Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

December 2006 MILITARY 

OPERATIONS 

High-Level DOD 

Action Needed to 

Address Long-standing 

Problems with 

Management and 

Oversight of 

Contractors 

Supporting Deployed 

Forces 

GAO-07-145 

This report was revised on December 21, 2006, to reflect a change to the text 

on page 5, in line 12 in the second bulleted paragraph, “training did provide” is 

revised to “training did not provide.”
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

December 2006

MILITARY OPERATIONS 

High-Level DOD Action Needed to 

Address Long-standing Problems with 

Management and Oversight of 

Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces 

Highlights of GAO-07-145, a report to 

congressional committees 

Prior GAO reports have identified

problems with the Department of

Defense’s (DOD) management and

oversight of contractors supporting 

deployed forces. GAO issued its 

first comprehensive report 

examining these problems in June

2003. Because of the broad 

congressional interest in U.S. 

military operations in Iraq and 

DOD’s increasing use of

contractors to support U.S. forces 

in Iraq, GAO initiated this follow-on 

review under the Comptroller 

General’s statutory authority. 

Specifically, GAO’s objective was 

to determine the extent to which

DOD has improved its management

and oversight of contractors 

supporting deployed forces since 

our 2003 report. GAO reviewed

DOD policies and interviewed 

military and contractor officials 

both at deployed locations and in 

the United States. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the 

Secretary of Defense appoint a 

focal point within the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics, at a sufficiently senior

level and with the appropriate 

resources, dedicated to leading 

DOD efforts to improve the

management and oversight of

contractors supporting deployed 

forces. DOD agreed with our

recommendation. 

DOD continues to face long-standing problems that hinder its management 

and oversight of contractors at deployed locations. DOD has taken some 

steps to improve its guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed 

forces, addressing some of the problems GAO has raised since the mid1990s. However, while the Office of the Secretary of Defense is responsible 

for monitoring and managing the implementation of this guidance, it has not 

allocated the organizational resources and accountability to focus on issues 

regarding contractor support to deployed forces. Also, while DOD’s new 

guidance is a noteworthy step, a number of problems we have previously 

reported on continue to pose difficulties for military personnel in deployed 

locations. For example: 

• DOD continues to have limited visibility over contractors because 

information on the number of contractors at deployed locations or the 

services they provide is not aggregated by any organization within DOD 

or its components. As a result, senior leaders and military commanders 

cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which they rely on 

contractors to support their operations. For example, when MultiNational Force-Iraq began to develop a base consolidation plan, officials 

were unable to determine how many contractors were deployed to bases 

in Iraq. They therefore ran the risk of over-building or under-building the 

capacity of the consolidated bases. 

• DOD continues to not have adequate contractor oversight personnel at 

deployed locations, precluding its ability to obtain reasonable assurance 

that contractors are meeting contract requirements efficiently and 

effectively at each location where work is being performed. While a lack 

of adequate contract oversight personnel is a DOD-wide problem, 

lacking adequate personnel in more demanding contracting 

environments in deployed locations presents unique difficulties.

• Despite facing many of the same difficulties managing and overseeing

contractors in Iraq that it faced in previous military operations, we found 

no organization within DOD or its components responsible for 

developing procedures to systematically collect and share its 

institutional knowledge using contractors to support deployed forces. As 

a result, as new units deploy to Iraq, they run the risk of repeating past 

mistakes and being unable to build on the efficiencies others have 

developed during past operations that involved contractor support. 

• Military personnel continue to receive limited or no training on the use 

of contractors as part of their pre-deployment training or professional 

military education. The lack of training hinders the ability of military 

commanders to adequately plan for the use of contractor support and 

inhibits the ability of contract oversight personnel to manage and 

oversee contractors in deployed locations. Despite DOD’s concurrence 

with our previous recommendations to improve such training, we found 

no standard to ensure information about contractor support is 

incorporated in pre-deployment training. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-145.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William M. Solis

at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

While DOD Has Made Some Noteworthy Improvements, Longstanding Problems Continue to Hinder DOD’s Management and 

Oversight of Contractors at Deployed Locations 10 

Conclusions 35

Recommendation for Executive Action 36 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 41 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 47 

Related GAO Products 53 

Table 

Table 1: Key Contract Management Roles and Responsibilities 10 

Figures 

Figure 1: Contracts for Select Services in Iraq Are Awarded by 

Many Different DOD Agencies 8 

Figure 2: Previous GAO Recommendations Highlighting the Need 

for Better Training on the Use of Contractor Support to 

Deployed Forces 28 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

LOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 

Page i GAO-07-145 Military Operations
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Page ii GAO-07-145 Military Operations
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

December 18, 2006 

Congressional Committees 

The U.S. military has long used contractors to provide supplies and 

services to deployed U.S. forces. However, the scale of contractor support 

the Department of Defense (DOD) relies on today in locations such as Iraq 

and elsewhere throughout Southwest Asia has increased considerably 

from what DOD relied on during previous military operations, such as 

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and in the Balkans. Moreover, 

DOD’s reliance on contractors continues to grow. The Army alone 

estimates that almost 60,000 contractor employees currently support 

ongoing military operations in Southwest Asia. By way of contrast, an 

estimated 9,200 contractor personnel supported military operations in the 

1991 Gulf War.1

 Similarly, the spending on contractors supporting 

deployed forces is significant. For example, spending on DOD’s single 

largest contract supporting U.S. forces in Southwest Asia—the Army’s 

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)—was about $15.4 billion 

between 2001 and 2004.

2

 Today, contractors provide deployed U.S. forces 

with communication services; interpreters who accompany military 

patrols; base operations support (e.g., food and housing); weapons 

systems maintenance; intelligence analysis; and a variety of other support. 

Many of these contractors live and work side by side with their military 

counterparts and share many of the same risks and hardships. 

Since 1997, we have reported on DOD’s management and training 

shortcomings related to its use of contractor support to deployed forces.3

In June 2003, we issued our first comprehensive review of DOD’s 

management and oversight of contractor support to deployed forces, 

 1

Estimated figures are used because neither DOD nor the services have a single point that 

collects information on contracts that support deployed forces. 

2

Established in 1985, LOGCAP is an Army program that preplans for the use of global

corporate resources to support worldwide contingency operations. In the event that U.S. 

forces deploy, contractor support is then available to a military commander as an option. 

3

See the end of this report for a list of prior GAO reports and testimonies on the use of 

contractors to support deployed U.S. forces. 

Page 1 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
focusing our efforts in the Balkans and Southwest Asia.4

 We reported that 

(1) DOD used contractors for a wide range of services; (2) DOD and the 

services had not identified essential services provided by contractors or 

developed backup plans for those services; and (3) guidance and contract 

language and oversight varied within DOD and the services, creating 

challenges that might hinder the efficient use of contractors. We made 

several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to improve DOD’s 

guidance, training, and contractor visibility at all levels of command, 

recommendations that DOD broadly agreed with. Moreover, we have 

established that clear policies, procedures, criteria, and management 

oversight are needed to help agencies use resources effectively and 

efficiently to meet organizational and program objectives.5

 However, our 

audit work on related subjects since 2003 indicated that DOD continued to

face difficulties regarding its use of contractors to support deployed 

forces. 

Because of continued congressional interest in DOD’s use of contractors 

to support deployed forces, we prepared this report under the Comptroller 

General’s statutory authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. 

Specifically, our objective was to determine the extent to which DOD has 

improved its management and oversight of contractors supporting 

deployed forces since our last comprehensive review of this issue in 2003. 

We focused our efforts in Iraq and elsewhere in Southwest Asia. 

To address our objective, we met with and obtained documentation from 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and service 

headquarters officials to review changes to key DOD and service guidance 

and obtain a comprehensive understanding of their efforts in addressing 

the issues raised in our 2003 report. We visited select DOD components 

based on their responsibilities for contract management, such as the 

Defense Contract Management Agency, and various service commands in 

the United States, including the Army Materiel Command, to discuss their 

roles in managing and overseeing contractors in deployed locations. We 

also interviewed staff officers from six combat units that had been 

 4

See GAO, Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces 

but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans, GAO-03-695 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 

2003). 

5

See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999) and Internal Control 

Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: August 2001). 

Page 2 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
deployed to Iraq between 2003 and 2006 to discuss their experiences with 

contractors at deployed locations. We traveled to Iraq and Kuwait to meet 

with deployed combat units, installation commanders, headquarters 

personnel, and other military personnel responsible for contracting and 

contract management at deployed locations. In addition, we met with 26 

U.S. and foreign contractors providing a variety of services to DOD at 

deployed locations to discuss their perspectives on contracting and 

contract management issues. We conducted our review from August 2005 

through October 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Details on our scope and methodology are contained in 

appendix I. 

Although DOD has taken action to improve its guidance on the use of 

contractors to support deployed forces since our 2003 report, a number of 

long-standing problems continue to hinder DOD’s management and 

oversight of contractors at deployed locations. Steps DOD has taken 

include amending its acquisition regulations to add standardized 

deployment language for contracts that may require contractors to 

accompany U.S. forces deployed outside the United States and, in October 

2005, issuing the first DOD-wide instruction on the use of contractors to 

support deployed forces, which addresses some of the problems we have 

previously raised. However, we have concerns that DOD components are 

not implementing this instruction. For example, while the instruction 

assigns responsibility for monitoring and managing its implementation to 

the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 

Materiel Readiness, there is no focal point within this office responsible 

for issues regarding contractor support to deployed forces. According to

officials within the office, given the multiple issues they are responsible 

for, implementing the instruction or taking other steps to improve DOD’s 

management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces is a 

lower priority. Ultimately, while DOD’s new guidance is a good first step 

towards improving the department’s management and oversight of 

contractors, the department continues to face problems, including: 

Results in Brief 

• Limited visibility over contractors and contractor activity: While DOD 

policy since 1990 has recognized the importance of having visibility over 

the number of contractors providing essential services to U.S. forces and 

the services they provide, DOD continues to lack the capability to provide 

senior leaders and military commanders with information on the totality of 

contractor support to deployed forces. Having this information is 

important in order for military commanders to incorporate contractor 

support into their planning efforts. For example, senior military 

Page 3 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
commanders in Iraq told us that when they began to develop a base 

consolidation plan for Iraq they had no source to draw upon to determine 

how many contractor employees were located on each installation. As a 

result, they ran the risk of overbuilding or underbuilding the capacity of 

the consolidated bases. Similarly, commanders need visibility over the 

number of contractor employees residing on an installation in order to 

make informed decisions regarding base operations support (e.g., food

and housing) and force protection. Having limited visibility can also 

unnecessarily increase contracting costs to the government. For example, 

according to an Army Materiel Command official, the Army estimates that 

because of their limited visibility over contractors at deployed locations 

and the government services they are entitled to, about $43 million is lost 

every year on free meals being provided to contractor employees who are 

also receiving a per diem allowance for food. DOD’s October 2005 

instruction requires the department to maintain by-name accountability of 

contractors deploying with the force. The Army has taken steps to develop 

a database that could provide this accountability for all DOD components 

and help military commanders incorporate contractor support into their 

planning efforts. However, at the time of our review, this database was still 

in development, and officials involved with this effort told us that greater 

involvement by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which is 

responsible for designating a database to provide this accountability, will 

be needed to direct all DOD components to use this database and resolve 

some additional institutional obstacles. 

