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NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR TEST: NEXT STEPS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

NOVEMBER 15, 2006

Serial No. 109–242

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/
(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

DENNIS HALPIN, Professional Staff Member 

JEAN CARROLL, Full Committee Hearing Coordinator 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political 

Affairs, United States Department of State ...................................................... 17

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable R. Nicholas Burns: Prepared statement ...................................... 21

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas: Prepared statement .................................................................................. 45

(1)

NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR TEST: NEXT STEPS 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 o’clock a.m. in 

room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde 

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. 

Without objection, the summary of the report of the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, Failure to Protect, will 

be made a part of the record. 

[The information referred to follows:]
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Chairman HYDE. Ambassador Burns, we are very pleased to have 

you here today. You are highly regarded as one of our most distinguished diplomats, and we look forward to hearing your observations on your recent trip to East Asia. We hope you can provide the 

Congress with definitive information on how the Administration, in 

consultation with our allies, plans to address the North Korean nuclear crisis. 

Let me also take the opportunity to offer congratulations to the 

former South Korean foreign minister, Ban Ki-moon, and to the 

Korean people on the occasion of his election as the UN’s new Secretary-General. This event is a source of pride for Koreans worldwide as they reflect on how their nation rose from the ashes of war 

to become a major diplomatic player on the world stage. It is also 

particularly fitting to have as the UN’s new leader a representative 

of a nation which owes its very existence as a free and sovereign 

state to the stalwart actions of the United Nations in 1950. 

I understand, Ambassador Burns, that you and your South Korean and Japanese counterparts stated in Seoul last week that 

‘‘North Korea will not be recognized as a nuclear weapons state.’’ 

But, in reality, isn’t the nuclear genie already out of the bottle? 

Aren’t we really talking about how to get that genie back inside the 

bottle, which is very difficult? 

Everyone said China holds the key to reining in a nuclear North 

Korea. Many have been enthusiastic about Beijing’s surprisingly 

constructive attitude. The Japanese press reported that Beijing 

even temporarily cut the flow of oil across the Yalu River. These 

drips of oil instead of the usual steady flow were meant to send a 

clear message to the North Korean regime to cease its provocative 

behavior. 

We can all thank the Chinese Government for pressuring North 

Korea back to the Six-Party Talks, although a date certain for resumption remains to be designated, but we should never forget 

that Beijing always acts skillfully and practically in its own national interest. The Chinese leaders saw clearly that the situation 

on the Korean Peninsula was getting out of hand. 

A number of Japanese and South Korean observers has cautioned the Committee that we should not be too effusive in our 

praise of Beijing. They advise that we should be on guard against 

outsourcing the North Korean nuclear problem entirely to Beijing. 

If Beijing becomes the key player in resolving the North Korean 

nuclear issue while we are engaged elsewhere; I fear potential 

long-term dire consequences. As I told former Deputy Secretary 

Zoellick last May when he sat where Ambassador Burns now sits, 

I fear that the future American generation may awaken from its 

Pacific slumber to find that our influence is removed entirely from 

the Asian mainland. Then a politically unreformed and assertive 

China could be calling the shots in the most vibrant and economic 

region in the world. These remain my parting words of caution to 

America’s Asian policymakers. 

I have also read press reports that our South Korean ally has 

been less than stalwart in supporting sanction and other tough 

measures which may be needed to rein in Kim Jong-il, but we 

should not be concerned. We have the word of no less a figure than 

the South Korean President himself. President Roh visited the 
9

Capitol in September and was asked by my good friend, Mr. Lantos, what would be his government’s reaction to a North Korean 

nuclear test. He pledged a firm reaction, including the likely use 

of sanctions. The House leadership was all there, including the 

Speaker and Ms. Pelosi. We are confident that President Roh is a 

man of his word and will keep his pledge to the Congress. 

Finally, if diplomacy fails, we would like to hear your thoughts 

on implementing inspection of North Korean ships under the Proliferation Security Initiative, something which our South Korean 

ally reportedly does not support. 

Interdiction of North Korean ships suspected of carrying weapons 

of mass destruction materials would not be without risk, as 

Pyongyang has stated publicly. Such measures would constitute an 

act of war; and as Korea is a peninsula, not an island, the three 

nations sharing the land border with North Korea—China, Russia 

and South Korea—must be fully engaged. Without their support in 

inspecting contraband across their respective frontiers, naval inspections could prove risky yet largely ineffective. 

