaluation of security controls to determine the 

extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating 

as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to 

meeting the security requirements for an information system or 

organization.

Security Control Assessor The individual, group, or organization responsible for conducting 

a security control assessment.

Security Control Baseline

[FIPS 200, Adapted]

The set of minimum security controls defined for a low-impact, 

moderate-impact, or high-impact information system that 

provides a starting point for the tailoring process.

Security Control 

Enhancement

Augmentation of a security control to: (i) build in additional, but 

related, functionality to the control; (ii) increase the strength of 

the control; or (iii) add assurance to the control.

Security Control 

Inheritance

[CNSSI 4009]

A situation in which an information system or application 

receives protection from security controls (or portions of security 

controls) that are developed, implemented, assessed, authorized, 

and monitored by entities other than those responsible for the 

system or application; entities either internal or external to the 

organization where the system or application resides. See 

Common Control.

Security Control Overlay See Overlay.

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Security Domain

[CNSSI 4009]

A domain that implements a security policy and is administered 

by a single authority.

Security Functionality The security-related features, functions, mechanisms, services, 

procedures, and architectures implemented within organizational 

information systems or the environments in which those systems 

operate.

Security Functions The hardware, software, and/or firmware of the information 

system responsible for enforcing the system security policy and 

supporting the isolation of code and data on which the protection 

is based.

Security Impact Analysis

[CNSSI 4009]

The analysis conducted by an organizational official to determine 

the extent to which changes to the information system have 

affected the security state of the system.

Security Incident See Incident.

Security Kernel

[CNSSI 4009]

Hardware, firmware, and software elements of a trusted 

computing base implementing the reference monitor concept. 

Security kernel must mediate all accesses, be protected from 

modification, and be verifiable as correct. 

Security Label The means used to associate a set of security attributes with a 

specific information object as part of the data structure for that 

object.

Security Marking The means used to associate a set of security attributes with 

objects in a human-readable form, to enable organizational 

process-based enforcement of information security policies.

Security Objective

[FIPS 199]

Confidentiality, integrity, or availability.

Security Plan Formal document that provides an overview of the security 

requirements for an information system or an information security 

program and describes the security controls in place or planned 

for meeting those requirements.

See System Security Plan or Information Security Program Plan.

Security Policy

[CNSSI 4009]

A set of criteria for the provision of security services.

Security Policy Filter A hardware and/or software component that performs one or 

more of the following functions: (i) content verification to ensure 

the data type of the submitted content; (ii) content inspection, 

analyzing the submitted content to verify it complies with a 

defined policy (e.g., allowed vs. disallowed file constructs and 

content portions); (iii) malicious content checker that evaluates 

the content for malicious code; (iv) suspicious activity checker 

that evaluates or executes the content in a safe manner, such as in 

a sandbox/detonation chamber and monitors for suspicious 

activity; or (v) content sanitization, cleansing, and transformation, 

which modifies the submitted content to comply with a defined 

policy.

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Security Requirement

[FIPS 200, Adapted]

A requirement levied on an information system or an organization 

that is derived from applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, 

policies, standards, instructions, regulations, procedures, and/or 

mission/business needs to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, 

and availability of information that is being processed, stored, or 

transmitted.

Note: Security requirements can be used in a variety of contexts from high-level 

policy-related activities to low-level implementation-related activities in system 

development and engineering disciplines.

Security Service

[CNSSI 4009]

A capability that supports one, or more, of the security 

requirements (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability). Examples 

of security services are key management, access control, and 

authentication. 

Security-Relevant 

Information

Any information within the information system that can 

potentially impact the operation of security functions or the 

provision of security services in a manner that could result in 

failure to enforce the system security policy or maintain isolation 

of code and data.

Senior Agency 

Information Security 

Officer

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3544]

Official responsible for carrying out the Chief Information 

Officer responsibilities under FISMA and serving as the Chief 

Information Officer’s primary liaison to the agency’s authorizing 

officials, information system owners, and information system 

security officers.

Note: Organizations subordinate to federal agencies may use the term Senior 

Information Security Officer or Chief Information Security Officer to denote 

individuals filling positions with similar responsibilities to Senior Agency 

Information Security Officers.

Senior Agency Official for 

Privacy

The senior organizational official with overall organization-wide 

responsibility for information privacy issues.

Senior Information 

Security Officer

See Senior Agency Information Security Officer.

Sensitive Information

[CNSSI 4009, Adapted]

Information where the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access or 

modification could adversely affect the national interest or the 

conduct of federal programs, or the privacy to which individuals 

are entitled under 5 U.S.C. Section 552a (the Privacy Act); that 

has not been specifically authorized under criteria established by 

an Executive Order or an Act of Congress to be kept classified in 

the interest of national defense or foreign policy.

Sensitive Compartmented 

Information

[CNSSI 4009]

Classified information concerning or derived from intelligence 

sources, methods, or analytical processes, which is required to be 

handled within formal access control systems established by the 

Director of National Intelligence. 

Service-Oriented 

Architecture

A set of principles and methodologies for designing and 

developing software in the form of interoperable services. These 

services are well-defined business functions that are built as 

software components (i.e., discrete pieces of code and/or data 

structures) that can be reused for different purposes.

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Software

[CNSSI 4009]

Computer programs and associated data that may be dynamically 

written or modified during execution.

Spam The abuse of electronic messaging systems to indiscriminately 

send unsolicited bulk messages.

Special Access Program

[CNSSI 4009]

A program established for a specific class of classified 

information that imposes safeguarding and access requirements 

that exceed those normally required for information at the same 

classification level.

Spyware Software that is secretly or surreptitiously installed into an 

information system to gather information on individuals or 

organizations without their knowledge; a type of malicious code.

Subject Generally an individual, process, or device causing information to 

flow among objects or change to the system state. See Object.

Subsystem A major subdivision or component of an information system 

consisting of information, information technology, and personnel 

that performs one or more specific functions.

Supplemental Guidance Statements used to provide additional explanatory information for

security controls or security control enhancements.

Supplementation The process of adding security controls or control enhancements 

to a security control baseline as part of the tailoring process 

(during security control selection) in order to adequately meet the 

organization’s risk management needs.

Supply Chain

[ISO 28001, Adapted]

Linked set of resources and processes between multiple tiers of 

developers that begins with the sourcing of products and services 

and extends through the design, development, manufacturing, 

processing, handling, and delivery of products and services to the 

acquirer.

Supply Chain Element An information technology product or product component that 

contains programmable logic and that is critically important to the 

functioning of an information system.

System See Information System.

System of Records Notice An official public notice of an organization’s system(s) of 

records, as required by the Privacy Act of 1974, that identifies: (i) 

the purpose for the system of records; (ii) the individuals covered 

by information in the system of records; (iii) the categories of 

records maintained about individuals; and (iv) the ways in which 

the information is shared.

System Security Plan

[NIST SP 800-18]

Formal document that provides an overview of the security 

requirements for an information system and describes the security 

controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements.

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System-Specific Security 

Control

A security control for an information system that has not been 

designated as a common security control or the portion of a 

hybrid control that is to be implemented within an information 

system.

Tailored Security Control 

Baseline

A set of security controls resulting from the application of 

tailoring guidance to a security control baseline. See Tailoring.

Tailoring The process by which security control baselines are modified by: 

(i) identifying and designating common controls; (ii) applying 

scoping considerations on the applicability and implementation of 

baseline controls; (iii) selecting compensating security controls; 

(iv) assigning specific values to organization-defined security 

control parameters; (v) supplementing baselines with additional 

security controls or control enhancements; and (vi) providing 

additional specification information for control implementation.

Threat

[CNSSI 4009, Adapted]

Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact 

organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or 

reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other 

organizations, or the Nation through an information system via 

unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of 

information, and/or denial of service.

Threat Assessment

[CNSSI 4009]

Formal description and evaluation of threat to an information 

system.

Threat Source

[FIPS 200]

The intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation of a 

vulnerability or a situation and method that may accidentally 

trigger a vulnerability. Synonymous with threat agent.

Trusted Path A mechanism by which a user (through an input device) can 

communicate directly with the security functions of the 

information system with the necessary confidence to support the 

system security policy. This mechanism can only be activated by 

the user or the security functions of the information system and 

cannot be imitated by untrusted software.

Trustworthiness

[CNSSI 4009]

The attribute of a person or enterprise that provides confidence to 

others of the qualifications, capabilities, and reliability of that 

entity to perform specific tasks and fulfill assigned 

responsibilities.

Trustworthiness

(Information System)

The degree to which an information system (including the 

information technology components that are used to build the

system) can be expected to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, 

and availability of the information being processed, stored, or 

transmitted by the system across the full range of threats. A 

trustworthy information system is a system that is believed to be 

capable of operating within defined levels of risk despite the 

environmental disruptions, human errors, structural failures, and 

purposeful attacks that are expected to occur in its environment of 

operation.

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User

[CNSSI 4009, adapted]

Individual, or (system) process acting on behalf of an individual, 

authorized to access an information system.

See Organizational User and Non-Organizational User.

Virtual Private Network

[CNSSI 4009]

Protected information system link utilizing tunneling, security 

controls, and endpoint address translation giving the impression 

of a dedicated line.

Vulnerability

[CNSSI 4009]

Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, 

internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or 

triggered by a threat source.

Vulnerability Analysis See Vulnerability Assessment.

Vulnerability Assessment

[CNSSI 4009]

Systematic examination of an information system or product to 

determine the adequacy of security measures, identify security 

deficiencies, provide data from which to predict the effectiveness 

of proposed security measures, and confirm the adequacy of such 

measures after implementation.

Whitelisting The process used to identify: (i) software programs that are 

authorized to execute on an information system; or (ii) authorized 

Universal Resource Locators (URL)/websites.

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APPENDIX C

ACRONYMS

COMMON ABBREVIATIONS

APT Advanced Persistent Threat

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CIO Chief Information Officer

CISO Chief Information Security Officer

CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program

CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program

CNSS Committee on National Security Systems

CPO Chief Privacy Officer

CUI Controlled Unclassified Information

DCS Distributed Control System

DNS Domain Name System

DoD Department of Defense

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

FEA Federal Enterprise Architecture

FICAM Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management

FIPP Fair Information Practice Principles

FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards

FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive

ICS Industrial Control System

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

IPsec Internet Protocol Security

ISO/IEC International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical 

Commission

ITL Information Technology Laboratory

LACS Logical Access Control System

LSI Large-Scale Integration

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

NISTIR National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency or Internal Report

NSA National Security Agency

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NSTISSI National Security Telecommunications and Information System Security 

Instruction

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OPSEC Operations Security

PBX Private Branch Exchange

PACS Physical Access Control System

PIA Privacy Impact Assessment

PII Personally Identifiable Information

PIV Personal Identity Verification

PKI Public Key Infrastructure

RBAC Role-Based Access Control

RD Restricted Data

RMF Risk Management Framework

SAISO Senior Agency Information Security Officer

SAMI Sources And Methods Information

SAOP Senior Agency Official for Privacy

SAP Special Access Program

SC Security Category

SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information

SOA Service-Oriented Architecture

SORN System of Records Notice

SP Special Publication

TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol

USB Universal Serial Bus

VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol

VPN Virtual Private Network

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APPENDIX D

SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES – SUMMARY

LOW-IMPACT, MODERATE-IMPACT, AND HIGH-IMPACT INFORMATION SYSTEMS

his appendix contains the security control baselines that represent the starting point in 

determining the security controls for low-impact, moderate-impact, and high-impact 

information systems.90 The three security control baselines are hierarchical in nature with 

regard to the security controls employed in those baselines.

91 If a security control is selected for 

one of the baselines, the family identifier and control number are listed in the appropriate column.

If a security control is not used in a particular baseline, the entry is marked not selected. Security 

control enhancements, when used to supplement security controls, are indicated by the number of 

the enhancement. For example, the IR-2 (1) (2) entry in the high baseline for IR-2 indicates that 

the second control from the Incident Response family has been selected along with control 

enhancements (1) and (2). Some security controls and enhancements are not used in any of the 

baselines in this appendix but are available for use by organizations if needed. This situation 

occurs, for example, when the results of a risk assessment indicate the need for additional security 

controls or control enhancements in order to adequately mitigate risk to organizational operations 

and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

Organizations can use the recommended priority code designation associated with each security 

control in the baselines to assist in making sequencing decisions for control implementation (i.e., 

a Priority Code 1 [P1] control has a higher priority for implementation than a Priority Code 2 [P2]

control; a Priority Code 2 [P2] control has a higher priority for implementation than a Priority 

Code 3 [P3] control, and a Priority Code 0 [P0] indicates the security control is not selected in 

any baseline). This recommended sequencing prioritization helps ensure that security controls 

upon which other controls depend are implemented first, thus enabling organizations to deploy 

controls in a more structured and timely manner in accordance with available resources. The 

implementation of security controls by sequence priority code does not imply any defined level of 

risk mitigation until all controls in the security plan have been implemented. The priority codes 

are used only for implementation sequencing, not for making security control selection decisions.

Table D-1 summarizes sequence priority codes for the baseline security controls in Table D-2.

TABLE D-1: SECURITY CONTROL PRIORITIZATION CODES

Priority Code Sequencing Action

Priority Code 1 (P1) FIRST Implement P1 security controls first.

Priority Code 2 (P2) NEXT Implement P2 security controls after implementation of P1 controls.

Priority Code 3 (P3) LAST Implement P3 security controls after implementation of P1 and P2 controls.

Unspecified Priority Code (P0) NONE Security control not selected in any baseline.

90 A complete description of all security controls is provided in Appendices F and G. In addition, separate documents 

for individual security control baselines (listed as Annexes 1, 2, and 3) are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications. 

An online version of the catalog of security controls is also available at http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/800-53/home. 

91 The hierarchical nature applies to the security requirements of each control (i.e., the base control plus all of its 

enhancements) at the low-impact, moderate-impact, and high-impact level in that the control requirements at a 

particular impact level (e.g., CP-4 Contingency Plan Testing—Moderate: CP-4(1)) meets a stronger set of security 

requirements for that control than the next lower impact level of the same control (e.g., CP-4 Contingency Plan 

Testing—Low: CP-4).

T

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Table D-2 provides a summary of the security controls and control enhancements from Appendix 

F that have been allocated to the initial security control baselines (i.e., low, moderate, and high). 

The sequence priority codes for security control implementation and those security controls that 

have been withdrawn from Appendix F are also indicated in Table D-2. In addition to Table D-2, 

the sequence priority codes and security control baselines are annotated in a priority and baseline 

allocation summary section below each security control in Appendix F.

TABLE D-2: SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES92

CNTL

NO. CONTROL NAME

PRIORITY

INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

Access Control

AC-1 Access Control Policy and Procedures P1 AC-1 AC-1 AC-1

AC-2 Account Management P1 AC-2 AC-2 (1) (2) (3) 

(4)

AC-2 (1) (2) (3) 

(4) (5) (11) (12) 

(13)

AC-3 Access Enforcement P1 AC-3 AC-3 AC-3

AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement P1 Not Selected AC-4 AC-4

AC-5 Separation of Duties P1 Not Selected AC-5 AC-5 

AC-6 Least Privilege P1 Not Selected AC-6 (1) (2) (5)

(9) (10)

AC-6 (1) (2) (3) 

(5) (9) (10)

AC-7 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts P2 AC-7 AC-7 AC-7

AC-8 System Use Notification P1 AC-8 AC-8 AC-8

AC-9 Previous Logon (Access) Notification P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

AC-10 Concurrent Session Control P3 Not Selected Not Selected AC-10 

AC-11 Session Lock P3 Not Selected AC-11 (1) AC-11 (1)

AC-12 Session Termination P2 Not Selected AC-12 AC-12

AC-13 Withdrawn --- --- --- ---

AC-14 Permitted Actions without Identification or 

Authentication

P3 AC-14 AC-14 AC-14

AC-15 Withdrawn --- --- --- --- 

AC-16 Security Attributes P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

AC-17 Remote Access P1 AC-17 AC-17 (1) (2) 

(3) (4)

AC-17 (1) (2) 

(3) (4)

AC-18 Wireless Access P1 AC-18 AC-18 (1) AC-18 (1) (4)

(5)

AC-19 Access Control for Mobile Devices P1 AC-19 AC-19 (5) AC-19 (5)

AC-20 Use of External Information Systems P1 AC-20 AC-20 (1) (2) AC-20 (1) (2)

AC-21 Information Sharing P2 Not Selected AC-21 AC-21

AC-22 Publicly Accessible Content P3 AC-22 AC-22 AC-22

AC-23 Data Mining Protection P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

AC-24 Access Control Decisions P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

AC-25 Reference Monitor P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

92 The security control baselines in Table D-2 are the initial baselines selected by organizations prior to conducting the 

tailoring activities described in Section 3.2. The control baselines and priority codes are only applicable to non-national 

security systems. Security control baselines for national security systems are included in CNSS Instruction 1253.

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CNTL

NO. CONTROL NAME

PRIORITY

INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

Awareness and Training

AT-1 Security Awareness and Training Policy and 

Procedures

P1 AT-1 AT-1 AT-1 

AT-2 Security Awareness Training P1 AT-2 AT-2 (2) AT-2 (2)

AT-3 Role-Based Security Training P1 AT-3 AT-3 AT-3 

AT-4 Security Training Records P3 AT-4 AT-4 AT-4 

AT-5 Withdrawn --- --- --- ---

Audit and Accountability

AU-1 Audit and Accountability Policy and 

Procedures

P1 AU-1 AU-1 AU-1 

AU-2 Audit Events P1 AU-2 AU-2 (3) AU-2 (3)

AU-3 Content of Audit Records P1 AU-3 AU-3 (1) AU-3 (1) (2)

AU-4 Audit Storage Capacity P1 AU-4 AU-4 AU-4

AU-5 Response to Audit Processing Failures P1 AU-5 AU-5 AU-5 (1) (2)

AU-6 Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting P1 AU-6 AU-6 (1) (3) AU-6 (1) (3) (5) 

(6)

AU-7 Audit Reduction and Report Generation P2 Not Selected AU-7 (1) AU-7 (1)

AU-8 Time Stamps P1 AU-8 AU-8 (1) AU-8 (1)

AU-9 Protection of Audit Information P1 AU-9 AU-9 (4) AU-9 (2) (3) (4)

AU-10 Non-repudiation P2 Not Selected Not Selected AU-10

AU-11 Audit Record Retention P3 AU-11 AU-11 AU-11

AU-12 Audit Generation P1 AU-12 AU-12 AU-12 (1) (3)

AU-13 Monitoring for Information Disclosure P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

AU-14 Session Audit P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

AU-15 Alternate Audit Capability P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

AU-16 Cross-Organizational Auditing P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

Security Assessment and Authorization

CA-1 Security Assessment and Authorization 

Policies and Procedures

P1 CA-1 CA-1 CA-1 

CA-2 Security Assessments P2 CA-2 CA-2 (1) CA-2 (1) (2)

CA-3 System Interconnections P1 CA-3 CA-3 (5) CA-3 (5)

CA-4 Withdrawn --- --- --- ---

CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones P3 CA-5 CA-5 CA-5 

CA-6 Security Authorization P2 CA-6 CA-6 CA-6 

CA-7 Continuous Monitoring P2 CA-7 CA-7 (1) CA-7 (1)

CA-8 Penetration Testing P2 Not Selected Not Selected CA-8

CA-9 Internal System Connections P2 CA-9 CA-9 CA-9

Configuration Management

CM-1 Configuration Management Policy and 

Procedures

P1 CM-1 CM-1 CM-1

CM-2 Baseline Configuration P1 CM-2 CM-2 (1) (3) (7) CM-2 (1) (2) (3) 

(7)

CM-3 Configuration Change Control P1 Not Selected CM-3 (2) CM-3 (1) (2)

CM-4 Security Impact Analysis P2 CM-4 CM-4 CM-4 (1)

CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change P1 Not Selected CM-5 CM-5 (1) (2) (3)

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CNTL

NO. CONTROL NAME

PRIORITY

INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

CM-6 Configuration Settings P1 CM-6 CM-6 CM-6 (1) (2)

CM-7 Least Functionality P1 CM-7 CM-7 (1) (2) (4) CM-7 (1) (2) (5)

CM-8 Information System Component Inventory P1 CM-8 CM-8 (1) (3) (5) CM-8 (1) (2) (3) 

(4) (5)

CM-9 Configuration Management Plan P1 Not Selected CM-9 CM-9

CM-10 Software Usage Restrictions P2 CM-10 CM-10 CM-10

CM-11 User-Installed Software P1 CM-11 CM-11 CM-11

Contingency Planning

CP-1 Contingency Planning Policy and 

Procedures

P1 CP-1 CP-1 CP-1 

CP-2 Contingency Plan P1 CP-2 CP-2 (1) (3) (8) CP-2 (1) (2) (3)

(4) (5) (8)

CP-3 Contingency Training P2 CP-3 CP-3 CP-3 (1)

CP-4 Contingency Plan Testing P2 CP-4 CP-4 (1) CP-4 (1) (2)

CP-5 Withdrawn --- --- --- ---

CP-6 Alternate Storage Site P1 Not Selected CP-6 (1) (3) CP-6 (1) (2) (3)

CP-7 Alternate Processing Site P1 Not Selected CP-7 (1) (2) (3) CP-7 (1) (2) (3) 

(4)

CP-8 Telecommunications Services P1 Not Selected CP-8 (1) (2) CP-8 (1) (2) (3) 

(4)

CP-9 Information System Backup P1 CP-9 CP-9 (1) CP-9 (1) (2) (3)

(5)

CP-10 Information System Recovery and 

Reconstitution

P1 CP-10 CP-10 (2) CP-10 (2) (4)

CP-11 Alternate Communications Protocols P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

CP-12 Safe Mode P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

CP-13 Alternative Security Mechanisms P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

Identification and Authentication

IA-1 Identification and Authentication Policy and 

Procedures

P1 IA-1 IA-1 IA-1 

IA-2 Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

P1 IA-2 (1) (12) IA-2 (1) (2) (3) 

(8) (11) (12)

IA-2 (1) (2) (3) 

(4) (8) (9) (11) 

(12)

IA-3 Device Identification and Authentication P1 Not Selected IA-3 IA-3 

IA-4 Identifier Management P1 IA-4 IA-4 IA-4

IA-5 Authenticator Management P1 IA-5 (1) (11) IA-5 (1) (2) (3) 

(11)

IA-5 (1) (2) (3) 

(11)

IA-6 Authenticator Feedback P2 IA-6 IA-6 IA-6 

IA-7 Cryptographic Module Authentication P1 IA-7 IA-7 IA-7 

IA-8 Identification and Authentication (NonOrganizational Users)P1 IA-8 (1) (2) (3) 

(4)

IA-8 (1) (2) (3) 

(4)

IA-8 (1) (2) (3) 

(4)

IA-9 Service Identification and Authentication P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

IA-10 Adaptive Identification and Authentication P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

IA-11 Re-authentication P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

Incident Response

IR-1 Incident Response Policy and Procedures P1 IR-1 IR-1 IR-1 

IR-2 Incident Response Training P2 IR-2 IR-2 IR-2 (1) (2)

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CNTL

NO. CONTROL NAME

PRIORITY

INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

IR-3 Incident Response Testing P2 Not Selected IR-3 (2) IR-3 (2)

IR-4 Incident Handling P1 IR-4 IR-4 (1) IR-4 (1) (4)

IR-5 Incident Monitoring P1 IR-5 IR-5 IR-5 (1)

IR-6 Incident Reporting P1 IR-6 IR-6 (1) IR-6 (1)

IR-7 Incident Response Assistance P2 IR-7 IR-7 (1) IR-7 (1)

IR-8 Incident Response Plan P1 IR-8 IR-8 IR-8

IR-9 Information Spillage Response P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

IR-10 Integrated Information Security Analysis 

Team

P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

Maintenance

MA-1 System Maintenance Policy and Procedures P1 MA-1 MA-1 MA-1 

MA-2 Controlled Maintenance P2 MA-2 MA-2 MA-2 (2)

MA-3 Maintenance Tools P3 Not Selected MA-3 (1) (2) MA-3 (1) (2) (3)

MA-4 Nonlocal Maintenance P2 MA-4 MA-4 (2) MA-4 (2) (3)

MA-5 Maintenance Personnel P2 MA-5 MA-5 MA-5 (1)

MA-6 Timely Maintenance P2 Not Selected MA-6 MA-6 

Media Protection

MP-1 Media Protection Policy and Procedures P1 MP-1 MP-1 MP-1 

MP-2 Media Access P1 MP-2 MP-2 MP-2

MP-3 Media Marking P2 Not Selected MP-3 MP-3

MP-4 Media Storage P1 Not Selected MP-4 MP-4

MP-5 Media Transport P1 Not Selected MP-5 (4) MP-5 (4)

MP-6 Media Sanitization P1 MP-6 MP-6 MP-6 (1) (2) (3)

MP-7 Media Use P1 MP-7 MP-7 (1) MP-7 (1)

MP-8 Media Downgrading P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

Physical and Environmental Protection

PE-1 Physical and Environmental Protection 

Policy and Procedures

P1 PE-1 PE-1 PE-1 

PE-2 Physical Access Authorizations P1 PE-2 PE-2 PE-2 

PE-3 Physical Access Control P1 PE-3 PE-3 PE-3 (1) 

PE-4 Access Control for Transmission Medium P1 Not Selected PE-4 PE-4

PE-5 Access Control for Output Devices P2 Not Selected PE-5 PE-5 

PE-6 Monitoring Physical Access P1 PE-6 PE-6 (1) PE-6 (1) (4)

PE-7 Withdrawn --- --- --- ---

PE-8 Visitor Access Records P3 PE-8 PE-8 PE-8 (1)

PE-9 Power Equipment and Cabling P1 Not Selected PE-9 PE-9 

PE-10 Emergency Shutoff P1 Not Selected PE-10 PE-10

PE-11 Emergency Power P1 Not Selected PE-11 PE-11 (1)

PE-12 Emergency Lighting P1 PE-12 PE-12 PE-12 

PE-13 Fire Protection P1 PE-13 PE-13 (3) PE-13 (1) (2) 

(3)

PE-14 Temperature and Humidity Controls P1 PE-14 PE-14 PE-14 

PE-15 Water Damage Protection P1 PE-15 PE-15 PE-15 (1) 

PE-16 Delivery and Removal P2 PE-16 PE-16 PE-16 

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CNTL

NO. CONTROL NAME

PRIORITY

INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

PE-17 Alternate Work Site P2 Not Selected PE-17 PE-17 

PE-18 Location of Information System Components P3 Not Selected Not Selected PE-18

PE-19 Information Leakage P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

PE-20 Asset Monitoring and Tracking P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

Planning

PL-1 Security Planning Policy and Procedures P1 PL-1 PL-1 PL-1 

PL-2 System Security Plan P1 PL-2 PL-2 (3) PL-2 (3)

PL-3 Withdrawn --- --- --- ---

PL-4 Rules of Behavior P2 PL-4 PL-4 (1) PL-4 (1)

PL-5 Withdrawn --- --- --- ---

PL-6 Withdrawn --- --- --- ---

PL-7 Security Concept of Operations P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

PL-8 Information Security Architecture P1 Not Selected PL-8 PL-8

PL-9 Central Management P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

Personnel Security

PS-1 Personnel Security Policy and Procedures P1 PS-1 PS-1 PS-1 

PS-2 Position Risk Designation P1 PS-2 PS-2 PS-2 

PS-3 Personnel Screening P1 PS-3 PS-3 PS-3 

PS-4 Personnel Termination P1 PS-4 PS-4 PS-4 (2)

PS-5 Personnel Transfer P2 PS-5 PS-5 PS-5 

PS-6 Access Agreements P3 PS-6 PS-6 PS-6 

PS-7 Third-Party Personnel Security P1 PS-7 PS-7 PS-7

PS-8 Personnel Sanctions P3 PS-8 PS-8 PS-8

Risk Assessment

RA-1 Risk Assessment Policy and Procedures P1 RA-1 RA-1 RA-1 

RA-2 Security Categorization P1 RA-2 RA-2 RA-2

RA-3 Risk Assessment P1 RA-3 RA-3 RA-3 

RA-4 Withdrawn --- --- --- ---

RA-5 Vulnerability Scanning P1 RA-5 RA-5 (1) (2) (5) RA-5 (1) (2) (4) 

(5)

RA-6 Technical Surveillance Countermeasures 

Survey

P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

System and Services Acquisition

SA-1 System and Services Acquisition Policy and 

Procedures

P1 SA-1 SA-1 SA-1 

SA-2 Allocation of Resources P1 SA-2 SA-2 SA-2 

SA-3 System Development Life Cycle P1 SA-3 SA-3 SA-3 

SA-4 Acquisition Process P1 SA-4 (10) SA-4 (1) (2) (9) 

(10)

SA-4 (1) (2) (9)

(10)

SA-5 Information System Documentation P2 SA-5 SA-5 SA-5

SA-6 Withdrawn --- --- --- ---

SA-7 Withdrawn --- --- --- ---

SA-8 Security Engineering Principles P1 Not Selected SA-8 SA-8 

SA-9 External Information System Services P1 SA-9 SA-9 (2) SA-9 (2)

APPENDIX D PAGE D-6
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CNTL

NO. CONTROL NAME

PRIORITY

INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management P1 Not Selected SA-10 SA-10

SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation P1 Not Selected SA-11 SA-11

SA-12 Supply Chain Protection P1 Not Selected Not Selected SA-12

SA-13 Trustworthiness P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SA-14 Criticality Analysis P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SA-15 Development Process, Standards, and 

Tools

P2 Not Selected Not Selected SA-15

SA-16 Developer-Provided Training P2 Not Selected Not Selected SA-16

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and Design P1 Not Selected Not Selected SA-17

SA-18 Tamper Resistance and Detection P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SA-19 Component Authenticity P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SA-20 Customized Development of Critical 

Components

P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SA-21 Developer Screening P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SA-22 Unsupported System Components P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

System and Communications Protection

SC-1 System and Communications Protection 

Policy and Procedures

P1 SC-1 SC-1 SC-1 

SC-2 Application Partitioning P1 Not Selected SC-2 SC-2 

SC-3 Security Function Isolation P1 Not Selected Not Selected SC-3

SC-4 Information in Shared Resources P1 Not Selected SC-4 SC-4 

SC-5 Denial of Service Protection P1 SC-5 SC-5 SC-5 

SC-6 Resource Availability P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected 

SC-7 Boundary Protection P1 SC-7 SC-7 (3) (4) (5) 

(7)

SC-7 (3) (4) (5) 

(7) (8) (18) (21)

SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity P1 Not Selected SC-8 (1) SC-8 (1)

SC-9 Withdrawn --- --- --- ---

SC-10 Network Disconnect P2 Not Selected SC-10 SC-10 

SC-11 Trusted Path P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and 

Management 

P1 SC-12 SC-12 SC-12 (1) 

SC-13 Cryptographic Protection P1 SC-13 SC-13 SC-13 

SC-14 Withdrawn --- --- --- ---

SC-15 Collaborative Computing Devices P1 SC-15 SC-15 SC-15 

SC-16 Transmission of Security Attributes P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-17 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates P1 Not Selected SC-17 SC-17 

SC-18 Mobile Code P2 Not Selected SC-18 SC-18 

SC-19 Voice Over Internet Protocol P1 Not Selected SC-19 SC-19

SC-20 Secure Name /Address Resolution Service

(Authoritative Source)

P1 SC-20 SC-20 SC-20

SC-21 Secure Name /Address Resolution Service

(Recursive or Caching Resolver)

P1 SC-21 SC-21 SC-21

SC-22 Architecture and Provisioning for

Name/Address Resolution Service

P1 SC-22 SC-22 SC-22

SC-23 Session Authenticity P1 Not Selected SC-23 SC-23

SC-24 Fail in Known State P1 Not Selected Not Selected SC-24

APPENDIX D PAGE D-7
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CNTL

NO. CONTROL NAME

PRIORITY

INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SC-25 Thin Nodes P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-26 Honeypots P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-27 Platform-Independent Applications P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest P1 Not Selected SC-28 SC-28

SC-29 Heterogeneity P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-30 Concealment and Misdirection P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-31 Covert Channel Analysis P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-32 Information System Partitioning P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-33 Withdrawn --- --- --- ---

SC-34 Non-Modifiable Executable Programs P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-35 Honeyclients P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-36 Distributed Processing and Storage P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-37 Out-of-Band Channels P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-38 Operations Security P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-39 Process Isolation P1 SC-39 SC-39 SC-39

SC-40 Wireless Link Protection P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-41 Port and I/O Device Access P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-42 Sensor Capability and Data P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-43 Usage Restrictions P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SC-44 Detonation Chambers P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

System and Information Integrity

SI-1 System and Information Integrity Policy and 

Procedures

P1 SI-1 SI-1 SI-1 

SI-2 Flaw Remediation P1 SI-2 SI-2 (2) SI-2 (1) (2)

SI-3 Malicious Code Protection P1 SI-3 SI-3 (1) (2) SI-3 (1) (2)

SI-4 Information System Monitoring P1 SI-4 SI-4 (2) (4) (5) SI-4 (2) (4) (5) 

SI-5 Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives P1 SI-5 SI-5 SI-5 (1)

SI-6 Security Function Verification P1 Not Selected Not Selected SI-6

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

P1 Not Selected SI-7 (1) (7) SI-7 (1) (2) (5) 

(7) (14)

SI-8 Spam Protection P2 Not Selected SI-8 (1) (2) SI-8 (1) (2)

SI-9 Withdrawn --- --- --- ---

SI-10 Information Input Validation P1 Not Selected SI-10 SI-10

SI-11 Error Handling P2 Not Selected SI-11 SI-11

SI-12 Information Handling and Retention P2 SI-12 SI-12 SI-12

SI-13 Predictable Failure Prevention P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SI-14 Non-Persistence P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SI-15 Information Output Filtering P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

SI-16 Memory Protection P1 Not Selected SI-16 SI-16

SI-17 Fail-Safe Procedures P0 Not Selected Not Selected Not Selected

APPENDIX D PAGE D-8
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Tables D-3 through D-19 provide a more detailed summary of the security controls and control 

enhancements in Appendix F. Each table focuses on a different security control family. Whereas 

Table D-2 includes only those security controls and control enhancements allocated to the three 

security control baselines, Tables D-3 through D-19 include all controls and enhancements for the 

respective security control families. The tables include the following information: (i) the security 

controls and control enhancements that have been selected for the security control baselines as

indicated by an “x” in the column for the selected baseline;

93 (ii) the security controls and control 

enhancements that have not been selected for any security control baseline (i.e., the controls and 

control enhancements available for selection to achieve greater protection) as indicated by blank 

cells in the baseline columns; (iii) the security controls and control enhancements that have been 

withdrawn from Appendix F as indicated by an “x” in the respective withdrawn column; and (iv) 

the security controls and control enhancements that have assurance-related characteristics or 

properties (i.e., assurance-related controls) as indicated by an “x” in the respective assurance 

column. Assurance-related controls are discussed in greater detail in Appendix E to include the 

allocation of such controls to security control baselines (see Tables E-1 through E-3).

93 The security control baselines in Tables D-3 through D-19 are only applicable to non-national security systems.

Security control baselines for national security systems are included in CNSS Instruction 1253.

APPENDIX D PAGE D-9

 
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TABLE D-3: SUMMARY — ACCESS CONTROLS

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

AC-1 Access Control Policy and Procedures x x x x

AC-2 Account Management x x x

AC-2(1) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED SYSTEM ACCOUNT 

MANAGEMENT

x x

AC-2(2) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | REMOVAL OF TEMPORARY / EMERGENCY 

ACCOUNTS

x x

AC-2(3) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE INACTIVE ACCOUNTS x x

AC-2(4) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED AUDIT ACTIONS x x

AC-2(5) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | INACTIVITY LOGOUT x

AC-2(6) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC PRIVILEGE MANAGEMENT

AC-2(7) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ROLE-BASED SCHEMES

AC-2(8) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC ACCOUNT CREATION

AC-2(9) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF SHARED /

GROUP ACCOUNTS

AC-2(10) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | SHARED / GROUP ACCOUNT CREDENTIAL 

TERMINATION

AC-2(11) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | USAGE CONDITIONS x

AC-2(12) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ACCOUNT MONITORING / ATYPICAL USAGE x

AC-2(13) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE ACCOUNTS FOR HIGH-RISK 

INDIVIDUALS

x

AC-3 Access Enforcement x x x

AC-3(1) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | RESTRICTED ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED 

FUNCTIONS

x Incorporated into AC-6.

AC-3(2) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

AC-3(3) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL

AC-3(4) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL

AC-3(5) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY-RELEVANT INFORMATION

AC-3(6) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | PROTECTION OF USER AND SYSTEM 

INFORMATION

x Incorporated into MP-4 and SC-28.

AC-3(7) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL

AC-3(8) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | REVOCATION OF ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS

AC-3(9) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | CONTROLLED RELEASE

AC-3(10) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | AUDITED OVERRIDE OF ACCESS CONTROL 

MECHANISMS

AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement x x

AC-4(1) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | OBJECT SECURITY ATTRIBUTES

AC-4(2) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PROCESSING DOMAINS

AC-4(3) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DYNAMIC INFORMATION FLOW 

CONTROL

AC-4(4) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | CONTENT CHECK ENCRYPTED 

INFORMATION

AC-4(5) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | EMBEDDED DATA TYPES

AC-4(6) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | METADATA

AC-4(7) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ONE-WAY FLOW MECHANISMS

AC-4(8) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY POLICY FILTERS

AC-4(9) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | HUMAN REVIEWS

AC-4(10) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ENABLE / DISABLE SECURITY 

POLICY FILTERS

APPENDIX D PAGE D-10
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

AC-4(11) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | CONFIGURATION OF SECURITY 

POLICY FILTERS

AC-4(12) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DATA TYPE IDENTIFIERS

AC-4(13) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DECOMPOSITION INTO POLICYRELEVANT SUBCOMPONENTS

AC-4(14) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY POLICY FILTER 

CONSTRAINTS

AC-4(15) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DETECTION OF UNSANCTIONED 

INFORMATION

AC-4(16) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | INFORMATION TRANSFERS ON 

INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS

x Incorporated into AC-4.

AC-4(17) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DOMAIN AUTHENTICATION

AC-4(18) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY ATTRIBUTE BINDING

AC-4(19) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | VALIDATION OF METADATA

AC-4(20) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | APPROVED SOLUTIONS

AC-4(21) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PHYSICAL / LOGICAL 

SEPARATION OF INFORMATION FLOWS

AC-4(22) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ACCESS ONLY

AC-5 Separation of Duties x x

AC-6 Least Privilege x x

AC-6(1) LEAST PRIVILEGE | AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONS x x

AC-6(2) LEAST PRIVILEGE | NON-PRIVILEGED ACCESS FOR NONSECURITY 

FUNCTIONS

x x

AC-6(3) LEAST PRIVILEGE | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED COMMANDS x

AC-6(4) LEAST PRIVILEGE | SEPARATE PROCESSING DOMAINS

AC-6(5) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS x x

AC-6(6) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGED ACCESS BY NON-ORGANIZATIONAL 

USERS

AC-6(7) LEAST PRIVILEGE | REVIEW OF USER PRIVILEGES

AC-6(8) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGE LEVELS FOR CODE EXECUTION

AC-6(9) LEAST PRIVILEGE | AUDITING USE OF PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS x x

AC-6(10) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PROHIBIT NON-PRIVILEGED USERS FROM 

EXECUTING PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS

x x

AC-7 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts x x x

AC-7(1) UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS | AUTOMATIC ACCOUNT LOCK x Incorporated into AC-7.

AC-7(2) UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS | PURGE / WIPE MOBILE DEVICE

AC-8 System Use Notification x x x

AC-9 Previous Logon (Access) Notification

AC-9(1) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | UNSUCCESSFUL LOGONS

AC-9(2) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | SUCCESSFUL / UNSUCCESSFUL 

LOGONS

AC-9(3) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | NOTIFICATION OF ACCOUNT 

CHANGES

AC-9(4) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | ADDITIONAL LOGON INFORMATION

AC-10 Concurrent Session Control x

AC-11 Session Lock x x

AC-11(1) SESSION LOCK | PATTERN-HIDING DISPLAYS x x

AC-12 Session Termination x x

APPENDIX D PAGE D-11
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

AC-12(1) SESSION TERMINATION | USER-INITIATED LOGOUTS / MESSAGE 

DISPLAYS

AC-13 Supervision and Review — Access Control x Incorporated into AC-2 and AU-6.

AC-14 Permitted Actions without Identification or Authentication x x x

AC-14(1) PERMITTED ACTIONS WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION OR AUTHENTICATION 

| NECESSARY USES

x Incorporated into AC-14.

AC-15 Automated Marking x Incorporated into MP-3.

AC-16 Security Attributes

AC-16(1) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | DYNAMIC ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATION

AC-16(2) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE VALUE CHANGES BY 

AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

AC-16(3) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | MAINTENANCE OF ATTRIBUTE 

ASSOCIATIONS BY INFORMATION SYSTEM

AC-16(4) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ASSOCIATION OF ATTRIBUTES BY 

AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

AC-16(5) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE DISPLAYS FOR OUTPUT DEVICES

AC-16(6) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | MAINTENANCE OF ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATION 

BY ORGANIZATION

AC-16(7) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | CONSISTENT ATTRIBUTE INTERPRETATION

AC-16(8) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ASSOCIATION TECHNIQUES / TECHNOLOGIES

AC-16(9) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE REASSIGNMENT

AC-16(10) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE CONFIGURATION BY 

AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

AC-17 Remote Access x x x

AC-17(1) REMOTE ACCESS | AUTOMATED MONITORING / CONTROL x x

AC-17(2) REMOTE ACCESS | PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY / INTEGRITY 

USING ENCRYPTION

x x

AC-17(3) REMOTE ACCESS | MANAGED ACCESS CONTROL POINTS x x

AC-17(4) REMOTE ACCESS | PRIVILEGED COMMANDS / ACCESS x x

AC-17(5) REMOTE ACCESS | MONITORING FOR UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONS x Incorporated into SI-4.

AC-17(6) REMOTE ACCESS | PROTECTION OF INFORMATION

AC-17(7) REMOTE ACCESS | ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR SECURITY 

FUNCTION ACCESS

x Incorporated into AC-3(10).

AC-17(8) REMOTE ACCESS | DISABLE NONSECURE NETWORK PROTOCOLS x Incorporated into CM-7.

AC-17(9) REMOTE ACCESS | DISCONNECT / DISABLE ACCESS

AC-18 Wireless Access x x x

AC-18(1) WIRELESS ACCESS | AUTHENTICATION AND ENCRYPTION x x

AC-18(2) WIRELESS ACCESS | MONITORING UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONS x Incorporated into SI-4.

AC-18(3) WIRELESS ACCESS | DISABLE WIRELESS NETWORKING

AC-18(4) WIRELESS ACCESS | RESTRICT CONFIGURATIONS BY USERS x

AC-18(5) WIRELESS ACCESS | ANTENNAS / TRANSMISSION POWER LEVELS x

AC-19 Access Control for Mobile Devices x x x

AC-19(1) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF WRITABLE /

PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES

x Incorporated into MP-7.

AC-19(2) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF PERSONALLY 

OWNED PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES

x Incorporated into MP-7.

AC-19(3) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF PORTABLE 

STORAGE DEVICES WITH NO IDENTIFIABLE OWNER

x Incorporated into MP-7.

APPENDIX D PAGE D-12
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

AC-19(4) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | RESTRICTIONS FOR 

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

AC-19(5) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | FULL DEVICE / CONTAINERBASED ENCRYPTION

x x

AC-20 Use of External Information Systems x x x

AC-20(1) USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | LIMITS ON AUTHORIZED

USE

x x

AC-20(2) USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | PORTABLE STORAGE 

DEVICES

x x

AC-20(3) USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | NONORGANIZATIONALLY OWNED SYSTEMS / COMPONENTS / DEVICES

AC-20(4) USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | NETWORK ACCESSIBLE 

STORAGE DEVICES

AC-21 Information Sharing x x

AC-21(1) INFORMATION SHARING | AUTOMATED DECISION SUPPORT

AC-21(2) INFORMATION SHARING | INFORMATION SEARCH AND RETRIEVAL

AC-22 Publicly Accessible Content x x x

AC-23 Data Mining Protection

AC-24 Access Control Decisions

AC-24(1) ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS | TRANSMIT ACCESS AUTHORIZATION 

INFORMATION

AC-24(2) ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS | NO USER OR PROCESS IDENTITY

AC-25 Reference Monitor x

APPENDIX D PAGE D-13
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE D-4: SUMMARY — AWARENESS AND TRAINING CONTROLS

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

AT-1 Security Awareness and Training Policy and Procedures x x x x

AT-2 Security Awareness Training x x x x

AT-2(1) SECURITY AWARENESS | PRACTICAL EXERCISES x

AT-2(2) SECURITY AWARENESS | INSIDER THREAT x x x

AT-3 Role-Based Security Training x x x x

AT-3(1) ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING | ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS x

AT-3(2) ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING | PHYSICAL SECURITY CONTROLS x

AT-3(3) ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING | PRACTICAL EXERCISES x

AT-3(4) ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING | SUSPICIOUS COMMUNICATIONS 

AND ANOMALOUS SYSTEM BEHAVIOR

x

AT-4 Security Training Records x x x x

AT-5 Contacts with Security Groups and Associations x Incorporated into PM-15.

APPENDIX D PAGE D-14
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE D-5: SUMMARY — AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY CONTROLS

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

AU-1 Audit and Accountability Policy and Procedures x x x x

AU-2 Audit Events x x x

AU-2(1) AUDIT EVENTS | COMPILATION OF AUDIT RECORDS FROM MULTIPLE 

SOURCES

x Incorporated into AU-12.

AU-2(2) AUDIT EVENTS | SELECTION OF AUDIT EVENTS BY COMPONENT x Incorporated into AU-12.

AU-2(3) AUDIT EVENTS | REVIEWS AND UPDATES x x

AU-2(4) AUDIT EVENTS | PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS x Incorporated into AC-6(9).

AU-3 Content of Audit Records x x x

AU-3(1) CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | ADDITIONAL AUDIT INFORMATION x x

AU-3(2) CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF 

PLANNED AUDIT RECORD CONTENT

x

AU-4 Audit Storage Capacity x x x

AU-4(1) AUDIT STORAGE CAPACITY | TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE

AU-5 Response to Audit Processing Failures x x x

AU-5(1) RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | AUDIT STORAGE 

CAPACITY

x

AU-5(2) RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | REAL-TIME ALERTS x

AU-5(3) RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | CONFIGURABLE 

TRAFFIC VOLUME THRESHOLDS

AU-5(4) RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | SHUTDOWN ON 

FAILURE

AU-6 Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting x x x x

AU-6(1) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | PROCESS INTEGRATION x x x

AU-6(2) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | AUTOMATED SECURITY 

ALERTS

x Incorporated into SI-4.

AU-6(3) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATE AUDIT 

REPOSITORIES

x x x

AU-6(4) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CENTRAL REVIEW AND 

ANALYSIS

x

AU-6(5) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | INTEGRATION /

SCANNING AND MONITORING CAPABILITIES

x x

AU-6(6) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATION WITH 

PHYSICAL MONITORING

x x

AU-6(7) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | PERMITTED ACTIONS x

AU-6(8) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | FULL TEXT ANALYSIS OF 

PRIVILEGED COMMANDS

x

AU-6(9) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATION WITH 

INFORMATION FROM NONTECHNICAL SOURCES

x

AU-6(10) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | AUDIT LEVEL 

ADJUSTMENT

x

AU-7 Audit Reduction and Report Generation x x x

AU-7(1) AUDIT REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION | AUTOMATIC 

PROCESSING

x x x

AU-7(2) AUDIT REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION | AUTOMATIC SORT

AND SEARCH

AU-8 Time Stamps x x x

AU-8(1) TIME STAMPS | SYNCHRONIZATION WITH AUTHORITATIVE TIME 

SOURCE

x x

AU-8(2) TIME STAMPS | SECONDARY AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCE

APPENDIX D PAGE D-15
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

AU-9 Protection of Audit Information x x x

AU-9(1) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | HARDWARE WRITE-ONCE 

MEDIA

AU-9(2) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | AUDIT BACKUP ON SEPARATE 

PHYSICAL SYSTEMS / COMPONENTS

x

AU-9(3) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | CRYPTOGRAPHIC 

PROTECTION

x

AU-9(4) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | ACCESS BY SUBSET OF 

PRIVILEGED USERS

x x

AU-9(5) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

AU-9(6) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | READ-ONLY ACCESS

AU-10 Non-repudiation x x

AU-10(1) NON-REPUDIATION | ASSOCIATION OF IDENTITIES x

AU-10(2) NON-REPUDIATION | VALIDATE BINDING OF INFORMATION PRODUCER

IDENTITY

x

AU-10(3) NON-REPUDIATION | CHAIN OF CUSTODY x

AU-10(4) NON-REPUDIATION | VALIDATE BINDING OF INFORMATION REVIEWER

IDENTITY

x

AU-10(5) NON-REPUDIATION | DIGITAL SIGNATURES x Incorporated into SI-7.

AU-11 Audit Record Retention x x x

AU-11(1) AUDIT RECORD RETENTION | LONG-TERM RETRIEVAL CAPABILITY x

AU-12 Audit Generation x x x

AU-12(1) AUDIT GENERATION | SYSTEM-WIDE / TIME-CORRELATED AUDIT TRAIL x

AU-12(2) AUDIT GENERATION | STANDARDIZED FORMATS

AU-12(3) AUDIT GENERATION | CHANGES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS x

AU-13 Monitoring for Information Disclosure x

AU-13(1) MONITORING FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE | USE OF AUTOMATED 

TOOLS

x

AU-13(2) MONITORING FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE | REVIEW OF 

MONITORED SITES

x

AU-14 Session Audit x

AU-14(1) SESSION AUDIT | SYSTEM START-UP x

AU-14(2) SESSION AUDIT | CAPTURE/RECORD AND LOG CONTENT x

AU-14(3) SESSION AUDIT | REMOTE VIEWING / LISTENING x

AU-15 Alternate Audit Capability

AU-16 Cross-Organizational Auditing

AU-16(1) CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDITING | IDENTITY PRESERVATION

AU-16(2) CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDITING | SHARING OF AUDIT 

INFORMATION

APPENDIX D PAGE D-16
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE D-6: SUMMARY — SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION CONTROLS

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

CA-1 Security Assessment and Authorization Policies and 

Procedures

x x x x

CA-2 Security Assessments x x x x

CA-2(1) SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | INDEPENDENT ASSESSORS x x x

CA-2(2) SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | SPECIALIZED ASSESSMENTS x x

CA-2(3) SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS x

CA-3 System Interconnections x x x x

CA-3(1) SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | UNCLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY 

SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

CA-3(2) SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY 

SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

CA-3(3) SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | UNCLASSIFIED NON-NATIONAL 

SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

CA-3(4) SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | CONNECTIONS TO PUBLIC NETWORKS

CA-3(5) SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | RESTRICTIONS ON EXTERNAL 

SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

x x

CA-4 Security Certification x Incorporated into CA-2.

CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones x x x x

CA-5(1) PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR 

ACCURACY / CURRENCY

x

CA-6 Security Authorization x x x x

CA-7 Continuous Monitoring x x x x

CA-7(1) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT x x x

CA-7(2) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | TYPES OF ASSESSMENTS x Incorporated into CA-2.

CA-7(3) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | TREND ANALYSES x

CA-8 Penetration Testing x x

CA-8(1) PENETRATION TESTING | INDEPENDENT PENETRATION AGENT OR 

TEAM

x

CA-8(2) PENETRATION TESTING | RED TEAM EXERCISES x

CA-9 Internal System Connections x x x x

CA-9(1) INTERNAL SYSTEM CONNECTIONS | SECURITY COMPLIANCE CHECKS x

APPENDIX D PAGE D-17
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE D-7: SUMMARY — CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

CM-1 Configuration Management Policy and Procedures x x x x

CM-2 Baseline Configuration x x x x

CM-2(1) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | REVIEWS AND UPDATES x x x

CM-2(2) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY

/ CURRENCY

x x

CM-2(3) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | RETENTION OF PREVIOUS 

CONFIGURATIONS

x x x

CM-2(4) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE x Incorporated into CM-7.

CM-2(5) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE x Incorporated into CM-7.

CM-2(6) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | DEVELOPMENT AND TEST

ENVIRONMENTS

x

CM-2(7) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | CONFIGURE SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS,

OR DEVICES FOR HIGH-RISK AREAS

x x x

CM-3 Configuration Change Control x x x

CM-3(1) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED DOCUMENT /

NOTIFICATION / PROHIBITION OF CHANGES

x x

CM-3(2) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | TEST / VALIDATE / DOCUMENT 

CHANGES

x x x

CM-3(3) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED CHANGE 

IMPLEMENTATION

CM-3(4) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE

CM-3(5) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED SECURITY 

RESPONSE 

CM-3(6) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | CRYPTOGRAPHY MANAGEMENT

CM-4 Security Impact Analysis x x x x

CM-4(1) SECURITY IMPACT ANALYSIS | SEPARATE TEST ENVIRONMENTS x x

CM-4(2) SECURITY IMPACT ANALYSIS | VERIFICATION OF SECURITY 

FUNCTIONS

x

CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change x x

CM-5(1) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | AUTOMATED ACCESS 

ENFORCEMENT / AUDITING

x

CM-5(2) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | REVIEW SYSTEM CHANGES x

CM-5(3) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | SIGNED COMPONENTS x

CM-5(4) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

CM-5(5) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | LIMIT PRODUCTION /

OPERATIONAL PRIVILEGES

CM-5(6) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | LIMIT LIBRARY PRIVILEGES

CM-5(7) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | AUTOMATIC IMPLEMENTATION 

OF SECURITY SAFEGUARDS

x Incorporated into SI-7.

CM-6 Configuration Settings x x x

CM-6(1) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | AUTOMATED CENTRAL MANAGEMENT /

APPLICATION / VERIFICATION

x

CM-6(2) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | RESPOND TO UNAUTHORIZED CHANGES x

CM-6(3) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | UNAUTHORIZED CHANGE DETECTION x Incorporated into SI-7.

CM-6(4) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | CONFORMANCE DEMONSTRATION x Incorporated into CM-4.

CM-7 Least Functionality x x x

CM-7(1) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PERIODIC REVIEW x x

CM-7(2) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PREVENT PROGRAM EXECUTION x x

APPENDIX D PAGE D-18
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

CM-7(3) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | REGISTRATION COMPLIANCE

CM-7(4) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE / BLACKLISTING x

CM-7(5) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE / WHITELISTING x

CM-8 Information System Component Inventory x x x x

CM-8(1) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | UPDATES DURING 

INSTALLATIONS / REMOVALS

x x x

CM-8(2) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED 

MAINTENANCE

x x

CM-8(3) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED 

UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENT DETECTION

x x x

CM-8(4) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ACCOUNTABILITY 

INFORMATION

x x

CM-8(5) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | NO DUPLICATE 

ACCOUNTING OF COMPONENTS

x x x

CM-8(6) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ASSESSED 

CONFIGURATIONS / APPROVED DEVIATIONS

x

CM-8(7) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | CENTRALIZED 

REPOSITORY

x

CM-8(8) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED 

LOCATION TRACKING

x

CM-8(9) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ASSIGNMENT OF 

COMPONENTS TO SYSTEMS

x

CM-9 Configuration Management Plan x x

CM-9(1) CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN | ASSIGNMENT OF 

RESPONSIBILITY

CM-10 Software Usage Restrictions x x x

CM-10(1) SOFTWARE USAGE RESTRICTIONS | OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE

CM-11 User-Installed Software x x x

CM-11(1) USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE | ALERTS FOR UNAUTHORIZED 

INSTALLATIONS

CM-11(2) USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE | PROHIBIT INSTALLATION WITHOUT 

PRIVILEGED STATUS

APPENDIX D PAGE D-19
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE D-8: SUMMARY — CONTINGENCY PLANNING CONTROLS

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

CP-1 Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures x x x x

CP-2 Contingency Plan x x x

CP-2(1) CONTINGENCY PLAN | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS x x

CP-2(2) CONTINGENCY PLAN | CAPACITY PLANNING x

CP-2(3) CONTINGENCY PLAN | RESUME ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS 

FUNCTIONS

x x

CP-2(4) CONTINGENCY PLAN | RESUME ALL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS x

CP-2(5) CONTINGENCY PLAN | CONTINUE ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS 

FUNCTIONS

x

CP-2(6) CONTINGENCY PLAN | ALTERNATE PROCESSING / STORAGE SITE

CP-2(7) CONTINGENCY PLAN | COORDINATE WITH EXTERNAL SERVICE 

PROVIDERS

CP-2(8) CONTINGENCY PLAN | IDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETS x x

CP-3 Contingency Training x x x x

CP-3(1) CONTINGENCY TRAINING | SIMULATED EVENTS x x

CP-3(2) CONTINGENCY TRAINING | AUTOMATED TRAINING ENVIRONMENTS x

CP-4 Contingency Plan Testing x x x x

CP-4(1) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS x x x

CP-4(2) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE x x

CP-4(3) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | AUTOMATED TESTING x

CP-4(4) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | FULL RECOVERY / RECONSTITUTION x

CP-5 Contingency Plan Update x Incorporated into CP-2.

CP-6 Alternate Storage Site x x

CP-6(1) ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE x x

CP-6(2) ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | RECOVERY TIME / POINT OBJECTIVES x

CP-6(3) ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | ACCESSIBILITY x x

CP-7 Alternate Processing Site x x

CP-7(1) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE x x

CP-7(2) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | ACCESSIBILITY x x

CP-7(3) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | PRIORITY OF SERVICE x x

CP-7(4) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | PREPARATION FOR USE x

CP-7(5) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | EQUIVALENT INFORMATION 

SECURITY SAFEGUARDS

x Incorporated into CP-7.

CP-7(6) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | INABILITY TO RETURN TO PRIMARY 

SITE

CP-8 Telecommunications Services x x

CP-8(1) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | PRIORITY OF SERVICE 

PROVISIONS

x x

CP-8(2) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | SINGLE POINTS OF FAILURE x x

CP-8(3) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | SEPARATION OF PRIMARY /

ALTERNATE PROVIDERS

x

CP-8(4) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | PROVIDER CONTINGENCY PLAN x

CP-8(5) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | ALTERNATE 

TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICE TESTING

CP-9 Information System Backup x x x

CP-9(1) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TESTING FOR RELIABILITY /

INTEGRITY

x x

APPENDIX D PAGE D-20
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

CP-9(2) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TEST RESTORATION USING 

SAMPLING

x

CP-9(3) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | SEPARATE STORAGE FOR CRITICAL 

INFORMATION

x

CP-9(4) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | PROTECTION FROM UNAUTHORIZED 

MODIFICATION

x Incorporated into CP-9.

CP-9(5) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE 

STORAGE SITE

x

CP-9(6) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | REDUNDANT SECONDARY SYSTEM

CP-9(7) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

CP-10 Information System Recovery and Reconstitution x x x

CP-10(1) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION |

CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING

x Incorporated into CP-4.

CP-10(2) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION |

TRANSACTION RECOVERY

x x

CP-10(3) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION |

COMPENSATING SECURITY CONTROLS

x Addressed by tailoring procedures.

CP-10(4) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | RESTORE 

WITHIN TIME PERIOD

x

CP-10(5) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | FAILOVER 

CAPABILITY

x Incorporated into SI-13.

CP-10(6) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION |

COMPONENT PROTECTION

CP-11 Alternate Communications Protocols

CP-12 Safe Mode x

CP-13 Alternative Security Mechanisms

APPENDIX D PAGE D-21
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE D-9: SUMMARY — IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION CONTROLS

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

IA-1 Identification and Authentication Policy and Procedures x x x x

IA-2 Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) x x x

IA-2(1) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |

NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

x x x

IA-2(2) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |

NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

x x

IA-2(3) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |

LOCAL ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

x x

IA-2(4) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |

LOCAL ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

x

IA-2(5) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |

GROUP AUTHENTICATION

IA-2(6) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |

NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - SEPARATE DEVICE

IA-2(7) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |

NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - SEPARATE 

DEVICE

IA-2(8) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |

NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - REPLAY RESISTANT

x x

IA-2(9) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |

NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - REPLAY 

RESISTANT

x

IA-2(10) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |

SINGLE SIGN-ON

IA-2(11) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |

REMOTE ACCESS - SEPARATE DEVICE

x x

IA-2(12) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |

ACCEPTANCE OF PIV CREDENTIALS

x x x

IA-2(13) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | OUT-OF-BAND 

AUTHENTICATION

IA-3 Device Identification and Authentication x x

IA-3(1) DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | CRYPTOGRAPHIC 

BIDIRECTIONAL AUTHENTICATION

IA-3(2) DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | CRYPTOGRAPHIC 

BIDIRECTIONAL NETWORK AUTHENTICATION

x Incorporated into IA-3(1).

IA-3(3) DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | DYNAMIC ADDRESS 

ALLOCATION

IA-3(4) DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | DEVICE 

ATTESTATION

IA-4 Identifier Management x x x

IA-4(1) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | PROHIBIT ACCOUNT IDENTIFIERS AS 

PUBLIC IDENTIFIERS

IA-4(2) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION

IA-4(3) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | MULTIPLE FORMS OF CERTIFICATION

IA-4(4) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | IDENTIFY USER STATUS

IA-4(5) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC MANAGEMENT

IA-4(6) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | CROSS-ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT

IA-4(7) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | IN-PERSON REGISTRATION

IA-5 Authenticator Management x x x

APPENDIX D PAGE D-22
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

IA-5(1) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PASSWORD-BASED 

AUTHENTICATION

x x x

IA-5(2) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PKI-BASED AUTHENTICATION x x

IA-5(3) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | IN-PERSON OR TRUSTED THIRDPARTY REGISTRATION

x x

IA-5(4) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED SUPPORT FOR 

PASSWORD STRENGTH DETERMINATION

IA-5(5) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | CHANGE AUTHENTICATORS PRIOR 

TO DELIVERY

IA-5(6) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PROTECTION OF AUTHENTICATORS

IA-5(7) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | NO EMBEDDED UNENCRYPTED 

STATIC AUTHENTICATORS

IA-5(8) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | MULTIPLE INFORMATION SYSTEM 

ACCOUNTS

IA-5(9) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | CROSS-ORGANIZATION 

CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENT

IA-5(10) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC CREDENTIAL

ASSOCIATION

IA-5(11) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | HARDWARE TOKEN-BASED 

AUTHENTICATION

x x x

IA-5(12) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | BIOMETRIC-BASED

AUTHENTICATION

IA-5(13) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | EXPIRATION OF CACHED

AUTHENTICATORS

IA-5(14) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | MANAGING CONTENT OF PKI TRUST 

STORES

IA-5(15) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | FICAM-APPROVED PRODUCTS AND 

SERVICES

IA-6 Authenticator Feedback x x x

IA-7 Cryptographic Module Authentication x x x

IA-8 Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational 

Users)

x x x

IA-8(1) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL 

USERS) | ACCEPTANCE OF PIV CREDENTIALS FROM OTHER AGENCIES

x x x

IA-8(2) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL 

USERS) | ACCEPTANCE OF THIRD-PARTY CREDENTIALS

x x x

IA-8(3) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL 

USERS) | USE OF FICAM-APPROVED PRODUCTS

x x x

IA-8(4) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL 

USERS) | USE OF FICAM-ISSUED PROFILES

x x x

IA-8(5) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL 

USERS) | ACCEPTANCE OF PIV-I CREDENTIALS

IA-9 Service Identification and Authentication

IA-9(1) SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | INFORMATION 

EXCHANGE

IA-9(2) SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | TRANSMISSION OF 

DECISIONS

IA-10 Adaptive Identification and Authentication

IA-11 Re-authentication

APPENDIX D PAGE D-23
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE D-10: SUMMARY — INCIDENT RESPONSE CONTROLS

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

IR-1 Incident Response Policy and Procedures x x x x

IR-2 Incident Response Training x x x x

IR-2(1) INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING | SIMULATED EVENTS x x

IR-2(2) INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING | AUTOMATED TRAINING 

ENVIRONMENTS

x x

IR-3 Incident Response Testing x x x

IR-3(1) INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING | AUTOMATED TESTING x

IR-3(2) INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING | COORDINATION WITH RELATED 

PLANS

x x x

IR-4 Incident Handling x x x

IR-4(1) INCIDENT HANDLING | AUTOMATED INCIDENT HANDLING PROCESSES x x

IR-4(2) INCIDENT HANDLING | DYNAMIC RECONFIGURATION

IR-4(3) INCIDENT HANDLING | CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS

IR-4(4) INCIDENT HANDLING | INFORMATION CORRELATION x

IR-4(5) INCIDENT HANDLING | AUTOMATIC DISABLING OF INFORMATION 

SYSTEM

IR-4(6) INCIDENT HANDLING | INSIDER THREATS - SPECIFIC CAPABILITIES

IR-4(7) INCIDENT HANDLING | INSIDER THREATS - INTRA-ORGANIZATION 

COORDINATION

IR-4(8) INCIDENT HANDLING | CORRELATION WITH EXTERNAL 

ORGANIZATIONS

IR-4(9) INCIDENT HANDLING | DYNAMIC RESPONSE CAPABILITY

IR-4(10) INCIDENT HANDLING | SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION

IR-5 Incident Monitoring x x x x

IR-5(1) INCIDENT MONITORING | AUTOMATED TRACKING / DATA COLLECTION 

/ ANALYSIS

x x

IR-6 Incident Reporting x x x

IR-6(1) INCIDENT REPORTING | AUTOMATED REPORTING x x

IR-6(2) INCIDENT REPORTING | VULNERABILITIES RELATED TO INCIDENTS

IR-6(3) INCIDENT REPORTING | COORDINATION WITH SUPPLY CHAIN

IR-7 Incident Response Assistance x x x

IR-7(1) INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR 

AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION / SUPPORT

x x

IR-7(2) INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE | COORDINATION WITH EXTERNAL 

PROVIDERS

IR-8 Incident Response Plan x x x

IR-9 Information Spillage Response

IR-9(1) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | RESPONSIBLE PERSONNEL

IR-9(2) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | TRAINING

IR-9(3) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | POST-SPILL OPERATIONS

IR-9(4) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | EXPOSURE TO UNAUTHORIZED 

PERSONNEL

IR-10 Integrated Information Security Analysis Team

APPENDIX D PAGE D-24
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE D-11: SUMMARY — MAINTENANCE CONTROLS

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

MA-1 System Maintenance Policy and Procedures x x x x

MA-2 Controlled Maintenance x x x

MA-2(1) CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE | RECORD CONTENT x Incorporated into MA-2.

MA-2(2) CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE | AUTOMATED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES x

MA-3 Maintenance Tools x x

MA-3(1) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT TOOLS x x

MA-3(2) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT MEDIA x x

MA-3(3) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL x

MA-3(4) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | RESTRICTED TOOL USE

MA-4 Nonlocal Maintenance x x x

MA-4(1) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | AUDITING AND REVIEW

MA-4(2) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | DOCUMENT NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE x x

MA-4(3) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | COMPARABLE SECURITY / SANITIZATION x

MA-4(4) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | AUTHENTICATION / SEPARATION OF 

MAINTENANCE SESSIONS

MA-4(5) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | APPROVALS AND NOTIFICATIONS

MA-4(6) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

MA-4(7) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | REMOTE DISCONNECT VERIFICATION

MA-5 Maintenance Personnel x x x

MA-5(1) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT APPROPRIATE 

ACCESS

x

MA-5(2) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR 

CLASSIFIED SYSTEMS

MA-5(3) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS FOR 

CLASSIFIED SYSTEMS

MA-5(4) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | FOREIGN NATIONALS

MA-5(5) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | NON-SYSTEM-RELATED MAINTENANCE

MA-6 Timely Maintenance x x

MA-6(1) TIMELY MAINTENANCE | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE

MA-6(2) TIMELY MAINTENANCE | PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE

MA-6(3) TIMELY MAINTENANCE | AUTOMATED SUPPORT FOR PREDICTIVE 

MAINTENANCE

APPENDIX D PAGE D-25
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE D-12: SUMMARY — MEDIA PROTECTION CONTROLS

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

MP-1 Media Protection Policy and Procedures x x x x

MP-2 Media Access x x x

MP-2(1) MEDIA ACCESS | AUTOMATED RESTRICTED ACCESS x Incorporated into MP-4(2).

MP-2(2) MEDIA ACCESS | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION x Incorporated into SC-28(1).

MP-3 Media Marking x x

MP-4 Media Storage x x

MP-4(1) MEDIA STORAGE | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION x Incorporated into SC-28(1).

MP-4(2) MEDIA STORAGE | AUTOMATED RESTRICTED ACCESS

MP-5 Media Transport x x

MP-5(1) MEDIA TRANSPORT | PROTECTION OUTSIDE OF CONTROLLED AREAS x Incorporated into MP-5.

MP-5(2) MEDIA TRANSPORT | DOCUMENTATION OF ACTIVITIES x Incorporated into MP-5.

MP-5(3) MEDIA TRANSPORT | CUSTODIANS

MP-5(4) MEDIA TRANSPORT | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION x x

MP-6 Media Sanitization x x x

MP-6(1) MEDIA SANITIZATION | REVIEW / APPROVE / TRACK / DOCUMENT /

VERIFY

x

MP-6(2) MEDIA SANITIZATION | EQUIPMENT TESTING x

MP-6(3) MEDIA SANITIZATION | NONDESTRUCTIVE TECHNIQUES x

MP-6(4) MEDIA SANITIZATION | CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION x Incorporated into MP-6.

MP-6(5) MEDIA SANITIZATION | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION x Incorporated into MP-6.

MP-6(6) MEDIA SANITIZATION | MEDIA DESTRUCTION x Incorporated into MP-6.

MP-6(7) MEDIA SANITIZATION | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

MP-6(8) MEDIA SANITIZATION | REMOTE PURGING / WIPING OF INFORMATION

MP-7 Media Use x x x

MP-7(1) MEDIA USE | PROHIBIT USE WITHOUT OWNER x x

MP-7(2) MEDIA USE | PROHIBIT USE OF SANITIZATION-RESISTANT MEDIA

MP-8 Media Downgrading

MP-8(1) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | DOCUMENTATION OF PROCESS

MP-8(2) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | EQUIPMENT TESTING

MP-8(3) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

MP-8(4) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

APPENDIX D PAGE D-26
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE D-13: SUMMARY — PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CONTROLS

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

PE-1 Physical and Environmental Protection Policy and 

Procedures

x x x x

PE-2 Physical Access Authorizations x x x

PE-2(1) PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | ACCESS BY POSITION / ROLE

PE-2(2) PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | TWO FORMS OF 

IDENTIFICATION

PE-2(3) PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | RESTRICT UNESCORTED 

ACCESS

PE-3 Physical Access Control x x x

PE-3(1) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | INFORMATION SYSTEM ACCESS x

PE-3(2) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | FACILITY / INFORMATION SYSTEM 

BOUNDARIES

PE-3(3) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | CONTINUOUS GUARDS / ALARMS /

MONITORING

PE-3(4) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | LOCKABLE CASINGS

PE-3(5) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | TAMPER PROTECTION

PE-3(6) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | FACILITY PENETRATION TESTING

PE-4 Access Control for Transmission Medium x x

PE-5 Access Control for Output Devices x x

PE-5(1) ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES | ACCESS TO OUTPUT BY 

AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS 

PE-5(2) ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES | ACCESS TO OUTPUT BY 

INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY

PE-5(3) ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES | MARKING OUTPUT 

DEVICES

PE-6 Monitoring Physical Access x x x x

PE-6(1) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | INTRUSION ALARMS /

SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT

x x x

PE-6(2) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | AUTOMATED INTRUSION 

RECOGNITION / RESPONSES

x

PE-6(3) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | VIDEO SURVEILLANCE x

PE-6(4) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS TO 

INFORMATION SYSTEMS

x x

PE-7 Visitor Control x Incorporated into PE-2 and PE-3.

PE-8 Visitor Access Records x x x x

PE-8(1) VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS | AUTOMATED RECORDS MAINTENANCE /

REVIEW

x

PE-8(2) VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS | PHYSICAL ACCESS RECORDS x Incorporated into PE-2.

PE-9 Power Equipment and Cabling x x

PE-9(1) POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING | REDUNDANT CABLING

PE-9(2) POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING | AUTOMATIC VOLTAGE CONTROLS

PE-10 Emergency Shutoff x x

PE-10(1) EMERGENCY SHUTOFF | ACCIDENTAL / UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVATION x Incorporated into PE-10.

PE-11 Emergency Power x x

PE-11(1) EMERGENCY POWER | LONG-TERM ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY -

MINIMAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

x

PE-11(2) EMERGENCY POWER | LONG-TERM ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY -

SELF-CONTAINED

APPENDIX D PAGE D-27
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

PE-12 Emergency Lighting x x x

PE-12(1) EMERGENCY LIGHTING | ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS 

FUNCTIONS

PE-13 Fire Protection x x x

PE-13(1) FIRE PROTECTION | DETECTION DEVICES / SYSTEMS x

PE-13(2) FIRE PROTECTION | SUPPRESSION DEVICES / SYSTEMS x

PE-13(3) FIRE PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION x x

PE-13(4) FIRE PROTECTION | INSPECTIONS

PE-14 Temperature and Humidity Controls x x x

PE-14(1) TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY CONTROLS | AUTOMATIC CONTROLS

PE-14(2) TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY CONTROLS | MONITORING WITH 

ALARMS / NOTIFICATIONS

PE-15 Water Damage Protection x x x

PE-15(1) WATER DAMAGE PROTECTION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT x

PE-16 Delivery and Removal x x x

PE-17 Alternate Work Site x x

PE-18 Location of Information System Components x

PE-18(1) LOCATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS | FACILITY SITE

PE-19 Information Leakage

PE-19(1) INFORMATION LEAKAGE | NATIONAL EMISSIONS / TEMPEST POLICIES 

AND PROCEDURES

PE-20 Asset Monitoring and Tracking

APPENDIX D PAGE D-28
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE D-14: SUMMARY — PLANNING CONTROLS

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

PL-1 Security Planning Policy and Procedures x x x x

PL-2 System Security Plan x x x x

PL-2(1) SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS x Incorporated into PL-7.

PL-2(2) SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE x Incorporated into PL-8.

PL-2(3) SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | PLAN / COORDINATE WITH OTHER 

ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES

x x x

PL-3 System Security Plan Update x Incorporated into PL-2.

PL-4 Rules of Behavior x x x x

PL-4(1) RULES OF BEHAVIOR | SOCIAL MEDIA AND NETWORKING 

RESTRICTIONS

x x x

PL-5 Privacy Impact Assessment x Incorporated into Appendix J, AR-2.

PL-6 Security-Related Activity Planning x Incorporated into PL-2.

PL-7 Security Concept of Operations

PL-8 Information Security Architecture x x x

PL-8(1) INFORMATION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE | DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH x

PL-8(2) INFORMATION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE | SUPPLIER DIVERSITY x

PL-9 Central Management x

APPENDIX D PAGE D-29
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE D-15: SUMMARY — PERSONNEL SECURITY CONTROLS

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

PS-1 Personnel Security Policy and Procedures x x x x

PS-2 Position Risk Designation x x x

PS-3 Personnel Screening x x x

PS-3(1) PERSONNEL SCREENING | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

PS-3(2) PERSONNEL SCREENING | FORMAL INDOCTRINATION

PS-3(3) PERSONNEL SCREENING | INFORMATION WITH SPECIAL PROTECTION 

MEASURES

PS-4 Personnel Termination x x x

PS-4(1) PERSONNEL TERMINATION | POST-EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

PS-4(2) PERSONNEL TERMINATION | AUTOMATED NOTIFICATION x

PS-5 Personnel Transfer x x x

PS-6 Access Agreements x x x x

PS-6(1) ACCESS AGREEMENTS | INFORMATION REQUIRING SPECIAL 

PROTECTION

x Incorporated into PS-3.

PS-6(2) ACCESS AGREEMENTS | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REQUIRING 

SPECIAL PROTECTION

x

PS-6(3) ACCESS AGREEMENTS | POST-EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS x

PS-7 Third-Party Personnel Security x x x x

PS-8 Personnel Sanctions x x x

APPENDIX D PAGE D-30
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE D-16: SUMMARY — RISK ASSESSMENT CONTROLS

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

RA-1 Risk Assessment Policy and Procedures x x x x

RA-2 Security Categorization x x x

RA-3 Risk Assessment x x x x

RA-4 Risk Assessment Update x Incorporated into RA-3.

RA-5 Vulnerability Scanning x x x x

RA-5(1) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | UPDATE TOOL CAPABILITY x x x

RA-5(2) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | UPDATE BY FREQUENCY / PRIOR TO NEW 

SCAN / WHEN IDENTIFIED

x x x

RA-5(3) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | BREADTH / DEPTH OF COVERAGE x

RA-5(4) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | DISCOVERABLE INFORMATION x x

RA-5(5) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | PRIVILEGED ACCESS x x x

RA-5(6) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | AUTOMATED TREND ANALYSES x

RA-5(7) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | AUTOMATED DETECTION AND 

NOTIFICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENTS

x Incorporated into CM-8.

RA-5(8) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | REVIEW HISTORIC AUDIT LOGS x

RA-5(9) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | PENETRATION TESTING AND ANALYSES x Incorporated into CA-8.

RA-5(10) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | CORRELATE SCANNING INFORMATION x

RA-6 Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Survey x

APPENDIX D PAGE D-31
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE D-17: SUMMARY — SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION CONTROLS

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SA-1 System and Services Acquisition Policy and Procedures x x x x

SA-2 Allocation of Resources x x x x

SA-3 System Development Life Cycle x x x x

SA-4 Acquisition Process x x x x

SA-4(1) ACQUISITION PROCESS | FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF SECURITY 

CONTROLS

x x x

SA-4(2) ACQUISITION PROCESS | DESIGN / IMPLEMENTATION INFORMATION 

FOR SECURITY CONTROLS

x x x

SA-4(3) ACQUISITION PROCESS | DEVELOPMENT METHODS / TECHNIQUES /

PRACTICES

x

SA-4(4) ACQUISITION PROCESS | ASSIGNMENT OF COMPONENTS TO 

SYSTEMS

x Incorporated into CM-8(9).

SA-4(5) ACQUISITION PROCESS | SYSTEM / COMPONENT / SERVICE 

CONFIGURATIONS

x

SA-4(6) ACQUISITION PROCESS | USE OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE

PRODUCTS

x

SA-4(7) ACQUISITION PROCESS | NIAP-APPROVED PROTECTION PROFILES x

SA-4(8) ACQUISITION PROCESS | CONTINUOUS MONITORING PLAN x

SA-4(9) ACQUISITION PROCESS | FUNCTIONS / PORTS / PROTOCOLS /

SERVICES IN USE

x x x

SA-4(10) ACQUISITION PROCESS | USE OF APPROVED PIV PRODUCTS x x x x

SA-5 Information System Documentation x x x x

SA-5(1) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES 

OF SECURITY CONTROLS

x Incorporated into SA-4(1).

SA-5(2) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | SECURITY-RELEVANT 

EXTERNAL SYSTEM INTERFACES

x Incorporated into SA-4(2).

SA-5(3) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | HIGH-LEVEL DESIGN x Incorporated into SA-4(2).

SA-5(4) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | LOW-LEVEL DESIGN x Incorporated into SA-4(2).

SA-5(5) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | SOURCE CODE x Incorporated into SA-4(2).

SA-6 Software Usage Restrictions x Incorporated into CM-10 and SI-7.

SA-7 User-Installed Software x Incorporated into CM-11 and SI-7.

SA-8 Security Engineering Principles x x x

SA-9 External Information System Services x x x x

SA-9(1) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | RISK ASSESSMENTS /

ORGANIZATIONAL APPROVALS

x

SA-9(2) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | IDENTIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS /

PORTS / PROTOCOLS / SERVICES

x x x

SA-9(3) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | ESTABLISH / MAINTAIN TRUST 

RELATIONSHIP WITH PROVIDERS

x

SA-9(4) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | CONSISTENT INTERESTS OF 

CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERS

x

SA-9(5) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | PROCESSING, STORAGE, AND 

SERVICE LOCATION

x

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management x x x

SA-10(1) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | SOFTWARE /

FIRMWARE INTEGRITY VERIFICATION

x

SA-10(2) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | ALTERNATIVE 

CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PROCESSES

x

APPENDIX D PAGE D-32
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SA-10(3) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | HARDWARE INTEGRITY 

VERIFICATION

x

SA-10(4) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | TRUSTED GENERATION x

SA-10(5) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | MAPPING INTEGRITY 

FOR VERSION CONTROL

x

SA-10(6) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | TRUSTED 

DISTRIBUTION

x

SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation x x x

SA-11(1) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | STATIC CODE 

ANALYSIS

x

SA-11(2) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | THREAT AND 

VULNERABILITY ANALYSES

x

SA-11(3) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | INDEPENDENT 

VERIFICATION OF ASSESSMENT PLANS / EVIDENCE

x

SA-11(4) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | MANUAL CODE 

REVIEWS

x

SA-11(5) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | PENETRATION 

TESTING

x

SA-11(6) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | ATTACK SURFACE 

REVIEWS

x

SA-11(7) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | VERIFY SCOPE 

OF TESTING / EVALUATION

x

SA-11(8) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | DYNAMIC CODE 

ANALYSIS

x

SA-12 Supply Chain Protection x x

SA-12(1) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | ACQUISITION STRATEGIES / TOOLS /

METHODS

x

SA-12(2) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | SUPPLIER REVIEWS x

SA-12(3) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | TRUSTED SHIPPING AND

WAREHOUSING

x Incorporated into SA-12(1).

SA-12(4) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | DIVERSITY OF SUPPLIERS x Incorporated into SA-12(13).

SA-12(5) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | LIMITATION OF HARM x

SA-12(6) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | MINIMIZING PROCUREMENT TIME x Incorporated into SA-12(1).

SA-12(7) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | ASSESSMENTS PRIOR TO SELECTION /

ACCEPTANCE / UPDATE

x

SA-12(8) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | USE OF ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE x

SA-12(9) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | OPERATIONS SECURITY x

SA-12(10) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | VALIDATE AS GENUINE AND NOT 

ALTERED

x

SA-12(11) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | PENETRATION TESTING / ANALYSIS OF 

ELEMENTS, PROCESSES, AND ACTORS

x

SA-12(12) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL AGREEMENTS x

SA-12(13) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | CRITICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM 

COMPONENTS

x

SA-12(14) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | IDENTITY AND TRACEABILITY x

SA-12(15) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | PROCESSES TO ADDRESS

WEAKNESSES OR DEFICIENCIES

x

SA-13 Trustworthiness x

SA-14 Criticality Analysis x

SA-14(1) CRITICALITY ANALYSIS | CRITICAL COMPONENTS WITH NO VIABLE 

ALTERNATIVE SOURCING

x Incorporated into SA-20.

APPENDIX D PAGE D-33
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 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SA-15 Development Process, Standards, and Tools x x

SA-15(1) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | QUALITY 

METRICS

x

SA-15(2) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | SECURITY 

TRACKING TOOLS

x

SA-15(3) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | CRITICALITY 

ANALYSIS

x

SA-15(4) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | THREAT 

MODELING / VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

x

SA-15(5) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | ATTACK 

SURFACE REDUCTION

x

SA-15(6) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | CONTINUOUS 

IMPROVEMENT

x

SA-15(7) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | AUTOMATED 

VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

x

SA-15(8) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | REUSE OF 

THREAT / VULNERABILITY INFORMATION

x

SA-15(9) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | USE OF LIVE 

DATA

x

SA-15(10) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | INCIDENT 

RESPONSE PLAN

x

SA-15(11) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | ARCHIVE 

INFORMATION SYSTEM / COMPONENT

x

SA-16 Developer-Provided Training x x

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and Design x x

SA-17(1) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | FORMAL 

POLICY MODEL

x

SA-17(2) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | SECURITYRELEVANT COMPONENTS

x

SA-17(3) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | FORMAL 

CORRESPONDENCE

x

SA-17(4) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | INFORMAL

CORRESPONDENCE

x

SA-17(5) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN |

CONCEPTUALLY SIMPLE DESIGN

x

SA-17(6) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | STRUCTURE 

FOR TESTING

x

SA-17(7) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | STRUCTURE

FOR LEAST PRIVILEGE

x

SA-18 Tamper Resistance and Detection x

SA-18(1) TAMPER RESISTANCE AND DETECTION | MULTIPLE PHASES OF SDLC x

SA-18(2) TAMPER RESISTANCE AND DETECTION | INSPECTION OF 

INFORMATION SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, OR DEVICES

x

SA-19 Component Authenticity x

SA-19(1) COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | ANTI-COUNTERFEIT TRAINING x

SA-19(2) COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | CONFIGURATION CONTROL FOR 

COMPONENT SERVICE / REPAIR

x

SA-19(3) COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | COMPONENT DISPOSAL x

SA-19(4) COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | ANTI-COUNTERFEIT SCANNING x

SA-20 Customized Development of Critical Components x

SA-21 Developer Screening x

APPENDIX D PAGE D-34
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SA-21(1) DEVELOPER SCREENING | VALIDATION OF SCREENING x

SA-22 Unsupported System Components x

SA-22(1) UNSUPPORTED SYSTEM COMPONENTS | ALTERNATIVE SOURCES FOR 

CONTINUED SUPPORT

x

APPENDIX D PAGE D-35
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE D-18: SUMMARY — SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION CONTROLS

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SC-1 System and Communications Protection Policy and 

Procedures

x x x x

SC-2 Application Partitioning x x x

SC-2(1) APPLICATION PARTITIONING | INTERFACES FOR NON-PRIVILEGED 

USERS

x

SC-3 Security Function Isolation x x

SC-3(1) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | HARDWARE SEPARATION x

SC-3(2) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | ACCESS / FLOW CONTROL 

FUNCTIONS

x

SC-3(3) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | MINIMIZE NONSECURITY

FUNCTIONALITY

x

SC-3(4) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | MODULE COUPLING AND 

COHESIVENESS

x

SC-3(5) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | LAYERED STRUCTURES x

SC-4 Information in Shared Resources x x

SC-4(1) INFORMATION IN SHARED RESOURCES | SECURITY LEVELS x Incorporated into SC-4.

SC-4(2) INFORMATION IN SHARED RESOURCES | PERIODS PROCESSING

SC-5 Denial of Service Protection x x x

SC-5(1) DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | RESTRICT INTERNAL USERS

SC-5(2) DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | EXCESS CAPACITY / BANDWIDTH /

REDUNDANCY

SC-5(3) DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | DETECTION / MONITORING

SC-6 Resource Availability x

SC-7 Boundary Protection x x x

SC-7(1) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PHYSICALLY SEPARATED SUBNETWORKS x Incorporated into SC-7.

SC-7(2) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PUBLIC ACCESS x Incorporated into SC-7.

SC-7(3) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ACCESS POINTS x x

SC-7(4) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | EXTERNAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 

SERVICES

x x

SC-7(5) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DENY BY DEFAULT / ALLOW BY EXCEPTION x x

SC-7(6) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESPONSE TO RECOGNIZED FAILURES x Incorporated into SC-7(18).

SC-7(7) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PREVENT SPLIT TUNNELING FOR REMOTE 

DEVICES

x x

SC-7(8) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ROUTE TRAFFIC TO AUTHENTICATED 

PROXY SERVERS

x

SC-7(9) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESTRICT THREATENING OUTGOING 

COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC

SC-7(10) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED EXFILTRATION

SC-7(11) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESTRICT INCOMING COMMUNICATIONS 

TRAFFIC

SC-7(12) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | HOST-BASED PROTECTION

SC-7(13) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ISOLATION OF SECURITY TOOLS /

MECHANISMS / SUPPORT COMPONENTS

SC-7(14) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PROTECTS AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED 

PHYSICAL CONNECTIONS

SC-7(15) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ROUTE PRIVILEGED NETWORK ACCESSES

SC-7(16) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PREVENT DISCOVERY OF COMPONENTS /

DEVICES

APPENDIX D PAGE D-36
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SC-7(17) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT OF 

PROTOCOL FORMATS

SC-7(18) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | FAIL SECURE x x

SC-7(19) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | BLOCKS COMMUNICATION FROM NONORGANIZATIONALLY CONFIGURED HOSTS

SC-7(20) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DYNAMIC ISOLATION / SEGREGATION

SC-7(21) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ISOLATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEM 

COMPONENTS

x x

SC-7(22) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | SEPARATE SUBNETS FOR CONNECTING TO 

DIFFERENT SECURITY DOMAINS

x

SC-7(23) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DISABLE SENDER FEEDBACK ON 

PROTOCOL VALIDATION FAILURE

SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity x x

SC-8(1) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC 

OR ALTERNATE PHYSICAL PROTECTION

x x

SC-8(2) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | PRE / POST 

TRANSMISSION HANDLING

SC-8(3) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC 

PROTECTION FOR MESSAGE EXTERNALS

SC-8(4) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | CONCEAL /

RANDOMIZE COMMUNICATIONS

SC-9 Transmission Confidentiality x Incorporated into SC-8.

SC-10 Network Disconnect x x

SC-11 Trusted Path x

SC-11(1) TRUSTED PATH | LOGICAL ISOLATION x

SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management x x x

SC-12(1) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT |

AVAILABILITY

x

SC-12(2) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT |

SYMMETRIC KEYS

SC-12(3) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT |

ASYMMETRIC KEYS

SC-12(4) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | PKI 

CERTIFICATES

x Incorporated into SC-12.

SC-12(5) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | PKI 

CERTIFICATES / HARDWARE TOKENS

x Incorporated into SC-12.

SC-13 Cryptographic Protection x x x

SC-13(1) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | FIPS-VALIDATED CRYPTOGRAPHY x Incorporated into SC-13.

SC-13(2) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | NSA-APPROVED CRYPTOGRAPHY x Incorporated into SC-13.

SC-13(3) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT FORMAL 

ACCESS APPROVALS

x Incorporated into SC-13.

SC-13(4) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | DIGITAL SIGNATURES x Incorporated into SC-13.

SC-14 Public Access Protections x Capability provided by AC-2, AC-3, 

AC-5, SI-3, SI-4, SI-5, SI-7, SI-10.

SC-15 Collaborative Computing Devices x x x

SC-15(1) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | PHYSICAL DISCONNECT

SC-15(2) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | BLOCKING INBOUND /

OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC

x Incorporated into SC-7.

SC-15(3) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | DISABLING / REMOVAL IN 

SECURE WORK AREAS

APPENDIX D PAGE D-37
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SC-15(4) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | EXPLICITLY INDICATE 

CURRENT PARTICIPANTS

SC-16 Transmission of Security Attributes

SC-16(1) TRANSMISSION OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | INTEGRITY VALIDATION

SC-17 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates x x

SC-18 Mobile Code x x

SC-18(1) MOBILE CODE | IDENTIFY UNACCEPTABLE CODE / TAKE CORRECTIVE 

ACTIONS

SC-18(2) MOBILE CODE | ACQUISITION / DEVELOPMENT / USE

SC-18(3) MOBILE CODE | PREVENT DOWNLOADING / EXECUTION

SC-18(4) MOBILE CODE | PREVENT AUTOMATIC EXECUTION

SC-18(5) MOBILE CODE | ALLOW EXECUTION ONLY IN CONFINED 

ENVIRONMENTS

SC-19 Voice Over Internet Protocol x x

SC-20 Secure Name /Address Resolution Service

(Authoritative Source)

x x x

SC-20(1) SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE 

SOURCE) | CHILD SUBSPACES

x Incorporated into SC-20.

SC-20(2) SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE 

SOURCE) | DATA ORIGIN / INTEGRITY

SC-21 Secure Name /Address Resolution Service

(Recursive or Caching Resolver)

x x x

SC-21(1) SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (RECURSIVE OR 

CACHING RESOLVER) | DATA ORIGIN / INTEGRITY

x Incorporated into SC-21.

SC-22 Architecture and Provisioning for

Name/Address Resolution Service

x x x

SC-23 Session Authenticity x x

SC-23(1) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | INVALIDATE SESSION IDENTIFIERS AT 

LOGOUT

SC-23(2) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | USER-INITIATED LOGOUTS / MESSAGE 

DISPLAYS

x Incorporated into AC-12(1).

SC-23(3) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | UNIQUE SESSION IDENTIFIERS WITH 

RANDOMIZATION

SC-23(4) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | UNIQUE SESSION IDENTIFIERS WITH 

RANDOMIZATION

x Incorporated into SC-23(3).

SC-23(5) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | ALLOWED CERTIFICATE AUTHORITIES

SC-24 Fail in Known State x x

SC-25 Thin Nodes

SC-26 Honeypots

SC-26(1) HONEYPOTS | DETECTION OF MALICIOUS CODE x Incorporated into SC-35.

SC-27 Platform-Independent Applications

SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest x x

SC-28(1) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST | CRYPTOGRAPHIC 

PROTECTION

SC-28(2) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST | OFF-LINE STORAGE

SC-29 Heterogeneity x

SC-29(1) HETEROGENEITY | VIRTUALIZATION TECHNIQUES x

SC-30 Concealment and Misdirection x

SC-30(1) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | VIRTUALIZATION TECHNIQUES x Incorporated into SC-29(1).

APPENDIX D PAGE D-38
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SC-30(2) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | RANDOMNESS x

SC-30(3) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | CHANGE PROCESSING /

STORAGE LOCATIONS

x

SC-30(4) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | MISLEADING INFORMATION x

SC-30(5) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | CONCEALMENT OF SYSTEM 

COMPONENTS

x

SC-31 Covert Channel Analysis x

SC-31(1) COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | TEST COVERT CHANNELS FOR 

EXPLOITABILITY

x

SC-31(2) COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | MAXIMUM BANDWIDTH x

SC-31(3) COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | MEASURE BANDWIDTH IN

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

x

SC-32 Information System Partitioning x

SC-33 Transmission Preparation Integrity x Incorporated into SC-8.

SC-34 Non-Modifiable Executable Programs x

SC-34(1) NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | NO WRITABLE STORAGE x

SC-34(2) NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | INTEGRITY PROTECTION

/ READ-ONLY MEDIA

x

SC-34(3) NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | HARDWARE-BASED 

PROTECTION

x

SC-35 Honeyclients

SC-36 Distributed Processing and Storage x

SC-36(1) DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING AND STORAGE | POLLING TECHNIQUES x

SC-37 Out-of-Band Channels x

SC-37(1) OUT-OF-BAND CHANNELS | ENSURE DELIVERY / TRANSMISSION x

SC-38 Operations Security x

SC-39 Process Isolation x x x x

SC-39(1) PROCESS ISOLATION | HARDWARE SEPARATION x

SC-39(2) PROCESS ISOLATION | THREAD ISOLATION x

SC-40 Wireless Link Protection

SC-40(1) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE

SC-40(2) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | REDUCE DETECTION POTENTIAL

SC-40(3) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | IMITATIVE OR MANIPULATIVE 

COMMUNICATIONS DECEPTION

SC-40(4) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | SIGNAL PARAMETER IDENTIFICATION

SC-41 Port and I/O Device Access

SC-42 Sensor Capability and Data

SC-42(1) SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA | REPORTING TO AUTHORIZED 

INDIVIDUALS OR ROLES

SC-42(2) SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA | AUTHORIZED USE

SC-42(3) SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA | PROHIBIT USE OF DEVICES

SC-43 Usage Restrictions

SC-44 Detonation Chambers

APPENDIX D PAGE D-39
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE D-19: SUMMARY — SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY CONTROLS

CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SI-1 System and Information Integrity Policy and Procedures x x x x

SI-2 Flaw Remediation x x x

SI-2(1) FLAW REMEDIATION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT x

SI-2(2) FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATED FLAW REMEDIATION STATUS x x

SI-2(3) FLAW REMEDIATION | TIME TO REMEDIATE FLAWS / BENCHMARKS 

FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

SI-2(4) FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATED PATCH MANAGEMENT TOOLS x Incorporated into SI-2.

SI-2(5) FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATIC SOFTWARE / FIRMWARE UPDATES

SI-2(6) FLAW REMEDIATION | REMOVAL OF PREVIOUS VERSIONS OF 

SOFTWARE / FIRMWARE

SI-3 Malicious Code Protection x x x

SI-3(1) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT x x

SI-3(2) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATES x x

SI-3(3) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | NON-PRIVILEGED USERS x Incorporated into AC-6(10).

SI-3(4) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | UPDATES ONLY BY PRIVILEGED 

USERS

SI-3(5) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES x Incorporated into MP-7.

SI-3(6) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | TESTING / VERIFICATION

SI-3(7) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | NONSIGNATURE-BASED DETECTION

SI-3(8) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | DETECT UNAUTHORIZED COMMANDS

SI-3(9) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | AUTHENTICATE REMOTE COMMANDS

SI-3(10) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | MALICIOUS CODE ANALYSIS

SI-4 Information System Monitoring x x x x

SI-4(1) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | SYSTEM-WIDE INTRUSION 

DETECTION SYSTEM

x

SI-4(2) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED TOOLS FOR REALTIME ANALYSIS

x x x

SI-4(3) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED TOOL 

INTEGRATION

x

SI-4(4) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INBOUND AND OUTBOUND

COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC

x x x

SI-4(5) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | SYSTEM-GENERATED ALERTS x x x

SI-4(6) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | RESTRICT NON-PRIVILEGED 

USERS

x Incorporated into AC-6(10).

SI-4(7) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED RESPONSE TO 

SUSPICIOUS EVENTS

x

SI-4(8) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PROTECTION OF MONITORING 

INFORMATION

x Incorporated into SI-4.

