Grounded, Louisiana

U.S. Coast Guard photo
233

Government Response: 

Th e Role of the White House

Acatastrophic event requires decisive leadership at all levels – from the aff ected locality, to the state government, to federal agencies, and to the White House. Hurricane 

Katrina was a test in leadership. Th ere were warnings. But there was not enough 

done to prepare. Th ere was the catastrophe. But on the day it struck, there was uncertainty 

and a lack of awareness as to the extent of the damage. Th ere was a response. But it was, 

initially, halting and not up to a disaster of such consequence.

Th ere was leadership, but not the measure Americans expected as they witnessed the devastation and human suff ering Katrina left in her wake. Th ough it was not alone, the White 

House failed to meet these expectations in at least three respects:

• Actual or Constructive Knowledge: Th e White House knew or should have 

known that Katrina could turn into the long-feared “New Orleans Scenario,” 

and could wreak devastation throughout the Gulf Coast region. Th e White 

House also may have been aware that FEMA was not prepared for such a 

catastrophe;

• Lack of Situational Awareness: Despite receiving information from multiple 

sources on the extent of the damage in New Orleans, the White House does 

not appear to have been aware that levees had broken and the city was fl ooding on the day of the storm and, indeed, appears to have remained for some 

time under the misimpression that the levees did not break until the day aft er 

Katrina made landfall; and,

• Inadequate Initial Response: Th e initial response to Katrina was halting and 

inadequate, in part due to poor situational awareness. Ultimately, the President 

and his team brought the full resources of the federal government to bear on 

the catastrophe.

Advance Knowledge of a Catastrophic Scenario, FEMA’s 

Shortcomings, and the Approach of the Storm

Katrina’s devastation should not have been a surprise to the White House.

In early 2004, the White House Deputy National Security Advisor, General John A. Gordon, went to New Orleans to receive a briefi ng on catastrophic-hurricane planning eff orts 

for the region. Th e detailed briefi ng covered the catastrophic consequences of a Category 3 

hurricane hitting New Orleans. General Gordon reported this to the White House, which 

may have infl uenced the funding that resulted in the Hurricane Pam exercise.1

 In addition, 

another White House aide, Janet Benini,2

 attended the Hurricane Pam exercise. Benini also 

chaired the group that developed the National Planning Scenarios, a set of 15 plausible, 

high-consequence events used by the federal government to come up with preparedness 

goals and lists of emergency response capabilities that federal, state, and local responders 

should have. One event included among the scenarios is modeled on a hurricane hitting 

New Orleans.

Chapter 15
Chapter 15

234

Th ere were also ample warnings specifi c to Hurricane Katrina. Th e National Weather 

Service, FEMA, other Department of Homeland Security components such as the National 

Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, and state offi cials warned the White House 

repeatedly over the weekend before landfall that Katrina was likely to be a catastrophe.3

Th e documents the White House provided to this Committee show that prior to and aft er 

landfall, the White House Homeland Security Council (HSC)4

 received large amounts of 

information from DHS’s Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), as well as other 

federal agencies and departments, including the National Guard Bureau, the Department of 

Energy, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration concerning the situation that could develop. Th e American Red Cross and other organizations were also briefed. 

Moreover, as Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff said, the President was 

“acutely aware of Katrina and the risk it posed” during the weekend before landfall.5

 “We 

went into the weekend before,” Chertoff said, “with an understanding and with warnings 

that this was potentially the nightmare scenario that I think people have talked about for 

years in terms of New Orleans.”6

On the Saturday before the storm made landfall, FEMA Director Michael Brown relayed to 

state, local, and federal offi cials – including the White House – his fears of the devastation 

Katrina could cause. During FEMA’s August 277

 noon video-conference call, Brown voiced 

the following concerns: 