I understand we have been in discussions with Australia and 

Japan in particular concerning possible naval inspections. Hopefully, policymakers have considered the delicate history of the region with regard to any inspections support from Japan. I am concerned that we would cause alarm among the South Korean populous if Tokyo has too visible a role in inspection of any Korean 

ships, even from the North. 

We have a vote pending. Two votes? I think we can stand in recess until the vote. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. 

I now am pleased to turn to my good friend, Tom Lantos, for his 

opening remarks. Mr. Lantos. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, as the 109th Congress comes to a close over the 

next few weeks, I would like to express my appreciation once again 

for the bipartisan, dignified and statesmanlike manner in which 

you have led this Committee. As we transition to the Democratic 

Majority, Mr. Chairman, I pledge to you that we will do our utmost 

to ensure a smooth, orderly and dignified transition. 

I also would like to join you in commending the new SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, with whom I am planning to meet 

next Tuesday in New York; and I want to commend you for your 

laudatory comments concerning our distinguished witness, Secretary Burns. He is a remarkable diplomat and is serving our Nation with extraordinary distinction and effectiveness. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Lantos; and Mr. 

Smith has a modest opening statement. 

Mr. LANTOS. I have an opening statement. 

Chairman HYDE. Oh, I am sorry. 

Mr. LANTOS. No problem. 

Chairman HYDE. We will now turn to Mr. Lantos for his opening 

statement. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, just 1 week ago, the American people sent a 

strong and unmistakable signal to Washington. They want a 
10

change. While much of the public discourse properly focused on 

Iraq, it is abundantly clear that a change in our approach toward 

North Korea is long overdue. 

Several missile shots and a nuclear test later, it is evident that 

the Administration’s policy toward North Korea is not an unqualified success. Without a doubt, the North Koreans bear ultimate responsibility for the deteriorating situation on the Korean Peninsula. The isolated leadership in Pyongyang made the profoundly 

unwise decision to try to become a nuclear nation, to test mediumand long-range missiles, and to continue their unchecked violations 

of the human rights of North Korea’s 24 million citizens. But with 

the proper combination of forceful action and high-level diplomacy, 

there is a chance, though slim, that we can find a comprehensive 

and verifiable solution to the North Korea problem. 

In light of North Korea’s nuclear test, it is imperative that 

Pyongyang understand the full consequences of its unwise decision. 

The UN Security Council resolution passed in the test’s aftermath 

must be fully enforced, and we must impress upon China and 

South Korea that the Security Council resolution will be meaningless without their full and active cooperation. 

I have seen on two recent occasions firsthand the need to cut off 

the sale of luxury goods to North Korea pursuant to the Security 

Council resolution. During my first visit to Pyongyang, I met with 

high-ranking generals in the North Korean military. At the conclusion of the meeting, the generals climbed into late-model MercedesBenz sedans waiting to whisk them back to their villas. Meanwhile, 

the children of North Korea continue to survive on starvation rations, their growth permanently stunted due to malnutrition. 

The single most dramatic fact I brought back with me from 

North Korea from both of my visits is that the average height of 

the North Korean is dramatically less than the average height of 

the South Korean. This is a mind-boggling fact. It would be analogous to suggesting that people west of the Mississippi are 5 inches 

shorter than people east of the Mississippi. This is the result of the 

deliberate policies of an unacceptable regime. 

This juxtaposition of privilege and deprivation is one of the 

world’s great scandals, Mr. Chairman. The pampered North Korean 

leadership must feel personal pain for their destabilizing and irresponsible actions. 

But tough new steps against North Korea are not a substitute for 

a comprehensive and effective new approach toward this seemingly 

intractable problem. Heightened diplomacy, including new bilateral 

overtures, must be part of a new bold approach. We should all welcome the forthcoming resumption of the Six-Party Talks, but unless 

the Administration tries something new on the diplomatic front 

they will once again end in disappointment. 

For that reason, Mr. Chairman, I believe Ambassador Chris Hill 

must be dispatched to Beijing with the authority to negotiate a 

comprehensive and verifiable deal. Hardliners launched in the Office of the Vice President and the Defense Department must not be 

given a veto. Ambassador Hill must also make a stopover in 

Pyongyang on his way back from the Six-Party Talks, not to negotiate a new and separate deal but rather to demonstrate to 

Pyongyang our peaceful intent. The Administration’s refusal to 
11

allow visits by American diplomats to North Korea must end, and 

it must end now. 

