UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-4634

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

JENNIFER MURPHY, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief 

District Judge; Robert E. Payne, Senior District Judge. (3:07-

cr-00012-REP) 

Submitted: March 18, 2009 Decided: April 9, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Reginald M. Barley, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Norman 

Scott Sacks, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richard 

Daniel Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Jennifer Murphy appeals her convictions by a jury of 

possession of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2006), 

possession of an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 

§ 5861(d) (2006), and maintaining a place for the purpose of 

distributing controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 856 (2006); and her sentence of forty-one months of 

imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether 

the district court properly denied Murphy’s motion to suppress 

evidence.* Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court. 

 On appeal from a district court’s denial of a motion 

to suppress, the district court’s factual findings are reviewed 

for clear error and the legal determinations are reviewed de 

novo. See United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 553 (4th Cir. 

2007). Under a clear error standard of review, this court will 

reverse only if “left with the definite and firm conviction that 

a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Stevenson, 396 

F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir. 2005)(quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 

 *

 Murphy was informed of her right to file a pro se 

supplemental brief but has not done so. 

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470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). It is well-settled that this court 

will give particular deference to a district court’s credibility 

determinations for “it is the role of the district court to 

observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial 

motion to suppress.” United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 

232 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 

1161, 1169 (4th Cir. 1995)). Finally, where, as here, the 

district court denies a motion to suppress, this court reviews 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. 

United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 704 (4th Cir. 2006). 

 The district court, after hearing the evidence at the 

suppression hearing and a subsequent hearing, determined that 

Murphy consented to the search. “Absent compelling evidence to 

the contrary, this Court declines to overturn a factual 

determination founded on witness demeanor and credibility.” 

United States v. Locklear, 829 F.2d 1314, 1317 (4th Cir. 1987) 

(citing United States v. Wolf, 813 F.2d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 

1987)). The record does not reveal compelling evidence contrary 

to the district court’s credibility determination, and 

therefore, Murphy’s claim fails. 

 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. We 

remand to the district court for correction of the first page of 

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4 

the written judgment to reflect that the offense in Count Two, 

possession of cocaine, is a misdemeanor offense. 

 This court requires that counsel inform Murphy, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Murphy requests a petition 

be filed, but counsel believes such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on Murphy. 

 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED