Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide

Pandemic Influenza 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery 

Guide for critical infrastructure and key resources 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS, 

RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY GUIDE FOR CRITICAL 

INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES 

For more information including a PDF copy of the CI/KR 

guide, please visit www.pandemicflu.gov or email your CI/ 

KR-related questions to dhspandemic@dhs.gov. 

Publication date: September 19, 2006 
Table of Contents


Executive Summary.................................................................................................................................................................................. ii

Section 1: Introduction............................................................................................................................................................................. 1

• 1.1 Secretary Chertoff’s Message to the Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Sectors.................................................................. 1

• 1.2 Purpose........................................................................................................................................................................................... 2

• 1.3 Situation........................................................................................................................................................................................... 2

• 1.4 Overview of CI/KR Guide Sections.................................................................................................................................................. 2

• 1.5 Guide Distribution Versions.............................................................................................................................................................. 3

Section 2: Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities-Summary............................................................................................................. 4

• 2.1 Overview.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 6

• 2.2 What Should Private Sector Businesses Know, and Why?.............................................................................................................. 6

• 2.3 What are Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources or CI/KR?....................................................................................................... 6 

• 2.4 Why is this Important for Businesses?............................................................................................................................................. 6

• 2.5 Roles and Responsibilities............................................................................................................................................................... 8

Section 3: Pandemic Infl uenza Context-Summary................................................................................................................................ 10

• 3.1 Overview.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 12

• 3.2 Why is this Important for Business?................................................................................................................................................. 12

• 3.3 National Context.............................................................................................................................................................................. 12

• 3.4 International Context........................................................................................................................................................................ 15

• 3.5 U.S. National Alert Stages................................................................................................................................................................ 16 

Section 4: Pandemic Implications for Businesses................................................................................................................................ 18 

• 4.1 Overview of Business Continuity of Operations Plan-Essential (COP-E)........................................................................................ 20

• 4.2 Defi ning “Essential”.......................................................................................................................................................................... 20 

• 4.3 Pandemic Planning Assumptions and Impacts................................................................................................................................ 20

Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) Guide............................................................................................................ 26

• 5.1 Develop and Implement a Continuity of Operations Plan................................................................................................................ 28 

• 5.2 How Does COP-E Fit with Current Contingency Plans?.................................................................................................................. 29 

• 5.3 Why COP-E is Important to the Private Sector................................................................................................................................ 30

• 5.4 The COP-E Planning Process......................................................................................................................................................... 31

• 5.5 COP-E Scenario-Driven Pandemic Planning................................................................................................................................... 31

• 5.6 COP-E Phases: Planning, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery.............................................................................................. 34

Section 6: Partnerships and Information Sharing................................................................................................................................. 64

• 6.1 Essential Partnership for Success................................................................................................................................................... 66

• 6.2 Facilitate Public-Private Partnerships.............................................................................................................................................. 67

• 6.3 Identify and Enhance Partner Interdependencies............................................................................................................................ 67

• 6.4 DHS Partnering and Information-Sharing Capabilities and Initiatives.............................................................................................. 68

• 6.5 Partnering and Information-Sharing Points of Contact..................................................................................................................... 70

Section 7: Public and Media Relations................................................................................................................................................... 72 

• 7.1 Communicating with the Public........................................................................................................................................................ 74

• 7.2 Communicating with Employees and their Families......................................................................................................................... 74

• 7.3 Communicating with the Media........................................................................................................................................................ 79

Annexes and Appendices

NOTE: When completed and approved, the full Annex (all Sector-Specific Checklists, Roles and Responsibilities, and Pandemic 

Context) and the Appendix (Pandemic Scenarios, COP-E templates, and Web links) will be available in the reference Pandemic Guide. 

i 
Executive Summary


Public health experts warn pandemic influenza poses a significant risk to the United States and the 

world—only its timing, severity, and exact strain remain uncertain. International, Federal, State, local, 

and tribal government agencies are diligently planning for the public health response to this potential 

pandemic. The disease could be severe and could affect our critical infrastructure and our nation’s 

economic and social security. It is important that you take action. 

As part of the U.S. Government’s pandemic preparedness 

strategy, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

supports the efforts of the public and private sector Critical 

Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR) community 

and their businesses to develop and execute their essential 

pandemic contingency plans and preparedness actions. 

The Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery Guide is one of the practical tools DHS 

has developed for business owner-operators and their 

contingency planners to enhance pandemic planning.This 

guide assembles the primary government and pandemic 

infl uenza-specific background material, references, 

and contacts all in one place. It introduces an enhanced 

contingency planning process for a pandemic and provides 

business planners with numerous sector-specifi c and 

common pandemic influenza planning variables keyed to 

escalating disaster phases. This Guide will complement 

and enhance, not replace, extensive private sector 

contingency planning already in place. 

The primary purpose of this Guide is to stimulate the U.S. 

private sector business community to act now. With this 

Guide, DHS hopes to assist our nation’s 17 CI/KR sectors, 

and business and industry in general, with the actions 

they should be taking to prepare for, respond to, and 

recover from a localized outbreak, as well as the broader 

pandemic. This Guide urges private sector business 

planners to expand upon their traditional notions of 

continuity of operations, as a pandemic promises to test 

the limits of their current contingency plans. 

Eighty-five percent of critical infrastructure resources 

reside in the private sector, which generally lacks 

individual and system-wide business continuity plans 

specifically for catastrophic health emergencies such as 

pandemic influenza. Many businesses have extensive 

contingency plans in response to threats from diverse 

natural and manmade disasters. While useful for their 

intended purpose, these plans may prove ineff ective 

given they do not account for the extreme health impact 

assumptions and containment strategies projected for a 

severe pandemic infl uenza. 

Successful pandemic preparedness demands full 

participation from private sector businesses of all types and 

sizes. Businesses know best which activities and personnel 

in their operations are most critical. They know what 

priorities and choices they need to consider in maintaining 

essential levels of service and how advance planning and 

preparedness can help sustain their critical infrastructure. 

While the government continues to make progress in 

pandemic planning, it still has work to do to ensure all 

CI/KR sectors are planning, as well. Private sector planning 

must be well coordinated across our interdependent critical 

infrastructures and between all appropriate public and 

private entities. The Pandemic Infl uenza Preparedness, 

Response, and Recovery Guide is a positive fi rst step 

toward achieving this essential outcome. 

“Once again, nature has presented 

us with a daunting challenge: the 

possibility of an infl uenza pandemic... 

Together we will confront this emerging 

threat and together, as Americans, we 

will be prepared to protect our families, 

our communities, this great nation, and 

our world.”

 President GeorgeW. Bush

 November 2005 

ii 
Section 1: Introduction


1.1 Secretary Chertoff’s Message to the Critical 

Infrastructure and Key Resource Sectors 

Securing the homeland requires our constant vigilance. The Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) is committed to working with State, local, and tribal 

governments, as well as the private sector to build formidable partnerships to 

secure the Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR). As new 

threats emerge, the Nation must rally together to plan and prepare for possible 

disasters—both natural and manmade. One of these threats is a pandemic 

resulting from a new influenza virus. 

A severe pandemic influenza presents a tremendous challenge as it may 

affect the lives of millions of Americans, cause significant numbers of illnesses 

and fatalities, and substantially disrupt our economic and social stability. It is 

imperative for government officials and business leaders to work together now to develop effective pandemicrelated business continuity plans and to implement successful preparedness and protective strategies. 

DHS, along with its Federal partners, will work with the Nation’s CI/KR owner-operators to develop and 

integrate effective continuity of operations plans that ensure essential services remain functional and essential 

goods remain available in the event of a pandemic. This Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response and 

Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources is a major milestone in our ongoing efforts to 

support private sector pandemic planning. Owners and operators of our Nation’s critical infrastructure facilities 

will be able to use this guide to facilitate and inform their continuity planning efforts. 

September 11, 2001, taught us the importance of strong public-private partnerships and information sharing. 

Working together, we will again reveal the value in these powerful relationships as we confront the serious threat 

a pandemic poses to the United States and the world. Thank you for your help in this important endeavor. 

Michael Chertoff


 Secretary 

1 
Section 1: Introduction


1.2 Purpose 

The primary purpose of this Guide is to stimulate the U.S. private sector to act now. With this Guide, DHS hopes to assist 

our nation’s 17 CI/KR sector businesses (large, medium, and small), and and industry in general, with the actions they 

should be taking to prepare and respond to, and recover from, a localized outbreak, as well as the broader pandemic. (For 

a list of all 17 CI/KR sectors, please see Figure A on page 7.) As additional federal pandemic guidance for non-CI/KR 

businesses is developed, it will be made available at www.pandemicflu.gov. This Guide urges private sector business 

planners to move beyond the traditional notions of continuity of operations, as a pandemic promises to test the limits of 

their current contingency plans. 

1.3 Situation 

The mounting risk of a worldwide influenza pandemic poses numerous potentially devastating consequences for critical 

infrastructure in the United States. A pandemic will likely reduce dramatically the number of available workers in all 

sectors, and significantly disrupt the movement of people and goods, which will threaten essential services and operations 

within and across our nation’s CI/KR sectors. Industries in every sector of the critical infrastructure will experience 

pandemic impacts. Given today’s highly mobile population, disease outbreaks may occur simultaneously throughout 

the country making the reallocation of human and material resources more difficult than in other disaster or emergency 

situations. Thus, each community and CI/KR sector and industry must be primarily reliant on its own internal resources 

for response, at least initially. 

Preparedness for and response to a pandemic outbreak is a shared responsibility of all levels of government and the 

private sector. Leading the nation’s critical infrastructure protection efforts, DHS must support and in partnership with 

business harness the vast capabilities of the private sector to respond effectively to the widespread impacts of a pandemic. 

Current pandemic influenza planning in the public sector does not extend to the majority of private sector industries, most 

of which lack contingency plans for a potentially catastrophic pandemic. 

1.4 Overview of CI/KR Guide Sections 

Section 1-Introduction: Providing background and a statement of purpose, this section describes the basic authorities 

defining the role of DHS in developing critical infrastructure and key resource frameworks. It also describes robust 

partnerships with the private sector to enable preparedness for both natural and manmade disasters. 

Section 2-Roles and Responsibilities and Authorities-Summary: Defining and sharing information about the roles and 

responsibilities for all levels of government and the private sector prior to a pandemic disaster is crucial. Government and 

businesses need a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all partners during a disaster. Section 2 provides 

an overview of the assigned duties and authorities of Federal agencies; State, local, and tribal governments; and the 

private sector with a role in pandemic preparedness. This Guide also references current pandemic plans involving those 

Federal agencies with responsibility for the security of the CI/KR sectors. 

Section 3-Pandemic Infl uenza Context-Summary: Section 3 summarizes the context for pandemic preparedness actions 

with an overview of pandemic influenza, how it spreads, options for reducing transmissibility, international efforts to 

contain its spread, as well as major planning assumptions and implications for CI/KR in the United States. 

Section 4-Pandemic Implications for Businesses: Section 4 introduces the need to enhance existing contingency 

planning while emphasizing the dual definition of “essential” operations for a pandemic. It also integrates the health 

2 
impacts and disease mitigation strategies highlighted in Section 3. Section 4 considers how the combined effects may 

cause a greater negative consequence for businesses and the potential implications for essential business operations during 

a pandemic. 

Section 5-Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) Guide: Section 5 serves as the Guide’s core component. 

It provides CI/KR businesses with a practical tool to assist in their pandemic planning and response efforts. It also 

emphasizes the importance of a shift from conventional business continuity planning to pandemic-specific COP-E. COP-E 

planning scenarios assume pandemic-specific impacts and allow business contingency planners to address key actions 

needed to identify essential functions, people, and material within/across sectors. It proposes alternative methods to 

protect and sustain these at each phase, from preparation through recovery. 

Section 6-Partnerships and Information Sharing: Section 6 focuses on the importance of an effective public-private 

partnership and efficient communications both before and during a pandemic. These trusted partnerships become vehicles 

for reliable, realtime, two-way information exchanges. Disease containment strategies will rely heavily on fi rst responders 

and the business community to detect and notify government officials of the occurrence of a pandemic and the rapidly 

evolving impacts on essential operations. DHS will exercise its information-sharing networks, such as the Homeland 

Security Information Network (HSIN), to allow for greater communications, coordination, and information-sharing 

between the private sector and the government. 

Section 7-Public and Media Relations: Section 7 presents another critical pandemic preparedness and response 

component—public and media relations. Practical plans must be developed and implemented to ensure streamlined, 

coordinated information flows for accurate and consistent messages to both the public and the media. This section 

outlines strategies for communicating critical and timely information to the public and the media and other information 

management options for each phase of a pandemic. 

1.5 Guide Distribution Versions 

This Guide will be distributed through a number of media (Web site

download and electronic mail) and will be available initially in two 

different versions. 

1. The primary Pandemic Guide, an abridged version tailored 

to businesses with contingency planning teams, includes 

actionable abstracts of the reference CI/KR Guide sections, 

as well as detailed planning guidance, action checklists, and 

useful information on information-sharing and media relations. 

2. A full-scale reference Pandemic Guide with an expanded 

Section 2 (Roles and Responsibilities) and Section 3 (Pandemic 

Context) and all 17 CI/KR sector-specific checklists in the 

Annex, as well as supporting Appendices (Pandemic Planning 

Scenarios, COP-E Templates, Web Links, and Contact 

Information) for those businesses seeking more detailed planning 

and background information. 

3 
Section 2: Roles, Responsibilities, 

and Authorities-Summary 

“The avian flu bears the potential for societal 

disruption of unprecedented proportion. 

Strong partnerships and smart planning will 

be our best protection against this threat.”1 

Secretary Michael Chertoff 

Department of Homeland Security 

December 5, 2005 

IN THIS SECTION: Overview • What and Why Should Private Sector Businesses Know? 

• What are Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources or CI/KR? • Why is this Important for Businesses? 

• Roles and Responsibilities 

4 
5 
Section 2: Roles, Responsibilities, 

and Authorities-Summary 

2.1 Overview 

Understanding the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of Federal, State, local, and tribal governments as well as private 

sector businesses is key to assisting business planners to construct effective pandemic influenza contingency plans. This 

section summary illustrates what the Federal government means by CI/KR, highlights the basic roles and relationships 

of all governmental players, and provides insights into the significance of these relationships for business. The reference 

Guide’s Annex contains a more extensive discussion of these relationships. 

2.2 What Should Private Sector Businesses Know, and Why? 

Understanding the pandemic planning context offers business contingency planners a practical framework in which 

to develop and execute their plans. The context provides the nature of the threat and support variables essential to 

networking the business’ plan within the greater operational environment. Specifically knowing government roles, 

responsibilities, and authorities enables planners to obtain answers rapidly for many basic planning questions, such as: 

• What is the threat (e.g., spread, duration, virulence) to my business, the community, and the nation? 

• Where will it appear first, and how will I know when it does? 

• When will it begin affecting my business? 

• How will government help to inform and support my business? 

• How can my business help to support my business sector, my community and our nation? 

• How will it affect my business and those that depend on me? 

2.3 What are Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources or CI/KR? 

The U.S. Government has formally identified 13 Critical Infrastructure and 4 Key Resource sectors essential to our 

nation’s security, and economic and social stability.

2 This working partnership between the government, including CI/KR 

Sector-Specific Agencies, and private sector businesses allows all stakeholders to share information and develop and 

implement plans and actions to improve our nation’s homeland security. Of note, while this Guide focuses on support of 

the 17 CI/KR sectors, there are numerous other non-CI/KR businesses and business subsectors that are vital to the nation’s 

economic and social stability. The Guide also can assist these other businesses with their pandemic preparedness (Figure A). 

2.4 Why is this Important for Businesses? 

Health departments at all levels of government are working to protect the nation, its businesses, and citizens from an 

influenza outbreak. Knowing what these groups can do and are doing, and monitoring with them the evolving pandemic 

threat, will ensure that business has the most accurate information and maximum preparation time. Similarly, knowing 

what other government departments can and will do, and then collaborating with them to provide necessary support during 

a pandemic, helps define the external operational parameters and networks within which business must plan for during 

the preparedness, response, and recovery phases. The reference CI/KR Guide’s Annex provides a detailed review of the 

roles, responsibilities, and authorities summarized below. 

6 
17 NATIONAL CI/KRs


Key Resources 

Government 

Facilities Dams 

Physical Critical Infrastructure 

and Key Resources 

Figure A 

National 

Monuments & 

Icons 

Critical 

Infrastructure 

Food & 

Agriculture 

Banking & 

Finance 

Chemical & 

Hazardous 

Materials 

Defense 

Industrial Base 

Water 

Energy 

Emergency 

Services 

Information 

Technology 

Telecommunications 

Postal & 

Shipping 

Transportation 

Commercial 

Facilities 

Nuclear Power 

Plants 

Physical Critical Infrastructure - thirteen sectors that provide the production of 

essential goods and services, interconnectedness and operability, public safety, and 

security that contribute to a strong national defense and thriving economy 

Key Resources - facilities, sites, and groups of organized people whose destruction 

could cause large-scale injury, death, or destruction of property and/or profoundly 

damage our national prestige and confidence 

• 

• 

KEY OBSERVATIONS 

Public Health 

and Healthcare 

7 
Section 2: Roles, Responsibilities, 

and Authorities-Summary 

2.5 Roles and Responsibilities 

2.5.1 Federal 

On November 1, 2005, President Bush announced the nation’s comprehensive approach to prepare for 

and combat a potential pandemic influenza, emphasizing the need for proactive efforts combining the full 

capabilities and support of all levels of government and the private sector. The President also launched the 

primary Federal Web site, www.pandemicfl u.gov, to provide up-to-date information and pandemic links, and 

he released the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. 

3

 On May 6, 2006, the U.S. Homeland Security Council 

distributed the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan to provide operational direction and 

specific implementation actions for all Federal Departments as well as guidance for State, local, and tribal 

governments and the private sector. The Implementation Plan complements and extends existing national 

disaster management documents to include the National Response Plan and National Incident Management 

System (see Guide Annex and www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=14). From this guidance, government 

stakeholders will develop their actionable pandemic plans to support their specific areas of responsibility and 

authority. This CI/KR Guide incorporates the guidance provided in the Implementation Plan and specifi cally 

addresses one of the support actions directed in Chapter 9 of the Implementation Plan. 

2.5.2 State, Local, and Tribal 

This level of government represents the nation’s front lines in the pandemic battle. They will face extreme challenges 

in maintaining normal operations in the face of widespread illness and increased demand on most government services. 

States are diligently updating their pandemic plans; these are available for review at www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/ 

stateplans.html. As outlined in the Strategy, State, local, and tribal responsibilities include the following: 

• ensuring all reasonable measures are taken to limit the spread of an outbreak within and beyond the community’s 

borders; 

• establishing comprehensive and credible preparedness and response plans that are exercised on a regular basis; 

• integrating non-health entities, including law enforcement, utilities, and city services in pandemic planning; 

• identifying key spokespersons for the community, ensuring that they are educated in risk communications, and 

having coordinated crisis communications plans; 

• establishing State and community-based stockpiles and distribution systems; and 

• providing public education campaigns on pandemic influenza. 

2.5.3 Private Sector 

The impact of all disasters is generally felt most severely at the local level. Private sector businesses should familiarize 

themselves with the various pandemic containment and response options including social distancing, quarantine laws, and 

movement restrictions, in the jurisdictions where they operate. Business planners should also assess the diverse national 

and international legal and regulatory authorities, issues, and restraints that could affect their business, supply chain, 

transportation of goods and services, priority for municipal services, and workplace safety issues. Additionally, planners 

should fully assess the risks, impacts, and implications of pandemic-related disruptions to international production, supply 

8 
chain, and goods and personnel movement. The majority 

of U.S. businesses rely on a global network of essential 

material and support functions. Disruptions in international 

trade could result in cascading impacts across U.S. private 

sector businesses even before pandemic disease outbreaks 

reach the United States. 

Much as they did in the months leading up to Y2K, Federal 

and State government agencies will address possible 

temporary regulatory relief strategies to help businesses 

stay afloat during the pandemic. DHS is committed 

to reviewing legal authorities and their effects on business during a pandemic and pledges to coordinate with public 

and private partners to examine the efficacy of enacting emergency powers or suspending statutory frameworks and 

regulations. 

DHS, in concert with the Federal CI/KR Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs), will help coordinate Federal, State, local, 

and tribal requirements (legislative, regulatory, resource, and financial) to address critical infrastructure systems and 

operations requirements at each phase of the pandemic. For its part, the private sector has a significant role to play, as 

outlined in the Strategy, including: 

• establishing a process for infection control in the workplace, including options for working offsite while ill, 

systems to reduce infection transmission, and worker education; 

• establishing internal surveillance protocols to monitor the health of workers and business stakeholders and to keep 

State and local public health offi cials informed; 

• developing pandemic specific continuity of operations plans to maintain delivery of essential goods and services 

despite significant and sustained worker absenteeism; 

• monitoring regional/national/international pandemic threat levels for trigger-point changes that will affect the 

business; 

• coordinating with government officials and community stakeholders to share planning, preparedness, response, 

and recovery information; and 

• establishing partnerships with other members of the sector to provide mutual support and maintenance of essential 

services during a pandemic. 

1 Department of Health and Human Services News Release, “Federal Government Begins Pandemic Planning with States,” 5 December 2005, 

www.hhs.gov/news/press/2005pres/20051205.html 

2 www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-5.html 

3 www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/#strategy 

9 
Section 3: Pandemic Infl uenza 

Context-Summary 

“Some will say this 

iscussion of the Avian Flu 

s an overreaction. Some may 

ay,‘Did we cry wolf?’ The 

eality is that if the H5N1 

d

i

s

r

virus does not trigger pandemic fl u, there 

will be another virus that will.” 

Secretary Mike Leavitt 

Department of Health and Humans Services 

November 2, 2005 

IN THIS SECTION: Overview • Why is this Important for Business? 

• National Context • International Context 

10 
Flu Terms Defi ned 

Seasonal (or common) fl u is a respiratory 

illness that can be transmitted person to 

person. Most people have some immunity, and 

a vaccine is available. 

Avian (or bird) fl u is caused by influenza 

viruses that occur naturally among wild birds. 

The H5N1 variant is deadly to domestic fowl 

and can be transmitted from birds to humans. 

There is no human immunity and no vaccine is 

available. 

Pandemic fl u is virulent human flu that 

causes a global outbreak, or pandemic, of 

serious illness. Because there is little natural 

immunity, the disease can spread easily 

from person to person. Currently, there is no 

pandemic flu. 

www.pandemicfl u.gov 

11 
Section 3: Pandemic Infl uenza 

Context-Summary 

3.1 Overview 

Understanding the pandemic threat allows business planners to appreciate the context within which they must build their 

pandemic influenza contingency plans. Section 3 summarizes what is important for businesses to know about pandemic 

influenza by highlighting major health planning assumptions, disease containment strategies, and economic implications. 

In the reference CI/KR Guide’s Annex, there is a much more extensive discussion of the pandemic context. 

3.2 Why is this Important for Business? 

Business planners should integrate and network their plans given current facts and insights. Section 5, the COP-E Guide, 

systematically addresses the basic ways and means of accomplishing this integration. For now, assess the summaries 

below and consider integrating them into your own pandemic influenza contingency plan. These summaries may answer 

planning questions such as: 

• How is pandemic influenza different from seasonal influenza? 

• How great a threat does pandemic influenza potentially pose? 

• Will a pandemic influenza vaccine and antiviral drugs be available? 

• What is being done internationally and nationally to contain and eliminate the threat? 

• What are the business implications from the threat and proposed containment strategies? 

3.3 National Context 

Business contingency planners must assess, prioritize, and incorporate specific health impact assumptions, strategies, 

and implications into their pandemic planning process. A pandemic has the potential to be a catastrophic disaster of 

unprecedented scale. The ability to implement effective pandemic preparedness plans, continuously monitor all business 

activities, and effect rapid adjustments based upon observed and anticipated impacts will be the hallmark of the business 

that copes most effectively during a pandemic. 

3.3.1 Health Impact Assumptions 

The Federal government based its pandemic preparedness planning on assumptions from the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention (CDC) regarding the evolution and impacts of a pandemic. Defining the potential magnitude 

of a pandemic is difficult because of the large differences in severity for the three 20th-century pandemics. While the 

1918 pandemic resulted in an estimated 500,000 deaths in the United States, the 1958 pandemic killed approximately 

70,000 Americans and the 1968 pandemic caused an estimated 34,000 U.S. deaths. This difference largely relates to the 

severity of infections and the virulence of the influenza viruses that caused the pandemics. The 20th century pandemics 

also have shared similar characteristics. In each pandemic, about 30 percent of the U.S. population developed illness, 

with about half of those Americans seeking medical care. Children under the age of 18 have tended to have the highest 

rates of illness, though not of severe disease and death. Geographical spread in each pandemic was rapid and virtually all 

communities experienced outbreaks. 

12 
Planning Assumptions for the Implementation Plan4 

Pandemics are unpredictable. While history offers useful benchmarks, there is no way to know the characteristics 

of a pandemic virus before it emerges. Nevertheless, we must make assumptions to facilitate planning efforts. 

Federal planning efforts assume the following: 

1. Susceptibility to the pandemic influenza virus will be universal. 

2. Efficient and sustained person-to-person transmission signals an imminent pandemic. 

3. The clinical disease attack rate will be 30 percent in the overall population during the pandemic. Illness 

rates will be highest among school-aged children (about 40 percent) and decline with age. Among 

working adults, an average of 20 percent will become ill during a community outbreak. 

4. Some persons will become infected but not develop clinically significant symptoms. Asymptomatic or 

minimally symptomatic individuals can transmit infection and develop immunity to subsequent infection. 

5. While the number of patients seeking medical care cannot be predicted with certainty, in previous 

pandemics about half of those who became ill sought care. With the availability of effective antiviral 

drugs for treatment, this proportion may be higher in the next pandemic. 

6. Rates of serious illness, hospitalization, and deaths will depend on the virulence of the pandemic virus and 

differ by an order of magnitude between more and less severe scenarios. Risk groups for severe and fatal 

infection cannot be predicted with certainty but are likely to include infants, the elderly, pregnant women, 

and persons with chronic or immunosuppressive medical conditions. 

7. Rates of absenteeism will depend on the severity of the pandemic. In a severe pandemic, absenteeism 

attributable to illness, the need to care for ill family members, and fear of infection may reach 40 percent 

during the peak weeks of a community outbreak, with lower rates of absenteeism during the weeks before 

and after the peak. Certain public health measures (closing schools, quarantining household contacts of 

infected individuals, “snow days”) are likely to increase rates of absenteeism. 

8. The typical incubation period (interval between infection and onset of symptoms) for infl uenza is 

approximately 2 days. 

9. Persons who become ill may shed virus and can transmit infection for one-half to one day before the onset 

of illness. Viral shedding and the risk of transmission will be greatest during the first 2 days of illness. 

Children will play a major role in transmission of infection as their illness rates are likely to be higher 

because they shed more virus over a longer period of time and they do not control their secretions as well. 

10. On average, infected persons will transmit infection to approximately two other people. 

11. Epidemics will last 6 to 8 weeks in affected communities. 

12. Multiple waves (periods during which community outbreaks occur across the country) of illness are likely 

to occur with each wave lasting 2 to 3 months. Historically, the largest waves have occurred in the fall and 

winter, but the seasonality of a pandemic cannot be predicted with certainty. 

13 
Section 3: Pandemic Infl uenza 

Context-Summary 

3.3.2 Pandemic Disease Containment/Control Strategies 

Specific pandemic protection and response strategies being considered will have varied implications and effi cacy within 

and across CI/KR sectors. All are necessary health strategies to limit social interactions and disease spread; thus reducing 

illness and death and mitigating the direct economic impacts. All also have potentially significant economic side effects 

and social consequences that, when coupled with the health impact assumptions, substantially compound the direct effects 

on all businesses. It is thus imperative for businesses to stay fully informed of government actions to implement disease 

containment strategies and to factor the potential side effects and impacts on their business into their pandemic plan. Key 

disease containment strategies include: 

• Isolation: Separation of persons with specific infectious illnesses in their homes, in hospitals, or in designated 

healthcare facilities. 

• Quarantine: Separation and restriction of the movement, usually of a group of people, who, while not yet ill, 

have potentially been exposed to an infectious agent. 

• Social Distancing: Within the workplace, social distancing measures could take the form of: modifying the 

frequency and type of face-to-face employee encounters (e.g., placing moratoriums on hand-shaking, substituting 

teleconferences for face-to-face meetings, staggering breaks, posting infection control guidelines); establishing 

flexible work hours or worksite, (e.g., telecommuting); promoting social distancing between employees and 

customers to maintain three-feet spatial separation between individuals; and implementing strategies that request 

and enable employees with influenza to stay home at the first sign of symptoms. 

• Closing Places of Assembly: Voluntary or mandatory closure of public places, including churches, schools, and 

theaters. 

• “Snow Days/Weeks” and/or Furloughing Non-Essential Workers: Voluntary or mandatory closure of all nonessential businesses and/or furloughing all non-essential workers. 

• Changes in Movement Patterns: Restricting movement at the border, instituting reductions in the transportation 

sector, and applying quarantine protocols. 

3.3.3 Societal and Economic Planning Implications 

The specific implications for each business’ operations from the direct health impacts combined with the proposed disease 

containment strategies should be identified, assessed, and incorporated into the business’ pandemic plan, implications such 

as: 

• Dramatic worker absenteeism (40 percent or more) will occur at all levels due to illness, family member care, 

death, childcare, and “worried well” (otherwise healthy people who avoid the workplace for fear of exposure). 

• Pandemic disease spread will be rapid and unpredictable, likely precluding shifting personnel, resources, and 

emergency operations centers to “safe” areas. 

• Movement restrictions and/or quarantines will disrupt the supply chains and municipal services. 

• Social distancing requirements will affect business operations, especially when public contact is unavoidable (e.g., 

retail food) or workers share a common workspace (e.g., plants). 

14 
• Business closures and furloughs for prolonged periods may cause extensive financial harm or even ruin, 

increasing demand for social and welfare support. 

• Lost income and competition for remaining skilled workers and scarce supplies and materials will dramatically 

affect business response and recovery. 

• Reduced worker availability among first responders may result in greater risk of social and security disruptions. 

• Disruptions and failures at essential businesses will cause localized economic and social challenges and may 

affect other businesses in the sector, region, and, perhaps, the nation. 

“The (1918 Spanish Influenza) epidemic killed, at a very, very conservative estimate, 

550,000 Americans in 10 months; that’s more Americans than died in combat in all 

the wars of this century...”

 Alfred W. Crosby

 Influenza 1918,The American Experience 

3.4 International Context 

By definition, a “pandemic” is a disease epidemic spread over a wide geographic area and affecting a large proportion of 

the population. In the case of the three 20th Century influenza pandemics, they have been of varying severity but all were 

global events.5

 Given the international context, President Bush announced the International Partnership on Avian and 

Pandemic Influenza6

 in September 2005. This global surveillance and preparedness network will help detect and respond 

quickly to any disease outbreaks. 

This Partnership will help us improve international surveillance, transparency, timeliness, and response capabilities. The 

U.S. Government (USG) will utilize the full expertise of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and HHS/ 

CDC to aid the World Health Organization (WHO) and our partner countries in managing and containing the pandemic 

threat. The Partnership requires countries facing an outbreak to immediately share information and provide samples to 

the WHO. Already, 88 countries and nine international organizations joined the initial effort. In the past year, the United 

States has already spent $25 million to control the spread of avian influenza in Southeast Asia, and has provided more than 

$13 million in technical assistance and pandemic preparedness grants. 

Meanwhile the WHO has developed its own comprehensive Global Preparedness Plan,

7

 which assists WHO Member 

States (including the United States) and those responsible for public health, medical, and emergency preparedness to 

respond to pandemic influenza-related threats. The WHO has defined the phases of increasing public health risk associated 

with the emergence of a new influenza virus, recommended actions for national authorities, and outlined the measures it 

will take during each phase. 

In 2005, the WHO redefined the six phases of a pandemic to provide guidance to the international community and to 

national governments on preparedness and response for pandemic threats. The WHO matrix has specific alert periods 

based on the evolving phases of the disease (Figure B). 

For national governments, there are numerous implications each time the WHO declares a pandemic change to Phases 4, 

5, or 6 in an affected country. For instance, when the WHO raises the pandemic alert to Phase 5, affected countries are 

directed to implement realtime monitoring of essential resources, designate special status (i.e., state of emergency) to 

15 
Section 3: Pandemic Infl uenza 

Context-Summary 

affected areas, and commence with triage arrangement for efficient use of healthcare facilities.8 Private sector businesses, 

especially those with international operations, should learn the quarantine laws and containment policies of the countries 

where they have satellite offi ces. 

3.5 U.S. National Alert Stages 

The USG Implementation Plan details a 

U.S.-specific, yet complementary, matrix for 

Federal Government Response Stages (see 

Figure B, next page) for pandemic alerts 

focused on the domestic situation and our 

nation’s interests. For the United States, the 

HHS Secretary recommends to the President 

the specific U.S. pandemic response stage in 

coordination with the global alert phase. In 

practice, the severity, speed, and reach of a 

pandemic may blur the distinction between the 

various alert phases, underscoring the need for 

flexibility from all partners. 

The implications for business are diverse 

and significant. Businesses should develop 

plans and internal trigger points for their 

pandemic response actions based on the 

alert phase changes. They should closely monitor international and national developments to determine when to activate 

these triggers. Sections 4 and 5 of this Guide address specific business impacts relating to changes in the WHO/USG 

phases. For instance, if there is sustained human-to-human disease transmission and the WHO/USG declares a Phase 6, 

governments will rapidly increase their disease surveillance and containment strategies at borders and ports, which will 

likely slow the delivery of goods and limit international business travel. For a list of HHS recommendations and potential 

actions when the WHO declares a new pandemic phase, see www.hhs.gov/pandemicfl u/plan/part1.html#5. For business 

travel updates from the CDC, see www.cdc.gov/travel. For State Department-issued travel restrictions, see www.state. 

gov/travelandbusiness. 

16 
17 

4 www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/pandplan.html 

5 http://pandemicflu.gov 

6 www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53865.htm 

7 www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/WHO_CDS_CSR_GIP_2005_5.pdf 

8 www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/GIP_2005_5Eweb.pdf 

WHO Phases Federal Government Response Stages 

INTER-PANDEMIC PERIOD 

No new influenza virus subtypes have been 

1 

detected in humans. An influenza virus subtype 

that has caused a human infection may be present 

in animals. If present in animals, the risk of 

human disease is considered to be low. 0 New domestic animal outbreak in 

at-risk country 

No new influenza virus subtypes have been 

2 detected in humans. However, a circulating 

animal influenza subtype poses a substantial risk 

of human disease. 

PANDEMIC ALERT PERIOD 

3 

Human infection(s) with a new subtype, but no 

human-to-human spread, or at most rare instances 

of spread to a close contact. 

0 New domestic animal outbreak in 

at-risk country 

1 Suspected human outbreak overseas 

4 

Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human 

transmission but spread is highly localized, 

suggesting that the virus is not well adapted to 

humans. 

2 Confirmed human outbreak overseas Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still 

localized, suggesting that the virus is becoming 

5 increasingly better adapted to humans, but may 

not yet be fully transmissible (substantial 

pandemic risk). 

Figure B 

PANDEMIC PERIOD 

6 Pandemic phase: increased and sustained 

transmission in general population. 

3 Widespread human outbreaks in 

multiple locations overseas 

4 First human case in North America 

5 Spread throughout United States 

6 Recovery and preparation for 

subsequent waves 
Section 4: Pandemic Implications 

for Businesses 

“We don’t know the timing of the 

next pandemic, how severe it will 

be.We don’t know what drugs will 

work.We don’t have a vaccine.Yet 

we are telling everyone to prepare 

for a pandemic. It’s tricky...This is scary and we 

don’t know...That’s the message.” 

Dick Thompson 

World Health Organization 

December 2005 

IN THIS SECTION: Overview of Business “Continuity of Operations Plan-Essential (COP-E)” 

• Defi ning “Essential” • Pandemic Planning Assumptions and Impacts • Health Assumptions 

• Disease Mitigation Strategies • Business Impacts • State, Local, and Tribal • Private Sector Business 

Impacts and Implications 

18 
19 
Section 4: Pandemic Implications 

for Businesses 

4.1 Overview of Business 

Continuity of Operations PlanEssential (COP-E) 

A pandemic influenza threatens to disrupt the essential 

services and operations within and across our nation’s 17 

CI/KR sectors and our national security and economic and 

social stability. America’s healthcare sector is planning 

for every conceivable contingency to protect our nation. 

However, if national disease containment strategies fail, 

businesses and individuals will find themselves thrust to 

the frontlines in this public health battle. The potentially 

catastrophic impacts demand a new, tailored, business 

contingency plan and preparedness effort. 