Even with enhanced diplomacy and tough implementation of UN 

Security Council sanctions, a denuclearized Korean Peninsula may 

prove elusive. North Korea may have made the decision to firmly 

enshrine themselves among the list of nuclear nations and to hang 

on to power at all costs. But we must give diplomacy a try, even 

if only to manage our relations with key allies in the region. 

Mr. Chairman, the next few months will be a time of great transition here in Congress and, hopefully, in American foreign policy. 

The White House must try a new and bold approach toward the 

vexing North Korean crisis as it is now abundantly clear to the 

world that our current policies have failed. I look forward to leading the efforts in Congress to keep North Korea on the front burner 

and to pushing the Administration to resolve the feuds within its 

own ranks which have hobbled North Korean policy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Let me say, Mr. Lantos, that while this hearing 

is not the last—we have one tomorrow—I want the record to show 

that I have unbounded admiration for your knowledge, for your talent, for your patriotism, for your service to the country. It has been 

an unmixed pleasure working with you, and one of my keen regrets 

is that I won’t be able to continue to work with you in the next 

Congress. But I will watch with great anticipation and pleasure the 

work you do; and it has been a real joy to work with you, Mr. Lantos. 

Mr. LANTOS. It has been my joy and my pleasure, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

For brief opening statements, Mr. Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you for holding the hearing on one of the most 

urgent issues of our time; and I do want to join Mr. Lantos in 

praising your extraordinary leadership, your incredible commitment to human rights and humanitarian issues, your work product, 

your laws, which will clearly endure the test of time. They have 

helped countless numbers of vulnerable and disenfranchised people, and I want to thank you for that leadership. It is extraordinary. 

Mr. Chairman, the threat posed by nuclear weapons is the cause 

for the utmost concern and vigilance by all of us, but the possession 

of such means for mass destruction in the hands of a ruthless dictator like Kim Jong-il necessitates a smart, robust, coordinated and 

comprehensive response from the international community; and I 

want to thank Ambassador Burns and the Administration for taking the lead, for their dogged determination to try to mitigate this 

unconscionable threat. 

In the course of our discussions, Mr. Chairman, I do believe it 

is crucial that we address the relationship between this security 

threat and the abysmal lack of respect for fundamental human 

rights by the North Korean regime. As Pope John Paul II said so 

aptly, ‘‘If you want peace, work for justice’’; and I believe that we 

must work overtime to try to ensure that the people of North Korea 
12

who, like people around the world, are deserving of fundamental 

and basic human rights, not the gulag, not the torture. 

As we all know, the use of torture by the North Korean regime 

is a spectacle of horror; and as I think you know, Mr. Chairman, 

along with Jim Leach, we have Co-Chaired three hearings on 

human rights abuses in North Korea in this Congress alone. It is 

time for action; and, again, I think this hearing helps us to get a 

better feel where we are today and what we need to do going forward. 

Again, I want to thank you for convening this important hearing. 

Yield back. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

Mr. Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you for 

your leadership of this Committee. We are all going to be sad to 

see you go. 

The President is right that the most important thing is keeping 

nuclear weapons out of the worst hands. Aside from deposing a 

leader who merely fantasized about nuclear weapons, this Administration over the last 6 years has done little. The only enemy we 

have that has nuclear weapons is North Korea, and they have got 

a lot more now than they had 6 years ago. We need maximum carrots, maximum sticks and maximum focus. 

As the maximum carrots, we ought to be offering the North Korean Government what they asked for, a nonaggression pact, if 

they eliminate verifiably forever their nuclear weapons. Yet, as Mr. 

Lantos points out, there are those hardliners with a veto in the Administration that prevent that from happening, not to mention that 

nonaggression pacts are a bit of a bureaucratic bugaboo with 

some—in other parts of our Government. We ought to be willing to 

tell Pyongyang if they do not have nuclear weapons we will not invade. 

Second, we need maximum sticks. That can only mean changing 

the behavior of China and South Korea. Yet South Korea has disappointed us, and our response is to propose a Free Trade Agreement. That is carrots for them continuing to disappoint us in how 

they treat North Korea. 

