The U.S. Coast Guard

Strategy

for

Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

WASHINGTON, D.C.
ON THE COVER: The cover features a picture of the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf

(WMSL 750). The USCGC Bertholf is the fi rst-in-class of the multi-mission National 

Security Cutters to be built under the Integrated Deepwater System program. The USCGC 

Bertholf was christened on Veterans Day, November 11, 2006 and will be delivered to the 

Coast Guard in 2007 (Art courtesy of Northrop Grumman).

The National Security Cutters will be capable of meeting multiple maritime safety, 

security, and stewardship mission needs. As the largest and most technically advanced 

class of cutter in the Coast Guard, they will typically deploy with a versatile complement of 

high-speed small boats and multi-mission aircraft capable of conducting over-the-horizon 

operational missions. These cutters will have the ability to carry more fuel, personnel, and 

provisions than any legacy Coast Guard asset—allowing them to operate throughout the 

global maritime domain, in support of the nation’s maritime and national security interests. 

Their enhanced command and control and situational awareness capabilities will make 

them ideal platforms for responding to domestic or international emergencies and will 

provide the Coast Guard with previously unparalleled interoperability with other military 

ships and aircraft.
THE COMMANDANT OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

Washington, D.C. 20593-0001

January 19, 2007

Commandant’s Letter of Promulgation

For over two centuries, the U.S. Coast Guard has safeguarded our citizens, secured our maritime borders and 

served as a responsible steward of the world’s oceans. From the early fi ght against the slave trade, to protection 

of fur seals in newly acquired Alaska, to the enforcement of Prohibition laws, we have continually confronted 

asymmetrical, transnational threats. 

The challenge is enduring. The threats of the Cold War are gone, and we again fi nd ourselves operating in an 

environment where piracy, illegal migration, drug smuggling, terrorism, arms proliferation and environmental 

crimes are carried out by anonymous, loosely affi liated perpetrators. At the same time, the threat of a man-made 

or natural disaster along our coastline or internal waters demands resiliency. We need response and recovery 

systems that protect not only the population and critical infrastructure, but the economic lifeline of the Nation as 

well. 

We live in a coastal Nation State that relies on interconnected rivers, lakes, oceans and waterways to feed us, 

supply us with energy, connect us with the global supply chain, provide us with recreation, and buffer us from 

those who would do us harm or exploit our scarce resources. We have done much in the wake of the 9/11 attacks 

and the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina to meet the threats, challenges, and vulnerabilities that are 

converging in the maritime domain. We can do more. It is now time to act collectively ... but with strategic 

intent. 

The Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship (CGS) provides the framework and 

the strategic intent that will guide our actions. It is the U.S. Coast Guard’s commitment to the American people 

to remain Always Ready for all hazards and all threats. Built on the foundation of the Coast Guard’s Evergreen 

strategic planning process and its guiding principles, this Strategy aligns with the National Strategy for 

Maritime Security and supports the goals and priorities of the Department of Homeland Security. 

This Strategy identifi es strategic priorities for implementation across all Coast Guard missions in support of 

America’s maritime safety, security, and stewardship interests. It focuses on enhancements to legal regimes, 

awareness, and operational capabilities that best position the Coast Guard to defeat the asymmetrical, 

transnational threats America will encounter in the future. We will work with the Congress, our interagency 

partners, and our state, local, private, and international partners to bring this Strategy to life. As we stand watch, 

we will build the 21st century Coast Guard America expects and deserves.

The CGS is our compass. We have plotted the course for the future. America’s Coast Guard will be the most 

capable, adaptive, and responsive multi-mission, maritime and military service in our Nation’s history. We will 

remain Semper Paratus to answer the call whenever and wherever America needs us.

THAD W. ALLEN

Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard

i

Contents

 Letter of Promulgation i

 Executive Summary 3

 Section I: America’s Coast Guard 9

 Maritime Safety 10

 Maritime Security 11

 Maritime Stewardship 13

 The Value of a Military, Multi-Mission Maritime Force 14

 

 Section II: Challenges and Threats in the Maritime Domain 17

 Increasing Complexity and Usage of the U.S. EEZ 18

 Growth of the Global Maritime Supply System 20

 Emergence of Transnational Threats 21

 Increasing Scale of and Potential for Catastrophic Incidents 24

 Vastness, Anonymity, and Limited Governance 26

 

 Section III: Maritime Governance 27

 A Systems Approach to Maritime Governance 28

 Maritime Regimes 29

 Domain Awareness 30

 Operational Capabilities 32

 Section IV: Strategic Priorities for the U.S. Coast Guard 37

 

 Strengthening Regimes for the U.S. Maritime Domain 38

 Achieving Awareness in the Maritime Domain 40

 Enhancing Unity of Effort in Maritime Planning and Operations 43

 Integrating Coast Guard Capabilities for National Defense 46

 Developing a National Capacity for MTS Recovery 48

 Focusing International Engagement on Maritime Governance 50

 Section V: The Way Ahead 53

 Appendix, Glossary 54

 Photo & Graphic Credits 54

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Figure 1: Policy Environment for the U.S. Coast Guard Strategy

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship describes 

how the U.S. Coast Guard will work to safeguard the nation against all threats, hazards, 

and challenges in the maritime domain, today and in the future. It discusses the Coast 

Guard’s enduring roles, future challenges and threats, and a systems approach for 

improving maritime governance. From these foundations, the Strategy presents strategic 

priorities that build on the Coast Guard’s strengths and best focus its capabilities to 

serve the Department of Homeland Security and the nation.

This Strategy is shaped by the laws, executive orders, international conventions and 

agreements, and other guidance that determine U.S. maritime policy (Figure 1). It takes 

signifi cant shape from the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS), the President’s 

Ocean Action Plan (OAP), National and Homeland Security Presidential Directives 

(NSPD/HSPD), and the Department of Homeland Security goals and priorities. This 

Strategy is also the product of the Coast Guard’s Evergreen Project, which looks across 

alternative futures to determine robust strategies that best position the Coast Guard and 

the nation for a changing world.
4 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

Section I: America’s Coast Guard

Maritime safety, security, and stewardship are enduring roles of the Coast Guard. These 

roles refl ect long-standing responsibilities, assigned to the Coast Guard over two centuries of 

service because they are traditionally governmental, have an essential federal component, and 

are interrelated such that they can be best accomplished by a single military, multi-mission, 

maritime force. 

The Coast Guard’s multi-mission character is defi ned by its ability to conduct distinct yet 

complementary functions in the maritime domain—law enforcement, national defense, mobility, 

maritime safety, environmental protection, and humanitarian response. This unique character 

positions the Coast Guard to meet a broad range of national interests within the maritime domain. 

The Coast Guard secures the nation’s vast maritime border while ensuring the safe and effi cient 

transportation of people and goods. It protects the marine environment and guards natural resources. 

It defends the nation at home and abroad alongside the other Armed Services. And it saves the lives 

of those in distress, both at sea and ashore. 

The Coast Guard must look to the future and adapt to the changing needs of the nation. The 

Service’s character, forged by its enduring roles of safety, security, and stewardship, has given it 

three key strengths for meeting tomorrow’s challenges: 

Broad authorities and an expansive network of partnerships: The Coast Guard’s 

comprehensive authorities combined with its culture of partnership will be key to 

building layered security and safety systems.

Flexible, adaptable operational capability and presence: Military, multi-mission 

capabilities, practiced daily throughout the nation’s waters and far beyond, can be 

scaled quickly and effectively to meet all threats and all hazards.

Access and relevant expertise within the international community: Common purpose 

with the world’s maritime forces and a tradition of cooperation within international 

organizations will enable the Coast Guard to forge global solutions to the global 

challenges in the maritime domain.

Section II: Challenges and Threats in the Maritime Domain

The United States faces very different challenges and threats from those that defi ned its national 

interests during the Cold War. The maritime domain today is shaped by changes that are fueling 

its productivity and usefulness but also increasing its complexity and vulnerability. While many 

factors infl uence U.S. maritime interests, fi ve broad challenges are shaping the strategic direction 

of the Coast Guard and the nation: 

The increasing complexity and use of the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): 

Advances in technology and changing environmental conditions are expanding the 

use of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), the Arctic, and other maritime regions 

to meet growing demands for commerce, energy, food, resources, and recreation. 

Growth in activity has increased risks to mariners, communities, and ecosystems, 

and challenges traditional legal regimes and capabilities for governing the maritime 

domain.

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The growth of the global maritime supply system: Globalization has transformed 

maritime trade into the key link in the global supply chain that connects a worldwide 

network of interdependent economies. But as maritime trade has grown in global 

importance, its system of sea routes and ports has become increasingly vulnerable 

to disruption.

The emergence of transnational threats: Transnational criminals, pirates, 

and terrorists seek to exploit the complexity of the maritime domain and the 

vulnerabilities of the global supply system. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 

contraband smuggling, and small vessel threats, such as water-borne improvised 

explosive devices (WBIEDs), represent the greatest risks from terrorism in the 

maritime domain. Today’s traffi cking of drugs, migrants, and contraband by 

criminals is becoming increasingly sophisticated and threatening as well. The 

illegal exploitation of the maritime environment and its resources also challenges 

the health and sustainability of the oceans.

The increasing scale of and potential for catastrophic incidents: Coastal regions 

and ports have become heavily developed and densely populated. Catastrophic 

incidents, whether caused by nature or by a weapon of mass destruction, will 

have enormous consequences in coastal areas and can disrupt regional and global 

commerce. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita illustrated the potential scope and scale of 

such disasters. A related challenge is the enormous size of today’s cruise, tanker, and 

container ships and the “challenge of scale” they present to maritime authorities. 

The vastness, anonymity, and limited governance of the global maritime domain: 

The maritime domain, by its nature, creates its own challenges. Legitimate uses and 

criminal threats are growing in a realm that spans the globe, has limited governance, 

and provides little transparency of activity (particularly for smaller vessels). This 

creates tension between recognized legal regimes and the emerging need for greater 

security and safety.

Section III: Maritime Governance

The Coast Guard’s Strategy builds on a 60-year, post-World War II effort to more effectively and 

effi ciently execute its missions in the maritime domain. Recognizing evolving challenges and 

threats, however, the Coast Guard must think and act anew to safeguard the nation’s interests into 

the future. These past efforts and current initiatives are best understood when viewed as parts of a 

larger interlocking system of governance comprised of maritime regimes, domain awareness, and 

operational capabilities. 

Regimes are the system of “rules” that shape acceptable activity. Statutes, regulations, and 

international agreements, conventions, and standards all establish the maritime “rule set.” Domain 

awareness allows for the detection and monitoring of activities using situational awareness and 

intelligence. Together, regimes and awareness inform decision makers and trigger national action 

when necessary. Operational capabilities allow authorities to deter, respond to, verify, and counter 

threats. They also ensure the safe and sustainable use of the maritime domain day-to-day, and 

speed recovery from natural or man-made disasters in times of crisis.

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Executive Summary
6 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

Laws such as the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), initiatives such as Maritime 

Domain Awareness (MDA) and recapitalization of Coast Guard platforms and systems through 

the Integrated Deepwater System program are examples of necessary components within a strong 

maritime system. Viewing such initiatives as part of a larger system enables a better understanding 

of their inter-relationships and overall effectiveness. A well designed system of regimes, awareness, 

and operational capabilities creates overlapping domestic and international safety nets, layers of 

security, and effective stewardship. These elements, taken together, provide a comprehensive 

system of maritime governance for the nation.

Section IV: Strategic Priorities for the U.S. Coast Guard

This Strategy identifi es six cross-cutting priorities for improving the nation’s preparedness and 

advancing U.S. maritime interests. These strategic priorities draw on the Coast Guard’s key 

strengths as a military, multi-mission, maritime service—its authorities and partnerships, fl exible 

operational capabilities and presence, and access and relevant expertise within the international 

community—to achieve an integrated, systematic approach to maritime governance. Taken 

together, these strategic priorities best ensure safety, security, and stewardship within the maritime 

domain, now and into the future: 

 

Strengthening regimes for the U.S. maritime domain: The nation needs a set of 

coordinated and interlocking domestic and international regimes that increase 

transparency of activity, reduce risk, and balance competing uses within the 

maritime domain. Strengthened rules, authorities, and agreements also enable 

consistent, coordinated action on threats and provide an acceptable framework of 

standards that facilitate commerce and maritime use. The Coast Guard will work 

with Department of Homeland Security (DHS), interagency partners, U.S. maritime 

stakeholders, and the international community to update and strengthen existing 

maritime regimes and put in place new regimes where needed to address emerging 

challenges and threats. 

Achieving Awareness in the Maritime Domain: The nation needs a greater 

awareness and effective understanding of maritime activity. This will require 

greater collection and sharing of data, as well as increased cooperation in fusing, 

analyzing, and disseminating maritime information. The Coast Guard will work 

with the Department of Defense (DoD), U.S. interagency partners, state and local 

governments, the private sector, and the international community to implement the 

National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness as intended by the National 

Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS). 

Enhancing unity of effort in maritime planning and operations: The nation must 

better integrate its operational capabilities and efforts across government and with 

private sector partners. To support this, the Coast Guard will improve its integrated 

planning with all partners, its network of command and control centers, and its 

operational capabilities. In doing this, the Coast Guard will advance unity of 

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7

command where possible, and unity of effort at all times. The Coast Guard will also 

align its operational structure around shore based, maritime patrol, and deployable 

specialized forces to better allow force packaging and scalable response to all 

threats and all hazards. This will support the NSMS and its Maritime Operational 

Threat Response Plan (MOTR), as well as the National Response Plan.

Integrating Coast Guard capabilities for national defense: The nation needs both 

U.S. Navy and Coast Guard capabilities along its own coasts, on the high seas, 

and deployed abroad in support of U.S. national security interests. Coast Guard 

assets should be ready to serve in support of the Combatant Commanders and the 

National Military Strategy (NMS). To achieve this, the Coast Guard will better 

integrate its capabilities with DoD and optimize its forces within a Navy/Coast 

Guard relationship. This will build upon the “National Fleet” model and support the 

NMS as well as the NSMS and its subordinate plans.

Developing a national capacity for Marine Transportation System recovery: The 

nation needs a coordinated, integrated approach to planning for and responding to 

major disruptions in the MTS. To support the NSMS and its Maritime Infrastructure 

Recovery Plan (MIRP), the Coast Guard will leverage its authorities, responsibilities, 

and capabilities to lead the national planning agenda for assuring the continuity of 

commerce and critical maritime activities.

 

Focusing international engagement on improving maritime governance: The nation 

benefi ts from strong maritime relationships and capacities around the world, because 

today’s global maritime system ties U.S. interests and welfare to the effective 

maritime governance of all nations and the global commons. The Coast Guard will 

focus its international efforts to assist maritime organizations and partner nations in 

building the sustainable regimes, awareness, and operational capabilities necessary 

to improve the governance of the global maritime domain.