Most large businesses have extensive contingency plans 

on hand for managing natural and man-made disasters.9 

However, the majority of these business continuity plans 

do not fully account for the significant negative impacts 

resulting from a severe pandemic influenza. 

Pandemic preparedness must involve all types and sizes 

of businesses. Moreover, it demands a shift in business 

continuity planning from one that anticipates a short-term, 

near-normal condition, to one that prepares for extreme 

long-term, catastrophic contingencies. In the event of 

a pandemic, the private sector must cope to sustain the 

nation’s essential security, as well as its economic and 

social stability. To do this, the private sector must maintain 

production of essential goods and services while mitigating 

the pandemic impact on operations. COP-E planning 

assumes pandemic-specific impacts and encourages 

business contingency planners to identify truly essential 

functions, people, and materials within and across critical 

sectors. COP-E also proposes alternative methods tailored 

to each pandemic phase from preparation to recovery. 

4.2 Defi ning “Essential” 

Traditional business contingency planning requires 

identifying essential functions and people. In light of a 

pandemic, private sector businesses should refi ne their 

definition of essential if they are to continue to provide 

critical goods and services. The definition should also 

address the essential delivery of goods and services as 

these contribute to the continuity of operations for their 

community and nation. For all businesses, defi ning what 

is and is not essential requires applying diverse lenses and 

filters at each step. We will discuss assessing essential with 

examples of these planning filters in Section 5. Official 

USG definitions from the National Strategy for Pandemic 

Influenza Implementation Plan (www.pandemicflu.gov) 

include: 

Critical infrastructure: Systems and assets, whether 

physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the 

incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets 

would have a debilitating impact on security, national 

economic security, national public health or safety, or any 

combination of those matters. 

Essential functions: Functions that are absolutely 

necessary to keep a business operating during an influenza 

pandemic, and critical to survival and recovery. 

4.3 Pandemic Planning 

Assumptions and Impacts 

Business contingency planners should have something 

measurable upon which to base their planning, and 

something tangible from which to extrapolate their 

specific impacts and implications. The assumptions and 

implications discussed in Section 3 and Annex 7.2 of 

the reference Guide provide the context for this process. 

Planners should tailor these to their business. 

4.3.1 Health Assumptions 

Section 3 presented the significant health risks and 

assumptions guiding the nation’s planners as they 

anticipate a pandemic. Business contingency planners 

should assess carefully each of these 12 assumptions and 

consider possible second and third order assumptions. 

4.3.2 Disease Mitigation 

Strategies 

The disease mitigation strategies discussed in Section 

3 and Annex 7.2 of the reference Guide, underpin all 

pandemic planning efforts. The public health and social 

distancing strategies will ultimately contain the disease 

and will reduce the risk of infection and loss of life, but 

they also will have significant operational side effects for 

private sector businesses that must be carefully managed. 

20 
4.3.3 Business Impacts 

Businesses should examine each impact and assumption in 

the context of its operational environment. This Guide will 

provide your business contingency planners with the basic 

assumptions and strategies assumed for a severe pandemic 

at a time when the nation is in full response mode. 

Workforce Absenteeism: Whether the actual workforce absenteeism number is 30 or 40 percent during a severe 

pandemic wave, this is your “best case” for planning purposes. To complicate matters, the disease may appear randomly 

among employees striking anywhere from the CEO to the front-line worker. Adding significantly to the total number or 

workers absent will be those dual-income and single-parent families required to care for children at home when schools 

are closed for extended periods. 

CONSIDER 

How will businesses: 

!

•	 Maintain essential operations and services if 

40 percent or more of all workers are out sick 

or choose to stay home to avoid exposure? 

•	 Maintain essential operations and services 

when well workers choose, or are forced, to 

stay home? 

•	 Maintain essential operations and services 

when community outbreaks last six to eight 

weeks and multiple waves strike in a calendar 

year? 

•	 Bolster the depth of reserves for essential 

workers at all levels? 

•	 Ensure family and childcare support for 

essential workers? 

•	 Provide delegations of authority and orders 

of succession for workers? 

! Note: The “Consider” questions are intended to assist 

planners in identifying issues to be considered during 

the planning process, they will each be addressed in more 

detail in Section 5 “Actions,” in the CI/KR Guide Annex, and 

additional guidance is available in the planning sections at 

www.pandemicflu.gov. 

Geographic Dispersion and Rapid Spread: Should 

human-to-human transmission occur, and should 

international containment efforts not succeed, the 

geographic dispersion will be rapid and global. 

Initial outbreaks may be in Asia, Europe, or even the 

United States, as happened in 1918.10 As noted in the 

Implementation Plan for the National Strategy, if 

international containment fails: 

Unlike geographically and temporally bounded disasters, 

a pandemic will spread across the globe over the course 

of months or over a year, possibly in waves, and will affect 

communities of all sizes and compositions. In terms of 

its scope, the impact of a severe pandemic may be more 

comparable to that of war or a widespread economic crisis 

than a hurricane, earthquake, or act of terrorism.11 

Given a pandemic’s global reach, typical disaster response 

mechanisms and methods (i.e., shifting available resources 

from affected areas to safe areas) may prove untenable 

because there will be few, if any, available resources to 

shift and few, if any, safe areas. Consequently, typical 

contingency planning that calls for the geographic 

shifting of reserves of essential personnel and materials 

from affected to safe areas may be impractical if, not 

impossible. 

21 
Section 4: Pandemic Implications 

for Businesses 

! CONSIDER


How will businesses: 

•	 Maintain essential operations and services 

when necessary resources are not available? 

•	 Ensure sufficient essential resources are 

available at each worksite? 

•	 Ensure that their planning takes into account 

the people and businesses that depend on 

them for supplies and services? 

•	 Afford to cross-train nonessential personnel 

for essential functions? 

•	 Afford to stockpile adequate levels of 

essential reserve materials? 

Time Duration and “Waves”: A pandemic “wave” may 

linger in a community for six to eight weeks. There will 

be fundamentally greater negative impacts on individuals, 

businesses, and the nation from the compounding effects 

of the disease impacts and disease mitigation strategies 

applied over a much greater duration than other typical 

disaster scenarios. In their revised contingency planning, 

businesses must account for these effects caused by a 

pandemic’s unprecedented duration. 

CONSIDER 

How will businesses: 

!

•	 Ensure essential functions over a six-to- 


eight-week pandemic wave? 


•	 Ensure recovery from a first wave, while 


preparing for possible subsequent waves 


over the course of a calendar year? 


•	 Define breaking points when a portion or 


all basic and essential business functions 


begin to fail?


Mobility and Travel: Once human-to-human outbreaks 

appear, the numbers of national and international transit 

restrictions and closings will grow dramatically. 

For U.S. businesses with international offi ces, production 

plants, and other interests, the implications are obvious and 

immediate. At a minimum, all businesses must assess their 

current contingency planning to determine the level of risk 

based upon the potential for substantial movement and 

border restrictions. 

! CONSIDER 

How will businesses: 

• Ensure continuity despite significant delays 

in, and restrictions on, moving personnel and 

materials? 

• Withstand a lengthy quarantine for all 

traveling personnel? 

• Ensure continuity of overseas operations 

if U.S. personnel abroad return to protect their 

families and/or seek better healthcare? 

Supply Chain and Delivery Networks: For domestic 

U.S.-based businesses and most small businesses, the 

impacts from international and national restrictions may 

not be readily apparent. However, given the increasingly 

interconnected global economy, movement restrictions 

affecting raw materials, manufacturers, wholesalers, 

consolidators, and retailers will have immediate negative 

outcomes. As noted in the Implementation Plan for the 

National Strategy: 

Planning efforts need to assess systemic effects (i.e., 

supply chain impact, just-in-time delivery, warehousing, 

22 
and logistics) and support the development of contingency 

plans to address lack of critical services and delivery 

of essential commodities, such as chlorine for water 

purification, gasoline, food, and medical supplies.12 

More and more, businesses rely on the just-in-time 

delivery of materials, goods, and services to maintain their 

economic livelihood. To survive economically, businesses 

must deliver their finished goods and services to other 

business and customers. 

For essential goods and material, businesses must 

completely explore their supply chain relationships, 

beginning with their internal storage areas and tracking 

along the branches of their supply chain network back 

to the source of the materials. A key component while 

exploring the supply chain will be assessing the business’ 

essential supply chain partners to ensure they, too, are 

adequately planning and preparing for a pandemic. For the 

business to be successful, all members of their network 

CONSIDER 

How will businesses: 

!

•	 Ensure continuity when worker absenteeism 

and movement restrictions delay or stop their 

supply and delivery chains? 

•	 Ensure adequate visibility of their entire 

essential supply and delivery chain in 

order to uncover potential impacts on secondand third-order manufacturers and suppliers? 

•	 Define the breaking points when movement 

restrictions affect a portion or all of the 

functions of a business? 

•	 Ensure all essential business partners in the 

supply chain are equally well prepared for a 

pandemic? 

must be equally well prepared. 

Healthcare Delivery and Public Health: Medical science 

will ultimately solve the pandemic riddle. However, will 

anti-viral medications and vaccines be suffi ciently timely 

to save us from the initial shock? As discussed in Section 

3, most medical experts believe the answer is “no.” As 

noted by CDC: 

Currently, there is no vaccine to protect people from 

pandemic infl uenza. A vaccine probably would not be 

available in the early stages of a pandemic... Once a 

potential pandemic strain of influenza virus is identified, 

it will take [six to nine] months before a vaccine will be 

widely available.13 

What effect will this have on workers and businesses and 

their pandemic planning and preparedness? What will 

be the impacts and implications of few, if any, targeted 

prophylaxis or treatment regimes being available for the 

first pandemic wave? What will be the business impacts 

when the healthcare delivery and public health systems 

are overwhelmed? One obvious inference: everyone is 

susceptible. Therefore, without vaccine and antiviral 

protection, effective worker, worker family, and workplace 

protection strategies and protocols become a necessity for 

survival. 

23 
Section 4: Pandemic Implications 

for Businesses 

An estimated 50 percent of those who get the fl u may 

require medical intervention, and the burgeoning throng of 

patients and “worried well” may overwhelm our healthcare 

delivery system. Similarly, the radically increased demand 

will overwhelm local public health systems that currently 

have insufficient surge resources. One of the basic business 

and community health strategies for infl uenza involves 

sending workers home at the first sign of infection. 

However, as the CDC observes, “Persons who become ill 

may shed virus and can transmit infection for one-half to 

one day before the onset of illness. Viral shedding and the 

risk for transmission will be greatest during the fi rst two 

days of illness.”14 

Specific options for businesses to consider to ease the 

demand on the healthcare system include: 

• Coordinate with local public health and 

healthcare delivery teams to share information 

on capabilities, options, and preparedness and 

response plans. 

• Maximize the effectiveness of worker, family, and 

worksite pandemic protection strategies to reduce 

the numbers requiring medical attention. 

• Use effective risk management communications 

to validate the business as a reliable source for 

pandemic updates and worker health monitoring. 

• For larger businesses with health and medical 

staffs, consider establishing an internal pandemic 

response capability to serve as an alternate 

healthcare triage site and a dispensing site for 

vaccine and antiviral drugs. 

• For smaller businesses, consider coordinating with 

other businesses with internal medical support to 

establish a shared alternate healthcare delivery 

site. 

! CONSIDER 

How will businesses: 

Ensure the healthcare and public health 

support for workers and their families? 

Know when their workers and their families 

have contracted the virus? 

Know how to protect their employees and 

families when seemingly healthy individuals 

are spreading the disease? 

Protect workers from others who, while 

infected, do not yet feel ill or exhibit any 

symptoms? 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Stay Healthy 

Take common-sense steps to limit the spread of germs. 

Make good hygiene a habit. 

•	 Wash hands frequently with soap and water. 

•	 Cover your mouth and nose with a tissue when 

you cough or sneeze. 

•	 Put used tissues in a waste basket. 

•	 Cough or sneeze into your upper sleeve if you 

don’t have a tissue. 

•	 Clean your hands after coughing or sneezing. Use 

soap and water or an alcohol-based hand cleaner. 

•	 Stay at home if you are sick. 

Source: www.pandemicfl u.gov


For additional information, see www.cdc.gov/fl u/


protect/stopgerms.htm


24 
National Economic Disruption: Consumer and business 

spending fuel the nation’s economic engine. Regardless 

of the available liquidity and supporting financial 

processes, a dramatic and extended reduction in spending 

and the corresponding cascading effects in the private 

sector may cause an unprecedented national economic 

disruption. To ensure their own business’ survival and 

diminish the effects on the national economy, private 

sector planners must pay equal attention to actions they 

may categorize as essential in terms of their business’ 

continuity of operations and in terms of their relationship 

to the continuity of operations of the nation’s critical 

infrastructure and economy. 

FAST FACT 

According to the Congressional 

Budget Offi ce, a severe pandemic 

might cost the U.S. economy more than 

$600 billion, or about 5 percent of the 

Gross Domestic Product. 

CONSIDER 

How will businesses: 

!

•	 Ensure their economic viability at each phase 

of the pandemic? 

•	 Prepare and respond when other businesses 

around them are failing? 

Security Risks and Social Stability: Shortages of 

and disruptions to basic commodities and municipal 

infrastructure may cause localized security challenges for 

businesses and communities. Business planners should 

assume some level of social disruption and plan for direct 

security risks to their operations and along their supply 

chain. Effective coordination with public safety officials 

will facilitate the integration of essential businesses in

!

to all 

community emergency operations plans. 

CONSIDER 

How will businesses: 

•	 Ensure the security of their workers and 

families at work and home? 

•	 Ensure the security of their workplace 

operations and supplies? 

•	 Ensure the security up and down their supply 

and delivery chains? 

25 

9 Deloitte Center for Health Solutions, “Business Preparations for Pandemic Flu,” 2006 

10 Barry, John M., “The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History,” February 2005 

11 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan, page 1, May 2006, www.pandemicflu.gov 

12 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan, page 79, May 2006, www.pandemicflu.gov 

13 U.S. Centers for Disease Control, “Pandemic Influenza, Q&A,” December 2005, CDC Web site www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic/qanda.htm 

14 Health and Human Services, Pandemic Influenza Plan, “Part 1, Strategic Plan,” November 2005, HHS Web site www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/ 

part1.html 
“If a pandemic hits our shores, 

it will affect almost every sector 

of our society, not just health 

care, but transportation systems, 

workplaces, schools, public 

safety and more. It will require 

a coordinated government-wide 

response, including Federal, State 

and local governments, and it will 

require the private sector and all 

of us as individuals to be ready.” 

Secretary Mike Leavitt 

Department of Health and Humans Services15 

Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

IN THIS SECTION: Develop and Implement a Pandemic Continuity of Operations Plan 

• How Does COP-E Fit with Current Contingency Plans? • Why COP-E is Important to the Private Sector 

• The COP-E Planning Process • COP-E Scenario-Driven Pandemic Planning • COP-E Phases: Planning, 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery 

26 
27 
Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

5.1 Develop and Implement a Pandemic Continuity of 

Operations Plan 

Disaster planning and preparedness is a fundamental requirement of good business practice. All organizations must 

ensure the capability exists to continue essential operations in response to potential operational interruptions, including 

a pandemic influenza.16 This is perhaps more simply said than done in the case of a severe pandemic. The compounded 

effects of health impact assumptions, proposed disease mitigation strategies, extended duration, and resultant implications 

for all businesses place a severe pandemic at the extreme on a disaster continuum. Pandemic influenza has the potential 

for causing levels of global illness, death, economic disruption, and social disturbance like no other. But will a pandemic 

occur and how severe will it actually prove to be? We simply do not know. 

“Planning for and maintaining essential critical infrastructure operations during an 

influenza pandemic requires an emphasis on the ‘well/not yet sick’—the 60 percent 

of the population that will be available to operate and sustain critical process and 

systems operations.”

 James Caverly

 Director, Infrastructure Partnerships Division, DHS 

When you do not know all the variables, but the risk is extreme, the lesson becomes: Plan for it all. Business continuity 

plans have integrated most of the known disaster scenarios, but until recently have generally not included a pandemic 

influenza. This Pandemic Guide recommends an exhaustive review of all existing continuity of operations plans to update 

and address the specific impacts and implications for pandemic influenza, including updates to address the extreme case, 

called a Continuity of Operations Plan-Essential (COP-E). 

28 
5.2 How Does COP-E Fit with Current Contingency Plans? 

COP-E is an extension and refinement of current business contingency and continuity of operations planning that fully 

exploits existing efforts and integrates within the suite of business disaster plans. The COP-E process assumes severe 

pandemic-specific impacts to enhance and compliment existing business continuity plans. In addition, COP-E integrates 

the additional actions needed to identify and prioritize essential functions, people, and material within the business, across 

business sectors, and as important for the community and the nation. It highlights actions and options to protect and 

sustain these at each pandemic phase from preparation to recovery. In addition, COP-E incorporates a measured approach 

for “survival” under distinct COP-E scenarios, and serves a broader mission as an enhancement process for business 

continuity planning to address other catastrophic disasters like an extreme biological, chemical or radiological attack. 

Each COP-E scenario will be highlighted in the following sections. 

DISASTER PLANNING CONTINUUM 

Normal 

Operations 

Basic Contingency Plans 

Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) 

Continuity of Operations Plan - Essential (COP-E) Pandemic Influenza, Massive 

Bio, Chemical or Radiological 

Event, Category 5 Hurricane, 

8.0 Earthquake 

Major Hurricane, Earthquake or 

Flood, Localized Terrorist 

Conventional or Bio-attack 

Localized Power Outage, Plant 

Fire, IT Failure 

 Increasing Impacts on CI/KR Businesses and National Economy and Social Stability 

Disaster Severity 

5.2.1 Business Contingency Plan Suite 

• Basic Contingency Planning: To some degree, all business types and sizes should already have contingency plans 

to prepare for and respond to business disruptions, such as localized power outages, snow storms, plant fi res, IT 

failures, and myriad other possibilities. 

• Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP): Many businesses, particularly large ones, produce formal business 

continuity plans to address potentially significant business disruptions based on an assessment of their 

29 
Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

vulnerability, location, and other risk factors. These business continuity plans typically include actions for likely 

hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and even localized terrorist events. 