SI-4(9) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | TESTING OF MONITORING 

TOOLS

x

SI-4(10) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | VISIBILITY OF ENCRYPTED 

COMMUNICATIONS

x

SI-4(11) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE COMMUNICATIONS 

TRAFFIC ANOMALIES

x

SI-4(12) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED ALERTS x

SI-4(13) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE TRAFFIC / EVENT 

PATTERNS

x

SI-4(14) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | WIRELESS INTRUSION 

DETECTION

x

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CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SI-4(15) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | WIRELESS TO WIRELINE

COMMUNICATIONS

x

SI-4(16) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | CORRELATE MONITORING

INFORMATION

x

SI-4(17) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INTEGRATED SITUATIONAL 

AWARENESS

x

SI-4(18) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE TRAFFIC / COVERT 

EXFILTRATION

x

SI-4(19) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INDIVIDUALS POSING GREATER 

RISK

x

SI-4(20) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PRIVILEGED USER x

SI-4(21) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PROBATIONARY PERIODS x

SI-4(22) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | UNAUTHORIZED NETWORK

SERVICES

x

SI-4(23) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | HOST-BASED DEVICES x

SI-4(24) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE x

SI-5 Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives x x x x

SI-5(1) SECURITY ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND DIRECTIVES | AUTOMATED 

ALERTS AND ADVISORIES

x x

SI-6 Security Function Verification x x

SI-6(1) SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | NOTIFICATION OF FAILED 

SECURITY TESTS

x Incorporated into SI-6.

SI-6(2) SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR 

DISTRIBUTED TESTING

SI-6(3) SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | REPORT VERIFICATION 

RESULTS

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity x x x

SI-7(1) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITY 

CHECKS

x x x

SI-7(2) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUTOMATED 

NOTIFICATIONS OF INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS

x x

SI-7(3) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CENTRALLY

MANAGED INTEGRITY TOOLS

x

SI-7(4) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | TAMPEREVIDENT PACKAGING

x Incorporated into SA-12.

SI-7(5) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUTOMATED 

RESPONSE TO INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS

x x

SI-7(6) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY |

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

x

SI-7(7) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY |

INTEGRATION OF DETECTION AND RESPONSE

x x x

SI-7(8) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUDITING 

CAPABILITY FOR SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

x

SI-7(9) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | VERIFY 

BOOT PROCESS

x

SI-7(10) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | PROTECTION 

OF BOOT FIRMWARE

x

SI-7(11) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CONFINED 

ENVIRONMENTS WITH LIMITED PRIVILEGES

x

SI-7(12) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITY 

VERIFICATION

x

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CNTL

NO.

CONTROL NAME

Control Enhancement Name

WITHDRAWN

ASSURANCE

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

SI-7(13) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CODE 

EXECUTION IN PROTECTED ENVIRONMENTS

x

SI-7(14) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | BINARY OR 

MACHINE EXECUTABLE CODE

x x

SI-7(15) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CODE 

AUTHENTICATION

x

SI-7(16) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | TIME LIMIT 

ON PROCESS EXECUTION WITHOUT SUPERVISION

x

SI-8 Spam Protection x x

SI-8(1) SPAM PROTECTION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT x x

SI-8(2) SPAM PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATES x x

SI-8(3) SPAM PROTECTION | CONTINUOUS LEARNING CAPABILITY

SI-9 Information Input Restrictions x Incorporated into AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, 

AC-6.

SI-10 Information Input Validation x x x

SI-10(1) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | MANUAL OVERRIDE CAPABILITY x

SI-10(2) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | REVIEW / RESOLUTION OF ERRORS x

SI-10(3) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | PREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR x

SI-10(4) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | REVIEW / TIMING INTERACTIONS x

SI-10(5) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | REVIEW / RESTRICT INPUTS TO 

TRUSTED SOURCES AND APPROVED FORMATS

x

SI-11 Error Handling x x

SI-12 Information Handling and Retention x x x

SI-13 Predictable Failure Prevention x

SI-13(1) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | TRANSFERRING COMPONENT 

RESPONSIBILITIES

x

SI-13(2) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | TIME LIMIT ON PROCESS 

EXECUTION WITHOUT SUPERVISION

x Incorporated into SI-7(16).

SI-13(3) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | MANUAL TRANSFER BETWEEN 

COMPONENTS

x

SI-13(4) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | STANDBY COMPONENT 

INSTALLATION / NOTIFICATION

x

SI-13(5) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | FAILOVER CAPABILITY x

SI-14 Non-Persistence x

SI-14(1) NON-PERSISTENCE | REFRESH FROM TRUSTED SOURCES x

SI-15 Information Output Filtering x

SI-16 Memory Protection x x x

SI-17 Fail-Safe Procedures x

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ADJUSTMENTS TO SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES

ALLOCATION OF SECURITY CONTROLS AND ASSIGNMENT OF PRIORITY SEQUENCING CODES

With each revision to SP 800-53, minor adjustments may occur with the security control baselines 

including, for example, allocating additional controls and/or control enhancements, eliminating 

selected controls/enhancements, and changing sequencing priority codes (P-codes). These changes 

reflect: (i) the ongoing receipt and analysis of threat information; (ii) the periodic reexamination of 

the initial assumptions that generated the security control baselines; (iii) the desire for common 

security control baseline starting points for national security and non-national security systems to 

achieve community-wide convergence (relying subsequently on specific overlays to describe any 

adjustments from the common starting points); and (iv) the periodic reassessment of priority codes 

to appropriately balance the workload of security control implementation. Over time, as the security 

control catalog expands to address the continuing challenges from a dynamic and growing threat 

space that is increasingly sophisticated, organizations will come to rely to a much greater degree on 

overlays to provide the needed specialization for their security plans.

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APPENDIX E

ASSURANCE AND TRUSTWORTHINESS

MEASURES OF CONFIDENCE FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS

ecurity assurance is a critical aspect in determining the trustworthiness of information 

systems. Assurance is the measure of confidence that the security functions, features, 

practices, policies, procedures, mechanisms, and architecture of organizational information 

systems accurately mediate and enforce established security policies.

94 The objective of this 

appendix is:

• To encourage organizations to include assurance requirements in procurements of 

information systems, system components, and services;

• To encourage hardware, software, and firmware developers to employ development practices 

that result in more trustworthy information technology products and systems;

• To encourage organizations to identify, select, and use information technology products that 

have been built with appropriate levels of assurance and to employ sound systems and 

security engineering techniques and methods during the system development life cycle 

process;

• To reduce information security risk by deploying more trustworthy information technology 

products within critical information systems or system components; and

• To encourage developers and organizations to obtain on an ongoing basis, assurance evidence 

for maintaining trustworthiness of information systems.

Minimum security requirements for federal information and information systems are defined in

FIPS Publication 200.These requirements can be satisfied by selecting, tailoring, implementing, 

and obtaining assurance evidence for the security controls in the low, moderate, or high baselines 

in Appendix D.

95 The baselines also include the assurance-related controls for the minimum

assurance requirements that are generally applicable to federal information and information 

systems.

96 However, considering the current threat space and the increasing risk to organizational 

operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, posed by the advanced 

persistent threat (APT), organizations may choose to implement additional assurance-related

controls from Appendix F. These additional controls can be selected based on the tailoring 

guidance provided in Section 3.2. Organizations can also consider developing high-assurance 

overlays for critical missions/business functions, specialized environments of operation, and/or 

information technologies (see Section 3.3 and Appendix I). When assurance-related controls 

cannot be satisfied, organizations can propose compensating controls (e.g., procedural/operational

94 Section 2.6 provides an introduction to the concepts of assurance and trustworthiness and how the two concepts are 

related. A trustworthiness model is illustrated in Figure 3.

95 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides security control baselines for national security systems. Therefore, the assurancerelated controls in the baselines established for the national security community, if so designated, may differ from those 

controls designated in Tables E-1 through E-3.

96 It is difficult to determine if a given security control baseline from Appendix D provides the assurance needed across 

all information technologies, users, platforms, and organizations. For example, while the use of formal methods might 

be appropriate in a cross-domain product, different assurance techniques might be appropriate for a complex air traffic 

control system or for a web server providing emergency preparedness information from the Department of Homeland 

Security. Still, the existing baselines do have assurance aspects that reflect the minimum assurance that is anticipated to 

be common across all technologies, users, platforms, and organizations.

S

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solutions to compensate for insufficient technology-based solutions) or assume a greater degree 

of risk with regard to the actual security capability achieved.

The following sections provide a description of the assurance-related controls that are included in 

each of the security control baselines in Appendix D. The criteria for whether a security control is 

assurance-related or functionality-related is based on the overall characteristics of the control. In 

general, assurance-related controls are controls that: (i) define processes, procedures, techniques, 

or methodologies for designing and developing information systems and system components (i.e., 

hardware, software, firmware); (ii) provide supporting operational processes including improving 

the quality of systems/components/processes; (iii) produce security evidence from developmental

or operational activities; (iv) determine security control effectiveness or risk (e.g., audit, testing, 

evaluation, analysis, assessment, verification, validation, monitoring); or (v) improve personnel 

skills, expertise, and understanding (e.g., security awareness/training, incident response training, 

contingency training).

Security controls may be designated as assurance-related controls even when the controls exhibit 

some functional characteristics or properties (e.g., SI-4, Information System Monitoring). The 

distinction between functionality and assurance is less important when describing the assurancerelated controls in the baselines—primarily because the security controls in the three baselines 

after the tailoring process is applied, become part of the security plans for information systems 

and for organizations.97 However, the distinction becomes more important when organizations 

exercise the option of selecting additional security controls to increase the level of assurance (or 

the degree of confidence) in the security functionality and security capability.

97 Organizations are cautioned to carefully examine the assurance-related controls in the baselines during the tailoring 

process, including the development of overlays, to help ensure that controls are not being inadvertently eliminated that 

provide the measures of confidence in the security functionality needed for mission/business protection.

The New Look for Assurance

While previous versions of Special Publication 800-53 addressed minimum assurance requirements, 

the focus was on higher-level, more abstract requirements applied to the low, moderate, and high 

baselines. This revision takes a fundamentally different approach to assurance by defining specific 

assurance-related security controls in Appendix F that can be implemented by organizations based 

on the security categorizations of their information systems—making the assurance requirements 

more actionable and providing opportunities for increasing the levels of assurance based on mission 

and business needs, current/projected threats, unique operating environments, or the use of new 

technologies. The identification of specific assurance-related controls in the low, moderate, and high 

baselines in easy-to read tables (Tables E-1, E-2, E-3) helps organizations to quickly define controls 

necessary to satisfy minimum assurance requirements. The optional assurance-related controls in 

Table E-4 provide organizations with specification language to use in acquisitions targeted at the 

developers of information systems, system components, and information system services. The 

controls address specific methodologies, techniques, design, and architectural considerations as 

well as sound system and security engineering principles to fundamentally improve the quality of 

hardware, software, and firmware components that will be integrated into organizational information 

systems or the critical infrastructure. The designation of assurance-related controls is not intended to 

imply a greater level of importance for such controls. Achieving adequate security for organizational 

information systems requires the correct combination of both functionality- and assurance-related 

security controls. Only by understanding the importance of the concept of assurance and recognizing 

which security controls are more assurance-oriented versus functionality-oriented can organizations 

select the most appropriate combination of controls to protect their organizational operations and 

assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

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Minimum Assurance Requirements – Low-Impact Systems

Assurance Requirement: The organization, based on its security requirements, security policies, and needed 

security capabilities, has an expectation of: (i) a limited strength of security functionality; and (ii) a limited

degree of confidence supported by the depth and coverage of associated security evidence, that the security 

functionality is complete, consistent, and correct.

Supplemental Guidance: Security functionality and assurance for low-impact systems are achieved by the 

implementation of security controls from the tailored low baseline in Appendix D. Assurance requirements

for low-impact systems (including the information technology components that are part of those systems),

align with that which is readily achievable with unmodified, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products and 

services. Due to the limited strength of functionality expected for low-impact systems, the depth/coverage 

of security evidence98 produced is minimal and is not expected to be more than what is routinely provided 

by COTS manufacturers, vendors, and resellers. The depth/coverage evidence is further supplemented by 

the results of security control assessments and the ongoing monitoring of organizational information 

systems and environments in which the systems operate. For other than technology-based functionality, the 

emphasis is on a limited degree of confidence in the completeness, correctness, and consistency of 

procedural and/or operational security functionality (e.g., policies, procedures, physical security, and 

personnel security). Assurance requirements specified in the form of developmental and operational 

assurance controls for low-impact systems are listed in Table E-1. Organizations, through the tailoring 

process (including an organizational assessment of risk), may choose to add other assurance-related 

controls and/or control enhancements to the set included in Table E-1.

TABLE E-1: ASSURANCE-RELATED CONTROLS FOR LOW-IMPACT SYSTEMS99

ID CONTROLS ID CONTROLS

AC AC-1 MP MP-1

AT AT-1, AT-2, AT-3, AT-4 PE PE-1, PE-6, PE-8

AU AU-1, AU-6 PL PL-1, PL-2, PL-4

CA CA-1, CA-2, CA-3, CA-5, CA-6, CA-7, CA-9 PS PS-1, PS-6, PS-7

CM CM-1, CM-2, CM-4, CM-8 RA RA-1, RA-3, RA-5

CP CP-1, CP-3, CP-4 SA SA-1, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-4(10), SA-5, SA-9

IA IA-1 SC SC-1, SC-39

IR IR-1, IR-2, IR-5 SI SI-1, SI-4, SI-5

MA MA-1

98 NIST Special Publication 800-53A provides additional information on depth and coverage in security control 

assessments.

99 The assurance-related controls in Table E-1 are a subset of the security controls contained in the security control 

baseline for low-impact systems in Appendix D. Implementing the assurance-related controls in Table E-1 (including 

depth/coverage security evidence from NIST Special Publication 800-53A) will satisfy the minimum assurance 

requirements for low-impact systems mandated by FIPS Publication 200.

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Minimum Assurance Requirements – Moderate-Impact Systems

Assurance Requirement: The organization, based on its security requirements, security policies, and needed 

security capabilities, has an expectation of: (i) a moderate strength of security functionality; and (ii) a 

moderate degree of confidence supported by the depth and coverage of associated security evidence, that 

the security functionality is complete, consistent, and correct.

Supplemental Guidance: Security functionality and assurance for moderate-impact systems are achieved by 

the implementation of security controls from the tailored moderate baseline in Appendix D. Assurance 

requirements for moderate-impact systems (including the information technology components that are part 

of those systems) add to the expectations at the low-assurance level by: (i) incorporating COTS security

functionality with greater strength of mechanism and capability than the strength of mechanism and 

capability achieved in low-impact systems; (ii) requiring perhaps, some special development; (iii)

establishing more secure configuration settings; and (iv) requiring some additional assessment of the 

implemented capability. Due to the moderate strength of functionality expected for moderate-impact 

systems, the depth/coverage of security evidence100 produced is more substantial than the minimal evidence

produced for low-impact systems but still in the range of what can be provided by COTS manufacturers, 

vendors, and resellers. The depth/coverage evidence is further supplemented by the results of additional 

security control assessments and the ongoing monitoring of organizational information systems and 

environments of operation. For other than technology-based functionality, the emphasis is on a moderate 

degree of confidence in the completeness, correctness, and consistency of procedural and/or operational 

security functionality (e.g., policies, procedures, physical security, and personnel security). Assurance 

requirements in the form of developmental and operational assurance controls for moderate-impact systems 

are listed in Table E-2. Organizations, through the tailoring process (including an organizational assessment 

of risk), may choose to add other assurance-related controls and/or control enhancements to the set 

included in Table E-2.

TABLE E-2: ASSURANCE-RELATED CONTROLS FOR MODERATE-IMPACT SYSTEMS101

ID CONTROLS ID CONTROLS

AC AC-1 MP MP-1

AT AT-1, AT-2, AT-2(2), AT-3, AT-4 PE PE-1, PE-6, PE-6(1), PE-8

AU AU-1, AU-6, AU-6(1), AU-6(3), AU-7, AU-7(1) PL PL-1, PL-2, PL-2(3), PL-4, PL-4(1), PL-8

CA CA-1, CA-2, CA-2(1), CA-3, CA-5, CA-6, CA-7, CA-7(1), CA-9 PS PS-1, PS-6, PS-7

CM CM-1, CM-2, CM-2(1), CM-2(3), CM-2(7), CM-3, CM-3(2), CM4, CM-8, CM-8(1), CM-8(3), CM-8(5)RA RA-1, RA-3, RA-5, RA-5(1), RA-5(2), RA-5(5)

CP CP-1, CP-3, CP-4, CP-4(1) SA SA-1, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-4(1), SA-4(2), SA-4(9), SA-4(10), 

SA-5, SA-8, SA-9, SA-9(2), SA-10, SA-11

IA IA-1 SC SC-1, SC-2, SC-39

IR IR-1, IR-2, IR-3, IR-3(2), IR-5 SI SI-1, SI-4, SI-4(2), SI-4(4), SI-4(5), SI-5, SI-7, SI-7(1), SI-7(7), 

MA MA SI-10, SI-16 -1

100 NIST Special Publication 800-53A provides additional information on depth and coverage in security control 

assessments.

101 The assurance-related controls in Table E-2 are a subset of the security controls contained in the security control 

baseline for moderate-impact systems in Appendix D. Implementing the assurance-related controls in Table E-2 

(including depth/coverage security evidence from NIST Special Publication 800-53A) will satisfy the minimum 

assurance requirements for moderate-impact systems mandated by FIPS Publication 200. The bold text indicates the 

delta from the low baseline (i.e., the assurance-related controls added to the low baseline to produce the increased level 

of assurance in the moderate baseline).

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Minimum Assurance Requirements – High-Impact Systems

Assurance Requirement: The organization, based on its security requirements, security policies, and needed 

security capabilities, has an expectation of: (i) a high strength of security functionality; and (ii) a high

degree of confidence supported by the depth and coverage of associated security evidence, that the security 

functionality is complete, consistent, and correct.

Supplemental Guidance: Security functionality and assurance for high-impact systems are achieved by the 

implementation of security controls from the tailored high baseline in Appendix D. Assurance requirements 

for high-impact systems (including the information technology components that are part of those systems), 

add to the expectations at the moderate assurance level by: (i) incorporating higher-end COTS security 

capabilities that result from the application of commonly accepted best commercial development practices 

for reducing latent flaw rates, some special development, and additional assessment of the implemented 

capability. Due to the high strength of functionality expected for high-impact systems, the depth/coverage 

of security evidence102 produced is more comprehensive than the evidence produced for moderate-impact 

systems. Although the evidence may still be in the range of what can be provided by COTS manufacturers, 

vendors, and resellers, greater assurance from independent assessment providers may be required. The

depth/coverage evidence is supplemented by the results of additional security control assessments and the 

ongoing monitoring of organizational information systems/environments of operation. For other than 

technology-based functionality, there is a high degree of confidence in the completeness, correctness, and 

consistency of procedural and/or operational security functionality (e.g., policies, procedures, physical 

security, and personnel security). Assurance requirements in the form of developmental and operational 

assurance controls for high-impact information systems are listed in Table E-3. Organizations, through the 

tailoring process (including an organizational assessment of risk), may choose to add other assurancerelated controls and/or control enhancements to the set included in Table E-3.

TABLE E-3: ASSURANCE-RELATED CONTROLS FOR HIGH-IMPACT SYSTEMS103

ID CONTROLS ID CONTROLS

AC AC-1 MP MP-1

AT AT-1, AT-2, AT-2(2), AT-3, AT-4 PE PE-1, PE-6, PE-6(1), PE-6(4), PE-8

AU AU-1, AU-6, AU-6(1), AU-6(3), AU-6(5), AU-6(6), AU-7, AU7(1), AU-10PL PL-1, PL-2, PL-2(3), PL-4, PL-4(1), PL-8

CA CA-1, CA-2, CA-2(1), CA-2(2), CA-3, CA-5, CA-6, CA-7, CA7(1), CA-8, CA-9PS PS-1, PS-6, PS-7

CM CM-1, CM-2, CM-2(1), CM-2(2), CM-2(3), CM-2(7), CM-3, CM3(1), CM-3(2), CM-4, CM-4(1), CM-8, CM-8(1), CM-8(2), CM8(3), CM-8(4), CM-8(5)RA RA-1, RA-3, RA-5, RA-5(1), RA-5(2), RA-5(4), RA-5(5)

CP CP-1, CP-3, CP-3(1), CP-4, CP-4(1), CP-4(2) SA SA-1, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-4(1), SA-4(2), SA-4(9), SA-4(10), 

SA-5, SA-8, SA-9, SA-9(2), SA-10, SA-11, SA-12, SA-15, SA16, SA-17

IA IA-1 SC SC-1, SC-2, SC-3, SC-7(18), SC-7(21), SC-24, SC-39

IR IR-1, IR-2, IR-2(1), IR-2(2), IR-3, IR-3(2), IR-5, IR-5(1) SI SI-1, SI-4, SI-4(2), SI-4(4), SI-4(5), SI-5, SI-5(1), SI-6, SI-7, SIMA MA 7(1), SI-7(2), SI-7(5), SI-7(7), SI-7(14), SI-10, SI-16 -1

102 NIST Special Publication 800-53A provides additional information on depth and coverage in security control 

assessments.

103 The assurance-related controls in Table E-3 are a subset of the security controls contained in the security control 

baseline for high-impact systems in Appendix D. Implementing the assurance-related controls in Table E-3 (including 

depth/coverage security evidence from NIST Special Publication 800-53A) will satisfy the minimum assurance 

requirements for high-impact systems mandated by FIPS Publication 200. The bold text indicates the delta from the 

moderate baseline (i.e., the assurance-related controls added to the moderate baseline to produce the increased level of 

assurance in the high baseline).

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Security Controls to Achieve Enhanced Assurance

While the assurance-related controls allocated to the low, moderate, and high baselines in the 

previous sections, represent minimum assurance requirements, organizations can, over time, 

choose to raise the level of assurance in their information systems—increasing the level of 

trustworthiness accordingly. This is accomplished by adding assurance-related controls to the 

controls in the baselines to increase both the strength of security functionality and degree of 

confidence that the functionality is correct, complete, and consistent—making the functionality

highly resistant to penetration, tamper, or bypass. Security functionality that is highly resistant to 

penetration, tamper, and bypass requires a significant work factor on the part of adversaries to 

compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the information system or system 

components where that functionality is employed.

Since high-assurance information technology products may be more costly and difficult to obtain, 

organizations may choose to partition their information systems into distinct subsystems to isolate 

the critical components and focus the high-assurance efforts on a more narrowly defined subset of 

information resources. Organizations that find it difficult to achieve high-assurance information 

technology solutions may have to rely to a greater extent on procedural or operational protections 

to ensure mission and business success. This includes, for example, reengineering critical mission 

and business processes to be less susceptible to high-end threats. Table E-4 provides additional 

developmental and operational activities (e.g., in the SA, SI, and CM security control families), 

that organizations can select to achieve an enhanced level of assurance (up to and including high 

assurance). The list of assurance-related controls is not intended to be exhaustive. Organizations, 

during the tailoring process, may choose to designate other security controls as assurance-related 

and add to the exemplar set in Table E-4.

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TABLE E-4: SECURITY CONTROLS FOR ENHANCED ASSURANCE104

ID CONTROLS ID CONTROLS

AC AC-25 MP No additional controls.

AT AT-2(1), AT-3 (all enhancements) PE PE-6(2), PE-6(3)

AU AU-6(4), AU-6(7), AU-6(8), AU-6(9), AU-6(10), AU-10 (all

enhancements), AU-11(1), AU-13 (plus enhancements), AU14 (plus enhancements)

PL PL-8 (all enhancements), PL-9

CA CA-2(3), CA-5(1), CA-7(3), CA-8 (all enhancements), CA-9(1) PS PS-6(2), PS-6(3)

CM CM-2(6), CM-4(2), CM-8(6), CM-8(7), CM-8(8), CM-8(9) RA RA-5(3), RA-5(6), RA-5(8), RA-5(10), RA-6

CP CP-3(2), CP-4(3), CP-4(4), CP-12 SA SA-4(3), SA-4(5), SA-4(6), SA-4(7), SA-4(8), SA-9(1), SA9(3), SA-9(4), SA-9(5), SA-10 (all enhancements), SA-11 (all 

enhancements), SA-12 (all enhancements), SA-13, SA-14, 

SA-15 (all enhancements), SA-17 (all enhancements), SA-18

(plus enhancements), SA-19 (plus enhancements), SA-20, 

SA-21 (plus enhancement), SA-22 (plus enhancement)

IA No additional controls. SC SC-2(1), SC-3 (all enhancements), SC-6, SC-7(22), SC-11

(plus enhancement), SC-29 (plus enhancement), SC-30 (plus 

enhancements), SC-31 (plus enhancements), SC-32, SC-34

(plus enhancements), SC-36 (plus enhancement), SC-37 (plus 

enhancement), SC-38, SC-39 (all enhancements)

IR IR-3(1) SI SI-4(1), SI-4(3), SI-4(7), SI-4(9), SI-4(10), SI-4(11), SI-4(12), 

SI-4(13), SI-4(14), SI-4(15), SI-4(16), SI-4(17), SI-4(18), SI4(19), SI-4(20), SI-4(21), SI-4(22), SI-4(23), SI-4(24), SI-7(3), 

SI-7(6), SI-7(8), SI-7(9), SI-7(10), SI-7(11), SI-7(12), SI-7(13), 

SI-7(15), SI-7(16), SI-10 (all enhancements), SI-13 (plus 

enhancements), SI-14 (plus enhancement), SI-15, SI-17

MA No additional controls.

104 The assurance-related controls in Table E-4 represent the additional security controls needed to achieve enhanced 

levels of assurance (i.e., the controls needed to go beyond the minimum assurance levels that are represented by the

assurance-related controls in Tables E-1, E-2, and E-3). When an assurance-related control is allocated to a baseline 

(i.e., listed in Tables E-1, E-2, or E-3), but all of its control enhancements are in Table E-4, it is designated in the table 

as Control (all enhancements). When an assurance-related control and all of its control enhancements are not allocated 

to baselines, it is designated in the table as Control (plus enhancements). When assurance-related control enhancements 

from a particular control are allocated to one of the baselines, the remaining unselected control enhancements are listed 

individually in Table E-4.

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APPENDIX F

SECURITY CONTROL CATALOG 

SECURITY CONTROLS, ENHANCEMENTS, AND SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE

he catalog of security controls in this appendix provides a range of safeguards and 

countermeasures for organizations and information systems.105 The security controls have 

been designed to facilitate compliance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, 

directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines.

106 The organization of the security 

control catalog, the structure of the security controls, and the concept of allocating security 

controls and control enhancements to the initial baselines in Appendix D are described in Chapter 

Two. The security controls in the catalog with few exceptions, have been designed to be policyand technology-neutral. This means that security controls and control enhancements focus on the 

fundamental safeguards and countermeasures necessary to protect information during processing, 

while in storage, and during transmission. Therefore, it is beyond the scope of this publication to 

provide guidance on the application of security controls to specific technologies, communities of 

interest, environments of operation, or missions/business functions. These areas are addressed by 

the use of the tailoring process described in Chapter Three and the development of overlays 

described in Appendix I.

In the few cases where specific technologies are called out in security controls (e.g., mobile, PKI, 

wireless, VOIP), organizations are cautioned that the need to provide adequate security goes well 

beyond the requirements in a single control associated with a particular technology. Many of the 

needed safeguards/countermeasures are obtained from the other security controls in the catalog 

allocated to the initial control baselines as the starting point for the development of security plans 

and overlays using the tailoring process. In addition to the organization-driven development of 

specialized security plans and overlays, NIST Special Publications and Interagency Reports may 

provide guidance on recommended security controls for specific technologies and sector-specific 

applications (e.g., Smart Grid, healthcare, Industrial Control Systems, and mobile).

Employing a policy- and technology-neutral security control catalog has the following benefits:

• It encourages organizations to focus on the security capabilities required for mission/business 

success and the protection of information, irrespective of the information technologies that 

are employed in organizational information systems;

• It encourages organizations to analyze each security control for its applicability to specific 

technologies, environments of operation, missions/business functions, and communities of 

interest; and

105 An online version of the catalog of security controls is also available at http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/800-53/home.

106 Compliance necessitates organizations executing due diligence with regard to information security and risk 

management. Information security due diligence includes using all appropriate information as part of an organizationwide risk management program to effectively use the tailoring guidance and inherent flexibility in NIST publications so 

that the selected security controls documented in organizational security plans meet the specific mission and business 

requirements of organizations. Using the risk management tools and techniques that are available to organizations is 

essential in developing, implementing, and maintaining the safeguards and countermeasures with the necessary and 

sufficient strength of mechanism to address the current threats to organizational operations and assets, individuals, 

other organizations, and the Nation. Employing effective risk-based processes, procedures, and technologies will help 

ensure that all federal information systems and organizations have the necessary resilience to support ongoing federal 

responsibilities, critical infrastructure applications, and continuity of government.

T

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• It encourages organizations to specify security policies as part of the tailoring process for 

security controls that have variable parameters.

For example, organizations using smart phones, tablets, or other types of mobile devices would 

start the tailoring process by assuming that all security controls and control enhancements in the 

appropriate baseline (low, moderate, or high) are needed. The tailoring process may result in 

certain security controls being eliminated for a variety of reasons, including, for example, the 

inability of the technology to support the implementation of the control. However, the elimination 

of such controls without understanding the potential adverse impacts to organizational missions 

and business functions can significantly increase information security risk and should be carefully 

analyzed. This type of analysis is essential in order for organizations to make effective risk-based 

decisions including the selection of appropriate compensating security controls, when considering

the use of these emerging mobile devices and technologies. The specialization of security plans 

using the tailoring guidance and overlays, together with a comprehensive set of technology- and 

policy-neutral security controls, promotes cost-effective, risk-based information security for 

organizations—in any sector, for any technology, and in any operating environment.

The security controls in the catalog are expected to change over time, as controls are withdrawn, 

revised, and added. In order to maintain stability in security plans and automated tools supporting 

the implementation of Special Publication 800-53, security controls will not be renumbered each 

time a control is withdrawn. Rather, notations of security controls that have been withdrawn are 

maintained in the catalog for historical purposes. Security controls are withdrawn for a variety of 

reasons including, for example: the security capability provided by the withdrawn control has 

been incorporated into another control; the security capability provided by the withdrawn control 

is redundant to an existing control; or the security control is deemed to be no longer necessary.

There may, on occasion, be repetition in requirements that appear in the security controls and 

control enhancements that are part of the security control catalog. This repetition in requirements 

is intended to reinforce the security requirements from the perspective of multiple controls and/or 

enhancements. For example, the requirement for strong identification and authentication when 

conducting remote maintenance activities appears in the MA family in the specific context of 

systems maintenance activities conducted by organizations. The identification and authentication 

requirement also appears in a more general context in the IA family. While these requirements 

appear to be redundant (i.e., overlapping), they are, in fact, mutually reinforcing and not intended 

to require additional effort on the part of organizations in the development and implementation of 

security programs.

Implementation Tip

New security controls and control enhancements will be developed on a regular basis using state-ofthe-practice information from national-level threat and vulnerability databases as well as information 

on the tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by adversaries in launching cyber attacks. The 

proposed modifications to security controls and security control baselines will be carefully weighed 

during each revision cycle, considering the desire for stability of the security control catalog and the 

need to respond to changing threats, vulnerabilities, attack methods, and information technologies. 

The overall objective is to raise the basic level of information security over time. Organizations may 

choose to develop new security controls when there is a specific security capability required and the

appropriate controls are not available in Appendices F or G.

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SECURITY CONTROL CLASS DESIGNATIONS

MANAGEMENT, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNICAL REFERENCES

Because many security controls within the security control families in Appendix F have various 

combinations of management, operational, and technical properties, the specific class designations 

have been removed from the security control families. Organizations may still find it useful to 

apply such designations to individual security controls and control enhancements or to individual 

sections within a particular control/enhancement. Organizations may find it beneficial to employ 

class designations as a way to group or refer to security controls. The class designations may also 

help organizations with the process of allocating security controls and control enhancements to: (i) 

responsible parties or information systems (e.g., as common or hybrid controls); (ii) specific roles; 

and/or (iii) specific components of a system. For example, organizations may determine that the 

responsibility for system-specific controls they have placed in the management class belong to the 

information system owner, controls placed in the operational class belong to the Information 

System Security Officer (ISSO), and controls placed in the technical class belong to one or more 

system administrators. This example is provided to illustrate the potential usefulness of designating 

classes for controls and/or control enhancements; it is not meant to suggest or require additional 

tasks for organizations.

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CAUTIONARY NOTE

DEVELOPMENT OF SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, AND SERVICES

With the renewed emphasis on trustworthy information systems and supply chain security, it is 

essential that organizations have the capability to express their information security requirements 

with clarity and specificity in order to engage the information technology industry and obtain the 

systems, components, and services necessary for mission and business success. To ensure that 

organizations have such capability, Special Publication 800-53 provides a set of security controls in 

the System and Services Acquisition family (i.e., SA family) addressing requirements for the 

development of information systems, information technology products, and information system 

services. Therefore, many of the controls in the SA family are directed at developers of those 

systems, components, and services. It is important for organizations to recognize that the scope of 

the security controls in the SA family includes all system/component/service development and the 

developers associated with such development whether the development is conducted by internal 

organizational personnel or by external developers through the contracting/acquisition process. 

Affected controls include SA-8, SA-10, SA-11, SA-15, SA-16, SA-17, SA-20, and SA-21.

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Fundamentals of the Catalog

Security controls and control enhancements in Appendices F and G are generally designed to be 

policy-neutral and technology/implementation-independent. Organizations provide information 

about security controls and control enhancements in two ways:

• By specifying security control implementation details (e.g., platform dependencies) in the 

associated security plan for the information system or security program plan for the 

organization; and

• By establishing specific values in the variable sections of selected security controls through the 

use of assignment and selection statements.

Assignment and selection statements provide organizations with the capability to specialize 

security controls and control enhancements based on organizational security requirements or 

requirements originating in federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, 

standards, or guidelines. Organization-defined parameters used in assignment and selection 

statements in the basic security controls apply also to all control enhancements associated with 

those controls. Control enhancements strengthen the fundamental security capability in the base 

control but are not a substitute for using assignment or selection statements to provide greater 

specificity to the control. Assignment statements for security controls and control enhancements 

do not contain minimum or maximum values (e.g., testing contingency plans at least annually). 

Organizations should consult specific federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, or guidelines as the definitive sources for such information. The absence of 

minimum and maximum values from the security controls and control enhancements does not 

obviate the need for organizations to comply with requirements in the controlling source 

publications.

The first security control in each family (i.e., the dash-1 control) generates requirements for 

specific policies and procedures that are needed for the effective implementation of the other 

security controls in the family. Therefore, individual controls and control enhancements in a 

particular family do not call for the development of such policies and procedures. Supplemental 

guidance sections of security controls and control enhancements do not contain any requirements 

or references to FIPS or NIST Special Publications. NIST publications are, however, included in 

a references section for each security control. 

In support of the Joint Task Force initiative to develop a unified information security framework 

for the federal government, security controls and control enhancements for national security 

systems are included in this appendix. The inclusion of such controls and enhancements is not 

intended to impose security requirements on organizations that operate national security systems. 

Rather, organizations can use the security controls and control enhancements on a voluntary basis 

with the approval of federal officials exercising policy authority over national security systems. In 

addition, the security control priorities and security control baselines listed in Appendix D and in 

the priority and baseline allocation summary boxes below each security control in Appendix F, 

apply to non-national security systems only unless otherwise directed by the federal officials with 

national security policy authority.

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Using the Catalog

Organizations employ security controls107 in federal information systems and the environments in 

which those systems operate in accordance with FIPS Publication 199, FIPS Publication 200, and 

NIST Special Publications 800-37 and 800-39. Security categorization of federal information and 

information systems, as required by FIPS Publication 199, is the first step in the RMF.

108 Next, 

organizations select the appropriate security control baselines for their information systems by 

satisfying the minimum security requirements set forth in FIPS Publication 200. Appendix D 

includes three security control baselines that are associated with the designated impact levels of 

information systems as determined during the security categorization process.109 After baseline 

selection, organizations tailor the baselines by: (i) identifying/designating common controls; (ii) 

applying scoping considerations; (iii) selecting compensating controls, if needed; (iv) assigning 

control parameter values in selection and assignment statements; (v) supplementing the baseline 

controls with additional controls and control enhancements from the security control catalog; and 

(vi) providing additional information for control implementation. Organizations can also use the 

baseline tailoring process with the overlay concept that is described in Section 3.2 and Appendix 

I. Risk assessments, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-30, guide and inform the 

security control selection process.110

107 The security controls in Special Publication 800-53 are available online and can be downloaded in various formats 

from the NIST web site at: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/800-53/home.

108 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides guidance for security categorization of national security systems.

109 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides guidance on security control baselines for national security systems and specific

tailoring requirements associated with such systems.

110 There are additional security controls and control enhancements that appear in the catalog that are not used in any of 

the initial baselines. These additional controls and control enhancements are available to organizations and can be used 

in the tailoring process to achieve the needed level of protection in accordance with organizational risk assessments.

CAUTIONARY NOTE

USE OF CRYPTOGRAPHY

If cryptography is required for the protection of information based on the selection of security 

controls in Appendix F and subsequently implemented by organizational information systems, the 

cryptographic mechanisms comply with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, 

policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. This includes, for NSA-approved cryptography to 

protect classified information, FIPS-validated cryptography to protect unclassified information, and 

NSA-approved and FIPS-compliant key management technologies and processes. Security controls 

SC-12 and SC-13 provide specific information on the selection of appropriate cryptographic 

mechanisms, including the strength of such mechanisms.

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FAMILY: ACCESS CONTROL

AC-1 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles]:

1. An access control policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, 

management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; 

and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the access control policy and associated 

access controls; and

b. Reviews and updates the current:

1. Access control policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and

2. Access control procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AC family. 

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can 

be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The 

procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information 

systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AC-1 MOD AC-1 HIGH AC-1

AC-2 ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT

Control: The organization:

a. Identifies and selects the following types of information system accounts to support 

organizational missions/business functions: [Assignment: organization-defined information 

system account types];

b. Assigns account managers for information system accounts;

c. Establishes conditions for group and role membership;

d. Specifies authorized users of the information system, group and role membership, and access 

authorizations (i.e., privileges) and other attributes (as required) for each account;

e. Requires approvals by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] for requests to 

create information system accounts;

f. Creates, enables, modifies, disables, and removes information system accounts in accordance 

with [Assignment: organization-defined procedures or conditions];

g. Monitors the use of information system accounts;

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h. Notifies account managers:

1. When accounts are no longer required;

2. When users are terminated or transferred; and

3. When individual information system usage or need-to-know changes;

i. Authorizes access to the information system based on:

1. A valid access authorization;

2. Intended system usage; and

3. Other attributes as required by the organization or associated missions/business functions;

j. Reviews accounts for compliance with account management requirements [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency]; and

k. Establishes a process for reissuing shared/group account credentials (if deployed) when 

individuals are removed from the group.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system account types include, for example, individual, shared, 

group, system, guest/anonymous, emergency, developer/manufacturer/vendor, temporary, and 

service. Some of the account management requirements listed above can be implemented by 

organizational information systems. The identification of authorized users of the information 

system and the specification of access privileges reflects the requirements in other security 

controls in the security plan. Users requiring administrative privileges on information system 

accounts receive additional scrutiny by appropriate organizational personnel (e.g., system owner, 

mission/business owner, or chief information security officer) responsible for approving such 

accounts and privileged access. Organizations may choose to define access privileges or other 

attributes by account, by type of account, or a combination of both. Other attributes required for 

authorizing access include, for example, restrictions on time-of-day, day-of-week, and point-oforigin. In defining other account attributes, organizations consider system-related requirements 

(e.g., scheduled maintenance, system upgrades) and mission/business requirements, (e.g., time 

zone differences, customer requirements, remote access to support travel requirements). Failure to 

consider these factors could affect information system availability. Temporary and emergency

accounts are accounts intended for short-term use. Organizations establish temporary accounts as a 

part of normal account activation procedures when there is a need for short-term accounts without

the demand for immediacy in account activation. Organizations establish emergency accounts in 

response to crisis situations and with the need for rapid account activation. Therefore, emergency 

account activation may bypass normal account authorization processes. Emergency and temporary 

accounts are not to be confused with infrequently used accounts (e.g., local logon accounts used 

for special tasks defined by organizations or when network resources are unavailable). Such 

accounts remain available and are not subject to automatic disabling or removal dates. Conditions 

for disabling or deactivating accounts include, for example: (i) when shared/group, emergency, or 

temporary accounts are no longer required; or (ii) when individuals are transferred or terminated. 

Some types of information system accounts may require specialized training. Related controls: 

AC-3, AC-4, AC-5, AC-6, AC-10, AC-17, AC-19, AC-20, AU-9, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8, CM-5, 

CM-6, CM-11, MA-3, MA-4, MA-5, PL-4, SC-13.

Control Enhancements:

(1) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED SYSTEM ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT

The organization employs automated mechanisms to support the management of information 

system accounts.

Supplemental Guidance: The use of automated mechanisms can include, for example: using 

email or text messaging to automatically notify account managers when users are terminated 

or transferred; using the information system to monitor account usage; and using telephonic 

notification to report atypical system account usage.

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(2) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | REMOVAL OF TEMPORARY / EMERGENCY ACCOUNTS

The information system automatically [Selection: removes; disables] temporary and emergency 

accounts after [Assignment: organization-defined time period for each type of account].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires the removal of both temporary and

emergency accounts automatically after a predefined period of time has elapsed, rather than at 

the convenience of the systems administrator.

(3) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE INACTIVE ACCOUNTS

The information system automatically disables inactive accounts after [Assignment: organizationdefined time period].

(4) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED AUDIT ACTIONS

The information system automatically audits account creation, modification, enabling, disabling, 

and removal actions, and notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AU-2, AU-12.

(5) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | INACTIVITY LOGOUT

The organization requires that users log out when [Assignment: organization-defined time-period 

of expected inactivity or description of when to log out].

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SC-23.

(6) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC PRIVILEGE MANAGEMENT

The information system implements the following dynamic privilege management capabilities:

[Assignment: organization-defined list of dynamic privilege management capabilities].

Supplemental Guidance: In contrast to conventional access control approaches which employ 

static information system accounts and predefined sets of user privileges, dynamic access 

control approaches (e.g., service-oriented architectures) rely on run time access control 

decisions facilitated by dynamic privilege management. While user identities may remain 

relatively constant over time, user privileges may change more frequently based on ongoing 

mission/business requirements and operational needs of organizations. Dynamic privilege 

management can include, for example, the immediate revocation of privileges from users, as 

opposed to requiring that users terminate and restart their sessions to reflect any changes in 

privileges. Dynamic privilege management can also refer to mechanisms that change the 

privileges of users based on dynamic rules as opposed to editing specific user profiles. This

type of privilege management includes, for example, automatic adjustments of privileges if 

users are operating out of their normal work times, or if information systems are under duress 

or in emergency maintenance situations. This control enhancement also includes the ancillary 

effects of privilege changes, for example, the potential changes to encryption keys used for 

communications. Dynamic privilege management can support requirements for information 

system resiliency. Related control: AC-16.

(7) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ROLE-BASED SCHEMES

The organization:

(a) Establishes and administers privileged user accounts in accordance with a role-based access 

scheme that organizes allowed information system access and privileges into roles;

(b) Monitors privileged role assignments; and

(c) Takes [Assignment: organization-defined actions] when privileged role assignments are no 

longer appropriate.

Supplemental Guidance: Privileged roles are organization-defined roles assigned to individuals 

that allow those individuals to perform certain security-relevant functions that ordinary users 

are not authorized to perform. These privileged roles include, for example, key management, 

account management, network and system administration, database administration, and web 

administration.

(8) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC ACCOUNT CREATION

The information system creates [Assignment: organization-defined information system accounts]

dynamically.

Supplemental Guidance: Dynamic approaches for creating information system accounts (e.g., as 

implemented within service-oriented architectures) rely on establishing accounts (identities) at 

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run time for entities that were previously unknown. Organizations plan for dynamic creation 

of information system accounts by establishing trust relationships and mechanisms with the

appropriate authorities to validate related authorizations and privileges. Related control: AC16.

(9) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF SHARED / GROUP ACCOUNTS

The organization only permits the use of shared/group accounts that meet [Assignment: 

organization-defined conditions for establishing shared/group accounts].

(10) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | SHARED / GROUP ACCOUNT CREDENTIAL TERMINATION

The information system terminates shared/group account credentials when members leave the 

group.

(11) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | USAGE CONDITIONS

The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances and/or usage 

conditions] for [Assignment: organization-defined information system accounts].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can describe the specific conditions or circumstances 

under which information system accounts can be used, for example, by restricting usage to 

certain days of the week, time of day, or specific durations of time.

(12) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ACCOUNT MONITORING / ATYPICAL USAGE

The organization:

(a) Monitors information system accounts for [Assignment: organization-defined atypical usage]; 

and

(b) Reports atypical usage of information system accounts to [Assignment: organization-defined 

personnel or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: Atypical usage includes, for example, accessing information systems 

at certain times of the day and from locations that are not consistent with the normal usage 

patterns of individuals working in organizations. Related control: CA-7.

(13) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE ACCOUNTS FOR HIGH-RISK INDIVIDUALS

The organization disables accounts of users posing a significant risk within [Assignment: 

organization-defined time period] of discovery of the risk.

Supplemental Guidance: Users posing a significant risk to organizations include individuals for 

whom reliable evidence or intelligence indicates either the intention to use authorized access 

to information systems to cause harm or through whom adversaries will cause harm. Harm

includes potential adverse impacts to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other 

organizations, or the Nation. Close coordination between authorizing officials, information 

system administrators, and human resource managers is essential in order for timely execution 

of this control enhancement. Related control: PS-4.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AC-2 MOD AC-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) HIGH AC-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (11) (12) (13)

AC-3 ACCESS ENFORCEMENT

Control: The information system enforces approved authorizations for logical access to information 

and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.

Supplemental Guidance: Access control policies (e.g., identity-based policies, role-based policies, 

control matrices, cryptography) control access between active entities or subjects (i.e., users or 

processes acting on behalf of users) and passive entities or objects (e.g., devices, files, records, 

domains) in information systems. In addition to enforcing authorized access at the information

system level and recognizing that information systems can host many applications and services in 

support of organizational missions and business operations, access enforcement mechanisms can

also be employed at the application and service level to provide increased information security. 

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Related controls: AC-2, AC-4, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16, AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, AC-21, AC22, AU-9, CM-5, CM-6, CM-11, MA-3, MA-4, MA-5, PE-3.

Control Enhancements:

(1) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | RESTRICTED ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6].

(2) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

The information system enforces dual authorization for [Assignment: organization-defined 

privileged commands and/or other organization-defined actions].

Supplemental Guidance: Dual authorization mechanisms require the approval of two authorized 

individuals in order to execute. Organizations do not require dual authorization mechanisms 

when immediate responses are necessary to ensure public and environmental safety. Dual 

authorization may also be known as two-person control. Related controls: CP-9, MP-6.

(3) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL

The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined mandatory access control 

policy] over all subjects and objects where the policy:

(a) Is uniformly enforced across all subjects and objects within the boundary of the information 

system; 

(b) Specifies that a subject that has been granted access to information is constrained from doing 

any of the following;

(1) Passing the information to unauthorized subjects or objects;

(2) Granting its privileges to other subjects; 

(3) Changing one or more security attributes on subjects, objects, the information system, or 

information system components;

(4) Choosing the security attributes and attribute values to be associated with newly created 

or modified objects; or

(5) Changing the rules governing access control; and

(c) Specifies that [Assignment: organization-defined subjects] may explicitly be granted 

[Assignment: organization-defined privileges (i.e., they are trusted subjects)] such that they 

are not limited by some or all of the above constraints.

Supplemental Guidance: Mandatory access control as defined in this control enhancement is

synonymous with nondiscretionary access control, and is not constrained only to certain 

historical uses (e.g., implementations using the Bell-LaPadula Model). The above class of

mandatory access control policies constrains what actions subjects can take with information 

obtained from data objects for which they have already been granted access, thus preventing 

the subjects from passing the information to unauthorized subjects and objects. This class of 

mandatory access control policies also constrains what actions subjects can take with respect 

to the propagation of access control privileges; that is, a subject with a privilege cannot pass 

that privilege to other subjects. The policy is uniformly enforced over all subjects and objects 

to which the information system has control. Otherwise, the access control policy can be 

circumvented. This enforcement typically is provided via an implementation that meets the 

reference monitor concept (see AC-25). The policy is bounded by the information system 

boundary (i.e., once the information is passed outside of the control of the system, additional 

means may be required to ensure that the constraints on the information remain in effect). The 

trusted subjects described above are granted privileges consistent with the concept of least 

privilege (see AC-6). Trusted subjects are only given the minimum privileges relative to the 

above policy necessary for satisfying organizational mission/business needs. The control is 

most applicable when there is some policy mandate (e.g., law, Executive Order, directive, or 

regulation) that establishes a policy regarding access to sensitive/classified information and 

some users of the information system are not authorized access to all sensitive/classified

information resident in the information system. This control can operate in conjunction with 

AC-3 (4). A subject that is constrained in its operation by policies governed by this control is 

still able to operate under the less rigorous constraints of AC-3 (4), but policies governed by 

this control take precedence over the less rigorous constraints of AC-3 (4). For example, 

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while a mandatory access control policy imposes a constraint preventing a subject from 

passing information to another subject operating at a different sensitivity label, AC-3 (4)

permits the subject to pass the information to any subject with the same sensitivity label as the 

subject. Related controls: AC-25, SC-11.

(4) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL

The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined discretionary access control 

policy] over defined subjects and objects where the policy specifies that a subject that has been 

granted access to information can do one or more of the following:

(a) Pass the information to any other subjects or objects;

(b) Grant its privileges to other subjects; 

(c) Change security attributes on subjects, objects, the information system, or the information 

system’s components;

(d) Choose the security attributes to be associated with newly created or revised objects; or

(e) Change the rules governing access control.

Supplemental Guidance: When discretionary access control policies are implemented, subjects 

are not constrained with regard to what actions they can take with information for which they 

have already been granted access. Thus, subjects that have been granted access to information 

are not prevented from passing (i.e., the subjects have the discretion to pass) the information 

to other subjects or objects. This control enhancement can operate in conjunction with AC-3 

(3). A subject that is constrained in its operation by policies governed by AC-3 (3) is still able 

to operate under the less rigorous constraints of this control enhancement. Thus, while AC-3 

(3) imposes constraints preventing a subject from passing information to another subject 

operating at a different sensitivity level, AC-3 (4) permits the subject to pass the information 

to any subject at the same sensitivity level. The policy is bounded by the information system 

boundary. Once the information is passed outside of the control of the information system,

additional means may be required to ensure that the constraints remain in effect. While the 

older, more traditional definitions of discretionary access control require identity-based access 

control, that limitation is not required for this use of discretionary access control.

(5) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY-RELEVANT INFORMATION

The information system prevents access to [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant 

information] except during secure, non-operable system states.

Supplemental Guidance: Security-relevant information is any information within information 

systems that can potentially impact the operation of security functions or the provision of 

security services in a manner that could result in failure to enforce system security policies or 

maintain the isolation of code and data. Security-relevant information includes, for example, 

filtering rules for routers/firewalls, cryptographic key management information, configuration 

parameters for security services, and access control lists. Secure, non-operable system states 

include the times in which information systems are not performing mission/business-related 

processing (e.g., the system is off-line for maintenance, troubleshooting, boot-up, shut down).

Related control: CM-3.

(6) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | PROTECTION OF USER AND SYSTEM INFORMATION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-4 and SC-28].

(7) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL

The information system enforces a role-based access control policy over defined subjects and 

objects and controls access based upon [Assignment: organization-defined roles and users

authorized to assume such roles].

Supplemental Guidance: Role-based access control (RBAC) is an access control policy that 

restricts information system access to authorized users. Organizations can create specific roles 

based on job functions and the authorizations (i.e., privileges) to perform needed operations 

on organizational information systems associated with the organization-defined roles. When 

users are assigned to the organizational roles, they inherit the authorizations or privileges

defined for those roles. RBAC simplifies privilege administration for organizations because 

privileges are not assigned directly to every user (which can be a significant number of 

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individuals for mid- to large-size organizations) but are instead acquired through role 

assignments. RBAC can be implemented either as a mandatory or discretionary form of 

access control. For organizations implementing RBAC with mandatory access controls, the 

requirements in AC-3 (3) define the scope of the subjects and objects covered by the policy.

(8) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | REVOCATION OF ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS

The information system enforces the revocation of access authorizations resulting from changes 

to the security attributes of subjects and objects based on [Assignment: organization-defined rules 

governing the timing of revocations of access authorizations].

Supplemental Guidance: Revocation of access rules may differ based on the types of access 

revoked. For example, if a subject (i.e., user or process) is removed from a group, access may 

not be revoked until the next time the object (e.g., file) is opened or until the next time the 

subject attempts a new access to the object. Revocation based on changes to security labels 

may take effect immediately. Organizations can provide alternative approaches on how to 

make revocations immediate if information systems cannot provide such capability and 

immediate revocation is necessary.

(9) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | CONTROLLED RELEASE

The information system does not release information outside of the established system boundary 

unless:

(a) The receiving [Assignment: organization-defined information system or system component] 

provides [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]; and

(b) [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] are used to validate the 

appropriateness of the information designated for release.

Supplemental Guidance: Information systems can only protect organizational information 

within the confines of established system boundaries. Additional security safeguards may be 

needed to ensure that such information is adequately protected once it is passed beyond the

established information system boundaries. Examples of information leaving the system 

boundary include transmitting information to an external information system or printing the 

information on one of its printers. In cases where the information system is unable to make a

determination of the adequacy of the protections provided by entities outside its boundary, as 

a mitigating control, organizations determine procedurally whether the external information 

systems are providing adequate security. The means used to determine the adequacy of the

security provided by external information systems include, for example, conducting 

inspections or periodic testing, establishing agreements between the organization and its 

counterpart organizations, or some other process. The means used by external entities to 

protect the information received need not be the same as those used by the organization, but

the means employed are sufficient to provide consistent adjudication of the security policy to 

protect the information. This control enhancement requires information systems to employ 

technical or procedural means to validate the information prior to releasing it to external

systems. For example, if the information system passes information to another system 

controlled by another organization, technical means are employed to validate that the security 

attributes associated with the exported information are appropriate for the receiving system. 

Alternatively, if the information system passes information to a printer in organizationcontrolled space, procedural means can be employed to ensure that only appropriately 

authorized individuals gain access to the printer. This control enhancement is most applicable 

when there is some policy mandate (e.g., law, Executive Order, directive, or regulation) that 

establishes policy regarding access to the information, and that policy applies beyond the 

realm of a particular information system or organization.

(10) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | AUDITED OVERRIDE OF ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISMS

The organization employs an audited override of automated access control mechanisms under 

[Assignment: organization-defined conditions].

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AU-2, AU-6.

References: None.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AC-3 MOD AC-3 HIGH AC-3

AC-4 INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT

Control: The information system enforces approved authorizations for controlling the flow of 

information within the system and between interconnected systems based on [Assignment: 

organization-defined information flow control policies].

Supplemental Guidance: Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to travel 

within an information system and between information systems (as opposed to who is allowed to 

access the information) and without explicit regard to subsequent accesses to that information.

Flow control restrictions include, for example, keeping export-controlled information from being 

transmitted in the clear to the Internet, blocking outside traffic that claims to be from within the 

organization, restricting web requests to the Internet that are not from the internal web proxy 

server, and limiting information transfers between organizations based on data structures and 

content. Transferring information between information systems representing different security 

domains with different security policies introduces risk that such transfers violate one or more 

domain security policies. In such situations, information owners/stewards provide guidance at 

designated policy enforcement points between interconnected systems. Organizations consider

mandating specific architectural solutions when required to enforce specific security policies.

Enforcement includes, for example: (i) prohibiting information transfers between interconnected 

systems (i.e., allowing access only); (ii) employing hardware mechanisms to enforce one-way 

information flows; and (iii) implementing trustworthy regrading mechanisms to reassign security 

attributes and security labels.

Organizations commonly employ information flow control policies and enforcement mechanisms 

to control the flow of information between designated sources and destinations (e.g., networks, 

individuals, and devices) within information systems and between interconnected systems. Flow 

control is based on the characteristics of the information and/or the information path. Enforcement

occurs, for example, in boundary protection devices (e.g., gateways, routers, guards, encrypted 

tunnels, firewalls) that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict information 

system services, provide a packet-filtering capability based on header information, or messagefiltering capability based on message content (e.g., implementing key word searches or using 

document characteristics). Organizations also consider the trustworthiness of filtering/inspection 

mechanisms (i.e., hardware, firmware, and software components) that are critical to information 

flow enforcement. Control enhancements 3 through 22 primarily address cross-domain solution 

needs which focus on more advanced filtering techniques, in-depth analysis, and stronger flow 

enforcement mechanisms implemented in cross-domain products, for example, high-assurance 

guards. Such capabilities are generally not available in commercial off-the-shelf information 

technology products. Related controls: AC-3, AC-17, AC-19, AC-21, CM-6, CM-7, SA-8, SC-2, 

SC-5, SC-7, SC-18.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | OBJECT SECURITY ATTRIBUTES

The information system uses [Assignment: organization-defined security attributes] associated 

with [Assignment: organization-defined information, source, and destination objects] to enforce 

[Assignment: organization-defined information flow control policies] as a basis for flow control 

decisions.

Supplemental Guidance: Information flow enforcement mechanisms compare security attributes 

associated with information (data content and data structure) and source/destination objects, 

and respond appropriately (e.g., block, quarantine, alert administrator) when the mechanisms 

encounter information flows not explicitly allowed by information flow policies. For example, 

an information object labeled Secret would be allowed to flow to a destination object labeled 

Secret, but an information object labeled Top Secret would not be allowed to flow to a 

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destination object labeled Secret. Security attributes can also include, for example, source and 

destination addresses employed in traffic filter firewalls. Flow enforcement using explicit 

security attributes can be used, for example, to control the release of certain types of 

information. Related control: AC-16.

(2) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PROCESSING DOMAINS

The information system uses protected processing domains to enforce [Assignment: organizationdefined information flow control policies] as a basis for flow control decisions.

Supplemental Guidance: Within information systems, protected processing domains are 

processing spaces that have controlled interactions with other processing spaces, thus 

enabling control of information flows between these spaces and to/from data/information 

objects. A protected processing domain can be provided, for example, by implementing 

domain and type enforcement. In domain and type enforcement, information system processes 

are assigned to domains; information is identified by types; and information flows are 

controlled based on allowed information accesses (determined by domain and type), allowed 

signaling among domains, and allowed process transitions to other domains.

(3) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DYNAMIC INFORMATION FLOW CONTROL

The information system enforces dynamic information flow control based on [Assignment: 

organization-defined policies].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational policies regarding dynamic information flow control 

include, for example, allowing or disallowing information flows based on changing conditions 

or mission/operational considerations. Changing conditions include, for example, changes in 

organizational risk tolerance due to changes in the immediacy of mission/business needs, 

changes in the threat environment, and detection of potentially harmful or adverse events. 

Related control: SI-4.

(4) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | CONTENT CHECK ENCRYPTED INFORMATION

The information system prevents encrypted information from bypassing content-checking 

mechanisms by [Selection (one or more): decrypting the information; blocking the flow of the 

encrypted information; terminating communications sessions attempting to pass encrypted 

information; [Assignment: organization-defined procedure or method]].

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SI-4.

(5) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | EMBEDDED DATA TYPES

The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined limitations] on embedding 

data types within other data types.

Supplemental Guidance: Embedding data types within other data types may result in reduced 

flow control effectiveness. Data type embedding includes, for example, inserting executable 

files as objects within word processing files, inserting references or descriptive information 

into a media file, and compressed or archived data types that may include multiple embedded 

data types. Limitations on data type embedding consider the levels of embedding and prohibit 

levels of data type embedding that are beyond the capability of the inspection tools.

(6) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | METADATA

The information system enforces information flow control based on [Assignment: organizationdefined metadata].

Supplemental Guidance: Metadata is information used to describe the characteristics of data. 

Metadata can include structural metadata describing data structures (e.g., data format, syntax, 

and semantics) or descriptive metadata describing data contents (e.g., age, location, telephone 

number). Enforcing allowed information flows based on metadata enables simpler and more 

effective flow control. Organizations consider the trustworthiness of metadata with regard to

data accuracy (i.e., knowledge that the metadata values are correct with respect to the data),

data integrity (i.e., protecting against unauthorized changes to metadata tags), and the binding

of metadata to the data payload (i.e., ensuring sufficiently strong binding techniques with 

appropriate levels of assurance). Related controls: AC-16, SI-7.

(7) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ONE-WAY FLOW MECHANISMS

The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined one-way information flows] 

using hardware mechanisms.

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(8) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY POLICY FILTERS

The information system enforces information flow control using [Assignment: organization-defined 

security policy filters] as a basis for flow control decisions for [Assignment: organization-defined 

information flows].

Supplemental Guidance: Organization-defined security policy filters can address data structures 

and content. For example, security policy filters for data structures can check for maximum 

file lengths, maximum field sizes, and data/file types (for structured and unstructured data). 

Security policy filters for data content can check for specific words (e.g., dirty/clean word 

filters), enumerated values or data value ranges, and hidden content. Structured data permits 

the interpretation of data content by applications. Unstructured data typically refers to digital 

information without a particular data structure or with a data structure that does not facilitate 

the development of rule sets to address the particular sensitivity of the information conveyed 

by the data or the associated flow enforcement decisions. Unstructured data consists of: (i) 

bitmap objects that are inherently non language-based (i.e., image, video, or audio files); and 

(ii) textual objects that are based on written or printed languages (e.g., commercial off-theshelf word processing documents, spreadsheets, or emails). Organizations can implement 

more than one security policy filter to meet information flow control objectives (e.g., 

employing clean word lists in conjunction with dirty word lists may help to reduce false 

positives).

(9) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | HUMAN REVIEWS

The information system enforces the use of human reviews for [Assignment: organization-defined 

information flows] under the following conditions: [Assignment: organization-defined conditions].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations define security policy filters for all situations where 

automated flow control decisions are possible. When a fully automated flow control decision 

is not possible, then a human review may be employed in lieu of, or as a complement to,

automated security policy filtering. Human reviews may also be employed as deemed 

necessary by organizations.

(10) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ENABLE / DISABLE SECURITY POLICY FILTERS

The information system provides the capability for privileged administrators to enable/disable 

[Assignment: organization-defined security policy filters] under the following conditions: 

[Assignment: organization-defined conditions].

Supplemental Guidance: For example, as allowed by the information system authorization, 

administrators can enable security policy filters to accommodate approved data types.

(11) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | CONFIGURATION OF SECURITY POLICY FILTERS

The information system provides the capability for privileged administrators to configure 

[Assignment: organization-defined security policy filters] to support different security policies.

Supplemental Guidance: For example, to reflect changes in security policies, administrators can 

change the list of “dirty words” that security policy mechanisms check in accordance with the 

definitions provided by organizations.

(12) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DATA TYPE IDENTIFIERS

The information system, when transferring information between different security domains, uses

[Assignment: organization-defined data type identifiers] to validate data essential for information 

flow decisions.

Supplemental Guidance: Data type identifiers include, for example, filenames, file types, file 

signatures/tokens, and multiple internal file signatures/tokens. Information systems may allow 

transfer of data only if compliant with data type format specifications.

(13) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DECOMPOSITION INTO POLICY-RELEVANT SUBCOMPONENTS

The information system, when transferring information between different security domains,

decomposes information into [Assignment: organization-defined policy-relevant subcomponents]

for submission to policy enforcement mechanisms.

Supplemental Guidance: Policy enforcement mechanisms apply filtering, inspection, and/or 

sanitization rules to the policy-relevant subcomponents of information to facilitate flow 

enforcement prior to transferring such information to different security domains. Parsing 

transfer files facilitates policy decisions on source, destination, certificates, classification, 

attachments, and other security-related component differentiators.

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(14) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY POLICY FILTER CONSTRAINTS

The information system, when transferring information between different security domains,

implements [Assignment: organization-defined security policy filters] requiring fully enumerated 

formats that restrict data structure and content.

Supplemental Guidance: Data structure and content restrictions reduce the range of potential 

malicious and/or unsanctioned content in cross-domain transactions. Security policy filters 

that restrict data structures include, for example, restricting file sizes and field lengths. Data 

content policy filters include, for example: (i) encoding formats for character sets (e.g., 

Universal Character Set Transformation Formats, American Standard Code for Information 

Interchange); (ii) restricting character data fields to only contain alpha-numeric characters; 

(iii) prohibiting special characters; and (iv) validating schema structures.

(15) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DETECTION OF UNSANCTIONED INFORMATION

The information system, when transferring information between different security domains,

examines the information for the presence of [Assignment: organized-defined unsanctioned 

information] and prohibits the transfer of such information in accordance with the [Assignment: 

organization-defined security policy].

Supplemental Guidance: Detection of unsanctioned information includes, for example, checking 

all information to be transferred for malicious code and dirty words. Related control: SI-3.

(16) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | INFORMATION TRANSFERS ON INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-4].

(17) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DOMAIN AUTHENTICATION

The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates source and destination points by 

[Selection (one or more): organization, system, application, individual] for information transfer.

Supplemental Guidance: Attribution is a critical component of a security concept of operations. 

The ability to identify source and destination points for information flowing in information 

systems, allows the forensic reconstruction of events when required, and encourages policy 

compliance by attributing policy violations to specific organizations/individuals. Successful 

domain authentication requires that information system labels distinguish among systems,

organizations, and individuals involved in preparing, sending, receiving, or disseminating 

information. Related controls: IA-2, IA-3, IA-4, IA-5.

(18) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY ATTRIBUTE BINDING

The information system binds security attributes to information using [Assignment: organizationdefined binding techniques] to facilitate information flow policy enforcement.

Supplemental Guidance: Binding techniques implemented by information systems affect the 

strength of security attribute binding to information. Binding strength and the assurance 

associated with binding techniques play an important part in the trust organizations have in 

the information flow enforcement process. The binding techniques affect the number and 

degree of additional reviews required by organizations. Related controls: AC-16, SC-16.

(19) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | VALIDATION OF METADATA

The information system, when transferring information between different security domains, applies 

the same security policy filtering to metadata as it applies to data payloads.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires the validation of metadata and the 

data to which the metadata applies. Some organizations distinguish between metadata and 

data payloads (i.e., only the data to which the metadata is bound). Other organizations do not 

make such distinctions, considering metadata and the data to which the metadata applies as 

part of the payload. All information (including metadata and the data to which the metadata 

applies) is subject to filtering and inspection.

(20) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | APPROVED SOLUTIONS

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined solutions in approved 

configurations] to control the flow of [Assignment: organization-defined information] across 

security domains.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations define approved solutions and configurations in crossdomain policies and guidance in accordance with the types of information flows across 

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classification boundaries. The Unified Cross Domain Management Office (UCDMO) 

provides a baseline listing of approved cross-domain solutions.

(21) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PHYSICAL / LOGICAL SEPARATION OF INFORMATION FLOWS 

The information system separates information flows logically or physically using [Assignment: 

organization-defined mechanisms and/or techniques] to accomplish [Assignment: organizationdefined required separations by types of information].

Supplemental Guidance: Enforcing the separation of information flows by type can enhance 

protection by ensuring that information is not commingled while in transit and by enabling 

flow control by transmission paths perhaps not otherwise achievable. Types of separable 

information include, for example, inbound and outbound communications traffic, service 

requests and responses, and information of differing security categories.

(22) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ACCESS ONLY 

The information system provides access from a single device to computing platforms, 

applications, or data residing on multiple different security domains, while preventing any 

information flow between the different security domains.

Supplemental Guidance: The information system, for example, provides a desktop for users to 

access each connected security domain without providing any mechanisms to allow transfer 

of information between the different security domains.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD AC-4 HIGH AC-4

AC-5 SEPARATION OF DUTIES

Control: The organization:

a. Separates [Assignment: organization-defined duties of individuals];

b. Documents separation of duties of individuals; and

c. Defines information system access authorizations to support separation of duties.

Supplemental Guidance: Separation of duties addresses the potential for abuse of authorized 

privileges and helps to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion. Separation of 

duties includes, for example: (i) dividing mission functions and information system support 

functions among different individuals and/or roles; (ii) conducting information system support 

functions with different individuals (e.g., system management, programming, configuration 

management, quality assurance and testing, and network security); and (iii) ensuring security 

personnel administering access control functions do not also administer audit functions. Related 

controls: AC-3, AC-6, PE-3, PE-4, PS-2.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD AC-5 HIGH AC-5

AC-6 LEAST PRIVILEGE

Control: The organization employs the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized 

accesses for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) which are necessary to accomplish

assigned tasks in accordance with organizational missions and business functions.

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Supplemental Guidance: Organizations employ least privilege for specific duties and information 

systems. The principle of least privilege is also applied to information system processes, ensuring 

that the processes operate at privilege levels no higher than necessary to accomplish required

organizational missions/business functions. Organizations consider the creation of additional

processes, roles, and information system accounts as necessary, to achieve least privilege. 

Organizations also apply least privilege to the development, implementation, and operation of 

organizational information systems. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, CM-6, CM-7, PL-2. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) LEAST PRIVILEGE | AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONS

The organization explicitly authorizes access to [Assignment: organization-defined security 

functions (deployed in hardware, software, and firmware) and security-relevant information].

Supplemental Guidance: Security functions include, for example, establishing system accounts, 

configuring access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), setting events to be audited, 

and setting intrusion detection parameters. Security-relevant information includes, for 

example, filtering rules for routers/firewalls, cryptographic key management information, 

configuration parameters for security services, and access control lists. Explicitly authorized 

personnel include, for example, security administrators, system and network administrators, 

system security officers, system maintenance personnel, system programmers, and other 

privileged users. Related controls: AC-17, AC-18, AC-19.

(2) LEAST PRIVILEGE | NON-PRIVILEGED ACCESS FOR NONSECURITY FUNCTIONS

The organization requires that users of information system accounts, or roles, with access to 

[Assignment: organization-defined security functions or security-relevant information], use nonprivileged accounts or roles, when accessing nonsecurity functions.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement limits exposure when operating from within

privileged accounts or roles. The inclusion of roles addresses situations where organizations 

implement access control policies such as role-based access control and where a change of 

role provides the same degree of assurance in the change of access authorizations for both the 

user and all processes acting on behalf of the user as would be provided by a change between 

a privileged and non-privileged account. Related control: PL-4.

(3) LEAST PRIVILEGE | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED COMMANDS

The organization authorizes network access to [Assignment: organization-defined privileged 

commands] only for [Assignment: organization-defined compelling operational needs] and 

documents the rationale for such access in the security plan for the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Network access is any access across a network connection in lieu of 

local access (i.e., user being physically present at the device). Related control: AC-17.

(4) LEAST PRIVILEGE | SEPARATE PROCESSING DOMAINS

The information system provides separate processing domains to enable finer-grained allocation 

of user privileges.

Supplemental Guidance: Providing separate processing domains for finer-grained allocation of 

user privileges includes, for example: (i) using virtualization techniques to allow additional

privileges within a virtual machine while restricting privileges to other virtual machines or to 

the underlying actual machine; (ii) employing hardware and/or software domain separation 

mechanisms; and (iii) implementing separate physical domains. Related controls: AC-4, SC-3, 

SC-30, SC-32.

(5) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

The organization restricts privileged accounts on the information system to [Assignment: 

organization-defined personnel or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: Privileged accounts, including super user accounts, are typically 

described as system administrator for various types of commercial off-the-shelf operating 

systems. Restricting privileged accounts to specific personnel or roles prevents day-to-day 

users from having access to privileged information/functions. Organizations may differentiate 

in the application of this control enhancement between allowed privileges for local accounts 

and for domain accounts provided organizations retain the ability to control information 

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system configurations for key security parameters and as otherwise necessary to sufficiently 

mitigate risk. Related control: CM-6.

(6) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGED ACCESS BY NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS

The organization prohibits privileged access to the information system by non-organizational 

users.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: IA-8.

(7) LEAST PRIVILEGE | REVIEW OF USER PRIVILEGES

The organization:

(a) Reviews [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] the privileges assigned to 

[Assignment: organization-defined roles or classes of users] to validate the need for such 

privileges; and

(b) Reassigns or removes privileges, if necessary, to correctly reflect organizational 

mission/business needs.

Supplemental Guidance: The need for certain assigned user privileges may change over time 

reflecting changes in organizational missions/business function, environments of operation, 

technologies, or threat. Periodic review of assigned user privileges is necessary to determine if 

the rationale for assigning such privileges remains valid. If the need cannot be revalidated, 

organizations take appropriate corrective actions. Related control: CA-7.

(8) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGE LEVELS FOR CODE EXECUTION

The information system prevents [Assignment: organization-defined software] from executing at 

higher privilege levels than users executing the software.

Supplemental Guidance: In certain situations, software applications/programs need to execute 

with elevated privileges to perform required functions. However, if the privileges required for 

execution are at a higher level than the privileges assigned to organizational users invoking 

such applications/programs, those users are indirectly provided with greater privileges than 

assigned by organizations.

(9) LEAST PRIVILEGE | AUDITING USE OF PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS

The information system audits the execution of privileged functions.

Supplemental Guidance: Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally 

by authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised information 

system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts

on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse, 

and in doing so, help mitigate the risk from insider threats and the advanced persistent threat

(APT). Related control: AU-2.

(10) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PROHIBIT NON-PRIVILEGED USERS FROM EXECUTING PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS

The information system prevents non-privileged users from executing privileged functions to 

include disabling, circumventing, or altering implemented security safeguards/countermeasures.

Supplemental Guidance: Privileged functions include, for example, establishing information 

system accounts, performing system integrity checks, or administering cryptographic key 

management activities. Non-privileged users are individuals that do not possess appropriate 

authorizations. Circumventing intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms or malicious 

code protection mechanisms are examples of privileged functions that require protection from 

non-privileged users.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD AC-6 (1) (2) (5) (9) (10) HIGH AC-6 (1) (2) (3) (5) (9) (10)

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AC-7 UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS

Control: The information system:

a. Enforces a limit of [Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive invalid logon

attempts by a user during a [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and

b. Automatically [Selection: locks the account/node for an [Assignment: organization-defined 

time period]; locks the account/node until released by an administrator; delays next logon

prompt according to [Assignment: organization-defined delay algorithm]] when the 

maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies regardless of whether the logon occurs via a local or 

network connection. Due to the potential for denial of service, automatic lockouts initiated by 

information systems are usually temporary and automatically release after a predetermined time 

period established by organizations. If a delay algorithm is selected, organizations may choose to 

employ different algorithms for different information system components based on the capabilities 

of those components. Responses to unsuccessful logon attempts may be implemented at both the 

operating system and the application levels. Related controls: AC-2, AC-9, AC-14, IA-5.

Control Enhancements:

(1) UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS | AUTOMATIC ACCOUNT LOCK

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-7].

(2) UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS | PURGE / WIPE MOBILE DEVICE

The information system purges/wipes information from [Assignment: organization-defined mobile 

devices] based on [Assignment: organization-defined purging/wiping requirements/techniques] 

after [Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive, unsuccessful device logon 

attempts.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies only to mobile devices for which a 

logon occurs (e.g., personal digital assistants, smart phones, tablets). The logon is to the 

mobile device, not to any one account on the device. Therefore, successful logons to any 

accounts on mobile devices reset the unsuccessful logon count to zero. Organizations define

information to be purged/wiped carefully in order to avoid over purging/wiping which may 

result in devices becoming unusable. Purging/wiping may be unnecessary if the information 

on the device is protected with sufficiently strong encryption mechanisms. Related controls: 

AC-19, MP-5, MP-6, SC-13.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW AC-7 MOD AC-7 HIGH AC-7

AC-8 SYSTEM USE NOTIFICATION

Control: The information system:

a. Displays to users [Assignment: organization-defined system use notification message or 

banner] before granting access to the system that provides privacy and security notices

consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, 

standards, and guidance and states that:

1. Users are accessing a U.S. Government information system;

2. Information system usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject to audit;

3. Unauthorized use of the information system is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil 

penalties; and

4. Use of the information system indicates consent to monitoring and recording;

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b. Retains the notification message or banner on the screen until users acknowledge the usage 

conditions and take explicit actions to log on to or further access the information system; and

c. For publicly accessible systems:

1. Displays system use information [Assignment: organization-defined conditions], before 

granting further access;

2. Displays references, if any, to monitoring, recording, or auditing that are consistent with 

privacy accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities; and

3. Includes a description of the authorized uses of the system.

Supplemental Guidance: System use notifications can be implemented using messages or warning 

banners displayed before individuals log in to information systems. System use notifications are

used only for access via logon interfaces with human users and are not required when such human 

interfaces do not exist. Organizations consider system use notification messages/banners displayed 

in multiple languages based on specific organizational needs and the demographics of information 

system users. Organizations also consult with the Office of the General Counsel for legal review 

and approval of warning banner content.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AC-8 MOD AC-8 HIGH AC-8

AC-9 PREVIOUS LOGON (ACCESS) NOTIFICATION

Control: The information system notifies the user, upon successful logon (access) to the system, of 

the date and time of the last logon (access). 

Supplemental Guidance: This control is applicable to logons to information systems via human user 

interfaces and logons to systems that occur in other types of architectures (e.g., service-oriented 

architectures). Related controls: AC-7, PL-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | UNSUCCESSFUL LOGONS

The information system notifies the user, upon successful logon/access, of the number of 

unsuccessful logon/access attempts since the last successful logon/access.

(2) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | SUCCESSFUL / UNSUCCESSFUL LOGONS

The information system notifies the user of the number of [Selection: successful logons/accesses;

unsuccessful logon/access attempts; both] during [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

(3) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | NOTIFICATION OF ACCOUNT CHANGES

The information system notifies the user of changes to [Assignment: organization-defined

security-related characteristics/parameters of the user’s account] during [Assignment: 

organization-defined time period].

(4) PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | ADDITIONAL LOGON INFORMATION

The information system notifies the user, upon successful logon (access), of the following 

additional information: [Assignment: organization-defined information to be included in addition to 

the date and time of the last logon (access)].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement permits organizations to specify additional 

information to be provided to users upon logon including, for example, the location of last 

logon. User location is defined as that information which can be determined by information 

systems, for example, IP addresses from which network logons occurred, device identifiers, or 

notifications of local logons.

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References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

AC-10 CONCURRENT SESSION CONTROL

Control: The information system limits the number of concurrent sessions for each [Assignment: 

organization-defined account and/or account type] to [Assignment: organization-defined number].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may define the maximum number of concurrent sessions for 

information system accounts globally, by account type (e.g., privileged user, non-privileged user, 

domain, specific application), by account, or a combination. For example, organizations may limit 

the number of concurrent sessions for system administrators or individuals working in particularly 

sensitive domains or mission-critical applications. This control addresses concurrent sessions for 

information system accounts and does not address concurrent sessions by single users via multiple 

system accounts.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH AC-10

AC-11 SESSION LOCK

Control: The information system:

a. Prevents further access to the system by initiating a session lock after [Assignment: 

organization-defined time period] of inactivity or upon receiving a request from a user; and

b. Retains the session lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification and 

authentication procedures.

Supplemental Guidance: Session locks are temporary actions taken when users stop work and move

away from the immediate vicinity of information systems but do not want to log out because of the 

temporary nature of their absences. Session locks are implemented where session activities can be 

determined. This is typically at the operating system level, but can also be at the application level.

Session locks are not an acceptable substitute for logging out of information systems, for example,

if organizations require users to log out at the end of workdays. Related control: AC-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SESSION LOCK | PATTERN-HIDING DISPLAYS

The information system conceals, via the session lock, information previously visible on the 

display with a publicly viewable image.

Supplemental Guidance: Publicly viewable images can include static or dynamic images, for 

example, patterns used with screen savers, photographic images, solid colors, clock, battery 

life indicator, or a blank screen, with the additional caveat that none of the images convey 

sensitive information.

References: OMB Memorandum 06-16.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW Not Selected MOD AC-11 (1) HIGH AC-11 (1)

AC-12 SESSION TERMINATION

Control: The information system automatically terminates a user session after [Assignment: 

organization-defined conditions or trigger events requiring session disconnect].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the termination of user-initiated logical sessions in 

contrast to SC-10 which addresses the termination of network connections that are associated with 

communications sessions (i.e., network disconnect). A logical session (for local, network, and 

remote access) is initiated whenever a user (or process acting on behalf of a user) accesses an 

organizational information system. Such user sessions can be terminated (and thus terminate user 

access) without terminating network sessions. Session termination terminates all processes 

associated with a user’s logical session except those processes that are specifically created by the 

user (i.e., session owner) to continue after the session is terminated. Conditions or trigger events 

requiring automatic session termination can include, for example, organization-defined periods of 

user inactivity, targeted responses to certain types of incidents, time-of-day restrictions on 

information system use. Related controls: SC-10, SC-23.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SESSION TERMINATION | USER-INITIATED LOGOUTS / MESSAGE DISPLAYS

The information system:

(a) Provides a logout capability for user-initiated communications sessions whenever 

authentication is used to gain access to [Assignment: organization-defined information 

resources]; and

(b) Displays an explicit logout message to users indicating the reliable termination of 

authenticated communications sessions.

Supplemental Guidance: Information resources to which users gain access via authentication 

include, for example, local workstations, databases, and password-protected websites/webbased services. Logout messages for web page access, for example, can be displayed after 

authenticated sessions have been terminated. However, for some types of interactive sessions 

including, for example, file transfer protocol (FTP) sessions, information systems typically 

send logout messages as final messages prior to terminating sessions.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD AC-12 HIGH AC-12

AC-13 SUPERVISION AND REVIEW — ACCESS CONTROL

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-2 and AU-6].

AC-14 PERMITTED ACTIONS WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION OR AUTHENTICATION

Control: The organization:

a. Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined user actions] that can be performed on the 

information system without identification or authentication consistent with organizational 

missions/business functions; and

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b. Documents and provides supporting rationale in the security plan for the information system, 

user actions not requiring identification or authentication.

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses situations in which organizations determine that no 

identification or authentication is required in organizational information systems. Organizations

may allow a limited number of user actions without identification or authentication including, for 

example, when individuals access public websites or other publicly accessible federal information 

systems, when individuals use mobile phones to receive calls, or when facsimiles are received.

Organizations also identify actions that normally require identification or authentication but may

under certain circumstances (e.g., emergencies), allow identification or authentication mechanisms 

to be bypassed. Such bypasses may occur, for example, via a software-readable physical switch 

that commands bypass of the logon functionality and is protected from accidental or unmonitored 

use. This control does not apply to situations where identification and authentication have already 

occurred and are not repeated, but rather to situations where identification and authentication have 

not yet occurred. Organizations may decide that there are no user actions that can be performed on 

organizational information systems without identification and authentication and thus, the values

for assignment statements can be none. Related controls: CP-2, IA-2.

Control Enhancements: None.

(1) PERMITTED ACTIONS WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION OR AUTHENTICATION | NECESSARY USES

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-14].

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW AC-14 MOD AC-14 HIGH AC-14

AC-15 AUTOMATED MARKING

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-3].

AC-16 SECURITY ATTRIBUTES

Control: The organization:

a. Provides the means to associate [Assignment: organization-defined types of security 

attributes] having [Assignment: organization-defined security attribute values] with 

information in storage, in process, and/or in transmission;

b. Ensures that the security attribute associations are made and retained with the information;

c. Establishes the permitted [Assignment: organization-defined security attributes] for 

[Assignment: organization-defined information systems]; and

d. Determines the permitted [Assignment: organization-defined values or ranges] for each of the 

established security attributes.

Supplemental Guidance: Information is represented internally within information systems using

abstractions known as data structures. Internal data structures can represent different types of 

entities, both active and passive. Active entities, also known as subjects, are typically associated 

with individuals, devices, or processes acting on behalf of individuals. Passive entities, also known 

as objects, are typically associated with data structures such as records, buffers, tables, files, interprocess pipes, and communications ports. Security attributes, a form of metadata, are abstractions 

representing the basic properties or characteristics of active and passive entities with respect to 

safeguarding information. These attributes may be associated with active entities (i.e., subjects) 

that have the potential to send or receive information, to cause information to flow among objects, 

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or to change the information system state. These attributes may also be associated with passive 

entities (i.e., objects) that contain or receive information. The association of security attributes to 

subjects and objects is referred to as binding and is typically inclusive of setting the attribute value 

and the attribute type. Security attributes when bound to data/information, enables the enforcement

of information security policies for access control and information flow control, either through

organizational processes or information system functions or mechanisms. The content or assigned 

values of security attributes can directly affect the ability of individuals to access organizational 

information.

Organizations can define the types of attributes needed for selected information systems to support 

missions/business functions. There is potentially a wide range of values that can be assigned to 

any given security attribute. Release markings could include, for example, US only, NATO, or 

NOFORN (not releasable to foreign nationals). By specifying permitted attribute ranges and 

values, organizations can ensure that the security attribute values are meaningful and relevant. The 

term security labeling refers to the association of security attributes with subjects and objects 

represented by internal data structures within organizational information systems, to enable 

information system-based enforcement of information security policies. Security labels include, 

for example, access authorizations, data life cycle protection (i.e., encryption and data expiration), 

nationality, affiliation as contractor, and classification of information in accordance with legal and 

compliance requirements. The term security marking refers to the association of security attributes 

with objects in a human-readable form, to enable organizational process-based enforcement of 

information security policies. The AC-16 base control represents the requirement for user-based 

attribute association (marking). The enhancements to AC-16 represent additional requirements 

including information system-based attribute association (labeling). Types of attributes include, 

for example, classification level for objects and clearance (access authorization) level for subjects.

An example of a value for both of these attribute types is Top Secret. Related controls: AC-3, AC4, AC-6, AC-21, AU-2, AU-10, SC-16, MP-3.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | DYNAMIC ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATION

The information system dynamically associates security attributes with [Assignment: organizationdefined subjects and objects] in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined security 

policies] as information is created and combined.

Supplemental Guidance: Dynamic association of security attributes is appropriate whenever the 

security characteristics of information changes over time. Security attributes may change, for 

example, due to information aggregation issues (i.e., the security characteristics of individual 

information elements are different from the combined elements), changes in individual access 

authorizations (i.e., privileges), and changes in the security category of information. Related 

control: AC-4.

(2) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE VALUE CHANGES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

The information system provides authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf of 

individuals) the capability to define or change the value of associated security attributes.

Supplemental Guidance: The content or assigned values of security attributes can directly affect 

the ability of individuals to access organizational information. Therefore, it is important for 

information systems to be able to limit the ability to create or modify security attributes to 

authorized individuals. Related controls: AC-6, AU-2.

(3) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | MAINTENANCE OF ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATIONS BY INFORMATION SYSTEM

The information system maintains the association and integrity of [Assignment: organizationdefined security attributes] to [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and objects].

Supplemental Guidance: Maintaining the association and integrity of security attributes to 

subjects and objects with sufficient assurance helps to ensure that the attribute associations 

can be used as the basis of automated policy actions. Automated policy actions include, for 

example, access control decisions or information flow control decisions.

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(4) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ASSOCIATION OF ATTRIBUTES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

The information system supports the association of [Assignment: organization-defined security 

attributes] with [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and objects] by authorized individuals

(or processes acting on behalf of individuals).

Supplemental Guidance: The support provided by information systems can vary to include: (i) 

prompting users to select specific security attributes to be associated with specific information 

objects; (ii) employing automated mechanisms for categorizing information with appropriate 

attributes based on defined policies; or (iii) ensuring that the combination of selected security 

attributes selected is valid. Organizations consider the creation, deletion, or modification of 

security attributes when defining auditable events.

(5) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE DISPLAYS FOR OUTPUT DEVICES

The information system displays security attributes in human-readable form on each object that 

the system transmits to output devices to identify [Assignment: organization-identified special 

dissemination, handling, or distribution instructions] using [Assignment: organization-identified 

human-readable, standard naming conventions].

Supplemental Guidance: Information system outputs include, for example, pages, screens, or 

equivalent. Information system output devices include, for example, printers and video 

displays on computer workstations, notebook computers, and personal digital assistants.

(6) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | MAINTENANCE OF ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATION BY ORGANIZATION

The organization allows personnel to associate, and maintain the association of [Assignment: 

organization-defined security attributes] with [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and 

objects] in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined security policies].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires individual users (as opposed to the 

information system) to maintain associations of security attributes with subjects and objects.

(7) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | CONSISTENT ATTRIBUTE INTERPRETATION

The organization provides a consistent interpretation of security attributes transmitted between 

distributed information system components.

Supplemental Guidance: In order to enforce security policies across multiple components in 

distributed information systems (e.g., distributed database management systems, cloud-based 

systems, and service-oriented architectures), organizations provide a consistent interpretation 

of security attributes that are used in access enforcement and flow enforcement decisions. 

Organizations establish agreements and processes to ensure that all distributed information 

system components implement security attributes with consistent interpretations in automated 

access/flow enforcement actions.

(8) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ASSOCIATION TECHNIQUES / TECHNOLOGIES

The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or 

technologies] with [Assignment: organization-defined level of assurance] in associating security 

attributes to information.

Supplemental Guidance: The association (i.e., binding) of security attributes to information 

within information systems is of significant importance with regard to conducting automated 

access enforcement and flow enforcement actions. The association of such security attributes 

can be accomplished with technologies/techniques providing different levels of assurance. For 

example, information systems can cryptographically bind security attributes to information 

using digital signatures with the supporting cryptographic keys protected by hardware devices

(sometimes known as hardware roots of trust).

(9) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE REASSIGNMENT

The organization ensures that security attributes associated with information are reassigned only 

via re-grading mechanisms validated using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or 

procedures].

Supplemental Guidance: Validated re-grading mechanisms are employed by organizations to 

provide the requisite levels of assurance for security attribute reassignment activities. The 

validation is facilitated by ensuring that re-grading mechanisms are single purpose and of 

limited function. Since security attribute reassignments can affect security policy enforcement 

actions (e.g., access/flow enforcement decisions), using trustworthy re-grading mechanisms is 

necessary to ensure that such mechanisms perform in a consistent/correct mode of operation.

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(10) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE CONFIGURATION BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

The information system provides authorized individuals the capability to define or change the type 

and value of security attributes available for association with subjects and objects.

Supplemental Guidance: The content or assigned values of security attributes can directly affect 

the ability of individuals to access organizational information. Therefore, it is important for 

information systems to be able to limit the ability to create or modify security attributes to 

authorized individuals only.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

AC-17 REMOTE ACCESS

Control: The organization:

a. Establishes and documents usage restrictions, configuration/connection requirements, and 

implementation guidance for each type of remote access allowed; and

b. Authorizes remote access to the information system prior to allowing such connections.

Supplemental Guidance: Remote access is access to organizational information systems by users (or 

processes acting on behalf of users) communicating through external networks (e.g., the Internet). 

Remote access methods include, for example, dial-up, broadband, and wireless. Organizations 

often employ encrypted virtual private networks (VPNs) to enhance confidentiality and integrity 

over remote connections. The use of encrypted VPNs does not make the access non-remote; 

however, the use of VPNs, when adequately provisioned with appropriate security controls (e.g., 

employing appropriate encryption techniques for confidentiality and integrity protection) may 

provide sufficient assurance to the organization that it can effectively treat such connections as 

internal networks. Still, VPN connections traverse external networks, and the encrypted VPN 

does not enhance the availability of remote connections. Also, VPNs with encrypted tunnels can 

affect the organizational capability to adequately monitor network communications traffic for 

malicious code. Remote access controls apply to information systems other than public web 

servers or systems designed for public access. This control addresses authorization prior to 

allowing remote access without specifying the formats for such authorization. While organizations

may use interconnection security agreements to authorize remote access connections, such 

agreements are not required by this control. Enforcing access restrictions for remote connections is

addressed in AC-3. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, CA-3, CA-7, CM-8, 

IA-2, IA-3, IA-8, MA-4, PE-17, PL-4, SC-10, SI-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) REMOTE ACCESS | AUTOMATED MONITORING / CONTROL

The information system monitors and controls remote access methods.

Supplemental Guidance: Automated monitoring and control of remote access sessions allows 

organizations to detect cyber attacks and also ensure ongoing compliance with remote access 

policies by auditing connection activities of remote users on a variety of information system 

components (e.g., servers, workstations, notebook computers, smart phones, and tablets).

Related controls: AU-2, AU-12.

(2) REMOTE ACCESS | PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY / INTEGRITY USING ENCRYPTION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and 

integrity of remote access sessions.

Supplemental Guidance: The encryption strength of mechanism is selected based on the security 

categorization of the information. Related controls: SC-8, SC-12, SC-13.

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(3) REMOTE ACCESS | MANAGED ACCESS CONTROL POINTS

The information system routes all remote accesses through [Assignment: organization-defined 

number] managed network access control points.

Supplemental Guidance: Limiting the number of access control points for remote accesses 

reduces the attack surface for organizations. Organizations consider the Trusted Internet 

Connections (TIC) initiative requirements for external network connections. Related control: 

SC-7.

(4) REMOTE ACCESS | PRIVILEGED COMMANDS / ACCESS

The organization:

(a) Authorizes the execution of privileged commands and access to security-relevant information

via remote access only for [Assignment: organization-defined needs]; and

(b) Documents the rationale for such access in the security plan for the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-6.

(5) REMOTE ACCESS | MONITORING FOR UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-4].

(6) REMOTE ACCESS | PROTECTION OF INFORMATION

The organization ensures that users protect information about remote access mechanisms from 

unauthorized use and disclosure.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AT-2, AT-3, PS-6.

(7) REMOTE ACCESS | ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR SECURITY FUNCTION ACCESS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-3 (10)].

(8) REMOTE ACCESS | DISABLE NONSECURE NETWORK PROTOCOLS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-7].

(9) REMOTE ACCESS | DISCONNECT / DISABLE ACCESS

The organization provides the capability to expeditiously disconnect or disable remote access to 

the information system within [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires organizations to have the capability 

to rapidly disconnect current users remotely accessing the information system and/or disable 

further remote access. The speed of disconnect or disablement varies based on the criticality 

of missions/business functions and the need to eliminate immediate or future remote access to 

organizational information systems.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-46, 800-77, 800-113, 800-114, 800-121.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AC-17 MOD AC-17 (1) (2) (3) (4) HIGH AC-17 (1) (2) (3) (4)

AC-18 WIRELESS ACCESS

Control: The organization:

a. Establishes usage restrictions, configuration/connection requirements, and implementation 

guidance for wireless access; and

b. Authorizes wireless access to the information system prior to allowing such connections.

Supplemental Guidance: Wireless technologies include, for example, microwave, packet radio 

(UHF/VHF), 802.11x, and Bluetooth. Wireless networks use authentication protocols (e.g., 

EAP/TLS, PEAP), which provide credential protection and mutual authentication. Related 

controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-17, AC-19, CA-3, CA-7, CM-8, IA-2, IA-3, IA-8, PL-4, SI-4.

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Control Enhancements:

(1) WIRELESS ACCESS | AUTHENTICATION AND ENCRYPTION

The information system protects wireless access to the system using authentication of [Selection 

(one or more): users; devices] and encryption.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: SC-8, SC-13.

(2) WIRELESS ACCESS | MONITORING UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONS 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-4].

(3) WIRELESS ACCESS | DISABLE WIRELESS NETWORKING

The organization disables, when not intended for use, wireless networking capabilities internally 

embedded within information system components prior to issuance and deployment.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-19.

(4) WIRELESS ACCESS | RESTRICT CONFIGURATIONS BY USERS

The organization identifies and explicitly authorizes users allowed to independently configure 

wireless networking capabilities.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational authorizations to allow selected users to configure 

wireless networking capability are enforced in part, by the access enforcement mechanisms 

employed within organizational information systems. Related controls: AC-3, SC-15.

(5) WIRELESS ACCESS | ANTENNAS / TRANSMISSION POWER LEVELS

The organization selects radio antennas and calibrates transmission power levels to reduce the 

probability that usable signals can be received outside of organization-controlled boundaries.

Supplemental Guidance: Actions that may be taken by organizations to limit unauthorized use 

of wireless communications outside of organization-controlled boundaries include, for 

example: (i) reducing the power of wireless transmissions so that the transmissions are less 

likely to emit a signal that can be used by adversaries outside of the physical perimeters of 

organizations; (ii) employing measures such as TEMPEST to control wireless emanations;

and (iii) using directional/beam forming antennas that reduce the likelihood that unintended 

receivers will be able to intercept signals. Prior to taking such actions, organizations can 

conduct periodic wireless surveys to understand the radio frequency profile of organizational 

information systems as well as other systems that may be operating in the area. Related 

control: PE-19.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-48, 800-94, 800-97.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AC-18 MOD AC-18 (1) HIGH AC-18 (1) (4) (5)

AC-19 ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES

Control: The organization:

a. Establishes usage restrictions, configuration requirements, connection requirements, and 

implementation guidance for organization-controlled mobile devices; and

b. Authorizes the connection of mobile devices to organizational information systems.

Supplemental Guidance: A mobile device is a computing device that: (i) has a small form factor 

such that it can easily be carried by a single individual; (ii) is designed to operate without a 

physical connection (e.g., wirelessly transmit or receive information); (iii) possesses local, nonremovable or removable data storage; and (iv) includes a self-contained power source. Mobile 

devices may also include voice communication capabilities, on-board sensors that allow the device 

to capture information, and/or built-in features for synchronizing local data with remote locations. 

Examples include smart phones, E-readers, and tablets. Mobile devices are typically associated 

with a single individual and the device is usually in close proximity to the individual; however, the 

degree of proximity can vary depending upon on the form factor and size of the device. The 

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processing, storage, and transmission capability of the mobile device may be comparable to or 

merely a subset of desktop systems, depending upon the nature and intended purpose of the 

device. Due to the large variety of mobile devices with different technical characteristics and 

capabilities, organizational restrictions may vary for the different classes/types of such devices. 

Usage restrictions and specific implementation guidance for mobile devices include, for example,

configuration management, device identification and authentication, implementation of mandatory 

protective software (e.g., malicious code detection, firewall), scanning devices for malicious code, 

updating virus protection software, scanning for critical software updates and patches, conducting 

primary operating system (and possibly other resident software) integrity checks, and disabling 

unnecessary hardware (e.g., wireless, infrared). Organizations are cautioned that the need to 

provide adequate security for mobile devices goes beyond the requirements in this control. Many 

safeguards and countermeasures for mobile devices are reflected in other security controls in the 

catalog allocated in the initial control baselines as starting points for the development of security 

plans and overlays using the tailoring process. There may also be some degree of overlap in the 

requirements articulated by the security controls within the different families of controls. AC-20 

addresses mobile devices that are not organization-controlled. Related controls: AC-3, AC-7, AC18, AC-20, CA-9, CM-2, IA-2, IA-3, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, PL-4, SC-7, SC-43, SI-3, SI-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF WRITABLE / PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7].