Section V: The Way Ahead

The Coast Guard has already taken important measures in many of these areas. The Service 

accelerated efforts to improve the nation’s maritime regimes, awareness, and operational capabilities 

following 9-11. Efforts are also underway to integrate initiatives, build collaboration, and increase 

unity of effort—as called for by the National Strategy for Maritime Security. But much work 

remains to be done. Gaps in safety, security, and stewardship are broadly recognized, and the 

Coast Guard and DHS will work with the Executive Branch, Congress and other federal, state, 

local, private, and international partners to make needed changes. For still other areas, the way 

ahead will begin with national and international dialogues where maritime stakeholders will help 

determine the changes that are necessary to improve maritime governance.

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Executive Summary
8 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship
9

1 The fi ve goals (maritime safety, maritime security, national defense, maritime mobility, and protection of natural resources) found

in Coast Guard Publication 1 and in other previous Coast Guard planning documents have been grouped into maritime safety, 

security, and stewardship for the purposes of this Strategy. As such, the role of maritime security encompasses both traditional 

maritime security and national defense activities, and the role of maritime stewardship encompasses activities for maritime mobility 

and the protection of natural resources. The Coast Guard’s eleven mandated mission-programs remain unchanged and fall under the

roles of maritime safety, security, and stewardship. 

2

 The 1999 Inter-Agency Task Force on the Roles and Missions of the U.S. Coast Guard, established by Executive Order 13115,

validated that it was in the best interest of the United States for the Coast Guard to maintain a broad multi-mission character, and 

concluded that the Coast Guard must recapitalize assets (e.g., the Integrated Deepwater System program) that support all Coast 

Guard missions. U.S. Department of Transportation, A Coast Guard for the Twenty First Century: Report of the Inter-Agency Task 

Force on U.S. Coast Guard Roles and Missions (Washington, DC: 2001) 4-2 – 4-3.

Section I: America’s Coast Guard

Section I

America’s Coast Guard

Since the earliest days of the Republic, the United States has been a maritime 

nation, tied to the seas for security, commerce, and resources. To sustain its strength, 

America must protect its maritime borders from unlawful intrusion and uphold its 

maritime sovereignty. It must ensure the safe passage of cargoes and people on its 

waters and rescue those in distress. Finally, America must prevent the misuse of the 

oceans and preserve its marine resources for future generations. The Coast Guard 

supports these national interests and generates broad public value through its roles 

of maritime safety, security, and stewardship.1 

These roles are enduring, long-standing responsibilities, assigned to the Coast Guard 

over two centuries of service because they are traditionally governmental, have an 

essential federal component, and are closely interrelated, such that they can be 

best accomplished by a single, military, multi-mission maritime force.2 These roles 

are also common to, and largely shared by, governments of all seagoing nations. 

They refl ect the mutual national interests of coastal States and their maritime forces 

around the world.

Maritime Safety 10

Maritime Security 11

Maritime Stewardship 13

The Value of a Military, Multi-Mission Maritime Force 14
10 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

The Coast Guard’s Maritime Safety Role

Ensure safe operation of the Marine Transportation 

System (MTS) and protect the lives and safety of those 

on the sea.

The Coast Guard will advance the safety of recreational 

and commercial activities in the maritime domain, using 

focused prevention and response programs and activities. 

When incidents do occur, the Coast Guard will lead in 

rendering aid to those in distress to minimize injury or loss 

of life and property damage or loss.

Respond to maritime disasters, natural or man made, 

to protect lives and ensure safety in U.S. communities. 

The Coast Guard will prepare for and respond to natural 

or man-made disasters affecting the U.S. public in concert 

with other federal agencies, U.S. and foreign military 

services, state and local governments, private relief 

organizations, and international agencies.

I

n partnership with other federal agencies, state and 

local governments, marine industries, and individual 

mariners, the Coast Guard advances the safety of maritime 

communities, trade, transportation, and recreational 

boating through focused prevention and response 

programs.

Prevention is founded on domestic and internationally 

harmonized regulatory regimes3 aimed at ensuring 

maritime safety and the effi cient fl ow of commerce. 

Prevention efforts are developed by virtue of the service’s 

strong maritime expertise, emphasize the human element, 

and work best when implemented through strong 

partnerships with the commercial and recreational users 

of the nation’s ports and waterways. Through domestic 

regulations and programs and active participation in the 

International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Coast 

Guard shapes effective maritime safety regimes. Using its 

broad legal authorities,4

 the Coast Guard enforces safety 

regimes through inspection of U.S. and foreign vessels 

and investigation of incidents that occur, with the goal of 

preventing future marine casualties.

3

 Regimes are defi ned here as the system of rules consistent with the established legal order (including international law; regional,

multinational, or bilateral agreements; domestic laws and regulation; and standard practices and procedures) that shape and defi ne 

acceptable activity.

4 Coast Guard conducts safety inspections using legal authorities under Title 14, 33, 46, and 50 U.S. Code for recreational vessels and

as Captains of the Port (COTP) and Offi cers-in-Charge of Marine Inspection (OCMI) for commercial vessels.

Maritime Safety

The most basic responsibility of the U.S. government is to protect the lives and safety of its 

citizens. In addition to the value of lives saved, Coast Guard maritime safety activities minimize 

damage to property, the environment, and the U.S. economy.
11

The sea is an unforgiving environment where mariners or 

others may fi nd themselves in distress. As the designated 

Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) coordinator under the 

National SAR Plan, the Coast Guard operates command, 

communications, and rescue facilities and leads activities 

that save lives and property. The Coast Guard also engages 

the world’s merchant fl eet to rescue mariners in distress 

worldwide through the Automated Mutual-Assistance 

Vessel Rescue (AMVER) System. SAR capacity is also 

instrumental in responding to disasters in coastal and 

maritime communities, including hurricanes, fl ooding, 

maritime casualties, and any other incidents of national 

signifi cance requiring rescue and assistance. Under 

its broad Captain of the Port (COTP) authorities and 

responsibilities, the Coast Guard also coordinates response 

efforts to ensure public safety and restore commerce on 

U.S. waterways in the aftermath of mishaps or disasters.

An essential attribute of any nation is its ability to protect its citizens and to maintain sovereign 

control of its land, air, and sea borders. In the maritime domain, this means exerting and safeguarding 

sovereignty in the nation’s internal waters, ports and waterways, and littorals, as well as protecting 

vital national interests on the high seas.

The Coast Guard’s Maritime Security Role

Protect the U.S. maritime domain and the Marine 

Transportation System, and deny their use and 

exploitation by terrorists as a means for attacks 

on U.S. territory, population, vessels, and critical 

infrastructure. 

The Coast Guard will work with federal, state, and local 

agencies and with the private sector to protect the maritime 

domain, deny its use by terrorists, prepare for and respond 

to attacks and minimize any consequences, and ensure 

the continued vitality of U.S. national interests within the 

maritime domain. 

Uphold U.S. maritime sovereignty and enforce U.S. 

law, international conventions, and treaties against 

criminal activities. 

The Coast Guard will enforce all laws, conventions, and 

treaties in the maritime domain aimed at suppressing 

illegal migration, human traffi cking, smuggling of drugs 

and other contraband, and all other federal or international 

crime. These enforcement actions are integral to national 

initiatives that secure air, land, and sea borders. 

Section I: America’s Coast Guard

Maritime Security
12 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

Defend U.S. national interests in the maritime 

domain against hostile acts through military action.

The Coast Guard will help to defend the United States 

from direct attacks on its territory through planning and 

execution of homeland defense, and from threats to its 

national security through military activities wherever 

needed. 

The Coast Guard works closely with its governmental and non-governmental partners to safeguard 

America’s maritime interests and ensure its maritime 

sovereignty. Deterring crime on the sea relies on a 

foundation of strong laws, awareness, and active 

presence. Patrols, interceptions, and inspections, 

supported by detection, tracking, monitoring, and 

operational intelligence, serve to counter contraband 

smuggling, human traffi cking and mass migrations, 

criminal activities, and terrorist threats. The U.S. Coast 

Guard also leads in developing security standards and 

international enforcement agreements, and partners with 

the private sector to develop effective self-regulatory 

regimes. 

As part of the U.S. Armed Forces,7

 the Coast Guard 

supports the National Security Strategy and related 

defense strategies. The Coast Guard complements the 

capabilities of the U.S. Navy, as an essential component 

of the National Fleet,8 and operates alongside the U.S. 

Marine Corps, as it has done throughout the past two 

centuries. In this capacity, the Coast Guard provides 

unique, non-redundant support to the military Combatant 

Commanders, including maritime interception, military 

environmental response, port security, peacetime 

military engagement, and coastal sea control.9

The Coast Guard has long been responsible for 

protecting ports, harbors, vessels, and waterfront 

facilities from accidents, criminal acts, terrorism, and 

sabotage.5 After the “9/11” terrorist attacks, the Coast 

Guard took on new authorities as the Federal Maritime 

Security Coordinator (FMSC) within U.S. ports and 

adjacent waters.6

 As a result, the Coast Guard is now 

responsible for coordinating all maritime security 

planning and operations in the nation’s ports and 

waterways, including efforts to prevent terrorist attacks 

and to respond as necessary to mitigate the consequences 

of an attack, should one occur. 

5

 The Espionage Act of 1917, the Magnuson Act of 1950 (implemented at 33 C.F.R Part 6), and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act

of 1972 provide the Coast Guard with broad authorities to protect U.S. ports and waterways.

6

 The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295) designated COTPs as FMSC for their respective zones.

7 Section 101 of Title 10 U.S. Code defi nes the term “armed forces” as the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.

8 The National Fleet: A Joint Navy/Coast Guard Policy Statement (Washington DC: 2006) developed by the Department of the Navy

and the U.S. Coast Guard calls for cooperation and integration of non-redundant and complementary capabilities between the 

services.

9 A 1995 Department of Defense-Department of Transportation Memorandum of Agreement identifi es specifi c national defense

missions for the U. S. Coast Guard.
13

Maritime Stewardship

The nation’s prosperity relies on the balanced and sustainable use of inland, coastal, and ocean 

waters and resources. The foundation for this prosperity—an effi cient, resilient MTS—must be 

maintained in order to facilitate maritime mobility and protect the nation’s economy. At the same 

time, the marine environment must be protected against threats from pollution, environmental 

degradation, the spread of invasive species, and the illegal harvesting of marine resources. 

The Coast Guard’s Maritime Stewardship Role

Facilitate the economical movement of goods and 

people through the MTS and maximize access for 

recreational boating activity.

The Coast Guard will provide navigation systems, 

information, and services that enable a safe, secure, 

effi cient, effective, accessible, and environmentally 

responsible MTS for moving goods and people. 

Safeguard U.S. marine resources, threatened and 

endangered species, and the ocean from unlawful acts 

and environmental degradation.

The Coast Guard will conduct vigorous enforcement 

against all activities that lead to harming endangered 

species, over-fi shing, ocean pollution, and the introduction 

and spread of invasive species. 

Conduct maritime recovery operations in the aftermath 

of incidents of national signifi cance, including 

transportation security incidents, to ensure the continuity 

of commerce and other critical port and waterway 

functions.

The Coast Guard will coordinate maritime recovery 

operations and rapidly restore the functionality of 

the ports and waterways affected by an incident 

of national signifi cance or other emergency that 

signifi cantly impacts the MTS. 

Competing demands in America’s ports and waterways–

–commerce, national security, public health and 

safety, environmental concerns, recreation, fi sheries, and 

more––must be balanced. To achieve this balance, the 

Coast Guard provides services as well as coordination and 

leadership among government and private sector partners. 

Through waterways information and infrastructure, vessel 

traffi c services, aids to navigation, domestic icebreaking, 

bridge administration, and waterways management 

activities the Coast Guard helps ensure the nation’s 

waterways remain effi cient and safe for commercial and 

recreational use. These same Coast Guard capabilities 

are brought to bear in a disaster, natural or man-made, 

ensuring the quick recovery of waterways and the 

restoration of essential commerce within U.S. ports. The 

Coast Guard works across multiple partners towards a 

common purpose: To ensure that America has safe and 

reliable maritime gateways to the world. 

The Coast Guard, in coordination with other federal and 

state agencies, enforces marine resource management and 

protection regimes that preserve healthy stocks of fi sh 

and other living marine resources. Fisheries protection 

requires oversight and presence throughout and beyond 

the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone. The Coast Guard 

patrols these ocean regions to uphold U.S. sovereignty 

and protect marine resources. The Coast Guard also 

operates the nation’s only polar icebreakers, which provide 

U.S. capability to advance national interests in the polar 

regions. 
14 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

10 Under The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (40 CFR Part 300), as required by the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (as amended by the Superfund Amendments and 

Reauthorization Act of 1986) and by the Clean Water Act (as amended by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990), the Coast Guard is the predesignated Federal On-Scene Coordinator to direct federal removal efforts at the scene of an oil or hazardous substance discharge in 

the coastal zone.

11 U.S. Department of Transportation, Coast Guard Publication One, U.S. Coast Guard: America’s Maritime Guardian (Washington,

DC: 2002), 56-63.

12 Recognizing the value of maintaining the military, multi-mission nature of the Coast Guard, Congress transferred the service intact

with its full complement of missions to the Department of Homeland Security as per Section 888(a) (2) of the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002.

The Coast Guard works to keep the nation’s waters free 

of oil, chemicals, other marine pollution, and invasive 

species. Prevention strategies are foremost among the 

Coast Guard’s environmental initiatives, but stewardship 

of the marine environment also requires education, 

surveillance, interception, inspection, investigation, 

enforcement, and contingency planning. In the event of a 

spill, the Coast Guard coordinates response activities as 

the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) for the Coastal 

Zone.10 The Coast Guard has built strong partnerships with 

government agencies, academia, interest groups, private 

industry, and international organizations to carry out all of 

these critical tasks.

The Value of a Military, Multi-Mission, Maritime Service

The roles of the Coast Guard have their origins in single-purpose agencies that arose over the last 

two centuries; the Revenue Cutter Service, Lifesaving Service, Lighthouse Service, Steamboat 

Inspection Service, and the Bureau of Navigation. The integration of these organizations created 

a single military, multi-mission, maritime service that is today’s Coast Guard.11 The Service’s 

character, forged by its enduring roles of safety, security, and stewardship, has given it key strengths 

for meeting tomorrow’s challenges: 

Broad, Complementary Authorities and an Expansive 

Network of Partnerships

The Coast Guard’s ability to conduct distinct but interrelated maritime functions—law enforcement, 

national defense, mobility, safety, environmental 

protection, and humanitarian response—defi nes its unique 

multi-mission character and value.12 The Coast Guard is 

a member of the U.S. Armed Forces, a law-enforcement 

and regulatory authority, a member of the U.S. Intelligence 

Community, and a collaborative-response partner with 

federal, state, and local agencies. These interactions 
Section I: America’s Coast Guard 15

13 “Deploy layered security to unify public and private security measures” is one of the fi ve strategic actions of The National Strategy

for Maritime Security. Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, DC: 2005), 20. 

