PROTECTING ROTECTING Y OUR

C OMMUNITY OMMUNITY FROM

TERRORISM ERRORISM:

Volume 3:

Preparing for and 

Responding to Bioterrorism

Strategies for Local

Law Enforcement
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM:

The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series

VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

Melissa Reuland and Heather J. Davies 

with

William J. Bratton

Jonathan E. Fielding 

Richard A. Goodman

Jerome M. Hauer

Ronald L. Iden

Cathy L. Lanier 

Phil T. Pulaski

Ruth A. Vogel

Dani-Margot Zavasky
This project, conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), was supported by Cooperative

Agreement #2002-HS-WX-K001 by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing

Services. Points of views or opinions contained in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or the members of PERF.

The opinions expressed are generally those based on the consensus of executive session attendees. However, not

every view or statement presented in this report can necessarily be attributed to each individual participant.

Websites and sources listed provide useful information at the time of this writing, but the authors do not endorse

any information of the sponsor organization or other information on the websites.

© Police Executive Research Forum, September 2004

U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

Police Executive Research Forum

Washington, DC 20036

United States of America

September 2004

ISBN 1-878734-83-0

Library of Congress Number 2003105278

Photos courtesy of (from top to bottom):

Federal Emergency Management Association (1)

U.S. Capitol Police (2)

The Arlington County (VA) Police Department (3-5)

Cover design by David Edelson, PERF

Interior layout by David Edelson based on a design by Elliot Thomas Grant, etg Design
CONTENTS

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii

Chapters

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

2. The Bioterrorist Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

3. Law Enforcement Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Forensic Epidemiology: Joint Training for Law Enforcement and Public Health Officials 

on Investigative Responses to Bioterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Valuable Partners Address The Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

4. Detection and Notification of Bioterrorist Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 

Working Together to Protect Public Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

Partnerships between Police and Public Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

Designate Roles and Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

Rapid Threat Assessment Kit: Los Angeles Police Department’s Hazmat Unit . . . . . . . . . . . .38

Need for Coordination and Interoperability of Public Health Disciplines and Resources 

across Jurisdictional Lines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48

5. Intervention, Health Care Surge, and Communication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

6. Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53

Bioterrorism References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61 

Resource Section. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

Bioterrorism Web Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65

Appendices

A. Participants and Observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

About the Authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73

About the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), U.S. Department of Justice . . . . . .81

About the Police Executive Research Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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v

This paper is the result of an executive session—

the third in a series of five—all made possible by

the U.S. Department of Justice Office of

Community Oriented Policing Services’ (COPS)

support and guidance. We are grateful to Director

Carl Peed for believing in this project and for recognizing the need for law enforcement to maintain

its commitment to community policing in a security-conscious world. We are very appreciative of

our project monitor, Amy Schapiro, who has

assisted us in planning and convening the series of

executive sessions and the resulting white papers. 

We extend a special thanks to those who participated in the executive session (See Appendix A).

They engaged in thoughtful and sincere discussions about how local law enforcement, fire, public health, and other government officials can partner, prepare for, and respond to bioterrorism. Just

as impressive was their willingness to openly discuss sensitive issues and concerns regarding collaboration. They demonstrated a tremendous

commitment to developing solutions and

strengthening partnerships.

In attendance at the executive session

were several researchers who were tasked with

identifying relevant research concerns. The

National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funds their

involvement in these sessions. Our NIJ grant

monitor, Lois Mock, and these researchers—Jack

Greene, David Klinger, Michael Mair, Steve

Mastrofski, and Edward Richards—were an

invaluable resource when transforming complex

discussions into an informative discourse for law

enforcement agencies. We are grateful for their

sound observations. 

This session was extremely thought-provoking. Its success was achieved through the

efforts of many individuals and organizations in

Los Angeles. Special thanks go to The Getty

Center’s dedicated staff, especially Bob Coumbs,

Director of Security, and Boneshia Perry, Event

Manager, for hosting the executive session so

ANY VALUE THIS PAPER HAS TO THE FIELD IS DUE TO THE DEDICATION OF THE

many individuals involved in this project who work to improve how law

enforcement prepares for and responds to bioterrorism.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

vi

smoothly and in such a spectacular setting. We

also thank Chief William Bratton; Commander

Mark Leap with the Los Angeles Police

Department for assisting with logistics; the

President of the Los Angeles Police Commission,

Rick Caruso, for his thoughtful words during

lunch; and the Los Angeles Police Department

Westchester Training Academy. We appreciate the

support of personnel from the Los Angeles Police

Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s

Department who graciously allowed us to view and

observe the equipment and resources they would

use to respond to a bioterrorist attack. Their dedication to building a stronger response team is truly

remarkable. 

We also want to thank those who contributed to this paper by writing sidebar pieces:

William J. Bratton, Jonathan E. Fielding, Richard

A. Goodman, Jerome M. Hauer, Ronald L. Iden,

Cathy L. Lanier, Phil T. Pulaski, Ruth A. Vogel, and

Dani-Margot Zavasky.

Several members of the PERF staff spent

countless hours planning the executive session,

fact-checking the content of the paper, reviewing

drafts, and correcting mistakes. First and foremost, we are very appreciative of Martha Plotkin

for all of her efforts in editing and providing suggestions for this document. Executive Director

Chuck Wexler was instrumental in supporting and

facilitating the executive session and providing

feedback on this paper. We thank Rebecca

Neuberger for managing the logistics of the twoday event and making sure the executive session

was a success, and Research Assistant Alex Hayes

for compiling the references used in this document. Thanks are also due to David Edelson for

his layout and design efforts.

To those first responders—at every level of

government—who work to make our nation safe

from a biological attack, your efforts are truly valued. We hope this paper provides you with

resources and information to further assist you in

your efforts. 
FOREWORD

WHILE FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL POLICE AGENCIES WERE STILL REELING

from the aftershocks of the September 11th attacks, they were faced

with another form of terrorism that presented formidable challenges. That menace was bioterrorism. They were not alone in their struggle to

assume new roles and responsibilities that would address this emerging threat.

Emergency medical personnel, fire, public health workers, and other first responders were similarly trying to clarify their roles and learn how to begin work on a

collaborative, multidisciplinary response. 

While trained to deal with hazardous materials,

law enforcement never had to face a seemingly

imminent threat of bioterrorism. The pressing

need for a coordinated response was revealed in

early experiences with anthrax. Using the postal

system as the method of delivery, perpetrator(s)

sent letters filled with anthrax-laden powder to

targets in Washington, D.C, New York, Florida,

and Connecticut. The attacks left several victims,

including fatalities, and sent a wave of fear

through those communities and an already anxious nation. These events revealed to health care

professionals, emergency first responders, and law

enforcement the stark vulnerabilities their respective agencies faced in preparing for and responding

to bioterrorism. The need for these emergency

responders to work together to develop policies,

procedures, and protocols for dealing with this new

style of criminal and terrorist attack presents a

constant and urgent challenge. Many community

leaders in the United States are still grappling with

the risks and potential responses to such an act in

their buildings, classrooms, or city streets.

Much like the demand for interagency

cooperation when investigating and prosecuting

other forms of domestic terrorism, preventing and

responding to a chemical or biological attack

requires open lines of communication and mutual

aid agreements among police, fire, public health,

and other government agencies. As local, county,

tribal, and state police agencies train personnel to

take on new antiterrorism responsibilities, they

must include instruction on detecting and

responding to certain medical conditions and be

aware of containment procedures for a bioterrorist

attack. Addressing the growing threat of these

attacks places mounting pressure on these agencies, especially the first responders who must prepare for myriad potential scenarios. Recognizing

the need to redefine law enforcement’s roles and

responsibilities, the Police Executive Research

Forum (PERF) and the Office of Community

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vii
Oriented Policing Services (COPS) convened its

third executive session to address the options and

issues associated with bioterrorism. Like the previous sessions in this series on protecting communities from terrorism, the meeting yielded valuable

recommendations that agencies can tailor to the

unique needs of their jurisdictions. 

This executive session was unprecedented

in the range of expertise offered by its participants,

who represented local and state police departments, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),

the Department of Health and Human Services

(HHS), the Federal Emergency Management

Agency (FEMA), the Centers for Disease Control

and Prevention (CDC), and health and science

professionals and scholars. Participants shared

their insights, experiences, and recommendations

in a candid and productive discourse. This white

paper, based largely on the topics discussed at the

session, examines the new roles law enforcement

agencies must assume because of the numerous

demands placed on them and the limited resources

they can draw on if a biological attack occurs.

PERF staff also conducted fieldwork to identify

promising programs and approaches within the

community policing context. The COPS Office

and PERF are pleased to facilitate these forums

and to provide the law enforcement profession

with opportunities and products that encourage

the sharing of effective strategies that address terrorism and advance community policing.

Carl R. Peed Chuck Wexler

Director, COPS Executive Director, PERF

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THE EMERGENCE OF BIOTERRORISM AS A MAJOR THREAT TO THE AMERICAN

public demands that law enforcement redefine its responsibilities. Law

enforcement officials must assess and prioritize steps for preventing,

preparing for and responding to bioterrorism, while retaining the gains made

through community policing. Working with other public officials, law enforcement agencies must begin by determining their community’s risk of and vulnerabilities to potential bioterrorist attacks. This can be an overwhelming endeavor—exacerbated by competing demands for police service and limited resources. 

C HAPTER O N E

INTRODUCTION

Only a comprehensive and cooperative strategy

among police, fire, public health, and other government agencies can ensure proper readiness and

response in dealing with bioterrorism. Yet, the

level of collaboration and coordination needed to

address these challenges carries its own difficulties, as each agency struggles to identify and

resolve overlapping roles and responsibilities. As

each agency’s authority is defined and gaps are

addressed, it will become apparent that local law

enforcement’s role in the national effort to prevent

or respond to a biological attack is critical.

Efforts to build bridges with the community have never been more pressing as law enforcement seeks to gain information on preventing a

bioterrorist attack. Incidents in the United States

involving anthrax and ricin have also underscored

the need to enhance and redefine ongoing community policing efforts to help inform and educate

the public of potential biohazards.

Community policing’s emphasis on partnerships, trust, and problem solving is vital to preventing biological attacks and maintaining critical

relationships with all stakeholders.

The Project: Community

Policing in a SecurityConscious World

The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF),1

with support from the U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

(COPS), has convened a series of executive sessions for law enforcement chief executives, various

government leaders, and community members.

These forums allow participants to explore important issues, debate different approaches, and

VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

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1 PERF is a nonprofit membership organization of progressive policing professionals dedicated to advancing law enforcement

services to all communities through experimentation and national leadership. Its members serve more than half the nation’s

population and the organization provides training, technical assistance, research, publications and other services to its members and the profession. More information about PERF can be found at www.policeforum.org.
exchange information. These sessions are also

structured to provide law enforcement practitioners with opportunities to share and develop effective strategies for addressing terrorism while

enhancing community policing. The discussions

are captured in subsequent white papers that are

widely disseminated to law enforcement and decision makers at all levels of government.

(Additional white papers are planned for such topics as Intelligence and Information Sharing and

Law Enforcement Partnerships with the

Department of Homeland Security.) 

The first executive session, held on

November 7–8, 2002, resulted in a white paper on

Local-Federal Partnerships. The second session

was held on June 5–6, 2003; it provided law

enforcement with guidance on Working with

Diverse Communities. These white papers are the

first two in the series on Protecting Your

Community From Terrorism: Strategies for Local

Law Enforcement. (These reports are available as

free downloads at www.policeforum.org and

www.cops.usdoj.gov.) 

The Executive Session 

PERF convened the third executive session on July

24–25, 2003 at the Getty Center in Los Angeles.

To facilitate a comprehensive discussion of the

issues, the group was composed of local, state, and

federal law enforcement executives; public health

and fire officials; as well as other subject matter

experts. (See Appendix A for a list of the participants and observers.) The session began with a

presentation by Jerome M. Hauer, formerly the

Acting Assistant Secretary with the Department of

Health and Human Service’s (HHS) Office of

Public Health Emergency and Preparedness, on the

readiness of public health agencies for a terrorist

event. Don Van Duyn from the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) then gave an assessment of the

threat of a bioterrorist attack. Moderated by

PERF’s Executive Director, the day-and-a-half session resulted in a thorough discussion that identified the myriad challenges to collaboration among

all first responders, as well as the issues and strategies for preparing for and responding to bioterrorism. The session featured two tabletop exercises: a

suspicious letter and a clandestine release.

Participants discussed what types of policies, procedures, and protocols are being used, and most

importantly, what is still needed. Other aspects of

the session included a presentation by President of

the Los Angeles Police Commission Rick Caruso,

who provided a private sector perspective on Los

Angeles’ bioterrorism preparedness activities. The

participants also had a chance to observe the

LAPD Westchester Training Academy and learn

about the resources used by the Los Angeles Police

Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s

Department. In the end, session participants proposed practical recommendations for law enforcement agencies when responding to a bioterrorist

incident, determining jurisdictional responsibilities, and staffing incident command.

The White Paper

This white paper, the third in the series, summarizes participants’ discussions at the PERF executive session as well as follow-up site visits made by

PERF project staff to New York City; Washington,

D.C.; and Baltimore, Maryland. It is meant to

advance law enforcement’s efforts to prepare for

and respond to bioterrorism. The paper includes

several sidebars to provide diverse viewpoints on

topics that warrant additional attention. These

sidebars were written either by executive session

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participants or individuals interviewed during site

visits. 

The intent of this paper is to help local law

enforcement agencies identify the opportunities

and obstacles to effectively address bioterrorism

threats as well as to build partnerships with other

first responders. The paper begins with a discussion of the threat and describes the response challenges for first responders. Further, it details the

biological agents that may possibly be used in an

attack, the likelihood of each kind of threat, and

the critical response issues law enforcement agencies must address. The remaining chapters discuss

the five critical areas involved in planning for and

responding to a bioterrorism event. These issues

include detecting a biological attack; notifying the

proper first responders; intervening (in coordination with fire, EMS, and public health responses);

managing health care surge demands; and maintaining communication with all agencies and the

public. A number of proven strategies, tactics, and

promising approaches are identified that agencies

can tailor to the concerns of a particular jurisdiction. Other strategies are untested, but are based

on participants’ exchange of ideas and suggestions.

The white paper reiterates the need for law

enforcement professionals to strengthen their partnerships with other government agencies to make

them more effective. The paper concludes with

recommendations for local law enforcement agencies and other first responders as they navigate

their new role in a counterterrorism context.

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C HAPTER T W O

TH E BIOTERRORIST THREAT2

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THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 FOREVER CHANGED THIS NATION’S VIEW

of our security if faced with a large-scale terrorist attack. The anthraxladen letters sent to New York City; Washington, D.C.; and Florida

later that same year also demonstrated our vulnerability, particularly to a bioterrorist attack. With this new awareness of our susceptibility, law enforcement

agencies have rushed to gain expertise in biology and medical science that would

have been unthinkable just years before. With this knowledge, they have had to

formulate potential responses to the worst possible scenarios.

The discussion that follows puts the bioterrorism

threat in perspective for law enforcement and

describes the unique response challenges for their

agencies. It details which biological agents might

be used in an attack and describes critical law

enforcement response issues. It also examines

bioterrorism in the context of other potential terrorist threats and presents the relative likelihood

of each kind of threat. 

The Potential "CBR" Threats

The term "CBR" is used by law enforcement agencies as shorthand to include all potential terrorist

threats that can have consequences for the health

of large numbers of people. These threats include

chemical agents (C), biological agents (B), and

radiation exposure (R).3 The health consequences

of their release will demand unique law enforcement responses that require a close working rela2 This chapter was completed with the help of Jerome M. Hauer, the Director of Response to Emergencies and Disasters

Institute (READI), and Assistant Professor at The George Washington University. At the time of the executive session,

Hauer was the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, Department of Health and

Human Services.

3 Though some first responders refer to the threats as "CBRN " to include the potential use of nuclear weapons, that discussion topic is beyond the purview of this paper.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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tionship with many professionals, including public

health. 

The following is a brief overview of the

CBR threats and the potential consequences of

each type of threat. More detailed information

about these agents can be found in several guides

for first responders listed in the references and

resources sections of this white paper (see pp.

61–67). The summaries that follow simply offer a

context within which to consider the recommendations made in later sections. 

Chemical Threats

Law enforcement professionals should be concerned about chemical agents, which include toxic

industrial chemicals and military weapon agents.

Toxic industrial chemicals, such as hydrogen

cyanide, arsine, chlorine, and ammonia, can be

obtained easily and thus may pose a greater risk

than military agents. Terrorists can gain access to

these chemicals through legal purchases and illegal

means, including black market sales and theft as

chemicals are transported across the United States

in large quantities by tanker trucks and rail cars. 

In addition, harder-to-obtain military

nerve agents—such as sarin and VX—are of concern because of the high mortality rates associated

with contact and the speed with which people

become ill once exposed. These agents act quickly

by interfering with the nervous system’s functioning and can be delivered as a vapor or liquid (Sidell,

Patrick and Dashiell 2000). Treatment options are

limited because antidotes are not always available.

Biological Agents

In contrast to chemical agents, biological agents

that spread disease are even more difficult to

obtain and to release effectively. The mechanisms

used for releasing chemical agents would be inadequate for disseminating biological agents. These

agents are of particular concern, however, because

some of them—such as smallpox and plague—can

spread easily from person to person. If a biological

attack takes place, there is likely to be significant

public anxiety and almost certain disruption of the

daily work that supports the nation’s infrastructure that provides access to necessities.

Accordingly, biological agents require special preparedness by law enforcement, fire, medical, and

public health agencies.

The Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention (CDC) has identified six "Category A"

biological agents—smallpox, anthrax, plague, botulism, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fever

(Rotz et al. 2002). The CDC defines these

Category A agents as those that "the U.S. public

health system and primary health care providers

must be prepared to address [and] include

pathogens that are rarely seen in the United

States. High-priority agents include organisms

that pose a risk to national security because they

can be easily disseminated or transmitted from

person to person; result in high mortality rates and

have the potential for major public health impact;

might cause public panic and social disruption;

and require special action for public health preparedness."4

Several biological agents are of particular

concern. For example, should there be a largescale or simultaneous anthrax attack it would

require sufficient vaccination. Antibiotics are used

4 At the time of this writing, the definition of "Category A" agents could be obtained from the CDC Emergency Preparedness

and Response website www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp#catdef.
5 The CDC defines botulism as a "rare but serious paralytic illness caused by a nerve toxin that is produced by the bacterium Clostridium botulinum." More information on botulism can be found at www.cdc.gov.

6 For more information on other agents, see the CDC's Emergency Preparedness and Response website at www.bt.cdc.gov.

7 The figures in this section are based on Jerome M. Hauer’s assessment of the intelligence.

VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

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to treat anthrax, but if treatment is not begun

early, the fatality rate can range from 50 to 70 percent, depending on the type of anthrax (Inglesby et

al. 2002). While anthrax has already been used to

create fear, destabilize government operations, and

to kill and injure citizens, the effects of a botulism5 attack could be of even greater concern. The

impact of botulism could have a devastating effect

on the public.6

Radiation Exposure

Though there are various scenarios in which terrorists can employ radiological agents, the most

commonly discussed is the threat of a dirty bomb,

although other covert releases of a radiological

material are also possible. Dirty bombs are radiological dispersal devices that combine conventional explosives with radioactive materials. The necessary ingredients for such bombs are readily available. Exposure to radiation from such a bomb can

cause tissue damage, such as skin burns, or bone

marrow depression to those in the immediate

vicinity. In addition, individuals that are contaminated with radioactive material either in or on

their bodies can expose others to the effects of

radiation.

A dirty bomb's detonation may cause

immediate casualties, but the greater effect could

be wide-spread, long-term illnesses resulting from

radiation exposure. People do not need to come

into direct contact with the source of the radiation

to be affected (Maniscalco and Christen 2002).

They need only to be under the plume of the radiation or in contact with others who are contaminated. Terrorists could use a dirty bomb to fuel

public fear and destabilize services. A dirty bomb

can create panic and deep psychological damage,

without causing much physical destruction.

Bioterrorist Attack: Low

Likelihood, Great Impact

A critical question on the minds of all law enforcement professionals is, "How likely is a bioterrorist

attack?" There is, of course, no way to predict with

certainty the likelihood of a bioterrorist attack or

any other type of terrorist action. However, the

intelligence community has assessed the relative

likelihood and impact of various terrorist threats.