• Lack of adequate contract oversight personnel: Although having the right 

people with the right skills to oversee contractor performance is critical to

ensure the efficient and effective use of contractors, most contract 

oversight personnel we met with told us DOD does not have adequate 

personnel at deployed locations. Having too few contract oversight 

personnel precludes DOD from being able to obtain reasonable assurance 

that contractors are meeting their contract requirements at every location

where the work is being performed. For example, a Defense Contract 

Management Agency official responsible for overseeing portions of the 

Army’s LOGCAP contract at 27 installations in Iraq told us he was unable 

to visit all of these locations during his 6-month tour in Iraq. As a result, he 

could not effectively monitor the contractor’s performance at those sites. 

As we have previously reported, when contract oversight personnel are 

able to review the types and levels of services provided by contractors for 

both economy and efficiency, savings can be realized. Without adequate 

contract oversight personnel, DOD is at risk of being unable to identify 

and correct poor contractor performance in a timely manner. Prior GAO 

reports make clear that having too few contract oversight personnel is a 

DOD-wide problem affecting the department’s management and oversight

of contractors both in the United States and at deployed locations. 

Page 4 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
However, the more demanding contracting environment at deployed 

locations creates unique difficulties for contract oversight personnel. 

• Limited collection and sharing of institutional knowledge: DOD has made

few efforts to leverage its institutional knowledge and experiences using 

contractors to support deployed forces, despite facing many of the same 

difficulties managing contractors in Iraq that it faced in previous military 

operations. As early as 1997, we recommended that DOD incorporate 

lessons learned from previous and ongoing operations into its planning 

and preparation for the use of contractor support to deployed forces. 

However, we found no organization within DOD or its components 

responsible for developing procedures to capture lessons learned on the 

use of contractor support at deployed locations. Our review of lessons 

learned that were collected by DOD components, as well as discussions 

with DOD officials and military units deployed to Iraq, found that lessons 

learned on the use of contractor support at deployed locations were not 

routinely gathered and shared. For example, we found that a guidebook on

the use of a logistical support contract almost identical to LOGCAP, which 

was developed by U.S. Army, Europe for the Balkans, was not made 

available to military commanders in Iraq until 2006. As a result, 

commanders in Iraq were unable to take advantage of an important tool to

increase their familiarity with LOGCAP and build on efficiencies the Army 

had previously identified. 

• Limited or no information on contractor support in pre-deployment 

training: We have pointed out the need for better pre-deployment training 

of military commanders and contract oversight personnel on the use of 

contractor support in several of our earlier reports, and DOD has agreed 

with our recommendations addressing this need. However, we found little 

evidence that improvements have been made to include more information 

on the use of contractors in pre-deployment training. Several military 

commanders told us they were unaware of the types of services they 

would be relying on until after they deployed to Iraq. As a result, they were

unable to adequately plan for the use of contractor support. Similarly, 

several commanders of combat units told us that their pre-deployment 

would have to provide personnel to escort contractor personnel. As a 

result, these commanders could not incorporate this requirement into 

their planning efforts and were surprised by the substantial portion of 

their personnel they were required to allocate as escorts; personnel they 

had expected to be available to perform other functions. Limited or no predeployment training on the use of contractor support can also lead to 

confusion regarding roles and responsibilities military commanders have 

in overseeing contractors at a deployed location. We found several 

instances where military commanders attempted to direct or ran the risk 

of directing a contractor to perform work outside the scope of the 

Page 5 GAO-07-145 Military Operations

training did not provide them with information on the extent to which they 
contract, despite the fact commanders are not authorized to do so, which 

can result in increased costs to the government. In addition, limited or no 

information on the use of contractors in pre-deployment training can

inhibit the ability of contract oversight personnel to execute their 

responsibilities. For example, the contracting officer’s representative for a 

linguist support contract told us his pre-deployment training did not 

adequately prepare him for his responsibilities to review invoices 

submitted by the contractor. We found no DOD or service guidance, 

policy, or doctrine establishing standards to ensure that military units 

incorporate information about contractor support to deployed forces in 

their pre-deployment training. Nevertheless, several officials told us that 

DOD and its components need to include information on contractor 

support into their pre-deployment training, including mission rehearsal 

exercises, and that the use of contractors at deployed locations should 

also be integrated into professional military education. 

GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense appoint a focal point 

within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, at a sufficiently senior level and with the 

appropriate resources, dedicated to leading DOD’s efforts to improve 

contract management and oversight at deployed locations. The entity that

functions as this focal point would be responsible for, among other things, 

improving visibility over contractor support at deployed locations and 

developing standards to improve the pre-deployment training of military 

commanders and contract oversight personnel on issues related to 

contractor support to deployed forces. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 

recommendation. DOD stated in their comments that they had created the 

office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program 

Support) on October 1, 2006 to serve as the office of primary responsibility 

for issues related to contractor support. However, it is not clear that this 

office would serve as the focal point dedicated to leading DOD’s efforts to

improve contract management and oversight. DOD also provided several 

technical comments that we considered and incorporated where 

appropriate.

Since the early 1990s, DOD has increasingly relied on contractors to meet 

many of its logistical and operational support needs during combat 

operations, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian assistance missions, 

ranging from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and operations in the 

Balkans (e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo) to Afghanistan and Iraq. Factors that 

Background 

Page 6 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
have contributed to this increase include reductions in the size of the 

military, an increase in the number of operations and missions 

undertaken, and DOD’s use of increasingly sophisticated weapons 

systems. Depending on the service being provided by contractors, 

contractor employees may be U.S. citizens, host country nationals,6

 or 

third country nationals.7

 Contracts supporting weapons systems, for 

example, often restrict employment to U.S. citizens, while contracts 

providing base operations support frequently employ host country or third 

country nationals. 

Contracts supporting deployed forces typically fall into three broad 

categories—theater support, external support, and systems support. 

Theater support contracts are normally awarded by contracting agencies 

associated with the regional combatant command, for example, the U.S. 

Central Command or service component commands, such as the U.S. 

Army Central Command, or by contracting offices at deployed locations 

such as in Iraq. Contracts can be for recurring services—such as 

equipment rental or repair, minor construction, security, and intelligence 

services—or for the one-time delivery of goods and services at the 

deployed location. External support contracts are awarded by commands 

external to the combatant command or component commands, such as the 

Defense Logistics Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Under 

external support contracts, contractors are generally expected to provide 

services at the deployed location. LOGCAP is an example of an external

support contract. Finally, systems support contracts provide logistics 

support to maintain and operate weapons and other systems. These types 

of contracts are most often awarded by the commands responsible for 

building and buying the weapons or other systems. 

The individual services and a wide array of DOD and non-DOD agencies 

can award contracts to support deployed forces.8

 Within a service or 

agency, numerous contracting officers, with varying degrees of knowledge 

 6

A host country national is an employee of a contractor who is a citizen of the country 

where the work is being performed. 

7

A third country national is an employee of a contractor who is neither a citizen of the 

United States nor the host country. 

8

For example, in 2003 DOD relied on a Department of the Interior contracting office that 

specializes in awarding and administering contracts for other agencies to obtain 

contractor-provided intelligence-related services quickly to support U.S. forces in Iraq. See

GAO, Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD’s and Interior’s Orders to Support 

Military Operations, GAO-05-201 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005). 

Page 7 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
about how contractors and the military operate in deployed locations, can 

award contracts that support deployed forces. According to DOD 

estimates, in 2005 several hundred contractor firms provided U.S. forces 

with a wide range of services at deployed locations. Figure 1 illustrates the 

broad array of contractor services being provided in Iraq and the DOD 

agency that awarded each contract. 

Figure 1: Contracts for Select Services in Iraq Are Awarded by Many Different DOD Agencies 

The customer (e.g., a military unit) for these contractor-provided services

is responsible for identifying and validating requirements to be addressed 

by the contractor as well as evaluating the contractor’s performance and 

ensuring that contractor-provided services are used in an economical and

efficient manner. In addition, DOD has established specific policies on 

how contracts, including those that support deployed forces, should be 

administered and managed. Oversight of contracts ultimately rests with 

the contracting officer who has the responsibility for ensuring that 

contractors meet the requirements set forth in the contract. However, 

Page 8 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
most contracting officers are not located at the deployed location. As a 

result, contracting officers appoint contract oversight personnel who 

represent the contracting officer at the deployed location and are 

responsible for monitoring contractor performance. How contracts and 

contractors are monitored at a deployed location is largely a function of 

the size and scope of the contract. Contracting officers for large-scale and 

high-value contracts such as LOGCAP have opted to have personnel from 

the Defense Contract Management Agency monitor a contractor’s 

performance and management systems to ensure that the cost, product 

performance, and delivery schedules comply with the terms and 

conditions of the contract. Defense Contract Management Agency officials 

delegate daily oversight responsibilities to individuals drawn from units 

receiving support from these contractors to act as contracting officer’s 

representatives for specific services being provided. For smaller contracts,

contracting officers usually directly appoint contracting officer’s 

representatives or contracting officer’s technical representatives to 

monitor contractor performance at the deployed location. These 

individuals are typically drawn from units receiving contractor-provided 

services, are not normally contracting specialists, and serve as contract 

monitors as an additional duty. They cannot direct the contractor by 

making commitments or changes that affect price, quality, quantity, 

delivery, or other terms and conditions of the contract. Instead, they act as 

the eyes and ears of the contracting officer and serve as the liaison 

between the contractor and the contracting officer. Table 1 provides 

additional information on the contract management roles and 

responsibilities of key DOD personnel. 

Page 9 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
Table 1: Key Contract Management Roles and Responsibilities 

Customers: 

• Develop requirements. 

• Write statements of work. 

• Obtain funding. 

• Provide contracting officer’s 

representatives to monitor contract 

performance. 

Contracting officer: 

• Interpret the contract. 

• Obligate the government for work under the 

contract. 

• Delegate contract management 

responsibilities to deployed personnel who 

monitor contractor performance. 

• Ensure that the contractor corrects cited 

deficiencies. 

Defense Contract Management

Agency: 

• Appoint contracting officer’s 

representatives for LOGCAP.

• Review and approve purchase 

requisitions. 

• Monitor government property. 

• Evaluate quality assurance. 

• Monitor contract performance. 

• Evaluate technical performance. 

Contracting officer’s representative: 

• Provide daily contract oversight. 

• Evaluate quality assurance. 

• Monitor contract performance. 