And as to China, we have made it very clear that our markets 

will remain wide open to them without the slightest hint of any 

problem, even if they continue to do what they think is in their 

best interest with regard to North Korea. So we have limited our 

actions in China to trying to persuade them that we are smart, 

that they are dumb, that they don’t understand what is in their interest and if they would only listen to us, they would change their 

policies. 

Obviously, to change China’s policy, we would have to change our 

policy. To change their policy on North Korea, we have to hint 

slightly and diplomatically—far more diplomatically than I am capable of being at this time—that their trade relationship is dependent upon how they deal with the greatest threat in their region of 

the world to the safety of Americans that is the North Korean nuclear program. 

I look forward to hearing from Secretary Burns how in the last 

2 years of this Administration we are going to somehow be success-
13

ful while continuing the same policies of no linkage and no nonaggression pact, but perhaps I will be wrong and perhaps you will 

be successful. 

I yield back. 

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman; and I 

wish to reiterate our admiration, our appreciation, our esteem for 

Chairman Hyde for his many years of service to this Nation, this 

Chamber and, most importantly, this Committee. He will sorely be 

missed. 

Years of Six-Party Talks failed to prevent North Korea from testing its long-range missiles this summer, nor from testing a nuclear 

device in October of this year. Despite the concessions offered, 

which included the easing of United States sanctions by President 

Clinton, the provisions of assistance for the construction of nuclear 

research reactors and later security guarantees, North Korea 

marched onward in its pursuit of activities which posed a threat to 

global security and peace. 

Should it surprise us? After all, in September 2005 they issued 

a joint statement. For example, the international community never 

sought reciprocal assurances regarding Pyongyang’s hostile intent 

toward South Korea. After all, it took North Korea conducting a 

nuclear test for the international community to agree to prevent 

certain nuclear-related technology and equipment from reaching 

this rogue regime. 

Is our policy now going to be to reward North Korea’s behavior 

by offering to enter into bilateral talks, as some have suggested, because Kim Jong-il is now a man of reason, because he now can be 

trusted? 

Well, after all, did North Korea not sign an agreement in 1994 

with the Clinton Administration pledging to freeze and eventually 

dismantle its nuclear weapons program and then in 2002 admitted 

to operating a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of such 

an agreement? Did North Korea not acknowledge this nuclear 

weapons program only when confronted by the United States with 

the evidence of such a covert effort? 

Is our policy going to focus, instead of increasing the pressure on 

North Korea, on sending a clear message to others like Iran that 

there will be a price to pay for violations of its nonproliferation obligations and its hostile behavior? Or is our policy simply to return 

to Six-Party Talks in December and see North Korea, as has been 

reported in the news sources this morning, demonstrating in concrete terms a commitment to end its nuclear program? 

I would appreciate it if the witness today, our good friend, Ambassador Burns, clarified what that means. What concrete, specific, 

verifiable steps are we requiring of North Korea? Are we simply 

seeing a revival of dialogue for dialogue sake? 

Also, news articles this morning say that U.S. measures are on 

the table, although UN sanctions would remain in place. Is the 

United States considering further inducements for North Korea? 

And, lastly, Mr. Chairman, what benchmarks and conditions, if 

any, are we and our allies placing on North Korea prior to the 

issuance of further concessions? History has shown us the consequences of appeasement. Let us heed these lessons now. 
14

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. Watson of California. 

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to say this to you. I have 

found you honorable, fair, respectful, and inclusive to my personal 

benefit. I am in your debt, and I wish you well. We will miss you. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Thank you. 

Ms. WATSON. I welcome the leadership of Tom Lantos. I look forward to the transition. I know the two of you have worked so well 

together over the few years that I have been here. 

So while I take it as a positive sign that North Korea has agreed 

to return to the Six-Party Talks, the fact is that the world has 

failed in preventing nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula. 

The world cannot afford another failure that would allow North 

Korea to then proliferate its nuclear weapons and material to the 

world. 

While I believe that Six-Party Talks to denuclearize North Korea 

should continue and every effort should be made to disarm North 

Korea of its nuclear weapons, I fear that the resumption in talks 

will result in what can simply be described as ‘‘deja vu all over 

again.’’

