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PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM:

The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

Gerard R. Murphy and Martha R. Plotkin

with

Secretary Edward A. Flynn

Chief Jane Perlov

Special Agent in Charge Kevin Stafford

Chief Darrel W. Stephens
This project, conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), was supported by Cooperative Agreement #2002-HS-WX-K001 by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services. Points of views or opinions contained in this document are those of the 

authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of 

Justice or the members of PERF.

The opinions expressed are generally those based on the consensus of executive session attendees. However, not every view or statement presented in this report can necessarily be attributed to each individual participant.

© Police Executive Research Forum,

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

Police Executive Research Forum

Washington, DC 20036

United States of America

March 2003

ISBN 1-878734-78-4

Library of Congress Number 2003105278

Photos courtesy of (from top to bottom):

The Arlington County (VA) Police Department (1–3)

Federal Emergency Management Agency (4)

Police Executive Research Forum (5)

Cover Design by David Edelson, PERF

Interior Design by Elliot Thomas Grant, etg Design
iii

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

Acknowledgments.................................................................................................................. v

Foreword............................................................................................................................... xi

Chapters

1. Introduction and Background ................................................................................................ 1

2. Major Themes and Issues...................................................................................................... 5

A Regional Response to Terrorism for Local Law Enforcement Agencies:

 A Site Visit Summary........................................................................................................ 15

3. Security Clearances and Information Sharing...................................................................... 19

A Commentary on Security Clearances............................................................................ 28

4. Joint Terrorism Task Forces ................................................................................................. 31

Heart of America Joint Terrorism Task Force: 

 The Counterterrorism Executive Board (Kansas City Division) ........................................ 39

5. FBI Strategies....................................................................................................................... 41

Difficult Decisions: FBI Priorities...................................................................................... 49

6. Intelligence .......................................................................................................................... 51

Overcoming Barriers to Intelligence Sharing..................................................................... 58

7. Multijurisdictional Information Sharing.............................................................................. 61

Gateway Information Sharing Project: A Site Visit Summary ........................................... 66

8. Training and Awareness....................................................................................................... 71

Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 77

References............................................................................................................................ 79

Appendices

A. FBI Policy and Guidelines .................................................................................................... 83

B. Edwin Delattre Speech: A Reflection on Successful Partnerships ......................................... 87

C. Participants and Observers List............................................................................................ 93

About the Authors ............................................................................................................... 97

About the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)

 U.S. Department of Justice ............................................................................................ 101

About PERF ....................................................................................................................... 103

CONTENTS
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

First and foremost, we must thank those who 

attended and participated in the executive 

session. (You will find these law enforcement 

leaders listed in Appendix C.) Their collective 

knowledge and insight was truly impressive. 

Just as impressive was their willingness to engage in a candid discussion of sensitive issues 

at a forum they knew was going to be based 

on a contentious agenda. Each participant 

outlined critical issues and concerns, but that 

was only the beginning. They were committed 

to understanding each other’s perspective and 

developing creative solutions to long-standing 

problems. They demonstrated the type of leadership that we have come to hope for in all law 

enforcement leaders who are engaged in this 

fight against terrorism.

This paper and the larger project are 

made possible with the Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services’ support and guidance, under the leadership of Director Carl 

Peed. Project Monitor Amy Schapiro has 

demonstrated patience and support as we have 

developed the template for this series of five 

executive sessions and white papers on local 

law enforcement and terrorism. Ellen Scrivner, 

who has been tasked to the FBI from the COPS 

office, also provided invaluable assistance on 

all phases of the project to date.

Deborah Daniels, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Justice Programs, provided 

important insights at the executive session and 

a thoughtful review of the final product. Edwin 

Delattre, Professor of Philosophy at Boston UniWE WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE MANY INDIVIDUALS WHO CONTRIButed to this paper. Their interest in seeing this paper finished is 

reflected in the tremendous time they spent providing advice, 

guidance and recommendations. Any value this paper has to the field is due largely to their willingness to answer endless questions and explain the many complex 

issues associated with local–federal partnerships.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

vi 

versity, graciously spoke to executive session 

participants at a special dinner and was among a 

select group of observers. He also took the time 

to conduct a detailed review of the draft report 

and provided critical feedback and guidance.

We want to thank those who contributed 

to this paper by writing commentaries or sidebar pieces: FBI Special Agent in Charge Kevin 

Stafford of the Kansas City, MO, Field Office; 

Police Chiefs Darrel Stephens of Charlotte–

Mecklenburg, NC, and Jane Perlov of Raleigh, 

NC; and Massachusetts Secretary of Public 

Safety Edward Flynn. They typify the kind of 

true innovators in law enforcement who will 

ultimately make our nation a safer place to 

live.

Throughout the executive session planning and the writing of this paper, a number 

of individuals at the FBI provided essential 

direction and perspective. FBI Director Robert 

S. Mueller, who has repeatedly reached out to 

local law enforcement, endorsed the idea of 

the executive session and made it possible. 

Retired Executive Assistant Director Kathleen 

McChesney identified and recruited FBI participants for the session. We thank Charles 

Prouty, who took over her position, helped coordinate FBI resources and participated fully 

in the executive session. Assistant Director 

Louis F. Quijas from the FBI’s Office of Law 

Enforcement Coordination attended much of 

the session and provided his important support for this effort. Special Agent Kathleen 

Timmons in the Office of Law Enforcement 

Coordination also served as our liaison during 

the research and writing portions of this project and tolerated our many inquiries. Lisa Michelle Keller, an FBI Public Affairs Specialist, 

and Edward M. Shubert, Section Chief of the 

Personnel Security Section, Security Division, 

provided much-needed resources and verified 

facts for the paper that would have taken us 

months to chase down.

A number of law enforcement professionals in the St. Louis, Missouri, and Redondo 

Beach, California, areas shared with us their 

innovative programs. In St. Louis, FBI Special 

Agent in Charge Thomas Bush and Metropolitan Police Chief Joseph Mokwa allowed us to 

observe their facilities and interview personnel 

and candidly spoke about the successes and 

challenges of the Gateway Information Project. 

St. Louis Police Sergeant Robert Hiemberger 

arranged our visit, consented to our interviews 

and carefully explained complex information 

technologies.

In Redondo Beach, Chief Robert Luman 

graciously hosted our visit. Lieutenant John 

Skipper and City Prosecutor Michael Webb arranged all details of our visit and spent long days 

with us as we tried to understand their many 

accomplishments. FBI Supervisory Agent Linas 

Danilevicius of the Long Beach Resident Office explained how the JTTF functions. Special 

Agent Supervisor Gary Edgington of CATIC and 

Lieutenant Phillip Hansen and Sergeant John 

Sullivan of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office detailed their programs as well.

Several members of the PERF staff spent 

countless hours tracking down information, 
vii

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

reviewing drafts of the paper, and correcting 

mistakes. Executive Director Chuck Wexler 

was instrumental in supporting and facilitating the executive session and ensured that 

the no-holds-barred discussion of the issues 

resulted in constructive recommendations and 

a compelling commitment to work together 

in implementing them. Research Assistant 

Judy Lim managed the logistics of the two-day 

event. David Bright helped research many of 

the issues in the report. We owe a thanks to 

Elliot Grant, of etg Design, and PERF staffer 

David Edelson for their design work. But it 

is Research Associate Heather Davies who 

deserves special recognition (maybe a medal) 

for her work on this paper, especially since she 

joined our staff after the executive session was 

held. Heather diligently learned the issues and 

spent many hours working with FBI personnel 

to verify facts and accurately portray them in 

the paper. She kept us on track, proofed every 

word and poured over reams of research materials—all with good humor.

We are sure we have left someone out 

unintentionally. Whoever you may be, and all 

those whom we list above, we thank you. To 

those of you in law enforcement at every level 

of government who work daily to make our 

communities safe from terrorism, we hope this 

paper provides you some of the resources and 

information you have been seeking.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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ix

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

There is no single, universally accepted definition of terrorism or 

agreement about whether a specific definition applies to a particular 

incident.

The FBI cites the Code of Federal Regulations in defining terrorism as

[t]he unlawful use of force and violence against persons or 

property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian 

population or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives1

 (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85).

This is the definition that will be used for the purposes of this report.

1 The FBI further distinguishes between domestic and international terrorism and cites the legal authority 

for activities used to counter, investigate and prosecute terrorists. See, e.g., FBI Policy Guidelines in Terrorism in the United States: 1999 (FBI 2000). Excerpts are provided in Appendix A to this document.

TERRORISM
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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xi

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

Because of these, and the likelihood of additional change agents, the law enforcement 

profession is repositioning itself for how it 

fights terrorism. Many agencies have engaged 

in internal discussions to determine their 

capabilities and responsibilities, and more organized discussions have progressed in some 

states. Yet, on a national level, law enforcement is just beginning to develop comprehensive and detailed strategies for preventing and 

responding to terrorism. Policing as a profession is working on ways that the underlying 

principles of community policing can contribute to strategies to prevent terrorist activities. 

Finally, law enforcement leaders have not yet 

discussed how counterterrorism responsibilities could profoundly affect the police–citizen 

relationships and other positive influences 

of community policing on organizations and 

communities alike.

The Police Executive Research Forum 

(PERF), with funding from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS 

Office), will attempt to close those gaps. PERF 

has been providing local law enforcement leaders with the opportunity to examine these and 

other issues related to preventing and addressing terrorist acts. PERF is providing a series of 

forums for law enforcement chief executives, 

other policing professionals and government 

S

EPTEMBER 11, 2001, WAS A TURNING POINT FOR AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEment. Immediately following the attacks, local, state and federal law enforcement agencies faced service demands, problems and issues that they 

had never seen before. Within the next year, agencies witnessed how those developments affected budgets, policies, operational priorities, training and personnel. 

Sweeping reforms were not far behind. The passage of federal and state laws is 

only now being felt, and these mandates will surely continue to instigate additional changes in police organizations’ missions and strategies. Pending federal 

grant and technical assistance programs will also drive significant restructuring, 

as police agencies position themselves to receive that support.

FOREWORD
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

xii 

policymakers to explore, debate and exchange 

information on providing community-policing 

services in a security-conscious world. This 

initiative will produce practical advice for addressing immediate problems related to terrorism, as well as a framework to guide the 

profession for the next three to five years.

This white paper is the first in a series of 

five that takes on issues of primary concern to 

law enforcement professionals. It is based, in 

large part, on an unprecedented executive session that brought together sheriffs, police chief 

executives, FBI Special Agents in Charge and 

antiterrorist experts, and other leading thinkers on how law enforcement will deal with the 

new terrorist threat. It was a no-holds-barred 

meeting in which candid debates were conducted on the practical and very real concerns 

of those who must make daily decisions about 

how their personnel and other resources will 

be spent to address terrorism and competing 

demands for service. Participants took a hard 

look at how local and federal agencies work 

together and what needs to be done to improve 

cooperation. The result is the agenda set out 

in this paper—set by consensus and an urgent 

desire to move our preparedness and response 

forward in these difficult times, without abandoning our promise to our communities to address crime and disorder. It is one of a number 

of products being developed under this COPSsupported effort.

PERF will also conduct a national survey 

of law enforcement leaders and a series of four 

additional executive sessions that will address 

such tentative topics as policing multicultural 

communities, bioterrorism, intelligence and 

homeland security. In addition, PERF’s project 

team will conduct fieldwork to identify model 

programs and approaches that work to address 

terrorism in a community-policing context 

that others nationwide can tailor to the unique 

needs of their jurisdictions. The result will be 

four more white papers and a comprehensive 

written manual for police agencies.

The COPS Office and PERF are pleased 

to facilitate these forums and other work that 

will provide the profession with opportunities 

to share and develop effective strategies for addressing terrorism while continuing to advance 

community policing.

Carl Peed Chuck Wexler

Director, COPS Executive Director, PERF
1

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

CH A P T E R ON E

Local law enforcement agencies, in the face of 

new and uncertain threats to their communities, struggle to identify all their responsibilities and define their exact role in the nation’s 

fight against terrorism. The FBI and other federal agencies are also faced with new duties and 

priorities, such as expanding their intelligencegathering and coordinating functions, as well 

as other counterterrorism efforts. So, while 

every law enforcement agency strives to do 

its part, too many of them are unsure of what 

their part should be. And even those that feel 

certain of their charges must make significant 

changes to their structure, policies, procedures, 

personnel expertise, training and budgets—all 

with only their own guidelines or standards to 

ensure success.

The Local–Federal Partnership

Preventing and responding to terrorism is 

all the more complex because no agency 

can do it alone. The “readiness” of any one 

agency—whether it is the Lawrence (KS) Police Department, the Hennepin County (MN) 

Sheriff’s Office, the D.C. Metropolitan Police 

Department, or the FBI—is insufficient in the 

face of the potential threat. For more than 125 

years, American law enforcement has been organized around the principles of independence 

and decentralization. Some 18,0002 local, state 

MORE THAN A YEAR AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, AMERICAN LAW ENforcement is working diligently to prevent the next terrorist attack. Will it be enough? Leaders of every law enforcement agency in 

America want to do their part in the fight against terrorism, yet many local police 

are struggling to muster resources, reorient their personnel and carve out new 

relationships with their state and federal counterparts. To complicate matters, 

their efforts lack a strong unifying strategy and coordinated approach with other 

jurisdictions and with agencies at other levels of government.

2 According to Reaves and Hickman (2002), “As of June 2000, State and local governments in the United 

States operated 17,784 full-time law enforcement agencies—those that employed at least one full-time 

sworn officer with general arrest powers or the equivalent in part-time officers.”
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

2 

and federal agencies operate as autonomous 

entities, often unconnected to those in neighboring jurisdictions or at different levels of government. The threat of terrorism in America’s 

cities and towns, however, has revealed the 

critical need for improved coordination and 

resource sharing—whether personnel, equipment or information—to develop a formidable 

strategy to counter future acts of terrorism.

Local and federal law enforcement agencies 

have worked together for decades to prevent 

and solve crimes: bank robbery investigations, 

kidnappings, financial crimes, cybercrime, 

gangs and drugs. They have coordinated resources in the area of crime reporting and 

forensic and laboratory services. And they have 

engaged joint task forces to address a variety of 

crimes that cross jurisdictional boundaries. But 

these partnerships have not fully prepared law 

enforcement for the unprecedented demands 

they face now that international terrorists 

have struck in the United States and threaten 

to do so again. Local and federal law enforcement must build on positive past relationships 

and address any remaining impediments to full 

cooperation if they are to truly succeed in carrying out their new mandates.

The Executive Session

On November 7–8, 2002, PERF3 convened a 

group for an unparalleled discussion among 

big-city police chief executives; sheriffs; FBI 

experts on terrorism, including several Special 

Agents in Charge (SACs); policymakers; and 

observers in Washington, D.C., to examine 

the local–federal partnership. (See Appendix C 

for a list of the principal participants.) These 

leaders in policing were tasked with developing practical guidelines to improve how local 

law enforcement and federal agencies can 

sustain more effective partnerships. The law 

enforcement executives came from jurisdictions across the country and were almost 

Everybody here knows from 

experience that domestic 

tranquility and the common 

defense, fundamental purposes 

of government identified in the 

Preamble to the Constitution, 

cannot be achieved when local and 

federal agencies ignore obligations 

they can meet only by working 

together (Speech to Executive 

Session Participants4).

—Ed Delattre

3 PERF is a nonprofit membership organization of progressive policing professionals dedicated to advancing law enforcement services to all communities through experimentation and national leadership. Its 

members serve more than half the nation’s population, and the organization provides training, technical 

assistance, research, publications and other services to its members and the profession. More information 

about PERF can be found at www.policeforum.org.

4 Delattre’s speech can be found in Appendix B.
3

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

evenly divided between local chiefs and sheriffs 

from cities and counties and FBI SACs and 

Headquarters administrators. Moderated by 

PERF’s Executive Director, the session identified problems, potential solutions and strategic 

outcomes focusing on public safety and what is 

best for the country. A number of broad topics 

and specific questions related to those topics 

were used to guide the discussions, including 

the following:

• Defining the Local–Federal Partnership

• Federal and Local Law Enforcement 

Needs and Capacities

• Information Sharing Between Local and 

Federal Agencies

• Models of Successful Partnerships

• A Strategy for Improving Partnerships

After a day and a half of high-level discussions, the group summarized and reviewed 

its findings to identify areas that required additional work and to confirm consensus. The 

meeting was punctuated with a briefing for FBI 

Director Robert Mueller, who came to thank 

the participants for their work on improving 

collaborations and to discuss ideas with participants on key issues, including the challenges of 

implementing the group’s recommendations.

The White Paper

This paper details the first executive session 

participants’ major findings and recommendations, which were the result of thoughtful deliberation and the collective expertise of leaders 

in the fight against terrorism in our communities. The priorities are the centerpiece of the 

paper and will receive the most attention. In 

each priority area, various perspectives and 

highlights from the discussions are presented, 

with an emphasis on understanding the true 

nature of the problems and obstacles to effective partnerships, as well as recommendations 

for improved collaborations. Additionally, the 

paper includes several sidebar articles that take 

one of two forms: One type of sidebar is authored by one of the session participants and 

elaborates on a subject that draws on his or her 

perspectives and experiences. The other type of 

sidebar, written by project staff, describes programs that have been identified as potentially 

promising for addressing a vital element of a 

counterterrorism strategy. It is hoped that the 

paper will advance cooperation and coordination among law enforcement agencies at all 

levels.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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5

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

By the end of the first day, the participants 

identified more than 100 critical issues that 

could be divided into two categories: those that 

hindered an effective local–federal partnership 

and those that could improve that partnership. 

By the end of the second day, the list had been 

grouped into 12 priority topic areas, which 

PERF staff were able to refine and aggregate 

further after the session to the seven key priorities detailed in this paper. Many timely and 

important issues were beyond the parameters 

of this first executive session, and some issues 

received only a cursory review. Many of these 

topics, however, will be addressed in the five 

additional executive sessions that PERF will be 

facilitating.5

The first priority area addresses the importance of effective partnerships as well as 

the manner in which participants should work 

to strengthen them. The remaining six priority 

MAJOR THEMES AND ISSUES

CH A P T E R TW O

F

OR NEARLY TWO DAYS, LOCAL AND FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVES

engaged in a forum to dissect their collaboration efforts—identifying how 

to build on successes and address remaining challenges that will advance 

how they can prevent, investigate and respond to terrorist activity. The executive 

session was unprecedented, in both content and style. None of the participants 

could recall a similar national-level gathering of local and federal leaders in a candid exchange of ideas on joint law enforcement strategies. Nor could any recall 

a meeting where defensive postures and turf battles were put aside in an honest 

attempt to strengthen this essential partnership. Participants’ criticisms, explanations, descriptions and recommendations were introduced, discussed and debated. 

Ultimately, the group reached consensus on many seemingly intractable issues.

5 Though the topics have not been finalized, it is expected that four sessions will cover such issues as policing multicultural communities, bioterrorism, intelligence and homeland security systems. In addition, a 

final session will be held with support from the U.S. Justice Department’s National Institute of Justice to 

examine critical incident management systems in local law enforcement.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

6 

areas address specific programs or functions of 

the local–federal partnership. The seven priorities are

• Promoting Effective Local–Federal 

Partnerships,

• Security Clearances and Information 

Sharing,

• Joint Terrorism Task Forces,

• FBI Strategies,

• Intelligence,

• Multijurisdictional Information 

Sharing, and

• Training and Awareness.

The participants’ discussions about each of 

these priority issues also revealed a number of 

recurring and unifying themes that are listed 

below. These themes provide insight into the 

causes of some of the problems and challenges 

that law enforcement partners face. They also 

provide a context in which the discussions and 

recommendations can be more fully understood. These themes include concerns with 

the following:

• Accountability

• Awareness

• Communication

• Coordination

• Credibility

• Focus

• Honesty

• Integrity

• Openness

• Proactivity

• Respect

• Trust

• Unified Public Voice

The next section of this chapter is devoted 

to the first priority, as it provides the framework for examining the six more specific programmatic and issue-specific areas, which are 

detailed in subsequent chapters. Readers will 

observe how the themes listed above are woven 

through many of these discussions and the related recommendations for change.

Priority One:

Promoting Effective Local–Federal 

Partnerships

Throughout the first executive session, all participants emphasized that the need for a truly 

effective local–federal partnership is stronger 

today than ever before. This partnership has 

been productive many times in the past and 

remains vital today; however, it is not without 

its problems and requires additional work to 

realize its full potential. Both the local and 

federal participants admitted that confusion 

over roles, uncertainty about responsibilities, 

breakdowns in communication and even a 

“I agree that this is an 

unprecedented meeting. I have 

never attended a meeting with such 

a candid and productive dialogue on 

how we can work together.”

— FBI SAC
7

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

lack of trust have historically been among the 

factors that have plagued partnership efforts 

and recently have placed new strains on it.6

However, the participants expressed a strong 

resolve to work together to enhance their collective ability to protect our communities from 

terrorism.

Information Exchange and Access

Perhaps the cornerstone of this partnership is 

information exchange. Participants acknowledged that barriers to information exchange 

exist in all law enforcement agencies, and at 

every level. Barriers may be technological, organizational or territorial. They prevail in and 

among local police agencies as well as their 

state and federal counterparts. These barriers prevent agencies from sharing with other 

agencies and, just as importantly, from sharing 

information within agencies. There are many 

reasons why so many law enforcement personnel are protective of their information. They 

may be reluctant to share information with 

others to ensure protection of their sources or 

the integrity of an investigation, for example. 

Though it is common for individuals and organizations to hold information to retain control 

or to obtain a position of power in a collaboration, law enforcement must strive to overcome 

the barriers to information exchange—barriers 

that ultimately limit law enforcement effectiveness.

All participants agreed that better information exchange is critically needed and suggested a number of ideas for improving flow. The 

greatest complaint from all participants—local 

and federal—was that they received important 

terrorist alert information from CNN before 

their own partners or headquarters (respectively). CNN was seemingly picking up information in real time, disseminating it faster 

than even federal agencies could. (For more on 

the media, see page 11.) All participants also 

agreed that there may be a misperception that 

the FBI has more detailed, accurate or confirmed information than it actually has. FBI 

representatives discussed the overwhelming 

volume of raw data and information that is being analyzed and examined at the federal level 

that has not yet yielded the kind of detailed 

direction that local law enforcement is seeking. Clearly, greater mutual trust would help 

answer the question about whether valuable 

information is being withheld (and for what 

reason) or whether it simply does not exist.

Participants from the local agencies spoke 

of the need to improve communication and 

information exchange so that they have a bet6 Certainly local and federal partnerships vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Collaborations may be 

shaped by available local law enforcement resources to conduct investigations on crimes for which there 

is concurrent jurisdiction. Other factors include the length of a working relationship between the current 

police chief executive and SAC, budget issues, size of a jurisdiction and potential targets, personalities, 

organizational culture, history and myriad other features of a particular area. While many of these factors 

were discussed, the group’s focus was on developing strategies for resolving problems and challenges that 

could be tailored to a jurisdiction’s specific needs. 
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

8 

ter understanding of when and why federal officials are operating in their jurisdictions. They 

seek timely information that will support proactive and preventive measures. Local executives expressed a need for more information on 

investigations in their own backyards, including whom the federal agencies are examining. 

They expressed concerns about operational 

coordination and officer safety. Chiefs and 

sheriffs believe that early notification and information sharing would allow local police7

 to 

act as a force multiplier for the federal officers, 

in which they could offer help, coordinate undercover efforts, not open a parallel operation, 

or back off, if that was required.

While many participants extolled the positive working relationships in their own jurisdictions, there was a sense within the group that 

issues of trust, organizational culture, history 

of leaks or misuse of information and other 

matters continued to undermine some efforts 

across the country. There was consensus that 

local and federal leaders need to better address 

instances in which information was misused 

in the past and to ensure the integrity of the exchange in the future. FBI and local executives 

emphasized the importance of developing relationships during times of non-stress—before 

the crisis strikes. This relationship building 

must include developing processes and protocols for information sharing that can prevail 

if there are future personality conflicts. By 

their own admission, the executives believed 

relationships were largely dependent on personalities and agreed that how SACs and local police officials get along with one another 

will always be a part of the equation. They 

stressed, however, that partnerships must be 

established in ways that can survive executive 

or other key personnel turnover. The information must continue to flow regardless of who is 

in charge. The participants agreed that federal 

and local partners need to alert one another to 

perceived problems, obstacles and failures in a 

spirit of cooperation so they can be discussed 

and resolved. The partnerships must be based 

on openness, honesty and trust.

When trust and openness are tenets of 

information exchange, chiefs believe progress 

will be made in ameliorating local law enforcement’s perceptions that the information 

flow is unilateral. One chief, in stressing the 

importance of information exchange, described 

a partnership “as a coordinated effort on a continuous basis.” Unfortunately, the local police 

participants generally felt information is not 

always shared continuously, nor exchanged 

“Let’s be honest. The FBI just may 

not have the terrorism intelligence 

we are looking for.”