• Evaluate technical performance. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

A number of long-standing problems continue to hinder DOD’s 

management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations. Although 

DOD has issued departmentwide guidance on the use of contractors to 

support deployed forces and some DOD components have taken some 

actions to improve management and oversight of contractors, there is no 

DOD-wide effort in place to resolve these long-standing problems. These 

problems include a lack of visibility over the totality of contractor support 

at deployed locations; a lack of adequate contract oversight personnel; the 

failure to collect and share institutional knowledge on the use of 

contractors at deployed locations; and limited or no training of military 

personnel on the use of contractors as part of their pre-deployment 

training or professional military education. 

While DOD Has Made 

Some Noteworthy 

Improvements, Longstanding Problems 

Continue to Hinder 

DOD’s Management 

and Oversight of 

Contractors at 

Deployed Locations 

Page 10 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
In June 2003, we recommended that DOD take steps to improve its 

guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed U.S. forces. Our 

report noted the lack of standardized deployment language in contracts 

that support or may support deployed U.S. forces. Since then, in June 

2005, DOD amended its acquisition regulations, the Defense Federal 

Acquisition Regulation Supplement, by providing DOD-wide policy and a 

contract clause to address situations that may require contractors to 

accompany U.S. forces deployed outside the United States. Our 2003 

report also noted a lack of DOD-wide guidance regarding DOD’s use of 

and responsibilities to contractors supporting deployed forces. Since then, 

DOD has taken steps to improve its guidance by issuing the first DOD-wide

instruction on contractor support to deployed forces.9

 Specifically, in

October 2005, DOD issued DOD Instruction 3020.41, entitled Contractor 

Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces, which states, 

among other things, that it is DOD policy to 

DOD Has Taken Some 

Noteworthy Steps to 

Improve Its Policy and 

Guidance on the Use of 

Contractors to Support 

Deployed Forces, but Lack 

of High-Level Action 

Hinders Implementation 

• coordinate any proposed contractor logistic support arrangements that 

may affect Combatant Commanders’ operational plans and operations 

orders with the affected geographic Combatant Commands, 

• ensure contracts clearly and accurately specify the terms and conditions

under which the contractor is to perform and describe the specific support 

relationship between the contractor and DOD, and 

• maintain by-name accountability of contractors deploying with the force 

and contract capability information in a joint database.10

DOD Instruction 3020.41 provides guidance on a wide range of contractor 

support issues. For example, the instruction provides guidance on when

contractors can be used to provide security for DOD assets, when medical 

support can be provided to contractors, and commanders’ responsibilities 

for providing force protection and security to contractors. In addition, the 

instruction references a number of existing policies and guidance that may 

affect DOD’s responsibilities to contractors supporting U.S. forces at a 

deployed location. However, the instruction does not address a number of 

 9

Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to 

Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces (Oct. 3, 2005). 

10DOD Instruction 3020.41 requires the department to maintain by-name accountability of 

contractors deploying with the force, who are defined as systems support and external

support contractors, and associated subcontractors, specifically authorized in their 

contract to deploy to support U.S. forces. At the time of our review, DOD was in the

process of clarifying whether additional contractor personnel should be included in the 

joint database. 

Page 11 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
problems we have raised in previous reports. For example, although the 

instruction addresses the need for visibility over contractors, it does not 

address the need to provide adequate contract oversight personnel, to 

collect and share institutional knowledge on the use of contractors at 

deployed locations, or to provide pre-deployment training on the use of 

contractor support. 

While issuance of DOD Instruction 3020.41 represents a noteworthy 

improvement to DOD’s guidance on the use of contractor support to 

deployed forces, we found little evidence that DOD components are 

implementing the guidance. Moreover, Congress has concerns over 

implementation of the instruction as evidenced by a provision in the 

Conference Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2007 requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit to 

Congress a report on the department’s efforts to implement the 

instruction.11 DOD Instruction 3020.41 assigns responsibility for 

monitoring and managing the implementation of the instruction to the 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness 

(within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics). However, the Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness is responsible for several 

policy areas including supply chain management and transportation 

policy. A number of assistant deputy under secretaries serve as functional 

experts responsible for these areas. For example, the Assistant Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense (Transportation Policy) serves as the principal 

advisor for establishing policies and providing guidance to DOD 

components for efficient and effective use of DOD and commercial 

transportation resources. However, no similar individual is responsible 

primarily for issues regarding contractor support to deployed forces, 

including implementation of the instruction. According to senior officials 

within the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics 

and Material Readiness, given the multiple issues the office is responsible 

for, addressing contractor support to deployed forces issues is a lower 

priority. 

Consequently, at the time of our review we found that few measures had 

been taken by the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Logistics and Material Readiness to ensure that DOD components were 

 11National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-702, p. 

243 (Sept. 29, 2006). 

Page 12 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
complying with DOD Instruction 3020.41. For example, a senior official 

with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence told us 

that the office was not aware of its responsibility under the instruction to 

develop and implement, as required, procedures for counterintelligence 

and security screenings of contractors, until our inquiry regarding their 

compliance with that requirement. Similarly, a senior Joint Staff official 

involved in the issuance of DOD Instruction 3020.41 expressed concerns 

that only some of the senior officials who needed to know about the 

instruction had been made aware that it was issued. 

Instead, we found that working groups of subject matter experts within 

the Joint Staff and the services have begun to address the instruction’s 

requirements. For example, in May 2006 a working group began to draft a 

new joint publication that provides guidance on meeting the requirements 

of DOD Instruction 3020.41, as well as addresses other contractor support 

issues. As another example, beginning in April 2006 the Joint Staff 

Directorate of Logistics organized a joint contingency contract 

management working group consisting of representatives from each of the 

military services, the Joint Staff, and various DOD components that meets 

periodically to discuss issues related to implementing the instruction’s 

requirement to maintain by-name accountability of contractor personnel 

supporting deployed forces. However, joint contingency contract 

management working group officials told us they have no formal charter 

designating their responsibilities and that they therefore lack the authority 

to direct DOD components to implement the instruction’s requirements. 

Working group officials told us they are limited in how much they can 

accomplish without more direct involvement by senior officials within the 

Joint Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. For example, they told us that they 

will likely need someone at the general officer level to act as an advocate 

for their ongoing efforts to implement the instruction’s requirements and 

address other contractor support issues. Moreover, a number of senior 

officials, including a general officer responsible for logistics for MultiNational Force-Iraq and a senior official from the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, told us 

that a focused effort within the Office of the Secretary of Defense is 

needed to coordinate efforts to improve DOD’s management and oversight 

of contractors supporting deployed forces. 

We have previously reported on the benefits of establishing a single point

of focus at a sufficiently senior level to coordinate and integrate various 

DOD efforts to address concerns with antiterrorism and the 

Page 13 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
transformation of military capabilities.12 For example, DOD recognized the 

need for a single DOD entity to implement and improve the department’s 

antiterrorism guidance. In 1996, following the Khobar Towers bombing, 

the Downing task force investigated the incident and made 

recommendations on how to prevent or minimize the damage of future 

attacks. One of the central conclusions of the Downing task force was that 

DOD needed a stronger centralized approach to antiterrorism. To 

implement this approach, the task force said, a single DOD entity should 

be designated as responsible for antiterrorism. Further, this entity, among 

other things, should develop and issue physical security standards, inspect 

compliance with these standards, manage resources on both a routine and 

emergency basis, and assist field commanders with antiterrorism matters. 

The task force found in its review that the lack of a single DOD entity 

responsible for antiterrorism had had an adverse impact on the posture of

forces in the field. In response to the task force’s recommendation, the 

Secretary of Defense established an office within the Joint Staff to act as 

the focal point for antiterrorism. Among other things, this office has: 

• improved antiterrorism guidance, 

• established antiterrorism training standards for all levels of command, and 

• instituted outreach programs to collect and distribute antiterrorism 

lessons learned. 

Although DOD has long recognized the importance of having visibility over 

all contractor support at deployed locations, the department continues to

be able to provide senior leaders and military commanders with only 

limited visibility over those contractors. This limited visibility continues to 

hinder the management and oversight of contractors in deployed 

locations, including Iraq. In the absence of DOD-wide efforts to address 

these issues, some DOD components at deployed locations and in the 

United States have taken their own steps to improve visibility.

Limited Visibility over All 

Contractor Support 

Continues to Hinder DOD’s 

Management and 

Oversight of Contractors at 

Deployed Locations 

 12See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for 

Forces Overseas, GAO/NSIAD-00-181 (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2000) and Military 

Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to 

Enhance DOD’s Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities, GAO-05-70 (Washington, D.C.: 

Dec. 17, 2004). 

Page 14 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
DOD continues to lack the ability to provide military commanders and 

senior leaders with visibility over all contractor support at deployed 

locations, including the range of services being provided to U.S. forces and 

the number of contractor personnel at deployed locations. Although most 

of the contract oversight personnel we met with had visibility over the 

individual contracts for which they were directly responsible, including

the number and location of contractor personnel, this information was not 

aggregated by DOD and was not provided to commanders at higher levels. 

Many officials responsible for managing and overseeing contractors that 

support deployed forces at various levels of command in Iraq told us there 

was no office, database, or other source that could provide them 

consolidated information on all contractor support at a deployed location. 

The following are examples of what commanders in Iraq told us: 

DOD Continues to be Unable to 

Provide Military Commanders 

at Deployed Locations and 

Senior Leaders with Visibility 

over All Contractor Support 

• senior commanders within Multi-National Force-Iraq and Multi-National 

Corps-Iraq13 told us they had no source to go to that could provide them 

with a comprehensive summary of contractor services currently being

provided U.S. forces in Iraq; 

• the base commander of Logistical Support Area Anaconda, a major 

logistics hub in Iraq with about 10,000 contractor personnel, told us he 

only had limited visibility of the number of contractors at his installation 

and the support they were providing; and 

• a battalion commander from a Stryker brigade told us he was unable to 

determine the number of contractor-provided interpreters available to

support his unit. 

Moreover, we found that major commands and higher headquarters do not 

maintain a source of information that could provide improved visibility 

over all contractors at deployed locations, as illustrated by the following 

examples: 

• the Army Materiel Command and Air Force Materiel Command were 

unable to readily provide us with comprehensive information on the 

number of contractors they were using at deployed locations or the 

services those contractors were providing to U.S. forces, 

 13Multi-National Force-Iraq is responsible for counter-insurgency operations to isolate and

neutralize former regime extremists and foreign terrorists and for organizing, training, and

equipping Iraq’s security forces. Multi-National Corps-Iraq is the tactical unit of MultiNational Force-Iraq responsible for command and control of operations in Iraq. 

Page 15 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
• contracting officials at U.S. Central Command told us that they do not 

maintain centralized information on the contractor support within their 

area of operation, and 

• Air Force headquarters officials determined the Air Force had about 500 

civilians deployed to Iraq but could not readily identify how many of these 

individuals were contractor personnel as opposed to DOD civilians. 

