Filed 5/15/15 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

MICHAEL WILLIAMS , Petitioner,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
Respondent;

MARSHALLS OF CA , LLC,

Real Pa rty in Interest. B2 59967
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC503806 )

Petition for extraordinary writ

. William F. Highberger , Judge. P etition is denied

. Capstone Law, Glenn A. Danas, Robert Drexler, Stan Karas, Liana Carter for
Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Littler Mendelson, Robert G. Hulteng, Joshua J. Cliffe, Emily E. O ’ Connor, Scott D. Helsinger for Real Party in Interest.

_______________2 Background Beginning in January 2012, plaintiff Michael Willia ms was an employee at a retail store operated by Marshalls of CA (Marshalls) in Costa Mesa, California. O n March 22, 2013, after a little more than one year of employment, he brought a representative action against Marshalls under the Labor Code Private A ttorneys General Act of 2004 (PA GA) (Lab. Code, §§ 2698

- 2699.5), alleging Marshalls failed to provide its employees with meal and rest breaks or premium pay in lieu thereof (Lab. Code, §§ 226.7 & 512) , 1 to provide accurate wage statements (§ 226, subd. (a) ), to reimburse employees for necessary business

- related expenses (§§ 2800 & 2802), and to pay all earned wages during employment ( § 204)

. On February 5, 2014, plaintiff served special interrogatories seeking production of
the names and contact informati on of all nonexempt Marshalls employees in California who had worked for the company beginning o n March 22, 2012. Marshalls objected to the discovery on the ground it was irrelevant, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and implicated the privacy rights of its e mployees. Plaintiff met and conferred with Marshalls, offering to address its privacy concerns with a “ Belaire

- West notice, ” 2 but Marshalls rejected the offer. Plaintiff moved to compel the discovery, arguing the contact information was routinely discov erable in representative employee actions and vital to the prosecution of his PAGA claims. The trial court granted plaintiff ’ s motion in part, compelling Marshalls to produce contact information for the employees only at its Costa Mesa store and denying p roduction of the contact information of employees at Marshalls other 128

stores statewide. The court ordered that plaintiff could renew his motion to compel the remaining information after he had been deposed “ for at least six productive hours. ” The

cour t also ruled that in opposition to any such motion, Marshalls could attempt to show plaintiff ’ s substantive claims had no factual merit.

1 Undesignated statutory references will be to the Labor Code.

2 Belaire

- West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554.3

In these writ proceedings, plaintiff seeks a writ of mandate compelling the superior court to vacate its discovery or der and enter a new order granting plaintiff ’ s motion to compel production a list of all nonexempt employees who worked for Marshalls beginning on March 22, 2012.
Discussion
1. Standard of Review The standard for determining the scope of discovery is set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010, which provides that “ [u]nless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject ma tter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.

. . . Discovery may be o btained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter

. . . . ” However, “ [t] he court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs t he likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020, subd. (a).)

“ For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it ‘ might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, prepari ng for trial, or facilitating settlement. ’ [Citation.] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence. [Citation.] The phrase ‘ reasonably calculated to
lead to the di scovery of admissible evidence ’ makes it clear that the scope of discovery
extends to any information that reasonably might lead to other evidence that w ould be
admissible at trial. ‘ Thus, the scope of permissible discovery is one of reason, logic and

com mon sense

. ’ [Citation.] These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery. ” ( Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611

- 1612 .) Management of discovery lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. A discovery order is there fore reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. ( Krinsky v.
Doe 6 (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161.) “ Where there is a basis for the trial court ’ s4

ruling and it is supported by the evidence, a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion
for th at of the trial court. [Citation.] The trial court ’ s determination will be set aside only
when it has been demonstrated that there was ‘ no legal justification ’ for the order granting or denying the discovery in question. ” ( Lipton v. Superior Court , supr a , 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1612 .) Novel, important discovery issues may be reviewed by prerogative writ. ( See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 169 .)
2. Discovery o f M arshalls ’ Employee s ’ Contact Information Statewide is
Premat ure

“ Although the scope of civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless. ” ( Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223.) Discovery devices

must “ be used as tools to facilitate litigation rather than as weapons to wage li tigation. ” ( Id. at p. 221.) A party seeking to compel discovery must therefore “ set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought

. . . . ” ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1); see Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court , supra , 53 at p. 223.) To establish good cause, a discovery proponent must identify a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and explain how the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidenc e that will tend to prove or disprove
the fact. Plaintiff argues immediate discovery of the contact information of Marshalls ’ employees statewide is clearly germane to and necessary for progress in his PAGA
action

. We disagree. At this nascent stage of plaintiff ’ s PAGA action there has as yet been no discovery