It is fortunate for us that North Korea appears to have a long 

way to go before developing full capacity for mass production of nuclear weapons. It clearly does not have the level of investment and 

support to acquire a mass production capacity. It is a country that 

is isolated financially as well as technologically. However, North 

Korea’s deficits have not prevented it from developing a fairly sophisticated missile program. The combination of a nuclear weapons 

program and missile program is an extremely disturbing scenario. 

The North Korean nuclear test is another example of an international nonproliferation regime that is not functioning well. North 

Korea is the ninth country to process nuclear weapons. Two of the 

most recent countries to acquire nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan, are allies of the United States. In the case of India, we will 

soon reward its nonconcurrence with the NPT with a new pact. I 

believe it is long past time for the Administration and Congress to 

undertake a thorough and careful review of the NPT, with the goal 

of constructing a nonproliferation regime that meets the needs and 

the demands of the 21st century. 

So, Mr. Ambassador, we welcome your thoughts not only on the 

return to the Six-Party Talks but also your thoughts on how our 

Nation can work to strengthen the NPT. 

Thank you; and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Ambassador Watson. 

Mr. McCaul of Texas. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Again, I want to echo all the sentiments in this 

hearing room, how much of an honor it has been to serve with 

Henry Hyde, and it has really been an honor as a freshman, and 

I mean that very much from my heart. And I very much look forward to the new Chairman coming onboard and working with him 

in a bipartisan way. 

Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ackerman. 
15

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me also say it has been a 

great honor and privilege to serve with you. I, too, will miss you. 

I look forward with great excitement to Chairman Lantos continuing the leadership of this very, very important Committee. 

Mr. Chairman, almost 6 years ago the Bush Administration’s internal bickering and external dithering have wound up in producing precisely the result that none of us wanted. On October 9, 

with more fizzle than bang, North Korea announced that they, too, 

had become members of the nuclear club. International condemnation of the test was followed rapidly by a UN Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on the North. But the consensus on an 

international response evaporated almost immediately in disagreement over the scope of inspecting North Korean cargo. 

It is well past time for the President to cut to the chase. Those 

inside the Administration that believe if we simply sanction, isolate 

and pressure the North long enough they will collapse have misread the situation from the beginning. North Korea’s obvious willingness to defy its closest ally and largest provider of foreign aid 

should be a clear signal to all concerned that Kim Jong-il thinks 

he can survive the wave of international sanctions and still have 

his bomb. Anyone who thinks otherwise need only look at Kim 

Jong-il’s willingness to starve his own people as an object lesson 

and just how far he will go to assure the survival of his regime. 

It is now time for the Administration to stop outsourcing our foreign policy to China and to negotiate directly with the North Koreans to get them to abandon and dismantle their nuclear program, 

because it is clear that the Chinese are not going to do it for us. 

And notwithstanding the President’s view, negotiating directly 

with North Korea did result in a freeze on North Korea’s ability to 

reprocess at least plutonium for almost 10 years. Now that the 

North has tested, the price they will expect will be even higher; 

and it rises by the day. 

A good place for the President to start would be to appoint a congressionally-mandated coordinator for North Korea policy. I realize 

the President still has a month to make this appointment, but 

there is no reason to delay and every reason to move forward with 

all deliberate speed, or we could just stop worrying and learn to 

love the North Korean bomb. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much; and let me note that, 

in substance, I agree with what Mr. Ackerman just said and that 

is the United States should not rely on China to be a positive player and rely on that to bring about a situation that is acceptable to 

us on the North Korean Peninsula. 

However let me note that I certainly disagree with Mr. Ackerman’s analysis that this Administration should bear the brunt of 

the responsibility. Let’s note that the policies that we have been 

following in North Korea were put in place during the last Administration, during the Clinton Administration; and, in fact, we have 

subsidized the dictatorship in North Korea with a subsidy level 

that was established during the Clinton Administration beyond 

anything that any reasonable person could expect. In fact, I believe 

that the billion dollars that North Korea has received as part of the 

Clinton-initiated policies have made North Korea the biggest re-
16

cipient of foreign aid of any country in Asia, except for emergency 

foreign aid, of course. 

So what we have done with a stupid policy of trying to change 

the hearts of the North Korean dictatorship by giving them money, 

we have done nothing but make the situation worse, while they 

have used their own money to develop nuclear weapons. 