DOD has long recognized the importance of providing visibility over 

contractors supporting deployed forces. As discussed in our 2003 report, 

DOD has required since 1990 that DOD components maintain visibility 

over contractors providing essential services to U.S. forces and the 

services they provide. However, in 2003 we reported that DOD 

components were not meeting this requirement and that they lacked 

visibility over all contractor support to forces deployed to the Balkans and 

Southwest Asia. Further, a 2004 Joint Staff review of contract management 

at deployed locations found commanders continued to have insufficient 

visibility over contractors operating in deployed locations and 

recommended that DOD provide the combatant commander the capability 

to maintain visibility over contractor personnel and contract capabilities. 

In addition, DOD has been unable to provide Congress with information 

on the totality of contractor support in Iraq, including numbers of 

contractors and the costs of the services they provide. 

Limited visibility over contractor support poses a variety of problems for 

military commanders and senior leaders responsible for contract 

management and oversight in deployed locations such as Iraq. With limited 

visibility over contractors, military commanders and other senior leaders 

cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which they rely on 

contractors as an asset to support their operations. Further, they cannot 

build this reliance on contractors into their assessments of risks 

associated with the potential loss of essential services provided by 

contractors, an issue we discussed extensively in our 2003 report. 

We spoke with several senior military leaders in Iraq who told us their lack

of visibility over contractor support in Iraq hindered their ability to 

incorporate contractors into their planning efforts. For example, a general

officer responsible for logistics for Multi-National Force-Iraq told us that 

acquiring visibility over all contractor support in Iraq was a top priority 

because Multi-National Force-Iraq did not have the information needed to

include the presence of contractors in its planning activities. A number of 

Multi-National Force-Iraq officials told us that when they began to develop

plans to consolidate forward operating bases in Iraq, they discovered that 

while they could determine the number and type of military units on those 

Limited Visibility Continues to 

Hinder DOD’s Management and 

Oversight of Contractors in Iraq 

Page 16 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
bases, they had no means of obtaining similar information about 

contractors, including the number of contractor personnel on each base 

and the support the military was providing them. According to a senior 

Multi-National Force-Iraq official, without this information, Multi-National 

Force-Iraq ran the risk of overbuilding or underbuilding the capacity of the 

consolidated bases to accommodate the number of individuals expected to 

be stationed there. Because Multi-National Force-Iraq lacked a source to 

draw upon for information regarding the extent of contractor support in 

Iraq, Multi-National Force-Iraq issued a fragmentary order14 in April 2006 to 

base commanders in Iraq to conduct a census of contractors residing on 

the installations. However, at the time of our review, this effort had only 

yielded partial results which an Army official familiar with the census 

effort told us would not meet the initial goals of the fragmentary order. 

Limited visibility over contractors and the services they provide at a 

deployed location can also hinder military commanders’ abilities to fully 

understand the impact that their decisions can have on their installations. 

For example, when commanders make decisions to restrict access of host 

country nationals to an installation, this can result in the loss of some 

contractor-provided services, such as construction or the delivery of 

supplies that may be dependent upon the use of host country nationals. 

Similarly, one of the more frequent concerns contractors in Kuwait and 

Iraq related to us was the impact that base commanders’ decisions to 

change policies regarding badging requirements and other base access 

procedures had on their ability to provide services to those bases.15

Decisions affecting such functions as force protection and base operations

support also rely on commanders having an accurate picture of the 

contractor assets they have in their area of operations and an

understanding of the number of contractor personnel they have to 

support. As we reported in 2003, military commanders require visibility 

over contractor support at deployed locations because they are 

responsible for all the people in their area of operations, including 

 14A fragmentary order, or FRAGO, is an abbreviated form of an operation order used to

inform units of changes in missions and the tactical situation. 

15We recently reported that military commanders in Iraq have instituted a variety of base 

access procedures to address the risk third country and host country nationals may pose. 

See GAO, Military Operations: Background Screenings of Contractor Employees 

Supporting Deployed Forces May Lack Critical Information, but U.S. Forces Take Steps

to Mitigate the Risks Contractors May Pose, GAO-06-999R (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 

2006). 

Page 17 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
contractor personnel. Given the security situation in Iraq, knowledge of 

who is on their installation helps commanders account for all individuals 

in the event of a mortar attack or other hostile action. For example, Army 

officials assisting the movement of contractors into and out of Iraq 

described to us the difficulties DOD faced determining the identity of a 

contractor who was taken hostage and then killed by the insurgency in

Iraq. We also met with several military commanders who told us that a 

lack of visibility over contractors on their installations complicated their 

efforts to provide contractors with support such as food and housing. 

Several officials told us they regularly had contractor personnel 

unexpectedly show up in Iraq and request support, but were unable to 

verify what DOD-provided support those contractor personnel were 

entitled to. As a result, DOD and its components may be providing 

unauthorized support to contractors. For example, at one of the joint 

contingency contract management working group sessions GAO attended,

an Army Materiel Command official noted that the Army estimates that it 

loses about $43 million every year providing free meals to contractor 

employees who are also receiving a per diem allowance for food. 

In spite of DOD’s continued lack of capability to provide commanders with 

the information they need regarding the extent of contractor support at a 

deployed location, we found that some steps have been taken to provide 

commanders with improved visibility over the contracts they were directly 

responsible for. For example: 

Some Steps Have Been Taken 

to Address the Issue of 

Visibility 

• In early 2006, the commanding general of Multi-National Force-Iraq 

ordered his major subordinate commands in Iraq to provide a head count 

of non-DOD civilians on their installations, including contractor personnel 

for contracts exceeding $5 million per year. The information, captured in a 

database managed by Multi-National Force-Iraq, was needed to provide 

the general with a current count of all tenant organizations operating from

the various forward operating bases in Iraq. 

• Multi-National Corps-Iraq started a similar effort in February 2006 to 

provide the commanding general with detailed contract management 

information on recurring services contracts such as for the maintenance of 

certain aircraft, communications support, and power generation. 

• Also in 2006, the corps support command at Logistical Support Area 

Anaconda created a database to track recurring services contracts that 

support the installation. 

While these individual efforts improved visibility over a specific set of 

contractors, we found that no organization within DOD or its components 

has attempted to consolidate these individual sources of information that 

Page 18 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
could help improve its visibility over all contractor support in Iraq. Several 

DOD officials in Iraq familiar with the individual efforts described above 

told us that while a number of databases have been created to capture 

information on contractors in theater, the information is not aggregated at

a higher level because no one is responsible for consolidating this 

information. In most cases, these efforts were initiated by individual 

commanders and there is no assurance that they would continue when 

new units with new commanders deployed to replace them in the future.

Individual contractors we spoke with had excellent visibility over the 

number and location of their employees at specific deployed locations. For 

example, the contractors could readily provide us with information on the 

number of employees they had in Iraq in support of deployed U.S. forces 

and the specific installation to which those contractors were deployed.

This information was typically reported on a daily or weekly basis from 

the contractor in Iraq to their corporate headquarters in the United States

or elsewhere, as well as to the U.S. government agency that had awarded 

the contract. However, we found this information was not centrally 

collected. As discussed previously, there are several hundred contractor

firms that support deployed forces, including in Iraq, and contracts are 

awarded by numerous contracting offices both within DOD and from other 

U.S. government agencies. With such a large and diverse pool of 

contractors at deployed locations, it is impractical for individual 

commanders to obtain this information from contractors on their own. For 

example, several military officials involved in efforts to improve visibility 

over contractors in Iraq told us that while they were generally able to

obtain information from contractors with large numbers of employees, 

such as the LOGCAP contractor, it was extremely difficult to identify as 

well as collect information from all the numerous smaller contractors, 

who sometimes consisted of only one or two individuals. 

As discussed above, in October 2005 DOD issued DOD Instruction 3020.41, 

which included a requirement that DOD develop or designate a joint 

database to maintain by-name accountability of contractors deploying 

with the force and a summary of the services or capabilities they provide. 

Currently, no such DOD-wide database exists. However, Army Materiel 

Command and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology have taken the initiative to develop a database 

that could provide improved visibility over all contractors supporting U.S. 

forces in deployed locations and enable military commanders to 

Page 19 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
incorporate contractor support into their planning efforts.16 According to 

Army officials, this database is intended to collect information not only on 

the overall number of contractors supporting forces in a deployed location

but also on the organization or system they are supporting and other 

contract information that could be used by commanders to better manage 

contractors at deployed locations. The Army’s goal is to require that all 

contractors supporting deployed forces use this database, and in turn, 

create the central source of information to provide commanders with 

visibility over all contractor support at deployed locations. However, as of

the time of our review, the Army was still in the process of implementing 

the database, and it is uncertain when the process will be completed. For 

example, we found that only a few contractors were using the database,

and Army officials acknowledged it does not currently capture all 

contractors providing support at deployed locations. According to Army 

and Joint Staff officials familiar with these efforts, it is likely that DOD will

designate this database as the joint database for contractor visibility as 

required by DOD Instruction 3020.41. However, a number of issues must 

first be resolved. For example, efforts are still underway to get all the 

services to agree to enter their data into this database. Further, there is 

disagreement within the Army staff regarding whether the Deputy Chief of

Staff responsible for logistics or personnel has responsibility for the 

contractor visibility database. Several officials we met with who are 

involved with these efforts told us that while the Army Materiel Command

has made significant progress in developing the database, ultimate 

resolution of these issues will require action by the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense because the Army Materiel Command lacks the necessary 

directive authority to resolve them on its own. 

Having the right people with the right skills to oversee contractor 

performance is critical to ensuring that DOD receives the best value for 

the billions of dollars spent each year on contractor-provided services 

supporting forces deployed to Iraq and elsewhere. However, inadequate 

numbers of personnel to oversee and manage contracts that support 

deployed U.S. forces is another long-standing problem that continues to 

hinder DOD’s management and oversight of contractors in Iraq. In 2004,

we reported that DOD did not always have enough contract oversight 

personnel in place to manage and oversee its logistics support contracts 

such as LOGCAP. In addition, in 2005 we reported in our High-Risk Series 

DOD Still Does Not Have 

Adequate Contract 

Oversight Personnel in 

Place to Oversee and 

Manage Contractors 

Supporting U.S. Forces in 

Deployed Locations 

 16This database is known as the Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker. 

Page 20 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
that inadequate staffing contributed to contract management challenges in 

Iraq.17 While we could find no DOD guidelines on the appropriate number 

of personnel needed to oversee and manage DOD contracts at a deployed 

location, several contract oversight personnel told us DOD does not have 

adequate personnel at deployed locations to effectively oversee and 

manage contractors, as illustrated by the following examples:

• An Army Contracting Agency official told us that due to a downsizing of its 

overall contracting force and the need to balance that force among 

multiple competing needs, the Army is struggling to find the capacity and 

expertise to provide the contracting support needed in Iraq. 

• An official with the LOGCAP Program Office told us that, as the United 

States was preparing to commence Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the 

office did not prepare to hire additional budget analysts and legal 

personnel in anticipation of an increased use of LOGCAP services. 