—Local Law Enforcement Executive

7 Unless referring to a particular agency, the term “police” is used in the broadest sense and includes both 

police and sheriff organizations. Likewise, the term “chiefs” refers to all local law enforcement executives.
9

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

in a coordinated fashion. Without hearing an 

explanation for these inconsistencies, local 

executives may perceive the failure to share 

information as deliberate.

A number of executives said that the flow 

of information is primarily one-way: Locals 

give more to the federal agencies than they get 

in return. Local officials provide investigative 

information and even intelligence to FBI field 

offices but do not receive similar information. 

That frustration is aggravated by the perception that the FBI does not provide feedback on 

how they use the information that locals provide, and indeed may classify the information 

that may stymie local police follow-up or parallel efforts. Chiefs and sheriffs also indicated 

that the FBI does not always pass along new 

information it develops or receives from other 

law enforcement or national security agencies. 

It should be noted, however, that several local 

law enforcement executives recognized that 

the information exchange between their local 

agencies and the FBI has improved since September 11.

The FBI officials, however, countered that 

they work under several constraints, including 

the post-Hanssen culture and the concerns 

among agents that they do not inadvertently 

violate nondisclosure agreements, agency policies or otherwise endanger a source or investigation. They also noted that there may again 

be a misperception that they have better and 

more information than they actually have.

A number of local executives expressed 

concern that federal agencies were using local 

law enforcement’s lack of security clearances 

as an excuse not to share investigative and 

operational information in a timely manner. 

These concerns are addressed in sections on 

Clearances and Intelligence in more detail 

below and also were raised in the context of assessing the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 

forums as mechanisms for sharing information. As discussed more fully in later sections, 

chiefs are concerned about accountability and 

effectiveness when the JTTF member from his 

or her department cannot share information 

with the chief because the JTTF officer has a 

higher clearance or the police chief executive, 

as yet, has none at all.

There was agreement among the local law 

enforcement and federal agency representatives that much of the substantive information 

that chief executives need at the local level can 

be made available through alternative mechanisms without needing to invoke the highest 

security clearance protocols.

Building Partnerships Early

The proactive partnerships that participants 

referenced above regarding non-crisis planning 

included suggestions for joint field training exercises, Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), 

media policies and other efforts to determine 

more formally the scope and nature of the partnership. Building a strong partnership before a 

critical incident improves the chances that federal and local officials will work together effectively to manage the incident. If nothing else, 

the participants will at least know one another 
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

10 

and have a sense of counterparts’ operations. 

These proactive steps can take place between 

SACs and individual chiefs/sheriffs or through 

local, regional and statewide law enforcement 

associations. Partnership building also requires 

guidelines for how to address “offers of assistance”—setting parameters for those that are 

accepted and explaining the reasons why some 

offers will not be accepted.

Participants also felt strongly that both 

sides of the partnership need a better understanding of the other’s resources and how 

they may be used to complement partner’s 

efforts. Local officials stated that they would 

like to have a better understanding of the FBI’s 

capabilities—both at the organizational and 

field office level. This understanding would 

enhance the potential for federal and local resources to be used in a complementary, rather 

than competitive, fashion.

To be effective, local law enforcement 

needs a realistic awareness and understanding 

of FBI capabilities. The FBI SACs provided the 

local police participants with new information 

about the limits to resources they have in their 

field offices and the budgetary requirements 

they must follow that hamper SAC discretion 

about how resources can be allocated among 

their mandates. Too often, they felt, local law 

enforcement perceived that the FBI had unlimited resources, such as equipment, personnel, 

computers, funding and information. Specifically, SACs said that local executives accuse 

them of “holding out,” which in reality is a lack 

of communication and education about their 

parameters for sharing information and legal 

mandates on their level of involvement in terrorism versus other types of joint jurisdictional 

coordination.

Both federal and local executives expressed 

the need for honesty and accountability in operations. Local executives said that when an officer screws up or there is a perceived problem, 

the FBI needs to notify local executives right 

away so the problems can be corrected and not 

fester. The SACs said that chiefs and sheriffs 

should do the same thing when agents “screw 

up,” and even when SACs get it wrong.

Accountability for Chiefs

The executive session provided an opportunity for both sides to explain some of the constraints under which they operate and to clarify 

the checks and balances inherent in their respective positions. For example, the police 

chiefs were mindful of their responsibilities to 

their citizens and their political accountability, 

as well as the effect of their decisions on local 

government operations.

Local law enforcement executives detailed 

what is necessary to protect local infrastructure. In addition to their routine threat assessments, local officials will also take action 

based on information from federal officials. 

There are tremendous costs and consequences for large deployments and resource commitments based on others’ information (even 

the FBI’s), so they need to base requests for 

city resources on reliable federal information. 

Chiefs discussed the need to explain to politi-
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

cal and budget leaders why they must allocate 

the requested resources. A strong partnership 

that is based on open discussions provides the 

clear and timely information needed to make 

proper decisions. At the same time, local executives acknowledged that their colleagues 

must not demand too much information—information that would be nice to know versus 

the information they need to know. As one 

chief stated, “I know what it is like to babysit those [individuals in my own jurisdiction] 

who did not need to know information, but 

wanted to.”

Failure to base decisions on reliable and 

timely information has consequences for all 

involved. As one chief said, “SACs will find 

themselves working with a new chief if elected 

officials don’t have information that ultimately 

could have prevented a crisis.” The key, again, 

seems to be one of trust. Another chief spoke 

about shutting down a large tourist attraction 

based on information from a SAC on whose 

word he felt he could rely, and he indicated he 

would do it again.

Armed with timely and reliable information, chiefs felt they would be better able to 

meet their own accountability mandates. 

Chiefs believed they needed to try to build partnerships with their own city managers, mayors 

or other oversight authority to ensure that 

any early notice of a potential threat would 

be secure and understood. By explaining how 

they build relationships with political leaders 

that are based on trust and timing, the chiefs 

were able to identify with the demands that the 

SACs must balance.

Media Relations

Complicating issues related to information exchange among law enforcement agencies is the 

role of the media. Because this executive session convened in the shadow of the “Beltway 

Sniper Investigation,” there were heightened 

sensitivities about information leaked to the 

media—information that ultimately reached 

the public before all involved law enforcement 

agencies—which held the potential to derail 

the investigation.

All the participants stressed the hazards of 

not receiving threat or investigative information from knowledgeable colleagues before the 

media do. The SACs startled some of the local 

officials when they said they too have received 

critical information from CNN before it could 

be communicated through official channels.

Media leaks are a critical problem for both 

federal and local law enforcement and are not 

limited to any one rank. Chiefs and SACs 

spoke about the need to train agents and officers about the importance of preventing leaks. 

The group believed that too many law enforcement personnel talk too freely, sometimes 

violating disclosure agreements that come 

“You can’t ask for information that 

is nice to know. We need to only 

request what we need to know.”

—Local Law Enforcement Executive
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12 

with security clearances. The media and other 

organizations are using ex-officers to tap old 

friends for information. One chief discussed 

plans to work on securing information through 

training and policy to ensure that sensitive 

investigation issues are not discussed at home 

and with friends.

When the time has come to share information with the media, federal and local joint 

operations should rely on pre-established media strategies and media relation policies that 

inform the public and retain control over information that could damage coordinated efforts. 

Spokespersons and other details should be determined to minimize any tensions among the 

partners and so law enforcement can be seen as 

speaking with one voice.

Partnerships’ Effects on 

Community Policing

“Creating a safe nation starts with safe 

streets,” began one chief as he spoke about 

the importance and centrality of community 

policing to antiterrorism efforts. Local police 

are partners with the community in addressing 

crime, and now in collecting information that 

might prevent the next terrorist attack. Local 

chief participants voiced their concern that the 

FBI does not always understand the extent to 

which communities hold local chiefs and sheriffs accountable for federal agencies’ actions in 

the community and the importance of local 

police relations with their constituencies.

The local officials believed that community 

policing has provided valuable lessons, relationships and approaches that can be applied to 

“counterterrorism policing.” However, many of 

the local participants were concerned that federal officials are not aware of community issues 

when they sweep into a jurisdiction to search for 

an individual or engage in other investigatory 

practices and leave just as quickly. The unintended consequence is damage to police–citizen 

relations, particularly in minority communities, 

that took tremendous effort to build through 

community policing.

Citizen engagement and collaborative 

problem solving yield tremendous resources 

that allow local law enforcement to gather information. Several ideas were discussed about 

how local law enforcement might assist the 

FBI with engaging and disengaging when in 

their communities. For example, some local 

participants believed the FBI could work with 

the local agencies to have area police officers or 

deputies perform some operations or be counseled by local agencies on what has worked 

within their communities that might influence 

federal agency tactics. For example, local law 

enforcement suggested it can provide valuable 

street-level information and employ different 

methods, such as using citizen informants instead of paid informants. Planning for how federal and local agencies will engage area citizens 

may also involve arrangements for when SACs’ 

offices are not staffed for action. Arrangements 

may need to be made so that the FBI schedule 

is expanded or it agrees to support local investigators if they act on time-sensitive information 

in the middle of the night.
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

Federal-level investigative tactics should be 

examined, according to local enforcement officials, in the light of community-policing principles to ensure they will not create problems for 

local law enforcement when an investigation 

is finished. Whether it is the INS, ATF, FBI or 

other federal agency involved in an investigation, it is the local chief executive who is held 

accountable by the local community.

The FBI has recognized these concerns, 

and FBI participants expressed their commitment to improving community relationships 

in much the same way that local police have 

done through community policing efforts. The 

FBI is trying to work with minority communities and hopes to partner closely with local law 

enforcement to show a unified commitment. 

The FBI’s Office of Law Enforcement Coordination hopes to facilitate this effort by promoting the concepts of community-oriented 

policing in the FBI.

Recommendations and Concerns

• A strong local–federal partnership is 

essential to our nation’s fight against 

terrorism. This partnership should be 

multifaceted, and law enforcement 

must continue to identify ways to work 

together to advance common interests. 

This first executive session is a step 

in the right direction, but similar and 

complementary efforts are continually 

needed, particularly parallel work at the 

local–regional level.

• Information exchange and access can 

only be achieved through pre-crisis 

planning, which may involve formal 

mechanisms (MOUs, joint media and 

information dissemination policies for 

joint task forces, and more) to ensure 

that working relationships and roles are 

defined and that they survive changes in 

leadership or personality conflicts.

• Local police and federal officials must 

address any tensions, trust issues and 

misperceptions at the local level. Each 

should inform the other of their respective resources, legal mandates, limitations and accountability concerns. 

Guidelines for the nature and scope 

of the information that can be shared 

should be detailed as well. Each partner 

must also identify and redress barriers 

to interagency (among same-level agencies and between agencies at other levels 

of government) and intra-agency information sharing.

• Local and federal partners can be more 

supportive of one another’s efforts to ensure appropriate resources and flexibility 

are given SACs, local law enforcement 

chief executives and others coordinating 

“Locals need to live and work in 

that community long after the 

investigation and sometimes need 

to repair damaged relationships 

caused by federal investigators.”

—Local Law Enforcement Executive
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14 

the response to terrorism. For example, 

local law enforcement executives (chiefs 

and sheriffs) volunteered to speak to 

their elected representatives about the 

need for strengthening the local–federal 

partnership. The FBI can provide assistance to chiefs in developing protocols 

for sharing information with political 

leaders. Local law enforcement executive participants also offered to testify 

before Congress and other policymakers on behalf of, and with, the FBI to 

address obstacles to coordination and 

to ensure resources can be effectively 

deployed where they are most needed.

• Federal law enforcement (FBI, INS, 

DEA, ATF and others), the Department 

of Homeland Security and local agencies must work more closely to ensure 

that federal engagement and disengagement of area residents does not damage 

existing local police–citizen relations 

or otherwise undermine communitypolicing principles. Local and federal 

partners must work to realize community policing’s potential to provide 

all of law enforcement with valuable 

information and strategies for fighting 

terrorism.
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

A REGIONAL RESPONSE TO TERRORISM FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES:

A Site Visit Summary8

By their own admission, officials in the Redondo Beach Police Department (RBPD) recognize that 

the odds of international terrorists striking their community are slim. Yet even slim chances require enhancing agency preparedness. Situated midway between Los Angeles International Airport 

(LAX) and the Port of Los Angeles (POLA), and home to a number of potential terrorist targets 

such as an oil refinery, electricity power plant, regional shopping mall, defense contractors and 

beachfront tourist attractions, this agency of 105 personnel in southwest Los Angeles County has 

fashioned a comprehensive program that other midsize local law enforcement agencies across the 

nation may want to study and replicate.

The RBPD counterterrorism program is predicated on two approaches: developing internal 

resources and participating in four terrorism task forces,9 each organized at a different level of government. By fully developing its internal resources, RBPD officers believe they are better prepared 

to prevent and respond to a terrorist attack. RBPD’s participation in—and in some cases leadership of—task forces has enabled its officers to develop a network of intelligence and investigative 

resources that culminated with the assignment of a detective to GITMO (the Camp X-Ray prison 

for al Qaeda operatives at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station) to interrogate prisoners.

The attacks of September 11 caused local law enforcement agencies to ask, “What can we 

do?” RBPD personnel believed they had a place to look, if not an outright answer—The South 

Bay Police Chiefs Advisory Group.10 This group has a history of close cooperation. In fact, prior to 

September 11, 2001, one of the South Bay agencies was developing a plan to convene an advisory 

group to examine transnational crime. After the attacks, the focus of the proposed advisory group 

shifted to terrorism (one of the previously recognized transnational crimes). The Chiefs Group 

agreed with the plan for an advisory group and formed the South Bay Police Chiefs’ Terrorism 

Advisory Group chaired by RBPD Lieutenant John Skipper.

The advisory group adopted the following two goals as the foundation for its deliberations and 

recommendations:

• Integrate with and complement existing or emerging efforts at the 

federal, state and local levels—avoiding duplicating efforts.

• Examine and develop a response to the unique needs of the South Bay.

The advisory group then identified 10 categories of issues11 and appointed working groups 

8 This description was compiled by PERF project staff after conducting a January 2003 site visit; interviewing personnel from local, state and federal law enforcement agencies; and reviewing available 

literature on the programs.

9 The task forces are the South Bay Police Chiefs Terrorism Advisory Group, the FBI Long Beach JTTF, 

the LA County Sheriff’s Terrorism Early Warning Group and the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center.

10 Members of the group include police departments from Redondo Beach, El Segundo, Gardena, Hawthorne, Hermosa Beach, Inglewood, Manhattan Beach, Rancho Palos Verdes and Torrance. Combined, they have nearly 900 sworn officers.

11 The 10 issue categories are Terrorism Task Forces, Training, Threat Assessment, Information Sharing 

and Analysis, Contingency Planning, Explosive Device Detection, SWAT Capabilities, Communications, Cyber-Terrorism and Resources.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

16 

of subject-matter experts from the participating departments to examine each issue. Within 45 

days of receiving its charge, the advisory group had submitted nearly 100 recommendations 

to the chiefs, and within 90 days many of them were being implemented. Many of the recommendations have resulted in improved capabilities and new initiatives, while work continues 

on others. Recommendations in two of the categories—Terrorism Task Forces and Information 

Sharing and Analysis—have been especially successful and could be replicated or tailored by 

other agencies.

Terrorism Task Forces

One of the first and most successful efforts of the South Bay Group was integrating with other 

terrorism task forces in the Los Angeles area, especially the Long Beach JTTF. Prior to September 

11, the FBI Long Beach Resident Office did not have a JTTF, but a more limited National Security 

Squad with 8 Special Agents. However, because RBPD wanted to work with other agencies, it contacted the Long Beach Office and offered to detail an officer who would act as a liaison to all South 

Bay agencies. That offer was accepted on October 5, 2001, and later that month, a Torrance officer 

became the second South Bay member on the Squad.

Both South Bay detectives became fully credentialed, cross-designated federal officers with Top 

Secret clearances. The detectives work in the JTTF office and are treated like FBI Agents in virtually all aspects of case assignment and management. Although the local officers have Top Secret 

clearance, they do not always have the same level of access to information that Agents do. Several 

JTTF members stated that lifting this restriction would improve investigative effectiveness without compromising security.

The Squad was designated a JTTF when the Bureau implemented plans to increase the number of JTTFs. The Task Force now includes participants from the LAPD, the LASO and the Long 

Beach PD, as well as investigators from the U.S. Navy, U.S. Customs, INS and the EPA to work 

with the officers and Agents.

The South Bay personnel on the JTTF have participated in more than 150 terrorism investigations, ranging from visa violations to financial support for terrorism, to surveillance and the arrest 

of individuals of known terrorist organizations. In addition to the two assigned officers, South Bay 

departments provide the JTTF with other needed resources. In particular, the local agencies routinely provide surveillance teams to the JTTF and on other occasions have provided SWAT teams 

and overtime pay to facilitate investigations. The South Bay involvement included the six-week 

assignment of a RBPD detective to GITMO to interview imprisoned terrorist suspects. The FBI 

and RBPD shared the overtime costs associated with detailing the detective.

In addition to the JTTF, South Bay departments are working closely with two other task forces. 

One of these is the Los Angeles County Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW). The TEW is 

the intake center for information on terrorism, public order and dignitary security issues for LA 

County. Housed in the LA Sheriff’s state-of-the-art Emergency Operations Center, its mission is 

to monitor trends and forecasts indicating terrorist threats or attacks. Unlike the JTTF, the TEW’s 

staffing fluctuates according to need. Since October 5, 2001 officers from five South Bay departments, including the RBPD, have provided assistance to the TEW on a rotating basis.

A third task force in which South Bay participates is the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center (CATIC). CATIC was created after September 11 by the Governor. It serves as the 

central point for law enforcement terrorism intelligence. CATIC provides timely collection, coordination, analysis, investigation and dissemination of criminal intelligence information regarding 

terrorist activity to federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. The El Segundo PD assigned 

a sergeant to CATIC who serves as a representative for the nine South Bay departments.
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

12 Los Angeles County is 4,084 square miles and has a population of 9,902,700 and more than 50 local law 

enforcement agencies. 

Information Sharing and Analysis

To facilitate South Bay departments’ coordination, each agency has appointed a Terrorism Liaison 

Officer (TLO). The goal is to have every agency identify one person who will receive information 

regarding terrorism and transnational crime, effectively interpret and assess that information and 

appropriately forward or handle that information. To help the TLOs develop and improve their 

skills, officers from several South Bay departments have developed and provided a three-day TLO 

training course. TLOs are expected to possess the following knowledge and abilities:

• Knowledge of types of criminal activity that provide financial support for transnational criminal organizations and terrorism

• Knowledge of community, regional, county, state and federal resources 

dedicated to combating transnational crime and terrorism and how those 

resources can best be used to investigate and deter them

• Knowledge of the structure and current activities of significant transnational criminal and terrorist organizations

• Knowledge of foreign prosecution/extradition procedures

• Ability to recognize activity indicative of terrorism and transnational 

crime

• Ability to access international investigative resources such as INTERPOL, 

FBI LEGATS, international law enforcement liaisons, etc.

• Ability to conduct threat assessments regarding evaluating and interpretating terrorism and transnational criminal activity information

Because of the sheer size of Los Angeles County and the number of law enforcement agencies,12 the LA County Sheriff’s Office has adopted the South Bay Chiefs’ recommendation that 

each Sheriff’s station appoint a TLO. The Sheriff’s Office also is helping other police agencies in 

the county appoint TLOs. To maximize effective information sharing and analysis, the Sheriffs’ 

Office and the South Bay Chiefs’ Group are working to appoint a TLO Area Representative (AR) 

for each of the seven mutual aid areas in the county. Each AR would represent several departments 

and would serve at the TEW in a full-time capacity.

Other Successes

Recall that the South Bay Terrorism Advisory Group adopted nearly 100 recommendations. In addition to the successes described above, other noteworthy achievements follow. In keeping with its 

two goals, each of these successes either integrated South Bay resources with other federal, state 

and local efforts or improved the capabilities of the South Bay departments.

• Worked with the California POST to create training courses that address 

identified law enforcement needs. To date, the South Bay agencies have 

developed and delivered courses for law enforcement executives throughout 

the state and have developed train-the-trainer curricula for first-responder 

courses.

• Used an existing Serious Crime Reduction Fund to help support threat assessments, training, overtime and equipment.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

18 

• Working with State Assemblyman to pass legislation that would create 

a Terrorism Crime Reduction Fund to further support training and firstresponder resources.

• With members of the business community, established the Foundation 

for Combating Terrorism and Transnational Crime, a nonprofit 501(c)3 

organization that will collect tax-exempt donations to purchase terrorismrelated resources. More than $60,000 has been donated to the Foundation 

at the time of this writing, and it has purchased an explosive detecting 

dog for the L.A. Sheriff and Level C protective equipment for the South 

Bay WMD Response Platoon. It also has sponsored officer exchanges with 

Spain and Northern Ireland.

• Worked with the FBI and U.S. Attorney’s office to develop protocols for handing off cases related to terrorism, but that are more traditionally criminal in 

nature (e.g., identity theft, narcotics).

• Identified and arranged for threat assessment training from Texas A&M 

University in Torrance for multidisciplinary teams from all of the South Bay 

cities.

• Organized a training course in Weapons of Mass Destruction that was held 

in Redondo Beach. This was the first of six training courses provided statewide (includes train-the-trainer component).

• Developed local multidisciplinary terrorism critical-incident plans.

Lessons Learned

At the heart of RBPD’s success is a philosophy of service to communities and the profession. 

RBPD has built an extensive informational and operational network with local, county, state and 

federal agencies. Several RBPD staff spoke about the principles they follow—so fundamental as to 

risk being labeled platitudes. Yet they seem to explain much of RBPD’s success in building partnerships with other law enforcement agencies.

Have a Plan—RBPD studied the issues and developed a written plan with its partners in the 

South Bay Police Chiefs Group. This group of nine agencies first examined their own resources and 

needs and then expanded it to the FBI, the LA County TEW, the State POST and the CATIC.

Focus on Resource Building—No single agency has the resources to prevent the next terrorist attack. But by recognizing the value that each agency brings, these task forces—especially the 

JTTF—have been able to overcome many impediments to a successful partnership.

Commitment and Direction from the Top—The South Bay Chiefs’ Group formed a Terrorism 

Advisory Group and gave it a clear mandate. When the group’s recommendations were developed, 

the chiefs provided resources for implementation. In particular, the RBPD has provided resources 

for an officer to be detailed to GITMO and to allow other staff to develop and deliver training programs for the State of California.

Keep the Mission First—With four task forces at four different levels of government operating 

within 25 miles, failure is a distinct possibility. Egos, disputes and battles over turf and resources 

could easily undermine the success of any one task force or diminish cooperation. Some of these 

obstacles arise at times, and as these task forces grow in size there are greater opportunities for 

barriers to emerge. Yet, the ability of most participants to focus on the mission—preventing the 

next terrorist attack—has kept these task forces on track.
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

FBI personnel need a more detailed understanding of what information and materials can be 

shared as unclassified materials and which can 

be disseminated to those with Secret clearance 

levels. Both sides need to determine how to 

format, package or translate national-level 

information into a form that is more readily 

available and useful for local law enforcement 

investigators and officers.

SECURITY CLEARANCES AND

INFORMATION SHARING

CH A P T E R TH R E E

Introduction

I

SSUES RELATED TO SECURITY CLEARANCES AND NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS

are hot-button concerns for federal and local authorities alike—though often 

for very different reasons. Throughout the executive session, problems associated with security clearances were the subject of lively debate and discussion. 

Problems included those involving the process of receiving various clearances and 

how they affect the exchange of information. Generally, local law enforcement 

needs to know more about security clearances—the types of clearances, what they 

mean, and how they will affect law enforcement operations. They also need to 

understand nondisclosure agreements when they receive clearances, as well as 

similar limitations on federal officials’ information sharing.

“I thought I understood security 

clearances, but today’s exchange 

really opened my eyes as to how 

they work.”

—Local Law Enforcement Executive
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20 

A Brief History of Security 

Clearances/Executive Orders

Clearance levels—“Secret” or “Top Secret”—

are based on the “need-to-know” doctrine, 

which requires an FBI background check be 

conducted for those officials who need to have 

access to national security information that 

has been classified as “Confidential” or “Secret.”13 As stated in the FBI brochure (2002) 

on the Security Clearance Process for State and 

Local Law Enforcement,

• “A Secret security clearance may be 

granted to those persons who have a 

“need-to-know” national security information, classified at the Confidential or 

Secret level.”

• “A Top Secret clearance may be granted 

to those persons who have a “need-toknow” national security information, 

classified up to the Top Secret level, 

and who need unescorted access in FBI 

facilities, when necessary [emphasis 

added].”

