alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit
      32.2





CERTIFICATION
      OF PERIODIC FINANCIAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
      ACT
      OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350








In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Simclar, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form
      10-Q/A for the period ended March 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Marshall W. Griffin,
      Jr., Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Secretary of the Company, hereby
      certify as of the date hereof, solely for purpose of Title 18, Chapter 63,
      Section 1350 of the United States Code, that to the best of my
      knowledge:





(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





This
      Certification has not been, and shall not be deemed, “filed” with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission.








/s/
                Marshall W. Griffin, Jr.Marshall
                W. Griffin, Jr., Chief Financial Officer,
              Treasurer
                and Secretary
              Simclar,
                Inc.
              July
                2, 2007
§ 603.840 Negotiating data and patent rights. ( a ) The contracting officer must confer with program officials and assigned intellectual property counsel to develop an overall strategy for intellectual property that takes into account inventions and data that may result from the project and future needs the Government may have for rights in them. The strategy should take into account program mission requirements and any special circumstances that would support modification of standard patent and data terms, and should include considerations such as the extent of the recipient's contribution to the development of the technology; expected Government or commercial use of the technology; the need to provide equitable treatment among consortium or team members; and the need for the DOE to engage non-traditional Government contractors with unique capabilities.
( b ) Because a TIA entails substantial cost sharing by recipients, the contracting officer must use discretion in negotiating Government rights to data and patentable inventions resulting from the RD&D under the agreements. The considerations in §§ 603.845 through 603.875 are intended to serve as guidelines, within which there is considerable latitude to negotiate provisions appropriate to a wide variety of circumstances that may arise.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Barney Wolfson, Appellant.

Order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated June 14, 1967, affirmed. Defendant was indicted on October 15, 1931 for murder in the first degree. During the trial he entered a plea of guilty to murder in the second degree and was sentenced on March 21, 1932, to a term of 25 years to life. About 30 years later he obtained a vacatur of the judgment -on the ground that the guilty plea had been induced by a promise of a sentence of 20 years to life. He was rearraigned under the charge of murder in the first degree and a plea of guilty to murder in the second degree was again accepted. On May 9, 1961 he was resentenced to a term of 20 years to life; and in the present *coram nobis*proceeding he sought to vacate the judgment of May 9, 1961 on the ground that his rearraignment under the charge of murder in the first degree constituted double jeopardy. In our opinion, the application was properly denied. Under the circumstances herein defendant was not subjected to double jeopardy *(United States*v. *Tateo,*377 U. S. 463). The holdings in *United States ex rel. Hetenyi*v. *Wilkins*(348 F. 2d 844, cert. den. *sub nom. Mancusi*v. *Hetenyi,*383 U. S. 913) and *People*v. *Ressler*(17 N Y 2d 174), both of which involved convictions after trial of a lesser degree of the crime charged, are not in point. In those eases a jury had been given the opportunity to find the defendant guilty of the higher degree of crime and the defendant had thereby been placed in jeopardy (see *People*v. *Jackson,*20 N Y 2d 440, 448). Defendant’s other contentions have been considered and rejected. Christ, Acting P. J., Brennan, Rabin, Hopkins and Kleinfeld, JJ., concur.
#### § 590.503 Opinion and order on rehearing.

Upon application for rehearing, the Assistant Secretary may grant or deny rehearing or may abrogate or modify the final opinion and order, conditional order, or emergency interim order with or without further proceedings.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ALMA T. MCBROOM, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:06-CV-767-F

)

JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER )

GENERAL, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

DEFENDANT JOHN E. POTTER’S REPLY TO 

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO HIS MOTION TO DISMISS

COMES NOW Defendant, John E. Potter, in his official capacity as Postmaster

General of the United States, by and through Leura G. Canary, United States Attorney for

the Middle District of Alabama, and replies as follows to Plaintiff’s response to his

motion to dismiss:

1. Plaintiff concedes that her sole claim against the Postmaster General is an

official-capacity constitutional tort claim against the Postal Service. Such claims are

precluded by FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994).