As depicted in Figure 1, some experts

believe that the most likely near-term terrorist

events are those involving explosives, followed by

events involving toxic industrial chemicals.7 The

likelihood that terrorists will use radiological dispersal devices and biological agents or weapons is

Most Likely

Explosives

Toxic Industrial Chemicals

Radiological Dispersal Devices

Biological Agents/Weapons 

Nuclear Weapons

Least Likely

Fig. 1 Terrorist Threats
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8 There are other possible scenarios not covered by this list, including the combination of a physical attack with a cyber

attack that would facilitate or enhance the impact of the biological attack.

9 The information in this section is based on Jerome M. Hauer’s presentation at PERF’s Executive Session in Los Angeles

in July 2003.

in the middle of the range. Nuclear weapons are

the least likely type of terrorist event. Yet, the

impact of these various events on the public is

nearly the reverse, with biological agents having

the greatest impact, followed by nuclear devices,

toxic chemical release, radiological dispersal

devices and explosives (see Figure 2). 

This combination—a mid-range possibility of occurrence with the greatest potential

impact—makes planning for biological weapons

an essential effort. Following the release of a biological agent, the demands placed on law enforcement agencies may be overwhelming. 

Presentation of Biological

Agents

Terrorists could leverage or present biological

agents in at least four ways:8

through a credible threat; 

through delivery of a letter or package; 

through clandestine (covert) release in

a building, subway, or outside environment; or

through a purposefully public (overt)

release. 

A credible threat can be a communication

made to law enforcement, another government

authority, or the media that is a convincing declaration or evidence of a potential or actual attack.9

The second possible scenario is the release of an

agent when a letter or package is opened. With this

kind of dispersal mechanism, the presence of a

biological agent might be immediately apparent to

those affected, particularly given public awareness

about powdered substances after the experiences

with mailed anthrax letters in fall 2001 or the

more recent detection of ricin in a congressional

mailroom. In contrast, a clandestine release could

take days to detect. For example, the release of

anthrax in a ventilation system of a building or

subway might not be detected until those exposed

became symptomatic (1–4 days). In a purposefully

public release (of liquid anthrax, for example)

detection would likely be almost immediate.

The presentation mechanism used will

often determine the law enforcement response, as

will such other factors as the type or amount of an

agent. For example, a letter or package containing

a suspicious powder may be treated like any hazardous material and require a "lights and sirens

response" from law enforcement. In contrast, a

clandestine release of a communicable agent will

first be a major public health emergency. The

Greatest Impact 

Biological Agents/Weapons 

Nuclear Weapons

Toxic Industrial Chemicals

Radiological Dispersal Devices

Explosives

Least Impact

Fig. 2 Level of Impact by

Weapon Used

 

 

 


VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

9

attack would be detected when non-traditional

first responders such as emergency room physicians, EMTs, or family practitioners recognize

something out of the ordinary in their patients and

report it to the local health department. Law

enforcement will be notified by public health

authorities rather than through traditional 911

calls. Consequently, it may be days or even weeks

before law enforcement becomes aware that a

bioterrorist event has occurred. The original site of

the attack may be difficult, if not impossible, for

law enforcement investigators to determine. 

The type of biological agent used also

determines the window of opportunity during

which properly prepared public health, law

enforcement, and fire agencies can save the most

lives. In a chemical attack, that window is minutes; in a bioterrorist attack it can be days. While

this may seem like an advantage in bioterrorism

response planning, there are numerous issues that

require careful attention and pre-incident preparation to minimize the spread and severity of illness

and loss of life.

Critical Issues in Bioterrorism

Response

There are five critical issues involved in planning

for and responding to a bioterrorism event. These

are

detecting the event, 

notifying the proper authorities, 

intervening (in coordination with fire,

EMS, and public health responses), 

managing the surge of demands

placed on health care and other systems, and 

maintaining effective communication

with all agencies involved as well as

with the public. 

These issues are reviewed briefly below to

provide the reader with a concise overview of the

areas in which planning must occur. Each of these

issues is dealt with in more detail in Chapters 4

and 5.

Detection

The first challenge in any bioterrorist attack will

be to detect its occurrence and assess the scope

and severity of the incident. Because the key to

effective responses and minimal community

impact will be early detection—particularly for biological agents that cause communicable diseases—

public health and law enforcement must collaborate to develop effective recognition strategies. 

If a bioterrorist attack involves a clandestine release, primary care providers (family practitioners, emergency room doctors and nurses, and

nurse practitioners) or the public health system

will likely be the first to detect it. Consequently,

as part of a community's preparedness, health care

providers in clinical settings must be trained to

recognize and communicate unusual happenings.

Their ability to identify a pattern of illness or

symptoms early on, and to convey their information and concerns to the public health department

and law enforcement will be crucial.

To assist in identifying the "unusual," the

public health community has designed several passive mechanisms to detect bioterrorist events. For

example, several surveillance systems are in place

across the country to track early indicators of a

bioterrorist attack such as a spike in the sale of certain medications (e.g., over-the-counter diarrhea

treatments) in a community, dramatic increases in

calls to emergency medical services (EMS), or visits to emergency rooms. The BioWatch initiative

 

 

 

 

 
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

10

(of the Department of Homeland Security) consists of a network of air sample collectors, which is

in place in many cities to detect airborne particles

of certain biological agents. Because the detectors

are spread widely apart, this system will only work

if a city experiences a very large release or what is

called a "line source," in which an aircraft or vehicle sprays a long line of material as it travels. In

addition, the system could miss some subway

releases because the detectors are not yet installed

in all stations below ground. At this writing, the

Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Area Transit

Authority has been among those testing and using

a subway detector system.

As first responders to the scene of a site or

package release police officers, fire fighters, and

EMS workers will need to be able to detect a potentially harmful substance.10 While some agencies

use hand-held assays to accomplish this task,

these devices are not reliable because they can give

false positive (or even false negative) results.

Accordingly, the federal government recommends

that first responders not rely on these devices.11

Line-level first responders must therefore be

trained to recognize indicators of a bioterrorist

attack and treat a letter or package as they would

any unknown, potentially hazardous material. A

sample should then be sent to a predesignated laboratory to test for the presence of a harmful biological agent.

Notification

Once someone suspects or detects that a bioterrorist event has occurred, timely notification of other

government authorities is critical. Some health

care providers may not know whom to call or may

be reluctant to voice suspicions they fear could be

premature. This can have significant consequences for the public health. For example, in an

episode involving a monkey pox outbreak, the

local health care practitioner did not call the CDC

immediately because of inadequate training. If this

agent had been smallpox, the disease could have

spread to many more victims during the window

of opportunity this provider missed. 

Once local medical professionals (including those at public health laboratories responsible

for identifying unknown substances) have found

something unusual, they must immediately communicate their suspicions to their local public

health department and the CDC. Local law

enforcement should be notified as well. If the medical community is not already working closely with

the police and public health departments, efforts

to communicate during a crisis may be problematic, thus raising the threat to public health. (For

information on notification to the public see the

Communication section on page 49.)

Intervention

Responding to a bioterrorist attack will involve two

immediate efforts: First, the public health and

medical system will focus on controlling the

spread and severity of the disease and treating

those who are ill. Second, law enforcement will

10 See, the document published by the International Association of Fire Chiefs 2004 for an example of model procedures

for responding to a package that may pose a biological threat. 

11 At the time of this writing, this information was obtained from the webcast transcript "Anthrax: What Every

Clinician Should Know, Part 2," November 1, 2001. This document could be found at the following website:

www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/webcast/110101/anthrax-webcast-transcript110101.doc.
12 See "Criminal and Epidemiological Investigation Report." U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM). Proceedings, 2000 NDPO/DoD Criminal and Epidemiological Investigation Workshop. January 19-21, 2000 for

more information on joint investigations.

13 See www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/ for more information on the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA)

privacy regulations that regulate sharing of medical information.

14 For more advice on sheltering-in-place preparation, see www.ready.gov. For additional information on quarantine and

police powers, see Richards et al., forthcoming.

VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

11

concentrate on criminal investigation, offender

apprehension, and public safety issues. In a

bioterrorist attack, trained public health investigators will need to interview patients to determine

the origin of the disease at the same time law

enforcement officers must interview them to

investigate the crime. Before an incident occurs,

communities must develop a process by which

these agencies can conduct joint interviews. In

several communities, including New York City,

investigators have worked for a number of years to

develop a process to conduct joint epidemiological

and law enforcement investigations.12 To this

end, agency leaders must establish protocols to

enable law enforcement and public health investigators to do their jobs and to effectively share

information. These protocols must both safeguard

the privacy of health information and maintain

the confidentiality of sensitive case investigation

information.13

Public health intervention strategies

designed to limit the spread of the disease are twopronged—they involve isolating sick victims and

quarantining those individuals who have come in

contact with victims. Experience has shown that

the quarantine process works best if it is achieved

voluntarily. Many logistical, ethical, and legal

questions arise when imposing quarantine. Who

has the authority to order quarantine? How does a

community control even a voluntary quarantine of

a large area? What level of law enforcement should

be used to ensure compliance with an imposed

quarantine? That is, what will law enforcement do

with people who refuse to be quarantined? Should

they be incarcerated? Should police use force? If so,

what level of force? What are the criteria for who

should be quarantined and how will their needs be

met? Law enforcement chief executives and other

government leaders must look at a range of

options for quarantine, and concentrate on those

that minimize law enforcement’s use of force

while encouraging public involvement. 

In the event of a bioterrorist attack, the

federal government may recommend that individuals in the area stay home or inside as they would

for a snow day, a strategy known as "sheltering in

place."14 It is only after community leaders successfully restrict the movement of large numbers

of people that they can reduce the spread of the

disease. The key to this strategy will be the integral

involvement of community members and the efficient coordination between public health and

police. 

Past experience with such public health

crises as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

(SARS) demonstrates that if a community must

decide to isolate and quarantine its citizens to

reduce the spread of a deadly disease, the governing authority will first turn to the law enforcement

chief executives and public health officials for help.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

12

Consequently, joint advance planning in this area

is essential.

Health Care Surge Management

In any significant bioterrorism event, there will be

an enormous demand placed on the health care

system. Accordingly, the ability of a community to

effectively treat and isolate people in a bioterrorist

attack will depend on that community’s "health

care surge capacity." This capacity is expressed as

the number of hospital beds, trained medical professionals, and medical equipment it will take to

achieve this intervention. In large communities, it

may involve converting armories, churches, and

community centers into clinics. 

A stumbling block to meeting demands for

health care may be a paucity of local equipment

stocks needed to treat large numbers of seriously

ill people. Jurisdictions need to be informed about

where they can draw additional apparatuses. The

Department of Health and Human Services has

large stockpiles of antibiotics and vaccines as well

as medical equipment, such as ventilators, that

they can transport to anywhere in the nation within 6 to 12 hours. Ventilators are particularly critical for treating certain biological agents (such as

botulism and anthrax), but even federal sources

may not be able to provide equipment for every

jurisdiction in need. Planners in New York City,

for example, have worked with supply vendors to

supplement existing equipment by ensuring access

to warehoused supplies.

Another critical concern for planners is

how to provide adequate staffing for treatment. In

the recent experience with SARS (for which there

is no vaccine at this writing), a significant portion

of the health care providers who were exposed

became ill. Given the risks to providers that will

likely result from exposure to biological agents,

there is a real concern about identifying and

retaining the medical personnel necessary to carry

out treatment and isolation. Concurrently, potentially overwhelming demands may be placed on

law enforcement and EMS workers to provide

security and support, such as monitoring clinics

and transporting ill people to health care settings. 

Community leaders must address these

critical staffing issues. Every effort should be

made to protect first responders and health care

professionals, including providing appropriate

equipment and planning for their treatment if

exposure leads to illness. Also, if police officers

and health care workers are concerned about their

loved ones, they may not come to work until they

take measures to protect them. Therefore, plans

should include treatment strategies for first

responders as well as their families.

Communication

Multi-pronged communication strategies for the

hours and days immediately following a bioterrorist attack must be developed. Communication

plans should include protocols for communications among service providers—including law

enforcement, fire, EMS, and public health entities.

These plans must address terminology issues,

equipment interoperability, the need for redundant

systems, and dispatch protocols. Communication

strategies must also focus on notifying the public

of the attack and treatment options. For instance,

plans must address who will be the primary communicator and how that person will calm the community and release information about preventive

care such as accessing antibiotics or vaccinations. 
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

13

The Law Enforcement Role in

Responding to Bioterrorism

Myriad important functions are involved in each

of the five critical issue areas just discussed.

Although law enforcement agencies do not directly provide all of these functions, among their many

roles will be to support the public health response,

to transport those in need to health care services,

and to contribute to a coherent communication

strategy. In addition, police must engage in such

efforts as calming the community, preventing riots

or violence around health care facilities, identifying and preserving the crime scene, conducting a

criminal investigation, and responding to calls for

service. 
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

14
C HAPTER T HREE

LA W ENFORCEMENT PREPAREDNESS

VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

15

E

XECUTIVE SESSION PARTICIPANTS WHO HAVE DEVELOPED DETAILED BIOterrorism response plans provided recommendations for how state and

local law enforcement agencies can enhance bioterrorism preparedness in

the five critical areas described in Chapter 2—detection, notification, intervention, health care surge management, and communications. These participants

also stressed the importance of three overarching issues that must be considered

in preparing for these critical areas: funding and resources, training, and intelligence.15

The importance of focusing on readiness is reflected in the recent findings from a GAO study of state

and local jurisdiction bioterrorism preparedness

and response planning (GAO 2003). The GAO

staff visited seven cities and their associated state

governments in 2001 and 2002 to assess their preparedness in three areas: health care infrastructure

capacity (hospital isolation facilities, respirators,

laboratories); workforce adequacy (in health care

and essential emergency response services such as

police and fire); and degree of coordination, cooperation and communication among various

responders to ensure a comprehensive approach to

bioterrorism. These responders include public

health professionals, hospital workers and police,

fire, and EMS personnel.

The GAO findings indicate a range of preparedness, with the best preparations found in

jurisdictions with prior experience responding to

either natural disasters, such as earthquakes, or

major public events, such as political conventions

or protests. The GAO researchers noted a lack of

coordination between different regions—both

across state lines and national borders. The

researchers cited the need for guidelines about

what constitutes an adequate response plan. In

addition, representatives from the study sites

pointed out the need for shared best practices,

derived from the experiences of jurisdictions with

more expertise in bioterrorism planning and

response. GAO analysis reinforces the importance

of a standardized national incident management

system (NIMS) and emphasizes the need for realistic drills and exercises that provide experience

15 The discussion of intelligence gathering and how to determine a credible threat is touched on only briefly in this white

paper. Intelligence and information sharing is the focus of the subsequent white paper from Executive Session 4.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

16

prior to a major public event or natural disaster.16

The following discussion presents the recommendations of executive session participants

on funding and resources, training, and intelligence—as each of these issues is critical to bioterrorism preparedness.

Funding and Resource Issues

Executive session participants with significant

expertise in planning for and responding to bioterrorism assert that law enforcement executives may

not be fully prepared for the enormous demands

that will be placed on their agency’s resources during a bioterrorism incident, or the consequent

impact on department budgets. In addition to incident management and investigation, law enforcement duties will include providing security at

health care sites, keeping or restoring order, and

assisting quarantine efforts. The budget shortfalls

that result from planning and conducting these

efforts could have serious consequences for routine

law enforcement operations. Session participants

stressed that local and state governments, as well

as the federal government, must identify funding

to augment already strained budgets and assess

existing resources. 

Identifying Funds

The limitation of resources—and the need to share

and coordinate resources across regions—prompted session participants to question how the federal government should distribute antiterrorism

funding. They suggested that federal agencies

should consider requiring regional or statewide

cooperation to be eligible for federal grants.

Further, participants noted that while direct funding to large cities may make sense for a variety of

reasons, consideration must also be given to smaller cities and towns to access needed funds. While

large cities may be at higher risk, session participants cautioned that much of America is rural and

those areas need to prepare for a potential bioterrorism incident.17

The choice of whether to fund large or

small communities (or both) is only one of many

funding concerns. Some session participants were

troubled that while federal funding has gone mostly to law enforcement and fire departments, hospitals need sufficient resources to become involved

in advance planning and to be better prepared to

respond to a bioterrorism incident (Waeckerle

2000). Session participants stressed that hospitals

also need specialized equipment, supplies, and

increased staffing. 

Waeckerle (2000) also noted that hospitals

will need the federal government to provide protection from liability should their staff become

contaminated, or unable to treat patients for other

reasons related to a bioterrorism attack. The cities

examined in the GAO report (2003) had similar

concerns about funding streams and how funds

would be shared among different response agencies

(e.g., hospitals and government agencies). 

Assessing Resources 

In order to request appropriate funding, agencies

should develop bioterrorism response plans and

16 At the time of this writing, more information on National Incident Management System (NIMS) can be found at

www.fema.gov/preparedness/nims/nims.shtm.

17 Charlotte-Mecklenberg is an example of a well-known police-public health partnership that could be applied to smaller

jurisdictions.
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

17

then assemble the necessary human and technological assets to implement these plans. These

should include command and oversight capacity to

manage them. As a critical first step in bioterrorism preparedness, therefore, session participants

urged law enforcement agencies to assess their

existing resources, in terms of both staffing and

equipment.

A recommended mechanism for assessing

such resources is a "gap analysis," which involves

inventorying staffing and equipment capabilities

from a wide variety of disciplines (e.g., the fire

department) to identify redundancies and shortfalls. For example, many communities in the

United States rely solely on volunteer fire departments for emergency response. Unfortunately,

these departments do not typically have sufficient

resources should they need to respond to a large

bioterrorism event. In California, state planners

addressed this gap by combining the volunteer fire

department resources across several regions to

enhance emergency response. A gap analysis can

also be used to assess equipment needs and develop plans to purchase, maintain, and replace equipment. This assessment must be comprehensive

and should be regional or even statewide.

Training Issues

Law enforcement training serves a variety of purposes—to enhance detection of a bioterrorism

event, to reduce exposure to the agent, to ensure

smooth coordination of on-scene hazardous materials responses, and to promote effective investigation and management of a contagious organism.

Session participants stressed that all first responders at all levels must be trained initially and then

given frequent in-service training.

In particular, session participants emphasized that to maintain first responder readiness,

agencies must offer frequent and consistent training on precautions to reduce exposure. This training should cover signs and symptoms of contamination by a potential bioterrorism agent and critical immediate response procedures. Detection will

be enhanced if officers are informed about possible

indicators of bioterrorism. In addition, labor

unions and police executives have expressed concerns about officers’ safety and protecting their

health. One session participant, for instance, recommended that agencies provide 8 to 16 hours of

hazardous materials training for all recruits and

in-service personnel.

Law enforcement, public health, and

other first responders should educate the community and private sector agencies/entities, especially private security, on the critical issues in

responding to a potential biohazard. Private security is crucial to assisting law enforcement with

identifying and locating terrorists or disrupting

terrorist attacks, and is the primary guardian of

many critical infrastructures or dangerous materials. Community members and private security

forces are also critical information sources essential to counterterrorism efforts. They can help act

as the "eyes and ears" of a comprehensive intelligence-gathering strategy, but only if they know

what to look for. The private sector agencies/companies, especially private security, should be

included in training on protecting critical infrastructure from biological attacks, such as vulner-
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

18

ability assessments, strategic planning efforts,

and exercises.18

Types of Training for Emergency

Incidents

Numerous emergency services providers will converge at the scene of a suspected bioterrorism incident. Session participants suggested conducting

multi-agency training so that clear strategies

engage all agencies across government. They also

encouraged authorities to develop communication

and command plans related to incident management systems. This training should include specialists and all personnel involved in on-scene

responses for a particular jurisdiction. 

Executive session participants identified a

range of training techniques to achieve their goals

effectively and efficiently. These included tabletop

exercises, field drills, classroom training, and computer simulations. For example, a growing number

of communities are conducting field drills that

involve officers, hospitals, private security, and

community members who enact possible scenarios. These types of experiential learning methods

are needed, in addition to standard classroom

training, to help prepare first responders and to

identify vulnerabilities and flaws in plans. 