The background investigation process for 

Secret and Top Secret clearances are mandated 

by Presidential Executive Order. The FBI does 

not have the ability to waive these requirements. Any reforms that local law enforcement 

might like to see made to the procedures for 

obtaining a clearance would require changing 

the Executive Order. (Indeed, later sections detail suggestions that local chiefs would like to 

see made to the process.)

The categories of, and processes for, security clearances were developed years ago 

during the Cold War for a very different type 

of threat than what we face today. The executive session participants spoke about how the 

new threats to national security and domestic 

tranquility require rethinking the process by 

which security clearances are granted. While 

local law enforcement recognizes and respects 

the critical need to protect intelligence sources, 

every effort should be made to find innovative 

and more expansive efforts to provide local 

law enforcement with the information they 

need to confront terrorist threats in their own 

communities. The challenge for the country 

is to find some mechanism for conveying the 

information in a declassified format or bringing local law enforcement more rapidly within 

the classified arena, which will help protect our 

13 An individual applying for employment or for a clearance must fill out a Standard Form 86 (Questionnaire for National Security Position). After a successful background check, the candidate will be required 

to sign the Standard Form 312 (Nondisclosure Agreement). The SF 312 form signifies that the individual 

is responsible as a holder of the particular clearance approved to protect national security. These forms are 

available from the Office of Personnel Management. However, each federal agency has supplemental forms 

that may need to be completed in addition to the SF 86 and SF 312. At this writing, these forms are not 

available online. In the near future, these forms will be available for individuals to complete online at the 

website for each federal agency and will be available on the OPM website. At this time, law enforcement 

personnel should obtain a form from their SAC, Security Officer, or the Senior Resident Agent from their 

locale. These individuals will assist law enforcement personnel through the process (FBI Office of Law 

Enforcement Coordination 2003).
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

counties, cities and towns across the country 

without compromising intelligence sources.

The Sticking Points

The Office (now Department) of Homeland Security has been collecting information on challenges that must be addressed to ensure that 

all law enforcement resources are focused and 

coordinated in our fight against terrorism. The 

executive session participants encourage the 

Department of Homeland Security and other 

federal agencies to review the Executive Order 

that currently prevents a more expedited clearance process for local law enforcement officials 

and is a barrier to bringing state and local law 

enforcement resources to bear effectively on 

the task before us all.

The Long and Cumbersome Road to 

Clearance

This call for a review was the result of extensive 

executive session discussions about how security clearance issues exacerbate local–federal 

tensions and create frustration among local law 

enforcement leaders who perceive the process 

as confusing and impeding critical communication. Specifically, chiefs and sheriffs expressed 

frustration about the time required to receive a 

clearance. Several of the executives at the session did not yet have clearances. Among those 

were a few chiefs who did not know if their applications would yield results of value to justify 

the investment in the process.

The position of local law enforcement 

around the table was that they are trustworthy 

and already engaged in collecting sensitive intelligence. As one chief said, “Why should we have 

to jump through hoops to prove our integrity?” 

There was consensus that chiefs and sheriffs 

want to receive security clearances without the 

usual waiting times to process paperwork. Local 

executives need to know what is happening in 

their jurisdictions regarding threats and investigations now and do not want to have to rely 

on a JTTF detective to determine what the local 

law enforcement executive should know.

The session participants suggested the 

following reforms to the Executive Order, FBI 

Guidelines and policies to eliminate the backlog and expedite future applications. These 

include shortening the forms, streamlining the 

process, using more retired officers to conduct 

investigations, working with local law enforcement to determine who needs a clearance, 

and using existing military or federal agency 

clearances, among others. A number of executives questioned whether the entire clearance 

process should be changed, or at least use some 

type of abbreviated approach for police.

FBI personnel spoke about the security 

clearance problem from their perspective. Local law enforcement personnel do not always 

complete and return the paperwork, or if they 

“More than a year after 9–11, I still 

don’t feel like I’m in the game. And I 

need to be in the game.”

—Local Law Enforcement Executive
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22 

do complete it, there are delays in returning it. 

Forms are not always fully or accurately completed. And too often local officials apply for 

Top Secret clearances when all they really need 

is a Secret clearance. There is a misperception 

that the FBI has control over the process—and 

local law enforcement sometimes believes that 

the process is an affront to their professionalism, when it is really just about following mandatory authorities.

FBI Follow-Up

Efforts are already underway to address the participants’ recommendations. Executive Order 

12968, which mandates that the FBI follow a 

long and arduous process for granting security 

clearances, has been further scrutinized. Following the executive session, the FBI arranged 

for an advisory group of state and local law 

enforcement executives to meet with the Intelligence Community Security Directors Forum 

on February 24, 2003, to discuss policies and 

procedures related to the Executive Order governing access to classified information and the 

security clearance processes. Representatives 

from the Department of Homeland Security 

and the Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Homeland Security were also present. 

The meeting was complemented by a site visit 

to the Central Intelligence Agency. The forum 

was very productive—with discussions of law 

enforcement’s concerns about the security 

clearance process. The FBI will be discussing 

how best to address them, including possibly 

recommending a change to policies governing 

the security clearance process.14

Different Federal Agencies, 

Different Clearances

Different federal agencies can require a local 

official to obtain a security clearance through 

that particular agency. For example, one local 

executive had two federal security clearances, 

but not one from the FBI. Consequently, the 

FBI would not share classified information 

with him. Another executive had a Top Secret 

clearance for the National Guard, but only a 

Secret clearance from the FBI.

Session participants learned that it is possible to have one federal agency transfer its 

security clearance to another federal agency immediately if the applicant makes a request.15

14 The participants also discussed how they could work together to address the special training needs of state 

and local law enforcement in the counterterrorism/intelligence arena (Timmons 2003).

15 As an example, the following procedures need to be completed if a police chief has a Department of Defense 

clearance and needs to transfer this clearance to the FBI to work on a task force. The police chief must 

contact the Department of Defense security office and request their clearance paperwork to be transferred 

to the FBI Clearance Access and Data Management Unit. The FBI practices reciprocity; therefore, a background check would not be required. An entry is made by the FBI Clearance Access and Data Management 

Unit into the FBI system to recognize that the police chief has an active clearance with another agency. 

The transfer of clearance can take place immediately, usually within that same day (Shubert 2003).

 The same process is used to transfer a clearance from other federal agencies besides the Department 

of Defense to the FBI. The police chief must contact the security office of the federal agency to begin the 
23

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

Knowing Sources Versus Acquiring 

Information

Significant portions of FBI investigations into 

terrorist activity may focus on criminal code 

violations. These investigations are not classified, and participation in (and knowledge 

of) them does not require a security clearance. Conversely, other portions of terrorism 

investigations focus on national security issues and are classified. In counterterrorism 

investigations, the sources of information 

and the information-collection methods can 

determine a classification. For example, the 

information source—mechanical intercept 

versus human source—can determine the 

classification. Human source-generated information is given higher classification to protect 

his or her identity. Human sources require 

tremendous security. Local law enforcement 

participants also understood that the FBI cannot share National Security Agency and other 

certain federal information by law. Even without source information, some information will 

still be classified.

Chiefs and sheriffs agreed: They need to 

know that a source is credible and reliable 

when receiving information. They do not always need to know the individual or specifics 

of how the information was obtained. This can 

mean the difference between needing a Secret 

(less source information available) and Top 

Secret clearance. Secret clearances can provide 

access to key information and escorted access 

to FBI facilities, which should be sufficient for 

any official not doing regular business at the 

FBI as part of a task force. The discussions revealed these important perspectives:

• Chiefs do not always need, and should 

not demand the source of, classified 

information. Information can be shared 

to a greater extent if sources are not 

disclosed. It is the information that is 

critical and need only be put in a context 

that characterizes the source. As one local executive said, chiefs and sheriffs 

need to distinguish between “need to 

know” and “want to know.” It is important to “trust the information broker.” 

He compared receiving source information from the FBI to his days as a narcotics officer, when he would not give up 

a source but could still share important 

information. He said that it was more 

transfer process. In order to expedite a security clearance process of a local law enforcement official with a 

security clearance from another federal agency, the local official should request that the clearance be transferred from one federal agency to another, rather than initiating a new application. If a local law enforcement chief has the same level of security clearance from another federal agency, transferring the security 

clearance from the other agency is quicker than filling out the paperwork for a new security clearance. 

 A security clearance that is more than five years old must be renewed through a background reinvestigation of those past five years. The process would be quicker for the local law enforcement official 

to renew his or her clearance from the other agency before transferring to the FBI, instead of starting a 

security clearance process from the beginning through the FBI (Shubert 2003).
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

24 

important to know the level of credibility of information from someone qualified to assess that. The important issue 

for him is to know whether the source 

was reliable, unreliable or untested.

• Some local law enforcement participants emphasized that they would want 

to know if the source was in their own 

jurisdiction or a neighboring jurisdiction. Such information would allow a 

local law enforcement agency the opportunity to link information and contacts simply because of their intimate 

knowledge of their local communities. 

Another executive concluded by saying 

that if we know the FBI is operating in 

an area or looking for an individual, the 

local executive can then direct officers 

to track the person without giving them 

the source information.

However, those local antiterrorism specialists that require more information on sources 

and more extensive access to detailed information will require the higher clearance level. Local police officers and investigators assigned to 

a JTTF require a Top Secret clearance, which 

allows them to sit in front of an FBI terminal, 

work on an FBI computer and have access to 

certain federal databases. They may be privy to 

more specifics about sources of intelligence, if 

they need to know. The time required to obtain 

this clearance is six to nine months.

Most chiefs, by their own admission, substantively need only a Secret clearance and 

not a Top Secret. The Secret clearance can be 

awarded in 45 days. FBI SACs can also obtain 

an expedited clearance, if necessary. The chief 

may obtain “needed” information but will not 

obtain the source or methods of the information. The SF 86 and SF 312 forms will need to 

be completed, even after the fact, to obtain the 

appropriate clearance.16

Yet local law enforcement felt that a 

greater education effort must be made to ensure chiefs, sheriffs, mayors, city managers 

and others in municipal and state government 

understand the nuances of which clearance 

should be sought. Too often, policymakers, 

politicians and even law enforcement within 

their own agencies attach significance to the 

clearance level afforded a chief law enforcement executive.

16 A law enforcement chief executive who meets the appropriate criteria may obtain an expedited security 

clearance if “exceptional circumstances” exist for the granting of an interim Top Secret security clearance 

as part of the FBI’s Law Enforcement Executives and Elected Officials Security Clearance Initiative (LEO 

Initiative). Because the United States is at war against terrorism, the FBI’s top priority is counterterrorism. 

Executive law enforcement officials who have a legitimate “need-to-know” to protect the citizens of their 

respective jurisdictions are fulfilling an essential part of the FBI’s counterterrorism strategy. There is a 

national security interest in rapidly providing classified information to executive law enforcement officials. 

Additionally, the issuance of an interim Top Secret security clearance will only apply to LEO Initiative 

candidates requiring that clearance. In most cases, law enforcement chief executives will not need a Top 
25

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

Perceptions Associated with Different 

Clearance Levels

So the fact that an investigator assigned to a 

JTTF has a Top Secret clearance while the chief 

has only a Secret clearance should not concern 

the chief . . . unless you are the chief.

Elected and appointed local government 

leaders and law enforcement personnel attach 

significance, even status, to the higher of the 

two clearance levels. They might wonder why 

the chief could not get the higher clearance, 

while others in the agency have it. The concern 

that chiefs have relates to their credibility and 

leadership abilities within their community. 

It also has implications for supervising lowerranking personnel’s work on JTTFs and other 

similar assignments. One recommendation 

from a session participant was to tie a clearance level to a rank, as it is done in the military. Others also advocated a comprehensive 

education effort. All those in governance and 

policing must understand that Top Secret and 

Secret clearances allow access to much of the 

same information. Both Secret and Top Secret 

clearance will ultimately be determined by the 

“need-to-know” information doctrine.

Nondisclosure Concerns

Another concern with different clearance levels is the extent to which information can be 

shared or released among persons with different security clearances or with a person lacking 

a security clearance, such as a mayor or city or 

county manager, or even key commanders in 

the law enforcement agency. No one wanted to 

put a commander or JTTF representative on 

the spot, having them try to decide whether the 

information can be shared with their bosses. 

They should not be encouraged to violate a 

nondisclosure agreement (punishable by criminal charges and/or termination of clearance),17

nor do they want to undermine accountability. 

Secret security clearance, as a Secret security clearance will suffice to meet their need to protect citizens 

(Shubert 2003).

 However, in the event that an interim Top Secret security clearance is required, the applicant must 

complete a SF 86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions, and two applicant fingerprint cards. The 

applicant must undergo a Single Scope Background Investigation covering a 10-year period. The requirement for completing a background investigation has been established by Executive Order 12968 and is 

mandatory for all candidates requiring access to National Security Information. The candidate will be 

interviewed and checks conducted regarding the information provided on the SF 86, local agency checks 

to include internal affairs, verification of birth, credit checks and national agency checks (IE OPM, DCII 

and FBI records). After favorable results are received from these checks, an interim Top Secret security 

clearance will usually be granted within 30 days while the remainder of the background investigation is 

completed. The FBI has established a 180-day requirement to complete the full background investigation. 

The final Top Secret security clearance adjudication will be completed by the FBI’s Security Division. Once 

favorably adjudicated for a Top Secret security clearance, the candidate will be briefed and execute an SF 

312 Non-Disclosure Agreement (Shubert 2003).

17 The punishment for unauthorized disclosure is detailed on the nondisclosure form. Also, when obtaining a security clearance, the individual is briefed on the sensitivity of the issues. Intentionally disclosing 

information to others not holding security clearances can lead to termination of the individual’s security 

clearance and criminal charges by the U.S. Attorney’s Office (Shubert 2003). 
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

26 

Agency personnel at all levels must be briefed 

about the scope and nature of what can be disclosed once clearance is obtained.

The FBI will accommodate agencies that 

want their senior administrators to have clearances, with the caution that it will take time. 

Chiefs and sheriffs need to say for whom they 

want clearances. Nonetheless, the Nondisclosure Agreement is legally binding. Executives 

must also be aware of the impact of nondisclosure agreements on individuals with clearances: Some FBI agents who wanted to share 

information with local law enforcement and 

others they felt should have the information 

are under scrutiny to determine if that sharing 

was in violation of that agreement.

Conclusion

The conversations on security clearances 

proved enlightening on many fronts but also 

demonstrated that all parties have significant 

frustrations with the issue. Despite this, all 

session participants see security clearances as 

a “winnable issue” and in that light developed 

the following recommendations.

Recommendations and Concerns

• Local, state and federal law enforcement, 

at all levels, must be better educated on 

the types of clearances, what they mean 

and where to go from here. They must 

then share that information with those 

in state and local governance. FBI and 

other federal personnel need more education on what and how things can be 

shared as unclassified materials. Federal 

agency personnel also need more extensive guidance about how to format 

information for local law enforcement 

and information for line officers. Then 

local law enforcement must be educated 

on what is available.

• The Executive Order governing security clearances should be reviewed and 

changed. Local law enforcement also 

want other administrative and legislative actions explored to facilitate the 

clearance process. Specifically, changes 

are needed to expedite the clearance 

process for law enforcement officials.

• It is possible to transfer security clearances from one federal agency to another 

if the applicant makes a request. Law 

enforcement officials with a security 

clearance from a federal agency should 

request that the clearance be transferred 

to another federal agency, rather than 

initiating a new application, by contacting the Security Office of the federal 

agency for which they currently have a 

clearance.

“If the FBI gets intelligence about 

a specific threat in your backyard, I 

guarantee you will know about it.”

—FBI SAC
27

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

• Local chiefs and sheriffs request that the 

FBI make every effort to reduce the time 

required for Secret clearance from 45 

days to 30 days.

• Local law enforcement personnel should 

also commit to expediting the process. 

First, locals have to complete and return 

the necessary paperwork. They should 

return the forms as quickly as possible. 

Forms must be filled out completely and 

accurately.

• Because most chiefs need only a Secret clearance, rather than Top Secret, 

chiefs and sheriffs should apply for the 

Secret clearance. The Secret clearance 

can be awarded in 45 days, whereas 

the Top Secret clearance can require 

nine months. The FBI can expedite a 

chief’s clearance if there are exigent 

circumstances, but the background 

check process will then still need to be 

completed.

• Chiefs should refrain from requesting 

the source of classified information 

when it is not needed. And federal 

agencies, to the extent possible, should 

inform state and local authorities when 

there is information being generated 

from their local communities.

• Local law enforcement officers must 

adhere to nondisclosure agreements.

• Local agencies need to determine who 

in their police departments most need 

clearances and what levels of clearance 

are really needed.

• Local, state and federal partners should 

meet and discuss issues of trust and 

determine the best ways to share information through reformatting and other 

methods so that security clearances are 

not a barrier.
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28 

A COMMENTARY ON SECURITY CLEARANCES

by Edward A. Flynn, Secretary of Public Safety for Massachusetts and 

former Chief of the Arlington County (VA) Police Department18

When the Pentagon calls 911, it is the Arlington County Police Department that responds.19 And 

that is what we did on September 11, 2001, when my officers and I became first responders to 

the terrorist attack. Since that time, my agency has been immersed in dealing with the domestic 

terrorism threat. Many issues of concern have emerged through that work, and our labors on 

the Joint Terrorism Task Force, that have yet to be resolved. And while much has to be done on 

improving coordination, intelligence-gathering 

functions, interoperability and other aspects of a 

comprehensive antiterrorist response, we seem 

continually to come back to the core issues related to security clearances for local law enforcement and information sharing among federal, 

state and local authorities.

To be fair, I think the security clearance issue is something of a red herring. If you listen to 

any local police chief, sheriff, director of public 

safety or other chief executive, you will learn 

that their real concern is that local police perceive that they are not getting information from 

federal agencies, in particular, that might be 

useful in identifying potential terrorist threats. 

Security clearances are just one symptom of that 

problem and act as a lightening rod for law enforcement’s ire.

One reason for this state of affairs is that many local police professionals believe that security 

clearance restrictions are sometimes used as an excuse by members of federal agencies not to share 

information with local law enforcement. Chief executives report that they are told they cannot be 

given information because they lack the necessary clearances, but that they are unable to gain that 

clearance in a timely manner. They also report that some members of their own agency, particularly 

officers assigned to terrorism task forces, are unable to report information to the chief because the 

officer has clearance, but the chief does not. As you might imagine, this does not sit well with most 

chief executives. We need to fix the problems associated with police chiefs not receiving their necessary clearances, which frankly should not be that hard. Then we can build on the real work that is being done to remove remaining obstacles to information sharing among law enforcement agencies.

There were several issues raised at the executive session regarding clearances that seemed to 

resonate with all participants. To put these comments in proper context, I should acknowledge that 

I have been guilty of holding up my own security clearance by not filling out the forms as Chief of 

the Arlington County Police Department,20 though there is plenty of blame to go around. 

18 At the time of the executive session, Flynn was the police chief in Arlington County, Virginia.

19 Interestingly, the media and others have misperceived that the Pentagon is in Washington, D.C., 

when it is really located in Arlington County, Virginia.

20 The writer has since left Arlington County and is now the Secretary of Public Safety for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

To be fair, I think the security 

clearance issue is something of 

a red herring. If you listen to any 

local police chief, sheriff, director 

of public safety or other chief 

executive, you will learn that their 

real concern is that local police 

perceive that they are not getting 

information from federal agencies.
29

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

I was, admittedly, petulant about the need to fill out a lengthy form and undergo a detailed process. 

I had already had a tremendous terrorist attack in my jurisdiction; having responded and worked 

intensely on the issues in the months that followed, I felt a bit put out that I now had to jump 

through hoops to get a security clearance. After participating in PERF’s executive session, I am 

now penitent and better informed about why the federal agencies must operate as they do. In that 

spirit, I believe efforts should be focused on addressing these three primary concerns:

First, local law enforcement often presumes that federal agencies are withholding detailed, 

relevant and important information, for any number of reasons.21 I am not convinced that this is 

the case. The FBI is learning to get back into the intelligence-gathering game just as we are, and we 

must acknowledge that the information just may not be there sometimes. Then, we need to work 

on issues of mutual trust so that we can share what information there is, while retaining necessary security and integrity. There have been instances we can all recall when we got information 

from CNN before the FBI. This can only be resolved through improved coordination, cooperation 

and accountability. There are old relationships and agency cultures that must be overcome to 

make this happen. And we must ensure that federal agents are not hiding behind clearances as the 

reason for not sharing information that could be properly given to local law enforcement if packaged correctly. We need to share information, whether through executive committees of JTTFs or 

other means, by presenting the information in ways that may not require clearances at the highest 

levels.

Second, I never fully realized that you could get the same substantive information with a Secret clearance that you can with a Top Secret clearance. We don’t all need computer terminal access 

at the FBI. We don’t need to know the precise source of significant information, only whether the 

source is credible, reliable and other more basic characterizations of the source. We also need to 

educate our own officers, city and county leaders, and others who attach importance to the security 

levels one has so that chief executives will be more comfortable seeking a Secret clearance (which 

can be granted much more expediently than a Top Secret clearance). If, in time, a chief executive 

feels he or she needs a higher-level clearance, it could be pursued at a later time.

Third, we need to work with the federal agencies to make the process less painful for police 

chief executives. This would acknowledge that federal agencies find the chief executives’ input 

and involvement valuable to our joint efforts and want to share information with them. We need 

to request changes to legal authorities and regulations, whether White House Executive Orders or 

agency mandates, that place unnecessary burdens on the process for providing law enforcement 

professionals with clearances. Then we must identify who really needs the clearances and fill out 

the paperwork accurately and completely to expedite the process further. This can only happen in 

an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect.

We are more than a year past the terrorist attacks, and I’m not alone when I say that local law 

enforcement executives do not feel like they are in the game. If we fix the clearance issue, we will 

be one step closer to using local law enforcement as they should be used—full partners in the fight 

against terrorism.

21 We should not underestimate how fear of disciplinary or legal action can affect officers’/agents’ decision to share information. Nondisclosure agreements; the threat of losing a job, or worse, in the wake 

of the Hanssen investigation; and confusion around exactly what level of information can be shared 

are all factors in that decision. 
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

30 
31

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

A Force Multiplier, But Too Limited

While the JTTFs can be an effective “force 

multiplier,” the executive session participants 

were concerned that they have been inadequate for sharing information and conducting 

investigations related to terrorist threats. This 

consensus resulted in two alternative recommendations: First, the local law enforcement 

agencies could advocate for a complementary, 

but different, forum in which they would get 

the level and type of information they are seeking. Or second, they could advocate for reforms 

to the JTTFs that would bring them closer to 

their intended purpose.

A JTTF Alternative?

Some participants suggested that while JTTFs 

are beneficial, law enforcement needs complementary mechanisms for handling terrorism 

investigations. The FBI does not have unlimited resources and cannot provide all the support 

local law enforcement needs. They contend 

that JTTFs are not the panacea to local–federal 

information sharing and cannot effectively deal 

with the comprehensive information-gathering 

and analysis required to address terrorism, even 

with every local or state agency giving another 

10 command-level law enforcement officers to 

the effort. They are simply too limited by the 

JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCES

CH A P T E R FO U R

Introduction

THE FIRST JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) BEGAN IN 1980 IN

New York City with 11 NYPD officers and 11 FBI special agents. The 

concept behind the JTTF was to combine the efforts and resources of 

federal and local law enforcement to focus on persistent or nefarious criminal activity. By September 11, 2001, there were 35 JTTFs in operation. Since that date, 

the number has grown to 66 (Mueller 2003a, 2003b).
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

32 

number of personnel and resources they have. 

The typical JTTF model dictates that only a 

small number of local investigators are involved, which constrains the information flow 

within local departments.22 Local members on 

JTTFs also cannot always debrief their own 

commanders because of the security clearance 

restrictions described in the previous chapter. 

Accordingly, this group of participants felt that 

these task forces are not the answer to local 

law enforcement’s need for additional information on strategy, tactics and counsel on a wide 

range of issues. They proposed that chiefs need 

a complementary or additional forum to be effective decisionmakers and leaders on threats 

to their communities. Without an alternative 

forum, the limited nature of the JTTFs will 

continue to keep local law enforcement from 

being completely “in the game.”

JTTF Reforms: Fixing What’s Broken

Alternatively, some participants said that a 

different or complementary forum was not 

needed, but rather the focus should be on 

strengthening the existing JTTFs, including 

securing additional resources. Both these FBI 

officials and chiefs agreed that they need to 

make a stronger commitment to the JTTFs. 

They involve too few law enforcement officers 

and do not draw on the full capabilities that 

local law enforcement can bring to the table. 