I know I’m preaching to the choir on this one, but I’ve learned over the past 

four and a half, fi ve years, to go with my gut on a lot of things, and I’ve got to 

tell you my gut hurts on this one. It hurts. I’ve got cramps. So, we need to take 

this one very, very seriously.8

Joe Hagin, White House Deputy Chief of Staff , participated on the same conference call 

while in Crawford, Texas, and listened to the warnings presented by Brown and others. He 

asked no questions and off ered only the following statement: “We’re here, and anything we 

can do, obviously, to support you, but it sounds like the planning, as usual, is in good shape, 

and good luck to the states and just know that we’re watching, and we’ll do the right thing 

as fast as we can.”9

Th e warnings continued through the night: At 11:24 p.m., the White House received a 

National Hurricane Center report stating: “Th e bottom line is that Katrina is expected to be 

an intense and dangerous hurricane heading towards the North Central Gulf Coast and this 

has to be taken very seriously.”10

At noon on Sunday, August 28, President Bush participated from his ranch in Crawford, 

Texas, with FEMA, Department of Homeland Security, and state offi cials in a video-conference call in which Max Mayfi eld, Director of the National Hurricane Center, predicted 

Katrina would be a “very dangerous hurricane”: 

Th e problem that we’re going to have here — remember, the winds go counterclockwise around the center of the hurricane. So if the really strong winds 

clip Lake Pontchartrain, that’s going to pile some of that water from Lake 

Pontchartrain over on the south side of the lake. I don’t think any model can 

tell you with any confi dence right now whether the levies will be topped or not, 

but that’s obviously a very, very grave concern. ... And, quite frankly, for the 

folks in Louisiana, if you can’t get people out, you know, if you’re ever going 

to, you know, talk about vertical refuge [sheltering in the upper stories of tall 

buildings], this is the time to do it.11
Government Response: The Role of the White House

235

During the same call, Brown stated: “My gut tells me — I told you guys my gut was that this 

(missing) is a bad one and a big one,” and that Katrina could be “a catastrophe within a catastrophe.”12 Th e State of Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness’ Chief of Operations, Bill Doran, also informed the President on the same call that the 

state was doing “catastrophic planning” for Katrina.13 Th e President asked no questions, but 

made the following statement: 

I want to assure the folks at the state level that we are fully prepared to not only 

help you during the storm, but we will move in whatever resources and assets 

we have at our disposal aft er the storm to help you deal with the loss of property. And we pray for no loss of life, of course. 

Unfortunately, we’ve had experience at this in recent years, and I — the FEMA 

folks have done great work in the past, and I’m confi dent, Mike, that you and 

your team will do all you can to help the good folks in these aff ected states. 

Again, I want to thank Governor Blanco and Governor Riley and Governor 

[Barbour], Governor Bush of Florida, for heeding these warnings, and doing all you can possibly do with your state folks and local folks to prepare the 

citizenry for this storm. 

In the meantime, I know the nation will be praying for the good folks in the 

aff ected areas, and we just hope for the very best.14

In addition to the conference call, the White House continued to receive additional warnings of the storm’s projected force and fury throughout the day.

Th e White House also may have received warnings that FEMA lacked the support and 

capability to prepare for and respond to a Katrina-like catastrophe. Brown claims to have 

warned President Bush, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, and White House 

Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin as early as January 2005 that “We [FEMA] weren’t getting 

the money we needed [and] we weren’t getting the personnel that we needed,” and that, 

consequently, FEMA was not ready to handle a disaster like a tsunami.15

It is not clear what, if anything, the White House did to address these concerns and to help 

ensure that FEMA was ready when disaster struck. But the concerns appear to have gone 

unheeded by the White House and DHS in the period prior to Katrina.

On the other hand, the President did take signifi cant steps in preparation for the storm. On 

Saturday evening, in response to Governor Blanco’s request earlier that day, President Bush 

took the unusual step of issuing an emergency declaration for the State of Louisiana, which 

the White House described as being “indicative of the recognition that Katrina had the 

potential to be particularly devastating.”16 Th e declaration eff ectively assured the state that 

the federal government would pay for costs associated with evacuating residents prior to the 

storm.