A tabletop drill can be a valuable learning

experience. For example, the tabletop drills in

Chicago, Illinois and Seattle, Washington conducted in the spring of 2003 helped assess critical

agency communication capabilities and problems

as well as information deficits (Shenon 2003). The

need for determining those outcomes is the very

reason executive session participants support continued drills. They recognize, however, that these

drills can be costly and are therefore not an option

for all agencies or communities. For jurisdictions,

after-action reports that identify lessons learned in

completed drills can be quite valuable.

In fall 2003, PERF staff conducted site visits with individuals from cities that were represented at the executive session. Personnel provided the project team with more detailed information about their field training drills. In the

Washington, D.C. area, for instance, first responder preparedness was tested with a field experiment involving an unknown substance in a warehouse. In this "red envelope" drill, a dispatch call

went out to all patrol officers. Washington

Metropolitan Police Chief Charles Ramsey handed

a note to the first patrol unit that responded indicating that a drill was being conducted. The note

described the signs and symptoms that had been

observed—consistent with the release of a chemical substance—during a basketball game. (This

same drill can be used for a biological attack.

There would not necessarily be symptoms, but

there could be signs of a substance (e.g., white

powder) that would alert patrol officers of a potential agent.) If the first responders reacted in a way

that would, in a real incident, have caused them

serious harm or death, the police chief handed

them a red card that read: "you’re dead." If this situation actually had involved a deadly chemical,

the first three patrol officers and two supervisors

would have died as a result of their failure to follow protocol, despite the information they were

18 For more information on law enforcement partnerships with private security see IACP and COPS Office National Policy

Summit, Building Private Security/Public Law Enforcement Partnerships to Prevent and Respond to Terrorism and Public

Disorder: Vital Issues and Policy Recommendations (2004).
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

19

provided and the personal protective equipment

(PPE) available in the trunk of all patrol cars. 

This drill demonstrated—not just to the

department commanders, but also to front-line

officers—the need for more training on response

protocols for a chemical or biological attack. The

fact that the chief was on the scene, handing out

the drill instructions, ensured that information

about the drill would be carried throughout the

agency. As a result of the drill, all patrol officers in

the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police

Department (MPD) at the time of this writing, are

receiving 16 hours of terrorist response training,

including the proper use of PPE and decision making for addressing chemical and biological agents

and scenarios. In September 2003 a joint exercise

was conducted in New York with the NYPD, the

New York City Office of the Chief Medical

Examiner, the New York City Department of

Environmental Protection, the FBI, and New York

City Department of Health. This exercise demonstrated the necessity for strong partnerships across

disciplines before an event occurs.

The CDC has developed a basic classroom

training course, "Forensic Epidemiology: Joint

Training for Law Enforcement and Public Health

Officials on Investigative Responses to

Bioterrorism," which draws on the Criminal and

Epidemiological Investigation Handbook. This

course brings together public health and law

enforcement officials from the same region to meet

each other, learn what each agency would do in a

bioterrorism investigation, and train collaboratively. To be effective, a significant number of front-line

police and public health personnel must attend the

course to ensure all first responders from each

agency are trained and able to work well together

after this opportunity. The CDC course uses three

scenarios based on actual incidents. Promoting a

common language and knowledge base is at the

core of the training. (A sidebar on page 21 provides

more information on this training.)

Agent-specific simulation models prepared

by social scientists using computer software programs also can provide jurisdictions with insight

into how different response systems (public health,

law enforcement, and EMS) work, or don’t work, as

they interact with each other.19 The benefit of

these models is their ability to test the impact of a

variety of assumptions about the response of each

system and then evaluate the outcome. These

assumptions can be based on a variety of information sources, including how various agencies in this

area or other communities have responded to actual crises, such as natural (e.g., earthquakes and

floods) or manmade disasters (hazardous material

spills). The major benefits of testing assumptions

through simulations are the lack of disruption to

ongoing operations and lower costs.

Training for Contagious Organisms

In the hours and days after a community has

detected the release of a contagious biological

agent, law enforcement officers will be placed

squarely at the intersection of concerned, frightened, or potentially ill citizens and the government

efforts designed to assist them. Law enforcement

has been and will continue to be the "face of gov19 The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce,

hosted two workshops on "Modeling & Simulation for Emergency Response" on March 4-6, 2003 and March 2-3, 2004. The

summary report of the presentations and breakout working sessions as well as a list of standards and tools relevant to modeling and simulation for emergency response are available at www.nist.gov/simresponse.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

20

ernment" for communities all across this country.

It will be critical for the success of government

plans to contain an outbreak that law enforcement

officers remain calm and be well informed about

the contagion, the health risks and benefits of vaccination, and available medical treatments. Law

enforcement officers will need this information for

two reasons: to pass it along to concerned citizens,

and to reassure themselves, their coworkers, and

their families that they can continue to work safely.

Given the significance of law enforcement

roles in the event of an outbreak—including

responding to calls for service, maintaining order

and assisting with vaccination—personnel must

be educated about contagious organisms. This

education should include information about biological agents, their disease spread and manifestations, available vaccines and treatments, and the

risks and benefits of those treatments. Law

enforcement officers will also need to know how to

interact safely with people who are potentially contagious. Session participants encouraged health

department officials to be involved in first responder education (to include police, fire, EMS, and

health care providers) about physical protection

and mental health concerns. In addition, private

security should be educated on contagious organisms and trained in the proper response protocols. 

Participants recommended that agencies

conduct this education in such a way as not to

cause unnecessary anxiety. The law enforcement

agency should reach out to other police chiefs and

sheriffs in its region to design training. Agencies

should also consider including medical ethicists,

physicians, public health professionals, and scientists expert in contagious diseases to develop staff

training.

A community must also develop and conduct joint exercises that test local capabilities in

carrying out quarantine and isolation plans.

Session participants noted the value of conducting

large tabletop and operational exercises focusing

on quarantine and isolation issues that address

both local and regional response plans.

In New York City, members of the police

department and the FBI have conducted joint

training to evaluate their involvement in effectively administering prophylactic anthrax treatments

(such as antibiotics) or vaccines and conducting

interviews to obtain information about the site of

exposure (Rashbaum and Miller 2004). The New

York City Department of Health and Mental

Hygiene (DOHMH) administers preventative

treatments, whereas the NYPD and FBI are responsible for conducting the criminal investigation.

During the anthrax event that affected

NBC television in New York City, the NYPD and

FBI interviewed every individual who was given a

screening questionnaire by the DOHMH prior to

obtaining medical treatment. The NYPD learned

from that experience that it was not necessary to

do an in-depth interview on everyone who was

screened. In the future, the NYPD is considering

using the health screening questionnaire to decide

whom to interview. But, this procedure will only

be feasible if a small number of individuals need to

be screened. If the DOHMH must administer

treatment or vaccines to a large segment of the

population, it would be virtually impossible to

interview everyone.
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

21

FORENSIC EPIDEMIOLOGY:

JOINT TRAINING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH

OFFICIALS ON INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSES TO BIOTERRORISM

by Richard A. Goodman, Co-Director, Public Health Law Program,

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Since at least the mid-1970s, public health and law enforcement officials have conducted joint or parallel investigations of health problems possibly associated with criminal intent, or of crimes having

particular health dimensions. However, the anthrax and other terrorist attacks of fall 2001 have dramatically underscored the needs that public health, law enforcement, and other public safety officials

have for a clearer understanding of the goals and methods each discipline uses in investigating such

problems. To foster improved understanding of the investigative goals and methods specific to each

discipline, and to strengthen interdisciplinary collaborative effectiveness in response to future attacks

involving biological and chemical agents, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in

partnership with other agencies, undertook development of a "Forensic Epidemiology" course for the

joint training of law enforcement and public health officials.

A primary goal of the Forensic Epidemiology training course is to enhance the combined effectiveness of law enforcement and public health when both disciplines conduct concurrent criminal and

epidemiological investigations, respectively, in response to a threat or attack involving possible biological or chemical agents. The course objectives cover key topics in the basic areas of (1) criminal and

epidemiological investigative methods; (2) operations and procedures; and (3) communication. These

three areas, in turn, encompass a spectrum of specific operational and legal issues.

The course addresses its primary goal and objectives by bringing together equal numbers of law

enforcement and public heath officials who sit side-by-side for one-and-a-half-days to interact directly

while working through three fact-based scenarios involving threats and attacks with potential biological agents. As preparation for working through three scenarios, all participants in forensic epidemiology training are given background information on each professional discipline’s approaches to investigative responses. The domains essential to working through the scenarios are principles of public

health and epidemiology (geared to the law enforcement and public safety participants), principles of

law enforcement and criminal investigations (geared to the public health participants), the roles of the

public health and crime laboratories, and coordination of joint investigations from the federal perspective of the FBI. 

The fact-based case scenarios used for this training are based on real events to ensure that the

operational and legal issues that surface during the training are grounded in reality. In addition, the

scenarios were selected because they represent a range of categories of bioterrorism- and chemical-related threats and problems likely to confront law enforcement and public health officials. The specific

incidents are (1) an overt (announced) scenario—the receipt of a "white powder" letter; (2) a covert/overt

scenario—the initial recognition in Florida of the anthrax attacks of October 2001 in which the problem first presented as one of possible naturally-occurring origin, but soon thereafter was recognized as
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

22

Intelligence Issues and

Bioterrorism

Many executive session participants believed that

a central law enforcement task in bioterrorism

preparedness is to collect information and translate it into useful intelligence—intelligence that

would permit authorities to intervene before biological agents could be released. Prevention of

bioterrorism events arguably includes gathering

information, analyzing it to identify threats, and

sharing information with relevant partners.

Unfortunately, participants see a lack of actionable

intelligence that can be used both to prevent biological attacks and focus limited resources for preparedness efforts. So the question remains, how

can law enforcement develop such intelligence?

The remainder of this chapter provides a brief

overview of tasks involved in generating intelligence on bioterrorism. A detailed examination of

intelligence to prevent all types of terrorist attacks

is the focus of a forthcoming white paper on the

fourth executive session in this series. 

Information Gathering

To enhance the overall intelligence capabilities

needed to combat terrorism in the United States,

having intentional and criminal origins; and (3) a covert scenario—the 1984 outbreak of Salmonella

Typhimurium gastroenteritis, which presented and was investigated as a naturally occurring outbreak,

but for which criminal intention was suspected only at a later stage in the investigation.

In addition to the course’s defined objectives, this training approach enables participants to

consider a host of related legal and operational questions. Foremost is the issue of defining and clarifying the implications of the laws of entry into premises and workplaces during concurrent public

health and criminal investigations. Another example relates to the now lowered threshold for considering the causal contribution of deliberate criminal behavior to the origin of a public health problem

and related implications for the "covert/overt" scenario—that is, an event initially considered to be naturally occurring (or at least of deliberate but non-criminal origin), but which subsequently is re-classified as having potential criminal origins. Under these circumstances, critical questions that arise

include, At what point during an investigation would roles shift in terms of which discipline is in the

lead?, What are the implications of a shift in lead?, and What are the specific relevant constitutional,

statutory, and other laws that apply to the problem?

The Forensic Epidemiology course was designed by CDC to stand as a self-contained instructional template for use in any U.S. jurisdiction. The course initially was implemented in November

2002 in North Carolina, where planning and cosponsorship involved a model partnership of state and

federal law enforcement and public health organizations, including the state health department, the

state bureau of investigation, the state’s field office of the FBI, a U.S. Attorney’s office, and a school of

public health. Participants represented the cosponsoring organizations, as well as local and state law

enforcement, public health, other governmental and professional organizations, and the judiciary. The

course was further piloted in other jurisdictions before being released for use nationally at a U.S.

Department of Justice-sponsored meeting in spring 2003. Additional information regarding the availability and implementation of this training resource is available at www.phppo.cdc.gov/od/phlp.
20 More information on the impact of intelligence gathering on diverse communities can be found in the white paper resulting from the second executive session. It can be downloaded for free at www.policeforum.org. 

21 At the time of this writing, more information on CLEAR can be found online at www.lapdonline.org/general_information/dept_pub_program/clear.htm.

22 For information regarding TTIC, visit the CIA website at www.cia.gov or DHS website at www.dhs.gov.

VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

23

local law enforcement agencies must make the

most of information that officers can garner from

members of the community. Agencies should

reevaluate their intelligence-gathering techniques,

and community reaction to those techniques, particularly among diverse communities.20

Law enforcement agencies should pay particular attention to developing intelligence-gathering techniques for line-level officers, as they constitute the single largest resource at the street level

for collecting this information. Session participants called for further discussion, however, about

what officers should be looking for. Agencies can

also actively encourage community members to

provide information. This can be achieved through

public education campaigns (or other techniques

that solicit public input) that convey the need for

various types of information and what protections

would be offered to community members who

come forward. 

Intelligence Sharing

Efficient and effective information gathering and

analysis is dependant on agencies working together. Once state and local law enforcement agencies

enhance their efforts, they must work to share raw

information and any resulting intelligence.

Because information comes from a variety of

sources and may come from many different agencies (fire, police, public health), it is imperative

that agencies be able to quickly and effectively

share information and analyses with others.

Several participants at the executive session

expressed concern about timely information sharing among agencies. Of concern was how bioterrorism information would be shared across functional responsibilities and disciplines (e.g., law

enforcement, fire, and health); across local jurisdictions; and among local, state, and federal levels

of government. 

Session participants also cautioned

against information sharing related to bioterrorism that would lead to additional "stove-piping" of

intelligence systems that are already poorly integrated. Session participants suggested building on

existing intelligence systems (e.g., those designed

to deal with illegal drugs), which would produce a

single, seamless intelligence system useful for a

wide range of threats (e.g., gangs, international terrorists, and others). The Los Angeles City/County

Community Law Enforcement and Recovery

(CLEAR) Program uses some of these systems

now.21

To address some of these concerns, the

Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) was

created, which is meant to be a resource for identifying terrorism threats and sharing intelligence.22 The TTIC fuses information and the analytic capabilities of different government organizations. It enables full integration of U.S.

Government terrorist threat-related information

and analysis and is structured to ensure rapid and
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

24

VALUABLE PARTNERS ADDRESS THE THREAT 

by Assistant Director Ronald L. Iden, Federal Bureau of Investigation,

Los Angeles Field Office2 3

Los Angeles-area law enforcement, fire, safety, and health service agencies have for many years enjoyed

a strong and productive working relationship in preparing for the threat of terrorism in general, and

bioterrorism in particular. The FBI has been a full partner in those crucial preparedness efforts. We

have found over the course of time that each agency brings unique knowledge and capabilities to bear,

which are critical in dealing with that threat. In the Los Angeles area, three valuable partnerships

address the threat of bioterrorism, the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), the Los Angeles County

Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEWG), and the FBI's liaison with the UCLA Medical Center.

The Los Angeles JTTF, which is staffed by area federal, state, and local law enforcement and

intelligence agencies, is one of the oldest in the nation, having been formed in 1984. The JTTF facilitates terrorism-related information sharing among member agencies. Worldwide intelligence pertaining to bioterrorism-related capabilities, attacks, arrests, and more is shared through the JTTF with all

member agencies. Bioterrorism threats and incidents are jointly investigated by participating agencies.

23 As this paper goes to print, Iden has accepted the position of Senior Vice President of Security for the Walt Disney

Company. 

unfettered sharing of relevant information across

departmental lines. TTIC collects intelligence from

the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI's

Counterterrorism Division, the CIA's

Counterterrorist Center, the Department of

Defense, and other federal agencies. It then provides

threat analyses to state and local law enforcement

through the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).

Intelligence Analysis and Threat

Assessment

Executive session participants commented on local

law enforcement’s challenge to be considered a "full

partner" in the intelligence arena. They agreed that

local law enforcement agencies presently have little

intelligence analysis capability and stressed the need

to improve or access that capacity. They also noted

that obtaining an accurate threat assessment for

bioterrorism is difficult because of limited information about how terrorists and their network might

obtain, store, transport, and release biological agents

in the United States. 

Session participants expressed the need for a

better mechanism to determine if a threat is credible

and when information should be released to local

first responders. Typically, a federal entity identifies

a threat and then local law enforcement is called on

to protect targets. Local law enforcement wants a

process that gives it a greater voice in decision making and information sharing—beyond that provided

by the JTTFs. 
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

25

Bioterrorism-related training, including tabletop and field training exercises, are conducted jointly as

well. Operation Westwind, a bioterrorism field training exercise coordinated by the Los Angeles JTTF

and TEWG, involved 2,000 participants.

The TEWG, which is composed of representatives from law enforcement, intelligence, fire,

safety, and health service agencies, assesses and analyzes all terrorism-related information and develops protocols for response. It provides a forum that allows members the opportunity to fully discuss

issues regarding preparedness and response, and to resolve any conflicts that arise in investigations and

in the information-sharing process. Because the TEWG includes non-law enforcement members, information can be swiftly distributed to other agencies and businesses that have a need to know that

information.

Another partnership that has been of great value to the FBI and the TEWG has been with the

UCLA Medical Center. UCLA has provided training on bioterrorism issues to the FBI and other local

agencies. That partnership and training has allowed the participating agencies to receive in-depth information regarding bioterrorism issues that would otherwise not be available to them. It also provides

another opportunity for agencies to interact with each other and strengthen relationships that are critical to bioterrorism preparedness.

The most significant issue faced by the many agencies that have partnered in the bioterrorism

effort has been the lack of understanding of one another’s missions, capabilities, and resources. That

barrier has been overcome in Los Angeles by the unwavering commitment of all agency participants to

effectively address this significant issue through joint training exercises and through collaborative reallife responses to bioterrorism threats and suspected acts. Training opportunities and actual events are

non-stop in a metropolitan area as large as Los Angeles—and every agency that has any role to play

has been a vital partner in that essential collaboration. 

The lesson that the FBI and all Los Angeles-area emergency and health agencies have learned

in their many years of terrorism preparedness is that trust is essential to an effective working relationship, and that trust develops through commitment to full collaboration. By working with our local

partners, we have learned how best to pool our resources and make the most effective use of our collective capabilities.

Summary

Bioterrorism preparedness planning involves careful consideration of the issues related to resources

and funding, training, and intelligence. Many participants recognized that additional funds—as disbursed by local, state, and federal governments—

are essential for adequate preparedness. These

funds support resource acquisition as well as training of all staff, both initially and through frequent

in-service opportunities. Session participants also

highlighted the critical need for training, using a

range of techniques, to better prepare first responders for potential bioterrorism events and to safeguard their health. It is also imperative that public

health, law enforcement, fire, and EMS agencies be

able to quickly and effectively share information to

enhance responses to bioterrorism. 
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

26
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

27

C HAPTER F OUR

DETECTION AND NOTIFICATION OF

BIOTERRORIST ATTACKS

DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OF A BIOLOGICAL AGENT AND ITS RELEASE

mechanism, actions taken in the five critical areas—detection, notification, intervention, health care surge, and communication—may

happen almost simultaneously and all are affected by issues related to resources,

funding, training, and intelligence.24 For clarity, however, these five steps will be

addressed separately in the remainder of this white paper. To assist in bioterrorism planning efforts, this chapter details executive session participants’ issues

and concerns with the first two—detection and notification. Detection focuses on

collaboration, scene management, and the assessment of substances.

Notification relates to communication between local, state, and tribal law

enforcement and federal agencies as well as notification strategies between health

care providers and law enforcement.

Executive session participants noted repeatedly

that because bioterrorism requires not only law

enforcement, fire, and EMS responses, but public

health and hospital responses as well, agencies

must determine in advance the roles of all

involved systems and actors. Overlapping and

sometimes competing organizational missions

need to be addressed. Session participants reinforced the need for interagency and interdisciplinary cooperation. 

Another concern raised by participants at

the session was the need for pre-event on-scene

response protocols that would define agency roles

and responsibilities and survive personality conflicts and turnover. Participants also noted that

because there is no single model protocol for every

jurisdiction, they encouraged agencies to allow for

flexibility within protocols and to make room for

needed revisions. For example, new infections may

emerge that dictate changes to protocols. 

24 For example, in a package release of anthrax, when law enforcement contains the package and calls for health laboratory analysis, this represents detection, notification, and intervention all at the same time.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

28

WORKING TOGETHER TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH

by Assistant Chief Phil T. Pulaski and Medical Director Dani-Margot

Zavasky, Counterterrorism Bureau, New York City Police Department 

The NYPD and the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) have always shared

the goal of protecting the public health. The two agencies, however, have different perspectives and paradigms to address common problems. 