According to the official, had adequate staffing been in place early on, the

Army could have realized substantial savings through more effective 

reviews of the increasing volume of LOGCAP requirements. 

• Officials responsible for contracting with Multi-National Force-Iraq told us

they did not have enough contract oversight personnel and quality 

assurance representatives to allow Multi-National Force-Iraq to award 

more sustainment contracts for base operations support in Iraq. 

• The contracting officer’s representative for a contract providing linguist 

support in Iraq told us that he had only one part-time assistant, limiting his 

ability to manage and oversee the contractor personnel for whom he was 

responsible. As he observed, he had a battalion’s worth of people with a 

battalion’s worth of problems but lacked the equivalent of a battalion’s 

staff to deal with those problems. 

We also found a number of organizational and personnel policies of 

various DOD agencies responsible for contract management and oversight 

contributed to inadequate numbers of personnel to oversee and manage 

contracts that support deployed forces. The following are some examples: 

• A 2004 Joint Staff review of the Defense Contract Management Agency’s 

responsiveness and readiness to support deployed forces in the event of 

war found that the agency had not programmed adequate resources to 

support current and future contingency contract requirements, 

compromising its readiness to execute its mission. The review further 

found that Defense Contract Management Agency manpower shortages 

 17See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005). 

Page 21 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
were aggravated by internal policies that limit the availability of personnel 

to execute those missions. 

• During its 2003 deployment to Iraq, a unit with the 4th Infantry Division 

reported that the divisional contracting structure did not adequately 

support the large volume of transactions that were needed in an austere 

environment. For example, the unit reported problems with the quality of 

services provided by host country nationals, which were exacerbated by a 

lack of contracting officer’s representatives to properly oversee the 

performance of contracting terms. 

• An official with the Army Contracting Agency, Southwest Asia told us that

as of January 2006 the agency had only 18 of the 33 staff it was authorized 

and that this number of personnel was not enough to support the agency’s

mission. In contrast, he told us that other commands, such as Army 

Contracting Agency, Korea, were authorized more than 130 staff even

though they were responsible for significantly fewer obligated funds. 

Without adequate contract oversight personnel in place to monitor its 

many contracts in deployed locations such as Iraq, DOD may not be able 

to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are meeting their contract 

requirements efficiently and effectively at each location. For example, a 

Defense Contract Management Agency official responsible for overseeing

the LOGCAP contractor’s performance at 27 installations in Iraq told us he

was unable to personally visit all 27 locations himself during his 6-month 

tour in Iraq. As a result, he was unable to determine the extent to which 

the contractor was meeting the contract’s requirements at each of those 27

sites. Moreover, he only had one quality assurance representative to assist 

him. The official told us that in order to properly oversee this contract, he

should have had at least three quality assurance representatives assisting 

him. The contracting officer’s representative for an intelligence support 

contract in Iraq told us he was also unable to visit all of the locations that 

he was responsible for overseeing. At the locations he did visit he was able

to work with the contractor to improve its efficiency. However, because

he was not able to visit all of the locations at which the contractor 

provided services in Iraq he was unable to duplicate those efficiencies at 

all of the locations in Iraq where the contractor provided support. As we 

previously reported in 2000 and 2004, when contract oversight personnel 

are able to review the types and levels of services provided by contractors 

for both economy and efficiency, savings can be realized. Conversely, 

without adequate contract oversight personnel in place to manage and 

oversee contractors, DOD continues to be at risk of being unable to 

identify and correct poor contractor performance in a timely manner. 

Page 22 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
The inability of contract oversight personnel to visit all locations they are 

responsible for can also create problems for units that are facing 

difficulties resolving contractor performance issues at those locations. For 

example, officials from a brigade support battalion told us they had 

several concerns with the performance of a contractor that provided 

maintenance for the brigade’s mine-clearing equipment. These concerns 

included delays in obtaining spare parts and a disagreement over the 

contractor’s obligation to provide support in more austere locations in 

Iraq. According to the officials, their efforts to resolve these problems in a 

timely manner were hindered because the contracting officer’s 

representative was located in Baghdad while the unit was stationed in 

western Iraq. In other instances, some contract oversight personnel may 

not even reside within the theater of operations. For example, we found 

the Defense Contract Management Agency’s legal personnel responsible 

for LOGCAP in Iraq were stationed in Germany, while other LOGCAP 

contract oversight personnel were stationed in the United States. 

According to a senior Defense Contract Management Agency official in

Iraq, relying on support from contract oversight personnel outside the 

theater of operations may not meet the needs of military commanders in

Iraq who are operating under the demands and higher operational tempo 

of a contingency operation in a deployed location. 

Although the problems discussed above concern contract management 

and oversight at deployed locations, the lack of adequate contract 

oversight personnel is a DOD-wide problem, not limited to deployed 

locations. We first designated DOD contract management as a high-risk 

area in 1992, and it remains so today due, in part, to concerns over the 

adequacy of the department’s acquisition workforce, including contract 

oversight personnel. We subsequently reported that although DOD had 

made progress in laying a foundation for reshaping its acquisition 

workforce, it did not yet have a comprehensive strategic workforce plan 

needed to guide its efforts. Yet having too few contract oversight 

personnel presents unique difficulties at deployed locations given the 

more demanding contracting environment compared to the United States.

For example, the deputy commander of a corps support command told us 

that contracting officer’s representatives have more responsibilities at 

deployed locations than in the United States. Similarly, several officials 

responsible for contract management and oversight told us that the 

operational tempo for contract oversight personnel is significantly higher 

at deployed locations than in the United States. 

Page 23 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
Despite the fact the DOD and its components face many of the same types 

of difficulties working with contractors in Iraq that they faced in prior 

military operations, DOD still does not systematically ensure that 

institutional knowledge gained from prior experience is shared with 

military personnel at deployed locations. We have previously reported that 

DOD could benefit from systematically collecting and sharing its 

institutional knowledge across a wide range of issues to help ensure that it 

is factored into planning, work processes, and other activities.18 With 

respect to DOD’s use of contractors to support deployed forces, in 1997 

we recommended that DOD incorporate lessons learned from the Bosnia 

peacekeeping mission and other operations in the Balkans to improve the 

efficiency and effectiveness of the Army’s LOGCAP contract—a 

recommendation DOD agreed with. Similarly, in 2004 we recommended 

that DOD implement a departmentwide lessons-learned program to 

capture the experience of military units and others that have used logistics 

support contracts—a recommendation DOD also agreed with. 

In its responses to the recommendations made in our 1997 and 2004 

reports, DOD stated it would investigate how best to establish procedures 

to capture lessons learned on the use of contracts to support deployed 

forces and would make this information available DOD-wide. However as 

of 2006, DOD still had not established any procedures to systematically 

collect and share DOD’s lessons learned on the use of contracts to support 

deployed forces. Moreover, we found no organization within DOD or its 

components responsible for developing those procedures. By way of 

comparison, we have previously reported that when DOD created a Joint 

Staff office responsible for acting as a focal point for the department’s 

antiterrorism efforts, that office was able to develop outreach programs to 

collect and share antiterrorism lessons learned and best practices.19

While some DOD organizations such as the Joint Forces Command’s Joint 

Center for Operational Analysis and the Army’s Center for Army Lessons 

Learned are responsible for collecting lessons learned from recent military 

operations, we found that neither organization was actively collecting 

lessons learned on the use of contractor support in Iraq. Similarly, Army 

DOD Is Not Systematically 

Collecting or Sharing 

Institutional Knowledge on 

the Use of Contractors to 

Support Deployed Forces 

 18See GAO, Information Technology: DOD Needs to Leverage Lessons Learned from Its 

Outsourcing Projects, GAO-03-371 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2003) and Military 

Training: Potential to Use Lessons Learned to Avoid Past Mistakes is Largely Untapped, 

GAO/NSIAD-95-152 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 9, 1995). 

19See GAO/NSIAD-00-181. 

Page 24 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
guidance requires that customers receiving services under LOGCAP 

collect and share lessons learned, as appropriate.20 However, we found no 

procedures in place to ensure units follow this guidance. Further, our 

review of historical records and after-action reports from military units 

that deployed to Iraq found that while units made some observations on 

the use of contractor support, DOD had done little to collect those lessons 

learned or make them available to other units that were preparing to 

deploy. 21 Moreover, in some instances, officials from units we met with 

told us that their current procedures actually preclude the collection and 

sharing of institutional knowledge, such as lessons learned. For example, 

officials with the 3rd Infantry Division, as well as a corps support group 

that deployed to Iraq, told us that their computers were wiped clean and 

the information archived before they redeployed to the United States, 

which hindered opportunities for sharing lessons learned with incoming 

units. 

When lessons learned are not collected and shared, DOD and its 

components run the risk of repeating past mistakes and being unable to 

build on the efficiencies and effectiveness others have developed during 

past operations that involved contractor support. For example, the deputy 

commander of a corps support command responsible for much of the 

contractor-provided logistics support in Iraq told us that without ensuring 

that lessons learned are shared as units rotate into and out of Iraq, each 

new unit essentially starts at ground zero, creating a number of difficulties 

until they familiarize themselves with their roles and responsibilities. 

Similarly, lessons learned using logistics support contracts in the Balkans 

were not easily accessible to military commanders and other individuals 

responsible for contract oversight and management in Iraq, an issue we 

also identified in 2004. For example, during our visit to Iraq we found that 

a guidebook developed by U.S. Army, Europe on the use of a logistical 

support contract almost identical to LOGCAP for operations in the 

Balkans was not made available to military commanders in Iraq until mid2006. According to one official, U.S. Army Central Command was aware of 

this guidebook in Iraq as early as late 2003; however, the guidebook was 

not made available to commanders in Iraq until 2006. According to the 

 20Army Regulation 700-137, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) (Dec. 16, 

1985). 

21After-action reports provide an official description of the results of military operations. 

An after-action report typically includes a summary of objectives, operational limitations, 

major participants, a description of strengths and weaknesses, and recommended actions.

Page 25 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
official, if the guidebook had been made available sooner to commanders 

in Iraq it could have helped better familiarize them with the LOGCAP 

contract and build on efficiencies U.S. Army, Europe had identified. 

Similarly, U.S. Army, Europe included contract familiarization with its 

logistical support contractor in mission rehearsal exercises of units 

preparing to deploy to the Balkans. However, we found no similar effort 

had been made to include familiarization with LOGCAP in the mission 

rehearsal exercises of units preparing to deploy to Iraq. 