The Department of Defense’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support states: “Guiding homeland defense planning is the 

concept of an active, layered defense, predicated on seizing the initiative from adversaries.” Department of Defense, Strategy for 

Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington, DC: 2005), 10.

14 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned highlights the value of the Coast Guard’s surge capability as

a military organization: “DoD...demonstrated that along with the Coast Guard, it was one of the only Federal departments that 

possessed real operational capabilities to translate Presidential decisions into prompt, effective action on the ground.” The White 

House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: 2006), 54. 

generate strong civil-military partnerships and networks 

that cover all facets of maritime activities, at home 

and abroad. The Coast Guard has broad jurisdictional 

authorities to combat nearly every maritime threat, hazard, 

or challenge to the nation. The Coast Guard also works 

extensively with public and private partners to coordinate 

planning for and response to maritime emergencies. 

These wide authorities and partnerships yield advantages 

in today’s maritime domain. Layered security and 

overlapping safety systems are key concepts in many 

national strategies.13 Layers of security are built by 

addressing each point of vulnerability––e.g., people, 

cargo, conveyances, facilities, transportation routes, and 

more. Layering is also achieved through: “hardening” 

of facilities and infrastructure against natural disasters 

and man-made attacks; military and law-enforcement 

operations; commercial practices; international standards; 

and other steps. Using its broad authorities and extensive 

partnerships, the Coast Guard can coordinate law 

enforcement, intelligence, military, diplomatic, and private 

sector activity into a comprehensive, mutually reinforcing 

system of “layers.” 

Flexible, Adaptable Operational Capability

and Presence

The Coast Guard’s military, multi-mission, maritime 

character provides agile, adaptable, and ready 

operational capabilities that are well suited to serve the 

nation’s maritime interests. The majority of the U.S. 

population lives near the seacoasts and a diverse range 

of activities—shipping, fi shing, energy exploration, 

exploitation of other natural resources, and recreation—are 

conducted within the Exclusive Economic Zone. These 

regions also contain much of the critical infrastructures 

and many of the key economic assets that enable the 

United States to sustain its economy and reach out globally 

to overseas markets. In this land-sea “ribbon” around the 

nation, the Coast Guard provides a constant, credible, and 

recognized maritime presence in the performance of its 

safety, security, and stewardship roles. 

This presence, supported by a military command, control, 

and communications network, allows the Coast Guard 

both to prevent threats and respond to natural disasters 

and man-made emergencies. The Coast Guard can scale 

forces with essential expertise, from purely local actions 

up to a national- or even international-level response, 

regardless of the danger. The Coast Guard’s response to the 

terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

demonstrated the Service’s surge capacity and response 

capability.14 In responding to domestic disasters and 

emergencies, the Coast Guard can also accept and integrate 

assistance from the U.S. Armed Forces. 

The Coast Guard also has capability, experience, and 

expertise for homeland defense and overseas missions, 

including expanded maritime interception operations in 

support of the Global War on Terrorism. The Coast Guard 

can fl ow its non-redundant capabilities to the Department 

of Defense for national security contingencies. As both a 

military service and law-enforcement agency, it straddles 

the seam separating the federal government’s homeland 

security and homeland defense missions. Regardless of 

whether a maritime threat requires law enforcement or a 

military response, the Coast Guard, because of its military, 

multi-mission character, can respond appropriately. 
16 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

Access and Relevant Expertise within the International 

Community

The Coast Guard has long provided the United States with the ability for international engagement 

in maritime affairs. The Coast Guard’s military, law 

enforcement, and humanitarian functions—all blended into 

a single maritime force—closely resemble those of the vast 

majority of the world’s navies and coast guards in terms of 

structure, capabilities, and missions. This promotes instant 

understanding and interoperability and makes the Coast 

Guard a useful “match” for many important naval and 

maritime partners. 

The Coast Guard’s white-hulled cutters with their 

orange and blue “racing stripes” demonstrate U.S. 

interest, resolve, will, and commitment to shared 

maritime objectives. The Coast Guard has access to 

multiple ministries of a country, such as transportation, 

interior, security, justice, defense, and environment. This 

opens many doors for enduring relationships, building 

upon common interests in maritime administration, 

humanitarian, environmental, and law-enforcement 

missions, in addition to “military-to-military” exercises 

and operations. The Coast Guard has a long history of 

providing international training to maritime forces around 

the world, improving the capabilities of partner nations 

and promoting operations that support common interests. 

The Coast Guard’s effectiveness in international affairs 

also stems from its recognized leadership in multi-national 

forums and institutions where the Coast Guard has long 

advanced maritime safety, security, and stewardship 

standards.
Section II: Challenges and Threats in the Maritime Domain 17

Section II

Challenges and Threats in the Maritime Domain

The Coast Guard’s “world of work” is the seas, lakes, rivers, harbors, and coastal 

communities of this nation, as well as the oceans and marine transportation system 

that connect America to the global economy. This “world” is being shaped by 

changes that are fueling its productivity and usefulness but also increasing its 

complexity and vulnerability. While these challenges and threats are numerous and 

complex, fi ve broad “driving forces of change” are shaping the strategic direction 

of the Coast Guard and the nation.

Increasing Complexity and Usage of the U.S. EEZ 18

Growth of the Global Maritime Supply System 20

Emergence of Transnational Threats 21

Increasing Scale of and Potential for Catastrophic Incidents 24

Vastness, Anonymity, and Limited Governance 26
18 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

Outer Continental Shelf Development

Domestic energy supplies and industry in the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) provide a major 

source of revenue as well as generating tens of thousands 

of U.S. jobs. About 30% of the nation’s oil supplies 

and 25% of its natural gas supplies are produced from 

offshore areas, and new advances in technology will 

allow production to occur in deeper waters.16 During the 

past several years, discoveries of huge reserves of oil 

and gas in the deeper waters of the Gulf Coast OCS have 

already increased the amount of drilling in these areas. 

This can be expected to drive larger and more complex 

platforms, increased pipeline infrastructure, a larger 

offshore workforce, and increased surface and subsurface 

movement of oil and gas. All of these developments will 

be coupled with issues of foreign ownership, operation, 

crewing, and supply chains––factors that are not fully 

addressed in current regimes for governance.17 

The demand for natural gas and the desire for future 

renewable sources of energy are increasing in the 

United States. While in early 2007 the U.S. has only six 

operating Liquefi ed Natural Gas (LNG) marine terminals, 

new terminals are in various stages of planning. These 

and other terminals may be built on the OCS under the 

Deepwater Port Act, adding critical offshore infrastructure 

but at the same time bringing related safety and security 

concerns. 

The EEZ also represents signifi cant potential as a source 

for renewable energy using wind turbines, ocean thermal 

energy conversion technology, and mechanical devices 

driven by waves, tides, and currents. While sometimes 

controversial, renewable energy infrastructure illustrates 

the broad pressure to develop and extract energy from the 

EEZ. 

15 U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century. (Washington, DC: 2004), 2.

16 Ibid., 6.

17 For the purposes of this document, maritime governance means the use of institutions, structures of authority, and sovereign

capabilities to oversee maritime activities and safeguard national maritime interests.

Increasing Complexity and Usage

of the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone

The U.S. EEZ covers over 3.4 million square nautical miles of ocean territory and is among the most 

valuable and productive natural resources on Earth. In 2000, offshore activities contributed more 

than $117 billion and two million jobs to American prosperity, while the overall economic activity 

of the coastal areas totaled over $1 trillion, creating one-tenth of the nation’s annual gross domestic 

product.15 Use of the EEZ is growing for maritime trade, recreation and tourism, commercial and 

recreational fi shing, energy development, and sea-bed mining. Advancing technologies, and in 

some cases climate change, are reshaping these maritime activities and allowing them to expand 

throughout the EEZ. These increasing and sometimes competing uses will challenge the safety, 

security, and health of the maritime environment.
19

18 Ibid., 6.

19 Scott Borgerson, “Breaking the Ice Up North,” New York Times. October 20, 2005.

20 The National Research Council has noted, “The potential for increased human activity in the northern latitudes will likely increase

the need for the United States to assert a more active and infl uential presence in the Arctic to protect not only its territorial interests, 

but also to project its presence as a world power concerned with the security, economic, scientifi c and international political issues 

of the region.” National Research Council, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs (Washington, DC: 

2006), S-2.

Section II: Challenges and Threats in the Maritime Domain

Other Increasing and Competing Uses 

The EEZ supports a wide range of activities, such as navigation and transportation, contains a complex 

network of infrastructure, and is the nation’s gateway to 

the global supply chain. It is also used by tens of thousands 

of recreational boaters and a rapidly expanding ocean 

tourism sector that drive U.S. coastal economies. The EEZ 

is home to an increasing number of marine sanctuaries 

designed to conserve critical ocean ecosystems. U.S. 

fi sh stocks are harvested by recreational and commercial 

fi sherman in a $48 billion annual industry.18 Technologies 

for unearthing deep sea-bed mineral resources are also 

improving, enabling mineral extractions from increasingly 

deeper waters in the EEZ. These trends, combined with 

OCS development, add complexity and vulnerability in 

the maritime domain. The growth in EEZ activities is 

remarkable and needs to be matched by the development 

of comprehensive, integrated, and non-confl icting rules 

necessary to address the safety, security, and stewardship 

concerns of the nation. 

The Future of the Arctic 

Scientifi c evidence indicates that the Arctic ice cap has shrunk by nearly half since the early 1950s, 

suggesting that an oceanic trade route across the Arctic 

from the North Atlantic to the North Pacifi c will eventually 

become reality. Such a trade route would represent a 

transformational shift in maritime trade, akin to the 

opening of the Panama Canal in the early 20th Century. An 

Arctic marine highway would cut existing oceanic transit 

by an estimated 5,000 nautical miles or up to one week 

of sailing time. Further, experts believe that one-quarter, 

if not more, of the world’s oil and natural gas resources 

may lie in the Arctic, creating signifi cant offshore-energy 

production opportunities as the ice melts.19

While transportation and energy developments in the 

Arctic could be critical to future national interests, the 

Arctic represents an especially complex and ecologically 

sensitive oceanic area. Navigation practices and traffi c 

schemes, vessel standards, environmental protection, 

and enforcement and response capability unique to the 

environment are just a short list of sovereignty and 

maritime governance issues that must be addressed.20
20 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

21 Department of Homeland Security, Secure Seas, Open Ports: Keeping our waters safe, secure and open for business (Washington,

DC: 2004), 2

22 Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America, Free Trade and the Environment: The Picture Becomes Clearer

(Montreal (Quebec), Canada: 2002), 12.

23 James D. Hessman, “The Maritime Dimension: Special Report The Coast Guard’s Role in Homeland Security,” Sea Power, April

2002, 1.

24 U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century. (Washington, DC: 2004), 31

25 Ibid., 193.

Vulnerabilities to Disruption

As the MTS has grown in global importance, it has also become more vulnerable. The majority of freight 

moving by sea is shipped for “just-in-time” delivery—a 

means for reducing inventory and lowering operating costs 

for industry. As a result, the MTS operates within tight 

tolerances and has limited ability to deal with disruptions. 

Global maritime trade moves through a small number 

of major trading nodes, often referred to as mega-ports, 

and through a handful of strategic maritime chokepoints. 

Spread across Asia, North America, and Europe are 

30 mega-ports that constitute the world’s primary, 

interdependent trading web. Similar critical shipping nodes 

exist within the U.S. MTS. Out of the some 326 ports 

nationwide, ten handle 85% of all ship-borne containerized 

cargo.25 These nodes are connected by trade routes that 

pass through a few critical international straits, such as the 

Straits of Gibraltar, Bab-el-Mandeb, Hormuz, Malacca, 

and Formosa. Perhaps as much as 75% of the world’s 

maritime trade and 50% of the world’s shipped oil passes 

through a handful of critical chokepoints.

 

Growth of the Global Maritime Supply System

In 2001, merchant vessels carried approximately 80% of world trade by volume.21 The United 

States is the world’s leading maritime trading nation, accounting for nearly 20% of the annual 

world ocean-borne overseas trade.22 The global Marine Transportation System––a complex and 

interconnected system of waterways, ports, terminals, inter-modal connections, vessels, people, 

support service industries, and users spanning the domestic and international public and private 

sectors––is the economic lifeblood of the global economy and is critical to U.S. national interests. 

Nearly 700 ships arrive in U.S. ports each day, and on the order of 8,000 foreign-fl ag ships, manned 

by 200,000 foreign mariners, enter U.S. ports every year.23 Annually, the nation’s ports handle more 

than $700 billion in merchandise, while the cruise industry and its passengers account for another 

$11 billion in spending. All told, the U.S. MTS supports a global chain of economic activity that 

contributes more than $700 billion to America’s economy each year.24
21

These critical nodes and chokepoints create opportunities 

to disrupt trade, which can have immediate and signifi cant 

economic impacts. By one estimate, the cost to the U.S. 

economy from port closures on the West Coast due to a 

labor management dispute in 2003 was approximately 

$1 billion per day for the fi rst fi ve days, rising sharply 

thereafter.26 Terrorist attacks at the world’s chokepoints or 

mega-ports might trigger a similar disruption. 

The key to limiting the risk of disruption in the MTS is 

to ensure security at sea and security and resilience in 

major ports. Security at sea and in foreign ports requires 

common effort, awareness, and stronger maritime 

governance in many coastal States, including the United 

States. Resiliency in the MTS requires protocols between 

government and the private sector on how to handle 

disruptions, minimize impact, and quickly restart the fl ow 

of commerce. In early 2007, these types of protocols or 

regimes were limited or nonexistent.

26 The total cost to the U.S. economy from the 11-day work stoppage has been estimated to be as much as $20 billion. Peter Chalk,

“Maritime Terrorism in the Contemporary Era: Threat and Potential Future Contingencies,” The MIPT Terrorism Annual 2006, 25.

Section II: Challenges and Threats in the Maritime Domain

Maritime Terrorism 

Terrorists have shown repeated successful use of the sea to mount deadly attacks. The Achille Lauro hijacking, 

the emergence of the Tamil “Sea Tigers” in Sri Lanka, the 

Al Qaeda-inspired attacks against the USS Cole and the M/

V Limburg, the Al Qaeda-affi liated Abu Sayyaf’s bombing 

and sinking of the Superferry 14, and other such incidents 

all show maritime attacks as an established means 

for terrorists to achieve the spectacular economic and 

psychological impacts they seek. A recurring attack mode 

in the maritime domain has been the use of small boats 

The Emergence of Transnational Threats

Many of today’s maritime threats come from non-State actors that do not respect national borders, 

are not military in nature, and seek to blend into the normal course of legitimate activity in the 

maritime domain. Criminal actors are constantly learning, adapting and growing as they use the 

vastness of the oceans to their advantage, cloak themselves within the anonymity afforded to 

most maritime activities, exploit advances of globalization, and fl ourish in weak coastal States 

with poor governance. Transnational terrorism has leapt into prominence after the 9/11 attacks, 

and will likely remain the dominant security concern in the maritime domain, for the foreseeable 

future. The merging of international terrorism with longstanding criminal networks may be the 

next challenge to peaceful nations.
22 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

27 Bulk, break bulk, and car carriers are among the many different cargo vessels that frequent United States ports and are potential

conveyances that could be exploited by terrorists or traffi ckers.