2. Plaintiff argues that, prior to dismissal, she should be granted leave to amend

her complaint. Pl’s Response at 2, 3. However, she gives no clue as to the amendment

she proposes. It is well-established in this Circuit that “the movant must either attach a

copy of the proposed amendment to the motion or set forth the substance thereof.” 

Case 2:06-cv-00767-MEF-SRW Document 29 Filed 12/12/2006 Page 1 of 3
Page 2 of 3

Atkins v. McInteer, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 3461441 (11 Cir. 2006). See also, Long v. th

Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1279-80 (11 Cir. 1999). Plaintiff has not shown how her complaint th

could be amended to save her meritless claim against the Postal Service. Accordingly,

even if the Court were to interpret Plaintiff’s response as a Rule 15 (a) motion to amend,

that motion is due to be denied. Id.

WHEREFORE, for the above reasons and the reasons stated in his moving papers,

Defendant, the Postmaster General, requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

against him in their entirety with prejudice.

Respectfully submitted this 12th day of December, 2006. 

LEURA G. CANARY 

United States Attorney

 By: /s/Stephen M. Doyle 

STEPHEN M. DOYLE

Chief, Civil Division

Assistant United States Attorney

Attorney for Defendant

Post Office Box 197

Montgomery, AL 36101-0197

District of Columbia Bar No. 422474 

Telephone No.: (334) 223-7280

Facsimile No.: (334) 223-7418

E-mail: stephen.doyle@usdoj.gov

Case 2:06-cv-00767-MEF-SRW Document 29 Filed 12/12/2006 Page 2 of 3
Page 3 of 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on December 12, 2006, I electronically filed the foregoing

with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of

such filing to Anton Hajjar, Esq., Brenda Zwack, Esq., Patricia K. Nakamura, Esq., and

William Post Roberts, II, Esq., and mailed a copy of same, first class, postage prepaid,

addressed as follows:

Alma T. McBroom, Pro se

921 Hugh Street

Montgomery, AL 36108

 /s/Stephen M. Doyle 

Assistant United States Attorney

Case 2:06-cv-00767-MEF-SRW Document 29 Filed 12/12/2006 Page 3 of 3
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Angeles
Income Properties LTD. IV 1997 Second Quarter 10-QSB and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such 10-QSB filing.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000763049
<NAME> ANGELES INCOME PROPERTIES LTD IV
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                           3,195
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      180
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                          23,033
<DEPRECIATION>                                  12,022
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  16,156
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F1>
<BONDS>                                         15,300
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                         586
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    16,156
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 2,155
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,376
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 765
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 13,881
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             13,881
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    13,881
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   103.38<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Registrant has an unclassified balance sheet.
<F2>Multiplier is 1.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with theaccompanying Quarterly Report of Greene County Bancshares, Inc. (the “Company”)on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2006 (the “Report”), I, James E.Adams, Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Assistant Secretaryof the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)                                  The Reportfully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(1)                                  Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
|        |   | s/ James E. Adams                      |
|--------|--------|----------------------------------------|
|   |   | James E. Adams                         |
|   |   | Senior Vice President, Chief Financial |
|   |   | Officer and Assistant Secretary        |

 

Date:  August 8, 2006

----
2007-2175.

#### State v. Bailey.

Jefferson App. No. 06 JE 22, 2007-Ohio-4995. On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.

Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer and O’Donnell, JJ., dissent.
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7335 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7335

   To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the amount 
allowed as a deduction for interest on education loans paid by married 
                                couples.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 19, 2018

Mr. Danny K. Davis of Illinois introduced the following bill; which was 
              referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the amount 
allowed as a deduction for interest on education loans paid by married 
                                couples.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Fairness and Opportunities for 
Married Households With Student Loans Act''.

SEC. 2. INCREASE IN DEDUCTION FOR INTEREST ON EDUCATION LOANS PAID BY 
              MARRIED COUPLES.

    (a) In General.--Section 221(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 is amended by inserting ``($5,000 in the case of a joint return)'' 
after ``$2,500''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to amounts paid in taxable years beginning after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
2004 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-4-2004

In Re: Price

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 03-2084

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2004 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"In Re: Price " (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 565.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/565
PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 03-2084

IN RE: MICHAEL B. PRICE; CHRISTINE R. PRICE,

Debtors

MICHAEL B. PRICE; CHRISTINE R. PRICE,

Appellants

v.