The 2001 anthrax terrorist attacks placed the NYPD, DOHMH and FBI Joint Terrorism Task

Force investigators, doctors, and laboratory scientists in an unprecedented situation. This was a serious nationwide terrorist attack; in New York City we suffered one inhalation anthrax homicide victim

and seven non-fatal cutaneous anthrax victims. Key personnel from each agency, working long hours

under enormous stress during a dynamic and rapidly unfolding crisis, were able to conduct a joint investigation that addressed the needs of both law enforcement and public health. This was the result of an

extraordinary effort not simply to learn each other’s procedures and techniques, but also to understand

them and respect the differences. It was only through mutual respect for each other’s dissimilarities

that misunderstandings were reconciled, conflicts avoided and, ultimately, an atmosphere was created

in which law enforcement and public health personnel learned from one another. Consequently, the

best methods and techniques used by both law enforcement and public health were applied to the task

of attempting to solve these horrific crimes and prevent any additional individuals from being infected.

As the process of mutual understanding and respect progressed, exceptionally collegial professional relationships developed. Our DOHMH associates are no longer vaguely familiar names and

phone numbers in a palm pilot with whom we are required to interact only after an emergency arises.

Instead, they are well-known colleagues with whom we maintain frequent contact. We enjoy a rapport

with our DOHMH partners and automatically keep each other informed of developing situations of

mutual concern. Now when a crisis arises, we are not contacting virtual strangers. Instead, we are conferring with trusted partners with whom we have previously trained, planned, and worked to solve joint

public health and law enforcement-related problems. 

The benefits of this outstanding relationship have been invaluable and not limited to bioterrorism. Where, other than New York City, could the Assistant Commissioner for Communicable

Diseases phone the Chief of Counter Terrorism at 11:00 A.M. on a Saturday morning asking for assistance and receive this kind of response: 30 minutes later, the Chief of Bronx Detectives assigned several teams of experienced NYPD detectives the task of locating an unidentified individual in the Bronx

who unknowingly possessed several kittens that might have had rabies. 

The investigation of the 2001 anthrax terrorist attacks created a very special relationship

between the NYPD and the DOHMH. This relationship was further enhanced when the NYPD created the permanent full-time position of Counter Terrorism Medical Director and hired an experienced

infectious disease physician. Today, executives, managers, supervisors, and staff from both agencies

remain fully committed to ensuring that this extraordinary partnership continues to develop and grow

even stronger.
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

29

Detection

Three important issues were raised at the executive session related to detection: collaborating to

detect bioterrorism (issues related to working with

hospitals and public health departments), managing the on-scene responses (concerns about incident command structure), and assessing potentially lethal substances (using appropriate personal

protective devices and other technologies). 

Collaborating to Detect Bioterrorism

Detection of bioterrorism will likely come either

from the medical community or emergency first

responders, such as law enforcement. If the conduit is the medical community, the key to detection will be effective surveillance mechanisms.

Executive session participants highlighted the

need for means to detect a significant increase in

public health indicators that are symptomatic of

high-risk biological agents (such as anthrax or

smallpox). Because treatment for exposure to certain biological agents must be started quickly, dayto-day monitoring of indicators is essential.

A wide range of health care providers

should be able to provide information that could

alert authorities to potential bioterrorist attacks.

These providers include nurses or doctors in hospitals or health care clinics, pharmacists, and

emergency medical technicians. Information about

the nature and extent of EMS responses for certain

health conditions can be critical to identifying

spikes in illness. In Los Angeles, for instance, EMS

calls are reviewed daily to identify such spikes. 

To facilitate information exchange among

such a large number of health care providers, executive session participants stressed that data from

these sources should be reported through electronic channels to a centralized health data-gathering

facility (e.g., local health department). Officials

could then analyze any suspicious shifts in the pattern of relevant symptoms. When health care

providers identify an illness that is outside the normal range, it is crucial that they report their suspicions to their local health department. The information should also be conveyed to law enforcement. Several executive session participants indicated that their partnerships with health care

providers and the health department are only in

their infancy. 

If instead a law enforcement officer—or

some other emergency first responder such as a fire

fighter—recognizes that the incident is related to

bioterrorism, his or her agency will need to initiate

a close collaboration between the medical community, public health officials, and other emergency

first responders. The need for effective interagency

partnerships is apparent at the first point of detection. This type of collaboration is no longer unusual. Law enforcement agencies have formed partnerships with various members of their communities through ongoing community policing activities. They can easily build on those relationships

to include the medical and public health communities. Close collaboration will enhance information sharing between these agencies and increase

their ability to quickly detect possible bioterrorism. 

There is an impressive array of people and

resources to support first responders that must not

be overlooked in planning bioterrorism responses,

especially in detection. The executive session participants detailed experiences that demonstrated

the abilities of multiple agencies to work closely

together and to navigate the complexities of combined responses. Many jurisdictions have effectively integrated multi-agency responses by clearly

articulating and documenting each agency’s role in
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

30

PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN POLICE AND PUBLIC HEALTH

by Jonathan E. Fielding, Director of Public Health and Health Officer,

Los Angeles County Department of Health Services

Not very long ago, law enforcement and public health inhabited very different and very distinct worlds.

While the police were in pursuit of criminals, health staff were in pursuit of disease organisms. The

separate worlds of criminals and contagion collided with the anthrax attacks of 2001. Suddenly, law

enforcement officers needed to understand about infectious agents and what threats they might pose to

their forces. And just as suddenly, public health staff needed to learn among other things about 911

response times and chain of evidence rules. We were thrust into a new partnership. While still in their

early stages, many communities in the nation are starting to explore and learn the mutual advantages

of such a partnership.

In Los Angeles, the health department is their full partner in the Terrorism Early Warning

Group, in which law enforcement, fire, EMS, and health professionals convene to assess threats and

plan coordinated responses. In many other areas, law enforcement’s only exposure to health departments is through EMS, and we’ve heard what traditional first responders say about EMS: "We thought

you were the health department!" Alongside EMS, public health in Los Angeles has worked to understand and respond to the needs of law enforcement in preparing for bioterrorism, emerging infectious

diseases and other public health emergencies. As we understand them, our new partners’ needs include

rapid identification of biological agents to which they might have been exposed, determination of who

has been exposed and who remains at risk, prompt and consistent guidance for proper protections from

the agent, rapid treatment for or vaccination against the threat agent or quarantine, and follow up with

all those who might have been exposed.

While these are all issues that public health has followed since its origins, new to public health

are the time pressures for response under which law enforcement operates and chain-of-custody issues

in handling specimens. Communications have sometimes been hindered by the different ways in which

police and health personnel use the same terms, such as surveillance, suspect, and case. To address

some of these barriers, Los Angeles sponsored a Forensics Epidemiology conference to present through

a case study method the similarities and differences involved in criminal investigations and disease

investigations. Involving all three levels of government in law enforcement and in health, more than

one hundred participants learned the uniqueness and commonalities of each others’ work. With understanding comes respect for the skills of professionals on each side; and from respect grows a willingness

to trust the other—with information, contact data, and a new commitment to remain involved in future

planning and problem solving.

To respond to law enforcement’s needs, the Los Angeles Public Health Authority is also working to significantly enhance public health laboratories’ ability for rapid disease identification. Also, communications improvements have been made by including law enforcement in our alert systems, and by

exchanging emergency contact information. Public health is providing the Terrorism Early Warning

Group with a public health professional to provide epidemiological data and analysis as well. Joint planning, exercises, and drills cement these connections. The new partnership between police and public

health in Los Angeles continues to grow stronger, and all the residents of our county are the

beneficiaries.
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

31

advance of a terrorist incident. These roles are

detailed in written agreements among multiple

jurisdictions within regions as part of their planning efforts. Agreements must be explicit and

comprehensive. For example, at this writing,

California has area-wide plans for disaster management and preparedness that specifies roles and

decision-making authority for police, fire, public

health, politicians, community members, and

businesses.

The most critical partners for law enforcement in the medical community include public

health laboratories, hospitals, and public health

departments. Public health laboratories are

responsible for screening samples of suspicious

substances and determining their nature. As such,

executive session participants recommend that

personnel in these facilities nationwide receive

training to increase their capacity to screen samples for law enforcement and identify their components (Chyba 1998). Members of the JTTF in New

York City, for instance, help train public health

laboratory personnel on the evidence chain of

custody.

Executive session participants said it is

vital that hospitals work closely with law enforcement as well. To strengthen that relationship, participants recommended inviting hospital CEOs

and medical directors to meetings on identifying

effective collaboration strategies. A solid relationship facilitates more active involvement in preparedness planning for bioterrorism. Participants

also stressed the value of active partnerships with

experts in the public health community, including

epidemiologists and microbiologists who work in

universities and hospitals around the country. 

The public health department is another

critical partner in bioterrorism planning and

response because it is charged with ensuring the

welfare of the community, and has a staff of public

health investigators (public health officers) who

have unique authority to investigate infectious diseases and control their spread. Hospitals are

required to report potentially infectious diseases

they diagnose to the health department, which in

turn is authorized to conduct contact tracing and

even declare a quarantine if warranted (for more

information on public health authority, consult

Richards 2002 and Richards et al. forthcoming).

In Baltimore, Maryland, area hospitals

and the public health department have been working with law enforcement to plan for bioterrorism,

including participating in tabletop exercises and

drills. The Maryland Hospital Association became

engaged in these efforts from the start. The association’s signature on the invitation letter for area

hospitals facilitated hospital cooperation. One of

the exercises relied heavily on the involvement of

key staff at each hospital—including an infection

control practitioner (ICP) and the security personnel. Lessons learned during this drill spawned

training by hospital staff for law enforcement on

types of and effective use of personal protective

equipment and on contagion of infectious

diseases.

Law enforcement agencies must be aware

of the roles and responsibilities of hospitals' infection control practitioners. These practitioners,

usually nurses, are responsible for notifying the

department of public health if someone with an

infectious disease is treated by their hospital. In

addition, bioterrorism preparedness planners

should be aware that many hospitals are accredited by the Joint Commission for the Accreditation
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

32

of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), which

offers a "seal of approval that indicates a hospital

meets high performance standards."25 JCAHO

added a standard for hospital emergency management in January 2002 that requires hospitals to be

involved in community-wide emergency response

drills and to work with other emergency response

agencies.26 In the case of bioterrorism responses,

the collaboration should include local law enforcement.

Several executive session participants indicated that the role of private security in detection

activities also requires greater discussion and consideration. Given that the ratio of public to private

police is approximately one to three,27 executive

session participants stressed that private security

has significant potential to detect a bioterrorist

event. Law enforcement agencies should determine how to involve private security forces in

planning and prevention efforts. According to participants, private security firms would welcome

the collaboration with local law enforcement and

resulting protocols on detection, notification, and

response activities should they become aware of

suspicious substances. 

Managing On-Scene Responses

Executive session participants raised several questions regarding how best to manage on-scene

responses. Jurisdictions represented at the executive session differed on which agency should

respond first, the roles and responsibilities of each

responder, and how these multiple agencies should

handle redundancies and gaps in services.

Although some participants believed first responders will work well together on a bioterrorism

crime scene, others felt on-scene roles and responsibilities need to be better defined, particularly

when communication is compromised. Some participants even expressed considerable cynicism

that multi-agency efforts could work in actual

practice. 

Roles of First Responders. In many jurisdictions represented at the executive session, a 911

call would initiate both a police and fire response.

In some localities, medical expertise is then

brought to the scene—in the form of emergency

medical technicians and public health officials—to

assist on potential bioterrorist scenes. Several

executive session participants use teams of police,

fire, ambulance, and public health personnel to

respond to a scene. They stress that these teams

must be regionalized—to address concerns about

responding adequately both to large metropolitan

areas as well as small towns—and member agencies must focus on having compatible rather than

competing plans.

An important consideration in developing

multi-agency response plans is to determine activities that first responders from each discipline

should complete when they arrive, and then coordinate them. Executive session participants

expressed conflicting views about which agency

should have primary responsibility for activities at

25 For more information on JCAHO, visit www.jcaho.org.

26 For more information please see www.jcrinc.com/subscribers/perspectives.asp?durki=2914#ref3link.

27 The following link provides statistics for public law enforcement/deputies and for private security officers:

www.bls.gov/oes/2002/oes333051.htm and www.bls.gov/oes/2002/oes339032.htm.
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

33

the scene of a potential bioterrorist event. For

some participants, hazmat calls are traditionally

classified as an accident and are appropriately

managed as such by the fire department. These

participants see bioterrorism (such as a package

release of anthrax or a dirty bomb) as a deliberate

act requiring a law enforcement response. Because

these situations represent crime scenes, they contend that law enforcement must "own"’ these

scenes initially. Even though the ownership of the

scene may change later, law enforcement has the

primary role of investigating the crime. If one

accepts that law enforcement should take the lead,

there is still debate about how local and federal law

enforcement should cooperate to handle the investigation. Some agencies believe the fire department

should have control of the scene of a bioterrorist

event instead of police precisely because of the fire

fighters expertise in hazmat. These decisions

should be made at the regional level among all

stakeholders before an event occurs. 

Most agencies represented at the executive

session agreed that the fire department’s role generally is to manage rescue operations, treat

patients and provide hazmat management, whereas law enforcement’s role is to investigate the

crime, manage the crime scene, and safeguard evidence and witnesses. This separation of responsibility would likely be blurred at a large bioterrorist

event that involves a crime scene. For example,

additional hazmat support may be needed and

could be supplied in some jurisdictions either by a

FBI hazmat team or by hazmat-trained personnel

within the police department. This redundancy in

capability signals the need for advance planning

and communication. Some participants reiterated

that a clearly delineated role for each agency in

particular situations is critical to overcoming "turf"

issues.

Incident Command System. Many participants discussed the importance of establishing a

unified command to coordinate multi-agency

responses at the scene.28 California, for instance,

mandates the use of the Incident Command

System (ICS) at any critical incident or natural disaster for which reimbursement will be sought from

the state. An investigation of the 1993

Oakland/Berkeley fires response led to passage of

the California Standardized Emergency

Management System (SEMS) law in 1996.29 The

law helps to ensure that valuable time is not lost

responding to large, complex incidents by mutual

aid agencies that use different methods of command organization, reducing confusion among

agencies. SEMS outlines the principles of the ICS.

Unified command includes all of the major players

in an incident that need to share information,

resources, and responsibility for the delivery of

effective services. 

In the ICS, there must be one individual

who makes the final decision in directing the focus

of the entire group. The task of this Incident

Commander during a terrorist incident is to coordinate a cooperative effort between the commanders of all the agencies (e.g., local fire department,

local law enforcement, and the FBI). In an organizational chart in the shape of a triangle, the

Incident Commander is at the top; however, mul28 More information on incident command can be found in Kane 2001.

29 At the time of this writing, more information on SEMS can be found at the California Governor’s Office of Emergency

Services website at www.oes.ca.gov/.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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DESIGNATE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

by Commander Cathy L. Lanier, Special Operations Division,

D.C. Metropolitan Police Department 

When it comes to acts of terrorism, attacks that are biological in nature are by far the most disconcerting for first responders. For a variety of reasons the release of a biological agent is clearly one of the

most difficult for police officers and fire fighters to respond to. While most law enforcement and fire

agencies have had some experience with chemical incidents (usually in the form of a hazmat accident),

they have little or no experience with harmful biological agents. To complicate matters further, it is

challenging to train and adequately prepare for a biological attack, simply because of the nature of the

weapon. 

Despite the challenges, first responders must prepare for the possibility that they may have to

respond to and deal with a biological agent used as a weapon. In any case, event recognition will dictate the roles and responses of the various agencies that will be called on to deal with that event.

Realistically, there are only three scenarios that police and fire fighters will encounter when it comes

to biological terrorism. 

The first and most likely event will call for a response to a suspicious package containing an

unknown substance. In this scenario in Washington, D.C., although law enforcement may be called to

the scene first, it is up to the fire department to do preliminary testing to determine if the substance

may in fact be a biological agent. This is a fairly simple test that indicates the presence of proteins and

measures the pH level. These preliminary indicators will determine if further testing is necessary. 

The second scenario would involve an "announced event" where a claim of a biological release

is received prior to the detection of an actual agent. Again, both the police and fire departments may

respond to assess the validity of the alleged act; however, whether or not a harmful agent is found, a

crime has occurred and the FBI would be responsible for the follow up. In this same scenario, if the

substance does turn out to be a biological agent, the D.C. Department of Health would take the lead

with regard to mitigation.

The final, and most likely with regards to a genuine terrorist act, would be the response to an

unannounced event, where the confirmation of the biological release is identified through individuals

showing up at hospitals or physicians’ offices with signs and symptoms. In this case, the D.C.

Department of Health would essentially lead other agencies for response and mitigation. 

Obviously, for each scenario the roles and responsibilities of law enforcement, fire, EMS, and

the Department of Health will be different. The key is in ensuring that these roles and responsibilities

are designated and agreed upon in advance in order to minimize confusion if a biological attack does

become a reality.
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

35

tiple agency bosses can reside in the top triangle.

The premise of "who’s in command" and the

Unified Command system only work if all agencies

are aware of each other’s primary needs. 

The progression of incident command

responsibility for a terrorist act may pass from one

group to another, depending on the stage of the

incident. The fire department may assume the lead

as the Incident Commander and set the goals for

the operation during the initial fire, rescue, and

medical response. Local law enforcement may

assume command after fire-rescue-medical

resources have neutralized the situation and while

a preliminary criminal investigation is conducted,

and before the FBI is prepared or able to assume

control. Under the federal authority of the

Presidential Decision Directive 39, the FBI is the

lead investigative agency in any act of foreign or

domestic terrorism and will lead the subsequent

criminal investigation if it is determined or suspected that the incident is terrorism-related. 

When determining the Incident

Command, the key players come together on the

scene and form a Unified Command Group. The

unified command is the strategy preferred by session participants to ensure that personnel from

multiple agencies do not overlook an important

response or duplicate efforts. In a unified command, the ranking on-scene representatives from

each of the responding agencies work together to

coordinate response activities. Ideally, each agency

would also set up its own operations command.

The agency representative on the unified command

would then communicate with his or her operations commander to execute activities decided by

the joint command leaders. 

The executive session participants believe

it is critical to set command and control correctly.

Ultimately, they said a command center may need

to be activated. The FBI coordinates the federal

response to an act of terrorism by establishing a

Joint Operations Center (JOC), corresponding to

the local government’s Emergency Operations

Center (EOC). The JOC is the location where all

federal agency first responders first report and work

for the duration of the incident, whereas the EOC

is where all local first responders report and work

during the incident. If at all possible, the EOC

should be co-located with the JOC. At a minimum,

a federal command officer should stay at the local

EOC to facilitate effective communication between

the groups involved in the Unified Command and

to facilitate the sharing of resources, personnel, and

information. Health care professionals may lack

knowledge about Incident Command and Unified

Command structures used by local and federal law

enforcement and fire departments. Law enforcement may be unaware that hospitals also operate

their own incident command system, called the

Hospital Emergency Incident Command System

(HEICS),30 which should be integrated into the

unified command structures. 

Assessing the Substance

Executive session participants—particularly those

from large jurisdictions—emphasized that agencies

must train police and fire responders to conduct

initial substance assessments. Once word of a

potential attack spreads, responding agencies risk

being overwhelmed by the heavy volume of calls

that may occur when a community fears a bioterrorist attack. Hoaxes or a panicked public can bring

30 To learn more about HEICS, go to www.emsa.ca.gov/Dms2/heics3.htm.
TABLE 1

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT3 1

LEVEL 

agency responses to a standstill if the front line is

not well trained to distinguish between real or

imagined concerns. First responders must reduce

the likelihood that agencies will become overwhelmed with call volume by conducting careful

analyses, making quick determinations and

promptly reassuring or directing the public. 

One of the most critical considerations

associated with on-scene substance assessment

and management is the level of personnel protective equipment that should be supplied to on-scene

responders. Some participants stated that in some

jurisdictions line-level personnel, labor unions,

and chief executives have voiced concerns that

agencies do not provide adequate officer protection. Law enforcement agencies have many choices in deciding how to budget bioterrorism preparedness funds appropriated by Congress.

Informed decisions need to be made in the selection, maintenance, and use of appropriate personal protective equipment for front-line personnel. At

the same time, law enforcement personnel must

have a thorough understanding of the limitations

and hazards associated with all levels of protective

equipment. Table 1 illustrates the level of protection, description, type of protection afforded, and

circumstance for use of each level of equipment.