In addition to authorizing funds to help with the pre-storm evacuation, President Bush 

urged that an evacuation take place. On Sunday, August 28, President Bush spoke with 

Governor Blanco to encourage her to order a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans.

While these steps were important and commendable, the White House could have marshaled federal resources more proactively in advance of the storm. Katrina was a hurricane 

that the White House knew or should have known could cause massive devastation in and 

around New Orleans. Th e preparations simply were not proportionate to the likely imminent catastrophe.
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236

Lack of Situational Awareness

Th e record indicates that as early as 11:13 a.m. ET, on Monday, August 29, the White House 

Homeland Security Council circulated to, among others, Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend, Deputy White House Chief of Staff Joe Hagin, Deputy Homeland Security 

Advisor Ken Rapuano, and White House Counsel Harriet Miers, a report indicating the 

following:

• A levee in New Orleans had broken;

• Th rough a report from the Homeland Security Operations Center, water was 

rising in the city’s Lower Ninth Ward; 

• Th rough a report from the State of Louisiana, water was rising at one foot per 

hour; and

• Th rough a report from Mayor C. Ray Nagin of New Orleans, problems with a 

pumping station were causing fl ooding in New Orleans.17

Brown claims that, also on Monday, he reported to Deputy Chief of Staff Hagin on the 

developing catastrophe in New Orleans.18 Brown told the Committee that, by no later than 

6 p.m. CT on the day of landfall, Hagin knew the 17th Street levee in New Orleans had broken, and that the city was fl ooding.19

Still, the White House does not appear to have been cognizant that Katrina was fl ooding the 

streets, homes, and hospitals of New Orleans on Monday, the day of the storm’s landfall. 

President Bush later characterized the mindset on Monday, August 29, aft er learning that 

President Bush greeting Mayor 

Nagin, Secretary Chertoff

Photo © 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 

all rights reserved. Used with permission of the 

Times-Picayune
Government Response: The Role of the White House

237

Katrina did not hit New Orleans directly: “a sense of relaxation.”20 In addition, as late as 

Friday, September 2, the President expressed the belief that the levees broke on Tuesday, the 

day aft er landfall, even though they had broken on Monday.

On Tuesday, August 30, the White House received confi rmation that Katrina was an undeniable catastrophe. At 12:02 a.m. ET, the White House received a report from the Homeland Security Operations Center that included the following statement by FEMA’s lone 

offi cial in New Orleans that day, Marty Bahamonde: “Th ere is a quarter-mile [breach] in the 

levee near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards from Lake Pontchartrain allowing water to 

fl ow into the City – an estimated 2/3 to 75% of the city is under water.”21

At 6:33 a.m. ET, Tuesday morning, the White House received a Department of Homeland 

Security situation report confi rming the extent of damage and fl ooding in New Orleans:

Widespread and signifi cant fl ooding has occurred throughout the city of New 

Orleans, extending eastward, across the Mississippi gulf coast into coastal 

Alabama. Th e following fl ood reports have been received for the city of New 

Orleans:

• Industrial Canal at Tennessee St.: levee has been breached with water to a 

depth of 5 feet at Jackson Barracks;

• 17th St. at Canal Blvd.: levee has been breached – breach extends several 100 

meters in length;

• Much of downtown and east New Orleans is underwater, depth unknown at 

this time.

Th e U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimates are in progress and project that it could take 

months to dewater the City of New Orleans.22

A report at 10:23 a.m. ET on Tuesday, from the Homeland Security Operations Center detailed the location of the breached levees and noted specifi c concerns about the 17th Street 

Canal and Tennessee Street levees.23

Brown also told the Committee of a secure telephone call he said was held on Tuesday aft ernoon with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Chertoff , and Deputy Chief of 

Staff Karl Rove. Brown claims to have told them that at least 90 percent of the city’s population had been displaced and he “needed military assets [because] this was the big one.”24