• COP-E: COP-E planning assumes a major disaster of national significance like a pandemic cascades into a 

national and international catastrophe. It assumes planning for degrees of “essential” operational requirements 

based upon a dramatically worsening situation and the need to sustain not only the business, but also the 

community and the nation. Thus, the scale and scope of the impacts and possible outcomes demands a dedicated 

level of effort, investment, and planning beyond typical business continuity planning. COP-E expands initial 

business continuity plans to create an agile, actionable plan for responding and recovering from a potential 

catastrophic failure on a national or international scale. COP-E planning exploits three “worsening” scenarios of 

assumptions and actions to support specific local and national outcomes, which are all outlined in Section 5.5. 

5.3 Why COP-E is Important to the Private Sector 

Typical business continuity plans have not integrated the unique impacts and implications for pandemic influenza on a 

national or international scale. While simply adapting current business continuity plans to contain pandemic influenza 

impacts will certainly improve a business’ opportunity for success, it may not provide sufficient planning granularity or 

response flexibility for a catastrophic disaster. 

COP-E processes integrate a range of “worsening” scenarios intended to facilitate an exhaustive examination of impacts 

and compounding effects as they rapidly evolve and influence response and recovery. COP-E scenarios provide business 

planners a broad yet detailed perspective within which to develop graduated response and recovery actions. COP-E assists 

planners in prioritizing their actions and costs in a measured fashion, and it prepares them for the rapid adjustments 

necessary as pandemic impacts evolve. 

COP-E is not prescriptive. COP-E scenarios are not nationally defined or formally directed as with the DHS color-coded 

Threat Advisory. They are planning tools to assist CI/KR sectors and private sector businesses tailor their continuity 

planning toward more extreme possibilities. The scenarios describe evolving national and regional conditions but must 

be customized and assessed in the context of the local business’ environment. The same type and size businesses in a 

particular region or community may well be experiencing the impacts of a different COP-E scenario at the same time. 

Planners should be sure to emphasize the business, worker and family care, and the national/regional/local community 

objectives when they build their pandemic COP-E plans. COP-E builds upon and complements basic business continuity 

planning. COP-E planning keeps businesses from becoming too comfortable with their current contingency plans. The 

scenario and action “what ifs” allow planners to assess possible impacts and responses. It also shows planners how to 

build flexible plans capable of rapidly adjusting to a graduated response. 

How is “catastrophic” different than all other major disasters? There are fundamental differences in all respects between 

disasters that impact a business, a group of businesses or even businesses across a region, and a disaster that involves 

all businesses to varying degrees across a nation and the world. As evidenced with major natural disasters including, 

Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, and the tsunami in Southeast Asia in 2004, a natural disaster can quickly evolve from a 

local or regional event into a national or international tragedy in a matter of hours or minutes. These devastating major 

natural disasters demand planning and response capabilities far beyond most natural disasters. While these major disasters 

affected businesses well beyond their impact zone, their impacts still pale to the potential catastrophic effects from a 

major terrorist event with weapons of mass destruction or a pandemic influenza. There is a fundamental difference in the 

preparation, complexity, quality of effort, and scope of catastrophic disaster as opposed to a major natural disaster. For 

a catastrophic disaster, the CI/KR business not only must strive to sustain itself, but as impacts worsen it may be called 

upon to adjust and consolidate its typical essential processes so that it may survive as an economic entity. Yet, through 

good planning and an agile response, it will adapt and cope sufficiently to continue providing the most essential goods and 

services necessary to sustain the community and the nation. 

30 
5.4 The COP-E Planning Process 

The WHO Pandemic Alert Phases, the USG Federal Government Response Stages, and the pandemic scenarios set the 

context for COP-E planning. Within this context, the three COP-E business scenarios and planning actions across the 

pandemic disaster phases serve as the planner’s basic tools to expand and refine the planning effort for a catastrophic 

disaster. 

• WHO/USG Phases/Stages: The Alert and Response Phases/Stages are the real-world touchstone and provide the 

working context for businesses. Continuously monitoring these and managing trigger points for changes in their 

planning strategies for preparedness, response, and recovery will be keys to ensuring success. 

• Pandemic Scenarios: The Appendix to the reference Guide provides planners with pandemic scenarios that 

highlight an assumed but realistic regional, national, and international context within which to envision their 

business and the impacts on its operations. 

• COP-E Business Scenarios: The three COP-E planning scenarios outlined in Section 5.5 take the planner’s 

perspective down from the 50,000-foot national level to the operational level in an effort to refine and prioritize 

business processes across worsening situations and constrained goals. To ensure a comprehensive yet flexible 

plan, planners should assess and implement actions based upon the changes in COP-E scenarios and potential 

implications for both business operations and goals. 

• COP-E Actions and Disaster Phases: Within the real-world context of the Alert Phases and assumed context 

of the pandemic and COP-E business scenarios, the actions, issues for consideration, and supporting actions are 

assessed across the disaster phases. Examining these actions within an evolving context aids in a comprehensive 

review focused on resolving diverse business challenges. 

5.5 COP-E Scenario-Driven Pandemic Planning 

“Scenario-driven” planning is an important tool for enhancing the disaster planning process. It involves envisioning and 

exercising business plans and operations within assumed circumstances that represent a real-world disaster situation. 

Many businesses, particularly large ones, utilize scenario-driven planning to produce formal continuity of operations 

plans for all known significant business disruptions. Depending on the geographic location, these businesses formulate 

continuity plans for risks from major hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and localized terrorist events. A similar process 

should be employed for pandemic planning. A severe pandemic influenza scenario assumes a typically localized major 

disaster of national significance cascades into a potentially catastrophic national and international incident. The scale and 

scope of the impacts and possible outcomes from a pandemic demand a dedicated level of effort, investment, and planning 

beyond most existing business continuity planning. 

This Guide provides two support tools to assist businesses in developing their pandemic scenarios. First, the Section 9 

Appendix to the reference Guide offers two pandemic scenario examples and reference links to others. These scenarios 

describe an international and national operational context that evolves over time. These scenarios describe an external 

context, but don’t address business particulars. Second, three examples of business specific impacts that can refi ne the 

external scenario context are listed below. These three examples of “worsening” business scenarios address pandemic 

assumptions and business implications to support both local and national essential outcomes. Planners should assess their 

planning actions within the context described by the national pandemic scenario for each COP-E business scenario, and 

then compare back and across COP-E scenarios to identify specific changes in trigger and breaking points, priorities, 

costs, and possible confl icting actions. 

31 
Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

5.5.1 COP-E Scenario One 

Scenario One assumes a pandemic disaster of national significance affecting businesses for an extended period. Planners 

assume a significant degradation in normal business operations over an extended period of time and substantial economic 

loss. However, by reprioritizing and rapidly shifting efforts internally to sustain essential and critical functions, the 

disruptions can be contained and hopefully not result in business failure. The specific assumptions for Scenario One 

are: 

•	 Worker absenteeism reduces the number of available workers by 30-40 percent during the peak weeks of the 

pandemic wave. 

•	 Transportation restrictions and disruptions substantially slow the movement of essential supplies to their business 

and end-user customers. 

•	 Voluntary and directed closures of select schools occur in most communities and regions with disease outbreaks. 

•	 Social distancing strategies negatively affect production efficiency, adding to the overall cost of producing goods 

and services and affect workforce morale. 

•	 Businesses with direct public interface experience a precipitous decline in the numbers of customers purchasing 

goods and services through personal contact, while businesses with online/telephone ordering capabilities see 

sharp increases. 

•	 Banks and financial institutions reduce direct contact with customers. Electronic transfers, ATM machines, and 

drive-up tellers are the financial options of choice. 

•	 Basic commodity availability and municipal infrastructure are sustained with some reduced food options and 

delays in service and maintenance to routine local utility disruptions. 

•	 Patients inundate healthcare facilities, as well as emergency and social services. Most elective procedures and 

routine doctor visits are deferred. Federal and State governments mobilize all healthcare reserve forces. 

5.5.2 COP-E Scenario Two 

Scenario Two assumes a pandemic disaster of national significance that catastrophically affects businesses directly 

or indirectly for an extended period. Planners assume a near total loss in normal business operations and significant 

economic impacts. The priority for action shifts entirely to sustaining truly essential functions to preserving and 

recovering the business over time and ensuring continuous provision of essential functions, goods, and services. If the 

business fails, the likelihood increases dramatically for cascading effects affecting other businesses and the community. 

The specific assumptions for Scenario Two are: 

•	 Worker absenteeism stands at 40 percent during the peak weeks of the pandemic wave; however, those out sick 

include many more key essential senior and line management, technical staff, and workers of all types. 

•	 Border restrictions and transportation disruptions significantly delay or halt the movement of all basic and most 

essential supplies to their business and end-user customers, especially where movements cross international and 

national borders. 

•	 Social distancing combined with Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) use increases negative impacts on 

production efficiency and capability. This causes reductions or stoppages in the production of non-essential goods 

and services, and adds considerably to the overall cost of producing essential goods and services. 

32 
•	 Voluntary and directed closures of places of assembly and schools in nearly all communities (with and without 

confirmed outbreaks) send many service workers and nearly all children home. 

•	 Fear, social distancing, and lost income for one or more family providers significantly increase impacts on workers 

and their family’s morale. 

•	 Businesses with essential direct public/customer interface maintain very limited and controlled numbers of 

customers purchasing their goods and services through personal contact by enacting strict social distancing work 

practices and other protection measures for both workers and customers. 

•	 Financial markets, the banking industry, and basic market liquidity is sustained although small business closures 

and failures mount and certain large businesses have announced long-term reductions and even possible failures. 

•	 Basic commodity availability and municipal infrastructure is sustained but with considerable reduction in available 

fuel and food types and accessibility options, along with expanded localized disruptions in electrical supply and 

potable water. 

•	 Localized economic and social disruptions have increased, requiring state and regional augmentation for public 

safety and security forces. 

5.5.3 COP-E Scenario Three 

Scenario Three assumes a pandemic disaster of national significance that catastrophically affects businesses directly or 

indirectly for an extended period. Without government or private sector support, planners assume a business’ impending 

failure. Its failure greatly increases the potential for cascading negative effects for other businesses and the community. A 

rapid, calculated reprioritization and focus on the business’ remaining capability and capacity must take place to ensure 

minimal preservation of those functions that support essential local, regional, and national functions, goods, and services. 

The specific assumptions for Scenario Three are: 

•	 Worker absenteeism from flu and flu-related impacts, as well as school closures and fear of contact, increases 

reductions in the total number of available workers to at least 50 percent for weeks at a time. Those absent now 

include most essential senior and line management, technical staff, and key workers of all types. 

•	 Personnel and material transportation disruptions delay the movement of all but the most essential supplies to 

businesses and end-user customers. 

•	 Businesses implement voluntary furloughing policies for all non-essential workers, and close all non-essential 

production lines and services. 

•	 Communities request/require all non-essential businesses to implement “snow day” closures for the duration of the 

pandemic wave. 

•	 The pandemic significantly affects financial markets, the banking industry, and basic market liquidity as small 

business closures rapidly escalate. Many large businesses anticipate long-term reductions and failure based on 

cascading and compounding localized catastrophic outcomes for specific sub-sector businesses. 

•	 Basic commodity availability and municipal infrastructure impacts increase dramatically to include extensive and 

extended local and regional disruptions in the availability of food, fuel, potable water, communications and power. 

•	 Economic and social disruptions increase requiring national augmentation for state and local public safety and 

security forces. 

33 
Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

5.6 COP-E Phases: Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

The remainder of Section 5 provides CI/KR business planners with specific actions or checklists for each of the pandemic 

phases. These CI/KR Guide actions fully incorporate and expand on the CDC’s initial pandemic business planning 

checklists developed and distributed in December 2005 (www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/#business). Businesses already 

using the HHS/CDC checklists are ahead in the process, as none of the original Federal recommendations have changed. 

However, these companies may also want to review the actions below to determine if there are additional items that may 

prove useful for their particular business’ pandemic planning needs, especially across the COP-E scenarios. Industryspecific planning checklists created with CI/KR private sector representatives are also included in the Guide Annex and 

appropriate ones will be distributed with the Guide to businesses in each sector. 

Planners may use the following checklists of actions within the scenario context to assist in constructing their business 

continuity plan for pandemic influenza. Each section provides three levels of guidance. 

Action 

Each overarching action serves as a checklist item and will likely have numerous supporting actions necessary to achieve its 

objective. These actions are purposefully “generic” to business type, size, or sophistication in continuity planning. Thus, 

the major actions are also useful as a quick reference for business planners familiar with continuity of operations planning 

to check if they have this particular base covered, and it allows them to move to the next action without spending time on 

the issues or supporting actions. 

Issues to Consider 

This column of the checklist expands on the action for those seeking further clarification. 

Supporting Actions 

The final column presents a checklist of possible supporting actions to help assist business planners in their efforts to 

complete the main action. The supporting actions are neither comprehensive, nor specific to an industry or sector. They are 

simply a starting point and intended to stimulate thinking about further options. 

The Guide organizes action checklists in four basic pandemic management phases: Planning, Preparedness, Response, and 

Recovery. They are in these four major categories to simplify their association with the major disaster management process 

changes and to arrange them in accordance with the WHO and USG pandemic phases/stages. These phases may be further 

sub-divided by planners to manage the complexity of the efforts required, or the actions may be put into whatever categories 

the planner determines are most useful for their type/size business. 

5.6.1 COP-E Planning Phase 

Whether it is manmade or natural, a disaster affecting business operations exhibits many of the same impacts and outcomes, 

and requires the same essential preparations. The time to plan for disaster contingencies is well before the disaster strikes. 

With the sheer number and type of disasters threatening businesses, from localized power outages and snowstorms to 

catastrophic national disasters, one plan will likely not fit all. In today’s post 9/11 environment, businesses should assemble 

a family of carefully targeted disaster preparedness, response, and recovery plans. In the pandemic context, the goals 

and objectives driving the planner’s efforts may require very different preparedness, response, and recovery actions. 

34 
Action 

Identify overall lead pandemic 

coordinator and/or team 

Integrate planning input 

from inside and outside the 

business 

PLANNING PHASE 

Issues to Consider 

Identify and include in all planning 

processes, a pandemic coordinator 

and/or team with defined roles and 

responsibilities. 

Seek input and support from all 

employees, supply chain businesses, key 

supporting businesses (e.g., insurers, 

clients, and customers), and, when 

appropriate, the public. 

Supporting Actions 

•	 Designate a pandemic coordinator(s). 

• Assign members to the team and 

train for the tasks. 

•	 Conduct meetings and exercises with 

all internal and external stakeholders. 

•	 Establish a Web site, email, or 

telephone pandemic information 

sharing and concerns input center. 

•	 Conduct town hall meetings with 

employees, customers, and the 

public. 

Defi ne “essential” Defining what’s “essential” may be the 

most important and most difficult task 

for planners. It first demands a truly 

comprehensive review of all functions 

and all obvious first order functions, as 

well as those less obvious second and 

third order ones. Also, it requires a frank 

assessment of what is really essential 

and what may be “simply” critical or 

useful. 

•	

•	

•	

Define “essential” functions, goods, 

and services a business requires 

to sustain its own operations and 

survive as an economic entity. 

Define those essential goods and 

services it provides that are vital to 

sustain the national, regional, and 

local communities. 

Define the changes and implications 

of these changes for what is 

“essential” for each COP-E scenario 

as impacts become worse and goals 

shift. 

Identify and prioritize specifi c 

impacts on the business 

For each COP-E scenario, identify the 

impacts from disruptions to essential 

functions, services, and goods. Assess 

these impacts in terms of priorities, time 

and “breaking points”. 

•	

•	

Identify the prioritized effects on 

the business and the community, 

specifically noting what it means at 

each level when they are unavailable. 

Identify how long a business can 

expect to continue providing essential 

functions, goods, and services in total 

or reduced quantities. 

The following are examples of major actions, issues, and supporting actions businesses should incorporate during the 

planning phase in concert with the initial WHO and USG pandemic alert phases/stages. Given the variety of CI/KR business 

types, these are not exhaustive of all possible actions. The checklist should afford a reasonable start, and, at a minimum, 

should help the planner raise awareness and sensitivity to issues and actions not previously considered. PLANNING PHASE 

35 
PLANNING PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

•	 Identify breaking points when 

outside resources can no longer 

provide essential functions, 

goods, and services. 

Prioritize devolving essential Devolution is the capability to transfer •	 Identify primary and supporting 

functions authority and responsibility for essential functions based upon their impacts 

functions from an organization’s primary on providing essential goods and 

operating staff and facilities, to other services for the business and the 

employees and facilities, and to sustain community. 

operational capability under devolved 

authority for an extended period. •	 Prioritize actions to support the 

Because local outbreaks will occur at “devolution of normal, critical, and 

different times, have variable durations, essential functions.” 

and may vary in their severity, devolution 

planning may need to consider rotating 

operations between regional/field offices 

as a pandemic wave moves throughout 

the United States. 

Delegate authorities and “Delegating authorities” is a formal chain • Develop formal protocols for 

orders of succession of authority for business operations. implementing “Delegations of 

Authority.” 

• Develop and implement formal 

processes for “Orders of Succession” 

for all essential personnel. 

• Define the changes and implications 

of these changes for what is 

“essential” for each COP-E scenario 

as impacts become worse and goals 

shift. 

Identify/prioritize workers, For the essential functions, identify those • Uncover potential second and third 

supplies, equipment, and personnel, supplies, and equipment order impacts on workers, supplies, 

second/third order support vital to maintain the business’ essential equipment, and supporting functions. 

internal and external functions, services 

and goods. • Assess unforeseen supporting 

interdependencies of “non-essential” 

functions. 

• Examine essential internal functions 

for other challenges, including 

work outsourced or performed by 

temporary, part-time, or contract 

employees. 

Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery PLANNING PHASE 

36 
PLANNING PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

Forecast worker absences Forecast absences during a pandemic •	 Meet with community health and 

based on factors such as worker or emergency personnel to gather 

family member illness, community information on potential health 

impacts and disease containment containment measures and quarantines, strategies. school and/or business closures, and 

public transportation closures. •	 Monitor Federal, State, local, and 

tribal pandemic information sites 

for information on containment 

strategies. 

•	 Meet with workers and their families 

to assess specific impacts based on 

worker concerns and needs. 

Sustain essential functions, Identify and propose actions to protect •	 Cross-train non-essential backup 

supplies, material, and and sustain essential functions, supplies, workers to perform essential 

equipment materials, equipment, and systems functions. 

support. 

•	 Retrain and update recently retired 

De essential and non-essential workers. velop prioritized actions to promote 

“roster depth” for all essential functions 

•	 Train new reserve workers and and personnel and to ensure sufficient appropriate worker family members. stocks and/or rapid, reliable re-supply 

processes for all essential materials and •	 Coordinate with like sector 

equipment for each COP-E scenario. businesses to consolidate essential 

functions and workers at critical 

pandemic trigger points. 