28 International Maritime Organization - Maritime Safety Committee, “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships,”

MSC 04, Circular 81, 22 March 2006.

as water-borne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs). 

WBIEDs could be used in a Cole- or Limburg-like attack 

against cruise ships, petroleum or chemical tankers, busy 

public waterfront areas, or maritime critical infrastructure. 

Large vessels could be used as a kinetic weapon against 

other vessels and critical infrastructure. Vessels could also 

be used as a delivery platform for an attack employing 

a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) against a major 

metropolitan area.

Terrorists have also used the marine transportation system 

as a threat-vector to move weapons, materials, money, 

and people for further attacks in the maritime domain or 

elsewhere throughout the United States. The use of the 

MTS as a vector is not limited to containerized cargo 

vessels, but could include any of the thousands of other 

cargo,27 fi shing, and recreational vessels plying U.S. and 

international waters. 

Criminal Traffi cking and Piracy 

While terrorism is viewed as the most signifi cant threat to U.S. national interests, criminal 

activities in the form of piracy, human smuggling, drug 

traffi cking, and weapons and contraband smuggling 

have all grown signifi cantly in recent years. Traffi cking 

organizations threaten and corrupt the governments of 

countries worldwide, including many within the Western 

Hemisphere, and are primary sources of illegal drugs 

and other contraband. In response to interdiction efforts, 

maritime traffi ckers continually modify their transit routes 

and their means and methods of delivery. Smugglers are 

fi nding new ways to avoid detection and apprehension 

and are becoming more sophisticated in using fraudulent 

documents and other deception techniques. Maritime 

piracy has signifi cantly increased since the 1980s,28 posing 

dangers to U.S. national interests, global commerce, and 

the freedom of navigation, including the movement of 

critical energy commodities. 

 

Finally, the distinction between terrorism and criminal 

activities is blurring as extremist groups attempt to support 

their objectives through other criminal enterprises. For 

example, maritime smuggling can be a more secure avenue 

than land routes as a channel for weapons, explosives, 

and lucrative contraband. Terrorists may seek to exploit 

established smuggling routes, methods, and organizations 

in an attempt to smuggle weapons and cash, and enter the 

United States or its territories clandestinely. The criminal 

fi nancial gains from drug traffi cking, piracy, and other 

criminal enterprises also offer a potential source of funding 

for terrorists.

Illegal Migration 

I

llegal migration, as well as organized human smuggling, 

undermines U.S. sovereignty and challenges the 

nation’s borders. Illegal migration adversely affects 

regional economies and creates unacceptable conditions 

of human suffering and loss of life. Such maritime 

migration can range from the day-to-day movement of 

individuals to the episodic mass migration of people in 

response to deteriorating political or economic conditions. 

Routine illegal migration results in nearly 7,000 maritime 

interdictions per year.29 Mass migrations are large-scale 
Section II: Challenges and Threats in the Maritime Domain 23

29 This statistic is based on a fi ve-year average of Coast Guard data from fi scal years 2001 through 2005.

30 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, The State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture. (Rome, Italy: United

Nations 2002), 23.

31 National Marine Fisheries Service, Annual Report to Congress on the Status of U.S. Fisheries—2003 (Washington, D.C.: National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2004), 4.

32 U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century. (Washington, DC: 2004), 40.

33 Ibid., 41.

crises during which tens of thousands of migrants can 

be interdicted in only a few weeks. The primary sourcecountries in 2006 for illegal migration and human 

smuggling were Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 

Haiti, and the People’s Republic of China. Illegal entry 

into the United States by stowaways, absconders, and/or 

deserters from commercial vessels calling on U.S. ports 

also creates new concerns after 9/11.

Of the country’s 267 major fi shstocks, roughly 20% were 

either already overfi shed, experiencing overfi shing, or 

are rapidly approaching an overfi shed condition.31 While 

declining fi sh populations are the result of many factors, 

overfi shing, the unintentional removal of non-targeted 

species (known as “bycatch”), and uneven management 

are key factors.32 Other forms of depletion include the 

illegal harvesting of resources by both domestic and 

foreign actors. 

Although maritime pollution and invasive species are 

not generally criminal threats, they present similar 

transnational challenges to maritime governance 

and sovereignty. Marine pollution continues to have 

signifi cant acute and chronic affects on marine life and 

the environment, while marine debris often harms or kills 

marine organisms, damages fi shing gear, and reduces the 

appeal of recreational beaches. Likewise, the introduction 

of alien marine species transported in ships’ ballast water 

poses severe threats to U.S. and global ecosystems. More 

than 7,000 different species are transported around the 

world every day, an estimated two million gallons of 

ballast water arrive in U.S. waters every hour, and nearly 

500 non-native species are already established in North 

American coastal habitats.33

Disease 

I

nfectious diseases may not seem a signifi cant threat 

in the maritime domain, yet the legal and illegal 

movement of people through America’s maritime borders 

could introduce or spread diseases in the United States. 

Biotechnology, which may emerge as the next innovation 

to benefi t society, could also be misused as a weapon, 

perhaps with catastrophic effects. This threat is expected 

to complicate U.S. and global security during the next 20 

years, if not longer. While America’s maritime borders 

are not the most signifi cant means of entry for travelers to 

the United States, vessels arrive in U.S. waters from ports 

all over the world every day. Any one of the passengers 

or crew members from these vessels could be a vector, 

either intentionally or unintentionally, for the spread of an 

infectious disease. 

Environmental Exploitation and Degradation 

Depletion of living marine resources is a serious challenge. From 25% to 30% of the world’s major 

fi sh stocks are overexploited,30 and a 2004 report indicates 

that U.S. fi sheries are experiencing similar diffi culties. 
24 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

34 Ibid., 41.

35 Ibid., 42 (with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita added).

Increased Coastal Density 

The increased scale of catastrophic maritime incidents—or the degree of damage resulting from 

them—is signifi cantly linked to the expanding population 

and infrastructure densities of the nation’s coastal regions. 

America’s coastal population density is fi ve times greater 

than the country as a whole, and the number of coastal 

residents could easily increase by another 21 million by 

2015.34 More densely populated and developed coastal 

areas and urban centers subject more people and property 

to storms, hurricanes, fl ooding, and earthquakes. Before 

1989, no single storm caused losses greater than $1 billion. 

Since then, more than a dozen storms have resulted in such 

losses.35 The effects of Hurricane Katrina illustrate the 

potential scale and consequences of incidents in a densely 

populated coastal region. Katrina effectively forced 

the evacuation of a major city, shut down a key port, 

devastated critical infrastructure, and forced the adaptation 

of the supply chain to minimize economic impact. The 

hurricane highlighted weaknesses in national operational 

capability, communications, coordination protocols, 

and supporting logistic capabilities that are necessary 

to respond to large catastrophic events in the nation’s 

maritime regions.

Increasing Scale of and Potential for Catastrophic Events

America is increasingly vulnerable to catastrophic incidents, whether from a terrorist attack or an 

extraordinary act of nature. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita gave the nation a grim appreciation for 

the potential size and impact of such incidents. These catastrophes drove home the implications of 

the nation’s population growth in the coastal regions, as well as the potential for mass effects from 

a terrorist’s WMD attack or a natural disaster. Adding to the challenge of responding to maritime 

disasters is the remarkable increase in size of ships today.

Potential Impacts from Weapons of Mass Destruction 

The gravest maritime threat facing the nation is the potential for a terrorist group to obtain a nuclear 

weapon or other WMD and use it within the confi nes of 

a major U.S. port city. While much focus has been placed 

on WMD detection in maritime containers, it is equally 

probable, if not even more likely, that such a device would 

be loaded onboard a low-value bulk freighter, a fi shing 

boat, or a recreational yacht or power boat that allows 

constant possession of a WMD device by a terrorist group. 

Many of these vessels also operate under minimal regimes 

and protocols for control, making their movements mostly 

anonymous to authorities. The catastrophic impacts of 

such a terrorist attack, launched within dense urban port 

areas, make this a particularly lethal threat. 
Section II: Challenges and Threats in the Maritime Domain 25

Growing Size of Ships 

The enormous growth in capacity of cruise liners exemplifi es the broader challenges created by the 

enormous vessels now used in the maritime industry. The 

new ocean liners are 18 decks high, span the lengths of 

three football fi elds, and can carry nearly 6,000 people. A 

catastrophic incident on one of these ships, whether from a 

safety hazard or from an intentional terrorist attack, would 

test the nation’s capacity for mass rescue at sea. Ultralarge crude oil carriers are approaching 1,500 feet in length 

and 300-foot widths. The size of these oil supertankers 

transiting near U.S. shores means that if an accident 

does occur, the magnitude of the environmental impacts 

could be enormous. While standards for construction and 

operation have improved dramatically since the Exxon 

Valdez spill, the world must now consider that terrorists 

could potentially hijack and use these vessels as a weapon 

in order to cause a massive explosion, or intentionally 

spill millions of gallons of oil as an act of eco-terrorism. 

Similarly, a containership in the 1960s could only carry a 

few hundred containers. Today, container ships frequently 

carry 5,000 containers, and the largest can carry more than 

8,000 containers. These ships and their cargoes present a 

“challenge of scale” for authorities to screen and intercept 

illegal or dangerous shipments.
26 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

zones, and announce their presence only after arrival, if 

at all. While safety, security, and stewardship regimes are 

increasingly being developed for larger vessels on the sea, 

many smaller vessels, including most fi shing vessels, tugs, 

and recreational vessels, are not covered by these regimes 

and remain largely anonymous. 

Limited oversight and visibility creates a challenging 

environment for the enforcement of maritime sovereignty, 

including the protection of natural resources and the 

control of maritime borders. The permeability of U.S. 

maritime borders to the movement of goods and all types 

of vessels makes the maritime domain attractive for 

criminal and terrorist activities. With tightening security 

at U.S. land borders, and with the extensive security 

applied to air travel, criminal and terrorist actors may 

look to the vast and open sea to fi nd easier movement and 

less stringent security precautions. These criminal and 

terrorist elements will also seek out areas lacking strong 

governance as places to establish, stage, and ultimately 

export their illicit activities to other portions of the 

maritime domain.

Vessels of all kinds move back and forth between 

U.S. offshore waters and the high seas, with minimal 

or no oversight and limited requirements for reporting 

their activities. Many are anonymous and unmonitored 

as they travel through U.S. territorial seas and economic 

Vastness, Anonymity, and Limited Governance

of the Maritime Domain

The U.S. exercises certain sovereign rights over 3.4 million square nautical miles of ocean territory 

in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). It also oversees some 95,000 miles of shoreline and more 

than 300 ports of entry, from the largest mega-port to small fi shing harbors and marinas. For a “cop 

on the beat,” this is an enormous area in which to monitor the safety of mariners, secure national 

borders and the global supply chain, and protect natural resources. Adding to those challenges, 

the maritime domain can be characterized as one of the least governed regions left on earth. Many 

millions of square miles of ocean are a global commons under no nation’s jurisdiction. Unlike 

national land and air space, with clearly defi ned borders, much of the ocean is only lightly governed 

and its maritime borders are generally less restricted and are freely accessible to transit without 

mechanisms for detection and investigation. 
27

Section III

Maritime Governance

“Maritime governance” involves the use of institutions, structures of authority, 

and sovereign capabilities to oversee maritime activities and safeguard national 

maritime interests. Shaped by global threats and challenges, efforts to govern the 

maritime domain today refl ect complex, interwoven mutual interests and actions. 

Maritime nations, industries, and stakeholders work together to ensure maritime 

safety, security, and stewardship in the global commons. At the same time, each 

coastal State must address sovereign responsibilities in waters under its jurisdiction. 

These global and local actions to promote safety, security, or environmental 

protection often are interrelated and complementary in how they advance national 

interests. The Coast Guard uses a system view of these activities to help shape and 

lead maritime governance today.

Section III: Maritime Governance

A Systems Approach to Maritime Governance 28

Maritime Regimes 29

Domain Awareness 30

Operational Capabilities 32
28 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

Coast Guard actions and initiatives are best understood when viewed as parts of a larger 

interlocking system of governance comprised of maritime regimes, domain awareness, and 

operational capabilities.

Regimes are the system of “rules” that shape acceptable activities. Awareness involves the detection and 

monitoring of activities occurring within the maritime 

domain. Together, regimes and domain awareness inform 

decision makers and allow them to identify trends, 

anomalies, and activities that threaten or endanger U.S. 

interests. Operational capabilities allow authorities to 

deter, respond to, verify, and counter threats. They also 

allow the safe and sustainable day-to-day use of the 

maritime domain and speed recovery from natural or manmade impacts in times of crisis. 

These activities are not the sole province of the Coast 

Guard; they require participation from federal, state, local, 

private and international partners and demand unity of 

effort. Nor are they solely domestic; they span the globe 

Figure 2: Conceptual depiction of maritime governance

and take place throughout the maritime domain. A systems 

approach to maritime governance must be global in scope 

and must be built upon a foundation of international 

cooperation. Finally, these activities provide a common 

framework for advancing safety, security, and stewardship, 

often serving all three through common regimes, 

monitoring, and enforcement efforts. 

Viewing maritime initiatives and policies as part of a 

larger system enables a better understanding of their interrelationships and effectiveness. A well designed system of 

regimes, awareness, and operational capabilities creates 

overlapping domestic and international safety nets, layers 

of security, and effective stewardship. Taken together, they 

provide a comprehensive, integrated system of maritime 

governance for the nation.

A Systems Approach to Maritime Governance
Section III: Maritime Governance 29

Maritime Regimes

“While legal, policy, and institutional frameworks exist for managing some ocean uses, there remain increasingly 

unacceptable gaps. The nation needs a coordinated offshore management regime that encompasses traditional and 

emerging uses and is adaptable enough to incorporate uses not yet clearly foreseen.”

-Final Report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004

36 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea entered into force on November 16, 1994. The U.S. has signed, but has not

yet acceded to the treaty.

Maritime regimes are the system of rules consistent 

with the established legal order (including 

international law; regional, multinational, or bilateral 

agreements; domestic laws and regulations; and standard 

practices and procedures) that shape and defi ne acceptable 

activity and enforcement schemes. They touch both 

international and domestic activities and apply across the 

global supply chain, throughout the marine transportation 

system, and to the natural resources of the domain. These 

regimes build upon a single unifying framework, the U.N. 