Brown also told them that he “needed the help of the entire cabinet ... DOD and HHS and 

everybody else,” and that there was a “discussion about convening the cabinet.”25 Brown 

opined that, up until that conversation took place, he believed that the White House had 

failed to comprehend fully the catastrophic nature of Hurricane Katrina.26

A Hesitant Response

Despite these reports of a catastrophe, the White House failed to grasp the gravity of the 

situation as it unfolded. As a result, the White House’s initial response appeared halting 

and inadequate. Th roughout Monday, the day of the storm, the President maintained his 

regular schedule. In the morning, he celebrated Senator John McCain’s birthday at Luke Air 

Force Base near Phoenix, Arizona.27 Later that morning, the President had a “Conversation 

on Medicare” at the Pueblo El Mirage RV Resort and Country Club in nearby El Mirage, 

Arizona.28 He also spoke to the people in the Gulf Coast region, off ering that, “When the 
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238

storm passes, the federal government has got assets and resources that we’ll be deploying to 

help you.”29

Likewise, on Monday aft ernoon, the President fl ew to California and gave a speech in Rancho Cucamonga on Medicare and the new prescription-drug benefi t. Th ere, he reassured 

his audience that the government was prepared to respond to Katrina.30 But this did not 

turn out to be the case.

Th e hesitancy continued into the following day. Despite mounting reports on the extent of 

the catastrophe, no one from the White House participated in FEMA’s intergovernmental 

conference call on Tuesday at noon.

At noon ET that day, the President stood at a naval base in San Diego and off ered a picture 

of a fully prepared federal government that was ready to respond to Katrina: “Our teams 

and equipment are in place and we’re beginning to move in the help that people need.”31

On the same day, White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan announced the President 

would return to Washington, D.C., the following day in order to “oversee the response efforts from there.”32

Th ereaft er, the White House began to chart a more aggressive course of response to Katrina. 

At a 5:11 p.m. briefi ng Wednesday evening, President Bush, surrounded by his Cabinet, 

addressed the nation from the Rose Garden and announced that he had called the Cabinet 

together, and had “directed Secretary of Homeland Security Mike Chertoff to chair a Cabinet-level task force to coordinate all our assistance from Washington.”33

Th e task force demanded a list of available resources from each federal agency assigned 

responsibility under the National Response Plan.34 For example, the White House asked 

FEMA on Wednesday for “the inventory of all department agency operations/activity ... 

are there any Federal powers or other processes that could be implemented to expedite 

the response or make it more effi cient ... [w]hat are the plans for providing housing to ... 

displaced people?”35 Had these questions been asked and this sense of urgency imparted 

earlier, vital federal help might have arrived sooner.

Th e more vigorous response continued throughout the week. For example, despite reports 

of lawlessness in New Orleans and the need for federal assistance, there were only a handful 

of FBI and other Department of Justice law-enforcement offi cers in the New Orleans area 

as of Th ursday morning. As DOJ continued to formulate a response plan, President Bush 

discussed with the Attorney General the situation in New Orleans, and DOJ offi cers began 

to deploy that day. Likewise, on Saturday, the President ordered thousands of active-duty 

military forces to deploy to the region to assist in what he saw was an unacceptable response 

to the suff ering of thousands of Katrina victims in various locations around the city.

1 Committee staff interview of Gary Jones, Acting Regional Director, Region VI, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), conducted on Jan. 11, 2006, transcript pp. 48-49, 149-152; Committee staff interview of Wayne Fairley, 

Response Operations Branch Chief, Region VI, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 18, 2006, pp. 2, 57-58; Ron Castleman, e-mail 

to Patricia English, May 17, 2004, 10:11 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA 0058-0000097.

2 Janet Benini was Director of Response and Planning for the White House Homeland Security Council prior to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall. She did not work at the White House during the Katrina response.

3 Th e White House does not dispute that the President received these warnings and communications before landfall: 

“Th e President received regular briefi ngs, had countless conversations with Federal, State, and local offi cials, and took 

extraordinary steps prior to landfall.” U.S. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Th e 
Government Response: The Role of the White House

239

Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Feb. 2006, pp. 28-29 

[hereinaft er Th e White House, Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned]. But the White House did not detail in either its report, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, Frances Fragos Townsend’s February 13, 2006 speech 

at the NEMA’s mid-year conference, or elsewhere, any specifi c details about the briefi ngs or conversations. Th e White 

House, Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, pp. 28-29, 174. 