•	 Propose cost-effective and efficient 

preparedness actions to stockpile 

strategic reserves for all essential 

supplies, material, and equipment. 

•	 Propose cost-effective and efficient 

preparedness actions to sustain 

supporting systems for essential 

functions, such as periodic 

maintenance, repair, and emergency 

replenishment. 

Sustain essential workers Assess and propose pandemic response •	 Ensure availability of medical 

policies and actions to initially protect consultation and advice for potentially 

and sustain all business workers, family ill workers and their families and for 

members, customers, clients, and the emergency response. 

public, and then more specifically for the 

business’ essential workers. •	 Encourage and track annual influenza 

vaccination for employees. 

•	 Train new reserve workers, and 

appropriate worker family members. 

PLANNING PHASE 

37 
PLANNING PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

Establish flexible worksite (e.g., 

telecommuting) and work hour 

policies. 

•	 Establish policies to limit influenza 

spread at the worksite. 

•	 Establish infection control policies 

(e.g., immediate mandatory sick 

leave) for sick employees, and 

reassign personnel who are at high 

risk to develop influenza-related 

complications. 

•	 Establish policies restricting travel to 

affected domestic and international 

PLANNING PHASE 

areas, evacuating employees 

working in or near affected areas, 

and providing guidance to employees 

returning from affected areas (see 

CDC travel recommendations). 

•	 Exercise and test policies and 

procedures. 

•	 Train managers and educate 

employees on policies and 

procedures. 

Identify and assess workers’ Whenever possible and with appropriate •	 Develop pandemic education and 

family care requirements privacy protections, identify and assess information sharing processes 

issues for supporting worker family targeted for worker families. 

care. Under such extreme conditions, a 

worker’s family becomes an essential •	 Integrate protocols and technologies 

supporting or risk element for the worker into emergency communications. 

and the business. Better understanding 

the particular needs of workers’ families •	 Ensure sensitivity to worker privacy 

allows for focused actions in developing on any information gathered. 

and implementing a business “family 

care plan.” •	 Identify essential workers who are 

dual-income working parents or 

single, head of household parents. 

•	 Assess the number of workers 

with school-age children or other 

dependents at home. 

•	 Review the number of workers and 

families who rely solely on public 

transportation. 

Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

38 
PLANNING PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

PLANNING PHASE 

•	 Consider availability of social and 

community services support. 

•	 Plan for grief counseling and psychiatric 

care. 

•	 Account for language issues and 

barriers. 

•	 Identify other special family support 

needs. 

Prioritize support requirements Prioritize the business’ essential 

functions, personnel, and material 

needs for initial distribution of limited 

medical resources and for Federal, 

State, local, and tribal non-healthcare 

support. Federal prioritization schemes 

for vaccines, antivirals, and other medical 

countermeasures will be based on 

functional catagories or occupational 

types. The business will need to identify 

and prioritize their specific essential 

workers within these federal categories 

and types. 

Examine the business’ inbound Identify and prioritize critical 

supply and support chain interdependencies along the entire 

supply chain, especially noting parttime and outsourced contract support, 

and other second and third order 

relationships. 

•	 Prioritize personnel for receipt of 

vaccines and antiviral medications. 

•	 Prioritize personnel for receipt 

of other types of medical 

countermeasures and personal 

protective equipment. 

•	 Identify and prioritize essential 

functions and equipment requiring 

municipal infrastructure support 

(water, elect, gas, etc.), essential 

supplies, and/or dedicated security 

support. 

•	 Review all in-house supply 

requirements. 

•	 Meet with suppliers to identify the 

supply chain through each level of 

supply and delivery. 

•	 Meet with inbound distributors and 

transporters. 

•	 Examine all second and third tier 

relationships and other contract 

arrangements. 

Explore and assess the Assess interdependencies for essential 

business’ outbound supply functions, goods, and services that the 

chain business provides along the supply 

chain. Take special note of part-time and 

temporary support, outsourced contract 

support, and other important second and 

third order relationships. 

•	 Review all in-house products and 

services distribution requirements. 

•	 Meet with outbound retailers, 

distributors, and transporters to 

examine issues with delivering the 

business’ goods and services. 

39 
Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

PLANNING PHASE PLANNING PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

• Examine all second and third tier 

relationships and other contract 

arrangements. 

Examine national, regional, Assess and prioritize impacts from • Assess the business’ supply chain 

and local supply chain potential disruptions to national, regional, for potential impacts from movement 

interdependencies and impacts and local supply chains. disruptions. 

• Prioritize operational impacts. 

Investigate international Assess and prioritize impacts from • Assess implications for the business’ 

interdependencies and impacts disruptions in business travel and international workers/offices/affiliates. 

material movement for international 

workers/offices/plants/affiliates and • Assess supply chain requirements 

across supply chains. involving international suppliers. 

• Prioritize all impacts by affects on 

the business’ essential, critical, and 

normal operations. 

Model interdependencies Map and model the network of essential •	 Identify the network of supporting 

PLANNING PHASE

intra- and inter-sector, cross-border, and interdependencies. 

cross-jurisdictional interdependencies 

between the business and its supply •	 Model these interdependencies 

chain and all government partners. to uncover any critical crossdependencies. 

Connect with Federal, State, The business cannot stand alone; • Collaborate with State, regional, 

PLANNING PHASE local, and tribal government during a pandemic the business and the local, and tribal health departments, 

agencies community will need to work closely as a emergency response, and municipal 

supporting team to ensure success. infrastructure managers to ensure 

they identify your business as an 

essential supplier of functions, goods, 

and services. 

• Coordinate potential support 

requirements in advance, such as 

healthcare, municipal infrastructure, 

movement, and security. 

• Identify the assets and services 

your business could offer to the 

community. 

Connect with insurers, health Consider essential actions to ensure your • Collaborate with insurers, health 

plans, and major healthcare workforce and their family’s protection plans, and healthcare facilities. 

facilities and assure them of plans for their 

medical support. • Share pandemic plans and integrate 

plan with theirs. 

40 
PLANNING PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

Coordinate risk Effective, consistent, and timely risk •	 Assess and prioritize the 

communications protocols and communication is essential to inform and business’ normal and emergency 

communications capabilities assure internal and external stakeholders communications protocols, processes 

during a disaster. Coordinate and and capabilities for rapid information 

support risk communications and sharing with all relevant stakeholders. 

information sharing initiatives for 

pandemic surveillance and detection •	 Meet with all internal and external 

within the business, across the supply stakeholder groups to identify 

chain, across all interdependent sectors, concerns and support needs. 

and with all appropriate government 

partners. •	 Where practical, pre-package risk 

communications message options. 

•	 Coordinate with the local public health 

and emergency management teams 

on message and information sharing 

initiatives. 

•	 Develop information sharing 

processes and protocols tailored for 

each audience group. 

Provide for communications Provide for appropriate information •	 Identify and assess current 

PLANNING PHASE technologies and protocols technology, support, and protocols to and available communications 

ensure effective and efficient information technologies in the business, in the 

sharing and risk communications community, and from Federal/State 

consistent with the business’ pandemic government. 

preparedness, response, and recovery 

needs. •	 Develop a plan for enhancing, 

procuring, leasing, or sharing 

Establish tailored business emergency necessary communications 

communications and information technologies. 

protocols that address differing 

requirements across all pandemic •	 Establish emergency and information 

phases. sharing communication protocols for 

different technologies. 

•	 Ensure sufficient redundancy in 

technologies are available and 

planned. 

Public and media relations Public and media relations will be critical •	 Meet with local and regional media 

to ensuring the business maintains staff and coordinators to discuss 

community support, that its workers and processes and shared support. 

customers/clients are consistently and 

factually informed, and to rapidly dispel •	 Assess requirements for public 

any misinformation about the business. relations, likely target audiences, 

potential messages, and various 

mediums for delivering the messages. 

41 
Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

PLANNING PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

•	 Develop messages and prioritized 

actions for sharing information with 

the media. 

•	 Identify and mitigate challenges to 

supporting public and media relations. 

•	 Exploit opportunities to inform 

suppliers, customers, workers, and 

the public. 

PLANNING PHASE 

Identify, document, coordinate, 

and test “trigger points” and 

resultant actions 

A “triggering event” occurs when 

something in the external or internal 

environment changes and forces a 

business to respond. Identify and assess 

“triggering events” for each potential 

action, such as changes in the WHO and 

the USG pandemic alert matrix; Federal, 

State, tribal, and local government 

direction; and resource availability. 

•	

•	

•	

•	

•	

•	

Assess what triggers a change in the 

international pandemic alert status. 

Assess what triggers a change in the 

Federal, State, and local pandemic 

alert. 

Identify and assess what these 

triggers mean to the business’ 

preparedness and response actions. 

Establish authorities, triggers, 

and procedures for activating and 

terminating the business’ response 

and recovery plans. 

Establish formal mechanisms for 

altering business operations and 

transferring business knowledge to 

key employees. 

Establish procedures to monitor the 

internal and external environment to 

respond to triggering events. 

Consider essential business 

support for the community and 

nation 

Consider creative opportunities to adapt 

the business’ essential and non-essential 

product lines and services to optimize 

availability of the most essential goods 

and services (e.g., a soft drink bottler 

could shift to bottle potable water). 

•	

•	

•	

Assess current product lines and 

services for alternative uses. 

Coordinate with local public health 

and emergency managers on 

potential critical shortage needs. 

Identify costs and actions necessary 

to rapidly adapt products and 

services. 

42 
PLANNING PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

Identify direct and indirect Costs and resource availability are key •	 Assess resource implications 

costs considerations in determining what can associated with each action to aid in 

be afforded and how long preparedness prioritizing actions and in obtaining 

actions may take to accomplish. Develop outside support. 

actions to identify and track all pandemic 

specific resource costs for each disaster •	 Assess costs in developing 

phase to facilitate decision making reasonable implementation 

concerning prioritizing and allocating milestones and timelines. 

limited business resources. •	 Develop processes to monitor costs 

during pandemic phases both to 

reprioritize resources, and to validate 

costs for later reviews and possible 

compensation. 

Assess and incorporate 

actions developed for each 

disaster and COP-E phase 

Pandemic impacts will evolve and 

requirements will alter dramatically based 

upon changes at each disaster phase. 

•	

•	

Identify and examine the 

assessments, processes, and 

actions developed for each disaster 

implementation phase (prepare, 

respond, and recover). 

Review in light of both the business 

and the greater good. 

PLANNING PHASE Identify metrics, milestones, 

and timelines 

Identifying both external and internal 

metrics and milestone aids to ensure 

the business’ planning expectations and 

preparedness horizons are achievable 

and practical. 

•	

•	

•	

•	

Assess each action to identify subactions and tasks. 

Identify specific measurable 

processes or outcomes for each 

action. 

Assess potential milestone and 

timeline implications based on best 

available time projections and WHO/ 

CDC information on the pandemic. 

Assess the time required to 

implement a potential action (e.g., 

one month vs. three years). 

Assess and develop exercise 

and training options 

Exercises and training sessions 

are powerful tools for preparing the 

participants and the planners. Involving 

both internal and external business 

stakeholders in focused pandemic 

exercises and training sessions are 

critical components of any pandemic 

plan. 

•	 Assess requirements for pandemic 

scenario-driven exercises with groups 

consisting of the business’ managers 

and workers, as well as key suppliers, 

customers, and government 

emergency managers. 

43 
Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

PLANNING PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

•	 Develop scenario-driven exercises 

to test planning actions and involve 

internal and external stakeholders. 

See business specific scenario input 

above and Section 9-Appendix in 

the reference Guide for examples of 

pandemic scenarios and exercises. 

•	 Develop training programs for all 

personnel on personal, workplace 

and family protection protocols, and 

actions to take for each phase of a 

pandemic. 

•	 Assess and prioritize costs and 

available resources. 

PLANNING PHASE PLANNING PHASE

Monitor actions and 

milestones 

Develop a monitoring process and 

instrument sensitive to business privacy 

issues. 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Identify and develop a monitoring 

tool/instrument for use with the 

business’ pandemic preparedness, 

response, and recovery actions. 

Assess costs to develop and 

implement monitoring processes. 

Develop, where practical, sharing 

agreements with similar businesses. 

Coordinate with Federal, State, and 

local public health and emergency 

management officials to share 

monitoring capabilities and real-time 

status information. 

Finalize, implement, and review 

periodically 

Finalize and implement the business’ 

pandemic influenza plan(s) in a rational 

and timely way in order to ensure the 

business is fully prepared to respond 

and recover from a potentially severe 

pandemic influenza. Review all planning 

actions and processes periodically. 

•	

•	

•	

•	

Implement initial appropriate actions 

for the pandemic phase and external 

trigger point. 

Continuously monitor and assess 

implementation actions to ensure 

staying on target. 

Adjust plans as necessary to ensure 

a flexible, effective, and successful 

implementation. 

Review plans periodically; at least 

every 90 days initially and more 

frequently as the pandemic evolves. 

44 
5.6.2 COP-E Preparedness Phase 

Businesses vary greatly in their ability to plan for, respond to, and ultimately recover from a major disaster like a 

pandemic. How these differences are managed within a business, between businesses, and across sectors will be crucial to 

overall economic success. 

The first implementation section from the business’ Pandemic Plan incorporates specific assessments and actions needed 

to prepare the business to respond and recover from a pandemic influenza. The Preparedness Phase relates to the WHO 

Pandemic Alert Phases 1-4 and USG Stages 0-1; at Phase 5 and Stage 2 the time remaining to prepare for response is 

minimal. To succeed, preparedness demands involvement and support from all business echelons, ranging from CEOs to 

frontline workers and their families. Pandemic preparedness-specific processes and challenges are listed in the checklist 

below. 

PREPAREDNESS PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

Empower a pandemic The pandemic planning coordinator •	 Identify and assign pandemic 

preparedness and response and team may also serve as the lead emergency operations leadership and 

team preparedness and response team. support team. 

•	 For larger businesses, establish 

an emergency operations center 

to manage response and recovery 

operations during outbreaks. 

•	 Leverage personnel and functions 

already established for other disaster 

contingency requirements. 

PREPAREDNESS PHASE Incorporate disaster phases Planning and preparedness are not •	 Businesses should track changes in 

and COP-E scenarios for the end-states. All actions necessary the WHO and USG pandemic alerts 

pandemic periods during response and recovery must to define objective “trigger points” 

have corresponding planning and when their preparedness activities 

preparedness actions. should shift to the next level. 

•	 Integrate all the critical actions for 

the response and recovery disaster 

phases to ensure preparedness 

activities are focused and timely. 

•	 Successful preparedness 

necessitates prioritizing and 

implementing actions based on a 

full understanding and integration of 

requirements across each pandemic 

period and disaster phase. 

45 
Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

PREPAREDNESS PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

•	 Refine and focus prioritized actions 

with respect to sustaining essential 

business, community and national 

functions, goods and services and 

achieving success under the three 

worsening scenarios. 

Sustain essential functions The bottom-line for preparedness • Preparedness actions should 

is to support sustaining essential concentrate on resolving potential 

functions during response and weaknesses in these networks before 

recovery. Incorporate and prioritize all their failure causes an entire function 

preparedness actions to ensure this to fail. 

primary outcome. 

•	 Plan for scenarios likely to result in 

increased or decreased demand 

for goods and services (e.g., hand 

washing disinfectants and protective 

gloves) during a pandemic. 

PREPAREDNESS PHASE Prepare to sustain essential •	 Reduce risk and protect workers Implement actions and policies to 

workers and their families. reduce overall and specific “risk” and 

protect the workforce from internal and 

external contacts. 

•	 Improve the numbers of available One essential worker should not be 

essential workers. the only employee able to perform a 

specific essential function. Implement 

preparedness actions to improve the 

roster depth of numbers for essential 

workers available for each function. 

•	 Auxillary workforce Train and prepare an auxillary 

workforce to assume particular roles in 

helping to sustain essential functions 

(e.g., contractors, part-time employees, 

and family members). 

•	 Virtual operations To build a more flexible worksite, 

establish and implement creative 

policies and actions, including 

promoting telecommuting; providing 

“batch-loading” tasks; and installing 

remote handling and delivery 

capabilities (i.e., drive-up windows). 

46 
PREPAREDNESS PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

• Information technology support Implement preparedness actions to 

enhance IT support for telecommuters 

to provide sufficient computer and 

telephone equipment, lines, and 

bandwidth at the business and at 

intermediary telecommunications 

systems. 

• Manage worker shifts Practice “ghost-shift changes” wherever 

possible, with workers going off duty 

leaving the workplace before the new 

shift enters. 

• Create worker “shifts” Consider expanding the normal oneshift workday to one with multiple shift 

periods to minimize worker contact. 

• “Safe” workers Set up a process to track and deploy 

workers recovering from influenza to 

PREPAREDNESS PHASE 

perform high-risk, essential services. 

• Home care options Establish and test home care options 

for workers from single-parent and 

dual-income worker families. Home 

care options may include employing 

non-essential workers to help care for 

essential worker families. 

• Dedicated transportation Identify worker transportation 

requirements. For those essential 

workers without options or for those 

who rely solely on public transportation, 

establish a means of dedicated 

transportation to/from work while 

maintaining necessary infection control 

processes (e.g., social distancing and 

surface cleaning). 

• Business and worker insurance Review, revise, and implement 

insurance for workers, including 

providing adequate health insurance, 

business interruption insurance, and 

liability insurance for home care or 

dedicated transportation. 

47 
Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

PREPAREDNESS PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

• Worker leave Implement policies and funds to pay for 

extended sick and family care leaves, 

worker furloughing, and “snow days.” 

• International workers Take measures to support workers 

at international sites and ensure the 

safety of returning U.S. workers and 

their families. 

Ensure essential supplies, • Prioritized actions Implement prioritized actions to ensure 

material, equipment and adequate reserves in a timely manner 

support systems for all essential supplies, material, 

equipment, and systems support. 

• Reserve duration Ensure pandemic reserves are 

sufficient to endure the initial 6-8 

week wave, and to replenish rapidly 

during the first recovery period and 

PREPAREDNESS PHASE 

subsequent waves. 

• Just-in-time requirements Ensure businesses can maintain 

existing just-in-time supply and 

maintenance arrangements, or ensure 

sufficient reserve stockpiles are onhand. 