These participants posit that the FBI should 

work more closely with local law enforcement to identify local investigators who can 

be pulled into investigations on an as-needed 

basis. Other federal agencies, such as INS and 

ATF, should also participate more. Local chiefs 

need to commit more qualified and committed 

personnel as well. The effectiveness of JTTFs 

depends on local executives assigning and leaving officers on JTTFs, which FBI officials have 

said has been a problem in the past. Given the 

strain on resources, local agencies are finding 

it difficult to assign personnel solely to JTTFs, 

particularly when there are other task forces in 

the same jurisdiction that require staffing as 

well. This local police commitment has also 

been derailed at times by a cyclical problem in 

which local executives are unwilling to commit more than minimal resources because 

they perceive they will get little back from 

their investment. But their investment cannot 

pay off until they commit resources to a JTTF 

that will, in turn, ensure valuable and practical 

information will flow back to the local police 

executive.

22 There are 56 FBI field offices, each of which chairs a Joint Terrorism Task Force. Each JTTF includes 

members of such other federal agencies as INS, Customs, CIA and ATF, as well as state and local law 

enforcement. There are an additional 10 satellite JTTFs that are affiliated with the 56 field office JTTFs. 

Homeland Security is included as well. The mission of the JTTFs is to identify and target for prosecution 

terrorists and terrorist organizations planning or carrying out terrorist acts occurring in or affecting a 

geographic region and to apprehend individuals committing such acts. These task forces substantially increase the resources and scope of the effort to prevent terrorist attacks but also substantially enhance collecting and sharing real-time information, fundamental to effective intelligence support (Mueller 2003a, 

2003b; Timmons 2003). 
33

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

Information that the JTTFs provide to local law enforcement must be as timely as possible to make certain local agencies will stay 

involved. Another effort that would promote 

long-term local agency involvement would 

include developing a formal mechanism for 

providing regular briefings to, and ensuring accountability by, participating agencies. Several 

local executives suggested developing a briefing 

format similar to Compstat meetings used by 

local agencies. (See also, the Intelligence chapter for an in-depth discussion of the executivebriefing issue.) All can agree on one point: The 

JTTFs generally lack the structure, appropriate 

number of analysts and administrative personnel to support investigators and other critical 

resources.

While there are varying degrees to which 

participants believed their JTTFs have been 

effective, JTTF reformers are driven by their 

commitment to these task forces and to improving them to meet the needs of local agencies. These participants believe that JTTFs 

provide the proper venue for international terrorism investigations. They advocate for a centralized structure and believe the JTTF is the 

best current mechanism. Information needs to 

rest in a single place, and the JTTF provides 

that forum. They are concerned that a different 

or complementary forum might undermine the 

JTTFs, provide confusion and redundancy, and 

further drain limited resources. One local chief 

said that he depended on his JTTF representative and trusted him to share information that 

the chief needed to know. “I feel he has enough 

law enforcement expertise to make those decisions,” said the chief.

Their bottom line: The focus should be on 

using the JTTF as the primary investigative 

mechanism, but with an eye toward improving 

it. For example, a resident agent teamed with 

local officers (some on a part-time basis) can be 

an ancillary part of a JTTF. Smaller local agencies should at least establish a point of contact 

for JTTFs.

How JTTFs Can Use Local Resources

Though the issue of supporting the current 

JTTFs—versus a complementary forum to 

JTTFs—was not fully resolved, the executive 

session participants went on to discuss reforms 

that would make the current JTTFs more effective. The first proposed change involved improving federal agencies’ understanding of how 

local enforcement resources could be used in 

a mutually beneficial manner. In return, local 

agencies would make the greatest commitment 

possible.

“Local law enforcement is still not being 

used by the FBI after September 11,” a chief 

insisted. Others agreed, citing examples of how 

their offers to provide investigators to the federal agency and/or the JTTF were turned down. 

“If one of our officers doesn’t carry 

his weight, the SAC should let us 

know so we can address it.”

—Local Law Enforcement Executive
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34 

(Executives from large local agencies described 

how they could make dozens and even hundreds of investigators available to the JTTF, 

though other chiefs said they could not afford 

to deploy additional investigators.) And some 

of the SACs mentioned that they have struggled with how to incorporate the resources 

they were offered. All agreed that there should 

be better communication to local agencies that 

included the reasons why offers of assistance 

are being refused.

Ultimately each JTTF, individually, will 

need to determine how best to use local resources. The proper determination will probably depend on local agency size. Generally, 

larger agencies should be more involved in 

JTTFs. Medium-size agencies may be able 

to provide additional investigators on an ad 

hoc basis. Expanding a JTTF beyond a metropolitan area could include relying upon an 

ancillary group of local officers who are cleared 

and briefed as needed. They might attend big 

briefings or address specific issues or tasks but 

are not committed to the task force. This may 

also be a good approach to share information 

with smaller cities. At minimum, however, session participants suggested that local agencies 

should be prepared to make a short-term commitment to assigning an investigator to see 

how JTTF investigators work the cases. Some 

liaison between JTTFs and local agencies may 

be needed to help JTTF investigators remain 

effective.

Briefing Chiefs

Local executives expressed frustration about 

not knowing about JTTF investigations, especially those that occur in their own jurisdiction. 

They said that in some cases they could not get 

full briefings because they lacked the proper security clearance. Other local law enforcement 

participants said that they have to rely on the 

investigators they assign to the JTTF for updates because they were not getting direct briefings from the SAC. In response, several SACs 

said they now can brief local executives on the 

number of individuals in the executive’s city 

that are under scrutiny.

Several SACs and chiefs spoke about using 

an executive committee to their JTTF. With 

this model, the executive committee might include the SAC, chiefs and sheriffs who contribute officers to the JTTF, and possibly others. 

All members of the executive committee would 

have at least Secret security clearances. The executive committee would serve as a governing 

board, assessing JTTF activities and conducting planning on terrorism issues. They would 

receive fewer operational details than their investigators assigned to the task force but would 

still get useful information from meeting on 

“I don’t want a PowerPoint 

presentation after the fact, I want 

to know what is going on in my 

own city.”

—Local Law Enforcement Executive
35

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

a regular basis. Several session participants 

employ such a model and believe it effectively 

provides more comprehensive and regular 

briefings to local and state law enforcement, 

while maintaining the integrity of sources and 

investigations.23

One area that an executive committee 

needs to emphasize is succession planning 

for its JTTF. Turnover among SACs and local executives, as well as the addition of new 

members, requires developing protocols for 

bringing in and orienting new members. Such 

long-term planning would help to formalize 

relationships that can survive turnover and 

personality conflicts.

Apart from an executive committee, the 

participants spoke about the need for more 

regular communication among law enforcement agencies in a region. For example, the 

FBI could regularly brief an identifiable and 

specific group of local police officials. In addition, investigators and officers should receive 

overview information about the role of the 

JTTF, perhaps through roll call training. Again, 

there appeared to be consensus that significant 

information could be shared if properly formatted or presented in such a way that security 

clearances would not be necessary. Valuable 

information can be conveyed, if properly packaged by federal agencies, to local law enforcement personnel who do not have security 

clearances.

Task Force Redundancy

While discussing the JTTFs, several participants cautioned that law enforcement runs 

the risk of having too many task forces. The 

existence of terrorism task forces at the local, 

county, state and federal levels could lead to 

less coordination and loss of information. One 

participant said, “I would prefer to have one 

single task force with the FBI coordinating it.” 

Local executives also emphasized their resource 

limitations, especially in light of redundant 

federal task forces (i.e., FBI, ATF, SS, HIDTA, 

INS) addressing the same crime problems (i.e., 

cybercrime, drugs, gangs and other issues). Local law enforcement warned that they may not 

be able to continue to contribute resources to 

all these task forces.

U.S. Attorney Task Forces

The U.S. Attorneys’ Anti-Terrorism Task 

Forces (ATTFs) also were the focus of executive session participants’ concern. ATTFs were 

initiated after September 11. Careful consideration is needed to ensure that the ATTFs do 

not duplicate the work of JTTFs and pull critical resources, such as analysts and equipment, 

from the JTTFs. Indeed, some participants 

suggested that the ATTFs should be working 

closely with the JTTFs, with the U.S. Attorney 

becoming part of the executive committee.

23 The executive committees that some JTTFs have at this time do not follow a single model but are tailored 

to meet the unique needs of a jurisdiction, as participants stated they should be.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

36 

Coordinating JTTF

The FBI has created a national-level JTTF 

(NJTTF) that operates out of Washington, 

D.C., and is available to help resolve problems 

a local JTTF may experience. The NJTTF is 

staffed by officers from 30 different federal, 

state and local agencies and operates out of the 

FBI’s Strategic Information Operations Center. 

The NJTTF brings a needed national perspective and focus to the local task forces. It acts as 

a “point of fusion” for terrorism information by 

coordinating the flow of information between 

FBI Headquarters and the other JTTFs located 

across the country, as well as among the agencies represented on the NJTTF and other government agencies, such as the Department of 

Homeland Security (Mueller 2003a, 2003b).

Participants cautioned against overcentralizing information in this coordinating task force. 

It is important that the NJTTF send important 

information to the field offices and then provide 

them the latitude to make decisions about personnel, investigative focus and priorities that are 

consistent with local crimes and issues. Local 

executives spoke of the lessons that community policing has provided about moving decisionmaking and operational activities to lower levels.

Federal Inconsistency

Local law enforcement agencies are also concerned that federal resources must be better 

used by local authorities. One concern they 

mentioned was that at a time of stretched 

federal resources from which they can draw, 

some are duplicative. For example, some training programs on specific topics (e.g., hazardous 

materials response, weapons of mass destruction) are offered by more than one federal 

agency in the same area (such as FEMA, ODP), 

while in other areas, training is not offered. A 

better needs assessment for local law enforcement should be conducted, and federal agency 

training and technical assistance should be assessed to minimize duplication. The problem 

is less critical than the duplication of task 

forces but should still be addressed, especially 

in light of plans to increase training by federal 

agencies, including the FBI.

Conclusion

The JTTFs have been effective (though the 

extent varies among jurisdictions) but can 

be improved significantly if they are made a 

higher priority, receive additional resources 

and have better direction and governance.24 Local law enforcement’s resources should be used 

to their full potential, and every effort should 

be made to eliminate redundancy and other 

drains on personnel. In return, local law enforcement should attempt to make a stronger 

commitment to JTTFs and work with others to 

create an executive committee or other means 

24 A strong cautionary note is needed, however. When developing criteria and guidelines for what information should be collected and shared among law enforcement agencies, every effort must be made to protect 

those guidelines because they provide a roadmap to intelligence collection efforts and could help those 

trying to infiltrate law enforcement.
37

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

to expedite information sharing among law enforcement partners.

Recommendations and Concerns

• JTTFs can be an effective “force multiplier,” but the primary concern is 

that they are currently inadequate for 

sharing information and conducting investigations related to terrorist threats. 

While some participants recommended 

complementary mechanisms to better share information and coordinate 

investigations with local law enforcement, many pushed for reforms that 

would make the current JTTFs more 

effective.

• Additional resources should be provided 

to the JTTFs, and both the FBI and chiefs 

need to make a stronger commitment to 

make the JTTFs more successful.

• Additional investigators, analysts and 

administrative staff are needed, either 

through direct assignment by local police and the FBI or supported through 

federal grant funds.

• The JTTFs need to consider alternative 

approaches to using the investigative resources that local law enforcement can 

provide on an as-needed basis.

• The JTTFs should establish a governing 

board in the form of an executive committee composed of the Field Office SAC 

(or Assistant Director in Charge) and 

local chiefs, sheriffs, directors of public 

safety and other key law enforcement 

personnel. This forum would ensure 

proper information sharing, commitment, accountability and coordination.

• The executive committees should develop a succession plan for their respective 

JTTFs that considers turnover in the 

chief executive positions, reassignment 

of officers and agents, and other local 

issues.

• Information produced by the JTTFs 

should be prepared and presented so 

that it has the greatest local relevance 

and is “user friendly” for local law 

enforcement.

• JTTFs should design and implement a 

Compstat-like process that would be the 

centerpiece for regular briefings and for 

ensuring accountability by participating 

agencies. Local agencies should designate a liaison to the appropriate JTTF if 

they do not have a permanent member 

on it. Likewise, FBI officials should encourage and accept these liaisons. These 

liaisons will facilitate the development 

of relationships among local agencies 

and JTTF personnel and provide a point 

of contact when needed by the JTTF.

• Federal law enforcement agencies 

should limit the number of redundant 

task forces (e.g., drugs, financial crimes, 

cybercrimes) or realize that the effectiveness of these task forces could be 

harmed by the inability of local law enforcement to keep supplying personnel 

and resources.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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• The U.S Attorneys Anti-Terrorism Task 

Forces (ATTFs) should work closely 

with the JTTFs to reduce duplication 

of efforts, reduce the omission of necessary steps, ensure that resources are not 

drawn away from the JTTF, and coordinate effective strategies. The U.S. Attorney should be a key member on the 

proposed JTTF executive committee.

• In many regions, federal resources (task 

forces, specific training) are abundant 

and sometimes redundant, while in 

other regions they are lacking altogether. 

Chiefs, sheriffs and SACs all stressed the 

need for strategic planning to achieve 

greater consistency and coordination.
39

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

HEART OF AMERICA JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE: 

The Counterterrorism Executive Board (Kansas City Division)

by Kevin Stafford, Kansas City Special Agent in Charge (SAC)

On December 16, 2001, the FBI’s Kansas City Division (KCD) officially created the Heart of 

America Joint Terrorism Task Force (HOA JTTF). The task force was created to effectively and efficiently develop, analyze and disseminate intelligence and to work cases involving international 

and domestic terrorism matters in Kansas and western Missouri. Consistent with FBI national 

priorities, the primary mission of the HOA JTTF is to prevent acts of terrorism and to respond 

to, investigate and prosecute individuals or groups involved in acts of terrorism. The HOA JTTF 

comprises FBI Special Agents and full-time task force officers from 19 different federal, state, 

county and municipal law enforcement/intelligence agencies. HOA JTTF personnel are located in 

the Kansas City headquarters office, as well as in several resident agencies.

On February 4, 2002, the SAC established the Counterterrorism Executive Board (CEB). Initially, the CEB was composed of agency heads from 19 federal, state, county and municipal law 

enforcement organizations—with each assigning a full-time investigator to the HOA JTTF. As it 

has evolved, membership in the CEB has been modified to include individuals who bring unique 

subject-matter expertise that enhances the tactical and strategic capabilities of the CEB. Currently, representatives from eight federal agencies; five state agencies, including the Directors of 

Homeland Security for both Kansas and Missouri; and 10 local agencies constitute the CEB. Also 

included on the Board is Dr. Joseph Waeckerle, a nationally recognized medical expert on weapons 

of mass destruction and emergency medicine.

The CEB was created to ensure that federal, state, county and municipal law enforcement 

officials receive critical terrorism threat intelligence concerning their territorial responsibilities 

in the most thorough and expeditious manner and, most important, are given the opportunity 

to provide operational input on how those threats could be addressed. The CEB meets on an asneeded basis, but no less than quarterly. As of January 2002, the CEB has formally met six times. 

Classified information is disseminated personally by the SAC or through agency investigators assigned to the JTTF, who then brief their agency head. All members of the CEB maintain a Secret or 

Top Secret security clearance. The CEB addresses the concerns that many PERF executive session 

participants voiced—that local law enforcement chief executives wanted more direct, substantive 

briefings and effective mechanisms to contribute to the work of their JTTF and coordinate their 

efforts with federal and state agencies.

To address investigative matters that will arise in the event of hostilities, the CEB recently 

developed (and is in the process of implementing) satellite command posts to handle unclassified investigative leads that the KCD receives or develops. These command posts, referred to 

as Intelligence Integration and Regional Operation Centers (IIROICs), will support the KCD’s 

Crisis Management Center (CMC) by providing more human resources, including staffing additional telephone banks, and handling unclassified leads. As this paper goes to press, the FBI 

anticipates that all investigative activities conducted by the IIROICs will be assigned and coordinated through Rapid Start,25 operated at the KCD’s CMC. The IIROCs are based in locations 

25 Rapid Start is a computer database designed to organize a large volume of case information to include 

tracking leads, subjects, victims and witnesses. Reports can be obtained through Rapid Start such as how 

many leads are assigned or unassigned, how many leads are outstanding, and to whom the leads are assigned. Rapid Start also has full-text search capability. Searching in the database assists in preventing the 

duplication of leads.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

40 

where the KCD experienced a high concentration of terrorism-related leads during the last two 

years, specifically in Overland Park, Kansas; Jefferson City, Missouri; Springfield, Missouri; and 

Wichita, Kansas. There are 865 federal, state, county and municipal law enforcement agencies in 

the KCD territory. The territory includes all of Kansas and the western two-thirds of Missouri. 

These centers will provide appropriate coordination of intelligence and will pool area resources and 

address future leads in a timely manner. Leads are documented in the Rapid Start database, which 

will facilitate coordination among law enforcement agencies within the territory.

Advice for Establishing a CEB

All law enforcement agencies that have provided full-time task force members need to be included 

in the CEB. Additionally, the CEB should include individuals who are capable of providing unique 

tactical and strategic expertise to assist in the development of JTTF investigative strategies. The 

overall effectiveness and efficiency of law enforcement counterterrorism efforts can be significantly 

enhanced by involving a select group of federal, state, county and municipal law enforcement executives in the operations decisions of select JTTF investigation initiatives, rather than making 

them merely the passive recipients of intelligence information.

Conclusion

The level of cooperation among CEB members in sharing intelligence and participating in operational decisions on counterterrorism cases has significantly improved the JTTF’s strategic and tactical capabilities. The CEB integrates and enhances the intelligence and operational capabilities 

of all federal, state, county and municipal law enforcement and provides a unique forum for the 

exchange of ideas as well as the sharing of information and personnel resources.
41

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

Match Priorities to Expertise

According to participants, the FBI and other 

federal partners need to reassess their priorities and the strategies they use to achieve them 

within the context of the new threat of domestic terrorism. They, like all law enforcement 

agencies, need to ask, “Where is our greatest 

value to communities, and how do we use our 

unique expertise?”

Enormous expectations are now placed on 

the FBI to deal with a wide range of problems, 

particularly since its focus was broadened in the 

1980s to deal with drugs and violent crime. The 

FBI has been given concurrent jurisdiction for 

myriad traditionally state and local crimes, which 

puts them in the position of providing services 

that make them too much like local police—and 

that’s not a good use of their resources.

Due to their expertise, the FBI should have 

a much narrower focus, particularly when state 

and local law enforcement authorities have the 

capability to address those crimes that have been 

the subject of recent federalization. FBI Headquarters should establish broad categories and 

standards but provide the flexibility that would 

allow FBI field offices to work with local law enforcement to establish priorities consistent with 

the needs of local jurisdictions. The FBI should 

not be doing traditional local police streetwork 

but should focus on those efforts that bring the 

most value to communities for the investment.

FBI STRATEGIES

CH A P T E R FI V E

Introduction

S

INCE SEPTEMBER 11, TERRORISM PREVENTION AND INVESTIGATIONS HAVE

become the top priority for the FBI. Many local and state law enforcement agencies include that duty among their highest priorities as well. 

How federal and local law enforcement assume these new responsibilities, while 

managing existing responsibilities, received significant attention from the executive session participants.

“Local law enforcement must 

understand that the FBI doesn’t 

have unlimited resources.”

—FBI SAC
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42 

Some, but not all, local participants suggested that the FBI should not be involved in 

investigating bank robberies or drug cases, 

except at higher levels to target financial networks. Rather, the FBI priorities should be on 

criminal activities for which local law enforcement does not have extensive expertise, such 

as the following:

• Comprehensive information collection 

and analysis, which includes being a 

conduit for information exchange at the 

national level. Law enforcement needs 

federal support to identify and examine 

patterns or trends nationwide.

• Financial crimes.

• Drug trafficking that crosses local jurisdictional boundaries.

• Identity theft.

• Cybercrime.

The FBI’s operational priorities should 

take into account the size, resources and expertise of other agencies in their jurisdiction. 

Chief law enforcement executives and SACs 

will need to assess the situation and make a 

determination that is responsive to the specific 

needs of the jurisdiction. Currently, according 

to one SAC, they do not have that flexibility. 

Another SAC said FBI national priorities call 

for field offices in larger cities to focus on national terrorism and spend less time on drugs, 

gangs and other traditional crimes. But the FBI 

resource allocation restrictions do limit their 

further flexibility (described more fully in the 

section below on FBI Restrictions regarding the 

TURK system). SACs want to fill information, 

resource or operational voids that local law enforcement identifies. They need to learn from 

local law enforcement where FBI resources are 

most needed and then determine how they can 

work together to arrange those allocations.

Local law enforcement ultimately may 

receive more assistance in the areas in which 

they lack the expertise or national collection 

mechanisms. Still, they must be prepared to 

undertake those criminal investigations that 

some federal offices have conducted for the 

past decade, but from which they may now 

withdraw. For example, nationally, the FBI has 

about 1,800 agents for financial crime investigations. The FBI and local law enforcement 

may need to team up more to overcome diminishing federal resources for these and other 

traditional crimes and jointly decide where 

they should be directed. The FBI Director sets 

national priorities, but SACs should be able to 

determine local needs.

FBI Reliance on Local Expertise

As stated in the previous chapter, FBI agents 

by themselves cannot prevent another terrorist 

attack and want to learn more about how to 

integrate resources that local agencies can offer. One SAC stated, “I need every officer, DMV 

officer, campus police and others on the front 

line to gather and share their information.”

FBI SACs who participated in the session 

want to rely upon the knowledge and contacts 

that reside with local law enforcement. Local 
43

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

law enforcement officers are the experts on 

local areas and crime problems. Participants 

agreed that the FBI and each local law enforcement agency need to complement one 

another’s expertise. One SAC said, “I need 

close working relationships with investigators/

detectives in local agencies.” Consequently, a 

few SACs believed some of their FBI colleagues 

may be reluctant to pull out of drug and gang 

investigations because they fear losing contacts 

with local agencies. A chief countered that the 

FBI could lose contacts in some areas but 

would gain other contacts associated with their 

more focused responsibilities.

Local law enforcement can facilitate information gathering among community groups 

with whom they have good relationships. 

Community advisory boards that include Arab 

and Muslim members, for example, can be 

brought together for meetings with the FBI to 

provide information. Community relations are 

important for the FBI and can be strengthened 

by working with local law enforcement. This 

will only fortify the FBI’s ties with local law 

enforcement personnel.

SAC Tenure

SACs face a tremendous challenge trying to 

integrate local law enforcement’s resources 

and needs while implementing FBI programs 

in response to national priorities. This is exacerbated by job turnover, with a typical SAC tenure of only two to three years in a field office. 

The frequent turnover makes it difficult for 

each new SAC to integrate into existing groups 

and to develop partnerships with local law enforcement. According to one SAC, “It takes two 

years just to build partnerships and get comfortable working with local counterparts.” The 

consensus of the executive session participants 

is that the recommended tenure for SACs in a 

field office should be five years.

The real challenge for law enforcement, 

however, is to try to formalize relationships 

between local and federal counterparts, so that 

personality-based partnerships do not diminish when SACs and local law enforcement 

positions turn over.

Communication Channels

Communication between the FBI and local law 

enforcement is critical but sometimes difficult. 

One SAC spoke about working with 450 chiefs 

and sheriffs, which makes consistent communication difficult. Currently, he relies upon 

emails, which may be the best approach until 

a more systematic means of communication is 

possible. Of course, he clarified, he still relies 

on phone calls to chiefs or sheriffs in the face 

of an immediate threat.

“I need every officer, DMV officer, 

campus police and others on the 

front line to gather and share their 

information.”

—FBI SAC
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44 

Another SAC spoke about setting up a 

schedule of monthly meetings with local executives. This has improved communication 

and has facilitated the exchange of information 

among a number of cities. Also, new National 

Law Enforcement Telecommunications System 

(NLETS) messages provide weekly updates.

Other SACs spoke about how they try to 

provide and participate in training and educational programs that involve local law enforcement. One telling example of the potential 

success of this approach was an example in 

which a local police officer who received such 

training was able to identify and report valuable information to the JTTF gathered during 

a routine eviction resulting from a landlord–

tenant dispute.

Other FBI Restrictions

Currently, the FBI is operating under a number 

of constraints that affect its ability to conduct 

investigations and share information. Some 

are legal, some are administrative and some 

are cultural, reflective of what one SAC called 

the “Post-Hanssen Climate.”

Legal Parameters

The Privacy Act26 and the U.S. Attorney General Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise 

Investigations (Ashcroft 2002a) limit law 

enforcement’s collecting information on activities that are considered expressions of First 

Amendment Rights.27

The FBI can investigate criminal activity 

but has been restricted from collecting and keeping information related to First Amendmentprotected activities. State and local law enforcement can, unless expressly prohibited, collect information about individuals and their affiliations 

that the FBI has been prohibited from amassing. 

For example, the FBI could not collect and retain 

information about white supremacists or other 

groups at high risk for criminal activity. Some 

state police could collect that information and 

run it against the FBI database, but the FBI could 

not then retain that information. However, as one 

chief pointed out, state laws and consent decrees 

on cases from the 1970s sometimes limit local 

“State and local law enforcement 

do not need the FBI, as much as 

the FBI needs state and local law 

enforcement. . . . The FBI needs 

the information that local law 

enforcement has on community 

issues and crime problems, and 

we need to identify what local law 

enforcement needs from us.”