(2) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF PERSONALLY OWNED PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7].

(3) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES WITH NO IDENTIFIABLE OWNER

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7].

(4) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | RESTRICTIONS FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 

The organization:

(a) Prohibits the use of unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing information systems 

processing, storing, or transmitting classified information unless specifically permitted by the

authorizing official; and

(b) Enforces the following restrictions on individuals permitted by the authorizing official to use 

unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing information systems processing, storing, 

or transmitting classified information:

(1) Connection of unclassified mobile devices to classified information systems is 

prohibited;

(2) Connection of unclassified mobile devices to unclassified information systems requires 

approval from the authorizing official;

(3) Use of internal or external modems or wireless interfaces within the unclassified mobile 

devices is prohibited; and

(4) Unclassified mobile devices and the information stored on those devices are subject to 

random reviews and inspections by [Assignment: organization-defined security officials], 

and if classified information is found, the incident handling policy is followed.

(c) Restricts the connection of classified mobile devices to classified information systems in 

accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined security policies].

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-6, IR-4.

(5) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | FULL DEVICE / CONTAINER-BASED ENCRYPTION

The organization employs [Selection: full-device encryption; container encryption] to protect the 

confidentiality and integrity of information on [Assignment: organization-defined mobile devices].

Supplemental Guidance: Container-based encryption provides a more fine-grained approach to 

the encryption of data/information on mobile devices, including for example, encrypting 

selected data structures such as files, records, or fields. Related controls: MP-5, SC-13, SC28.

References: OMB Memorandum 06-16; NIST Special Publications 800-114, 800-124, 800-164.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AC-19 MOD AC-19 (5) HIGH AC-19 (5)

AC-20 USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Control: The organization establishes terms and conditions, consistent with any trust relationships 

established with other organizations owning, operating, and/or maintaining external information 

systems, allowing authorized individuals to:

a. Access the information system from external information systems; and

b. Process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information using external information 

systems.

Supplemental Guidance: External information systems are information systems or components of 

information systems that are outside of the authorization boundary established by organizations

and for which organizations typically have no direct supervision and authority over the application 

of required security controls or the assessment of control effectiveness. External information 

systems include, for example: (i) personally owned information systems/devices (e.g., notebook 

computers, smart phones, tablets, personal digital assistants); (ii) privately owned computing and 

communications devices resident in commercial or public facilities (e.g., hotels, train stations, 

convention centers, shopping malls, or airports); (iii) information systems owned or controlled by 

nonfederal governmental organizations; and (iv) federal information systems that are not owned 

by, operated by, or under the direct supervision and authority of organizations. This control also 

addresses the use of external information systems for the processing, storage, or transmission of 

organizational information, including, for example, accessing cloud services (e.g., infrastructure as 

a service, platform as a service, or software as a service) from organizational information systems.

For some external information systems (i.e., information systems operated by other federal 

agencies, including organizations subordinate to those agencies), the trust relationships that have 

been established between those organizations and the originating organization may be such, that 

no explicit terms and conditions are required. Information systems within these organizations 

would not be considered external. These situations occur when, for example, there are pre-existing 

sharing/trust agreements (either implicit or explicit) established between federal agencies or 

organizations subordinate to those agencies, or when such trust agreements are specified by 

applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, or policies. Authorized individuals include, for 

example, organizational personnel, contractors, or other individuals with authorized access to 

organizational information systems and over which organizations have the authority to impose 

rules of behavior with regard to system access. Restrictions that organizations impose on 

authorized individuals need not be uniform, as those restrictions may vary depending upon the 

trust relationships between organizations. Therefore, organizations may choose to impose different 

security restrictions on contractors than on state, local, or tribal governments.

This control does not apply to the use of external information systems to access public interfaces 

to organizational information systems (e.g., individuals accessing federal information through 

www.usa.gov). Organizations establish terms and conditions for the use of external information 

systems in accordance with organizational security policies and procedures. Terms and conditions 

address as a minimum: types of applications that can be accessed on organizational information 

systems from external information systems; and the highest security category of information that 

can be processed, stored, or transmitted on external information systems. If terms and conditions 

with the owners of external information systems cannot be established, organizations may impose 

restrictions on organizational personnel using those external systems. Related controls: AC-3, AC17, AC-19, CA-3, PL-4, SA-9.

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Control Enhancements:

(1) USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | LIMITS ON AUTHORIZED USE 

The organization permits authorized individuals to use an external information system to access 

the information system or to process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information only 

when the organization:

(a) Verifies the implementation of required security controls on the external system as specified 

in the organization’s information security policy and security plan; or

(b) Retains approved information system connection or processing agreements with the 

organizational entity hosting the external information system.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement recognizes that there are circumstances

where individuals using external information systems (e.g., contractors, coalition partners) 

need to access organizational information systems. In those situations, organizations need 

confidence that the external information systems contain the necessary security safeguards 

(i.e., security controls), so as not to compromise, damage, or otherwise harm organizational 

information systems. Verification that the required security controls have been implemented 

can be achieved, for example, by third-party, independent assessments, attestations, or other 

means, depending on the confidence level required by organizations. Related control: CA-2.

(2) USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES

The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the use of organization-controlled portable 

storage devices by authorized individuals on external information systems.

Supplemental Guidance: Limits on the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices

in external information systems include, for example, complete prohibition of the use of such 

devices or restrictions on how the devices may be used and under what conditions the devices 

may be used.

(3) USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | NON-ORGANIZATIONALLY OWNED SYSTEMS / COMPONENTS / DEVICES

The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the use of non-organizationally owned information 

systems, system components, or devices to process, store, or transmit organizational information.

Supplemental Guidance: Non-organizationally owned devices include devices owned by other 

organizations (e.g., federal/state agencies, contractors) and personally owned devices. There 

are risks to using non-organizationally owned devices. In some cases, the risk is sufficiently 

high as to prohibit such use. In other cases, it may be such that the use of non-organizationally 

owned devices is allowed but restricted in some way. Restrictions include, for example: (i) 

requiring the implementation of organization-approved security controls prior to authorizing 

such connections; (ii) limiting access to certain types of information, services, or applications; 

(iii) using virtualization techniques to limit processing and storage activities to servers or 

other system components provisioned by the organization; and (iv) agreeing to terms and 

conditions for usage. For personally owned devices, organizations consult with the Office of 

the General Counsel regarding legal issues associated with using such devices in operational 

environments, including, for example, requirements for conducting forensic analyses during 

investigations after an incident.

(4) USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | NETWORK ACCESSIBLE STORAGE DEVICES 

The organization prohibits the use of [Assignment: organization-defined network accessible 

storage devices] in external information systems.

Supplemental Guidance: Network accessible storage devices in external information systems 

include, for example, online storage devices in public, hybrid, or community cloud-based 

systems.

References: FIPS Publication 199.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AC-20 MOD AC-20 (1) (2) HIGH AC-20 (1) (2)

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AC-21 INFORMATION SHARING

Control: The organization:

a. Facilitates information sharing by enabling authorized users to determine whether access 

authorizations assigned to the sharing partner match the access restrictions on the information 

for [Assignment: organization-defined information sharing circumstances where user 

discretion is required]; and

b. Employs [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms or manual processes] to 

assist users in making information sharing/collaboration decisions.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to information that may be restricted in some manner 

(e.g., privileged medical information, contract-sensitive information, proprietary information, 

personally identifiable information, classified information related to special access programs or 

compartments) based on some formal or administrative determination. Depending on the particular 

information-sharing circumstances, sharing partners may be defined at the individual, group, or 

organizational level. Information may be defined by content, type, security category, or special 

access program/compartment. Related control: AC-3.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION SHARING | AUTOMATED DECISION SUPPORT

The information system enforces information-sharing decisions by authorized users based on 

access authorizations of sharing partners and access restrictions on information to be shared.

(2) INFORMATION SHARING | INFORMATION SEARCH AND RETRIEVAL 

The information system implements information search and retrieval services that enforce 

[Assignment: organization-defined information sharing restrictions].

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD AC-21 HIGH AC-21

AC-22 PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE CONTENT

Control: The organization:

a. Designates individuals authorized to post information onto a publicly accessible information 

system;

b. Trains authorized individuals to ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain

nonpublic information;

c. Reviews the proposed content of information prior to posting onto the publicly accessible

information system to ensure that nonpublic information is not included; and

d. Reviews the content on the publicly accessible information system for nonpublic information

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and removes such information, if discovered.

Supplemental Guidance: In accordance with federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, 

regulations, standards, and/or guidance, the general public is not authorized access to nonpublic 

information (e.g., information protected under the Privacy Act and proprietary information). This 

control addresses information systems that are controlled by the organization and accessible to the 

general public, typically without identification or authentication. The posting of information on 

non-organization information systems is covered by organizational policy. Related controls: AC-3, 

AC-4, AT-2, AT-3, AU-13.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW AC-22 MOD AC-22 HIGH AC-22

AC-23 DATA MINING PROTECTION

Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined data mining prevention and 

detection techniques] for [Assignment: organization-defined data storage objects] to adequately 

detect and protect against data mining.

Supplemental Guidance: Data storage objects include, for example, databases, database records, and 

database fields. Data mining prevention and detection techniques include, for example: (i) limiting 

the types of responses provided to database queries; (ii) limiting the number/frequency of database 

queries to increase the work factor needed to determine the contents of such databases; and (iii) 

notifying organizational personnel when atypical database queries or accesses occur. This control 

focuses on the protection of organizational information from data mining while such information 

resides in organizational data stores. In contrast, AU-13 focuses on monitoring for organizational 

information that may have been mined or otherwise obtained from data stores and is now available 

as open source information residing on external sites, for example, through social networking or 

social media websites.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

AC-24 ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS

Control: The organization establishes procedures to ensure [Assignment: organization-defined 

access control decisions] are applied to each access request prior to access enforcement.

Supplemental Guidance: Access control decisions (also known as authorization decisions) occur 

when authorization information is applied to specific accesses. In contrast, access enforcement 

occurs when information systems enforce access control decisions. While it is very common to 

have access control decisions and access enforcement implemented by the same entity, it is not 

required and it is not always an optimal implementation choice. For some architectures and 

distributed information systems, different entities may perform access control decisions and access

enforcement.

Control Enhancements:

(1) ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS | TRANSMIT ACCESS AUTHORIZATION INFORMATION

The information system transmits [Assignment: organization-defined access authorization 

information] using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to [Assignment: 

organization-defined information systems] that enforce access control decisions.

Supplemental Guidance: In distributed information systems, authorization processes and access 

control decisions may occur in separate parts of the systems. In such instances, authorization 

information is transmitted securely so timely access control decisions can be enforced at the 

appropriate locations. To support the access control decisions, it may be necessary to transmit 

as part of the access authorization information, supporting security attributes. This is due to 

the fact that in distributed information systems, there are various access control decisions that 

need to be made and different entities (e.g., services) make these decisions in a serial fashion, 

each requiring some security attributes to make the decisions. Protecting access authorization 

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information (i.e., access control decisions) ensures that such information cannot be altered, 

spoofed, or otherwise compromised during transmission.

(2) ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS | NO USER OR PROCESS IDENTITY

The information system enforces access control decisions based on [Assignment: organizationdefined security attributes] that do not include the identity of the user or process acting on behalf 

of the user.

Supplemental Guidance: In certain situations, it is important that access control decisions can be 

made without information regarding the identity of the users issuing the requests. These are 

generally instances where preserving individual privacy is of paramount importance. In other 

situations, user identification information is simply not needed for access control decisions 

and, especially in the case of distributed information systems, transmitting such information 

with the needed degree of assurance may be very expensive or difficult to accomplish.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

AC-25 REFERENCE MONITOR

Control: The information system implements a reference monitor for [Assignment: organizationdefined access control policies] that is tamperproof, always invoked, and small enough to be 

subject to analysis and testing, the completeness of which can be assured.

Supplemental Guidance: Information is represented internally within information systems using 

abstractions known as data structures. Internal data structures can represent different types of 

entities, both active and passive. Active entities, also known as subjects, are typically associated 

with individuals, devices, or processes acting on behalf of individuals. Passive entities, also known 

as objects, are typically associated with data structures such as records, buffers, tables, files, interprocess pipes, and communications ports. Reference monitors typically enforce mandatory access 

control policies—a type of access control that restricts access to objects based on the identity of 

subjects or groups to which the subjects belong. The access controls are mandatory because 

subjects with certain privileges (i.e., access permissions) are restricted from passing those 

privileges on to any other subjects, either directly or indirectly—that is, the information system 

strictly enforces the access control policy based on the rule set established by the policy. The 

tamperproof property of the reference monitor prevents adversaries from compromising the 

functioning of the mechanism. The always invoked property prevents adversaries from bypassing

the mechanism and hence violating the security policy. The smallness property helps to ensure the 

completeness in the analysis and testing of the mechanism to detect weaknesses or deficiencies 

(i.e., latent flaws) that would prevent the enforcement of the security policy. Related controls: AC3, AC-16, SC-3, SC-39.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

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FAMILY: AWARENESS AND TRAINING

AT-1 SECURITY AWARENESS AND TRAINING POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles]:

1. A security awareness and training policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 

responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, 

and compliance; and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security awareness and training policy 

and associated security awareness and training controls; and

b. Reviews and updates the current:

1. Security awareness and training policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];

and

2. Security awareness and training procedures [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AT family.

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can 

be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The 

procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information 

systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-16, 800-50, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AT-1 MOD AT-1 HIGH AT-1

AT-2 SECURITY AWARENESS TRAINING

Control: The organization provides basic security awareness training to information system users 

(including managers, senior executives, and contractors):

a. As part of initial training for new users;

b. When required by information system changes; and

c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine the appropriate content of security awareness 

training and security awareness techniques based on the specific organizational requirements and 

the information systems to which personnel have authorized access. The content includes a basic 

understanding of the need for information security and user actions to maintain security and to 

respond to suspected security incidents. The content also addresses awareness of the need for 

operations security. Security awareness techniques can include, for example, displaying posters, 

offering supplies inscribed with security reminders, generating email advisories/notices from 

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senior organizational officials, displaying logon screen messages, and conducting information 

security awareness events. Related controls: AT-3, AT-4, PL-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SECURITY AWARENESS | PRACTICAL EXERCISES 

The organization includes practical exercises in security awareness training that simulate actual 

cyber attacks.

Supplemental Guidance: Practical exercises may include, for example, no-notice social 

engineering attempts to collect information, gain unauthorized access, or simulate the adverse 

impact of opening malicious email attachments or invoking, via spear phishing attacks,

malicious web links. Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, CP-4, IR-3.

(2) SECURITY AWARENESS | INSIDER THREAT 

The organization includes security awareness training on recognizing and reporting potential 

indicators of insider threat.

Supplemental Guidance: Potential indicators and possible precursors of insider threat can 

include behaviors such as inordinate, long-term job dissatisfaction, attempts to gain access to 

information not required for job performance, unexplained access to financial resources, 

bullying or sexual harassment of fellow employees, workplace violence, and other serious 

violations of organizational policies, procedures, directives, rules, or practices. Security 

awareness training includes how to communicate employee and management concerns 

regarding potential indicators of insider threat through appropriate organizational channels in 

accordance with established organizational policies and procedures. Related controls: PL-4, 

PM-12, PS-3, PS-6.

References: C.F.R. Part 5 Subpart C (5 C.F.R. 930.301); Executive Order 13587; NIST Special 

Publication 800-50.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AT-2 MOD AT-2 (2) HIGH AT-2 (2)

AT-3 ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING

Control: The organization provides role-based security training to personnel with assigned security 

roles and responsibilities:

a. Before authorizing access to the information system or performing assigned duties;

b. When required by information system changes; and

c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine the appropriate content of security training based 

on the assigned roles and responsibilities of individuals and the specific security requirements of 

organizations and the information systems to which personnel have authorized access. In addition, 

organizations provide enterprise architects, information system developers, software developers, 

acquisition/procurement officials, information system managers, system/network administrators, 

personnel conducting configuration management and auditing activities, personnel performing 

independent verification and validation activities, security control assessors, and other personnel 

having access to system-level software, adequate security-related technical training specifically 

tailored for their assigned duties. Comprehensive role-based training addresses management, 

operational, and technical roles and responsibilities covering physical, personnel, and technical 

safeguards and countermeasures. Such training can include for example, policies, procedures, 

tools, and artifacts for the organizational security roles defined. Organizations also provide the 

training necessary for individuals to carry out their responsibilities related to operations and

supply chain security within the context of organizational information security programs. RoleAPPENDIX F-AT PAGE F-38
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based security training also applies to contractors providing services to federal agencies. Related 

controls: AT-2, AT-4, PL-4, PS-7, SA-3, SA-12, SA-16.

Control Enhancements:

(1) ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING | ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS 

The organization provides [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] with initial and

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] training in the employment and operation of 

environmental controls.

Supplemental Guidance: Environmental controls include, for example, fire suppression and 

detection devices/systems, sprinkler systems, handheld fire extinguishers, fixed fire hoses, 

smoke detectors, temperature/humidity, HVAC, and power within the facility. Organizations 

identify personnel with specific roles and responsibilities associated with environmental 

controls requiring specialized training. Related controls: PE-1, PE-13, PE-14, PE-15.

(2) ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING | PHYSICAL SECURITY CONTROLS

The organization provides [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] with initial and 

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] training in the employment and operation of 

physical security controls.

Supplemental Guidance: Physical security controls include, for example, physical access control 

devices, physical intrusion alarms, monitoring/surveillance equipment, and security guards 

(deployment and operating procedures). Organizations identify personnel with specific roles 

and responsibilities associated with physical security controls requiring specialized training. 

Related controls: PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, PE-5.

(3) ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING | PRACTICAL EXERCISES

The organization includes practical exercises in security training that reinforce training objectives.

Supplemental Guidance: Practical exercises may include, for example, security training for 

software developers that includes simulated cyber attacks exploiting common software 

vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows), or spear/whale phishing attacks targeted at senior 

leaders/executives. These types of practical exercises help developers better understand the 

effects of such vulnerabilities and appreciate the need for security coding standards and 

processes.

(4) ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING | SUSPICIOUS COMMUNICATIONS AND ANOMALOUS SYSTEM BEHAVIOR

The organization provides training to its personnel on [Assignment: organization-defined 

indicators of malicious code] to recognize suspicious communications and anomalous behavior in 

organizational information systems.

Supplemental Guidance: A well-trained workforce provides another organizational safeguard 

that can be employed as part of a defense-in-depth strategy to protect organizations against 

malicious code coming in to organizations via email or the web applications. Personnel are 

trained to look for indications of potentially suspicious email (e.g., receiving an unexpected 

email, receiving an email containing strange or poor grammar, or receiving an email from an 

unfamiliar sender but who appears to be from a known sponsor or contractor). Personnel are 

also trained on how to respond to such suspicious email or web communications (e.g., not 

opening attachments, not clicking on embedded web links, and checking the source of email 

addresses). For this process to work effectively, all organizational personnel are trained and 

made aware of what constitutes suspicious communications. Training personnel on how to 

recognize anomalous behaviors in organizational information systems can potentially provide 

early warning for the presence of malicious code. Recognition of such anomalous behavior by 

organizational personnel can supplement automated malicious code detection and protection 

tools and systems employed by organizations.

References: C.F.R. Part 5 Subpart C (5 C.F.R. 930.301); NIST Special Publications 800-16, 800-

50.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AT-3 MOD AT-3 HIGH AT-3

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AT-4 SECURITY TRAINING RECORDS

Control: The organization:

a. Documents and monitors individual information system security training activities including 

basic security awareness training and specific information system security training; and

b. Retains individual training records for [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

Supplemental Guidance: Documentation for specialized training may be maintained by individual 

supervisors at the option of the organization. Related controls: AT-2, AT-3, PM-14.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW AT-4 MOD AT-4 HIGH AT-4

AT-5 CONTACTS WITH SECURITY GROUPS AND ASSOCIATIONS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PM-15].

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FAMILY: AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

AU-1 AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles]:

1. An audit and accountability policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, 

management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; 

and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the audit and accountability policy and 

associated audit and accountability controls; and

b. Reviews and updates the current:

1. Audit and accountability policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and

2. Audit and accountability procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AU family.

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can 

be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The 

procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information 

systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing 

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-1 MOD AU-1 HIGH AU-1

AU-2 AUDIT EVENTS

Control: The organization:

a. Determines that the information system is capable of auditing the following events: 

[Assignment: organization-defined auditable events];

b. Coordinates the security audit function with other organizational entities requiring auditrelated information to enhance mutual support and to help guide the selection of auditable 

events;

c. Provides a rationale for why the auditable events are deemed to be adequate to support afterthe-fact investigations of security incidents; and

d. Determines that the following events are to be audited within the information system: 

[Assignment: organization-defined audited events (the subset of the auditable events defined 

in AU-2 a.) along with the frequency of (or situation requiring) auditing for each identified 

event].

Supplemental Guidance: An event is any observable occurrence in an organizational information 

system. Organizations identify audit events as those events which are significant and relevant to 

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the security of information systems and the environments in which those systems operate in order 

to meet specific and ongoing audit needs. Audit events can include, for example, password 

changes, failed logons, or failed accesses related to information systems, administrative privilege

usage, PIV credential usage, or third-party credential usage. In determining the set of auditable 

events, organizations consider the auditing appropriate for each of the security controls to be 

implemented. To balance auditing requirements with other information system needs, this control 

also requires identifying that subset of auditable events that are audited at a given point in time.

For example, organizations may determine that information systems must have the capability to 

log every file access both successful and unsuccessful, but not activate that capability except for 

specific circumstances due to the potential burden on system performance. Auditing requirements,

including the need for auditable events, may be referenced in other security controls and control 

enhancements. Organizations also include auditable events that are required by applicable federal 

laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards. Audit records can be 

generated at various levels of abstraction, including at the packet level as information traverses the 

network. Selecting the appropriate level of abstraction is a critical aspect of an audit capability and 

can facilitate the identification of root causes to problems. Organizations consider in the definition 

of auditable events, the auditing necessary to cover related events such as the steps in distributed, 

transaction-based processes (e.g., processes that are distributed across multiple organizations) and 

actions that occur in service-oriented architectures. Related controls: AC-6, AC-17, AU-3, AU-12, 

MA-4, MP-2, MP-4, SI-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) AUDIT EVENTS | COMPILATION OF AUDIT RECORDS FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AU-12].

(2) AUDIT EVENTS | SELECTION OF AUDIT EVENTS BY COMPONENT

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AU-12].

(3) AUDIT EVENTS | REVIEWS AND UPDATES

The organization reviews and updates the audited events [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Over time, the events that organizations believe should be audited may 

change. Reviewing and updating the set of audited events periodically is necessary to ensure 

that the current set is still necessary and sufficient.

(4) AUDIT EVENTS | PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6 (9)].

References: NIST Special Publication 800-92; Web: http://idmanagement.gov.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-2 MOD AU-2 (3) HIGH AU-2 (3)

AU-3 CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS

Control: The information system generates audit records containing information that establishes

what type of event occurred, when the event occurred, where the event occurred, the source of the 

event, the outcome of the event, and the identity of any individuals or subjects associated with the 

event.

Supplemental Guidance: Audit record content that may be necessary to satisfy the requirement of 

this control, includes, for example, time stamps, source and destination addresses, user/process 

identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, filenames involved, and access control or 

flow control rules invoked. Event outcomes can include indicators of event success or failure and 

event-specific results (e.g., the security state of the information system after the event occurred). 

Related controls: AU-2, AU-8, AU-12, SI-11.

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Control Enhancements:

(1) CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | ADDITIONAL AUDIT INFORMATION 

The information system generates audit records containing the following additional information: 

[Assignment: organization-defined additional, more detailed information].

Supplemental Guidance: Detailed information that organizations may consider in audit records 

includes, for example, full text recording of privileged commands or the individual identities 

of group account users. Organizations consider limiting the additional audit information to 

only that information explicitly needed for specific audit requirements. This facilitates the use 

of audit trails and audit logs by not including information that could potentially be misleading 

or could make it more difficult to locate information of interest.

(2) CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF PLANNED AUDIT RECORD CONTENT

The information system provides centralized management and configuration of the content to be 

captured in audit records generated by [Assignment: organization-defined information system 

components].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires that the content to be captured in 

audit records be configured from a central location (necessitating automation). Organizations 

coordinate the selection of required audit content to support the centralized management and 

configuration capability provided by the information system. Related controls: AU-6, AU-7.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-3 MOD AU-3 (1) HIGH AU-3 (1) (2)

AU-4 AUDIT STORAGE CAPACITY

Control: The organization allocates audit record storage capacity in accordance with [Assignment: 

organization-defined audit record storage requirements].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations consider the types of auditing to be performed and the audit 

processing requirements when allocating audit storage capacity. Allocating sufficient audit storage 

capacity reduces the likelihood of such capacity being exceeded and resulting in the potential loss 

or reduction of auditing capability. Related controls: AU-2, AU-5, AU-6, AU-7, AU-11, SI-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) AUDIT STORAGE CAPACITY | TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE

The information system off-loads audit records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] onto 

a different system or media than the system being audited.

Supplemental Guidance: Off-loading is a process designed to preserve the confidentiality and 

integrity of audit records by moving the records from the primary information system to a 

secondary or alternate system. It is a common process in information systems with limited 

audit storage capacity; the audit storage is used only in a transitory fashion until the system 

can communicate with the secondary or alternate system designated for storing the audit

records, at which point the information is transferred.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-4 MOD AU-4 HIGH AU-4

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AU-5 RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES

Control: The information system:

a. Alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] in the event of an audit 

processing failure; and

b. Takes the following additional actions: [Assignment: organization-defined actions to be taken 

(e.g., shut down information system, overwrite oldest audit records, stop generating audit 

records)].

Supplemental Guidance: Audit processing failures include, for example, software/hardware errors, 

failures in the audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded. 

Organizations may choose to define additional actions for different audit processing failures (e.g., 

by type, by location, by severity, or a combination of such factors). This control applies to each 

audit data storage repository (i.e., distinct information system component where audit records are

stored), the total audit storage capacity of organizations (i.e., all audit data storage repositories 

combined), or both. Related controls: AU-4, SI-12.

Control Enhancements:

(1) RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | AUDIT STORAGE CAPACITY

The information system provides a warning to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel, roles, 

and/or locations] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when allocated audit 

record storage volume reaches [Assignment: organization-defined percentage] of repository 

maximum audit record storage capacity.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may have multiple audit data storage repositories 

distributed across multiple information system components, with each repository having 

different storage volume capacities.

(2) RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | REAL-TIME ALERTS

The information system provides an alert in [Assignment: organization-defined real-time period] to 

[Assignment: organization-defined personnel, roles, and/or locations] when the following audit 

failure events occur: [Assignment: organization-defined audit failure events requiring real-time 

alerts].

Supplemental Guidance: Alerts provide organizations with urgent messages. Real-time alerts 

provide these messages at information technology speed (i.e., the time from event detection to 

alert occurs in seconds or less).

(3) RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | CONFIGURABLE TRAFFIC VOLUME THRESHOLDS

The information system enforces configurable network communications traffic volume thresholds 

reflecting limits on auditing capacity and [Selection: rejects; delays] network traffic above those 

thresholds.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations have the capability to reject or delay the processing of 

network communications traffic if auditing such traffic is determined to exceed the storage 

capacity of the information system audit function. The rejection or delay response is triggered 

by the established organizational traffic volume thresholds which can be adjusted based on 

changes to audit storage capacity. 

(4) RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | SHUTDOWN ON FAILURE

The information system invokes a [Selection: full system shutdown; partial system shutdown; 

degraded operational mode with limited mission/business functionality available] in the event of 

[Assignment: organization-defined audit failures], unless an alternate audit capability exists.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine the types of audit failures that can trigger 

automatic information system shutdowns or degraded operations. Because of the importance 

of ensuring mission/business continuity, organizations may determine that the nature of the 

audit failure is not so severe that it warrants a complete shutdown of the information system 

supporting the core organizational missions/business operations. In those instances, partial 

information system shutdowns or operating in a degraded mode with reduced capability may 

be viable alternatives. Related control: AU-15.

References: None.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-5 MOD AU-5 HIGH AU-5 (1) (2)

AU-6 AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING

Control: The organization:

a. Reviews and analyzes information system audit records [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency] for indications of [Assignment: organization-defined inappropriate or unusual 

activity]; and

b. Reports findings to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: Audit review, analysis, and reporting covers information security-related 

auditing performed by organizations including, for example, auditing that results from monitoring 

of account usage, remote access, wireless connectivity, mobile device connection, configuration 

settings, system component inventory, use of maintenance tools and nonlocal maintenance, 

physical access, temperature and humidity, equipment delivery and removal, communications at 

the information system boundaries, use of mobile code, and use of VoIP. Findings can be reported 

to organizational entities that include, for example, incident response team, help desk, information 

security group/department. If organizations are prohibited from reviewing and analyzing audit 

information or unable to conduct such activities (e.g., in certain national security applications or 

systems), the review/analysis may be carried out by other organizations granted such authority.

Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-6, AC-17, AT-3, AU-7, AU-16, CA-7, CM-5, CM-10, CM-11, 

IA-3, IA-5, IR-5, IR-6, MA-4, MP-4, PE-3, PE-6, PE-14, PE-16, RA-5, SC-7, SC-18, SC-19, SI-3, 

SI-4, SI-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | PROCESS INTEGRATION

The organization employs automated mechanisms to integrate audit review, analysis, and 

reporting processes to support organizational processes for investigation and response to 

suspicious activities.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational processes benefiting from integrated audit review, 

analysis, and reporting include, for example, incident response, continuous monitoring, 

contingency planning, and Inspector General audits. Related controls: AU-12, PM-7.

(2) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | AUTOMATED SECURITY ALERTS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-4]. 

(3) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATE AUDIT REPOSITORIES

The organization analyzes and correlates audit records across different repositories to gain 

organization-wide situational awareness.

Supplemental Guidance: Organization-wide situational awareness includes awareness across all 

three tiers of risk management (i.e., organizational, mission/business process, and information 

system) and supports cross-organization awareness. Related controls: AU-12, IR-4.

(4) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CENTRAL REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

The information system provides the capability to centrally review and analyze audit records from 

multiple components within the system.

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms for centralized reviews and analyses include, 

for example, Security Information Management products. Related controls: AU-2, AU-12.

(5) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | INTEGRATION / SCANNING AND MONITORING CAPABILITIES

The organization integrates analysis of audit records with analysis of [Selection (one or more): 

vulnerability scanning information; performance data; information system monitoring information;

[Assignment: organization-defined data/information collected from other sources]] to further 

enhance the ability to identify inappropriate or unusual activity.

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Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement does not require vulnerability scanning, the 

generation of performance data, or information system monitoring. Rather, the enhancement 

requires that the analysis of information being otherwise produced in these areas is integrated 

with the analysis of audit information. Security Event and Information Management System 

tools can facilitate audit record aggregation/consolidation from multiple information system 

components as well as audit record correlation and analysis. The use of standardized audit 

record analysis scripts developed by organizations (with localized script adjustments, as 

necessary) provides more cost-effective approaches for analyzing audit record information 

collected. The correlation of audit record information with vulnerability scanning information 

is important in determining the veracity of vulnerability scans and correlating attack detection 

events with scanning results. Correlation with performance data can help uncover denial of 

service attacks or cyber attacks resulting in unauthorized use of resources. Correlation with 

system monitoring information can assist in uncovering attacks and in better relating audit 

information to operational situations. Related controls: AU-12, IR-4, RA-5.

(6) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATION WITH PHYSICAL MONITORING

The organization correlates information from audit records with information obtained from 

monitoring physical access to further enhance the ability to identify suspicious, inappropriate, 

unusual, or malevolent activity.

Supplemental Guidance: The correlation of physical audit information and audit logs from 

information systems may assist organizations in identifying examples of suspicious behavior 

or supporting evidence of such behavior. For example, the correlation of an individual’s

identity for logical access to certain information systems with the additional physical security 

information that the individual was actually present at the facility when the logical access 

occurred, may prove to be useful in investigations.

(7) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | PERMITTED ACTIONS

The organization specifies the permitted actions for each [Selection (one or more): information 

system process; role; user] associated with the review, analysis, and reporting of audit 

information.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations specify permitted actions for information system 

processes, roles, and/or users associated with the review, analysis, and reporting of audit 

records through account management techniques. Specifying permitted actions on audit 

information is a way to enforce the principle of least privilege. Permitted actions are enforced 

by the information system and include, for example, read, write, execute, append, and delete.

(8) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | FULL TEXT ANALYSIS OF PRIVILEGED COMMANDS

The organization performs a full text analysis of audited privileged commands in a physically

distinct component or subsystem of the information system, or other information system that is 

dedicated to that analysis.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires a distinct environment for the 

dedicated analysis of audit information related to privileged users without compromising such

information on the information system where the users have elevated privileges including the 

capability to execute privileged commands. Full text analysis refers to analysis that considers 

the full text of privileged commands (i.e., commands and all parameters) as opposed to 

analysis that considers only the name of the command. Full text analysis includes, for 

example, the use of pattern matching and heuristics. Related controls: AU-3, AU-9, AU-11, 

AU-12.

(9) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATION WITH INFORMATION FROM NONTECHNICAL SOURCES

The organization correlates information from nontechnical sources with audit information to 

enhance organization-wide situational awareness.

Supplemental Guidance: Nontechnical sources include, for example, human resources records 

documenting organizational policy violations (e.g., sexual harassment incidents, improper use 

of organizational information assets). Such information can lead organizations to a more 

directed analytical effort to detect potential malicious insider activity. Due to the sensitive 

nature of the information available from nontechnical sources, organizations limit access to 

such information to minimize the potential for the inadvertent release of privacy-related 

information to individuals that do not have a need to know. Thus, correlation of information 

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from nontechnical sources with audit information generally occurs only when individuals are 

suspected of being involved in a security incident. Organizations obtain legal advice prior to 

initiating such actions. Related control: AT-2.

(10) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | AUDIT LEVEL ADJUSTMENT

The organization adjusts the level of audit review, analysis, and reporting within the information 

system when there is a change in risk based on law enforcement information, intelligence 

information, or other credible sources of information.

Supplemental Guidance: The frequency, scope, and/or depth of the audit review, analysis, and 

reporting may be adjusted to meet organizational needs based on new information received.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-6 MOD AU-6 (1) (3) HIGH AU-6 (1) (3) (5) (6)

AU-7 AUDIT REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION

Control: The information system provides an audit reduction and report generation capability that:

a. Supports on-demand audit review, analysis, and reporting requirements and after-the-fact 

investigations of security incidents; and

b. Does not alter the original content or time ordering of audit records.

Supplemental Guidance: Audit reduction is a process that manipulates collected audit information 

and organizes such information in a summary format that is more meaningful to analysts. Audit 

reduction and report generation capabilities do not always emanate from the same information 

system or from the same organizational entities conducting auditing activities. Audit reduction 

capability can include, for example, modern data mining techniques with advanced data filters to 

identify anomalous behavior in audit records. The report generation capability provided by the 

information system can generate customizable reports. Time ordering of audit records can be a 

significant issue if the granularity of the timestamp in the record is insufficient. Related control: 

AU-6.

Control Enhancements:

(1) AUDIT REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION | AUTOMATIC PROCESSING

The information system provides the capability to process audit records for events of interest 

based on [Assignment: organization-defined audit fields within audit records].

Supplemental Guidance: Events of interest can be identified by the content of specific audit 

record fields including, for example, identities of individuals, event types, event locations,

event times, event dates, system resources involved, IP addresses involved, or information 

objects accessed. Organizations may define audit event criteria to any degree of granularity 

required, for example, locations selectable by general networking location (e.g., by network or 

subnetwork) or selectable by specific information system component. Related controls: AU-2, 

AU-12.

(2) AUDIT REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION | AUTOMATIC SORT AND SEARCH

The information system provides the capability to sort and search audit records for events of 

interest based on the content of [Assignment: organization-defined audit fields within audit 

records].

Supplemental Guidance: Sorting and searching of audit records may be based upon the contents 

of audit record fields, for example: (i) date/time of events; (ii) user identifiers; (iii) Internet 

Protocol (IP) addresses involved in the event; (iv) type of event; or (v) event success/failure.

References: None.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD AU-7 (1) HIGH AU-7 (1)

AU-8 TIME STAMPS

Control: The information system:

a. Uses internal system clocks to generate time stamps for audit records; and

b. Records time stamps for audit records that can be mapped to Coordinated Universal Time 

(UTC) or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) and meets [Assignment: organization-defined 

granularity of time measurement].

Supplemental Guidance: Time stamps generated by the information system include date and time.

Time is commonly expressed in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), a modern continuation of 

Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), or local time with an offset from UTC. Granularity of time 

measurements refers to the degree of synchronization between information system clocks and 

reference clocks, for example, clocks synchronizing within hundreds of milliseconds or within 

tens of milliseconds. Organizations may define different time granularities for different system 

components. Time service can also be critical to other security capabilities such as access control 

and identification and authentication, depending on the nature of the mechanisms used to support 

those capabilities. Related controls: AU-3, AU-12.

Control Enhancements:

(1) TIME STAMPS | SYNCHRONIZATION WITH AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCE

The information system:

(a) Compares the internal information system clocks [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency] with [Assignment: organization-defined authoritative time source]; and

(b) Synchronizes the internal system clocks to the authoritative time source when the time 

difference is greater than [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement provides uniformity of time stamps for 

information systems with multiple system clocks and systems connected over a network.

(2) TIME STAMPS | SECONDARY AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCE

The information system identifies a secondary authoritative time source that is located in a 

different geographic region than the primary authoritative time source.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-8 MOD AU-8 (1) HIGH AU-8 (1)

AU-9 PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION

Control: The information system protects audit information and audit tools from unauthorized 

access, modification, and deletion.

Supplemental Guidance: Audit information includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit 

settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity. This control 

focuses on technical protection of audit information. Physical protection of audit information is 

addressed by media protection controls and physical and environmental protection controls.

Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, MP-2, MP-4, PE-2, PE-3, PE-6.

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Control Enhancements:

(1) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | HARDWARE WRITE-ONCE MEDIA

The information system writes audit trails to hardware-enforced, write-once media.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to the initial generation of audit 

trails (i.e., the collection of audit records that represents the audit information to be used for 

detection, analysis, and reporting purposes) and to the backup of those audit trails. The 

enhancement does not apply to the initial generation of audit records prior to being written to 

an audit trail. Write-once, read-many (WORM) media includes, for example, Compact DiskRecordable (CD-R) and Digital Video Disk-Recordable (DVD-R). In contrast, the use of 

switchable write-protection media such as on tape cartridges or Universal Serial Bus (USB)

drives results in write-protected, but not write-once, media. Related controls: AU-4, AU-5.

(2) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | AUDIT BACKUP ON SEPARATE PHYSICAL SYSTEMS / COMPONENTS

The information system backs up audit records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] onto 

a physically different system or system component than the system or component being audited.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement helps to ensure that a compromise of the 

information system being audited does not also result in a compromise of the audit records.

Related controls: AU-4, AU-5, AU-11.

(3) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION 

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity of audit 

information and audit tools.

Supplemental Guidance: Cryptographic mechanisms used for protecting the integrity of audit 

information include, for example, signed hash functions using asymmetric cryptography

enabling distribution of the public key to verify the hash information while maintaining the 

confidentiality of the secret key used to generate the hash. Related controls: AU-10, SC-12, 

SC-13.

(4) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | ACCESS BY SUBSET OF PRIVILEGED USERS

The organization authorizes access to management of audit functionality to only [Assignment: 

organization-defined subset of privileged users].

Supplemental Guidance: Individuals with privileged access to an information system and who 

are also the subject of an audit by that system, may affect the reliability of audit information 

by inhibiting audit activities or modifying audit records. This control enhancement requires

that privileged access be further defined between audit-related privileges and other privileges, 

thus limiting the users with audit-related privileges. Related control: AC-5.

(5) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

The organization enforces dual authorization for [Selection (one or more): movement; deletion] of 

[Assignment: organization-defined audit information].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose different selection options for different 

types of audit information. Dual authorization mechanisms require the approval of two 

authorized individuals in order to execute. Dual authorization may also be known as twoperson control. Related controls: AC-3, MP-2.

(6) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | READ ONLY ACCESS

The organization authorizes read-only access to audit information to [Assignment: organizationdefined subset of privileged users].

Supplemental Guidance: Restricting privileged user authorizations to read-only helps to limit 

the potential damage to organizations that could be initiated by such users (e.g., deleting audit 

records to cover up malicious activity).

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-9 MOD AU-9 (4) HIGH AU-9 (2) (3) (4)

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AU-10 NON-REPUDIATION

Control: The information system protects against an individual (or process acting on behalf of an 

individual) falsely denying having performed [Assignment: organization-defined actions to be 

covered by non-repudiation].

Supplemental Guidance: Types of individual actions covered by non-repudiation include, for 

example, creating information, sending and receiving messages, approving information (e.g., 

indicating concurrence or signing a contract). Non-repudiation protects individuals against later 

claims by: (i) authors of not having authored particular documents; (ii) senders of not having 

transmitted messages; (iii) receivers of not having received messages; or (iv) signatories of not 

having signed documents. Non-repudiation services can be used to determine if information 

originated from a particular individual, or if an individual took specific actions (e.g., sending an 

email, signing a contract, approving a procurement request) or received specific information. 

Organizations obtain non-repudiation services by employing various techniques or mechanisms 

(e.g., digital signatures, digital message receipts). Related controls: SC-12, SC-8, SC-13, SC-16, 

SC-17, SC-23.

Control Enhancements:

(1) NON-REPUDIATION | ASSOCIATION OF IDENTITIES 

The information system:

(a) Binds the identity of the information producer with the information to [Assignment: 

organization-defined strength of binding]; and

(b) Provides the means for authorized individuals to determine the identity of the producer of the 

information.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement supports audit requirements that provide 

organizational personnel with the means to identify who produced specific information in the 

event of an information transfer. Organizations determine and approve the strength of the 

binding between the information producer and the information based on the security category

of the information and relevant risk factors. Related controls: AC-4, AC-16.

(2) NON-REPUDIATION | VALIDATE BINDING OF INFORMATION PRODUCER IDENTITY

The information system:

(a) Validates the binding of the information producer identity to the information at [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency]; and

(b) Performs [Assignment: organization-defined actions] in the event of a validation error.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement prevents the modification of information

between production and review. The validation of bindings can be achieved, for example, by 

the use of cryptographic checksums. Organizations determine if validations are in response to 

user requests or generated automatically. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-16.

(3) NON-REPUDIATION | CHAIN OF CUSTODY

The information system maintains reviewer/releaser identity and credentials within the established 

chain of custody for all information reviewed or released.

Supplemental Guidance: Chain of custody is a process that tracks the movement of evidence 

through its collection, safeguarding, and analysis life cycle by documenting each person who 

handled the evidence, the date and time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose for the 

transfer. If the reviewer is a human or if the review function is automated but separate from 

the release/transfer function, the information system associates the identity of the reviewer of 

the information to be released with the information and the information label. In the case of 

human reviews, this control enhancement provides organizational officials the means to 

identify who reviewed and released the information. In the case of automated reviews, this 

control enhancement ensures that only approved review functions are employed. Related 

controls: AC-4, AC-16.

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(4) NON-REPUDIATION | VALIDATE BINDING OF INFORMATION REVIEWER IDENTITY

The information system:

(a) Validates the binding of the information reviewer identity to the information at the transfer or 

release points prior to release/transfer between [Assignment: organization-defined security 

domains]; and

(b) Performs [Assignment: organization-defined actions] in the event of a validation error.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement prevents the modification of information 

between review and transfer/release. The validation of bindings can be achieved, for example, 

by the use of cryptographic checksums. Organizations determine validations are in response 

to user requests or generated automatically. Related controls: AC-4, AC-16.

(5) NON-REPUDIATION | DIGITAL SIGNATURES

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7].

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH AU-10

AU-11 AUDIT RECORD RETENTION

Control: The organization retains audit records for [Assignment: organization-defined time period

consistent with records retention policy] to provide support for after-the-fact investigations of 

security incidents and to meet regulatory and organizational information retention requirements.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations retain audit records until it is determined that they are no 

longer needed for administrative, legal, audit, or other operational purposes. This includes, for 

example, retention and availability of audit records relative to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 

requests, subpoenas, and law enforcement actions. Organizations develop standard categories of 

audit records relative to such types of actions and standard response processes for each type of 

action. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) General Records Schedules 

provide federal policy on record retention. Related controls: AU-4, AU-5, AU-9, MP-6.

Control Enhancements:

(1) AUDIT RECORD RETENTION | LONG-TERM RETRIEVAL CAPABILITY 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined measures] to ensure that long-term 

audit records generated by the information system can be retrieved.

Supplemental Guidance: Measures employed by organizations to help facilitate the retrieval of 

audit records include, for example, converting records to newer formats, retaining equipment 

capable of reading the records, and retaining necessary documentation to help organizational 

personnel understand how to interpret the records.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW AU-11 MOD AU-11 HIGH AU-11

AU-12 AUDIT GENERATION

Control: The information system:

a. Provides audit record generation capability for the auditable events defined in AU-2 a. at 

[Assignment: organization-defined information system components];

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b. Allows [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to select which auditable 

events are to be audited by specific components of the information system; and

c. Generates audit records for the events defined in AU-2 d. with the content defined in AU-3.

Supplemental Guidance: Audit records can be generated from many different information system 

components. The list of audited events is the set of events for which audits are to be generated.

These events are typically a subset of all events for which the information system is capable of 

generating audit records. Related controls: AC-3, AU-2, AU-3, AU-6, AU-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) AUDIT GENERATION | SYSTEM-WIDE / TIME-CORRELATED AUDIT TRAIL 

The information system compiles audit records from [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system components] into a system-wide (logical or physical) audit trail that is timecorrelated to within [Assignment: organization-defined level of tolerance for the relationship 

between time stamps of individual records in the audit trail].

Supplemental Guidance: Audit trails are time-correlated if the time stamps in the individual 

audit records can be reliably related to the time stamps in other audit records to achieve a time 

ordering of the records within organizational tolerances. Related controls: AU-8, AU-12.

(2) AUDIT GENERATION | STANDARDIZED FORMATS

The information system produces a system-wide (logical or physical) audit trail composed of audit 

records in a standardized format.

Supplemental Guidance: Audit information that is normalized to common standards promotes 

interoperability and exchange of such information between dissimilar devices and information 

systems. This facilitates production of event information that can be more readily analyzed 

and correlated. Standard formats for audit records include, for example, system log records 

and audit records compliant with Common Event Expressions (CEE). If logging mechanisms 

within information systems do not conform to standardized formats, systems may convert 

individual audit records into standardized formats when compiling system-wide audit trails.

(3) AUDIT GENERATION | CHANGES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS 

The information system provides the capability for [Assignment: organization-defined individuals 

or roles] to change the auditing to be performed on [Assignment: organization-defined information 

system components] based on [Assignment: organization-defined selectable event criteria] within 

[Assignment: organization-defined time thresholds].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement enables organizations to extend or limit 

auditing as necessary to meet organizational requirements. Auditing that is limited to conserve 

information system resources may be extended to address certain threat situations. In addition, 

auditing may be limited to a specific set of events to facilitate audit reduction, analysis, and 

reporting. Organizations can establish time thresholds in which audit actions are changed, for 

example, near real-time, within minutes, or within hours. Related control: AU-7.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW AU-12 MOD AU-12 HIGH AU-12 (1) (3)

AU-13 MONITORING FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE

Control: The organization monitors [Assignment: organization-defined open source information

and/or information sites] [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] for evidence of 

unauthorized disclosure of organizational information.

Supplemental Guidance: Open source information includes, for example, social networking sites.

Related controls: PE-3, SC-7.

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Control Enhancements:

(1) MONITORING FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE | USE OF AUTOMATED TOOLS

The organization employs automated mechanisms to determine if organizational information has 

been disclosed in an unauthorized manner.

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms can include, for example, automated scripts to 

monitor new posts on selected websites, and commercial services providing notifications and 

alerts to organizations.

(2) MONITORING FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE | REVIEW OF MONITORED SITES

The organization reviews the open source information sites being monitored [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency].

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

AU-14 SESSION AUDIT

Control: The information system provides the capability for authorized users to select a user 

session to capture/record or view/hear.

Supplemental Guidance: Session audits include, for example, monitoring keystrokes, tracking 

websites visited, and recording information and/or file transfers. Session auditing activities are 

developed, integrated, and used in consultation with legal counsel in accordance with applicable 

federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, or standards. Related controls: 

AC-3, AU-4, AU-5, AU-9, AU-11.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SESSION AUDIT | SYSTEM START-UP

The information system initiates session audits at system start-up.

(2) SESSION AUDIT | CAPTURE/RECORD AND LOG CONTENT

The information system provides the capability for authorized users to capture/record and log 

content related to a user session.

(3) SESSION AUDIT | REMOTE VIEWING / LISTENING 

The information system provides the capability for authorized users to remotely view/hear all 

content related to an established user session in real time.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

AU-15 ALTERNATE AUDIT CAPABILITY

Control: The organization provides an alternate audit capability in the event of a failure in primary 

audit capability that provides [Assignment: organization-defined alternate audit functionality].

Supplemental Guidance: Since an alternate audit capability may be a short-term protection employed 

until the failure in the primary auditing capability is corrected, organizations may determine that 

the alternate audit capability need only provide a subset of the primary audit functionality that is 

impacted by the failure. Related control: AU-5.

Control Enhancements: None.

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References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

AU-16 CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDITING

Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined methods] for coordinating 

[Assignment: organization-defined audit information] among external organizations when audit 

information is transmitted across organizational boundaries.

Supplemental Guidance: When organizations use information systems and/or services of external 

organizations, the auditing capability necessitates a coordinated approach across organizations. 

For example, maintaining the identity of individuals that requested particular services across 

organizational boundaries may often be very difficult, and doing so may prove to have significant 

performance ramifications. Therefore, it is often the case that cross-organizational auditing (e.g.,

the type of auditing capability provided by service-oriented architectures) simply captures the 

identity of individuals issuing requests at the initial information system, and subsequent systems 

record that the requests emanated from authorized individuals. Related control: AU-6.

Control Enhancements:

(1) CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDITING | IDENTITY PRESERVATION

The organization requires that the identity of individuals be preserved in cross-organizational audit 

trails.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies when there is a need to be able to 

trace actions that are performed across organizational boundaries to a specific individual.

(2) CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDITING | SHARING OF AUDIT INFORMATION

The organization provides cross-organizational audit information to [Assignment: organizationdefined organizations] based on [Assignment: organization-defined cross-organizational sharing 

agreements].

Supplemental Guidance: Because of the distributed nature of the audit information, crossorganization sharing of audit information may be essential for effective analysis of the 

auditing being performed. For example, the audit records of one organization may not provide 

sufficient information to determine the appropriate or inappropriate use of organizational 

information resources by individuals in other organizations. In some instances, only the home 

organizations of individuals have the appropriate knowledge to make such determinations, 

thus requiring the sharing of audit information among organizations.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

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FAMILY: SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION

CA-1 SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel 

or roles]:

1. A security assessment and authorization policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 

responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational 

entities, and compliance; and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security assessment and 

authorization policy and associated security assessment and authorization controls;

and

b. Reviews and updates the current:

1. Security assessment and authorization policy [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency]; and

2. Security assessment and authorization procedures [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CA family.

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can 

be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The 

procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information 

systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing 

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-37, 800-53A, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CA-1 MOD CA-1 HIGH CA-1

CA-2 SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

Control: The organization:

a. Develops a security assessment plan that describes the scope of the assessment including:

1. Security controls and control enhancements under assessment;

2. Assessment procedures to be used to determine security control effectiveness; and

3. Assessment environment, assessment team, and assessment roles and responsibilities;

b. Assesses the security controls in the information system and its environment of operation

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine the extent to which the controls 

are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with 

respect to meeting established security requirements;

c. Produces a security assessment report that documents the results of the assessment; and

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d. Provides the results of the security control assessment to [Assignment: organization-defined

individuals or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations assess security controls in organizational information 

systems and the environments in which those systems operate as part of: (i) initial and ongoing 

security authorizations; (ii) FISMA annual assessments; (iii) continuous monitoring; and (iv) 

system development life cycle activities. Security assessments: (i) ensure that information security 

is built into organizational information systems; (ii) identify weaknesses and deficiencies early in 

the development process; (iii) provide essential information needed to make risk-based decisions 

as part of security authorization processes; and (iv) ensure compliance to vulnerability mitigation 

procedures. Assessments are conducted on the implemented security controls from Appendix F

(main catalog) and Appendix G (Program Management controls) as documented in System 

Security Plans and Information Security Program Plans. Organizations can use other types of 

assessment activities such as vulnerability scanning and system monitoring to maintain the 

security posture of information systems during the entire life cycle. Security assessment reports

document assessment results in sufficient detail as deemed necessary by organizations, to 

determine the accuracy and completeness of the reports and whether the security controls are 

implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to 

meeting security requirements. The FISMA requirement for assessing security controls at least 

annually does not require additional assessment activities to those activities already in place in 

organizational security authorization processes. Security assessment results are provided to the 

individuals or roles appropriate for the types of assessments being conducted. For example, 

assessments conducted in support of security authorization decisions are provided to authorizing 

officials or authorizing official designated representatives.

To satisfy annual assessment requirements, organizations can use assessment results from the 

following sources: (i) initial or ongoing information system authorizations; (ii) continuous 

monitoring; or (iii) system development life cycle activities. Organizations ensure that security 

assessment results are current, relevant to the determination of security control effectiveness, and 

obtained with the appropriate level of assessor independence. Existing security control assessment 

results can be reused to the extent that the results are still valid and can also be supplemented with 

additional assessments as needed. Subsequent to initial authorizations and in accordance with 

OMB policy, organizations assess security controls during continuous monitoring. Organizations

establish the frequency for ongoing security control assessments in accordance with organizational 

continuous monitoring strategies. Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts provide useful 

examples of vulnerability mitigation procedures. External audits (e.g., audits by external entities 

such as regulatory agencies) are outside the scope of this control. Related controls: CA-5, CA-6, 

CA-7, PM-9, RA-5, SA-11, SA-12, SI-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | INDEPENDENT ASSESSORS

The organization employs assessors or assessment teams with [Assignment: organization-defined 

level of independence] to conduct security control assessments.

Supplemental Guidance: Independent assessors or assessment teams are individuals or groups

who conduct impartial assessments of organizational information systems. Impartiality 

implies that assessors are free from any perceived or actual conflicts of interest with regard to 

the development, operation, or management of the organizational information systems under 

assessment or to the determination of security control effectiveness. To achieve impartiality, 

assessors should not: (i) create a mutual or conflicting interest with the organizations where 

the assessments are being conducted; (ii) assess their own work; (iii) act as management or

employees of the organizations they are serving; or (iv) place themselves in positions of 

advocacy for the organizations acquiring their services. Independent assessments can be 

obtained from elements within organizations or can be contracted to public or private sector 

entities outside of organizations. Authorizing officials determine the required level of 

independence based on the security categories of information systems and/or the ultimate risk 

to organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. Authorizing officials also 

determine if the level of assessor independence provides sufficient assurance that the results 

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are sound and can be used to make credible, risk-based decisions. This includes determining 

whether contracted security assessment services have sufficient independence, for example, 

when information system owners are not directly involved in contracting processes or cannot 

unduly influence the impartiality of assessors conducting assessments. In special situations, 

for example, when organizations that own the information systems are small or organizational 

structures require that assessments are conducted by individuals that are in the developmental, 

operational, or management chain of system owners, independence in assessment processes

can be achieved by ensuring that assessment results are carefully reviewed and analyzed by 

independent teams of experts to validate the completeness, accuracy, integrity, and reliability 

of the results. Organizations recognize that assessments performed for purposes other than 

direct support to authorization decisions are, when performed by assessors with sufficient 

independence, more likely to be useable for such decisions, thereby reducing the need to 

repeat assessments.

(2) SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | SPECIALIZED ASSESSMENTS

The organization includes as part of security control assessments, [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency], [Selection: announced; unannounced], [Selection (one or more): in-depth 

monitoring; vulnerability scanning; malicious user testing; insider threat assessment;

performance/load testing; [Assignment: organization-defined other forms of security assessment]].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can employ information system monitoring, insider 

threat assessments, malicious user testing, and other forms of testing (e.g., verification and 

validation) to improve readiness by exercising organizational capabilities and indicating 

current performance levels as a means of focusing actions to improve security. Organizations 

conduct assessment activities in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, 

directives, policies, regulations, and standards. Authorizing officials approve the assessment 

methods in coordination with the organizational risk executive function. Organizations can 

incorporate vulnerabilities uncovered during assessments into vulnerability remediation 

processes. Related controls: PE-3, SI-2.

(3) SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS

The organization accepts the results of an assessment of [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system] performed by [Assignment: organization-defined external organization] when 

the assessment meets [Assignment: organization-defined requirements].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may often rely on assessments of specific information 

systems by other (external) organizations. Utilizing such existing assessments (i.e., reusing 

existing assessment evidence) can significantly decrease the time and resources required for 

organizational assessments by limiting the amount of independent assessment activities that 

organizations need to perform. The factors that organizations may consider in determining 

whether to accept assessment results from external organizations can vary. Determinations for 

accepting assessment results can be based on, for example, past assessment experiences one 

organization has had with another organization, the reputation that organizations have with 

regard to assessments, the level of detail of supporting assessment documentation provided, or 

mandates imposed upon organizations by federal legislation, policies, or directives.

References: Executive Order 13587; FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-37, 

800-39, 800-53A, 800-115, 800-137.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW CA-2 MOD CA-2 (1) HIGH CA-2 (1) (2)

CA-3 SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS

Control: The organization:

a. Authorizes connections from the information system to other information systems through the 

use of Interconnection Security Agreements;

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b. Documents, for each interconnection, the interface characteristics, security requirements, and 

the nature of the information communicated; and

c. Reviews and updates Interconnection Security Agreements [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to dedicated connections between information systems

(i.e., system interconnections) and does not apply to transitory, user-controlled connections such 

as email and website browsing. Organizations carefully consider the risks that may be introduced 

when information systems are connected to other systems with different security requirements and 

security controls, both within organizations and external to organizations. Authorizing officials 

determine the risk associated with information system connections and the appropriate controls 

employed. If interconnecting systems have the same authorizing official, organizations do not 

need to develop Interconnection Security Agreements. Instead, organizations can describe the

interface characteristics between those interconnecting systems in their respective security plans. 

If interconnecting systems have different authorizing officials within the same organization, 

organizations can either develop Interconnection Security Agreements or describe the interface 

characteristics between systems in the security plans for the respective systems. Organizations 

may also incorporate Interconnection Security Agreement information into formal contracts, 

especially for interconnections established between federal agencies and nonfederal (i.e., private 

sector) organizations. Risk considerations also include information systems sharing the same 

networks. For certain technologies (e.g., space, unmanned aerial vehicles, and medical devices), 

there may be specialized connections in place during preoperational testing. Such connections may 

require Interconnection Security Agreements and be subject to additional security controls.

Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-20, AU-2, AU-12, AU-16, CA-7, IA-3, SA-9, SC-7, SI-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | UNCLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

The organization prohibits the direct connection of an [Assignment: organization-defined 

unclassified, national security system] to an external network without the use of [Assignment:

organization-defined boundary protection device].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations typically do not have control over external networks 

(e.g., the Internet). Approved boundary protection devices (e.g., routers, firewalls) mediate 

communications (i.e., information flows) between unclassified national security systems and 

external networks. This control enhancement is required for organizations processing, storing, 

or transmitting Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).

(2) SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

The organization prohibits the direct connection of a classified, national security system to an 

external network without the use of [Assignment: organization-defined boundary protection 

device].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations typically do not have control over external networks 

(e.g., the Internet). Approved boundary protection devices (e.g., routers, firewalls) mediate

communications (i.e., information flows) between classified national security systems and 

external networks. In addition, approved boundary protection devices (typically managed 

interface/cross-domain systems) provide information flow enforcement from information 

systems to external networks.

(3) SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | UNCLASSIFIED NON-NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

The organization prohibits the direct connection of an [Assignment: organization-defined 

unclassified, non-national security system] to an external network without the use of [Assignment; 

organization-defined boundary protection device].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations typically do not have control over external networks 

(e.g., the Internet). Approved boundary protection devices (e.g., routers, firewalls) mediate 

communications (i.e., information flows) between unclassified non-national security systems

and external networks. This control enhancement is required for organizations processing, 

storing, or transmitting Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).

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(4) SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | CONNECTIONS TO PUBLIC NETWORKS

The organization prohibits the direct connection of an [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system] to a public network.

Supplemental Guidance: A public network is any network accessible to the general public

including, for example, the Internet and organizational extranets with public access.

(5) SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | RESTRICTIONS ON EXTERNAL SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

The organization employs [Selection: allow-all, deny-by-exception; deny-all, permit-by-exception] 

policy for allowing [Assignment: organization-defined information systems] to connect to external 

information systems.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can constrain information system connectivity to 

external domains (e.g., websites) by employing one of two policies with regard to such 

connectivity: (i) allow-all, deny by exception, also known as blacklisting (the weaker of the 

two policies); or (ii) deny-all, allow by exception, also known as whitelisting (the stronger of 

the two policies). For either policy, organizations determine what exceptions, if any, are

acceptable. Related control: CM-7.

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-47.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CA-3 MOD CA-3 (5) HIGH CA-3 (5)

CA-4 SECURITY CERTIFICATION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CA-2].

CA-5 PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops a plan of action and milestones for the information system to document the 

organization’s planned remedial actions to correct weaknesses or deficiencies noted during 

the assessment of the security controls and to reduce or eliminate known vulnerabilities in the 

system; and

b. Updates existing plan of action and milestones [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] 

based on the findings from security controls assessments, security impact analyses, and 

continuous monitoring activities.

Supplemental Guidance: Plans of action and milestones are key documents in security authorization

packages and are subject to federal reporting requirements established by OMB. Related controls: 

CA-2, CA-7, CM-4, PM-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY / CURRENCY

The organization employs automated mechanisms to help ensure that the plan of action and 

milestones for the information system is accurate, up to date, and readily available.

References: OMB Memorandum 02-01; NIST Special Publication 800-37.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW CA-5 MOD CA-5 HIGH CA-5

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CA-6 SECURITY AUTHORIZATION

Control: The organization:

a. Assigns a senior-level executive or manager as the authorizing official for the information 

system;

b. Ensures that the authorizing official authorizes the information system for processing before

commencing operations; and

c. Updates the security authorization [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Security authorizations are official management decisions, conveyed 

through authorization decision documents, by senior organizational officials or executives (i.e., 

authorizing officials) to authorize operation of information systems and to explicitly accept the 

risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based 

on the implementation of agreed-upon security controls. Authorizing officials provide budgetary 

oversight for organizational information systems or assume responsibility for the mission/business 

operations supported by those systems. The security authorization process is an inherently federal 

responsibility and therefore, authorizing officials must be federal employees. Through the security 

authorization process, authorizing officials assume responsibility and are accountable for security 

risks associated with the operation and use of organizational information systems. Accordingly, 

authorizing officials are in positions with levels of authority commensurate with understanding 

and accepting such information security-related risks. OMB policy requires that organizations

conduct ongoing authorizations of information systems by implementing continuous monitoring

programs. Continuous monitoring programs can satisfy three-year reauthorization requirements, so 

separate reauthorization processes are not necessary. Through the employment of comprehensive 

continuous monitoring processes, critical information contained in authorization packages (i.e., 

security plans, security assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones) is updated on an 

ongoing basis, providing authorizing officials and information system owners with an up-to-date

status of the security state of organizational information systems and environments of operation.

To reduce the administrative cost of security reauthorization, authorizing officials use the results 

of continuous monitoring processes to the maximum extent possible as the basis for rendering 

reauthorization decisions. Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, PM-9, PM-10. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: OMB Circular A-130; OMB Memorandum 11-33; NIST Special Publications 800-37, 

800-137.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW CA-6 MOD CA-6 HIGH CA-6

CA-7 CONTINUOUS MONITORING

Control: The organization develops a continuous monitoring strategy and implements a continuous 

monitoring program that includes:

a. Establishment of [Assignment: organization-defined metrics] to be monitored;

b. Establishment of [Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for monitoring and 

[Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for assessments supporting such monitoring;

c. Ongoing security control assessments in accordance with the organizational continuous 

monitoring strategy;

d. Ongoing security status monitoring of organization-defined metrics in accordance with the 

organizational continuous monitoring strategy;

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e. Correlation and analysis of security-related information generated by assessments and 

monitoring;

f. Response actions to address results of the analysis of security-related information; and

g. Reporting the security status of organization and the information system to [Assignment: 

organization-defined personnel or roles] [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Continuous monitoring programs facilitate ongoing awareness of threats, 

vulnerabilities, and information security to support organizational risk management decisions. The 

terms continuous and ongoing imply that organizations assess/analyze security controls and 

information security-related risks at a frequency sufficient to support organizational risk-based 

decisions. The results of continuous monitoring programs generate appropriate risk response 

actions by organizations. Continuous monitoring programs also allow organizations to maintain 

the security authorizations of information systems and common controls over time in highly 

dynamic environments of operation with changing mission/business needs, threats, vulnerabilities, 

and technologies. Having access to security-related information on a continuing basis through 

reports/dashboards gives organizational officials the capability to make more effective and timely 

risk management decisions, including ongoing security authorization decisions. Automation 

supports more frequent updates to security authorization packages, hardware/software/firmware 

inventories, and other system information. Effectiveness is further enhanced when continuous 

monitoring outputs are formatted to provide information that is specific, measurable, actionable, 

relevant, and timely. Continuous monitoring activities are scaled in accordance with the security 

categories of information systems. Related controls: CA-2, CA-5, CA-6, CM-3, CM-4, PM-6, PM9, RA-5, SA-11, SA-12, SI-2, SI-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT 

The organization employs assessors or assessment teams with [Assignment: organization-defined 

level of independence] to monitor the security controls in the information system on an ongoing 

basis.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can maximize the value of assessments of security 

controls during the continuous monitoring process by requiring that such assessments be 

conducted by assessors or assessment teams with appropriate levels of independence based on 

continuous monitoring strategies. Assessor independence provides a degree of impartiality to 

the monitoring process. To achieve such impartiality, assessors should not: (i) create a mutual 

or conflicting interest with the organizations where the assessments are being conducted; (ii) 

assess their own work; (iii) act as management or employees of the organizations they are 

serving; or (iv) place themselves in advocacy positions for the organizations acquiring their 

services.

(2) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | TYPES OF ASSESSMENTS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CA-2].

(3) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | TREND ANALYSES 

The organization employs trend analyses to determine if security control implementations, the 

frequency of continuous monitoring activities, and/or the types of activities used in the continuous 

monitoring process need to be modified based on empirical data.

Supplemental Guidance: Trend analyses can include, for example, examining recent threat 

information regarding the types of threat events that have occurred within the organization or 

across the federal government, success rates of certain types of cyber attacks, emerging 

vulnerabilities in information technologies, evolving social engineering techniques, results 

from multiple security control assessments, the effectiveness of configuration settings, and 

findings from Inspectors General or auditors.

References: OMB Memorandum 11-33; NIST Special Publications 800-37, 800-39, 800-53A, 800-

115, 800-137; US-CERT Technical Cyber Security Alerts; DoD Information Assurance 

Vulnerability Alerts.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW CA-7 MOD CA-7 (1) HIGH CA-7 (1)

CA-8 PENETRATION TESTING

Control: The organization conducts penetration testing [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency] on [Assignment: organization-defined information systems or system components].

Supplemental Guidance: Penetration testing is a specialized type of assessment conducted on 

information systems or individual system components to identify vulnerabilities that could be 

exploited by adversaries. Such testing can be used to either validate vulnerabilities or determine

the degree of resistance organizational information systems have to adversaries within a set of 

specified constraints (e.g., time, resources, and/or skills). Penetration testing attempts to duplicate 

the actions of adversaries in carrying out hostile cyber attacks against organizations and provides a 

more in-depth analysis of security-related weaknesses/deficiencies. Organizations can also use the 

results of vulnerability analyses to support penetration testing activities. Penetration testing can be 

conducted on the hardware, software, or firmware components of an information system and can 

exercise both physical and technical security controls. A standard method for penetration testing 

includes, for example: (i) pretest analysis based on full knowledge of the target system; (ii) pretest 

identification of potential vulnerabilities based on pretest analysis; and (iii) testing designed to 

determine exploitability of identified vulnerabilities. All parties agree to the rules of engagement 

before the commencement of penetration testing scenarios. Organizations correlate the penetration 

testing rules of engagement with the tools, techniques, and procedures that are anticipated to be 

employed by adversaries carrying out attacks. Organizational risk assessments guide decisions on 

the level of independence required for personnel conducting penetration testing. Related control: 

SA-12.

Control Enhancements:

(1) PENETRATION TESTING | INDEPENDENT PENETRATION AGENT OR TEAM

The organization employs an independent penetration agent or penetration team to perform 

penetration testing on the information system or system components.

Supplemental Guidance: Independent penetration agents or teams are individuals or groups who 

conduct impartial penetration testing of organizational information systems. Impartiality 

implies that penetration agents or teams are free from any perceived or actual conflicts of 

interest with regard to the development, operation, or management of the information systems

that are the targets of the penetration testing. Supplemental guidance for CA-2 (1) provides 

additional information regarding independent assessments that can be applied to penetration 

testing. Related control: CA-2.

(2) PENETRATION TESTING | RED TEAM EXERCISES

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined red team exercises] to simulate 

attempts by adversaries to compromise organizational information systems in accordance with 

[Assignment: organization-defined rules of engagement].

Supplemental Guidance: Red team exercises extend the objectives of penetration testing by 

examining the security posture of organizations and their ability to implement effective cyber 

defenses. As such, red team exercises reflect simulated adversarial attempts to compromise 

organizational mission/business functions and provide a comprehensive assessment of the 

security state of information systems and organizations. Simulated adversarial attempts to 

compromise organizational missions/business functions and the information systems that 

support those missions/functions may include technology-focused attacks (e.g., interactions 

with hardware, software, or firmware components and/or mission/business processes) and 

social engineering-based attacks (e.g., interactions via email, telephone, shoulder surfing, or 

personal conversations). While penetration testing may be largely laboratory-based testing, 

organizations use red team exercises to provide more comprehensive assessments that reflect 

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real-world conditions. Red team exercises can be used to improve security awareness and 

training and to assess levels of security control effectiveness.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH CA-8

CA-9 INTERNAL SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

Control: The organization:

a. Authorizes internal connections of [Assignment: organization-defined information system 

components or classes of components] to the information system; and

b. Documents, for each internal connection, the interface characteristics, security requirements, 

and the nature of the information communicated.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to connections between organizational information 

systems and (separate) constituent system components (i.e., intra-system connections) including, 

for example, system connections with mobile devices, notebook/desktop computers, printers, 

copiers, facsimile machines, scanners, sensors, and servers. Instead of authorizing each individual 

internal connection, organizations can authorize internal connections for a class of components 

with common characteristics and/or configurations, for example, all digital printers, scanners, and 

copiers with a specified processing, storage, and transmission capability or all smart phones with a 

specific baseline configuration. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-18, AC-19, AU-2, AU-12, CA7, CM-2, IA-3, SC-7, SI-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INTERNAL SYSTEM CONNECTIONS | SECURITY COMPLIANCE CHECKS

The information system performs security compliance checks on constituent system components 

prior to the establishment of the internal connection.

Supplemental Guidance: Security compliance checks may include, for example, verification of 

the relevant baseline configuration. Related controls: CM-6.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW CA-9 MOD CA-9 HIGH CA-9

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FAMILY: CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

CM-1 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles]:

1. A configuration management policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, 

management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; 

and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the configuration management policy and 

associated configuration management controls; and

b. Reviews and updates the current:

1. Configuration management policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and

2. Configuration management procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CM family.

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can 

be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The 

procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information 

systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing 

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CM-1 MOD CM-1 HIGH CM-1

CM-2 BASELINE CONFIGURATION

Control: The organization develops, documents, and maintains under configuration control, a 

current baseline configuration of the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: This control establishes baseline configurations for information systems

and system components including communications and connectivity-related aspects of systems. 

Baseline configurations are documented, formally reviewed and agreed-upon sets of specifications 

for information systems or configuration items within those systems. Baseline configurations 

serve as a basis for future builds, releases, and/or changes to information systems. Baseline 

configurations include information about information system components (e.g., standard software 

packages installed on workstations, notebook computers, servers, network components, or mobile 

devices; current version numbers and patch information on operating systems and applications;

and configuration settings/parameters), network topology, and the logical placement of those

components within the system architecture. Maintaining baseline configurations requires creating 

new baselines as organizational information systems change over time. Baseline configurations of

information systems reflect the current enterprise architecture. Related controls: CM-3, CM-6, 

CM-8, CM-9, SA-10, PM-5, PM-7.

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Control Enhancements:

(1) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | REVIEWS AND UPDATES

The organization reviews and updates the baseline configuration of the information system:

(a) [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];

(b) When required due to [Assignment organization-defined circumstances]; and

(c) As an integral part of information system component installations and upgrades.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CM-5.

(2) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY / CURRENCY

The organization employs automated mechanisms to maintain an up-to-date, complete, accurate, 

and readily available baseline configuration of the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms that help organizations maintain consistent 

baseline configurations for information systems include, for example, hardware and software 

inventory tools, configuration management tools, and network management tools. Such tools 

can be deployed and/or allocated as common controls, at the information system level, or at 

the operating system or component level (e.g., on workstations, servers, notebook computers, 

network components, or mobile devices). Tools can be used, for example, to track version 

numbers on operating system applications, types of software installed, and current patch 

levels. This control enhancement can be satisfied by the implementation of CM-8 (2) for 

organizations that choose to combine information system component inventory and baseline 

configuration activities. Related controls: CM-7, RA-5.

(3) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | RETENTION OF PREVIOUS CONFIGURATIONS

The organization retains [Assignment: organization-defined previous versions of baseline 

configurations of the information system] to support rollback.

Supplemental Guidance: Retaining previous versions of baseline configurations to support 

rollback may include, for example, hardware, software, firmware, configuration files, and 

configuration records.

(4) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-7].

(5) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-7].

(6) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | DEVELOPMENT AND TEST ENVIRONMENTS 

The organization maintains a baseline configuration for information system development and test 

environments that is managed separately from the operational baseline configuration.

Supplemental Guidance: Establishing separate baseline configurations for development, testing, 

and operational environments helps protect information systems from unplanned/unexpected

events related to development and testing activities. Separate baseline configurations allow 

organizations to apply the configuration management that is most appropriate for each type of 

configuration. For example, management of operational configurations typically emphasizes 

the need for stability, while management of development/test configurations requires greater 

flexibility. Configurations in the test environment mirror the configurations in the operational 

environment to the extent practicable so that the results of the testing are representative of the 

proposed changes to the operational systems. This control enhancement requires separate 

configurations but not necessarily separate physical environments. Related controls: CM-4, 

SC-3, SC-7.

(7) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | CONFIGURE SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, OR DEVICES FOR HIGH-RISK AREAS 

The organization:

(a) Issues [Assignment: organization-defined information systems, system components, or 

devices] with [Assignment: organization-defined configurations] to individuals traveling to

locations that the organization deems to be of significant risk; and

(b) Applies [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to the devices when the 

individuals return.

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Supplemental Guidance: When it is known that information systems, system components, or 

devices (e.g., notebook computers, mobile devices) will be located in high-risk areas, 

additional security controls may be implemented to counter the greater threat in such areas

coupled with the lack of physical security relative to organizational-controlled areas. For 

example, organizational policies and procedures for notebook computers used by individuals 

departing on and returning from travel include, for example, determining which locations are 

of concern, defining required configurations for the devices, ensuring that the devices are 

configured as intended before travel is initiated, and applying specific safeguards to the 

device after travel is completed. Specially configured notebook computers include, for 

example, computers with sanitized hard drives, limited applications, and additional hardening 

(e.g., more stringent configuration settings). Specified safeguards applied to mobile devices 

upon return from travel include, for example, examining the device for signs of physical 

tampering and purging/reimaging the hard disk drive. Protecting information residing on 

mobile devices is covered in the media protection family.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-128.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CM-2 MOD CM-2 (1) (3) (7) HIGH CM-2 (1) (2) (3) (7)

CM-3 CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL

Control: The organization:

a. Determines the types of changes to the information system that are configuration-controlled;

b. Reviews proposed configuration-controlled changes to the information system and approves 

or disapproves such changes with explicit consideration for security impact analyses;

c. Documents configuration change decisions associated with the information system;

d. Implements approved configuration-controlled changes to the information system;

e. Retains records of configuration-controlled changes to the information system for 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period];

f. Audits and reviews activities associated with configuration-controlled changes to the 

information system; and

g. Coordinates and provides oversight for configuration change control activities through 

[Assignment: organization-defined configuration change control element (e.g., committee, 

board)] that convenes [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined configuration change conditions]].

Supplemental Guidance: Configuration change controls for organizational information systems

involve the systematic proposal, justification, implementation, testing, review, and disposition of 

changes to the systems, including system upgrades and modifications. Configuration change 

control includes changes to baseline configurations for components and configuration items of 

information systems, changes to configuration settings for information technology products (e.g., 

operating systems, applications, firewalls, routers, and mobile devices), unscheduled/unauthorized

changes, and changes to remediate vulnerabilities. Typical processes for managing configuration 

changes to information systems include, for example, Configuration Control Boards that approve 

proposed changes to systems. For new development information systems or systems undergoing 

major upgrades, organizations consider including representatives from development organizations 

on the Configuration Control Boards. Auditing of changes includes activities before and after 

changes are made to organizational information systems and the auditing activities required to 

implement such changes. Related controls: CA-7, CM-2, CM-4, CM-5, CM-6, CM-9, SA-10, SI2, SI-12.

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Control Enhancements:

(1) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED DOCUMENT / NOTIFICATION / PROHIBITION OF CHANGES

The organization employs automated mechanisms to:

(a) Document proposed changes to the information system;

(b) Notify [Assignment: organized-defined approval authorities] of proposed changes to the 

information system and request change approval;

(c) Highlight proposed changes to the information system that have not been approved or 

disapproved by [Assignment: organization-defined time period];

(d) Prohibit changes to the information system until designated approvals are received;

(e) Document all changes to the information system; and

(f) Notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel] when approved changes to the 

information system are completed.

(2) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | TEST / VALIDATE / DOCUMENT CHANGES

The organization tests, validates, and documents changes to the information system before 

implementing the changes on the operational system.

Supplemental Guidance: Changes to information systems include modifications to hardware, 

software, or firmware components and configuration settings defined in CM-6. Organizations

ensure that testing does not interfere with information system operations. Individuals/groups

conducting tests understand organizational security policies and procedures, information 

system security policies and procedures, and the specific health, safety, and environmental 

risks associated with particular facilities/processes. Operational systems may need to be taken 

off-line, or replicated to the extent feasible, before testing can be conducted. If information 

systems must be taken off-line for testing, the tests are scheduled to occur during planned 

system outages whenever possible. If testing cannot be conducted on operational systems, 

organizations employ compensating controls (e.g., testing on replicated systems).

(3) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED CHANGE IMPLEMENTATION

The organization employs automated mechanisms to implement changes to the current 

information system baseline and deploys the updated baseline across the installed base.

(4) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE

The organization requires an information security representative to be a member of the 

[Assignment: organization-defined configuration change control element].

Supplemental Guidance: Information security representatives can include, for example, senior 

agency information security officers, information system security officers, or information 

system security managers. Representation by personnel with information security expertise is 

important because changes to information system configurations can have unintended side 

effects, some of which may be security-relevant. Detecting such changes early in the process 

can help avoid unintended, negative consequences that could ultimately affect the security 

state of organizational information systems. The configuration change control element in this 

control enhancement reflects the change control elements defined by organizations in CM-3.

(5) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED SECURITY RESPONSE

The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined security responses] 

automatically if baseline configurations are changed in an unauthorized manner.

Supplemental Guidance: Security responses include, for example, halting information system 

processing, halting selected system functions, or issuing alerts/notifications to organizational 

personnel when there is an unauthorized modification of a configuration item.

(6) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | CRYPTOGRAPHY MANAGEMENT 

The organization ensures that cryptographic mechanisms used to provide [Assignment: 

organization-defined security safeguards] are under configuration management.

Supplemental Guidance: Regardless of the cryptographic means employed (e.g., public key, 

private key, shared secrets), organizations ensure that there are processes and procedures in 

place to effectively manage those means. For example, if devices use certificates as a basis for 

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identification and authentication, there needs to be a process in place to address the expiration 

of those certificates. Related control: SC-13.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-128.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD CM-3 (2) HIGH CM-3 (1) (2)

CM-4 SECURITY IMPACT ANALYSIS

Control: The organization analyzes changes to the information system to determine potential 

security impacts prior to change implementation.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational personnel with information security responsibilities (e.g., 

Information System Administrators, Information System Security Officers, Information System 

Security Managers, and Information System Security Engineers) conduct security impact analyses.

Individuals conducting security impact analyses possess the necessary skills/technical expertise to 

analyze the changes to information systems and the associated security ramifications. Security 

impact analysis may include, for example, reviewing security plans to understand security control

requirements and reviewing system design documentation to understand control implementation

and how specific changes might affect the controls. Security impact analyses may also include 

assessments of risk to better understand the impact of the changes and to determine if additional 

security controls are required. Security impact analyses are scaled in accordance with the security 

categories of the information systems. Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, CM-3, CM-9, SA-4, SA-5, 

SA-10, SI-2.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SECURITY IMPACT ANALYSIS | SEPARATE TEST ENVIRONMENTS

The organization analyzes changes to the information system in a separate test environment 

before implementation in an operational environment, looking for security impacts due to flaws, 

weaknesses, incompatibility, or intentional malice.

Supplemental Guidance: Separate test environment in this context means an environment that is 

physically or logically isolated and distinct from the operational environment. The separation 

is sufficient to ensure that activities in the test environment do not impact activities in the 

operational environment, and information in the operational environment is not inadvertently 

transmitted to the test environment. Separate environments can be achieved by physical or 

logical means. If physically separate test environments are not used, organizations determine 

the strength of mechanism required when implementing logical separation (e.g., separation 

achieved through virtual machines). Related controls: SA-11, SC-3, SC-7.

(2) SECURITY IMPACT ANALYSIS | VERIFICATION OF SECURITY FUNCTIONS

The organization, after the information system is changed, checks the security functions to verify 

that the functions are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired 

outcome with regard to meeting the security requirements for the system.

Supplemental Guidance: Implementation is this context refers to installing changed code in the 

operational information system. Related control: SA-11.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-128.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW CM-4 MOD CM-4 HIGH CM-4 (1)

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CM-5 ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE

Control: The organization defines, documents, approves, and enforces physical and logical access 

restrictions associated with changes to the information system. 

Supplemental Guidance: Any changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of

information systems can potentially have significant effects on the overall security of the systems. 

Therefore, organizations permit only qualified and authorized individuals to access information 

systems for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications. Organizations 

maintain records of access to ensure that configuration change control is implemented and to 

support after-the-fact actions should organizations discover any unauthorized changes. Access 

restrictions for change also include software libraries. Access restrictions include, for example, 

physical and logical access controls (see AC-3 and PE-3), workflow automation, media libraries, 

abstract layers (e.g., changes implemented into third-party interfaces rather than directly into 

information systems), and change windows (e.g., changes occur only during specified times,

making unauthorized changes easy to discover). Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, PE-3.

Control Enhancements:

(1) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | AUTOMATED ACCESS ENFORCEMENT / AUDITING

The information system enforces access restrictions and supports auditing of the enforcement 

actions.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AU-2, AU-12, AU-6, CM-3, CM-6.

(2) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | REVIEW SYSTEM CHANGES

The organization reviews information system changes [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency] and [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances] to determine whether 

unauthorized changes have occurred.

Supplemental Guidance: Indications that warrant review of information system changes and the 

specific circumstances justifying such reviews may be obtained from activities carried out by 

organizations during the configuration change process. Related controls: AU-6, AU-7, CM-3, 

CM-5, PE-6, PE-8.

(3) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | SIGNED COMPONENTS

The information system prevents the installation of [Assignment: organization-defined software

and firmware components] without verification that the component has been digitally signed using

a certificate that is recognized and approved by the organization.

Supplemental Guidance: Software and firmware components prevented from installation unless 

signed with recognized and approved certificates include, for example, software and firmware 

version updates, patches, service packs, device drivers, and basic input output system (BIOS)

updates. Organizations can identify applicable software and firmware components by type, by 

specific items, or a combination of both. Digital signatures and organizational verification of 

such signatures, is a method of code authentication. Related controls: CM-7, SC-13, SI-7.

(4) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

The organization enforces dual authorization for implementing changes to [Assignment: 

organization-defined information system components and system-level information].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations employ dual authorization to ensure that any changes to 

selected information system components and information cannot occur unless two qualified 

individuals implement such changes. The two individuals possess sufficient skills/expertise to

determine if the proposed changes are correct implementations of approved changes. Dual 

authorization may also be known as two-person control. Related controls: AC-5, CM-3.

(5) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | LIMIT PRODUCTION / OPERATIONAL PRIVILEGES

The organization:

(a) Limits privileges to change information system components and system-related information 

within a production or operational environment; and

(b) Reviews and reevaluates privileges [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: In many organizations, information systems support multiple core 

missions/business functions. Limiting privileges to change information system components 

with respect to operational systems is necessary because changes to a particular information 

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system component may have far-reaching effects on mission/business processes supported by 

the system where the component resides. The complex, many-to-many relationships between 

systems and mission/business processes are in some cases, unknown to developers. Related 

control: AC-2.

(6) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | LIMIT LIBRARY PRIVILEGES

The organization limits privileges to change software resident within software libraries.

Supplemental Guidance: Software libraries include privileged programs. Related control: AC-2.

(7) ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | AUTOMATIC IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY SAFEGUARDS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7].

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD CM-5 HIGH CM-5 (1) (2) (3)

CM-6 CONFIGURATION SETTINGS

Control: The organization:

a. Establishes and documents configuration settings for information technology products 

employed within the information system using [Assignment: organization-defined security 

configuration checklists] that reflect the most restrictive mode consistent with operational 

requirements;

b. Implements the configuration settings;

c. Identifies, documents, and approves any deviations from established configuration settings for 

[Assignment: organization-defined information system components] based on [Assignment: 

organization-defined operational requirements]; and

d. Monitors and controls changes to the configuration settings in accordance with organizational 

policies and procedures.

Supplemental Guidance: Configuration settings are the set of parameters that can be changed in 

hardware, software, or firmware components of the information system that affect the security 

posture and/or functionality of the system. Information technology products for which securityrelated configuration settings can be defined include, for example, mainframe computers, servers 

(e.g., database, electronic mail, authentication, web, proxy, file, domain name), workstations, 

input/output devices (e.g., scanners, copiers, and printers), network components (e.g., firewalls, 

routers, gateways, voice and data switches, wireless access points, network appliances, sensors), 

operating systems, middleware, and applications. Security-related parameters are those parameters 

impacting the security state of information systems including the parameters required to satisfy

other security control requirements. Security-related parameters include, for example: (i) registry 

settings; (ii) account, file, directory permission settings; and (iii) settings for functions, ports, 

protocols, services, and remote connections. Organizations establish organization-wide 

configuration settings and subsequently derive specific settings for information systems. The 

established settings become part of the systems configuration baseline.

Common secure configurations (also referred to as security configuration checklists, lockdown

and hardening guides, security reference guides, security technical implementation guides) provide 

recognized, standardized, and established benchmarks that stipulate secure configuration settings 

for specific information technology platforms/products and instructions for configuring those 

information system components to meet operational requirements. Common secure configurations

can be developed by a variety of organizations including, for example, information technology

product developers, manufacturers, vendors, consortia, academia, industry, federal agencies, and 

other organizations in the public and private sectors. Common secure configurations include the 

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United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) which affects the implementation of 

CM-6 and other controls such as AC-19 and CM-7. The Security Content Automation Protocol 

(SCAP) and the defined standards within the protocol (e.g., Common Configuration Enumeration)

provide an effective method to uniquely identify, track, and control configuration settings. OMB 

establishes federal policy on configuration requirements for federal information systems. Related 

controls: AC-19, CM-2, CM-3, CM-7, SI-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | AUTOMATED CENTRAL MANAGEMENT / APPLICATION / VERIFICATION

The organization employs automated mechanisms to centrally manage, apply, and verify 

configuration settings for [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-7, CM-4.

(2) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | RESPOND TO UNAUTHORIZED CHANGES

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to respond to 

unauthorized changes to [Assignment: organization-defined configuration settings].

Supplemental Guidance: Responses to unauthorized changes to configuration settings can 

include, for example, alerting designated organizational personnel, restoring established 

configuration settings, or in extreme cases, halting affected information system processing.

Related controls: IR-4, SI-7.

(3) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | UNAUTHORIZED CHANGE DETECTION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7].

(4) CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | CONFORMANCE DEMONSTRATION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-4].

References: OMB Memoranda 07-11, 07-18, 08-22; NIST Special Publications 800-70, 800-128; 

Web: http://nvd.nist.gov, http://checklists.nist.gov, http://www.nsa.gov. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CM-6 MOD CM-6 HIGH CM-6 (1) (2)

CM-7 LEAST FUNCTIONALITY

Control: The organization:

a. Configures the information system to provide only essential capabilities; and

b. Prohibits or restricts the use of the following functions, ports, protocols, and/or services: 

[Assignment: organization-defined prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or 

services].

Supplemental Guidance: Information systems can provide a wide variety of functions and services. 

Some of the functions and services, provided by default, may not be necessary to support essential 

organizational operations (e.g., key missions, functions). Additionally, it is sometimes convenient 

to provide multiple services from single information system components, but doing so increases 

risk over limiting the services provided by any one component. Where feasible, organizations limit 

component functionality to a single function per device (e.g., email servers or web servers, but not 

both). Organizations review functions and services provided by information systems or individual 

components of information systems, to determine which functions and services are candidates for 

elimination (e.g., Voice Over Internet Protocol, Instant Messaging, auto-execute, and file sharing).

Organizations consider disabling unused or unnecessary physical and logical ports/protocols (e.g., 

Universal Serial Bus, File Transfer Protocol, and Hyper Text Transfer Protocol) on information

systems to prevent unauthorized connection of devices, unauthorized transfer of information, or 

unauthorized tunneling. Organizations can utilize network scanning tools, intrusion detection and 

prevention systems, and end-point protections such as firewalls and host-based intrusion detection 

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systems to identify and prevent the use of prohibited functions, ports, protocols, and services.

Related controls: AC-6, CM-2, RA-5, SA-5, SC-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PERIODIC REVIEW

The organization:

(a) Reviews the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to identify 

unnecessary and/or nonsecure functions, ports, protocols, and services; and

(b) Disables [Assignment: organization-defined functions, ports, protocols, and services within 

the information system deemed to be unnecessary and/or nonsecure].

Supplemental Guidance: The organization can either make a determination of the relative 

security of the function, port, protocol, and/or service or base the security decision on the 

assessment of other entities. Bluetooth, FTP, and peer-to-peer networking are examples of 

less than secure protocols. Related controls: AC-18, CM-7, IA-2.

(2) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PREVENT PROGRAM EXECUTION 

The information system prevents program execution in accordance with [Selection (one or more): 

[Assignment: organization-defined policies regarding software program usage and restrictions]; 

rules authorizing the terms and conditions of software program usage].

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CM-8, PM-5.

(3) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | REGISTRATION COMPLIANCE

The organization ensures compliance with [Assignment: organization-defined registration 

requirements for functions, ports, protocols, and services].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations use the registration process to manage, track, and 

provide oversight for information systems and implemented functions, ports, protocols, and 

services.

(4) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE / BLACKLISTING

The organization:

(a) Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined software programs not authorized to execute on 

the information system];

(b) Employs an allow-all, deny-by-exception policy to prohibit the execution of unauthorized 

software programs on the information system; and

(c) Reviews and updates the list of unauthorized software programs [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: The process used to identify software programs that are not authorized 

to execute on organizational information systems is commonly referred to as blacklisting. 

Organizations can implement CM-7 (5) instead of this control enhancement if whitelisting 

(the stronger of the two policies) is the preferred approach for restricting software program 

execution. Related controls: CM-6, CM-8, PM-5.

(5) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE / WHITELISTING

The organization:

(a) Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined software programs authorized to execute on the

information system];

(b) Employs a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy to allow the execution of authorized software

programs on the information system; and

(c) Reviews and updates the list of authorized software programs [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: The process used to identify software programs that are authorized to 

execute on organizational information systems is commonly referred to as whitelisting. In 

addition to whitelisting, organizations consider verifying the integrity of white-listed software 

programs using, for example, cryptographic checksums, digital signatures, or hash functions. 

Verification of white-listed software can occur either prior to execution or at system startup. 

Related controls: CM-2, CM-6, CM-8, PM-5, SA-10, SC-34, SI-7.

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References: DoD Instruction 8551.01.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CM-7 MOD CM-7 (1) (2) (4) HIGH CM-7 (1) (2) (5)

CM-8 INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY

Control: The organization:

a. Develops and documents an inventory of information system components that:

1. Accurately reflects the current information system;

2. Includes all components within the authorization boundary of the information system;

3. Is at the level of granularity deemed necessary for tracking and reporting; and

4. Includes [Assignment: organization-defined information deemed necessary to achieve 

effective information system component accountability]; and

b. Reviews and updates the information system component inventory [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to implement centralized information system 

component inventories that include components from all organizational information systems. In 

such situations, organizations ensure that the resulting inventories include system-specific 

information required for proper component accountability (e.g., information system association, 

information system owner). Information deemed necessary for effective accountability of 

information system components includes, for example, hardware inventory specifications,

software license information, software version numbers, component owners, and for networked 

components or devices, machine names and network addresses. Inventory specifications include, 

for example, manufacturer, device type, model, serial number, and physical location. Related 

controls: CM-2, CM-6, PM-5.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | UPDATES DURING INSTALLATIONS / REMOVALS

The organization updates the inventory of information system components as an integral part of 

component installations, removals, and information system updates.

(2) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED MAINTENANCE

The organization employs automated mechanisms to help maintain an up-to-date, complete, 

accurate, and readily available inventory of information system components.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations maintain information system inventories to the extent 

feasible. Virtual machines, for example, can be difficult to monitor because such machines are 

not visible to the network when not in use. In such cases, organizations maintain as up-todate, complete, and accurate an inventory as is deemed reasonable. This control enhancement 

can be satisfied by the implementation of CM-2 (2) for organizations that choose to combine 

information system component inventory and baseline configuration activities. Related 

control: SI-7.

(3) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENT DETECTION

The organization:

(a) Employs automated mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to detect the 

presence of unauthorized hardware, software, and firmware components within the 

information system; and

(b) Takes the following actions when unauthorized components are detected: [Selection (one or 

more): disables network access by such components; isolates the components; notifies

[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]].

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Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement is applied in addition to the monitoring for 

unauthorized remote connections and mobile devices. Monitoring for unauthorized system 

components may be accomplished on an ongoing basis or by the periodic scanning of systems

for that purpose. Automated mechanisms can be implemented within information systems or 

in other separate devices. Isolation can be achieved, for example, by placing unauthorized 

information system components in separate domains or subnets or otherwise quarantining 

such components. This type of component isolation is commonly referred to as sandboxing. 

Related controls: AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, CA-7, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7, RA-5.

(4) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ACCOUNTABILITY INFORMATION

The organization includes in the information system component inventory information, a means for 

identifying by [Selection (one or more): name; position; role], individuals responsible/accountable 

for administering those components.

Supplemental Guidance: Identifying individuals who are both responsible and accountable for 

administering information system components helps to ensure that the assigned components 

are properly administered and organizations can contact those individuals if some action is 

required (e.g., component is determined to be the source of a breach/compromise, component 

needs to be recalled/replaced, or component needs to be relocated).

(5) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | NO DUPLICATE ACCOUNTING OF COMPONENTS

The organization verifies that all components within the authorization boundary of the information 

system are not duplicated in other information system component inventories.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses the potential problem of duplicate 

accounting of information system components in large or complex interconnected systems.

(6) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ASSESSED CONFIGURATIONS / APPROVED DEVIATIONS

The organization includes assessed component configurations and any approved deviations to 

current deployed configurations in the information system component inventory.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement focuses on configuration settings established 

by organizations for information system components, the specific components that have been 

assessed to determine compliance with the required configuration settings, and any approved 

deviations from established configuration settings. Related controls: CM-2, CM-6.

(7) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | CENTRALIZED REPOSITORY

The organization provides a centralized repository for the inventory of information system 

components.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to implement centralized information 

system component inventories that include components from all organizational information 

systems. Centralized repositories of information system component inventories provide 

opportunities for efficiencies in accounting for organizational hardware, software, and 

firmware assets. Such repositories may also help organizations rapidly identify the location 

and responsible individuals of system components that have been compromised, breached, or 

are otherwise in need of mitigation actions. Organizations ensure that the resulting centralized 

inventories include system-specific information required for proper component accountability 

(e.g., information system association, information system owner).

(8) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED LOCATION TRACKING

The organization employs automated mechanisms to support tracking of information system 

components by geographic location.

Supplemental Guidance: The use of automated mechanisms to track the location of information 

system components can increase the accuracy of component inventories. Such capability may 

also help organizations rapidly identify the location and responsible individuals of system 

components that have been compromised, breached, or are otherwise in need of mitigation 

actions.