• Equipment maintenance schedules Review all equipment standard 

maintenance and repair schedules, 

maintenance history, and equipment 

life expectancy to ensure all essential 

and critical pieces are capable of 

sustained operation with the supply and 

maintenance resources available onsite or in reserves. 

• 2nd/3rd order effects Target possible second and third order 

effects, such as “who supplies the 

suppliers” and identify their potential 

weaknesses. 

48 
PREPAREDNESS PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

Address other interdependent For the business to be fully prepared, Implement actions to help prepare 

systems it must ensure all its essential other essential interdependent support 

interdependent in-house sub-contractors, systems, including those performed by 

and external suppliers, deliverers, and various onsite contractors and subother connected systems are equally well contractors (e.g., security and food 

prepared. operations), and by outsourced off-site 

contractors (e.g., hazardous waste 

removal, physical, IT security, and 

emergency response). 

Implement internal surveillance Monitoring the environment to detect •	 Different hospitals and health centers 

and detection disease occurrence and outbreaks and treating patients may not detect an 

the evolution from animals to humans outbreak immediately. The business 

affords the veterinary and human public suddenly experiencing greater than 

health teams their best opportunity normal numbers of workers with fluto swiftly interdict the disease and like symptoms may be first to alert the 

potentially contain its spread. Businesses community and nation. 

play a critical role in supporting and 

conducting surveillance and detection, •	 To assist Federal, State, tribal, and 

PREPAREDNESS PHASE 

and monitoring their situational local public health officials, businesses 

awareness. should implement internal surveillance 

protocols and processes to monitor 

the health status of all workers, 

contractors, and family members. 

•	 Coordinate with local public health 

officials to develop a surveillance plan. 

•	 Collaborate with local public health 

officials to establish the best methods 

to report potential illness and outbreak 

information. 

Where available, utilize Typically, large- and medium-sized •	 For busineses with in-house 

occupational health and businesses have extensive in-house occupational health and medical staff, 

medical teams occupational health teams available for implement and share surveillance 

surveillance and response phase for information with government public 

health support. health officials. 

•	 Smaller business should explore 

sharing surveillance information and 

resources with larger businesses in 

their supply chain and the community. 

•	 Regardless of size, businesses 

should contact state and local public 

health offices to coordinate sharing 

expertise and disease surveillance 

strategies. 

49 
Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

PREPAREDNESS PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

Exploit external surveillance Exploit international, national, state and Visit these Web sites: 

and detection local public health surveillance resources 

(e.g., international and national health •	 (HHS/CDC) http://pandemicfl u.gov 

surveillance Web sites; local emergency 

operations centers; and public health •	 (WHO) www.who.int/csr/


offices academic institutions) for outbreaknetwork/en


monitoring disease progress externally to 

provide important insights into potential •	 (Pan American Health Organization) 

pandemic timing, impacts, and trigger www.paho.org/english/ad/dpc/cd/ 

points. infl uenza.htm 

•	 (European Union) www.eu.int/


comm/health/index_en.html


Monitor and coordinate Businesses that monitor external •	 Monitor and adjust business trigger 

changes in trigger and surveillance efforts and implement points and actions from changes 

breaking points internal surveillance programs will be in international, national, and local 

better informed and prepared to adjust pandemic phases. 

key actions for their own pandemic 

preparedness and response and •	 Large businesses should share their 

PREPAREDNESS PHASE 

recovery trigger points. external surveillance information and 

insights on trigger points with smaller 

Coordinate and update government and businesses in their supply chain and 

local emergency response units and community. 

essential points of contact concerning 

changes to the business’ response and •	 Identify key points of contact at all 

recovery trigger and breaking points. government and emergency services 

providers on preparedness actions 

and support requirements. 

•	 Ensure they are aware and able to 

respond to changes in the business’ 

critical trigger and breaking points. 

Implement risk Implement risk communications and •	 Implement risk communications and 

communications and information sharing protocols to ensure information sharing protocols and 

information sharing an open, consistent two-way information technologies. 

flow with suppliers, customers, workers, 

families and all appropriate government •	 Train all appropriate internal 

and emergency response agencies. and external stakeholders on 

communications systems. 

•	 Test communications effectiveness 

under exercise conditions. 

50 
PREPAREDNESS PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

Coordinate business and Implement a business and public •	 Provide overview information on 

public relations relations strategy that allows for the symptoms of influenza, modes of 

dissemination of programs and materials transmission, etc. 

on business preparedness and pandemic 

fundamentals. •	 Provide information on personal 

protection and response strategies 

As businesses become more expert at (e.g., hand hygiene, sneezing 

tracking and understanding international, etiquette, and PPE). 

national and local surveillance actions, 

they will be better able to assure internal •	 Provide information on disease 

and external stakeholders and manage containment strategies (e.g., social 

misinformation about the pandemic and distancing and snow days). 

their operations. •	 Provide updated business planning 

and preparedness information. 

•	 Share information on trigger point 

and phase changes and implications 

for the business with all internal and 

external stakeholders. 

PREPAREDNESS PHASE 

•	 Coordinate with public and media 

relations points of contact to ensure 

they are aware of changes and any 

impacts on the business. 

Share and compare best Many preparedness actions are •	 Share best practices with other 

business practices common across various businesses businesses in your community, 

and community agencies, by sharing chambers of commerce, and 

and comparing best practices the associations to improve community 

business can not only improve its own response efforts. 

preparedness but save resources on less 

effective actions. •	 Participate in business and community 

working groups to share information 

about interdependent and essential 

functions, develop supporting 

relationships, and ensure visibility for 

all business preparedness, response 

and recovery plans. 

Implement exercises, Implement and test preparedness •	 Implement scenario-driven exercises 

education, and training exercise, education, and training to test planning actions and involve 

programs for in-house workers, their internal and external stakeholders. 

families, contactors, suppliers, and 

customers as well as for appropriate •	 Train all personnel on personal, 

external businesses and community workplace, and family protection 

support. protocols, and actions to take for 

each phase of a pandemic. 

51 
Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

PREPAREDNESS PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

Refine costs and resources Refine and reprogram initial planning • Assess all costs based upon actual 

“costs” associated with pandemic preparedness expenditures and 

preparedness and reprioritize update estimates for response and 

implementation based upon available recovery. 

resources. 

PREPAREDNESS PHASE 

•	 Reprioritize all actions based upon 

any changes in pandemic timing, 

costs, and available resources. 

Adjust actions Rapidly and effectively adjust actions • Continuously assess ongoing 

based upon changes in the operational preparedness activities to adjust 

environment. objectives, effects, and actions 

based upon changes in the business 

and greater economic and social 

environments. 

•	 Continuously assess planned 

response and recovery actions to 

ensure they remain the best actions 

to achieve success. 

52 
5.6.3 COP-E Response Phase 

WHO Alert Phase 5 and USG Stage 2 describe an evolving pandemic with confirmed but not sustained human-to-human 

outbreaks at one or more sites. At this stage, there will be little or no time remaining before communities and businesses 

in the United States begin reacting. Thus, final preparations and initial response actions should be implemented now. 

Actions taken in the response phase should exploit the solid foundation constructed during preparedness. However, what 

is planned and what actually occurs as the pandemic unfolds may be quite different. Businesses should train workers to 

adjust from planned actions as pandemic impacts materialize in order to contain any new challenges before their localized 

impacts and implications can produce cascading effects with potentially catastrophic outcomes. Response phase actions 

are listed in the checklist below. 

RESPONSE PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

RESPONSE PHASE 

Assess swiftness of the 

pandemic outbreaks 

The speed with which pandemic 

outbreaks may appear and spread 

across the nation will severely challenge 

typical Federal, State, and private sector 

disaster response capabilities and 

capacities. 

•	 Monitor international, national, State, 

and local pandemic outbreak reports. 

•	 Assess and adjust actions based on 

potential implications for the business 

as it spreads. 

•	 Assess implications on all business 

locations. 

•	 Assess supply chain impacts on the 

business due to outbreaks. 

Employ risk management 

strategies at the workplace 

There are two basic categories of risk 

management intervention: transmission 

interventions (i.e., cough etiquette and 

hand hygiene) and contact interventions 

(i.e., social distancing techniques and the 

implementation of liberal leave policies). 

• 

• 

Implement specific strategies to 

protect employees from getting 

or spreading influenza on the job, 

including instituting processes that 

request and enable employees with 

influenza to stay home at the first sign 

of symptoms. 

After assessing workers, the business 

should tailor interventions to the 

particular needs of individuals or of 

the business. 

Manage and track individual 

worker risk for complications 

Individuals at high risk for severe and 

fatal infection cannot be predicted with 

certainty but will likely include: 

• Pregnant women 

• Persons with compromised immune 

systems 

• Persons with underlying chronic 

conditions 

•	

•	

•	

Identify and assess implications 

for those at-risk workers and family 

members. 

Provide additional protections 

for employees falling into at-risk 

categories. 

Track the health status of these high 

risk workers and their families. 

53 
Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

RESPONSE PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

• Persons age 65 or older. • Coordinate with local public health 

and healthcare delivery sites to report 

incidents and prioritize care. 

Recommend worker family 

protection strategies 

Share with workers and their families 

personal and home protection measures 

and social distancing strategies similar 

to those employed in the workplace or in 

public. 

For additional guidance on individual 

and family care pandemic planning, 

visit www.pandemicfl u.gov/planguide/ 

checklist.html 

RESPONSE PHASE RESPONSE PHASE 

Enforce worker protection 

strategies 

In concert with their fellow workers, 

workers should pursue individual 

protective strategies while at the 

worksite. Businesses should publish 

these strategies for use by all workers. 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Implement personal social distancing 

strategies: where practical maintain 

three feet spatial separation between 

workers. 

Avoid crowded places and heavily 

populated gatherings. 

Avoid face-to-face meetings— 

use teleconference calls, 

videoconferencing, and the Internet to 

conduct business. 

Avoid public transportation or 

avoid rush hour crowding on public 

transportation. 

Avoid workplace cafeterias and 

introduce staggered lunchtimes. 

Avoid congregating in break rooms. 

If a face-to-face meeting with people 

is unavoidable, minimize the meeting 

time, choose a large room, and sit at 

least one yard away from each other. 

Consider use of PPE If symptomatic persons cannot stay 

home during the acute phase of their 

illness, require them to wear a surgical/ 

procedure mask or N95 respirator in 

public places. 

• Although officials have not 

documented the efficacy of surgical/ 

procedure masks or N95 respirators, 

workers may wear one as part of an 

individual protection strategies. 

54 
RESPONSE PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

•	 Even with proper PPE and training, 

and employing all other appropriate 

infection control procedures, 

symptomatic workers should only 

be allowed in the workplace under 

the most extreme circumstances to 

sustain essential business continuity. 

•	 Visit www.hhs.gov/pandemicfl u/ 

plan/sup4.html#ppestan for more 

information and updates on PPE. 

RESPONSE PHASE 

Enforce worksite protection 

strategies 

Basic worker protection strategies should 

be incorporated in business pandemic 

plans and preparedness actions. 

•	

•	

•	

•	

•	

•	

•	

Implement relevant social 

distancing policies, including 

furloughing non-essential workers 

and employing “snow days.” 

Promote hand hygiene and cough 

etiquette in workplace. 

Develop policies for financially 

assisting furloughed workers. 

Modify office and plant layouts and 

workstation arrangements. 

Set up pick-up or delivery systems 

where clients and customers 

can pre-order and/or request 

information via telephone/email/fax. 

Provide sufficient and accessible 

infection control supplies. 

Evaluate worker access to and 

availability of healthcare services 

during a pandemic. 

Publish and encourage 

individual protection strategies 

Implement the CDC recommended 

personal health protection strategies at 

www.cdc.gov/fl u/protect/stopgerms.htm. 

•	

•	

•	

•	

•	

Avoid close contact. 

Stay home when sick. 

Cover your mouth and nose. 

Clean your hands. 

Avoid touching eyes, nose or mouth. 

55 
Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

RESPONSE PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

Restrict workforce travel Establish policies for restricting 

travel to affected geographic areas, 

evacuating employees working in or 

near affected areas, and providing 

guidance for employees returning from 

affected areas (refer to CDC travel 

recommendations). Organizations should 

anticipate how such measures might 

further substantially aggravate staffing 

shortages. 

•	 Monitor worker travel plans. 

•	 Monitor U.S. government health and 

travel Web sites (www.cdc.gov/travel/ 

index.htm and www.state.gov/travel). 

•	 Cancel trips based on travel 

advisories issued by the USG. 

•	 Conduct business using 

teleconference, conference calls, or 

other means. 

RESPONSE PHASE 

Clean facilities and equipment Given that influenza can spread through 

contaminated objects and surfaces, 

additional protection measures may be 

required to minimize the transmission 

of the virus through environmental 

surfaces such as sinks, handles, 

railings, and counters. Transmission from 

contaminated hard surfaces is unlikely 

but influenza viruses may live up to two 

days on such surfaces. 

•	

•	

•	

The CDC recommends cleaning 

worksite surfaces with soap and 

water or a detergent/disinfectant, 

depending on the nature of the 

surface and the type and degree of 

contamination. 

Clean surfaces touched with 

hands, at least daily. 

HHS will develop additional 

guidance regarding cleaning 

procedures and handling of 

potentially contaminated waste in 

non-healthcare settings such as 

the workplace. 

Ensure social and 

psychological support 

Experiences with disaster relief efforts 

suggest enhanced workforce support 

activities help workers remain effective 

during emergencies. During a pandemic, 

the occupational stresses will likely differ 

from those faced by relief workers in 

the aftermath of a natural disaster. The 

severity and duration of illness along with 

potentially high numbers of deaths will 

add considerably to personal and social 

stress. 

•	

•	

•	

Monitor worker and worker family 

social and psychological concerns. 

Create alliances with communitybased, government and nongovernmental organizations with 

expertise in providing psychosocial 

support services. 

Visit www.hhs.gov/pandemicfl u/plan/ 

sup11.html for updated information. 

Conduct training and exercises 

in workplace and personal 

protection 

The protocols employed are usually 

not part of normal business operations, 

and employers must train workers on 

them under actual work conditions and 

settings. 

•	 Exercise and train pandemic 

response teams on protection 

protocols periodically during 

preparedness phase and actively in 

response. 

56 
RESPONSE PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

RESPONSE PHASE 

•	 Train workers on personal and 

worksite protection strategies. 

•	 If PPE is used, ensure all workers 

have been thoroughly trained and 

where appropriate fitted for use 

according to CDC, OSHA, and 

manufacturer’s guidance. 

Implement protection 

strategies and actions and 

monitor completing milestones 

Planners and pandemic response teams 

should include deliberate methods to 

measure, monitor, and adjust actions 

to changing conditions and improved 

protection strategies. 

•	

•	

•	

Implement a formal worker and 

workplace protection strategy 

with metrics for assessing worker 

conformance and workplace 

cleanliness. 

Monitor and periodically test 

protection methods. 

Track and implement changes 

in approved or recommended 

protection measures. 

Assess and coordinate 

impacts on disaster response 

support 

Shifting resources geographically from 

a safe zone to an impacted one will be 

a limited option for government and 

private sector businesses. Businesses 

will initially rely solely on their own prepositioned, on-site resource reserves. 

•	

•	

•	

•	

Pre-position material and equipment 

onsite. 

Ensure essential personnel are at the 

primary worksite. 

Reaffirm that essential suppliers have 

their material and personnel on-hand 

and are able to respond and support 

as planned. 

Coordinate with local public health 

and emergency response points of 

contact to ensure open, adequate 

communications. 

Manage compounding impacts, 

business “breaking points,” 

and cascading effects 

The diverse stressors on critical 

infrastructures may be compounded 

by the sheer scope and severity of 

pandemic impacts, which may cause 

businesses to exceed system breaking 

points faster than predicted. Businesses 

must be prepared to efficiently respond 

and contain these local and perhaps 

seemingly minor breakdowns before they 

cause major cascading effects. 

•	

•	

As pandemic impacts mount, closely 

monitor all essential functions to 

ensure sustained operations. 

Monitor potential weaknesses in 

the system that may fail faster than 

planned. 

57 
Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

RESPONSE PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

RESPONSE PHASE 

•	 Rapidly adjust actions to address 

any normal, critical, or essential 

system disruptions or failures in 

order to correct for the loss and to 

mitigate and contain any potential 

cascading effects on essential 

systems. 

Monitor and adjust for crosssector and international 

interdependencies and 

cascading effects 

National cross-sector support 

challenges and international supply 

chain interdependencies may cause 

catastrophic cascading effects due to 

reliance on essential “unknown” second 

and third-order supplies and suppliers. 

•	

•	

•	

Assess the supply chain and all 

supporting businesses to ensure 

essential functions are sustained. 

Coordinate with supporting businesses 

to ensure no previously “unknown” 

challenge has arisen. 

Monitor international, national, State, 

and local information channels for new 

impacts and implications. 

Ensure response support 

risk communications and 

technologies 

Response personnel at all levels must 

have a common operating picture for 

unfolding events to prioritize and allocate 

support resources. Given the sheer scale 

and numbers involved, however, current 

communications systems may prove 

ineffective and incapable of supporting 

information sharing within and across 

sectors. 

• 

• 

• 

Re-test all internal and external 

business emergency, risk, and 

information sharing communications 

systems and protocols. 

Re-test all community-based 

emergency and information sharing 

communications systems. 

Ensure and re-test options for workaround opportunities when primary 

communications systems fail. 

Coordinate government direct 

and indirect support 

Direct support may be in the form of 

vaccines, antiviral drugs, and personal 

protection supplies for essential workers, 

priority and clearances for a business’ 

supply deliveries, on-site public safety 

and physical security augmentation, 

and specific material from government 

stockpiles. Support that is more indirect 

may come from governmental relief 

with waivers for key regulatory and 

jurisdictional restrictions specific to an 

essential sector or particular business. 

•	

•	

•	

•	

Re-affirm contacts and planned 

actions with government and 

community emergency management 

personnel. 

Track availability of government direct 

and indirect support. 

Assess and project support needs 

to inform and coordinate with 

government and community teams. 

Coordinate with all supporting 

businesses to assess their needs and 

timing for government support. 

58 
RESPONSE PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

Exercise media and public 

relations 

Controlling misinformation and rumors will 

remain a critical function for government 

and businesses during times of extreme 

stress. 

•	 Re-affirm contacts and planned 

actions with public and media 

relations points of contact. 

•	 Assess pre-planned message and 

adjust for changing conditions. 

•	 Monitor and forecast potential public 

and media relations issues. 

•	 Quickly address rumors and 

misinformation. 

•	 Keep all internal and external 

stakeholders informed in a timely 

manner. 