—FBI SAC

26 Pub. Law No. 93–579.

27 A copy of the guidelines can be found at www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf.
45

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

police agencies’ abilities to keep that information 

as well. Law enforcement at every level must be 

diligent in researching any legal limitations on 

their intelligence collection, analysis and retention capabilities and then share that information 

with their partners.

The Patriot Act28 has eased some of these 

restrictions. The FBI can now attend public 

rallies to monitor extremist functions and 

events, even if no crime has been committed 

and no terrorist links are confirmed. The FBI 

can now look in chat rooms and visit public 

domain websites. But there are still legal limits 

to what they can do, which are delineated in 

the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Federal 

Bureau of Investigation Undercover Operations (Ashcroft 2002b).29 Some of these limitations may not apply to state and local police. 

FBI session participants expressed their desire 

to share all the information they can. But there 

are legal impediments and criminal sanctions 

regarding their release of information.

Administrative Constraints

Generally, the SACs believed that local law 

enforcement operates under the misperception 

that the FBI has more information than it actually has. “This is not a matter of hoarding; we 

just don’t have the information,” commented 

one SAC. However, several local executives said 

that the FBI would be well served to better educate local law enforcement about what they can 

collect and retain and what they cannot—as 

well as administrative protocols that seem to 

slow investigations and what local law enforcement might do to ameliorate these barriers.

During the discussion on investigative protocols, one of the SACs mentioned that they 

must continually monitor investigative assignments to ensure consistency with the Time 

Utilization Record Keeping System (TURK 

System). The existence of the TURK System 

was a revelation for the local executives. This 

system requires SACs to allocate investigators 

and resources according to predetermined formulas tied to budget allocations. End-of-year 

utilization must match the budget. Only minimal deviation is permitted because future budget allocations are tied to the extent to which 

SACs adhered to previous projections. The 

SACs explained how the TURK system keeps 

them from allocating resources to meet emerging or new crime problems. For example, if a 

SAC’s budget requires that 20 percent of the 

resources be spent on bank robberies, even if 

the local agencies have bank robbery investigations under control, they cannot reallocate that 

money to terrorism-related efforts.

One chief noted that the U.S. Attorneys 

seem more independent than SACs and that 

perhaps they could help with modifying the 

TURK System. Discussions revealed that the 

28 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 

Terrorism (Pub. Law No. 107–56).

29 This document can be found at www.usdoj.gov/olp/fbiundercover.pdf.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

46 

U.S. Attorneys are indeed more independent, but 

that they also influence what SACs can do with 

investigative resources. Sometimes the SACs 

and U.S. Attorneys want to pursue different investigations, and these may further diverge from 

the priorities of Headquarters. Though there 

was some concern about whether this issue has 

been adequately addressed, session participants 

believed it was worth examining.

Perhaps the most significant administrative constraint the FBI is attempting to overcome is outdated information technology. The 

FBI is embarking on a three-year effort to implement technologies that facilitate better organization and analysis of information, as well 

as employee access to this information. This 

program includes providing each employee 

with the hardware and software to function in 

a “desktop” environment, installing high-speed 

connections linking FBI offices, and developing 

investigative software applications to improve 

information management functions.

Other administrative constraints include 

the need to address a comprehensive Department of Justice Management Review of four 

functional areas of the FBI: organizational 

structure/mission, information technology policies and practices, personnel policies and procedures, and crisis management procedures. In 

addition to this Management Review, the FBI 

has been making significant changes, including 

appointing four Executive Assistant Directors, 

instituting an Office of Law Enforcement Coordination and a variety of other changes that 

require time and resources to implement.

Organizational Culture

In response to the arrest of former FBI Special 

Agent Robert Hanssen for espionage, the FBI 

convened a committee of Headquarters and 

field office executives to evaluate the FBI’s 

internal security practices. This committee 

made numerous recommendations to improve 

the FBI’s ability to prevent, detect, investigate 

and correct security policy violations. The primary recommendation was to create a Security 

Division, under the leadership of an Assistant 

Director. Other recommendations are intended 

to promote better understanding of and compliance with security policies, including awareness initiatives. The FBI also has expanded 

its polygraph program, increased background 

re-investigations and initiated routine audits 

and verification of “need-to-know” information—all while transforming the organization 

to fight terrorism. These changes are having 

profound effects on the organizational culture, 

just as they are on the organizational structures and administrative systems.

Conclusion

The FBI is making significant efforts to confront its culture and the challenge of organizational change. Some session participants 

believe there is still a culture within the FBI 

and other law enforcement agencies that rewards information hoarding, secrecy and wariness of partnering with others. Organizational 

change is difficult, and the participating local 

law enforcement chief executives understand 

the demanding implementation path that 
47

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

must be followed. They expressed a desire to 

assist the FBI in its endeavors. They know it 

is very hard to adapt to a new mission, change 

the organization and make significant changes 

to the organizational infrastructure. Together, 

participants believed they could assist their 

partner agencies through the growing pains 

and implementation problems that affect organizational capabilities to respond to cooperative enforcement efforts.

Recommendations and Concerns

• The FBI and local law enforcement 

should reach consensus on strategies 

to prevent and investigate criminal 

activities that are consistent with the 

capabilities, resources and authority 

at each level of government. Local law 

enforcement and field offices should use 

their expertise to collaboratively develop 

strategies consistent with local needs 

and priorities.

• The FBI should use its expertise to focus 

on such counterterrorism and criminal 

activity as cybercrime, financial crime, 

identity theft and other crimes that affect multiple jurisdictions. In large cities 

at least, the FBI should, in consultation 

with local law enforcement, determine 

whether to reduce its emphasis on bank 

robberies, violent crime, gangs and 

street-level drug sales. If local agencies 

can support the shift, the FBI can focus 

more on providing local agencies with 

valuable terrorism information.

• The tenure of SACs in field offices should 

be increased to five years to provide the 

necessary stability and expertise to effect 

long-term change and oversee complex 

efforts. The FBI should also develop a 

“survival guide” for SACs based on best 

practices among local law enforcement 

executives and SACs that would help 

with succession planning, building local 

partnerships and more.

• Law enforcement at all levels also must 

be aware of legal mandates that prohibit 

certain activities. Local law enforcement 

must be particularly vigilant about researching past consent decrees, state 

laws and ordinances that would limit 

intelligence collection and retention efforts. They must also be aware of federal 

limitations to stave off their personnel’s 

perceptions that the FBI is simply being 

uncooperative.

• FBI SACs could be more effective if given additional resources and flexibility. 

SACs should have more discretion in 

determining their investigative priorities and should do this in a way that is 

consistent with local needs and issues.

• The FBI should examine and assess 

the overall effectiveness of its TURK 

System. Local law enforcement can support these efforts to ensure they allow 

flexibility in response to changing crime 

patterns.

• The FBI should broaden the investigative categories that govern field office 
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

48 

activities to provide SACs more latitude 

in counterterrorism investigations.

• Law enforcement agencies at all levels 

must educate one another about organizational obstacles, and efforts to address them, that may affect cooperative 

efforts. Local executives have extensive 

experience with organizational change 

that could be valuable to the FBI.
49

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

DIFFICULT DECISIONS: FBI PRIORITIES

by Darrel W. Stephens, Chief of Police, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, NC

The PERF/COPS Executive Session provided a unique opportunity for police chiefs and FBI executives in America to engage in an important conversation about their expectations of one another 

and to address the enormous challenges facing law enforcement in the future. Since 9–11, Homeland Security responsibilities have been added to the long list of expectations for law enforcement 

at the federal, state and local levels. Few would say that any law enforcement agency possessed 

adequate resources to address these expectations prior to 9–11, and most would agree they are still 

lacking. But for the FBI, the challenge is particularly onerous, as their number-one priority is to 

“Protect the United States from terrorist attack.”30 How is the FBI going to meet this challenge with 

11,000 Special Agents—2,500 fewer sworn officers than the Chicago Police Department and about 

28 percent of the total number of sworn officers in the NYPD?31 The simple answer is they cannot 

achieve that priority without at least three reforms32—and even then there are no guarantees.

These three reforms are

• stronger and more effective working relationships with state and local 

police,

• significant enhancements in technological capabilities, and

• more focused efforts on a much narrower list of responsibilities and 

priorities.

The focal point of this commentary is on the last.

In the wake of 9–11 and the appointment of Director Robert Mueller, the FBI identified and 

announced on May 2, 2002, 10 priorities.33 A reorganization plan announced the same day indicated that 3,718 agents (34% of the 11,000 special agents) would be assigned to antiterrorism 

investigations. Of these, 518 were moved from other criminal investigative assignments (most 

from drug investigations, violent crime and white collar crime), and the plan included hiring an 

additional 900 agents. Nevertheless, the priorities continued to encompass virtually everything 

the FBI was doing prior to 9–11, albeit fewer resources would be devoted to non-terrorism investi30 As stated on the FBI website at www.fbi.gov/priorities/priorities.htm.

31 As stated on the FBI website (www.fbi.gov) and Chicago PD website (www.ci.chi.il.us/

CommunityPolicing/AboutCPD/Organization/Overview.html).

32 There are others, but these three seem most critical to me. 

33 1. Protect the United States from terrorist attack

2. Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage

3. Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes

4. Combat public corruption at all levels

5. Protect civil rights

6. Combat transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises 

7. Combat major white-collar crime

8. Combat significant violent crime

9. Support federal, state, local and international partners

10. Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI’s mission

(www.fbi.gov/priorities/priorities.htm)
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gations.34 This is a good start to be sure, but simply does not go far enough because the priorities 

continue to suggest the FBI can do it all.

The debate continues across the nation about whether the FBI should move away from bank 

robberies and violent crime and drug investigations (areas in which there is concurrent jurisdiction with local law enforcement). In most cases the FBI gives the impression it will continue doing 

all the things it has done before—just, perhaps, in fewer cases than before and more selectively. 

The time is long overdue—well before 9–11 for the FBI (and other federal law enforcement agencies)—to resolve the strategic question of what activities the FBI should sustain to provide the 

greatest value for America, given its unique capabilities and authority. Local law enforcement can 

be supportive of these decisions, particularly if they are based on collaborative problem solving between municipal and county police executives and their area SACs. These are decisions that need 

national direction but require some flexibility at the SAC and local level. It is not entirely the FBI 

that causes priorities to include everything—many chiefs like having them involved with drugs, 

bank robbery, violent crime and more. The chief executives have just as much, perhaps more, difficulty establishing priorities than the FBI. We want it both ways—that is part of the reason why 

we have the dilemma of the FBI having to be everything to everyone.

The question of federal jurisdiction and involvement was not given sufficient thought when 

the drug enforcement authority of the DEA was also given to the FBI. Nor did the country engage in thoughtful discourse in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when many violent crimes were 

federalized. These significant policy changes were made for political expediency—not thoughtful 

responses to how these national problems might be most effectively addressed using the full range 

of law enforcement and other resources available to the nation. Though decisionmakers seem to 

be a little more thoughtful on terrorism, they are frightfully close to following the same course.

Does the FBI need to be engaged in violent crime, drugs or bank robbery investigations? What 

capabilities do they bring to these investigations that do not exist at the local level? If there is 

a role, what should that be? The most appropriate role would be to focus on supporting the investigations of those cases that cross state boundaries. There is an enormous void in local law 

enforcement’s tracking and analysis capabilities for crimes that are committed by offenders who 

move from one part of the country to another—such as federal agencies’ critical role in the D.C. 

sniper shootings. As with terrorism intelligence, connecting the dots among the cases proved to 

be very difficult. The same may also be true in more rural areas where local law enforcement resources are limited.

Is there a federal role in creating a system for tracking unsolved homicides on a national basis 

or other crimes like bank robbery, identity theft or money laundering? There are examples already—NCIC and IAFIS—in which the unique capability of federal law enforcement has enhanced 

the ability of police agencies across the nation to deal more effectively with crime.

There is no easy answer to determining FBI priorities and resource allocations. But we must 

recognize—just like local police agencies—that the FBI has limited means and that they must be 

effectively applied to those areas in which they will have the greatest impact on domestic security 

and on filling gaps where local law enforcement’s resources and authority do not exist. To do that, 

it is important that the FBI and political leaders re-engage in a national dialogue that asks the 

tough questions about what the most strategic and best use of their critical and unique resources 

should be.

 34 See abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/fbi_restructure020529.html and www.cnn.com/2002/US/05/

29/fbi.reorganization/.
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

INTELLIGENCE

CH A P T E R SI X

Introduction

THE EXECUTIVE SESSION PARTICIPANTS DISCUSSED SUCCESSES AND PROBlems with collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence.35 A recurring theme was law enforcement’s need for more valuable and 

comprehensive education, training and awareness, reflecting their desire to be 

more effective as they get back into the intelligence business. This forum provided 

participants with an opportunity to identify the pressing issues that law enforcement faces. The more detailed exchange of ideas on the intricacies of the intelligence function in policing was beyond the parameters of this first gathering. That 

discussion will occur at an upcoming executive session dedicated to the topic.

35 It is important to be aware of the differences between “information” and “intelligence.” As noted in the 

IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report (2002), “intelligence” is the combination of credible information with quality analysis—information that has been evaluated and from which conclusions have been 

drawn. As one expert has argued, “Information [consists of] scattered bits of data,” whereas intelligence is 

“information that has been filtered, distilled and analyzed . . . [it is] something that can be acted upon . . . 

[it is] what managers need to make decisions” (Kahaner 1997).

 “Intelligence sharing” requires law enforcement agencies first to conduct and then share analysis. 

The intelligence generation and sharing has multiple stages wherein law enforcement and other collaborating agencies must be able to plan, gather, collate, analyze, manage, disseminate and then use intelligence data. Criminal intelligence is data that can be used proactively for strategic and tactical purposes 

(IACP 2002).
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Shared Intelligence

The primary concern among participants 

was the extent to which intelligence is shared 

among law enforcement agencies. This sharing, 

the executives stressed, needs to occur within 

agencies, between agencies at the same level and 

among agencies at all levels of government.

Failures to share information are not 

unique to the local–federal partnership and 

sometimes plague coordination among local jurisdictions. Even information-sharing 

problems among divisions in the same agency 

have slowed the effective dissemination of information, whether they are the result of a lack 

of common databases or an unwillingness to 

share criminal intelligence with fellow officers. 

These problems exacerbate information sharing among local, state and federal agencies. 

Addressing the barriers to internal and external sharing will ensure that more relationships 

and patterns are detected.36

Local police, for example, can provide vehicle stop information around sites where other 

agencies have observed people taking notes 

about the area or pictures of monuments or 

potential targets. Local and state law enforcement can help connect the dots to places where 

the FBI is intercepting calls or investigating 

individuals. Participants believe that we must 

find ways to share the information with those 

who need it and figure out the accountability issues that will ensure it happens without 

compromising sources, investigations or other 

law enforcement personnel.

The consensus was that the FBI should be 

the primary conduit for intelligence analysis 

and exchange on a national level. But they 

cannot do it alone. The profession—at all 

levels—needs to improve its ability to analyze 

and share intelligence. With every agency fully 

engaged, progress can be made in addressing 

interagency sharing. For example, several local 

executives spoke about the need for receiving 

more intelligence on security threats. Citing 

the need to plan and respond immediately, as 

well as to work with political and other government leaders, the chiefs and sheriffs stressed 

the need for more timely briefings. This was 

cited as an excellent example for improving 

federal–local partnerships.

Another mechanism that could facilitate 

intelligence sharing among agencies is to de-

“We have opened access to 

intelligence, and we want to put all 

area intelligence in one building. We 

make 100,000 arrests per year, have 

great intelligence, but don’t have a 

way to share the information.”

—Local Law Enforcement Executive

36 The ability to share information internally and externally will also be dependent on technology reforms 

that promote sharing and interoperability, as well as advances in information collection protocols and 

records management processes. 
53

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

velop protocols for regional briefings, including 

some that might include a Compstat-like component. The mapping and geographic analysis 

functions could be invaluable for keeping executives apprised of ongoing threats and investigations. It would also prompt those involved 

to consider what other information they could 

provide to the model to complete the picture.

Intelligence Functions: 

Back to Basics

The participants were candid about the extent 

to which all of law enforcement needs to learn 

more about the intelligence function, beginning with how to collect information and then 

how to share and store it.

For example, chiefs and sheriffs indicated 

that officers are still uncertain about precisely 

what information they should look for that 

might indicate terrorist activity. There are 

obvious signs, of course, but there also may be 

more subtle indicators that routine patrol and 

special units could detect if properly trained. 

Detectives and investigators may possess valuable information without knowing it and may 

not know how to share information because 

they have never had adequate terrorism intelligence training. Most local law enforcement 

officers have never been in the intelligence 

business, and many remember the abuses of 

decades past that must be avoided this time 

around. And because agencies lack qualified 

analysts, equipment, policies, training and 

other essential resources, they may not be sure 

about how to develop an intelligence function.

As discussed more fully in the chapter on 

security clearances, there are legal mandates 

that will prohibit some information sharing or 

disclosure, and others that will preclude retaining certain intelligence. Local law enforcement 

executives also need to distinguish between 

need to know and nice to know when requesting information from the FBI—you can’t ask 

for everything. After a long discussion about 

source information, the local executives generally agreed that they do not need to know the 

sources, just whether the source is credible 

and the implications of the intelligence for 

the public safety of a local jurisdiction. In fact, 

one SAC said that local officials should always 

insist on a characterization of the source. Similarly, local executives must begin to determine 

what information is appropriate for different 

levels and functions in local law enforcement. 

Not all information is equal.

Re-Engineering Intelligence

Local law enforcement needs help in reengineering the intelligence function. Many 

local agencies are looking for expert counsel 

about how to re-establish intelligence units—

units that were once disbanded in the wake of 

“We may need a new model for the 

intelligence function, because our 

old model had some problems.”

—Local Law Enforcement Executive
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54 

civil rights and privacy abuses in the 1960s and 

1970s.37

The FBI could play a key role in providing 

assistance based on its own efforts to reorient 

its intelligence function. Other resources may 

be available, too. At the time this Executive Session was held, one of the only significant pieces 

of relevant federal legislation was the Patriot 

Act. On November 15, 2002, the Homeland 

Security Act became law, with the potential to 

alter how law enforcement intelligence is collected, analyzed and disseminated. This Act 

empowers the newly created Department of 

Homeland Security to establish an Office of 

Information Analysis under the direction of an 

Assistant Secretary, who has the authority to review and make recommendations for improvements in sharing law enforcement information 

and intelligence within the federal government 

and between the federal government and state 

and local law enforcement.38

Intelligence units of the past were focused on 

traditional crimes, not domestic terrorist threats. 

Today’s law enforcement now has a compelling need to connect with other local agencies 

across the country and with federal agencies 

in an unprecedented way—which requires FBI 

involvement. Most agencies experience difficulties performing intelligence functions and have 

varied approaches to overcoming the many barri37 Police officials say that laws, regulations, court decisions and ordinances created in the 1970s and 1980s 

to halt law enforcement’s previous abuses in scrutinizing citizens without evidence that a crime was committed now prevent them from reconnoitering at mosques and other settings where terrorists may plot 

attacks. On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed the USA Patriot Act (Pub. Law No. 107–56), which 

gave new powers to both domestic law enforcement and international intelligence agencies and eliminated 

some previous court oversight.

 For example, in 2003, New York City Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly lauded the overturning 

of a federal court decree, the Handschu agreement, governing the limits on police surveillance of citizens. 

The decree prohibited police from photographing and carrying out surveillance of political demonstrations. 

Under the decree, to infiltrate lawful political and social organizations, police must establish there is suspected criminal activity and gain the permission of a special three-person authority to act. On February 

12, 2003, U.S. District Court Judge Charles Haight expanded NYPD’s powers to carry out surveillance of 

political organizations by overturning the Handschu agreement. Judge Haight stated that the restrictions 

placed upon the NYPD as a result of the spying and intimidation of the 1960s “addressed different perils 

in a different time” (Weiser 2003). The 1985 consent decree order stemmed from a lawsuit brought in 

1971 over the infiltration of the Black Panther Party by members of the NYPD’s Red Squad. In the 1950s, 

that squad compiled large files on political meetings of left-leaning organizations and photographed and 

collected information on personal and business affairs of prominent liberals and others, then shared that 

information with the FBI and Congress to compile a list of suspected communist sympathizers. 

 Municipal mandates have a similar effect. For example, nearly a quarter-century ago, after discovering that the Seattle Police Department of that time had an intelligence unit that kept files on the public, 

the City Council passed an ordinance forbidding such police activity. Today’s Seattle Police Department 

believes the ordinance may create obstacles to their efforts to track individuals who pose a genuine terrorism threat. In the words of Seattle’s Police Chief, the ordinance is “one whose time has passed” (Powell 

2002; Moss and Fessenden 2002).

38 Homeland Security Act of 2002, U.S. Public Law 296, 107th Cong., 2d sess., 15 November 2002. Department of Homeland Security Act Public Law 107–296 can be found at www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/

hr_5005_enr.pdf. The “Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan,” dated November 25, 

2002, is available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/reorganization_plan.pdf.
55

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

ers to effective implementation. For example, the 

NYPD hired a former CIA expert and has sent 

investigators to the Middle East and other places 

of long-standing terrorist activity where intelligence gathering has been a way of life for law 

enforcement (Rashbaum 2002; Cooper 2002). 

Obviously, not every agency can or will go this 

far. Local law enforcement needs models and 

approaches that will align with their resources, 

systems and unique jurisdictional needs. These 

intelligence operations cannot bring the rest of 

their services to a standstill. They still need to focus on the crime problems in cities and counties, 

as well as the new threat. The endeavor can seem 

overwhelming, and not everyone knows how to 

begin the process.

And while the FBI can provide some guidance based on their efforts in the last year to 

step up their terrorism intelligence efforts, it is 

important to remember that this is relatively 

new to them as well. Most field offices have 

not had a long-standing terrorism intelligence 

function, and those that did collect intelligence 

typically targeted more traditional criminal activity. Still, there are lessons learned that can be 

shared with local law enforcement, and the FBI 

is working to develop a national Office of Intelligence and a strategic intelligence function. 

Local law enforcement needs to stay abreast of 

these developments and the FBI’s capacities to 

conduct information analysis and exchange.

The FBI and local law enforcement should 

collaboratively develop collection standards 

so that raw information can be more easily 

integrated and used. Likewise, the FBI should 

partner with state and local agencies to provide 

intelligence information in a format that is 

more useful to local law enforcement and, to 

the degree possible, keeps the access to information out of the clearances-only arena.

U.S. Attorney General Guidelines

The FBI operates under the U.S. Attorney 

General’s Guidelines on terrorism enterprise 

investigations and FBI undercover operations.39

These guidelines direct the FBI’s criminal investigations, including the circumstances for 

beginning an investigation, permissible scope, 

duration, subject matters and objectives. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, these guidelines 

were reviewed, modified and reissued. Still, 

both federal and local executives wondered 

whether enough changes had been made to the 

guidelines to allow for the proper initiation of 

investigations of persons or activities that appear to be a direct threat to communities.

Local law enforcement representatives 

called for additional reforms to the U.S. Attorney 

General Guidelines on terrorism investigations 

and undercover operations. Recognizing the 

political realities and obstacles to such reform, 

39 The Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise 

Investigations (Ashcroft 2002a) is available online at www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf; The Attorney 

General’s Guidelines on Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover Operations (Ashcroft 2002b) is available online at www.usdoj.gov/olp/fbiundercover.pdf.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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the local executives still believed that additional 

changes would significantly affect public safety. 

One local representative used an example of a 

Saudi-sponsored mosque that has engaged in 

recruiting individuals since 1988 to fight in Afghanistan. This local agency, without a dedicated intelligence function but through traditional 

criminal investigations, has uncovered information about the activities at the mosque that 

might have been useful to the FBI. (The FBI was 

previously unable to initiate a more thorough 

investigation because there was no evidence of 

a crime.) Situations such as this cause confusion and concern among law enforcement at all 

levels. Several FBI SACs expressed significant 

frustration with trying to change and interpret 

the guidelines, especially when they seem to 

contradict current FBI policies.

Conclusion

If the FBI gets information that indicates a 

significant level of a threat in a local jurisdiction, local chiefs and sheriffs will know about 

it, one SAC insisted. There must be greater 

understanding of the enormity of the task in 

collecting and analyzing tremendous amounts 

of information.

The problems of developing and maintaining effective intelligence functions are extensive 

and largely beyond the purview of this first executive session. Session participants are, however, 

committed to changing internal and external 

processes and mechanisms to ensure better information collection and sharing. All acknowledged that the road ahead is filled with barriers 

that can be overcome only with extensive training, education and awareness for all law enforcement personnel. Legal and agency mandates 

must be examined to ensure compliance and 

the proper balance between individual rights 

and law enforcement’s needs to ensure public 

safety. The FBI, while in a key coordinating role, 

must work collaboratively with state and local 

law enforcement to facilitate information dissemination and analysis, as well as intelligence 

archiving. Many of these specifics will surely be 

addressed in the future executive session dedicated to exploring these issues in detail.