Failure to share other kinds of institutional knowledge on the use of 

contractor support to deployed forces can also impact military operations 

or result in confusion between the military and contractors. Several 

officials we met with from combat units that deployed to Iraq as well as 

contractors supporting U.S. forces in Southwest Asia told us that 

redeploying units do not always share important information with new 

units that are rotating into theater, including information on contractors 

providing support to U.S. forces at the deployed location. Such 

information could include the number of contractors and the services they

provide a unit or installation, existing base access procedures, and other 

policies and procedures that have been developed over time. In addition, 

representatives from several contractor firms we met with told us that 

there can be confusion when new units rotate into Iraq regarding such 

things as the procedures contractors should follow to access an 

installation or in dealing with contractors. In some instances, such 

confusion can place either contractors or the military at risk. For example, 

a contractor providing transportation services in Iraq told us that a unit 

responsible for providing convoy security that had just deployed to Iraq 

had not been informed of the existing procedures for responding to 

incidents involving the contractor. The existing procedures required the 

unit to remain with the contractor until its equipment could be recovered. 

However, following an actual incident in which a vehicle rolled over, there 

was confusion between the contractor and the unit as to what the required 

actions were. 

Page 26 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
DOD does not routinely incorporate information about contractor support 

to deployed forces in its pre-deployment training of military personnel, 

despite the long-standing recognition of the need to provide such 

information. Military commanders continue to deploy with limited or no 

pre-deployment training on the contractor support they will rely on or on 

their roles and responsibilities with regard to managing those contractors. 

Similarly, contract oversight personnel typically deploy without prior 

training on their contract management and oversight responsibilities and 

are often only assigned those responsibilities once arriving at a deployed 

location. Many DOD and service officials at various levels of command 

told us that ultimately the key to better preparing military personnel to 

effectively work with contractors in a deployed location is to integrate 

information on the use of contractors into DOD’s institutional training 

activities. 

We have been discussing the need for better pre-deployment training on 

the use of contractors to support deployed forces since the mid-1990s. 

Specifically, we reported that better training was needed because military 

commanders are responsible for incorporating the use of contractor 

support while planning operations. In addition, as a customer for 

contractor-provided services, military commanders are responsible for 

identifying and validating requirements to be addressed by the contractor

as well as evaluating the contractor’s performance and ensuring the 

contract is used in an economical and efficient manner. Further, better 

training was needed for contract oversight personnel, including 

contracting officer’s representatives, because they monitor the 

contractor’s performance for the contracting officer and act as the 

interface between military commanders and contractors. 

Accordingly, we have made several recommendations that DOD improve 

its training. Some of our prior recommendations highlighted the need for 

improved training of military personnel on the use of contractor support at 

deployed locations, while others focused on training regarding specific 

contracts, such as LOGCAP. In each instance, DOD concurred with our 

recommendation. Figure 2 shows the recommendations we have made 

since 1997. 

Military Commanders and 

Contract Oversight 

Personnel Continue to 

Receive Limited or No 

Information on Contractor 

Support in their PreDeployment Training 

Several GAO Reports Have 

Discussed, and DOD Has 

Acknowledged, the Need to 

Provide Better Pre-deployment 

Training on Contractor Support 

to Deployed Forces 

Page 27 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
Figure 2: Previous GAO Recommendations Highlighting the Need for Better 

Training on the Use of Contractor Support to Deployed Forces 

In addition, according to DOD policy, personnel should receive timely and

effective training to ensure they have the knowledge and other tools 

necessary to accomplish their missions. For example, a March 2006 

instruction on joint training policy issued by the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff stated in part that DOD components are to ensure their 

personnel and organizations are trained to meet combatant commanders’

requirements prior to deploying for operations. It further identified 

management of contractors supporting deployed forces as a training issue 

to be focused on. Nevertheless, we continue to find little evidence that 

improvements have been made in terms of how DOD and its components 

train military commanders and contract oversight personnel on the use of 

contractors to support deployed forces prior to their deployment. 

As we have previously reported, limited or no pre-deployment training on

the use of contractor support can cause a variety of problems for military 

commanders in a deployed location. With limited or no pre-deployment 

training on the extent of contractor support to deployed forces, military 

commanders may not be able to adequately plan for the use of those 

contractors in a deployed location. Several military commanders—

including the major general responsible for logistics for Multi-National 

Force-Iraq, the deputy commander of a corps support command, a base 

commander, and commanders of combat units deployed to Iraq—told us 

that their pre-deployment training did not provide them with sufficient 

Military Commanders Continue 

to Receive Limited or No Predeployment Training to Plan 

For and Manage Contractors at 

Deployed Locations 

Page 28 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
information regarding the extent of contractor support they would be 

relying on in Iraq. Although some of these officials were aware of large

contracts such as LOGCAP, almost all of them told us they were surprised 

by the large number of contractors they dealt with in Iraq and the variety

of services that contractors provided. As a result, they could not 

incorporate the use of contractors into their planning efforts until after 

they arrived in Iraq and acquired a more complete understanding of the 

broad range of services provided by contractors. Similarly, several 

commanders of combat units that deployed to Iraq told us their predeployment training included limited or no information on the contractorprovided services they would be relying on or the extent to which they 

would have to provide personnel to escort contractor personnel. They 

were therefore unable to integrate the need to provide on-base escorts for 

third country and host country nationals, convoy security, and other force 

protection support to contractors into their planning efforts. As a result, 

the commanders were surprised by the substantial portion of their 

personnel they had to allocate to fulfill these missions; personnel they had

expected to be available to perform other functions. 

Limited or no pre-deployment training for military commanders on the use 

of contractor support to deployed forces can also result in confusion 

regarding their roles and responsibilities in managing and overseeing 

contractors. As discussed above, military commanders are responsible for 

incorporating the use of contractor support in their operations planning 

and, in some instances, for evaluating a contractor’s performance. 

However, many officials responsible for contract management and 

oversight in Iraq told us military commanders who deployed to Iraq 

received little or no training on the use of contractors prior to their 

deployment, leading to confusion over their roles and responsibilities. For 

example: 

• Staff officers with the 3rd Infantry Division told us they believed the 

division was poorly trained to integrate and work with contractors prior to 

its deployment. According to these officers, this inadequate training 

resulted in confusion among the officers over the command and control of

contractors. 

• Army Field Support Command officials told us many commanders voiced 

concerns that they did not want to work with contractors and did not want 

contractors in their area of operations. According to the officials, these 

commanders did not understand the extent of contractor support in Iraq 

and how to integrate LOGCAP support into their own planning efforts. The 

officials attributed this confusion to a lack of pre-deployment training on 

Page 29 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
the services LOGCAP provided, how it was used, and commanders’ roles 

and responsibilities in managing and overseeing the LOGCAP contractor. 

• Several Defense Contract Management Agency officials told us that 

although they were only responsible for managing and overseeing the 

LOGCAP contractor, military commanders came to them for all 

contracting questions because they had not been trained on how to work 

with contractors and did not realize that different contractors have 

different contract managers. 

In addition, some contractors told us how crucial it was that commanders 

receive training in their roles and responsibilities regarding contractors 

prior to their deployment because, although they do not have the authority 

to, commanders sometimes direct contractors to perform activities that

may be outside the scope of work of the contract. We found some 

instances where a lack of training raised concerns over the potential for

military commanders to direct contractors to perform work outside the 

scope of the contract. For example, one contractor told us he was 

instructed by a military commander to release equipment the contractor 

was maintaining even though this action was not within the scope of the 

contract. The issue ultimately had to be resolved by the contracting 

officer. As another example, a battalion commander deployed to Iraq told

us that although he was pleased with the performance of the contractors 

supporting him, he did not know what was required of the contractor 

under the contract. Without this information, he ran the risk of directing 

the contractor to perform work beyond what was called for in the 

contract. As Army guidance makes clear, when military commanders try to 

direct contractors to perform activities outside the scope of the contract,

this can cause the government to incur additional charges because 

modifications would need to be made to the contract and, in some cases, 

the direction may potentially result in a violation of competition 

requirements.22

We found that many military commanders we spoke with had little or no 

prior exposure to contractor support issues in deployed locations, 

exacerbating the problems discussed above. Many of the commanders we 

met with from combat units deployed to Iraq told us this was their first 

experience working with contractors and that they had had little or no 

prior training or exposure to contract management. According to officials 

 22For example, it is improper for an agency to order a supply or service outside the scope of 

the contract because the work covered by the order is subject to the Competition in 

Contracting Act (10 U.S.C. § 2304 and 41 U.S.C. § 253) requirements for competition. 

Page 30 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
responsible for contract management and oversight in Iraq as well as 

several contactor representatives we met with, it can take newly deployed

personnel, including military commanders, several weeks to develop the 

knowledge needed to effectively work with contractors in a deployed

location. For complex contracts such as LOGCAP, these officials told us 

that it can take substantially longer than that. This can result in gaps in 

oversight as newly deployed personnel familiarize themselves with their 

roles and responsibilities in managing and overseeing contracts. 

We also found that contract oversight personnel such as contracting 

officer’s representatives continue to receive limited or no pre-deployment

training regarding their roles and responsibilities in monitoring contractor 

performance. Although DOD has created an online training course for 

contracting officer’s representatives, very few of the contracting officer’s 

representatives we met with had taken the course prior to deploying to 

Iraq. In most cases, individuals deployed without knowing that they would

be assigned the role of a contracting officer’s representative until after 

they arrived at the deployed location, precluding their ability to take the 

course. Moreover, some of the individuals who took the course once 

deployed expressed concerns that the training did not provide them with 

the knowledge and other tools they needed to effective monitor contractor

performance. Other officials told us it was difficult to set aside the time 

necessary to complete the training once they arrived in Iraq. DOD’s 

acquisition regulations require that contracting officer’s representatives be

qualified through training and experience commensurate with the 

responsibilities delegated to them. However, as was the case with military 

commanders, we found that many of the contract oversight personnel we 

spoke with had little or no exposure to contractor support issues prior to 

their deployment, which exacerbated the problems they faced given the 

limited pre-deployment training. 

We found several instances where the failure to identify and train contract 

oversight personnel prior to their deployment hindered the ability of those 

individuals to effectively manage and oversee contractors in Iraq, in some 

cases negatively affecting unit morale or military operations. The following 

are examples of what we found: 

Contract Oversight Personnel 

Continue to Receive Limited or 

No Pre-deployment Training to 

Effectively Monitor Contractor 

Performance 

• The contracting officer’s representative for a major contract providing 

intelligence support to U.S. forces in Iraq had not been informed of his 

responsibilities in managing and overseeing this contract prior to his 

deployment. As a result, he received no training on his contract oversight 

responsibilities prior to deploying. Moreover, he had no previous 

experience working with contractors. The official told us that he found 

Page 31 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
little value in DOD’s online training course and believed this training did 

not adequately prepare him to execute his contract oversight 

responsibilities, such as reviewing invoices submitted by the contractor. 

• According to officials from a corps support group deployed to Iraq, the 

group deployed with 95 Army cooks even though their meals were to be 

provided by LOGCAP. However, prior to deploying, the unit had neither 

identified nor trained any personnel to serve as contracting officer’s 

representatives for the LOGCAP contract. According to unit officials, they

experienced numerous problems with regard to the quality of food 

services provided by LOGCAP, which impacted unit morale, until 

individuals from the unit were assigned as contracting officer’s 

representatives to work with the contractor to improve the quality of its 

services. 