(9) INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ASSIGNMENT OF COMPONENTS TO SYSTEMS 

The organization:

(a) Assigns [Assignment: organization-defined acquired information system components] to an 

information system; and 

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(b) Receives an acknowledgement from the information system owner of this assignment.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine the criteria for or types of information system 

components (e.g., microprocessors, motherboards, software, programmable logic controllers, 

and network devices) that are subject to this control enhancement. Related control: SA-4.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-128.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CM-8 MOD CM-8 (1) (3) (5) HIGH CM-8 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

CM-9 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN

Control: The organization develops, documents, and implements a configuration management plan 

for the information system that:

a. Addresses roles, responsibilities, and configuration management processes and procedures;

b. Establishes a process for identifying configuration items throughout the system development 

life cycle and for managing the configuration of the configuration items;

c. Defines the configuration items for the information system and places the configuration items 

under configuration management; and

d. Protects the configuration management plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification. 

Supplemental Guidance: Configuration management plans satisfy the requirements in configuration 

management policies while being tailored to individual information systems. Such plans define 

detailed processes and procedures for how configuration management is used to support system 

development life cycle activities at the information system level. Configuration management plans 

are typically developed during the development/acquisition phase of the system development life 

cycle. The plans describe how to move changes through change management processes, how to 

update configuration settings and baselines, how to maintain information system component 

inventories, how to control development, test, and operational environments, and how to develop, 

release, and update key documents. Organizations can employ templates to help ensure consistent 

and timely development and implementation of configuration management plans. Such templates 

can represent a master configuration management plan for the organization at large with subsets of 

the plan implemented on a system by system basis. Configuration management approval processes

include designation of key management stakeholders responsible for reviewing and approving 

proposed changes to information systems, and personnel that conduct security impact analyses 

prior to the implementation of changes to the systems. Configuration items are the information 

system items (hardware, software, firmware, and documentation) to be configuration-managed. As 

information systems continue through the system development life cycle, new configuration items 

may be identified and some existing configuration items may no longer need to be under 

configuration control. Related controls: CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-5, CM-8, SA-10.

Control Enhancements:

(1) CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN | ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY

The organization assigns responsibility for developing the configuration management process to 

organizational personnel that are not directly involved in information system development.

Supplemental Guidance: In the absence of dedicated configuration management teams assigned 

within organizations, system developers may be tasked to develop configuration management 

processes using personnel who are not directly involved in system development or integration.

This separation of duties ensures that organizations establish and maintain a sufficient degree 

of independence between the information system development and integration processes and

configuration management processes to facilitate quality control and more effective oversight.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-128.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD CM-9 HIGH CM-9

CM-10 SOFTWARE USAGE RESTRICTIONS

Control: The organization:

a. Uses software and associated documentation in accordance with contract agreements and 

copyright laws;

b. Tracks the use of software and associated documentation protected by quantity licenses to 

control copying and distribution; and

c. Controls and documents the use of peer-to-peer file sharing technology to ensure that this 

capability is not used for the unauthorized distribution, display, performance, or reproduction 

of copyrighted work.

Supplemental Guidance: Software license tracking can be accomplished by manual methods (e.g., 

simple spreadsheets) or automated methods (e.g., specialized tracking applications) depending on 

organizational needs. Related controls: AC-17, CM-8, SC-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SOFTWARE USAGE RESTRICTIONS | OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE

The organization establishes the following restrictions on the use of open source software: 

[Assignment: organization-defined restrictions].

Supplemental Guidance: Open source software refers to software that is available in source code

form. Certain software rights normally reserved for copyright holders are routinely provided 

under software license agreements that permit individuals to study, change, and improve the 

software. From a security perspective, the major advantage of open source software is that it 

provides organizations with the ability to examine the source code. However, there are also 

various licensing issues associated with open source software including, for example, the 

constraints on derivative use of such software.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW CM-10 MOD CM-10 HIGH CM-10

CM-11 USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE

Control: The organization:

a. Establishes [Assignment: organization-defined policies] governing the installation of software 

by users;

b. Enforces software installation policies through [Assignment: organization-defined methods]; 

and

c. Monitors policy compliance at [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: If provided the necessary privileges, users have the ability to install 

software in organizational information systems. To maintain control over the types of software 

installed, organizations identify permitted and prohibited actions regarding software installation. 

Permitted software installations may include, for example, updates and security patches to existing 

software and downloading applications from organization-approved “app stores.” Prohibited 

software installations may include, for example, software with unknown or suspect pedigrees or 

software that organizations consider potentially malicious. The policies organizations select 

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governing user-installed software may be organization-developed or provided by some external 

entity. Policy enforcement methods include procedural methods (e.g., periodic examination of user 

accounts), automated methods (e.g., configuration settings implemented on organizational 

information systems), or both. Related controls: AC-3, CM-2, CM-3, CM-5, CM-6, CM-7, PL-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE | ALERTS FOR UNAUTHORIZED INSTALLATIONS 

The information system alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] when the 

unauthorized installation of software is detected.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-7, SI-4.

(2) USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE | PROHIBIT INSTALLATION WITHOUT PRIVILEGED STATUS 

The information system prohibits user installation of software without explicit privileged status.

Supplemental Guidance: Privileged status can be obtained, for example, by serving in the role 

of system administrator. Related control: AC-6.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CM-11 MOD CM-11 HIGH CM-11

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FAMILY: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

CP-1 CONTINGENCY PLANNING POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles]:

1. A contingency planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, 

management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; 

and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the contingency planning policy and 

associated contingency planning controls; and

b. Reviews and updates the current:

1. Contingency planning policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and

2. Contingency planning procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CP family.

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can 

be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The 

procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information 

systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing 

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: Federal Continuity Directive 1; NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-34, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CP-1 MOD CP-1 HIGH CP-1

CP-2 CONTINGENCY PLAN

Control: The organization:

a. Develops a contingency plan for the information system that:

1. Identifies essential missions and business functions and associated contingency 

requirements;

2. Provides recovery objectives, restoration priorities, and metrics;

3. Addresses contingency roles, responsibilities, assigned individuals with contact 

information;

4. Addresses maintaining essential missions and business functions despite an information 

system disruption, compromise, or failure; 

5. Addresses eventual, full information system restoration without deterioration of the 

security safeguards originally planned and implemented; and

6. Is reviewed and approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];

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b. Distributes copies of the contingency plan to [Assignment: organization-defined key 

contingency personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements];

c. Coordinates contingency planning activities with incident handling activities;

d. Reviews the contingency plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency];

e. Updates the contingency plan to address changes to the organization, information system, or 

environment of operation and problems encountered during contingency plan implementation, 

execution, or testing;

f. Communicates contingency plan changes to [Assignment: organization-defined key 

contingency personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements]; and

g. Protects the contingency plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

Supplemental Guidance: Contingency planning for information systems is part of an overall 

organizational program for achieving continuity of operations for mission/business functions. 

Contingency planning addresses both information system restoration and implementation of 

alternative mission/business processes when systems are compromised. The effectiveness of 

contingency planning is maximized by considering such planning throughout the phases of the 

system development life cycle. Performing contingency planning on hardware, software, and 

firmware development can be an effective means of achieving information system resiliency. 

Contingency plans reflect the degree of restoration required for organizational information 

systems since not all systems may need to fully recover to achieve the level of continuity of 

operations desired. Information system recovery objectives reflect applicable laws, Executive 

Orders, directives, policies, standards, regulations, and guidelines. In addition to information 

system availability, contingency plans also address other security-related events resulting in a 

reduction in mission and/or business effectiveness, such as malicious attacks compromising the

confidentiality or integrity of information systems. Actions addressed in contingency plans

include, for example, orderly/graceful degradation, information system shutdown, fallback to a 

manual mode, alternate information flows, and operating in modes reserved for when systems are

under attack. By closely coordinating contingency planning with incident handling activities, 

organizations can ensure that the necessary contingency planning activities are in place and 

activated in the event of a security incident. Related controls: AC-14, CP-6, CP-7, CP-8, CP-9, 

CP-10, IR-4, IR-8, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, PM-8, PM-11.

Control Enhancements:

(1) CONTINGENCY PLAN | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS

The organization coordinates contingency plan development with organizational elements 

responsible for related plans.

Supplemental Guidance: Plans related to contingency plans for organizational information 

systems include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity 

of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Cyber 

Incident Response Plans, Insider Threat Implementation Plan, and Occupant Emergency 

Plans.

(2) CONTINGENCY PLAN | CAPACITY PLANNING

The organization conducts capacity planning so that necessary capacity for information 

processing, telecommunications, and environmental support exists during contingency 

operations.

Supplemental Guidance: Capacity planning is needed because different types of threats (e.g., 

natural disasters, targeted cyber attacks) can result in a reduction of the available processing, 

telecommunications, and support services originally intended to support the organizational 

missions/business functions. Organizations may need to anticipate degraded operations during 

contingency operations and factor such degradation into capacity planning.

(3) CONTINGENCY PLAN | RESUME ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS

The organization plans for the resumption of essential missions and business functions within 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period] of contingency plan activation.

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Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning 

activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning 

including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. The time period for resumption of 

essential missions/business functions may be dependent on the severity/extent of disruptions 

to the information system and its supporting infrastructure. Related control: PE-12.

(4) CONTINGENCY PLAN | RESUME ALL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS

The organization plans for the resumption of all missions and business functions within 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period] of contingency plan activation.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning 

activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning 

including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. The time period for resumption of

all missions/business functions may be dependent on the severity/extent of disruptions to the 

information system and its supporting infrastructure. Related control: PE-12.

(5) CONTINGENCY PLAN | CONTINUE ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS

The organization plans for the continuance of essential missions and business functions with little 

or no loss of operational continuity and sustains that continuity until full information system 

restoration at primary processing and/or storage sites.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning 

activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning 

including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Primary processing and/or storage 

sites defined by organizations as part of contingency planning may change depending on the 

circumstances associated with the contingency (e.g., backup sites may become primary sites). 

Related control: PE-12.

(6) CONTINGENCY PLAN | ALTERNATE PROCESSING / STORAGE SITE

The organization plans for the transfer of essential missions and business functions to alternate 

processing and/or storage sites with little or no loss of operational continuity and sustains that 

continuity through information system restoration to primary processing and/or storage sites.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning 

activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning 

including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Primary processing and/or storage 

sites defined by organizations as part of contingency planning may change depending on the 

circumstances associated with the contingency (e.g., backup sites may become primary sites). 

Related control: PE-12.

(7) CONTINGENCY PLAN | COORDINATE WITH EXTERNAL SERVICE PROVIDERS

The organization coordinates its contingency plan with the contingency plans of external service 

providers to ensure that contingency requirements can be satisfied.

Supplemental Guidance: When the capability of an organization to successfully carry out its 

core missions/business functions is dependent on external service providers, developing a 

timely and comprehensive contingency plan may become more challenging. In this situation, 

organizations coordinate contingency planning activities with the external entities to ensure 

that the individual plans reflect the overall contingency needs of the organization. Related 

control: SA-9.

(8) CONTINGENCY PLAN | IDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETS

The organization identifies critical information system assets supporting essential missions and 

business functions.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning 

activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning 

including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Organizations identify critical 

information system assets so that additional safeguards and countermeasures can be employed 

(above and beyond those safeguards and countermeasures routinely implemented) to help 

ensure that organizational missions/business functions can continue to be conducted during 

contingency operations. In addition, the identification of critical information assets facilitates 

the prioritization of organizational resources. Critical information system assets include

technical and operational aspects. Technical aspects include, for example, information 

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technology services, information system components, information technology products, and 

mechanisms. Operational aspects include, for example, procedures (manually executed 

operations) and personnel (individuals operating technical safeguards and/or executing 

manual procedures). Organizational program protection plans can provide assistance in 

identifying critical assets. Related controls: SA-14, SA-15.

References: Federal Continuity Directive 1; NIST Special Publication 800-34.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CP-2 MOD CP-2 (1) (3) (8) HIGH CP-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (8)

CP-3 CONTINGENCY TRAINING

Control: The organization provides contingency training to information system users consistent 

with assigned roles and responsibilities:

a. Within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of assuming a contingency role or 

responsibility;

b. When required by information system changes; and

c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.

Supplemental Guidance: Contingency training provided by organizations is linked to the assigned 

roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure that the appropriate content and 

level of detail is included in such training. For example, regular users may only need to know 

when and where to report for duty during contingency operations and if normal duties are affected;

system administrators may require additional training on how to set up information systems at 

alternate processing and storage sites; and managers/senior leaders may receive more specific 

training on how to conduct mission-essential functions in designated off-site locations and how to 

establish communications with other governmental entities for purposes of coordination on 

contingency-related activities. Training for contingency roles/responsibilities reflects the specific 

continuity requirements in the contingency plan. Related controls: AT-2, AT-3, CP-2, IR-2.

Control Enhancements:

(1) CONTINGENCY TRAINING | SIMULATED EVENTS

The organization incorporates simulated events into contingency training to facilitate effective 

response by personnel in crisis situations. 

(2) CONTINGENCY TRAINING | AUTOMATED TRAINING ENVIRONMENTS

The organization employs automated mechanisms to provide a more thorough and realistic 

contingency training environment.

References: Federal Continuity Directive 1; NIST Special Publications 800-16, 800-50.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW CP-3 MOD CP-3 HIGH CP-3 (1)

CP-4 CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING

Control: The organization:

a. Tests the contingency plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency] using [Assignment: organization-defined tests] to determine the effectiveness of 

the plan and the organizational readiness to execute the plan;

b. Reviews the contingency plan test results; and

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c. Initiates corrective actions, if needed.

Supplemental Guidance: Methods for testing contingency plans to determine the effectiveness of the 

plans and to identify potential weaknesses in the plans include, for example, walk-through and 

tabletop exercises, checklists, simulations (parallel, full interrupt), and comprehensive exercises.

Organizations conduct testing based on the continuity requirements in contingency plans and 

include a determination of the effects on organizational operations, assets, and individuals arising 

due to contingency operations. Organizations have flexibility and discretion in the breadth, depth, 

and timelines of corrective actions. Related controls: CP-2, CP-3, IR-3.

Control Enhancements:

(1) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS

The organization coordinates contingency plan testing with organizational elements responsible 

for related plans.

Supplemental Guidance: Plans related to contingency plans for organizational information 

systems include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity 

of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Cyber 

Incident Response Plans, and Occupant Emergency Plans. This control enhancement does not 

require organizations to create organizational elements to handle related plans or to align such 

elements with specific plans. It does require, however, that if such organizational elements are 

responsible for related plans, organizations should coordinate with those elements. Related 

controls: IR-8, PM-8.

(2) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE

The organization tests the contingency plan at the alternate processing site:

(a) To familiarize contingency personnel with the facility and available resources; and

(b) To evaluate the capabilities of the alternate processing site to support contingency 

operations.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CP-7.

(3) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | AUTOMATED TESTING

The organization employs automated mechanisms to more thoroughly and effectively test the 

contingency plan.

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms provide more thorough and effective testing 

of contingency plans, for example: (i) by providing more complete coverage of contingency 

issues; (ii) by selecting more realistic test scenarios and environments; and (iii) by effectively 

stressing the information system and supported missions.

(4) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | FULL RECOVERY / RECONSTITUTION

The organization includes a full recovery and reconstitution of the information system to a known 

state as part of contingency plan testing.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CP-10, SC-24.

References: Federal Continuity Directive 1; FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-

34, 800-84.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW CP-4 MOD CP-4 (1) HIGH CP-4 (1) (2)

CP-5 CONTINGENCY PLAN UPDATE

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-2].

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CP-6 ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE

Control: The organization:

a. Establishes an alternate storage site including necessary agreements to permit the storage and 

retrieval of information system backup information; and

b. Ensures that the alternate storage site provides information security safeguards equivalent to 

that of the primary site.

Supplemental Guidance: Alternate storage sites are sites that are geographically distinct from 

primary storage sites. An alternate storage site maintains duplicate copies of information and data

in the event that the primary storage site is not available. Items covered by alternate storage site 

agreements include, for example, environmental conditions at alternate sites, access rules, physical 

and environmental protection requirements, and coordination of delivery/retrieval of backup 

media. Alternate storage sites reflect the requirements in contingency plans so that organizations 

can maintain essential missions/business functions despite disruption, compromise, or failure in 

organizational information systems. Related controls: CP-2, CP-7, CP-9, CP-10, MP-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE 

The organization identifies an alternate storage site that is separated from the primary storage site 

to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.

Supplemental Guidance: Threats that affect alternate storage sites are typically defined in 

organizational assessments of risk and include, for example, natural disasters, structural 

failures, hostile cyber attacks, and errors of omission/commission. Organizations determine 

what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between primary and alternate storage 

sites based on the types of threats that are of concern. For one particular type of threat (i.e., 

hostile cyber attack), the degree of separation between sites is less relevant. Related control: 

RA-3.

(2) ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | RECOVERY TIME / POINT OBJECTIVES

The organization configures the alternate storage site to facilitate recovery operations in 

accordance with recovery time and recovery point objectives.

(3) ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | ACCESSIBILITY

The organization identifies potential accessibility problems to the alternate storage site in the 

event of an area-wide disruption or disaster and outlines explicit mitigation actions.

Supplemental Guidance: Area-wide disruptions refer to those types of disruptions that are broad 

in geographic scope (e.g., hurricane, regional power outage) with such determinations made 

by organizations based on organizational assessments of risk. Explicit mitigation actions 

include, for example: (i) duplicating backup information at other alternate storage sites if

access problems occur at originally designated alternate sites; or (ii) planning for physical 

access to retrieve backup information if electronic accessibility to the alternate site is 

disrupted. Related control: RA-3.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-34.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD CP-6 (1) (3) HIGH CP-6 (1) (2) (3)

CP-7 ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE

Control: The organization:

a. Establishes an alternate processing site including necessary agreements to permit the transfer 

and resumption of [Assignment: organization-defined information system operations] for 

essential missions/business functions within [Assignment: organization-defined time period

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consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives] when the primary processing 

capabilities are unavailable;

b. Ensures that equipment and supplies required to transfer and resume operations are available 

at the alternate processing site or contracts are in place to support delivery to the site within

the organization-defined time period for transfer/resumption; and

c. Ensures that the alternate processing site provides information security safeguards equivalent 

to those of the primary site.

Supplemental Guidance: Alternate processing sites are sites that are geographically distinct from 

primary processing sites. An alternate processing site provides processing capability in the event 

that the primary processing site is not available. Items covered by alternate processing site 

agreements include, for example, environmental conditions at alternate sites, access rules, physical 

and environmental protection requirements, and coordination for the transfer/assignment of 

personnel. Requirements are specifically allocated to alternate processing sites that reflect the 

requirements in contingency plans to maintain essential missions/business functions despite 

disruption, compromise, or failure in organizational information systems. Related controls: CP-2,

CP-6, CP-8, CP-9, CP-10, MA-6.

Control Enhancements:

(1) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE

The organization identifies an alternate processing site that is separated from the primary 

processing site to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.

Supplemental Guidance: Threats that affect alternate processing sites are typically defined in 

organizational assessments of risk and include, for example, natural disasters, structural 

failures, hostile cyber attacks, and errors of omission/commission. Organizations determine 

what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between primary and alternate processing 

sites based on the types of threats that are of concern. For one particular type of threat (i.e., 

hostile cyber attack), the degree of separation between sites is less relevant. Related control: 

RA-3.

(2) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | ACCESSIBILITY

The organization identifies potential accessibility problems to the alternate processing site in the 

event of an area-wide disruption or disaster and outlines explicit mitigation actions.

Supplemental Guidance: Area-wide disruptions refer to those types of disruptions that are broad 

in geographic scope (e.g., hurricane, regional power outage) with such determinations made 

by organizations based on organizational assessments of risk. Related control: RA-3.

(3) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | PRIORITY OF SERVICE

The organization develops alternate processing site agreements that contain priority-of-service 

provisions in accordance with organizational availability requirements (including recovery time 

objectives).

Supplemental Guidance: Priority-of-service agreements refer to negotiated agreements with 

service providers that ensure that organizations receive priority treatment consistent with their 

availability requirements and the availability of information resources at the alternate 

processing site.

(4) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | PREPARATION FOR USE

The organization prepares the alternate processing site so that the site is ready to be used as the 

operational site supporting essential missions and business functions.

Supplemental Guidance: Site preparation includes, for example, establishing configuration 

settings for information system components at the alternate processing site consistent with the 

requirements for such settings at the primary site and ensuring that essential supplies and 

other logistical considerations are in place. Related controls: CM-2, CM-6.

(5) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | EQUIVALENT INFORMATION SECURITY SAFEGUARDS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-7].

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(6) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | INABILITY TO RETURN TO PRIMARY SITE

The organization plans and prepares for circumstances that preclude returning to the primary 

processing site.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-34.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD CP-7 (1) (2) (3) HIGH CP-7 (1) (2) (3) (4)

CP-8 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

Control: The organization establishes alternate telecommunications services including necessary 

agreements to permit the resumption of [Assignment: organization-defined information system 

operations] for essential missions and business functions within [Assignment: organizationdefined time period] when the primary telecommunications capabilities are unavailable at either 

the primary or alternate processing or storage sites.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to telecommunications services (data and voice) for 

primary and alternate processing and storage sites. Alternate telecommunications services reflect 

the continuity requirements in contingency plans to maintain essential missions/business functions 

despite the loss of primary telecommunications services. Organizations may specify different time 

periods for primary/alternate sites. Alternate telecommunications services include, for example, 

additional organizational or commercial ground-based circuits/lines or satellites in lieu of groundbased communications. Organizations consider factors such as availability, quality of service, and 

access when entering into alternate telecommunications agreements. Related controls: CP-2, CP-6, 

CP-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | PRIORITY OF SERVICE PROVISIONS

The organization:

(a) Develops primary and alternate telecommunications service agreements that contain priorityof-service provisions in accordance with organizational availability requirements (including 

recovery time objectives); and

(b) Requests Telecommunications Service Priority for all telecommunications services used for 

national security emergency preparedness in the event that the primary and/or alternate 

telecommunications services are provided by a common carrier.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations consider the potential mission/business impact in 

situations where telecommunications service providers are servicing other organizations with 

similar priority-of-service provisions.

(2) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | SINGLE POINTS OF FAILURE

The organization obtains alternate telecommunications services to reduce the likelihood of sharing 

a single point of failure with primary telecommunications services.

(3) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | SEPARATION OF PRIMARY / ALTERNATE PROVIDERS

The organization obtains alternate telecommunications services from providers that are separated

from primary service providers to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.

Supplemental Guidance: Threats that affect telecommunications services are typically defined 

in organizational assessments of risk and include, for example, natural disasters, structural 

failures, hostile cyber/physical attacks, and errors of omission/commission. Organizations 

seek to reduce common susceptibilities by, for example, minimizing shared infrastructure 

among telecommunications service providers and achieving sufficient geographic separation 

between services. Organizations may consider using a single service provider in situations 

where the service provider can provide alternate telecommunications services meeting the 

separation needs addressed in the risk assessment.

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(4) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | PROVIDER CONTINGENCY PLAN

The organization:

(a) Requires primary and alternate telecommunications service providers to have contingency 

plans;

(b) Reviews provider contingency plans to ensure that the plans meet organizational contingency 

requirements; and

(c) Obtains evidence of contingency testing/training by providers [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Reviews of provider contingency plans consider the proprietary nature 

of such plans. In some situations, a summary of provider contingency plans may be sufficient 

evidence for organizations to satisfy the review requirement. Telecommunications service 

providers may also participate in ongoing disaster recovery exercises in coordination with the 

Department of Homeland Security, state, and local governments. Organizations may use these 

types of activities to satisfy evidentiary requirements related to service provider contingency 

plan reviews, testing, and training.

(5) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | ALTERNATE TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICE TESTING

The organization tests alternate telecommunication services [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency].

References: NIST Special Publication 800-34; National Communications Systems Directive 3-10; 

Web: http://www.dhs.gov/telecommunications-service-priority-tsp.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD CP-8 (1) (2) HIGH CP-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)

CP-9 INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP

Control: The organization:

a. Conducts backups of user-level information contained in the information system [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives];

b. Conducts backups of system-level information contained in the information system 

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time and recovery 

point objectives];

c. Conducts backups of information system documentation including security-related 

documentation [Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time 

and recovery point objectives]; and 

d. Protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of backup information at storage 

locations.

Supplemental Guidance: System-level information includes, for example, system-state information, 

operating system and application software, and licenses. User-level information includes any 

information other than system-level information. Mechanisms employed by organizations to 

protect the integrity of information system backups include, for example, digital signatures and 

cryptographic hashes. Protection of system backup information while in transit is beyond the 

scope of this control. Information system backups reflect the requirements in contingency plans as 

well as other organizational requirements for backing up information. Related controls: CP-2, CP6, MP-4, MP-5, SC-13.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TESTING FOR RELIABILITY / INTEGRITY

The organization tests backup information [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to verify

media reliability and information integrity.

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Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CP-4.

(2) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TEST RESTORATION USING SAMPLING

The organization uses a sample of backup information in the restoration of selected information 

system functions as part of contingency plan testing.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CP-4.

(3) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | SEPARATE STORAGE FOR CRITICAL INFORMATION

The organization stores backup copies of [Assignment: organization-defined critical information 

system software and other security-related information] in a separate facility or in a fire-rated 

container that is not collocated with the operational system.

Supplemental Guidance: Critical information system software includes, for example, operating 

systems, cryptographic key management systems, and intrusion detection/prevention systems.

Security-related information includes, for example, organizational inventories of hardware, 

software, and firmware components. Alternate storage sites typically serve as separate storage 

facilities for organizations. Related controls: CM-2, CM-8.

(4) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | PROTECTION FROM UNAUTHORIZED MODIFICATION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-9].

(5) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE

The organization transfers information system backup information to the alternate storage site 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period and transfer rate consistent with the recovery time 

and recovery point objectives].

Supplemental Guidance: Information system backup information can be transferred to alternate 

storage sites either electronically or by physical shipment of storage media.

(6) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | REDUNDANT SECONDARY SYSTEM

The organization accomplishes information system backup by maintaining a redundant secondary 

system that is not collocated with the primary system and that can be activated without loss of 

information or disruption to operations.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CP-7, CP-10.

(7) INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

The organization enforces dual authorization for the deletion or destruction of [Assignment: 

organization-defined backup information].

Supplemental Guidance: Dual authorization ensures that the deletion or destruction of backup 

information cannot occur unless two qualified individuals carry out the task. Individuals 

deleting/destroying backup information possess sufficient skills/expertise to determine if the 

proposed deletion/destruction of backup information reflects organizational policies and 

procedures. Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control. Related controls: 

AC-3, MP-2.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-34.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CP-9 MOD CP-9 (1) HIGH CP-9 (1) (2) (3) (5)

CP-10 INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION

Control: The organization provides for the recovery and reconstitution of the information system to 

a known state after a disruption, compromise, or failure.

Supplemental Guidance: Recovery is executing information system contingency plan activities to 

restore organizational missions/business functions. Reconstitution takes place following recovery 

and includes activities for returning organizational information systems to fully operational states. 

Recovery and reconstitution operations reflect mission and business priorities, recovery point/time 

and reconstitution objectives, and established organizational metrics consistent with contingency 

plan requirements. Reconstitution includes the deactivation of any interim information system

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capabilities that may have been needed during recovery operations. Reconstitution also includes

assessments of fully restored information system capabilities, reestablishment of continuous 

monitoring activities, potential information system reauthorizations, and activities to prepare the 

systems against future disruptions, compromises, or failures. Recovery/reconstitution capabilities

employed by organizations can include both automated mechanisms and manual procedures.

Related controls: CA-2, CA-6, CA-7, CP-2, CP-6, CP-7, CP-9, SC-24.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-4].

(2) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | TRANSACTION RECOVERY

The information system implements transaction recovery for systems that are transaction-based.

Supplemental Guidance: Transaction-based information systems include, for example, database 

management systems and transaction processing systems. Mechanisms supporting transaction 

recovery include, for example, transaction rollback and transaction journaling.

(3) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | COMPENSATING SECURITY CONTROLS

[Withdrawn: Addressed through tailoring procedures].

(4) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | RESTORE WITHIN TIME PERIOD

The organization provides the capability to restore information system components within

[Assignment: organization-defined restoration time-periods] from configuration-controlled and 

integrity-protected information representing a known, operational state for the components.

Supplemental Guidance: Restoration of information system components includes, for example, 

reimaging which restores components to known, operational states. Related control: CM-2.

(5) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | FAILOVER CAPABILITY

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-13].

(6) INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | COMPONENT PROTECTION

The organization protects backup and restoration hardware, firmware, and software.

Supplemental Guidance: Protection of backup and restoration hardware, firmware, and software 

components includes both physical and technical safeguards. Backup and restoration software 

includes, for example, router tables, compilers, and other security-relevant system software.

Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, PE-3.

References: Federal Continuity Directive 1; NIST Special Publication 800-34.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW CP-10 MOD CP-10 (2) HIGH CP-10 (2) (4)

CP-11 ALTERNATE COMMUNICATIONS PROTOCOLS

Control: The information system provides the capability to employ [Assignment: organizationdefined alternative communications protocols] in support of maintaining continuity of operations.

Supplemental Guidance: Contingency plans and the associated training and testing for those plans, 

incorporate an alternate communications protocol capability as part of increasing the resilience of 

organizational information systems. Alternate communications protocols include, for example, 

switching from Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) Version 4 to TCP/IP 

Version 6. Switching communications protocols may affect software applications and therefore, 

the potential side effects of introducing alternate communications protocols are analyzed prior to 

implementation.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

CP-12 SAFE MODE

Control: The information system, when [Assignment: organization-defined conditions] are 

detected, enters a safe mode of operation with [Assignment: organization-defined restrictions of 

safe mode of operation].

Supplemental Guidance: For information systems supporting critical missions/business functions 

including, for example, military operations and weapons systems, civilian space operations, 

nuclear power plant operations, and air traffic control operations (especially real-time operational 

environments), organizations may choose to identify certain conditions under which those systems 

revert to a predefined safe mode of operation. The safe mode of operation, which can be activated 

automatically or manually, restricts the types of activities or operations information systems could 

execute when those conditions are encountered. Restriction includes, for example, allowing only 

certain functions that could be carried out under limited power or with reduced communications

bandwidth.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

CP-13 ALTERNATIVE SECURITY MECHANISMS

Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined alternative or supplemental 

security mechanisms] for satisfying [Assignment: organization-defined security functions] when 

the primary means of implementing the security function is unavailable or compromised.

Supplemental Guidance: This control supports information system resiliency and contingency 

planning/continuity of operations. To ensure mission/business continuity, organizations can 

implement alternative or supplemental security mechanisms. These mechanisms may be less 

effective than the primary mechanisms (e.g., not as easy to use, not as scalable, or not as secure). 

However, having the capability to readily employ these alternative/supplemental mechanisms 

enhances overall mission/business continuity that might otherwise be adversely impacted if 

organizational operations had to be curtailed until the primary means of implementing the 

functions was restored. Given the cost and level of effort required to provide such alternative 

capabilities, this control would typically be applied only to critical security capabilities provided 

by information systems, system components, or information system services. For example, an 

organization may issue to senior executives and system administrators one-time pads in case 

multifactor tokens, the organization’s standard means for secure remote authentication, is 

compromised. Related control: CP-2.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

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FAMILY: IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

IA-1 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles]:

1. An identification and authentication policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 

responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, 

and compliance; and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication policy 

and associated identification and authentication controls; and

b. Reviews and updates the current:

1. Identification and authentication policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];

and

2. Identification and authentication procedures [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the IA family.

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can 

be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The 

procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information 

systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing 

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-63, 800-73, 800-76, 

800-78, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IA-1 MOD IA-1 HIGH IA-1

IA-2 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)

Control: The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates organizational users (or 

processes acting on behalf of organizational users).

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational users include employees or individuals that organizations

deem to have equivalent status of employees (e.g., contractors, guest researchers). This control 

applies to all accesses other than: (i) accesses that are explicitly identified and documented in AC14; and (ii) accesses that occur through authorized use of group authenticators without individual 

authentication. Organizations may require unique identification of individuals in group accounts 

(e.g., shared privilege accounts) or for detailed accountability of individual activity. Organizations 

employ passwords, tokens, or biometrics to authenticate user identities, or in the case multifactor 

authentication, or some combination thereof. Access to organizational information systems is 

defined as either local access or network access. Local access is any access to organizational 

information systems by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) where such access is 

obtained by direct connections without the use of networks. Network access is access to 

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organizational information systems by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) where such 

access is obtained through network connections (i.e., nonlocal accesses). Remote access is a type 

of network access that involves communication through external networks (e.g., the Internet). 

Internal networks include local area networks and wide area networks. In addition, the use of 

encrypted virtual private networks (VPNs) for network connections between organizationcontrolled endpoints and non-organization controlled endpoints may be treated as internal 

networks from the perspective of protecting the confidentiality and integrity of information 

traversing the network.

Organizations can satisfy the identification and authentication requirements in this control by 

complying with the requirements in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 consistent with 

the specific organizational implementation plans. Multifactor authentication requires the use of 

two or more different factors to achieve authentication. The factors are defined as: (i) something 

you know (e.g., password, personal identification number [PIN]); (ii) something you have (e.g., 

cryptographic identification device, token); or (iii) something you are (e.g., biometric). Multifactor 

solutions that require devices separate from information systems gaining access include, for 

example, hardware tokens providing time-based or challenge-response authenticators and smart 

cards such as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification card and the DoD common 

access card. In addition to identifying and authenticating users at the information system level 

(i.e., at logon), organizations also employ identification and authentication mechanisms at the 

application level, when necessary, to provide increased information security. Identification and 

authentication requirements for other than organizational users are described in IA-8. Related 

controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-14, AC-17, AC-18, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8.

Control Enhancements:

(1) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to privileged 

accounts.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-6.

(2) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to nonprivileged accounts.

(3) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | LOCAL ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

The information system implements multifactor authentication for local access to privileged 

accounts.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-6.

(4) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | LOCAL ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

The information system implements multifactor authentication for local access to non-privileged 

accounts.

(5) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | GROUP AUTHENTICATION

The organization requires individuals to be authenticated with an individual authenticator when a 

group authenticator is employed.

Supplemental Guidance: Requiring individuals to use individual authenticators as a second level 

of authentication helps organizations to mitigate the risk of using group authenticators.

(6) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - SEPARATE DEVICE

The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to privileged 

accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system gaining 

access and the device meets [Assignment: organization-defined strength of mechanism 

requirements].

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-6.

(7) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - SEPARATE DEVICE

The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to nonprivileged accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system 

gaining access and the device meets [Assignment: organization-defined strength of mechanism 

requirements].

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(8) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - REPLAY RESISTANT

The information system implements replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for network 

access to privileged accounts.

Supplemental Guidance: Authentication processes resist replay attacks if it is impractical to 

achieve successful authentications by replaying previous authentication messages. Replayresistant techniques include, for example, protocols that use nonces or challenges such as 

Transport Layer Security (TLS) and time synchronous or challenge-response one-time 

authenticators.

(9) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - REPLAY RESISTANT

The information system implements replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for network

access to non-privileged accounts.

Supplemental Guidance: Authentication processes resist replay attacks if it is impractical to 

achieve successful authentications by recording/replaying previous authentication messages. 

Replay-resistant techniques include, for example, protocols that use nonces or challenges such 

as Transport Layer Security (TLS) and time synchronous or challenge-response one-time 

authenticators.

(10) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | SINGLE SIGN-ON

The information system provides a single sign-on capability for [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system accounts and services].

Supplemental Guidance: Single sign-on enables users to log in once and gain access to multiple 

information system resources. Organizations consider the operational efficiencies provided by 

single sign-on capabilities with the increased risk from disclosures of single authenticators

providing access to multiple system resources.

(11) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | REMOTE ACCESS - SEPARATE DEVICE

The information system implements multifactor authentication for remote access to privileged and 

non-privileged accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the 

system gaining access and the device meets [Assignment: organization-defined strength of 

mechanism requirements].

Supplemental Guidance: For remote access to privileged/non-privileged accounts, the purpose 

of requiring a device that is separate from the information system gaining access for one of 

the factors during multifactor authentication is to reduce the likelihood of compromising 

authentication credentials stored on the system. For example, adversaries deploying malicious 

code on organizational information systems can potentially compromise such credentials 

resident on the system and subsequently impersonate authorized users. Related control: AC-6.

(12) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | ACCEPTANCE OF PIV CREDENTIALS

The information system accepts and electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification (PIV) 

credentials.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to organizations implementing 

logical access control systems (LACS) and physical access control systems (PACS). Personal 

Identity Verification (PIV) credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that 

conform to FIPS Publication 201 and supporting guidance documents. OMB Memorandum 

11-11 requires federal agencies to continue implementing the requirements specified in 

HSPD-12 to enable agency-wide use of PIV credentials. Related controls: AU-2, PE-3, SA-4.

(13) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | OUT-OF-BAND AUTHENTICATION

The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined out-of-band authentication]

under [Assignment: organization-defined conditions].

Supplemental Guidance: Out-of-band authentication (OOBA) refers to the use of two separate 

communication paths to identify and authenticate users or devices to an information system. 

The first path (i.e., the in-band path), is used to identify and authenticate users or devices, and 

generally is the path through which information flows. The second path (i.e., the out-of-band 

path) is used to independently verify the authentication and/or requested action. For example, 

a user authenticates via a notebook computer to a remote server to which the user desires 

access, and requests some action of the server via that communication path. Subsequently, the 

server contacts the user via the user’s cell phone to verify that the requested action originated 

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from the user. The user may either confirm the intended action to an individual on the 

telephone or provide an authentication code via the telephone. This type of authentication can 

be employed by organizations to mitigate actual or suspected man-in the-middle attacks. The 

conditions for activation can include, for example, suspicious activities, new threat indicators 

or elevated threat levels, or the impact level or classification level of information in requested 

transactions. Related controls: IA-10, IA-11, SC-37.

References: HSPD-12; OMB Memoranda 04-04, 06-16, 11-11; FIPS Publication 201; NIST 

Special Publications 800-63, 800-73, 800-76, 800-78; FICAM Roadmap and Implementation 

Guidance; Web: http://idmanagement.gov.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IA-2 (1) (12) MOD IA-2 (1) (2) (3) (8) (11)

(12)

HIGH IA-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (8) (9)

(11) (12)

IA-3 DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

Control: The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates [Assignment: organizationdefined specific and/or types of devices] before establishing a [Selection (one or more): local;

remote; network] connection.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational devices requiring unique device-to-device identification and 

authentication may be defined by type, by device, or by a combination of type/device. Information 

systems typically use either shared known information (e.g., Media Access Control [MAC] or 

Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol [TCP/IP] addresses) for device identification or

organizational authentication solutions (e.g., IEEE 802.1x and Extensible Authentication Protocol 

[EAP], Radius server with EAP-Transport Layer Security [TLS] authentication, Kerberos) to 

identify/authenticate devices on local and/or wide area networks. Organizations determine the 

required strength of authentication mechanisms by the security categories of information systems. 

Because of the challenges of applying this control on large scale, organizations are encouraged to 

only apply the control to those limited number (and type) of devices that truly need to support this 

capability. Related controls: AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, CA-3, IA-4, IA-5.

Control Enhancements:

(1) DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | CRYPTOGRAPHIC BIDIRECTIONAL AUTHENTICATION

The information system authenticates [Assignment: organization-defined specific devices and/or 

types of devices] before establishing [Selection (one or more): local; remote; network] connection 

using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based.

Supplemental Guidance: A local connection is any connection with a device communicating 

without the use of a network. A network connection is any connection with a device that 

communicates through a network (e.g., local area or wide area network, Internet). A remote 

connection is any connection with a device communicating through an external network (e.g., 

the Internet). Bidirectional authentication provides stronger safeguards to validate the identity 

of other devices for connections that are of greater risk (e.g., remote connections). Related 

controls: SC-8, SC-12, SC-13.

(2) DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | CRYPTOGRAPHIC BIDIRECTIONAL NETWORK AUTHENTICATION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-3 (1)].

(3) DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | DYNAMIC ADDRESS ALLOCATION

The organization:

(a) Standardizes dynamic address allocation lease information and the lease duration assigned to 

devices in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined lease information and lease 

duration]; and

(b) Audits lease information when assigned to a device.

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Supplemental Guidance: DHCP-enabled clients obtaining leases for IP addresses from DHCP 

servers, is a typical example of dynamic address allocation for devices. Related controls: AU2, AU-3, AU-6, AU-12.

(4) DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | DEVICE ATTESTATION

The organization ensures that device identification and authentication based on attestation is 

handled by [Assignment: organization-defined configuration management process].

Supplemental Guidance: Device attestation refers to the identification and authentication of a

device based on its configuration and known operating state. This might be determined via 

some cryptographic hash of the device. If device attestation is the means of identification and 

authentication, then it is important that patches and updates to the device are handled via a 

configuration management process such that the those patches/updates are done securely and 

at the same time do not disrupt the identification and authentication to other devices.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD IA-3 HIGH IA-3

IA-4 IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT

Control: The organization manages information system identifiers by:

a. Receiving authorization from [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to assign 

an individual, group, role, or device identifier;

b. Selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, or device;

c. Assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, or device;

d. Preventing reuse of identifiers for [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and

e. Disabling the identifier after [Assignment: organization-defined time period of inactivity].

Supplemental Guidance: Common device identifiers include, for example, media access control 

(MAC), Internet protocol (IP) addresses, or device-unique token identifiers. Management of 

individual identifiers is not applicable to shared information system accounts (e.g., guest and 

anonymous accounts). Typically, individual identifiers are the user names of the information 

system accounts assigned to those individuals. In such instances, the account management 

activities of AC-2 use account names provided by IA-4. This control also addresses individual 

identifiers not necessarily associated with information system accounts (e.g., identifiers used in

physical security control databases accessed by badge reader systems for access to information 

systems). Preventing reuse of identifiers implies preventing the assignment of previously used 

individual, group, role, or device identifiers to different individuals, groups, roles, or devices. 

Related controls: AC-2, IA-2, IA-3, IA-5, IA-8, SC-37.

Control Enhancements:

(1) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | PROHIBIT ACCOUNT IDENTIFIERS AS PUBLIC IDENTIFIERS

The organization prohibits the use of information system account identifiers that are the same as

public identifiers for individual electronic mail accounts.

Supplemental Guidance: Prohibiting the use of information systems account identifiers that are 

the same as some public identifier such as the individual identifier section of an electronic 

mail address, makes it more difficult for adversaries to guess user identifiers on organizational 

information systems. Related control: AT-2.

(2) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION

The organization requires that the registration process to receive an individual identifier includes 

supervisor authorization.

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(3) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | MULTIPLE FORMS OF CERTIFICATION

The organization requires multiple forms of certification of individual identification be presented to 

the registration authority.

Supplemental Guidance: Requiring multiple forms of identification, such as documentary 

evidence or a combination of documents and biometrics, reduces the likelihood of individuals 

using fraudulent identification to establish an identity, or at least increases the work factor of 

potential adversaries.

(4) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | IDENTIFY USER STATUS

The organization manages individual identifiers by uniquely identifying each individual as 

[Assignment: organization-defined characteristic identifying individual status].

Supplemental Guidance: Characteristics identifying the status of individuals include, for 

example, contractors and foreign nationals. Identifying the status of individuals by specific 

characteristics provides additional information about the people with whom organizational 

personnel are communicating. For example, it might be useful for a government employee to 

know that one of the individuals on an email message is a contractor. Related control: AT-2.

(5) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC MANAGEMENT

The information system dynamically manages identifiers.

Supplemental Guidance: In contrast to conventional approaches to identification which presume

static accounts for preregistered users, many distributed information systems including, for 

example, service-oriented architectures, rely on establishing identifiers at run time for entities 

that were previously unknown. In these situations, organizations anticipate and provision for

the dynamic establishment of identifiers. Preestablished trust relationships and mechanisms 

with appropriate authorities to validate identities and related credentials are essential. Related 

control: AC-16.

(6) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | CROSS-ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT

The organization coordinates with [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] for 

cross-organization management of identifiers.

Supplemental Guidance: Cross-organization identifier management provides the capability for 

organizations to appropriately identify individuals, groups, roles, or devices when conducting 

cross-organization activities involving the processing, storage, or transmission of information.

(7) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | IN-PERSON REGISTRATION

The organization requires that the registration process to receive an individual identifier be 

conducted in person before a designated registration authority.

Supplemental Guidance: In-person registration reduces the likelihood of fraudulent identifiers 

being issued because it requires the physical presence of individuals and actual face-to-face 

interactions with designated registration authorities.

References: FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 800-73, 800-76, 800-78.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IA-4 MOD IA-4 HIGH IA-4

IA-5 AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT

Control: The organization manages information system authenticators by:

a. Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, 

role, or device receiving the authenticator;

b. Establishing initial authenticator content for authenticators defined by the organization;

c. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use;

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d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator distribution, 

for lost/compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators;

e. Changing default content of authenticators prior to information system installation;

f. Establishing minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions and reuse conditions for 

authenticators;

g. Changing/refreshing authenticators [Assignment: organization-defined time period by 

authenticator type];

h. Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification;

i. Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific security safeguards to 

protect authenticators; and

j. Changing authenticators for group/role accounts when membership to those accounts changes.

Supplemental Guidance: Individual authenticators include, for example, passwords, tokens, 

biometrics, PKI certificates, and key cards. Initial authenticator content is the actual content (e.g., 

the initial password) as opposed to requirements about authenticator content (e.g., minimum 

password length). In many cases, developers ship information system components with factory 

default authentication credentials to allow for initial installation and configuration. Default 

authentication credentials are often well known, easily discoverable, and present a significant

security risk. The requirement to protect individual authenticators may be implemented via control 

PL-4 or PS-6 for authenticators in the possession of individuals and by controls AC-3, AC-6, and 

SC-28 for authenticators stored within organizational information systems (e.g., passwords stored 

in hashed or encrypted formats, files containing encrypted or hashed passwords accessible with 

administrator privileges). Information systems support individual authenticator management by 

organization-defined settings and restrictions for various authenticator characteristics including, 

for example, minimum password length, password composition, validation time window for time 

synchronous one-time tokens, and number of allowed rejections during the verification stage of 

biometric authentication. Specific actions that can be taken to safeguard authenticators include, for 

example, maintaining possession of individual authenticators, not loaning or sharing individual 

authenticators with others, and reporting lost, stolen, or compromised authenticators immediately. 

Authenticator management includes issuing and revoking, when no longer needed, authenticators 

for temporary access such as that required for remote maintenance. Device authenticators include, 

for example, certificates and passwords. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-6, CM-6, IA-2, IA-4, 

IA-8, PL-4, PS-5, PS-6, SC-12, SC-13, SC-17, SC-28.

Control Enhancements:

(1) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PASSWORD-BASED AUTHENTICATION

The information system, for password-based authentication:

(a) Enforces minimum password complexity of [Assignment: organization-defined requirements 

for case sensitivity, number of characters, mix of upper-case letters, lower-case letters, 

numbers, and special characters, including minimum requirements for each type];

(b) Enforces at least the following number of changed characters when new passwords are 

created: [Assignment: organization-defined number];

(c) Stores and transmits only cryptographically-protected passwords;

(d) Enforces password minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions of [Assignment: organizationdefined numbers for lifetime minimum, lifetime maximum];

(e) Prohibits password reuse for [Assignment: organization-defined number] generations; and

(f) Allows the use of a temporary password for system logons with an immediate change to a 

permanent password.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to single-factor authentication of 

individuals using passwords as individual or group authenticators, and in a similar manner,

when passwords are part of multifactor authenticators. This control enhancement does not

apply when passwords are used to unlock hardware authenticators (e.g., Personal Identity 

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Verification cards). The implementation of such password mechanisms may not meet all of 

the requirements in the enhancement. Cryptographically-protected passwords include, for 

example, encrypted versions of passwords and one-way cryptographic hashes of passwords.

The number of changed characters refers to the number of changes required with respect to 

the total number of positions in the current password. Password lifetime restrictions do not 

apply to temporary passwords. To mitigate certain brute force attacks against passwords, 

organizations may also consider salting passwords. Related control: IA-6.

(2) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PKI-BASED AUTHENTICATION

The information system, for PKI-based authentication:

(a) Validates certifications by constructing and verifying a certification path to an accepted trust 

anchor including checking certificate status information;

(b) Enforces authorized access to the corresponding private key;

(c) Maps the authenticated identity to the account of the individual or group; and

(d) Implements a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery and validation in case 

of inability to access revocation information via the network.

Supplemental Guidance: Status information for certification paths includes, for example, 

certificate revocation lists or certificate status protocol responses. For PIV cards, validation of 

certifications involves the construction and verification of a certification path to the Common 

Policy Root trust anchor including certificate policy processing. Related control: IA-6.

(3) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | IN-PERSON OR TRUSTED THIRD-PARTY REGISTRATION

The organization requires that the registration process to receive [Assignment: organizationdefined types of and/or specific authenticators] be conducted [Selection: in person; by a trusted 

third party] before [Assignment: organization-defined registration authority] with authorization by 

[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

(4) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED SUPPORT FOR PASSWORD STRENGTH DETERMINATION

The organization employs automated tools to determine if password authenticators are sufficiently 

strong to satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined requirements].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement focuses on the creation of strong passwords 

and the characteristics of such passwords (e.g., complexity) prior to use, the enforcement of 

which is carried out by organizational information systems in IA-5 (1). Related controls: CA2, CA-7, RA-5.

(5) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | CHANGE AUTHENTICATORS PRIOR TO DELIVERY

The organization requires developers/installers of information system components to provide 

unique authenticators or change default authenticators prior to delivery/installation.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement extends the requirement for organizations to 

change default authenticators upon information system installation, by requiring developers

and/or installers to provide unique authenticators or change default authenticators for system 

components prior to delivery and/or installation. However, it typically does not apply to the 

developers of commercial off-the-shelve information technology products. Requirements for 

unique authenticators can be included in acquisition documents prepared by organizations

when procuring information systems or system components.

(6) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PROTECTION OF AUTHENTICATORS

The organization protects authenticators commensurate with the security category of the 

information to which use of the authenticator permits access.

Supplemental Guidance: For information systems containing multiple security categories of 

information without reliable physical or logical separation between categories, authenticators

used to grant access to the systems are protected commensurate with the highest security 

category of information on the systems.

(7) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | NO EMBEDDED UNENCRYPTED STATIC AUTHENTICATORS

The organization ensures that unencrypted static authenticators are not embedded in applications 

or access scripts or stored on function keys.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations exercise caution in determining whether embedded or 

stored authenticators are in encrypted or unencrypted form. If authenticators are used in the 

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manner stored, then those representations are considered unencrypted authenticators. This is 

irrespective of whether that representation is perhaps an encrypted version of something else 

(e.g., a password).

(8) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | MULTIPLE INFORMATION SYSTEM ACCOUNTS

The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to manage 

the risk of compromise due to individuals having accounts on multiple information systems.

Supplemental Guidance: When individuals have accounts on multiple information systems,

there is the risk that the compromise of one account may lead to the compromise of other 

accounts if individuals use the same authenticators. Possible alternatives include, for example: 

(i) having different authenticators on all systems; (ii) employing some form of single sign-on 

mechanism; or (iii) including some form of one-time passwords on all systems.

(9) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | CROSS-ORGANIZATION CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENT

The organization coordinates with [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] for 

cross-organization management of credentials.

Supplemental Guidance: Cross-organization management of credentials provides the capability 

for organizations to appropriately authenticate individuals, groups, roles, or devices when 

conducting cross-organization activities involving the processing, storage, or transmission of 

information.

(10) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC CREDENTIAL ASSOCIATION

The information system dynamically provisions identities.

Supplemental Guidance: Authentication requires some form of binding between an identity and 

the authenticator used to confirm the identity. In conventional approaches, this binding is 

established by pre-provisioning both the identity and the authenticator to the information 

system. For example, the binding between a username (i.e., identity) and a password (i.e., 

authenticator) is accomplished by provisioning the identity and authenticator as a pair in the 

information system. New authentication techniques allow the binding between the identity 

and the authenticator to be implemented outside an information system. For example, with 

smartcard credentials, the identity and the authenticator are bound together on the card. Using 

these credentials, information systems can authenticate identities that have not been preprovisioned, dynamically provisioning the identity after authentication. In these situations, 

organizations can anticipate the dynamic provisioning of identities. Preestablished trust 

relationships and mechanisms with appropriate authorities to validate identities and related 

credentials are essential.

(11) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | HARDWARE TOKEN-BASED AUTHENTICATION

The information system, for hardware token-based authentication, employs mechanisms that 

satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined token quality requirements].

Supplemental Guidance: Hardware token-based authentication typically refers to the use of 

PKI-based tokens, such as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card.

Organizations define specific requirements for tokens, such as working with a particular PKI.

(12) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | BIOMETRIC-BASED AUTHENTICATION

The information system, for biometric-based authentication, employs mechanisms that satisfy 

[Assignment: organization-defined biometric quality requirements].

Supplemental Guidance: Unlike password-based authentication which provides exact matches 

of user-input passwords to stored passwords, biometric authentication does not provide such 

exact matches. Depending upon the type of biometric and the type of collection mechanism,

there is likely to be some divergence from the presented biometric and stored biometric which 

serves as the basis of comparison. There will likely be both false positives and false negatives 

when making such comparisons. The rate at which the false accept and false reject rates are 

equal is known as the crossover rate. Biometric quality requirements include, for example, 

acceptable crossover rates, as that essentially reflects the accuracy of the biometric.

(13) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | EXPIRATION OF CACHED AUTHENTICATORS 

The information system prohibits the use of cached authenticators after [Assignment: 

organization-defined time period].

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(14) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | MANAGING CONTENT OF PKI TRUST STORES

The organization, for PKI-based authentication, employs a deliberate organization-wide

methodology for managing the content of PKI trust stores installed across all platforms including 

networks, operating systems, browsers, and applications.

(15) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | FICAM-APPROVED PRODUCTS AND SERVICES

The organization uses only FICAM-approved path discovery and validation products and services.

Supplemental Guidance: Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM)-

approved path discovery and validation products and services are those products and services 

that have been approved through the FICAM conformance program, where applicable.

References: OMB Memoranda 04-04, 11-11; FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 

800-73, 800-63, 800-76, 800-78; FICAM Roadmap and Implementation Guidance;

Web: http://idmanagement.gov.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IA-5 (1) (11) MOD IA-5 (1) (2) (3) (11) HIGH IA-5 (1) (2) (3) (11)

IA-6 AUTHENTICATOR FEEDBACK

Control: The information system obscures feedback of authentication information during the 

authentication process to protect the information from possible exploitation/use by unauthorized 

individuals.

Supplemental Guidance: The feedback from information systems does not provide information that 

would allow unauthorized individuals to compromise authentication mechanisms. For some types 

of information systems or system components, for example, desktops/notebooks with relatively 

large monitors, the threat (often referred to as shoulder surfing) may be significant. For other types 

of systems or components, for example, mobile devices with 2-4 inch screens, this threat may be 

less significant, and may need to be balanced against the increased likelihood of typographic input 

errors due to the small keyboards. Therefore, the means for obscuring the authenticator feedback is 

selected accordingly. Obscuring the feedback of authentication information includes, for example, 

displaying asterisks when users type passwords into input devices, or displaying feedback for a 

very limited time before fully obscuring it. Related control: PE-18.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW IA-6 MOD IA-6 HIGH IA-6

IA-7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE AUTHENTICATION

Control: The information system implements mechanisms for authentication to a cryptographic 

module that meet the requirements of applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, 

policies, regulations, standards, and guidance for such authentication.

Supplemental Guidance: Authentication mechanisms may be required within a cryptographic 

module to authenticate an operator accessing the module and to verify that the operator is 

authorized to assume the requested role and perform services within that role. Related controls: 

SC-12, SC-13.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: FIPS Publication 140; Web: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html. 

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IA-7 MOD IA-7 HIGH IA-7

IA-8 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)

Control: The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates non-organizational users (or 

processes acting on behalf of non-organizational users).

Supplemental Guidance: Non-organizational users include information system users other than 

organizational users explicitly covered by IA-2. These individuals are uniquely identified and 

authenticated for accesses other than those accesses explicitly identified and documented in AC14. In accordance with the E-Authentication E-Government initiative, authentication of nonorganizational users accessing federal information systems may be required to protect federal, 

proprietary, or privacy-related information (with exceptions noted for national security systems). 

Organizations use risk assessments to determine authentication needs and consider scalability, 

practicality, and security in balancing the need to ensure ease of use for access to federal 

information and information systems with the need to protect and adequately mitigate risk. IA-2 

addresses identification and authentication requirements for access to information systems by 

organizational users. Related controls: AC-2, AC-14, AC-17, AC-18, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, MA-4, 

RA-3, SA-12, SC-8.

Control Enhancements:

(1) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | ACCEPTANCE OF PIV CREDENTIALS FROM OTHER AGENCIES

The information system accepts and electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification (PIV) 

credentials from other federal agencies.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to logical access control systems 

(LACS) and physical access control systems (PACS). Personal Identity Verification (PIV)

credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to FIPS Publication 

201 and supporting guidance documents. OMB Memorandum 11-11 requires federal agencies 

to continue implementing the requirements specified in HSPD-12 to enable agency-wide use 

of PIV credentials. Related controls: AU-2, PE-3, SA-4.

(2) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | ACCEPTANCE OF THIRD-PARTY CREDENTIALS

The information system accepts only FICAM-approved third-party credentials.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement typically applies to organizational 

information systems that are accessible to the general public, for example, public-facing 

websites. Third-party credentials are those credentials issued by nonfederal government 

entities approved by the Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) Trust 

Framework Solutions initiative. Approved third-party credentials meet or exceed the set of 

minimum federal government-wide technical, security, privacy, and organizational maturity 

requirements. This allows federal government relying parties to trust such credentials at their 

approved assurance levels. Related control: AU-2.

(3) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | USE OF FICAM-APPROVED PRODUCTS

The organization employs only FICAM-approved information system components in [Assignment: 

organization-defined information systems] to accept third-party credentials.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement typically applies to information systems that 

are accessible to the general public, for example, public-facing websites. FICAM-approved 

information system components include, for example, information technology products and 

software libraries that have been approved by the Federal Identity, Credential, and Access 

Management conformance program. Related control: SA-4.

(4) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | USE OF FICAM-ISSUED PROFILES

The information system conforms to FICAM-issued profiles.

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Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses open identity management 

standards. To ensure that these standards are viable, robust, reliable, sustainable (e.g., 

available in commercial information technology products), and interoperable as documented, 

the United States Government assesses and scopes identity management standards and 

technology implementations against applicable federal legislation, directives, policies, and 

requirements. The result is FICAM-issued implementation profiles of approved protocols

(e.g., FICAM authentication protocols such as SAML 2.0 and OpenID 2.0, as well as other 

protocols such as the FICAM Backend Attribute Exchange). Related control: SA-4.

(5) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | ACCEPTANCE OF PIV-I CREDENTIALS

The information system accepts and electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification-I (PIV-I) 

credentials.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement: (i) applies to logical and physical access 

control systems; and (ii) addresses Non-Federal Issuers (NFIs) of identity cards that desire to 

interoperate with United States Government Personal Identity Verification (PIV) information 

systems and that can be trusted by federal government-relying parties. The X.509 certificate 

policy for the Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA) addresses PIV-I requirements. 

The PIV-I card is suitable for Assurance Level 4 as defined in OMB Memorandum 04-04 and 

NIST Special Publication 800-63, and multifactor authentication as defined in NIST Special 

Publication 800-116. PIV-I credentials are those credentials issued by a PIV-I provider whose 

PIV-I certificate policy maps to the Federal Bridge PIV-I Certificate Policy. A PIV-I provider 

is cross-certified (directly or through another PKI bridge) with the FBCA with policies that 

have been mapped and approved as meeting the requirements of the PIV-I policies defined in 

the FBCA certificate policy. Related control: AU-2.

References: OMB Memoranda 04-04, 11-11, 10-06-2011; FICAM Roadmap and Implementation 

Guidance; FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 800-63, 800-116; National Strategy 

for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace; Web: http://idmanagement.gov. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IA-8 (1) (2) (3) (4) MOD IA-8 (1) (2) (3) (4) HIGH IA-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)

IA-9 SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

Control: The organization identifies and authenticates [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system services] using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].

Supplemental Guidance: This control supports service-oriented architectures and other distributed 

architectural approaches requiring the identification and authentication of information system 

services. In such architectures, external services often appear dynamically. Therefore, information 

systems should be able to determine in a dynamic manner, if external providers and associated 

services are authentic. Safeguards implemented by organizational information systems to validate 

provider and service authenticity include, for example, information or code signing, provenance 

graphs, and/or electronic signatures indicating or including the sources of services.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | INFORMATION EXCHANGE

The organization ensures that service providers receive, validate, and transmit identification and 

authentication information.

(2) SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | TRANSMISSION OF DECISIONS

The organization ensures that identification and authentication decisions are transmitted between 

[Assignment: organization-defined services] consistent with organizational policies.

Supplemental Guidance: For distributed architectures (e.g., service-oriented architectures), the 

decisions regarding the validation of identification and authentication claims may be made by 

services separate from the services acting on those decisions. In such situations, it is necessary 

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to provide the identification and authentication decisions (as opposed to the actual identifiers

and authenticators) to the services that need to act on those decisions. Related control: SC-8.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

IA-10 ADAPTIVE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

Control: The organization requires that individuals accessing the information system employ 

[Assignment: organization-defined supplemental authentication techniques or mechanisms] under

specific [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances or situations].

Supplemental Guidance: Adversaries may compromise individual authentication mechanisms and 

subsequently attempt to impersonate legitimate users. This situation can potentially occur with any 

authentication mechanisms employed by organizations. To address this threat, organizations may 

employ specific techniques/mechanisms and establish protocols to assess suspicious behavior 

(e.g., individuals accessing information that they do not typically access as part of their normal 

duties, roles, or responsibilities, accessing greater quantities of information than the individuals 

would routinely access, or attempting to access information from suspicious network addresses). 

In these situations when certain preestablished conditions or triggers occur, organizations can 

require selected individuals to provide additional authentication information. Another potential use 

for adaptive identification and authentication is to increase the strength of mechanism based on the 

number and/or types of records being accessed. Related controls: AU-6, SI-4.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

IA-11 RE-AUTHENTICATION

Control: The organization requires users and devices to re-authenticate when [Assignment: 

organization-defined circumstances or situations requiring re-authentication].

Supplemental Guidance: In addition to the re-authentication requirements associated with session 

locks, organizations may require re-authentication of individuals and/or devices in other situations

including, for example: (i) when authenticators change; (ii), when roles change; (iii) when security 

categories of information systems change; (iv), when the execution of privileged functions occurs;

(v) after a fixed period of time; or (vi) periodically. Related control: AC-11.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

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FAMILY: INCIDENT RESPONSE

IR-1 INCIDENT RESPONSE POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles]:

1. An incident response policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, 

management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; 

and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the incident response policy and associated 

incident response controls; and

b. Reviews and updates the current:

1. Incident response policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and

2. Incident response procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the IR family.

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can 

be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The 

procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information 

systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing 

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-61, 800-83, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IR-1 MOD IR-1 HIGH IR-1

IR-2 INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING

Control: The organization provides incident response training to information system users

consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities:

a. Within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of assuming an incident response role 

or responsibility;

b. When required by information system changes; and

c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.

Supplemental Guidance: Incident response training provided by organizations is linked to the 

assigned roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure the appropriate content 

and level of detail is included in such training. For example, regular users may only need to know 

who to call or how to recognize an incident on the information system; system administrators may 

require additional training on how to handle/remediate incidents; and incident responders may 

receive more specific training on forensics, reporting, system recovery, and restoration. Incident 

response training includes user training in the identification and reporting of suspicious activities, 

both from external and internal sources. Related controls: AT-3, CP-3, IR-8.

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Control Enhancements:

(1) INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING | SIMULATED EVENTS

The organization incorporates simulated events into incident response training to facilitate 

effective response by personnel in crisis situations. 

(2) INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING | AUTOMATED TRAINING ENVIRONMENTS

The organization employs automated mechanisms to provide a more thorough and realistic 

incident response training environment.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-16, 800-50.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW IR-2 MOD IR-2 HIGH IR-2 (1) (2)

IR-3 INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING

Control: The organization tests the incident response capability for the information system 

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] using [Assignment: organization-defined tests] to 

determine the incident response effectiveness and documents the results.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations test incident response capabilities to determine the overall

effectiveness of the capabilities and to identify potential weaknesses or deficiencies. Incident 

response testing includes, for example, the use of checklists, walk-through or tabletop exercises, 

simulations (parallel/full interrupt), and comprehensive exercises. Incident response testing can 

also include a determination of the effects on organizational operations (e.g., reduction in mission 

capabilities), organizational assets, and individuals due to incident response. Related controls: CP4, IR-8.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING | AUTOMATED TESTING

The organization employs automated mechanisms to more thoroughly and effectively test the 

incident response capability.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations use automated mechanisms to more thoroughly and 

effectively test incident response capabilities, for example: (i) by providing more complete 

coverage of incident response issues; (ii) by selecting more realistic test scenarios and test 

environments; and (iii) by stressing the response capability. Related control: AT-2.

(2) INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING | COORDINATION WITH RELATED PLANS

The organization coordinates incident response testing with organizational elements responsible 

for related plans.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational plans related to incident response testing include, for 

example, Business Continuity Plans, Contingency Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity 

of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, and 

Occupant Emergency Plans.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-84, 800-115.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD IR-3 (2) HIGH IR-3 (2)

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IR-4 INCIDENT HANDLING

Control: The organization:

a. Implements an incident handling capability for security incidents that includes preparation, 

detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery;

b. Coordinates incident handling activities with contingency planning activities; and

c. Incorporates lessons learned from ongoing incident handling activities into incident response 

procedures, training, and testing, and implements the resulting changes accordingly.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations recognize that incident response capability is dependent on 

the capabilities of organizational information systems and the mission/business processes being 

supported by those systems. Therefore, organizations consider incident response as part of the 

definition, design, and development of mission/business processes and information systems.

Incident-related information can be obtained from a variety of sources including, for example, 

audit monitoring, network monitoring, physical access monitoring, user/administrator reports, and 

reported supply chain events. Effective incident handling capability includes coordination among

many organizational entities including, for example, mission/business owners, information system 

owners, authorizing officials, human resources offices, physical and personnel security offices, 

legal departments, operations personnel, procurement offices, and the risk executive (function).

Related controls: AU-6, CM-6, CP-2, CP-4, IR-2, IR-3, IR-8, PE-6, SC-5, SC-7, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INCIDENT HANDLING | AUTOMATED INCIDENT HANDLING PROCESSES

The organization employs automated mechanisms to support the incident handling process.

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms supporting incident handling processes 

include, for example, online incident management systems.

(2) INCIDENT HANDLING | DYNAMIC RECONFIGURATION

The organization includes dynamic reconfiguration of [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system components] as part of the incident response capability.

Supplemental Guidance: Dynamic reconfiguration includes, for example, changes to router 

rules, access control lists, intrusion detection/prevention system parameters, and filter rules 

for firewalls and gateways. Organizations perform dynamic reconfiguration of information 

systems, for example, to stop attacks, to misdirect attackers, and to isolate components of 

systems, thus limiting the extent of the damage from breaches or compromises. Organizations

include time frames for achieving the reconfiguration of information systems in the definition 

of the reconfiguration capability, considering the potential need for rapid response in order to 

effectively address sophisticated cyber threats. Related controls: AC-2, AC-4, AC-16, CM-2, 

CM-3, CM-4.

(3) INCIDENT HANDLING | CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS

The organization identifies [Assignment: organization-defined classes of incidents] and 

[Assignment: organization-defined actions to take in response to classes of incidents] to ensure 

continuation of organizational missions and business functions. 

Supplemental Guidance: Classes of incidents include, for example, malfunctions due to 

design/implementation errors and omissions, targeted malicious attacks, and untargeted 

malicious attacks. Appropriate incident response actions include, for example, graceful 

degradation, information system shutdown, fall back to manual mode/alternative technology 

whereby the system operates differently, employing deceptive measures, alternate information 

flows, or operating in a mode that is reserved solely for when systems are under attack.

(4) INCIDENT HANDLING | INFORMATION CORRELATION

The organization correlates incident information and individual incident responses to achieve an 

organization-wide perspective on incident awareness and response.

Supplemental Guidance: Sometimes the nature of a threat event, for example, a hostile cyber 

attack, is such that it can only be observed by bringing together information from different 

sources including various reports and reporting procedures established by organizations.

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(5) INCIDENT HANDLING | AUTOMATIC DISABLING OF INFORMATION SYSTEM

The organization implements a configurable capability to automatically disable the information 

system if [Assignment: organization-defined security violations] are detected.

(6) INCIDENT HANDLING | INSIDER THREATS - SPECIFIC CAPABILITIES

The organization implements incident handling capability for insider threats.

Supplemental Guidance: While many organizations address insider threat incidents as an 

inherent part of their organizational incident response capability, this control enhancement 

provides additional emphasis on this type of threat and the need for specific incident handling 

capabilities (as defined within organizations) to provide appropriate and timely responses.

(7) INCIDENT HANDLING | INSIDER THREATS - INTRA-ORGANIZATION COORDINATION

The organization coordinates incident handling capability for insider threats across [Assignment: 

organization-defined components or elements of the organization].

Supplemental Guidance: Incident handling for insider threat incidents (including preparation, 

detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery) requires close coordination 

among a variety of organizational components or elements to be effective. These components 

or elements include, for example, mission/business owners, information system owners, 

human resources offices, procurement offices, personnel/physical security offices, operations 

personnel, and risk executive (function). In addition, organizations may require external 

support from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

(8) INCIDENT HANDLING | CORRELATION WITH EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS

The organization coordinates with [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] to 

correlate and share [Assignment: organization-defined incident information] to achieve a crossorganization perspective on incident awareness and more effective incident responses.

Supplemental Guidance: The coordination of incident information with external organizations

including, for example, mission/business partners, military/coalition partners, customers, and 

multitiered developers, can provide significant benefits. Cross-organizational coordination 

with respect to incident handling can serve as an important risk management capability. This 

capability allows organizations to leverage critical information from a variety of sources to 

effectively respond to information security-related incidents potentially affecting the 

organization’s operations, assets, and individuals.

(9) INCIDENT HANDLING | DYNAMIC RESPONSE CAPABILITY

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined dynamic response capabilities] to 

effectively respond to security incidents.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses the deployment of replacement or 

new capabilities in a timely manner in response to security incidents (e.g., adversary actions 

during hostile cyber attacks). This includes capabilities implemented at the mission/business 

process level (e.g., activating alternative mission/business processes) and at the information 

system level. Related control: CP-10.

(10) INCIDENT HANDLING | SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION

The organization coordinates incident handling activities involving supply chain events with other 

organizations involved in the supply chain.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations involved in supply chain activities include, for example, 

system/product developers, integrators, manufacturers, packagers, assemblers, distributors, 

vendors, and resellers. Supply chain incidents include, for example, compromises/breaches

involving information system components, information technology products, development 

processes or personnel, and distribution processes or warehousing facilities.

References: Executive Order 13587; NIST Special Publication 800-61.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IR-4 MOD IR-4 (1) HIGH IR-4 (1) (4)

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IR-5 INCIDENT MONITORING

Control: The organization tracks and documents information system security incidents.

Supplemental Guidance: Documenting information system security incidents includes, for example,

maintaining records about each incident, the status of the incident, and other pertinent information 

necessary for forensics, evaluating incident details, trends, and handling. Incident information can 

be obtained from a variety of sources including, for example, incident reports, incident response 

teams, audit monitoring, network monitoring, physical access monitoring, and user/administrator 

reports. Related controls: AU-6, IR-8, PE-6, SC-5, SC-7, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INCIDENT MONITORING | AUTOMATED TRACKING / DATA COLLECTION / ANALYSIS

The organization employs automated mechanisms to assist in the tracking of security incidents 

and in the collection and analysis of incident information.

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms for tracking security incidents and 

collecting/analyzing incident information include, for example, the Einstein network 

monitoring device and monitoring online Computer Incident Response Centers (CIRCs) or 

other electronic databases of incidents. Related controls: AU-7, IR-4.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-61.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IR-5 MOD IR-5 HIGH IR-5 (1)

IR-6 INCIDENT REPORTING

Control: The organization:

a. Requires personnel to report suspected security incidents to the organizational incident 

response capability within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and

b. Reports security incident information to [Assignment: organization-defined authorities].

Supplemental Guidance: The intent of this control is to address both specific incident reporting 

requirements within an organization and the formal incident reporting requirements for federal 

agencies and their subordinate organizations. Suspected security incidents include, for example, 

the receipt of suspicious email communications that can potentially contain malicious code. The 

types of security incidents reported, the content and timeliness of the reports, and the designated 

reporting authorities reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Current federal policy requires that all federal agencies (unless 

specifically exempted from such requirements) report security incidents to the United States 

Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) within specified time frames designated in the 

US-CERT Concept of Operations for Federal Cyber Security Incident Handling. Related controls: 

IR-4, IR-5, IR-8.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INCIDENT REPORTING | AUTOMATED REPORTING

The organization employs automated mechanisms to assist in the reporting of security incidents.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: IR-7.

(2) INCIDENT REPORTING | VULNERABILITIES RELATED TO INCIDENTS

The organization reports information system vulnerabilities associated with reported security 

incidents to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

(3) INCIDENT REPORTING | COORDINATION WITH SUPPLY CHAIN

The organization provides security incident information to other organizations involved in the 

supply chain for information systems or information system components related to the incident.

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Supplemental Guidance: Organizations involved in supply chain activities include, for example, 

system/product developers, integrators, manufacturers, packagers, assemblers, distributors, 

vendors, and resellers. Supply chain incidents include, for example, compromises/breaches

involving information system components, information technology products, development 

processes or personnel, and distribution processes or warehousing facilities. Organizations 

determine the appropriate information to share considering the value gained from support by 

external organizations with the potential for harm due to sensitive information being released 

to outside organizations of perhaps questionable trustworthiness.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-61; Web: http://www.us-cert.gov. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IR-6 MOD IR-6 (1) HIGH IR-6 (1)

IR-7 INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE

Control: The organization provides an incident response support resource, integral to the 

organizational incident response capability that offers advice and assistance to users of the 

information system for the handling and reporting of security incidents. 

Supplemental Guidance: Incident response support resources provided by organizations include, for 

example, help desks, assistance groups, and access to forensics services, when required. Related 

controls: AT-2, IR-4, IR-6, IR-8, SA-9.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION / SUPPORT

The organization employs automated mechanisms to increase the availability of incident responserelated information and support.

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms can provide a push and/or pull capability for 

users to obtain incident response assistance. For example, individuals might have access to a 

website to query the assistance capability, or conversely, the assistance capability may have 

the ability to proactively send information to users (general distribution or targeted) as part of 

increasing understanding of current response capabilities and support.

(2) INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE | COORDINATION WITH EXTERNAL PROVIDERS

The organization:

(a) Establishes a direct, cooperative relationship between its incident response capability and 

external providers of information system protection capability; and

(b) Identifies organizational incident response team members to the external providers.

Supplemental Guidance: External providers of information system protection capability include, 

for example, the Computer Network Defense program within the U.S. Department of 

Defense. External providers help to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to 

unauthorized activity within organizational information systems and networks.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW IR-7 MOD IR-7 (1) HIGH IR-7 (1)

IR-8 INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN

Control: The organization:

a. Develops an incident response plan that:

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1. Provides the organization with a roadmap for implementing its incident response 

capability;

2. Describes the structure and organization of the incident response capability;

3. Provides a high-level approach for how the incident response capability fits into the 

overall organization;

4. Meets the unique requirements of the organization, which relate to mission, size, 

structure, and functions;

5. Defines reportable incidents;

6. Provides metrics for measuring the incident response capability within the organization;

7. Defines the resources and management support needed to effectively maintain and 

mature an incident response capability; and

8. Is reviewed and approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];

b. Distributes copies of the incident response plan to [Assignment: organization-defined incident 

response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements];

c. Reviews the incident response plan [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];

d. Updates the incident response plan to address system/organizational changes or problems 

encountered during plan implementation, execution, or testing;

e. Communicates incident response plan changes to [Assignment: organization-defined incident 

response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements]; and

f. Protects the incident response plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

Supplemental Guidance: It is important that organizations develop and implement a coordinated 

approach to incident response. Organizational missions, business functions, strategies, goals, and 

objectives for incident response help to determine the structure of incident response capabilities.

As part of a comprehensive incident response capability, organizations consider the coordination

and sharing of information with external organizations, including, for example, external service 

providers and organizations involved in the supply chain for organizational information systems.

Related controls: MP-2, MP-4, MP-5.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-61.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW IR-8 MOD IR-8 HIGH IR-8

IR-9 INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE

Control: The organization responds to information spills by:

a. Identifying the specific information involved in the information system contamination;

b. Alerting [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of the information spill using 

a method of communication not associated with the spill;

c. Isolating the contaminated information system or system component;

d. Eradicating the information from the contaminated information system or component;

e. Identifying other information systems or system components that may have been subsequently 

contaminated; and

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f. Performing other [Assignment: organization-defined actions].

Supplemental Guidance: Information spillage refers to instances where either classified or sensitive 

information is inadvertently placed on information systems that are not authorized to process such 

information. Such information spills often occur when information that is initially thought to be of 

lower sensitivity is transmitted to an information system and then is subsequently determined to be 

of higher sensitivity. At that point, corrective action is required. The nature of the organizational 

response is generally based upon the degree of sensitivity of the spilled information (e.g., security 

category or classification level), the security capabilities of the information system, the specific 

nature of contaminated storage media, and the access authorizations (e.g., security clearances) of 

individuals with authorized access to the contaminated system. The methods used to communicate 

information about the spill after the fact do not involve methods directly associated with the actual 

spill to minimize the risk of further spreading the contamination before such contamination is 

isolated and eradicated.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | RESPONSIBLE PERSONNEL 

The organization assigns [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] with responsibility 

for responding to information spills.

(2) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | TRAINING 

The organization provides information spillage response training [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency].

(3) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | POST-SPILL OPERATIONS

The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined procedures] to ensure that 

organizational personnel impacted by information spills can continue to carry out assigned tasks

while contaminated systems are undergoing corrective actions.

Supplemental Guidance: Correction actions for information systems contaminated due to 

information spillages may be very time-consuming. During those periods, personnel may not 

have access to the contaminated systems, which may potentially affect their ability to conduct 

organizational business.

(4) INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | EXPOSURE TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONNEL

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] for personnel 

exposed to information not within assigned access authorizations.

Supplemental Guidance: Security safeguards include, for example, making personnel exposed 

to spilled information aware of the federal laws, directives, policies, and/or regulations 

regarding the information and the restrictions imposed based on exposure to such information.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

IR-10 INTEGRATED INFORMATION SECURITY ANALYSIS TEAM

Control: The organization establishes an integrated team of forensic/malicious code analysts, tool 

developers, and real-time operations personnel.

Supplemental Guidance: Having an integrated team for incident response facilitates information 

sharing. Such capability allows organizational personnel, including developers, implementers, and 

operators, to leverage the team knowledge of the threat in order to implement defensive measures 

that will enable organizations to deter intrusions more effectively. Moreover, it promotes the rapid

detection of intrusions, development of appropriate mitigations, and the deployment of effective 

defensive measures. For example, when an intrusion is detected, the integrated security analysis 

team can rapidly develop an appropriate response for operators to implement, correlate the new 

incident with information on past intrusions, and augment ongoing intelligence development. This 

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enables the team to identify adversary TTPs that are linked to the operations tempo or to specific 

missions/business functions, and to define responsive actions in a way that does not disrupt the 

mission/business operations. Ideally, information security analysis teams are distributed within 

organizations to make the capability more resilient.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

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FAMILY: MAINTENANCE

MA-1 SYSTEM MAINTENANCE POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles]:

1. A system maintenance policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, 

management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; 

and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system maintenance policy and 

associated system maintenance controls; and

b. Reviews and updates the current:

1. System maintenance policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and

2. System maintenance procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the MA family.

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can 

be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The 

procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information 

systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing 

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW MA-1 MOD MA-1 HIGH MA-1

MA-2 CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE

Control: The organization:

a. Schedules, performs, documents, and reviews records of maintenance and repairs on

information system components in accordance with manufacturer or vendor specifications 

and/or organizational requirements;

b. Approves and monitors all maintenance activities, whether performed on site or remotely and 

whether the equipment is serviced on site or removed to another location;

c. Requires that [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] explicitly approve the 

removal of the information system or system components from organizational facilities for 

off-site maintenance or repairs;

d. Sanitizes equipment to remove all information from associated media prior to removal from 

organizational facilities for off-site maintenance or repairs;

e. Checks all potentially impacted security controls to verify that the controls are still 

functioning properly following maintenance or repair actions; and

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f. Includes [Assignment: organization-defined maintenance-related information] in 

organizational maintenance records.

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the information security aspects of the information 

system maintenance program and applies to all types of maintenance to any system component

(including applications) conducted by any local or nonlocal entity (e.g., in-contract, warranty, inhouse, software maintenance agreement). System maintenance also includes those components not 

directly associated with information processing and/or data/information retention such as scanners, 

copiers, and printers. Information necessary for creating effective maintenance records includes, 

for example: (i) date and time of maintenance; (ii) name of individuals or group performing the 

maintenance; (iii) name of escort, if necessary; (iv) a description of the maintenance performed; 

and (v) information system components/equipment removed or replaced (including identification 

numbers, if applicable). The level of detail included in maintenance records can be informed by 

the security categories of organizational information systems. Organizations consider supply chain 

issues associated with replacement components for information systems. Related controls: CM-3, 

CM-4, MA-4, MP-6, PE-16, SA-12, SI-2.

Control Enhancements:

(1) CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE | RECORD CONTENT

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MA-2].

(2) CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE | AUTOMATED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES

The organization:

(a) Employs automated mechanisms to schedule, conduct, and document maintenance and 

repairs; and

(b) Produces up-to date, accurate, and complete records of all maintenance and repair actions 

requested, scheduled, in process, and completed.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-7, MA-3.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW MA-2 MOD MA-2 HIGH MA-2 (2)

MA-3 MAINTENANCE TOOLS

Control: The organization approves, controls, and monitors information system maintenance tools.

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses security-related issues associated with maintenance 

tools used specifically for diagnostic and repair actions on organizational information systems. 

Maintenance tools can include hardware, software, and firmware items. Maintenance tools are 

potential vehicles for transporting malicious code, either intentionally or unintentionally, into a 

facility and subsequently into organizational information systems. Maintenance tools can include, 

for example, hardware/software diagnostic test equipment and hardware/software packet sniffers. 

This control does not cover hardware/software components that may support information system 

maintenance, yet are a part of the system, for example, the software implementing “ping,” “ls,”

“ipconfig,” or the hardware and software implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet switch.

Related controls: MA-2, MA-5, MP-6.

Control Enhancements:

(1) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT TOOLS

The organization inspects the maintenance tools carried into a facility by maintenance personnel 

for improper or unauthorized modifications.

Supplemental Guidance: If, upon inspection of maintenance tools, organizations determine that 

the tools have been modified in an improper/unauthorized manner or contain malicious code, 

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the incident is handled consistent with organizational policies and procedures for incident 

handling. Related control: SI-7.

(2) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT MEDIA

The organization checks media containing diagnostic and test programs for malicious code before 

the media are used in the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: If, upon inspection of media containing maintenance diagnostic and 

test programs, organizations determine that the media contain malicious code, the incident is 

handled consistent with organizational incident handling policies and procedures. Related 

control: SI-3.

(3) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL

The organization prevents the unauthorized removal of maintenance equipment containing 

organizational information by:

(a) Verifying that there is no organizational information contained on the equipment;

(b) Sanitizing or destroying the equipment;

(c) Retaining the equipment within the facility; or

(d) Obtaining an exemption from [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] explicitly 

authorizing removal of the equipment from the facility.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational information includes all information specifically owned 

by organizations and information provided to organizations in which organizations serve as 

information stewards.

(4) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | RESTRICTED TOOL USE

The information system restricts the use of maintenance tools to authorized personnel only.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to information systems that are used 

to carry out maintenance functions. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-88.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW Not Selected MOD MA-3 (1) (2) HIGH MA-3 (1) (2) (3)

MA-4 NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE

Control: The organization:

a. Approves and monitors nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities;

b. Allows the use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic tools only as consistent with 

organizational policy and documented in the security plan for the information system;

c. Employs strong authenticators in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic 

sessions;

d. Maintains records for nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities; and

e. Terminates session and network connections when nonlocal maintenance is completed. 

Supplemental Guidance: Nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities 

conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the 

Internet) or an internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities 

carried out by individuals physically present at the information system or information system 

component and not communicating across a network connection. Authentication techniques used 

in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions reflect the network access 

requirements in IA-2. Typically, strong authentication requires authenticators that are resistant to 

replay attacks and employ multifactor authentication. Strong authenticators include, for example, 

PKI where certificates are stored on a token protected by a password, passphrase, or biometric.

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Enforcing requirements in MA-4 is accomplished in part by other controls. Related controls: AC2, AC-3, AC-6, AC-17, AU-2, AU-3, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8, MA-2, MA-5, MP-6, PL-2, SC-7, 

SC-10, SC-17.

Control Enhancements:

(1) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | AUDITING AND REVIEW 

The organization:

(a) Audits nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions [Assignment: organization-defined 

audit events]; and

(b) Reviews the records of the maintenance and diagnostic sessions.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AU-2, AU-6, AU-12.

(2) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | DOCUMENT NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE

The organization documents in the security plan for the information system, the policies and 

procedures for the establishment and use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic connections.

(3) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | COMPARABLE SECURITY / SANITIZATION

The organization:

(a) Requires that nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic services be performed from an 

information system that implements a security capability comparable to the capability

implemented on the system being serviced; or

(b) Removes the component to be serviced from the information system prior to nonlocal

maintenance or diagnostic services, sanitizes the component (with regard to organizational 

information) before removal from organizational facilities, and after the service is performed, 

inspects and sanitizes the component (with regard to potentially malicious software) before 

reconnecting the component to the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Comparable security capability on information systems, diagnostic 

tools, and equipment providing maintenance services implies that the implemented security 

controls on those systems, tools, and equipment are at least as comprehensive as the controls 

on the information system being serviced. Related controls: MA-3, SA-12, SI-3, SI-7.

(4) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | AUTHENTICATION / SEPARATION OF MAINTENANCE SESSIONS

The organization protects nonlocal maintenance sessions by:

(a) Employing [Assignment: organization-defined authenticators that are replay resistant]; and

(b) Separating the maintenance sessions from other network sessions with the information 

system by either:

(1) Physically separated communications paths; or

(2) Logically separated communications paths based upon encryption.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SC-13.

(5) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | APPROVALS AND NOTIFICATIONS

The organization:

(a) Requires the approval of each nonlocal maintenance session by [Assignment: organizationdefined personnel or roles]; and

(b) Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of the date and time of planned 

nonlocal maintenance.

Supplemental Guidance: Notification may be performed by maintenance personnel. Approval of 

nonlocal maintenance sessions is accomplished by organizational personnel with sufficient 

information security and information system knowledge to determine the appropriateness of 

the proposed maintenance.

(6) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity and 

confidentiality of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: SC-8, SC-13.

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(7) NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | REMOTE DISCONNECT VERIFICATION

The information system implements remote disconnect verification at the termination of nonlocal

maintenance and diagnostic sessions.

Supplemental Guidance: Remote disconnect verification ensures that remote connections from 

nonlocal maintenance sessions have been terminated and are no longer available for use. 

Related control: SC-13.

References: FIPS Publications 140-2, 197, 201; NIST Special Publications 800-63, 800-88; CNSS 

Policy 15.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW MA-4 MOD MA-4 (2) HIGH MA-4 (2) (3)

MA-5 MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL

Control: The organization:

a. Establishes a process for maintenance personnel authorization and maintains a list of 

authorized maintenance organizations or personnel;

b. Ensures that non-escorted personnel performing maintenance on the information system have

required access authorizations; and

c. Designates organizational personnel with required access authorizations and technical 

competence to supervise the maintenance activities of personnel who do not possess the 

required access authorizations.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to individuals performing hardware or software 

maintenance on organizational information systems, while PE-2 addresses physical access for 

individuals whose maintenance duties place them within the physical protection perimeter of the 

systems (e.g., custodial staff, physical plant maintenance personnel). Technical competence of 

supervising individuals relates to the maintenance performed on the information systems while 

having required access authorizations refers to maintenance on and near the systems. Individuals 

not previously identified as authorized maintenance personnel, such as information technology 

manufacturers, vendors, systems integrators, and consultants, may require privileged access to 

organizational information systems, for example, when required to conduct maintenance activities 

with little or no notice. Based on organizational assessments of risk, organizations may issue 

temporary credentials to these individuals. Temporary credentials may be for one-time use or for 

very limited time periods. Related controls: AC-2, IA-8, MP-2, PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, RA-3.

Control Enhancements:

(1) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT APPROPRIATE ACCESS

The organization:

(a) Implements procedures for the use of maintenance personnel that lack appropriate security 

clearances or are not U.S. citizens, that include the following requirements:

(1) Maintenance personnel who do not have needed access authorizations, clearances, or 

formal access approvals are escorted and supervised during the performance of 

maintenance and diagnostic activities on the information system by approved 

organizational personnel who are fully cleared, have appropriate access authorizations, 

and are technically qualified;

(2) Prior to initiating maintenance or diagnostic activities by personnel who do not have 

needed access authorizations, clearances or formal access approvals, all volatile 

information storage components within the information system are sanitized and all 

nonvolatile storage media are removed or physically disconnected from the system and 

secured; and

(b) Develops and implements alternate security safeguards in the event an information system 

component cannot be sanitized, removed, or disconnected from the system.

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Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement denies individuals who lack appropriate 

security clearances (i.e., individuals who do not possess security clearances or possess 

security clearances at a lower level than required) or who are not U.S. citizens, visual and 

electronic access to any classified information, Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), or 

any other sensitive information contained on organizational information systems. Procedures 

for the use of maintenance personnel can be documented in security plans for the information 

systems. Related controls: MP-6, PL-2.

(2) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR CLASSIFIED SYSTEMS

The organization ensures that personnel performing maintenance and diagnostic activities on an

information system processing, storing, or transmitting classified information possess security 

clearances and formal access approvals for at least the highest classification level and for all 

compartments of information on the system.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: PS-3.

(3) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASSIFIED SYSTEMS

The organization ensures that personnel performing maintenance and diagnostic activities on an

information system processing, storing, or transmitting classified information are U.S. citizens.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: PS-3.

(4) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | FOREIGN NATIONALS

The organization ensures that:

(a) Cleared foreign nationals (i.e., foreign nationals with appropriate security clearances), are 

used to conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on classified information systems only 

when the systems are jointly owned and operated by the United States and foreign allied 

governments, or owned and operated solely by foreign allied governments; and

(b) Approvals, consents, and detailed operational conditions regarding the use of foreign 

nationals to conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on classified information systems

are fully documented within Memoranda of Agreements.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: PS-3.

(5) MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | NONSYSTEM-RELATED MAINTENANCE

The organization ensures that non-escorted personnel performing maintenance activities not 

directly associated with the information system but in the physical proximity of the system, have 

required access authorizations.

Supplemental Guidance: Personnel performing maintenance activities in other capacities not 

directly related to the information system include, for example, physical plant personnel and 

janitorial personnel.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW MA-5 MOD MA-5 HIGH MA-5 (1)

MA-6 TIMELY MAINTENANCE

Control: The organization obtains maintenance support and/or spare parts for [Assignment: 

organization-defined information system components] within [Assignment: organization-defined 

time period] of failure.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations specify the information system components that result in 

increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the 

Nation when the functionality provided by those components is not operational. Organizational 

actions to obtain maintenance support typically include having appropriate contracts in place. 

Related controls: CM-8, CP-2, CP-7, SA-14, SA-15.

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Control Enhancements:

(1) TIMELY MAINTENANCE | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE

The organization performs preventive maintenance on [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system components] at [Assignment: organization-defined time intervals].

Supplemental Guidance: Preventive maintenance includes proactive care and servicing of 

organizational information systems components for the purpose of maintaining equipment and 

facilities in satisfactory operating condition. Such maintenance provides for the systematic 

inspection, tests, measurements, adjustments, parts replacement, detection, and correction of 

incipient failures either before they occur or before they develop into major defects. The 

primary goal of preventive maintenance is to avoid/mitigate the consequences of equipment

failures. Preventive maintenance is designed to preserve and restore equipment reliability by 

replacing worn components before they actually fail. Methods of determining what preventive 

(or other) failure management policies to apply include, for example, original equipment 

manufacturer (OEM) recommendations, statistical failure records, requirements of codes, 

legislation, or regulations within a jurisdiction, expert opinion, maintenance that has already 

been conducted on similar equipment, or measured values and performance indications.

(2) TIMELY MAINTENANCE | PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE

The organization performs predictive maintenance on [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system components] at [Assignment: organization-defined time intervals].

Supplemental Guidance: Predictive maintenance, or condition-based maintenance, attempts to 

evaluate the condition of equipment by performing periodic or continuous (online) equipment 

condition monitoring. The goal of predictive maintenance is to perform maintenance at a 

scheduled point in time when the maintenance activity is most cost-effective and before the 

equipment loses performance within a threshold. The predictive component of predictive 

maintenance stems from the goal of predicting the future trend of the equipment's condition. 

This approach uses principles of statistical process control to determine at what point in the 

future maintenance activities will be appropriate. Most predictive maintenance inspections are 

performed while equipment is in service, thereby minimizing disruption of normal system 

operations. Predictive maintenance can result in substantial cost savings and higher system 

reliability. Predictive maintenance tends to include measurement of the item. To evaluate 

equipment condition, predictive maintenance utilizes nondestructive testing technologies such 

as infrared, acoustic (partial discharge and airborne ultrasonic), corona detection, vibration 

analysis, sound level measurements, oil analysis, and other specific online tests.

(3) TIMELY MAINTENANCE | AUTOMATED SUPPORT FOR PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE

The organization employs automated mechanisms to transfer predictive maintenance data to a 

computerized maintenance management system.

Supplemental Guidance: A computerized maintenance management system maintains a 

computer database of information about the maintenance operations of organizations and 

automates processing equipment condition data in order to trigger maintenance planning, 

execution, and reporting.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD MA-6 HIGH MA-6

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FAMILY: MEDIA PROTECTION

MP-1 MEDIA PROTECTION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles]:

1. A media protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, 

management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; 

and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the media protection policy and associated 

media protection controls; and

b. Reviews and updates the current:

1. Media protection policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and

2. Media protection procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the MP family.

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can 

be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The 

procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information 

systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing 

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW MP-1 MOD MP-1 HIGH MP-1

MP-2 MEDIA ACCESS

Control: The organization restricts access to [Assignment: organization-defined types of digital 

and/or non-digital media] to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. 

Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk 

drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for 

example, paper and microfilm. Restricting non-digital media access includes, for example, 

denying access to patient medical records in a community hospital unless the individuals seeking 

access to such records are authorized healthcare providers. Restricting access to digital media 

includes, for example, limiting access to design specifications stored on compact disks in the 

media library to the project leader and the individuals on the development team. Related controls: 

AC-3, IA-2, MP-4, PE-2, PE-3, PL-2.

Control Enhancements:

(1) MEDIA ACCESS | AUTOMATED RESTRICTED ACCESS 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-4 (2)].

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(2) MEDIA ACCESS | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-28 (1)].

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-111.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW MP-2 MOD MP-2 HIGH MP-2

MP-3 MEDIA MARKING

Control: The organization:

a. Marks information system media indicating the distribution limitations, handling caveats, and 

applicable security markings (if any) of the information; and

b. Exempts [Assignment: organization-defined types of information system media] from marking

as long as the media remain within [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas]. 

Supplemental Guidance: The term security marking refers to the application/use of human-readable

security attributes. The term security labeling refers to the application/use of security attributes 

with regard to internal data structures within information systems (see AC-16). Information 

system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example,

diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and 

digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. Security 

marking is generally not required for media containing information determined by organizations to 

be in the public domain or to be publicly releasable. However, some organizations may require 

markings for public information indicating that the information is publicly releasable. Marking of

information system media reflects applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, 

regulations, standards, and guidance. Related controls: AC-16, PL-2, RA-3. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: FIPS Publication 199.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD MP-3 HIGH MP-3

MP-4 MEDIA STORAGE

Control: The organization:

a. Physically controls and securely stores [Assignment: organization-defined types of digital 

and/or non-digital media] within [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas]; and

b. Protects information system media until the media are destroyed or sanitized using approved 

equipment, techniques, and procedures.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. 

Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk 

drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for 

example, paper and microfilm. Physically controlling information system media includes, for 

example, conducting inventories, ensuring procedures are in place to allow individuals to check 

out and return media to the media library, and maintaining accountability for all stored media. 

Secure storage includes, for example, a locked drawer, desk, or cabinet, or a controlled media 

library. The type of media storage is commensurate with the security category and/or classification 

of the information residing on the media. Controlled areas are areas for which organizations 

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provide sufficient physical and procedural safeguards to meet the requirements established for 

protecting information and/or information systems. For media containing information determined 

by organizations to be in the public domain, to be publicly releasable, or to have limited or no 

adverse impact on organizations or individuals if accessed by other than authorized personnel, 

fewer safeguards may be needed. In these situations, physical access controls provide adequate 

protection. Related controls: CP-6, CP-9, MP-2, MP-7, PE-3.

Control Enhancements:

(1) MEDIA STORAGE | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-28 (1)].

(2) MEDIA STORAGE | AUTOMATED RESTRICTED ACCESS 

The organization employs automated mechanisms to restrict access to media storage areas and to 

audit access attempts and access granted.

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms can include, for example, keypads on the 

external entries to media storage areas. Related controls: AU-2, AU-9, AU-6, AU-12.

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-56, 800-57, 800-111.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD MP-4 HIGH MP-4

MP-5 MEDIA TRANSPORT

Control: The organization:

a. Protects and controls [Assignment: organization-defined types of information system media]

during transport outside of controlled areas using [Assignment: organization-defined security 

safeguards];

b. Maintains accountability for information system media during transport outside of controlled 

areas;

c. Documents activities associated with the transport of information system media; and

d. Restricts the activities associated with the transport of information system media to authorized 

personnel.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. 

Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk

drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for 

example, paper and microfilm. This control also applies to mobile devices with information

storage capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, E-readers), that are transported outside of controlled 

areas. Controlled areas are areas or spaces for which organizations provide sufficient physical

and/or procedural safeguards to meet the requirements established for protecting information 

and/or information systems. 

Physical and technical safeguards for media are commensurate with the security category or 

classification of the information residing on the media. Safeguards to protect media during 

transport include, for example, locked containers and cryptography. Cryptographic mechanisms 

can provide confidentiality and integrity protections depending upon the mechanisms used.

Activities associated with transport include the actual transport as well as those activities such as 

releasing media for transport and ensuring that media enters the appropriate transport processes. 

For the actual transport, authorized transport and courier personnel may include individuals from 

outside the organization (e.g., U.S. Postal Service or a commercial transport or delivery service).

Maintaining accountability of media during transport includes, for example, restricting transport 

activities to authorized personnel, and tracking and/or obtaining explicit records of transport 

activities as the media moves through the transportation system to prevent and detect loss, 

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destruction, or tampering. Organizations establish documentation requirements for activities 

associated with the transport of information system media in accordance with organizational 

assessments of risk to include the flexibility to define different record-keeping methods for the

different types of media transport as part of an overall system of transport-related records. Related 

controls: AC-19, CP-9, MP-3, MP-4, RA-3, SC-8, SC-13, SC-28.

Control Enhancements:

(1) MEDIA TRANSPORT | PROTECTION OUTSIDE OF CONTROLLED AREAS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-5].

(2) MEDIA TRANSPORT | DOCUMENTATION OF ACTIVITIES

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-5].

(3) MEDIA TRANSPORT | CUSTODIANS

The organization employs an identified custodian during transport of information system media

outside of controlled areas.

Supplemental Guidance: Identified custodians provide organizations with specific points of 

contact during the media transport process and facilitate individual accountability. Custodial 

responsibilities can be transferred from one individual to another as long as an unambiguous 

custodian is identified at all times.

(4) MEDIA TRANSPORT | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and 

integrity of information stored on digital media during transport outside of controlled areas.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to both portable storage devices

(e.g., USB memory sticks, compact disks, digital video disks, external/removable hard disk 

drives) and mobile devices with storage capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, E-readers). 

Related control: MP-2.

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-60.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD MP-5 (4) HIGH MP-5 (4)

MP-6 MEDIA SANITIZATION

Control: The organization:

a. Sanitizes [Assignment: organization-defined information system media] prior to disposal, 

release out of organizational control, or release for reuse using [Assignment: organizationdefined sanitization techniques and procedures] in accordance with applicable federal and 

organizational standards and policies; and

b. Employs sanitization mechanisms with the strength and integrity commensurate with the 

security category or classification of the information.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to all information system media, both digital and nondigital, subject to disposal or reuse, whether or not the media is considered removable. Examples 

include media found in scanners, copiers, printers, notebook computers, workstations, network 

components, and mobile devices. The sanitization process removes information from the media 

such that the information cannot be retrieved or reconstructed. Sanitization techniques, including

clearing, purging, cryptographic erase, and destruction, prevent the disclosure of information to 

unauthorized individuals when such media is reused or released for disposal. Organizations 

determine the appropriate sanitization methods recognizing that destruction is sometimes 

necessary when other methods cannot be applied to media requiring sanitization. Organizations 

use discretion on the employment of approved sanitization techniques and procedures for media 

containing information deemed to be in the public domain or publicly releasable, or deemed to 

have no adverse impact on organizations or individuals if released for reuse or disposal. 

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Sanitization of non-digital media includes, for example, removing a classified appendix from an 

otherwise unclassified document, or redacting selected sections or words from a document by 

obscuring the redacted sections/words in a manner equivalent in effectiveness to removing them 

from the document. NSA standards and policies control the sanitization process for media 

containing classified information. Related controls: MA-2, MA-4, RA-3, SC-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) MEDIA SANITIZATION | REVIEW / APPROVE / TRACK / DOCUMENT / VERIFY

The organization reviews, approves, tracks, documents, and verifies media sanitization and 

disposal actions.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations review and approve media to be sanitized to ensure 

compliance with records-retention policies. Tracking/documenting actions include, for 

example, listing personnel who reviewed and approved sanitization and disposal actions, 

types of media sanitized, specific files stored on the media, sanitization methods used, date 

and time of the sanitization actions, personnel who performed the sanitization, verification 

actions taken, personnel who performed the verification, and disposal action taken. 

Organizations verify that the sanitization of the media was effective prior to disposal. Related 

control: SI-12.

(2) MEDIA SANITIZATION | EQUIPMENT TESTING

The organization tests sanitization equipment and procedures [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency] to verify that the intended sanitization is being achieved.

Supplemental Guidance: Testing of sanitization equipment and procedures may be conducted by 

qualified and authorized external entities (e.g., other federal agencies or external service 

providers).

(3) MEDIA SANITIZATION | NONDESTRUCTIVE TECHNIQUES

The organization applies nondestructive sanitization techniques to portable storage devices prior 

to connecting such devices to the information system under the following circumstances: 

[Assignment: organization-defined circumstances requiring sanitization of portable storage 

devices].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to digital media containing classified 

information and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI). Portable storage devices can be 

the source of malicious code insertions into organizational information systems. Many of 

these devices are obtained from unknown and potentially untrustworthy sources and may 

contain malicious code that can be readily transferred to information systems through USB

ports or other entry portals. While scanning such storage devices is always recommended, 

sanitization provides additional assurance that the devices are free of malicious code to 

include code capable of initiating zero-day attacks. Organizations consider nondestructive 

sanitization of portable storage devices when such devices are first purchased from the 

manufacturer or vendor prior to initial use or when organizations lose a positive chain of 

custody for the devices. Related control: SI-3.

(4) MEDIA SANITIZATION | CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-6].

(5) MEDIA SANITIZATION | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-6].

(6) MEDIA SANITIZATION | MEDIA DESTRUCTION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-6].

(7) MEDIA SANITIZATION | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

The organization enforces dual authorization for the sanitization of [Assignment: organizationdefined information system media].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations employ dual authorization to ensure that information 

system media sanitization cannot occur unless two technically qualified individuals conduct

the task. Individuals sanitizing information system media possess sufficient skills/expertise to

determine if the proposed sanitization reflects applicable federal/organizational standards, 

policies, and procedures. Dual authorization also helps to ensure that sanitization occurs as 

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intended, both protecting against errors and false claims of having performed the sanitization 

actions. Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control. Related controls: AC-3, 

MP-2.

(8) MEDIA SANITIZATION | REMOTE PURGING / WIPING OF INFORMATION

The organization provides the capability to purge/wipe information from [Assignment: 

organization-defined information systems, system components, or devices] either remotely or 

under the following conditions: [Assignment: organization-defined conditions].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement protects data/information on organizational 

information systems, system components, or devices (e.g., mobile devices) if such systems, 

components, or devices are obtained by unauthorized individuals. Remote purge/wipe 

commands require strong authentication to mitigate the risk of unauthorized individuals

purging/wiping the system/component/device. The purge/wipe function can be implemented 

in a variety of ways including, for example, by overwriting data/information multiple times or 

by destroying the key necessary to decrypt encrypted data.

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-60, 800-88; 

Web: http://www.nsa.gov/ia/mitigation_guidance/media_destruction_guidance/index.shtml.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW MP-6 MOD MP-6 HIGH MP-6 (1) (2) (3)

MP-7 MEDIA USE

Control: The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the use of [Assignment: organizationdefined types of information system media] on [Assignment: organization-defined information 

systems or system components] using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].

Supplemental Guidance: Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. 

Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk

drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for 

example, paper and microfilm. This control also applies to mobile devices with information 

storage capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, E-readers). In contrast to MP-2, which restricts user 

access to media, this control restricts the use of certain types of media on information systems, for 

example, restricting/prohibiting the use of flash drives or external hard disk drives. Organizations 

can employ technical and nontechnical safeguards (e.g., policies, procedures, rules of behavior) to 

restrict the use of information system media. Organizations may restrict the use of portable storage 

devices, for example, by using physical cages on workstations to prohibit access to certain external 

ports, or disabling/removing the ability to insert, read or write to such devices. Organizations may 

also limit the use of portable storage devices to only approved devices including, for example, 

devices provided by the organization, devices provided by other approved organizations, and 

devices that are not personally owned. Finally, organizations may restrict the use of portable 

storage devices based on the type of device, for example, prohibiting the use of writeable, portable 

storage devices, and implementing this restriction by disabling or removing the capability to write 

to such devices. Related controls: AC-19, PL-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) MEDIA USE | PROHIBIT USE WITHOUT OWNER

The organization prohibits the use of portable storage devices in organizational information 

systems when such devices have no identifiable owner.

Supplemental Guidance: Requiring identifiable owners (e.g., individuals, organizations, or 

projects) for portable storage devices reduces the risk of using such technologies by allowing 

organizations to assign responsibility and accountability for addressing known vulnerabilities 

in the devices (e.g., malicious code insertion). Related control: PL-4.

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(2) MEDIA USE | PROHIBIT USE OF SANITIZATION-RESISTANT MEDIA 

The organization prohibits the use of sanitization-resistant media in organizational information 

systems.

Supplemental Guidance: Sanitization-resistance applies to the capability to purge information 

from media. Certain types of media do not support sanitize commands, or if supported, the 

interfaces are not supported in a standardized way across these devices. Sanitization-resistant 

media include, for example, compact flash, embedded flash on boards and devices, solid state 

drives, and USB removable media. Related control: MP-6.

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-111.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW MP-7 MOD MP-7 (1) HIGH MP-7 (1)

MP-8 MEDIA DOWNGRADING

Control: The organization:

a. Establishes [Assignment: organization-defined information system media downgrading 

process] that includes employing downgrading mechanisms with [Assignment: organizationdefined strength and integrity];

b. Ensures that the information system media downgrading process is commensurate with the 

security category and/or classification level of the information to be removed and the access 

authorizations of the potential recipients of the downgraded information;

c. Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined information system media requiring 

downgrading]; and

d. Downgrades the identified information system media using the established process.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to all information system media, digital and nondigital, subject to release outside of the organization, whether or not the media is considered 

removable. The downgrading process, when applied to system media, removes information from

the media, typically by security category or classification level, such that the information cannot 

be retrieved or reconstructed. Downgrading of media includes redacting information to enable 

wider release and distribution. Downgrading of media also ensures that empty space on the media 

(e.g., slack space within files) is devoid of information.

Control Enhancements:

(1) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | DOCUMENTATION OF PROCESS

The organization documents information system media downgrading actions.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can document the media downgrading process by 

providing information such as the downgrading technique employed, the identification 

number of the downgraded media, and the identity of the individual that authorized and/or 

performed the downgrading action.

(2) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | EQUIPMENT TESTING 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined tests] of downgrading equipment and 

procedures to verify correct performance [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

(3) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

The organization downgrades information system media containing [Assignment: organizationdefined Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)] prior to public release in accordance with 

applicable federal and organizational standards and policies.

(4) MEDIA DOWNGRADING | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

The organization downgrades information system media containing classified information prior to 

release to individuals without required access authorizations in accordance with NSA standards 

and policies.

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Supplemental Guidance: Downgrading of classified information uses approved sanitization 

tools, techniques, and procedures to transfer information confirmed to be unclassified from 

classified information systems to unclassified media.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

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FAMILY: PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

PE-1 PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles]:

1. A physical and environmental protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 

responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, 

and compliance; and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the physical and environmental protection 

policy and associated physical and environmental protection controls; and

b. Reviews and updates the current:

1. Physical and environmental protection policy [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency]; and

2. Physical and environmental protection procedures [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PE family.

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can 

be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The 

procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information 

systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing 

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PE-1 MOD PE-1 HIGH PE-1

PE-2 PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, approves, and maintains a list of individuals with authorized access to the facility 

where the information system resides;

b. Issues authorization credentials for facility access;

c. Reviews the access list detailing authorized facility access by individuals [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency]; and

d. Removes individuals from the facility access list when access is no longer required.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to organizational employees and visitors. Individuals 

(e.g., employees, contractors, and others) with permanent physical access authorization credentials 

are not considered visitors. Authorization credentials include, for example, badges, identification 

cards, and smart cards. Organizations determine the strength of authorization credentials needed 

(including level of forge-proof badges, smart cards, or identification cards) consistent with federal 

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standards, policies, and procedures. This control only applies to areas within facilities that have 

not been designated as publicly accessible. Related controls: PE-3, PE-4, PS-3.

Control Enhancements:

(1) PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | ACCESS BY POSITION / ROLE

The organization authorizes physical access to the facility where the information system resides 

based on position or role.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-6.

(2) PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | TWO FORMS OF IDENTIFICATION

The organization requires two forms of identification from [Assignment: organization-defined list of 

acceptable forms of identification] for visitor access to the facility where the information system 

resides.

Supplemental Guidance: Acceptable forms of government photo identification include, for 

example, passports, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards, and drivers’ licenses. In the 

case of gaining access to facilities using automated mechanisms, organizations may use PIV

cards, key cards, PINs, and biometrics. Related controls: IA-2, IA-4, IA-5.

(3) PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | RESTRICT UNESCORTED ACCESS

The organization restricts unescorted access to the facility where the information system resides 

to personnel with [Selection (one or more): security clearances for all information contained within 

the system; formal access authorizations for all information contained within the system; need for 

access to all information contained within the system; [Assignment: organization-defined 

credentials]].

Supplemental Guidance: Due to the highly sensitive nature of classified information stored 

within certain facilities, it is important that individuals lacking sufficient security clearances, 

access approvals, or need to know, be escorted by individuals with appropriate credentials to 

ensure that such information is not exposed or otherwise compromised. Related controls: PS2, PS-6.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PE-2 MOD PE-2 HIGH PE-2

PE-3 PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL

Control: The organization:

a. Enforces physical access authorizations at [Assignment: organization-defined entry/exit points 

to the facility where the information system resides] by;

1. Verifying individual access authorizations before granting access to the facility; and

2. Controlling ingress/egress to the facility using [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: 

organization-defined physical access control systems/devices]; guards];

b. Maintains physical access audit logs for [Assignment: organization-defined entry/exit points];

c. Provides [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to control access to areas 

within the facility officially designated as publicly accessible;

d. Escorts visitors and monitors visitor activity [Assignment: organization-defined 

circumstances requiring visitor escorts and monitoring];

e. Secures keys, combinations, and other physical access devices;

f. Inventories [Assignment: organization-defined physical access devices] every [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency]; and

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g. Changes combinations and keys [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and/or when 

keys are lost, combinations are compromised, or individuals are transferred or terminated.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to organizational employees and visitors. Individuals 

(e.g., employees, contractors, and others) with permanent physical access authorization credentials 

are not considered visitors. Organizations determine the types of facility guards needed including, 

for example, professional physical security staff or other personnel such as administrative staff or 

information system users. Physical access devices include, for example, keys, locks, combinations, 

and card readers. Safeguards for publicly accessible areas within organizational facilities include,

for example, cameras, monitoring by guards, and isolating selected information systems and/or 

system components in secured areas. Physical access control systems comply with applicable 

federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. The 

Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management Program provides implementation guidance 

for identity, credential, and access management capabilities for physical access control systems. 

Organizations have flexibility in the types of audit logs employed. Audit logs can be procedural

(e.g., a written log of individuals accessing the facility and when such access occurred), automated 

(e.g., capturing ID provided by a PIV card), or some combination thereof. Physical access points

can include facility access points, interior access points to information systems and/or components

requiring supplemental access controls, or both. Components of organizational information 

systems (e.g., workstations, terminals) may be located in areas designated as publicly accessible 

with organizations safeguarding access to such devices. Related controls: AU-2, AU-6, MP-2, 

MP-4, PE-2, PE-4, PE-5, PS-3, RA-3.

Control Enhancements:

(1) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | INFORMATION SYSTEM ACCESS 

The organization enforces physical access authorizations to the information system in addition to 

the physical access controls for the facility at [Assignment: organization-defined physical spaces 

containing one or more components of the information system].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement provides additional physical security for 

those areas within facilities where there is a concentration of information system components

(e.g., server rooms, media storage areas, data and communications centers). Related control: 

PS-2.

(2) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | FACILITY / INFORMATION SYSTEM BOUNDARIES

The organization performs security checks [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] at the 

physical boundary of the facility or information system for unauthorized exfiltration of information 

or removal of information system components.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine the extent, frequency, and/or randomness of

security checks to adequately mitigate risk associated with exfiltration. Related controls: AC4, SC-7.

(3) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | CONTINUOUS GUARDS / ALARMS / MONITORING

The organization employs guards and/or alarms to monitor every physical access point to the 

facility where the information system resides 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CP-6, CP-7.

(4) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | LOCKABLE CASINGS

The organization uses lockable physical casings to protect [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system components] from unauthorized physical access.

(5) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | TAMPER PROTECTION

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to [Selection 

(one or more): detect; prevent] physical tampering or alteration of [Assignment: organizationdefined hardware components] within the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may implement tamper detection/prevention at selected 

hardware components or tamper detection at some components and tamper prevention at other 

components. Tamper detection/prevention activities can employ many types of anti-tamper 

technologies including, for example, tamper-detection seals and anti-tamper coatings. Antitamper programs help to detect hardware alterations through counterfeiting and other supply 

chain-related risks. Related control: SA-12.

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(6) PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | FACILITY PENETRATION TESTING

The organization employs a penetration testing process that includes [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency], unannounced attempts to bypass or circumvent security controls associated 

with physical access points to the facility.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-2, CA-7.

References: FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 800-73, 800-76, 800-78, 800-116; 

ICD 704, 705; DoD Instruction 5200.39; Personal Identity Verification (PIV) in Enterprise 

Physical Access Control System (E-PACS); 

Web: http://idmanagement.gov, http://fips201ep.cio.gov. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PE-3 MOD PE-3 HIGH PE-3 (1)

PE-4 ACCESS CONTROL FOR TRANSMISSION MEDIUM

Control: The organization controls physical access to [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system distribution and transmission lines] within organizational facilities using 

[Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].

Supplemental Guidance: Physical security safeguards applied to information system distribution and 

transmission lines help to prevent accidental damage, disruption, and physical tampering. In 

addition, physical safeguards may be necessary to help prevent eavesdropping or in transit 

modification of unencrypted transmissions. Security safeguards to control physical access to 

system distribution and transmission lines include, for example: (i) locked wiring closets; (ii) 

disconnected or locked spare jacks; and/or (iii) protection of cabling by conduit or cable trays.

Related controls: MP-2, MP-4, PE-2, PE-3, PE-5, SC-7, SC-8.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NSTISSI No. 7003.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD PE-4 HIGH PE-4

PE-5 ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES

Control: The organization controls physical access to information system output devices to prevent 

unauthorized individuals from obtaining the output.

Supplemental Guidance: Controlling physical access to output devices includes, for example, 

placing output devices in locked rooms or other secured areas and allowing access to authorized 

individuals only, and placing output devices in locations that can be monitored by organizational 

personnel. Monitors, printers, copiers, scanners, facsimile machines, and audio devices are 

examples of information system output devices. Related controls: PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, PE-18. 

Control Enhancements:

(1) ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES | ACCESS TO OUTPUT BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

The organization:

(a) Controls physical access to output from [Assignment: organization-defined output devices];

and

(b) Ensures that only authorized individuals receive output from the device.

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Supplemental Guidance: Controlling physical access to selected output devices includes, for 

example, placing printers, copiers, and facsimile machines in controlled areas with keypad 

access controls or limiting access to individuals with certain types of badges.

(2) ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES | ACCESS TO OUTPUT BY INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY

The information system:

(a) Controls physical access to output from [Assignment: organization-defined output devices];

and

(b) Links individual identity to receipt of the output from the device.

Supplemental Guidance: Controlling physical access to selected output devices includes, for 

example, installing security functionality on printers, copiers, and facsimile machines that 

allows organizations to implement authentication (e.g., using a PIN or hardware token) on 

output devices prior to the release of output to individuals.

(3) ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES | MARKING OUTPUT DEVICES

The organization marks [Assignment: organization-defined information system output devices] 

indicating the appropriate security marking of the information permitted to be output from the 

device.

Supplemental Guidance: Outputs devices include, for example, printers, monitors, facsimile 

machines, scanners, copiers, and audio devices. This control enhancement is generally 

applicable to information system output devices other than mobiles devices.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD PE-5 HIGH PE-5

PE-6 MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS

Control: The organization:

a. Monitors physical access to the facility where the information system resides to detect and 

respond to physical security incidents;

b. Reviews physical access logs [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and upon 

occurrence of [Assignment: organization-defined events or potential indications of events]; 

and

c. Coordinates results of reviews and investigations with the organizational incident response 

capability.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational incident response capabilities include investigations of and 

responses to detected physical security incidents. Security incidents include, for example, apparent 

security violations or suspicious physical access activities. Suspicious physical access activities 

include, for example: (i) accesses outside of normal work hours; (ii) repeated accesses to areas not 

normally accessed; (iii) accesses for unusual lengths of time; and (iv) out-of-sequence accesses.

Related controls: CA-7, IR-4, IR-8.

Control Enhancements:

(1) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | INTRUSION ALARMS / SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT

The organization monitors physical intrusion alarms and surveillance equipment.

(2) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | AUTOMATED INTRUSION RECOGNITION / RESPONSES

The organization employs automated mechanisms to recognize [Assignment: organization-defined 

classes/types of intrusions] and initiate [Assignment: organization-defined response actions].

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SI-4.

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(3) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

The organization employs video surveillance of [Assignment: organization-defined operational 

areas] and retains video recordings for [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement focuses on recording surveillance video 

for purposes of subsequent review, if circumstances so warrant (e.g., a break-in detected by 

other means). It does not require monitoring surveillance video although organizations may 

choose to do so. Note that there may be legal considerations when performing and retaining 

video surveillance, especially if such surveillance is in a public location.

(4) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS TO INFORMATION SYSTEMS

The organization monitors physical access to the information system in addition to the physical 

access monitoring of the facility as [Assignment: organization-defined physical spaces containing 

one or more components of the information system].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement provides additional monitoring for those 

areas within facilities where there is a concentration of information system components (e.g., 

server rooms, media storage areas, communications centers). Related controls: PS-2, PS-3.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PE-6 MOD PE-6 (1) HIGH PE-6 (1) (4)

PE-7 VISITOR CONTROL

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-2 and PE-3].

PE-8 VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS

Control: The organization:

a. Maintains visitor access records to the facility where the information system resides for 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and

b. Reviews visitor access records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Visitor access records include, for example, names and organizations of 

persons visiting, visitor signatures, forms of identification, dates of access, entry and departure 

times, purposes of visits, and names and organizations of persons visited. Visitor access records 

are not required for publicly accessible areas.

Control Enhancements:

(1) VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS | AUTOMATED RECORDS MAINTENANCE / REVIEW

The organization employs automated mechanisms to facilitate the maintenance and review of 

visitor access records.

(2) VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS | PHYSICAL ACCESS RECORDS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-2].

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW PE-8 MOD PE-8 HIGH PE-8 (1)

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PE-9 POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING

Control: The organization protects power equipment and power cabling for the information system 

from damage and destruction.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine the types of protection necessary for power 

equipment and cabling employed at different locations both internal and external to organizational 

facilities and environments of operation. This includes, for example, generators and power cabling 

outside of buildings, internal cabling and uninterruptable power sources within an office or data 

center, and power sources for self-contained entities such as vehicles and satellites. Related 

control: PE-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING | REDUNDANT CABLING

The organization employs redundant power cabling paths that are physically separated by 

[Assignment: organization-defined distance].

Supplemental Guidance: Physically separate, redundant power cables help to ensure that power 

continues to flow in the event one of the cables is cut or otherwise damaged.

(2) POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING | AUTOMATIC VOLTAGE CONTROLS

The organization employs automatic voltage controls for [Assignment: organization-defined critical 

information system components].

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD PE-9 HIGH PE-9

PE-10 EMERGENCY SHUTOFF

Control: The organization:

a. Provides the capability of shutting off power to the information system or individual system 

components in emergency situations;

b. Places emergency shutoff switches or devices in [Assignment: organization-defined location

by information system or system component] to facilitate safe and easy access for personnel; 

and

c. Protects emergency power shutoff capability from unauthorized activation.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of 

information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe 

computer rooms. Related control: PE-15.

Control Enhancements:

(1) EMERGENCY SHUTOFF | ACCIDENTAL / UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVATION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-10].

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD PE-10 HIGH PE-10

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PE-11 EMERGENCY POWER

Control: The organization provides a short-term uninterruptible power supply to facilitate 

[Selection (one or more): an orderly shutdown of the information system; transition of the 

information system to long-term alternate power] in the event of a primary power source loss.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AT-3, CP-2, CP-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) EMERGENCY POWER | LONG-TERM ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY - MINIMAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

The organization provides a long-term alternate power supply for the information system that is 

capable of maintaining minimally required operational capability in the event of an extended loss of 

the primary power source.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement can be satisfied, for example, by the use of a 

secondary commercial power supply or other external power supply. Long-term alternate 

power supplies for the information system can be either manually or automatically activated.

(2) EMERGENCY POWER | LONG-TERM ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY - SELF-CONTAINED

The organization provides a long-term alternate power supply for the information system that is:

(a) Self-contained;

(b) Not reliant on external power generation; and

(c) Capable of maintaining [Selection: minimally required operational capability; full operational 

capability] in the event of an extended loss of the primary power source.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement can be satisfied, for example, by the use of 

one or more generators with sufficient capacity to meet the needs of the organization. Longterm alternate power supplies for organizational information systems are either manually or 

automatically activated.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD PE-11 HIGH PE-11 (1)

PE-12 EMERGENCY LIGHTING

Control: The organization employs and maintains automatic emergency lighting for the 

information system that activates in the event of a power outage or disruption and that covers

emergency exits and evacuation routes within the facility.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of 

information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe 

computer rooms. Related controls: CP-2, CP-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) EMERGENCY LIGHTING | ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS

The organization provides emergency lighting for all areas within the facility supporting essential 

missions and business functions.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PE-12 MOD PE-12 HIGH PE-12

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PE-13 FIRE PROTECTION

Control: The organization employs and maintains fire suppression and detection devices/systems 

for the information system that are supported by an independent energy source.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of 

information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe 

computer rooms. Fire suppression and detection devices/systems include, for example, sprinkler 

systems, handheld fire extinguishers, fixed fire hoses, and smoke detectors.

Control Enhancements:

(1) FIRE PROTECTION | DETECTION DEVICES / SYSTEMS 

The organization employs fire detection devices/systems for the information system that activate 

automatically and notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] and [Assignment: 

organization-defined emergency responders] in the event of a fire.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can identify specific personnel, roles, and emergency 

responders in the event that individuals on the notification list must have appropriate access 

authorizations and/or clearances, for example, to obtain access to facilities where classified 

operations are taking place or where there are information systems containing classified 

information.

(2) FIRE PROTECTION | SUPPRESSION DEVICES / SYSTEMS 

The organization employs fire suppression devices/systems for the information system that 

provide automatic notification of any activation to Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles] and [Assignment: organization-defined emergency responders].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can identify specific personnel, roles, and emergency 

responders in the event that individuals on the notification list must have appropriate access 

authorizations and/or clearances, for example, to obtain access to facilities where classified 

operations are taking place or where there are information systems containing classified 

information.

(3) FIRE PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION 

The organization employs an automatic fire suppression capability for the information system

when the facility is not staffed on a continuous basis.

(4) FIRE PROTECTION | INSPECTIONS 

The organization ensures that the facility undergoes [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]

inspections by authorized and qualified inspectors and resolves identified deficiencies within 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period].

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PE-13 MOD PE-13 (3) HIGH PE-13 (1) (2) (3)

PE-14 TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY CONTROLS

Control: The organization:

a. Maintains temperature and humidity levels within the facility where the information system

resides at [Assignment: organization-defined acceptable levels]; and

b. Monitors temperature and humidity levels [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of 

information system resources, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer 

rooms. Related control: AT-3.

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Control Enhancements:

(1) TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY CONTROLS | AUTOMATIC CONTROLS 

The organization employs automatic temperature and humidity controls in the facility to prevent 

fluctuations potentially harmful to the information system.

(2) TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY CONTROLS | MONITORING WITH ALARMS / NOTIFICATIONS 

The organization employs temperature and humidity monitoring that provides an alarm or 

notification of changes potentially harmful to personnel or equipment.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PE-14 MOD PE-14 HIGH PE-14

PE-15 WATER DAMAGE PROTECTION

Control: The organization protects the information system from damage resulting from water 

leakage by providing master shutoff or isolation valves that are accessible, working properly, and 

known to key personnel.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of 

information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe 

computer rooms. Isolation valves can be employed in addition to or in lieu of master shutoff 

valves to shut off water supplies in specific areas of concern, without affecting entire 

organizations. Related control: AT-3.

Control Enhancements:

(1) WATER DAMAGE PROTECTION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT 

The organization employs automated mechanisms to detect the presence of water in the vicinity of 

the information system and alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms can include, for example, water detection 

sensors, alarms, and notification systems.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PE-15 MOD PE-15 HIGH PE-15 (1)

PE-16 DELIVERY AND REMOVAL

Control: The organization authorizes, monitors, and controls [Assignment: organization-defined 

types of information system components] entering and exiting the facility and maintains records of 

those items.

Supplemental Guidance: Effectively enforcing authorizations for entry and exit of information 

system components may require restricting access to delivery areas and possibly isolating the 

areas from the information system and media libraries. Related controls: CM-3, MA-2, MA-3, 

MP-5, SA-12.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW PE-16 MOD PE-16 HIGH PE-16

PE-17 ALTERNATE WORK SITE

Control: The organization:

a. Employs [Assignment: organization-defined security controls] at alternate work sites;

b. Assesses as feasible, the effectiveness of security controls at alternate work sites; and

c. Provides a means for employees to communicate with information security personnel in case 

of security incidents or problems.

Supplemental Guidance: Alternate work sites may include, for example, government facilities or 

private residences of employees. While commonly distinct from alternative processing sites, 

alternate work sites may provide readily available alternate locations as part of contingency 

operations. Organizations may define different sets of security controls for specific alternate work 

sites or types of sites depending on the work-related activities conducted at those sites. This 

control supports the contingency planning activities of organizations and the federal telework 

initiative. Related controls: AC-17, CP-7.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-46.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD PE-17 HIGH PE-17

PE-18 LOCATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Control: The organization positions information system components within the facility to minimize 

potential damage from [Assignment: organization-defined physical and environmental hazards]

and to minimize the opportunity for unauthorized access.

Supplemental Guidance: Physical and environmental hazards include, for example, flooding, fire, 

tornados, earthquakes, hurricanes, acts of terrorism, vandalism, electromagnetic pulse, electrical 

interference, and other forms of incoming electromagnetic radiation. In addition, organizations

consider the location of physical entry points where unauthorized individuals, while not being 

granted access, might nonetheless be in close proximity to information systems and therefore 

increase the potential for unauthorized access to organizational communications (e.g., through the 

use of wireless sniffers or microphones). Related controls: CP-2, PE-19, RA-3.

Control Enhancements:

(1) LOCATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS | FACILITY SITE

The organization plans the location or site of the facility where the information system resides with 

regard to physical and environmental hazards and for existing facilities, considers the physical and 

environmental hazards in its risk mitigation strategy.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: PM-8.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH PE-18

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PE-19 INFORMATION LEAKAGE

Control: The organization protects the information system from information leakage due to 

electromagnetic signals emanations.

Supplemental Guidance: Information leakage is the intentional or unintentional release of 

information to an untrusted environment from electromagnetic signals emanations. Security 

categories or classifications of information systems (with respect to confidentiality) and 

organizational security policies guide the selection of security controls employed to protect 

systems against information leakage due to electromagnetic signals emanations.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION LEAKAGE | NATIONAL EMISSIONS / TEMPEST POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

The organization ensures that information system components, associated data communications, 

and networks are protected in accordance with national emissions and TEMPEST policies and 

procedures based on the security category or classification of the information.

References: FIPS Publication 199.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

PE-20 ASSET MONITORING AND TRACKING

Control: The organization:

a. Employs [Assignment: organization-defined asset location technologies] to track and monitor 

the location and movement of [Assignment: organization-defined assets] within [Assignment: 

organization-defined controlled areas]; and

b. Ensures that asset location technologies are employed in accordance with applicable federal 

laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance.

Supplemental Guidance: Asset location technologies can help organizations ensure that critical 

assets such as vehicles or essential information system components remain in authorized locations. 

Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel and the Senior Agency Official for 

Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) regarding the deployment and use of asset location 

technologies to address potential privacy concerns. Related control: CM-8.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

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FAMILY: PLANNING

PL-1 SECURITY PLANNING POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles]:

1. A security planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, 

management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; 

and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security planning policy and associated 

security planning controls; and

b. Reviews and updates the current:

1. Security planning policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and

2. Security planning procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PL family.

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can 

be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The 

procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information 

systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing 

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-18, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PL-1 MOD PL-1 HIGH PL-1

PL-2 SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN

Control: The organization:

a. Develops a security plan for the information system that:

1. Is consistent with the organization’s enterprise architecture;

2. Explicitly defines the authorization boundary for the system;

3. Describes the operational context of the information system in terms of missions and 

business processes;

4. Provides the security categorization of the information system including supporting 

rationale;

5. Describes the operational environment for the information system and relationships with 

or connections to other information systems;

6. Provides an overview of the security requirements for the system;

7. Identifies any relevant overlays, if applicable;

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8. Describes the security controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements

including a rationale for the tailoring decisions; and

9. Is reviewed and approved by the authorizing official or designated representative prior to 

plan implementation;

b. Distributes copies of the security plan and communicates subsequent changes to the plan to 

[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];

c. Reviews the security plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency]; 

d. Updates the plan to address changes to the information system/environment of operation or 

problems identified during plan implementation or security control assessments; and

e. Protects the security plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

Supplemental Guidance: Security plans relate security requirements to a set of security controls and 

control enhancements. Security plans also describe, at a high level, how the security controls and 

control enhancements meet those security requirements, but do not provide detailed, technical 

descriptions of the specific design or implementation of the controls/enhancements. Security plans

contain sufficient information (including the specification of parameter values for assignment and 

selection statements either explicitly or by reference) to enable a design and implementation that is 

unambiguously compliant with the intent of the plans and subsequent determinations of risk to 

organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation if the plan is 

implemented as intended. Organizations can also apply tailoring guidance to the security control 

baselines in Appendix D and CNSS Instruction 1253 to develop overlays for community-wide use 

or to address specialized requirements, technologies, or missions/environments of operation (e.g., 

DoD-tactical, Federal Public Key Infrastructure, or Federal Identity, Credential, and Access 

Management, space operations). Appendix I provides guidance on developing overlays.

Security plans need not be single documents; the plans can be a collection of various documents 

including documents that already exist. Effective security plans make extensive use of references

to policies, procedures, and additional documents (e.g., design and implementation specifications) 

where more detailed information can be obtained. This reduces the documentation requirements 

associated with security programs and maintains security-related information in other established 

management/operational areas related to enterprise architecture, system development life cycle, 

systems engineering, and acquisition. For example, security plans do not contain detailed 

contingency plan or incident response plan information but instead provide explicitly or by 

reference, sufficient information to define what needs to be accomplished by those plans. Related 

controls: AC-2, AC-6, AC-14, AC-17, AC-20, CA-2, CA-3, CA-7, CM-9, CP-2, IR-8, MA-4, 

MA-5, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, PL-7, PM-1, PM-7, PM-8, PM-9, PM-11, SA-5, SA-17.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-7].

(2) SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-8].

(3) SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | PLAN / COORDINATE WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES

The organization plans and coordinates security-related activities affecting the information system 

with [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or groups] before conducting such activities in 

order to reduce the impact on other organizational entities.

Supplemental Guidance: Security-related activities include, for example, security assessments, 

audits, hardware and software maintenance, patch management, and contingency plan testing.

Advance planning and coordination includes emergency and nonemergency (i.e., planned or 

nonurgent unplanned) situations. The process defined by organizations to plan and coordinate 

security-related activities can be included in security plans for information systems or other 

documents, as appropriate. Related controls: CP-4, IR-4.

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References: NIST Special Publication 800-18.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PL-2 MOD PL-2 (3) HIGH PL-2 (3)

PL-3 SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN UPDATE

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-2].

PL-4 RULES OF BEHAVIOR

Control: The organization:

a. Establishes and makes readily available to individuals requiring access to the information 

system, the rules that describe their responsibilities and expected behavior with regard to 

information and information system usage;

b. Receives a signed acknowledgment from such individuals, indicating that they have read, 

understand, and agree to abide by the rules of behavior, before authorizing access to 

information and the information system;

c. Reviews and updates the rules of behavior [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and

d. Requires individuals who have signed a previous version of the rules of behavior to read and 

re-sign when the rules of behavior are revised/updated.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to organizational users. Organizations

consider rules of behavior based on individual user roles and responsibilities, differentiating, for 

example, between rules that apply to privileged users and rules that apply to general users. 

Establishing rules of behavior for some types of non-organizational users including, for example, 

individuals who simply receive data/information from federal information systems, is often not 

feasible given the large number of such users and the limited nature of their interactions with the 

systems. Rules of behavior for both organizational and non-organizational users can also be 

established in AC-8, System Use Notification. PL-4 b. (the signed acknowledgment portion of this 

control) may be satisfied by the security awareness training and role-based security training 

programs conducted by organizations if such training includes rules of behavior. Organizations 

can use electronic signatures for acknowledging rules of behavior. Related controls: AC-2, AC-6, 

AC-8, AC-9, AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, AT-2, AT-3, CM-11, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, MP-7, PS-6, 

PS-8, SA-5.

Control Enhancements:

(1) RULES OF BEHAVIOR | SOCIAL MEDIA AND NETWORKING RESTRICTIONS

The organization includes in the rules of behavior, explicit restrictions on the use of social

media/networking sites and posting organizational information on public websites.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses rules of behavior related to the 

use of social media/networking sites: (i) when organizational personnel are using such sites 

for official duties or in the conduct of official business; (ii) when organizational information 

is involved in social media/networking transactions; and (iii) when personnel are accessing 

social media/networking sites from organizational information systems. Organizations also 

address specific rules that prevent unauthorized entities from obtaining and/or inferring nonpublic organizational information (e.g., system account information, personally identifiable 

information) from social media/networking sites.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-18.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW PL-4 MOD PL-4 (1) HIGH PL-4 (1)

PL-5 PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into Appendix J, AR-2].

PL-6 SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITY PLANNING

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-2].

PL-7 SECURITY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Control: The organization:

a. Develops a security Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the information system containing

at a minimum, how the organization intends to operate the system from the perspective of 

information security; and

b. Reviews and updates the CONOPS [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: The security CONOPS may be included in the security plan for the 

information system or in other system development life cycle-related documents, as appropriate.

Changes to the CONOPS are reflected in ongoing updates to the security plan, the information 

security architecture, and other appropriate organizational documents (e.g., security specifications 

for procurements/acquisitions, system development life cycle documents, and systems/security 

engineering documents). Related control: PL-2.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

PL-8 INFORMATION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Control: The organization:

a. Develops an information security architecture for the information system that:

1. Describes the overall philosophy, requirements, and approach to be taken with regard to 

protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of organizational information;

2. Describes how the information security architecture is integrated into and supports the 

enterprise architecture; and

3. Describes any information security assumptions about, and dependencies on, external 

services;

b. Reviews and updates the information security architecture [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency] to reflect updates in the enterprise architecture; and

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c. Ensures that planned information security architecture changes are reflected in the security 

plan, the security Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and organizational 

procurements/acquisitions.

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses actions taken by organizations in the design and 

development of information systems. The information security architecture at the individual 

information system level is consistent with and complements the more global, organization-wide 

information security architecture described in PM-7 that is integral to and developed as part of the 

enterprise architecture. The information security architecture includes an architectural description, 

the placement/allocation of security functionality (including security controls), security-related 

information for external interfaces, information being exchanged across the interfaces, and the 

protection mechanisms associated with each interface. In addition, the security architecture can 

include other important security-related information, for example, user roles and access privileges 

assigned to each role, unique security requirements, the types of information processed, stored, 

and transmitted by the information system, restoration priorities of information and information 

system services, and any other specific protection needs.

In today’s modern architecture, it is becoming less common for organizations to control all 

information resources. There are going to be key dependencies on external information services 

and service providers. Describing such dependencies in the information security architecture is 

important to developing a comprehensive mission/business protection strategy. Establishing, 

developing, documenting, and maintaining under configuration control, a baseline configuration 

for organizational information systems is critical to implementing and maintaining an effective 

information security architecture. The development of the information security architecture is 

coordinated with the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) to 

ensure that security controls needed to support privacy requirements are identified and effectively 

implemented. PL-8 is primarily directed at organizations (i.e., internally focused) to help ensure 

that organizations develop an information security architecture for the information system, and 

that the security architecture is integrated with or tightly coupled to the enterprise architecture

through the organization-wide information security architecture. In contrast, SA-17 is primarily 

directed at external information technology product/system developers and integrators (although 

SA-17 could be used internally within organizations for in-house system development). SA-17, 

which is complementary to PL-8, is selected when organizations outsource the development of 

information systems or information system components to external entities, and there is a need to 

demonstrate/show consistency with the organization’s enterprise architecture and information 

security architecture. Related controls: CM-2, CM-6, PL-2, PM-7, SA-5, SA-17, Appendix J.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE | DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH 

The organization designs its security architecture using a defense-in-depth approach that:

(a) Allocates [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to [Assignment: 

organization-defined locations and architectural layers]; and

(b) Ensures that the allocated security safeguards operate in a coordinated and mutually 

reinforcing manner.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations strategically allocate security safeguards (procedural, 

technical, or both) in the security architecture so that adversaries have to overcome multiple 

safeguards to achieve their objective. Requiring adversaries to defeat multiple mechanisms 

makes it more difficult to successfully attack critical information resources (i.e., increases 

adversary work factor) and also increases the likelihood of detection. The coordination of 

allocated safeguards is essential to ensure that an attack that involves one safeguard does not 

create adverse unintended consequences (e.g., lockout, cascading alarms) by interfering with 

another safeguard. Placement of security safeguards is a key activity. Greater asset criticality 

or information value merits additional layering. Thus, an organization may choose to place 

anti-virus software at organizational boundary layers, email/web servers, notebook computers, 

and workstations to maximize the number of related safeguards adversaries must penetrate 

before compromising the information and information systems. Related controls: SC-29, SC36.

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(2) INFORMATION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE | SUPPLIER DIVERSITY 

The organization requires that [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] allocated to 

[Assignment: organization-defined locations and architectural layers] are obtained from different 

suppliers.

Supplemental Guidance: Different information technology products have different strengths and 

weaknesses. Providing a broad spectrum of products complements the individual offerings. 

For example, vendors offering malicious code protection typically update their products at 

different times, often developing solutions for known viruses, Trojans, or worms according to 

their priorities and development schedules. By having different products at different locations 

(e.g., server, boundary, desktop) there is an increased likelihood that at least one will detect

the malicious code. Related control: SA-12.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD PL-8 HIGH PL-8

PL-9 CENTRAL MANAGEMENT

Control: The organization centrally manages [Assignment: organization-defined security controls 

and related processes].

Supplemental Guidance: Central management refers to the organization-wide management and 

implementation of selected security controls and related processes. Central management includes 

planning, implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally 

managed security controls and processes. As central management of security controls is generally 

associated with common controls, such management promotes and facilitates standardization of 

security control implementations and management and judicious use of organizational resources. 

Centrally-managed security controls and processes may also meet independence requirements for 

assessments in support of initial and ongoing authorizations to operate as part of organizational 

continuous monitoring. As part of the security control selection process, organizations determine 

which controls may be suitable for central management based on organizational resources and 

capabilities. Organizations consider that it may not always be possible to centrally manage every 

aspect of a security control. In such cases, the security control is treated as a hybrid control with 

the control managed and implemented either centrally or at the information system level. Controls 

and control enhancements that are candidates for full or partial central management include, but 

are not limited to: AC-2 (1) (2) (3) (4); AC-17 (1) (2) (3) (9); AC-18 (1) (3) (4) (5); AC-19 (4); 

AC-22; AC-23; AT-2 (1) (2); AT-3 (1) (2) (3); AT-4; AU-6 (1) (3) (5) (6) (9); AU-7 (1) (2); AU11, AU-13, AU-16, CA-2 (1) (2) (3); CA-3 (1) (2) (3); CA-7 (1); CA-9; CM-2 (1) (2); CM-3 (1) 

(4); CM-4; CM-6 (1); CM-7 (4) (5); CM-8 (all); CM-9 (1); CM-10; CM-11; CP-7 (all); CP-8 (all); 

SC-43; SI-2; SI-3; SI-7; and SI-8.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-37.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

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FAMILY: PERSONNEL SECURITY

PS-1 PERSONNEL SECURITY POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles]:

1. A personnel security policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, 

management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; 

and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the personnel security policy and 

associated personnel security controls; and

b. Reviews and updates the current:

1. Personnel security policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and

2. Personnel security procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PS family.

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can 

be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The 

procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information 

systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing 

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PS-1 MOD PS-1 HIGH PS-1

PS-2 POSITION RISK DESIGNATION

Control: The organization:

a. Assigns a risk designation to all organizational positions;

b. Establishes screening criteria for individuals filling those positions; and

c. Reviews and updates position risk designations [Assignment: organization-defined

frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Position risk designations reflect Office of Personnel Management policy 

and guidance. Risk designations can guide and inform the types of authorizations individuals 

receive when accessing organizational information and information systems. Position screening 

criteria include explicit information security role appointment requirements (e.g., training, security 

clearances). Related controls: AT-3, PL-2, PS-3.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: 5 C.F.R. 731.106.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PS-2 MOD PS-2 HIGH PS-2

PS-3 PERSONNEL SCREENING

Control: The organization:

a. Screens individuals prior to authorizing access to the information system; and

b. Rescreens individuals according to [Assignment: organization-defined conditions requiring 

rescreening and, where rescreening is so indicated, the frequency of such rescreening].

Supplemental Guidance: Personnel screening and rescreening activities reflect applicable federal 

laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidance, and specific criteria 

established for the risk designations of assigned positions. Organizations may define different 

rescreening conditions and frequencies for personnel accessing information systems based on

types of information processed, stored, or transmitted by the systems. Related controls: AC-2, IA4, PE-2, PS-2.

Control Enhancements:

(1) PERSONNEL SCREENING | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

The organization ensures that individuals accessing an information system processing, storing, or 

transmitting classified information are cleared and indoctrinated to the highest classification level 

of the information to which they have access on the system.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AC-3, AC-4.

(2) PERSONNEL SCREENING | FORMAL INDOCTRINATION 

The organization ensures that individuals accessing an information system processing, storing, or 

transmitting types of classified information which require formal indoctrination, are formally 

indoctrinated for all of the relevant types of information to which they have access on the system.

Supplemental Guidance: Types of classified information requiring formal indoctrination 

include, for example, Special Access Program (SAP), Restricted Data (RD), and Sensitive 

Compartment Information (SCI). Related controls: AC-3, AC-4.

(3) PERSONNEL SCREENING | INFORMATION WITH SPECIAL PROTECTION MEASURES 

The organization ensures that individuals accessing an information system processing, storing, or 

transmitting information requiring special protection:

(a) Have valid access authorizations that are demonstrated by assigned official government 

duties; and

(b) Satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined additional personnel screening criteria].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational information requiring special protection includes, for 

example, Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) and Sources and Methods Information 

(SAMI). Personnel security criteria include, for example, position sensitivity background 

screening requirements.

References: 5 C.F.R. 731.106; FIPS Publications 199, 201; NIST Special Publications 800-60, 

800-73, 800-76, 800-78; ICD 704.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PS-3 MOD PS-3 HIGH PS-3

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PS-4 PERSONNEL TERMINATION

Control: The organization, upon termination of individual employment:

a. Disables information system access within [Assignment: organization-defined time period];

b. Terminates/revokes any authenticators/credentials associated with the individual;

c. Conducts exit interviews that include a discussion of [Assignment: organization-defined 

information security topics];

d. Retrieves all security-related organizational information system-related property;

e. Retains access to organizational information and information systems formerly controlled by 

terminated individual; and

f. Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment: 

organization-defined time period].

Supplemental Guidance: Information system-related property includes, for example, hardware 

authentication tokens, system administration technical manuals, keys, identification cards, and 

building passes. Exit interviews ensure that terminated individuals understand the security 

constraints imposed by being former employees and that proper accountability is achieved for 

information system-related property. Security topics of interest at exit interviews can include, for 

example, reminding terminated individuals of nondisclosure agreements and potential limitations 

on future employment. Exit interviews may not be possible for some terminated individuals, for 

example, in cases related to job abandonment, illnesses, and nonavailability of supervisors. Exit 

interviews are important for individuals with security clearances. Timely execution of termination 

actions is essential for individuals terminated for cause. In certain situations, organizations 

consider disabling the information system accounts of individuals that are being terminated prior 

to the individuals being notified. Related controls: AC-2, IA-4, PE-2, PS-5, PS-6.

Control Enhancements:

(1) PERSONNEL TERMINATION | POST-EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

The organization:

(a) Notifies terminated individuals of applicable, legally binding post-employment requirements 

for the protection of organizational information; and

(b) Requires terminated individuals to sign an acknowledgment of post-employment 

requirements as part of the organizational termination process.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel 

regarding matters of post-employment requirements on terminated individuals.

(2) PERSONNEL TERMINATION | AUTOMATED NOTIFICATION

The organization employs automated mechanisms to notify [Assignment: organization-defined 

personnel or roles] upon termination of an individual.

Supplemental Guidance: In organizations with a large number of employees, not all personnel 

who need to know about termination actions receive the appropriate notifications—or, if such 

notifications are received, they may not occur in a timely manner. Automated mechanisms 

can be used to send automatic alerts or notifications to specific organizational personnel or 

roles (e.g., management personnel, supervisors, personnel security officers, information 

security officers, systems administrators, or information technology administrators) when 

individuals are terminated. Such automatic alerts or notifications can be conveyed in a variety 

of ways, including, for example, telephonically, via electronic mail, via text message, or via 

websites.

References: None.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PS-4 MOD PS-4 HIGH PS-4 (2)

PS-5 PERSONNEL TRANSFER

Control: The organization: 

a. Reviews and confirms ongoing operational need for current logical and physical access 

authorizations to information systems/facilities when individuals are reassigned or transferred 

to other positions within the organization;

b. Initiates [Assignment: organization-defined transfer or reassignment actions] within 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period following the formal transfer action];

c. Modifies access authorization as needed to correspond with any changes in operational need 

due to reassignment or transfer; and

d. Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment: 

organization-defined time period].

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies when reassignments or transfers of individuals are

permanent or of such extended durations as to make the actions warranted. Organizations define 

actions appropriate for the types of reassignments or transfers, whether permanent or extended. 

Actions that may be required for personnel transfers or reassignments to other positions within 

organizations include, for example: (i) returning old and issuing new keys, identification cards, 

and building passes; (ii) closing information system accounts and establishing new accounts; (iii) 

changing information system access authorizations (i.e., privileges); and (iv) providing for access 

to official records to which individuals had access at previous work locations and in previous 

information system accounts. Related controls: AC-2, IA-4, PE-2, PS-4.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW PS-5 MOD PS-5 HIGH PS-5

PS-6 ACCESS AGREEMENTS

Control: The organization:

a. Develops and documents access agreements for organizational information systems;

b. Reviews and updates the access agreements [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; 

and

c. Ensures that individuals requiring access to organizational information and information 

systems:

1. Sign appropriate access agreements prior to being granted access; and

2. Re-sign access agreements to maintain access to organizational information systems 

when access agreements have been updated or [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Access agreements include, for example, nondisclosure agreements, 

acceptable use agreements, rules of behavior, and conflict-of-interest agreements. Signed access 

agreements include an acknowledgement that individuals have read, understand, and agree to 

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abide by the constraints associated with organizational information systems to which access is 

authorized. Organizations can use electronic signatures to acknowledge access agreements unless 

specifically prohibited by organizational policy. Related control: PL-4, PS-2, PS-3, PS-4, PS-8.

Control Enhancements:

(1) ACCESS AGREEMENTS | INFORMATION REQUIRING SPECIAL PROTECTION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PS-3].

(2) ACCESS AGREEMENTS | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REQUIRING SPECIAL PROTECTION

The organization ensures that access to classified information requiring special protection is 

granted only to individuals who:

(a) Have a valid access authorization that is demonstrated by assigned official government 

duties;

(b) Satisfy associated personnel security criteria; and

(c) Have read, understood, and signed a nondisclosure agreement.

Supplemental Guidance: Classified information requiring special protection includes, for 

example, collateral information, Special Access Program (SAP) information, and Sensitive 

Compartmented Information (SCI). Personnel security criteria reflect applicable federal laws, 

Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance.

(3) ACCESS AGREEMENTS | POST-EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

The organization:

(a) Notifies individuals of applicable, legally binding post-employment requirements for 

protection of organizational information; and

(b) Requires individuals to sign an acknowledgment of these requirements, if applicable, as part 

of granting initial access to covered information.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel 

regarding matters of post-employment requirements on terminated individuals.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW PS-6 MOD PS-6 HIGH PS-6

PS-7 THIRD-PARTY PERSONNEL SECURITY

Control: The organization:

a. Establishes personnel security requirements including security roles and responsibilities for 

third-party providers;

b. Requires third-party providers to comply with personnel security policies and procedures 

established by the organization;

c. Documents personnel security requirements;

d. Requires third-party providers to notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles] of any personnel transfers or terminations of third-party personnel who possess 

organizational credentials and/or badges, or who have information system privileges within 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and

e. Monitors provider compliance.

Supplemental Guidance: Third-party providers include, for example, service bureaus, contractors, 

and other organizations providing information system development, information technology 

services, outsourced applications, and network and security management. Organizations explicitly

include personnel security requirements in acquisition-related documents. Third-party providers 

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may have personnel working at organizational facilities with credentials, badges, or information 

system privileges issued by organizations. Notifications of third-party personnel changes ensure 

appropriate termination of privileges and credentials. Organizations define the transfers and 

terminations deemed reportable by security-related characteristics that include, for example, 

functions, roles, and nature of credentials/privileges associated with individuals transferred or 

terminated. Related controls: PS-2, PS-3, PS-4, PS-5, PS-6, SA-9, SA-21.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-35.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW PS-7 MOD PS-7 HIGH PS-7

PS-8 PERSONNEL SANCTIONS

Control: The organization:

a. Employs a formal sanctions process for individuals failing to comply with established 

information security policies and procedures; and

b. Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment: 

organization-defined time period] when a formal employee sanctions process is initiated, 

identifying the individual sanctioned and the reason for the sanction.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational sanctions processes reflect applicable federal laws, 

Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Sanctions processes 

are described in access agreements and can be included as part of general personnel policies and 

procedures for organizations. Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel 

regarding matters of employee sanctions. Related controls: PL-4, PS-6.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P3 LOW PS-8 MOD PS-8 HIGH PS-8

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FAMILY: RISK ASSESSMENT

RA-1 RISK ASSESSMENT POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles]:

1. A risk assessment policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, 

management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; 

and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the risk assessment policy and associated 

risk assessment controls; and

b. Reviews and updates the current:

1. Risk assessment policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and

2. Risk assessment procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the RA family.

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can 

be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The 

procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information 

systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing 

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-30, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW RA-1 MOD RA-1 HIGH RA-1

RA-2 SECURITY CATEGORIZATION

Control: The organization:

a. Categorizes information and the information system in accordance with applicable federal 

laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance;

b. Documents the security categorization results (including supporting rationale) in the security 

plan for the information system; and

c. Ensures that the authorizing official or authorizing official designated representative reviews 

and approves the security categorization decision.

Supplemental Guidance: Clearly defined authorization boundaries are a prerequisite for effective 

security categorization decisions. Security categories describe the potential adverse impacts to 

organizational operations, organizational assets, and individuals if organizational information and 

information systems are comprised through a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability.

Organizations conduct the security categorization process as an organization-wide activity with 

the involvement of chief information officers, senior information security officers, information 

system owners, mission/business owners, and information owners/stewards. Organizations also 

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consider the potential adverse impacts to other organizations and, in accordance with the USA 

PATRIOT Act of 2001 and Homeland Security Presidential Directives, potential national-level

adverse impacts. Security categorization processes carried out by organizations facilitate the 

development of inventories of information assets, and along with CM-8, mappings to specific

information system components where information is processed, stored, or transmitted. Related 

controls: CM-8, MP-4, RA-3, SC-7.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-30, 800-39, 800-60.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW RA-2 MOD RA-2 HIGH RA-2

RA-3 RISK ASSESSMENT

Control: The organization:

a. Conducts an assessment of risk, including the likelihood and magnitude of harm, from the 

unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the 

information system and the information it processes, stores, or transmits;

b. Documents risk assessment results in [Selection: security plan; risk assessment report;

[Assignment: organization-defined document]];

c. Reviews risk assessment results [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];

d. Disseminates risk assessment results to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles]; and

e. Updates the risk assessment [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] or whenever there 

are significant changes to the information system or environment of operation (including the 

identification of new threats and vulnerabilities), or other conditions that may impact the 

security state of the system.

Supplemental Guidance: Clearly defined authorization boundaries are a prerequisite for effective 

risk assessments. Risk assessments take into account threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood, and 

impact to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation

based on the operation and use of information systems. Risk assessments also take into account 

risk from external parties (e.g., service providers, contractors operating information systems on 

behalf of the organization, individuals accessing organizational information systems, outsourcing 

entities). In accordance with OMB policy and related E-authentication initiatives, authentication of 

public users accessing federal information systems may also be required to protect nonpublic or 

privacy-related information. As such, organizational assessments of risk also address public access 

to federal information systems.

Risk assessments (either formal or informal) can be conducted at all three tiers in the risk 

management hierarchy (i.e., organization level, mission/business process level, or information 

system level) and at any phase in the system development life cycle. Risk assessments can also be 

conducted at various steps in the Risk Management Framework, including categorization, security 

control selection, security control implementation, security control assessment, information 

system authorization, and security control monitoring. RA-3 is noteworthy in that the control must 

be partially implemented prior to the implementation of other controls in order to complete the 

first two steps in the Risk Management Framework. Risk assessments can play an important role 

in security control selection processes, particularly during the application of tailoring guidance, 

which includes security control supplementation. Related controls: RA-2, PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

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References: OMB Memorandum 04-04; NIST Special Publications 800-30, 800-39; 

Web: http://idmanagement.gov. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW RA-3 MOD RA-3 HIGH RA-3

RA-4 RISK ASSESSMENT UPDATE

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into RA-3].

RA-5 VULNERABILITY SCANNING

Control: The organization:

a. Scans for vulnerabilities in the information system and hosted applications [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency and/or randomly in accordance with organization-defined 

process] and when new vulnerabilities potentially affecting the system/applications are 

identified and reported;

b. Employs vulnerability scanning tools and techniques that facilitate interoperability among 

tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for:

1. Enumerating platforms, software flaws, and improper configurations;

2. Formatting checklists and test procedures; and

3. Measuring vulnerability impact; 

c. Analyzes vulnerability scan reports and results from security control assessments;

d. Remediates legitimate vulnerabilities [Assignment: organization-defined response times] in 

accordance with an organizational assessment of risk; and

e. Shares information obtained from the vulnerability scanning process and security control 

assessments with [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to help eliminate 

similar vulnerabilities in other information systems (i.e., systemic weaknesses or 

deficiencies).

Supplemental Guidance: Security categorization of information systems guides the frequency and 

comprehensiveness of vulnerability scans. Organizations determine the required vulnerability 

scanning for all information system components, ensuring that potential sources of vulnerabilities 

such as networked printers, scanners, and copiers are not overlooked. Vulnerability analyses for 

custom software applications may require additional approaches such as static analysis, dynamic 

analysis, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three approaches. Organizations can employ these 

analysis approaches in a variety of tools (e.g., web-based application scanners, static analysis 

tools, binary analyzers) and in source code reviews. Vulnerability scanning includes, for example:

(i) scanning for patch levels; (ii) scanning for functions, ports, protocols, and services that should 

not be accessible to users or devices; and (iii) scanning for improperly configured or incorrectly 

operating information flow control mechanisms. Organizations consider using tools that express 

vulnerabilities in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) naming convention and that 

use the Open Vulnerability Assessment Language (OVAL) to determine/test for the presence of 

vulnerabilities. Suggested sources for vulnerability information include the Common Weakness 

Enumeration (CWE) listing and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). In addition, security 

control assessments such as red team exercises provide other sources of potential vulnerabilities 

for which to scan. Organizations also consider using tools that express vulnerability impact by the 

Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, CM-4, CM-6, 

RA-2, RA-3, SA-11, SI-2.

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Control Enhancements:

(1) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | UPDATE TOOL CAPABILITY

The organization employs vulnerability scanning tools that include the capability to readily update 

the information system vulnerabilities to be scanned.

Supplemental Guidance: The vulnerabilities to be scanned need to be readily updated as new 

vulnerabilities are discovered, announced, and scanning methods developed. This updating 

process helps to ensure that potential vulnerabilities in the information system are identified 

and addressed as quickly as possible. Related controls: SI-3, SI-7.

(2) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | UPDATE BY FREQUENCY / PRIOR TO NEW SCAN / WHEN IDENTIFIED

The organization updates the information system vulnerabilities scanned [Selection (one or more):

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; prior to a new scan; when new vulnerabilities are 

identified and reported].

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: SI-3, SI-5.

(3) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | BREADTH / DEPTH OF COVERAGE

The organization employs vulnerability scanning procedures that can identify the breadth and 

depth of coverage (i.e., information system components scanned and vulnerabilities checked).

(4) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | DISCOVERABLE INFORMATION

The organization determines what information about the information system is discoverable by 

adversaries and subsequently takes [Assignment: organization-defined corrective actions].

Supplemental Guidance: Discoverable information includes information that adversaries could 

obtain without directly compromising or breaching the information system, for example, by 

collecting information the system is exposing or by conducting extensive searches of the web. 

Corrective actions can include, for example, notifying appropriate organizational personnel, 

removing designated information, or changing the information system to make designated 

information less relevant or attractive to adversaries. Related control: AU-13.

(5) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | PRIVILEGED ACCESS

The information system implements privileged access authorization to [Assignment: organizationidentified information system components] for selected [Assignment: organization-defined 

vulnerability scanning activities].

Supplemental Guidance: In certain situations, the nature of the vulnerability scanning may be 

more intrusive or the information system component that is the subject of the scanning may 

contain highly sensitive information. Privileged access authorization to selected system 

components facilitates more thorough vulnerability scanning and also protects the sensitive 

nature of such scanning.

(6) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | AUTOMATED TREND ANALYSES

The organization employs automated mechanisms to compare the results of vulnerability scans 

over time to determine trends in information system vulnerabilities.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: IR-4, IR-5, SI-4.

(7) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | AUTOMATED DETECTION AND NOTIFICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENTS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-8].

(8) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | REVIEW HISTORIC AUDIT LOGS

The organization reviews historic audit logs to determine if a vulnerability identified in the 

information system has been previously exploited.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AU-6.

(9) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | PENETRATION TESTING AND ANALYSES

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CA-8].

(10) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | CORRELATE SCANNING INFORMATION

The organization correlates the output from vulnerability scanning tools to determine the presence 

of multi-vulnerability/multi-hop attack vectors.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-40, 800-70, 800-115; 

Web: http://cwe.mitre.org, http://nvd.nist.gov. 

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW RA-5 MOD RA-5 (1) (2) (5) HIGH RA-5 (1) (2) (4) (5)

RA-6 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES SURVEY

Control: The organization employs a technical surveillance countermeasures survey at 

[Assignment: organization-defined locations] [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined events or indicators occur]].

Supplemental Guidance: Technical surveillance countermeasures surveys are performed by qualified 

personnel to detect the presence of technical surveillance devices/hazards and to identify technical 

security weaknesses that could aid in the conduct of technical penetrations of surveyed facilities. 

Such surveys provide evaluations of the technical security postures of organizations and facilities 

and typically include thorough visual, electronic, and physical examinations in and about surveyed 

facilities. The surveys also provide useful input into risk assessments and organizational exposure 

to potential adversaries.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

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FAMILY: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

SA-1 SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles]:

1. A system and services acquisition policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 

responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, 

and compliance; and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and services acquisition policy 

and associated system and services acquisition controls; and

b. Reviews and updates the current:

1. System and services acquisition policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];

and

2. System and services acquisition procedures [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SA family.

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can 

be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The 

procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information 

systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing 

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SA-1 MOD SA-1 HIGH SA-1

SA-2 ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

Control: The organization:

a. Determines information security requirements for the information system or information 

system service in mission/business process planning;

b. Determines, documents, and allocates the resources required to protect the information system

or information system service as part of its capital planning and investment control process; 

and

c. Establishes a discrete line item for information security in organizational programming and 

budgeting documentation.

Supplemental Guidance: Resource allocation for information security includes funding for the initial 

information system or information system service acquisition and funding for the sustainment of 

the system/service. Related controls: PM-3, PM-11.

Control Enhancements: None.

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References: NIST Special Publication 800-65.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SA-2 MOD SA-2 HIGH SA-2

SA-3 SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE

Control: The organization:

a. Manages the information system using [Assignment: organization-defined system 

development life cycle] that incorporates information security considerations;

b. Defines and documents information security roles and responsibilities throughout the system 

development life cycle;

c. Identifies individuals having information security roles and responsibilities; and

d. Integrates the organizational information security risk management process into system 

development life cycle activities.

Supplemental Guidance: A well-defined system development life cycle provides the foundation for 

the successful development, implementation, and operation of organizational information systems.

To apply the required security controls within the system development life cycle requires a basic 

understanding of information security, threats, vulnerabilities, adverse impacts, and risk to critical 

missions/business functions. The security engineering principles in SA-8 cannot be properly 

applied if individuals that design, code, and test information systems and system components 

(including information technology products) do not understand security. Therefore, organizations 

include qualified personnel, for example, chief information security officers, security architects, 

security engineers, and information system security officers in system development life cycle 

activities to ensure that security requirements are incorporated into organizational information 

systems. It is equally important that developers include individuals on the development team that 

possess the requisite security expertise and skills to ensure that needed security capabilities are 

effectively integrated into the information system. Security awareness and training programs can 

help ensure that individuals having key security roles and responsibilities have the appropriate 

experience, skills, and expertise to conduct assigned system development life cycle activities. The 

effective integration of security requirements into enterprise architecture also helps to ensure that 

important security considerations are addressed early in the system development life cycle and that 

those considerations are directly related to the organizational mission/business processes. This 

process also facilitates the integration of the information security architecture into the enterprise 

architecture, consistent with organizational risk management and information security strategies.

Related controls: AT-3, PM-7, SA-8.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-37, 800-64.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SA-3 MOD SA-3 HIGH SA-3

SA-4 ACQUISITION PROCESS

Control: The organization includes the following requirements, descriptions, and criteria, explicitly 

or by reference, in the acquisition contract for the information system, system component, or 

information system service in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, 

directives, policies, regulations, standards, guidelines, and organizational mission/business needs:

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a. Security functional requirements;

b. Security strength requirements;

c. Security assurance requirements;

d. Security-related documentation requirements;

e. Requirements for protecting security-related documentation;

f. Description of the information system development environment and environment in which 

the system is intended to operate; and

g. Acceptance criteria.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system components are discrete, identifiable information 

technology assets (e.g., hardware, software, or firmware) that represent the building blocks of an 

information system. Information system components include commercial information technology 

products. Security functional requirements include security capabilities, security functions, and 

security mechanisms. Security strength requirements associated with such capabilities, functions, 

and mechanisms include degree of correctness, completeness, resistance to direct attack, and 

resistance to tampering or bypass. Security assurance requirements include: (i) development 

processes, procedures, practices, and methodologies; and (ii) evidence from development and 

assessment activities providing grounds for confidence that the required security functionality has 

been implemented and the required security strength has been achieved. Security documentation 

requirements address all phases of the system development life cycle.

Security functionality, assurance, and documentation requirements are expressed in terms of 

security controls and control enhancements that have been selected through the tailoring process. 

The security control tailoring process includes, for example, the specification of parameter values 

through the use of assignment and selection statements and the specification of platform 

dependencies and implementation information. Security documentation provides user and 

administrator guidance regarding the implementation and operation of security controls. The level 

of detail required in security documentation is based on the security category or classification level 

of the information system and the degree to which organizations depend on the stated security 

capability, functions, or mechanisms to meet overall risk response expectations (as defined in the 

organizational risk management strategy). Security requirements can also include organizationally

mandated configuration settings specifying allowed functions, ports, protocols, and services.

Acceptance criteria for information systems, information system components, and information 

system services are defined in the same manner as such criteria for any organizational acquisition 

or procurement. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Section 7.103 contains information 

security requirements from FISMA. Related controls: CM-6, PL-2, PS-7, SA-3, SA-5, SA-8, SA11, SA-12.

Control Enhancements:

(1) ACQUISITION PROCESS | FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF SECURITY CONTROLS 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or

information system service to provide a description of the functional properties of the security 

controls to be employed.

Supplemental Guidance: Functional properties of security controls describe the functionality 

(i.e., security capability, functions, or mechanisms) visible at the interfaces of the controls and 

specifically exclude functionality and data structures internal to the operation of the controls.

Related control: SA-5.

(2) ACQUISITION PROCESS | DESIGN / IMPLEMENTATION INFORMATION FOR SECURITY CONTROLS 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or

information system service to provide design and implementation information for the security 

controls to be employed that includes: [Selection (one or more): security-relevant external system 

interfaces; high-level design; low-level design; source code or hardware schematics; [Assignment: 

organization-defined design/implementation information]] at [Assignment: organization-defined 

level of detail].

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Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may require different levels of detail in design and 

implementation documentation for security controls employed in organizational information 

systems, system components, or information system services based on mission/business 

requirements, requirements for trustworthiness/resiliency, and requirements for analysis and 

testing. Information systems can be partitioned into multiple subsystems. Each subsystem 

within the system can contain one or more modules. The high-level design for the system is 

expressed in terms of multiple subsystems and the interfaces between subsystems providing 

security-relevant functionality. The low-level design for the system is expressed in terms of 

modules with particular emphasis on software and firmware (but not excluding hardware) and 

the interfaces between modules providing security-relevant functionality. Source code and 

hardware schematics are typically referred to as the implementation representation of the 

information system. Related control: SA-5.

(3) ACQUISITION PROCESS | DEVELOPMENT METHODS / TECHNIQUES / PRACTICES 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or

information system service to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle that 

includes [Assignment: organization-defined state-of-the-practice system/security engineering 

methods, software development methods, testing/evaluation/validation techniques, and quality 

control processes].

Supplemental Guidance: Following a well-defined system development life cycle that includes 

state-of-the-practice software development methods, systems/security engineering methods, 

quality control processes, and testing, evaluation, and validation techniques helps to reduce 

the number and severity of latent errors within information systems, system components, and 

information system services. Reducing the number/severity of such errors reduces the number 

of vulnerabilities in those systems, components, and services. Related control: SA-12.

(4) ACQUISITION PROCESS | ASSIGNMENT OF COMPONENTS TO SYSTEMS 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-8 (9)].

(5) ACQUISITION PROCESS | SYSTEM / COMPONENT / SERVICE CONFIGURATIONS 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or

information system service to:

(a) Deliver the system, component, or service with [Assignment: organization-defined security 

configurations] implemented; and

(b) Use the configurations as the default for any subsequent system, component, or service

reinstallation or upgrade.

Supplemental Guidance: Security configurations include, for example, the U.S. Government 

Configuration Baseline (USGCB) and any limitations on functions, ports, protocols, and 

services. Security characteristics include, for example, requiring that all default passwords 

have been changed. Related control: CM-8.

(6) ACQUISITION PROCESS | USE OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE PRODUCTS 

The organization:

(a) Employs only government off-the-shelf (GOTS) or commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 

information assurance (IA) and IA-enabled information technology products that compose an 

NSA-approved solution to protect classified information when the networks used to transmit 

the information are at a lower classification level than the information being transmitted; and

(b) Ensures that these products have been evaluated and/or validated by NSA or in accordance 

with NSA-approved procedures.

Supplemental Guidance: COTS IA or IA-enabled information technology products used to 

protect classified information by cryptographic means may be required to use NSA-approved 

key management. Related controls: SC-8, SC-12, SC-13.

(7) ACQUISITION PROCESS | NIAP-APPROVED PROTECTION PROFILES 

The organization:

(a) Limits the use of commercially provided information assurance (IA) and IA-enabled 

information technology products to those products that have been successfully evaluated 

against a National Information Assurance partnership (NIAP)-approved Protection Profile for a 

specific technology type, if such a profile exists; and

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(b) Requires, if no NIAP-approved Protection Profile exists for a specific technology type but a

commercially provided information technology product relies on cryptographic functionality 

to enforce its security policy, that the cryptographic module is FIPS-validated.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: SC-12, SC-13.

(8) ACQUISITION PROCESS | CONTINUOUS MONITORING PLAN 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or

information system service to produce a plan for the continuous monitoring of security control 

effectiveness that contains [Assignment: organization-defined level of detail].

Supplemental Guidance: The objective of continuous monitoring plans is to determine if the 

complete set of planned, required, and deployed security controls within the information 

system, system component, or information system service continue to be effective over time 

based on the inevitable changes that occur. Developer continuous monitoring plans include a 

sufficient level of detail such that the information can be incorporated into the continuous 

monitoring strategies and programs implemented by organizations. Related control: CA-7.

(9) ACQUISITION PROCESS | FUNCTIONS / PORTS / PROTOCOLS / SERVICES IN USE 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or

information system service to identify early in the system development life cycle, the functions, 

ports, protocols, and services intended for organizational use.

Supplemental Guidance: The identification of functions, ports, protocols, and services early in 

the system development life cycle (e.g., during the initial requirements definition and design 

phases) allows organizations to influence the design of the information system, information 

system component, or information system service. This early involvement in the life cycle 

helps organizations to avoid or minimize the use of functions, ports, protocols, or services that 

pose unnecessarily high risks and understand the trade-offs involved in blocking specific 

ports, protocols, or services (or when requiring information system service providers to do 

so). Early identification of functions, ports, protocols, and services avoids costly retrofitting 

of security controls after the information system, system component, or information system 

service has been implemented. SA-9 describes requirements for external information system 

services with organizations identifying which functions, ports, protocols, and services are 

provided from external sources. Related controls: CM-7, SA-9.

(10) ACQUISITION PROCESS | USE OF APPROVED PIV PRODUCTS 

The organization employs only information technology products on the FIPS 201-approved 

products list for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) capability implemented within organizational 

information systems.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: IA-2, IA-8.

References: HSPD-12; ISO/IEC 15408; FIPS Publications 140-2, 201; NIST Special Publications 

800-23, 800-35, 800-36, 800-37, 800-64, 800-70, 800-137; Federal Acquisition Regulation; 

Web: http://www.niap-ccevs.org, http://fips201ep.cio.gov, http://www.acquisition.gov/far. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SA-4 (10) MOD SA-4 (1) (2) (9) (10) HIGH SA-4 (1) (2) (9) (10)

SA-5 INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION

Control: The organization:

a. Obtains administrator documentation for the information system, system component, or 

information system service that describes:

1. Secure configuration, installation, and operation of the system, component, or service; 

2. Effective use and maintenance of security functions/mechanisms; and

3. Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative (i.e., privileged) 

functions;

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b. Obtains user documentation for the information system, system component, or information 

system service that describes:

1. User-accessible security functions/mechanisms and how to effectively use those security 

functions/mechanisms;

2. Methods for user interaction, which enables individuals to use the system, component, or 

service in a more secure manner; and

3. User responsibilities in maintaining the security of the system, component, or service;

c. Documents attempts to obtain information system, system component, or information system 

service documentation when such documentation is either unavailable or nonexistent and

takes [Assignment: organization-defined actions] in response;

d. Protects documentation as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy; and

e. Distributes documentation to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: This control helps organizational personnel understand the implementation

and operation of security controls associated with information systems, system components, and 

information system services. Organizations consider establishing specific measures to determine 

the quality/completeness of the content provided. The inability to obtain needed documentation

may occur, for example, due to the age of the information system/component or lack of support 

from developers and contractors. In those situations, organizations may need to recreate selected 

documentation if such documentation is essential to the effective implementation or operation of 

security controls. The level of protection provided for selected information system, component, or 

service documentation is commensurate with the security category or classification of the system.

For example, documentation associated with a key DoD weapons system or command and control 

system would typically require a higher level of protection than a routine administrative system. 

Documentation that addresses information system vulnerabilities may also require an increased 

level of protection. Secure operation of the information system, includes, for example, initially 

starting the system and resuming secure system operation after any lapse in system operation. 

Related controls: CM-6, CM-8, PL-2, PL-4, PS-2, SA-3, SA-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF SECURITY CONTROLS 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4 (1)].

(2) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | SECURITY-RELEVANT EXTERNAL SYSTEM INTERFACES 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4 (2)].

(3) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | HIGH-LEVEL DESIGN 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4 (2)].

(4) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | LOW-LEVEL DESIGN 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4 (2)].

(5) INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | SOURCE CODE

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4 (2)].

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW SA-5 MOD SA-5 HIGH SA-5

SA-6 SOFTWARE USAGE RESTRICTIONS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-10 and SI-7].

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SA-7 USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-11 and SI-7].

SA-8 SECURITY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES

Control: The organization applies information system security engineering principles in the 

specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations apply security engineering principles primarily to new 

development information systems or systems undergoing major upgrades. For legacy systems, 

organizations apply security engineering principles to system upgrades and modifications to the 

extent feasible, given the current state of hardware, software, and firmware within those systems.

Security engineering principles include, for example: (i) developing layered protections; (ii) 

establishing sound security policy, architecture, and controls as the foundation for design; (iii) 

incorporating security requirements into the system development life cycle; (iv) delineating

physical and logical security boundaries; (v) ensuring that system developers are trained on how to 

build secure software; (vi) tailoring security controls to meet organizational and operational needs;

(vii) performing threat modeling to identify use cases, threat agents, attack vectors, and attack 

patterns as well as compensating controls and design patterns needed to mitigate risk; and (viii) 

reducing risk to acceptable levels, thus enabling informed risk management decisions. Related 

controls: PM-7, SA-3, SA-4, SA-17, SC-2, SC-3.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-27.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SA-8 HIGH SA-8

SA-9 EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEM SERVICES

Control: The organization:

a. Requires that providers of external information system services comply with organizational 

information security requirements and employ [Assignment: organization-defined security 

controls] in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, 

regulations, standards, and guidance;

b. Defines and documents government oversight and user roles and responsibilities with regard 

to external information system services; and

c. Employs [Assignment: organization-defined processes, methods, and techniques] to monitor 

security control compliance by external service providers on an ongoing basis.

Supplemental Guidance: External information system services are services that are implemented 

outside of the authorization boundaries of organizational information systems. This includes 

services that are used by, but not a part of, organizational information systems. FISMA and OMB 

policy require that organizations using external service providers that are processing, storing, or 

transmitting federal information or operating information systems on behalf of the federal 

government ensure that such providers meet the same security requirements that federal agencies 

are required to meet. Organizations establish relationships with external service providers in a 

variety of ways including, for example, through joint ventures, business partnerships, contracts, 

interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements, licensing agreements, and supply chain 

exchanges. The responsibility for managing risks from the use of external information system 

services remains with authorizing officials. For services external to organizations, a chain of trust 

requires that organizations establish and retain a level of confidence that each participating 

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provider in the potentially complex consumer-provider relationship provides adequate protection 

for the services rendered. The extent and nature of this chain of trust varies based on the 

relationships between organizations and the external providers. Organizations document the basis 

for trust relationships so the relationships can be monitored over time. External information 

system services documentation includes government, service providers, end user security roles and 

responsibilities, and service-level agreements. Service-level agreements define expectations of 

performance for security controls, describe measurable outcomes, and identify remedies and 

response requirements for identified instances of noncompliance. Related controls: CA-3, IR-7, 

PS-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | RISK ASSESSMENTS / ORGANIZATIONAL APPROVALS 

The organization:

(a) Conducts an organizational assessment of risk prior to the acquisition or outsourcing of 

dedicated information security services; and

(b) Ensures that the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information security services is 

approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: Dedicated information security services include, for example, incident 

monitoring, analysis and response, operation of information security-related devices such as 

firewalls, or key management services. Related controls: CA-6, RA-3.

(2) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | IDENTIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS / PORTS / PROTOCOLS / SERVICES 

The organization requires providers of [Assignment: organization-defined external information 

system services] to identify the functions, ports, protocols, and other services required for the use 

of such services.

Supplemental Guidance: Information from external service providers regarding the specific 

functions, ports, protocols, and services used in the provision of such services can be 

particularly useful when the need arises to understand the trade-offs involved in restricting 

certain functions/services or blocking certain ports/protocols. Related control: CM-7.

(3) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | ESTABLISH / MAINTAIN TRUST RELATIONSHIP WITH PROVIDERS

The organization establishes, documents, and maintains trust relationships with external service 

providers based on [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements, properties, factors, 

or conditions defining acceptable trust relationships].

Supplemental Guidance: The degree of confidence that the risk from using external services is 

at an acceptable level depends on the trust that organizations place in the external providers, 

individually or in combination. Trust relationships can help organization to gain increased 

levels of confidence that participating service providers are providing adequate protection for 

the services rendered. Such relationships can be complicated due to the number of potential 

entities participating in the consumer-provider interactions, subordinate relationships and 

levels of trust, and the types of interactions between the parties. In some cases, the degree of 

trust is based on the amount of direct control organizations are able to exert on external 

service providers with regard to employment of security controls necessary for the protection 

of the service/information and the evidence brought forth as to the effectiveness of those 

controls. The level of control is typically established by the terms and conditions of the 

contracts or service-level agreements and can range from extensive control (e.g., negotiating 

contracts or agreements that specify security requirements for the providers) to very limited 

control (e.g., using contracts or service-level agreements to obtain commodity servicessuch as 

commercial telecommunications services). In other cases, levels of trust are based on factors 

that convince organizations that required security controls have been employed and that 

determinations of control effectiveness exist. For example, separately authorized external 

information system services provided to organizations through well-established business 

relationships may provide degrees of trust in such services within the tolerable risk range of 

the organizations using the services. External service providers may also outsource selected 

services to other external entities, making the trust relationship more difficult and complicated 

to manage. Depending on the nature of the services, organizations may find it very difficult to 

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place significant trust in external providers. This is not due to any inherent untrustworthiness 

on the part of providers, but to the intrinsic level of risk in the services.

(4) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | CONSISTENT INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERS

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to ensure that 

the interests of [Assignment: organization-defined external service providers] are consistent with 

and reflect organizational interests.

Supplemental Guidance: As organizations increasingly use external service providers, the 

possibility exists that the interests of the service providers may diverge from organizational 

interests. In such situations, simply having the correct technical, procedural, or operational 

safeguards in place may not be sufficient if the service providers that implement and control 

those safeguards are not operating in a manner consistent with the interests of the consuming 

organizations. Possible actions that organizations might take to address such concerns include, 

for example, requiring background checks for selected service provider personnel, examining

ownership records, employing only trustworthy service providers (i.e., providers with which 

organizations have had positive experiences), and conducting periodic/unscheduled visits to 

service provider facilities.

(5) EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | PROCESSING, STORAGE, AND SERVICE LOCATION

The organization restricts the location of [Selection (one or more): information processing; 

information/data; information system services] to [Assignment: organization-defined locations] 

based on [Assignment: organization-defined requirements or conditions].

Supplemental Guidance: The location of information processing, information/data storage, or 

information system services that are critical to organizations can have a direct impact on the 

ability of those organizations to successfully execute their missions/business functions. This 

situation exists when external providers control the location of processing, storage or services. 

The criteria external providers use for the selection of processing, storage, or service locations

may be different from organizational criteria. For example, organizations may want to ensure 

that data/information storage locations are restricted to certain locations to facilitate incident 

response activities (e.g., forensic analyses, after-the-fact investigations) in case of information 

security breaches/compromises. Such incident response activities may be adversely affected 

by the governing laws or protocols in the locations where processing and storage occur and/or 

the locations from which information system services emanate. 

References: NIST Special Publication 800-35.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SA-9 MOD SA-9 (2) HIGH SA-9 (2)

SA-10 DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

Control: The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to:

a. Perform configuration management during system, component, or service [Selection (one or 

more): design; development; implementation; operation];

b. Document, manage, and control the integrity of changes to [Assignment: organization-defined 

configuration items under configuration management];

c. Implement only organization-approved changes to the system, component, or service;

d. Document approved changes to the system, component, or service and the potential security 

impacts of such changes; and

e. Track security flaws and flaw resolution within the system, component, or service and report 

findings to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel].

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Supplemental Guidance: This control also applies to organizations conducting internal information 

systems development and integration. Organizations consider the quality and completeness of the 

configuration management activities conducted by developers as evidence of applying effective 

security safeguards. Safeguards include, for example, protecting from unauthorized modification 

or destruction, the master copies of all material used to generate security-relevant portions of the 

system hardware, software, and firmware. Maintaining the integrity of changes to the information 

system, information system component, or information system service requires configuration 

control throughout the system development life cycle to track authorized changes and prevent 

unauthorized changes. Configuration items that are placed under configuration management (if 

existence/use is required by other security controls) include: the formal model; the functional, 

high-level, and low-level design specifications; other design data; implementation documentation; 

source code and hardware schematics; the running version of the object code; tools for comparing 

new versions of security-relevant hardware descriptions and software/firmware source code with 

previous versions; and test fixtures and documentation. Depending on the mission/business needs 

of organizations and the nature of the contractual relationships in place, developers may provide

configuration management support during the operations and maintenance phases of the life cycle.

Related controls: CM-3, CM-4, CM-9, SA-12, SI-2.

Control Enhancements:

(1) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | SOFTWARE / FIRMWARE INTEGRITY VERIFICATION 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to enable integrity verification of software and firmware components.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement allows organizations to detect unauthorized 

changes to software and firmware components through the use of tools, techniques, and/or 

mechanisms provided by developers. Integrity checking mechanisms can also address 

counterfeiting of software and firmware components. Organizations verify the integrity of 

software and firmware components, for example, through secure one-way hashes provided by 

developers. Delivered software and firmware components also include any updates to such 

components. Related control: SI-7.

(2) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | ALTERNATIVE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PROCESSES

The organization provides an alternate configuration management process using organizational 

personnel in the absence of a dedicated developer configuration management team.

Supplemental Guidance: Alternate configuration management processes may be required, for 

example, when organizations use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) information technology 

products. Alternate configuration management processes include organizational personnel

that: (i) are responsible for reviewing/approving proposed changes to information systems, 

system components, and information system services; and (ii) conduct security impact 

analyses prior to the implementation of any changes to systems, components, or services (e.g., 

a configuration control board that considers security impacts of changes during development 

and includes representatives of both the organization and the developer, when applicable).

(3) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | HARDWARE INTEGRITY VERIFICATION

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to enable integrity verification of hardware components.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement allows organizations to detect unauthorized 

changes to hardware components through the use of tools, techniques, and/or mechanisms 

provided by developers. Organizations verify the integrity of hardware components, for 

example, with hard-to-copy labels and verifiable serial numbers provided by developers, and 

by requiring the implementation of anti-tamper technologies. Delivered hardware components 

also include updates to such components. Related control: SI-7.

(4) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | TRUSTED GENERATION

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to employ tools for comparing newly generated versions of securityrelevant hardware descriptions and software/firmware source and object code with previous 

versions.

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Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses changes to hardware, software, 

and firmware components between versions during development. In contrast, SA-10 (1) and 

SA-10 (3) allow organizations to detect unauthorized changes to hardware, software, and 

firmware components through the use of tools, techniques, and/or mechanisms provided by 

developers.

(5) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | MAPPING INTEGRITY FOR VERSION CONTROL

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to maintain the integrity of the mapping between the master build data 

(hardware drawings and software/firmware code) describing the current version of securityrelevant hardware, software, and firmware and the on-site master copy of the data for the current 

version.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses changes to hardware, software, 

and firmware components during initial development and during system life cycle updates. 

Maintaining the integrity between the master copies of security-relevant hardware, software, 

and firmware (including designs and source code) and the equivalent data in master copies 

on-site in operational environments is essential to ensure the availability of organizational 

information systems supporting critical missions and/or business functions.

(6) DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | TRUSTED DISTRIBUTION 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to execute procedures for ensuring that security-relevant hardware, 

software, and firmware updates distributed to the organization are exactly as specified by the 

master copies.

Supplemental Guidance: The trusted distribution of security-relevant hardware, software, and 

firmware updates helps to ensure that such updates are faithful representations of the master 

copies maintained by the developer and have not been tampered with during distribution.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-128.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SA-10 HIGH SA-10

SA-11 DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION

Control: The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to:

a. Create and implement a security assessment plan;

b. Perform [Selection (one or more): unit; integration; system; regression] testing/evaluation at 

[Assignment: organization-defined depth and coverage];

c. Produce evidence of the execution of the security assessment plan and the results of the 

security testing/evaluation;

d. Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process; and

e. Correct flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.

Supplemental Guidance: Developmental security testing/evaluation occurs at all post-design phases

of the system development life cycle. Such testing/evaluation confirms that the required security 

controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, enforcing the desired security policy, 

and meeting established security requirements. Security properties of information systems may be 

affected by the interconnection of system components or changes to those components. These

interconnections or changes (e.g., upgrading or replacing applications and operating systems) may 

adversely affect previously implemented security controls. This control provides additional types 

of security testing/evaluation that developers can conduct to reduce or eliminate potential flaws.

Testing custom software applications may require approaches such as static analysis, dynamic 

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analysis, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three approaches. Developers can employ these 

analysis approaches in a variety of tools (e.g., web-based application scanners, static analysis 

tools, binary analyzers) and in source code reviews. Security assessment plans provide the specific 

activities that developers plan to carry out including the types of analyses, testing, evaluation, and 

reviews of software and firmware components, the degree of rigor to be applied, and the types of 

artifacts produced during those processes. The depth of security testing/evaluation refers to the 

rigor and level of detail associated with the assessment process (e.g., black box, gray box, or white 

box testing). The coverage of security testing/evaluation refers to the scope (i.e., number and type) 

of the artifacts included in the assessment process. Contracts specify the acceptance criteria for 

security assessment plans, flaw remediation processes, and the evidence that the plans/processes

have been diligently applied. Methods for reviewing and protecting assessment plans, evidence, 

and documentation are commensurate with the security category or classification level of the 

information system. Contracts may specify documentation protection requirements. Related 

controls: CA-2, CM-4, SA-3, SA-4, SA-5, SI-2.

Control Enhancements:

(1) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | STATIC CODE ANALYSIS

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to employ static code analysis tools to identify common flaws and 

document the results of the analysis.

Supplemental Guidance: Static code analysis provides a technology and methodology for 

security reviews. Such analysis can be used to identify security vulnerabilities and enforce 

security coding practices. Static code analysis is most effective when used early in the 

development process, when each code change can be automatically scanned for potential 

weaknesses. Static analysis can provide clear remediation guidance along with defects to 

enable developers to fix such defects. Evidence of correct implementation of static analysis 

can include, for example, aggregate defect density for critical defect types, evidence that 

defects were inspected by developers or security professionals, and evidence that defects were 

fixed. An excessively high density of ignored findings (commonly referred to as ignored or 

false positives) indicates a potential problem with the analysis process or tool. In such cases,

organizations weigh the validity of the evidence against evidence from other sources.

(2) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | THREAT AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSES 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to perform threat and vulnerability analyses and subsequent 

testing/evaluation of the as-built system, component, or service.

Supplemental Guidance: Applications may deviate significantly from the functional and design 

specifications created during the requirements and design phases of the system development 

life cycle. Therefore, threat and vulnerability analyses of information systems, system 

components, and information system services prior to delivery are critical to the effective 

operation of those systems, components, and services. Threat and vulnerability analyses at 

this phase of the life cycle help to ensure that design or implementation changes have been 

accounted for, and that any new vulnerabilities created as a result of those changes have been 

reviewed and mitigated. Related controls: PM-15, RA-5.

(3) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF ASSESSMENT PLANS /

EVIDENCE

The organization:

(a) Requires an independent agent satisfying [Assignment: organization-defined independence 

criteria] to verify the correct implementation of the developer security assessment plan and

the evidence produced during security testing/evaluation; and

(b) Ensures that the independent agent is either provided with sufficient information to complete 

the verification process or granted the authority to obtain such information.

Supplemental Guidance: Independent agents have the necessary qualifications (i.e., expertise, 

skills, training, and experience) to verify the correct implementation of developer security 

assessment plans. Related controls: AT-3, CA-7, RA-5, SA-12.

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(4) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | MANUAL CODE REVIEWS 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to perform a manual code review of [Assignment: organization-defined 

specific code] using [Assignment: organization-defined processes, procedures, and/or

techniques].

Supplemental Guidance: Manual code reviews are usually reserved for the critical software and 

firmware components of information systems. Such code reviews are uniquely effective at 

identifying weaknesses that require knowledge of the application’s requirements or context 

which are generally unavailable to more automated analytic tools and techniques such as 

static or dynamic analysis. Components benefiting from manual review include for example, 

verifying access control matrices against application controls and reviewing more detailed

aspects of cryptographic implementations and controls.

(5) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | PENETRATION TESTING

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to perform penetration testing at [Assignment: organization-defined 

breadth/depth] and with [Assignment: organization-defined constraints].

Supplemental Guidance: Penetration testing is an assessment methodology in which assessors, 

using all available information technology product and/or information system documentation 

(e.g., product/system design specifications, source code, and administrator/operator manuals) 

and working under specific constraints, attempt to circumvent implemented security features 

of information technology products and information systems. Penetration testing can include, 

for example, white, gray, or black box testing with analyses performed by skilled security 

professionals simulating adversary actions. The objective of penetration testing is to uncover 

potential vulnerabilities in information technology products and information systems resulting 

from implementation errors, configuration faults, or other operational deployment weaknesses

or deficiencies. Penetration tests can be performed in conjunction with automated and manual 

code reviews to provide greater levels of analysis than would ordinarily be possible.

(6) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | ATTACK SURFACE REVIEWS

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to perform attack surface reviews. 

Supplemental Guidance: Attack surfaces of information systems are exposed areas that make 

those systems more vulnerable to cyber attacks. This includes any accessible areas where 

weaknesses or deficiencies in information systems (including the hardware, software, and 

firmware components) provide opportunities for adversaries to exploit vulnerabilities. Attack 

surface reviews ensure that developers: (i) analyze both design and implementation changes 

to information systems; and (ii) mitigate attack vectors generated as a result of the changes.

Correction of identified flaws includes, for example, deprecation of unsafe functions.

(7) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | VERIFY SCOPE OF TESTING / EVALUATION

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to verify that the scope of security testing/evaluation provides

complete coverage of required security controls at [Assignment: organization-defined depth of 

testing/evaluation].

Supplemental Guidance: Verifying that security testing/evaluation provides complete coverage 

of required security controls can be accomplished by a variety of analytic techniques ranging 

from informal to formal. Each of these techniques provides an increasing level of assurance 

corresponding to the degree of formality of the analysis. Rigorously demonstrating security 

control coverage at the highest levels of assurance can be provided by the use of formal 

modeling and analysis techniques including correlation between control implementation and 

corresponding test cases.

(8) DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | DYNAMIC CODE ANALYSIS 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to employ dynamic code analysis tools to identify common flaws and 

document the results of the analysis.

Supplemental Guidance: Dynamic code analysis provides run-time verification of software 

programs, using tools capable of monitoring programs for memory corruption, user privilege 

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issues, and other potential security problems. Dynamic code analysis employs run-time tools 

to help to ensure that security functionality performs in the manner in which it was designed. 

A specialized type of dynamic analysis, known as fuzz testing, induces program failures by 

deliberately introducing malformed or random data into software programs. Fuzz testing 

strategies derive from the intended use of applications and the functional and design 

specifications for the applications. To understand the scope of dynamic code analysis and 

hence the assurance provided, organizations may also consider conducting code coverage 

analysis (checking the degree to which the code has been tested using metrics such as percent 

of subroutines tested or percent of program statements called during execution of the test 

suite) and/or concordance analysis (checking for words that are out of place in software code 

such as non-English language words or derogatory terms).

References: ISO/IEC 15408; NIST Special Publication 800-53A; 

Web: http://nvd.nist.gov, http://cwe.mitre.org, http://cve.mitre.org, http://capec.mitre.org. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SA-11 HIGH SA-11

SA-12 SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION

Control: The organization protects against supply chain threats to the information system, system 

component, or information system service by employing [Assignment: organization-defined

security safeguards] as part of a comprehensive, defense-in-breadth information security strategy.

Supplemental Guidance: Information systems (including system components that compose those 

systems) need to be protected throughout the system development life cycle (i.e., during design, 

development, manufacturing, packaging, assembly, distribution, system integration, operations, 

maintenance, and retirement). Protection of organizational information systems is accomplished 

through threat awareness, by the identification, management, and reduction of vulnerabilities at 

each phase of the life cycle and the use of complementary, mutually reinforcing strategies to

respond to risk. Organizations consider implementing a standardized process to address supply 

chain risk with respect to information systems and system components, and to educate the 

acquisition workforce on threats, risk, and required security controls. Organizations use the 

acquisition/procurement processes to require supply chain entities to implement necessary security 

safeguards to: (i) reduce the likelihood of unauthorized modifications at each stage in the supply 

chain; and (ii) protect information systems and information system components, prior to taking 

delivery of such systems/components. This control also applies to information system services. 

Security safeguards include, for example: (i) security controls for development systems, 

development facilities, and external connections to development systems; (ii) vetting development 

personnel; and (iii) use of tamper-evident packaging during shipping/warehousing. Methods for 

reviewing and protecting development plans, evidence, and documentation are commensurate with 

the security category or classification level of the information system. Contracts may specify 

documentation protection requirements. Related controls: AT-3, CM-8, IR-4, PE-16, PL-8, SA-3, 

SA-4, SA-8, SA-10, SA-14, SA-15, SA-18, SA-19, SC-29, SC-30, SC-38, SI-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | ACQUISITION STRATEGIES / TOOLS / METHODS

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined tailored acquisition strategies, 

contract tools, and procurement methods] for the purchase of the information system, system 

component, or information system service from suppliers. 