Recommendations and Concerns

• Law enforcement agencies at all levels 

need technical assistance and training 

on recreating and re-engineering their 

intelligence functions, including the 

FBI. They must be aware of past abuses 

and take necessary steps to avoid misstepping or violating any legal or agency 

mandates. Overly restrictive mandates 

should be re-examined and considered 

for reform.

• The FBI should continue to be the 

primary law enforcement conduit for 

“We are struggling to do it right, 

not to keep it from you. It is difficult 

to vet all the information, get it 

processed and get it passed on to 

you.”

—FBI SAC
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

intelligence analysis and exchange on 

a national level, working in conjunction 

with local and state law enforcement. 

All law enforcement agencies must cooperate with the Department of Homeland Security to improve the analysis 

and dissemination of law enforcement 

information and intelligence.

• Federal, state and local law enforcement 

agencies must implement information sharing mechanisms that include 

regional briefings, some Compstat-like 

components and other steps that will 

help eliminate barriers to information 

exchanges. Agencies must examine 

their internal, cross-jurisdictional and 

local–federal processes to reduce technological, organizational and policy-related 

obstacles to sharing.

• The FBI should continue to make its 

Office of Intelligence a top priority. This 

office should seek to collect, analyze 

and disseminate information and intelligence that is relevant for and usable by 

local law enforcement.

• The law enforcement community needs 

to ensure that the FBI has adequate resources and flexibility to fulfill its coordinating and intelligence functions.

• Local law enforcement needs federal 

grant support for developing the intelligence function, including hiring 

intelligence analysts and having them 

trained to professional standards with 

assistance from the FBI.
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58 

OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO INTELLIGENCE SHARING

by Chief Jane Perlov, Raleigh (NC) Police Department

The collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding terrorist threats and investigations is central to law enforcement’s effectiveness in fighting terrorism. If we fail to manage this 

information, we risk any number of problems, including being overwhelmed with too much information, poor information sharing and feedback among agencies, and a lack of accountability for 

investigations. Ultimately, our inability to exchange information will diminish law enforcement’s 

motivation to work as a team in this new environment.

Insufficient resources and the absence of a model for using intelligence to guide operations 

hamper terrorist information and intelligence sharing among agencies. This demands that we develop a mechanism for sharing information and increasing accountability. Local law enforcement 

has had significant success in using some aspects of Compstat to accomplish these goals, and we 

may find that it has applicability for terrorism threats and investigations.

One Possible Solution

The regional JTTFs and the National JTTF should explore the feasibility of developing a Compstat-like process that would be used to track investigations and to keep state and local counterparts 

apprised of developments. The operating principle would be to ensure information and intelligence 

exchanges in a controlled environment among the individuals who need it.40

“Terrorstat” could improve a SAC’s ability to manage terrorism investigations among investigators, improve accountability among individual investigators and among participating agencies, 

and serve as the platform to facilitate information sharing among SACs, chiefs and sheriffs.

Terrorstat would enable a JTTF to collect information in a centralized location and determine 

the status and geographic location of a variety of investigations. It would serve as a regional (and 

potentially national) clearinghouse for investigative information and intelligence and would require regular input from all participating law enforcement agencies.

The computer system driving the center would require the flexibility to show regional and national trends as well as individual operations and events. Mapping and graphing tools would provide law enforcement officials with a clear perspective of counterterrorism activities. The system 

would have data-mining capabilities for analysts. On the walls could be large screens, pinpointing 

terrorist threats, investigations and other operations in progress.41

Regularly scheduled meetings would serve as a forum for different levels of briefings for investigators and administrators from federal and local law enforcement agencies. The briefings could 

be tailored, depending on the audience, from Top Secret to Secret and even to the level of public 

information.

40 The analogy to Compstat operations is limited, of course, by the lack of incident data in terrorism investigations. But many of the other aspects of tracking enforcement activities and other oversight functions 

may be applicable to coordinated counterterrorism efforts.

41 A similar system currently in operation is the Los Angeles County Regional Criminal Information Clearinghouse (L.A. CLEAR), which is the foundation for the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center 

(CATIC). 
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

The immediate benefits of such a system would be improved information sharing among and 

within agencies, improved accountability and a higher quality of intelligence production. This will 

allow for improved cooperation and coordination among law enforcement agencies in local, casespecific operations and at the national level for a more effective counterterrorism strategy.

Admittedly, this is a brief description of what Terrorstat could look like, and many details are 

lacking. However, it hopefully presents a concept that can spur additional ideas about how law 

enforcement can improve its ability to coordinate terrorism investigations and share information 

among investigators and executives.
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60 
61

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

Criminal justice practitioners and scholars 

have long recognized that the criminal justice 

system is not a system at all, but a group of 

loosely connected, independently operating 

organizations. This lack of “system” is perhaps 

nowhere more evident than in the lack of effective, coordinated law enforcement information 

sharing mechanisms nationwide. That is not 

to discount the significant progress made in the 

past 10 years to develop such mechanisms. In 

fact, there are many promising models. There 

is not, however, as yet a comprehensive, coordinated system that is functioning nationwide 

for law enforcement agencies at every level.

A number of local jurisdictions have developed integrated information systems that 

allow agencies to share criminal and investigative information and to facilitate analyses of 

MULTIJURISDICTIONAL INFORMATION SHARING

CH A P T E R SE V E N

Introduction

J

URISDICTIONAL LINES DO NOT CONSTRAIN CRIME, AND CITY AND STATE borders do not hold back terrorism. Because violence respects no boundaries, 

law enforcement at all levels of government must improve information sharing and analysis. It is a complex proposition with more than 17,000 local agencies 

governed under principles of autonomy and decentralization. Add to this context 

the differences among state governing structures, the varying mandates and organizational makeup of federal agencies, and the other components of the justice 

system with whom law enforcement coordinates—whether parole, probation, 

courts, corrections or those who work on offender reintegration into the community. Each agency has potentially valuable information that can be shared among 

agencies at the same local, state or federal agency level, and among those levels as 

well. Until those agencies link and analyze that information, critical patterns and 

early warning signs may remain overlooked.
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62 

criminal activity that is not limited to one jurisdiction.42 Several examples follow that were 

discussed by executive session participants. 

They are not presented here as an exhaustive 

list of programs, for there are surely many additional promising approaches, but they do 

serve as illustrations of the types of efforts being made to better integrate information and 

analysis functions among law enforcement 

entities.

• Hampton Roads CRIMES—This 

software system enables police officers from seven jurisdictions to access 

criminal justice information systems 

from desktop computers and laptops. 

The system relies on powerful search 

engines that query the existing records 

management systems of the participating law enforcement agencies (McKay 

2002).43

• Chicago CLEAR—This is a Webdeployed system that pushes customized information to users in real time. 

Relying upon a data warehouse and 

sophisticated records management 

systems, CLEAR allows the analysis 

of beat-level crime problems; predictive 

analysis to identify likely next targets; 

and online information on offenders, 

victims, arrests, evidence/property and 

similar cases. This system facilitates 

timely and effective investigations. 

CLEAR has enormous potential applicability outside of Chicago. Already, 

more than 120 agencies contribute 

their criminal records to CLEAR, and 

the Chicago Police Department has 

been identified as the statewide data 

warehouse for Illinois’s 1,200 law enforcement agencies.44

• Minnesota CriMNet—When completed, CriMNet will be a secure intranet system that links Minnesota’s 

1,100 criminal justice jurisdictions by 

using shared business practices and 

a standard computer language. Using 

CriMNet, any officer, prosecutor or probation or corrections official can obtain 

complete criminal history information 

42 Readers interested in regional crime mapping can see Mapping Across Boundaries: Regional Crime Analysis

(LaVigne and Wartell 2001) for detailed information on multijurisdictional systems, including case studies 

that focus on implementation, decisionmaking on software, hardware, data sharing and privacy agreements. Model Memoranda of Understanding are also included. It highlights San Diego’s ARJIS system, 

which is being examined by the FBI as a pilot site for possible local–federal information sharing, as well as 

those in Delaware, Baltimore, Orange County and Virginia. (See www.policeforum.org/pubs.html.)

43 For more information on the Hampton Roads CRIMES project, see www.templarcorp.com/crimes.htm.

44 See Chapman et al. (2002) for more information (available online at www.cops.usdoj.gov). A PowerPoint 

presentation, “The Power of Technology: Working Together to Combat Crime and Terrorism,” was delivered to PERF and COPS staff on March 20, 2002, by Barbara B. McDonald, Deputy Superintendent, and 

Ron Huberman, Executive Director of the Chicago Police Department. 
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

on suspects and criminals throughout 

the state.45

These few examples should serve to demonstrate that the characteristics of effective regional 

information-sharing systems require that data be 

entered only once but used many times, that the 

systems are part of the operational systems of the 

participating agencies and that they allow generalized query and reporting functions.46

The benefits of such integrated systems 

include developing unified strategies to reduce crime, eliminate criminal justice system 

bottlenecks, increase accountability among 

criminal justice agencies and provide a more 

complete picture of offender activity from arrest to sentencing. It is essential, however, 

that law enforcement remember the ultimate 

effectiveness of these systems is dependent on 

protecting their security and integrity.47

Current Federal Systems Open to 

State and Local Law Enforcement

Law Enforcement On-Line (LEO) is a virtual 

privacy network that contains significant sensitive but unclassified information. It is a Webbased system that is free for all levels of police 

and administered by the FBI. LEO has been 

interfaced with The Regional Information 

Sharing System Network (RISSNet) and is 

divided into six geographic regions. LEO will 

soon interface with Open Source Information 

System (OSIS). Sensitive but Unclassified 

(SBU) intelligence information will be merged 

with RISSNet, including OSIS commercial databases, OSIS-encrypted SBU email, the State 

Department visa database and other databases. 

Any law enforcement executive, analyst or officer can access the system if registered with 

both LEO and RISSNet.

Special Interest Groups (SIGs) are also on 

LEO, which includes all of at least one SAC’s 

state and local chiefs. This allows for quick communication among all the group participants. 

This has been proposed as a model for other field 

offices to use when communicating sensitive 

information. Accordingly, the FBI is considering 

establishing a SIG on LEO for each field office.

45 For more information on the Minnesota CriMNet project, see Streit (2001) and Harrison (2002) or www.

crimnet.state.mn.us. 

46 Chicago is one of the agencies that employed a process mapping approach to determine where there were 

data entry redundancies and other inefficiencies before the CLEAR project was implemented. More information on this process is detailed in Fraser et al. (1998).

47 The details of how these systems work and the costs and obstacles to engaging them are largely beyond 

the purview of this paper. However, PERF will host a future session on regional information systems and 

intelligence sharing.

“Without adequate security 

protections, regional information 

systems are potential targets for 

bad guys.”

—Local Law Enforcement Executive
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64 

NCIC also has a Violent Crime and Terrorism Offender (VICTOF) section that includes 

information on violent criminals and many 

of the GITMO prisoners. Local police now 

have access to pending investigations, and preliminary investigative files will soon be located 

there. Officers checking NCIC will receive a 

message that the FBI is looking for this individual and that the officer should arrest the 

person but also notify the FBI.

Current Inadequacies

Some of the information about federal resources was new to the local executives, which 

reflected the need for the FBI and other federal 

agencies to continue their efforts to notify and 

educate local law enforcement about available 

information.

Still, the central theme of the discussion 

on this issue was that current systems are 

simply inadequate. While progress is being 

made in certain regions, the lack of a national 

information sharing system severely limits the 

ability of law enforcement to prevent and investigate terrorism.

Local executives expressed their concern 

that unless the FBI becomes more involved in 

the local regional information systems, their 

value will be limited. The FBI is allowed to 

use these systems for investigative purposes 

but does not contribute to them or provide local agencies access to the federal investigative 

files. Several FBI field offices, at the time of this 

writing, are working to develop protocols for 

sharing investigative files. With greater federal 

involvement, local executives believe that law 

enforcement could create a national database 

that goes beyond what LEO and NLETS currently provide.

An intermediate step to developing a national information network is developing and 

improving these regional systems. The anticipated result would be an effective national database and analysis system. Law enforcement 

at all levels are concerned about maintaining 

security and safeguarding privacy and civil 

rights, but the consensus at the executive session was that a national database is within 

reach.

Pilot-Testing FBI Information 

Sharing with State and Local 

Law Enforcement

Pipelines for sharing information are one issue. 

Another issue is what is in the pipeline. For the 

first time, the FBI is contributing automated 

investigative case files (up to Secret classification) to a regional information sharing system 

involving local and state agencies.

The FBI is pilot-testing the JTTF Information Sharing Initiative in St. Louis, San Diego, 

Spokane, Norfolk and Baltimore. The St. Louis 

system is an interesting example because it includes investigative files and information from 

the FBI, a multistate effort that includes the 

Illinois State Police, and the St. Louis County 

and St. Louis Metropolitan Police Departments. INS and Customs may also participate. 

The Illinois U.S. Attorney, the FBI SAC and local police chiefs serve on the Governing Board.
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

Within St. Louis is an intelligence center 

where analysts from around the region participate and provide the means to access their 

agency’s files. Each analyst checks his or her 

own agency’s databases. A sergeant from the 

St. Louis Police Department runs the St. Louis 

Gateway Intelligence Center. The Oracle-based 

system uses iMap and other analysis software 

to connect “information dots.” Public source 

information, such as Lexis/Nexis, can be used 

with the system. Access is based on four levels 

of classification, ensuring that sensitive information is available only to those with the 

appropriate clearances. The FBI Office of Intelligence and the National JTTF will have access 

to this system.

The FBI representatives stated that this is 

still a pilot project, and additional funding is 

needed for the other four pilot sites and for any 

further expansion. This experiment has produced many good ideas, and the network has 

the potential to be used as a Compstat-style 

briefing and accountability system.48

Recommendations and Concerns

• The need for more effective national databases is critical, and local/state regional 

information-sharing networks can serve 

as a cornerstone for homeland security 

to detect patterns and warning signs that 

span jurisdictional boundaries.

• Local law enforcement needs to share 

information in forums in which federal 

agencies not only participate, but also 

contribute.

• The Gateway Information Sharing Project in St. Louis and the remaining sites 

in the JTTF Information Sharing Initiative hold promise for improving the 

sharing of criminal information among 

federal, state and local law enforcement.

• The Gateway project and other multijurisdictional efforts should remain 

top priorities for the FBI and the Department of Justice and should receive 

the resources necessary for continued 

development and effective evaluation. 

These approaches could serve as the 

foundation for improving and expanding the intelligence function in local law 

enforcement.

• Proper security controls and standards 

must be established to ensure that information is secure and that access is possible for local law enforcement agencies.

“The SAC–Chief relationship is 

critical to building effective 

information-sharing systems.”

—FBI SAC

48 Because these systems are potential targets, it is essential that security certification and standards be 

met before moving forward.
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GATEWAY INFORMATION SHARING PROJECT:

A Site Visit Summary49

Description

A regional electronic database will allow local, state and federal law enforcement agencies to share 

information with each other in the St. Louis area. The system will use data from local and state 

agencies in two states—Illinois and Missouri—effectively allowing agencies to analyze and map 

data without regard for jurisdictional boundaries. This database is truly exceptional because the 

FBI will contribute to the system, making its investigative files available to local and state agencies 

for the first time.

The effort to get the system—called the Gateway Information Sharing Project—up and running has taken six years. The process has not always been smooth, with false starts caused by inadequate funding or simply the magnitude of the effort. Along the way, it has endured such problems 

as agencies being reluctant to contribute to the system and retrieving extracted information after 

downloading. Despite these obstacles, the system is scheduled to go online by Spring 2003 and 

has the potential to change dramatically the way law enforcement agencies investigate crime and 

cooperate with one another.

Notably, the system has the potential to provide the local JTTF with robust intelligence tools 

for retrieving and analyzing information. Access to classified information will be limited to those 

with the proper clearances. Already, JTTF members are experimenting with fields that will allow 

them to retrieve and analyze information unique to a potential terrorist investigation. The system 

may become more powerful when other federal agencies in the St. Louis area enter their case information as well.

Each of the participating agencies will simply export their information to the system in the 

same format that they collect it. None of the agencies will have to develop new forms and reports 

or even modify their existing ones. Rather, the search and analytical features of the system will 

“translate” the data into one format for the end users. For example, the fact that every participating agency uses a different identifier for a Smith and Wesson handgun is inconsequential.

Investigators will be able to search the data by text, as well as such elements as people, location, property, events and alerts to retrieve information from other cases. In addition, they can 

search individual agency databases or the entire database. Once gathered, the system has the ability to analyze the information in a variety of ways, including link analysis and geographic mapping. 

Combined with other public domain analytical systems, the Gateway Project has the potential to 

let officers look at information in new ways. Ultimately, the power of the system is that it will 

allow officers to ask questions about data or look at information in a way that previously was inconceivable. Rather than merely spitting out data elements, the system will let officers ask why? 

and what does this mean?—then help provide them with the answers. In this way, the system can 

be more than just an information-sharing network; it can be a powerful intelligence network to 

prevent and reduce local crime and fight terrorism.

Lessons Learned

Although the system is not yet operational, those who have been building it—some for as long 

as six years—have learned a number of lessons that could help others who endeavor to build a 

similarly complex system. Some of those lessons are presented below. The order of these is not as 

49 This description was compiled by PERF project staff after conducting a January 2003 site visit, interviewing personnel from local and federal law enforcement agencies, and reviewing available literature on the 

project. 
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

important as the realization that they will be visited and revisited throughout the design, building 

and implementation phases.

1. System Complexities

First and foremost, all of the participants must understand the complexities of a multiagency 

information management system. Many agencies struggle to design, implement and manage an 

information system. When 5, 10 or 15 agencies try to integrate information systems, the problems 

can be far more complex.

In the design stage, take all participants’ concerns into account. Inevitably, someone will feel 

slighted for being left out of decisions or information exchanges. Some members may feel insecure 

when confronted with the expertise or experiences of other agencies. Still others will be reluctant 

to share information and will need time to acclimate to this new approach.

While this system will allow agencies to continue using their current forms and reports for 

collecting information, it is likely that these agencies will have to develop some new policies and 

procedures or modify existing ones. In addition, policies must be developed for managing the information system. The process and timeline for developing or modifying policies must be coordinated with the system’s development. Agencies have to be careful about sending mixed messages 

regarding official policies, traditional ways of conducting business and the changes that are needed 

to keep the system moving forward.

The FBI should be involved but need not be a participating agency right away. First, the system 

should be built with local and state agencies to create a sound foundation. Once it is up and running, then involve the FBI to access and submit their data. In those cases in which federal agency 

culture has traditionally discouraged sharing information with local law enforcement, it is better 

to focus first on building a system before trying to change that agency’s culture.

2. Executive-Level Commitment

Executive-level commitment may be the most critical element for success. Without that commitment and the agency support and resources that flow from that commitment, the system will be 

plagued with problems—if not outright failure.

Ownership is a critical issue. Specifically, agencies must balance the ownership of their agency 

information with their shared ownership of the system. An information/intelligence system based 

on shared resources requires that agency decisionmakers overcome jealousies of turf and zealous 

protection of their information so that the system can flourish. Conversely, they must develop 

and foster a shared sense of ownership for the system. There are successful models of agencies 

that have retained the necessary ownership of their data while working collaboratively in multijurisdictional systems.

A Governing Board composed of agency chief executives is the best approach for decisionmaking. But members must make allowances for executive-level transitions. The chances are, 

given the tenure of law enforcement chief executives, that one or more of the participating agencies 

will undergo a change of leaders. Sometimes, those leaders may be the strongest champions of the 

system; other times they may be the loudest naysayers. In any event, the remaining leadership 

will need to adapt.

3. Trust

Once a commitment has been made to develop a system, building and living up to trust among 

agencies is crucial. One of the mistakes that can undermine trust is starting too fast or too big. It 

is better to start small with a core group of committed agencies and build from there. However, it 

is important to demonstrate to other interested agencies that the system can grow.
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Realize that some agencies will have more experience and better judgment than others on appropriate information sharing. Give everyone time to adjust. Conversely, those agencies that are 

cautious have to be careful not to stand in the way of progress.

Keep expectations for the success of the system realistic so that frustrations, when they arise 

(and they will), can be diffused.

Keep egos in check, especially those of representatives from larger agencies. Maintain a positive outlook and remain patient while problems are resolved.

4. Expertise

Involving the right people in the system design is critical. This means including people at different 

levels of the various organizations, such as chief executives, computer and information technology 

specialists, crime analysts and end users. This also means involving people with varying levels 

of knowledge and expertise of information technology and computers. System design reliance on 

individuals without sufficient computer knowledge is self-defeating, because they will not even 

understand the system’s potential. Likewise, over-reliance on computer experts may severely limit 

the system’s ability to provide end users with valuable information. Involve attorneys and information systems experts early, so that the system can be built according to the security standards 

of relevant accrediting bodies.

Beyond hardware and software concerns, identify individuals who understand and can span 

the different organizational cultures that may be involved in the project. A local police department, 

a county sheriff’s office, a state police agency and the FBI may have very different missions and 

approaches to achieving them. A few individuals who know how these agencies conduct business 

can make valuable contributions to the project’s ultimate success.

Also, identify and retain the expertise necessary to make the system work once it is operational. A regional information system can store and produce, on demand, enormous amounts of complex information. At the same time, current technology makes that information easily portable, 

available to thousands of officers on laptops and PDAs. Someone needs to be able to make sense 

of this information, whether it is educated crime analysts using sophisticated tools or officers who 

receive enough training to do more than just enter and retrieve discrete data elements. This is especially important if the system is expected to evolve into an intelligence network with predictive 

capabilities. Without analytical expertise, agencies will continue to suffer from the “big ears, small 

brain syndrome” and may eventually overwhelm officers with too much information.

5. System Security and Information Quality

Important questions need to be asked about system security and quality control. These questions 

need to be posed early in the design so that they can be incorporated into the system. Basic questions include the following:

• Who will be allowed access to the system?

• Who will monitor the system?

• Who will be responsible for quality control of information placed in the system?

• Who will purge the system of “bad” data?
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

Beyond these basic questions are hundreds more that will need to be asked and answered. 

These questions need to be asked and answered early because they will affect the system design 

and how it operates. An important realization is that ultimately this will be a system designed and 

used by humans. Where mistakes are inevitable, administrators should strike a balance between 

their fear of sharing information and more effective law enforcement. Some law enforcement personnel will misuse the system, perhaps in a small way, perhaps in a great way. Everything should 

be done to prevent it, but accept that it will happen and have responses in place that address the 

behavior—ensuring that an individual action will not derail a system with tremendous potential 

for addressing crime and threats of terrorism.
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

Training on terrorism-related issues must 

start early in an officer’s career and be continuous.50 Some officers, primarily veterans, have 

had access to emergency-responder training 

and some antiterrorism training that has been 

further developed since September 11. Some of 

the training was offered by FEMA’s Office of 

National Preparedness (ONP), Office of Justice 

Program’s (OJP’s) Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) and the FBI’s National Domestic 

Preparedness Office (NDPO).

A number of training programs are under 

consideration and development by many federal 

agencies. The OJP is working with ODP—now 

operating within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—to coordinate training 

programs. The FBI is assisting this effort by 

reviewing these training programs. In addition, 

OJP will continue to evaluate the existing curricula related to weapons of mass destruction 

and other terrorism-related issues. OJP also 

indicated to executive session participants that 

TRAINING AND AWARENESS

CH A P T E R EI G H T

Introduction

THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN REORIENTING LAW ENFORCEMENT TOWARD A

counterterrorism mission are complex and unprecedented. Local, state 

and federal law enforcement professionals agree that education and 

training that is practical, focused and effective is critically needed—from the line 

officer to the executive.

50 For the purposes of this paper, the term “officer” will be used to describe all street-level personnel, including sheriffs’ deputies, state troopers and others on the front lines of law enforcement.
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the office would like to be able to provide more 

funding to state and local law enforcement for 

antiterrorism training, education and awareness programs. Other organizations, including 

the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and the 

COPS Office, are considering the development 

of training programs for local law enforcement. 

BJA has convened a Counter-Terrorism Working Group that will identify and review counterterrorism training programs.51 And the FBI is 

planning to implement a “train the trainer” 

program for Special Agents who will eventually provide intelligence gathering and analysis 

training to local officers.

Officer Training and Knowledge

Executive session participants agreed that 

officers generally do not know enough about 

domestic and international terrorist groups, 

including their history. They also lack training on the signs and indicators of terrorist 

activity. Street-level officers and investigators 

are given little guidance about what to look for 

and may not realize when they come across 

information that could reveal a potential terrorist act.