RESPONSE PHASE Anticipate economic and 

social disruption 

Potential shortages and disruptions 

to the delivery of provisions of basic 

commodities and maintenance of 

municipal infrastructure during the peak 

pandemic times may result in public 

safety and physical security challenges 

at the local and national level. 

•	

•	

•	

•	

Adjust business actions based on 

any unfolding economic and social 

disruptions. 

Coordinate closely with local 

government and community 

emergency response personnel to 

stay abreast of localized disruptions. 

Affirm all business plans and actions 

to maintain security for the workplace 

and workers. 

Coordinate with local community and 

other businesses to assist where 

possible in helping to maintain 

economic and social order. 

Monitor and rapidly adjust The ability to continuously monitor all 

business activities and then affect rapid 

adjustments based upon observed and 

anticipated changes and impacts will 

be the hallmark of the business that 

successfully copes during the pandemic 

response phase(s). 

•	

•	

•	

Implement the business response 

plan. 

Continuously monitor and assess 

response actions. 

Rapidly adjust actions as required 

to sustain essential functions and 

ensure success. 

59 
Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

5.6.4 COP-E Recovery Phase 

“Even if a 1918-like scenario unfolds, 98 out of every 100 people will still be alive 

at the end of the pandemic; how do we minimize their pain and suffering?.Hope and 

despair are not strategies...Comprehensive and serious planning is not optional...”

 Michael T. Osterholm Ph.D., MPH

 University of Minnesota

 February 2006 

Business contingency planners and response teams should assess how the different pandemic challenges in the response 

phase may affect their business and incorporate these into their plans and recovery actions. Furthermore, unlike nearly all 

other disasters, pandemic recovery duration and investments must be tempered by priorities for pandemic preparedness for 

follow-on waves. Examples of major recovery challenges are listed in the checklist below. RECOVERY PHASE 

RECOVERY PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

Assess response impacts, little There may be little physical damage •	 Assess all physical, economic, and 

physical damage yet still costly to municipal infrastructures, business social impacts. 

and protracted facilities, and worker homes. Physical 

damage likely will result from equipment •	 Adjust recovery actions based 

breakdowns from deferred maintenance upon actual impacts and 

and repair, and potentially from localized circumstances. 

security and social disruptions. However, 

the recovery phase will likely still be •	 Assess costs to prepare for next 

lengthy and costly for most businesses. wave. 

•	 Implement all planned and 

adjusted recovery actions to 

restore the business to full, normal 

operations. 

Prepare for next pandemic Unlike most other natural and manmade •	 Monitor international and national 

waves disasters, a pandemic could linger for health information sources for any 

more than a year with multiple outbreaks. updates on next pandemic waves. 

•	 Balance recovery actions with 

essential preparedness for next wave 

actions. 

Address impacts from Overcoming effects from worker and • Finding sufficient suitable 

influenza related illness and worker family illness and death will be a replacements will be difficult. 

deaths significant challenge for all businesses. 

60 
RECOVERY PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

RECOVERY PHASE RECOVERY PHASE 

•	 Skilled workers may take advantage 

of higher demand and compensation 

elsewhere. 

•	 There will be a substantial increase in 

single-parent families and orphans. 

•	 Widespread fear and grief will 

potentially cause long-term 

psychological trauma. 

Overcome impacts of skilled 

worker and essential material 

shortages and competition 

Lost income and competition for available 

skilled workers and scarce materials 

favors larger businesses. 

• 

• 

• 

Assess shortage impacts on the 

business. 

Forecast costs and time to recover. 

Implement options and actions to 

correct shortages. 

Examine competition impacts 

on small businesses 

For small business, the competition for 

personnel and supplies will delay or even 

end their recovery opportunities. 

• 

• 

The business community as a whole 

should assist to mitigate the impacts 

of competition and recovery on 

smaller businesses. 

Managing this competition through 

focused government interventions 

and/or business cooperation may 

prove vital to a national economic 

recovery. 

Mitigate impacts on worker 

lost income 

Lower- and middle-income workers 

lacking sufficient reserves to weather 

extended unemployment will be hardest 

hit. 

•	

•	

•	

Where practical develop internal 

programs to assist in assuring 

workers and their families will not face 

fi nancial ruin. 

Assess actual impacts on the 

business’ workers and families. 

Assist workers to access available 

business and government worker 

recovery support programs. 

Assess insurance and 

business impacts 

Where plant shutdowns are required, 

“restarts” for critical infrastructure 

manufacturing plants may be extensive 

and problematic for the plant and other 

businesses. 

• Assess impacts on insurance 

companies and self-insuring 

businesses. 

61 
RECOVERY PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

•	 Mitigate impacts on the business from 

potential failures in their supporting 

insurance. 

Examine impacts from 

production and other plant 

shutdowns 

Lost income and competition for available 

skilled workers and scarce materials 

favors larger businesses. 

• 

• 

• 

Assess and mitigate plant shutdown 

impacts. 

Assess and mitigate impacts from 

shutdowns in plants owned by 

others that provide the business with 

essential supplies and equipment. 

Communicate with customers, 

suppliers, and government recovery 

teams on potential challenges 

resulting from delayed plant restarts. 

RECOVERY PHASE International recovery 

potentially lagging behind the 

United States 

International raw material availability, 

manufacturing and assembly, supply 

chain support, as well as international 

purchases of U.S. goods may be delayed. 

• 

• 

Monitor international recovery 

operations and assess impacts from 

any delays. 

Mitigate delays in international supply 

chain recovery. 

Coordinate government and 

community support 

In the recovery phase, numerous 

opportunities exist for direct and indirect 

governmental and community support 

and relief, which include direct personnel 

and material support, indirect regulatory 

and jurisdictional waivers, and tax and 

fi nancial incentives. 

•	

•	

•	

Re-affirm contacts and planned 

actions with government and 

community emergency management 

personnel. 

Track availability of government direct 

and indirect recovery support. 

Assess and project potential support 

needs to inform and coordinate with 

government and community teams. 

Continue enhanced risk 

communications and 

information sharing 

Honest, accurate, and timely risk 

communications and open information 

sharing within and across businesses 

and the community and government is 

critical to a successful recovery. 

•	

•	

•	

Ensure communications and 

information-sharing channels remain 

open with all external stakeholders. 

Provide continuous updates 

concerning business recovery and 

next pandemic wave preparedness 

efforts. 

Share all information in an honest, 

consistent, and timely manner. 

Section 5: Continuity of Operations-Essential (COP-E) 

Guide: Pandemic Planning, Preparedness, Response, 

and Recovery 

62 
RECOVERY PHASE 

Action Issues to Consider Supporting Actions 

Maintain public and media Information sharing within the business, • Re-affirm contacts and planned 

relations between the business and its suppliers actions with public and media 

and customers, with other sector points of contact. 

businesses, and for public and media 

relations will remain essential to control • Assess pre-planned message and 

misinformation and rumors. adjust as necessary. 

RECOVERY PHASE 

• Monitor and forecast potential 

public/media relations issues. 

• Quickly address any rumors and 

misinformation. 

• Keep all internal and external 

stakeholders informed in a timely, 

consistent manner. 

Measure, monitor, and adjust Implementing and measuring recovery • Implement the business recovery and 

actions, and monitoring to adjust these prepare for next wave plan. 

based on observed and anticipated 

changes and impacts will continue to • Continuously monitor recovery and 

be the hallmark of the business that prepare actions. 

successfully copes through a pandemic. 

• Adjust actions to restore essential 

functions and ensure success for the 

next pandemic wave. 

15 Remarks of HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt on “Avian Flu,” National Press Club, Oct. 27, 2005, CQ Transcriptions 

16 DHS Pandemic Plan, Chapter 8, Introduction 

63 
Section 6: Partnerships


and Information Sharing


“Our nation has to work together in a unifi ed and 

coordinated manner across federal, state and local 

jurisdictions and with the private sector, and, most 

importantly, with the American people...We need to 

coordinate and share assets and resources and emergency 

plans in a way we haven’t done before.” 

Secretary Michael Chertoff 

Department of Homeland Security 

December 9, 2005 

IN THIS SECTION: Essential Partnership for Success • Facilitate Public-Private Partnerships 

• Why COP-E is Important to the Private Sector • Identify and Enhance Partner Interdependencies 

• DHS Partnering and Information Sharing Capabilities and Initiatives • Partnering and Information Sharing 

Points of Contact 

64 
65 
Section 6: Partnerships


and Information Sharing


6.1 Essential Partnership for 

Success 

A public-private partnership across all levels of 

government and the private sector is critical to preparing 

for and responding to all types of catastrophic events. The 

effects of a pandemic cross all sectors of infrastructure and 

government. Effective preparedness and timely response 

to and recovery from disasters of this scale necessitate 

fundamentally integrated partnerships between Federal, 

State, local, and tribal government agencies and private 

sector CI/KR owners and operators. 

From surviving the temporary loss of more than 40 percent 

of your workers to ensuring the delivery of essential 

commodities, a pandemic will test the private sector. 

DHS, in collaboration with all Federal departments and 

especially the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, 

Health and Human Services, State, and Transportation, 

is committed to working with the private sector to better 

prepare and respond to the potential impacts of a pandemic 

on business. 

This section of the guide focuses on establishing and 

maintaining effective communications both before and 

during a pandemic, specifically highlighting the vital 

nature of robust partnerships between the private sector 

and all levels of government. These trusted partnerships 

are valuable vehicles for a reliable, real-time, two-way 

exchange of information that assists in the preparation for, 

mitigation of, and response to a pandemic. 

Given their tremendous stake in sustaining essential 

business operations, many businesses in the private sector 

have comprehensive emergency management plans 

and systems in place. In addition, corporate America is 

positioned to lend a hand to the government’s pandemic 

response and recovery efforts. 

Pandemic containment strategies rely heavily on frontline 

private sector defenders—healthcare “fi rst responders” 

and the business community—to detect and notify 

government officials ofoccurrence of a pandemic, as well 

as its operational impacts. DHS’ information sharing 

networks, like the Homeland Security Information 

Network (HSIN) and the Sector Coordinating Councils 

(SCC) and Government Coordinating Councils (GCC), 

will be exercised fully for a pandemic allowing for greater 

synergy between the private sector and the government. 

It is important to recognize that a voluntary two-way 

information sharing system between industry and 

government requires the government to assist the private 

sector overcome barriers that, to date, have limited the 

relationship. 

Every business is a link in a chain of actions and 

reactions with all its partner businesses, as well as all 

other businesses, and the community at large. To survive 

a pandemic, all businesses must plan to collaborate 

with members all along their supply chain network, key 

customers, and business competitors. For essential goods 

and material, businesses must undertake a complete 

exploration of their supply chain relationships, starting 

from their internal storage areas and tracking as far as 

practicable along the branches of their supply chain 

network back to the source of the materials, and up to the 

end-user customers. Working with supply chain partners 

to uncover potential weaknesses and highlight critical 

paths through the network will allow for actionable 

planning focused on mitigating any pandemic-related 

challenges. Similarly, businesses must investigate and 

collaborate with their diverse interrelated local community 

and state officials and emergency response partners. 

As outlined in Section 5 of this Guide, security planners 

must educate themselves on how pandemic influenza 

changes the security risks (consequences, threats, 

vulnerabilities) they face. To achieve this effect, the 

Infrastructure Partnership Division of DHS will undertake 

a number of actions, including summarizing the likely 

impacts to each of the 17 CI/KR sectors, supporting CI/KR 

reviews of specific vulnerabilities, and so on. Much of this 

information can be found in the annex of this Guide. 

66 
6.2 Facilitate Public-Private 

Partnerships 

The National Response Plan (NRP) aligns the range of 

Federal incident management and emergency response 

plans into an effective and effi cient structure. Together 

the NRP and the National Incident Management System 

(NIMS) integrate the capabilities and resources of 

various governmental jurisdictions, incident management 

and emergency response disciplines, nongovernmental 

organizations, and the private sector into a cohesive, 

coordinated, and seamless national framework for 

domestic incident management. Specifically, the NIMS 

provides a nationwide template enabling Federal, State, 

local, and tribal governments and private sector and 

nongovernmental organizations to partner and work 

together efficiently to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and 

recover from domestic incidents, including pandemics. 

It is the NRP, using the NIMS, which establishes the 

mechanisms to, among other things: 

• improve coordination and integration of public and 

private partners; 

• maximize efficient use of resources needed to 

protect and restore the nation’s CI/KR; 

• improve incident communications and awareness 

between the public and private sectors; and 

• facilitate Federal emergency support to State, 

local, and tribal governments.17 

The NIMS and NRP are extensive documents; however, 

they are available online. Both should be reviewed to 

assess for business and government partnership and 

coordination implications and options during the planning 

phase, to integrate into continuity of operations plans, 

and to have available for reference during response and 

recovery. For the NRP, log on to www.dhs.gov/interweb/ 

assetlibrary/NRP_FullText.pdf. For more on NIMS, log 

on to http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interweb/assetlibrary/ 

NRP_FullText.pdf. 

6.3 Identify and Enhance 

Partner Interdependencies 

DHS has designed the Sector Partnership Framework, 

which is built on an unprecedented level of public-private 

cooperation. While DHS is responsible for the critical 

infrastructure program, implementation requires an 

integrated process among all key stakeholders, including 

the private sector. The National Infrastructure Protection 

Plan (NIPP) lays out the conceptual framework of the 

SCCs and GCCs. Moreover, the framework envisions these 

councils as the mechanisms for information exchange in 

matters relating to critical infrastructure protection (CIP) 

across the 17 critical sectors. 

• SCCs: Designed to develop an entire range of 

infrastructure protection activities and issues, 

including information sharing, SCCs are the 

sector’s principal point of entry into government. 

SCCs are self-organized, self-run, self-governed, 

and responsible for generating participation of the 

owners/operators within a sector. 

• GCCs: The complementary government 

counterpart for each sector, formed to achieve 

inter-agency coordination. GCCs coordinate 

critical infrastructure strategies, policy, programs, 

and communication across government. 

The Sector Partnership Framework is the mechanism 

for government and private industry to work together to 

address issues of critical infrastructure protection. For 

implementation of the framework to be effective, public 

and private sector stakeholders must have legitimate 

opportunities for meaningful participation. The 

framework generates real value when all partners create 

the work cooperatively. The coordinating councils will 

serve as resources to provide advice, information, and 

recommendations on issues associated with formal CIP 

programs. 

To implement the necessary disease containment strategies 

such as social distancing, worker furloughs, assembly 

closings, and movement restrictions requires strong 

pre-existing partnerships from the relevant public and 

private sector entities well in advance of human outbreaks 

within our borders. The work, however, is not limited to 

preparedness strategies. 

67 
Section 6: Partnerships


and Information Sharing


6.4 DHS Partnering and 

Information-Sharing 

Capabilities and Initiatives 

6.4.1 CI/KR Pandemic Planning 

Support 

Within the Preparedness Directorate of DHS, the Office 

of Infrastructure Protection (IP) leads the national 

preparedness effort to secure critical infrastructure from 

the effects of pandemic influenza. In collaboration with 

its Federal, State and local government partners, DHS-IP 

will work with CI/KR sector organizations and industries 

to identify potential cross-sector and cross-jurisdictional 

impacts. 

DHS-IP will assist and encourage the private sector to 

develop plans and procedures for sustaining essential 

levels of national, regional, and local services during a 

pandemic. To begin, businesses in each CI/KR sector will 

be encouraged to develop and implement a pandemic 

COP-E plan. To that end, DHS-IP will provide technical 

assistance to develop a business COP-E template. By using 

the Sector Partnership Framework, DHS-IP can tailor the 

templates to the diverse needs across the various sectors. 

Currently there is no standard, agreed-upon list of 

information items or shared actions between government 

and private sector businesses for a pandemic. An important 

early goal for the pandemic planning and preparedness 

process will be to ensure active collaboration between 

government at all levels and private sector businesses 

to define what information and actions should and can 

be efficiently and effectively shared between the two, 

and how best to expedite this sharing. With this Guide, 

DHS-IP has taken a first step toward realizing this goal by 

highlighting the challenge, describing issues and outcomes 

to consider, and proposing a process for resolution. 

DHS-IP will now work closely with the CI/KR sectors/ 

businesses and other government agencies to implement 

the Guide and manage the information-sharing process. 

6.4.2 National Infrastructure 

Coordinating Center (NICC) 

The DHS National Operations Center (NOC), formerly 

known as the Homeland Security Operations Center 

(HSOC), serves as the Nation’s hub for domestic incident 

management operational coordination and situational 

awareness. The National Infrastructure Coordinating 

Center (NICC), one of four sub-elements of the NOC, 

facilitates the passing of information between CI/KR 

sector businesses and the NOC. 

As a CI/KR-focused element of the NOC, the NICC, a 

“24/7” watch operations center, provides a centralized 

mechanism and process for information sharing and 

coordination between the government, SCCs, GCCs, 

and other industry partners. The NICC also disseminates 

products originated by the Homeland Infrastructure Threat 

and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) that contain allhazards warning, threat, and CI/KR protection information. 

When a pandemic influenza outbreak is imminent (WHO 

Pandemic Alert Period Phases 4/5 and USG Stages 1/2), 

or already occurred, the private sector is encouraged to 

communicate key information, negative and positive, 

affecting their business or industry to the NICC. 

WHO TO CONTACT: DHS has established a pandemic 

e-mail hotline for the private sector. To contact the 

NICC on pandemic-related issues or to share critical 

and timely information—24/7/365—send an email to 

dhspandemic@dhs.gov. Additionally, for those CI/KR 

businesses participating in the network, the NICC 

can be contacted through the Homeland Security 

Information Network (HSIN). 

DHS plans to use the NICC as the hub for all CI/KR 

private sector information sharing needs during all phases 

of a pandemic. The NICC provides private industry 

partners with a centralized mechanism to report and 

receive information pertaining to threats, events, and 

suspicious activity that may affect the private sector. When 

the pandemic strikes and infrastructure incidents result, the 

NICC will perform important triage and alerting functions, 

coordinating with the appropriate government and industry 

constituents to support situational awareness. These triage 

and alerting functions result in a more rapid and effective 

coordination during crisis response and recovery activities. 

68 
DHS-IP will communicate and update CI/KR private 

sector businesses on key pandemic information and 

government actions through direct interface with the NICC 

by exploiting the HSIN technology platform (discussed 

below). DHS-IP will utilize the NICC as the fi rst stop 

for CI/KR business interface to reduce communications 

confusion; both to receive business information and share 

government information so that together we can develop 

and implement effective, mutually supporting response 

options. 