— p laintiff has not even sat for his own deposition. The litigation therefore consists solely of the allegations in his complaint. But plaintiff alleges therein only that at the Costa Mesa store, h e and perhaps other employees at that store were subject ed to violations of the Labor Code. N owhere does he evince any knowledge of the practices of
Marshalls at other stores, nor any fact that would lead a reasonable person to believe he
knows whether Ma rshalls has a uniform statewide policy. That being the case, it was5

eminently reasonable for the trial judge to proceed with discovery in an incremental fashion, first requiring that plaintiff provide some support for his own, local claims and then perhap s later broadening the inquiry to discover whether some reason exists to suspect Marshalls ’ local practices extend statewide. Further, a trial court must consider the costs of any discovery and take reasonable steps to promote efficiency and economy. Sta tewide discovery that includes the mailing
of Belaire

- West notice s and tabulation of responses is costly. By staging discovery incrementally, the trial court delayed the incursion of potentially unnecessary costs until it becomes clear they are warranted.
Plaintiff ’ s proposed procedure, which contemplates jumping into extensive statewide discovery based only on the bare allegations of one local individual having no knowledge of the defendant ’ s statewide practices would be a classic use of discovery
tools t o wage litigation rather than facilitate it. We conclude bare allegations unsupported by any reason to believe a defendant ’ s conduct extends statewide furnishes no good cause for statewide discovery. Plaintiff argues that in a PAGA action such as this, h e stands in as a proxy for the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) , and should thus be entitled to all discovery to which that agency would be entitled, including “ free access to all places of
labor ” (§ 90). We disagree. It is true that p ursua nt to section 90, “ The Labor Commissioner, his deputies and agents, shall have free access to all places of labor. Any person, or agent or officer thereof, who refuses admission to the Labor Commissioner or his deputy or agent or who, upon request, willfu lly neglects or refuses to furnish them any statistics or information, pertaining to their lawful duties, which are in his possession or under his control, is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000). ”
B ut nothing in the PAGA suggests a private plaintiff standing in as a proxy for the DLSE is entitled to the same access. On the contrary, the PAGA states only that a private individual may bring a “ civil action ” to enforce labor laws, not that the individu al may

access “ all places of labor ” or demand unlimited information upon pain of criminal6

conviction. Discovery in a civil action is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. We think it prudent that absent any express direction from the Legislature to th e contrary, discovery in a civil action brought under the PAGA be subject to the same rules as discovery in civil actions generally. Plaintiff also argues the trial court ’ s order that at some future date Marshalls might resist further discovery by making a showing that plaintiff ’ s claims have no factual merit constitutes an added burden on discovery not contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure. We disagree. We read the court ’ s order as paraphrasing the common requirement that discovery not be ordered absent a showing of good cause.
3

. Employee P rivacy I nterests O utweigh P laintiff ’ s N eed for D isclosure at T his
T ime
Even if Marshalls ’ employees ’ identifying information was reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, their right to privacy unde r the California Constitution
would outweigh plaintiff ’ s need for the information at this time. 3
The California Constitution provides that all individuals have a right of privacy. ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) T h is express right is broader than the implied federal right to privacy

. (

American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 326.) Th e California privacy right “ limits what courts can compel through civil discovery. ” ( Rancho Publications v. Superior Court , supra , 68 Cal.App.4th at p p. 1547

- 1548.)

“ [W]hen the constitutional right of privacy is involved, the party seeking discovery of private matter must do more than satisfy the section 2017 [.010] standard. The party seeking discovery must demonstrate a compelling need for discovery, a nd that compelling need must be so strong as to outweigh the privacy right when these two competing interests are carefully balanced. ” ( Lantz v. Superior Court (199 4) 28 Cal.App .4th 1839, 1853

- 1854; see Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Superior Court

3 Marshalls possesses standing to assert its employees’ constitutional rights. (See Rancho Publications v. Superior Court (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1541 [a nonparty to civil litigation may assert the constitutionally protected right of another to remain unknown].)7

(20 00) 83 Cal.App.4th 347, 367 [courts must balance the privacy interests of the person subject to discovery against the litigant ’ s need for discovery].) A discovery proponent

may demonstrate compelling need by establishing the discovery sought is directly

r elevant and essential to the fair resolution of the underlying lawsuit. ( Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Superior Court
, supra , 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 367; Johnson v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1071 .) Applying this balancing test we conc lude Marshalls ’ employees ’ privacy interest s outweigh plaintiff ’ s need to discover their identity at this time. Th ose interest s begin
with the employees ’ right to be free from unwanted attention and perhaps fear of
retaliation from an employer

. On the ot her hand, plaintiff ’ s need for the discovery at this
time is practically nonexistent. His first task will be to establish he was himself subjected
to violations of the Labor Code. As he has not yet sat for deposition, this task remains
unfulfilled. The trial court could reasonably conclude that t he second task will be to
establish Marshalls ’ employment practices are uniform throughout the company, which might be accomplished by reference to a policy manual or perhaps deposition of a corporate officer. T he trial court could reasonably conclude that only then will plaintiff
be able to set forth facts justifying statewide discovery

. The courts will not lightly bestow statewide discovery power to a litigant who has only a parochial claim. Here, the trial court ’ s measured approach to discovery was reasonable. Therefore, plaintiff ’ s petition is denied. Disposition The petition for writ of mandate is denied

. Marshalls is to recover its costs on the original proceeding

. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

CHANEY, J. We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. JOHNSON , J.