Supplemental Guidance: The use of acquisition and procurement processes by organizations 

early in the system development life cycle provides an important vehicle to protect the supply 

chain. Organizations use available all-source intelligence analysis to inform the tailoring of 

acquisition strategies, tools, and methods. There are a number of different tools and 

techniques available (e.g., obscuring the end use of an information system or system 

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component, using blind or filtered buys). Organizations also consider creating incentives for 

suppliers who: (i) implement required security safeguards; (ii) promote transparency into their 

organizational processes and security practices; (iii) provide additional vetting of the 

processes and security practices of subordinate suppliers, critical information system 

components, and services; (iv) restrict purchases from specific suppliers or countries; and (v) 

provide contract language regarding the prohibition of tainted or counterfeit components. In 

addition, organizations consider minimizing the time between purchase decisions and required 

delivery to limit opportunities for adversaries to corrupt information system components or 

products. Finally, organizations can use trusted/controlled distribution, delivery, and 

warehousing options to reduce supply chain risk (e.g., requiring tamper-evident packaging of 

information system components during shipping and warehousing). Related control: SA-19.

(2) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | SUPPLIER REVIEWS

The organization conducts a supplier review prior to entering into a contractual agreement to 

acquire the information system, system component, or information system service.

Supplemental Guidance: Supplier reviews include, for example: (i) analysis of supplier 

processes used to design, develop, test, implement, verify, deliver, and support information 

systems, system components, and information system services; and (ii) assessment of supplier 

training and experience in developing systems, components, or services with the required 

security capability. These reviews provide organizations with increased levels of visibility 

into supplier activities during the system development life cycle to promote more effective 

supply chain risk management. Supplier reviews can also help to determine whether primary 

suppliers have security safeguards in place and a practice for vetting subordinate suppliers, for 

example, second- and third-tier suppliers, and any subcontractors.

(3) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | TRUSTED SHIPPING AND WAREHOUSING

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-12 (1)].

(4) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | DIVERSITY OF SUPPLIERS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-12 (13)].

(5) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | LIMITATION OF HARM

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to limit harm 

from potential adversaries identifying and targeting the organizational supply chain.

Supplemental Guidance: Supply chain risk is part of the advanced persistent threat (APT). 

Security safeguards and countermeasures to reduce the probability of adversaries successfully 

identifying and targeting the supply chain include, for example: (i) avoiding the purchase of 

custom configurations to reduce the risk of acquiring information systems, components, or 

products that have been corrupted via supply chain actions targeted at specific organizations; 

(ii) employing a diverse set of suppliers to limit the potential harm from any given supplier in

the supply chain; (iii) employing approved vendor lists with standing reputations in industry, 

and (iv) using procurement carve outs (i.e., exclusions to commitments or obligations).

(6) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | MINIMIZING PROCUREMENT TIME

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-12 (1)].

(7) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | ASSESSMENTS PRIOR TO SELECTION / ACCEPTANCE / UPDATE

The organization conducts an assessment of the information system, system component, or

information system service prior to selection, acceptance, or update.

Supplemental Guidance: Assessments include, for example, testing, evaluations, reviews, and 

analyses. Independent, third-party entities or organizational personnel conduct assessments of 

systems, components, products, tools, and services. Organizations conduct assessments to 

uncover unintentional vulnerabilities and intentional vulnerabilities including, for example,

malicious code, malicious processes, defective software, and counterfeits. Assessments can 

include, for example, static analyses, dynamic analyses, simulations, white, gray, and black 

box testing, fuzz testing, penetration testing, and ensuring that components or services are 

genuine (e.g., using tags, cryptographic hash verifications, or digital signatures). Evidence 

generated during security assessments is documented for follow-on actions carried out by 

organizations. Related controls: CA-2, SA-11.

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(8) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | USE OF ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

The organization uses all-source intelligence analysis of suppliers and potential suppliers of the

information system, system component, or information system service.

Supplemental Guidance: All-source intelligence analysis is employed by organizations to 

inform engineering, acquisition, and risk management decisions. All-source intelligence 

consists of intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all 

sources of information, most frequently including human intelligence, imagery intelligence, 

measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open source data in the 

production of finished intelligence. Where available, such information is used to analyze the 

risk of both intentional and unintentional vulnerabilities from development, manufacturing, 

and delivery processes, people, and the environment. This review is performed on suppliers at

multiple tiers in the supply chain sufficient to manage risks. Related control: SA-15.

(9) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | OPERATIONS SECURITY

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined Operations Security (OPSEC) 

safeguards] in accordance with classification guides to protect supply chain-related information

for the information system, system component, or information system service.

Supplemental Guidance: Supply chain information includes, for example: user identities; uses 

for information systems, information system components, and information system services; 

supplier identities; supplier processes; security requirements; design specifications; testing 

and evaluation results; and system/component configurations. This control enhancement 

expands the scope of OPSEC to include suppliers and potential suppliers. OPSEC is a process 

of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to 

operations and other activities to: (i) identify those actions that can be observed by potential 

adversaries; (ii) determine indicators that adversaries might obtain that could be interpreted or 

pieced together to derive critical information in sufficient time to cause harm to organizations; 

(iii) implement safeguards or countermeasures to eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level, 

exploitable vulnerabilities; and (iv) consider how aggregated information may compromise 

the confidentiality of users or uses of the supply chain. OPSEC may require organizations to 

withhold critical mission/business information from suppliers and may include the use of 

intermediaries to hide the end use, or users, of information systems, system components, or 

information system services.

(10) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | VALIDATE AS GENUINE AND NOT ALTERED

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to validate that 

the information system or system component received is genuine and has not been altered.

Supplemental Guidance: For some information system components, especially hardware, there 

are technical means to help determine if the components are genuine or have been altered. 

Security safeguards used to validate the authenticity of information systems and information 

system components include, for example, optical/nanotechnology tagging and side-channel 

analysis. For hardware, detailed bill of material information can highlight the elements with 

embedded logic complete with component and production location.

(11) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | PENETRATION TESTING / ANALYSIS OF ELEMENTS, PROCESSES, AND ACTORS

The organization employs [Selection (one or more): organizational analysis, independent thirdparty analysis, organizational penetration testing, independent third-party penetration testing] of 

[Assignment: organization-defined supply chain elements, processes, and actors] associated with 

the information system, system component, or information system service.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses analysis and/or testing of the 

supply chain, not just delivered items. Supply chain elements are information technology 

products or product components that contain programmable logic and that are critically 

important to information system functions. Supply chain processes include, for example: (i) 

hardware, software, and firmware development processes; (ii) shipping/handling procedures;

(iii) personnel and physical security programs; (iv) configuration management tools/measures 

to maintain provenance; or (v) any other programs, processes, or procedures associated with 

the production/distribution of supply chain elements. Supply chain actors are individuals with 

specific roles and responsibilities in the supply chain. The evidence generated during analyses 

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and testing of supply chain elements, processes, and actors is documented and used to inform 

organizational risk management activities and decisions. Related control: RA-5.

(12) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL AGREEMENTS

The organization establishes inter-organizational agreements and procedures with entities

involved in the supply chain for the information system, system component, or information system 

service.

Supplemental Guidance: The establishment of inter-organizational agreements and procedures 

provides for notification of supply chain compromises. Early notification of supply chain 

compromises that can potentially adversely affect or have adversely affected organizational 

information systems, including critical system components, is essential for organizations to 

provide appropriate responses to such incidents.

(13) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | CRITICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to ensure an 

adequate supply of [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components].

Supplemental Guidance: Adversaries can attempt to impede organizational operations by

disrupting the supply of critical information system components or corrupting supplier

operations. Safeguards to ensure adequate supplies of critical information system components

include, for example: (i) the use of multiple suppliers throughout the supply chain for the 

identified critical components; and (ii) stockpiling of spare components to ensure operation 

during mission-critical times.

(14) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | IDENTITY AND TRACEABILITY

The organization establishes and retains unique identification of [Assignment: organizationdefined supply chain elements, processes, and actors] for the information system, system 

component, or information system service.

Supplemental Guidance: Knowing who and what is in the supply chains of organizations is 

critical to gaining visibility into what is happening within such supply chains, as well as 

monitoring and identifying high-risk events and activities. Without reasonable visibility and 

traceability into supply chains (i.e., elements, processes, and actors), it is very difficult for 

organizations to understand and therefore manage risk, and to reduce the likelihood of adverse 

events. Uniquely identifying acquirer and integrator roles, organizations, personnel, mission

and element processes, testing and evaluation procedures, delivery mechanisms, support 

mechanisms, communications/delivery paths, and disposal/final disposition activities as well 

as the components and tools used, establishes a foundational identity structure for assessment 

of supply chain activities. For example, labeling (using serial numbers) and tagging (using 

radio-frequency identification [RFID] tags) individual supply chain elements including 

software packages, modules, and hardware devices, and processes associated with those 

elements can be used for this purpose. Identification methods are sufficient to support the 

provenance in the event of a supply chain issue or adverse supply chain event.

(15) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | PROCESSES TO ADDRESS WEAKNESSES OR DEFICIENCIES

The organization establishes a process to address weaknesses or deficiencies in supply chain 

elements identified during independent or organizational assessments of such elements.

Supplemental Guidance: Evidence generated during independent or organizational assessments 

of supply chain elements (e.g., penetration testing, audits, verification/validation activities) is 

documented and used in follow-on processes implemented by organizations to respond to the

risks related to the identified weaknesses and deficiencies. Supply chain elements include, for 

example, supplier development processes and supplier distribution systems.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-161; NIST Interagency Report 7622.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH SA-12

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SA-13 TRUSTWORTHINESS

Control: The organization:

a. Describes the trustworthiness required in the [Assignment: organization-defined information 

system, information system component, or information system service] supporting its critical 

missions/business functions; and

b. Implements [Assignment: organization-defined assurance overlay] to achieve such 

trustworthiness.

Supplemental Guidance: This control helps organizations to make explicit trustworthiness decisions 

when designing, developing, and implementing information systems that are needed to conduct 

critical organizational missions/business functions. Trustworthiness is a characteristic/property of 

an information system that expresses the degree to which the system can be expected to preserve 

the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information it processes, stores, or 

transmits. Trustworthy information systems are systems that are capable of being trusted to 

operate within defined levels of risk despite the environmental disruptions, human errors, and 

purposeful attacks that are expected to occur in the specified environments of operation.

Trustworthy systems are important to mission/business success. Two factors affecting the 

trustworthiness of information systems include: (i) security functionality (i.e., the security 

features, functions, and/or mechanisms employed within the system and its environment of 

operation); and (ii) security assurance (i.e., the grounds for confidence that the security

functionality is effective in its application). Developers, implementers, operators, and maintainers

of organizational information systems can increase the level of assurance (and trustworthiness), 

for example, by employing well-defined security policy models, structured and rigorous hardware, 

software, and firmware development techniques, sound system/security engineering principles, 

and secure configuration settings (defined by a set of assurance-related security controls in 

Appendix E).

Assurance is also based on the assessment of evidence produced during the system development 

life cycle. Critical missions/business functions are supported by high-impact systems and the 

associated assurance requirements for such systems. The additional assurance controls in Table E4 in Appendix E (designated as optional) can be used to develop and implement high-assurance 

solutions for specific information systems and system components using the concept of overlays 

described in Appendix I. Organizations select assurance overlays that have been developed, 

validated, and approved for community adoption (e.g., cross-organization, governmentwide), 

limiting the development of such overlays on an organization-by-organization basis. Organizations 

can conduct criticality analyses as described in SA-14, to determine the information systems, 

system components, or information system services that require high-assurance solutions. 

Trustworthiness requirements and assurance overlays can be described in the security plans for 

organizational information systems. Related controls: RA-2, SA-4, SA-8, SA-14, SC-3.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: FIPS Publications 199, 200; NIST Special Publications 800-53, 800-53A, 800-60, 

800-64.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SA-14 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS

Control: The organization identifies critical information system components and functions by 

performing a criticality analysis for [Assignment: organization-defined information systems, 

information system components, or information system services] at [Assignment: organizationdefined decision points in the system development life cycle].

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Supplemental Guidance: Criticality analysis is a key tenet of supply chain risk management and 

informs the prioritization of supply chain protection activities such as attack surface reduction, use 

of all-source intelligence, and tailored acquisition strategies. Information system engineers can 

conduct an end-to-end functional decomposition of an information system to identify missioncritical functions and components. The functional decomposition includes the identification of 

core organizational missions supported by the system, decomposition into the specific functions to 

perform those missions, and traceability to the hardware, software, and firmware components that 

implement those functions, including when the functions are shared by many components within 

and beyond the information system boundary. Information system components that allow for 

unmediated access to critical components or functions are considered critical due to the inherent 

vulnerabilities such components create. Criticality is assessed in terms of the impact of the 

function or component failure on the ability of the component to complete the organizational 

missions supported by the information system. A criticality analysis is performed whenever an 

architecture or design is being developed or modified, including upgrades. Related controls: CP-2, 

PL-2, PL-8, PM-1, SA-8, SA-12, SA-13, SA-15, SA-20.

Control Enhancements: None.

(1) CRITICALITY ANALYSIS | CRITICAL COMPONENTS WITH NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE SOURCING

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-20].

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SA-15 DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS

Control: The organization:

a. Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system 

service to follow a documented development process that:

1. Explicitly addresses security requirements;

2. Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process;

3. Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development 

process; and

4. Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools 

used in development; and

b. Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, 

and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organizationdefined security requirements].

Supplemental Guidance: Development tools include, for example, programming languages and 

computer-aided design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for 

example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes.

Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk 

assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle 

(including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track 

authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Related controls: SA-3, SA-8.

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Control Enhancements:

(1) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | QUALITY METRICS 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to:

(a) Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and

(b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined program review 

milestones]; upon delivery].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable 

levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections 

of completion criteria or sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of 

particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require 

the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have 

no impact on the effectiveness of required security capabilities. During the execution phases 

of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. 

Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics can include defining the 

severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in the 

delivered information system with a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) severity 

of Medium or High.

(2) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | SECURITY TRACKING TOOLS 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during the 

development process.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system development teams select and deploy security 

tracking tools, including, for example, vulnerability/work item tracking systems that facilitate 

assignment, sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated with 

system development processes.

(3) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | CRITICALITY ANALYSIS

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to perform a criticality analysis at [Assignment: organization-defined 

breadth/depth] and at [Assignment: organization-defined decision points in the system 

development life cycle].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement provides developer input to the criticality 

analysis performed by organizations in SA-14. Developer input is essential to such analysis 

because organizations may not have access to detailed design documentation for information 

system components that are developed as commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) information 

technology products (e.g., functional specifications, high-level designs, low-level designs, and 

source code/hardware schematics). Related controls: SA-4, SA-14.

(4) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | THREAT MODELING / VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 

The organization requires that developers perform threat modeling and a vulnerability analysis for 

the information system at [Assignment: organization-defined breadth/depth] that:

(a) Uses [Assignment: organization-defined information concerning impact, environment of 

operations, known or assumed threats, and acceptable risk levels];

(b) Employs [Assignment: organization-defined tools and methods]; and

(c) Produces evidence that meets [Assignment: organization-defined acceptance criteria].

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SA-4.

(5) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | ATTACK SURFACE REDUCTION 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to reduce attack surfaces to [Assignment: organization-defined 

thresholds].

Supplemental Guidance: Attack surface reduction is closely aligned with developer threat and 

vulnerability analyses and information system architecture and design. Attack surface 

reduction is a means of reducing risk to organizations by giving attackers less opportunity to 

exploit weaknesses or deficiencies (i.e., potential vulnerabilities) within information systems, 

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information system components, and information system services. Attack surface reduction 

includes, for example, applying the principle of least privilege, employing layered defenses, 

applying the principle of least functionality (i.e., restricting ports, protocols, functions, and 

services), deprecating unsafe functions, and eliminating application programming interfaces 

(APIs) that are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Related control: CM-7.

(6) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to implement an explicit process to continuously improve the 

development process.

Supplemental Guidance: Developers of information systems, information system components, 

and information system services consider the effectiveness/efficiency of current development 

processes for meeting quality objectives and addressing security capabilities in current threat 

environments.

(7) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | AUTOMATED VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to:

(a) Perform an automated vulnerability analysis using [Assignment: organization-defined tools];

(b) Determine the exploitation potential for discovered vulnerabilities;

(c) Determine potential risk mitigations for delivered vulnerabilities; and

(d) Deliver the outputs of the tools and results of the analysis to [Assignment: organizationdefined personnel or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: RA-5.

(8) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | REUSE OF THREAT / VULNERABILITY INFORMATION 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to use threat modeling and vulnerability analyses from similar systems, 

components, or services to inform the current development process.

Supplemental Guidance: Analysis of vulnerabilities found in similar software applications can 

inform potential design or implementation issues for information systems under development.

Similar information systems or system components may exist within developer organizations. 

Authoritative vulnerability information is available from a variety of public and private sector 

sources including, for example, the National Vulnerability Database.

(9) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | USE OF LIVE DATA

The organization approves, documents, and controls the use of live data in development and test 

environments for the information system, system component, or information system service.

Supplemental Guidance: The use of live data in preproduction environments can result in 

significant risk to organizations. Organizations can minimize such risk by using test or 

dummy data during the development and testing of information systems, information system 

components, and information system services.

(10) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to provide an incident response plan.

Supplemental Guidance: The incident response plan for developers of information systems, 

system components, and information system services is incorporated into organizational 

incident response plans to provide the type of incident response information not readily 

available to organizations. Such information may be extremely helpful, for example, when 

organizations respond to vulnerabilities in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) information 

technology products. Related control: IR-8.

(11) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | ARCHIVE INFORMATION SYSTEM / COMPONENT

The organization requires the developer of the information system or system component to archive 

the system or component to be released or delivered together with the corresponding evidence 

supporting the final security review.

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Supplemental Guidance: Archiving relevant documentation from the development process can 

provide a readily available baseline of information that can be helpful during information 

system/component upgrades or modifications.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH SA-15

SA-16 DEVELOPER-PROVIDED TRAINING

Control: The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to provide [Assignment: organization-defined training] on the correct 

use and operation of the implemented security functions, controls, and/or mechanisms.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to external and internal (in-house) developers. Training 

of personnel is an essential element to ensure the effectiveness of security controls implemented 

within organizational information systems. Training options include, for example, classroom-style 

training, web-based/computer-based training, and hands-on training. Organizations can also 

request sufficient training materials from developers to conduct in-house training or offer selftraining to organizational personnel. Organizations determine the type of training necessary and 

may require different types of training for different security functions, controls, or mechanisms.

Related controls: AT-2, AT-3, SA-5.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH SA-16

SA-17 DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN

Control: The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to produce a design specification and security architecture that:

a. Is consistent with and supportive of the organization’s security architecture which is 

established within and is an integrated part of the organization’s enterprise architecture;

b. Accurately and completely describes the required security functionality, and the allocation of 

security controls among physical and logical components; and

c. Expresses how individual security functions, mechanisms, and services work together to 

provide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection.

Supplemental Guidance: This control is primarily directed at external developers, although it could 

also be used for internal (in-house) development. In contrast, PL-8 is primarily directed at internal 

developers to help ensure that organizations develop an information security architecture and such 

security architecture is integrated or tightly coupled to the enterprise architecture. This distinction 

is important if/when organizations outsource the development of information systems, information 

system components, or information system services to external entities, and there is a requirement

to demonstrate consistency with the organization’s enterprise architecture and information security 

architecture. Related controls: PL-8, PM-7, SA-3, SA-8.

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Control Enhancements:

(1) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | FORMAL POLICY MODEL

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to:

(a) Produce, as an integral part of the development process, a formal policy model describing the 

[Assignment: organization-defined elements of organizational security policy] to be enforced; 

and

(b) Prove that the formal policy model is internally consistent and sufficient to enforce the 

defined elements of the organizational security policy when implemented.

Supplemental Guidance: Formal models describe specific behaviors or security policies using 

formal languages, thus enabling the correctness of those behaviors/policies to be formally

proven. Not all components of information systems can be modeled, and generally, formal 

specifications are scoped to specific behaviors or policies of interest (e.g., nondiscretionary 

access control policies). Organizations choose the particular formal modeling language and 

approach based on the nature of the behaviors/policies to be described and the available tools.

Formal modeling tools include, for example, Gypsy and Zed.

(2) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | SECURITY-RELEVANT COMPONENTS

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to:

(a) Define security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware; and

(b) Provide a rationale that the definition for security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware is 

complete.

Supplemental Guidance: Security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware represent the 

portion of the information system, component, or service that must be trusted to perform

correctly in order to maintain required security properties. Related control: SA-5.

(3) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | FORMAL CORRESPONDENCE

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to:

(a) Produce, as an integral part of the development process, a formal top-level specification that 

specifies the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware in terms of 

exceptions, error messages, and effects;

(b) Show via proof to the extent feasible with additional informal demonstration as necessary, 

that the formal top-level specification is consistent with the formal policy model;

(c) Show via informal demonstration, that the formal top-level specification completely covers the 

interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware;

(d) Show that the formal top-level specification is an accurate description of the implemented 

security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware; and

(e) Describe the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms not addressed

in the formal top-level specification but strictly internal to the security-relevant hardware, 

software, and firmware.

Supplemental Guidance: Correspondence is an important part of the assurance gained through 

modeling. It demonstrates that the implementation is an accurate transformation of the model, 

and that any additional code or implementation details present have no impact on the 

behaviors or policies being modeled. Formal methods can be used to show that the high-level 

security properties are satisfied by the formal information system description, and that the 

formal system description is correctly implemented by a description of some lower level, for 

example a hardware description. Consistency between the formal top-level specification and 

the formal policy models is generally not amenable to being fully proven. Therefore, a

combination of formal/informal methods may be needed to show such consistency. 

Consistency between the formal top-level specification and the implementation may require 

the use of an informal demonstration due to limitations in the applicability of formal methods 

to prove that the specification accurately reflects the implementation. Hardware, software, and 

firmware mechanisms strictly internal to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware 

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include, for example, mapping registers and direct memory input/output. Related control: SA5.

(4) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | INFORMAL CORRESPONDENCE

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to:

(a) Produce, as an integral part of the development process, an informal descriptive top-level 

specification that specifies the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and 

firmware in terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects;

(b) Show via [Selection: informal demonstration, convincing argument with formal methods as 

feasible] that the descriptive top-level specification is consistent with the formal policy model;

(c) Show via informal demonstration, that the descriptive top-level specification completely 

covers the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware;

(d) Show that the descriptive top-level specification is an accurate description of the interfaces to 

security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware; and

(e) Describe the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms not addressed

in the descriptive top-level specification but strictly internal to the security-relevant hardware, 

software, and firmware.

Supplemental Guidance: Correspondence is an important part of the assurance gained through 

modeling. It demonstrates that the implementation is an accurate transformation of the model, 

and that any additional code or implementation details present has no impact on the behaviors 

or policies being modeled. Consistency between the descriptive top-level specification (i.e., 

high-level/low-level design) and the formal policy model is generally not amenable to being 

fully proven. Therefore, a combination of formal/informal methods may be needed to show 

such consistency. Hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms strictly internal to securityrelevant hardware, software, and firmware include, for example, mapping registers and direct

memory input/output. Related control: SA-5.

(5) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | CONCEPTUALLY SIMPLE DESIGN

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or

information system service to:

(a) Design and structure the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware to use a 

complete, conceptually simple protection mechanism with precisely defined semantics; and

(b) Internally structure the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware with specific regard 

for this mechanism.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SC-3.

(6) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | STRUCTURE FOR TESTING

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to structure security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware to 

facilitate testing.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SA-11.

(7) DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | STRUCTURE FOR LEAST PRIVILEGE

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service to structure security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware to 

facilitate controlling access with least privilege.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AC-5, AC-6.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH SA-17

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SA-18 TAMPER RESISTANCE AND DETECTION

Control: The organization implements a tamper protection program for the information system, 

system component, or information system service.

Supplemental Guidance: Anti-tamper technologies and techniques provide a level of protection for 

critical information systems, system components, and information technology products against a 

number of related threats including modification, reverse engineering, and substitution. Strong 

identification combined with tamper resistance and/or tamper detection is essential to protecting 

information systems, components, and products during distribution and when in use. Related 

controls: PE-3, SA-12, SI-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) TAMPER RESISTANCE AND DETECTION | MULTIPLE PHASES OF SDLC 

The organization employs anti-tamper technologies and techniques during multiple phases in the 

system development life cycle including design, development, integration, operations, and 

maintenance.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations use a combination of hardware and software techniques 

for tamper resistance and detection. Organizations employ obfuscation and self-checking, for 

example, to make reverse engineering and modifications more difficult, time-consuming, and 

expensive for adversaries. Customization of information systems and system components can 

make substitutions easier to detect and therefore limit damage. Related control: SA-3.

(2) TAMPER RESISTANCE AND DETECTION | INSPECTION OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, OR DEVICES

The organization inspects [Assignment: organization-defined information systems, system 

components, or devices] [Selection (one or more): at random; at [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency], upon [Assignment: organization-defined indications of need for inspection]] to 

detect tampering.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses both physical and logical 

tampering and is typically applied to mobile devices, notebook computers, or other system 

components taken out of organization-controlled areas. Indications of need for inspection 

include, for example, when individuals return from travel to high-risk locations. Related 

control: SI-4.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SA-19 COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY

Control: The organization:

a. Develops and implements anti-counterfeit policy and procedures that include the means to 

detect and prevent counterfeit components from entering the information system; and

b. Reports counterfeit information system components to [Selection (one or more): source of 

counterfeit component; [Assignment: organization-defined external reporting organizations];

[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Sources of counterfeit components include, for example, manufacturers, 

developers, vendors, and contractors. Anti-counterfeiting policy and procedures support tamper 

resistance and provide a level of protection against the introduction of malicious code. External 

reporting organizations include, for example, US-CERT. Related controls: PE-3, SA-12, SI-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | ANTI-COUNTERFEIT TRAINING

The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit 

information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware).

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(2) COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | CONFIGURATION CONTROL FOR COMPONENT SERVICE / REPAIR

The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system components] awaiting service/repair and serviced/repaired components 

awaiting return to service.

(3) COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | COMPONENT DISPOSAL

The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organizationdefined techniques and methods].

Supplemental Guidance: Proper disposal of information system components helps to prevent

such components from entering the gray market.

(4) COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | ANTI-COUNTERFEIT SCANNING

The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency].

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SA-20 CUSTOMIZED DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS

Control: The organization re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined 

critical information system components].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine that certain information system components likely 

cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which 

there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Re-implementation

or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. 

This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, 

and firmware) such that the standard attacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations 

where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom 

develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., 

enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from 

deletion of system and application files. Related controls: CP-2, SA-8, SA-14.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SA-21 DEVELOPER SCREENING

Control: The organization requires that the developer of [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system, system component, or information system service]:

a. Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organizationdefined official government duties]; and

b. Satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined additional personnel screening criteria].

Supplemental Guidance: Because the information system, system component, or information system 

service may be employed in critical activities essential to the national and/or economic security 

interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that the developer is 

trustworthy. The degree of trust required of the developer may need to be consistent with that of 

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the individuals accessing the information system/component/service once deployed. Examples of 

authorization and personnel screening criteria include clearance, satisfactory background checks, 

citizenship, and nationality. Trustworthiness of developers may also include a review and analysis 

of company ownership and any relationships the company has with entities potentially affecting 

the quality/reliability of the systems, components, or services being developed. Related controls:

PS-3, PS-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) DEVELOPER SCREENING | VALIDATION OF SCREENING 

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or 

information system service take [Assignment: organization-defined actions] to ensure that the 

required access authorizations and screening criteria are satisfied.

Supplemental Guidance: Satisfying required access authorizations and personnel screening 

criteria includes, for example, providing a listing of all the individuals authorized to perform 

development activities on the selected information system, system component, or information 

system service so that organizations can validate that the developer has satisfied the necessary 

authorization and screening requirements.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SA-22 UNSUPPORTED SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Control: The organization:

a. Replaces information system components when support for the components is no longer 

available from the developer, vendor, or manufacturer; and

b. Provides justification and documents approval for the continued use of unsupported system 

components required to satisfy mission/business needs.

Supplemental Guidance: Support for information system components includes, for example, 

software patches, firmware updates, replacement parts, and maintenance contracts. Unsupported 

components (e.g., when vendors are no longer providing critical software patches), provide a 

substantial opportunity for adversaries to exploit new weaknesses discovered in the currently 

installed components. Exceptions to replacing unsupported system components may include, for 

example, systems that provide critical mission/business capability where newer technologies are 

not available or where the systems are so isolated that installing replacement components is not an 

option. Related controls: PL-2, SA-3.

Control Enhancements:

(1) UNSUPPORTED SYSTEM COMPONENTS | ALTERNATIVE SOURCES FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT

The organization provides [Selection (one or more): in-house support; [Assignment: organizationdefined support from external providers]] for unsupported information system components.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses the need to provide continued 

support for selected information system components that are no longer supported by the 

original developers, vendors, or manufacturers when such components remain essential to 

mission/business operations. Organizations can establish in-house support, for example, by 

developing customized patches for critical software components or secure the services of 

external providers who through contractual relationships, provide ongoing support for the 

designated unsupported components. Such contractual relationships can include, for example, 

Open Source Software value-added vendors.

References: None.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION CONTROLS

DEVELOPMENT OF SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, AND SERVICES

With the renewed emphasis on trustworthy information systems and supply chain security, it is 

essential that organizations have the capability to express their information security requirements 

with clarity and specificity in order to engage the information technology industry and obtain the 

systems, components, and services necessary for mission and business success. To ensure that 

organizations have such capability, this publication provides a set of security controls in the System 

and Services Acquisition family (i.e., SA family) addressing requirements for the development of 

information systems, information technology products, and information system services. Therefore, 

many of the controls in the SA family are directed at developers of those systems, components, and 

services. It is important for organizations to recognize that the scope of the security controls in the 

SA family includes all system/component/service development and the developers associated with 

such development whether the development is conducted by internal organizational personnel or by 

external developers through the contracting/acquisition process. Affected controls include SA-8, 

SA-10, SA-11, SA-15, SA-16, SA-17, SA-20, and SA-21.

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FAMILY: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

SC-1 SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles]:

1. A system and communications protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 

responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, 

and compliance; and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and communications protection

policy and associated system and communications protection controls; and

b. Reviews and updates the current:

1. System and communications protection policy [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency]; and

2. System and communications protection procedures [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SC family.

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can 

be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The 

procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information 

systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing 

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-1 MOD SC-1 HIGH SC-1

SC-2 APPLICATION PARTITIONING

Control: The information system separates user functionality (including user interface services) 

from information system management functionality.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system management functionality includes, for example, 

functions necessary to administer databases, network components, workstations, or servers, and 

typically requires privileged user access. The separation of user functionality from information 

system management functionality is either physical or logical. Organizations implement separation

of system management-related functionality from user functionality by using different computers,

different central processing units, different instances of operating systems, different network 

addresses, virtualization techniques, or combinations of these or other methods, as appropriate.

This type of separation includes, for example, web administrative interfaces that use separate 

authentication methods for users of any other information system resources. Separation of system 

and user functionality may include isolating administrative interfaces on different domains and

with additional access controls. Related controls: SA-4, SA-8, SC-3.

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Control Enhancements:

(1) APPLICATION PARTITIONING | INTERFACES FOR NON-PRIVILEGED USERS 

The information system prevents the presentation of information system management-related 

functionality at an interface for non-privileged users.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement ensures that administration options (e.g., 

administrator privileges) are not available to general users (including prohibiting the use of 

the grey-out option commonly used to eliminate accessibility to such information). Such 

restrictions include, for example, not presenting administration options until users establish 

sessions with administrator privileges. Related control: AC-3.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-2 HIGH SC-2

SC-3 SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION

Control: The information system isolates security functions from nonsecurity functions.

Supplemental Guidance: The information system isolates security functions from nonsecurity 

functions by means of an isolation boundary (implemented via partitions and domains). Such 

isolation controls access to and protects the integrity of the hardware, software, and firmware that 

perform those security functions. Information systems implement code separation (i.e., separation 

of security functions from nonsecurity functions) in a number of ways, including, for example, 

through the provision of security kernels via processor rings or processor modes. For non-kernel 

code, security function isolation is often achieved through file system protections that serve to 

protect the code on disk, and address space protections that protect executing code. Information 

systems restrict access to security functions through the use of access control mechanisms and by 

implementing least privilege capabilities. While the ideal is for all of the code within the security 

function isolation boundary to only contain security-relevant code, it is sometimes necessary to 

include nonsecurity functions within the isolation boundary as an exception. Related controls: AC3, AC-6, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SA-13, SC-2, SC-7, SC-39.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | HARDWARE SEPARATION 

The information system utilizes underlying hardware separation mechanisms to implement

security function isolation.

Supplemental Guidance: Underlying hardware separation mechanisms include, for example, 

hardware ring architectures, commonly implemented within microprocessors, and hardwareenforced address segmentation used to support logically distinct storage objects with separate 

attributes (i.e., readable, writeable).

(2) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | ACCESS / FLOW CONTROL FUNCTIONS 

The information system isolates security functions enforcing access and information flow control 

from nonsecurity functions and from other security functions.

Supplemental Guidance: Security function isolation occurs as a result of implementation; the 

functions can still be scanned and monitored. Security functions that are potentially isolated 

from access and flow control enforcement functions include, for example, auditing, intrusion 

detection, and anti-virus functions.

(3) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | MINIMIZE NONSECURITY FUNCTIONALITY

The organization minimizes the number of nonsecurity functions included within the isolation 

boundary containing security functions.

Supplemental Guidance: In those instances where it is not feasible to achieve strict isolation of 

nonsecurity functions from security functions, it is necessary to take actions to minimize the 

nonsecurity-relevant functions within the security function boundary. Nonsecurity functions 

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contained within the isolation boundary are considered security-relevant because errors or 

maliciousness in such software, by virtue of being within the boundary, can impact the 

security functions of organizational information systems. The design objective is that the 

specific portions of information systems providing information security are of minimal 

size/complexity. Minimizing the number of nonsecurity functions in the security-relevant 

components of information systems allows designers and implementers to focus only on those 

functions which are necessary to provide the desired security capability (typically access 

enforcement). By minimizing nonsecurity functions within the isolation boundaries, the 

amount of code that must be trusted to enforce security policies is reduced, thus contributing 

to understandability.

(4) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | MODULE COUPLING AND COHESIVENESS

The organization implements security functions as largely independent modules that maximize 

internal cohesiveness within modules and minimize coupling between modules.

Supplemental Guidance: The reduction in inter-module interactions helps to constrain security 

functions and to manage complexity. The concepts of coupling and cohesion are important 

with respect to modularity in software design. Coupling refers to the dependencies that one 

module has on other modules. Cohesion refers to the relationship between the different 

functions within a particular module. Good software engineering practices rely on modular 

decomposition, layering, and minimization to reduce and manage complexity, thus producing 

software modules that are highly cohesive and loosely coupled.

(5) SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | LAYERED STRUCTURES

The organization implements security functions as a layered structure minimizing interactions 

between layers of the design and avoiding any dependence by lower layers on the functionality or 

correctness of higher layers.

Supplemental Guidance: The implementation of layered structures with minimized interactions 

among security functions and non-looping layers (i.e., lower-layer functions do not depend on 

higher-layer functions) further enables the isolation of security functions and management of 

complexity.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH SC-3

SC-4 INFORMATION IN SHARED RESOURCES

Control: The information system prevents unauthorized and unintended information transfer via 

shared system resources.

Supplemental Guidance: This control prevents information, including encrypted representations of 

information, produced by the actions of prior users/roles (or the actions of processes acting on 

behalf of prior users/roles) from being available to any current users/roles (or current processes) 

that obtain access to shared system resources (e.g., registers, main memory, hard disks) after those

resources have been released back to information systems. The control of information in shared 

resources is also commonly referred to as object reuse and residual information protection. This 

control does not address: (i) information remanence which refers to residual representation of data 

that has been nominally erased or removed; (ii) covert channels (including storage and/or timing 

channels) where shared resources are manipulated to violate information flow restrictions; or (iii) 

components within information systems for which there are only single users/roles. Related 

controls: AC-3, AC-4, MP-6.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION IN SHARED RESOURCES | SECURITY LEVELS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-4].

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(2) INFORMATION IN SHARED RESOURCES | PERIODS PROCESSING

The information system prevents unauthorized information transfer via shared resources in 

accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined procedures] when system processing 

explicitly switches between different information classification levels or security categories.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies when there are explicit changes in 

information processing levels during information system operations, for example, during 

multilevel processing and periods processing with information at different classification levels 

or security categories. Organization-defined procedures may include, for example, approved 

sanitization processes for electronically stored information.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-4 HIGH SC-4

SC-5 DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION

Control: The information system protects against or limits the effects of the following types of 

denial of service attacks: [Assignment: organization-defined types of denial of service attacks or 

references to sources for such information] by employing [Assignment: organization-defined

security safeguards].

Supplemental Guidance: A variety of technologies exist to limit, or in some cases, eliminate the 

effects of denial of service attacks. For example, boundary protection devices can filter certain 

types of packets to protect information system components on internal organizational networks

from being directly affected by denial of service attacks. Employing increased capacity and 

bandwidth combined with service redundancy may also reduce the susceptibility to denial of 

service attacks. Related controls: SC-6, SC-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | RESTRICT INTERNAL USERS 

The information system restricts the ability of individuals to launch [Assignment: organizationdefined denial of service attacks] against other information systems.

Supplemental Guidance: Restricting the ability of individuals to launch denial of service attacks 

requires that the mechanisms used for such attacks are unavailable. Individuals of concern can 

include, for example, hostile insiders or external adversaries that have successfully breached 

the information system and are using the system as a platform to launch cyber attacks on third 

parties. Organizations can restrict the ability of individuals to connect and transmit arbitrary 

information on the transport medium (i.e., network, wireless spectrum). Organizations can 

also limit the ability of individuals to use excessive information system resources. Protection 

against individuals having the ability to launch denial of service attacks may be implemented 

on specific information systems or on boundary devices prohibiting egress to potential target 

systems.

(2) DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | EXCESS CAPACITY / BANDWIDTH / REDUNDANCY 

The information system manages excess capacity, bandwidth, or other redundancy to limit the 

effects of information flooding denial of service attacks.

Supplemental Guidance: Managing excess capacity ensures that sufficient capacity is available 

to counter flooding attacks. Managing excess capacity may include, for example, establishing 

selected usage priorities, quotas, or partitioning.

(3) DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | DETECTION / MONITORING

The organization:

(a) Employs [Assignment: organization-defined monitoring tools] to detect indicators of denial of 

service attacks against the information system; and

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(b) Monitors [Assignment: organization-defined information system resources] to determine if 

sufficient resources exist to prevent effective denial of service attacks.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations consider utilization and capacity of information system 

resources when managing risk from denial of service due to malicious attacks. Denial of 

service attacks can originate from external or internal sources. Information system resources 

sensitive to denial of service include, for example, physical disk storage, memory, and CPU 

cycles. Common safeguards to prevent denial of service attacks related to storage utilization 

and capacity include, for example, instituting disk quotas, configuring information systems to 

automatically alert administrators when specific storage capacity thresholds are reached, using 

file compression technologies to maximize available storage space, and imposing separate 

partitions for system and user data. Related controls: CA-7, SI-4.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-5 MOD SC-5 HIGH SC-5

SC-6 RESOURCE AVAILABILITY

Control: The information system protects the availability of resources by allocating [Assignment: 

organization-defined resources] by [Selection (one or more); priority; quota; [Assignment: 

organization-defined security safeguards]].

Supplemental Guidance: Priority protection helps prevent lower-priority processes from delaying or

interfering with the information system servicing any higher-priority processes. Quotas prevent 

users or processes from obtaining more than predetermined amounts of resources. This control 

does not apply to information system components for which there are only single users/roles.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-7 BOUNDARY PROTECTION

Control: The information system:

a. Monitors and controls communications at the external boundary of the system and at key 

internal boundaries within the system;

b. Implements subnetworks for publicly accessible system components that are [Selection: 

physically; logically] separated from internal organizational networks; and

c. Connects to external networks or information systems only through managed interfaces 

consisting of boundary protection devices arranged in accordance with an organizational

security architecture.

Supplemental Guidance: Managed interfaces include, for example, gateways, routers, firewalls, 

guards, network-based malicious code analysis and virtualization systems, or encrypted tunnels

implemented within a security architecture (e.g., routers protecting firewalls or application 

gateways residing on protected subnetworks). Subnetworks that are physically or logically 

separated from internal networks are referred to as demilitarized zones or DMZs. Restricting or

prohibiting interfaces within organizational information systems includes, for example, restricting 

external web traffic to designated web servers within managed interfaces and prohibiting external 

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traffic that appears to be spoofing internal addresses. Organizations consider the shared nature of 

commercial telecommunications services in the implementation of security controls associated 

with the use of such services. Commercial telecommunications services are commonly based on 

network components and consolidated management systems shared by all attached commercial 

customers, and may also include third party-provided access lines and other service elements.

Such transmission services may represent sources of increased risk despite contract security 

provisions. Related controls: AC-4, AC-17, CA-3, CM-7, CP-8, IR-4, RA-3, SC-5, SC-13.

Control Enhancements:

(1) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PHYSICALLY SEPARATED SUBNETWORKS 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7].

(2) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PUBLIC ACCESS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7].

(3) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ACCESS POINTS 

The organization limits the number of external network connections to the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Limiting the number of external network connections facilitates more 

comprehensive monitoring of inbound and outbound communications traffic. The Trusted 

Internet Connection (TIC) initiative is an example of limiting the number of external network 

connections.

(4) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | EXTERNAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

The organization:

(a) Implements a managed interface for each external telecommunication service;

(b) Establishes a traffic flow policy for each managed interface;

(c) Protects the confidentiality and integrity of the information being transmitted across each 

interface;

(d) Documents each exception to the traffic flow policy with a supporting mission/business need 

and duration of that need; and

(e) Reviews exceptions to the traffic flow policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] 

and removes exceptions that are no longer supported by an explicit mission/business need.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SC-8.

(5) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DENY BY DEFAULT / ALLOW BY EXCEPTION

The information system at managed interfaces denies network communications traffic by default 

and allows network communications traffic by exception (i.e., deny all, permit by exception).

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to both inbound and outbound 

network communications traffic. A deny-all, permit-by-exception network communications 

traffic policy ensures that only those connections which are essential and approved are 

allowed.

(6) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESPONSE TO RECOGNIZED FAILURES

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7 (18)].

(7) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PREVENT SPLIT TUNNELING FOR REMOTE DEVICES

The information system, in conjunction with a remote device, prevents the device from 

simultaneously establishing non-remote connections with the system and communicating via 

some other connection to resources in external networks.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement is implemented within remote devices (e.g., 

notebook computers) through configuration settings to disable split tunneling in those devices, 

and by preventing those configuration settings from being readily configurable by users. This 

control enhancement is implemented within the information system by the detection of split 

tunneling (or of configuration settings that allow split tunneling) in the remote device, and by 

prohibiting the connection if the remote device is using split tunneling. Split tunneling might 

be desirable by remote users to communicate with local information system resources such as 

printers/file servers. However, split tunneling would in effect allow unauthorized external 

connections, making the system more vulnerable to attack and to exfiltration of organizational 

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information. The use of VPNs for remote connections, when adequately provisioned with 

appropriate security controls, may provide the organization with sufficient assurance that it 

can effectively treat such connections as non-remote connections from the confidentiality and 

integrity perspective. VPNs thus provide a means for allowing non-remote communications 

paths from remote devices. The use of an adequately provisioned VPN does not eliminate the 

need for preventing split tunneling.

(8) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ROUTE TRAFFIC TO AUTHENTICATED PROXY SERVERS

The information system routes [Assignment: organization-defined internal communications traffic]

to [Assignment: organization-defined external networks] through authenticated proxy servers at 

managed interfaces.

Supplemental Guidance: External networks are networks outside of organizational control. A 

proxy server is a server (i.e., information system or application) that acts as an intermediary 

for clients requesting information system resources (e.g., files, connections, web pages, or 

services) from other organizational servers. Client requests established through an initial 

connection to the proxy server are evaluated to manage complexity and to provide additional 

protection by limiting direct connectivity. Web content filtering devices are one of the most 

common proxy servers providing access to the Internet. Proxy servers support logging 

individual Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) sessions and blocking specific Uniform 

Resource Locators (URLs), domain names, and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Web proxies

can be configured with organization-defined lists of authorized and unauthorized websites.

Related controls: AC-3, AU-2.

(9) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESTRICT THREATENING OUTGOING COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC

The information system:

(a) Detects and denies outgoing communications traffic posing a threat to external information 

systems; and

(b) Audits the identity of internal users associated with denied communications.

Supplemental Guidance: Detecting outgoing communications traffic from internal actions that 

may pose threats to external information systems is sometimes termed extrusion detection. 

Extrusion detection at information system boundaries as part of managed interfaces includes 

the analysis of incoming and outgoing communications traffic searching for indications of 

internal threats to the security of external systems. Such threats include, for example, traffic 

indicative of denial of service attacks and traffic containing malicious code. Related controls: 

AU-2, AU-6, SC-38, SC-44, SI-3, SI-4.

(10) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED EXFILTRATION

The organization prevents the unauthorized exfiltration of information across managed interfaces.

Supplemental Guidance: Safeguards implemented by organizations to prevent unauthorized 

exfiltration of information from information systems include, for example: (i) strict adherence 

to protocol formats; (ii) monitoring for beaconing from information systems; (iii) monitoring 

for steganography; (iv) disconnecting external network interfaces except when explicitly 

needed; (v) disassembling and reassembling packet headers; and (vi) employing traffic profile 

analysis to detect deviations from the volume/types of traffic expected within organizations or 

call backs to command and control centers. Devices enforcing strict adherence to protocol 

formats include, for example, deep packet inspection firewalls and XML gateways. These 

devices verify adherence to protocol formats and specification at the application layer and 

serve to identify vulnerabilities that cannot be detected by devices operating at the network or 

transport layers. This control enhancement is closely associated with cross-domain solutions 

and system guards enforcing information flow requirements. Related control: SI-3.

(11) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESTRICT INCOMING COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC

The information system only allows incoming communications from [Assignment: organizationdefined authorized sources] to be routed to [Assignment: organization-defined authorized 

destinations].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement provides determinations that source and 

destination address pairs represent authorized/allowed communications. Such determinations

can be based on several factors including, for example, the presence of source/destination 

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address pairs in lists of authorized/allowed communications, the absence of address pairs in

lists of unauthorized/disallowed pairs, or meeting more general rules for authorized/allowed 

source/destination pairs. Related control: AC-3.

(12) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | HOST-BASED PROTECTION

The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined host-based boundary protection 

mechanisms] at [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].

Supplemental Guidance: Host-based boundary protection mechanisms include, for example, 

host-based firewalls. Information system components employing host-based boundary 

protection mechanisms include, for example, servers, workstations, and mobile devices.

(13) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ISOLATION OF SECURITY TOOLS / MECHANISMS / SUPPORT COMPONENTS

The organization isolates [Assignment: organization-defined information security tools, 

mechanisms, and support components] from other internal information system components by 

implementing physically separate subnetworks with managed interfaces to other components of 

the system.

Supplemental Guidance: Physically separate subnetworks with managed interfaces are useful, 

for example, in isolating computer network defenses from critical operational processing 

networks to prevent adversaries from discovering the analysis and forensics techniques of 

organizations. Related controls: SA-8, SC-2, SC-3.

(14) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PROTECTS AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PHYSICAL CONNECTIONS

The organization protects against unauthorized physical connections at [Assignment: 

organization-defined managed interfaces].

Supplemental Guidance: Information systems operating at different security categories or 

classification levels may share common physical and environmental controls, since the 

systems may share space within organizational facilities. In practice, it is possible that these 

separate information systems may share common equipment rooms, wiring closets, and cable 

distribution paths. Protection against unauthorized physical connections can be achieved, for 

example, by employing clearly identified and physically separated cable trays, connection 

frames, and patch panels for each side of managed interfaces with physical access controls 

enforcing limited authorized access to these items. Related controls: PE-4, PE-19.

(15) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ROUTE PRIVILEGED NETWORK ACCESSES

The information system routes all networked, privileged accesses through a dedicated, managed 

interface for purposes of access control and auditing.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AU-2, SI-4.

(16) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PREVENT DISCOVERY OF COMPONENTS / DEVICES

The information system prevents discovery of specific system components composing a managed 

interface.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement protects network addresses of information 

system components that are part of managed interfaces from discovery through common tools 

and techniques used to identify devices on networks. Network addresses are not available for 

discovery (e.g., network address not published or entered in domain name systems), requiring 

prior knowledge for access. Another obfuscation technique is to periodically change network 

addresses.

(17) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT OF PROTOCOL FORMATS 

The information system enforces adherence to protocol formats.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system components that enforce protocol formats include, 

for example, deep packet inspection firewalls and XML gateways. Such system components

verify adherence to protocol formats/specifications (e.g., IEEE) at the application layer and 

identify significant vulnerabilities that cannot be detected by devices operating at the network 

or transport layers. Related control: SC-4.

(18) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | FAIL SECURE

The information system fails securely in the event of an operational failure of a boundary 

protection device. 

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Supplemental Guidance: Fail secure is a condition achieved by employing information system 

mechanisms to ensure that in the event of operational failures of boundary protection devices

at managed interfaces (e.g., routers, firewalls, guards, and application gateways residing on

protected subnetworks commonly referred to as demilitarized zones), information systems do 

not enter into unsecure states where intended security properties no longer hold. Failures of

boundary protection devices cannot lead to, or cause information external to the devices to 

enter the devices, nor can failures permit unauthorized information releases. Related controls: 

CP-2, SC-24.

(19) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | BLOCKS COMMUNICATION FROM NON-ORGANIZATIONALLY CONFIGURED HOSTS

The information system blocks both inbound and outbound communications traffic between 

[Assignment: organization-defined communication clients] that are independently configured by 

end users and external service providers.

Supplemental Guidance: Communication clients independently configured by end users and 

external service providers include, for example, instant messaging clients. Traffic blocking 

does not apply to communication clients that are configured by organizations to perform 

authorized functions.

(20) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DYNAMIC ISOLATION / SEGREGATION

The information system provides the capability to dynamically isolate/segregate [Assignment: 

organization-defined information system components] from other components of the system.

Supplemental Guidance: The capability to dynamically isolate or segregate certain internal 

components of organizational information systems is useful when it is necessary to partition 

or separate certain components of dubious origin from those components possessing greater 

trustworthiness. Component isolation reduces the attack surface of organizational information 

systems. Isolation of selected information system components is also a means of limiting the 

damage from successful cyber attacks when those attacks occur.

(21) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ISOLATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS 

The organization employs boundary protection mechanisms to separate [Assignment: 

organization-defined information system components] supporting [Assignment: organizationdefined missions and/or business functions].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can isolate information system components performing 

different missions and/or business functions. Such isolation limits unauthorized information 

flows among system components and also provides the opportunity to deploy greater levels of 

protection for selected components. Separating system components with boundary protection

mechanisms provides the capability for increased protection of individual components and to 

more effectively control information flows between those components. This type of enhanced 

protection limits the potential harm from cyber attacks and errors. The degree of separation 

provided varies depending upon the mechanisms chosen. Boundary protection mechanisms 

include, for example, routers, gateways, and firewalls separating system components into 

physically separate networks or subnetworks, cross-domain devices separating subnetworks, 

virtualization techniques, and encrypting information flows among system components using 

distinct encryption keys. Related controls: CA-9, SC-3.

(22) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | SEPARATE SUBNETS FOR CONNECTING TO DIFFERENT SECURITY DOMAINS

The information system implements separate network addresses (i.e., different subnets) to connect 

to systems in different security domains.

Supplemental Guidance: Decomposition of information systems into subnets helps to provide 

the appropriate level of protection for network connections to different security domains 

containing information with different security categories or classification levels.

(23) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DISABLE SENDER FEEDBACK ON PROTOCOL VALIDATION FAILURE 

The information system disables feedback to senders on protocol format validation failure.

Supplemental Guidance: Disabling feedback to senders when there is a failure in protocol 

validation format prevents adversaries from obtaining information which would otherwise be 

unavailable.

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-41, 800-77.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-7 MOD SC-7 (3) (4) (5) (7) HIGH SC-7 (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (18) (21)

SC-8 TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY

Control: The information system protects the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of 

transmitted information.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to both internal and external networks and all types of 

information system components from which information can be transmitted (e.g., servers, mobile 

devices, notebook computers, printers, copiers, scanners, facsimile machines). Communication 

paths outside the physical protection of a controlled boundary are exposed to the possibility of 

interception and modification. Protecting the confidentiality and/or integrity of organizational 

information can be accomplished by physical means (e.g., by employing protected distribution 

systems) or by logical means (e.g., employing encryption techniques). Organizations relying on 

commercial providers offering transmission services as commodity services rather than as fully 

dedicated services (i.e., services which can be highly specialized to individual customer needs), 

may find it difficult to obtain the necessary assurances regarding the implementation of needed 

security controls for transmission confidentiality/integrity. In such situations, organizations 

determine what types of confidentiality/integrity services are available in standard, commercial 

telecommunication service packages. If it is infeasible or impractical to obtain the necessary 

security controls and assurances of control effectiveness through appropriate contracting vehicles, 

organizations implement appropriate compensating security controls or explicitly accept the 

additional risk. Related controls: AC-17, PE-4.

Control Enhancements:

(1) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR ALTERNATE PHYSICAL PROTECTION 

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to [Selection (one or more): 

prevent unauthorized disclosure of information; detect changes to information] during 

transmission unless otherwise protected by [Assignment: organization-defined alternative physical 

safeguards].

Supplemental Guidance: Encrypting information for transmission protects information from 

unauthorized disclosure and modification. Cryptographic mechanisms implemented to protect 

information integrity include, for example, cryptographic hash functions which have common 

application in digital signatures, checksums, and message authentication codes. Alternative 

physical security safeguards include, for example, protected distribution systems. Related 

control: SC-13.

(2) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | PRE / POST TRANSMISSION HANDLING

The information system maintains the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of 

information during preparation for transmission and during reception.

Supplemental Guidance: Information can be either unintentionally or maliciously disclosed or 

modified during preparation for transmission or during reception including, for example,

during aggregation, at protocol transformation points, and during packing/unpacking. These 

unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the 

information. Related control: AU-10.

(3) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION FOR MESSAGE EXTERNALS 

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect message externals 

unless otherwise protected by [Assignment: organization-defined alternative physical safeguards].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses protection against unauthorized 

disclosure of information. Message externals include, for example, message headers/routing 

information. This control enhancement prevents the exploitation of message externals and 

applies to both internal and external networks or links that may be visible to individuals who 

are not authorized users. Header/routing information is sometimes transmitted unencrypted 

because the information is not properly identified by organizations as having significant value 

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or because encrypting the information can result in lower network performance and/or higher 

costs. Alternative physical safeguards include, for example, protected distribution systems. 

Related controls: SC-12, SC-13.

(4) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | CONCEAL / RANDOMIZE COMMUNICATIONS

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to conceal or randomize 

communication patterns unless otherwise protected by [Assignment: organization-defined 

alternative physical safeguards].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses protection against unauthorized 

disclosure of information. Communication patterns include, for example, frequency, periods, 

amount, and predictability. Changes to communications patterns can reveal information 

having intelligence value especially when combined with other available information related 

to missions/business functions supported by organizational information systems. This control 

enhancement prevents the derivation of intelligence based on communications patterns and 

applies to both internal and external networks or links that may be visible to individuals who 

are not authorized users. Encrypting the links and transmitting in continuous, fixed/random 

patterns prevents the derivation of intelligence from the system communications patterns. 

Alternative physical safeguards include, for example, protected distribution systems. Related 

controls: SC-12, SC-13.

References: FIPS Publications 140-2, 197; NIST Special Publications 800-52, 800-77, 800-81, 

800-113; CNSS Policy 15; NSTISSI No. 7003.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-8 (1) HIGH SC-8 (1)

SC-9 TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-8].

SC-10 NETWORK DISCONNECT

Control: The information system terminates the network connection associated with a 

communications session at the end of the session or after [Assignment: organization-defined time 

period] of inactivity.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to both internal and external networks. Terminating 

network connections associated with communications sessions include, for example, de-allocating 

associated TCP/IP address/port pairs at the operating system level, or de-allocating networking 

assignments at the application level if multiple application sessions are using a single, operating 

system-level network connection. Time periods of inactivity may be established by organizations 

and include, for example, time periods by type of network access or for specific network accesses.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-10 HIGH SC-10

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SC-11 TRUSTED PATH

Control: The information system establishes a trusted communications path between the user and 

the following security functions of the system: [Assignment: organization-defined security 

functions to include at a minimum, information system authentication and re-authentication]. 

Supplemental Guidance: Trusted paths are mechanisms by which users (through input devices) can 

communicate directly with security functions of information systems with the requisite assurance 

to support information security policies. The mechanisms can be activated only by users or the 

security functions of organizational information systems. User responses via trusted paths are 

protected from modifications by or disclosure to untrusted applications. Organizations employ 

trusted paths for high-assurance connections between security functions of information systems

and users (e.g., during system logons). Enforcement of trusted communications paths is typically 

provided via an implementation that meets the reference monitor concept. Related controls: AC16, AC-25.

Control Enhancements:

(1) TRUSTED PATH | LOGICAL ISOLATION

The information system provides a trusted communications path that is logically isolated and 

distinguishable from other paths.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-12 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT

Control: The organization establishes and manages cryptographic keys for required cryptography 

employed within the information system in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined 

requirements for key generation, distribution, storage, access, and destruction].

Supplemental Guidance: Cryptographic key management and establishment can be performed using 

manual procedures or automated mechanisms with supporting manual procedures. Organizations 

define key management requirements in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive 

Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance, specifying appropriate options, 

levels, and parameters. Organizations manage trust stores to ensure that only approved trust 

anchors are in such trust stores. This includes certificates with visibility external to organizational 

information systems and certificates related to the internal operations of systems. Related controls: 

SC-13, SC-17.

Control Enhancements:

(1) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | AVAILABILITY 

The organization maintains availability of information in the event of the loss of cryptographic keys 

by users.

Supplemental Guidance: Escrowing of encryption keys is a common practice for ensuring

availability in the event of loss of keys (e.g., due to forgotten passphrase).

(2) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | SYMMETRIC KEYS 

The organization produces, controls, and distributes symmetric cryptographic keys using 

[Selection: NIST FIPS-compliant; NSA-approved] key management technology and processes.

(3) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | ASYMMETRIC KEYS 

The organization produces, controls, and distributes asymmetric cryptographic keys using 

[Selection: NSA-approved key management technology and processes; approved PKI Class 3 

certificates or prepositioned keying material; approved PKI Class 3 or Class 4 certificates and 

hardware security tokens that protect the user’s private key].

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(4) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | PKI CERTIFICATES 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-12].

(5) CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | PKI CERTIFICATES / HARDWARE TOKENS 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-12].

References: NIST Special Publications 800-56, 800-57.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-12 MOD SC-12 HIGH SC-12 (1)

SC-13 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

Control: The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined cryptographic 

uses and type of cryptography required for each use] in accordance with applicable federal laws, 

Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.

Supplemental Guidance: Cryptography can be employed to support a variety of security solutions 

including, for example, the protection of classified and Controlled Unclassified Information, the 

provision of digital signatures, and the enforcement of information separation when authorized 

individuals have the necessary clearances for such information but lack the necessary formal 

access approvals. Cryptography can also be used to support random number generation and hash 

generation. Generally applicable cryptographic standards include FIPS-validated cryptography and 

NSA-approved cryptography. This control does not impose any requirements on organizations to 

use cryptography. However, if cryptography is required based on the selection of other security 

controls, organizations define each type of cryptographic use and the type of cryptography 

required (e.g., protection of classified information: NSA-approved cryptography; provision of 

digital signatures: FIPS-validated cryptography). Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-7, AC-17, 

AC-18, AU-9, AU-10, CM-11, CP-9, IA-3, IA-7, MA-4, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, SA-4, SC-8, SC-12, 

SC-28, SI-7.

Control Enhancements: None.

(1) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | FIPS-VALIDATED CRYPTOGRAPHY 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-13].

(2) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | NSA-APPROVED CRYPTOGRAPHY

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-13].

(3) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT FORMAL ACCESS APPROVALS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-13].

(4) CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | DIGITAL SIGNATURES 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-13].

References: FIPS Publication 140; Web: http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval, http://www.cnss.gov. 

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-13 MOD SC-13 HIGH SC-13

SC-14 PUBLIC ACCESS PROTECTIONS

[Withdrawn: Capability provided by AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, SI-3, SI-4, SI-5, SI-7, SI-10].

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SC-15 COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES

Control: The information system:

a. Prohibits remote activation of collaborative computing devices with the following exceptions: 

[Assignment: organization-defined exceptions where remote activation is to be allowed]; and

b. Provides an explicit indication of use to users physically present at the devices.

Supplemental Guidance: Collaborative computing devices include, for example, networked white 

boards, cameras, and microphones. Explicit indication of use includes, for example, signals to 

users when collaborative computing devices are activated. Related control: AC-21.

Control Enhancements:

(1) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | PHYSICAL DISCONNECT 

The information system provides physical disconnect of collaborative computing devices in a 

manner that supports ease of use.

Supplemental Guidance: Failing to physically disconnect from collaborative computing devices 

can result in subsequent compromises of organizational information. Providing easy methods 

to physically disconnect from such devices after a collaborative computing session helps to 

ensure that participants actually carry out the disconnect activity without having to go through 

complex and tedious procedures.

(2) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | BLOCKING INBOUND / OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7].

(3) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | DISABLING / REMOVAL IN SECURE WORK AREAS 

The organization disables or removes collaborative computing devices from [Assignment: 

organization-defined information systems or information system components] in [Assignment: 

organization-defined secure work areas].

Supplemental Guidance: Failing to disable or remove collaborative computing devices from 

information systems or information system components can result in subsequent compromises 

of organizational information including, for example, eavesdropping on conversations.

(4) COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | EXPLICITLY INDICATE CURRENT PARTICIPANTS

The information system provides an explicit indication of current participants in [Assignment: 

organization-defined online meetings and teleconferences].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement helps to prevent unauthorized individuals 

from participating in collaborative computing sessions without the explicit knowledge of 

other participants.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-15 MOD SC-15 HIGH SC-15

SC-16 TRANSMISSION OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES

Control: The information system associates [Assignment: organization-defined security attributes]

with information exchanged between information systems and between system components.

Supplemental Guidance: Security attributes can be explicitly or implicitly associated with the 

information contained in organizational information systems or system components. Related 

controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-16.

Control Enhancements:

(1) TRANSMISSION OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | INTEGRITY VALIDATION

The information system validates the integrity of transmitted security attributes.

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Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement ensures that the verification of the integrity 

of transmitted information includes security attributes. Related controls: AU-10, SC-8.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-17 PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE CERTIFICATES

Control: The organization issues public key certificates under an [Assignment: organizationdefined certificate policy] or obtains public key certificates from an approved service provider.

Supplemental Guidance: For all certificates, organizations manage information system trust stores to 

ensure only approved trust anchors are in the trust stores. This control addresses both certificates 

with visibility external to organizational information systems and certificates related to the internal 

operations of systems, for example, application-specific time services. Related control: SC-12.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: OMB Memorandum 05-24; NIST Special Publications 800-32, 800-63.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-17 HIGH SC-17

SC-18 MOBILE CODE

Control: The organization:

a. Defines acceptable and unacceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies;

b. Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for acceptable mobile code and 

mobile code technologies; and

c. Authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of mobile code within the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Decisions regarding the employment of mobile code within organizational 

information systems are based on the potential for the code to cause damage to the systems if used 

maliciously. Mobile code technologies include, for example, Java, JavaScript, ActiveX, Postscript, 

PDF, Shockwave movies, Flash animations, and VBScript. Usage restrictions and implementation 

guidance apply to both the selection and use of mobile code installed on servers and mobile code 

downloaded and executed on individual workstations and devices (e.g., smart phones). Mobile 

code policy and procedures address preventing the development, acquisition, or introduction of 

unacceptable mobile code within organizational information systems. Related controls: AU-2, 

AU-12, CM-2, CM-6, SI-3.

Control Enhancements:

(1) MOBILE CODE | IDENTIFY UNACCEPTABLE CODE / TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 

The information system identifies [Assignment: organization-defined unacceptable mobile code]

and takes [Assignment: organization-defined corrective actions].

Supplemental Guidance: Corrective actions when unacceptable mobile code is detected include, 

for example, blocking, quarantine, or alerting administrators. Blocking includes, for example, 

preventing transmission of word processing files with embedded macros when such macros 

have been defined to be unacceptable mobile code.

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(2) MOBILE CODE | ACQUISITION / DEVELOPMENT / USE 

The organization ensures that the acquisition, development, and use of mobile code to be 

deployed in the information system meets [Assignment: organization-defined mobile code 

requirements].

(3) MOBILE CODE | PREVENT DOWNLOADING / EXECUTION

The information system prevents the download and execution of [Assignment: organizationdefined unacceptable mobile code].

(4) MOBILE CODE | PREVENT AUTOMATIC EXECUTION

The information system prevents the automatic execution of mobile code in [Assignment: 

organization-defined software applications] and enforces [Assignment: organization-defined 

actions] prior to executing the code.

Supplemental Guidance: Actions enforced before executing mobile code, include, for example, 

prompting users prior to opening electronic mail attachments. Preventing automatic execution

of mobile code includes, for example, disabling auto execute features on information system 

components employing portable storage devices such as Compact Disks (CDs), Digital Video 

Disks (DVDs), and Universal Serial Bus (USB) devices. 

(5) MOBILE CODE | ALLOW EXECUTION ONLY IN CONFINED ENVIRONMENTS

The organization allows execution of permitted mobile code only in confined virtual machine 

environments.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-28; DoD Instruction 8552.01.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-18 HIGH SC-18

SC-19 VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL

Control: The organization:

a. Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for Voice over Internet Protocol 

(VoIP) technologies based on the potential to cause damage to the information system if used 

maliciously; and

b. Authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of VoIP within the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CM-6, SC-7, SC-15.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-58.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-19 HIGH SC-19

SC-20 SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE)

Control: The information system:

a. Provides additional data origin authentication and integrity verification artifacts along with 

the authoritative name resolution data the system returns in response to external name/address 

resolution queries; and

b. Provides the means to indicate the security status of child zones and (if the child supports 

secure resolution services) to enable verification of a chain of trust among parent and child 

domains, when operating as part of a distributed, hierarchical namespace.

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Supplemental Guidance: This control enables external clients including, for example, remote 

Internet clients, to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the 

host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service.

Information systems that provide name and address resolution services include, for example, 

domain name system (DNS) servers. Additional artifacts include, for example, DNS Security 

(DNSSEC) digital signatures and cryptographic keys. DNS resource records are examples of 

authoritative data. The means to indicate the security status of child zones includes, for example,

the use of delegation signer resource records in the DNS. The DNS security controls reflect (and 

are referenced from) OMB Memorandum 08-23. Information systems that use technologies other 

than the DNS to map between host/service names and network addresses provide other means to 

assure the authenticity and integrity of response data. Related controls: AU-10, SC-8, SC-12, SC13, SC-21, SC-22.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE) | CHILD SUBSPACES 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-20].

(2) SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE) | DATA ORIGIN / INTEGRITY 

The information system provides data origin and integrity protection artifacts for internal 

name/address resolution queries.

References: OMB Memorandum 08-23; NIST Special Publication 800-81.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-20 MOD SC-20 HIGH SC-20

SC-21 SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (RECURSIVE OR CACHING RESOLVER)

Control: The information system requests and performs data origin authentication and data 

integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from 

authoritative sources.

Supplemental Guidance: Each client of name resolution services either performs this validation on 

its own, or has authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that 

provide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive 

resolving or caching domain name system (DNS) servers. DNS client resolvers either perform 

validation of DNSSEC signatures, or clients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers that 

perform such validations. Information systems that use technologies other than the DNS to map 

between host/service names and network addresses provide other means to enable clients to verify 

the authenticity and integrity of response data. Related controls: SC-20, SC-22.

Control Enhancements: None.

(1) SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (RECURSIVE OR CACHING RESOLVER) | DATA ORIGIN / INTEGRITY

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-21].

References: NIST Special Publication 800-81.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-21 MOD SC-21 HIGH SC-21

SC-22 ARCHITECTURE AND PROVISIONING FOR NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE 

Control: The information systems that collectively provide name/address resolution service for an 

organization are fault-tolerant and implement internal/external role separation.

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Supplemental Guidance: Information systems that provide name and address resolution services 

include, for example, domain name system (DNS) servers. To eliminate single points of failure 

and to enhance redundancy, organizations employ at least two authoritative domain name system 

servers, one configured as the primary server and the other configured as the secondary server.

Additionally, organizations typically deploy the servers in two geographically separated network 

subnetworks (i.e., not located in the same physical facility). For role separation, DNS servers with 

internal roles only process name and address resolution requests from within organizations (i.e., 

from internal clients). DNS servers with external roles only process name and address resolution 

information requests from clients external to organizations (i.e., on external networks including 

the Internet). Organizations specify clients that can access authoritative DNS servers in particular 

roles (e.g., by address ranges, explicit lists). Related controls: SC-2, SC-20, SC-21, SC-24.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-81.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-22 MOD SC-22 HIGH SC-22

SC-23 SESSION AUTHENTICITY

Control: The information system protects the authenticity of communications sessions.

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses communications protection at the session, versus 

packet level (e.g., sessions in service-oriented architectures providing web-based services) and 

establishes grounds for confidence at both ends of communications sessions in ongoing identities

of other parties and in the validity of information transmitted. Authenticity protection includes, for 

example, protecting against man-in-the-middle attacks/session hijacking and the insertion of false 

information into sessions. Related controls: SC-8, SC-10, SC-11.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | INVALIDATE SESSION IDENTIFIERS AT LOGOUT

The information system invalidates session identifiers upon user logout or other session 

termination.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement curtails the ability of adversaries from 

capturing and continuing to employ previously valid session IDs.

(2) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | USER-INITIATED LOGOUTS / MESSAGE DISPLAYS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-12 (1)].

(3) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | UNIQUE SESSION IDENTIFIERS WITH RANDOMIZATION

The information system generates a unique session identifier for each session with [Assignment: 

organization-defined randomness requirements] and recognizes only session identifiers that are 

system-generated.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement curtails the ability of adversaries from 

reusing previously valid session IDs. Employing the concept of randomness in the generation 

of unique session identifiers helps to protect against brute-force attacks to determine future 

session identifiers. Related control: SC-13.

(4) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | UNIQUE SESSION IDENTIFIERS WITH RANDOMIZATION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-23 (3)].

(5) SESSION AUTHENTICITY | ALLOWED CERTIFICATE AUTHORITIES

The information system only allows the use of [Assignment: organization-defined certificate 

authorities] for verification of the establishment of protected sessions.

Supplemental Guidance: Reliance on certificate authorities (CAs) for the establishment of 

secure sessions includes, for example, the use of Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and/or Transport 

Layer Security (TLS) certificates. These certificates, after verification by the respective 

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certificate authorities, facilitate the establishment of protected sessions between web clients

and web servers. Related control: SC-13.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-52, 800-77, 800-95.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-23 HIGH SC-23

SC-24 FAIL IN KNOWN STATE

Control: The information system fails to a [Assignment: organization-defined known-state] for

[Assignment: organization-defined types of failures] preserving [Assignment: organization-defined 

system state information] in failure.

Supplemental Guidance: Failure in a known state addresses security concerns in accordance with the 

mission/business needs of organizations. Failure in a known secure state helps to prevent the loss 

of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information in the event of failures of organizational 

information systems or system components. Failure in a known safe state helps to prevent systems 

from failing to a state that may cause injury to individuals or destruction to property. Preserving 

information system state information facilitates system restart and return to the operational mode 

of organizations with less disruption of mission/business processes. Related controls: CP-2, CP10, CP-12, SC-7, SC-22.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH SC-24

SC-25 THIN NODES

Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined information system 

components] with minimal functionality and information storage.

Supplemental Guidance: The deployment of information system components with reduced/minimal 

functionality (e.g., diskless nodes and thin client technologies) reduces the need to secure every 

user endpoint, and may reduce the exposure of information, information systems, and services to 

cyber attacks. Related control: SC-30.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-26 HONEYPOTS

Control: The information system includes components specifically designed to be the target of 

malicious attacks for the purpose of detecting, deflecting, and analyzing such attacks.

Supplemental Guidance: A honeypot is set up as a decoy to attract adversaries and to deflect their 

attacks away from the operational systems supporting organizational missions/business function. 

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Depending upon the specific usage of the honeypot, consultation with the Office of the General 

Counsel before deployment may be needed. Related controls: SC-30, SC-44, SI-3, SI-4.

Control Enhancements: None.

(1) HONEYPOTS | DETECTION OF MALICIOUS CODE 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-35].

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-27 PLATFORM-INDEPENDENT APPLICATIONS

Control: The information system includes: [Assignment: organization-defined platformindependent applications].

Supplemental Guidance: Platforms are combinations of hardware and software used to run software 

applications. Platforms include: (i) operating systems; (ii) the underlying computer architectures, 

or (iii) both. Platform-independent applications are applications that run on multiple platforms. 

Such applications promote portability and reconstitution on different platforms, increasing the 

availability of critical functions within organizations while information systems with specific 

operating systems are under attack. Related control: SC-29.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-28 PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST

Control: The information system protects the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of 

[Assignment: organization-defined information at rest].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the confidentiality and integrity of information at 

rest and covers user information and system information. Information at rest refers to the state of 

information when it is located on storage devices as specific components of information systems. 

System-related information requiring protection includes, for example, configurations or rule sets 

for firewalls, gateways, intrusion detection/prevention systems, filtering routers, and authenticator 

content. Organizations may employ different mechanisms to achieve confidentiality and integrity 

protections, including the use of cryptographic mechanisms and file share scanning. Integrity

protection can be achieved, for example, by implementing Write-Once-Read-Many (WORM) 

technologies. Organizations may also employ other security controls including, for example, 

secure off-line storage in lieu of online storage when adequate protection of information at rest 

cannot otherwise be achieved and/or continuous monitoring to identify malicious code at rest. 

Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, CA-7, CM-3, CM-5, CM-6, PE-3, SC-8, SC-13, SI-3, SI-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized 

disclosure and modification of [Assignment: organization-defined information] on [Assignment: 

organization-defined information system components].

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Supplemental Guidance: Selection of cryptographic mechanisms is based on the need to protect

the confidentiality and integrity of organizational information. The strength of mechanism is 

commensurate with the security category and/or classification of the information. This control 

enhancement applies to significant concentrations of digital media in organizational areas 

designated for media storage and also to limited quantities of media generally associated with 

information system components in operational environments (e.g., portable storage devices, 

mobile devices). Organizations have the flexibility to either encrypt all information on storage 

devices (i.e., full disk encryption) or encrypt specific data structures (e.g., files, records, or 

fields). Organizations employing cryptographic mechanisms to protect information at rest also 

consider cryptographic key management solutions. Related controls: AC-19, SC-12.

(2) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST | OFF-LINE STORAGE

The organization removes from online storage and stores off-line in a secure location [Assignment: 

organization-defined information].

Supplemental Guidance: Removing organizational information from online information system 

storage to off-line storage eliminates the possibility of individuals gaining unauthorized 

access to the information through a network. Therefore, organizations may choose to move

information to off-line storage in lieu of protecting such information in online storage.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-56, 800-57, 800-111.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SC-28 HIGH SC-28

SC-29 HETEROGENEITY

Control: The organization employs a diverse set of information technologies for [Assignment: 

organization-defined information system components] in the implementation of the information 

system.

Supplemental Guidance: Increasing the diversity of information technologies within organizational

information systems reduces the impact of potential exploitations of specific technologies and also 

defends against common mode failures, including those failures induced by supply chain attacks.

Diversity in information technologies also reduces the likelihood that the means adversaries use to 

compromise one information system component will be equally effective against other system 

components, thus further increasing the adversary work factor to successfully complete planned 

cyber attacks. An increase in diversity may add complexity and management overhead which 

could ultimately lead to mistakes and unauthorized configurations. Related controls: SA-12, SA14, SC-27.

Control Enhancements:

(1) HETEROGENEITY | VIRTUALIZATION TECHNIQUES 

The organization employs virtualization techniques to support the deployment of a diversity of 

operating systems and applications that are changed [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: While frequent changes to operating systems and applications pose 

configuration management challenges, the changes can result in an increased work factor for 

adversaries in order to carry out successful cyber attacks. Changing virtual operating systems

or applications, as opposed to changing actual operating systems/applications, provide virtual 

changes that impede attacker success while reducing configuration management efforts. In 

addition, virtualization techniques can assist organizations in isolating untrustworthy software 

and/or software of dubious provenance into confined execution environments.

References: None.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-30 CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION

Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined concealment and 

misdirection techniques] for [Assignment: organization-defined information systems] at 

[Assignment: organization-defined time periods] to confuse and mislead adversaries.

Supplemental Guidance: Concealment and misdirection techniques can significantly reduce the 

targeting capability of adversaries (i.e., window of opportunity and available attack surface) to 

initiate and complete cyber attacks. For example, virtualization techniques provide organizations 

with the ability to disguise information systems, potentially reducing the likelihood of successful 

attacks without the cost of having multiple platforms. Increased use of concealment/misdirection

techniques including, for example, randomness, uncertainty, and virtualization, may sufficiently 

confuse and mislead adversaries and subsequently increase the risk of discovery and/or exposing 

tradecraft. Concealment/misdirection techniques may also provide organizations additional time to 

successfully perform core missions and business functions. Because of the time and effort required 

to support concealment/misdirection techniques, it is anticipated that such techniques would be 

used by organizations on a very limited basis. Related controls: SC-26, SC-29, SI-14.

Control Enhancements: 

(1) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | VIRTUALIZATION TECHNIQUES 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-29 (1)].

(2) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | RANDOMNESS

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined techniques] to introduce 

randomness into organizational operations and assets.

Supplemental Guidance: Randomness introduces increased levels of uncertainty for adversaries 

regarding the actions organizations take in defending against cyber attacks. Such actions may 

impede the ability of adversaries to correctly target information resources of organizations 

supporting critical missions/business functions. Uncertainty may also cause adversaries to 

hesitate before initiating or continuing attacks. Misdirection techniques involving randomness 

include, for example, performing certain routine actions at different times of day, employing 

different information technologies (e.g., browsers, search engines), using different suppliers, 

and rotating roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel.

(3) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | CHANGE PROCESSING / STORAGE LOCATIONS

The organization changes the location of [Assignment: organization-defined processing and/or 

storage] [Selection: [Assignment: organization-defined time frequency]; at random time intervals]].

Supplemental Guidance: Adversaries target critical organizational missions/business functions 

and the information resources supporting those missions and functions while at the same time, 

trying to minimize exposure of their existence and tradecraft. The static, homogeneous, and 

deterministic nature of organizational information systems targeted by adversaries, make such 

systems more susceptible to cyber attacks with less adversary cost and effort to be successful. 

Changing organizational processing and storage locations (sometimes referred to as moving 

target defense) addresses the advanced persistent threat (APT) using techniques such as 

virtualization, distributed processing, and replication. This enables organizations to relocate 

the information resources (i.e., processing and/or storage) supporting critical missions and 

business functions. Changing locations of processing activities and/or storage sites introduces 

uncertainty into the targeting activities by adversaries. This uncertainty increases the work 

factor of adversaries making compromises or breaches to organizational information systems 

much more difficult and time-consuming, and increases the chances that adversaries may 

inadvertently disclose aspects of tradecraft while attempting to locate critical organizational 

resources.

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(4) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | MISLEADING INFORMATION

The organization employs realistic, but misleading information in [Assignment: organizationdefined information system components] with regard to its security state or posture.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement misleads potential adversaries regarding the 

nature and extent of security safeguards deployed by organizations. As a result, adversaries 

may employ incorrect (and as a result ineffective) attack techniques. One way of misleading 

adversaries is for organizations to place misleading information regarding the specific security 

controls deployed in external information systems that are known to be accessed or targeted

by adversaries. Another technique is the use of deception nets (e.g., honeynets, virtualized 

environments) that mimic actual aspects of organizational information systems but use, for 

example, out-of-date software configurations.

(5) CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | CONCEALMENT OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined techniques] to hide or conceal 

[Assignment: organization-defined information system components].

Supplemental Guidance: By hiding, disguising, or otherwise concealing critical information 

system components, organizations may be able to decrease the probability that adversaries

target and successfully compromise those assets. Potential means for organizations to hide

and/or conceal information system components include, for example, configuration of routers 

or the use of honeynets or virtualization techniques.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-31 COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS

Control: The organization:

a. Performs a covert channel analysis to identify those aspects of communications within the

information system that are potential avenues for covert [Selection (one or more): storage; 

timing] channels; and

b. Estimates the maximum bandwidth of those channels.

Supplemental Guidance: Developers are in the best position to identify potential areas within 

systems that might lead to covert channels. Covert channel analysis is a meaningful activity when 

there is the potential for unauthorized information flows across security domains, for example, in 

the case of information systems containing export-controlled information and having connections 

to external networks (i.e., networks not controlled by organizations). Covert channel analysis is 

also meaningful for multilevel secure (MLS) information systems, multiple security level (MSL) 

systems, and cross-domain systems. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, PL-2.

Control Enhancements:

(1) COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | TEST COVERT CHANNELS FOR EXPLOITABILITY

The organization tests a subset of the identified covert channels to determine which channels are 

exploitable.

(2) COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | MAXIMUM BANDWIDTH 

The organization reduces the maximum bandwidth for identified covert [Selection (one or more); 

storage; timing] channels to [Assignment: organization-defined values].

Supplemental Guidance: Information system developers are in the best position to reduce the 

maximum bandwidth for identified covert storage and timing channels.

(3) COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | MEASURE BANDWIDTH IN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 

The organization measures the bandwidth of [Assignment: organization-defined subset of 

identified covert channels] in the operational environment of the information system.

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Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses covert channel bandwidth in 

operational environments versus developmental environments. Measuring covert channel 

bandwidth in operational environments helps organizations to determine how much 

information can be covertly leaked before such leakage adversely affects organizational 

missions/business functions. Covert channel bandwidth may be significantly different when 

measured in those settings that are independent of the particular environments of operation 

(e.g., laboratories or development environments).

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-32 INFORMATION SYSTEM PARTITIONING

Control: The organization partitions the information system into [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system components] residing in separate physical domains or environments based on 

[Assignment: organization-defined circumstances for physical separation of components].

Supplemental Guidance: Information system partitioning is a part of a defense-in-depth protection 

strategy. Organizations determine the degree of physical separation of system components from 

physically distinct components in separate racks in the same room, to components in separate

rooms for the more critical components, to more significant geographical separation of the most

critical components. Security categorization can guide the selection of appropriate candidates for 

domain partitioning. Managed interfaces restrict or prohibit network access and information flow

among partitioned information system components. Related controls: AC-4, SA-8, SC-2, SC-3, 

SC-7.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: FIPS Publication 199.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-33 TRANSMISSION PREPARATION INTEGRITY

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-8].

SC-34 NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS

Control: The information system at [Assignment: organization-defined information system 

components]:

a. Loads and executes the operating environment from hardware-enforced, read-only media; 

and

b. Loads and executes [Assignment: organization-defined applications] from hardwareenforced, read-only media.

Supplemental Guidance: The term operating environment is defined as the specific code that hosts 

applications, for example, operating systems, executives, or monitors including virtual machine 

monitors (i.e., hypervisors). It can also include certain applications running directly on hardware 

platforms. Hardware-enforced, read-only media include, for example, Compact Disk-Recordable

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(CD-R)/Digital Video Disk-Recordable (DVD-R) disk drives and one-time programmable readonly memory. The use of non-modifiable storage ensures the integrity of software from the point 

of creation of the read-only image. The use of reprogrammable read-only memory can be accepted 

as read-only media provided: (i) integrity can be adequately protected from the point of initial 

writing to the insertion of the memory into the information system; and (ii) there are reliable 

hardware protections against reprogramming the memory while installed in organizational 

information systems. Related controls: AC-3, SI-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | NO WRITABLE STORAGE 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] 

with no writeable storage that is persistent across component restart or power on/off.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement: (i) eliminates the possibility of malicious 

code insertion via persistent, writeable storage within the designated information system 

components; and (ii) applies to both fixed and removable storage, with the latter being 

addressed directly or as specific restrictions imposed through access controls for mobile 

devices. Related controls: AC-19, MP-7.

(2) NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | INTEGRITY PROTECTION / READ-ONLY MEDIA 

The organization protects the integrity of information prior to storage on read-only media and 

controls the media after such information has been recorded onto the media.

Supplemental Guidance: Security safeguards prevent the substitution of media into information 

systems or the reprogramming of programmable read-only media prior to installation into the 

systems. Security safeguards include, for example, a combination of prevention, detection, 

and response. Related controls: AC-5, CM-3, CM-5, CM-9, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, SA-12, SC28, SI-3.

(3) NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | HARDWARE-BASED PROTECTION

The organization:

(a) Employs hardware-based, write-protect for [Assignment: organization-defined information 

system firmware components]; and

(b) Implements specific procedures for [Assignment: organization-defined authorized individuals] 

to manually disable hardware write-protect for firmware modifications and re-enable the writeprotect prior to returning to operational mode.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-35 HONEYCLIENTS

Control: The information system includes components that proactively seek to identify malicious 

websites and/or web-based malicious code.

Supplemental Guidance: Honeyclients differ from honeypots in that the components actively probe 

the Internet in search of malicious code (e.g., worms) contained on external websites. As with 

honeypots, honeyclients require some supporting isolation measures (e.g., virtualization) to ensure 

that any malicious code discovered during the search and subsequently executed does not infect 

organizational information systems. Related controls: SC-26, SC-44, SI-3, SI-4.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-36 DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING AND STORAGE

Control: The organization distributes [Assignment: organization-defined processing and storage] 

across multiple physical locations.

Supplemental Guidance: Distributing processing and storage across multiple physical locations

provides some degree of redundancy or overlap for organizations, and therefore increases the work 

factor of adversaries to adversely impact organizational operations, assets, and individuals. This

control does not assume a single primary processing or storage location, and thus allows for 

parallel processing and storage. Related controls: CP-6, CP-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING AND STORAGE | POLLING TECHNIQUES 

The organization employs polling techniques to identify potential faults, errors, or compromises to 

[Assignment: organization-defined distributed processing and storage components].

Supplemental Guidance: Distributed processing and/or storage may be employed to reduce 

opportunities for adversaries to successfully compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or 

availability of information and information systems. However, distribution of processing 

and/or storage components does not prevent adversaries from compromising one (or more) of 

the distributed components. Polling compares the processing results and/or storage content 

from the various distributed components and subsequently voting on the outcomes. Polling

identifies potential faults, errors, or compromises in distributed processing and/or storage 

components. Related control: SI-4.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-37 OUT-OF-BAND CHANNELS

Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined out-of-band channels] for 

the physical delivery or electronic transmission of [Assignment: organization-defined information, 

information system components, or devices] to [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or 

information systems].

Supplemental Guidance: Out-of-band channels include, for example, local (nonnetwork) accesses to 

information systems, network paths physically separate from network paths used for operational 

traffic, or nonelectronic paths such as the US Postal Service. This is in contrast with using the 

same channels (i.e., in-band channels) that carry routine operational traffic. Out-of-band channels 

do not have the same vulnerability/exposure as in-band channels, and hence the confidentiality, 

integrity, or availability compromises of in-band channels will not compromise the out-of-band 

channels. Organizations may employ out-of-band channels in the delivery or transmission of many 

organizational items including, for example, identifiers/authenticators, configuration management 

changes for hardware, firmware, or software, cryptographic key management information, security 

updates, system/data backups, maintenance information, and malicious code protection updates.

Related controls: AC-2, CM-3, CM-5, CM-7, IA-4, IA-5, MA-4, SC-12, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7.

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Control Enhancements:

(1) OUT-OF-BAND CHANNELS | ENSURE DELIVERY / TRANSMISSION 

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to ensure that 

only [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or information systems] receive the 

[Assignment: organization-defined information, information system components, or devices].

Supplemental Guidance: Techniques and/or methods employed by organizations to ensure that 

only designated information systems or individuals receive particular information, system 

components, or devices include, for example, sending authenticators via courier service but 

requiring recipients to show some form of government-issued photographic identification as a 

condition of receipt.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-38 OPERATIONS SECURITY

Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined operations security 

safeguards] to protect key organizational information throughout the system development life 

cycle.

Supplemental Guidance: Operations security (OPSEC) is a systematic process by which potential 

adversaries can be denied information about the capabilities and intentions of organizations by 

identifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified information that specifically relates 

to the planning and execution of sensitive organizational activities. The OPSEC process involves 

five steps: (i) identification of critical information (e.g., the security categorization process); (ii) 

analysis of threats; (iii) analysis of vulnerabilities; (iv) assessment of risks; and (v) the application 

of appropriate countermeasures. OPSEC safeguards are applied to both organizational information 

systems and the environments in which those systems operate. OPSEC safeguards help to protect 

the confidentiality of key information including, for example, limiting the sharing of information 

with suppliers and potential suppliers of information system components, information technology 

products and services, and with other non-organizational elements and individuals. Information 

critical to mission/business success includes, for example, user identities, element uses, suppliers, 

supply chain processes, functional and security requirements, system design specifications, testing 

protocols, and security control implementation details. Related controls: RA-2, RA-5, SA-12.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-39 PROCESS ISOLATION

Control: The information system maintains a separate execution domain for each executing 

process.

Supplemental Guidance: Information systems can maintain separate execution domains for each 

executing process by assigning each process a separate address space. Each information system 

process has a distinct address space so that communication between processes is performed in a 

manner controlled through the security functions, and one process cannot modify the executing 

code of another process. Maintaining separate execution domains for executing processes can be 

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achieved, for example, by implementing separate address spaces. This capability is available in 

most commercial operating systems that employ multi-state processor technologies. Related 

controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-6, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SC-2, SC-3.

Control Enhancements:

(1) PROCESS ISOLATION | HARDWARE SEPARATION 

The information system implements underlying hardware separation mechanisms to facilitate 

process separation.

Supplemental Guidance: Hardware-based separation of information system processes is 

generally less susceptible to compromise than software-based separation, thus providing 

greater assurance that the separation will be enforced. Underlying hardware separation 

mechanisms include, for example, hardware memory management.

(2) PROCESS ISOLATION | THREAD ISOLATION

The information system maintains a separate execution domain for each thread in [Assignment: 

organization-defined multi-threaded processing].

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SC-39 MOD SC-39 HIGH SC-39

SC-40 WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION

Control: The information system protects external and internal [Assignment: organization-defined 

wireless links] from [Assignment: organization-defined types of signal parameter attacks or 

references to sources for such attacks].

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to internal and external wireless communication links 

that may be visible to individuals who are not authorized information system users. Adversaries 

can exploit the signal parameters of wireless links if such links are not adequately protected. There 

are many ways to exploit the signal parameters of wireless links to gain intelligence, deny service, 

or to spoof users of organizational information systems. This control reduces the impact of attacks 

that are unique to wireless systems. If organizations rely on commercial service providers for 

transmission services as commodity items rather than as fully dedicated services, it may not be 

possible to implement this control. Related controls: AC-18, SC-5.

Control Enhancements:

(1) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms that achieve [Assignment: 

organization-defined level of protection] against the effects of intentional electromagnetic 

interference.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement protects against intentional jamming that 

might deny or impair communications by ensuring that wireless spread spectrum waveforms

used to provide anti-jam protection are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. The 

control enhancement may also coincidentally help to mitigate the effects of unintentional 

jamming due to interference from legitimate transmitters sharing the same spectrum. Mission 

requirements, projected threats, concept of operations, and applicable legislation, directives, 

regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines determine levels of wireless link availability

and performance/cryptography needed. Related controls: SC-12, SC-13.

(2) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | REDUCE DETECTION POTENTIAL

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to reduce the detection potential 

of wireless links to [Assignment: organization-defined level of reduction]. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement is needed for covert communications and 

protecting wireless transmitters from being geo-located by their transmissions. The control 

enhancement ensures that spread spectrum waveforms used to achieve low probability of 

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detection are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. Mission requirements, projected 

threats, concept of operations, and applicable legislation, directives, regulations, policies, 

standards, and guidelines determine the levels to which wireless links should be undetectable. 

Related controls: SC-12, SC-13.

(3) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | IMITATIVE OR MANIPULATIVE COMMUNICATIONS DECEPTION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to identify and reject wireless 

transmissions that are deliberate attempts to achieve imitative or manipulative communications 

deception based on signal parameters.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement ensures that the signal parameters of 

wireless transmissions are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. Such unpredictability 

reduces the probability of imitative or manipulative communications deception based upon 

signal parameters alone. Related controls: SC-12, SC-13.

(4) WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | SIGNAL PARAMETER IDENTIFICATION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to prevent the identification of

[Assignment: organization-defined wireless transmitters] by using the transmitter signal 

parameters.

Supplemental Guidance: Radio fingerprinting techniques identify the unique signal parameters 

of transmitters to fingerprint such transmitters for purposes of tracking and mission/user 

identification. This control enhancement protects against the unique identification of wireless 

transmitters for purposes of intelligence exploitation by ensuring that anti-fingerprinting 

alterations to signal parameters are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. This control 

enhancement helps assure mission success when anonymity is required. Related controls: SC12, SC-13.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-41 PORT AND I/O DEVICE ACCESS

Control: The organization physically disables or removes [Assignment: organization-defined 

connection ports or input/output devices] on [Assignment: organization-defined information 

systems or information system components].

Supplemental Guidance: Connection ports include, for example, Universal Serial Bus (USB) and 

Firewire (IEEE 1394). Input/output (I/O) devices include, for example, Compact Disk (CD) and 

Digital Video Disk (DVD) drives. Physically disabling or removing such connection ports and I/O 

devices helps prevent exfiltration of information from information systems and the introduction of 

malicious code into systems from those ports/devices.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

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SC-42 SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA

Control: The information system:

a. Prohibits the remote activation of environmental sensing capabilities with the following 

exceptions: [Assignment: organization-defined exceptions where remote activation of sensors 

is allowed]; and

b. Provides an explicit indication of sensor use to [Assignment: organization-defined class of 

users].

Supplemental Guidance: This control often applies to types of information systems or system 

components characterized as mobile devices, for example, smart phones, tablets, and E-readers.

These systems often include sensors that can collect and record data regarding the environment 

where the system is in use. Sensors that are embedded within mobile devices include, for example, 

cameras, microphones, Global Positioning System (GPS) mechanisms, and accelerometers. While 

the sensors on mobiles devices provide an important function, if activated covertly, such devices

can potentially provide a means for adversaries to learn valuable information about individuals 

and organizations. For example, remotely activating the GPS function on a mobile device could 

provide an adversary with the ability to track the specific movements of an individual.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA | REPORTING TO AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS OR ROLES

The organization ensures that the information system is configured so that data or information 

collected by the [Assignment: organization-defined sensors] is only reported to authorized 

individuals or roles.

Supplemental Guidance: In situations where sensors are activated by authorized individuals

(e.g., end users), it is still possible that the data/information collected by the sensors will be 

sent to unauthorized entities.

(2) SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA | AUTHORIZED USE

The organization employs the following measures: [Assignment: organization-defined measures],

so that data or information collected by [Assignment: organization-defined sensors] is only used

for authorized purposes.

Supplemental Guidance: Information collected by sensors for a specific authorized purpose 

potentially could be misused for some unauthorized purpose. For example, GPS sensors that 

are used to support traffic navigation could be misused to track movements of 

individuals. Measures to mitigate such activities include, for example, additional training to 

ensure that authorized parties do not abuse their authority, or (in the case where sensor 

data/information is maintained by external parties) contractual restrictions on the use of the 

data/information.

(3) SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA | PROHIBIT USE OF DEVICES

The organization prohibits the use of devices possessing [Assignment: organization-defined 

environmental sensing capabilities] in [Assignment: organization-defined facilities, areas, or 

systems].

Supplemental Guidance: For example, organizations may prohibit individuals from bringing cell 

phones or digital cameras into certain facilities or specific controlled areas within facilities

where classified information is stored or sensitive conversations are taking place.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

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SC-43 USAGE RESTRICTIONS

Control: The organization:

a. Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for [Assignment: organizationdefined information system components] based on the potential to cause damage to the 

information system if used maliciously; and

b. Authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of such components within the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system components include hardware, software, or firmware 

components (e.g., Voice Over Internet Protocol, mobile code, digital copiers, printers, scanners, 

optical devices, wireless technologies, mobile devices). Related controls: CM-6, SC-7.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SC-44 DETONATION CHAMBERS

Control: The organization employs a detonation chamber capability within [Assignment: 

organization-defined information system, system component, or location].

Supplemental Guidance: Detonation chambers, also known as dynamic execution environments, 

allow organizations to open email attachments, execute untrusted or suspicious applications, and

execute Universal Resource Locator (URL) requests in the safety of an isolated environment or 

virtualized sandbox. These protected and isolated execution environments provide a means of 

determining whether the associated attachments/applications contain malicious code. While 

related to the concept of deception nets, the control is not intended to maintain a long-term 

environment in which adversaries can operate and their actions can be observed. Rather, it is 

intended to quickly identify malicious code and reduce the likelihood that the code is propagated 

to user environments of operation (or prevent such propagation completely). Related controls: SC7, SC-25, SC-26, SC-30.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

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FAMILY: SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

SI-1 SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Control: The organization:

a. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or 

roles]:

1. A system and information integrity policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 

responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, 

and compliance; and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and information integrity policy 

and associated system and information integrity controls; and

b. Reviews and updates the current:

1. System and information integrity policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];

and

2. System and information integrity procedures [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 

effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SI family.

Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization 

level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can 

be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can 

be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The 

procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information 

systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing 

policy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SI-1 MOD SI-1 HIGH SI-1

SI-2 FLAW REMEDIATION

Control: The organization:

a. Identifies, reports, and corrects information system flaws;

b. Tests software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and 

potential side effects before installation;

c. Installs security-relevant software and firmware updates within [Assignment: organizationdefined time period] of the release of the updates; and

d. Incorporates flaw remediation into the organizational configuration management process.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations identify information systems affected by announced 

software flaws including potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws, and report this 

information to designated organizational personnel with information security responsibilities.

Security-relevant software updates include, for example, patches, service packs, hot fixes, and 

anti-virus signatures. Organizations also address flaws discovered during security assessments, 

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continuous monitoring, incident response activities, and system error handling. Organizations take 

advantage of available resources such as the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) or Common 

Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases in remediating flaws discovered in organizational 

information systems. By incorporating flaw remediation into ongoing configuration management 

processes, required/anticipated remediation actions can be tracked and verified. Flaw remediation 

actions that can be tracked and verified include, for example, determining whether organizations 

follow US-CERT guidance and Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts. Organization-defined 

time periods for updating security-relevant software and firmware may vary based on a variety of 

factors including, for example, the security category of the information system or the criticality of 

the update (i.e., severity of the vulnerability related to the discovered flaw). Some types of flaw 

remediation may require more testing than other types. Organizations determine the degree and 

type of testing needed for the specific type of flaw remediation activity under consideration and 

also the types of changes that are to be configuration-managed. In some situations, organizations 

may determine that the testing of software and/or firmware updates is not necessary or practical, 

for example, when implementing simple anti-virus signature updates. Organizations may also 

consider in testing decisions, whether security-relevant software or firmware updates are obtained 

from authorized sources with appropriate digital signatures. Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, CM-3, 

CM-5, CM-8, MA-2, IR-4, RA-5, SA-10, SA-11, SI-11.

Control Enhancements:

(1) FLAW REMEDIATION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT 

The organization centrally manages the flaw remediation process.

Supplemental Guidance: Central management is the organization-wide management and 

implementation of flaw remediation processes. Central management includes planning, 

implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally 

managed flaw remediation security controls.

(2) FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATED FLAW REMEDIATION STATUS

The organization employs automated mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] 

to determine the state of information system components with regard to flaw remediation.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CM-6, SI-4.

(3) FLAW REMEDIATION | TIME TO REMEDIATE FLAWS / BENCHMARKS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The organization:

(a) Measures the time between flaw identification and flaw remediation; and

(b) Establishes [Assignment: organization-defined benchmarks] for taking corrective actions.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires organizations to determine the 

current time it takes on the average to correct information system flaws after such flaws have 

been identified, and subsequently establish organizational benchmarks (i.e., time frames) for 

taking corrective actions. Benchmarks can be established by type of flaw and/or severity of 

the potential vulnerability if the flaw can be exploited.

(4) FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATED PATCH MANAGEMENT TOOLS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-2].

(5) FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATIC SOFTWARE / FIRMWARE UPDATES

The organization installs [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant software and 

firmware updates] automatically to [Assignment: organization-defined information system 

components].

Supplemental Guidance: Due to information system integrity and availability concerns, 

organizations give careful consideration to the methodology used to carry out automatic 

updates. Organizations must balance the need to ensure that the updates are installed as soon 

as possible with the need to maintain configuration management and with any mission or 

operational impacts that automatic updates might impose.

(6) FLAW REMEDIATION | REMOVAL OF PREVIOUS VERSIONS OF SOFTWARE / FIRMWARE

The organization removes [Assignment: organization-defined software and firmware components] 

after updated versions have been installed.

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Supplemental Guidance: Previous versions of software and/or firmware components that are not 

removed from the information system after updates have been installed may be exploited by 

adversaries. Some information technology products may remove older versions of software 

and/or firmware automatically from the information system.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-40, 800-128.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SI-2 MOD SI-2 (2) HIGH SI-2 (1) (2)

SI-3 MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION

Control: The organization:

a. Employs malicious code protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit points to 

detect and eradicate malicious code;

b. Updates malicious code protection mechanisms whenever new releases are available in 

accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures;

c. Configures malicious code protection mechanisms to:

1. Perform periodic scans of the information system [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency] and real-time scans of files from external sources at [Selection (one or more); 

endpoint; network entry/exit points] as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in 

accordance with organizational security policy; and

2. [Selection (one or more): block malicious code; quarantine malicious code; send alert to 

administrator; [Assignment: organization-defined action]] in response to malicious code 

detection; and

d. Addresses the receipt of false positives during malicious code detection and eradication and 

the resulting potential impact on the availability of the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system entry and exit points include, for example, firewalls, 

electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, remote-access servers, workstations, notebook 

computers, and mobile devices. Malicious code includes, for example, viruses, worms, Trojan 

horses, and spyware. Malicious code can also be encoded in various formats (e.g., UUENCODE, 

Unicode), contained within compressed or hidden files, or hidden in files using steganography.

Malicious code can be transported by different means including, for example, web accesses, 

electronic mail, electronic mail attachments, and portable storage devices. Malicious code 

insertions occur through the exploitation of information system vulnerabilities. Malicious code 

protection mechanisms include, for example, anti-virus signature definitions and reputation-based 

technologies. A variety of technologies and methods exist to limit or eliminate the effects of 

malicious code. Pervasive configuration management and comprehensive software integrity 

controls may be effective in preventing execution of unauthorized code. In addition to commercial 

off-the-shelf software, malicious code may also be present in custom-built software. This could 

include, for example, logic bombs, back doors, and other types of cyber attacks that could affect 

organizational missions/business functions. Traditional malicious code protection mechanisms 

cannot always detect such code. In these situations, organizations rely instead on other safeguards

including, for example, secure coding practices, configuration management and control, trusted 

procurement processes, and monitoring practices to help ensure that software does not perform

functions other than the functions intended. Organizations may determine that in response to the 

detection of malicious code, different actions may be warranted. For example, organizations can 

define actions in response to malicious code detection during periodic scans, actions in response to 

detection of malicious downloads, and/or actions in response to detection of maliciousness when 

attempting to open or execute files. Related controls: CM-3, MP-2, SA-4, SA-8, SA-12, SA-13, 

SC-7, SC-26, SC-44, SI-2, SI-4, SI-7.

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Control Enhancements:

(1) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT 

The organization centrally manages malicious code protection mechanisms.

Supplemental Guidance: Central management is the organization-wide management and 

implementation of malicious code protection mechanisms. Central management includes 

planning, implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, 

centrally managed flaw malicious code protection security controls. Related controls: AU-2, 

SI-8.

(2) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATES

The information system automatically updates malicious code protection mechanisms.

Supplemental Guidance: Malicious code protection mechanisms include, for example, signature 

definitions. Due to information system integrity and availability concerns, organizations give 

careful consideration to the methodology used to carry out automatic updates. Related control: 

SI-8.

(3) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | NON-PRIVILEGED USERS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6 (10)].

(4) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | UPDATES ONLY BY PRIVILEGED USERS

The information system updates malicious code protection mechanisms only when directed by a 

privileged user.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement may be appropriate for situations where for 

reasons of security or operational continuity, updates are only applied when selected/approved 

by designated organizational personnel. Related controls: AC-6, CM-5.

(5) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7].

(6) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | TESTING / VERIFICATION

The organization:

(a) Tests malicious code protection mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] 

by introducing a known benign, non-spreading test case into the information system; and

(b) Verifies that both detection of the test case and associated incident reporting occur.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, RA-5.

(7) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | NONSIGNATURE-BASED DETECTION

The information system implements nonsignature-based malicious code detection mechanisms.

Supplemental Guidance: Nonsignature-based detection mechanisms include, for example, the 

use of heuristics to detect, analyze, and describe the characteristics or behavior of malicious 

code and to provide safeguards against malicious code for which signatures do not yet exist or 

for which existing signatures may not be effective. This includes polymorphic malicious code 

(i.e., code that changes signatures when it replicates). This control enhancement does not 

preclude the use of signature-based detection mechanisms.

(8) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | DETECT UNAUTHORIZED COMMANDS

The information system detects [Assignment: organization-defined unauthorized operating system 

commands] through the kernel application programming interface at [Assignment: organizationdefined information system hardware components] and [Selection (one or more): issues a warning;

audits the command execution; prevents the execution of the command].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement can also be applied to critical interfaces 

other than kernel-based interfaces, including for example, interfaces with virtual machines 

and privileged applications. Unauthorized operating system commands include, for example, 

commands for kernel functions from information system processes that are not trusted to 

initiate such commands, or commands for kernel functions that are suspicious even though 

commands of that type are reasonable for processes to initiate. Organizations can define the 

malicious commands to be detected by a combination of command types, command classes, 

or specific instances of commands. Organizations can define hardware components by 

specific component, component type, location in the network, or combination therein.

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Organizations may select different actions for different types/classes/specific instances of 

potentially malicious commands. Related control: AU-6.

(9) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | AUTHENTICATE REMOTE COMMANDS

The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to 

authenticate [Assignment: organization-defined remote commands].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement protects against unauthorized commands 

and replay of authorized commands. This capability is important for those remote information 

systems whose loss, malfunction, misdirection, or exploitation would have immediate and/or 

serious consequences (e.g., injury or death, property damage, loss of high-valued assets or 

sensitive information, or failure of important missions/business functions). Authentication 

safeguards for remote commands help to ensure that information systems accept and execute 

in the order intended, only authorized commands, and that unauthorized commands are 

rejected. Cryptographic mechanisms can be employed, for example, to authenticate remote 

commands. Related controls: SC-12, SC-13, SC-23.

(10) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | MALICIOUS CODE ANALYSIS

The organization:

(a) Employs [Assignment: organization-defined tools and techniques] to analyze the 

characteristics and behavior of malicious code; and

(b) Incorporates the results from malicious code analysis into organizational incident response 

and flaw remediation processes.

Supplemental Guidance: The application of selected malicious code analysis tools and 

techniques provides organizations with a more in-depth understanding of adversary tradecraft 

(i.e., tactics, techniques, and procedures) and the functionality and purpose of specific 

instances of malicious code. Understanding the characteristics of malicious code facilitates 

more effective organizational responses to current and future threats. Organizations can 

conduct malicious code analyses by using reverse engineering techniques or by monitoring 

the behavior of executing code.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-83.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SI-3 MOD SI-3 (1) (2) HIGH SI-3 (1) (2)

SI-4 INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING

Control: The organization:

a. Monitors the information system to detect:

1. Attacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with [Assignment: organizationdefined monitoring objectives]; and

2. Unauthorized local, network, and remote connections;

b. Identifies unauthorized use of the information system through [Assignment: organizationdefined techniques and methods];

c. Deploys monitoring devices:

1. Strategically within the information system to collect organization-determined essential 

information; and

2. At ad hoc locations within the system to track specific types of transactions of interest to 

the organization;

d. Protects information obtained from intrusion-monitoring tools from unauthorized access, 

modification, and deletion;

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e. Heightens the level of information system monitoring activity whenever there is an indication 

of increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or 

the Nation based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible 

sources of information;

f. Obtains legal opinion with regard to information system monitoring activities in accordance 

with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, or regulations; and

g. Provides [Assignment: organization-defined information system monitoring information] to 

[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] [Selection (one or more): as needed;

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]].

Supplemental Guidance: Information system monitoring includes external and internal monitoring. 

External monitoring includes the observation of events occurring at the information system 

boundary (i.e., part of perimeter defense and boundary protection). Internal monitoring includes 

the observation of events occurring within the information system. Organizations can monitor 

information systems, for example, by observing audit activities in real time or by observing other 

system aspects such as access patterns, characteristics of access, and other actions. The monitoring 

objectives may guide determination of the events. Information system monitoring capability is 

achieved through a variety of tools and techniques (e.g., intrusion detection systems, intrusion 

prevention systems, malicious code protection software, scanning tools, audit record monitoring 

software, network monitoring software). Strategic locations for monitoring devices include, for 

example, selected perimeter locations and near server farms supporting critical applications, with 

such devices typically being employed at the managed interfaces associated with controls SC-7 

and AC-17. Einstein network monitoring devices from the Department of Homeland Security can 

also be included as monitoring devices. The granularity of monitoring information collected is 

based on organizational monitoring objectives and the capability of information systems to 

support such objectives. Specific types of transactions of interest include, for example, Hyper Text 

Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic that bypasses HTTP proxies. Information system monitoring is 

an integral part of organizational continuous monitoring and incident response programs. Output 

from system monitoring serves as input to continuous monitoring and incident response programs.

A network connection is any connection with a device that communicates through a network (e.g., 

local area network, Internet). A remote connection is any connection with a device communicating 

through an external network (e.g., the Internet). Local, network, and remote connections can be 

either wired or wireless. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-8, AC-17, AU-2, AU-6, AU-7, AU-9, 

AU-12, CA-7, IR-4, PE-3, RA-5, SC-7, SC-26, SC-35, SI-3, SI-7.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | SYSTEM-WIDE INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM

The organization connects and configures individual intrusion detection tools into an information 

system-wide intrusion detection system.

(2) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED TOOLS FOR REAL-TIME ANALYSIS

The organization employs automated tools to support near real-time analysis of events.

Supplemental Guidance: Automated tools include, for example, host-based, network-based, 

transport-based, or storage-based event monitoring tools or Security Information and Event 

Management (SIEM) technologies that provide real time analysis of alerts and/or notifications 

generated by organizational information systems.

(3) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED TOOL INTEGRATION

The organization employs automated tools to integrate intrusion detection tools into access 

control and flow control mechanisms for rapid response to attacks by enabling reconfiguration of 

these mechanisms in support of attack isolation and elimination.

(4) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INBOUND AND OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC

The information system monitors inbound and outbound communications traffic [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency] for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions.

Supplemental Guidance: Unusual/unauthorized activities or conditions related to information 

system inbound and outbound communications traffic include, for example, internal traffic 

that indicates the presence of malicious code within organizational information systems or 

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propagating among system components, the unauthorized exporting of information, or 

signaling to external information systems. Evidence of malicious code is used to identify 

potentially compromised information systems or information system components.

(5) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | SYSTEM-GENERATED ALERTS

The information system alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] when the 

following indications of compromise or potential compromise occur: [Assignment: organizationdefined compromise indicators].

Supplemental Guidance: Alerts may be generated from a variety of sources, including, for 

example, audit records or inputs from malicious code protection mechanisms, intrusion 

detection or prevention mechanisms, or boundary protection devices such as firewalls, 

gateways, and routers. Alerts can be transmitted, for example, telephonically, by electronic 

mail messages, or by text messaging. Organizational personnel on the notification list can 

include, for example, system administrators, mission/business owners, system owners, or 

information system security officers. Related controls: AU-5, PE-6.

(6) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | RESTRICT NON-PRIVILEGED USERS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6 (10)].

(7) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED RESPONSE TO SUSPICIOUS EVENTS

The information system notifies [Assignment: organization-defined incident response personnel 

(identified by name and/or by role)] of detected suspicious events and takes [Assignment: 

organization-defined least-disruptive actions to terminate suspicious events].

Supplemental Guidance: Least-disruptive actions may include, for example, initiating requests

for human responses.

(8) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PROTECTION OF MONITORING INFORMATION

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-4].

(9) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | TESTING OF MONITORING TOOLS

The organization tests intrusion-monitoring tools [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Testing intrusion-monitoring tools is necessary to ensure that the tools 

are operating correctly and continue to meet the monitoring objectives of organizations. The 

frequency of testing depends on the types of tools used by organizations and methods of 

deployment. Related control: CP-9.

(10) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | VISIBILITY OF ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS

The organization makes provisions so that [Assignment: organization-defined encrypted 

communications traffic] is visible to [Assignment: organization-defined information system 

monitoring tools].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations balance the potentially conflicting needs for encrypting 

communications traffic and for having insight into such traffic from a monitoring perspective. 

For some organizations, the need to ensure the confidentiality of communications traffic is 

paramount; for others, mission-assurance is of greater concern. Organizations determine 

whether the visibility requirement applies to internal encrypted traffic, encrypted traffic 

intended for external destinations, or a subset of the traffic types.

(11) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC ANOMALIES

The organization analyzes outbound communications traffic at the external boundary of the 

information system and selected [Assignment: organization-defined interior points within the 

system (e.g., subnetworks, subsystems)] to discover anomalies.

Supplemental Guidance: Anomalies within organizational information systems include, for 

example, large file transfers, long-time persistent connections, unusual protocols and ports in 

use, and attempted communications with suspected malicious external addresses.

(12) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED ALERTS

The organization employs automated mechanisms to alert security personnel of the following 

inappropriate or unusual activities with security implications: [Assignment: organization-defined 

activities that trigger alerts].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement focuses on the security alerts generated by 

organizations and transmitted using automated means. In contrast to the alerts generated by 

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information systems in SI-4 (5), which tend to focus on information sources internal to the 

systems (e.g., audit records), the sources of information for this enhancement can include 

other entities as well (e.g., suspicious activity reports, reports on potential insider threats). 

Related controls: AC-18, IA-3.

(13) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE TRAFFIC / EVENT PATTERNS

The organization:

(a) Analyzes communications traffic/event patterns for the information system;

(b) Develops profiles representing common traffic patterns and/or events; and

(c) Uses the traffic/event profiles in tuning system-monitoring devices to reduce the number of 

false positives and the number of false negatives.

(14) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | WIRELESS INTRUSION DETECTION

The organization employs a wireless intrusion detection system to identify rogue wireless devices 

and to detect attack attempts and potential compromises/breaches to the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Wireless signals may radiate beyond the confines of organizationcontrolled facilities. Organizations proactively search for unauthorized wireless connections 

including the conduct of thorough scans for unauthorized wireless access points. Scans are not 

limited to those areas within facilities containing information systems, but also include areas 

outside of facilities as needed, to verify that unauthorized wireless access points are not 

connected to the systems. Related controls: AC-18, IA-3.

(15) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | WIRELESS TO WIRELINE COMMUNICATIONS

The organization employs an intrusion detection system to monitor wireless communications 

traffic as the traffic passes from wireless to wireline networks.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-18.

(16) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | CORRELATE MONITORING INFORMATION

The organization correlates information from monitoring tools employed throughout the 

information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Correlating information from different monitoring tools can provide a 

more comprehensive view of information system activity. The correlation of monitoring tools 

that usually work in isolation (e.g., host monitoring, network monitoring, anti-virus software) 

can provide an organization-wide view and in so doing, may reveal otherwise unseen attack 

patterns. Understanding the capabilities/limitations of diverse monitoring tools and how to 

maximize the utility of information generated by those tools can help organizations to build, 

operate, and maintain effective monitoring programs. Related control: AU-6.

(17) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INTEGRATED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

The organization correlates information from monitoring physical, cyber, and supply chain 

activities to achieve integrated, organization-wide situational awareness.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement correlates monitoring information from a 

more diverse set of information sources to achieve integrated situational awareness. Integrated 

situational awareness from a combination of physical, cyber, and supply chain monitoring 

activities enhances the capability of organizations to more quickly detect sophisticated cyber 

attacks and investigate the methods and techniques employed to carry out such attacks. In 

contrast to SI-4 (16) which correlates the various cyber monitoring information, this control 

enhancement correlates monitoring beyond just the cyber domain. Such monitoring may help 

reveal attacks on organizations that are operating across multiple attack vectors. Related

control: SA-12.

(18) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE TRAFFIC / COVERT EXFILTRATION

The organization analyzes outbound communications traffic at the external boundary of the 

information system (i.e., system perimeter) and at [Assignment: organization-defined interior 

points within the system (e.g., subsystems, subnetworks)] to detect covert exfiltration of 

information.

Supplemental Guidance: Covert means that can be used for the unauthorized exfiltration of 

organizational information include, for example, steganography.

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(19) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INDIVIDUALS POSING GREATER RISK

The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined additional monitoring] of 

individuals who have been identified by [Assignment: organization-defined sources] as posing an 

increased level of risk.

Supplemental Guidance: Indications of increased risk from individuals can be obtained from a 

variety of sources including, for example, human resource records, intelligence agencies, law 

enforcement organizations, and/or other credible sources. The monitoring of individuals is 

closely coordinated with management, legal, security, and human resources officials within 

organizations conducting such monitoring and complies with federal legislation, Executive 

Orders, policies, directives, regulations, and standards.

(20) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PRIVILEGED USERS

The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined additional monitoring] of 

privileged users.

(21) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PROBATIONARY PERIODS

The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined additional monitoring] of 

individuals during [Assignment: organization-defined probationary period].

(22) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | UNAUTHORIZED NETWORK SERVICES

The information system detects network services that have not been authorized or approved by 

[Assignment: organization-defined authorization or approval processes] and [Selection (one or 

more): audits; alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]].

Supplemental Guidance: Unauthorized or unapproved network services include, for example, 

services in service-oriented architectures that lack organizational verification or validation 

and therefore may be unreliable or serve as malicious rogues for valid services. Related 

controls: AC-6, CM-7, SA-5, SA-9.

(23) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | HOST-BASED DEVICES

The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined host-based monitoring 

mechanisms] at [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].

Supplemental Guidance: Information system components where host-based monitoring can be

implemented include, for example, servers, workstations, and mobile devices. Organizations 

consider employing host-based monitoring mechanisms from multiple information technology 

product developers.

(24) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

The information system discovers, collects, distributes, and uses indicators of compromise.

Supplemental Guidance: Indicators of compromise (IOC) are forensic artifacts from intrusions 

that are identified on organizational information systems (at the host or network level). IOCs 

provide organizations with valuable information on objects or information systems that have 

been compromised. IOCs for the discovery of compromised hosts can include for example, 

the creation of registry key values. IOCs for network traffic include, for example, Universal 

Resource Locator (URL) or protocol elements that indicate malware command and control 

servers. The rapid distribution and adoption of IOCs can improve information security by 

reducing the time that information systems and organizations are vulnerable to the same 

exploit or attack.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-61, 800-83, 800-92, 800-94, 800-137.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SI-4 MOD SI-4 (2) (4) (5) HIGH SI-4 (2) (4) (5)

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SI-5 SECURITY ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND DIRECTIVES

Control: The organization:

a. Receives information system security alerts, advisories, and directives from [Assignment: 

organization-defined external organizations] on an ongoing basis;

b. Generates internal security alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed necessary;

c. Disseminates security alerts, advisories, and directives to: [Selection (one or more):

[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; [Assignment: organization-defined 

elements within the organization]; [Assignment: organization-defined external

organizations]]; and

d. Implements security directives in accordance with established time frames, or notifies the 

issuing organization of the degree of noncompliance.

Supplemental Guidance: The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) 

generates security alerts and advisories to maintain situational awareness across the federal 

government. Security directives are issued by OMB or other designated organizations with the 

responsibility and authority to issue such directives. Compliance to security directives is essential

due to the critical nature of many of these directives and the potential immediate adverse effects

on organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation should the 

directives not be implemented in a timely manner. External organizations include, for example, 

external mission/business partners, supply chain partners, external service providers, and other 

peer/supporting organizations. Related control: SI-2.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SECURITY ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND DIRECTIVES | AUTOMATED ALERTS AND ADVISORIES

The organization employs automated mechanisms to make security alert and advisory information 

available throughout the organization.

Supplemental Guidance: The significant number of changes to organizational information 

systems and the environments in which those systems operate requires the dissemination of 

security-related information to a variety of organizational entities that have a direct interest in 

the success of organizational missions and business functions. Based on the information 

provided by the security alerts and advisories, changes may be required at one or more of the 

three tiers related to the management of information security risk including the governance 

level, mission/business process/enterprise architecture level, and the information system level.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-40.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW SI-5 MOD SI-5 HIGH SI-5 (1)

SI-6 SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION

Control: The information system:

a. Verifies the correct operation of [Assignment: organization-defined security functions];

b. Performs this verification [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined system 

transitional states]; upon command by user with appropriate privilege; [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency]];

c. Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of failed security verification 

tests; and

d. [Selection (one or more): shuts the information system down; restarts the information system; 

[Assignment: organization-defined alternative action(s)]] when anomalies are discovered.

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Supplemental Guidance: Transitional states for information systems include, for example, system 

startup, restart, shutdown, and abort. Notifications provided by information systems include, for 

example, electronic alerts to system administrators, messages to local computer consoles, and/or 

hardware indications such as lights. Related controls: CA-7, CM-6.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | NOTIFICATION OF FAILED SECURITY TESTS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-6].

(2) SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR DISTRIBUTED TESTING 

The information system implements automated mechanisms to support the management of 

distributed security testing.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SI-2.

(3) SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | REPORT VERIFICATION RESULTS

The organization reports the results of security function verification to [Assignment: organizationdefined personnel or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational personnel with potential interest in security function 

verification results include, for example, senior information security officers, information 

system security managers, and information systems security officers. Related controls: SA-12, 

SI-4, SI-5.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH SI-6

SI-7 SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

Control: The organization employs integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes to 

[Assignment: organization-defined software, firmware, and information].

Supplemental Guidance: Unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information can occur 

due to errors or malicious activity (e.g., tampering). Software includes, for example, operating 

systems (with key internal components such as kernels, drivers), middleware, and applications. 

Firmware includes, for example, the Basic Input Output System (BIOS). Information includes 

metadata such as security attributes associated with information. State-of-the-practice integritychecking mechanisms (e.g., parity checks, cyclical redundancy checks, cryptographic hashes) and 

associated tools can automatically monitor the integrity of information systems and hosted 

applications. Related controls: SA-12, SC-8, SC-13, SI-3.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITY CHECKS

The information system performs an integrity check of [Assignment: organization-defined 

software, firmware, and information] [Selection (one or more): at startup; at [Assignment: 

organization-defined transitional states or security-relevant events]; [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]].

Supplemental Guidance: Security-relevant events include, for example, the identification of a 

new threat to which organizational information systems are susceptible, and the installation of 

new hardware, software, or firmware. Transitional states include, for example, system startup, 

restart, shutdown, and abort.

(2) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUTOMATED NOTIFICATIONS OF INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS

The organization employs automated tools that provide notification to [Assignment: organizationdefined personnel or roles] upon discovering discrepancies during integrity verification.

Supplemental Guidance: The use of automated tools to report integrity violations and to notify 

organizational personnel in a timely matter is an essential precursor to effective risk response.

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Personnel having an interest in integrity violations include, for example, mission/business 

owners, information system owners, systems administrators, software developers, systems 

integrators, and information security officers.

(3) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CENTRALLY-MANAGED INTEGRITY TOOLS

The organization employs centrally managed integrity verification tools.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AU-3, SI-2, SI-8.

(4) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | TAMPER-EVIDENT PACKAGING

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-12].

(5) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUTOMATED RESPONSE TO INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS

The information system automatically [Selection (one or more): shuts the information system 

down; restarts the information system; implements [Assignment: organization-defined security 

safeguards]] when integrity violations are discovered.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may define different integrity checking and anomaly 

responses: (i) by type of information (e.g., firmware, software, user data); (ii) by specific 

information (e.g., boot firmware, boot firmware for a specific types of machines); or (iii) a 

combination of both. Automatic implementation of specific safeguards within organizational 

information systems includes, for example, reversing the changes, halting the information 

system, or triggering audit alerts when unauthorized modifications to critical security files 

occur.

(6) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to detect unauthorized changes to 

software, firmware, and information.

Supplemental Guidance: Cryptographic mechanisms used for the protection of integrity include, 

for example, digital signatures and the computation and application of signed hashes using 

asymmetric cryptography, protecting the confidentiality of the key used to generate the hash, 

and using the public key to verify the hash information. Related control: SC-13.

(7) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRATION OF DETECTION AND RESPONSE

The organization incorporates the detection of unauthorized [Assignment: organization-defined 

security-relevant changes to the information system] into the organizational incident response 

capability.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement helps to ensure that detected events are 

tracked, monitored, corrected, and available for historical purposes. Maintaining historical 

records is important both for being able to identify and discern adversary actions over an 

extended period of time and for possible legal actions. Security-relevant changes include, for 

example, unauthorized changes to established configuration settings or unauthorized elevation 

of information system privileges. Related controls: IR-4, IR-5, SI-4.

(8) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUDITING CAPABILITY FOR SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The information system, upon detection of a potential integrity violation, provides the capability to 

audit the event and initiates the following actions: [Selection (one or more): generates an audit 

record; alerts current user; alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; 

[Assignment: organization-defined other actions]].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations select response actions based on types of software, 

specific software, or information for which there are potential integrity violations. Related 

controls: AU-2, AU-6, AU-12.

(9) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | VERIFY BOOT PROCESS

The information system verifies the integrity of the boot process of [Assignment: organizationdefined devices].

Supplemental Guidance: Ensuring the integrity of boot processes is critical to starting devices in 

known/trustworthy states. Integrity verification mechanisms provide organizational personnel 

with assurance that only trusted code is executed during boot processes.

(10) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | PROTECTION OF BOOT FIRMWARE

The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to 

protect the integrity of boot firmware in [Assignment: organization-defined devices].

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Supplemental Guidance: Unauthorized modifications to boot firmware may be indicative of a 

sophisticated, targeted cyber attack. These types of cyber attacks can result in a permanent 

denial of service (e.g., if the firmware is corrupted) or a persistent malicious code presence 

(e.g., if code is embedded within the firmware). Devices can protect the integrity of the boot 

firmware in organizational information systems by: (i) verifying the integrity and authenticity 

of all updates to the boot firmware prior to applying changes to the boot devices; and (ii) 

preventing unauthorized processes from modifying the boot firmware.

(11) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CONFINED ENVIRONMENTS WITH LIMITED PRIVILEGES 

The organization requires that [Assignment: organization-defined user-installed software] execute 

in a confined physical or virtual machine environment with limited privileges. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations identify software that may be of greater concern with 

regard to origin or potential for containing malicious code. For this type of software, user 

installations occur in confined environments of operation to limit or contain damage from 

malicious code that may be executed.

(12) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITY VERIFICATION 

The organization requires that the integrity of [Assignment: organization-defined user-installed 

software] be verified prior to execution.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations verify the integrity of user-installed software prior to 

execution to reduce the likelihood of executing malicious code or code that contains errors 

from unauthorized modifications. Organizations consider the practicality of approaches to 

verifying software integrity including, for example, availability of checksums of adequate 

trustworthiness from software developers or vendors.

(13) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CODE EXECUTION IN PROTECTED ENVIRONMENTS

The organization allows execution of binary or machine-executable code obtained from sources 

with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code only in confined physical or 

virtual machine environments and with the explicit approval of [Assignment: organization-defined 

personnel or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to all sources of binary or machineexecutable code including, for example, commercial software/firmware and open source 

software.

(14) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | BINARY OR MACHINE EXECUTABLE CODE

The organization:

(a) Prohibits the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no 

warranty and without the provision of source code; and

(b) Provides exceptions to the source code requirement only for compelling mission/operational 

requirements and with the approval of the authorizing official.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to all sources of binary or machineexecutable code including, for example, commercial software/firmware and open source 

software. Organizations assess software products without accompanying source code from 

sources with limited or no warranty for potential security impacts. The assessments address 

the fact that these types of software products may be very difficult to review, repair, or 

extend, given that organizations, in most cases, do not have access to the original source code,

and there may be no owners who could make such repairs on behalf of organizations. Related 

control: SA-5.

(15) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CODE AUTHENTICATION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to authenticate [Assignment: 

organization-defined software or firmware components] prior to installation.

Supplemental Guidance: Cryptographic authentication includes, for example, verifying that 

software or firmware components have been digitally signed using certificates recognized and 

approved by organizations. Code signing is an effective method to protect against malicious 

code.

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(16) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | TIME LIMIT ON PROCESS EXECUTION W/O SUPERVISION

The organization does not allow processes to execute without supervision for more than 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses processes for which normal 

execution periods can be determined and situations in which organizations exceed such 

periods. Supervision includes, for example, operating system timers, automated responses, or 

manual oversight and response when information system process anomalies occur.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-147, 800-155.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SI-7 (1) (7) HIGH SI-7 (1) (2) (5) (7) (14)

SI-8 SPAM PROTECTION

Control: The organization:

a. Employs spam protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit points to detect 

and take action on unsolicited messages; and

b. Updates spam protection mechanisms when new releases are available in accordance with 

organizational configuration management policy and procedures.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system entry and exit points include, for example, firewalls, 

electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, remote-access servers, workstations, mobile 

devices, and notebook/laptop computers. Spam can be transported by different means including, 

for example, electronic mail, electronic mail attachments, and web accesses. Spam protection 

mechanisms include, for example, signature definitions. Related controls: AT-2, AT-3, SC-5, SC7, SI-3.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SPAM PROTECTION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT

The organization centrally manages spam protection mechanisms.

Supplemental Guidance: Central management is the organization-wide management and 

implementation of spam protection mechanisms. Central management includes planning, 

implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally 

managed spam protection security controls. Related controls: AU-3, SI-2, SI-7.

(2) SPAM PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATES

The information system automatically updates spam protection mechanisms.

(3) SPAM PROTECTION | CONTINUOUS LEARNING CAPABILITY

The information system implements spam protection mechanisms with a learning capability to 

more effectively identify legitimate communications traffic.

Supplemental Guidance: Learning mechanisms include, for example, Bayesian filters that 

respond to user inputs identifying specific traffic as spam or legitimate by updating algorithm 

parameters and thereby more accurately separating types of traffic.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-45.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD SI-8 (1) (2) HIGH SI-8 (1) (2)

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SI-9 INFORMATION INPUT RESTRICTIONS

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6].

SI-10 INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION

Control: The information system checks the validity of [Assignment: organization-defined 

information inputs].

Supplemental Guidance: Checking the valid syntax and semantics of information system inputs

(e.g., character set, length, numerical range, and acceptable values) verifies that inputs match 

specified definitions for format and content. Software applications typically follow well-defined 

protocols that use structured messages (i.e., commands or queries) to communicate between

software modules or system components. Structured messages can contain raw or unstructured 

data interspersed with metadata or control information. If software applications use attackersupplied inputs to construct structured messages without properly encoding such messages, then 

the attacker could insert malicious commands or special characters that can cause the data to be 

interpreted as control information or metadata. Consequently, the module or component that 

receives the tainted output will perform the wrong operations or otherwise interpret the 

data incorrectly. Prescreening inputs prior to passing to interpreters prevents the content from 

being unintentionally interpreted as commands. Input validation helps to ensure accurate and 

correct inputs and prevent attacks such as cross-site scripting and a variety of injection attacks.

Control Enhancements:

(1) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | MANUAL OVERRIDE CAPABILITY 

The information system:

(a) Provides a manual override capability for input validation of [Assignment: organizationdefined inputs];

(b) Restricts the use of the manual override capability to only [Assignment: organization-defined 

authorized individuals]; and

(c) Audits the use of the manual override capability.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CM-3, CM-5.

(2) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | REVIEW / RESOLUTION OF ERRORS

The organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period].

Supplemental Guidance: Resolution of input validation errors includes, for example, correcting 

systemic causes of errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input.

(3) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | PREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR

The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects

organizational and system objectives when invalid inputs are received.

Supplemental Guidance: A common vulnerability in organizational information systems is 

unpredictable behavior when invalid inputs are received. This control enhancement ensures

that there is predictable behavior in the face of invalid inputs by specifying information 

system responses that facilitate transitioning the system to known states without adverse, 

unintended side effects.

(4) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | REVIEW / TIMING INTERACTIONS

The organization accounts for timing interactions among information system components in 

determining appropriate responses for invalid inputs.

Supplemental Guidance: In addressing invalid information system inputs received across 

protocol interfaces, timing interactions become relevant, where one protocol needs to consider 

the impact of the error response on other protocols within the protocol stack. For example, 

802.11 standard wireless network protocols do not interact well with Transmission Control 

Protocols (TCP) when packets are dropped (which could be due to invalid packet input). TCP 

assumes packet losses are due to congestion, while packets lost over 802.11 links are typically 

dropped due to collisions or noise on the link. If TCP makes a congestion response, it takes

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precisely the wrong action in response to a collision event. Adversaries may be able to use 

apparently acceptable individual behaviors of the protocols in concert to achieve adverse

effects through suitable construction of invalid input.

(5) INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | RESTRICT INPUTS TO TRUSTED SOURCES AND APPROVED FORMATS

The organization restricts the use of information inputs to [Assignment: organization-defined 

trusted sources] and/or [Assignment: organization-defined formats].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies the concept of whitelisting to 

information inputs. Specifying known trusted sources for information inputs and acceptable 

formats for such inputs can reduce the probability of malicious activity.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SI-10 HIGH SI-10

SI-11 ERROR HANDLING

Control: The information system:

a. Generates error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without 

revealing information that could be exploited by adversaries; and

b. Reveals error messages only to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations carefully consider the structure/content of error messages.

The extent to which information systems are able to identify and handle error conditions is guided 

by organizational policy and operational requirements. Information that could be exploited by 

adversaries includes, for example, erroneous logon attempts with passwords entered by mistake as 

the username, mission/business information that can be derived from (if not stated explicitly by) 

information recorded, and personal information such as account numbers, social security numbers, 

and credit card numbers. In addition, error messages may provide a covert channel for transmitting 

information. Related controls: AU-2, AU-3, SC-31.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW Not Selected MOD SI-11 HIGH SI-11

SI-12 INFORMATION HANDLING AND RETENTION

Control: The organization handles and retains information within the information system and 

information output from the system in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, 

directives, policies, regulations, standards, and operational requirements.

Supplemental Guidance: Information handling and retention requirements cover the full life cycle of 

information, in some cases extending beyond the disposal of information systems. The National 

Archives and Records Administration provides guidance on records retention. Related controls: 

AC-16, AU-5, AU-11, MP-2, MP-4.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P2 LOW SI-12 MOD SI-12 HIGH SI-12

SI-13 PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION

Control: The organization:

a. Determines mean time to failure (MTTF) for [Assignment: organization-defined information 

system components] in specific environments of operation; and

b. Provides substitute information system components and a means to exchange active and 

standby components at [Assignment: organization-defined MTTF substitution criteria].

Supplemental Guidance: While MTTF is primarily a reliability issue, this control addresses potential 

failures of specific information system components that provide security capability. Failure rates 

reflect installation-specific consideration, not industry-average. Organizations define criteria for 

substitution of information system components based on MTTF value with consideration for 

resulting potential harm from component failures. Transfer of responsibilities between active and 

standby components does not compromise safety, operational readiness, or security capability

(e.g., preservation of state variables). Standby components remain available at all times except for 

maintenance issues or recovery failures in progress. Related controls: CP-2, CP-10, MA-6.

Control Enhancements:

(1) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | TRANSFERRING COMPONENT RESPONSIBILITIES 

The organization takes information system components out of service by transferring component 

responsibilities to substitute components no later than [Assignment: organization-defined fraction 

or percentage] of mean time to failure.

(2) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | TIME LIMIT ON PROCESS EXECUTION WITHOUT SUPERVISION 

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7 (16)].

(3) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | MANUAL TRANSFER BETWEEN COMPONENTS 

The organization manually initiates transfers between active and standby information system 

components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] if the mean time to failure exceeds 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period].

(4) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | STANDBY COMPONENT INSTALLATION / NOTIFICATION 

The organization, if information system component failures are detected:

(a) Ensures that the standby components are successfully and transparently installed within 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and

(b) [Selection (one or more): activates [Assignment: organization-defined alarm]; automatically 

shuts down the information system].

Supplemental Guidance: Automatic or manual transfer of components from standby to active

mode can occur, for example, upon detection of component failures.

(5) PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | FAILOVER CAPABILITY 

The organization provides [Selection: real-time; near real-time] [Assignment: organization-defined 

failover capability] for the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Failover refers to the automatic switchover to an alternate information 

system upon the failure of the primary information system. Failover capability includes, for 

example, incorporating mirrored information system operations at alternate processing sites or 

periodic data mirroring at regular intervals defined by recovery time periods of organizations.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

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SI-14 NON-PERSISTENCE

Control: The organization implements non-persistent [Assignment: organization-defined 

information system components and services] that are initiated in a known state and terminated 

[Selection (one or more): upon end of session of use; periodically at [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]].

Supplemental Guidance: This control mitigates risk from advanced persistent threats (APTs) by 

significantly reducing the targeting capability of adversaries (i.e., window of opportunity and 

available attack surface) to initiate and complete cyber attacks. By implementing the concept of 

non-persistence for selected information system components, organizations can provide a known 

state computing resource for a specific period of time that does not give adversaries sufficient time 

on target to exploit vulnerabilities in organizational information systems and the environments in 

which those systems operate. Since the advanced persistent threat is a high-end threat with regard 

to capability, intent, and targeting, organizations assume that over an extended period of time, a 

percentage of cyber attacks will be successful. Non-persistent information system components and 

services are activated as required using protected information and terminated periodically or upon 

the end of sessions. Non-persistence increases the work factor of adversaries in attempting to 

compromise or breach organizational information systems.

Non-persistent system components can be implemented, for example, by periodically re-imaging 

components or by using a variety of common virtualization techniques. Non-persistent services 

can be implemented using virtualization techniques as part of virtual machines or as new instances

of processes on physical machines (either persistent or non-persistent).The benefit of periodic 

refreshes of information system components/services is that it does not require organizations to 

first determine whether compromises of components or services have occurred (something that 

may often be difficult for organizations to determine). The refresh of selected information system 

components and services occurs with sufficient frequency to prevent the spread or intended impact 

of attacks, but not with such frequency that it makes the information system unstable. In some 

instances, refreshes of critical components and services may be done periodically in order to 

hinder the ability of adversaries to exploit optimum windows of vulnerabilities. Related controls: 

SC-30, SC-34.

Control Enhancements:

(1) NON-PERSISTENCE | REFRESH FROM TRUSTED SOURCES

The organization ensures that software and data employed during information system component 

and service refreshes are obtained from [Assignment: organization-defined trusted sources].

Supplemental Guidance: Trusted sources include, for example, software/data from write-once,

read-only media or from selected off-line secure storage facilities.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SI-15 INFORMATION OUTPUT FILTERING

Control: The information system validates information output from [Assignment: organizationdefined software programs and/or applications] to ensure that the information is consistent with 

the expected content.

Supplemental Guidance: Certain types of cyber attacks (e.g., SQL injections) produce output results 

that are unexpected or inconsistent with the output results that would normally be expected from 

software programs or applications. This control enhancement focuses on detecting extraneous 

content, preventing such extraneous content from being displayed, and alerting monitoring tools 

that anomalous behavior has been discovered. Related controls: SI-3, SI-4.

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Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

SI-16 MEMORY PROTECTION

Control: The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined security 

safeguards] to protect its memory from unauthorized code execution.

Supplemental Guidance: Some adversaries launch attacks with the intent of executing code in nonexecutable regions of memory or in memory locations that are prohibited. Security safeguards 

employed to protect memory include, for example, data execution prevention and address space 

layout randomization. Data execution prevention safeguards can either be hardware-enforced or 

software-enforced with hardware providing the greater strength of mechanism. Related controls: 

AC-25, SC-3.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD SI-16 HIGH SI-16

SI-17 FAIL-SAFE PROCEDURES

Control: The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined fail-safe 

procedures] when [Assignment: organization-defined failure conditions occur].

Supplemental Guidance: Failure conditions include, for example, loss of communications among 

critical system components or between system components and operational facilities. Fail-safe 

procedures include, for example, alerting operator personnel and providing specific instructions on 

subsequent steps to take (e.g., do nothing, reestablish system settings, shut down processes, restart 

the system, or contact designated organizational personnel). Related controls: CP-12, CP-13, SC24, SI-13.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P0 LOW Not Selected MOD Not Selected HIGH Not Selected

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APPENDIX G

INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAMS

ORGANIZATION-WIDE INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

he Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) requires organizations to 

develop and implement an organization-wide information security program to address

information security for the information and information systems that support the 

operations and assets of the organization, including those provided or managed by another 

organization, contractor, or other source. The information security program management (PM) 

controls described in this appendix are typically implemented at the organization level and not 

directed at individual organizational information systems. The program management controls 

have been designed to facilitate compliance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, 

directives, policies, regulations, and standards. The controls are independent of any FIPS 

Publication 200 impact levels and therefore, are not directly associated with any of the security 

control baselines described in Appendix D. The program management controls do, however, 

complement the security controls in Appendix F and focus on the programmatic, organizationwide information security requirements that are independent of any particular information system

and are essential for managing information security programs. Tailoring guidance can be applied 

to the program management controls in a manner similar to how the guidance is applied to 

security controls in Appendix F. Organizations specify the individual or individuals responsible 

and accountable for the development, implementation, assessment, authorization, and monitoring 

of the program management controls. Organizations document program management controls in

the information security program plan. The organization-wide information security program plan 

supplements the individual security plans developed for each organizational information system. 

Together, the security plans for the individual information systems and the information security 

program cover the totality of security controls employed by the organization.

In addition to documenting the information security program management controls, the security 

program plan provides a vehicle for the organization, in a central repository, to document all 

security controls from Appendix F that have been designated as common controls (i.e., security 

controls inheritable by organizational information systems).111 The information security program 

management controls and common controls contained in the information security program plan 

are implemented, assessed for effectiveness,112 and authorized by a senior organizational official, 

with the same or similar authority and responsibility for managing risk as the authorization 

officials for information systems. Plans of action and milestones are developed and maintained 

for the program management and common controls that are deemed through assessment to be less 

than effective. Information security program management and common controls are also subject 

to the same continuous monitoring requirements as security controls employed in individual 

organizational information systems.

Table G-1 provides a summary of the security controls in the program management family from 

Appendix G. Organizations can use the recommended priority code designation associated with 

each program management control to assist in making sequencing decisions for implementation 

111 Common controls are those security controls that are inheritable by one or more organizational information systems, 

and thus are separate and distinct from information security program management controls.

112 Assessment procedures for program management controls and common controls can be found in NIST Special 

Publication 800-53A.

T

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(i.e., a Priority Code 1 [P1] control has a higher priority for implementation than a Priority Code 

2 [P2] control; and a Priority Code 2 [P2] control has a higher priority for implementation than a 

Priority Code 3 [P3] control.

TABLE G-1: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

CNTL

NO. CONTROL NAME

PRIORITY

INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES

LOW MOD HIGH

PM-1 Information Security Program Plan P1

Deployed organization-wide.

Supporting information security program.

Not associated with security control baselines.

Independent of any system impact level.

PM-2 Senior Information Security Officer P1

PM-3 Information Security Resources P1

PM-4 Plan of Action and Milestones Process P1

PM-5 Information System Inventory P1

PM-6 Information Security Measures of 

Performance

P1

PM-7 Enterprise Architecture P1

PM-8 Critical Infrastructure Plan P1

PM-9 Risk Management Strategy P1

PM-10 Security Authorization Process P1

PM-11 Mission/Business Process Definition P1

PM-12 Insider Threat Program P1

PM-13 Information Security Workforce P1

PM-14 Testing, Training, and Monitoring P1

PM-15 Contacts with Security Groups and 

Associations

P3

PM-16 Threat Awareness Program P1

Cautionary Note

Organizations are required to implement security program management controls to provide a foundation 

for the organizational information security program. The successful implementation of security controls 

for organizational information systems depends on the successful implementation of organization-wide 

program management controls. However, the manner in which organizations implement the program 

management controls depends on specific organizational characteristics including, for example, the size, 

complexity, and mission/business requirements of the respective organizations.

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PM-1 INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM PLAN

Control: The organization:

a. Develops and disseminates an organization-wide information security program plan that:

1. Provides an overview of the requirements for the security program and a description of 

the security program management controls and common controls in place or planned for 

meeting those requirements;

2. Includes the identification and assignment of roles, responsibilities, management 

commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance;

3. Reflects coordination among organizational entities responsible for the different aspects 

of information security (i.e., technical, physical, personnel, cyber-physical); and

4. Is approved by a senior official with responsibility and accountability for the risk being 

incurred to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, and 

reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation;

b. Reviews the organization-wide information security program plan [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency];

c. Updates the plan to address organizational changes and problems identified during plan 

implementation or security control assessments; and

d. Protects the information security program plan from unauthorized disclosure and 

modification.

Supplemental Guidance: Information security program plans can be represented in single documents

or compilations of documents at the discretion of organizations. The plans document the program 

management controls and organization-defined common controls. Information security program 

plans provide sufficient information about the program management controls/common controls 

(including specification of parameters for any assignment and selection statements either explicitly 

or by reference) to enable implementations that are unambiguously compliant with the intent of 

the plans and a determination of the risk to be incurred if the plans are implemented as intended.

The security plans for individual information systems and the organization-wide information 

security program plan together, provide complete coverage for all security controls employed 

within the organization. Common controls are documented in an appendix to the organization’s 

information security program plan unless the controls are included in a separate security plan for 

an information system (e.g., security controls employed as part of an intrusion detection system 

providing organization-wide boundary protection inherited by one or more organizational 

information systems). The organization-wide information security program plan will indicate 

which separate security plans contain descriptions of common controls. 

Organizations have the flexibility to describe common controls in a single document or in multiple 

documents. In the case of multiple documents, the documents describing common controls are

included as attachments to the information security program plan. If the information security 

program plan contains multiple documents, the organization specifies in each document the

organizational official or officials responsible for the development, implementation, assessment, 

authorization, and monitoring of the respective common controls. For example, the organization 

may require that the Facilities Management Office develop, implement, assess, authorize, and 

continuously monitor common physical and environmental protection controls from the PE family 

when such controls are not associated with a particular information system but instead, support 

multiple information systems. Related control: PM-8.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

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PM-2 SENIOR INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICER

Control: The organization appoints a senior information security officer with the mission and 

resources to coordinate, develop, implement, and maintain an organization-wide information 

security program. 

Supplemental Guidance: The security officer described in this control is an organizational official. 

For a federal agency (as defined in applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, 

or regulations) this official is the Senior Agency Information Security Officer. Organizations may 

also refer to this official as the Senior Information Security Officer or Chief Information Security 

Officer.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

PM-3 INFORMATION SECURITY RESOURCES

Control: The organization:

a. Ensures that all capital planning and investment requests include the resources needed to 

implement the information security program and documents all exceptions to this 

requirement;

b. Employs a business case/Exhibit 300/Exhibit 53 to record the resources required; and

c. Ensures that information security resources are available for expenditure as planned.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations consider establishing champions for information security 

efforts and as part of including the necessary resources, assign specialized expertise and resources 

as needed. Organizations may designate and empower an Investment Review Board (or similar 

group) to manage and provide oversight for the information security-related aspects of the capital 

planning and investment control process. Related controls: PM-4, SA-2.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-65.

PM-4 PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES PROCESS 

Control: The organization:

a. Implements a process for ensuring that plans of action and milestones for the security 

program and associated organizational information systems:

1. Are developed and maintained;

2. Document the remedial information security actions to adequately respond to risk to 

organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation; and

3. Are reported in accordance with OMB FISMA reporting requirements.

b. Reviews plans of action and milestones for consistency with the organizational risk 

management strategy and organization-wide priorities for risk response actions.

Supplemental Guidance: The plan of action and milestones is a key document in the information 

security program and is subject to federal reporting requirements established by OMB. With the 

increasing emphasis on organization-wide risk management across all three tiers in the risk 

management hierarchy (i.e., organization, mission/business process, and information system), 

organizations view plans of action and milestones from an organizational perspective, prioritizing 

risk response actions and ensuring consistency with the goals and objectives of the organization. 

Plan of action and milestones updates are based on findings from security control assessments and 

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continuous monitoring activities. OMB FISMA reporting guidance contains instructions regarding 

organizational plans of action and milestones. Related control: CA-5.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: OMB Memorandum 02-01; NIST Special Publication 800-37.

PM-5 INFORMATION SYSTEM INVENTORY 

Control: The organization develops and maintains an inventory of its information systems. 

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the inventory requirements in FISMA. OMB 

provides guidance on developing information systems inventories and associated reporting 

requirements. For specific information system inventory reporting requirements, organizations 

consult OMB annual FISMA reporting guidance.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: Web: http://www.omb.gov. 

PM-6 INFORMATION SECURITY MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE

Control: The organization develops, monitors, and reports on the results of information security 

measures of performance.

Supplemental Guidance: Measures of performance are outcome-based metrics used by an 

organization to measure the effectiveness or efficiency of the information security program and 

the security controls employed in support of the program.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-55.

PM-7 ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE 

Control: The organization develops an enterprise architecture with consideration for information 

security and the resulting risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other 

organizations, and the Nation. 

Supplemental Guidance: The enterprise architecture developed by the organization is aligned with 

the Federal Enterprise Architecture. The integration of information security requirements and 

associated security controls into the organization’s enterprise architecture helps to ensure that 

security considerations are addressed by organizations early in the system development life cycle 

and are directly and explicitly related to the organization’s mission/business processes. This 

process of security requirements integration also embeds into the enterprise architecture, an 

integral information security architecture consistent with organizational risk management and 

information security strategies. For PM-7, the information security architecture is developed at a 

system-of-systems level (organization-wide), representing all of the organizational information 

systems. For PL-8, the information security architecture is developed at a level representing an 

individual information system but at the same time, is consistent with the information security 

architecture defined for the organization. Security requirements and security control integration 

are most effectively accomplished through the application of the Risk Management Framework 

and supporting security standards and guidelines. The Federal Segment Architecture Methodology

provides guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into 

enterprise architectures. Related controls: PL-2, PL-8, PM-11, RA-2, SA-3.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-39.

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PM-8 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN 

Control: The organization addresses information security issues in the development, 

documentation, and updating of a critical infrastructure and key resources protection plan. 

Supplemental Guidance: Protection strategies are based on the prioritization of critical assets and 

resources. The requirement and guidance for defining critical infrastructure and key resources and 

for preparing an associated critical infrastructure protection plan are found in applicable federal 

laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. Related 

controls: PM-1, PM-9, PM-11, RA-3.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: HSPD 7; National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

PM-9 RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 

Control: The organization:

a. Develops a comprehensive strategy to manage risk to organizational operations and assets, 

individuals, other organizations, and the Nation associated with the operation and use of 

information systems;

b. Implements the risk management strategy consistently across the organization; and

c. Reviews and updates the risk management strategy [Assignment: organization-defined 

frequency] or as required, to address organizational changes. 

Supplemental Guidance: An organization-wide risk management strategy includes, for example, an 

unambiguous expression of the risk tolerance for the organization, acceptable risk assessment 

methodologies, risk mitigation strategies, a process for consistently evaluating risk across the 

organization with respect to the organization’s risk tolerance, and approaches for monitoring risk 

over time. The use of a risk executive function can facilitate consistent, organization-wide 

application of the risk management strategy. The organization-wide risk management strategy can 

be informed by risk-related inputs from other sources both internal and external to the organization

to ensure the strategy is both broad-based and comprehensive. Related control: RA-3.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-30, 800-39.

PM-10 SECURITY AUTHORIZATION PROCESS 

Control: The organization:

a. Manages (i.e., documents, tracks, and reports) the security state of organizational information 

systems and the environments in which those systems operate through security authorization

processes;

b. Designates individuals to fulfill specific roles and responsibilities within the organizational 

risk management process; and

c. Fully integrates the security authorization processes into an organization-wide risk 

management program.

Supplemental Guidance: Security authorization processes for information systems and environments 

of operation require the implementation of an organization-wide risk management process, a Risk 

Management Framework, and associated security standards and guidelines. Specific roles within 

the risk management process include an organizational risk executive (function) and designated 

authorizing officials for each organizational information system and common control provider.

Security authorization processes are integrated with organizational continuous monitoring 

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processes to facilitate ongoing understanding and acceptance of risk to organizational operations 

and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. Related control: CA-6.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-37, 800-39.

PM-11 MISSION/BUSINESS PROCESS DEFINITION

Control: The organization:

a. Defines mission/business processes with consideration for information security and the 

resulting risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other 

organizations, and the Nation; and

b. Determines information protection needs arising from the defined mission/business processes 

and revises the processes as necessary, until achievable protection needs are obtained.

Supplemental Guidance: Information protection needs are technology-independent, required 

capabilities to counter threats to organizations, individuals, or the Nation through the compromise 

of information (i.e., loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability). Information protection needs 

are derived from the mission/business needs defined by the organization, the mission/business 

processes selected to meet the stated needs, and the organizational risk management strategy. 

Information protection needs determine the required security controls for the organization and the 

associated information systems supporting the mission/business processes. Inherent in defining an 

organization’s information protection needs is an understanding of the level of adverse impact that 

could result if a compromise of information occurs. The security categorization process is used to 

make such potential impact determinations. Mission/business process definitions and associated 

information protection requirements are documented by the organization in accordance with 

organizational policy and procedure. Related controls: PM-7, PM-8, RA-2.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-60.

PM-12 INSIDER THREAT PROGRAM

Control: The organization implements an insider threat program that includes a cross-discipline 

insider threat incident handling team.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations handling classified information are required, under 

Executive Order 13587 and the National Policy on Insider Threat, to establish insider threat 

programs. The standards and guidelines that apply to insider threat programs in classified

environments can also be employed effectively to improve the security of Controlled Unclassified 

Information in non-national security systems. Insider threat programs include security controls to 

detect and prevent malicious insider activity through the centralized integration and analysis of 

both technical and non-technical information to identify potential insider threat concerns. A senior 

organizational official is designated by the department/agency head as the responsible individual 

to implement and provide oversight for the program. In addition to the centralized integration and 

analysis capability, insider threat programs as a minimum, prepare department/agency insider 

threat policies and implementation plans, conduct host-based user monitoring of individual 

employee activities on government-owned classified computers, provide insider threat awareness 

training to employees, receive access to information from all offices within the department/agency 

(e.g., human resources, legal, physical security, personnel security, information technology, 

information system security, and law enforcement) for insider threat analysis, and conduct selfassessments of department/agency insider threat posture.

Insider threat programs can leverage the existence of incident handling teams organizations may 

already have in place, such as computer security incident response teams. Human resources

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records are especially important in this effort, as there is compelling evidence to show that some 

types of insider crimes are often preceded by nontechnical behaviors in the workplace (e.g., 

ongoing patterns of disgruntled behavior and conflicts with coworkers and other colleagues). 

These precursors can better inform and guide organizational officials in more focused, targeted 

monitoring efforts. The participation of a legal team is important to ensure that all monitoring 

activities are performed in accordance with appropriate legislation, directives, regulations, 

policies, standards, and guidelines. Related controls: AC-6, AT-2, AU-6, AU-7, AU-10, AU-12, 

AU-13, CA-7, IA-4, IR-4, MP-7, PE-2, PS-3, PS-4, PS-5, PS-8, SC-7, SC-38, SI-4, PM-1, PM-14.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: Executive Order 13587.

PM-13 INFORMATION SECURITY WORKFORCE

Control: The organization establishes an information security workforce development and 

improvement program.

Supplemental Guidance: Information security workforce development and improvement programs 

include, for example: (i) defining the knowledge and skill levels needed to perform information 

security duties and tasks; (ii) developing role-based training programs for individuals assigned 

information security roles and responsibilities; and (iii) providing standards for measuring and 

building individual qualifications for incumbents and applicants for information security-related 

positions. Such workforce programs can also include associated information security career paths 

to encourage: (i) information security professionals to advance in the field and fill positions with 

greater responsibility; and (ii) organizations to fill information security-related positions with 

qualified personnel. Information security workforce development and improvement programs are 

complementary to organizational security awareness and training programs. Information security 

workforce development and improvement programs focus on developing and institutionalizing 

core information security capabilities of selected personnel needed to protect organizational 

operations, assets, and individuals. Related controls: AT-2, AT-3.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

PM-14 TESTING, TRAINING, AND MONITORING

Control: The organization:

a. Implements a process for ensuring that organizational plans for conducting security testing, 

training, and monitoring activities associated with organizational information systems:

1. Are developed and maintained; and

2. Continue to be executed in a timely manner;

b. Reviews testing, training, and monitoring plans for consistency with the organizational risk 

management strategy and organization-wide priorities for risk response actions.

Supplemental Guidance: This control ensures that organizations provide oversight for the security 

testing, training, and monitoring activities conducted organization-wide and that those activities 

are coordinated. With the importance of continuous monitoring programs, the implementation of 

information security across the three tiers of the risk management hierarchy, and the widespread 

use of common controls, organizations coordinate and consolidate the testing and monitoring 

activities that are routinely conducted as part of ongoing organizational assessments supporting a 

variety of security controls. Security training activities, while typically focused on individual 

information systems and specific roles, also necessitate coordination across all organizational 

elements. Testing, training, and monitoring plans and activities are informed by current threat and 

vulnerability assessments. Related controls: AT-3, CA-7, CP-4, IR-3, SI-4.

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Control Enhancements: None.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-16, 800-37, 800-53A, 800-137.

PM-15 CONTACTS WITH SECURITY GROUPS AND ASSOCIATIONS

Control: The organization establishes and institutionalizes contact with selected groups and 

associations within the security community:

a. To facilitate ongoing security education and training for organizational personnel;

b. To maintain currency with recommended security practices, techniques, and technologies; and

c. To share current security-related information including threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents.

Supplemental Guidance: Ongoing contact with security groups and associations is of paramount 

importance in an environment of rapidly changing technologies and threats. Security groups and 

associations include, for example, special interest groups, forums, professional associations, news 

groups, and/or peer groups of security professionals in similar organizations. Organizations select

groups and associations based on organizational missions/business functions. Organizations share 

threat, vulnerability, and incident information consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive 

Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. Related control: SI-5.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

PM-16 THREAT AWARENESS PROGRAM

Control: The organization implements a threat awareness program that includes a crossorganization information-sharing capability.

Supplemental Guidance: Because of the constantly changing and increasing sophistication of 

adversaries, especially the advanced persistent threat (APT), it is becoming more likely that 

adversaries may successfully breach or compromise organizational information systems. One of 

the best techniques to address this concern is for organizations to share threat information. This 

can include, for example, sharing threat events (i.e., tactics, techniques, and procedures) that 

organizations have experienced, mitigations that organizations have found are effective against 

certain types of threats, threat intelligence (i.e., indications and warnings about threats that are 

likely to occur). Threat information sharing may be bilateral (e.g., government-commercial 

cooperatives, government-government cooperatives), or multilateral (e.g., organizations taking 

part in threat-sharing consortia). Threat information may be highly sensitive requiring special 

agreements and protection, or less sensitive and freely shared. Related controls: PM-12, PM-16.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: None.

APPENDIX G PAGE G-9
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

APPENDIX H

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION SECURITY STANDARDS 

SECURITY CONTROL MAPPINGS FOR ISO/IEC 27001 AND 15408

he mapping tables in this appendix provide organizations with a general indication of 

security control coverage with respect to ISO/IEC 27001, Information technology–Security 

techniques–Information security management systems–Requirements113 and ISO/IEC

15408, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Evaluation criteria for IT security.

114

ISO/IEC 27001 may be applied to all types of organizations and specifies requirements for 

establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining, and improving a 

documented information security management system (ISMS) within the context of business 

risks. NIST Special Publication 800-39 includes guidance on managing risk at the organizational 

level, mission/business process level, and information system level, is consistent with ISO/IEC 

27001, and provides additional implementation detail for the federal government and its 

contractors. ISO/IEC 15408 (also known as the Common Criteria) provides functionality and 

assurance requirements for developers of information systems and information system 

components (i.e., information technology products). Since many of the technical security controls 

defined in Appendix F are implemented in hardware, software, and firmware components of 

information systems, organizations can obtain significant benefit from the acquisition and 

employment of information technology products evaluated against the requirements of ISO/IEC 

15408. The use of such products can provide evidence that certain security controls are 

implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired effect in satisfying stated 

security requirements.

Previously, the ISO/IEC 27001 mappings were created by relating the primary security topic 

identified in each of the Special Publication 800-53 base controls to a similar security topic in the 

ISO/IEC standard. This methodology resulted in a mapping of security control relationships 

rather than a mapping of equivalent security control requirements. The ISO/IEC 27001:2013 

update provided an opportunity to reassess whether the implementation of a security control from 

Special Publication 800-53 satisfied the intent of the mapped control from ISO/IEC 27001 and 

conversely, whether the implementation of a security control from ISO/IEC 27001 satisfied the 

intent of the mapped control from Special Publication 800-53. To successfully meet the mapping 

criteria, the implementation of the mapped controls should result in an equivalent information 

security posture. However, this does not mean that security control equivalency based solely on 

the mapping tables herein should be assumed by organizations. While the revised security control 

mappings are more accurate, there is still some degree of subjectivity in the mapping analysis 

because the mappings are not always one-to-one and may not be completely equivalent. The 

following examples illustrate some of the mapping issues:

• Example 1: Special Publication 800-53 contingency planning and ISO/IEC 27001 business 

continuity management were deemed to have similar, but not the same, functionality.

• Example 2: In some cases, similar topics are addressed in the two security control sets but 

provide a different context, perspective, or scope. Special Publication 800-53 addresses 

113 ISO/IEC 27001 was published in October 2013 by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the 

International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).

114 ISO/IEC 15408 was published in September 2012 by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and 

the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).

T

APPENDIX H PAGE H-1

 
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

information flow control broadly in terms of approved authorizations for controlling access 

between source and destination objects, whereas ISO/IEC 27001 addresses information flow 

more narrowly as it applies to interconnected network domains.

• Example 3: Security control A.6.1.1, Information Security Roles and Responsibilities, in 

ISO/IEC 27001 states that “all information security responsibilities shall be defined and 

allocated” while security control PM-10, Security Authorization Process, in Special 

Publication 800-53 that is mapped to A.6.1.1, has three distinct parts. The first part states that 

the organization “designates individuals to fulfill specific roles and responsibilities...” If 

A.6.1.1 is mapped to PM-10 without providing any additional information, organizations 

might assume that if they implement A.6.1.1 (i.e., all responsibilities are defined and 

allocated), then the intent of PM-10 would also be fully satisfied. However, this would not be 

the case since the other two parts of PM-10 would not have been addressed. To resolve and 

clarify the security control mappings, when a security control in the right column of Tables 

H-1 and H-2 does not fully satisfy the intent of the security control in the left column of the 

tables, the control in the right column is designated with an asterisk (*). 

In a few cases, an ISO/IEC 27001 security control could only be directly mapped to a Special 

Publication 800-53 control enhancement. In such cases, the relevant enhancement is specified in 

Table H-2 indicating that the corresponding ISO/IEC 27001 control satisfies only the intent of the 

specified enhancement and does not address the associated base control from Special Publication 

800-53 or any other enhancements under that base control. Where no enhancement is specified, 

the ISO/IEC 27001 control is relevant only to the Special Publication 800-53 base control.

And finally, the security controls from ISO/IEC 27002 were not considered in the mapping 

analysis since the standard is informative rather than normative.

APPENDIX H PAGE H-2
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

Table H-1 provides a mapping from the security controls in NIST Special Publication 800-53 to 

the security controls in ISO/IEC 27001. Please review the introductory text at the beginning of 

Appendix H before employing the mappings in Table H-1.

TABLE H-1: MAPPING NIST SP 800-53 TO ISO/IEC 27001

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not 

fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.

AC-1 Access Control Policy and Procedures A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.9.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, 

A.18.2.2

AC-2 Account Management A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.5, A.9.2.6

AC-3 Access Enforcement A.6.2.2, A.9.1.2, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5, A.13.1.1, 

A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.18.1.3

AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3

AC-5 Separation of Duties A.6.1.2

AC-6 Least Privilege A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5

AC-7 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts A.9.4.2

AC-8 System Use Notification A.9.4.2

AC-9 Previous Logon (Access) Notification A.9.4.2

AC-10 Concurrent Session Control None

AC-11 Session Lock A.11.2.8, A.11.2.9

AC-12 Session Termination None

AC-13 Withdrawn ---

AC-14 Permitted Actions without Identification or 

Authentication 

None

AC-15 Withdrawn ---

AC-16 Security Attributes None

AC-17 Remote Access A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.2

AC-18 Wireless Access A.6.2.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1

AC-19 Access Control for Mobile Devices A.6.2.1, A.11.2.6, A.13.2.1

AC-20 Use of External Information Systems A.11.2.6, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1

AC-21 Information Sharing None

AC-22 Publicly Accessible Content None

AC-23 Data Mining Protection None

AC-24 Access Control Decisions A.9.4.1*

AC-25 Reference Monitor None

AT-1 Security Awareness and Training Policy and 

Procedures

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2

AT-2 Security Awareness Training A.7.2.2, A.12.2.1

AT-3 Role-Based Security Training A.7.2.2*

AT-4 Security Training Records None

AT-5 Withdrawn ---

AU-1 Audit and Accountability Policy and Procedures A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2

AU-2 Audit Events None

AU-3 Content of Audit Records A.12.4.1*

AU-4 Audit Storage Capacity A.12.1.3

AU-5 Response to Audit Processing Failures None

AU-6 Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting A.12.4.1, A.16.1.2, A.16.1.4

AU-7 Audit Reduction and Report Generation None

AU-8 Time Stamps A.12.4.4

AU-9 Protection of Audit Information A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.18.1.3

AU-10 Non-repudiation None

AU-11 Audit Record Retention A.12.4.1, A.16.1.7

AU-12 Audit Generation A.12.4.1, A.12.4.3

APPENDIX H PAGE H-3
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not 

fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.

AU-13 Monitoring for Information Disclosure None

AU-14 Session Audit A.12.4.1*

AU-15 Alternate Audit Capability None

AU-16 Cross-Organizational Auditing None

CA-1 Security Assessment and Authorization Policies 

and Procedures

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2

CA-2 Security Assessments A.14.2.8, A.18.2.2, A.18.2.3

CA-3 System Interconnections A.13.1.2, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2

CA-4 Withdrawn ---

CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones None

CA-6 Security Authorization None

CA-7 Continuous Monitoring None

CA-8 Penetration Testing None

CA-9 Internal System Connections None

CM-1 Configuration Management Policy and 

Procedures

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2

CM-2 Baseline Configuration None

CM-3 Configuration Change Control A.12.1.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4

CM-4 Security Impact Analysis A.14.2.3

CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change A.9.2.3, A.9.4.5, A.12.1.2, A.12.1.4, A.12.5.1

CM-6 Configuration Settings None

CM-7 Least Functionality A.12.5.1*

CM-8 Information System Component Inventory A.8.1.1, A.8.1.2

CM-9 Configuration Management Plan A.6.1.1*

CM-10 Software Usage Restrictions A.18.1.2

CM-11 User-Installed Software A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2

CP-1 Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2

CP-2 Contingency Plan A.6.1.1, A.17.1.1, A.17.2.1

CP-3 Contingency Training A.7.2.2*

CP-4 Contingency Plan Testing A.17.1.3

CP-5 Withdrawn ---

CP-6 Alternate Storage Site A.11.1.4, A.17.1.2, A.17.2.1

CP-7 Alternate Processing Site A.11.1.4, A.17.1.2, A.17.2.1

CP-8 Telecommunications Services A.11.2.2, A.17.1.2

CP-9 Information System Backup A.12.3.1, A.17.1.2, A.18.1.3

CP-10 Information System Recovery and 

Reconstitution

A.17.1.2

CP-11 Alternate Communications Protocols A.17.1.2*

CP-12 Safe Mode None

CP-13 Alternative Security Mechanisms A.17.1.2*

IA-1 Identification and Authentication Policy and 

Procedures

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2

IA-2 Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

A.9.2.1

IA-3 Device Identification and Authentication None

IA-4 Identifier Management A.9.2.1

IA-5 Authenticator Management A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.3

IA-6 Authenticator Feedback A.9.4.2

IA-7 Cryptographic Module Authentication A.18.1.5

IA-8 Identification and Authentication (NonOrganizational Users)A.9.2.1

IA-9 Service Identification and Authentication None

APPENDIX H PAGE H-4
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not 

fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.

IA-10 Adaptive Identification and Authentication None

IA-11 Re-authentication None

IR-1 Incident Response Policy and Procedures A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1 A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2

IR-2 Incident Response Training A.7.2.2*

IR-3 Incident Response Testing None

IR-4 Incident Handling A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.6

IR-5 Incident Monitoring None

IR-6 Incident Reporting A.6.1.3, A.16.1.2

IR-7 Incident Response Assistance None

IR-8 Incident Response Plan A.16.1.1

IR-9 Information Spillage Response None

IR-10 Integrated Information Security Analysis Team None

MA-1 System Maintenance Policy and Procedures A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2

MA-2 Controlled Maintenance A.11.2.4*, A.11.2.5*

MA-3 Maintenance Tools None

MA-4 Nonlocal Maintenance None

MA-5 Maintenance Personnel None

MA-6 Timely Maintenance A.11.2.4

MP-1 Media Protection Policy and Procedures A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2

MP-2 Media Access A.8.2.3, A.8.3.1, A.11.2.9

MP-3 Media Marking A.8.2.2

MP-4 Media Storage A.8.2.3, A.8.3.1, A.11.2.9

MP-5 Media Transport A.8.2.3, A.8.3.1, A.8.3.3, A.11.2.5, A.11.2.6

MP-6 Media Sanitization A.8.2.3, A.8.3.1, A.8.3.2, A.11.2.7

MP-7 Media Use A.8.2.3, A.8.3.1

MP-8 Media Downgrading None

PE-1 Physical and Environmental Protection Policy 

and Procedures

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2

PE-2 Physical Access Authorizations A.11.1.2*

PE-3 Physical Access Control A.11.1.1, A.11.1.2, A.11.1.3

PE-4 Access Control for Transmission Medium A.11.1.2, A.11.2.3

PE-5 Access Control for Output Devices A.11.1.2, A.11.1.3

PE-6 Monitoring Physical Access None

PE-7 Withdrawn ---

PE-8 Visitor Access Records None

PE-9 Power Equipment and Cabling A.11.1.4, A.11.2.1, A.11.2.2, A.11.2.3

PE-10 Emergency Shutoff A.11.2.2*

PE-11 Emergency Power A.11.2.2

PE-12 Emergency Lighting A.11.2.2*

PE-13 Fire Protection A.11.1.4, A.11.2.1

PE-14 Temperature and Humidity Controls A.11.1.4, A.11.2.1, A.11.2.2

PE-15 Water Damage Protection A.11.1.4, A.11.2.1, A.11.2.2

PE-16 Delivery and Removal A.8.2.3, A.11.1.6, A.11.2.5

PE-17 Alternate Work Site A.6.2.2, A.11.2.6, A.13.2.1

PE-18 Location of Information System Components A.8.2.3, A.11.1.4, A.11.2.1

PE-19 Information Leakage A.11.1.4, A.11.2.1

PE-20 Asset Monitoring and Tracking A.8.2.3*

PL-1 Security Planning Policy and Procedures A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2

PL-2 System Security Plan A.14.1.1

PL-3 Withdrawn ---

PL-4 Rules of Behavior A.7.1.2, A.7.2.1, A.8.1.3

APPENDIX H PAGE H-5
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not 

fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.

PL-5 Withdrawn ---

PL-6 Withdrawn ---

PL-7 Security Concept of Operations A.14.1.1*

PL-8 Information Security Architecture A.14.1.1*

PL-9 Central Management None

PS-1 Personnel Security Policy and Procedures A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2

PS-2 Position Risk Designation None

PS-3 Personnel Screening A.7.1.1

PS-4 Personnel Termination A.7.3.1, A.8.1.4

PS-5 Personnel Transfer A.7.3.1, A.8.1.4

PS-6 Access Agreements A.7.1.2, A.7.2.1, A.13.2.4

PS-7 Third-Party Personnel Security A.6.1.1*, A.7.2.1*

PS-8 Personnel Sanctions A.7.2.3

RA-1 Risk Assessment Policy and Procedures A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2

RA-2 Security Categorization A.8.2.1

RA-3 Risk Assessment A.12.6.1*

RA-4 Withdrawn ---

RA-5 Vulnerability Scanning A.12.6.1*

RA-6 Technical Surveillance Countermeasures 

Survey

None

SA-1 System and Services Acquisition Policy and 

Procedures

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2

SA-2 Allocation of Resources None

SA-3 System Development Life Cycle A.6.1.1, A.6.1.5, A.14.1.1, A.14.2.1, A.14.2.6

SA-4 Acquisition Process A.14.1.1, A.14.2.7, A.14.2.9, A.15.1.2

SA-5 Information System Documentation A.12.1.1*

SA-6 Withdrawn ---

SA-7 Withdrawn ---

SA-8 Security Engineering Principles A.14.2.5

SA-9 External Information System Services A.6.1.1, A.6.1.5, A.7.2.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.2.2, A.15.2.1,

A.15.2.2

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management A.12.1.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.4, A.14.2.7

SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation A.14.2.7, A.14.2.8

SA-12 Supply Chain Protections A.14.2.7, A.15.1.1, A.15.1.2, A.15.1.3

SA-13 Trustworthiness None

SA-14 Criticality Analysis None

SA-15 Development Process, Standards, and Tools A.6.1.5, A.14.2.1,

SA-16 Developer-Provided Training None

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and Design A.14.2.1, A.14.2.5

SA-18 Tamper Resistance and Detection None

SA-19 Component Authenticity None

SA-20 Customized Development of Critical 

Components

None

SA-21 Developer Screening A.7.1.1

SA-22 Unsupported System Components None

SC-1 System and Communications Protection Policy 

and Procedures

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2

SC-2 Application Partitioning None

SC-3 Security Function Isolation None

SC-4 Information In Shared Resources None

SC-5 Denial of Service Protection None

SC-6 Resource Availability None

APPENDIX H PAGE H-6
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not 

fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.

SC-7 Boundary Protection A.13.1.1, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3

SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity A.8.2.3, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3

SC-9 Withdrawn ---

SC-10 Network Disconnect A.13.1.1

SC-11 Trusted Path None

SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and 

Management

A.10.1.2

SC-13 Cryptographic Protection A.10.1.1, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.18.1.5

SC-14 Withdrawn ---

SC-15 Collaborative Computing Devices A.13.2.1*

SC-16 Transmission of Security Attributes None

SC-17 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates A.10.1.2

SC-18 Mobile Code None

SC-19 Voice Over Internet Protocol None

SC-20 Secure Name/Address Resolution Service 

(Authoritative Source)

None

SC-21 Secure Name/Address Resolution Service 

(Recursive or Caching Resolver)

None

SC-22 Architecture and Provisioning for 

Name/Address Resolution Service

None

SC-23 Session Authenticity None

SC-24 Fail in Known State None

SC-25 Thin Nodes None

SC-26 Honeypots None

SC-27 Platform-Independent Applications None

SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest A.8.2.3*

SC-29 Heterogeneity None

SC-30 Concealment and Misdirection None

SC-31 Covert Channel Analysis None

SC-32 Information System Partitioning None

SC-33 Withdrawn ---

SC-34 Non-Modifiable Executable Programs None

SC-35 Honeyclients None

SC-36 Distributed Processing and Storage None

SC-37 Out-of-Band Channels None

SC-38 Operations Security A.12.x

SC-39 Process Isolation None

SC-40 Wireless Link Protection None

SC-41 Port and I/O Device Access None

SC-42 Sensor Capability and Data None

SC-43 Usage Restrictions None

SC-44 Detonation Chambers None

SI-1 System and Information Integrity Policy and 

Procedures

A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2

SI-2 Flaw Remediation A.12.6.1, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.16.1.3

SI-3 Malicious Code Protection A.12.2.1

SI-4 Information System Monitoring None

SI-5 Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives A.6.1.4*

SI-6 Security Function Verification None

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity None

SI-8 Spam Protection None

SI-9 Withdrawn ---

APPENDIX H PAGE H-7
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not 

fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.

SI-10 Information Input Validation None

SI-11 Error Handling None

SI-12 Information Handling and Retention None

SI-13 Predictable Failure Prevention None

SI-14 Non-Persistence None

SI-15 Information Output Filtering None

SI-16 Memory Protection None

SI-17 Fail-Safe Procedures None

PM-1 Information Security Program Plan A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2

PM-2 Senior Information Security Officer A.6.1.1*

PM-3 Information Security Resources None

PM-4 Plan of Action and Milestones Process None

PM-5 Information System Inventory None

PM-6 Information Security Measures of Performance None

PM-7 Enterprise Architecture None

PM-8 Critical Infrastructure Plan None

PM-9 Risk Management Strategy None

PM-10 Security Authorization Process A.6.1.1*

PM-11 Mission/Business Process Definition None

PM-12 Insider Threat Program None

PM-13 Information Security Workforce A.7.2.2*

PM-14 Testing, Training, and Monitoring None

PM-15 Contacts with Security Groups and 

Associations

A.6.1.4

PM-16 Threat Awareness Program None

APPENDIX H PAGE H-8
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

Table H-2 provides a mapping from the security controls in ISO/IEC 27001 to the security

controls in Special Publication 800-53.115 Please review the introductory text at the beginning

of Appendix H before employing the mappings in Table H-2.

TABLE H-2: MAPPING ISO/IEC 27001 TO NIST SP 800-53

ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not 

fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.

A.5 Information Security Policies

A.5.1 Management direction for information security

A.5.1.1 Policies for information security All XX-1 controls

A.5.1.2 Review of the policies for information security All XX-1 controls

A.6 Organization of information security

A.6.1 Internal organization

A.6.1.1 Information security roles and responsibilities All XX-1 controls, CM-9, CP-2,PS-7, SA-3, SA-9, PM- 2,

PM-10

A.6.1.2 Segregation of duties AC-5

A.6.1.3 Contact with authorities IR-6

A.6.1.4 Contact with special interest groups SI-5, PM-15

A.6.1.5 Information security in project management SA-3, SA-9, SA-15

A.6.2 Mobile devices and teleworking

A.6.2.1 Mobile device policy AC-17, AC-18, AC-19

A.6.2.2 Teleworking AC-3, AC-17, PE-17

A.7 Human Resources Security

A.7.1 Prior to Employment

A.7.1.1 Screening PS-3, SA-21

A.7.1.2 Terms and conditions of employment PL-4, PS-6

A.7.2 During employment

A.7.2.1 Management responsibilities PL-4, PS-6, PS-7, SA-9

A.7.2.2 Information security awareness, education, and

training

AT-2, AT-3, CP-3, IR-2, PM-13

A.7.2.3 Disciplinary process PS-8

A.7.3 Termination and change of employment

A.7.3.1 Termination or change of employment

responsibilities

PS-4, PS-5

A.8 Asset Management

A.8.1 Responsibility for assets

A.8.1.1 Inventory of assets CM-8

A.8.1.2 Ownership of assets CM-8

A.8.1.3 Acceptable use of assets PL-4

A.8.1.4 Return of assets PS-4, PS-5

A.8.2 Information Classification

A.8.2.1 Classification of information RA-2

A.8.2.2 Labelling of Information MP-3

A.8.2.3 Handling of Assets MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, PE-16, PE-18, PE- 20,

SC-8, SC-28

A.8.3 Media Handling

A.8.3.1 Management of removable media MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7

A.8.3.2 Disposal of media MP-6

A.8.3.3 Physical media transfer MP-5

A.9 Access Control

115 The use of the term XX-1 controls in mapping Table H-2 refers to the set of security controls represented by the first 

control in each family in Appendix F, where XX is a placeholder for the two-letter family identifier.

APPENDIX H PAGE H-9

 
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 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not 

fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.

A.9.1 Business requirement of access control

A.9.1.1 Access control policy AC-1

A.9.1.2 Access to networks and network services AC-3, AC-6

A.9.2 User access management

A.9.2.1 User registration and de-registration AC-2, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8

A.9.2.2 User access provisioning AC-2

A.9.2.3 Management of privileged access rights AC-2, AC-3, AC-6, CM-5

A.9.2.4 Management of secret authentication information

of users

IA-5

A.9.2.5 Review of user access rights AC-2

A.9.2.6 Removal or adjustment of access rights AC-2

A.9.3 User responsibilities

A.9.3.1 Use of secret authentication information IA-5

A.9.4 System and application access control

A.9.4.1 Information access restriction AC-3, AC-24

A.9.4.2 Secure logon procedures AC-7, AC-8, AC-9, IA-6

A.9.4.3 Password management system IA-5

A.9.4.4 Use of privileged utility programs AC-3, AC-6

A.9.4.5 Access control to program source code AC-3, AC-6, CM-5

A.10 Cryptography

A.10.1 Cryptographic controls

A.10.1.1 Policy on the use of cryptographic controls SC-13

A.10.1.2 Key Management SC-12, SC-17

A.11 Physical and environmental security

A.11.1 Secure areas

A.11.1.1 Physical security perimeter PE-3*

A.11.1.2 Physical entry controls PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, PE-5

A.11.1.3 Securing offices, rooms and facilities PE-3, PE-5

A.11.1.4 Protecting against external and environmental

threats

CP-6, CP-7, PE-9, PE-13, PE-14, PE-15, PE-18, PE- 19

A.11.1.5 Working in secure areas SC-42(3)*

A.11.1.6 Delivery and loading areas PE-16

A.11.2 Equipment

A.11.2.1 Equipment siting and protection PE-9, PE-13, PE-14, PE-15, PE-18, PE-19

A.11.2.2 Supporting utilities CP-8, PE-9, PE-10, PE-11, PE-12, PE-14, PE-15

A.11.2.3 Cabling security PE-4, PE-9

A.11.2.4 Equipment maintenance MA-2, MA-6

A.11.2.5 Removal of assets MA-2, MP-5, PE-16

A.11.2.6 Security of equipment and assets off-premises AC-19, AC-20, MP-5, PE-17

A.11.2.7 Secure disposal or reuse of equipment MP-6

A.11.2.8 Unattended user equipment AC-11

A.11.2.9 Clear desk and clear screen policy AC-11, MP-2, MP-4

A.12 Operations security

A.12.1 Operational procedures and responsibilities

A.12.1.1 Documented operating procedures All XX-1 controls, SA-5

A.12.1.2 Change management CM-3, CM-5, SA-10

A.12.1.3 Capacity management AU-4, CP-2(2), SC-5(2)

A.12.1.4 Separation of development, testing, and

operational environments

CM-4(1)*, CM-5*

A.12.2 Protection from malware

A.12.2.1 Controls against malware AT-2, SI-3

APPENDIX H PAGE H-10
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________________________________________________________________________________________________

ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not 

fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.

A.12.3 Backup

A.12.3.1 Information backup CP-9

A.12.4 Logging and monitoring

A.12.4.1 Event logging AU-3, AU-6, AU-11, AU-12, AU-14

A.12.4.2 Protection of log information AU-9

A.12.4.3 Administrator and operator logs AU-9, AU-12

A.12.4.4 Clock synchronization AU-8

A.12.5 Control of operational software

A.12.5.1 Installation of software on operational systems CM-5, CM-7(4), CM-7(5), CM-11

A.12.6 Technical vulnerability management

A.12.6.1 Management of technical vulnerabilities RA-3, RA-5, SI-2, SI-5

A.12.6.2 Restrictions on software installation CM-11

A.12.7 Information systems audit considerations

A.12.7.1 Information systems audit controls AU-5*

A.13 Communications security

A.13.1 Network security management

A.13.1.1 Network controls AC-3, AC-17, AC-18, AC-20, SC-7, SC-8, SC-10

A.13.1.2 Security of network services CA-3, SA-9

A.13.1.3 Segregation in networks AC-4, SC-7

A.13.2 Information transfer

A.13.2.1 Information transfer policies and procedures AC-4, AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, CA-3, PE-17, SC-7, 

SC-8, SC-15

A.13.2.2 Agreements on information transfer CA-3, PS-6, SA-9

A.13.2.3 Electronic messaging SC-8

A.13.2.4 Confidentiality or nondisclosure agreements PS-6

A.14 System acquisition, development and

maintenance

A.14.1 Security requirements of information systems

A.14.1.1 Information security requirements analysis and

specification

PL-2, PL-7, PL-8, SA-3, SA-4

A.14.1.2 Securing application services on public networks AC-3, AC-4, AC-17, SC-8, SC-13

A.14.1.3 Protecting application services transactions AC-3, AC-4, SC-7, SC-8, SC-13

A.14.2 Security in development and support

processes

A.14.2.1 Secure development policy SA-3, SA-15, SA-17

A.14.2.2 System change control procedures CM-3, SA-10, SI-2

A.14.2.3 Technical review of applications after operating

platform changes

CM-3, CM-4, SI-2

A.14.2.4 Restrictions on changes to software packages CM-3, SA-10

A.14.2.5 Secure system engineering principles SA-8

A.14.2.6 Secure development environment SA-3*

A.14.2.7 Outsourced development SA-4, SA-10, SA-11, SA-12, SA-15

A.14.2.8 System security testing CA-2, SA-11

A.14.2.9 System acceptance testing SA-4, SA-12(7)

A.14.3 Test data

A.14.3.1 Protection of test data SA-15(9)*

A.15 Supplier Relationships

A.15.1 Information security in supplier relationships

A.15.1.1 Information security policy for supplier

relationships

SA-12

A.15.1.2 Address security within supplier agreements SA-4, SA-12

APPENDIX H PAGE H-11
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ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not 

fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.

A.15.1.3 Information and communication technology

supply chain

SA-12

A.15.2 Supplier service delivery management

A.15.2.1 Monitoring and review of supplier services SA-9

A.15.2.2 Managing changes to supplier services SA-9

A.16 Information security incident management

A.16.1 Managing of information security incidents and

improvements

A.16.1.1 Responsibilities and procedures IR-8

A.16.1.2 Reporting information security events AU-6, IR-6

A.16.1.3 Reporting information security weaknesses SI-2

A.16.1.4 Assessment of and decision on information

security events

AU-6, IR-4

A.16.1.5 Response to information security incidents IR-4

A.16.1.6 Learning from information security incidents IR-4

A.16.1.7 Collection of evidence AU-4*, AU-9*, AU-10(3)*, AU-11*

A.17 Information security aspects of business

continuity management

A.17.1 Information security continuity

A.17.1.1 Planning information security continuity CP-2

A.17.1.2 Implementing information security continuity CP-6, CP-7, CP-8, CP-9, CP-10, CP-11, CP-13

A.17.1.3 Verify, review, and evaluate information security

continuity

CP-4

A.17.2 Redundancies

A.17.2.1 Availability of information processing facilities CP-2,CP-6, CP-7

A.18 Compliance

A.18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual

requirements

A.18.1.1 Identification of applicable legislation and

contractual requirements

All XX-1 controls

A.18.1.2 Intellectual property rights CM-10

A.18.1.3 Protection of records AC-3, AC-23, AU-9, AU-10, CP-9, SC-8, SC-8(1), SC-13, 

SC-28, SC-28(1)

A.18.1.4 Privacy and protection of personal information Appendix J Privacy controls

A.18.1.5 Regulation of cryptographic controls IA-7, SC-12, SC-13, SC-17

A.18.2 Information security reviews

A.18.2.1 Independent review of information security CA-2(1), SA-11(3)

A.18.2.2 Compliance with security policies and standards All XX-1 controls, CA-2

A.18.2.3 Technical compliance review CA-2

Note: The content of Table H-3, the mapping from the functional and assurance requirements in ISO/IEC 15408 (Common Criteria)

to the security controls in Special Publication 800-53, is unaffected by the changes above.

APPENDIX H PAGE H-12
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________________________________________________________________________________________________

Table H-3 provides a generalized mapping from the functional and assurance requirements in 

ISO/IEC 15408 (Common Criteria) to the security controls in Special Publication 800-53. The 

table represents an informal correspondence between security requirements and security controls 

(i.e., the table is not intended to determine whether the ISO/IEC 15408 security requirements are 

fully, partially, or not satisfied by the associated security controls). However, the table can serve 

as a beneficial starting point for further correspondence analysis. Organizations are cautioned that 

satisfying ISO/IEC 15408 security requirements for an particular evaluated and validated 

information technology product as represented by the presence of certain security controls from 

Appendix F, does not imply that such requirements have been satisfied throughout the entire 

information system (which may consist of multiple, integrated individual component products). 

Additional information explaining the specific mappings that appear in Table H-3 is available at 

the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) website at: http://www.niap-ccevs.org.

TABLE H-3: MAPPING ISO/IEC 15408 TO NIST SP 800-53

ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

Functional Requirements

FAU_ARP.1 Security Audit Automatic Response

Security Alarms

AU-5 Response to Audit Processing Failures

AU-5(1) Response to Audit Processing Failures

Audit Storage Capacity

AU-5(2) Response to Audit Processing Failures

Real-Time Alerts

AU-5(3) Response to Audit Processing Failures

Configurable Traffic Volume Thresholds

AU-5(4) Response to Audit Processing Failures

Shutdown on Failure

PE-6(2) Monitoring Physical Access

Automated Intrusion Recognition / Responses

SI-3 Malicious Code Protection

SI-3(8) Malicious Code Protection

Detect Unauthorized Commands

SI-4(5) Information System Monitoring

System-Generated Alerts

SI-4(7) Information Systems Monitoring

Automated Response to Suspicious Events

SI-4(22) Information Systems Monitoring

Unauthorized Network Services

SI-7(2) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Automated Notifications of Integrity Violations

SI-7(5) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Automated Response to Integrity Violations

SI-7(8) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Auditing Capability for Significant Events

FAU_GEN.1 Security Audit Data Generation

Audit Data Generation

AU-2 Audit Events

AU-3 Content of Audit Records

AU-3(1) Content of Audit Records 

Additional Audit Information

AU-12 Audit Generation

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ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

FAU_GEN.2 Security Audit Data Generation

User Identity Association

AU-3 Content of Audit Records

FAU_SAA.1 Security Audit Analysis

Potential Violation Analysis

SI-4 Information System Monitoring 

FAU_SAA.2 Security Audit Analysis

Profile-Based Anomaly Detection

AC-2(12) Account Management

Account Monitoring / Atypical Usage

SI-4 Information System Monitoring

FAU_SAA.3 Security Audit Analysis

Simple Attack Heuristics

SI-3(7) Malicious Code Protection

Non Signature-Based Protection

SI-4 Information System Monitoring

FAU_SAA.4 Security Audit Analysis

Complex Attack Heuristics

SI-3(7) Malicious Code Protection

Non Signature-Based Protection

SI-4 Information System Monitoring

FAU_SAR.1 Security Audit Review

Audit Review

AU-7 Audit Reduction and Report Generation

FAU_SAR.2 Security Audit Review

Restricted Audit Review

AU-9(6) Protection of Audit Information

Read Only Access

FAU_SAR.3 Security Audit Review

Selectable Audit Review

AU-7 Audit Reduction and Report Generation

AU-7(1) Audit Reduction and Report Generation

Automatic Processing

AU-7(2) Audit Reduction and Report Generation

Automatic Sort and Search

FAU_SEL.1 Security Audit Event Selection

Selective Audit

AU-12 Audit Generation

FAU_STG.1 Security Audit Event Storage

Protected Audit Trail Storage

AU-9 Protection of Audit Information

FAU_STG.2 Security Audit Event Storage

Guarantees of Audit Data Availability

AU-9 Protection of Audit Information

Alternate audit capability

FAU_STG.3 Security Audit Event Storage

Action In Case of Possible Audit Data 

Loss

AU-5 Response to Audit Processing Failures

AU-5(1) Response to Audit Processing Failures

Audit Storage Capacity

AU-5(2) Response To Audit Processing Failures

Real-Time Alerts

AU-5(4) Response To Audit Processing Failures

Shutdown on Failure

FAU_STG.4 Security Audit Event Storage

Prevention of Audit Data Loss

AU-4 Audit Storage Capacity

AU-5 Response to Audit Processing Failures

AU-5(2) Response To Audit Processing Failures

Real-Time Alerts

AU-5(4) Response To Audit Processing Failures

Shutdown on Failure

FCO_NRO.1 Non-Repudiation of Origin

Selective Proof of Origin

AU-10 Non-Repudiation

AU-10(1) Non-Repudiation

Association Of Identities

AU-10(2) Non-Repudiation

Validate Binding of Information Producer

Identity

APPENDIX H PAGE H-14
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ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

FCO_NRO.2 Non-Repudiation of Origin

Enforced Proof of Origin

AU-10 Non-Repudiation

AU-10(1) Non-Repudiation

Association Of Identities

AU-10(2) Non-Repudiation

Validate Binding of Information Producer

Identity

FCO_NRR.1 Non-Repudiation of Receipt

Selective Proof of Receipt

AU-10 Non-Repudiation

AU-10(1) Non-Repudiation

Association Of Identities

AU-10(2) Non-Repudiation

Validate Binding of Information Producer

Identity

FCO_NRR.2 Non-Repudiation of Receipt

Enforced Proof of Receipt

AU-10 Non-Repudiation

AU-10(1) Non-Repudiation

Association Of Identities

AU-10(2) Non-Repudiation

Validate Binding of Information Producer

Identity

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Management

Cryptographic Key Generation

SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and 

Management

FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Management

Cryptographic Key Distribution

SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and 

Management

FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic Key Management

Cryptographic Key Access

SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and 

Management

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Management

Cryptographic Key Destruction

SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and 

Management

FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

Cryptographic Operation

SC-13 Cryptographic Protection

FDP_ACC.1 Access Control Policy

Subset Access Control

AC-3 Access Enforcement

AC-3(3) Access Enforcement

Mandatory Access Control

AC-3(4) Access Enforcement

Discretionary Access Control

AC-3(7) Access Enforcement

Role-Based Access Control

FDP_ACC.2 Access Control Policy

Complete Access Control

AC-3 Access Enforcement

AC-3(3) Access Enforcement

Mandatory Access Control

AC-3(4) Access Enforcement

Discretionary Access Control

AC-3(7) Access Enforcement

Role-Based Access Control

FDP_ACF.1 Access Control Functions

Security Attribute Based Access 

Control

AC-3 Access Enforcement

AC-3(3) Access Enforcement

Mandatory Access Control

AC-3(4) Access Enforcement

Discretionary Access Control

AC-3(7) Access Enforcement

Role-Based Access Control

AC-16 Security Attributes

APPENDIX H PAGE H-15
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ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

SC-16 Transmission of Security Attributes

FDP_DAU.1 Data Authentication

Basic Data Authentication

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

SI-7(1) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Integrity Checks

SI-7(6) Software, Firmware, And Information 

Integrity

Cryptographic Protection

SI-10 Information Input Validation

FDP_DAU.2 Data Authentication

Data Authentication With Identity of 

Guarantor

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

SI-7(1) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Integrity Checks

SI-7(6) Software, Firmware, And Information 

Integrity

Cryptographic Protection

SI-10 Information Input Validation

FDP_ETC.1 Export from the TOE

Export of User Data without Security 

Attributes

No Mapping.