4 Th e White House, Homeland Security President Directive-1: Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security 

Council, October 29, 2001. HSPD-1 states that the White House Homeland Security Council (HSC), is a unit within the 

White House responsible for coordination of homeland security activities between all federal departments and agencies. 

Th e HSC also is responsible for circulating information throughout the White House during a catastrophe. As stated during a Committee briefi ng conducted by the White House on February 3, 2006, the HSC handles preparedness issues and 

immediate response issues. It also serves as a gate-keeper to mitigate duplicative information requests to other agencies.

5 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security Department’s 

Preparation and Response, Feb. 15, 2006.

6 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e 

Role of the Department of Homeland Security, Oct. 19, 2005.

7 White House Briefi ng given to Committee, conducted by Kenneth Rapuano, Deputy Assistant to the President for 

Homeland Security, Dec. 13, 2005.

8 Michael Brown, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, transcript p. 22. Provided to Committee. 

9 Joseph Hagin, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, transcript p. 24. Provided to Committee.

10 Andrew Akers, e-mail to Homeland Security Operations Center Senior Watch Offi cer and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 

11:24 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 0005865 through 0005867. Th e other addressees for the 

e-mail are DC-NSC-WHSR, Bethany Nichols, Elliot Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, 

Daniel Kaniewski and copied to Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward 

McDonald, Gail Kulish, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson, John Wood, National Interagency Coordination Center, Secretary 

Briefi ng Staff , HSOC.HSIN. 

11 Max Mayfi eld, Ph.D., FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 6, 10. Provided to Committee.

12 Michael Brown, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript p. 37. Provided to the Committee. 

During his staff interview on February 23, 2006, Brown discussed a telephone call with Joe Hagin aft er the Noon VTC. 

He described the conversation as follows: “And Hagin and I were having a conversation just about how bad this one was 

going to be and, you know, dad-gamut all the – I mean, I was really bitching at Hagin about all of the planning I’d been 

asking for and you know, the catastrophic planning we’d been wanting to do, you know, now – and now here we are, 

and, you know, saying to him, you know, dad-gamut, why didn’t I quit earlier – then, you know, you guys knew I wanted 

to quit. I mean, we’re having this sparring match about all of this stuff that I was really mad about because I knew I was 

walking into this hornets’ nest, I’m really ticked off , because I know how bad this thing’s going to be.” Brown further described the conversation: “I’m just adamant that they understand my concern about New Orleans. I mean, I don’t know 

how to get this across to people that I have pushed and pushed for catastrophic disaster planning; we had chosen New 

Orleans as the fi rst place to do catastrophic disaster planning; and now, damn it, here was a, you know, a Cat 5 bearing 

down on – on New Orleans.” Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 

23, 2006, transcript pp. 34, 36-37.

13 Bill Doran, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 16-17. Provided to Committee.

14 President George Bush, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 14-15. Provided to Committee. Th e Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned describes the President as actively engaged the weekend 

prior to landfall, communicating with state and local offi cials and off ering federal resources. 

15 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 137-139, 141. Brown testifi ed that he had put the White House on notice of 

FEMA’s lack of capabilities to respond adequately to a catastrophe before Katrina approached the Gulf. Brown interview, 

Feb. 23, 2006, p. 143. In addition, Brown suggested that he spoke with the White House earlier than January, 2005 

regarding his concerns for FEMA. Specifi cally, when Brown was asked whether it was fair to say he was communicating 

with the White House during his tenure as Undersecretary and “expressing to them that FEMA was not ready; FEMA 

needed more resources.” Brown replied and discussed a letter sent to Sec. Tom Ridge in Sept. 2003, regarding FEMA’s 

integration in the Department of Homeland Sec. Although he said he raised this letter with Clay Johnson and Joe Hagin, 

and the fact that FEMA would fail if many of the proposed changes occurred, he also suggested that he spoke to Clay 