Convention on the Law of the Sea,36 which refl ects an 

international consensus on the balance of the rights and 

duties between coastal, fl ag, and port States. Regimes 

also encompass the operational frameworks necessary 

for action, including coordination across government and 

industry for preparedness, response, and recovery.

Some maritime regimes have grown from centuries of 

practice and custom. Many were developed in response 

to specifi c maritime catastrophes, such as oil spills or 

marine casualties, and focus on a narrow set of issues. 

Other regimes were created to guide the use of new 

technologies, such as electronic charts and advances in 

communications. The ad hoc development of maritime 

regimes has resulted in a patchwork approach to maritime 

governance that contains gaps and lacks integration. While 

such shortcomings may have been manageable in the past, 

they are a concern today. 

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the Coast Guard must 

look anew at existing maritime regimes as a systematic set 

of rules. Under scrutiny, current domestic and international 

maritime regimes can lack integration and may be 

insuffi cient to protect the United States and coastal nations 

against growing transnational threats, such as international 

terrorism. In ocean policy, the U.S needs integrated 

regimes that address concerns ranging from increased use 

of the EEZ to new uses of the Arctic. To fi ll these gaps and 

create a more integrated system, the Coast Guard must 

work to strengthen existing maritime regimes, and develop 

new ones where necessary.
30 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

Domain Awareness

“Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime 

domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.”

-National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, 2005

Domain awareness is a critical enabler that both informs the development of regimes and supports 

effective operations. Awareness requires that all-source 

intelligence and broad situational awareness37 be integrated 

to allow the United States and other nations to effectively 

understand activities, events, and trends that could threaten 

their safety, security, or natural resources. Awareness 

enables the nations of the world to better govern the global 

maritime commons. This knowledge is also necessary to 

inform the development of prevention-based requirements 

and standards, as well as enable coordinated response 

actions to counter criminal, terrorist, or other threats. This 

is especially important for combating transnational threats 

such as terrorists desiring to deliver a WBIED against a 

target using a small boat. Detecting and disrupting such 

threats while they are in the planning phases of an attack 

is much more likely to be successful than attempting to 

protect critical infrastructure and high value targets from 

attacks with defensive tactics on the water. Awareness 

can also trigger action to address unwelcome trends that 

impact safety, commerce, or the maritime environment and 

its natural resources. 

37 Situational Awareness involves having specifi c, real-time knowledge of vessels, people, infrastructure, environmental conditions,

and activities as they occur within the maritime domain, including maritime approaches, ports and inland waterways, anchorages,

fi shing grounds, choke-points, shipping lanes, etc.

38 Fusion refers to mining, organizing, and correlating data to enable subsequent analysis.

Improving awareness requires continued development of 

traditional all-source maritime intelligence capabilities, 

as well as a broader maritime situational awareness that 

leverages maritime Command, Control, Communications, 

Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

(C4ISR) capabilities and provides a “picture” of conditions 

and activity across the maritime domain. This awareness 

will include information about vessels (dynamic track data 

as well as static data on history, ownership, characteristics, 

etc.), people (passengers, crew, dock workers, agents, 

etc.), cargoes, weather, environment, and infrastructure. 

Achieving maritime domain awareness will involve 

collection, fusion,38 analysis, and dissemination to a wide 

range of decision makers from local enforcement offi cers 

to national leaders. The Coast Guard is working with DoD 

and other partner agencies to build domestic and global 

awareness of the maritime domain, but this will require the 

participation of all maritime stakeholders. Government and 

private stakeholders must establish an unprecedented level 

of information sharing and intelligence integration. 
Section III: Maritime Governance 31

The United States must protect its maritime interests 

across a vast domain with a limited number of assets 

spread out across multiple organizations. Having a shared 

awareness and understanding of the maritime domain 

among these organizations is essential for effective 

prevention, response, and recovery operations. This 

shared awareness acts as both a force multiplier and a 

means for coordinating maritime activities. Operations 

guided by intelligence and broad situational awareness can 

cover greater distances with greater accuracy in targeting 

their interdiction efforts. Tools that provide this shared 

awareness, such as a common operating picture (COP), 

will also greatly enhance unity of effort among the diverse 

group of organizations with maritime responsibilities and 

interests. Conceptually, global awareness systems could 

also assist the private sector in monitoring the global 

supply chain and improving the effi cient fl ow of goods 

between nations. 

U.S. maritime authorities are still hampered, however, 

by many gaps in their awareness—in their access to, 

and ability to share, fuse, and analyze large amounts of 

information regarding maritime activities—their ability to 

monitor the domain itself—and their ability to disseminate 

information through a national common operating 

picture. Of particular concern is the United States’ lack 

of capabilities to monitor vessel movements within many 

ports and inland waterways; drug traffi cking and illegal 

migration along known transit routes; fi shing activities 

throughout the EEZ; and activities in the Arctic region. 

While the U.S. requires large vessels to give notice 96 

hours prior to their arrival at U.S. ports, authorities are 

currently unable to monitor port approaches to ensure that 

all inbound craft have provided notice and been properly 

vetted. The maritime domain is a commonly used vector 

for drug traffi cking and illegal migration because of 

limited or non-existent monitoring of off-shore waters 

and coastal areas. Fishery conservation efforts depend 

upon monitoring schemes that rely on the cooperation of 

fi shermen, and the fragile Arctic is essentially invisible 

to us. Of even greater concern is the inability to monitor 

smaller vessels, which have little or no reporting 

requirements and are largely anonymous in the U.S. 

maritime domain. Terrorist groups have repeatedly used 

small boats as WBIEDs, and could also use such vessels 

to smuggle WMD materials, weapons, and people into 

the U.S. Detecting and tracking smaller vessels is one 

of the most pressing priorities for awareness efforts in the 

maritime domain. 
32 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

Operational Capabilities

“The creation of an effective National Preparedness System will require the Federal government to transform the way 

it does business. The most important objective of this Federal transformation will be to build and integrate operational 

capability. Each Federal department or agency...needs operational capability—or the capacity to get things done—to 

translate executive management direction promptly into results on the ground.”

-The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, February 2006 

Finally, the United States must have the operational capability (and suffi cient capacity) to ensure the safety, 

security, and stewardship of the maritime domain. This 

capability includes shore-based and mobile platforms, 

aircraft, and trained personnel—supported by dedicated 

command, control and logistics networks—that are capable 

of operating on inland waterways, the Great Lakes, coastal 

waters, the high seas, and beyond. These forces create the 

presence needed to deter illegal acts, infl uence activities 

that threaten the nation, protect U.S. sovereignty, and 

defend the nation. Coast Guard Deepwater assets must 

have the capacity not only to patrol U.S. coastal areas and 

maritime approaches, but also sustain maritime operations 

on the high seas and in the littoral waters of other coastal 

States. Deepwater assets are necessary for ensuring the 

safety of mariners and protecting natural resources in the 

far reaches of the EEZ, as well as interdicting transnational 

threats in international chokepoints, and off the distant 

coasts where criminals emerge. These maritime patrol 

forces are complemented by shore-base assets and by the 

growing Coast Guard capacity to deploy specialized forces 

to major events, such as environmental or natural disasters 

or nationally signifi cant security events.

 
Section III: Maritime Governance 33

39 There is a growing gap in operational capability to monitor—and enforce U.S. sovereign rights—in the polar regions. The National

Research Council has stated that “greater human activity will increase the need for the United States to assert a more active and 

infl uential presence as a world power concerned with the security, economic, scientifi c, and international political issues of the 

(Arctic) region.” As such, the Council acknowledged the need for more U.S. government icebreaking operational capability by 

concluding that “national interests in the polar regions require the United States immediately program, budget, design, and construct 

two new polar icebreakers to be operated by the U.S. Coast Guard.” National Research Council, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing 

World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs (Washington, DC: 2006), SC-1, S-9. 

The maritime operational capacity of the United 

States includes military assets capable of activities 

ranging from nation building and power projection 

to national defense and the security of the homeland. 

The United States’ naval forces—the U.S. Navy, 

Marine Corps and Coast Guard—must be closely 

aligned, maintain a high level of interoperability, 

and work together seamlessly when called upon to 

support the Combatant Commanders. 

While the Integrated Deepwater System program is 

essential to sustaining and improving the service’s 

operational capacities, the Coast Guard must work 

towards closing other capability gaps as well. For 

example, helping other nations strengthen their ports 

has become a major component of the U.S. strategy 

for “layered security.” The Coast Guard, however, 

has limited capacity to engage in these vital 

international activities. Another emerging security 

requirement is the need to interdict and defeat 

terrorists in the maritime environment. As a result, 

the Coast Guard is working with the Department of 

Defense and the Department of Justice to fashion 

an integrated maritime counter-terrorism capability. 

Other factors, such as the melting of the polar ice 

caps and the potential for increased activities in the 

Arctic,39 have created growing concerns over the 

Coast Guard’s future ability to provide operational 

support to U.S. activities in the polar regions. One 

of the Coast Guard’s most valued assets is the 

extensive, specialized expertise of its members in 

maritime safety, security, and stewardship. The rate 

of change in today’s dynamic maritime environment, 

however, is accelerating. Factors such as new 

technology are constantly evolving the way maritime 

activities are being conducted. Ensuring that the 

Coast Guard’s competencies and expertise keep pace 

with change is an increasingly diffi cult challenge for 

the service.

Addressing these gaps will require innovative 

and collaborative solutions. The terrorist attacks 

of 9/11 and the response to Hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita demonstrated the need for better integration of 

U.S. operational capabilities. Further, these events have 

shown that federal capacity alone is insuffi cient to meet 

national needs. State and local agencies, non-governmental 

organizations, and private industry provide essential 

capabilities in the maritime domain. Successful response 

to threats and hazards requires an integrated, cooperative 

approach where unity of effort is the modus operandi for 

operations in the maritime domain.
34 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

Securing the nation’s borders is one of the most important roles of government. The U.S. maritime borders 

are comprised of relatively open ports and coastlines that present an attractive avenue for entering illegally, 

conducting terrorist attacks, traffi cking contraband, or committing other criminal activities. As the United 

States improves control over its air and land borders, the nation’s expansive maritime borders could become 

a less risky alternative for bringing people and materials into the country illegally. The key to an effective, 

layered system of border controls, then, is balance and coverage across the air, land and maritime domains. 

Just as there are controls for the nation’s airspace and land crossings, there is a “wet” component to securing 

the nation’s borders.

Spotlight on Maritime Governance:

Securing the Nation’s Maritime Borders

The maritime border environment is particularly challenging because of its complexity. The maritime border 

is not only a vast space with diverse pathways into the nation; it is fi lled with all types of legitimate activity that 

can be exploited by terrorists and criminals. Fishing, commercial shipping, oil drilling and transport, resource 

extraction, pleasure boating, and other activities are constantly in motion in the waters that surround the 

nation.

Securing the maritime borders requires a layered approach of regimes, domain awareness, and operational 

capabilities. Interlocking regimes create rule-sets for operating vessels, transiting the domain, conducting 

maritime activities, entering ports of entry, declaring and unloading cargoes, and debarking passengers 

and crewmembers. Regimes also establish authorities and protocols for actions such as interdicting 

34 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship, 2006
35

vessels, controlling ports of entry, inspecting vessels and cargoes, and verifying the credentials of mariners, 

recreational boaters, and passengers. Domain awareness involves monitoring the compliance of activity, 

detecting anomalies that may signal illegal acts, and generating intelligence that enables law enforcement 

authorities to stop unlawful entry into the United States. Screening vessels, people, and cargo; surveillance 

and tracking maritime activity; and gathering, fusing, and distributing intelligence are all essential activities. 

Operational capabilities—trained personnel, aircraft, cutters and boats—close the triangle of maritime 

governance to secure the maritime border. Not only does active presence on shore and at sea allow forces 

to respond to and stop border threats, maritime forces generate valuable surveillance and awareness and 

create a deterrent effect against all forms of criminal activity in the maritime border region.

 

The U.S. maritime border, like the land and air borders, is integral to the global system of trade. Securing 

the maritime border is an international activity that requires pushing the nation’s layers of border security far 

away from its shores -- through U.S. waters, onto a well governed ocean commons, then seamlessly joining 

the secure maritime domain of foreign partners. It also requires extensive partnerships that integrate and 

build unity of effort among governments, agencies, and private-sector stakeholders around the world. 

Finally, the nation’s economic and national security requires that ports of entry, operations, and critical 

infrastructure are resilient and continue to function effectively in the wake of a natural disaster or security 

incident. Contingencies for border management and recovery systems must be capable of protecting the 

lives and property of its citizens while simultaneously assuring the continuity of commerce and critical 

maritime activity.

Section III: Maritime Governance 35
36 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship
37

Section IV

Strategic Priorities for the U.S. Coast Guard

The complex challenges and threats facing the United States require that the Coast 

Guard think and act anew. To prepare for the future, the Coast Guard has identifi ed 

six cross-cutting strategic priorities that improve the nation’s preparedness and 

advance U.S. maritime interests. These priorities draw on the Coast Guard’s key 

strengths and, taken together, outline how the Coast Guard will work to improve 

safety, security, and stewardship in the maritime domain, now and into the future. 

These six strategic priorities are: Strengthening Regimes for the U.S. Maritime 

Domain; Achieving Awareness in the Maritime Domain; Enhancing Unity 

of Effort in Maritime Planning and Operations; Integrating Coast Guard 

Capabilities for National Defense; Developing a National Capacity for Marine 

Transportation System Recovery; and Focusing International Engagement on 

Improving Maritime Governance.

The Coast Guard has already taken important measures in many of these areas. The 

Service has accelerated efforts to improve the nation’s maritime regimes, awareness, 

and operational capabilities following 9-11. Efforts are also underway to integrate 

these initiatives, build collaboration, and increase unity of effort. Still, gaps remain. 

The Coast Guard will work with Congress and other federal, state, local, private, 

and international partners to make the needed changes. And in some cases, the way 

ahead can only begin with national and international dialogues where stakeholders 

will help determine the changes necessary to improve maritime governance.

40 These strategic priorities were shaped by Project Evergreen, the Coast Guard’s long term scenario-based strategy process, as well as

a comprehensive review of national plans and policy. Of particular importance were the goals, national priorities, recommendations, 

and strategic actions found in: The 2006 DHS Priority Goals (July 21, 2006), the Interim National Preparedness Goal (Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 8 (March 2005)), the White House report “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 

Learned” and the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) and its eight subordinate plans.

Section IV: Strategic Priorities for the U.S. Coast Guard

Strengthening Regimes for the U.S. Maritime Domain 38

Achieving Awareness in the Maritime Domain 40

Enhancing Unity of Effort in Maritime Planning and Operations 43

Integrating Coast Guard Capabilities for National Defense 46

Developing a National Capacity for MTS Recovery 48

Focusing International Engagement on Maritime Governance 50
38 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

The Coast Guard must work with DHS, interagency partners, maritime stakeholders, and the 

international community to update and strengthen maritime regimes to address emergent threats 

and challenges. The result will be a set of coordinated and interlocking domestic and international 

regimes that provide better consistency for legitimate users, reduce potential confl icts, improve 

marine transportation system resiliency, and create a more ordered environment for governing the 

maritime domain. 