The challenges are significant. For example, officers need training on identifying 

the disenfranchised individual who poses a 

threat as much as the organized terrorist cell. 

The individuals on the fringe are energized 

by rhetoric and may strike out on their own, 

which make them particularly difficult to detect and stop.

This is not like training on a new piece 

of equipment; law enforcement is taking on a 

function it has never performed before. While 

they have some experience in intelligence gathering, though not always an auspicious one, 

even that differs from the unique threats of 

domestic terrorism by internationally directed 

forces. Many agencies have not engaged in intelligence functions in years and may not know 

where to begin. Even many of those agencies 

that have an intelligence function will need 

assistance on the best means for information 

gathering, analysis and intelligence retention 

related to potential terrorist activities.52

Information Sharing and Release

Officers are not always given a complete understanding of what information can be shared 

“I’m prepared to send 400 

detectives to a training program, 

but none exists.”

—Local Law Enforcement Executive

51 The Working Group has developed a website (www.counterterrorismtraining.gov) that provides comprehensive information about counter-terrorism training opportunities, related materials and website links. 

52 For examples of materials recently released by a federal agency, see Introduction to International Terrorism 

for State and Local Law Enforcement (FBI 2001a) and Introduction to Domestic Terrorism for State and 

Local Law Enforcement (FBI 2001b)—two CD-ROMs produced by the FBI’s Operational Training Unit in 

consultation with the Counter-Terrorism Division. At this writing, they can be obtained from all local FBI 

field offices. 
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

with citizens or how to present it. More important, officers sometimes lack guidance on how 

to ensure that information is kept confidential 

and the importance of preventing leaks. Executive session participants agreed that this aspect 

of training cannot be overlooked. As mentioned earlier, one participant’s local agency 

is planning a training program at the time of 

this writing to ensure that sensitive investigation issues are not discussed at home or with 

friends and former officers who may—unwittingly or knowingly—reveal sources and critical information.

Federal Resources

In addition to learning about what training 

programs federal agencies offer, state and local 

law enforcement must be more aware of what 

federal agencies can bring to a partnership. As 

part of their training, local law enforcement 

personnel need a deeper understanding about 

federal agencies’ (FBI, INS, DEA, ATF, Secret 

Service and others) capabilities and resources. 

In addition, they must have a keener understanding of federal limitations, such as Privacy 

Act considerations, as well as administrative 

protocols that can limit federal investigative 

authority and ability to share information.

Local law enforcement is not alone. There 

are many deficiencies at all levels of government in our knowledge and skills to deal with 

the kinds of threats our nation faces today. 

Some of these were highlighted by executive 

session participants as follows.

Federal Agency Training

The local law enforcement executives were 

most concerned about the INS’s, FBI’s and 

other federal agencies’ lack of experience with 

community policing and how it can be used for 

community engagement, information gathering, prevention and investigations. Just as they 

need to better understand federal capabilities 

and limitations, these executives believed federal agencies that operate in their jurisdictions 

would benefit from a greater appreciation of 

the time and effort required for local law enforcement to build effective communication 

networks and trust with communities. They 

want federal agencies to understand how just 

one poorly planned investigation can ruin 

years of local law enforcement outreach and 

undermine future community engagement 

needed for effective policing and counterterrorism work.

Executive-Level Training

The role of the local law enforcement executive 

has changed dramatically, as it has for his or 

her colleagues at the state and federal levels. 

One chief said, “I don’t adequately understand 

all the issues related to the kinds of questions 

raised by the community.” Chiefs and sheriffs 

who attended the session believe they and their 

peers need more resources and information to 

be effective leaders in the fight against terrorism. Many believed they have few resources 

that provide the education necessary to confidently deal with the terrorist threat. There is a 

need, at least initially, to better understand the 
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Muslim and Arab communities’ culture and 

needs, as well as their greatest concerns. They 

must also comprehend the thinking and motivation that drives those most likely to engage 

in violence against American targets.53

Local law enforcement executives also need 

assistance in making expensive and varied decisions to support their personnel as they address 

terrorist threats. For example, determining which 

types of equipment and technology alone to purchase for counterterrorist operations can be overwhelming. Each decision about a HazMat suit 

or apparatus, a software package to track leads, 

a communication program or countless other 

acquisitions require extensive research—often 

with minimal benchmarks or standards to guide 

them.54 The FBI, the COPS Office and OJP can 

play a key role in helping navigate these decisions 

and providing police professionals with needed 

support. The FBI and other federal agencies are 

also able to provide insights and training on how 

to determine priorities for which types of equipment and technology to acquire first and under 

what circumstances.

Conclusion

A comprehensive assessment of law enforcement professionals’ needs must be completed 

quickly. This first executive session did not provide the time or opportunity to detail that inventory, though future sessions are planned that will 

identify training needs in specific areas, such as 

intelligence, policing multicultural communities 

and indicators of terrorist activities.

Recommendations and Concerns

• Additional training and education is 

needed at all levels within local, county, 

state and federal law enforcement. 

Agencies should consider joint training to the fullest extent possible. Local 

law enforcement (as well as county and 

state) and federal agencies must volunteer their resources to each other, as well 

as invite one another to provide training and participate in classes. Local law 

enforcement participants, in particular, 

called for SACs to volunteer to share 

their expertise and materials at meetings and training programs, instead of 

waiting to be invited.

“We need education and awareness 

programs for all ranks—from the 

officer to the chief.”

—Local Law Enforcement Executive

53 A BJA- and ODP-funded project has attempted to fill this void with an upcoming publication, The Police 

Executive’s Terrorism Bookshelf (Goldfarb and Karchmer 2003). Another resource on counterterrorism 

training is available online at www.counterterrorismtraining.gov.

54 In November 2002, NIJ published its Guide for the Selection of Personal Protection Equipment for Emergency First Responders: NIJ Guide 102-00. The guide is available online at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/

191518.pdf. 
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

• There is a need to address redundancy 

and quality of all training programs to 

ensure they are practical and specific 

and meet the needs of local law enforcement. Federal assistance and coordination would facilitate this process.

• Training must be introduced for academy and in-service programs, and continuously updated.

• Law enforcement agencies at all levels 

of government must work together to 

increase their ability to preserve critical police–citizen relations, particularly 

with minority communities, and to 

safeguard the progress and promise of 

community policing.

• Chiefs, sheriffs and other law enforcement executives need a greater awareness and understanding of international 

terrorism and how it might manifest 

itself in their jurisdictions.

• Local and state law enforcement executives need to increase their knowledge of 

federal agencies and resources. (For example, the recent Montgomery County 

(MD) sniper case made many local law 

enforcement executives aware of a federal serial sniper law that would put 

additional federal resources at the local 

agencies’ door).55 They must also have a 

mutual understanding of the legal and 

organizational limitations that can affect law enforcement partnerships.

• Patrol officers and investigators need 

training on indicators and signs of terrorist activity and what to do with that 

information.

• Intelligence officers and analysts need 

training. Law enforcement should share 

training programs, resources and expertise at all levels.

• Along with training programs, local and 

federal law enforcement should develop 

and exchange model policies, programs 

and procedures on counterterrorism 

investigative protocols, as well as standards and guidelines on first-responder 

technology and equipment.

55 The law provides (28 USC 33, §540B)

Sec. 540B. —Investigation of serial killings 

(a) In General. —

The Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may investigate serial killings in violation of the laws of a State or political subdivision, if such investigation is requested by the head 

of a law enforcement agency with investigative or prosecutorial jurisdiction over the offense.

(b) Definitions. —In this section: 

(1) Killing. —The term ‘’killing’’ means conduct that would constitute an offense under section 1111 of 

title 18, United States Code, if Federal jurisdiction existed. 

(2) Serial killings. —The term ‘’serial killings’’ means a series of three or more killings, not less than one 

of which was committed within the United States, having common characteristics such as to suggest the 

reasonable possibility that the crimes were committed by the same actor or actors. 

(3) State. —The term ‘’State’’ means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

CONCLUSION

This paper began by posing that question, yet 

we can’t possibly know the answer until law 

enforcement is put to the test—certainly not 

a desired measure. Perhaps the better question 

is, “Will law enforcement at all levels be able 

to come together to produce an unprecedented 

coordinated strategy for addressing terrorism?” 

The proceedings of the Executive Session on 

Local–Federal Partnerships detailed in this 

paper demonstrate that local and federal law 

enforcement leaders are determined to work 

together to strengthen their existing partnerships. Their discussions and recommendations 

reflect their recognition that domestic security 

is dependent on every law enforcement agency 

joining together and that agencies at every level 

have a critical role to fill. As we have seen, that 

role can vary dramatically, depending on the 

authority, responsibilities and size of the law 

enforcement agencies involved.

The key to successful partnerships seems 

to be a mutual understanding of one another’s 

role in preventing terrorism and one another’s 

limitations. This executive session demonstrated that comprehensive knowledge of 

what other law enforcement agencies can do is 

sometimes lacking and that potential partners 

must take time to learn the specifics about 

resources and strategies. Only then can productive efforts be undertaken. This executive 

session allowed the participants to exchange 

information and dispel misperceptions in a 

candid and constructive forum. Their efforts 

acknowledged in this paper will hopefully enable other agencies to begin the same process 

of removing obstacles to effective local–federal 

partnerships.

The paper touches on countless issues and 

recommendations. Not every issue had a ready 

solution, and the participants were constrained 

MORE THAN A YEAR AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, AMERICAN LAW ENforcement is working diligently to prevent the next terrorist attack. Will it be enough?
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by the limited time they had to examine the 

issues and propose solutions. Many of these 

will be addressed in future executive sessions, 

working groups and other forums.

The recommendations are just that—

recommendations. They are not the last word 

on a perceived problem, but a proposed approach 

or course of action. The recommendations also 

vary in their scope and practicality. Some, such 

as regional information sharing systems, will require months or years of work by large numbers 

of individuals in multiple jurisdictions. Others 

can be accomplished fairly easily. Still others 

may never be implemented because of their 

complexity or changed circumstances.

For many of the recommendations, ownership was not assigned—that is, the possible 

implementation of the recommendation can 

rest with any number of law enforcement 

agencies at the federal and local level. Recommendations for improving training can begin 

immediately in agencies large and small. And 

recommendations for JTTF Executive Committees, as described in Chapter 4, can be 

explored by any of the JTTFs or it could be a 

required policy change on the national level by 

the FBI. Like many of the recommendations, 

implementation will need to be tailored to the 

unique needs of a jurisdiction.

Executive session participants expressed 

their hope that the issues and recommendations they raised will serve as the starting point 

for ongoing discussions and advance the debate 

and agenda nationwide. This Executive Session 

on Local–Federal Partnerships was just the first 

in a series of discussions on the national scene 

that PERF is coordinating on how local law 

enforcement, operating in a community policing context, will assume counter-terrorism 

responsibilities. Other sessions may focus on 

such topics as policing immigrant communities, bioterrorism, intelligence and homeland 

security systems. All sessions are premised on 

a single set of principles: Community policing 

has enabled local law enforcement to creatively 

address complex issues and resolve seemingly 

intractable problems regarding crime, disorder 

and quality of life. Community policing has 

provided police and sheriff agencies with a 

variety of resources and methods to improve 

their effectiveness. And community policing 

can help law enforcement prevent and respond 

to terrorist incidents by drawing on community contacts and citizen involvement. Law 

enforcement knows that citizens will continue 

to need help addressing crime and disorder. 

The threat of terrorist attacks, unfortunately, 

does not stop the flow of calls to 911 or address community concerns about violence in 

their neighborhoods. For law enforcement to 

continue performing their crime-fighting and 

antiterrorism roles, they must make the most 

of their resources, partnerships and other assets found in community policing approaches. 

It is in this spirit that this white paper has been 

presented.
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REFERENCES

Ashcroft, John. 2002a. The Attorney General’s 

Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise 

Investigations. U.S. Department of Justice. 

Available online at www.usdoj.gov/olp/

generalcrimes2.pdf.

Ashcroft, John. 2002b. The Attorney General’s 

Guidelines on Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover Operations. U.S. Department of Justice. Available online at 

www.usdoj.gov/olp/fbiundercover.pdf.

Chapman, Robert, Shelly Baker, Veh Bezdikian, Pam Cammarata, Debra Cohen, 

Nancy Leach, Amy Schapiro, Matthew 

Schider, Rita Varano (Community Policing Development, Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services) and Rachel 

Boba (Police Foundation, Washington, 

D.C.). 2002. Local Law Enforcement Responds to Terrorism: Lessons in Prevention and Preparedness. U.S. Department 

of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services. Available online at 

www.cops.usdoj.gov.

Cooper, Michael. 2002. “Spy Chief to Run 

Police Intelligence.” New York Times, 25 

January, sec. B, p. 3.

Fatah, Alim A., John A. Barrett, Richard D. 

Arcilesi Jr., Charlotte H. Lattin, Charles 

G. Janney and Edward A. Blackman. 

2002. Guide for the Selection of Personal Protection Equipment for Emergency 

First Responders: NIJ Guide 102-00. 

U.S. Department of Justice, National 

Institute of Justice. Available online at 

www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/191518.pdf.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2001a. Introduction to International Terrorism for 

State and Local Law Enforcement. CDROM. Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

Operational Training Unit in consultation 

with the Counter-Terrorism Division.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2001b. Introduction to Domestic Terrorism for State 

and Local Law Enforcement. CD-ROM. 

Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Operational Training Unit in consultation with 

the Counter-Terrorism Division.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2002. Security 

Clearance Process for State and Local Law 

Enforcement. Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2000. Terrorism 

in the United States: 1999. Counterterror-
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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ism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit 

of the Counterterrorism Division.. Available 

online at www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/

terror99.pdf.

Fraser, Craig B., Michael Scott, John Heisey 

and Robert Wasserman. 1998. Challenge 

to Change: The 21st Century Policing Project. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive 

Research Forum.

Goldfarb, Michael, and Clifford Karchmer. 

2003. The Police Executive’s Terrorism 

Bookshelf. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum. (Publication 

pending).

Harrison, Blake. 2002. “Fighting Crime with 

Information.” State Legislatures, January 

2002, pp. 28–30. For more information 

on the Minnesota CriMNet project, see 

www.crimnet.state.mn.us.

International Association of Chiefs of Police. 

2002. Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A 

National Plan for Intelligence-Led Policing 

at the Local, State and Federal Levels: Recommendations from the IACP Intelligence 

Summit. U.S. Department of Justice, 

Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services, Cooperative Agreement number 

2002-CK-WX-K1001.

Kahaner, Larry. 1997. Competitive Intelligence: How to Gather, Analyze and Use 

Information to Move Your Business to the 

Top. New York: Simon and Schuster, pp. 

20–21.

LaVigne, Nancy, and Julie Wartell. 2001. Mapping Across Boundaries: Regional Crime 

Analysis. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum.

McDonald, Barbara B., and Ron Huberman. 

2002. “The Power of Technology: Working 

Together to Combat Crime and Terrorism.” A PowerPoint presentation delivered 

to PERF and COPS staff on 20 March.

McKay, Jim. 2002. “Jumping the Jurisdictional 

Fence.” Government Technology, October 

2002, pp. 42 and 66. For more information 

on the Hampton Roads CRIMES project, 

see www.templarcorp.com/crimes.htm.

Moss, Michael, and Ford Fessenden. 2002 “New 

Tools for Domestic Spying, and Qualms.” 

New York Times, 10 December, pp. 1–4.

Mueller, Robert S., III. 2003a. Statement for 

the Record on War on Terrorism. Before the 

Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

United States Senate, Washington, D.C., 11 

February. Available online at www.fbi.gov/

congress/congress03/mueller021103.htm.

Mueller, Robert S., III. 2003b. Testimony 

on the War Against Terrorism: Working 

Together to Protect America. Before the 

United States Senate Committee on the 

Judiciary, Washington, D.C., 4 March. 

Available online at www.fbi.gov/congress/

congress03/mueller030403.htm.

Powell, Michael. 2002. “Domestic Spying 

Pressed Big-City Police Seek to Ease Limits Imposed After Abuses Decades Ago.” 

Washington Post, 29 November, A01.

Rashbaum, William K. 2002. “Terror Makes 

All the World A Beat for New York Police.” 

New York Times, 15 July, p.3.
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Reaves, Brian A., and Matthew J. Hickman. 

2002. Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies. Washington, D.C.: 

Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Shubert, Edward M. 2003. Conversations with 

PERF staff. Edward M. Shubert is Section 

Chief, Personnel Security Section, Security 

Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Streit, Corinne. 2001. “Minnesota gets connected with CriMNet.” Local Law Enforcement Technology (June), pp.116–118.

Timmons, Kathleen. 2003. Conversations with 

and faxes to PERF staff. Agent Timmons is 

with the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Timmons, Kathleen, and Lisa Michelle Keller. 

2003. Conversations with PERF staff. 

Agents Timmons and Keller are with the 

Office of Law Enforcement Coordination, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Weiser, Benjamin. 2003. “Threats and Responses: Law Enforcement: Rules Eased for 

Surveillance of New York Groups.” New 

York Times, 12 February, sec. A, p. 17.
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• Domestic terrorism investigations are 

conducted in accordance with The Attorney General’s Guidelines on General 

Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise, and 

Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations. These guidelines set forth the 

predication threshold and limits for investigations of U.S. persons who reside 

in the United States, who are not acting 

on behalf of a foreign power, and who 

may be conducting criminal activities in 

support of terrorist objectives.

• International terrorism investigations 

are conducted in accordance with The 

Attorney General Guidelines for FBI 

Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations. 

These guidelines set forth the predication level and limits for investigating 

U.S. persons or foreign nationals in the 

United States who are targeting national 

security interests on behalf of a foreign 

power.

AP P E N D I X A

FBI POLICY AND GUIDELINES

I

N ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY, THE FBI CONSIDERS terrorists to be criminals. FBI efforts in countering terrorist threats are 

multifaceted. Information obtained through FBI investigations is analyzed 

and used to prevent terrorist activity and, whenever possible, to effect the arrest 

and prosecution of potential perpetrators. FBI investigations are initiated in accordance with the following guidelines:
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Although various Executive Orders, Presidential Decision Directives and congressional 

statutes address the issue of terrorism, there is 

no single federal law specifically making terrorism a crime. Terrorists are arrested and convicted 

under existing criminal statutes. All suspected 

terrorists placed under arrest are provided access 

to legal counsel and normal judicial procedure, 

including Fifth Amendment guarantees.

Definitions

There is no single, universally accepted definition of terrorism. Terrorism is defined in the 

Code of Federal Regulations as “. . . the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or 

property to intimidate or coerce a government, 

the civilian population, or any segment thereof, 

in furtherance of political or social objectives.” 

(28 C.F.R. Section 0.85)

The FBI further describes terrorism as either domestic or international, depending on 

the origin, base and objectives of the terrorists. 

This report uses the following definitions:

• Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, 

or threatened use, of force or violence by 

a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or 

its territories without foreign direction 

committed against persons or property 

to intimidate or coerce a government, 

the civilian population or any segment 

thereof, in furtherance of political or 

social objectives.

• International terrorism involves violent 

acts or acts dangerous to human life 

that are a violation of the criminal laws 

of the United States or any state, or that 

would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United 

States or any state. These acts appear 

to be intended to intimidate or coerce a 

civilian population, influence the policy 

of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. 

International terrorist acts occur outside the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means 

by which they are accomplished, the 

persons they appear intended to coerce 

or intimidate, or the locale in which the 

perpetrators operate or seek asylum.

The FBI Divides Terrorist-Related 

Activity into Three Categories:

• A terrorist incident is a violent act or an 

act dangerous to human life, in violation 

of the criminal laws of the United States 

or of any state, to intimidate or coerce a 

government, the civilian population or 

any segment thereof, in furtherance of 

political or social objectives.

• A suspected terrorist incident is a potential act of terrorism for which responsibility cannot be attributed to a known 

or suspected group. Assessment of the 

circumstances surrounding the act determines its inclusion in this category.
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

• A terrorism prevention is a documented 

instance in which a violent act by a 

known or suspected terrorist group or 

individual with the means and a proven 

propensity for violence is successfully 

interdicted through investigative activity.

Note

The FBI investigates terrorism-related matters 

without regard to race, religion, national origin 

or gender. Reference to individual members of 

any political, ethnic or religious group in this 

report is not meant to imply that all members 

of that group are terrorists. Terrorists represent 

a small criminal minority in any larger social 

context.
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EDWIN DELATTRE SPEECH:

A Reflection on Successful Partnerships

AP P E N D I X B

GOOD EVENING. I AM INDEED HONORED BY CHUCK WEXLER’S INVITAtion

to offer a brief reflection on your discussion today of how to establish 

and improve local and federal partnerships to combat terrorism. Having taught sessions on ethics in the FBI Academy at Quantico, the Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center at Glynco and a wide range of federal law enforcement agencies since 1981; having spent time on the streets with police in most of 

America’s major cities since 1975; and having taught sessions in state and local 

police academies over a period now of almost 30 years, I have thought for more 

than two decades about how to secure the most effective cooperation between and 

among local, state and federal police and law enforcement agencies and individuals. I have asked this question, and written about it, while feeling a deep sense of 

kinship with and permanent debts of gratitude to local and state police and also 

federal law enforcement personnel. The question of effective partnerships has deserved our attention for at least half a century, and it demands our attention now.

I imagine that at least some of you came to 

today’s meeting suspecting that a good bit of 

fur might fly about turf and past failures and 

finger-pointing. I think others in law enforcement who should have been here did not come 

because they feared just that.

For several reasons, I did not believe that 

we would spend the day in squabbling and recrimination about failures in local and federal 

cooperation. First, the list of participants convinced me that everyone in attendance would 

already be concentrating on safeguarding the 
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public from terrorist atrocities and not on past 

grievances. Second, nobody on that list would 

believe that the history of federal/local interaction and cooperation—business as usual—has 

been good enough to secure, as much as is reasonably possible, the public safety. Everybody 

I expected to see here knows from experience 

that domestic tranquility and the common 

defense, fundamental purposes of government 

identified in the Preamble to the Constitution, 

cannot be achieved when local and federal 

agencies ignore obligations they can meet only 

by working together. Third, I expected serious, 

productive conversation today because crisis 

and adversity, exposure to savage attacks on 

noncombatants and the resolute efforts of 

enemies to destroy us and our loved ones and 

neighbors tend to bring out the best in people 

like you, people who live their lives willing to 

go in harm’s way to protect others.

Witnessing today’s conversation—and it

was a conversation, where you all listened to 

one another, and not a mere exchange, where 

everybody sat around busily thinking what he 

or she would say next instead of listening—was 

on the one hand tremendously encouraging. 

On the other hand, it reminded me of opportunities lost. Conversations like this one should 

have been earnestly pursued throughout the 

past 50 years or more, and they have not been. 

Even with the spectacular advances in policing 

and law enforcement professionalism in our 

lifetimes—fueled in part by shared educational 

programs at Quantico and elsewhere—it has 

taken our vulnerability to terrorist atrocity 

to lead us to such demanding and imperative 

conversations as we had today.

Today’s conversation was encouraging, at 

times inspiring, because the stakes are so high 

for us as a people and for our way of life—and 

yet nobody in the room flinched. The discussion was dead serious, but not humorless. 

There was among us a sense of proportion 

about the peril and mass destruction which 

terrorist states, cells and individuals will inflict 

on us if they can. We saw unblinking clarity 

about the danger from the intelligence agencies 

of terrorist states: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Yemen and Libya and problems directly related to 

Saudi Arabia. We heard candid accounts of the 

limits imposed on local/state/federal partnerships by applicable laws, executive findings, 

regulations and sanctions, some of which will 

have to be changed.

In short, we saw serious people at their 

best today. Sixty years ago, Walter Lippmann 

said that nothing is worse for the human soul 

than being dispensed on nothing—having no 

demanding work to do. Well, today we saw 

adults who are accustomed to doing difficult 

work talking forthrightly about even more 

difficult work they have to do together. As 

Abraham Lincoln insisted in 1858, “A house 

divided against itself cannot stand.” So too 

now, with the house of local, state and federal 

law enforcement.

Make no mistake: Talk is not cheap. Neither is it enough. Tomorrow, you are to articulate principles to follow together, and that task 

is not just about talk. It is about the actions 
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you need to take and the habits of shared purpose you need to forge in order to form federal/

local partnerships you can trust. Those habits 

and purposes have to outlast any particular individual’s tenure as a chief or a commissioner 

or a SAC, or as one of the leaders of an Executive Task Force or Joint Terrorism Task Force or 

a center or system for intelligence sharing.

I know of no substitute for the personal 

respect and sense of reciprocity between individuals—liking each other helps, too—on 

which successful partnerships are built. But 

you can’t prevent turnover—sometimes even 

rapid turnover—in leadership, and so you need 

ethos as well as ethics: a sense among yourselves and your subordinates that a partnership 

is not an episodic thing, along with a shared 

commitment to keep your accounts with each 

other straight.