Johnson generally about the problems with FEMA. When asked what he expressed to Johnson, and whether they were 

the same kinds of concerns previously described, Brown stated: “Th e same kind of concerns but probably in more detail 

with Clay at times because Clay was heading up the transition team for DHS, and so he really understood kind of what 

we should be doing and shouldn’t be doing. And I would have a lot of conversations with Clay about it.” Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 139-141. Brown did not address these concerns publicly or in writing with Congress. However, 

during his appearance before the U.S. House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate Preparation for and Response 

to Hurricane Katrina hearing on Sept. 27, 2005, Brown alluded to having had some conversations with members of 

Congress, though not with any members of this Committee regarding the state of FEMA. When asked about the emaciation of FEMA, Brown suggested that for several years, he privately discussed how FEMA would become extremely 

limited in both personnel and fi nancial resources hindering its capacity to handle a disaster. In response to a question 
Chapter 15

240

about Brown expressing his concerns about FEMA privately, but not publicly, Brown stated: “I can go to bed at night 

and sleep because I know I fought that battle.” In addition, later in the hearing when asked why he expressed his views 

about FEMA’s problems privately versus publicly, Brown testifi ed that he wanted to work within the system to make the 

needed changes. Brown, House Select Committee hearing, Sept. 27, 2005. Apparently, those eff orts failed.

16 Th e White House, Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, p. 27.

17 Daniel Kaniewski, e-mail to Dan Bartlett and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:13 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. OVP 004795. Th e other addressees are Todd Beyer, Bill Burck, Trent Duff y, Joseph Hagin, Brian Hook, Brett Kavanaugh, Emily Kropp, William McGurn, Stephen McMillin, Harriet Miers, Bruce Miller, Susan Ralston, Kenneth Rapuano, 

Scott Sforza, Kristen Silverberg, Heidi Smith, Frances Townsend, and copied to Steven Atkiss, Jessica Bennett, Stephen 

Black, Jamie Brown, John Burke, Shannon Burkhart, John Currin, Robert DeServi, DL-HSC-BTS, DL-HSC-CHEM-BIO, 

DL-HSCEXECSEC, DL-HSC-Front, DL-HSC-PPR, DL-NSC-WHSR, Lindsey Drouin, Debbie Fiddelke, Erin Healy, 

Taylor Hughes, Lauren Kane, Karyn Richman Kendall, Matthew Kirk, Ross Kyle, Jeannie Mamo, Christopher Michel, 

Alexander Mistri, John Mitnick, Derrick Morgan, Erin Nagle, Neil Patel, Dana Perino, Douglas Pitkin, Heather Roebke, 

Daniel Wilmot, Candace Wysocki, DeWitt Zemp (“Flooding signifi cant throughout the region and a levee in New 

Orleans has reportedly been breached sending 6 to 8 feet of water throughout the 9th Ward area of the city. Per the Governor, water is rising at 1 foot per hour and the New Orleans mayor reports problems with a pumping station, causing 

fl ooding. HSOC reports that due to the rising water in the 9th Ward, residents are in their attics and on their roofs.”). Th e 

President’s knowledge of when New Orleans’ levees breached has been the subject of much media attention. In the week 

aft er landfall, the President himself made statements regarding the levee breaches. For instance, on Friday, September 2, 

2005, during a press conference in Biloxi, Mississippi, the President stated: “Th e levees broke on Tuesday in New Orleans. 

On Wednesday, we – and Th ursday we started evacuating people. A lot of people have left that city. A lot of people have 

been pulled out on buses. It’s – I am satisfi ed with the response. I’m not satisfi ed with all the results. Th ey started pulling people off roofs immediately. Th ey started rallying – we started rallying choppers to get people off rooft ops, started 

savings lives. I mean, thousands of peoples’ lives have been saved immediately, and that’s good news. Th is is one of the 

worst storms in our nation’s history. New Orleans got hit by two storms, one the hurricane, and then the fl ood. And it’s 

going to take a monumental eff ort to continue moving forward, but we will.” Th e White House, “President Tours Biloxi, 

Mississippi Hurricane Damaged Neighborhoods,” press release, Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

WHK 01656, 01658. As set forth herein, several pieces of evidence show the levees breached on Monday.