FDP_ETC.2 Export from the TOE

Export of User Data with Security 

Attributes

AC-4(18) Information Flow Enforcement

Security Attribute Binding 

AC-16 Security Attributes

AC-16(5) Security Attributes

Attribute Displays for Output Devices 

SC-16 Transmission of Security Attributes

FDP_IFC.1 Information Flow Control Policy

Subset Information Flow Control

AC-3 Access Enforcement

AC-3(3) Access Enforcement

Mandatory Access Control

AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement

AC-4(1) Information Flow Enforcement

Object Security Attributes

FDP_IFC.2 Information Flow Control Policy

Complete Information Flow Control

AC-3 Access Enforcement

AC-3(3) Access Enforcement

Mandatory Access Control

AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement

FDP_IFF.1 Information Flow Control Functions

Simple Security Attributes

AC-3 Access Enforcement

AC-3(3) Access Enforcement

Mandatory Access Control

AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement

AC-4(1) Information Flow Enforcement

Object Security Attributes

AC-4(2) Information Flow Enforcement

Processing Domains

AC-4(7) Information Flow Enforcement

One-Way Flow Mechanisms

AC-16 Security Attributes

SC-7 Boundary Protection

APPENDIX H PAGE H-16
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ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

FDP_IFF.2 Information Flow Control Functions

Hierarchical Security Attributes

AC-3 Access Enforcement

AC-3(3) Access Enforcement

Mandatory Access Control

AC-4(1) Information Flow Enforcement

Object Security Attributes

AC-16 Security Attributes

FDP_IFF.3 Information Flow Control Functions

Limited Illicit Information Flows

SC-31 Covert Channel Analysis

SC-31(2) Covert Channel Analysis

Maximum Bandwidth

FDP_IFF.4 Information Flow Control Functions

Partial Elimination of Illicit Information 

Flows

SC-31 Covert Channel Analysis

SC-31(2) Covert Channel Analysis

Maximum Bandwidth

FDP_IFF.5 Information Flow Control Functions

No Illicit Information Flows

SC-31 Covert Channel Analysis

SC-31(2) Covert Channel Analysis

Maximum Bandwidth

FDP_IFF.6 Information Flow Control Functions

Illicit Information Flow Monitoring

SC-31 Covert Channel Analysis

SI-4(18) Information System Monitoring

Analyze Traffic / Covert Exfiltration

FDP_ITC.1 Import from Outside of the TOE

Import of User Data without Security 

Attributes

AC-4(9) Information Flow Enforcement

Human Reviews

AC-4(12) Information Flow Enforcement

Data Type Identifiers

FDP_ITC.2 Import from Outside of the TOE

Import of User Data with Security 

Attributes

AC-4(18) Information Flow Enforcement

Security Attribute Binding

AC-16 Security Attributes

SC-16 Transmission of Security Attributes

FDP_ITT.1 Internal TOE Transfer

Basic Internal Transfer Protection

SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1) Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection 

SC-5 Denial of Service Protection

FDP_ITT.2 Internal TOE Transfer

Transmission Separation by Attribute

SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1) Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection

SC-5 Denial of Service Protection

AC-4(21) Information Flow Enforcement

Physical / Logical Separation of Information 

Flows

FDP_ITT.3 Internal TOE Transfer

Integrity Monitoring

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

SI-7(1) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Integrity Checks

SC-8(1) Transmission Integrity

Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection

SI-7(5) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Automated Response to Integrity Violations

APPENDIX H PAGE H-17
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ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

FDP_ITT.4 Internal TOE Transfer

Attribute-Based Integrity Monitoring

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

SI-7(1) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Integrity Checks

SC-8(1) Transmission Integrity

Cryptographic or Alternate Physical 

Protection

AC-4(21) Information Flow Enforcement

Physical / Logical Separation of Information 

Flows

SI-7(5) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Automated Response to Integrity Violations

FDP_RIP.1 Residual Information Protection

Subset Residual Information 

Protection

SC-4 Information in Shared Resources

FDP_RIP.2 Residual Information Protection

Full Residual Information Protection

SC-4 Information in Shared Resources

FDP_ROL.1 Rollback

Basic Rollback

CP-10(2) Information System Recovery and 

Reconstitution 

Transaction Recovery

FDP_ROL.2 Rollback

Advanced Rollback

CP-10(2) Information System Recovery and 

Reconstitution

Transaction Recovery

FDP_SDI.1 Stored Data Integrity

Stored Data Integrity Monitoring

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

SI-7(1) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Integrity Scans

FDP_SDI.2 Stored Data Integrity

Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and 

Action

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

SI-7(1) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Integrity Scans 

SI-7(5) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Automated Response to Integrity Violations

FDP_UCT.1 Inter-TSF User Data Confidentiality 

Transfer Protection

Basic Data Exchange Confidentiality

SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1) Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection

FDP_UIT.1 Inter-TSF User Data Integrity 

Transfer Protection

Data Exchange Integrity

SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1) Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

SI-7(6) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Cryptographic Protection

FDP_UIT.2 Inter-TSF User Data Integrity 

Transfer Protection

Source Data Exchange Recovery

No Mapping.

APPENDIX H PAGE H-18
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ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

FDP_UIT.3 Inter-TSF User Data Integrity 

Transfer Protection

Destination Data Exchange Recovery

No Mapping.

FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure

Authentication Failure Handling

AC-7 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts

FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition

User Attribute Definition

AC-2 Account Management

IA-2 Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

FIA_SOS.1 Specification of Secrets

Verification of Secrets

IA-5 Authenticator Management

IA-5(1) Authenticator Management

Password-Based Authentication

IA-5(12) Authenticator Management

Biometric Authentication

FIA_SOS.2 Specification of Secrets

TSF Generation of Secrets

IA-5 Authenticator Management

IA-5(1) Authenticator Management

Password-Based Authentication

IA-5(12) Authenticator Management

Biometric Authentication

FIA_UAU.1 User Authentication

Timing of Authentication

AC-14 Permitted Actions without Identification or 

Authentication

IA-2 Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

IA-8 Identification and Authentication (NonOrganizational Users)

FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication

User Authentication Before Any Action

AC-14 Permitted Actions without Identification or 

Authentication

IA-2 Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

IA-8 Identification and Authentication (NonOrganizational Users)

FIA_UAU.3 User Authentication

Unforgeable Authentication

IA-2(8) Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

Network Access To Privileged Accounts -

Replay Resistant 

IA-2(9) Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

Network Access To Non-Privileged Accounts -

Replay Resistant

FIA_UAU.4 User Authentication

Single-Use Authentication 

Mechanisms

IA-2(8) Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

Network Access To Privileged Accounts -

Replay Resistant 

IA-2(9) Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

Network Access To Non-Privileged Accounts -

Replay Resistant

FIA_UAU.5 User Authentication

Multiple Authentication Mechanisms

IA-2(1) Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

Network Access To Privileged Accounts 

IA-2(2) Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

Network Access To Non-Privileged Accounts 

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ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

IA-2(3) Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

Local Access To Privileged Accounts 

IA-2(4) Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

Local Access To Non-Privileged Accounts 

IA-2(6) Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

Network Access To Privileged Accounts -

Separate Device 

IA-2(7) Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

Network Access To Non-Privileged Accounts -

Separate Device 

IA-2(11) Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

Remote Access - Separate Device

FIA_UAU.6 User Authentication

Re-Authenticating

IA-11 Re-authentication

FIA_UAU.7 User Authentication

Protected Authentication Feedback

IA-6 Authenticator Feedback

FIA_UID.1 User Identification

Timing of Identification

AC-14 Permitted Actions without Identification or 

Authentication

IA-2 Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

IA-8 Identification and Authentication (NonOrganizational Users)

FIA_UID.2 User Identification

User Identification Before Any Action

AC-14 Permitted Actions without Identification or 

Authentication

IA-2 Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

IA-8 Identification and Authentication (NonOrganizational Users)

FIA_USB.1 User-Subject Binding

User-Subject Binding

AC-16(3) Security Attributes

Maintenance Of Attribute Associations By 

Information System

FMT_MOF.1 Management of Functions in TSF

Management of Security Functions 

Behavior 

AC-3(7) Access Enforcement

Role-Based Access Control 

AC-6 Least Privilege

AC-6(1) Least Privilege

Authorize Access To Security Functions

FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes

Management of Security Attributes

AC-6 Least Privilege

AC-6(1) Least Privilege

Authorize Access To Security Functions

AC-16(2) Security Attributes

Attribute Value Changes By Authorized 

Individuals

AC-16(4) Security Attributes

Association of Attributes By Authorized 

Individuals

AC-16(10) Security Attributes

Attribute Configuration By Authorized 

Individuals

APPENDIX H PAGE H-20
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________________________________________________________________________________________________

ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

FMT_MSA.2 Management of Security Attributes

Secure Security Attributes

AC-16 Security Attributes

CM-6 Configuration Settings

SI-10 Information Input Validation

FMT_MSA.3 Management of Security Attributes

Static Attribute Initialization

No Mapping.

FMT_MSA.4 Management of Security Attributes

Security Attribute Value Inheritance 

No Mapping.

FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data

Management of TSF Data

AC-3(7) Access Enforcement

Role-Based Access Control

AC-6 Least Privilege

AC-6(1) Least Privilege

Authorize Access To Security Functions

AU-6(7) Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting

Permitted Actions

AU-9(4) Protection of Audit Information

Access By Subset of Privileged Users

FMT_MTD.2 Management of TSF Data

Management of Limits on TSF Data

AC-3(7) Access Enforcement

Role-based Access Control

AC-6 Least Privilege

AC-6(1) Least Privilege

Authorize Access To Security Functions

FMT_MTD.3 Management of TSF Data

Secure TSF Data

SI-10 Information Input Validation

FMT_REV.1 Revocation

Revocation

AC-3(7) Access Enforcement

Rose-based Access Control

AC-3(8) Access Enforcement

Revocation Of Access Authorizations

AC-6 Least Privilege

AC-6(1) Least Privilege

Authorize Access To Security Functions 

FMT_SAE.1 Security Attribute Expiration

Time-Limited Authorization

AC-3(7) Access Enforcement

Role-based Access Control

AC-6 Least Privilege

AC-6(1) Least Privilege

Authorize Access To Security Functions

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management 

Functions

Specification of Management 

Functions

No Mapping.

FMT_SMR.1 Security Management Roles

Security Roles

AC-2(7) Account Management

Role-based schemes

AC-3(7) Access Enforcement

Role-Based Access Control

AC-5 Separation of Duties

AC-6 Least Privilege

FMT_SMR.2 Security Management Roles

Restrictions on Security Roles

AC-2(7) Account Management

Role-based schemes

AC-3(7) Access Enforcement

Role-Based Access Control

AC-5 Separation of Duties

APPENDIX H PAGE H-21
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 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

AC-6 Least Privilege

FMT_SMR.3 Security Management Roles

Assuming Roles

AC-6(1) Least Privilege

Authorized Access to Security Functions

AC-6(2) Least Privilege

Non-Privileged Access For Nonsecurity

Functions

FPR_ANO.1 Anonymity

Anonymity

No Mapping.

FPR_ANO.2 Anonymity

Anonymity Without Soliciting 

Information

No Mapping.

FPR_PSE.1 Pseudonymity

Pseudonymity

No Mapping.

FPR_PSE.2 Pseudonymity

Reversible Pseudonymity

No Mapping.

FPR_PSE.3 Pseudonymity

Alias Pseudonymity

No Mapping.

FPR_UNL.1 Unlinkability

Unlinkability

No Mapping.

FPR_UNO.1 Unobservability

Unobservability

No Mapping.

FPR_UNO.2 Unobservability

Allocation of Information Impacting 

Unobservability

No Mapping.

FPR_UNO.3 Unobservability

Unobservability Without Soliciting 

Information

No Mapping.

FPR_UNO.4 Unobservability

Authorized User Observability

No Mapping.

FPT_FLS.1 Fail Secure

Failure with Preservation of Secure 

State

SC-7(18) Boundary Protection

Fail Secure

SC-24 Fail in Known State

FPT_ITA.1 Availability of Exported TSF Data

Inter-TSF Availability within a Defined 

Availability Metric

CP-10 Information System Recovery And 

Reconstitution

Restore Within Time Period

SC-5 Denial of Service Protection

SC-5(2) Denial of Service Protection

Excess Capacity/Bandwidth/Redundancy

SC-5(3) Denial of Service Protection

Detection/Monitoring

FPT_ITC.1 Confidentiality of Exported TSF 

Data

Inter-TSF Confidentiality During 

Transmission

SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1) Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

Cryptographic Or Alternate Physical Protection 

FPT_ITI.1 Integrity of Exported TSF Data

Inter-TSF Detection of Modification

SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1) Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

Cryptographic Or Alternate Physical Protection 

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

SI-7(1) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Integrity Scans 

APPENDIX H PAGE H-22
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 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

SI-7(5) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Automated Response to Integrity Violations

SI-7(6) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Cryptographic Protection

FPT_ITI.2 Integrity of Exported TSF Data

Inter-TSF Detection and Correction of 

Modification

SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1) Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

Cryptographic Or Alternate Physical Protection 

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

SI-7(1) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Integrity Scans 

SI-7(5) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Automated Response to Integrity Violations

SI-7(6) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Cryptographic Protection

FPT_ITT.1 Internal TOE TSF Data Transfer

Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer 

Protection

SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1) Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

Cryptographic Or Alternate Physical Protection

FPT_ITT.2 Internal TOE TSF Data Transfer

TSF Data Transfer Separation

AC-4(21) Information Flow Enforcement

Physical / Logical Separation Of Information 

Flows

SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1) Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

Cryptographic Or Alternate Physical Protection

FPT_ITT.3 Internal TOE TSF Data Transfer

TSF Data Integrity Monitoring

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

SI-7(1) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Integrity Scans 

SI-7(5) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Automated Response to Integrity Violations

SI-7(6) Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

Cryptographic Protection

FPT_PHP.1 TSF Physical Protection

Passive Detection of Physical Attack

PE-3(5) Physical Access Control

Tamper Protection 

PE-6(2) Monitoring Physical Access

Automated Intrusion Recognition / Responses

SA-18 Tamper Resistance and Detection

FPT_PHP.2 TSF Physical Protection

Notification of Physical Attack

PE-3(5) Physical Access Control

Tamper Protection 

PE-6(2) Monitoring Physical Access

Automated Intrusion Recognition / Responses

SA-18 Tamper Resistance and Detection

FPT_PHP.3 TSF Physical Protection

Resistance to Physical Attack

PE-3(5) Physical Access Control

Tamper Protection 

APPENDIX H PAGE H-23
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 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

SA-18 Tamper Resistance and Detection

FPT_RCV.1 Trusted Recovery

Manual Recovery

CP-10 Information System Recovery and 

Reconstitution

CP-12 Safe Mode

FPT_RCV.2 Trusted Recovery

Automated Recovery

CP-10 Information System Recovery and 

Reconstitution

CP-12 Safe Mode

FPT_RCV.3 Trusted Recovery

Automated Recovery Without Undue 

Loss

CP-10 Information System Recovery and 

Reconstitution

CP-12 Safe Mode

FPT_RCV.4 Trusted Recovery

Function Recovery

SI-6 Security Function Verification 

SI-10(3) Information Input Validation

Predictable Behavior

SC-24 Fail in Known State

FPT_RPL.1 Replay Detection

Replay Detection

IA-2(8) Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

Network Access To Privileged Accounts -

Replay Resistant

IA-2(9) Identification and Authentication 

(Organizational Users)

Network Access To Non-Privileged Accounts -

Replay Resistant 

SC-23 Session Authenticity 

SI-3(9) Malicious Code Protection

Authenticate Remote Commands

FPT_SSP.1 State Synchrony Protocol

Simple Trusted Acknowledgement

No Mapping.

FPT_SSP.2 State Synchrony Protocol

Mutual Trusted Acknowledgement

No Mapping.

FPT_STM.1 Time Stamps

Reliable Time Stamps

AU-8 Time Stamps

FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF TSF Data Consistency

Inter-TSF Basic Data Consistency

AC-16(7) Security Attributes | Consistent Attribute 

Interpretation

AC-16(8) Security Attributes

Association Techniques/Technologies

FPT_TEE.1 Testing of External Entities

Testing of External Entities

SI-6 Security Functionality Verification

FPT_TRC.1 Internal TOE TSF Data Replication 

Consistency

Internal TSF Consistency

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

FPT_TST.1 TSF Self-Test

TSF Testing

SI-6 Security Functionality Verification

SI-7 Software, Firmware, and Information 

Integrity

FRU_FLT.1 Fault Tolerance

Degraded Fault Tolerance

AU-15 Alternate Audit Capability

CP-11 Alternate Communications Protocols

SC-24 Fail in Known State

SI-13 Predictable Failure Prevention

SI-13(1) Predictable Failure Prevention

Transferring Component Responsibilities

APPENDIX H PAGE H-24
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 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

SI-13(2) Predictable Failure Prevention

Time Limit on Process Execution Without 

Supervision

SI-13(3) Predictable Failure Prevention

Manual Transfer Between Components

SI-13(4) Predictable Failure Prevention

Standby Component Installation/Notification

SI-13(5) Predictable Failure Prevention

Failover Capability

FRU_FLT.2 Fault Tolerance

Limited Fault Tolerance

AU-15 Alternate Audit Capability

CP-11 Alternate Communications Protocols

SC-24 Fail in Known State

SI-13 Predictable Failure Prevention

SI-13(1) Predictable Failure Prevention

Transferring Component Responsibilities

SI-13(2) Predictable Failure Prevention

Time Limit on Process Execution Without 

Supervision

SI-13(3) Predictable Failure Prevention

Manual Transfer Between Components

SI-13(4) Predictable Failure Prevention

Standby Component Installation/Notification

SI-13(5) Predictable Failure Prevention

Failover Capability

FRU_PRS.1 Priority of Service

Limited Priority of Service

SC-6 Resource Availability

FRU_PRS.2 Priority of Service

Full Priority of Service

SC-6 Resource Availability

FRU_RSA.1 Resource Allocation

Maximum Quotas

SC-6 Resource Availability

FRU_RSA.2 Resource Allocation

Minimum and Maximum Quotas

SC-6 Resource Availability

FTA_LSA.1 Limitation on Scope of Selectable 

Attributes

Limitation on Scope of Selectable 

Attributes

AC-2(6) Account Management

Dynamic Privilege Management

AC-2(11) Account Management

Usage Conditions

FTA_MCS.1 Limitation on Multiple Concurrent 

Sessions

Basic Limitation on Multiple 

Concurrent Sessions

AC-10 Concurrent Session Control

FTA_MCS.2 Limitation on Multiple Concurrent 

Sessions

Per-User Limitation on Multiple 

Concurrent Sessions

AC-10 Concurrent Session Control

FTA_SSL.1 Session Locking and Termination

TSF-Initiated Session Locking

AC-11 Session Lock

AC-11(1) Session Lock

Pattern-Hiding Displays

FTA_SSL.2 Session Locking and Termination

User-Initiated Locking

AC-11 Session Lock

AC-11(1) Session Lock

Pattern-Hiding Displays

APPENDIX H PAGE H-25
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________________________________________________________________________________________________

ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

FTA_SSL.3 Session Locking and Termination

TSF-Initiated Termination

AC-12 Session Termination

SC-10 Network Disconnect

FTA_SSL.4 Session Locking and Termination

User-Initiated Termination

AC-12(1) Session Termination

User-Initiated Logouts / Message Displays 

FTA_TAB.1 TOE Access Banners

Default TOE Access Banners

AC-8 System Use Notification

FTA_TAH.1 TOE Access History

TOE Access History

AC-9 Previous Login (Access) Notification

AC-9(1) Previous Login (Access) Notification

Unsuccessful Logons 

FTA_TSE.1 TOE Session Establishment

TOE Session Establishment

AC-2(11) Account Management

Usage Conditions

FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

IA-3(1) Device Identification and Authentication

Cryptographic Bidirectional Authentication

SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1) Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection

FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path

Trusted Path

SC-11 Trusted Path

Assurance Requirements

ASE_INT.1

EAL1

EAL2

EAL3

EAL4

EAL5

EAL6

EAL7

ST Introduction

ST Introduction

SA-4 Acquisition Process

ASE_CCL.1

EAL1

EAL2

EAL3

EAL4

EAL5

EAL6

EAL7

Conformance Claims

Conformance Claims

PL-2 System Security Plan

SA-4(7) Acquisition Process

NIAP-Approved Protection Profiles

ASE_SPD.1

EAL1

EAL2

EAL3

EAL4

EAL5

EAL6

EAL7

Security Problem Definition

Security Problem Definition

PL-2 System Security Plan

SA-4 Acquisition Process

ASE_OBJ.1

EAL1

Security Objectives

Security Objectives for the Operational 

Environment

PL-2 System Security Plan

SA-4 Acquisition Process

ASE_OBJ.2

EAL2

EAL3

EAL4

EAL5

EAL6

EAL7

Security Objectives

Security Objectives

PL-2 System Security Plan

SA-4 Acquisition Process

APPENDIX H PAGE H-26
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________________________________________________________________________________________________

ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

ASE_ECD.1

EAL1

EAL2

EAL3

EAL4

EAL5

EAL6

EAL7

Extended Components Definition

Extended Components Definition

No Mapping.

ASE_REQ.1

EAL1

Security Requirements

Stated Security Requirements

PL-2 System Security Plan

SA-4 Acquisition Process

ASE_REQ.2

EAL2

EAL3

EAL4

EAL5

EAL6

EAL7

Security Requirements

Derived Security Requirements

PL-2 System Security Plan

SA-4 Acquisition Process

ASE_TSS.1

EAL1

EAL2

EAL3

EAL4

EAL5

EAL6

EAL7

TOE Summary Specification

TOE Summary Specification

PL-2 System Security Plan

SA-4(1) Acquisition Process

Functional Properties of Security Controls

ASE_TSS.2 TOE Summary Specification

TOE Summary Specification with 

Architectural Design Summary

PL-2 System Security Plan

SA-4(1) Acquisition Process

Functional Properties of Security Controls

SA-4(2) Acquisition Process

Design / Implementation Information For 

Security Controls

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

ADV_ARC.1

EAL2

EAL3

EAL4

EAL5

EAL6

EAL7

Security Architecture

Security Architecture Description

AC-25 Reference Monitor

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

SA-18 Tamper Resistance and Detection

SC-3 Security Function Isolation

SC-3(1) Security Function Isolation

Hardware Separation

SC-3(2) Security Function Isolation

Minimize Nonsecurity Functionality 

SC-41 Process Isolation

ADV_FSP.1

EAL1

Functional Specification

Basic Functional Specification

SA-4(1) Acquisition Process

Functional Properties of Security Controls

SA-4(2) Acquisition Process

Design / Implementation Information for 

Security Controls 

ADV_FSP.2

EAL2

Functional Specification

Security-Enforcing Functional 

Specification

SA-4(1) Acquisition Process

Functional Properties of Security Controls

SA-4(2) Acquisition Process

Design / Implementation Information for 

Security Controls 

APPENDIX H PAGE H-27
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 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

SA-17(4) Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

Informal Correspondence

ADV_FSP.3

EAL3

Functional Specification

Functional Specification With 

Complete Summary

SA-4(1) Acquisition Process

Functional Properties of Security Controls

SA-4(2) Acquisition Process

Design / Implementation Information for 

Security Controls 

SA-17(4) Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

Informal Correspondence

ADV_FSP.4

EAL4

Functional Specification

Complete Functional Specification

SA-4(1) Acquisition Process

Functional Properties of Security Controls

SA-4(2) Acquisition Process

Design / Implementation Information for 

Security Controls 

SA-17(4) Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

Informal Correspondence

ADV_FSP.5

EAL5

EAL6

Functional Specification

Complete Semi-Formal Functional 

Specification with Additional Error 

Information

SA-4(1) Acquisition Process

Functional Properties of Security Controls

SA-4(2) Acquisition Process

Design / Implementation Information for 

Security Controls

SA-17(4) Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

Informal Correspondence

ADV_FSP.6

EAL7

Functional Specification

Complete Semi-Formal Functional 

Specification with Additional Formal 

Specification

SA-4(1) Acquisition Process

Functional Properties of Security Controls

SA-4(2) Acquisition Process

Design / Implementation Information for 

Security Controls

SA-17(3) Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

Formal Correspondence

SA-17(4) Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

Informal Correspondence

ADV_IMP.1

EAL4

EAL5

Implementation Representation

Implementation Representation of the 

TSF

SA-4(2) Acquisition Process

Design / Implementation Information for 

Security Controls

ADV_IMP.2

EAL6

EAL7

Implementation Representation

Complete Mapping of the 

Implementation Representation of the 

TSF

SA-4(2) Acquisition Process

Design / Implementation Information for 

Security Controls

SA-17(3) Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

Formal Correspondence 

ADV_INT.1 TSF Internals

Well-Structured Subset of TSF 

Internals

SA-8 Security Engineering Principles

SC-3(3) Security Function Isolation

Minimize Nonsecurity Functionality

SC-3(4) Security Function Isolation

Module Coupling and Cohesiveness

SC-3(5) Security Function Isolation

Layered Structures

APPENDIX H PAGE H-28
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________________________________________________________________________________________________

ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

ADV_INT.2

EAL5

TSF Internals

Well-Structured Internals

SA-8 Security Engineering Principles

SC-3(3) Security Function Isolation

Minimize Nonsecurity Functionality

SC-3(4) Security Function Isolation

Module Coupling and Cohesiveness

SC-3(5) Security Function Isolation

Layered Structures

ADV_INT.3

EAL6

EAL7

TSF Internals

Minimally Complex Internals

SA-8 Security Engineering Principles

SA-17(5) Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

Conceptually Simple Design

SC-3(3) Security Function Isolation

Minimize Nonsecurity

Functionality 

SC-3(4) Security Function Isolation

Module Coupling and Cohesiveness

SC-3(5) Security Function Isolation

Layered Structures

AC-25 Reference Monitor

ADV_SPM.1

EAL6

EAL7

Security Policy Modeling

Formal TOE Security Policy Model

SA-17(1) Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

Formal Policy Model

SA-17(3) Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

Formal Correspondence

ADV_TDS.1

EAL2

TOE Design

Basic Design

SA-4(2) Acquisition Process

Design / Implementation Information for 

Security Controls

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

ADV_TDS.2

EAL3

TOE Design

Architectural Design

SA-4(2) Acquisition Process

Design / Implementation Information for 

Security Controls

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

ADV_TDS.3

EAL4

TOE Design

Basic Modular Design

SA-4(2) Acquisition Process

Design / Implementation Information for 

Security Controls

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

ADV_TDS.4

EAL5

TOE Design

Semiformal Modular Design

SA-4(2) Acquisition Process

Design / Implementation Information for 

Security Controls

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

SA-17(2) Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

Security Relevant Components

SA-17(4) Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

Informal Correspondence

APPENDIX H PAGE H-29
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 and Organizations

________________________________________________________________________________________________

ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

ADV_TDS.5

EAL6

TOE Design

Complete Semiformal Modular Design

SA-4(2) Acquisition Process

Design / Implementation Information for 

Security Controls

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

SA-17(2) Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

Security Relevant Components

SA-17(4) Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

Informal Correspondence

ADV_TDS.6

EAL7

TOE Design

Complete Semiformal Modular Design 

with Formal High-Level Design 

Presentation

SA-4(2) Acquisition Process

Design / Implementation Information for 

Security Controls

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

SA-17(2) Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

Security Relevant Components

SA-17(3) Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

Formal Correspondence

SA-17(4) Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

Informal Correspondence

AGD_OPE.1

EAL1

EAL2

EAL3

EAL4

EAL5

EAL6

EAL7

Operational User Guidance

Operational User Guidance

SA-5 Information System Documentation

AGD_PRE.1

EAL1

EAL2

EAL3

EAL4

EAL5

EAL6

EAL7

Preparative Procedures

Preparative Procedures

SA-5 Information System Documentation

ALC_CMC.1

EAL1

CM Capabilities

Labeling of the TOE

CM-9 Configuration Management Plan

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management

ALC_CMC.2

EAL2

CM Capabilities

Use of a CM System

CM-9 Configuration Management Plan

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management

ALC_CMC.3

EAL3

CM Capabilities

Authorization Controls

CM-3 Configuration Change Control

CM-9 Configuration Management Plan

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management

ALC_CMC.4

EAL4

EAL5

CM Capabilities

Production Support, Acceptance 

Procedures, and Automation

CM-3 Configuration Change Control

CM-3(1) Configuration Change Control

Automated Document / Notification / 

Prohibition of Changes 

CM-3(3) Configuration Change Control

Automated Change Implementation 

CM-9 Configuration Management Plan

APPENDIX H PAGE H-30
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________________________________________________________________________________________________

ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management

ALC_CMC.5

EAL6

EAL7

CM Capabilities

Advanced Support

CM-3 Configuration Change Control

CM-3(1) Configuration Change Control

Automated Document / Notification / 

Prohibition of Changes 

CM-3(2) Configuration Change Control

Test / Validate / Document Changes 

CM-3(3) Configuration Change Control

Automated mechanisms to field and deploy 

CM-9 Configuration Management Plan

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management

ALC_CMS.1

EAL1

CM Scope

TOE CM Coverage

CM-9 Configuration Management Plan

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management

ALC_CMS.2

EAL2

CM Scope

Parts of the TOE CM Coverage

CM-9 Configuration Management Plan

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management

ALC_CMS.3

EAL3

CM Scope

Implementation Representation CM 

Coverage

CM-9 Configuration Management Plan

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management

ALC_CMS.4

EAL4

CM Scope

Problem Tracking CM Coverage

CM-9 Configuration Management Plan

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management

ALC_CMS.5

EAL5

EAL6

EAL7

CM Scope

Development Tools CM Coverage

CM-9 Configuration Management Plan

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management

ALC_DEL.1

EAL2

EAL3

EAL4

EAL5

EAL6

EAL7

Delivery

Delivery Procedures

MP-5 Media Transport

SA-10(1) Developer Configuration Management

Software / Firmware Integrity Verification

SA-10(6) Developer Configuration Management

Trusted Distribution

SA-18 Tamper Resistance and Detection

SA-19 Component Authenticity 

ALC_DVS.1

EAL3

EAL4

EAL5

Development Security

Identification of Security Measures

SA-1 System and Services Acquisition Policy 

and Procedures

SA-3 System Development Lifecycle

SA-12 Supply Chain Protection

ALC_DVS.2

EAL6

EAL7

Development Security

Sufficiency of Security Measures

CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change

SA-3 System Development Lifecycle

SA-12 Supply Chain Protection

ALC_FLR.1 Flaw Remediation

Basic Flaw Remediation

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management

SA-11 Developer Security Testing / Evaluation

SI-2 Flaw Remediation

ALC_FLR.2 Flaw Remediation

Flaw Reporting Procedures

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management

SA-11 Developer Security Testing / Evaluation

SI-2 Flaw Remediation

ALC_FLR.3 Flaw Remediation

Systematic Flaw Remediation

SA-10 Developer Configuration Management

SA-11 Developer Security Testing / Evaluation

SI-2 Flaw Remediation

APPENDIX H PAGE H-31
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________________________________________________________________________________________________

ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

ALC_LCD.1

EAL3

EAL4

EAL5

EAL6

Life-Cycle Definition

Developer Defined Life-Cycle Model

SA-3 System Development Life Cycle

SA-15 Development Process, Standards, and 

Tools

ALC_LCD.2

EAL7

Life-Cycle Definition

Measurable Life-Cycle Model

SA-3 System Development Life Cycle

SA-15 Development Process, Standards, and 

Tools

ALC_TAT.1

EAL4

Tools and Techniques

Well-Defined Development Tools

SA-15 Development Process, Standards, and 

Tools

ALC_TAT.2

EAL5

Tools and Techniques

Compliance with Implementation 

Standards

SA-15 Development Process, Standards, and 

Tools

ALC_TAT.3

EAL6

EAL7

Tools and Techniques

Compliance with Implementation 

Standards – All Parts

SA-15 Development Process, Standards, and 

Tools

ATE_COV.1

EAL2

Coverage

Evidence of Coverage

SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

SA-11(7) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Verify Scope of Testing / Evaluation

ATE_COV.2

EAL3

EAL4

EAL5

Coverage

Analysis of Coverage

SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

SA-11(7) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Verify Scope of Testing / Evaluation

ATE_COV.3

EAL6

EAL7

Coverage

Rigorous Analysis of Coverage

SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

SA-11(7) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Verify Scope of Testing / Evaluation

ATE_DPT.1

EAL3

Depth

Testing: Basic Design

SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

SA-11(7) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Verify Scope of Testing / Evaluation

ATE_DPT.2

EAL4

Depth

Testing: Security Enforcing Modules

SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

SA-11(7) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Verify Scope of Testing / Evaluation

ATE_DPT.3

EAL5

EAL6

Depth

Testing: Modular Design

SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

SA-11(7) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Verify Scope of Testing / Evaluation

ATE_DPT.4

EAL7

Depth

Testing: Implementation 

Representation

SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

SA-11(7) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Verify Scope of Testing / Evaluation

ATE_FUN.1

EAL2

EAL3

EAL4

EAL5

Functional Tests

Functional Testing

SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

ATE_FUN.2

EAL6

EAL7

Functional Tests

Ordered Functional Testing

SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

ATE_IND.1

EAL1

Independent Testing

Independent Testing – Conformance 

CA-2 Security Assessments

CA-2(1) Security Assessments

Independent Assessors

SA-11(3) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Independent Verification of Assessment Plans 

/ Evidence

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ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

ATE_IND.2

EAL2

EAL3

EAL4

EAL5

EAL6

Independent Testing

Independent Testing – Sample

CA-2 Security Assessments

CA-2(1) Security Assessments

Independent Assessors

SA-11(3) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Independent Verification of Assessment Plans 

/ Evidence

ATE_IND.3

EAL7

Independent Testing

Independent Testing – Complete

CA-2 Security Assessments

CA-2(1) Security Assessments

Independent Assessors

SA-11(3) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Independent Verification of Assessment Plans 

/ Evidence

AVA_VAN.1

EAL1

Vulnerability Analysis

Vulnerability Survey

CA-2(2) Security Assessments

Specialized Assessments

CA-8 Penetration Testing

RA-3 Risk Assessment

SA-11(2) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Threat And Vulnerability Analyses / Flaw 

Remediation

SA-11(5) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Penetration Testing

AVA_VAN.2

EAL2

EAL3

Vulnerability Analysis

Vulnerability Analysis

CA-2(2) Security Assessments

Specialized Assessments

CA-8 Penetration Testing

RA-3 Risk Assessment

SA-11(2) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Threat And Vulnerability Analyses / Flaw 

Remediation

SA-11(5) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Penetration Testing

AVA_VAN.3

EAL4

Vulnerability Analysis

Focused Vulnerability Analysis

CA-2(2) Security Assessments

Specialized Assessments 

CA-8 Penetration Testing

RA-3 Risk Assessment

SA-11( 2) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Threat And Vulnerability Analyses / Flaw 

Remediation

SA-11(5) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Penetration Testing

AVA_VAN.4

EAL5

Vulnerability Analysis

Methodical Vulnerability Analysis

CA-2(2) Security Assessments

Types of Assessments 

CA-8 Penetration Testing

RA-3 Risk Assessment

SA-11(2) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Threat And Vulnerability Analyses / Flaw 

Remediation

SA-11(5) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Penetration Testing

AVA_VAN.5

EAL6

EAL7

Vulnerability Analysis

Advanced Methodical Vulnerability 

Analysis

CA-2(2) Security Assessments

Types of Assessments 

CA-8 Penetration Testing

RA-3 Risk Assessment

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SA-11(2) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Threat And Vulnerability Analyses / Flaw 

Remediation

SA-11(5) Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

Penetration Testing

ACO_COR.1 Composition Rationale

Composition Rationale

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

ACO_DEV.1 Development Evidence

Functional Description

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

ACO_DEV.2 Development Evidence

Basic Evidence of Design

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

ACO_DEV.3 Development Evidence

Detailed Evidence of Design

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

ACO_REL.1 Reliance on Dependent Component

Basic Reliance Information

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

ACO_REL.2 Reliance on Dependent Component

Reliance Information

SA-17 Developer Security Architecture and 

Design

ACO_CTT.1 Composed TOE Testing

Interface Testing 

SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

ACO_CTT.2 Composed TOE Testing

Rigorous Interface Testing 

SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

ACO_VUL.1 Composition Vulnerability Analysis

Composition Vulnerability Review

CA-2 Security Assessments

CA-8 Penetration Testing

RA-3 Risk Assessment

SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

ACO_VUL.2 Composition Vulnerability Analysis

Composition Vulnerability Analysis

CA-2 Security Assessments

CA-8 Penetration Testing

RA-3 Risk Assessment

SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

ACO_VUL.3 Composition Vulnerability Analysis

Enhanced-Basic Composition 

Vulnerability Review

CA-2 Security Assessments

CA-8 Penetration Testing

RA-3 Risk Assessment

SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

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APPENDIX I

OVERLAY TEMPLATE

APPLYING TAILORING GUIDANCE FOR SPECIAL CONDITIONS OR COMMUNITY-WIDE USE116

rganizations may use the following template when developing tailored baselines using the 

concept of overlays.117 The template is provided as an example only—organizations may 

choose to use other formats or modify the format in this appendix based on organizational 

needs and the type of overlay being developed. The level of detail included in the overlay is at the 

discretion of the organization initiating the overlay but should be of sufficient breadth and depth 

to provide an appropriate rationale and justification for the resulting tailored baseline developed, 

including any risk-based decisions made during the overlay development process. Security 

control baseline tailoring using the concept of overlays results in security plans that are subject to 

approval by authorizing officials. The example template consists of eight sections:

• Identification;

• Overlay Characteristics;

• Applicability;

• Overlay Summary;

• Detailed Overlay Control Specifications;

• Tailoring Considerations;

• Definitions; and

• Additional Information or Instructions.

How Overlays Can Be Used

Within the Risk Management Framework (RMF), overlays are implemented as part of the 

tailoring process after the completion of an initial security categorization process described in 

Section 3.1 and any organization-specific guidance. The security categorization process results in 

the determination of an impact level of the information system, and is subsequently used to select 

an initial set of security controls from one of the security control baselines in Appendix D.118

After the initial set of security controls is identified, organizations initiate the tailoring process to 

modify and align the controls more closely with the specific conditions within the organizations. 

Overlays provide tailoring guidance from a community-wide perspective to address specialized 

requirements, missions/business functions, technologies, or environments of operation. Overlays 

provide uniformity and efficiency of security control selection by presenting tailoring options 

116 Tailored baselines produced using the concept of overlays can be published independently in a variety of venues and 

publications including, for example, OMB policies, CNSS Instructions, NIST Special Publications, industry standards, 

and sector-specific guidance. As part of the overlay initiative, the previous guidance in Appendix I regarding industrial 

and process control system security will be transferred to NIST Special Publication 800-82.

117 While organizations are encouraged to use the overlay concept to tailor security control baselines, generating widely 

divergent overlays on the same topic may prove to be counterproductive. The overlay concept is most effective when 

communities of interest work together to create consensus-based overlays that are not duplicative.

118 CNSS Instruction 1253 provides security categorization guidance and security control baselines for national security 

systems. 

O

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developed by security experts and other subject matter experts to information system owners 

responsible for implementing and maintaining such systems.

There is a considerable range of options that can be used to construct overlays, depending on the 

specificity desired by the overlay developers. Some overlays may be very specific with respect to 

the hardware, firmware, and software that form the key components the information system and 

the environment in which the system operates. Other overlays may be more abstract in order to be 

applicable to a large class of information systems that may be deployed in different environments. 

The example template described below can be used for any level of specificity on this continuum 

of potential options for overlays.

Overlays that provide greater specificity are typically developed by organizations with authority 

over the information system owners and environments of operation. Organizations decide on the

appropriate tailoring actions for the selected baseline security controls as described in Section 3.2.

Many of the variables and conditions that qualify the overlay for use on a specific information 

system are made explicit to ensure consistency when applying the overlay. Overlays that provide 

less specificity can also be developed by security and subject matter experts for application to 

large classes of information systems or in situations where there is less than full knowledge about 

the specific implementation details related to the system. Less specific overlays may require 

additional tailoring to customize the set of security controls for the specific information system. 

These overlays leave many of the assignment and selection statements in the security controls 

(i.e., the variable portion of the controls) to be completed by the organization that owns and 

operates the information system. The eight sections comprising the overlay are described below.

Identification

Organizations identify the overlay by providing: (i) a unique name for the overlay; (ii) a version 

number and date; (iii) the version of NIST Special Publication 800-53 used to create the overlay; 

(iv) other documentation used to create the overlay; (v) author or authoring group and point of 

contact; and (vi) type of organizational approval received. Organizations define how long the 

overlay is to be in effect and any events that may trigger an update to the overlay other than 

changes to NIST Special Publication 800-53 or organization-specific security guidance. If there 

are no unique events that can trigger an update for the overlay, this section provides that notation.

Overlay Characteristics

Organizations describe the characteristics that define the intended use of the overlay in order to 

help potential users select the most appropriate overlay for their missions/business functions. This 

may include, for example, a description of: (i) the environment in which the information system

will be used (e.g., inside a guarded building within the continental United States, in an unmanned 

space vehicle, while traveling for business to a foreign country that is known for attempting to 

gain access to sensitive or classified information, or in a mobile vehicle that is in close proximity 

to hostile entities); (ii) the type of information that will be processed, stored, or transmitted (e.g.,

personal identity and authentication information, financial management information, facilities, 

fleet, and equipment management information, defense and national security information, system 

development information); (iii) the functionality within the information system or the type of

system (e.g., standalone system, industrial/process control system, or cross-domain system); and 

(iv) other characteristics related to the overlay that help protect organizational missions/business 

functions, information systems, information, or individuals from a specific set of threats that may 

not be addressed by the assumptions described in Chapter Three.

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Applicability

Organizations provide criteria to assist potential users of the overlay in determining whether or 

not the overlay applies to a particular information system or environment of operation. Typical 

formats include, for example, a list of questions or a decision tree based on the description of the 

characteristics of the information system (including associated applications) and its environment 

of operation at the level of specificity appropriate to the overlay.

Overlay Summary

Organizations provide a brief summary of the salient characteristics of the overlay. This summary 

may include, for example: (i) the security controls and control enhancements that are affected by

the overlay; (ii) an indication of which controls/enhancements are selected or not selected based 

on the characteristics and assumptions in the overlay, the tailoring guidance provided in Section 

3.2, or any organization-specific guidance; (iii) the selected controls/enhancements including an 

overview of new supplemental guidance and parameter values; and (iv) references to applicable

laws, Executive Orders, directives, instructions, regulations, policies, or standards. 

Detailed Overlay Control Specifications

Organizations provide a comprehensive expression of the security controls/control enhancements 

in the overlay as part of the tailoring process. This may include, for example: (i) justification for 

selecting or not selecting a specific security control/control enhancement; (ii) modifications to the 

supplemental guidance or the addition of new supplemental guidance for the security controls and 

control enhancements to address the characteristics of the overlay and the environments in which 

the overlay is intended to operate; (iii) unique parameter values for security control selection or 

assignment statements; (iv) specific statutory and/or regulatory requirements (above and beyond 

FISMA) that are met by a security control or control enhancement; (v) recommendations for 

compensating controls, as appropriate; and (vi) guidance that extends the basic capability of the 

control/enhancement by specifying additional functionality, altering the strength of mechanism, 

or adding or limiting implementation options.

Tailoring Considerations

Organizations provide information to information system owners and authorizing officials to 

consider during the tailoring process when determining the set of security controls applicable to 

their specific information systems. This is especially important for overlays that are used in an 

environment of operation different from the one assumed by the security control baselines (as 

defined in Section 3.1). In addition, organizations can provide guidance on the use of multiple 

overlays applied to a security control baseline and address any potential conflicts that may arise 

between overlay specifications and baseline controls.

Definitions

Organizations provide any terms and associated definitions that are unique and relevant to the 

overlay. The terms and definitions are listed in alphabetical order. If there are no unique terms or 

definitions for the overlay, this is stated in this section.

Additional Information or Instructions 

Organizations provide any additional information or instructions relevant to the overlay not 

covered in the previous sections.

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APPENDIX J

PRIVACY CONTROL CATALOG 

PRIVACY CONTROLS, ENHANCEMENTS, AND SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE

he need to protect an individual's privacy is as important today as it was in 1974 when the 

Privacy Act first sought to balance the government's need to collect information from an 

individual with a citizen's right to be notified as to how that information was being used, 

collected, maintained, and disposed of after the requisite period of use. These concerns are also 

shared in the private sector, where healthcare, financial, and other services continue to be 

delivered via the web with increasingly higher levels of personalization. The proliferation of 

social media, Smart Grid, mobile, and cloud computing, as well as the transition from structured 

to unstructured data and metadata environments, have added significant complexities and 

challenges for federal organizations in safeguarding privacy. These challenges extend well 

beyond the traditional information technology security view of protecting privacy which focused 

primarily on ensuring confidentiality. Now there are greater implications with respect to 

controlling the integrity of an individual's information, and with ensuring that an individual's 

information is available on demand. The challenging landscape requires federal organizations to 

expand their view of privacy, in order to meet citizen expectations of privacy that go beyond 

information security.

Privacy, with respect to personally identifiable information (PII),

119 is a core value that can be 

obtained only with appropriate legislation, policies, procedures, and associated controls to ensure 

compliance with requirements. Protecting the privacy of individuals and their PII that is collected, 

used, maintained, shared, and disposed of by programs and information systems, is a fundamental 

responsibility of federal organizations. Privacy also involves each individual’s right to decide 

when and whether to share personal information, how much information to share, and the 

particular circumstances under which that information can be shared. In today’s digital world, 

effective privacy for individuals depends on the safeguards employed within the information 

systems that are processing, storing, and transmitting PII and the environments in which those 

systems operate. Organizations cannot have effective privacy without a basic foundation of 

information security. Privacy is more than security, however, and includes, for example, the

principles of transparency, notice, and choice.

This appendix provides a structured set of controls for protecting privacy and serves as a roadmap 

for organizations to use in identifying and implementing privacy controls concerning the entire 

life cycle of PII, whether in paper or electronic form. The controls focus on information privacy 

as a value distinct from, but highly interrelated with, information security. Privacy controls are 

119 OMB Memorandum 07-16 defines PII as information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s 

identity such as their name, social security number, biometric records, etc., alone, or when combined with other 

personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, 

mother’s maiden name, etc. OMB Memorandum 10-22 further states that “the definition of PII is not anchored to any 

single category of information or technology. Rather, it requires a case-by-case assessment of the specific risk that an 

individual can be identified by examining the context of use and combination of data elements. In performing this 

assessment, it is important for agencies to recognize that non-PII can become PII, whenever additional information is 

made publicly available, in any medium and from any source that, when combined with other available information, 

could be used to identify an individual.” NIST Special Publication 800-122 also includes a definition of PII that differs 

from this appendix because it was focused on the security objective of confidentiality and not privacy in the broad 

sense. Organizational definitions of PII may vary based on the consideration of additional regulatory requirements. The 

privacy controls in this appendix apply regardless of the definition of PII by organizations.

T

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the administrative, technical, and physical safeguards employed within organizations to protect 

and ensure the proper handling of PII.120 Organizations may also engage in activities that do not 

involve the collection and use of PII, but may nevertheless raise privacy concerns and associated 

risk. The privacy controls are equally applicable to those activities and can be used to analyze the 

privacy risk and mitigate such risk when necessary.

The privacy controls in this appendix are based on the Fair Information Practice Principles 

(FIPPs)121 embodied in the Privacy Act of 1974, Section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002, 

and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) policies. The FIPPs are designed to build public 

trust in the privacy practices of organizations and to help organizations avoid tangible costs and 

intangible damages from privacy incidents. There are eight privacy control families, each aligning 

with one of the FIPPs. The privacy families can be implemented at the organization, department, 

agency, component, office, program, or information system level, under the leadership and 

oversight of the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO)122 and 

in coordination with the Chief Information Security Officer, Chief Information Officer, program 

officials, legal counsel, and others as appropriate. Table J-1 provides a summary of the privacy 

controls by family in the privacy control catalog. 

TABLE J-1: SUMMARY OF PRIVACY CONTROLS BY FAMILY

ID PRIVACY CONTROLS

AP Authority and Purpose

AP-1 Authority to Collect

AP-2 Purpose Specification

AR Accountability, Audit, and Risk Management

AR-1 Governance and Privacy Program

AR-2 Privacy Impact and Risk Assessment

AR-3 Privacy Requirements for Contractors and Service Providers

AR-4 Privacy Monitoring and Auditing

AR-5 Privacy Awareness and Training

AR-6 Privacy Reporting

AR-7 Privacy-Enhanced System Design and Development

AR-8 Accounting of Disclosures

DI Data Quality and Integrity

DI-1 Data Quality

DI-2 Data Integrity and Data Integrity Board

DM Data Minimization and Retention

DM-1 Minimization of Personally Identifiable Information

DM-2 Data Retention and Disposal

120 In 2010, the Federal CIO Council Privacy Committee issued a framework for designing and implementing a privacy 

program entitled Best Practices: Elements of a Federal Privacy Program (Elements White Paper). The privacy controls 

in this appendix mirror a number of the elements included in the paper. Organizations can use the privacy controls and 

the guidance in the paper to develop an organization-wide privacy program or enhance an already existing program. 

121 The FIPPs are widely accepted in the United States and internationally as a general framework for privacy and are 

reflected in other federal and international laws and policies. In a number of organizations, FIPPs serve as the basis for 

analyzing privacy risks and determining appropriate mitigation strategies. The Federal Enterprise Architecture Security 

and Privacy Profile (FEA-SPP) also provided information and materials in development of the privacy controls.

122 All federal agencies and departments designate an SAOP/CPO as the senior organizational official with the overall 

organization-wide responsibility for information privacy issues. OMB Memorandum 05-08 provides guidance for the 

designation of SAOPs/CPOs. The term SAOP/CPO as used in this appendix means an organization’s senior privacy 

leader, whose job title may vary from organization to organization.

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ID PRIVACY CONTROLS

DM-3 Minimization of PII Used in Testing, Training, and Research

IP Individual Participation and Redress

IP-1 Consent

IP-2 Individual Access

IP-3 Redress

IP-4 Complaint Management

SE Security

SE-1 Inventory of Personally Identifiable Information

SE-2 Privacy Incident Response

TR Transparency

TR-1 Privacy Notice

TR-2 System of Records Notices and Privacy Act Statements

TR-3 Dissemination of Privacy Program Information

UL Use Limitation

UL-1 Internal Use

UL-2 Information Sharing with Third Parties

There is a strong similarity between the structure of the privacy controls in this appendix and the 

structure of the security controls in Appendices F and G. For example, the control AR-1 

(Governance and Privacy Program) requires organizations to develop privacy plans that can be 

implemented at the organizational or program level. These plans can also be used in conjunction 

with security plans to provide an opportunity for organizations to select the appropriate set of 

security and privacy controls in accordance with organizational mission/business requirements 

and the environments in which the organizations operate. Incorporating the fundamental concepts 

associated with managing information security risk helps to ensure that the employment of 

privacy controls is carried out in a cost-effective and risk-based manner while simultaneously 

meeting compliance requirements. Standardized privacy controls and assessment procedures

(developed to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls) will provide a more disciplined and 

structured approach for satisfying federal privacy requirements and demonstrating compliance 

with those requirements.

In summary, the Privacy Appendix achieves several important objectives. The appendix:

• Provides a structured set of privacy controls, based on best practices, that helps organizations 

comply with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, instructions, regulations, 

policies, standards, guidance, and organization-specific issuances;

• Establishes a linkage and relationship between privacy and security controls for purposes of 

enforcing respective privacy and security requirements that may overlap in concept and in 

implementation within federal information systems, programs, and organizations;

• Demonstrates the applicability of the NIST Risk Management Framework in the selection, 

implementation, assessment, and ongoing monitoring of privacy controls deployed in federal 

information systems, programs, and organizations; and

• Promotes closer cooperation between privacy and security officials within the federal 

government to help achieve the objectives of senior leaders/executives in enforcing the 

requirements in federal privacy legislation, policies, regulations, directives, standards, and 

guidance.

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HOW TO USE THIS APPENDIX

The privacy controls outlined in this publication are primarily for use by an organization’s Senior 

Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) when working with program managers, 

mission/business owners, information owners/stewards, Chief Information Officers, Chief Information 

Security Officers, information system developers/integrators, and risk executives to determine how 

best to incorporate effective privacy protections and practices (i.e., privacy controls) within 

organizational programs and information systems and the environments in which they operate. The 

privacy controls facilitate the organization’s efforts to comply with privacy requirements affecting those 

organizational programs and/or systems that collect, use, maintain, share, or dispose of personally 

identifiable information (PII) or other activities that raise privacy risks. While the security controls in 

Appendix F are allocated to the low, moderate, and high baselines in Appendix D, the privacy controls 

are selected and implemented based on the privacy requirements of organizations and the need to 

protect the PII of individuals collected and maintained by organizational information systems and 

programs, in accordance with federal privacy legislation, policies, directives, regulations, guidelines, and 

best practices.

Organizations analyze and apply each privacy control with respect to their distinct mission/business and 

operational needs based on their legal authorities and obligations. Implementation of the privacy 

controls may vary based upon this analysis (e.g., organizations that are defined as covered entities

pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act [HIPAA] may have additional 

requirements that are not specifically enumerated in this publication). This enables organizations to 

determine the information practices that are compliant with law and policy and those that may need 

review. It also enables organizations to tailor the privacy controls to meet their defined and specific 

needs at the organization level, mission/business process level, and information system level. 

Organizations with national security or law enforcement authorities take those authorities as well as 

privacy interests into account in determining how to apply the privacy controls in their operational 

environments. Similarly, organizations subject to the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical 

Efficiency Act (CIPSEA), implement the privacy controls consistent with that Act. All organizations 

implement the privacy controls consistent with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, subject to any 

exceptions and/or exemptions.

Privacy control enhancements described in Appendix J reflect best practices which organizations should 

strive to achieve, but are not mandatory. Organizations should decide when to apply control 

enhancements to support their particular missions/business functions. Specific overlays for privacy, 

developed in accordance with the guidance in Section 3.2 and Appendix I, can also be considered to 

facilitate the tailoring of the security control baselines in Appendix D with the requisite privacy controls 

to ensure that both security and privacy requirements can be satisfied by organizations. Many of the 

security controls in Appendix F provide the fundamental information protection for confidentiality, 

integrity, and availability within organizational information systems and the environments in which 

those systems operate—protection that is essential for strong and effective privacy.

Organizations document the agreed upon privacy controls to be implemented in organizational 

programs and information systems and the environments in which they operate. At the discretion of 

the implementing organization, privacy controls may be documented in a distinct privacy plan or 

incorporated into other risk management documents (e.g., system security plans). Organizations also 

establish appropriate assessment methodologies to determine the extent to which the privacy controls 

are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to 

meeting designated privacy requirements. Organizational assessments of privacy controls can be 

conducted either by the SAOP/CPO alone or jointly with the other organizational risk management 

offices including the information security office.

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Implementation Tip

• Select and implement privacy controls based on the privacy requirements of organizations and 

the need to protect the personally identifiable information (PII) of individuals collected and 

maintained by systems and programs.

• Coordinate privacy control selection and implementation with the organizational Risk Executive 

Function, mission/business owners, enterprise architects, Chief Information Officer, SAOP/CPO, 

and Chief Information Security Officer.

• View the privacy controls in Appendix J from the same perspective as the Program 

Management controls in Appendix G—that is, the controls are implemented for each 

organizational information system irrespective of the FIPS 199 categorization for that system.

• Select and implement the optional privacy control enhancements when there is a demonstrated 

need for additional privacy protection for individuals and PII.

• Apply the privacy controls consistent with any specific exceptions and exemptions included in 

legislation, Executive Orders, directives, policies, and regulations (e.g., law enforcement or 

national security considerations).

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FAMILY: AUTHORITY AND PURPOSE

This family ensures that organizations: (i) identify the legal bases that authorize a particular 

personally identifiable information (PII) collection or activity that impacts privacy; and (ii) specify in 

their notices the purpose(s) for which PII is collected.

AP-1 AUTHORITY TO COLLECT

Control: The organization determines and documents the legal authority that permits the collection, 

use, maintenance, and sharing of personally identifiable information (PII), either generally or in 

support of a specific program or information system need.

Supplemental Guidance: Before collecting PII, the organization determines whether the 

contemplated collection of PII is legally authorized. Program officials consult with the Senior 

Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) and legal counsel regarding the 

authority of any program or activity to collect PII. The authority to collect PII is documented in 

the System of Records Notice (SORN) and/or Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) or other 

applicable documentation such as Privacy Act Statements or Computer Matching Agreements. 

Related controls: AR-2, DM-1, TR-1, TR-2.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e); Section 208(c), E-Government Act of 

2002 (P.L. 107-347); OMB Circular A-130, Appendix I.

AP-2 PURPOSE SPECIFICATION

Control: The organization describes the purpose(s) for which personally identifiable information

(PII) is collected, used, maintained, and shared in its privacy notices.

Supplemental Guidance: Often, statutory language expressly authorizes specific collections and uses 

of PII. When statutory language is written broadly and thus subject to interpretation, organizations 

ensure, in consultation with the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer

(CPO) and legal counsel, that there is a close nexus between the general authorization and any 

specific collection of PII. Once the specific purposes have been identified, the purposes are clearly 

described in the related privacy compliance documentation, including but not limited to Privacy 

Impact Assessments (PIAs), System of Records Notices (SORNs), and Privacy Act Statements 

provided at the time of collection (e.g., on forms organizations use to collect PII). Further, in order 

to avoid unauthorized collections or uses of PII, personnel who handle PII receive training on the 

organizational authorities for collecting PII, authorized uses of PII, and on the contents of the 

notice. Related controls: AR-2, AR-4, AR-5, DM-1, DM-2, TR-1, TR-2, UL-1, UL-2.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e)(3)(A)-(B); Sections 208(b), (c), EGovernment Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347).

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FAMILY: ACCOUNTABILITY, AUDIT, AND RISK MANAGEMENT

This family enhances public confidence through effective controls for governance, monitoring, risk 

management, and assessment to demonstrate that organizations are complying with applicable 

privacy protection requirements and minimizing overall privacy risk.

AR-1 GOVERNANCE AND PRIVACY PROGRAM

Control: The organization: 

a. Appoints a Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO)

accountable for developing, implementing, and maintaining an organization-wide governance 

and privacy program to ensure compliance with all applicable laws and regulations regarding 

the collection, use, maintenance, sharing, and disposal of personally identifiable information 

(PII) by programs and information systems;

b. Monitors federal privacy laws and policy for changes that affect the privacy program;

c. Allocates [Assignment: organization-defined allocation of budget and staffing] sufficient 

resources to implement and operate the organization-wide privacy program;

d. Develops a strategic organizational privacy plan for implementing applicable privacy 

controls, policies, and procedures;

e. Develops, disseminates, and implements operational privacy policies and procedures that 

govern the appropriate privacy and security controls for programs, information systems, or 

technologies involving PII; and

f. Updates privacy plan, policies, and procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency, 

at least biennially].

Supplemental Guidance: The development and implementation of a comprehensive governance and 

privacy program demonstrates organizational accountability for and commitment to the protection 

of individual privacy. Accountability begins with the appointment of an SAOP/CPO with the 

authority, mission, resources, and responsibility to develop and implement a multifaceted privacy 

program. The SAOP/CPO, in consultation with legal counsel, information security officials, and 

others as appropriate: (i) ensures the development, implementation, and enforcement of privacy 

policies and procedures; (ii) defines roles and responsibilities for protecting PII; (iii) determines

the level of information sensitivity with regard to PII holdings; (iv) identifies the laws, regulations,

and internal policies that apply to the PII; (v) monitors privacy best practices; and (vi) 

monitors/audits compliance with identified privacy controls. 

To further accountability, the SAOP/CPO develops privacy plans to document the privacy 

requirements of organizations and the privacy and security controls in place or planned for 

meeting those requirements. The plan serves as evidence of organizational privacy operations and 

supports resource requests by the SAOP/CPO. A single plan or multiple plans may be necessary 

depending upon the organizational structures, requirements, and resources, and the plan(s) may 

vary in comprehensiveness. For example, a one-page privacy plan may cover privacy policies, 

documentation, and controls already in place, such as Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA) and 

System of Records Notices (SORN). A comprehensive plan may include a baseline of privacy 

controls selected from this appendix and include: (i) processes for conducting privacy risk 

assessments; (ii) templates and guidance for completing PIAs and SORNs; (iii) privacy training 

and awareness requirements; (iv) requirements for contractors processing PII; (v) plans for 

eliminating unnecessary PII holdings; and (vi) a framework for measuring annual performance 

goals and objectives for implementing identified privacy controls.

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Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-

347); Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3541; OMB 

Memoranda 03-22, 05-08, 07-16; OMB Circular A-130; Federal Enterprise Architecture Security 

and Privacy Profile.

AR-2 PRIVACY IMPACT AND RISK ASSESSMENT

Control: The organization: 

a. Documents and implements a privacy risk management process that assesses privacy risk to 

individuals resulting from the collection, sharing, storing, transmitting, use, and disposal of 

personally identifiable information (PII); and

b. Conducts Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) for information systems, programs, or other 

activities that pose a privacy risk in accordance with applicable law, OMB policy, or any 

existing organizational policies and procedures.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational privacy risk management processes operate across the life 

cycles of all mission/business processes that collect, use, maintain, share, or dispose of PII. The 

tools and processes for managing risk are specific to organizational missions and resources. They 

include, but are not limited to, the conduct of PIAs. The PIA is both a process and the document 

that is the outcome of that process. OMB Memorandum 03-22 provides guidance to organizations 

for implementing the privacy provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002, including guidance on 

when PIAs are required for information systems. Some organizations may be required by law or 

policy to extend the PIA requirement to other activities involving PII or otherwise impacting 

privacy (e.g., programs, projects, or regulations). PIAs are conducted to identify privacy risks and 

identify methods to mitigate those risks. PIAs are also conducted to ensure that programs or 

information systems comply with legal, regulatory, and policy requirements. PIAs also serve as 

notice to the public of privacy practices. PIAs are performed before developing or procuring 

information systems, or initiating programs or projects, that collect, use, maintain, or share PII and 

are updated when changes create new privacy risks.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: Section 208, E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); Federal Information Security 

Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3541; OMB Memoranda 03-22, 05-08, 10-23.

AR-3 PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTRACTORS AND SERVICE PROVIDERS

Control: The organization: 

a. Establishes privacy roles, responsibilities, and access requirements for contractors and service 

providers; and

b. Includes privacy requirements in contracts and other acquisition-related documents.

Supplemental Guidance: Contractors and service providers include, but are not limited to,

information providers, information processors, and other organizations providing information 

system development, information technology services, and other outsourced 

applications. Organizations consult with legal counsel, the Senior Agency Official for Privacy 

(SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO), and contracting officers about applicable laws, directives, 

policies, or regulations that may impact implementation of this control. Related control: AR-1, 

AR-5, SA-4.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m); Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 

C.F.R. Part 24; OMB Circular A-130.

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AR-4 PRIVACY MONITORING AND AUDITING

Control: The organization monitors and audits privacy controls and internal privacy policy

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to ensure effective implementation.

Supplemental Guidance: To promote accountability, organizations identify and address gaps in 

privacy compliance, management, operational, and technical controls by conducting regular 

assessments (e.g., internal risk assessments). These assessments can be self-assessments or thirdparty audits that result in reports on compliance gaps identified in programs, projects, and 

information systems. In addition to auditing for effective implementation of all privacy controls 

identified in this appendix, organizations assess whether they: (i) implement a process to embed 

privacy considerations into the life cycle of personally identifiable information (PII), programs, 

information systems, mission/business processes, and technology; (ii) monitor for changes to 

applicable privacy laws, regulations, and policies; (iii) track programs, information systems, and 

applications that collect and maintain PII to ensure compliance; (iv) ensure that access to PII is 

only on a need-to-know basis; and (v) ensure that PII is being maintained and used only for the 

legally authorized purposes identified in the public notice(s). 

Organizations also: (i) implement technology to audit for the security, appropriate use, and loss of 

PII; (ii) perform reviews to ensure physical security of documents containing PII; (iii) assess 

contractor compliance with privacy requirements; and (iv) ensure that corrective actions identified 

as part of the assessment process are tracked and monitored until audit findings are corrected. The 

organization Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) coordinates

monitoring and auditing efforts with information security officials and ensures that the results are 

provided to senior managers and oversight officials. Related controls: AR-6, AR-7, AU-1, AU-2, 

AU-3, AU-6, AU-12, CA-7, TR-1, UL-2.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; Federal Information Security Management 

Act (FISMA) of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3541; Section 208, E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); 

OMB Memoranda 03-22, 05-08, 06-16, 07-16; OMB Circular A-130.

AR-5 PRIVACY AWARENESS AND TRAINING

Control: The organization: 

a. Develops, implements, and updates a comprehensive training and awareness strategy aimed at 

ensuring that personnel understand privacy responsibilities and procedures;

b. Administers basic privacy training [Assignment: organization-defined frequency, at least 

annually] and targeted, role-based privacy training for personnel having responsibility for 

personally identifiable information (PII) or for activities that involve PII [Assignment: 

organization-defined frequency, at least annually]; and

c. Ensures that personnel certify (manually or electronically) acceptance of responsibilities for 

privacy requirements [Assignment: organization-defined frequency, at least annually].

Supplemental Guidance: Through implementation of a privacy training and awareness strategy, the 

organization promotes a culture of privacy. Privacy training and awareness programs typically 

focus on broad topics, such as responsibilities under the Privacy Act of 1974 and E-Government 

Act of 2002 and the consequences of failing to carry out those responsibilities, how to identify 

new privacy risks, how to mitigate privacy risks, and how and when to report privacy incidents. 

Privacy training may also target data collection and use requirements identified in public notices, 

such as Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) or System of Records Notices (SORNs) for a program 

or information system. Specific training methods may include: (i) mandatory annual privacy 

awareness training; (ii) targeted, role-based training; (iii) internal privacy program websites; (iv) 

manuals, guides, and handbooks; (v) slide presentations; (vi) events (e.g., privacy awareness week, 

privacy clean-up day); (vii) posters and brochures; and (viii) email messages to all employees and 

contractors. Organizations update training based on changing statutory, regulatory, mission, 

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program, business process, and information system requirements, or on the results of compliance 

monitoring and auditing. Where appropriate, organizations may provide privacy training as part of 

existing information security training. Related controls: AR-3, AT-2, AT-3, TR-1.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e); Section 208, E-Government Act of 2002

(P.L. 107-347); OMB Memoranda 03-22, 07-16.

AR-6 PRIVACY REPORTING

Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and updates reports to the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB), Congress, and other oversight bodies, as appropriate, to 

demonstrate accountability with specific statutory and regulatory privacy program mandates, and 

to senior management and other personnel with responsibility for monitoring privacy program 

progress and compliance.

Supplemental Guidance: Through internal and external privacy reporting, organizations promote 

accountability and transparency in organizational privacy operations. Reporting also helps

organizations to determine progress in meeting privacy compliance requirements and privacy 

controls, compare performance across the federal government, identify vulnerabilities and gaps in 

policy and implementation, and identify success models. Types of privacy reports include: (i) 

annual Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP) reports to OMB; (ii) reports to Congress 

required by the Implementing Regulations of the 9/11 Commission Act; and (iii) other public 

reports required by specific statutory mandates or internal policies of organizations. The 

organization Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) consults

with legal counsel, where appropriate, to ensure that organizations meet all applicable privacy 

reporting requirements.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; Section 208, E-Government Act of 2002 

(P.L. 107-347); Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 

3541; Section 803, 9/11 Commission Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1; Section 804, 9/11 Commission 

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-3; Section 522, Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 (P.L. 108-447); 

OMB Memoranda 03-22; OMB Circular A-130.

AR-7 PRIVACY-ENHANCED SYSTEM DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

Control: The organization designs information systems to support privacy by automating privacy 

controls.

Supplemental Guidance: To the extent feasible, when designing organizational information systems, 

organizations employ technologies and system capabilities that automate privacy controls on the 

collection, use, retention, and disclosure of personally identifiable information (PII). By building 

privacy controls into system design and development, organizations mitigate privacy risks to PII, 

thereby reducing the likelihood of information system breaches and other privacy-related 

incidents. Organizations also conduct periodic reviews of systems to determine the need for 

updates to maintain compliance with the Privacy Act and the organization’s privacy policy. 

Regardless of whether automated privacy controls are employed, organizations regularly monitor 

information system use and sharing of PII to ensure that the use/sharing is consistent with the 

authorized purposes identified in the Privacy Act and/or in the public notice of organizations, or in 

a manner compatible with those purposes. Related controls: AC-6, AR-4, AR-5, DM-2, TR-1.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10); Sections 208(b) and(c), EGovernment Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); OMB Memorandum 03-22.

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AR-8 ACCOUNTING OF DISCLOSURES

Control: The organization: 

a. Keeps an accurate accounting of disclosures of information held in each system of records 

under its control, including:

(1) Date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure of a record; and

(2) Name and address of the person or agency to which the disclosure was made;

b. Retains the accounting of disclosures for the life of the record or five years after the 

disclosure is made, whichever is longer; and

c. Makes the accounting of disclosures available to the person named in the record upon request.

Supplemental Guidance: The Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer

(CPO) periodically consults with managers of organization systems of record to ensure that the 

required accountings of disclosures of records are being properly maintained and provided to 

persons named in those records consistent with the dictates of the Privacy Act. Organizations are

not required to keep an accounting of disclosures when the disclosures are made to individuals

with a need to know, are made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, or are made to a law 

enforcement agency pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(3). Heads of agencies can promulgate rules to 

exempt certain systems of records from the requirement to provide the accounting of disclosures to 

individuals. Related control: IP-2. 

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (c)(1), (c)(3), (j), (k).

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FAMILY: DATA QUALITY AND INTEGRITY

This family enhances public confidence that any personally identifiable information (PII) collected 

and maintained by organizations is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete for the purpose for which 

it is to be used, as specified in public notices.

DI-1 DATA QUALITY

Control: The organization: 

a. Confirms to the greatest extent practicable upon collection or creation of personally 

identifiable information (PII), the accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness of that 

information;

b. Collects PII directly from the individual to the greatest extent practicable;

c. Checks for, and corrects as necessary, any inaccurate or outdated PII used by its programs or 

systems [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and

d. Issues guidelines ensuring and maximizing the quality, utility, objectivity, and integrity of 

disseminated information. 

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations take reasonable steps to confirm the accuracy and relevance 

of PII. Such steps may include, for example, editing and validating addresses as they are collected 

or entered into information systems using automated address verification look-up application 

programming interfaces (API). The types of measures taken to protect data quality are based on 

the nature and context of the PII, how it is to be used, and how it was obtained. Measures taken to 

validate the accuracy of PII that is used to make determinations about the rights, benefits, or 

privileges of individuals under federal programs may be more comprehensive than those used to 

validate less sensitive PII. Additional steps may be necessary to validate PII that is obtained from 

sources other than individuals or the authorized representatives of individuals.

When PII is of a sufficiently sensitive nature (e.g., when it is used for annual reconfirmation of a 

taxpayer’s income for a recurring benefit), organizations incorporate mechanisms into information 

systems and develop corresponding procedures for how frequently, and by what method, the

information is to be updated. Related controls: AP-2, DI-2, DM-1, IP-3, SI-10.

Control Enhancements:

(1) DATA QUALITY | VALIDATE PII 

The organization requests that the individual or individual’s authorized representative validate PII 

during the collection process.

(2) DATA QUALITY | RE-VALIDATE PII 

The organization requests that the individual or individual’s authorized representative revalidate 

that PII collected is still accurate [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (c) and (e); Treasury and General 

Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (P.L. 106-554), app C § 515, 114 Stat. 

2763A-153-4; Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3501; OMB Guidelines for Ensuring and 

Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by 

Federal Agencies (October 2001); OMB Memorandum 07-16.

DI-2 DATA INTEGRITY AND DATA INTEGRITY BOARD

Control: The organization: 

a. Documents processes to ensure the integrity of personally identifiable information (PII)

through existing security controls; and

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b. Establishes a Data Integrity Board when appropriate to oversee organizational Computer 

Matching Agreements123 and to ensure that those agreements comply with the computer 

matching provisions of the Privacy Act.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations conducting or participating in Computer Matching 

Agreements with other organizations regarding applicants for and recipients of financial assistance 

or payments under federal benefit programs or regarding certain computerized comparisons 

involving federal personnel or payroll records establish a Data Integrity Board to oversee and 

coordinate their implementation of such matching agreements. In many organizations, the Data 

Integrity Board is led by the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer

(CPO). The Data Integrity Board ensures that controls are in place to maintain both the quality and 

the integrity of data shared under Computer Matching Agreements. Related controls: AC-1, AC-3, 

AC-4, AC-6, AC-17, AC-22, AU-2, AU-3, AU-6, AU-10, AU-11, DI-1, SC-8, SC-28, UL-2.

Control Enhancements:

(1) DATA INTEGRITY AND DATA INTEGRITY BOARD | PUBLISH AGREEMENTS ON WEBSITE

The organization publishes Computer Matching Agreements on its public website.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a (a)(8)(A), (o), (p), (u); OMB Circular A130, Appendix I.

123 Organizations enter into Computer Matching Agreements in connection with computer matching programs to which 

they are a party. With certain exceptions, a computer matching program is any computerized comparison of two or 

more automated systems of records or a system of records with nonfederal records for the purpose of establishing or 

verifying the eligibility of, or continuing compliance with, statutory and regulatory requirements by, applicants for, 

recipients or beneficiaries of, participants in, or providers of services with respect to cash or in-kind assistance or 

payments under federal benefit programs or computerized comparisons of two or more automated federal personnel or 

payroll systems of records or a system of federal personnel or payroll records with nonfederal records. See Computer 

Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a)(8)(A).

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FAMILY: DATA MINIMIZATION AND RETENTION

This family helps organizations implement the data minimization and retention requirements to 

collect, use, and retain only personally identifiable information (PII) that is relevant and necessary 

for the purpose for which it was originally collected. Organizations retain PII for only as long as 

necessary to fulfill the purpose(s) specified in public notices and in accordance with a National 

Archives and Records Administration (NARA)-approved record retention schedule.

DM-1 MINIMIZATION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

Control: The organization: 

a. Identifies the minimum personally identifiable information (PII) elements that are relevant 

and necessary to accomplish the legally authorized purpose of collection;

b. Limits the collection and retention of PII to the minimum elements identified for the purposes 

described in the notice and for which the individual has provided consent; and

c. Conducts an initial evaluation of PII holdings and establishes and follows a schedule for 

regularly reviewing those holdings [Assignment: organization-defined frequency, at least 

annually] to ensure that only PII identified in the notice is collected and retained, and that the 

PII continues to be necessary to accomplish the legally authorized purpose.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations take appropriate steps to ensure that the collection of PII is 

consistent with a purpose authorized by law or regulation. The minimum set of PII elements 

required to support a specific organization business process may be a subset of the PII the 

organization is authorized to collect. Program officials consult with the Senior Agency Official for 

Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) and legal counsel to identify the minimum PII 

elements required by the information system or activity to accomplish the legally authorized 

purpose.

Organizations can further reduce their privacy and security risks by also reducing their inventory 

of PII, where appropriate. OMB Memorandum 07-16 requires organizations to conduct both an 

initial review and subsequent reviews of their holdings of all PII and ensure, to the maximum 

extent practicable, that such holdings are accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. Organizations 

are also directed by OMB to reduce their holdings to the minimum necessary for the proper 

performance of a documented organizational business purpose. OMB Memorandum 07-16 

requires organizations to develop and publicize, either through a notice in the Federal Register or 

on their websites, a schedule for periodic reviews of their holdings to supplement the initial 

review. Organizations coordinate with their federal records officers to ensure that reductions in 

organizational holdings of PII are consistent with NARA retention schedules.

By performing periodic evaluations, organizations reduce risk, ensure that they are collecting only 

the data specified in the notice, and ensure that the data collected is still relevant and necessary for 

the purpose(s) specified in the notice. Related controls: AP-1, AP-2, AR-4, IP-1, SE-1, SI-12, TR1.

Control Enhancements:

(1) MINIMIZATION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION | LOCATE / REMOVE / REDACT / ANONYMIZE PII 

The organization, where feasible and within the limits of technology, locates and removes/redacts 

specified PII and/or uses anonymization and de-identification techniques to permit use of the 

retained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure.

Supplemental Guidance: NIST Special Publication 800-122 provides guidance on 

anonymization.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §552a (e); Section 208(b), E-Government Act of 

2002 (P.L. 107-347); OMB Memoranda 03-22, 07-16.

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DM-2 DATA RETENTION AND DISPOSAL

Control: The organization: 

a. Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment: 

organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as 

required by law;

b. Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage,

in accordance with a NARA-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that prevents 

loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; and

c. Uses [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or 

destruction of PII (including originals, copies, and archived records). 

Supplemental Guidance: NARA provides retention schedules that govern the disposition of federal 

records. Program officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate 

retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain PII longer than 

is operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice. 

Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper.

Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g., 

delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period 

for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (this 

effort is undertaken in consultation with an organization’s records officer to receive NARA 

approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records 

Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII.

Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may not 

permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database contained 

on such media. Related controls: AR-4, AU-11, DM-1, MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, 

MP-7, MP-8, SI-12, TR-1.

Control Enhancements:

(1) DATA RETENTION AND DISPOSAL | SYSTEM CONFIGURATION

The organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII is 

collected, created, or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record 

retention schedule.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e)(1), (c)(2); Section 208 (e), EGovernment Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); 44 U.S.C. Chapters 29, 31, 33; OMB Memorandum 07-

16; OMB Circular A-130; NIST Special Publication 800-88.

DM-3 MINIMIZATION OF PII USED IN TESTING, TRAINING, AND RESEARCH

Control: The organization: 

a. Develops policies and procedures that minimize the use of personally identifiable information 

(PII) for testing, training, and research; and

b. Implements controls to protect PII used for testing, training, and research.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations often use PII for testing new applications or information 

systems prior to deployment. Organizations also use PII for research purposes and for training. 

The use of PII in testing, research, and training increases risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse 

of the information. If PII must be used, organizations take measures to minimize any associated 

risks and to authorize the use of and limit the amount of PII for these purposes. Organizations 

consult with the SAOP/CPO and legal counsel to ensure that the use of PII in testing, training, and 

research is compatible with the original purpose for which it was collected. 

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Control Enhancements:

(1) MINIMIZATION OF PII USED IN TESTING, TRAINING, AND RESEARCH | RISK MINIMIZATION TECHNIQUES 

The organization, where feasible, uses techniques to minimize the risk to privacy of using PII for 

research, testing, or training.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can minimize risk to privacy of PII by using techniques 

such as de-identification.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-122.

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FAMILY: INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION AND REDRESS

This family addresses the need to make individuals active participants in the decision-making process 

regarding the collection and use of their personally identifiable information (PII). By providing 

individuals with access to PII and the ability to have their PII corrected or amended, as appropriate, 

the controls in this family enhance public confidence in organizational decisions made based on the 

PII.

IP-1 CONSENT

Control: The organization: 

a. Provides means, where feasible and appropriate, for individuals to authorize the collection, 

use, maintaining, and sharing of personally identifiable information (PII) prior to its 

collection;

b. Provides appropriate means for individuals to understand the consequences of decisions to 

approve or decline the authorization of the collection, use, dissemination, and retention of PII;

c. Obtains consent, where feasible and appropriate, from individuals prior to any new uses or 

disclosure of previously collected PII; and

d. Ensures that individuals are aware of and, where feasible, consent to all uses of PII not 

initially described in the public notice that was in effect at the time the organization collected 

the PII.

Supplemental Guidance: Consent is fundamental to the participation of individuals in the decisionmaking process regarding the collection and use of their PII and the use of technologies that may 

increase risk to personal privacy. To obtain consent, organizations provide individuals appropriate 

notice of the purposes of the PII collection or technology use and a means for individuals to 

consent to the activity. Organizations tailor the public notice and consent mechanisms to meet 

operational needs. Organizations achieve awareness and consent, for example, through updated 

public notices.

Organizations may obtain consent through opt-in, opt-out, or implied consent. Opt-in consent is 

the preferred method, but it is not always feasible. Opt-in requires that individuals take affirmative 

action to allow organizations to collect or use PII. For example, opt-in consent may require an 

individual to click a radio button on a website, or sign a document providing consent. In contrast, 

opt-out requires individuals to take action to prevent the new or continued collection or use of 

such PII. For example, the Federal Trade Commission’s Do-Not-Call Registry allows individuals 

to opt-out of receiving unsolicited telemarketing calls by requesting to be added to a list. Implied 

consent is the least preferred method and should be used in limited circumstances. Implied consent 

occurs where individuals’ behavior or failure to object indicates agreement with the collection or 

use of PII (e.g., by entering and remaining in a building where notice has been posted that security 

cameras are in use, the individual implies consent to the video recording). Depending upon the 

nature of the program or information system, it may be appropriate to allow individuals to limit 

the types of PII they provide and subsequent uses of that PII. Organizational consent mechanisms

include a discussion of the consequences to individuals of failure to provide PII. Consequences 

can vary from organization to organization. Related controls: AC-2, AP-1, TR-1, TR-2.

Control Enhancements:

(1) CONSENT | MECHANISMS SUPPORTING ITEMIZED OR TIERED CONSENT 

The organization implements mechanisms to support itemized or tiered consent for specific uses 

of data.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can provide, for example, individuals’ itemized choices 

as to whether they wish to be contacted for any of a variety of purposes. In this situation, 

organizations construct consent mechanisms to ensure that organizational operations comply 

with individual choices. 

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References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b), (e)(3); Section 208(c), E-Government 

Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); OMB Memoranda 03-22, 10-22.

IP-2 INDIVIDUAL ACCESS

Control: The organization: 

a. Provides individuals the ability to have access to their personally identifiable information 

(PII) maintained in its system(s) of records;

b. Publishes rules and regulations governing how individuals may request access to records 

maintained in a Privacy Act system of records;

c. Publishes access procedures in System of Records Notices (SORNs); and

d. Adheres to Privacy Act requirements and OMB policies and guidance for the proper 

processing of Privacy Act requests.

Supplemental Guidance: Access affords individuals the ability to review PII about them held within 

organizational systems of records. Access includes timely, simplified, and inexpensive access to 

data. Organizational processes for allowing access to records may differ based on resources, legal 

requirements, or other factors. The organization Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief 

Privacy Officer (CPO) is responsible for the content of Privacy Act regulations and record request 

processing, in consultation with legal counsel. Access to certain types of records may not be 

appropriate, however, and heads of agencies may promulgate rules exempting particular systems

from the access provision of the Privacy Act. In addition, individuals are not entitled to access to 

information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action or proceeding. Related controls: 

AR-8, IP-3, TR-1, TR-2.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a (c)(3), (d)(5), (e) (4); (j), (k), (t); OMB 

Circular A-130.

IP-3 REDRESS

Control: The organization: 

a. Provides a process for individuals to have inaccurate personally identifiable information (PII)

maintained by the organization corrected or amended, as appropriate; and

b. Establishes a process for disseminating corrections or amendments of the PII to other 

authorized users of the PII, such as external information-sharing partners and, where feasible 

and appropriate, notifies affected individuals that their information has been corrected or 

amended.

Supplemental Guidance: Redress supports the ability of individuals to ensure the accuracy of PII 

held by organizations. Effective redress processes demonstrate organizational commitment to data 

quality especially in those business functions where inaccurate data may result in inappropriate 

decisions or denial of benefits and services to individuals. Organizations use discretion in 

determining if records are to be corrected or amended, based on the scope of redress requests, the 

changes sought, and the impact of the changes. Individuals may appeal an adverse decision and 

have incorrect information amended, where appropriate.

To provide effective redress, organizations: (i) provide effective notice of the existence of a PII 

collection; (ii) provide plain language explanations of the processes and mechanisms for 

requesting access to records; (iii) establish criteria for submitting requests for correction or 

amendment; (iv) implement resources to analyze and adjudicate requests; (v) implement means of 

correcting or amending data collections; and (vi) review any decisions that may have been the 

result of inaccurate information.

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Organizational redress processes provide responses to individuals of decisions to deny requests for 

correction or amendment, including the reasons for those decisions, a means to record individual 

objections to the organizational decisions, and a means of requesting organizational reviews of the 

initial determinations. Where PII is corrected or amended, organizations take steps to ensure that 

all authorized recipients of that PII are informed of the corrected or amended information. In 

instances where redress involves information obtained from other organizations, redress processes 

include coordination with organizations that originally collected the information. Related controls: 

IP-2, TR-1, TR-2, UL-2.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (d), (c)(4); OMB Circular A-130.

IP-4 COMPLAINT MANAGEMENT

Control: The organization implements a process for receiving and responding to complaints, 

concerns, or questions from individuals about the organizational privacy practices.

Supplemental Guidance: Complaints, concerns, and questions from individuals can serve as a 

valuable source of external input that ultimately improves operational models, uses of technology, 

data collection practices, and privacy and security safeguards. Organizations provide complaint 

mechanisms that are readily accessible by the public, include all information necessary for 

successfully filing complaints (including contact information for the Senior Agency Official for 

Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) or other official designated to receive complaints), 

and are easy to use. Organizational complaint management processes include tracking mechanisms

to ensure that all complaints received are reviewed and appropriately addressed in a timely 

manner. Related controls: AR-6, IP-3.

Control Enhancements:

(1) COMPLAINT MANAGEMENT | RESPONSE TIMES 

The organization responds to complaints, concerns, or questions from individuals within 

[Assignment: organization-defined time period].

References: OMB Circular A-130; OMB Memoranda 07-16, 08-09.

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FAMILY: SECURITY

This family supplements the security controls in Appendix F to ensure that technical, physical, and 

administrative safeguards are in place to protect personally identifiable information (PII) collected or 

maintained by organizations against loss, unauthorized access, or disclosure, and to ensure that 

planning and responses to privacy incidents comply with OMB policies and guidance. The controls 

in this family are implemented in coordination with information security personnel and in accordance 

with the existing NIST Risk Management Framework.

SE-1 INVENTORY OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

Control: The organization: 

a. Establishes, maintains, and updates [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] an 

inventory that contains a listing of all programs and information systems identified as 

collecting, using, maintaining, or sharing personally identifiable information (PII); and

b. Provides each update of the PII inventory to the CIO or information security official

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to support the establishment of information 

security requirements for all new or modified information systems containing PII.

Supplemental Guidance: The PII inventory enables organizations to implement effective 

administrative, technical, and physical security policies and procedures to protect PII consistent 

with Appendix F, and to mitigate risks of PII exposure. As one method of gathering information 

for their PII inventories, organizations may extract the following information elements from 

Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA) for information systems containing PII: (i) the name and 

acronym for each system identified; (ii) the types of PII contained in that system; (iii) 

classification of level of sensitivity of all types of PII, as combined in that information system; and 

(iv) classification of level of potential risk of substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or 

unfairness to affected individuals, as well as the financial or reputational risks to organizations, if 

PII is exposed. Organizations take due care in updating the inventories by identifying linkable data 

that could create PII. Related controls: AR-1, AR-4, AR-5, AT-1, DM-1, PM-5.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e) (10); Section 208(b)(2), E-Government 

Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); OMB Memorandum 03-22; OMB Circular A-130, Appendix I; FIPS 

Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-37, 800-122.

SE-2 PRIVACY INCIDENT RESPONSE

Control: The organization: 

a. Develops and implements a Privacy Incident Response Plan; and

b. Provides an organized and effective response to privacy incidents in accordance with the 

organizational Privacy Incident Response Plan. 

Supplemental Guidance: In contrast to the Incident Response (IR) family in Appendix F, which 

concerns a broader range of incidents affecting information security, this control uses the term 

Privacy Incident to describe only those incidents that relate to personally identifiable information 

(PII). The organization Privacy Incident Response Plan is developed under the leadership of the 

SAOP/CPO. The plan includes: (i) the establishment of a cross-functional Privacy Incident 

Response Team that reviews, approves, and participates in the execution of the Privacy Incident 

Response Plan; (ii) a process to determine whether notice to oversight organizations or affected 

individuals is appropriate and to provide that notice accordingly; (iii) a privacy risk assessment 

process to determine the extent of harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to affected 

individuals and, where appropriate, to take steps to mitigate any such risks; (iv) internal 

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procedures to ensure prompt reporting by employees and contractors of any privacy incident to 

information security officials and the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy 

Officer (CPO), consistent with organizational incident management structures; and (v) internal 

procedures for reporting noncompliance with organizational privacy policy by employees or 

contractors to appropriate management or oversight officials. Some organizations may be required 

by law or policy to provide notice to oversight organizations in the event of a breach.

Organizations may also choose to integrate Privacy Incident Response Plans with Security 

Incident Response Plans, or keep the plans separate. Related controls: AR-1, AR-4, AR-5, AR-6, 

AU-1 through 14, IR-1 through IR-8, RA-1.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e), (i)(1), and (m); Federal Information 

Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3541; OMB Memoranda 06-19, 07-16; 

NIST Special Publication 800-37.

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FAMILY: TRANSPARENCY

This family ensures that organizations provide public notice of their information practices and the 

privacy impact of their programs and activities.

TR-1 PRIVACY NOTICE

Control: The organization: 

a. Provides effective notice to the public and to individuals regarding: (i) its activities that 

impact privacy, including its collection, use, sharing, safeguarding, maintenance, and disposal 

of personally identifiable information (PII); (ii) authority for collecting PII; (iii) the choices, if 

any, individuals may have regarding how the organization uses PII and the consequences of 

exercising or not exercising those choices; and (iv) the ability to access and have PII amended 

or corrected if necessary;

b. Describes: (i) the PII the organization collects and the purpose(s) for which it collects that 

information; (ii) how the organization uses PII internally; (iii) whether the organization shares 

PII with external entities, the categories of those entities, and the purposes for such sharing; 

(iv) whether individuals have the ability to consent to specific uses or sharing of PII and how 

to exercise any such consent; (v) how individuals may obtain access to PII; and (vi) how the 

PII will be protected; and

c. Revises its public notices to reflect changes in practice or policy that affect PII or changes in 

its activities that impact privacy, before or as soon as practicable after the change.

Supplemental Guidance: Effective notice, by virtue of its clarity, readability, and comprehensiveness, 

enables individuals to understand how an organization uses PII generally and, where appropriate, 

to make an informed decision prior to providing PII to an organization. Effective notice also 

demonstrates the privacy considerations that the organization has addressed in implementing its 

information practices. The organization may provide general public notice through a variety of 

means, as required by law or policy, including System of Records Notices (SORNs), Privacy 

Impact Assessments (PIAs), or in a website privacy policy. As required by the Privacy Act, the 

organization also provides direct notice to individuals via Privacy Act Statements on the paper and 

electronic forms it uses to collect PII, or on separate forms that can be retained by the individuals.

The organization Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) is

responsible for the content of the organization’s public notices, in consultation with legal counsel 

and relevant program managers. The public notice requirement in this control is satisfied by an 

organization’s compliance with the public notice provisions of the Privacy Act, the E-Government 

Act’s PIA requirement, with OMB guidance related to federal agency privacy notices, and, where 

applicable, with policy pertaining to participation in the Information Sharing Environment 

(ISE).124 Changing PII practice or policy without prior notice is disfavored and should only be 

undertaken in consultation with the SAOP/CPO and counsel. Related controls: AP-1, AP-2, AR-1, 

AR-2, IP-1, IP-2, IP-3, UL-1, UL-2.

Control Enhancements:

(1) PRIVACY NOTICE | REAL-TIME OR LAYERED NOTICE 

The organization provides real-time and/or layered notice when it collects PII.

Supplemental Guidance: Real-time notice is defined as notice at the point of collection. A 

layered notice approach involves providing individuals with a summary of key points in the 

organization’s privacy policy. A second notice provides more detailed/specific information.

124 The Information Sharing Environment is an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism and homeland security 

information. The ISE was established by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 

108-458, 118 Stat. 3638. See the ISE website at: http://www.ise.gov. 

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References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e)(3), (e)(4); Section 208(b), EGovernment Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); OMB Memoranda 03-22, 07-16, 10-22, 10-23; ISE 

Privacy Guidelines.

TR-2 SYSTEM OF RECORDS NOTICES AND PRIVACY ACT STATEMENTS

Control: The organization: 

a. Publishes System of Records Notices (SORNs) in the Federal Register, subject to required 

oversight processes, for systems containing personally identifiable information (PII);

b. Keeps SORNs current; and

c. Includes Privacy Act Statements on its forms that collect PII, or on separate forms that can be 

retained by individuals, to provide additional formal notice to individuals from whom the 

information is being collected.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations issue SORNs to provide the public notice regarding PII 

collected in a system of records, which the Privacy Act defines as “a group of any records under 

the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of an individual or by 

some identifying number, symbol, or other identifier.” SORNs explain how the information is 

used, retained, and may be corrected, and whether certain portions of the system are subject to 

Privacy Act exemptions for law enforcement or national security reasons. Privacy Act Statements 

provide notice of: (i) the authority of organizations to collect PII; (ii) whether providing PII is 

mandatory or optional; (iii) the principal purpose(s) for which the PII is to be used; (iv) the 

intended disclosures (routine uses) of the information; and (v) the consequences of not providing 

all or some portion of the information requested. When information is collected verbally, 

organizations read a Privacy Act Statement prior to initiating the collection of PII (for example, 

when conducting telephone interviews or surveys). Related control: DI-2.

Control Enhancements:

(1) SYSTEM OF RECORDS NOTICES AND PRIVACY ACT STATEMENTS | PUBLIC WEBSITE PUBLICATION 

The organization publishes SORNs on its public website.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e)(3); OMB Circular A-130.

TR-3 DISSEMINATION OF PRIVACY PROGRAM INFORMATION

Control: The organization: 

a. Ensures that the public has access to information about its privacy activities and is able to 

communicate with its Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer 

(CPO); and

b. Ensures that its privacy practices are publicly available through organizational websites or 

otherwise.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations employ different mechanisms for informing the public about 

their privacy practices including, but not limited to, Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), System 

of Records Notices (SORNs), privacy reports, publicly available web pages, email distributions, 

blogs, and periodic publications (e.g., quarterly newsletters). Organizations also employ publicly 

facing email addresses and/or phone lines that enable the public to provide feedback and/or direct 

questions to privacy offices regarding privacy practices. Related control: AR-6.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; Section 208, E-Government Act of 2002 

(P.L. 107-347); OMB Memoranda 03-22, 10-23.

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FAMILY: USE LIMITATION

This family ensures that organizations only use personally identifiable information (PII) either as 

specified in their public notices, in a manner compatible with those specified purposes, or as 

otherwise permitted by law. Implementation of the controls in this family will ensure that the scope 

of PII use is limited accordingly.

UL-1 INTERNAL USE

Control: The organization uses personally identifiable information (PII) internally only for the 

authorized purpose(s) identified in the Privacy Act and/or in public notices.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations take steps to ensure that they use PII only for legally 

authorized purposes and in a manner compatible with uses identified in the Privacy Act and/or in 

public notices. These steps include monitoring and auditing organizational use of PII and training 

organizational personnel on the authorized uses of PII. With guidance from the Senior Agency 

Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) and where appropriate, legal counsel, 

organizations document processes and procedures for evaluating any proposed new uses of PII to 

assess whether they fall within the scope of the organizational authorities. Where appropriate, 

organizations obtain consent from individuals for the new use(s) of PII. Related controls: AP-2, 

AR-2, AR-3, AR-4, AR-5, IP-1, TR-1, TR-2.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b)(1).

UL-2 INFORMATION SHARING WITH THIRD PARTIES

Control: The organization: 

a. Shares personally identifiable information (PII) externally, only for the authorized purposes 

identified in the Privacy Act and/or described in its notice(s) or for a purpose that is 

compatible with those purposes;

b. Where appropriate, enters into Memoranda of Understanding, Memoranda of Agreement, 

Letters of Intent, Computer Matching Agreements, or similar agreements, with third parties 

that specifically describe the PII covered and specifically enumerate the purposes for which 

the PII may be used;

c. Monitors, audits, and trains its staff on the authorized sharing of PII with third parties and on 

the consequences of unauthorized use or sharing of PII; and

d. Evaluates any proposed new instances of sharing PII with third parties to assess whether the 

sharing is authorized and whether additional or new public notice is required.

Supplemental Guidance: The organization Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief 

Privacy Officer (CPO) and, where appropriate, legal counsel review and approve any proposed 

external sharing of PII, including with other public, international, or private sector entities, for 

consistency with uses described in the existing organizational public notice(s). When a proposed 

new instance of external sharing of PII is not currently authorized by the Privacy Act and/or 

specified in a notice, organizations evaluate whether the proposed external sharing is compatible 

with the purpose(s) specified in the notice. If the proposed sharing is compatible, organizations

review, update, and republish their Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), System of Records 

Notices (SORNs), website privacy policies, and other public notices, if any, to include specific 

descriptions of the new uses(s) and obtain consent where appropriate and feasible. Informationsharing agreements also include security protections consistent with the sensitivity of the 

information being shared. Related controls: AR-3, AR-4, AR-5, AR-8, AP-2, DI-1, DI-2, IP-1, 

TR-1.

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Control Enhancements: None.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a)(7), (b), (c), (e)(3)(C), (o); ISE Privacy 

Guidelines.

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Acknowledgements

This appendix was developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the 

Privacy Committee of the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) Council. In particular, we 

wish to thank the members of the Privacy Committee's Best Practices Subcommittee and its 

Privacy Controls Appendix Working Group—Claire Barrett, Chris Brannigan, Pamela Carcirieri, 

Debra Diener, Deborah Kendall, Martha Landesberg, Steven Lott, Lewis Oleinick, and Roanne 

Shaddox—for their valuable insights, subject matter expertise, and overall contributions in 

helping to develop the content for this appendix to Special Publication 800-53. We also wish to 

recognize and thank Erika McCallister, Toby Levin, James McKenzie, Julie McEwen, and 

Richard Graubart for their significant contributions to this project. A special note of thanks goes 

to Peggy Himes and Elizabeth Lennon for their superb administrative support. The authors also 

gratefully acknowledge and appreciate the significant contributions from individuals, groups, and 

organizations in the public and private sectors, whose thoughtful and constructive comments 

improved the overall quality, thoroughness, and usefulness of this publication.

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