Session participants recommended that agencies

carefully review their protective equipment and

upgrade it if necessary to enhance officer safety at

the scene. As an example, in one department, officers have level C personal protection equipment in

D Work uniform

C

DESCRIPTION PROTECTION CIRCUMSTANCE

B

A

Full facepiece, air purifying,

canister-equipped respirator

and chemical-resistant

clothing. 

Chemical-resistant clothing (overalls and long

sleeves) and self-contained

breathing apparatus

(SCBA).

Fully encapsulating chemical-resistant suit and selfcontained breathing apparatus (SCBA).

Can only be worn for 15 to

30 minutes due to overheating. Special training is

required.

Provides full protection.

When the highest level of respiratory,

skin, eye, and mucous membrane protection is needed.

Provides splash protection.

When the highest level of respiratory

protection is needed but a lesser level

of skin and eye protection is sufficient.

Same skin protection as level B,

but a lower level respirator.

Worn when airborne substance is

known, concentration is measured,

criteria for using air-purifying

respirators are met, and skin and eye

exposures are unlikely.

Provides no respiratory protection and minimal skin

protection.

Should not be worn on any site where

respiratory or skin hazards exist.

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31 This table was constructed from information obtained from the University of Nebraska’s Medical Center. For more information on personal protective equipment see www.unmc.edu/bioterrorism/equpiment.htm.

The Department of Homeland Security developed standards on protective gear for first responders. At this writing,

more information on these standards can be found at www.dhs.gov.
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

37

their trunks to protect against exposure to biological agents. More protection is provided to special

teams who work on-scene.

Session participants’ experiences have also

demonstrated that simply providing personal protective equipment for officers does not constitute

adequate preparedness. Additional measures are

needed because much of the effectiveness of this

protective equipment expires after a period of

months or years and therefore must be replaced,

and some of it requires special ongoing storage and

maintenance. In addition, during stressful "red

envelope" drills, even officers who had appropriate

protective equipment in their patrol cars did not

always remember when or how to use it. Agencies

must repeatedly train officers to ensure proper use.

Appropriately protected officers can use a

variety of methods for assaying the nature of suspicious substances they encounter in the field. In

some jurisdictions, either the patrol officer or the

fire department performs that initial assessment

at the scene. This initial analysis is often preliminary in that it provides only an early indication of

the nature of the substance. After the initial

analysis, samples are usually immediately sent for

more complete analysis to the local public health

laboratory. 

In Los Angeles, because of the volume of

calls, the department developed a field test procedure that relies on microscopic identification at

the scene. In this protocol, which takes approximately 30 minutes, specially trained LAPD hazmat technicians use a microscope at the scene of a

suspicious substance. Subsequently, they examine

the substance under the microscope and make an

initial assessment of its nature. At the same time,

the team may send microscope images to public

health laboratory authorities for consultation.

They also have the ability to conduct additional

field tests, such as a Polymerase Chain Reaction

(PCR) to further enhance their capabilities. Other

agencies use field tests such as protein tests, pH

tests and basic magnifying glass, as well as more

sophisticated analytic equipment. Many agencies

are working to develop more sophisticated technological mechanisms to detect agents in the field.

For those agencies that do not have the

capability to conduct field-testing, the fire department or a specialized unit of the police department

may be responsible for removing specimens for offsite analysis. For example, in one major city there

is no field analysis done. The department of health

is less than 30 minutes from any location in the

city and is notified immediately if it is determined

that analysis is required. An emergency services

unit transports the specimens, possibly with help

from the FBI. Team members can expect a preliminary determination of the nature of the substance

within one hour and a final determination within

24 hours. In other jurisdictions in the nation, the

fire department works with public health officers

who respond to the scene to conduct basic tests.

The public health official would then carry the

substance to the state public health laboratory for

further analysis. In this situation, results could

take four hours.

One difficulty agencies may encounter is

what to do at the scene while waiting for laboratory analysis results. Those jurisdictions that have

addressed this issue determined that police and

fire couldn’t legally prohibit residents from occupying the scene during the analysis period

(Richards 2002). Typically health departments

alone have the authority to prevent occupation
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RAPID THREAT ASSESSMENT KIT:

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT’S HAZMAT UNIT

by Chief William Bratton, Los Angeles Police Department

Following the anthrax incidents and the potential for other biological threats, the Los Angeles Police

Department’s Hazmat Unit, Hazardous Devices Section, Emergency Services Division, was equipped

with technologies similar to those of other responders. Primarily, this consisted of bioassay tickets

designed to confirm the presence of particular biological agents. Bioassay tickets had some critics and

skeptics. While useful, this technology was insufficient for making critical field decisions.

During the height of the bioterrorism threat responses, a member of the Hazmat Unit was an

undergraduate student at the University of California, Irvine. With access to scientists and laboratories

at this university specializing in the field of epidemiology and environmental sciences, the concept of

using a field microscope for screening potential biological threats was born.

The Rapid Threat Assessment Kit (RTAK) was designed to assist specialized responders in

quickly assessing suspicious, unknown powder threats, using simple analytical instruments (portable

phase microscope) and chemical indicator tests. The RTAK is based on scientific principles with a stepwise procedure to categorize the substance as either harmless or as a potential threat. The RTAK does

not replace laboratory analysis. Instead, the RTAK quickly distinguishes potentially dangerous substances from harmless ones, allowing first responders to quickly address biological threats. 

The RTAK is an improvement in the set of tools available to technical responders. Existing tools

typically focus on a specific biological agent. The RTAK considers a broader range of potential threats.

Because the RTAK algorithm assesses the basic chemical and physical properties of substances, its

strength is in sorting threats from non-threats. The entire procedure can be completed in 30 to 45 minutes. The assessment process reduces downtime at critical facilities and the number of samples transported to a laboratory. This ability also reduces economic impacts to city services.

The RTAK is packaged in a ruggedized pelican case with a handle and wheels for mobility. The

RTAK is intended to be transportable in any vehicle. In addition, the RTAK’s case is waterproof for

decontamination purposes, enabling it to be brought in and out of a warm or hot zone. 

The RTAK requires specialized training and field-testing. Local universities and laboratory professionals assisted with developing skills, such as sampling, slide preparation, and phase microscopy

techniques. The training provided proficiency to deploy the technology in the field. Overall, the strength

of the field microscope is its simplicity and solid scientific basis. The weakness is the required training

and proficiency. The skills are highly perishable, which can be overcome by continuous training.

Since development, the kit was incorporated into the Haztech Systems line of Technical WMD

Responder tools. Haztech systems combined certain aspects of their technology with the RTAK to

develop a Weapons of Mass Destruction field analysis kit and training program. The RTAK is now
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

39

offered by Haztech Systems as the MicroCat WMD system. In addition, they have developed a five-day

certification course at this writing.

The Hazmat Unit also maintains additional technologies such as the Tetracore Bioassay

Tickets, Guardian Readers, and Air Sampling Devices. These technologies are based solely on bioassay

reliability. The Hazmat Unit uses all of these items as integral "pieces of the puzzle" to formulate

response decisions. In addition, the Hazmat Unit is in the process of acquiring a portable Polymerase

Chain Reaction (PCR) tool to further enhance decision-making capabilities.

At the time of the executive session, the complete MicroCat WMD system cost $16,750. This

has included the phased microscope and the materials to identify potential biological threats and

chemical warfare agents. The kit has also included a basic radiological screening instrument. The fiveday certification course, which provides training on the use of the microscope and the system, was

$900. Beyond the initial equipment costs, additional maintenance and expendables (slides, reagents)

are minimal.

This creative application of technological resources will position the LAPD to respond effectively to a potential terrorist attack. 

based on a biological threat. In those cases where

the health department is not involved, first

responders must leave it up to the property owner

to determine what to do with the building or

other property where the suspicious package was

found. 

Notification

Some have argued that the "terror" in bioterrorism

comes from the contagion factor and the fear of

exposure (Chyba 1998). Because incubation periods may distance the initial point of exposure from

the point of detection, vigilance against bioterrorism requires efficient, coordinated public health

surveillance mechanisms. One aspect of this surveillance is its "sensitivity," or how likely the system in place is able to detect an attack. The second

aspect of surveillance is "connectivity," or how efficiently information is conveyed to state and federal officials, and communicated to relevant personnel throughout each level. This is a notification

function and was the concern of many executive

session participants.

Executive session participants suggested

that written interagency agreements specify a decision tree and optimal information-sharing paths to

facilitate notification of suspected bioterrorism.

The decision tree would specify who is responsible

for making determinations as well as ensuring

actions are then performed by the appropriate partners. The document should specify, for instance,

the threshold criteria for different levels of police

intervention and how many personnel the agency

should deploy for each level. 

During an event, once the initial assessment is made that a bioterrorist attack has

occurred, agencies must set protocols to evaluate

whether the incident is isolated or part of a pattern. Part of the process for determining the extent

of the attack involves an investigation function, in

which, for example, law enforcement first responders gather information from those who opened or
32 More information on the Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Services Systems (MIEMSS) can be found at

http://miemss.umaryland.edu.

33 For more information on the District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency, go to

http://dcema.dc.gov/dcema/site/default.asp.

PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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handled a letter containing an agent. Another

aspect is related to notification of the federal government so as to facilitate communication. If

there were positive readings in multiple locations,

session participants were concerned about how

they would communicate and learn about these

episodes. Communication from the local officials

to the federal government and then back to local

personnel would be improved through decision

trees and contact flow diagrams. 

There are multiple notification routes,

including traditional law enforcement and public

health channels. For example, in Los Angeles, the

public health department communicates with

CDC and local hospitals about the information

they have on a substance. CDC’s role is to determine who has been exposed and possible remediation. CDC will also notify states through the

Health Alert Network, which links public health

departments across the country, which then notifies local law enforcement. 

If law enforcement believes an incident is

a potential bioterrorist event, in some cases the

responding officers would call the appropriate Joint

Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). Several participants were uncertain about exactly when to alert

the their JTTF and health authorities. The session

participants discussed the JTTFs role in the notification process. The JTTFs can make an initial

threat assessment—to determine whether this is

an isolated event or not—based on information

coming in from local calls. Their initial threat

assessment helps them determine law enforcement's subsequent actions, as does public health’s

analysis. Federal agency participants noted that

the JTTFs and the FBI's Strategic Information and

Operations Center (SIOC) would then notify all 66

JTTFs in the event of a positive or negative finding. FBI information would be disseminated to

law enforcement and health departments around

the country. 

In addition to the alert system through the

JTTFs, several participants discussed regional alert

systems used if an emergency occurs. The

Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical

Services Systems (MIEMSS) is mandated to coordinate the state’s emergency medical systems.32

The MIEMSS uses a statewide system of

microwave towers to connect hospitals to the

emergency dispatch communications system.

After the events of September 11, staff at MIEMSS

used that existing system to develop a Facility

Resources Emergency Database (FRED), which is a

web-based application that provides information

to hospitals about an ongoing emergency. When a

FRED alert goes out, the receiver’s computer

sounds an audible alarm and the person is linked

to information about the emergency. The FRED

system also maintains information about hospitals and can request hospital capacity assessments

and ambulance availability in an emergency. 

The District of Columbia Emergency

Management Agency (DCEMA)33 ensures the

continuity of government during and following

major disasters by coordinating communications

efforts. DCEMA's mission is to protect the lives
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

41

and property of District residents and visitors during major emergencies and disasters through planning and timely operational response. DCEMA

maintains the Executive Command and

Communications Center (ECC), which provides

communications and information regarding city

conditions to the Executive Office and other

District government officials. The ECC is staffed

24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and additional personnel are available if a situation requires.

DCEMA also manages the Emergency Operations

Center (EOC), the civilian operations command

center used during disasters and emergencies. 

In Washington, D.C., first responders activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to

facilitate the flow of information and begin coordinated management. The EOC is connected

through multiple technologies to the Metropolitan

Police Department Joint Operation Command

Complex (JOCC), the law enforcement command

center, as well as the operations centers of other

critical agencies such as the District Department

of Transportation and the Department of Health.

These centers rely on multiple communication

devices, including the Washington Area Radio

Circuit and the Washington Hospital Association

Network, which connects 29 hospitals including

Walter Reed Army Medical Center, to facilitate

notification of a possible bioterrorist attack. 

Summary

This chapter discussed the issues and concerns

executive session participants raised about detection and notification. Detection is dependant on

collaboration, scene management, and the assessment of suspicious substances. Notification is an

essential issue related to communications between

local law enforcement and federal agencies as well

as notification strategies between health care

providers and law enforcement. Agencies must

decide before an event occurs what the roles and

responsibilities of all government agencies will be,

including police, fire, public health, and hospitals.

Interagency and interdisciplinary cooperation and

on-scene response protocols tailored to individual

jurisdictions are essential. 
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VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

43

C HAPTER F IVE

INTERVENTION, HEALTH CARE SURGE,

AND COMMUNICATION

THIS CHAPTER DETAILS THE VARIOUS LAW ENFORCEMENT ROLES DISCUSSED AT

the executive session for intervening in a bioterrorist attack, managing

the health care surge, and communicating in ways that reduce public

fear. The executive session discussion addressed several themes related to law

enforcement officers’ roles if real or threatened release of a biological agent

occurs. A close working relationship between law enforcement and health care

professionals is essential. Law enforcement personnel will often be in a support

role rather than act as decision makers during these activities. Executive session

participants stressed the need for advance planning on the specifics of these relatively new duties and responsibilities for police. 

Intervention

The public typically turns to the police as their

immediate contact for many matters related to

the provision of government services whether or

not those services are typically part of law enforcement’s responsibility. Because law enforcement is

highly visible and accessible, the tendency to turn

to police would be no different in the event of a

bioterrorist attack. If one or more cases of smallpox were confirmed or even suspected, for

instance, community members and government

leaders would call on police to respond to dramatically increased calls for service as well as two general categories of duties: 1) investigating the crime

of bioterrorism, and 2) assisting in health care

delivery. 

Investigating the Crime

The principle responsibility of law enforcement in

a bioterrorist event is to investigate the crime. If a

large outbreak is confirmed, investigating the

crime would be impossible unless police and public health investigators worked together when

interviewing suspects. Teams comprised of law

enforcement and public health investigators can

collaborate on interview questions that gather

information both about exposure to agents and the

circumstances of an individual's exposure that
34 See, also, the National Domestic Preparedness Office/Department of Defense Criminal and Epidemiological

Investigation Report 2000 for more details. The issue of joint police and public health investigations is also addressed in

the sidebar "Partnership Between Police and Public Health" in Chapter 3.

35 For more information on these issues, see Richards 2002. At the time of this writing, this publication was available at

www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol8no10/02-0465.htm. Also consult Goodman et al. 2003.

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may constitute evidence of the crime. Joint interviewing can both streamline the investigative

process and provide different perspectives on the

information gathered.34

Joint police/public health investigations

pose significant legal challenges that agencies

must explore before implementing policies. For

example, public health officials generally have

broader authority in search and seizure situations

than do law enforcement personnel. Public health

departments have been granted this authority to

enable them to stem the spread of infectious disease promptly. Public health officials also may be

more familiar with privacy regulations and how to

support them while still sharing critical information with law enforcement. Police and public

health authorities must consider the differences in

their authority and goals, and then plan for how

they will be addressed if an incident occurs.

Planning is essential to reduce the chances that

critical evidence will be lost due to role confusion

and legal mandates.35

Although a memorandum of understanding (MOU) alone will not create an effective working relationship between police and public health,

one is clearly advised. To be effective, MOUs must

have a sufficient level of detail in such areas as

determining who will have authority for each function, which functions may be necessary to manage

a threat, the chain of command for multi-agency

actions, and the procedure for assuring that one

agency can get needed help from another without

delay. An agreement should be accompanied with

legal documentation that supports departmental

authority to enter into the agreement. 

Assisting Health Care Delivery 

Past experience with smallpox outbreaks, such as

the one in New York City in 1947, dictates swift

preventive and control measures, such as large

cities being prepared to orchestrate a massive vaccination program. In this instance, one person

infected 12 others while on a short trip to the city.

Using the help of local law enforcement, officials

instituted a vaccination of six million people in

one month—and though tragic, only two people

died (Chyba 1998). If a bioterrorist attack occurs

today, law enforcement personnel would be called

on to assist health care providers to locate and isolate (perhaps through quarantine) those individuals who have been in contact with infected people,

to maintain order at health care centers and to provide support during mass administration of vaccinations or medical prophylaxis treatment. They

would also be faced with unusual demands for traffic control, fear reduction, and other more traditional duties—stretching their available resources

to the fullest.

In addition, law enforcement will also

likely respond to numerous subsequent calls from

fearful citizens who are ill and worried they may be

infected. Others will want medicine or treatment

to ensure they don’t get infected in the days ahead.

Potential "suspicious powder" incidents (even
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

45

those that turn out only to be spilled coffee creamer) can create significant panic. Police officers who

are stationed in emergency rooms in large cities to

help provide security could have direct contact

with seriously or potentially ill people. They will

also certainly encounter people who are frightened,

possibly panicking, and in need of reassurance and

guidance.

Isolation and quarantine. In the event of

a bioterrorist attack involving a contagious organism, law enforcement will have a vital role in disease containment measures such as isolation and

quarantine. Law enforcement will be called upon

to assist in locating known associates and possibly

even casual contacts of infected people. This strategy is consistent with "ring vaccination," a strategy

begun in the late 1960s and which ultimately

helped eradicate smallpox in the United States.36

Containment strategies usually involve

quarantining exposed people and those who have

had contact with them. Public health has the

authority under law to quarantine a building, but

does not have the power to enforce that law.

Consequently, public health authorities must

work closely with law enforcement to determine

how to enforce isolation and quarantine scenarios.

Executive session participants noted that

mandatory quarantines would be extremely difficult to enforce and suggested instead using voluntary strategies. Law enforcement officials and public health officials would request exposed individuals be quarantined voluntarily. Elected officials

(such as the mayor) would need to step forward to

calm the public as well as request their full

cooperation. Law enforcement would also need

to assuage community fears and ensure public

safety around treatment or quarantine facilities.

Vaccination and prophylaxis. If there is a

large-scale bioterrorist attack, public health officials may vaccinate or provide antibiotics to individuals in large geographic areas as prophylaxis.

This type of widespread response may be necessary should multiple outbreaks occur simultaneously or in response to public pressure. In these

situations, law enforcement officers will likely be

responsible for maintaining order for personnel

providing medical treatment in hospital emergency rooms, clinic settings, or temporary vaccination centers. 

If there is a significant anthrax attack, for

instance, studies suggest that prompt distribution

from the national stockpile of antibiotics may be

the most critical step in reducing causalities and

controlling public panic (Wein and Kaplan 2003).

The Department of Health and Human Services

(HHS) would work with the Department of

Homeland Security to identify populations at risk

and distribute antibiotics to them in any city in

the United States in as little as six hours. HHS

indicated at the executive session that they have

the ability to deliver antibiotics to 20 million people for their immediate needs and 12 million people for 60 days. Executive session participants cautioned that public panic would occur if antibiotics

were not distributed fairly and quickly. They

warned that citizens will attempt any means—

even storming pharmacies and health care centers

or rioting—to obtain these medications.

Several jurisdictions represented at the

executive session have developed plans for receiving and transporting medical stockpiles to distribution sites. These sites (emergency rooms, phar36 More information on this strategy can be found at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/prep/cdc-prep.asp.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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macies, and armories) will all be critical locations

for law enforcement protection and crowd management. Executive session participants recommended that law enforcement agencies and public

health officials prepare protocols and drill on the

distribution process.

Health Care Surge

Although the critical issue of "health care surge"

refers most directly to the spike in demand facing

health care providers if a large outbreak occurs, law

enforcement representatives at the executive session had several operational concerns related to

their own staffing. Faced with current staff shortages, participants anticipated even greater personnel problems. To make the most resources

available, the participants suggested proactive

staff preparation, such as advance vaccines and

education, and gathering and identifying such

force multipliers as citizen groups and the

National Guard. 