DELAWARE STATE POLICE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION

US TRUSTEE,

Trustee

 

ORDER

Per the direction of the Court, the caption of the precedential opinion filed on June

3, 2004 is amended so as to delete the designation of Chief Judge proceeding District

Court Judge: Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.

For the Court,

 /s/ Marcia M. Waldron 

Clerk

Date: June 4, 2004

SLC/cc: Andrea G. Green, Esq. 

 W. J. Winterstein, Jr., Esq.

 Eric L. Frank, Esq.
#### SEBESTYEN, Respondent, v. CAYUGA LAKE CEMENT CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

January 6, 1915.)

Action by Steven Sebestyen against the Cayuga Lake Cement Company.

No opinion. Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs.
#### REMINGTON et al., Respondents, v. SUMMERVILLE et al., Appellants.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

July 7, 1914.)

Action by Charles R. Remington and others, as executors, etc., against Ida R. Summerville and others.

PER CURIAM.

Judgment modified, by striking out the paragraphs of the judgment numbered 2 and 3, and in lieu thereof adjudging that there is no unlawful accumulation under the provisions of the will, and directing that whatever income remains be paid over with the principal to the Remington Institute, as is_ provided in the paragraph numbered 4 in the judgment; and, as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, without costs of this appeal to any party.
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04

- 18

- 00541

- CR IN RE Wilbert P. STEWART Original Mandamus Proceeding 1
PER CURIAM Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Delivered and Filed: August 15, 2018
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION Relator complains of the trial court’s denial of his motion for judgment nunc pro tunc by which he sought to correct an alleged error in flat

- time credit. The Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction to grant postconviction relief from an otherwise final felony conviction.
T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC
. A NN
. art. 11.07 § 5 (West 2015); Board of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Court of Appeals for Eigh th Dist. , 910 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). This includes matters relating to flat

- time credit. See, e.g., Ex parte
Lee , 223 S.W.3d 360, 360

- 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)

. Because the proper avenue for resolving the issue is by application for writ of habeas corpus as authorized

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 1993

- CR

- 0145, styled The State of Texas v. Wilbert P. Stewart , pending in the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Sid L. Harle presiding.04

- 18

- 0 0541

- CR

- 2

- by article 11.07 , we dismiss relator’s petition for writ of mandamus for lack of jurisdiction

. See
T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 52.8(a).
PER CURIAM Do not publish
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Alvin Thomas Briggs, Appellant.

Reynolds, J.

Appeal from an order of the County Court, 'Chemung County, denying appellant’s motion for resentence. No appeal lies from an order denying a motion to be resentenced (Code Grim. *597Pro., § 517; *People*v. *Jordan,*25 A D 2d 808). Treating the application as one for *coram nobis*relief appellant in urging a specific maximum sentence is attacking the validity rather than the term of the sentence (see *People*v. *Machado,*17 N Y 2d 440, cert. den. 383 TJ. S. 921), we find no merit in appellant’s petition and the order should be affirmed. Former Penal Law, section 2195 provides explicitly that a court imposing an indeterminate sentence under former Penal Law, section 2184-a. “shall not fix or limit the duration thereof”, and thus clearly precludes the relief appellant seeks in the instant proceeding (see *People ex rel. Ward*v. *Jackson,*286 App. Div. 942, affd. 3 N Y 2d 1020; *People*v. *Kousch,*204 Mise. 482; Penal Law, § 5.05). Order affirmed. Herlihy, P. J., Reynolds, Staley, Jr., Greenblott and Sweeney, JJ., concur in memorandum by Reynolds) J.
Fourth Department,

September, 1980

(September 12, 1980)

#### In the Matter of E. Robert Griffin, Respondent, v Rocco Termini, Appellant, and Edward Herndon et al., and Edward J. Mahoney et al., Constituting the Board of Elections of the County of Erie, Respondents.