• According to officials with the Army’s Intelligence and Security Command, 

quality assurance representatives responsible for assessing the 

performance of a linguist support contractor did not speak Arabic. As a 

result, it was unclear how they could assess the proficiency of the 

linguists. Some units that used interpreters under this contract told us they 

experienced cases where they discovered that their interpreters were not 

correctly translating conversations. 

• Intelligence officials with a Stryker brigade told us a lack of contractor 

management training hindered their ability to resolve staffing issues with a 

contractor conducting background screenings of third country nationals 

and host country nationals. Shortages of contractor-provided screeners 

forced the brigade to use their own intelligence personnel to conduct 

these screenings. As a result, those personnel were not available to carry 

out their primary intelligence-gathering responsibilities. 

The frequent rotations of contract oversight personnel, who can deploy for 

as little as 3-4 months, can also hinder DOD’s management and oversight

of contractors in a deployed location. Several contractors told us the 

frequent rotation of contracting officer’s representatives was frustrating 

because the contractors continually had to adjust to the varying extent of 

knowledge those personnel had regarding the contractor support they 

were responsible for. Moreover, several contractors told us that frequent 

rotations meant that by the time contract oversight personnel had 

familiarized themselves with their responsibilities they were preparing the 

leave the country. If these personnel were replaced by individuals who 

were not familiar with the contract or had not received training in their 

roles and responsibilities, problems could occur. For example, a 

contractor providing food services in Iraq told us that while the contract 

specified a 21-day menu rotation, some of the newly deployed contracting 

officer’s representatives assigned to monitor the contract directed the 

contractor to modify the menu rotation, which affected the contractor’s 

Page 32 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
inventory of food stores and ran the risk of directing the contractor to 

perform work outside the scope of the contract.

Many contractors told us that a consistent level of pre-deployment training 

would help to ensure some continuity as individuals rotate into and out of 

deployed locations. In addition, several contractors, as well as military 

officials responsible for contract management and oversight, told us that

the length of deployment for contracting officer’s representatives is too 

short and that by the time individuals have acquired the knowledge to 

effectively monitor a contract, they are preparing to redeploy. For 

example, senior Defense Contract Management Agency officials told us 

that the current 6-month deployments of contract oversight personnel 

monitoring the LOGCAP contract in Iraq were too short to make the most 

efficient use of personnel who had developed the expertise to effectively 

manage that contract. As a result, senior Defense Contract Management 

Agency officials told us they are considering extending the length of 

deployment for their contract oversight personnel assigned to monitor the 

LOGCAP contract from 6 months to 1 year. 

We found that contract oversight personnel who had received training in 

their roles and responsibilities prior to their deployment appeared better 

prepared to manage and oversee contractors once they arrived at a 

deployed location. For example, the program office for the Army’s C-12 

aircraft maintenance contract developed a 3-day training course that all 

contracting officer’s representatives for this contract are required to take 

prior to deploying. This training provides contracting officer’s

representatives with information regarding recurring reporting 

requirements, processes that should be followed to resolve disputes with 

the contractor, and the variety of technical and administrative

requirements these individuals should be familiar with to monitor the 

contractor’s performance. Officials familiar with this training course told 

us that they found the course to be very helpful in providing contracting 

officer’s representatives with the knowledge and tools necessary to 

effectively execute their responsibilities. As a result, the program office 

developed a similar course for another of its aviation maintenance 

contracts. Similarly, Defense Contract Management Agency officials 

responsible for overseeing LOGCAP told us they are developing a 

standardized process for evaluating the contractor’s performance in Iraq,

which includes ensuring units deploying to Iraq identify and train contract

oversight personnel for the LOGCAP contract. 

Page 33 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
Officials Believe Integrating 

Information on the Use of 

Contractors into DOD’s 

Institutional Training Activities 

Could Improve the 

Management and Oversight of 

Contractors 

Our review of DOD and service guidance, policies, and doctrine found no 

existing criteria or standards to ensure that all military units incorporate 

information regarding contractor support to deployed forces in their predeployment training. According to a official with the Army’s Training and 

Doctrine Command, while some steps have been taken to create elective 

courses on issues related to contractor support to deployed forces, it is 

important that all DOD components incorporate this information into their 

existing institutional training so that military personnel who may interact

with contractors at deployed locations have a basic awareness of 

contractor support issues prior to deploying. Moreover, most of the 

military commanders and officials responsible for contract management 

and oversight we met with in deployed locations told us that better 

training on the use of contractors to support deployed forces should be 

incorporated into how DOD prepares its personnel to deploy. Some 

officials believed that additional training should address the specific roles 

and responsibilities of military personnel responsible for managing and 

overseeing contractors in deployed locations. For example, the base 

commander of Logistical Support Area Anaconda told us there should be a 

weeklong pre-deployment course for all base commanders specific to 

contractor support to deployed forces. Similarly, the commander of a unit 

operating Army C-12 aircraft stated that the contracting officer’s 

representative training developed by the program office, as discussed 

above, should not only be required for all contract oversight personnel but 

also for military commanders of units operating the aircraft. 

Other officials believed that their pre-deployment preparations, such as 

mission rehearsal exercises, should incorporate the role that contractors 

have in supporting U.S. forces in a deployed location. However, we found 

that most units we met with did not incorporate the role of contractor 

support into their mission rehearsal exercises. Moreover, we found no 

existing DOD requirement that mission rehearsal exercises should include 

such information, even for key contracts such as LOGCAP. Several 

officials told us that including contractors in these exercises could enable

military commanders to better plan and prepare for the use of contractor 

support prior to deploying. For example, when a Stryker brigade held its 

training exercise prior to deploying to Iraq, the brigade commander was 

surprised at the number of contractors embedded with the brigade. 

Initially, he wanted to bar all civilians from the exercise because he did 

not realize how extensively the brigade relied on contractor support. By 

including contractors in the exercise, their critical role was made clear 

early on and the brigade’s commanders were better positioned to 

understand their contract management roles and responsibilities prior to 

deploying to Iraq. In addition, officials responsible for the LOGCAP 

Page 34 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
contract told us they were undertaking efforts to include basic information 

on how to work with LOGCAP into the mission rehearsal exercises of 

units deploying to Iraq. 

Many officials we met with in the United States and at deployed locations 

told us that ultimately the issue of better preparing military commanders 

and contract oversight personnel for their contract management and 

oversight roles at deployed locations lies with including training on the use 

of contractors as part of professional military education. Professional 

military education is designed to provide officers with the necessary skills 

and knowledge to function effectively and to assume additional 

responsibilities. However, several officials told us that the need to educate 

military personnel on the use of contractors is something the military has 

not yet embraced. As corps support command officials observed, the 

military does a good job training logisticians to be infantrymen, but does 

not require infantrymen to have any familiarity with contracting or the 

roles and responsibilities they may have in working with contractors at a 

deployed location. 

DOD’s reliance on contractor support to deployed forces has grown 

significantly since the 1991 Gulf War and this reliance continues to grow. 

In Iraq and other deployed locations, contractors provide billions of 

dollars worth of services each year and play a role in most aspects of 

military operations—from traditional support roles such as feeding 

soldiers and maintaining equipment to providing interpreters who 

accompany soldiers on patrols and augmenting intelligence analysis. The 

magnitude and importance of contractor support demands that DOD 

ensure military personnel have the guidance, resources, and training to 

effectively monitor contractor performance at deployed locations. In prior 

reports, we made a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening 

DOD’s management and oversight of contractor support at deployed 

locations, and the department has agreed to implement many of those 

recommendations. However, DOD has failed to implement some of our 

key recommendations, in part because it has not yet institutionally 

embraced the need to change the way it prepares military personnel to 

work with contractors in deployed locations. While we found no 

contractor performance problems that led to mission failure, problems 

with management and oversight of contractors have negatively impacted 

military operations and unit morale and hindered DOD’s ability to obtain 

reasonable assurance that contractors are effectively meeting their 

contract requirements in the most cost-efficient manner. 

Conclusions 

Page 35 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
The difficulties DOD faces regarding contractor support to deployed 

forces are exacerbated by the fragmented nature of contracting, with 

multiple agencies in multiple locations able to award and manage 

contracts that may all provide services to a particular military unit or 

installation. However, DOD’s actions to date have largely been driven by 

individual efforts to resolve particular issues at particular moments. A lack 

of clear accountability and authority within the department to coordinate 

these actions has hindered DOD’s ability to systematically address its 

difficulties regarding contractor support—difficulties that currently affect 

military commanders in Iraq and other deployed locations and will likely 

affect commanders in future operations unless DOD institutionally 

addresses the problems we have identified. When faced with similar 

challenges regarding the department’s antiterrorism efforts, DOD 

designated an office within the Joint Staff to serve as a single focal point to

coordinate its efforts, which helped improve its protection of military 

forces stationed overseas. Moreover, the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has established 

dedicated organizations to coordinate efforts to address departmentwide 

problems in areas such as supply chain management. Unless a similar, 

coordinated, departmentwide effort is made to address long-standing 

contract management and oversight problems at deployed locations, DOD 

and its components will continue to be at risk of being unable to ensure 

that contractors are providing the services they are required to in an 

effective and efficient manner. 

To improve DOD’s management and oversight of contractors at deployed 

locations, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense appoint a 

focal point within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, at a sufficiently senior level and 

with the appropriate resources, dedicated to leading DOD’s efforts to 

improve contract management and oversight. The entity that functions as 

the focal point would act as an advocate within the department for issues 

related to the use of contractors to support deployed forces, serve as the 

principal advisor for establishing relevant policy and guidance to DOD 

components, and be responsible for carrying out actions, including the 

following six actions: 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 

• oversee development of the joint database to provide visibility over all 

contractor support to deployed forces, including a summary of services or

capabilities provided and by-name accountability of contractors; 

• develop a strategy for DOD to incorporate the unique difficulties of 

contract management and oversight at deployed locations into DOD’s 

Page 36 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
ongoing efforts to address concerns about the adequacy of its acquisition 

workforce; 

• lead and coordinate the development of a departmentwide lessons-learned 

program that will capture the experiences of units that have deployed to 

locations with contractor support and develop a strategy to apply this 

institutional knowledge to ongoing and future operations; 

• develop the requirement that DOD components, combatant commanders,

and deploying units (1) ensure military commanders have access to key 

information on contractor support, including the scope and scale of 

contractor support they will rely on and the roles and responsibilities of 

commanders in the contract management and oversight process, (2) 

incorporate into their pre-deployment training the need to identify and

train contract oversight personnel in their roles and responsibilities, and 

(3) ensure mission rehearsal exercises include key contractors to increase

familiarity of units preparing to deploy with the contractor support they 

will rely on; 

• develop training standards for the services on the integration of basic 

familiarity with contractor support to deployed forces into their 

professional military education to ensure that military commanders and 

other senior leaders who may deploy to locations with contractor support 

have the knowledge and skills needed to effectively manage contractors; 

and 

• review the services’ efforts to meet the standards and requirements 

established above to ensure that training on contractor support to 

deployed forces is being consistently implemented by the services. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 

recommendation. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also

provided several technical comments which we considered and 

incorporated where appropriate. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense 

appoint a focal point within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, at a sufficiently senior level and 

with the appropriate resources, dedicated to leading DOD’s efforts to 

improve contract management and oversight. DOD further stated that the 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness 

established the office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

(Program Support) on October 1, 2006 to serve as the office of primary 

responsibility for issues related to contractor support. However, DOD 

noted in its comments that the office is not yet fully staffed.

