IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-40624

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JHOANNA RAMOS, also known as JoJo,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:17-CR-121-3

Before DENNIS, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Following her guilty plea conviction for conspiracy to possess with the 

intent to distribute methamphetamine, Jhoanna Ramos was sentenced to 135 

months of imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of supervised release. 

At sentencing, the district court advised that she would be required to comply 

with the mandatory and special conditions of supervised release set forth in 

the PSR. Its written judgment specified, under the heading of “special 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 16, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 18-40624 Document: 00514918621 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/16/2019
No. 18-40624

2

conditions of supervised release,” that Ramos would be required to provide the 

probation officer with any requested financial information for purposes of 

monitoring her efforts to maintain lawful employment and that she must 

participate in, and pay for, a program of testing and treatment for drug abuse.

Ramos now argues that the district court abused its discretion in 

imposing, as part of its written judgment, the two special conditions which had 

been listed in the PSR but were not orally pronounced at sentencing. The 

Government’s assertion that review is limited to plain error is incorrect. See 

United States v. Rivas-Estrada, 906 F.3d 346, 348-50 (5th Cir. 2018) (reviewing 

for abuse of discretion under identical facts and finding cases applying plain 

error review where defendants were afforded a “unique opportunity to object,”

including United States v. Rouland, 726 F.3d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 2013), to be 

distinguishable). 

A defendant “has a constitutional right to be present at sentencing.” 

United States v. Bigelow, 462 F.3d 378, 380-81 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). If there is a conflict between the 

sentence imposed in court and the written judgment, the oral pronouncement 

controls. United States v. Martinez, 250 F.3d 941, 942 (5th Cir. 2001). There 

is no conflict between the written judgment and oral pronouncement if the 

judgment includes supervised release conditions that are mandatory, 

standard, or recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines, even if the conditions 

were not orally pronounced at sentencing. United States v. Torres-Aguilar, 

352 F.3d 934, 938 (5th Cir. 2003). However, when the written judgment 

contains a special condition of supervised release that was not in the oral 

pronouncement of sentence, a conflict exists, the oral pronouncement controls, 

and the written judgment should be reformed by deleting the special condition. 

See id. at 936. 

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3

Here, the district court abused its discretion in imposing the 

unpronounced financial-information provision when such condition was not 

recommended under the Guidelines, is not a mandatory condition adopted by 

the Eastern District of Texas, and is not the equivalent of any standard 

condition. See Rivas-Estrada, 906 F.3d at 348, 350-51; Torres-Aguilar, 

352 F.3d at 938; see also U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(3). The district court similarly 

abused its discretion when it imposed the mandatory-drug-treatment provision

without specifically announcing it at sentencing.1 See Rivas-Estrada, 906 F.3d 

at 348-51. Although the record indicates that Ramos had a history of drug 

abuse and thus that treatment could be recommended under § 5D1.3(d)(4), the 

written judgment form adopted by the district court, form AO 245B, specifically 

lists the drug-treatment condition as a “special” rather than “standard” 

condition and thus creates a conflict between the written judgment and oral 

pronouncement of sentence. See id; Rouland, 726 F.3d at 736-37; Bigelow, 

462 F.3d at 381-82; see also Martinez, 250 F.3d at 942.

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is VACATED IN PART AND 

REMANDED for the district court to amend its written judgment to conform 

to its oral sentence by removing the two unpronounced special conditions of 

supervised release.

 

1 The Government’s assertion that this court should not review Ramos’s challenge to 

the imposition of the drug-treatment condition because she invited or waived the error by 

requesting drug treatment during incarceration is not well-taken. Ramos’s request to 

participate in an approved drug-treatment program while in custody did not waive her right 

to object to the imposition of a special condition of supervised release, included in the 

judgment but not announced at sentencing, requiring her to participate in, and pay for, 

substance abuse treatment while on supervision following her release from custody, nor did 

such request invite any error related thereto. See United States v. Salazar, 751 F.3d 326, 

332 (5th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Dodson, 288 F.3d 153, 160 (5th Cir. 2002).

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