Engage in a National and International Dialog to 

Strengthen the Nation’s Maritime Regimes

The Coast Guard will initiate a national dialog on the changes needed to strengthen U.S. maritime regimes. 

Concurrently, the Coast Guard, in coordination with the 

Department of State, will engage the international maritime 

community and explore potential regimes of mutual 

benefi t. The Coast Guard’s objective is to work through its 

partnerships to identify rules that: increase the transparency 

of vessels, people, and maritime activities; reduce overall 

risk; and balance competing uses of the maritime domain.41

41 The NSMS identifi es “Embedding Security into Commercial Practices” and “Deploy Layered Security” as two of its fi ve strategic

actions. Strengthening regimes is critical to accomplishing these two actions. Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy 

for Maritime Security (Washington, DC: 2005), 18-23.

42 Increasing transparency through updated maritime regimes is critical to achieving DHS goals and priorities designed to control U.S.

borders and strengthen screening procedures.

43 Section 109 of the Safe Port Act of 2006 directs the Secretary of DHS to publish a rulemaking requiring foreign vessels arriving at

U.S. Outer Continental Shelf facilities to submit an Advance Notice of Arrival. This is an excellent example of a change in the

existing maritime regimes needed to increase the transparency of vessels operations in and around the United States.

Increasing transparency means improving the nation’s 

ability to distinguish among different types of vessels, 

people, and activities occurring on the water.42 One of the 

most recognized gaps in the maritime domain is awareness 

– authorities today are “blind” to much maritime activity. 

However, domain awareness cannot be achieved without 

rules that increase the overall transparency of the maritime 

system.43 Awareness without the enabling regimes also will 

not allow the United States to make intelligent, risk-based, 

decisions regarding threat identifi cation, compliance and 

enforcement activities, ocean usage, or natural resource 

Strengthening Regimes for the U.S. Maritime Domain
Section IV: Strategic Priorities for the U.S. Coast Guard 39

Identifying potential or actual confl icts and developing 

solutions that allow legitimate, sustainable uses without 

damaging the marine environment or threatening 

national interests.

Competing uses may be particularly challenging in 

the Arctic.45 The Coast Guard must be more active in 

the development and implementation of national and 

international regimes specifi c to that region. These should 

include requirements that ensure, at a minimum:

Safe and reliable navigation throughout the region.

Multinational cooperation on vessel traffi c routing.

Comprehensive environmental protection and safety 

standards that base prevention measures on an in-depth 

risk assessment.

Develop Regimes that Support U.S. Ocean Policy 

I

n response to the recommendations of the U.S. Ocean 

Commission for a more comprehensive approach to 

ocean policy, Executive Order 13366 and the U.S. Ocean 

Action Plan46 created a federal interagency governance 

structure for ocean-related matters. The Coast Guard will 

actively participate and serve as the lead for DHS within 

this structure. The Coast Guard will:

Contribute to and support policies and actions taken by 

the Committee on Ocean Policy (COP), the Committee 

on Marine Transportation Systems (CMTS), and their 

subcommittees.

Incorporate DHS and Coast Guard requirements for 

safety, security, and stewardship into the Ocean Action 

Plan data collection requirements for the Integrated 

Ocean Observing System (IOOS), Global Ocean 

Observing System (GOOS), the CMTS database, and 

National Research Priorities 

Promote the development of regimes that achieve U.S. 

Ocean Policy goals and objectives.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

44 The Coast Guard has developed several risk-based decision making tools to identify and prioritize risk. The Maritime Security

Risk Assessment Model (MSRAM) is currently being used by Area Maritime Security Committees to quantify risk to U.S. ports and 

waterways and establish common doctrine for risk-based decision making in the maritime domain.

45 The National Research Council has noted, “Economic activity is predicted to increase and move northward as a result of sea ice

retreat. Those deploying fi shing fl eets, cruise ships, mining and the associated ore transit ships, as well as petroleum recovery and 

transport anticipate increased operations in the region.” National Research Council, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An 

Assessment of U.S. Needs (Washington, DC: 2006), S-2.

46 In 2004, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy issued its fi nal report, An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century, which contained

numerous practical recommendations for developing a comprehensive, coordinated ocean policy for the United States. In response 

to the report, the President released the U.S. Ocean Action Plan: The Bush Administration’s Response to the U.S. Commission on 

Ocean Policy.

management. New or strengthened regimes can increase 

transparency in such areas as:

Vessels: Size, type, purpose, registry, location, 

destination, etc. Transparency is especially lacking 

when it comes to the activities of smaller commercial 

and recreational vessels.

People: Citizenship, criminal history, qualifi cations etc. 

of operators, passengers, crew, transportation workers, 

vendors, etc.

Activities: Type, location, time of year, cargo, etc.

Reducing risk means mitigating threats, vulnerabilities, 

or consequences until acceptable levels are achieved. 

Reducing risk is accomplished by: 

Systematically identifying and prioritizing risks.44

Deploying mitigation strategies that emphasize defense 

in depth and recognize the interactions between the 

system and components across safety, security, and 

stewardship concerns.

Balancing the deployment of prevention and protection 

measures with the facilitation of commerce and the 

legitimate and sustainable use of the maritime domain.

A critical area that must be addressed is the risk of 

terrorists using small vessels, either as WBIEDs to attack 

maritime targets, or as a means to smuggle WMD into 

the U.S. The United States and the international maritime 

community must address the prevention and mitigation 

of such activities. Strengthening regimes will be an 

important part of that discussion. 

Balancing competing uses means accommodating diverse 

and growing maritime use in a safe, secure, and equitable 

manner. It may also mean that traditional notions of 

unlimited access, privacy, and use are balanced with 

the societal need for safety, security, and stewardship. 

Competing uses are balanced by:

Recognizing interdependencies across safety, security, 

and stewardship, and deploying solutions that minimize 

mariner impact while improving desired outcomes.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
40 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

The Coast Guard, acting for DHS, must implement the systems and processes necessary to achieve 

maritime domain awareness as required by the National Strategy for Maritime Security.47 The 

Maritime Domain Awareness Implementation Team (MDA-IT),48 co-lead by DoD and DHS, will 

create a collaborative maritime intelligence and information sharing environment, supported by 

infrastructure for sensing, collecting, fusing, analyzing, and disseminating information. These 

actions will enable the United States to identify, understand, and take action against maritimerelated threats and hazards as early and as distant from U.S. shores as possible. To do this, the 

Coast Guard will work to:

Increase the Ability to Sense and Collect

Maritime Data 

Enforcing maritime sovereignty requires awareness 

of the people, vessels, cargoes, and activities in the 

maritime domain. Many “blind spots” exist, however, 

and one of the most pressing challenges authorities face 

in securing the nation’s maritime borders is tracking 

and understanding the enormous volume of activity in 

and around U.S. waters. The Coast Guard will work 

closely with other agencies and maritime stakeholders 

to close critical information gaps that limit awareness 

in the maritime domain. This will involve increasing or 

improving: 

Port, coastal and offshore surveillance. The Coast 

Guard will increase its ability to monitor maritime 

activities through improvements to its Vessel Traffi c 

Service systems, the implementation of Rescue 21, and 

the increased sensing capabilities of its new Deepwater 

assets. These improvements will also enable greater 

unity of effort through improved “Blue Force” tracking 

(i.e., the tracking of Coast Guard and other friendly 

maritime forces).

Vessel tracking systems. The Coast Guard will use 

Automatic Identifi cation System (AIS) technology 

to provide continuous, real-time information on the 

•

•

47 The NSMS identifi es “Maximize Domain Awareness” as one of its main strategic actions and states, “A key national security

requirement is the effective understanding of all activities, events, and trends within any relevant domain...that could threaten the 

safety, security, economy, or environment of the United States.” “To maximize domain awareness, the United States will leverage its 

global maritime intelligence capability...and oversee the implementation of a shared situational awareness capability that integrates 

intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation systems, and other operational information inputs.” Department of Homeland 

Security, National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, DC: 2005), 16.

48 NSPD-41/HSPD-13 required the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to coordinate national efforts to achieve maximum

maritime domain awareness, including the development of a national plan for improving domain awareness in support of the NSMS. 

The MDA Implementation Team (MDA-IT) was formed to coordinate the implementation of the resulting National Plan to Achieve 

Maritime Domain Awareness, including the development of a MDA concept of operations and an integrated investment strategy.

Achieving Awareness in the Maritime Domain

identity, location, speed and course of vessels operating 

in designated areas of the U.S. maritime domain. AIS 

capabilities are already operational in several U.S. 

ports, and the Coast Guard’s Nationwide Automatic 

Identifi cation System (NAIS) project will expand these 

abilities to ports nationwide. For vessels beyond the 

U.S. maritime domain, the Coast Guard is working 

with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to 

develop a global Long Range Identifi cation Tracking 

(LRIT) scheme that will provide information on ships 

of 300 gross tons and above operating within 1,000 

nautical miles of the United States.

Transparency of maritime activities. The Coast 

Guard and DHS will work with federal, state, and 

private sector partners to improve the transparency 

of maritime activities, including merchant mariner 

licensing, and vessel documentation and registration 

systems, that strike a balance between national 

security and commercial interests. The Coast Guard 

and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

will develop and enforce the Transportation Worker 

Identifi cation Credential (TWIC) program for all 

transportation workers in the U.S. maritime domain. 

Collection of intelligence on maritime activities. The 

Coast Guard will continue to expand its capabilities 

to collect human and other intelligence through new 

•

•
Section IV: Strategic Priorities for the U.S. Coast Guard 41

Field Intelligence Support Teams (FISTs), Coast Guard 

Attaches, and deployable Maritime Intelligence Support 

Teams (MISTs). The Coast Guard will also work with 

maritime stakeholders to expand the use of maritime 

community watch programs.

WMD detection. The Coast Guard is establishing 

basic radiation detection capabilities for all boarding 

and inspection teams, and is building the necessary 

competencies and experience to effectively use the 

more advanced human portable radiation detection 

systems (strategically distributed amongst Coast Guard 

units) within the maritime domain. 

Improve the Fusion and Analysis of Maritime 

Intelligence

Early warning of evolving conditions and threats 

requires collecting data from many sources, fusing 

together different pieces of information, and conducting 

analysis, often before intelligence is refi ned enough “to 

connect all the dots.” The Coast Guard is working with 

other government agencies and a wide range of maritime 

stakeholders to improve information sharing, fusion, 

•

analysis, and maritime intelligence integration.49 As a 

member of the Intelligence Community, the Coast Guard 

is well positioned to integrate maritime intelligence 

through a network of information collection, fusion, and 

analysis centers. This network includes a core element at 

the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) linked 

to a number of other critical nodes such as the National 

Vessel Movement Center (NVMC), the Inland River 

Vessel Movement Center (IRVMC), the National Targeting 

Center, Global Trader, and the Maritime Intelligence 

Fusion Centers. In order to increase the effectiveness of 

the maritime intelligence enterprise, the Coast Guard will 

work to:

Increase Interagency Participation. Achieving a fully 

functioning core element at the NMIC requires strong 

representation from DHS, including Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), as well as the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), 

National Security Agency (NSA), and other agencies. 

Improve Analytic Capabilities. Successfully identifying 

evolving trends and threats, especially threats related to 

transnational terrorism, requires sophisticated analysis 

•

•

49 The Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) Plan (required by NSPD-41/HSPD-13) establishes an intelligence enterprise

and community of interest that effectively supports MDA. The Director of the GMII intelligence enterprise has oversight for the

collection, integration, and analytical coordination of maritime intelligence and reports to the Director of National Intelligence. 

Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan (Washington, DC: 2005).
42 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

50 The National Plan for Achieving Maritime Domain Awareness describes a common operating picture as a network-centric,

dynamically tailorable, near real-time virtual information grid that can be shared, at appropriate security levels, by federal, state, 

local, and international agencies with maritime interests and responsibilities.

51 A data sharing Community of Interest (COI) is a collaborative group of people that must exchange information in pursuit of its

shared goals, interests, missions, or business processes.

52 HSPD-8 establishes information sharing between federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector entities to enable effective

prevention, protection, response, and recovery activities as a national priority.

53 A User Defi ned Operational Picture (UDOP) is a display of relevant information defi ned by an individual user. Under the National

Plan for Achieving Maritime Domain Awareness, each user should have the ability to fi lter and contribute to the COP according to 

their information needs, responsibilities, and level of access.

54 Maritime Awareness Global Network (MAGNET) is an intelligence tool that provides for the collection, correlation, fusion, and

dissemination of maritime information via web-enabled user interfaces to specifi c user groups in support of MDA. 

methods, such as anomaly detection and pattern 

recognition programs. 

Expand the collection and analysis of open source 

information from the private sector. 

Increase the reporting of information and intelligence 

from state and local law enforcement entities. 

Transform the Sharing and Dissemination of Maritime 

Information

One of the important fi ndings of the 9-11 Commission 

was not that information was unavailable, but that it 

was not properly shared and understood. To address this 

within the maritime domain, the Coast Guard will support 

the efforts of the MDA-IT and the Intelligence Community 

to create an information sharing environment that links 

all levels of government together through a common 

operational picture (COP),50 and corresponding common 

intelligence picture (CIP). This information sharing 

environment will combine situational awareness with 

elements of shared information and intelligence in order 

to provide information to decision makers throughout the 

public and private sectors, as well as improve mission 

execution and unity of effort among agencies with 

maritime responsibilities. To accomplish this, the Coast 

Guard will:

Develop a global maritime data sharing community 

of interest (COI).51 This maritime COI will work to 

bridge separate, stove-piped, and proprietary networks 

to better share information and intelligence. This will 

require extensive partnerships among the boating 

public, the maritime industry, law enforcement, the 

Intelligence Community, defense establishments, and 

other federal agencies, state, local, and international 

partners to be successful.52 A fi rst step will be to pilot 

a program with NORTHCOM that establishes data 

exchange procedures and protocols to support the 

national MDA enterprise.

•

•

•

Create a national common operating picture (COP) 

within the maritime domain that uses a servicesoriented architecture (SOA) and facilitates user-defi ned 

operational pictures (UDOPs).53 The SOA will be an 

access-controlled, “publish and subscribe” system that 

serves as the primary method for information sharing, 

collaborative planning, and decision support for 

members of the COI. 

Invest in Coast Guard capabilities that will promote 

information sharing. Initiatives such as integrated 

command and control centers (similar to Project 

Seahawk and other Joint Harbor Operations Centers), 

Command 2010, Maritime Awareness Global Network 

(MAGNET),54 and Deepwater will facilitate and 

signifi cantly improve information sharing and unity of 

effort among maritime entities. 