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 37 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
While we commend the department for taking the initiative to establish 

this office and believe that it is appropriately located within the Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

it is not clear that this office would serve as the focal point dedicated to 

leading DOD’s efforts to improve contract management and oversight. In 

our recommendation, we identified several actions that such a focal point

would be responsible for implementing. In concurring with those 

recommended actions, DOD offered additional information on the steps it 

intended to take in order to address the recommended actions. However, 

none of these steps included information on the roles and responsibilities 

of the office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program 

Support) in implementing and overseeing these corrective actions. For 

example, in concurring with our recommendation that the focal point 

develop requirements to ensure that mission rehearsal exercises include 

key contractors, DOD specified corrective actions that the Joint Staff, the 

Defense Acquisition University, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense

would take. However, it is not clear what role the office of the Assistant 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) would have in 

meeting this requirement, nor is it clear that this office would be the entity

responsible for ensuring the requirement is met, as stated in our 

recommendation. 

As noted in the report, a lack of clear accountability and authority within 

the department to coordinate actions intended to improve contract 

management and oversight has hindered DOD’s ability to systematically 

address its difficulties regarding contractor support in the past. We 

continue to believe that a single focal point with clearly defined roles and

responsibilities is critical if DOD is to effectively address these longstanding problems and we therefore encourage the department to clearly

identify the roles and responsibilities of the office of the Assistant Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) in implementing and 

overseeing each of the corrective actions discussed in our 

recommendation. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies 

available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at 

no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202)

512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

Page 38 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
of this report. Key contributors include David A. Schmitt, Assistant 

Director; Vincent Balloon, Carole F. Coffey, Grace Coleman, Laura 

Czohara, Wesley A. Johnson, James A. Reynolds, Kevin J. Riley, and Karen 

Thornton. 

William M. Solis 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 39 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha, Jr. 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 40 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has 

improved its management and oversight of contractors supporting 

deployed forces, we met with DOD, Joint Staff, and service headquarters 

officials to obtain a comprehensive understanding of their efforts in 

addressing the issues raised in our June 2003 report. We also reviewed 

changes to key DOD and DOD component policies and other guidance. In 

some instances, guidance was not available. For example, guidance was 

not available on the appropriate number of personnel needed to monitor 

contractors in a deployed location. In those instances, we relied on the 

judgments and views of DOD officials and contract oversight personnel 

who had served in deployed locations as to the adequacy of staffing. We

visited select DOD components and various military contracting 

commands in the United States based on their role and responsibility in 

managing and overseeing contracts that support deployed U.S. forces. 

Because there was no consolidated list of contractors supporting deployed 

forces available, we asked DOD officials at the components and 

commands we visited to identify, to the extent possible, the extent of 

contractor support to their deployed U.S. forces. We focused our efforts 

on contractors supporting military operations in Iraq and elsewhere in 

Southwest Asia because of the broad range of services contractors provide 

U.S. forces in support of the Global War on Terrorism. 

We held discussions with military commanders, staff officers, and other 

representatives from five Army divisions and one Marine Expeditionary 

Force as well as various higher headquarters and supporting commands 

that deployed to Iraq or elsewhere in Southwest Asia during the 2003-2006 

time frame to discuss their experiences working with contractors and the 

challenges they faced managing and overseeing contractors in a deployed

location. Specifically, we met with unit officials responsible for such 

functions as contracting and contract management, base operations and 

logistical support, and force protection and intelligence. These units were 

selected because, for the most part, they had recently returned from 

Southwest Asia and unit officials had not yet redeployed or been 

transferred to other locations within the United States. We also met with 

representatives from the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development to discuss the extent to which they have

visibility over contractors supporting their activities in Iraq. In addition, 

we traveled to deployed locations within Southwest Asia, including Iraq, to

meet with deployed combat units and to discuss the use of contractor 

support to deployed forces with various military commanders, installation 

commanders, headquarters personnel, and other military personnel 

responsible for contracting and contract management at deployed 

locations. 

Page 41 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

We met with 26 U.S. and foreign contractors who provide support to DOD 

in Southwest Asia to discuss a variety of contracting and contract 

management issues. For example, we held discussions with contractors to 

obtain an understanding of the types of services they provide deployed

U.S. forces and the difficulties they have experienced providing those 

services to DOD in a deployed location. The contractors we met with 

reflected a wide range of services provided to deployed forces, including

theater support, external support, and systems support, and represented 

both prime contractors and subcontractors. 

We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review: 

Department of Defense: 

• Defense Contract Management Agency, Alexandria, VA; Houston, TX; 

• Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA 

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics, Washington, DC

• Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 

Materiel Readiness 

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Washington, DC 

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 

Washington, DC 

• U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL 

• U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

• J-3 Operations, Washington, DC 

• J-4 Logistics, Washington, DC 

• J-7 Operational Plans and Interoperability, Washington, DC 

• J-8 Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, Washington, DC 

Department of the Army: 

• Headquarters, Washington, DC 

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 Personnel

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 Logistics 

• Army Contracting Agency, Fort McPherson, GA; Fort Drum, NY; Fort 

Lewis, WA 

• Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, VA 

• Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, AL 

• Program Executive Office, Aviation 

• Program Executive Office, Missiles & Space 

Page 42 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

• Army Field Support Command, Rock Island, IL 

• Program Office, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 

• Army Communications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, NJ 

• Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, MI 

• Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, VA 

• Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA 

• Combined Armed Support Command, Fort Lee, VA

• Stryker Brigades, Fort Lewis, WA 

• 2nd Infantry Division 

• 3rd Brigade, Stryker Brigade Combat Team 

• 25th Infantry Division 

• 1st Brigade, Stryker Brigade Combat Team 

• Task Force Olympia 

• 593rd Corps Support Group 

• U.S. Army Central Command, Fort McPherson, GA 

• 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA 

• 2nd Brigade Combat Team 

• 26th Brigade Support Battalion 

• 3rd Sustainment Brigade 

• 87th Corps Support Battalion 

• 4th Brigade Combat Team 

• 703rd Brigade Support Battalion 

• 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY 

Department of the Navy: 

• Headquarters, Washington, DC 

• Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition 

Management 

• 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, CA 

Department of the Air Force: 

• Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH 

• Program Office, Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, Tyndall Air 

Force Base, FL 

Other Government Agencies: 

• Department of State, Washington, DC 

• U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC 

Page 43 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Contractors: 

• CACI International, Arlington, VA 

• Dimensions International, Inc. Sterling Heights, MI 

• DUCOM, Inc., Sterling Heights, MI 

• DynCorp International, Irving, TX 

• General Dynamics Land Systems, Fort Lewis, WA 

• Kellogg, Brown and Root, Houston, TX; Arlington, VA 

• L-3 Communications Corp. 

• L-3 Titan Linguist Operations and Technical Support, Reston, VA 

• Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control, Dallas, TX 

• Mantech International, Chantilly, VA 

• M7 Aerospace, San Antonio, TX 

• PWC Logistics, Kuwait 

• Readiness Management Support, Panama City, FL

• SEI Group, Inc., Huntsville, AL 

• Triple Canopy, Inc., Herndon, VA 

The overseas activities and contractors we visited, by country, were: 

Iraq: 

• Camp Victory, U.S. Military 

• Multi-National Force-Iraq 

• Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

• Defense Contract Management Agency 

• 4th Infantry Division 

• Camp Victory, Contractors 

• Kellogg, Brown and Root 

• L-3 Communications Corp. 

• L-3 Communications ILEX Systems, Inc. 

• L-3 Government Services, Inc. 

• International Zone, U.S. Military 

• Multi-National Force-Iraq 

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics 

• Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Regional Division 

• Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan 

• International Zone, Contractors 

• L-3 Communications Corp. 

• L-3 Titan Linguist Operations and Technical Support 

Page 44 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

• Private Security Company Association of Iraq 

• Logistics Support Area Anaconda, U.S. Military 

• Logistics Support Area Anaconda Garrison Command 

• 3rd Corps Support Command 

• Aerial Port of Debarkation operations 

• Program Management Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

• Logistics Support Area Anaconda, Contractors 

• AAI Corporation 

• DynCorp International 

• General Atomics Aeronautical Systems 

• General Dynamics Land Systems 

• L-3 Communications Corp. 

• L-3 Titan Linguist Operations and Technical Support 

• M7 Aerospace 

Kuwait: 

• Camp Arifjan, U.S. Military 

• Coalition Forces Land Component Command 

• Area Support Group, Kuwait 

• Army Contracting Agency, Southwest Asia 

• Army Field Support Brigade, Southwest Asia 

• Army Materiel Command

• U.S. Embassy, Kuwait City 

• Camp Arifjan, Contractors 

• Ahmadah General Trading & Contracting Co. 

• British Link Kuwait 

• Combat Support Associates 

• Computer Sciences Corporation 

• IAP World Services 

• ITT Industries 

• Kellogg, Brown and Root 

• Kuwait & Gulf Link Transport Co. 

• Tamimi Global Co. 

United Arab Emirates: 

• Dubai, Contractors 

• Kellogg, Brown and Root 

• Prime Projects International 

Page 45 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

We conducted our review from August 2005 through October 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 46 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 47 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 48 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 49 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 50 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 51 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 52 GAO-07-145 Military Operations
Related GAO Products 

Page 53 GAO-07-145

Related GAO Products 

Military Operations: Background Screenings of Contractor Employees 

Supporting Deployed Forces May Lack Critical Information, but U.S. 

Forces Take Steps to Mitigate the Risks Contractors May Pose. GAO-06-

999R. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private 

Security Providers. GAO-06-865T. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private Security 

Providers. GAO-05-737. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005. 

Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD’s and Interior’s Orders to 

Support Military Operations. GAO-05-201. Washington, D.C.: April 29, 

2005. 

Defense Logistics: High-Level DOD Coordination Is Needed to Further 

Improve the Management of the Army’s LOGCAP Contract. GAO-05-328. 

Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2005. 

Military Operations: DOD’s Extensive Use of Logistics Support 

Contracts Requires Strengthened Oversight. GAO-04-854. Washington, 

D.C.: July 19, 2004. 

Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed 

Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans. GAO-03-695. 

Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003. 

Contingency Operations: Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost 

in the Balkans. GAO/NSIAD-00-225. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2000. 

Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civil 

Augmentation Program. GAO/NSIAD-97-63. Washington, D.C.: February 

11, 1997. 

(350739) Military Operations
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