When I first started on the streets with 

cops in Toledo, Ohio, long ago, I watched 

grandfathers, fathers and sons all in uniform 

at the same time. And what the older taught 

the younger about conduct unbecoming a cop 

came in the words, “We don’t do that here.” 

The same thing is necessary for partnerships. 

We have to have a clear understanding of what 

we do and don’t do here. Partnerships require 

habits of reciprocity that secure durable trust.

I take the first principle to be drawn from 

today’s conversation to be simple. All of 

you—chiefs, SACs, central administrators in 

the FBI—need to say systematically to others 

in positions of authority and power what you 

said to one another today. You need to speak 

in one voice to mayors, legislators at all levels, 

governors, the White House. Your voice, your 

lucidity, on what you have to do together and 

cannot accomplish separately, and on the steps 

in legislation, regulation and policy necessary 

for you to do your work, is essential to the 

public safety. You need one voice on the fundamentals, and you may already have found 

something of it here, something to build on in 

addition to personal friendships and cooperative working histories. This principle applies, 

no matter what shape or what size a federal 

Department of Homeland Security may take.

The second principle is also straightforward. Keep yourselves abreast of the major 

reports being published on homeland security, 

policing and law enforcement. The Brookings 

Institute Press has just published Protecting 

the American Homeland. It says, “Key to any 

successful prevention against future attacks 

will be the effective use of information technology for the collection, sharing, and deployment 

of key data” (p. 2). We have to link “the databases of various law enforcement and intelligence agencies . . . ” (p. 3), but “the NCIC does 

not contain information about immigration 

status or minor crimes. . . .” (p. 42). The report 

says the FBI doesn’t need 450 new agents to 

perform its counterterrorism mission. It needs 

5,000 (p. 38).

A task force of the Council on Foreign 

Relations co-chaired by former senators Gary 

Hart and Warren Rudman has just published 

“America Still Unprepared—America Still in 

Danger.” It says, “650,000 local and state po-
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lice officials continue to operate in a virtual 

intelligence vacuum, without access to terrorist 

watch lists provided by the U.S. Department of 

State to immigration and consular officials. . . .” 

(p. 9). “First responders—police, fire, emergency 

medical technician personnel—are not prepared 

. . . Their radios cannot communicate with one 

another. . . .” (p. 10). Each state needs “a twentyfour hour operations center . . . that can provide 

access to terrorist watch lists information via 

real time intergovernmental links between local and federal law enforcement. . . .” (p. 11). 

“When it comes to combating terrorism, the police officers on the beat are effectively operating 

deaf, dumb, and blind” (p. 19).

The Task Force on National Security in the 

Information Age of the Markle Foundation has 

just published “Protecting America’s Freedom 

in the Information Age.” Co-chaired by Zoe 

Baird (failed candidate for attorney general 

during the Clinton administration) and James 

Barkdale, the report vaunts a Department of 

Homeland Security; calls for a widespread, systematic network of information technology to 

be used in all relevant institutions in the public and private sectors; and claims that the FBI 

should not be the lead agency in establishing 

domestic priorities in intelligence acquisition 

and sharing.

I have read these reports, and so will others 

who make decisions about policy and law. With 

all due respect to those reports’ authors, there 

was a great deal more knowledge, wisdom and 

front line experience in the Colonial Room of 

the Mayflower Hotel today than I have found 

in these reports. Even though there is enormous detail in some of the reports, and issues 

are raised that go far beyond today’s discussion, you should know what is in them. You 

are better positioned to comment on the truth 

and falsity of claims about policing and law 

enforcement than anyone else, and the public 

cannot afford for others to be speaking for you 

or instead of you. I admit that academic reports 

tend to become shelf paper, but that does not 

mean they are without influence in the short 

run. Accordingly, you—or people to whom you 

delegate the authority—have to track these 

publications and have to take initiative in commenting on them. The alternative is to become 

accustomed to watching others influence and 

make decisions that you have good reason to 

consider unwise and ineffective.

You do have something to learn from 

scholars or academics and philosophers. An 

analogy may be useful. When a scholar sets out 

to write a dissertation or a book, he or she has 

to do research and scholarship, gathering intelligence from everywhere it is likely to be found. 

Then he has to organize it, make it permanently accessible to himself in such ways that 

he can, at will, know what he knows. Nobody 

can remember it all. Then he has to figure out 

how all this data, information and knowledge 

fit together. He has to be able to connect the 

dots. And then he has to write the book: He 

has to put all that intelligence in a form that 

others can use, make sense of, rely on, and he 

has to continue to go on learning from others 

at the same time. That’s one microcosm of the 
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intelligence/information/working partnership 

macrocosm you have to build.

You asked and replied to good questions 

today. You asked and told one another what 

you expect and need in the way of partnerships 

across local, state and federal jurisdictions. You 

can benefit from asking also, as in the Golden 

Rule, “What would I want from me, if I were 

in his shoes, or hers?” Your duties are not so 

remote from each other as to be impenetrable 

to such questions.

For those of you who are eager to know 

more about terrorism, the mind sets of terrorists, their history, here’s a short list. Read 

Michael Ledeen’s new book, The War Against 

the Terror Masters: How it Happened. Where 

We Are Now. How We’ll Win. That may lead 

you to read Niccolo Machiavelli’s classic on 

war and politics, The Prince, first published in 

1532. Ledeen relies heavily on Machiavelli in 

his own strategic and tactical thinking.

Rent the 1967 movie The Battle of Algiers.

The film deals with the years 1955 through 

1960 in Algiers, shows that a war against terrorism is a war for intelligence and analysis 

of information, and implies that whoever acquires the most advance knowledge, either by 

infiltration or interrogation, wins. By showing 

how the terrorists prevailed against the French, 

the film advocates the belief that sufficiently 

determined terrorists cannot be defeated. The 

French used compassion, bribery, torture and 

the guillotine—and still lost. We have a much 

more difficult international challenge than the 

French did, with all sorts of language barriers 

they did not have to face, and yet we cannot in 

the end simply withdraw and call it quits.

Read The Last Summer of Reason: A Novel, by Tahar Djout. He was assassinated by terrorists at the age of 39, and his book published 

posthumously in 2001 by Ruminator Books. 

It is a window to terrorist self-righteousness 

and fanaticism. And read What Went Wrong: 

Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response

by Bernard Lewis, professor emeritus at Princeton and the most important western scholar 

of Islam. It is an Oxford University Press book. 

Along with the CD produced by the FBI on terrorism and how to combat it described today, 

and educational sessions led by FBI counterterrorism people, a trove of knowledge is available 

to all of us. You don’t need to read a library full, 

either.

What’s the principle? The principle is that 

knowing what we don’t know is as important 

as knowing what we do know—that is, having the guts to admit what we don’t know 

and then asking those who do know to help 

us learn what we need to know. We saw a lot 

of that today. Tomorrow is not too early to establish real educational arrangements. There 

is no need for delay on that, anymore than 

in making the calls proposing executive task 

forces and studying the models of intelligence 

centers described today. There is a corollary to 

the principle: Some learning, some of the need 

to know, cannot be delegated. That’s why Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces cannot do the work of 

an executive task force—no matter how useful, 

even indispensable, they are.
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Let me say a few last words about resolve 

and constancy of purpose. In the midst of 

Shay’s Rebellion in 1786 and 1787, George 

Washington wrote to James Madison to express 

his profound fear that the peril to the country 

was so great that the United States might collapse. Madison replied that he allowed himself 

a measure of hope. The great historian Katherine Drinker Bowen wrote later, “It was like 

Madison to realize that the situation was too 

serious for despair.” So it was, and so it must 

be with us.

We are going to suffer losses and heartaches 

and missed opportunities, and we are going to 

make mistakes, because we are human and 

fallible. We will suffer casualties, because the 

terror masters and the homicidal fanatics who 

do their will are ruthless and shrewd and they 

exempt no one from the domain of targets. The 

fight against terrorism will, I think, be long, 

perhaps perpetual, and certainly a factor in 

our way of life. We will get better and better at 

traveling that road, especially if we refuse to be 

deterred by frustration and roadblocks and red 

tape that should have been avoidable but were 

not. Our situation is certainly “too serious for 

despair.”

During the years when I worked in Washington, I learned a good bit about resolve and 

constancy from my friendship with Admiral 

Elmo Zumwalt. We had a lot to talk about. My 

wife and I had lost a child to bubonic plague, 

and Bud Zumwalt’s son was fighting a longodds battle against cancer, probably caused by 

exposure to Agent Orange. Bud Zumwalt had 

commanded the brown water navy in Vietnam 

and had ordered the use of Agent Orange in 

a desperate attempt to protect his men from 

deadly fire along river shores. Again and again 

the media asked the Admiral, “How do you 

live with the fact that your son and others who 

served under you are dying because of your 

decision to use Agent Orange?” And he always 

replied that he had done the best he could to 

protect his men and then added, “I keep leaning forward.”

That’s what resolve and constancy take. 

That’s the most fundamental principle of all. 

We have to keep leaning forward. Today may 

suggest that we can do considerable leaning 

together.

Thanks very much.

 

Edwin J. Delattre

Professor of Philosophy

College of Arts and Sciences

Boston University
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AP P E N D I X C

PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVERS LIST

Participants

Peter Ahearn

Special Agent in Charge

FBI Buffalo Division

David Bejarano

Chief

San Diego Police Department

Mark Bullock

Deputy Assistant Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Patrick Carroll

Commissioner

New Rochelle Police Department

Arthur Cummings

Section Chief

Counterterrorism Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Deborah Daniels

Assistant Attorney General

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Rocco Diina

Commissioner

Buffalo Police Department

William Eubanks56

Manager of Global Security

Eli Lilly and Company

Paul Evans

Commissioner

Boston Police Department

Ed Flynn57

Secretary

Executive Office of Public Safety

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

William Gore58

Chief Investigator

San Diego District Attorney’s Office

Harold Hurtt

Chief

Phoenix Police Department

Tom Manger

Chief

Fairfax County (VA) Police Department

Patrick McGowan

Sheriff

Hennepin County (MN) Sheriff’s Office

Charles Moose

Chief

Montgomery County (MD) Police Department

56 Previously, SAC FBI Headquarters.

57 Previously, Chief of Arlington County (VA) Police Department.

58 Previously, SAC FBI San Diego Division.
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Edward Norris59

Superintendent of State Police

Office of Maryland State Police

Dan Oates

Chief

Ann Arbor Police Department

Ronald Olin

Chief

Lawrence (KS) Police Department

Jerry Oliver

Commissioner

Detroit Police Department

Robert Olson

Chief

Minneapolis Police Department

Carl Peed

Director

Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services

U.S. Department of Justice

Jane Perlov

Chief

Raleigh Police Department

D. Strebel Pierce

Special Agent in Charge

FBI Minneapolis Division

Charles Prouty

Executive Assistant Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Louis Quijas

Assistant Director

Office of Law Enforcement Coordination

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Charles Ramsey

Chief

DC Metropolitan Police Department

Mike Rolince

Special Agent in Charge

FBI Washington Field Office

Prentice Sanders

Chief

San Francisco Police Department

Ken Senser

Assistant Director

FBI Security Division

Kevin Stafford

Special Agent in Charge

FBI Kansas City Division

Darrel Stephens

Chief

Charlotte-Mecklenburg (NC) Police 

Department

Chris Swecker

Special Agent in Charge

FBI Charlotte Division

Charlene Thornton

Special Agent in Charge

FBI Phoenix Division

Observers

Lorie Sharpe Day

Director

Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

U.S. Department of Justice

Edwin Delattre

Professor of Philosophy

Boston University

Heather Fong

Deputy Chief

San Francisco Police Department

Brian Forst

Professor

Justice, Law and Society

American University

59 Previously, Commissioner of the Baltimore (MD) Police Department.
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

Thomas Frazier

Executive Director

Major City Chief’s Association

Mike Fry

General Counsel

Montgomery County (MD) Police Department

Charles Goodwin

Special Assistant

Law Enforcement Services Branch

Greg Harris

Principal Deputy Director

Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

U.S. Department of Justice

Sara Hart

Director

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

Lisa Keller

Public Affairs Specialist

Office of Law Enforcement Coordination

Federal Bureau of Investigation

David Klinger

Associate Professor

University of Missouri–St. Louis

Ed Maguire

Associate Professor

George Mason University

Steve Mastrofski

Director

Administration of Justice Program

George Mason University

Lois Mock

Social Science Analyst

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

Richard Nedelkoff

Director

Bureau of Justice Assistance

U.S. Department of Justice

Tony Pate

Senior Research Associate

Cosmos Corporation

Melinda Pengel

Deputy Chief

San Francisco Police Department

Steve Rickman

CNA Corporation

Ellen Scrivner

Office of Law Enforcement Coordination

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Michael Seelman

Office of Law Enforcement Coordination

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Kathleen Timmons

Special Agent

Office of Law Enforcement Coordination

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Bryan Vila

Director

Crime Control and Prevention 

Research Division

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

Dick Ward

Director

Bureau of Justice Assistance

U.S. Department of Justice
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COPS Office

1100 Vermont Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20530

Beverly Alford

Assistant Director

Karl Bickel

Sr. Policy Analyst

Dave Buchanan

Assistant Director

Pam Cammarata

Deputy Director

Rob Chapman

Sr. Social Science Analyst

Joe Kuhns

Deputy Director

Carl Peed

Director

Tim Quinn

Deputy Director

Dana Rollocks

Intergovernmental and Public 

Liaison Specialist

Maria Carolina Rozas

Assistant Director

Amy Schapiro

Sr. Social Science Analyst

Juliette White

Acting Assistant Director

PERF Staff

1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW

Suite 930

Washington, DC 20036

Phone: 202.466.7820

Fax: 202.466.7826

Lisa Carroll

Research Associate

Lorie Fridell

Director of Research

Cliff Karchmer

Director of Program Development

Judy Lim

Research Assistant

Gerard Murphy

Senior Research Associate

Rebecca Neuburger

Membership/Marketing Coordinator

Martha Plotkin

Director of Communications

Camille Preston

Senior Research Associate

Melissa Reuland

Senior Research Associate

Chuck Wexler

Executive Director
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Gerard R. Murphy

Senior Research Associate

Mr. Murphy has more than 20 years experience 

in law enforcement research and practice. He 

currently directs a number of PERF projects, 

including Community Policing in a Security Conscious World, An Assessment of the 

Beltway Sniper Task Force, and Case Studies 

of Law Enforcment Responses on September 

11. Previously, he was Director of Planning 

and Research for the Baltimore County (MD) 

Police Department. His primary responsibilities included developing and implementing the 

department’s strategic plan, researching and 

developing all department policies, managing 

federal and state grants, and serving as the 

agency’s accreditation manager. Prior to holding that position, he was the Assistant to the 

Police Chief for eight years. In that capacity 

he worked for three chiefs, providing policy 

advice and guidance and undertaking a variety 

of special projects to improve organizational 

efficiency. In addition, during his entire tenure 

with the department, he served as executive director of the Baltimore County Police Foundation. Murphy holds a master’s degree in public 

policy, has completed extensive work towards 

his doctorate in public policy and is a graduate 

of Federal Executive Institute.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Martha R. Plotkin

Director of Communications and 

Legislative Affairs

Martha Plotkin has more than 15 years of experience writing and researching criminal justice 

issues. She currently directs PERF’s publications program, which produces an average of 

six publications and papers each year on myriad 

policing issues. Plotkin also directs the media 

and legislative programs—providing briefings, 

testimony, editorials and other information 

to the press and policymakers. An attorney, 

Plotkin also works on amicus briefs and other 

legal issues affecting police agencies. She is the 

author of A Time for Dignity and other articles 

and training materials on the police response 

to elder abuse, is co-author of Police and the 

Homeless: A Status Report and editor of Under 

Fire: Gun Buy-Backs, Exchanges and Amnesty 

Programs. She has managed and continues to 

contribute to research projects on the police 

response to special populations and victims.

Secretary Edward A. Flynn

Edward A. Flynn is the Secretary of Public Safety 

for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. His 

responsibilities include oversight of the state 

police, National Guard, the department of 

corrections, homeland security, emergency 
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management and police training. Previously he 

was police chief in Arlington County, Virginia; 

Braintree, Massachusetts; and Chelsea, Massachusetts. He was credited for modernizing 

these departments and implementing community policing. His early career was spent in the 

Jersey City Police Department, where he was 

promoted from patrol officer through the ranks 

of sergeant, lieutenant, captain and inspector.

Chief Flynn is a member of the board of 

directors for the Police Executive Research Forum and is a recipient of the prestigious Gary P. 

Hayes Memorial Award for Police Leadership. 

He is on the board of directors of the national 

bipartisan anticrime organization Fight Crime: 

Invest in Kids and is a member of the Administration of Justice Advisory Committee at 

George Mason University.

He holds a bachelor’s degree in history 

from LaSalle University in Philadelphia and a 

master’s degree in criminal justice from John 

Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York; 

he also has completed all course work in the 

Ph.D. program in criminal justice from the 

City University in New York. Chief Flynn is 

a graduate of the FBI National Academy and 

the National Executive Institute and was a 

National Institute of Justice Pickett Fellow at 

Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.

Chief Jane Perlov

Chief Jane Perlov is in her second year as chief 

of the Raleigh, North Carolina, Police Department. The New York native is one of a handful 

of women chiefs of police in North Carolina.

A graduate of the John Jay College of 

Criminal Justice, Columbia University’s Police 

Management Institute and the Senior Management Institute for Police, Chief Perlov brings 

an extensive background in law enforcement 

and public safety to her current post. Chief 

Perlov joined the ranks of New York’s finest in 

January 1981. A distinguished career with the 

NYPD took her from assignments in Harlem 

to Times Square and from the rank of police 

officer to deputy chief.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts 

called in January 1999, and Perlov answered to 

serve on the Governor’s Cabinet as Secretary 

of Public Safety until August 2001. She won 

praise from law enforcement, fire fighters and 

emergency workers from her work guiding the 

response from the Commonwealth when six 

firefighters were killed in a tragic warehouse 

fire and building collapse in December 1999.

In September 2001, she was selected as chief 

of Raleigh’s 700-plus-member department.

With her work have come honors and 

accolades. She had been selected as one of 

“Twenty-Five People to Watch in New York 

City in 1998” by the New York Daily News,

“One of Ten Women To Watch in 1999” by 

Jewish Women International and “Ten People 

to Watch in 2002” by the Raleigh (North Carolina) News and Observer.

She lectures on Community Policing and 

Crime Strategies to both national and international groups.
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VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCAL–FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

Special Agent in Charge Kevin Stafford

Special Agent in Charge Kevin Stafford was 

born July 5, 1954, in Jacksonville, Illinois. 

He earned a bachelor’s degree in business administration, economics and psychology from 

Illinois College in 1976; a master’s degree 

in business administration from the University of Illinois in 1980; and a law degree from 

Southern Illinois University School of Law 

in 1985. Stafford is a member of the Illinois 

and Missouri bars. He was sworn in as a 

deputy sheriff in the Morgan County Sheriff’s 

Department, Jacksonville, Illinois, in 1974, 

where he served as a dispatcher from 1975 to 

1976. In 1976, he joined the Jacksonville, Illinois, Police Department as a patrolman and 

was promoted to a detective in 1980, where he 

served until 1981.

Stafford entered on duty with the FBI 

as a Special Agent on July 23, 1983; upon 

completion of training at the FBI Academy, 

he was assigned to the Kansas City Division. 

He subsequently served as a Special Agent in 

the New York Division from 1986 to 1987; a 

Supervisory Special Agent in the Office of the 

General Counsel, FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ), 

Washington, D.C., from 1987 to 1990; and a 

Supervisory Special Agent in the Organized 

Crime/Drug Intelligence Section, Criminal 

Investigative Division (CID), FBIHQ, from 

1990 to 1992. In 1992, Stafford was transferred to the Baltimore Division, Maryland 

Metropolitan Office, where he served as the 

Senior Supervisory Resident Agent until 

1997.

In January 1997, Stafford was designated 

as the Assistant Special Agent in Charge of 

the San Antonio Division, McAllen Resident 

Agency, where he served until October 1998. 

Between October 1998 and May 2001, he 

served as the Chief of the Drug Section, CID, 

and FBIHQ. On March 20, 2001, Stafford was 

selected by Director Louis J. Freeh to be the 

Special Agent in Charge of the Kansas City 

Division.

Chief Darrel W. Stephens

Darrel W. Stephens was appointed CharlotteMeklenburg (NC) Police Chief in September 

1999. He was the City Administrator for the 

City of St. Petersburg, Florida, for more than 

two years after accepting the position in June 

1997. He was responsible for day-to-day oversight and management of all city operations 

and a workforce of more than 3,000 employees. 

He also served as Police Chief in St. Petersburg 

from December 1992 to June 1997. He spent 

most of his career in policing, including six and 

a half years as executive director of PERF. He 

began his career in 1968 as a police officer with 

the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, 

which included a 10-month visiting fellowship 

at the National Institute of Justice in 1972. He 

became the assistant police chief in Lawrence, 

Kansas, in 1976. In 1979 he accepted the 

Largo, Florida, police chief’s position. In 1983 

he took the police chief’s position in Newport 

News, Virginia, where that department became nationally recognized for its work with 

problem-oriented policing that provided much 
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of the foundation for community policing. He 

has co-authored several books and published 

many articles on policing issues. He holds a 

bachelor’s degree in administration of justice 

from the University of Missouri–Kansas City 

and a master’s degree in public administration 

from Central Missouri State University.
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ABOUT THE OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED

POLICING SERVICES (COPS)

U.S. Department of Justice

THE OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES (COPS) WAS

created in 1994 and has the unique mission to directly serve the needs 

of state and local law enforcement. The COPS Office is an innovative 

agency that has been the driving force in advancing the concept of community policing through the creation of locally driven problem-solving strategies and policecommunity partnerships. COPS is responsible for one of the greatest infusions of 

resources into state, local and tribal law enforcement in our nation’s history.

Since 1994, COPS has invested $9.6 billion to add community policing officers to the nation’s 

streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime prevention initiatives and advance community policing nationwide. COPS funding has furthered the advancement of community policing 

through community policing innovation conferences, the development of model practices, pilot 

community policing programs and applied research and evaluation initiatives. COPS has also positioned itself to respond directly to emerging law enforcement needs. Examples include working 

in partnership with departments to enhance police integrity, promoting safe schools and combating the methamphetamine drug problem and recently homeland security efforts.

Through its Fiscal Year 2003 grant programs, COPS is assisting and encouraging local, state 

and tribal law enforcement agencies to enhance their homeland security efforts. Traditional COPS 

programs such as Universal Hiring (UHP) will give priority consideration to those applicants that 

demonstrate a use of funds related to terrorism preparedness or response through community policing. The COPS in Schools (CIS) program has a mandatory training component that will include 

topics on terrorism prevention, emergency response and the critical role schools can play in community response. In addition, COPS is developing interoperability and overtime programs that 

will assist in addressing the homeland security demands that inevitably fall to law enforcement.
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The COPS Office has made substantial investments in law enforcement training. COPS created a national network of Regional Community Policing Institutes (RCPIs) that has revolutionized 

law enforcement training. Most recently the RCPIs have been focusing their efforts on developing 

and delivering homeland security training. COPS also supports the advancement of community 

policing strategies through the national training delivery system provided by the Community Policing Consortium. Furthermore, COPS has made a major investment in research which makes 

possible the growing body of substantive knowledge covering all aspects of community policing.

These substantial investments have produced a significant community policing infrastructure 

across the country as evidenced by the fact that more than two-thirds of the nation’s law enforcement agencies have sought COPS grants and were awarded funding. The COPS Office continues 

to respond proactively by providing critical resources, training and technical assistance to help 

state, local and tribal law enforcement implement innovative and effective community policing 

strategies.
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ABOUT PERF

THE POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM (PERF) IS A NATIONAL PROFESsional association of chief executives of large city, county and state law enforcement agencies. PERF’s objective is to improve the delivery of 

police services and the effectiveness of crime control through several means:

• the exercise of strong national leadership,

• the public debate of police and criminal issues,

• the development of research and policy, and

• the provision of vital management and leadership services to police agencies.

PERF members are selected on the basis of their commitment to PERF’s objectives and principles. 

PERF operates under the following tenets:

• Research, experimentation and exchange of ideas through public discussion and debate are 

paths for the development of a comprehensive body of knowledge about policing.

• Substantial and purposeful academic study is a prerequisite for acquiring, understanding 

and adding to that body of knowledge.

• Maintenance of the highest standards of ethics and integrity is imperative in the improvement of policing.

• The police must, within the limits of the law, be responsible and accountable to citizens as 

the ultimate source of police authority.

• The principles embodied in the Constitution are the foundation of policing.

Categories of membership also allow the organization to benefit from the diverse views of 

criminal justice researchers, law enforcement at all ranks and other professionals committed to 

advancing law enforcement services to all communities.
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Additional color copies of this report can be downloaded free of charge at 

www.policeforum.org/terrorismwp.html

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