Increase Coast Guard capacities to share information 

at the port level. The Coast Guard will expand its use 

of Sector Intelligence Offi cers (SIOs) and FISTs to 

oversee collection and reporting activities, promote 

sharing of intelligence and other law enforcement 

information among Coast Guard commands, DHS 

components, and other federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies, and the dissemination of threat 

information with the operators of critical infrastructure. 

Remove cultural and legal barriers hindering 

information sharing. Promote a philosophy of “need 

to share” and advocate architectures and policies that 

enable appropriate distribution of data and information. 

Designate existing centers of intellectual capital and 

capabilities as “centers of excellence.” These centers 

will foster greater understanding of the MDA processes, 

stakeholder relationships, test adequacy of MDA 

systems and sensors, and support exercises to measure 

the effectiveness of MDA support to decision-makers. 

At least one of these centers of excellence should 

be staffed and operated to develop strategic-level 

collaborative guidance.

•

•

•

•

•
Section IV: Strategic Priorities for the U.S. Coast Guard 43

The complexity and challenges of today’s operating environment require that government agencies 

at all levels and stakeholders with maritime interests work together to achieve common interests 

and objectives through improved unity of effort. More than 100 of the 125 recommendations 

from the Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned Report were focused on improving interagency 

coordination.55 The Coast Guard will work with DHS to enhance command and control capabilities, 

grow operational planning capabilities, and improve readiness for large-scale maritime operations. 

In doing so, the Service will fi ll a critical gap in the coordination and integration of maritime 

operations in order to promote interagency operations in meeting national response needs. 

Enhancing Unity of Effort in Maritime Planning and Operations

Create an Integrated Command, Control,

and Communications (C3) System

DHS must have a fl exible and reliable C3 system to 

support dynamic, unifi ed response operations.56 This 

system must maintain connectivity among federal, state, 

and local authorities and provide full situational awareness 

to support real-time local, regional, and national decision 

making. This system should facilitate federal, state, and 

local coordination, and accommodate industry, private, 

and non-governmental organization (NGO) participation. 

A robust C3 system will make the best use of technical 

expertise to coordinate public services. To help create this 

system, the Coast Guard will: 

Establish unifi ed command centers at the local (Coast 

Guard Sector) level as part of the service-wide 

•

55 “During the Federal response to Katrina, four critical fl aws in our national preparedness became evident: Our processes for unifi ed

management...command and control structures...knowledge of our preparedness plans...and regional planning and coordination.” 

The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: 2006), 52.

56 Building a nimble, effective emergency response system is a national priority within the current DHS goals and priorities.

Department of Homeland Security Priority Goals: July 21, 2006 (Washington, DC: 2006), 6.
44 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

initiative. Integrated command centers will allow 

governmental partners to work side-by-side to carry 

out joint mission planning and operations, and provide 

fusion of local intelligence and common operating 

pictures.57

Work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) and other government agencies to establish 

mobile command centers with suffi cient capabilities 

and skilled incident management personnel to meet 

national needs. These centers would be deployed 

immediately to replace or supplement fi xed C3 systems 

that are compromised, insuffi cient, or too remote to 

meet response needs. 

Continue to coordinate the C3 investments under 

Deepwater, Rescue 21, and Command 2010, with 

the Secure Border Initiative and other similar DHS 

programs. This action will provide integrated C3 tools 

to maritime forces that will work seamlessly with the 

land and air components to effectively control U.S. 

borders. 

Focus on Integrated Planning, Exercises,

and Evaluation 

The U.S. Government must create the planning 

structures for ensuring unity of effort in maritime 

operations. As an established leader in maritime mission 

coordination, the Coast Guard will work with maritime 

stakeholders to create unifi ed plans that are adaptable 

and scalable to meet emerging threats. The Coast Guard 

and its industry partners must also explore how to test, 

evaluate, and measure collective preparedness and use the 

lessons learned to improve responses to major maritime 

safety or security events. To enhance national planning and 

preparedness, the Coast Guard will:

Provide increased support to the DHS Offi ce of 

Policy to facilitate the integration of maritime issues 

into national plans, policies, and strategies. In this 

regard, the Coast Guard will continue to provide 

support on behalf of DHS to the Maritime Security 

Policy Coordinating Committee and its supporting 

subcommittees and working groups. 

•

•

•

57 HSPD-8 establishes efforts to expand regional collaboration through increased communications and coordination as a national

priority. Section 108 of the Safe Port Act of 2006 also requires the establishment of interagency operations centers for enhancing 

port security. 

58 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned states that DHS “requires a more systematic and institutional

program for homeland security professional development.” “Over the long term...professional development and education programs 

must break down interagency barriers to build a unifi ed team across the Federal government.” The White House, The Federal 

Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: 2006), 73.

Work with DHS to build professional development 

programs focused on creating common doctrine and 

practices among interagency professionals.58 

Integrate the efforts of the Coast Guard Preparedness 

and Exercise Coordination Program with the DHS 

Exercise Evaluation Program to enhance assessment, 

planning, resource allocation, exercises, lessons 

learned, and remedial actions.

Optimize Operational Capabilities to Meet National 

Threats & Challenges

The success of the National Response Plan (NRP) andNational Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) 

is predicated on the government’s ability to provide 

integrated operational capability in an interagency 

environment. DHS must be able to effectively fl ow forces 

capable of coordinated maritime operations. To improve 

the effectiveness (and interoperability) of its operational 

capabilities, the Coast Guard will reorganize Coast Guard 

forces under a strategic “Force Trident” that includes:

Shore-based multi-mission forces of Coast Guard 

Sector commands. The consolidation of Coast Guard 

operational commands in each major port region will 

provide coordinated service delivery and improved 

unity of command and effort.

Maritime patrol and interdiction forces. Newly 

recapitalized assets under the Integrated Deepwater 

System will be highly adaptable and capable of meeting 

homeland and national security needs throughout the 

maritime domain. This fully networked and highly 

mobile force will signifi cantly improve domain 

awareness and be fully capable of coordinating 

multi-mission, interagency operations. These forces 

work principally in the offshore and international 

environments but can also operate near shore or within 

ports following a disaster or major disruption to local 

C3 capabilities.

Specialized deployable forces. The Coast Guard will 

combine its existing specialized deployable forces 

under a newly created Coast Guard deployable 

operations command. Referred to (in concept) as the 

Deployable Operations Group (DOG), this command 

•

•

•

•

•
Section IV: Strategic Priorities for the U.S. Coast Guard 45

59 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned indicates, “there is a compelling need to strengthen operational

capabilities across the federal government. Those departments and agencies that have a responsibility to participate in a catastrophic 

response must build up their crisis deployable capabilities.” The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 

Learned (Washington, DC: 2006), 72.

60 HSPD-5 states that “the Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal offi cial for domestic incident management.

Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary is responsible for coordinating Federal operations within the United 

States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.” (Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 5 (February 2003). The formation of the Coast Guard Deployable Operations Group will improve operational

capabilities within the service and DHS, and will better enable the Secretary of Homeland Security to perform his responsibilities 

under HSPD-5. 

61 Both HSPD-8 and 2006 DHS Priority Goals identify strengthening WMD detection, prevention, response, and decontamination

capabilities as national priorities.

will oversee, coordinate, and integrate deployable force 

packages from all Coast Guard specialized teams (e.g., 

Maritime Safety and Security Teams, Port Security 

Units, Law Enforcement Detachments, etc.). These 

combined specialized teams will provide the Coast 

Guard with better surge capability and fl exibility in 

emergencies.59 This command can also coordinate 

with the managers of other DHS components and 

government agencies to develop integrated, multiagency, force packages to address all maritime 

homeland safety, security, and stewardship threats.60

Within the deployable operations command, the Coast 

Guard will continue to develop highly-specialized and 

trained rapid-reaction forces, such as the Maritime 

Security Response Team and the National Strike Force, 

that are capable of responding immediately to potential 

or actual WMD incidents or extremely hostile threats 

within the maritime domain.61
46 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

Strengthen the Interface between the Coast Guard and 

the Department of Defense

The Coast Guard’s non-redundant capabilities are exportable to support U.S. national security interests 

at home and around the globe, and should be ready to 

serve Combatant Commanders in support of both the 

National Security Strategy and the National Military 

Strategy. To integrate its capabilities more effectively, the 

Coast Guard will: 

Pursue amendments to Title 14 to bring its wording 

into alignment with the post-Goldwater-Nichols DoD 

structure, for the purposes of providing Coast Guard 

forces to the Combatant Commanders.65 

Develop doctrine and strategic plans and policies that 

integrate the Coast Guard with the DoD, the Combatant 

•

•

Commanders, and the services to ensure that the Coast 

Guard can respond to the emerging needs of national 

security, including homeland defense and expeditionary 

operations. 

Pursue a DHS-DoD Memorandum of Agreement 

(MOA) to replace the 1995 Department of 

Transportation (DOT)-DoD MOA that remained 

operative under the savings provisions upon the 

creation of DHS. The new MOA will capture the 

changes envisioned above, formalize more completely 

DHS recognition of the Coast Guard’s domestic and 

expeditionary roles for national security, and confi rm 

protocols for DHS-DoD connectivity on Coast Guard 

issues.

Detail appropriate personnel to the Offi ce of the 

Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Combatant 

•

•

62 The MOA between DoD and DHS for DoD Support to the USCG for Maritime Homeland Security establishes an operational

construct for DoD support to maritime security missions under the authority and control of DHS, when exercised through the Coast 

Guard. Similarly, the MOA between the DoD and the DHS for the Inclusion of the USCG in Support of Maritime Homeland Defense

establishes the construct for USCG support to DoD maritime homeland defense operations.

63 The DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support provides a strategic concept for an active, layered defense that

seamlessly integrates US capabilities to protect the United States from direct attack. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland 

Defense and Civil Support (Washington, DC: 2005), 10. 

64 The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan, as required by NSPD-41/HSPD-13, established protocols for coordinating the

national response to signifi cant security threats to the United States that occur in the maritime domain.

65 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433) led to improved joint military operations.

Under Goldwater-Nichols, each service chief acts as a force provider to Combatant Commanders responsible for a specifi c function 

(e.g., Transportation, Special Operations), or a geographic region of the globe (e.g., Europe, North America, etc.) who have 

command of all assigned DoD forces in their theaters of operation.

Military and law enforcement operations are integral to the Global War on Terrorism, and the 

capacity of a single force to execute either mission set offers advantages where threats are uncertain 

and required responses can change quickly. This is particularly true for homeland security and 

defense, where the Coast Guard’s military and civilian authorities and capabilities enable it to 

provide a link between DHS and DoD.62 The Coast Guard, as a military, maritime force with a 

persistent presence in the U.S. maritime domain, must stand ready for homeland defense.63 If a 

threat to America’s national security is discovered in the U.S. maritime domain, it is likely that the 

Coast Guard will be the fi rst maritime force components to respond in defense of the nation.64

Internationally, the Coast Guard can provide the Combatant Commanders with presence, access, 

and infl uence in nations where humanitarian and constabulary mission skills are most needed. 

The Coast Guard’s experience and expertise, resulting from its civil authorities found within U.S. 

Code Titles 14, 33, 46, 49, and 50, and military authorities within Titles 10 and 14, and 50 make 

the Service relevant to the needs of maritime forces in most developing nations. Recognizing its 

responsibilities and roles as a military service, the Coast Guard must strengthen its interoperability 

and capabilities to meet national security requirements at home and abroad.

Integrating Coast Guard Capabilities for National Defense
Section IV: Strategic Priorities for the U.S. Coast Guard 47

Commanders, the Department of the Navy, and other 

military organizations to increase participation of Coast 

Guard personnel in support of strategic and operational 

planning. This participation will focus on ensuring 

Coast Guard capabilities and expertise are optimally 

integrated into military operations in support of 

national security objectives. Similarly, the Coast Guard 

should include DoD liaison offi cers in its planning and 

command and control functions to improve unity of 

effort in maritime operations.

Expand Cooperation between the Coast Guard

and the U.S. Navy 

The United States needs Naval and Coast Guard capabilities along its own coasts, on the high seas, 

and deployed abroad to foreign waters and ports to 

safeguard its national interests. DoD and DHS can 

optimize the effectiveness of these assets through a fullyaligned USN/USCG relationship and the development 

of a global maritime concept of operations. The National 

Fleet policy66 provides an initial construct for meeting the 

spectrum of maritime needs with the forces available to the 

nation. 

Recognizing this, the Coast Guard will fully implement 

the National Fleet Policy and continue to work with the 

U.S. Navy to develop a global concept of operations for 

the employment of the nation’s maritime forces.67 This 

engagement between the sea services is essential to the 

successful pursuit of many important initiatives, including:

Implementing the National Plan for Achieving 

Maritime Domain Awareness.

Integrating USCG-USN maritime defense operations.

Establishing joint command, control, and 

communications (C3) centers.

Fielding of interoperable equipment and reducing 

redundancies in the acquisition of new capabilities.

Participating in joint training programs for 

expeditionary operations, such as the Naval 

Expeditionary Combat Command. 

Supporting global maritime partnerships.

Training, manning, and equipping of patrol boat 

forces.68 

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

66 The National Fleet Policy Statement of March 2006 calls for full cooperation and integration of non-redundant and complementary

capabilities between the services in order to meet the expanding range of maritime and naval threats and challenges facing the 

nation. 

67 In a June 14, 2006 speech at the Current Strategy Forum in Newport, Rhode Island, CNO Admiral Michael Mullen called for a new

maritime strategy that redefi nes the use of sea power and how the sea services will train and operate together to meet the challenges 

of globalization.

68 The Coast Guard’s current fl eet of 119 patrol boats, combined with the law enforcement skills of its military crews, is a foundational

component of the nation’s ability to conduct effective maritime security operations at home and along foreign shores when 

necessary. In addition to these vessels, the Coast Guard operates approximately 1,400 boats under 65’ in length, most of which are 

deployed with qualifi ed law enforcement teams.
48 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

69 Both HSPD-8 and the 2006 DHS Priority Goals identify strengthening information sharing and collaboration for recovery and

continuity planning, as well as efforts to secure and enhance the resiliency of critical infrastructure, as national priorities.

70 The Secretary of DHS delegated the responsibility of developing plans for responding to, and minimizing the damage from

a transportation security incident to the Coast Guard (2003 DHS Delegation No: 0170.1). The President later reaffi rmed this 

responsibility in the NSMS which identifi ed the Coast Guard as the executive agent for DHS for maritime homeland security, 

including the coordination of mitigation measures to expedite the recovery of infrastructure and transportation systems in the 

maritime domain. Section 108 of the Safe Port of 2006 also designates Coast Guard Captain of the Ports as incident commanders 

during a transportation security incident, unless otherwise directed by the President.