Staffing

Those executive session participants who had

experience planning for and managing bioterrorist

attacks warned that demand for law enforcement

personnel in these situations is enormous. One

person may serve two or more first responder roles

during normal operations but will not be able to do

both when a crisis occurs.37 One participant estimated the demand would be six times the number

of officers who ordinarily are available on a given

shift—that is if all officers come to work—and

many participants were concerned that approximately 20 to 25 percent of the police force will stay

home to protect loved ones and out of fear. 

Executive session participants proposed

several strategies to minimize law enforcement’s

absenteeism in the event of a bioterrorist attack.

The first strategy is to provide adequate education

in advance. This education should include information on how to protect oneself from exposure to

biological hazards, how to protect suspects and

reduce their exposure to others, and ways to identify risky situations before there is unintended

exposure to a biological threat. 

Session participants also suggested that

agencies provide first responders, their families

and other key service providers with medical treatments in advance of a bioterrorism crisis. This

strategy might reduce absenteeism caused by personnel who stay home to assure their families’

health. As an alternative to providing medical

treatments in advance, participants suggest communities maintain and be ready to distribute adequate stockpiles of antibiotics for all key personnel

and their families.

As part of the advance preparations for

bioterrorism, the federal government has attempted to implement a policy of vaccinating against

smallpox approximately 500,000 first responders,

including medical staff and public health workers

(Turner 2004). These first responders could then

be ready to respond to possible bioterrorism in

their city or to assist in another city. The

federal policy envisioned that at least some number of local law enforcement officers would be

vaccinated. 

Local jurisdictions have had difficulty

gaining voluntary compliance with this strategy

for several reasons: Responders are concerned

37 See John F. Kennedy School of Government 2002 for more information on surge capacity and first responder roles during a critical incident. 
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

47

about the health risks associated with the vaccination itself, and many do not think the odds of a

threat of a bioterrorist event outweigh the risks of

complications from the vaccine. There is also concern about who would pay the health care costs

should vaccinated responders become ill and supplemental staffing costs if workers need time off

(Turner 2004).

Force Multipliers

In addressing surge problems for health care, some

have suggested creating a pool of voluntary medical professionals who could deploy to the site of

an attack with little notice (Wein and Kaplan

2003). In community policing jurisdictions, partners in the community—who are already a

tremendous resource for police during non-crisis

times—could be viewed as a similar asset during

the event of a bioterrorist attack (Glass and

Schoch-Spana 2002). Evidence for this capacity to

help has been demonstrated by public reaction to

previous natural disasters and disease outbreaks,

where members of the public have often reacted

effectively. Executive session participants recommended that community leaders develop programs

that specify duties for appropriate organizations

and individuals during a response to a bioterrorism crisis. For example, community members can

organize groups to assist elderly or disabled neighbors who cannot leave their homes to evacuate or

obtain treatments. Law enforcement executives

are well situated to reach out to enlist this type of

help because of existing relationships with many

local groups. All individuals who will be assisting

law enforcement to bolster their ranks must be

trained and supervised to address community fear

and needs for treatment. The Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) announced the development of the Private Sector Office, reflecting the

recognition that private security is vital to homeland security efforts. The Private Sector Office38

provides guidance on policies and regulations;

works with federal labs; develops innovative

approaches and technologies in research and development centers and through academia; and promotes public-private partnerships, programs, and

best practices. 

Other response assistance will come from

the federal government, including the National

Guard and DHS. The National Guard could provide some of the force multiplier that is required,

especially for such duties as securing facilities and

escorting food and medical supplies to distribution

centers. The National Disaster Medical System

within DHS is also prepared to provide on-scene

response teams that offer medical and veterinary

services. These teams include approximately 35 to

40 people who can be deployed for two to four

weeks. DHS also has resources to assist mortuary

services, such as identification of remains; casualty evacuation; and identification of medical bed

capacity. DHS can also supplement hospital facilities and resources during incidents as well as provide some mental health resources.

38 At the time of this writing, more information on the DHS Private Sector Office can be found at www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=9&content=3699.
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NEED FOR COORDINATION AND INTEROPERABILITY OF PUBLIC

HEALTH DISCIPLINES AND RESOURCES

ACROSS JURISDICTIONAL LINES

by Ruth A. Vogel, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response,

Commisioner’s Office, Baltimore City Health Department

The attacks of September 11 and subsequent terrorism events have affected virtually all aspects of life

including domestic security, public health and safety, environmental issues, and the health care community—all historically viewed as separate entities and issues. This changing environment has highlighted the need for better coordination and interoperability of public health disciplines and resources

across jurisdictional lines. A key determinant for appropriately addressing this need for collaboration

is the inclusion and appropriate representation of public health resources and authorities acting in concert with emergency management officials, first responders, and public and private community-based

partners. 

As a local health department that is implementing an "anti-terrorism" program, we have found

through our efforts two salient needs: 1) improvement is needed regarding basic understanding of public health roles and responsibilities among all partners, and 2) public health must be represented in

anti-terrorism and emergency preparedness planning initiatives. The infrastructure of a public health

agency is complicated and includes a variety of programs and services whose roles and responsibilities

are what essentially define the health and well-being of a community. The public health discipline is

historically founded in prevention-based initiatives using epidemiology, risk assessments and surveillance to drive program goals, objectives, and activities. Many of the existing prevention-based programs also have a front-line component that provides defensive and ongoing management of natural

and man-made public health threats. It is these existing resources that need integration for effective

responses to any public health emergency. Consequently, we are currently focusing our efforts toward

developing more effective initiatives that include the resources and assets of Maryland's state and local

public health in coordinated prevention, planning, preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation

efforts for both natural and man-made disasters.

This first step to improving the integration of public health is recognizing that our roles are

unique as they relate to homeland security and emergency response. The Baltimore City Health

Department is working closely with other state, local, and regional agencies in Maryland to achieve

this. For example, the State of Maryland’s Department of Homeland Security has coordinated a public health technical working group that through a collaborative effort with local public health at the

table, agreed to the following objectives that are now being used to improve the public health role in

Maryland’s emergency preparedness and response efforts:
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

49

Objective: Improve the knowledge base of all response partners by providing basic public

health "101"-type training so that partnering agencies and institutions can appropriately utilize

resources within their respective emergency operations infrastructures. 

Objective: Enhance opportunities for "hands on" training and exercises that incorporate public health roles and responsibilities, both among disciplines and jurisdictions.

Objective: Improve integration of federal partners and their resources for emergency planning

and response services. 

In summary, the current efforts to improve and incorporate public health into existing emergency

response systems have been largely based upon a crisis response mentality following September 11 and

the anthrax events of 2001. Optimal response is contingent upon tactics that incorporate a collage of

plans, agencies, and resources. It is clear that a more cohesive plan that can be easily adapted for a

variety of public health emergencies is needed. The challenge is to ensure it is structured so that it

represents all responders. 

Communication

A significant issue in the aftermath of a bioterrorist attack will be to manage the public panic that

could occur. Law enforcement agencies must use

existing ties with communities to mobilize a

recovery strategy that can get local areas back to

functioning as soon as possible following the

event. A clear communication plan and a consistent message to the public will be essential components of that recovery strategy. A communication plan should include the private sector, the

mass media, and community organizations.

Advance Public Education Campaign

Experts agree that community leaders should

engage in public information and education campaigns prior to a terrorist attack (Glass and

Schoch-Spana 2002). Executive session participants noted that the general public is poorly

informed about bioterrorism and what they should

do after an attack. In a crisis, public education is

almost impossible to provide through news

reports. The public should be educated before an

incident on such matters as whether they would be

required to go to distribution centers to obtain

antibiotics or vaccinations, and what preventive

measures to take to limit their exposure. This education must also address treatment compliance, a

concern that is based on experience with exposed

postal workers in the anthrax attacks in fall 2001.

Some of the workers did not comply with the full

treatment regimen (Wein and Kaplan 2003).

Executive session participants noted that

advance public education strategies for dealing

with the risks of bioterrorism should involve mass

media communications (such as broadcast media,
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39 For more information to the Department of Homeland Security guidelines and resources on preparation for a terrorist

attack, see www.ready.gov.

print media, and the Internet), public schools,

businesses, religious groups, and various community and civic organizations. Several mass media

experts emphasized the importance of early communication that is candid about what is, and is

not, known about the nature of the threat. This

information would be especially valuable for government officials who will be charged with providing the public with accurate information without

instigating panic.39

Developing the Public

Communications Strategy

Community policing’s focus on partnerships,

trust, and problem solving are essential to police

agencies’ efforts to better protect the public and

communicate after a bioterrorist attack. During a

critical incident, successful community policing

will reduce fear as well as ensure that the combined efforts and resources of the police, local government, and community members will be

deployed effectively. Honest communication with

the public will be essential to maintaining their

trust in a crisis. Executive session participants

stressed the need for transparency in communication strategies and the need for taking a proactive

approach. Some executive session participants

stressed that the effect of a bioterrorist attack on

the public’s mental health would require a keenly

coordinated and sensitive response. 

Making the announcement. A community must decide as part of its communication strategy which government authority will make the

announcement that a bioterrorist attack has

occurred. Executive session participants noted that

in all likelihood this would be an elected official

(such as the governor, county administrator, or

mayor). Some participants stressed that a public

health official should also be involved and the local

law enforcement executive’s visibility would also

help calm the public. 

Communications content. Executive session participants noted that communications

should include information about how the agent

was delivered, how illness is contracted, what the

symptoms are, and how the public can protect

itself from exposure. These participants urged giving individuals as much information as possible to

reduce panic and fear. They indicated that community members would want to know what law

enforcement is doing to investigate the crime and

what the medical community is doing to treat illness. They also stressed how important it is for

authorities to say what they do not know.

Communications frequency. Session participants who had experienced a biological attack

noted that while there may be a tendency to wait

before making announcements about the attack,

the media is likely to put tremendous pressure on

the authorities to get information out quickly.

These participants recommend beginning communications early (as soon as credible information

dictates) and updating available information

frequently. 
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

51

Summary

Partnerships and planning between law enforcement, other first responders, and the health care

community are critical in preparing for a bioterrorist event. Planning with other government

agencies will determine the roles and responsibilities of law enforcement officials and other stakeholders. Local law enforcement will shoulder a significant role in intervening in a bioterrorist attack,

helping to manage the health care surge, and in

communicating with the public to reduce fear.
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VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

53

C HAPTER S I X

RECOMMENDATIONS

THIS WHITE PAPER HAS LOOKED AT THE LESSONS SHARED BY EXECUTIVE SESSION

participants whose agencies have dealt with a bioterrorist event or have

developed response plans to a biological attack. It has also provided recommendations for law enforcement agencies to enhance bioterrorism preparedness in the five critical action areas involved in planning for and responding to a

bioterrorism event: detecting the event, notifying the proper authorities, intervening (in coordination with fire, EMS, and public health responses), managing

the surge of demands placed on heath care systems, and maintaining effective

communication with all agencies involved in a response as well as the public.

Three overarching concerns common to all of these five critical areas were also

discussed: funding and resources, training, and intelligence. 

There are numerous multi-agency efforts involved

in carrying out each of the five critical function

areas. Consequently, there is a need for interagency and interdisciplinary cooperation with clearly defined, on-scene response protocols that predetermine agency roles and responsibilities for each

jurisdiction. While there may be some overlapping

duties as some needs overtake available resources,

generally the fire department’s role may be to

manage rescue operations, treat victims, and provide hazardous materials response, whereas law

enforcement’s role may be to safeguard evidence

and witnesses, preserve and manage the crime

scene, investigate the crime, calm the community,

prevent violence around health care settings, and

respond to calls for service. 

Specific recommendations for law enforcement agencies on developing bioterrorism

response plans are outlined in the previous chapters. Listed below are highlights of selected recommendations.

Five Critical Areas

Detection

Determining a bioterrorist act has been committed is dependent on law enforcement collaborating

with hospitals, other health care facilities, and

public health departments. Partnerships with

these and other stakeholders allow police to detect

bioterrorism, manage the on-scene response using

the Incident Command System, provide appropriate equipment and training to enhance officer and
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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public safety, and assess the potentially lethal substance with appropriate, available technology.

Public health and law enforcement must

collaborate to develop effective detection strategies. A mechanism in each jurisdiction is needed

to detect a significant increase in public health

indicators that are symptomatic of high-risk biological agents. Law enforcement must collaborate

with health care providers, including nurses or

doctors in hospitals or health care clinics, pharmacists, emergency medical technicians, and

others who are in a position to identify spikes in

illness.

Line-level first responders must be trained to

recognize indicators of a potential bioterrorist

attack and treat suspicious letters or packages as

they would any unknown, potentially hazardous

material. Adequate, up-to-date personnel protective equipment should be provided to first responders to enhance officer safety at the scene.

Agencies must repeatedly train officers to ensure

compliance with equipment usage in the field.

As first responders to the scene of a potential bioterrorist attack, law enforcement personnel,

fire fighters, and EMS workers must also be able to

conduct preliminary assessments of potentially

harmful substances using available technologies

that are both sophisticated and practical. 

Law enforcement agencies should invite

health care leaders, such as hospital CEOs and

medical directors, to planning meetings designed

to identify effective collaborative bioterrorism

response strategies. There should also be an active

partnership between law enforcement and public

health experts, including epidemiologists and

microbiologists.

Law enforcement should be aware of local

hospitals that are accredited by the Joint

Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare

Organizations (JCAHO), which offers a "seal of

approval that indicates a hospital meets high performance standards." JCAHO-accredited hospitals

must conform to a standard requiring them to participate in emergency response training drills. 

Law enforcement agencies should collaborate with private security firms and establish protocols on detection (as well as notification and

response) activities should they become aware of

suspicious substances.

Jurisdictions must effectively integrate

multi-agency responses by clearly articulating and

documenting each agency’s role in detecting

bioterrorism, before an attack occurs. Written

agreements are encouraged for multiple jurisdictions within regions as part of their planning

efforts.

A Unified Command must be established to

coordinate multidisciplinary responses (e.g., local

fire, local law enforcement, FBI, and others such as

public works, public health, and EMS). The

Unified Command includes all of the major players in an incident that need to share information,
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

55

resources, and responsibility for the delivery of

effective services.40

Notification

Once first responders or medical professionals

detect that a bioterrorist event has occurred, they

must initiate a broader team response by notifying

the proper authorities. Notification occurs through

lines of communication developed between local

law enforcement and federal agencies as well as

between health care providers and law enforcement. 

On-scene response protocols must be in

place to ensure timely notification of government

authorities when a bioterrorist event is suspected

or confirmed. In some cases, responding officers

first contact the local Joint Terrorism Task Force

(JTTF), which is then responsible for subsequent

notifications.

Written interagency agreements should

specify a decision tree and optimal informationsharing paths to facilitate notification of suspected

bioterrorism. The decision tree should specify who

is responsible for making decisions, as well as

which actions are then required by which partners. 

Once local medical professionals (including

those at public health laboratories responsible for

identifying unknown substances) have found

something unusual, they must immediately communicate their suspicions to their local public

health department and the Centers for Disease

Control. Local law enforcement should be notified

immediately as well.

(Notification to the public is covered under

"Communication" below.)

Intervention

Local response to a bioterrorist attack involves

both a public health and medical component (controlling the spread and severity of the disease and

treating those who are ill) as well as a law enforcement component (concentrating on criminal

investigation, offender apprehension, public safety

issues, and assisting in health care delivery).

Law enforcement and public health agencies

should develop a protocol that permits their investigators to conduct joint interviews and share

information. Teams composed of law enforcement

and public health investigators can collaborate on

interview questions that gather information both

about exposure to agents and the circumstances of

an individual’s exposure that may constitute evidence of the crime. Joint interviews can both

streamline the investigative process and provide

different perspectives on information.

Protocols must both safeguard the privacy of

health information and maintain the confidentiality of sensitive case investigation information.

A memorandum of understanding (MOU)

should identify specific persons with authority for

each function during an intervention, the func40 For more information on multijurisdictional responses, setting up a Joint Operation Command Center, pre-event planning, and unified command, see Murphy and Wexler, forthcoming. In addition, more information on the National Incident

Management System (NIMS) can be found at www.fema.gov/preparedness/nims/nims.shtm.
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tions that are necessary to manage a threat, the

chain of command for multi-agency actions, and

the procedure for assuring that one agency can get

needed help from another without delay. 

Law enforcement agencies must work with

public health authorities to look at a range of

options for isolation and quarantine scenarios, or

to administer vaccinations or medical prophylaxis

treatment, and concentrate on those that minimize force and maximize public involvement. 

Law enforcement officers should know their

responsibility for maintaining order during the

process of distributing medical treatment—in hospital emergency rooms, clinic settings or temporary vaccination centers—or enforcing isolation or

quarantine. 

Law enforcement agencies and public health

officials must prepare protocols and practice the

distribution process for mass vaccination or prophylaxis.

Health Care Surge Management

In any significant bioterrorist event, there will be

enormous demands placed on both the health care

system and emergency responders. As a result, the

ability of a community to effectively manage a

bioterrorist attack will depend partly on that community’s "health care surge" capacity and partly on

its ability to maintain adequate emergency

responses. 

Law enforcement agencies must be aware

that stockpiles of antibiotics and vaccines as well

as medical equipment (e.g., ventilators) are available from the Department of Health and Human

Services, vendors, or through sharing arrangements among neighboring regions. 

Law enforcement must prepare for its role in

supporting medical service providers, which can

include providing security at health care settings,

transporting ill people to hospitals, and managing

traffic and crowds. 

Law enforcement must plan for treating and

protecting line officers and their family members

before an attack occurs.

Law enforcement must seek remedies anticipated staffing shortages, including advance treatments and education for current personnel. Law

enforcement must work with their emergency

management agency to plan for how to access

force multipliers, such as citizen groups and the

Citizens Corps’ Citizen Emergency Response

Team Program (CERT), the National Guard, private security, and the Department of Homeland

Security. Law enforcement executives can use

existing relationships with community groups to

enlist their help in augmenting police responses in

a bioterrorist attack. 

Police executives need to compute the minimum number of sworn personnel and civilian staff

who must be immunized so that the department

can continue to function in the event of a contagious organism outbreak. Then, executives must

work with personnel to determine the safest

means for their protection and address their

concerns.
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Communication

A multi-pronged communication strategy

for early education efforts and for the hours and

days immediately following a bioterrorist attack is

essential for an effective emergency response plan.

Communication plans must include protocols for

communications among service providers—

including law enforcement, fire, EMS, and public

health entities. These plans must address terminology issues, interoperability, dispatch protocols,

and public notification of the attack and treatment

plans. 

A law enforcement agency must use existing

ties within the community to mobilize a recovery

strategy that can get the local area into a non-crisis mode as soon as possible following the event. 

A clear communication plan and consistent

message to the public will be an essential part of a

recovery strategy. Early communication must be

candid about what is and is not known about the

nature of the threat. The effect of a bioterrorist

attack on the public’s mental health may be significant, so information on how to cope with the

stress and any available referral agency resources

should be shared. 

Public education strategies for dealing with

the risks of bioterrorism should involve mass

media communications (such as broadcast media,

print media, and the Internet), public schools,

businesses, religious groups, and various community and civic organizations. This public awareness campaign must occur in advance of an attack,

because it will not be possible for community leaders to effectively communicate critical information

(such as appropriate public responses to biological

agents, ways to access treatment regimens, and

behaviors that reduce the potential for exposure) in

a crisis.

Communities must decide as part of their

communication strategy which government

authority will make the announcement that a

bioterrorist attack has occurred. A public health

official should be involved, as should local law

enforcement executives, as their visibility will help

calm the public. The communication should

include information about how the agent was

delivered, how illness is contracted, what the

symptoms are, and how citizens can protect themselves from exposure or get assistance if exposed.

Common cautions about not overwhelming

emergency rooms, leaving roadways and emergency lanes open, not using cell phones unless

necessary, and others may be useful as well. 

Three Overarching Themes

Funding and Resource Issues

Funding is a major issue in preparing for and

responding to bioterrorism. Pooled resources will

build strong partnerships between law

enforcement, public health, fire, and other first

responders. 

Local, state, and federal governments must

assess existing resources, in terms of both staffing

and equipment, and identify funding to augment

already strained budgets. A recommended mechanism for assessing such resources is called a "gap

analysis," which is critical in identifying redundancies and shortfalls. A gap analysis can also be
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used to assess equipment needs and develop plans

to purchase, maintain, and replace equipment. 

Resources can be combined across several

regions or statewide to enhance emergency

responses. 