18 On the noon video teleconference, Brown said he spoke with President Bush at least twice on the day of landfall, likely 

prior to noon. Brown stated: “I talked to the President twice today, once in Crawford and then again on Air Force One.” 

Michael Brown, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2005, p. 14. Provided to Committee. Brown also testifi ed 

that he spoke to Hagin on at least two occasions on the day of landfall. Testimony of Brown, Senate Committee hearing, 

Feb. 10, 2005. See also: Andy Card, e-mail to Michael Brown, Aug. 29, 2005, 9:51 p.m. Provided to Committee (showing 

that Brown spoke with Hagin on August 29 to provide updates of the situation in New Orleans). When asked whether 

he spoke directly to the President on the night of landfall concerning Bahamonde’s over fl ight, Brown said he could not 

recall if he spoke to the President then. Brown stated: “I really don’t recall if the President got – normally during my 

conversations with Deputy Chief of Staff [Hagin], sometimes the President would get on the phone for a few minutes, 

sometimes he wouldn’t, and I don’t recall specifi cally that night whether he did or not.” Brown, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 10, 2006.

19 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 24-25 (“Question: Is there any reason for us to doubt that aft er you talked to Joe 

Hagin 5 or 6 o’clock on Monday evening, August 29, that he then knew from you that the 17th Street Canal levee had 

broke and the city was fl ooding? Answer: I don’t think there is any reason for any of us to doubt that they knew that. 

Question: Okay. And that they knew that at least in part from your phone conversation with Joe Hagin, correct? Answer: 

Th at’s correct.”). Brown said he spoke with Hagin on Monday evening to discuss Bahamonde’s report of his New 

Orleans fl yover over New Orleans, but could not recall whether he specifi cally told Hagin in that call that the levees had 

broken. Source: Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 21 (“I think I used the phrase to Joe that, you know, our – the worst 

nightmare is occurring. I can’t recall all of the words I used other than, this is, you know, our worst – this is the worst 

scenario; this is, you know my worst fears are coming true. You know, I used the phrase, you know we have breaches 

of the canals”); Brown, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 10, 2006, (“I think I told him that we were realizing our worst 

nightmare, that everything we had planned about, worried about, that FEMA, frankly, had worried about for 10 years, 

was coming true.”) Brown said he told Hagin or White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card about the levee breaches late 

in the aft ernoon on Monday because he recalled they were “debating” at the state Emergency Operations Center whether 

the levees were breached or overtopped. Source: Brown, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 10, 2006; Deposition of Michael 

Brown, before the House Katrina Select Committee staff , Feb. 11, 2006, pp. 113-114. Brown also received an e-mail from 

Card at 9:51 p.m., Monday, in which Card acknowledged Brown’s continued contact with Hagin and said: “Joe Hagin 

has kept me well-informed of your reports.” Source: Andy Card, e-mail to Michael Brown, Aug. 29, 2005, 9:51 p.m. Provided to Committee. Brown responded and stated: “Th anks for writing, Andy. Th is is a bad one.” Source: Michael Brown, 

e-mail to Andy Card, Aug. 29, 2005, 10 p.m. Provided to Committee.

20 Th e White House, “President, Lieutenant General Honoré Discuss Hurricane Relief in Louisiana,” press release, Sept. 

12, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 01723, 01725.