Establish the Leadership Role of the Coast Guard

Following major incidents in the maritime domain, the Coast Guard has traditionally regulated navigation and 

other activities on the water, coordinated efforts to restore 

waterway usage, mitigated environmental impacts, and 

ensured the public and private sectors were adequately 

informed of maritime conditions. The Coast Guard has 

expertise in maritime recovery operations, broad legal 

authorities, command and control capabilities, presence 

in the nation’s ports, and longstanding relationships with 

maritime stakeholders. As Captains of the Port (COTP), 

Federal Maritime Security Coordinators (FMSC), and 

Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSC), the Coast Guard 

To ensure that the nation has uninterrupted access to the global supply chain, the Coast Guard will 

lead an integrated planning effort for responding to major disruptions in the Marine Transportation 

System (MTS).69 The Coast Guard will work to build resiliency within the MTS by engaging 

the private sector, establishing government roles, and developing recovery policies, plans, and 

procedures at the local, regional, and national levels.

Developing a National Capacity for Marine Transportation

System Recovery

is well positioned to coordinate the short-term recovery 

activities that are aimed at restoring the fl ow of commerce 

and other critical maritime activities within the ports.70

With the intent of clarifying roles and providing national 

leadership, the Coast Guard will: 

Engage government agencies and the private sector to 

establish roles and responsibilities in maritime recovery. 

Lead the Maritime Modal Government Coordinating 

Council and continue to encourage the private sector to 

form a Maritime Modal Sector Coordinating Council in 

accordance with the National Infrastructure Protection 

Plan (NIPP).

•

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Section IV: Strategic Priorities for the U.S. Coast Guard 49

Complete the Maritime Modal Implementation Plan in 

support of the NIPP’s Transportation Sector Specifi c 

Plan. 

Engage with the Private Sector 

The Coast Guard has established relationships with the 

private sector at the port level through its leadership in 

area planning and advisory committees. Following a port 

level incident, these relationships allow marine industry 

representatives to integrate into the Incident Command 

System, where they provide expertise, information, and 

resources vital to reestablishing the fl ow of commerce. 

For larger scale incidents affecting multiple ports, 

however, the mechanisms to include the private sector and 

international trading partners are not as well defi ned—a 

gap that signifi cantly reduces the nation’s ability to 

rapidly recover from a catastrophic incident impacting 

the MTS. Because the marine industry is dynamic and 

varies in complexity and operations from port to port, the 

Coast Guard must engage with the private sector to build 

regional and national level recovery constructs that fully 

integrate public and private entities. Attaining this level of 

coordination will strengthen the resiliency of the nation’s 

MTS and ensure continuity of commerce and connectivity 

to the global supply chain.71 To accomplish this, the Coast 

Guard will:

Integrate national, regional, and local level public 

and private stakeholders into contingency planning, 

exercising, and execution of short-term recovery 

operations. 

Work with the National Maritime Security Advisory 

Committee (NMSAC) and similar advisory committees 

to develop effective coordination mechanisms with 

key organizations and subject matter experts from the 

various interests within the private sector. 

Work through local interagency committees to 

identify representative stakeholders, with subject 

matter expertise, who can coordinate with and advise 

government decision makers, at all levels, during 

response and recovery operations.

•

•

•

•

Develop Recovery Policies, Plans, and Procedures at 

the National, Regional, and Local Levels

The Coast Guard will work closely with other agencies 

and maritime stakeholders to develop and implement 

policies, procedures, and plans for response and recovery 

operations.72 Because the MTS is only the maritime 

portion of the global supply chain, this effort must also 

clarify the roles of agencies and stakeholders from other 

transportation modes. The Coast Guard will:

Continue developing the National Response Operations 

Matrix (NROM). The NROM provides DHS senior 

leadership with response options that take a measured 

approach to events without initiating the automatic 

shutdown of the MTS following a major incident. 

This methodology must also be used in planning, 

preparation, and exercise initiatives to ensure the 

public’s safety and the continuity of commerce.

Coordinate the development of an MTS and intermodal connector model. This will result in a greater 

understanding of the MTS, provide a planning tool 

for the public and private sectors, and help minimize 

negative impacts to the system.

Work with the private sector to develop standard 

methods for identifying alternative and surge 

capabilities outside impacted ports for handling 

commerce, as well as local and regional priorities for 

moving people and cargoes. 

Work with the private sector to develop plans and 

procedures for assessing impacts, conducting response 

and recovery operations, and designating safe haven 

and remote port locations. Plans should also identify 

pre-established mechanisms for communicating 

critical information necessary for recovery between all 

involved entities from the public and private sectors.73

Encourage the owners of vessels and facilities regulated 

under the Maritime Transportation Security Act, as well 

as the operators of non-regulated critical infrastructure 

within the ports to develop, maintain, and exercise 

business continuity plans.

•

•

•

•

•

71 The NSMS and the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan (required by NSPD-41/HSPD-13) highlight the need to assure the

continuity of the marine transportation system and to maintain vital commerce in the aftermath of a disruptive incident.

72 Section 202 of the Safe Port Act of 2006 requires the Secretary of DHS to develop protocols for the resumption of trade in the

event of a transportation disruption or a transportation security incident. In August 2006, the Coast Guard took an initial step toward 

achieving this objective by holding a National Maritime Recovery Symposium to gather input from a representative sample of 

maritime stakeholders in the public and private sectors.

73 “The Department of Homeland Security, working collaboratively with the private sector, should ...be able to rapidly assess the

impact of a disaster on critical infrastructure. We must use this knowledge to inform Federal response and prioritization decisions 

and to support infrastructure restoration in order to save lives and mitigate the impact of the disaster on the Nation.” The White 

House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: 2006), 61.
50 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

74 One of the fi ve strategic actions stated in the NSMS is, “Enhance International Cooperation.” Department of Homeland Security,

National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, DC: 2005), 14-15.

The security, safety, and economic well-being of the United States rely on the sound governance 

of the world’s oceans and on unimpeded global commerce. To advance these interests, the Coast 

Guard will help shape a coordinated U.S. international maritime engagement strategy that focuses 

on improving global maritime governance.74 The Coast Guard will assist the international maritime 

community in improving the collective governance of the global commons, as well as assist other 

coastal and port States in improving governance over their own territorial waters. This will involve 

collaboratively building regimes, awareness, and operational capabilities that strengthen coastal 

States and the international maritime community.

Focusing International Engagement on Improving

Maritime Governance

Develop a Coordinated U.S. International Maritime 

Engagement Strategy

Historically, U.S. international maritime engagement 

has focused on building capability through initiatives 

such as training and equipment transfers. Operational 

capabilities, however, should support broader national 

objectives for improving the global governance of the 

maritime domain. To better shape a coordinated U.S. 

international maritime engagement strategy for advancing 

global maritime governance, the Coast Guard will:

Work with DOS, DHS, DoD, and other agencies to 

align international maritime engagement efforts in 

accordance with an agreed upon strategy aimed at 

improving global maritime governance. 

Demonstrate and promote the value of the Coast 

Guard’s international engagement activities and 

expertise in support of DHS, the DOS’s International 

Outreach and Coordination Strategy, and the 

Combatant Commanders’ Theater Security Cooperation 

plans. 

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Section IV: Strategic Priorities for the U.S. Coast Guard 51

Improve International Maritime Regimes

 

The Coast Guard is a versatile instrument of U.S. foreign policy and moves easily within 

the interagency, multinational, multilateral world of 

United Nations-affi liated standards and policy setting 

organizations. Blending civil, regulatory, and military 

competencies, the Coast Guard is well positioned to 

collaboratively advance global maritime governance.75 For 

this reason, the Coast Guard will take a leadership role 

in developing international maritime regimes to promote 

effective and responsible management of the global 

maritime domain. The Coast Guard will:

Work with other U.S. federal agencies and maritime 

nations to shape mutually benefi cial international 

regimes that will protect the safety, security, and 

stewardship of the global maritime commons.

Shape international information sharing and 

enforcement regimes, infrastructure, and actions to 

increase the transparency, safety, and security of the 

marine transportation system and global supply chain. 

Build Coastal State Capacity for Maritime Governance

Weak coastal States provide potential havens for terrorists, criminals, and other hostile actors 

who exploit the maritime domain for drug smuggling, 

piracy, human traffi cking, illegal migration, movement 

of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorist acts. Weak 

coastal States often are not able to regulate or provide 

protection for the legitimate movement and safety of 

vessels within their waters. They are frequently illprepared to safeguard their maritime commerce and energy 

infrastructure, or protect their marine resources from 

illegal exploitation and environmental damage. Combined, 

these vulnerabilities not only threaten their population, 

resources, and economic development, but can threaten the 

security of the maritime commons and even the continuity 

of global commerce. 

•

•

The Coast Guard’s multi-mission nature and expertise 

position it to help coastal States build the regimes, 

awareness, and operational capabilities they need. This 

capacity is refl ected in the Maritime Transportation Security 

Act of 2002, which requires the Coast Guard to engage 

internationally to assess the effectiveness of anti-terrorism 

security measures in foreign ports. While the Coast Guard 

is increasingly in a position to help other nations identify 

gaps and solutions to improve their maritime governance, 

the demand for Coast Guard assistance far exceeds its 

current capacity and authorities to conduct international 

engagement.76 As a result, the Coast Guard will use a risk 

management approach to identify where U.S. efforts to 

improve maritime governance will most effectively advance 

U.S. national interests. The Coast Guard, in conjunction 

with other U.S. government agencies, will:

Assist other coastal States in improving their maritime 

governance when and where such activities support U.S. 

national security interests.

Seek to further expand MTSA authorities to conduct the 

full range of training required to build partner nations’ 

maritime governance capabilities.77

Seek to expand Coast Guard mandates, authorities, and 

resources to conduct a strategically driven international 

engagement program that advances the national security 

objectives the Coast Guard is best suited and uniquely 

positioned to achieve.

Engage in a new dialog with Congress, DoD, and DoS 

regarding the importance of reestablishing the Caribbean 

Support Tender concept, to include permanently assigned 

international crew members, as a proven tool for 

building and sustaining regional maritime organization 

capabilities and competencies.

Raise awareness within Congress and the Administration 

to gain legislative and budget support for enhanced Coast 

Guard international maritime engagement activities.

Work within the international community to establish 

an updated model for coastal State maritime governance 

that can be used by any nation.78

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•

•

•

•

75 The Department of State regularly designates the Coast Guard to lead U.S. delegations to the International Maritime Organization

to develop a wide array of international safety, security, and stewardship standards.

76 Section 202 of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006 expanded the Coast Guard’s existing authority to provide

technical assistance, including law enforcement and maritime safety and security training, to foreign navies, coast guards, and other 

maritime authorities. This assistance may be provided in conjunction with regular Coast Guard operations after consultation with the 

Secretary of State.

77 The Maritime Transportation Security Act currently requires the Secretary of DHS to operate a port security training program for

ports that lack effective antiterrorism measures. This authority has been delegated to the Commandant of the Coast Guard. 

78 The Coast Guard published the Model Maritime Service Code expressly for assisting coastal States in improving their regimes and

infrastructure for maritime governance. Department of Transportation, The Coast Guard Model Maritime Service Code

(Washington, DC: 1995).
52 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship
53

Section V

The Way Ahead

The U.S. Coast Guard is tasked with ensuring the safety, security, and stewardship 

of the maritime domain. It has accrued these roles over more than 200 years as the 

organization has evolved along with the country. Throughout its history, the Coast 

Guard has provided great value to the nation as a military, multi-mission, maritime 

service that has quickly adapted to America’s changing needs. However, most of 

these adaptations have come after a major catastrophe or event that highlighted 

gaps in the nation’s ability to effectively govern the maritime domain, such as the 

sinking of the Titanic, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and many 

others. The Coast Guard must strive to become less reactive, and more proactive 

and anticipatory in its actions. The Coast Guard must continue to act with strategic 

intent to address today’s threats and challenges, prepare for the challenges of the 

future, and hedge against future uncertainties.

This document sets the Coast Guard’s strategic course for the future. It has: 

described the roles of the Coast Guard and their value to the nation; outlined current 

and future challenges and threats in the maritime domain; described a construct 

for achieving effective and responsible maritime governance; and described the 

strategic priorities that the Coast Guard will undertake to help the nation achieve 

its goals. 

The next steps will be to: begin the conversations with maritime stakeholders on 

improving maritime governance; engage DHS, Congress, and other government 

agencies to garner support for implementing the strategic priorities; and execute 

these priorities through the continued development of major initiatives such 

as Deepwater, Command 2010, Rescue 21, and updated campaign plans. These 

plans will provide the necessary detail for Coast Guard personnel to best position 

forces, and most effectively carry out their missions, to address the challenges of an 

uncertain future and ensure that America’s military, multi-mission, maritime service 

remains Semper Paratus (always ready), no matter what the future may bring.

Section V: The Way Ahead
54 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

Appendix, Glossary

AIS (Carriage) Automatic Identifi cation System

C2 Command-and-control

C3 Command, control, and

 communications

C4ISR Command, Control, Communications,

 Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,

 and Reconnaissance

CMTS Committee on the Marine

 Transportation System

COI Community of Interest

COOP Continuity of Operations

COP Committee on Ocean Policy (per 

 MDA, ‘Common Operational Picture’)

COTP Captain of the Port

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DoD Department of Defense

DOS Department of State

DOT Department of Transportation

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

FEMA Federal Emergency Management 

 Agency

GOOS Global Ocean Observing System

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential 

 Directive

IOOS Integrated Ocean Observing System

ICS Incident Command System

IMO International Maritime Organization

ISPS International Ship and Port Facility 

 Security Code

JHOC Joint Harbor Operations Center

JIATF Joint Inter-Agency Task Force

LFA Lead Federal Agency

MDA Maritime Domain Awareness

MDA-IT MDA Implementation Team

MHLS Maritime Homeland Security

MOA Memorandum of Agreement

MOTR Maritime Operational Threat 

 Response

MTS Marine Transportation 

 System

MTSA Maritime Transportation 

 Security Act

NGO Non-governmental 

 organization

NIMS National Incident

 Management System

NOAA National Oceanic and

 Atmospheric Administration

NORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command

NRP National Response Plan

NSMS National Strategy for

 Maritime Security

OCS Outer Continental Shelf

SBI Secure Border Initiative

SBInet Secure Border Initiative’s 

 mix of current and next 

 generation technology, 

 infrastructure, staffi ng, and 

 response platforms. 

UCP Unifi ed Command Plan

UDOP User Defi ned Operating 

 Picture

UN United Nations

USCG United States Coast Guard

USN United States Navy

WBIED Water-borne Improvised

 Explosive Device

WMD Weapon of Mass 

 Destruction

Photo Credits

22 Photo of damage to the USS Cole following waterborne improvised explosive device attack from a small boat 

 (Courtesy of U.S. Department of Defense)

30 Graphic courtesy of Integrated Coast Guard Systems

32 Graphic courtesy of Integrated Coast Guard Systems

41 Graphic courtesy of John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
55
56 The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy

for

Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship

WASHINGTON, D.C.