Federal agencies should consider encouraging regional or statewide cooperation when awarding federal grants. Localities should consider the

ways funds could be used to accomplish more than

one purpose. 

Law enforcement agency budgets are already

strained to the limit as a shrinking police force

deals not only with traditional crime-fighting

duties, but also with antiterrorism duties. Funding

for all first responders must be quickly and effectively distributed.

Law enforcement partnerships with the private sector, especially private security can also

enhance funding and provide resources—such as

staff, equipment, and monetary support—to effectively respond to an emergency.

Training

Law enforcement training serves a variety of purposes—to enhance detection of a bioterrorist

event, to protect and treat area individuals, to

reduce exposure to the agent, to ensure smooth

coordination of on-scene hazardous materials

response, and to promote effective investigation

and management of contagious agents. Personnel

at all agency levels must be trained initially and

then given frequent in-service training.

To maintain first responder readiness, agencies must offer frequent and consistent training on

possible indicators of bioterrorism, precautions to

take to reduce exposure, the signs and symptoms

of contamination by a potential harmful biological

agent, and critical immediate response procedures. 

One executive session participant suggested

that at a minimum agencies must provide eight

hours of training (16 hours of training is preferable) on hazardous materials awareness for all

recruits and in-service law enforcement department members. 

Multi-agency training should be designed to

ensure that clear strategies engage all agencies

across government, and to work out communication and command issues related to incident management. This training should include specialists

and all personnel involved in on-scene response for

a particular jurisdiction. A local agency should

reach out to other police chiefs and sheriffs as well

as tribal and federal agencies in the region to

design training. Medical ethicists, physicians,

public health professionals, and scientists expert

in contagious diseases should be used to help

develop staff training.

Training should occur by any or all of the following means in each jurisdiction: tabletop exercises; computer simulations; and field training

drills (both planned and unplanned) involving officers, hospitals, private security, other first responders, other stakeholders, and the public who can

enact possible scenarios. 
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59

Law enforcement officers must be educated

on contagious organisms, and the risks and benefits of vaccination and medical treatments. This

education should include information about the

biological agents, their disease spread and manifestations, available vaccines and treatments, and

the risks and benefits of those treatments. Law

enforcement officers will also need to know how to

interact safely with people who are potentially contagious. Health department officials should be

involved in educating first responders (including

police, fire, EMS, and health care providers) about

physical protections and mental health concerns. 

Private security should be educated on contagious organisms and trained on how to respond

to them. Private security should also be included in

training with law enforcement and other first

responders when possible. 

Communities must develop and conduct

joint exercises that test local and regional capabilities in carrying out quarantine, evacuation, and

isolation plans. 

Training needs to be conducted in areas such

as law enforcement's involvement in the process of

administering prophylactic treatments (such as

antibiotics) or vaccinations and conducting interviews to obtain information about the suspects

and/or site of exposure. 

Intelligence Sharing

Information related to terrorism in general and

bioterrorism in particular may come from many

different sources and may be obtained from many

different agencies (fire, EMS, law enforcement,

public health, and myriad others). It is imperative

that agencies be able to quickly and effectively

share information with others.

Government agencies should build on existing intelligence systems that would produce a single, seamless intelligence system useful for a wide

range of threats (e.g., drugs, gangs, international

terrorists, etc.). 

The Terrorist Threat Integration Center

(TTIC) should be supported as a resource for identifying terrorism threats and sharing intelligence,

as it collects information from DHS, FBI, CIA,

DoD, and others, and provides integrated threat

analyses to state and local law enforcement

through the JTTFs and other means.

Intelligence analysis within local law

enforcement agencies should be upgraded or supplemented in order for local law enforcement to be

better positioned as a "full partner" in the counterterrorism arena.

Jurisdictions must improve mechanisms for

determining the criteria for when, a threat is

deemed credible and when information is appropriate for federal agencies release to local first

responders. 

Conclusion

These highlighted recommendations from this

white paper cover a wide range of issues for law

enforcement and other government agencies as

they prepare their response to a bioterrorist event.

The text offers more detailed suggestions that can

be tailored to the unique needs of a jurisdiction.

These approaches are meant as a starting point for

law enforcement and public health officials to
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develop a collaborative, proactive, and problem-oriented response to combat future bioterrorism and

reduce fear within our communities.
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

61

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a Terrorist Incident. Sacramento, Calif. Police Department. This article was presented as an Issues and

Ideas Paper in the November 2001 Symposium, Community Response to the Threat of Terrorism, at the

Public Entity Risk Institute (PERI) Available at www.riskinstitute.org or the www.eriskcenter.org.

Maniscalco, Paul M., and Hank T. Christen. 2002. Terrorism Response: Field Guide for Law Enforcement.

Boston: Prentice Hall Professional Technical Reference.

Murphy, Gerard and Chuck Wexler. Forthcoming. Managing Multijurisdictional Cases: Lessons Learned

from the Sniper Investigation. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum/Office of Justice

Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance.

National Domestic Preparedness Office, Department of Defense. December 2000. Criminal and

Epidemiological Investigation Report. Final Report of the Biological Warfare Improved Response Program

(BW-IRP) Department of Defense, National Domestic Preparedness Office Criminal and Epidemiological

Investigation Workshop, held January 19-21, 2000 to U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical

Command (SBC-COM). 

Rashbaum, William K., and Judith Miller. "New York Police Take Broad Steps In Facing Terror." The New

York Times, 15 February 2004, sec. 1, p. 1.

Richards, Edward. "Collaboration Between Public Health and Law Enforcement: The Constitutional

Challenge." Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2002, 8(10): 1157–59. Available at

www.cdc.gov./ncidod/EID/vol8no10/02-0465.htm.

Richards, Edward, Richard Goodman, and Stacy Milligan. Forthcoming. Quarantine and Police Powers:

The Role of Law Enforcement in a Biomedical Crisis. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice

Assistance/Police Executive Research Forum.

Rotz, Lisa D., Ali S. Khan, Scott R. Lillibridge, Stephen M. Ostroff, and James M. Hughes. "Public Health

Assessment of Potential Biological Terrorism Agents." Emerging Infectious Diseases, 8, no. 2 (2002):

225–30.

Shenon, Phillip. "Terrorism Drills Showed Lack of Preparedness, Report Says." The New York Times, 19

December 2003. sec. A, p. 32, col. 1.

Sidell, Frederick R., William C. Patrick, and Thomas R. Dashiell. 2000. Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook.

Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group.

Turner, Jim. 2004. A Biodefense Failure: The National Smallpox Vaccination Program One Year Later.

Washington, D.C.: Democratic Members of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, House

of Representatives. 

Waeckerle, Joseph F. 2000. "Domestic Preparedness for Events Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction."

Journal of the American Medical Association, 283(2): 252–54. 

Wein, Lawrence M., and Edward H. Kaplan. "Unready for Anthrax." The Washington Post, 28 July 2003,

sec. A. p. 21.
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RESOURCE SECTION4 1

Adler, Suman, Eddie Ayala, Tim Dixon, Richard Kussman, Peter Lowry and Philip Perkins. 2000.

"Biological Warfare Improved Response Program (Final Report)." Centers for Disease Control/Department

of Defense Smallpox Workshop. U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Response Command.

Bruce, Julie. "Bioterrorism Meets Privacy: An Analysis of the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act

and HIPAA Privacy Rule." Chicago Institute for Health Law, Annals of Health Law 12(1): 75–120.

Butler, Jay C., Mitchell L. Cohen, Cindy R. Friedman, Robert M. Scripp and Craig G. Watz. 2002.

"Collaboration Between Public Health and Law Enforcement: New Paradigms and Partnerships for

Bioterrorrism Planning and Response." Emerging Infectious Diseases 8(10): 1152–56. 

Dan, Bruce. B. Forthcoming. Understanding Health Hazards: A Primer for Police Executives on Biological,

Chemical, and Radiological Threats. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Domestic

Preparedness/Police Executive Research Forum.

Davies, Heather J. and Gerard R. Murphy. March 2004. Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: The

Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series. Vol.2: Working With Diverse Communities. Office of

Community Oriented Policing Services/Police Executive Research Forum.

Fidler, David P. "Bioterrorism, Public Health, and International Law." Chicago Journal of International

Law 3: 7–26 (2002).

Gostin, Lawrence O., Jason W. Saspin et al. "The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning for

and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases." Journal of the American

Medical Association. 288, no. 5 (7 August 2002): 622–28.

Hoffman, Richard E. and Jane E. Norton. 2002. "Lessons Learned from a Full-Scale Bioterrorism

Exercise." Emerging Infectious Diseases, 6(6): 652–53. Available at www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol6no6/hoffman.htm.

41 By inclusion here, neither PERF nor the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services endorses the content of these

materials.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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Kellman, Barry. "Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe." Harvard Journal of

Law and Public Policy 24 (Spring 2001): 417–92.

Murphy, Gerard R. and Martha R. Plotkin. March 2003. Protecting Your Community From Terrorism:

The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series. Vol.1: Local-Federal Partnerships. Office of Community

Oriented Policing Services/Police Executive Research Forum.

National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center. 2004. What Every Public Safety Officer

Should Know About Radiation and Radioactive Materials. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice

(NCJ 198193). Available at http://hps.org/hsc/documents/hderrad.pdf.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 2002. "Communicating in a Crisis: Risk

Communication Guidelines for Public Officials." Washington D.C.: Department of Health and Human

Services.
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

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BIOTERRORISM WE B RESOURCES4 2

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Emergency

Preparedness and Response 

www.bt.cdc.gov

The CDC’s Emergency Preparedness & Response website is one of the most comprehensive informational site involving bioterrorism on the Internet. It offers fact sheets and overviews on lethal agents and

diseases, including anthrax, Ricin, Sarin, smallpox, and others. Topics on biological agents include diagnosis/evaluation, environment/response, exposure management, infection control, preparation and planning, training opportunities and materials, vaccination, treatment, and surveillance and investigation.

The site has information on radiation emergencies, chemical agents, and other disasters and emergencies. The site offers links to pertinent topics such as sheltering in place, mass trauma related to catastrophic events, emergency preparedness for business, and has a clinician registry for email updates on

terrorism and emergency response.

Center for Biosecurity –University of Pittsburgh Medical Center

(UPMC)

www.upmc-biosecurity.org

The Center for Biosecurity is an independent, nonprofit organization of the University of Pittsburgh

Medical Center, with its base of operations located in Baltimore, MD. The Center works to prevent the

development and use of biological weapons, to catalyze advances in science and governance that diminish the power of biological weapons as agents of mass lethality, and to lessen the human suffering that

would result if prevention fails. The Center draws upon the expertise of multidisciplinary staff with experience in the government, medicine, public health, and bioscience. 

Center for Infectious Disease and Research Policy (CIDRAP),

University of Minnesota

www.cidrap.umn.edu

CIDRAP’s mission is to reduce illness and death from infectious diseases by conducting original, interdisciplinary research, and by facilitating public policy refinement and the adoption of science-based best

practices among professionals and the public. The center focuses on timely and emerging issues of greatest significance to public health and strives to create solutions targeted for greatest impact.

42 This list primarily includes the resource list created in 2003 for the Bureau of Justice Assistance-funded project, PoliceMedical Collaborations. While not exhaustive, these resources provided valuable information at the time at which they were

compiled. Neither PERF nor the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services endorses the content of any listed websites.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) 

www.cma.army.mil 

This website has chemical agent facts sheets on nerve agents.

Counter-Terrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement 

www.counterterrorismtraining.gov

The Counter-Terrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement website offers access to counter-terrorism training opportunities, related materials and website links from the federal government, private

and nonprofit organizations. The Counter-Terrorism Training Coordination Working Group convened by

the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Office of Justice Programs examined the counter-terrorism tools

available to law enforcement and first responders and recommended the establishment of a website. The

working group determined current training offered by DOJ components, identified duplication or gaps,

and recommended the most effective mechanisms for delivering training. These resources will help law

enforcement decision-makers develop strategic plans for professional training and local emergency

response.

National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO)

www.naccho.org

At the core of NACCHO’s bioterrorism programs is the belief that the capacities needed to effectively

respond to bioterrorism allow for multi-use response infrastructure that improves the ability to respond

to all hazards. NACCHO has been actively engaged in response activities since 1999. As part of a cooperative agreement with CDC, NACCHO has undertaken several programs that involve collaboration with

local, state, and federal partners to strengthen and improve local health agencies’ capacity to respond to

bioterrorism and other communicable diseases and environmental health threats.

National Library of Medicine Specialized Information Services

(Biological Warfare Page) 

www.sis.nlm.nih.gov

The Specialized Information Services (SIS) Division of the National Library of Medicine (NLM) is responsible for information resources and services in toxicology, environmental health, chemistry, HIV/AIDS,

and specialized topics in minority health. The website features an extensive database and other resources.

United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious

Diseases (USAMRIID) 

www.usamriid.army.mil

The United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick,

MD, conducts research to develop strategies, products, information, procedures, and training programs

for medical defense against biological warfare threats and naturally occurring infectious diseases that

require special containment. USAMRIID, an organization of the U.S. Army Medical Research and
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

67

Material Command (USAMRMC), is the lead medical research laboratory for the U.S. Biological Defense

Research Program. The Institute plays a key role in national defense and infectious disease research at

the largest biocontainment laboratory in the Department of Defense (DoD) for the study of hazardous

diseases.

U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/bioterrorism.html

The FDA's counterterrorism Web page covers biological agents such as anthrax, smallpox, botulism,

plague, etc. It also has extensive material on public health initiatives/actions, preparedness, vaccines, and

treatments.

Other Resources

U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command www.sbccomm.army.mil

For updated CDC Ricin see website www.emergencyemail.org/cdc.htm

The Emergency Email Network, Inc. www.emergencyemail.org/
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69

A PPENDIX A

PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVERS

43 Participant ranks and agency affiliations are listed as of the time of the executive session.

Participants4 3

Sheriff Leroy Baca

Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department

Los Angeles, CA

Fire Chief William Bamattre

Los Angeles (City) Fire Department

Los Angeles, CA

Chief Anthony Batts

Long Beach Police Department

Long Beach, CA

Assistant Director Joseph Billy

Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York

New York, NY

Chief William Bratton

Los Angeles Police Department

Los Angeles, CA

Chief Michael Brown

California Highway Patrol, Southern Division

Los Angeles, CA

Assistant Chief John Buchanan

Phoenix Police Department

Phoenix, AZ

President Rick Caruso

Los Angeles Police Commission

Los Angeles, CA

Deputy Chief Bill Conger

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department

Las Vegas, NV

Intelligence Analyst Glen Cross

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

Washington Field Office

Washington, DC

Deputy Director Mike Dayton

California Office of Homeland Security

Los Angeles, CA

Assistant Special Agent in Charge Thomas Donlon

Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York

New York, NY

Chief Alex Fagan

San Francisco Police Department

San Francisco, CA

Dr. Jonathan E. Fielding

Director, Public Health and Health Officer, Los

Angeles County Department of Health Services

Los Angeles, CA

Secretary Edward Flynn

Massachusetts Executive Office for Public Safety

Boston, MA

Fire Chief P. Michael Freeman

Los Angeles (County) Fire Department

Los Angeles, CA
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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Chief Terrance Gainer

U.S. Capitol Police

Washington, DC

Co-Director Richard Goodman

Public Health Law Program, Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention

Atlanta, GA

Acting Assistant Secretary Jerome M. Hauer

Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, 

Department of Health and Human Services

Washington, DC

Captain Joe Herbert

New York City Police Department

New York, NY

Assistant Director in Charge Ronald Iden

Federal Bureau of Investigation,

Los Angeles Field Office

Los Angeles, CA

Assistant Chief Steve Kreis

Phoenix Fire Department

Phoenix, AZ

David Ladd

Director, Hazardous Materials Response

Massachusetts Department of Fire Services

Stowe, MA

Commander Cathy Lanier

Metropolitan Police Department

Washington, DC

Supervisory Special Agent Howard Leadbetter

Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York

New York, NY

Commander Mark Leap

Los Angeles Police Department

Los Angeles, CA

Chief Deputy Gary Lockhart

Los Angeles (County) Fire Department

Los Angeles, CA

Chief Susan Manheimer

San Mateo Police Department

San Mateo, CA

Special Agent in Charge Michael Mason

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

Sacramento Field Office

Sacramento, CA

Commanding Officer John Miller

Critical Incident Management Bureau, 

Los Angeles Police Department

Los Angeles, CA

Chief Robert Olson

Minneapolis Police Department

Minneapolis, MN

Deputy Chief Kerry Payne

District of Columbia Department of 

Emergency Management

Washington, DC

Director Carl Peed

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

Washington, DC

Special Operations Supervisor Jim Rice

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

Washington Field Office 

Washington, DC

Senior Deputy Director Mike Richardson

Primary Care Prevention and Planning

District of Columbia Department of Public Health

Washington, DC

Deputy Chief Michael Sellitto

District of Columbia Fire Department

Washington, DC
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71

Public Health Manager Nancy Shaver

Phoenix Fire Department

Phoenix, AZ

General Manager Ellis Stanley, Sr.

Los Angeles Office of Emergency Preparedness

Los Angeles, CA

Section Chief Don Van Duyn

Counterterrorism Analysis Section, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters

Washington, DC

Chief Superintendent Alan Webb

London Metropolitan Police Department

London, England

Director Kevin Yeskey

Department of Human Services

Office of Emergency Response

Rockville, MD

OBSERVERS4 4

Deputy Chief Michael Berkow

Los Angeles Police Department

Los Angeles, CA

Deputy Director Lawrence Fetters

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Federal Security

Washington, DC

Dean Jack Greene

College of Criminal Justice

Northeastern University

Boston, MA

Deputy Chief Michael Hillman

Los Angeles Police Department

Los Angeles, CA

Commander Betty Kelepecz

Los Angeles Police Department

Los Angeles, CA

Associate Professor David Klinger

Criminology and Criminal Justice

University of Missouri, St. Louis

St. Louis, MO

Senior Research Assistant Michael Mair

Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of

Public Health

Baltimore, MD

Director Steve Mastrofski

Administration of Justice, Department of Public

and International Affairs

George Mason University 

Fairfax, VA

Lieutenant Tom McDonald

Los Angeles Police Department

Los Angeles, CA

Assistant Chief Jim McDonnell

Los Angeles Police Department

Los Angeles, CA

Senior Social Scientist Lois Felson Mock

National Institute of Justice

Washington, DC

Professor Edward Richards

Paul M. Hebert Law Center

Louisiana State University

Baton Rouge, LA

Captain Greg Roper

Los Angeles Police Department

Los Angeles, CA

Captain Gary Williams

Los Angeles Police Department

Los Angeles, CA

44 Observer ranks and agency affiliations are listed as of the time of the executive session.
45 At this writing, Gerard Murphy is the Director of the Homeland Security and Technology Division in the

National Governors Association Center for Best Practices.

PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services Staff

1100 Vermont Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20530

Phone: 1-800-421-6770

Fax: 202-616-2914

Website: www.cops.usdoj.gov

David Andelman

Management Analyst

Tamara Lucas

Senior Policy Analyst

Carl Peed

Director

Maria Carolina Rozas

Assistant Director

Amy Schapiro

Senior Social Science Analyst

Michael Seelman

Senior Social Science Analyst 

Police Executive Research

Forum 

1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 930

Washington, DC 20036

Phone: 202-466-7820

Fax: 202-466-7826

Website: www.policeforum.org

Heather Davies

Research Associate

Gerard Murphy45

Deputy Director of Research

Rebecca Neuburger

Assistant Director

Membership & Marketing

Melissa Reuland

Senior Research Associate

Chuck Wexler

Executive Director
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

73

Melissa Reuland

Senior Research Associate, 

Police Executive Research Forum

Melissa Reuland joined PERF in 1995, following

ten years of work in the social and medical sciences managing research projects and analyzing

large sets of survey data. Currently, Reuland is the

principal investigator and project director of the

Community Policing Partnerships for Domestic

Violence: Documentation and Assessment project,

funded by the Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services. She serves as project director for

PERF’s phase of the National Institute of Justicefunded project: Explaining the Prevalence,

Context, and Consequences of Dual Arrest in

Intimate Partner Cases and is the principal investigator for the NIJ-funded project Local Law

Enforcement and the Terrorist Threat, in which a

team of nationally known researchers and experts

will help develop a research agenda for law enforcement on terrorism responses. Reuland recently

completed work for the law enforcement track of

the Criminal Justice/Mental Health Consensus

Project. She also directed PERF’s prior project on

the police response to people with mental illnesses, co-authoring a publication of the same name.