21 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, HSOC Spot Report #13, Aug. 29, 2005, 10:30 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. WHK-07159. Th e Report further stated: “Only one of the main pumps is reported to still be working 

but cannot keep up with the demand and its longevity is doubtful.” Th e White House received this report at 12:02 a.m., 

Tuesday, Aug. 30, 2005. Michael Izner, e-mail to HSOC.HSIN and others, Aug. 30, 2005, 12:02 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 07158 through WHK 07160. Th e other addressees for the e-mail are DL-NSC-WHSR, 

the National Interagency Coordination Center, as well as the following offi cials, Bethany Nichol, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen 
Government Response: The Role of the White House

241

Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, Richard Davis, Michael Barton and copied to Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, Gail Kulish, Tom Parr, 

Michael Jackson, and John Wood. 

22 Michael Izner, e-mail to DL-NSC-WHSR, Aug. 30, 2005, 6:33 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. WHK 

06264. Th e other addressees of the e-mail are Bethany Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth 

Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, Richard Davis, Michael Barton, and copied to Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, 

Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald,

Gail Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson, (DepSec), John Wood, (COS), National Interagency Coordination Center 

Secretary Briefi ng Staff , HSOC.HSIN, HSOC.SWO. 

23 Insung Lee, e-mail to DL-NSC-WHSR and others, Aug. 30, 2005, 10:23 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. WHK 07910 through WHK 07913. Th e other addressees of the e-mail are Bethany Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen 

Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, Richard Davis, Michael Barton, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, Gail Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael 

Jackson, John Wood, (COS), National Interagency Coordination Center, Secretary Briefi ng Staff ; HSOC.HSIN, HSOC.

SWO, HSOC.FEMA, HSOC.DOD, HSOC.State&Local

24 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 89-90. Brown also testifi ed about this conversation before a closed-session with 

the House. On pages 111-112, when asked what he said in the secure call, he responds: “Th at probably 90 percent of 

the population of New Orleans had been displaced, that we had a true catastrophic disaster on our hands, that this 

was probably one of the most serious things that the country had faced; that it was. We needed to be doing everything 

possible.” Deposition of Michael Brown before the House Katrina Select Committee, Feb. 11, 2006, pp. 111-112.

25 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 90.

26 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 97-98.

27 Th e White House, Photo Gallery, Aug. 29, 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/images/20050829-5_p082905pm-0125-515h.html. Accessed on Mar. 2, 2006.

28 Th e White House, “President Participates in Conversation on Medicare,” press release, Aug. 29, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050829-5.html. Accessed on Mar. 7, 2006.

29 Th e White House, “President Participates in Conversation on Medicare,” press release, Aug. 29, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050829-5.html. Accessed on Mar. 7, 2006.

30 Th e White House, “President Discusses Medicare, New Prescription Drug Benefi ts,” press release, Aug. 29, 2005. 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050829-11.html. Accessed on Mar. 7, 2006.

31 Th e White House, “President Commemorates 60th Anniversary of V-J Day,” press release, Aug. 30, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050830-1.html. Accessed on Mar. 11, 2006.

32 Th e White House, “Press Gaggle by Scott McClellan, Naval Air Station North Island, San Diego, California,” Aug. 30, 

2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 01632 through 01633 (QUESTION: Th is is more - this is more 

symbolic. Cutting short his vacation is more symbolic because he can do all this from the ranch, right? McCLELLAN: 

No, I think – no, I disagree. Like I said, this is one of the most devastating storms in our nation’s history, and the President, aft er receiving a further update this morning, made the decision that he wanted to get back to D.C. and oversee the 

response eff orts from there.”).

33 Th e White House, “President Outlines Hurricane Katrina Relief Eff orts,” press release, Aug. 31, 2005. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 01636 through 01637.

34 Committee staff interview of Laurence Broun, Departmental Emergency Coordinator, U.S. Department of Interior, 

conducted on Mar. 21, 2006, transcript pp. 15-16.

35 Insung Lee, e-mail to Homeland Security Operations Center, Senior Watch Offi cer and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 12:41 

p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 12588 through 12598. Th e other addressees of the e-mail are 

DL-NSC-WHSR, Bethany Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel 

Kaniewski, Richard Davis, Michael Barton, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, Gail Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson, (DepSec), John Wood, (COS); National Interagency 

Coordination Center; Secretary Briefi ng Staff ; HSOC.HSIN; IMD.