Order only insofar as it validates designating petition unanimously affirmed, without costs. (Appeal from order of Erie Supreme Court—Election Law.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Hancock, Jr., Schnepp, Doerr and Witmer, JJ. (Decided Aug. 21, 1980.)
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Francine Klein, Respondent, v Shearson, Hayden, Stone et al., Appellants. Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

Appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed December 28, 1979. The board found: "inasmuch as the employer picked an attractive vacation site for the convention and did not in any way discourage the early arrival of the employees, the accidental death occurred within the precincts of the employment.” Substantial evidence in the record supports the determination of the board. Decision affirmed, with costs to the Workers’ Compensation Board against the employer and its insurance carrier. Mahoney, P. J., Greenblott, Main and Mikoll, JJ., concur; Staley, Jr., J., not taking part.
#### LONDON FINANCE CO., Appellant, v. SHATTUCK, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

January 29, 1915.)

Action by the London Finance Company against John L. Shattuck.

L. B. Williams, of New York City, for appellant. H. B. Lewis, of New York City, for respondent.

No opinion. Order affirmed,. with $10 costs and disbursements. Order filed.
PUBLIC LAW 109–380—DEC. 1, 2006 120 STAT. 2671

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S. 101:

SENATE REPORTS: No. 109–46 (Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

Vol. 151 (2005): July 26, considered and passed Senate.

Vol. 152 (2006): Nov. 15, considered and passed House.

Æ

Public Law 109–380

109th Congress

An Act

To convey to the town of Frannie, Wyoming, certain land withdrawn by the Commissioner of Reclamation.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CONVEYANCE OF LAND TO THE TOWN OF FRANNIE,

WYOMING.

(a) CONVEYANCE.—Subject to valid existing rights, the Secretary

of the Interior shall convey by quitclaim deed, without consideration,

all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to the

parcel of land described in subsection (b) to the town of Frannie,

Wyoming.

(b) DESCRIPTION OF LAND.—The parcel of land referred to in

subsection (a) is the parcel of land withdrawn by the Commissioner

of Reclamation—

(1) consisting of approximately 37,500 square feet;

(2) located in the town of Frannie, Wyoming; and

(3) more particularly described in the approved Plat of

Survey of Frannie Townsite, Wyoming, as the North 1⁄2 of

Block 26, T. 58 N, R. 97 W.

(c) RESERVATION OF MINERAL RIGHTS.—The conveyance under

subsection (a) shall be subject to the reservation by the United

States of any oil and gas rights.

(d) REVOCATIONS.—

(1) SPECIAL USE PERMIT.—The special use permit issued

by the Commissioner of Reclamation, numbered O–LM–60–

L1413, and dated April 20, 1990, is revoked with respect to

the land described in subsection (b).

(2) SECRETARIAL ORDERS.—The following Secretarial Orders

issued by the Commissioner of Reclamation are revoked with

respect to the land described in subsection (b):

(A) The Secretarial Order for the withdrawal of land

for the Shoshone Reclamation Project dated October 21,

1913, as amended.

(B) The Secretarial Order for the withdrawal of land

for the Frannie Townsite Reservation dated April 19, 1920.

Approved December 1, 2006.

Dec. 1, 2006

[S. 101]
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Halina Dzebolo, Appellant.

[814 NYS2d 737]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Lange, J.), rendered August 13, 2004, convicting her of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was suppress physical evidence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a *818reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]).

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the warrantless search and seizure of certain items in her apartment did not violate her rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The police responded to the defendant’s apartment in response to an emergency call for an ambulance and, upon their arrival, the defendant let the police into the apartment. While the police lawfully remained inside the apartment, they properly seized only those items, in plain view, which constituted evidence of a crime *(see Texas v Brown,*460 US 730, 741-742 [1983]; *People v George,*7 AD3d 810, 811 [2004]; *People v Dixon,*281 AD2d 430 [2001]; *People v Rielly,*190 AD2d 695, 695-696 [1993]; *People v Thebner,*168 AD2d 653, 654 [1990]; *People v Reilly,*155 AD2d 961, 962 [1989]).

The sentence imposed was not excessive *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80, 83 [1982]).

The defendant’s contention that she was deprived of a fair trial by certain statements made by the prosecutor during summation is without merit and the defendant’s remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review. Goldstein, J.P., Mastro, Rivera and Lunn, JJ., concur.