Reuland’s PERF publications include several community policing and problem-solving curricula. She has also edited Information

Management and Crime Analysis (1997) and

Solving Crime and Disorder Problems (2001).

Most recently, she wrote a guide on implementing

police-based diversion for people with mental illness, which was published by the TAPA Center for

Jail Diversion, U.S. Department of Health and

Human Services. Reuland received her master's in

criminal justice from the University of Baltimore. 

Heather J. Davies

Research Associate, 

Police Executive Research Forum

Heather Davies, Ph.D., has experience in criminal

justice and child welfare research, evaluation,

training, and technical assistance. She is currently

responsible for managing national-level terrorism

research and policy development projects. She is

the project director of the white paper series,

Protecting Your Community from Terrorism:

Strategies for Local Law Enforcement, and the subsequent Community Policing in a Security

Conscious World project, to address local law

enforcement’s concerns in preventing and preparing for terrorist acts. Davies is first author of the

second white paper in this series, Working with

Diverse Communities. Davies is also one of

PERF’s representatives for several terrorism

research working groups. She is also the project

coordinator on a Bureau of Justice Assistancefunded project, Managing Multijurisdictional

Cases: Lessons Learned from the Sniper

Investigation.

Prior to joining PERF in 2003, Davies was

a senior research associate with the American Bar

Association’s Center on Children and the Law, and

the Criminal Justice Section. She was the principal

investigator on a project evaluating parental
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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involvement practices of juvenile courts, and one

on improving legal and judicial responses to

parental kidnapping. Davies conducted an analysis

of legal services provided by the District of

Columbia's Office of Corporation Counsel to the

Child and Family Services Agency. In addition, she

served as the project manager on such studies as

the implementation of the Michigan LawyerGuardian Ad Litem Statute, a national assessment

of law enforcement and community partnerships

for helping children exposed to domestic violence,

and an evaluation of domestic violence no-drop

policies. Davies is the co-author of a National

Center for Missing and Exploited Children monograph, Child Pornography: The Criminal Justice

Response. She holds a bachelor’s degree in sociology from Virginia Tech, and a master’s degree and a

Ph.D. in justice, law and society from American

University. Her dissertation addressed

Understanding Variations in Murder Clearance

Rates: The Influence of the Political Environment.

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS4 6

William J. Bratton

Chief, Los Angeles Police Department

Appointed the chief of the Los Angeles Police

Department (LAPD) in October 2002, William J.

Bratton oversees the operations of one of the largest

major municipal law enforcement agencies in the

United States. His responsibilities include the

supervision of 9,304 sworn and 3,055 civilian

employees. Bratton directs all patrol, investigative,

and administrative operations. A strong advocate of

transparent community policing that embraces

partnership, problem solving, and prevention, he

initiated a major reengineering of the LAPD to be

more responsive to local community needs.

Bratton’s vision includes a comprehensive and

assertive strategy for dramatically reducing crime,

disorder, and fear. Particular emphasis has been

placed on gang-related crimes and the culture that

creates it. He joined the LAPD with more than 32

years of public and private sector law enforcement

experience. 

His policing career began as a police sergeant in the U.S. Army Military Police. He then

joined the Boston Police Department in 1970 and

rose through the ranks to Superintendent of Police,

the highest sworn rank, by 1980. In 1983, Bratton

became chief of the Massachusetts Bay

Transportation Authority Police Department. In

1986, he was appointed as the Superintendent of

the Metropolitan District Commission Police,

which patrols the Boston Metropolitan Area. 

In 1990, he became Chief of Police/Senior

Vice President for the New York City Transit

Authority Police Department, where he won

national recognition for his leadership by initiating

reforms and strategies that eventually cut subway

crime by nearly 50 percent. Then Bratton returned

to the Boston Police Department as Superintendent

in Chief and in 1993 was appointed as Police

Commissioner. During his tenure, he significantly

reduced crime and improved relations between the

police and minority communities.

Bratton returned to New York City in 1994

when he was appointed as Police Commissioner.

His leadership helped foster a 39 percent decline in

serious crimes and a 50 percent reduction in homicides. From 1994–1996, he also initiated the internationally acclaimed COMPSTAT system—a com46 The contributing author bios are listed in alphabetical order.
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

75

puter-driven management accountability process

that is integral to his decentralized management

philosophy. From 1996–2002, Bratton worked in

the private sector, where he formed his own consulting company, The Bratton Group, L.L.C. He

also served as a senior consultant with Kroll

Associates. 

He holds a bachelor’s degree in law

enforcement from Boston State College/University

of Massachusetts. He is a graduate of the FBI

National Executive Institute and was a Senior

Executive Fellow at Harvard University’s John F.

Kennedy School of Government, where he served

as a Research Fellow. He is a graduate of the Senior

Management Institute for Police (SMIP). From

1993–1996, he served as the elected president of

the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), and

again was elected as PERF’s president in March

2004. A frequent guest lecturer, writer, and commentator, he is the co-author of his autobiography,

Turnaround. Among his many other honors and

awards, Bratton holds the Schroeder Brother’s

Medal, which is the Boston Police Department’s

highest award for valor and the PERF Leadership

Award.

Jonathan E. Fielding

Director, Public Health and Health Officer, Los

Angeles County Department of Health Services

Jonathan E. Fielding is Director of Public Health

and Health Officer for Los Angeles County responsible for all public health functions including surveillance and control of both communicable and

non-communicable diseases, and of health protection (including against bioterrorism) for the county’s 10 million residents. By 2004, he was directing a staff of 3,600 with an annual budget exceeding $600 million.

He chairs the U.S. Community Preventive

Services Task Force and was a founding member of

the U.S. Clinical Preventive Services Task Force.

Fielding is also a professor in the UCLA Schools of

Medicine and Public Health and has authored over

150 peer-reviewed articles, chapters, and editorials

on a wide range of public health and preventive

medicine issues. He is the editor of the Annual

Review of Public Health, the vice-chairman of

Partnership for Prevention and an elected member

in the National Academy of Sciences Institute of

Medicine.

Formerly, Fielding was the Massachusetts

Commissioner of Public Health and was a vice

president of Johnson & Johnson. He received his

medical and public health degrees from Harvard

University and a M.B.A. in finance from the

Wharton School of Business.

Richard A. Goodman 

Co-Director, Public Health Law Program, 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Richard A. Goodman, M.D., J.D., is co-director of

the Public Health Law Program, Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta,

Georgia, and is the former editor of CDC’s

Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR)

Series. Goodman received his medical degree and

completed a residency in internal medicine at the

University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, and earned

a law degree at Emory University in Atlanta. He is

Board Certified in both Internal Medicine and

Preventive Medicine. A commissioned officer in

the U.S. Public Health Service, he holds the grade
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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of Medical Director (Captain: O-6). Following

completion of his internal medicine residency in

1978, he joined CDC’s Epidemic Intelligence

Service Program and has remained on that

agency’s staff in assignments to the Georgia

Department of Human Resources and to the

UCLA School of Public Health. Goodman also

holds appointments as a professor (adjunct) at the

Rollins School of Public Health, Emory University,

and at the College of Law, Georgia State

University. He has published on a broad range of

topics in applied epidemiology— from surveillance

and outbreak investigations of acute infectious diseases, to population-based studies of the epidemiology of homicide, and the law of public health.

He also is the lead editor of Law in Public Health

Practice, published by Oxford University Press.

Jerome M. Hauer

Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of Public 

Health Emergency Preparedness,

Department of Health and Human Services

As of this writing, Hauer is the first director of the

Response to Emergencies and Disasters Institute

(READI) and an assistant professor at The George

Washington University. Working with the

Department of Homeland Security, Hauer’s duties

include coordinating and delivering first responder,

medical, and public health training to the National

Capital Region (NCR). Hauer also teaches at The

George Washington University as an assistant professor in the School of Public Health and the

School of Medicine.

At the time of the executive session,

Jerome Hauer was the Acting Assistant Secretary

for the Office of Public Health Emergency

Preparedness. He was responsible for coordinating

the country’s medical and public health preparedness and response to emergencies, including acts

of biological, chemical, and nuclear terrorism.

Hauer also served as senior advisor to the

Secretary for National Security and Emergency

Management during the events of September 11,

2001 and the nation’s anthrax crisis. He was the

first director of the Mayor’s Office of Emergency

Management in New York City. During his

tenure, New York City developed the country’s

first bioterrorism response plans and surveillance

systems, and conducted the country’s largest

bioterrorism tabletop exercise.

Hauer holds a master’s degree from the

Johns Hopkins School of Public Health and has

more than twenty years of experience in emergency management. He is the recipient of numerous honors, including the Outstanding Alumni of

the Year award from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg

School of Public Health, the Indiana

Commendation Medal for Exceptional

Meritorious Service, Legion of Hoosier Heroes

Award, and the Distinguished Alumni award from

NYU. He is a member of the New York City Police

Department’s Honor Legion, and is an honorary

assistant chief in the New York City Fire

Department.

Ronald L. Iden

Assistant Director in Charge, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, Los Angeles Field Office

At the time of the executive session, Iden was the

Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Los

Angeles Field Office. He was later appointed as the

Director of the California Office of Homeland

Security on January 6, 2004, after 25 years of service with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM

77

As this paper goes to print, Iden has accepted the

position of Senior Vice President of Security for the

Walt Disney Company. He holds a bachelor’s

degree in the administration of criminal justice

from the University of Illinois, as well as a master’s degree in public administration from the

Illinois Institute of Technology.

From July 2001 until his retirement from

the FBI in January 2004, Iden served in the FBI’s

Los Angeles Field Office. From 1998 to 2001, he

was assigned as the Special Agent in Charge of the

Los Angeles FBI’s investigations of terrorism, foreign counterintelligence, financial crimes, and

civil rights matters. From 1997 to 1998, Iden

served as the Deputy Assistant Director of the

FBI’s Information Resources Division. In that

capacity, he was responsible for the FBI’s worldwide automation and information management

requirements. Prior to that assignment, he served

for one year as chief of the Information Resources

Division’s strategic planning, budget, and personnel operations.

From 1992 to 1996, Iden served as an

Assistant Special Agent in Charge within the Los

Angeles FBI Office where he was responsible for all

violent crime investigations conducted by the FBI

within the seven-county Los Angeles metropolitan

area. He served as chief of the FBI’s Public

Corruption Unit at FBI Headquarters during 1991

and 1992. In April 1990, while assigned to FBI

Headquarters, he was tasked to supervise the FBI’s

investigation of the bombing deaths of a federal

judge in Birmingham, Alabama, and a civil rights

attorney in Savannah, Georgia. That investigation

resulted in the convictions of all involved.

In October 1984, while assigned to the

FBI’s San Juan Division, he was responsible for the

investigation of a Puerto Rican terrorist group’s

involvement in a $7 million armored car robbery

in Connecticut. That investigation resulted in the

indictment of 17 terrorists and the dismantling of

that terrorist organization. In May 1979, while

assigned to the FBI’s San Antonio, Texas,

Division, he was assigned to investigate the assassination of a federal judge as well as the attempted

assassination of a federal prosecutor. Those investigations resulted in the convictions of all

involved. He was appointed as a Special Agent

with the FBI in May 1978, after serving 10 years as

a police officer with the Elk Grove Village, Illinois,

Police Department. 

Cathy L. Lanier

Commander, Special Operations Division, 

D.C. Metropolitan Police Department 

Cathy L. Lanier is currently serving as commanding officer of the Special Operations Division of

the Metropolitan Police Department where she

manages members of the Emergency Response

Team, Aviation and Harbor Units, Horse Mounted

and Canine Units, Special Events/Dignitary

Protection Branch, and the newly formed

Domestic Security Office and Special Threat

Action Teams. 

Lanier has been with the D.C.

Metropolitan Police Department for fourteen

years, rising through the ranks to become Captain

in the Uniform Patrol Division. In 1999, she was

appointed to the rank of inspector, where she

served as the commanding officer of the

Department’s Major Narcotics Branch and

Vehicular Homicide Units in the Special Services

Division.

After reaching the rank of commander, she

returned to the Uniform Patrol Division where she

served as the district commander of the largest and
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78

most diverse residential district in the city for

nearly two years. In early 2002, Lanier was transferred to the Special Operations Division, becoming the first female commander to head the specialized units in the department’s history. Since

reaching the executive level of the department,

Lanier has handled numerous large-scale special

events, demonstrations, and civil disturbances to

include the IMF/World Bank Conferences, the

World Figure Skating Championship, and numerous "right to life" and "anti-war" marches on

Washington. 

She is a graduate of the FBI’s National

Academy and the DEA’s Drug Unit Commanders

Academy. She is also certified at the technician

level in hazardous materials operations. Lanier has

a bachelor’s and master’s degree in management

and leadership from Johns Hopkins University,

and will complete her second master’s degree in

homeland security in September 2005.

Phil T. Pulaski 

Assistant Chief, Counter Terrorism Bureau, 

New York City Police Department

Assistant Chief Phil T. Pulaski has been a member

of the NYPD for 23 years where he has held

numerous command positions. He currently

serves as the Commanding Officer of the Counter

Terrorism Bureau. As such, he is in command of

the more than 135 NYPD detectives and supervisors assigned to the FBI/NYPD Joint Terrorism

Task Force, and is also responsible for the NYPD

programs involving critical infrastructure protection, counterterrorism force deployment/countermeasures, intelligence analysis, counterterrorismrelated training, and the evaluation of emerging

counter terrorism-related technology. Pulaski is

also responsible for overseeing the NYPD’s

Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

Nuclear/Hazardous Materials Programs as well as

the integration of those programs with other city,

state, and federal agencies such as the NYC

Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, NYC

Department of Environmental Protection, NYS

Civil Support Team, FBI, and the U.S. Department

of Homeland Security.

Prior to his current assignment, Pulaski

was the NYPD Commanding Officer of the

FBI/NYPD Joint Terrorism Task Force. As such,

together with his FBI counterpart, he managed and

directed terrorism-related investigations, including

the 9-11 World Trade Center/Pentagon attacks and

October 2001 anthrax attacks, as well as, the collection, vetting, and analysis of terrorism-related

intelligence. He has also served as Commanding

Officer, Manhattan Detectives; Commanding

Officer, Bronx Detectives; Commanding Officer,

Forensic Investigations Division; Acting Director,

Police Laboratory; Commanding Officer, Special

Investigations Division; Commanding Officer,

Arson and Explosion Squad; and Managing

Attorney, Legal Bureau. He holds a J.D. from St.

Johns University Law School, and has been

licensed to practice law for 24 years. He also holds

both a master’s degree and bachelor’s degree in

engineering from Manhattan College, and worked

as a civil engineer for the United States

Environmental Protection Agency. He has also

worked as an adjunct assistant professor at John

Jay College of Criminal Justice.

Ruth A. Vogel

Executive Director, Office of Public 

Health Preparedness and Response, 

Baltimore City Health Department

Ruth Vogel was appointed director of the Baltimore
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79

City Health Department's Office of Public Health

Preparedness and Response in May 2002. She is

the executive advisor to the mayor and the commissioner of health for all public health emergency

preparedness, planning, and response issues. She

serves on the Mayor's Joint Executive Committee

for Homeland Security, the City’s Security

Cabinet, and is a member of the Maryland AntiTerrorism Task Force. One of her primary responsibilities is to provide leadership on collaborative

projects with key institutions and agencies within

the Baltimore metropolitan region. 

Prior to her current position, she was the

division director for the Baltimore City Health

Department's Health Promotion and Disease

Prevention. She was responsible for overall implementation of the HIV, STD, and TB Prevention

Programs, and the Acute Communicable Disease

Program. She was recognized nationally for her

work with the Ujima Demonstration Project.

Vogel has undergraduate degrees from the

University of Minnesota in Nursing, and the

University of North Dakota in community health.

She completed her graduate work at Johns

Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public

Health and Hygiene. 

Dani-Margot Zavasky

Medical Director, Counter Terrorism Bureau,

New York City Police Department

Dani-Margot Zavasky has been serving the New

York City Police Department as the Medical

Director of Counter Terrorism since July 2002.

She is the medical and science advisor regarding

Chemical, Biological, and Radiological/Nuclear

(CBRN) terrorism to the Deputy Commissioner of

Counter Terrorism and is the police department

liaison to the public health authorities. Her other

responsibilities include developing and supporting

CBRN-related defense policies and strategies, as

well as assisting in the police department personnel’s CBRN terrorism training and education.

Zavasky received her medical degree as

well as her postgraduate residency training in

internal medicine from the University of

Washington in Seattle. She completed the fellowship program in infectious diseases at the

University of Utah in Salt Lake City. She is board

certified in internal medicine and infectious diseases. Prior to her assignment in the New York

City Police Department, Dr. Zavasky had been a

practicing physician in infectious diseases.
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80
ABOUT TH E OFFICE OF COMMUNITY

ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

THE OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES (COPS) WAS

created in 1994 and has the unique mission to directly serve the needs

of state and local law enforcement. The COPS Office has been the driving force in advancing the concept of community policing, and is responsible for

one of the greatest infusions of resources into state, local, and tribal law enforcement in our nation’s history.

Since 1994, COPS has invested over $10 billion to add community policing officers to the

nation’s streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime prevention initiatives, and provide

training and technical assistance to help advance community policing. COPS funding has furthered the

advancement of community policing through community policing innovation conferences, the development of best practices, pilot community policing programs, and applied research and evaluation initiatives. COPS has also positioned itself to respond directly to emerging law enforcement needs. Examples

include working in partnership with departments to enhance police integrity, promoting safe schools,

combating the methamphetamine drug problem, and supporting homeland security efforts.

Through its grant programs, COPS is assisting and encouraging local, state, and tribal law

enforcement agencies to enhance their homeland security efforts using proven community policing strategies. Traditional COPS programs such as the Universal Hiring Program (UHP) give priority consideration

to those applicants that demonstrate a use of funds related to terrorism preparedness or response through

community policing. The COPS in Schools (CIS) program has a mandatory training component that

includes topics on terrorism prevention, emergency response, and the critical role schools can play in the

community response. Finally, COPS is implementing grant programs intended to develop interoperable

voice and data communications networks among emergency response agencies that will assist in addressing local homeland security demands.

The COPS Office has made substantial investments in law enforcement training. COPS created

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81
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82

a national network of Regional Community Policing Institutes (RCPIs) to offer state and local law enforcement, elected officials, and community leaders training opportunities on a wide range of community

policing topics. Most recently the RCPIs have been focusing their efforts on developing and delivering

homeland security training. COPS also supports the advancement of community policing strategies

through the Community Policing Consortium. Additionally, COPS has made a major investment in

applied research that makes possible the growing body of substantive knowledge covering all aspects of

community policing.

These substantial investments have produced a significant community policing infrastructure

across the country, as evidenced by the fact that at the present time, approximately 86 percent of the

nation’s population is served by law enforcement agencies practicing community policing. The COPS

Office continues to respond proactively by providing critical resources, training, and technical assistance

to help state, local, and tribal law enforcement implement innovative and effective community policing

strategies.
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83

THE POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM (PERF) IS A NATIONAL PROFESsional association of chief executives of large city, county, and state law

enforcement agencies. PERF’s objective is to improve the delivery of

police services and the effectiveness of crime control through several means:

the exercise of strong national leadership,

the public debate of policing and criminal justice issues,

the development of research and policy, and

the provision of vital management and leadership services to law enforcement agencies.

PERF members are selected on the basis of their commitment to the organization’s objectives and

principles. PERF operates under the following tenets:

Research, experimentation, and exchange of ideas through public discussion and debate are

paths for the development of a comprehensive body of knowledge about policing.

Substantial and purposeful academic study is a prerequisite for acquiring, understanding, and

adding to that body of knowledge.

Maintenance of the highest standards of ethics and integrity is imperative in the improvement of policing.

The police must, within the limits of the law, be responsible and accountable to citizens as

the ultimate source of police authority.

The principles embodied in the Constitution are the foundation of policing.

Categories of membership also allow the organization to benefit from the diverse views of criminal justice researchers, law enforcement of all ranks, and other professionals committed to advancing law

enforcement services to all communities.









ABOUT PERF










NOTES

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www.policeforum.org and www.cops.usdoj.gov.

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