6.4.3 Homeland Security 

Information Network (HSIN) 

HSIN is the primary internet-based technology platform 

for information sharing between CI/KR businesses, 

sector leadership and the NICC/DHS. Along with the 

NICC direct contact email and telephone numbers above, 

HSIN affords private sector businesses another contact 

solution and continuous source for monitoring pandemic 

information that exploits the power of the internet. For 

all domestic threats, to include an infl uenza pandemic, 

HSIN is the mechanism for collaboration on threats and 

vulnerabilities pertaining to the nation’s CI/KR referred to 

in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD-7). 

HSIN is an operational and technical platform providing a 

suite of tools that will enable DHS and the critical sector 

owners and operators to communicate, coordinate, and 

share information. 

For more information or to enroll in the HSIN-CS, visit 

www.swern.gov/forms/enrollrequirements.php 

In 2005, DHS launched HSIN-Critical Sectors (CS) 

to communicate real-time information to critical 

infrastructure owners and operators. The mission of the 

HSIN-CS program is to ensure the protection and reliable 

performance of the nation’s CI/KR sectors through the 

strategic use of information sharing and communication 

capabilities. Additionally, HSIN creates an enhanced 

partnership between the owners and operators of the 

nation’s critical infrastructures, DHS and the SectorSpecifi c Agencies (SSAs). 

While the primary users of the HSIN platform are 

currently Federal, State, and local government users, the 

possibility of pandemic offers a tremendous opportunity 

to leverage the system’s capabilities for CI/KR sector 

owners and operators. The DHS-run system is a lowcost information-sharing platform that enables the CI/KR 

sectors to coordinate and receive, submit, share, and 

collaborate on timely, actionable, and accurate information 

pertaining to the threats, vulnerabilities, and security 

affecting each sector’s infrastructure. 

Through HSIN-CS, participating users receive the 

following functionality: timely broadcast alerts, threats, 

warnings, and incident reporting; sharing critical 

documents and analyses; real-time collaboration on key 

issues or crises; support best practices and protective 

strategies and the growth of “communities of interest.” 

DHS will also work with critical infrastructure 

stakeholders on an ongoing basis to create and improve 

the value of the HSIN-CS program, and to determine and 

address constraints in the program. 

Much of the success of the program relies on the active 

participation of the critical infrastructure sector members. 

Each sector, working in partnership with DHS, will 

develop the program and the network to further protect and 

sustain the reliability of the specific critical infrastructure 

sector participating in HSIN-CS. 

As with information protection for the HSOC and NICC, 

the Federal government recognizes that, given privacy 

concerns and fear of public disclosure, the private 

sector may be reluctant to share information with the 

Federal government using HSIN. The Protected Critical 

Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program encourages 

private industry to share voluntarily their sensitive 

and proprietary business information with the Federal 

government. If it satisfies the requirements of the Critical 

Infrastructure Information Act of 2002, submitted 

information is protected from public disclosure. For 

more information, visit: www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/ 

editorial/editorial_0404.xml. 

69 
Section 6: Partnerships


and Information Sharing


6.5 Partnering and Information-Sharing Points of Contact 

The following are useful links as your company begins working on its pandemic planning: 

■ For a complete list of state homeland security advisors, visit: www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_ 

0291.xml 

■ To reach the 24/7 CDC Hotline, contact: 800-CDC-INFO (800-232-4636) or email cdcinfo@cdc.gov 

■ For a list of State and territorial publichealth offi cials, visit: www.astho.org/index.php?template=regional_links. 

php&PHPSESSID=58b56231688358e09f989713c70ede0a 

■ For a list of State health departments, visit: www.phppo.cdc.gov/phtn/sites.asp#state 

■ For a list of United States Fire Administration State Points of Contact, visit: www.usfa.fema.gov/pocs/ 

■ For a comprehensive link to all State Emergency Management Agencies, visit: http://www.fema.gov/about/

contact/statedr.shtm

■ For a contact list of all Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regional offi ces, visit: http://www.fema. 

gov/about/contact/regions.shtm 

■ For more information on HHS offices and services available in each region, and how to contact HHS regional 

offi ces, visit: www.hhs.gov/about/regions 

■ For DHS basic preparedness information for businesses and individuals, visit: www.ready.gov 

■ For information on Federal labor laws, visit: www.dol.gov 

■ For information on emergency workforce planning through the public, visit America’s Service Locator at www. 

servicelocator.org 

Please refer to the Appendix in the reference Guide for a more exhaustive list of pandemic-related Web sites. 

70 
71 

17 National Response Plan, for more information, see www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NRP_FullText.pdf 
Section 7: Public 

and Media Relations 

“The media and public officials helped create that 

error [of the 1918 influenza pandemic]—not by 

xaggerating the disease but by minimizing it, in their 

ttempts to reassure the public.”

 John Barry 

“The Great Influenza,” 200418 

t

e

a

IN THIS SECTION: Essential Partnership for Success • Facilitate Public-Private Partnerships 

• Why COP-E is Important to the Private Sector • Identify and Enhance Partner Interdependencies 

• DHS Partnering and Information Sharing Capabilities and Initiatives • Partnering and Information Sharing 

Points of Contact 

72 
73 
Section 7: Public 

and Media Relations 

7.1 Communicating with 

the Public 

The massive scope and broad reach of a pandemic will 

make it virtually impossible for any stakeholder— 

government official or private sector owner and operator— 

to ensure accurate, consistent information. Therefore, 

information management should be a primary focus. 

Whether it is the President informing the public about the 

Federal handling of the crisis or a business owner assuring 

employees about the safety of the workplace, the demands 

for information during a pandemic will be unremitting 

for weeks, even months at a time. Moreover, sustaining 

employee confidence and morale for many months will be 

a tremendous challenge. As with any crisis communication 

plan, business leaders must provide their employees, the 

media, and the public with consistent, relevant, truthful, 

and timely information. 

In the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, 

19 

the White House outlined strategies designed to help 

communicate expectations and responsibilities in the face 

of a pandemic. The National Strategy recognizes planning 

for a pandemic requires the government to articulate 

clearly the actions and priorities necessary to prepare for 

and respond to a pandemic. In order to accomplish this 

goal, the Federal government will: 

• Ensure clear and coordinated risk communication, 

domestically and internationally, before and during 

a pandemic. This includes identifying credible 

spokespersons who can communicate helpful, 

informative, and timely messages. 

• Provide guidance to the private sector and critical 

infrastructure entities on their role in the pandemic 

response, and considerations necessary to 

maintain essential services and operations despite 

significant and sustained worker absenteeism. 

• Provide guidance to individuals on infection 

control behaviors they should adopt pre-pandemic, 

and the specific actions they will need to take 

during a severe influenza season or pandemic. 

• Provide guidance and support to poultry, swine, 

and related industries on their role in responding to 

an outbreak of avian influenza, including ensuring 

the protection of animal workers and initiating 

or strengthening public education campaigns to 

minimize the risks of infection from animals.20 

Sustaining the nation’s infrastructure and essential 

services—the underpinnings of the national economy— 

during a pandemic crisis requires a strong commitment 

from the private sector. DHS will coordinate with HHS 

and State, local, and tribal officials on the messages 

released to the public to ensure communications are 

consistent and accurate. The private sector’s important role 

cannot be overstated. Employers are often the fi rst ones 

to educate employees on prevention strategies, protect 

customers’ health and safety, and mitigate the impact to the 

nation’s economy. 

“I think it’s absolutely critical as a 

leader to deliver an honest message, a 

message that contains all the parts, the 

good and the bad.”

 Dr. John Agwunobi 

Florida State Health Director 

during the 2001 Anthrax attacks 21 

Effective risk communication is essential to inform your 

employees and mitigate panic. As you prepare for the 

pandemic, it is critical for your company to develop a 

coordinated and streamlined information framework 

that facilitates, not impedes, communication to your 

employees, the public, government officials, and the 

media. 

7.2 Communicating with 

Employees and their Families 

The impact of the pandemic on your employees and their 

families will be tremendous. At a time when as many as 

half your staff will be out of the office and nightly media 

accounts report about the virus, it is critical for businesses 

to keep an open two-way line of communication between 

employer and employee. To accomplish this, businesses 

must develop their pandemic emergency communications 

plan now. 

74 
Employers are likely to find themselves communicating 

with anxious employees, a fact that will only contribute 

more to high rates of absenteeism and the “worried well” 

population. It is important that you begin immediately 

disseminating information from public health sources 

covering routine infection control (e.g., hand hygiene, 

coughing, and sneezing etiquette), pandemic influenza 

fundamentals (e.g., signs and symptoms of influenza, 

modes of transmission) as well as personal and family 

protection and response strategies. Prior to the pandemic, 

we recommend beginning an in-house dialogue with 

employees that will: 

• Communicate to your employees very early 

about the possibility of a pandemic, its possible 

ramifications, and your company’s preparedness to 

withstand it. 

• Explain how HR policies will respond to the 

pandemic (i.e., “snow days,” leave policies, 

schools closings, telecommuting policies). 

• Hold a “Pandemic 101” brownbag lunch series 

and multi-media campaign to educate employees 

on pandemic basics and engage them in planning 

efforts. 

• Advise employees where to find up-to-date and 

reliable pandemic information from Federal, State, 

and local public health sources. 

• Inform employees in newsletters, intranet, emails, 

and other internal communication tools on the 

company’s steps (i.e., providing PPE, office 

cleanings) to ensure a safe workplace. 

• Circulate public health information about caring 

for ill family members at home. 

• Identify pandemic coordinator and response team 

(including in-house nurse or healthcare provider) 

with defined roles for preparedness, response, and 

recovery. 

INVOLVE THE STAFF 

Be sure to involve your co-workers in your 

preparedness planning. One of the best methods 

of assuring your company’s recovery is to provide 

for your co-workers’ well-being. Communicate 

regularly with employees before, during, and after 

an incident. 

1.	 Involve co-workers from all levels in 


emergency planning.


2.	 Use newsletters, intranets, staff meetings, 

and other internal communications tools 

to communicate emergency plans and 

procedures. 

3.	 Set up procedures to warn employees. Plan 

how you will communicate with people who 

are hearing-impaired or have other disabilities 

or who do not speak English. 

4.	 Set up a telephone call tree, passwordprotected page on the company website, 

email alert, or call-in voice recording 

to communicate with employees in an 

emergency. 

5.	 Designate an out-of-town phone number 

where employees can leave an “I’m OK” 

message in a catastrophic disaster. 

6.	 Encourage employees to have alternate 

means and routes for getting to and from 

work. 

7.	 Keep a record of employee emergency 

contact information with other important 

documents in your emergency kit and at an 

off-site location. 

8.	 If you rent, lease, or share space with other 

businesses, it is important to communicate, 

share, and coordinate evacuation procedures 

and other emergency plans. 

Courtesy of Ready.gov, for more information,

Visit: www.ready.gov/business/st2-involvecoworkers.html

75 
Section 7: Public 

and Media Relations 

• Work with local public health authorities to determine legal authority and to identify trigger points and procedures 

for company closings and re-openings. 

• Establish an emergency communications plan identifying key contacts with State and local public health officials. 

• Develop and test platforms (e.g., hotlines, “telephone trees,” dedicated Web sites) for communicating pandemic 

status and actions to employee sand families. 

COMMUNICATING WITH YOUR EMPLOYEES 

In the event of a pandemic influenza, businesses will play a key role in protecting employees’ health safety as well as 

limiting the negative impact to the economy and society. Planning for pandemic influenza is critical. To assist you in your 

efforts, HHS/CDC has developed a checklist for large businesses. It identifies important specific activities you can do now 

to prepare, many of which will also help you in other emergencies. 

The communications checklist below is an excerpt from the larger planning document available at www.pandemicflu. 

gov/plan/pdf/businesschecklist.pdf. 

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7.2.1 Strategies for Supporting Businesses and Sectors, Customers 

and the Public 

Given that 85 percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure resides in the hands of the private sector, it is essential for 

corporate America to engage in all Federal, State, and local pandemic preparedness and response activities. When the 

pandemic begins, business leaders must be able to restore employee confidence and morale while conducting media and 

stakeholder outreach that restores public and shareholder confidence in the safety, security, and solvency of the company. 

76 
Decisions made by the private sector can have cascading impacts across various sectors of the economy. Effective 

information management during a pandemic requires planning and coordination across the public and private sectors. It is 

also important to assess your business’ normal communications processes and capabilities for rapid information sharing 

with government partners, supply chain businesses, customers, and workers and their families. 

As you read in Section 6 of this Guide, there are arrays of partnership opportunities available to you as you begin 

developing your preparedness plan. It is important to remember not only your company’s needs, but also how these needs 

can be impacted by other businesses in your sector, government agencies, suppliers along your chain, and key customers 

and contractors. 

In the pre-pandemic period, it will be necessary to enhance and maintain situational awareness across your business and 

to establish working partnerships with other key sector entities, to help identify essential functions and critical intra- and 

inter-sector and cross-border planning, response, and mitigation needs. Due to the complexity of your business and the 

dynamic effect of local decisions on the entire sector, communications plans should address a number of the following 

challenges, including: 

• ensuring adequate information sharing, analysis, and coordination among the private sector, Federal, State, and 

local governments, and international partners; 

• providing updates on the operational status of your business; 

• maintaining awareness of public health measures under consideration that may impact your business, such as 

vaccine/antiviral distribution, need for food and other essential services during quarantines, and social distancing 

measures; and 

• establishing clear notification protocols to keep government partners informed of early warning signs and 

potential cases within your company.

Update existing emergency communications in light of the pandemic threat. Detail how you will communicate with 

employees, authorities, and customers during and after a pandemic disaster. Below are some basic audience-specific 

strategies, developed by DHS for the Ready.Gov Web site. 

1. Employees: Provide employees with information on when, if, and how to report to work following an emergency. 

2. Management: Provide top company executives with all relevant information needed for the protection of 

employees, customers, vendors, and nearby facilities. 

3. Public: Update the public with assurances that you are utilizing all resources to protect workers and the 

community. 

4. Customers: Update customers on the status of products, services, and deliveries. 

5. Government: Tell authorities what you can do, and what you need, in the recovery effort. 

6. Other Businesses/Immediate Neighbors: Be prepared to give competing companies a prompt briefing on the 

nature of the emergency so they can assess their own threat levels. 

77 
Section 7: Public 

and Media Relations 

7.2.2 Response to Changing Conditions and Rumors 

“Sometimes you really don’t know what you don’t know. Dealing with new and 

emerging infections is a very humbling experience. We should not pretend to know 

what will happen. Will it be severe or mild? Which age groups will be most affected? 

We just don’t know.”

 Dr. Margaret Chan

 Representative of the Director for Pandemic Infl uenza, WHO 22 

During a pandemic, anticipate the fear and anxiety of employees and their families based on rumors and misinformation. 

After the initial stages, news media coverage will be a mix of positive and critical coverage. As the media proceeds with 

in-depth analysis of what happened and why, these elements become important to an effective response that fosters trust 

among you and your employees: 

• Monitor news media reports and public inquiries to identify emerging issues, rumors, and misperceptions and 

respond with communications accordingly. 

• Conduct daily conference calls or morning roundtables with a cross-section of your company’s pandemic team to 

discuss latest developments. 

• Distribute prompt daily communications to all staff to update the number of sick employees, respond to rumors, 

and meet with workers and families about deaths. 

REMEMBER THE STARCC PRINCIPLE 

In a crisis, your message to employees and the media must be: 

Simple—Frightened people do not want to hear big words. 

Timely—Frightened people want information now. 

Accurate—Frightened people will not get nuances, so give it straight. 

Relevant—Answer their questions and give action steps. 

Credible—Empathy and openness are your keys to credibility. 

Consistent—The slightest change in the message is upsetting. 

78 
7.3 Communicating with the Media 

Without a doubt, a pandemic will be a full-scale media event. With that understood, it is best to know the press will be there 

and they will be asking questions. Depending on the nature of your business, there is a high probability that the media will 

report something related to your business, so it is your job to make sure they report the facts and to correct them (politely 

and quickly) when they are wrong. 

There are two primary reasons to collaborate with the press before and during a pandemic influenza crisis. First, in 

the throes of a pandemic with many employees working from home, the media may be your primary tool to get public 

safety messages to your employees and information about your business to your customers. Second, the media knows its 

audiences better than you do and can often translate and simplify your message better than you can. 

As with all issues related to the pandemic, working with the media is easier when you have coordinated in advance to 

ensure you have the right contacts and networks within a particular newspaper, radio station, or television news station. For 

more information on dealing with the media during a crisis, visit: www.cdc.gov/communication/emergency/leaders.pdf to 

read the CDC’s publication, “Crisis & Emergency Risk Communications: By Leaders for Leaders.” 

Below you will find a number of excellent risk communications guides and resources for public officials and leaders of any 

enterprise that will help in your pandemic planning efforts. 

• Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication: By Leaders For Leaders (CDC), Course Book (PDF) (695KB), visit: 

www.cdc.gov/communication/emergency/leaders.pdf 

• Participant’s Manual (includes slides) (PDF) (447KB), visit: www.cdc.gov/communication/emergency/part_man.pdf 

• Communicating in a Crisis: Risk Communication Guidelines for Public Officials (Substance Abuse and Mental Health 

Services Administration), visit: www.riskcommunication.samhsa.gov/ 

• Effective Media Communication during Public Health Emergencies (WHO), visit: www.who.int/csr/resources/

publications/WHO_CDS_2005_31/en/

• Terrorism and Other Public Health Emergencies: A Reference Guide for the Media (HHS), visit: www.hhs.gov/

emergency/mediaguide/PDF/

• WHO Handbook for Journalists: Influenza Pandemic (PDF) (738KB), visit: www.who.int/entity/csr/don/Handbook_ 

influenza_pandemic_dec05.pdf 

• WHO Outbreak Communications Guidelines (PDF) (452KB) (WHO), visit: www.who.int/infectious-disease-news/ 

IDdocs/whocds200528/whocds200528en.pdf 

18 Barry, John, The Great Influenza: The epic story of the deadliest plague in history, Penguin Books, pg 462, 2004 

19 www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/pandemic-influenza.html 

20 Ibid 

21 www.cdc.gov/communication/emergency/leaders.pdf 

22 www.who.int/entity/csr/don/Handbook_influenza_pandemic_dec05.pdf 

79 
For more information including a PDF copy of the expanded 

CI/KR guide, please visit www.pandemicflu.gov or email your 

CI/KR-related questions to dhspandemic@dhs.gov.