Back to the China point, I am deeply concerned, as Mr. Ackerman just suggested, that we are relying somewhat on China to accomplish our goals. The U.S.-China Economic Security Review 

Commission will issue a report tomorrow which will indicate that 

there is ample evidence that China has played a significant negative role when it comes to proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially those dealing with North Korea. We know, of course, that 

China has helped in proliferation of weapons to Pakistan, who then 

passed it on to North Korea, I might say, using China—landing in 

China as part of their channel to put these weapons at the North 

Korean’s disposal. 

North Korea is a terrible dictatorship. We should be treating it 

as a dictatorship, not trying to have goodwill toward them. 

If the South Korean people don’t believe the United States is 

playing a positive role here, they should let us know, and we will 

go home. But the fact is that, right now, whatever chance for peace 

and freedom on that peninsula will deal with the leadership for the 

United States; and this Administration should not be relying on 

China to accomplish that end. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Royce of California. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, it is often said that politics stops at the water’s 

edge; and I would just like to say that Chairman Henry Hyde, 

through his work with Ranking Member Lantos, has personified 

that adage. He is a leader for all of us. Other Committees in the 

House and indeed the Congress as a whole would do well to take 

their cue from the leadership that Chairman Henry Hyde provided 

this Committee. 

The issues being dealt with in our Committee, the issues of war 

and peace, are just too important to succumb to partisan rancor; 

and though he has been tried at times, Henry Hyde understood 

that. He understood that we are Americans more than we are Republicans and Democrats, and he makes many of us a little 

prouder to serve in Congress, and I just wanted to share that sentiment today, Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROYCE. I also wanted to share with Secretary Burns that 

during the discussions that returned North Korea to the Six-Party 

Talks, I think we found out what was really important to Kim 

Jong-il, and what was important to him turned out to be money. 

It turned out that paying his generals was important to him, any 

asset freeze that was placed made it impossible for him to do that, 

and apparently the North Korean representative’s only request to 

restart this Six-Party Talks included the discussion of that financial situation which began last year when Banco Delta Asia was 

blacklisted for assisting North Korea in money laundering. 
17

What I am worried about as we go forward is that we might get 

wobbly on this issue. Because I think we have discovered one of the 

keys in terms of getting the attention of this regime. We have to 

continue to demonstrate that unless Kim Jong-il disarms he will 

continue to be isolated and starved for cash and trade. That is a 

very important principle. North Korea is susceptible to financial 

and economic pressure. So let’s keep that up. 

I would like to hear during your presentation, Secretary Burns, 

on how we will be handling discussions in this special working 

group on financial issues. 

Thank you again, Chairman Hyde. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

R. Nicholas Burns is the Under Secretary of State for Political 

Affairs. He previously served as Ambassador to NATO and to 

Greece, as spokesman for the Department of State and as Acting 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs under Secretaries of State 

Christopher and Albright. He also served on the National Security 

Council at the White House. He was Special Assistant to President 

Clinton and Senior Director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasian Affairs and Director of Soviet Affairs under President George H.W. 

Bush. He also worked at Embassies in Cairo and Jerusalem. 

We have been joined by Mr. Crowley. Do you wish to make an 

opening statement? 

Mr. CROWLEY. Not at this time. 

Chairman HYDE. Alright. Thank you. 

Ambassador Burns, we are very grateful that you could join us 

today. If you could proceed with a 5-minute summary of your prepared testimony, and your full statement will be made a part of the 

record. Ambassador Burns. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE R. NICHOLAS BURNS, 

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. BURNS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I will be happy 

to do as you say. 

I have submitted the statement for the record, and I will just 

cover the major points in summary fashion. I look forward to your 

questions and those of your colleagues, because I join all of your 

colleagues today, Mr. Chairman, in wishing you all the best in your 

retirement——

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

Mr. BURNS [continuing]. And expressing the deep appreciation of 

our Department, the State Department, for the leadership that you 

have given to this Committee. 

I think everyone knows that you are one of the last in the House 

of Representatives who served in the Pacific during the Second 

World War, and so you leave us with a great deal of wisdom and 

experience of how we should be acting in East Asia and safeguarding American interest, and the Congress will lose a lot of wisdom and experience when you leave as Chairman. So on behalf of 

all of my colleagues at the State Department, I want to thank you 

for your support for American diplomacy and for the American Foreign Service. We are very grateful to you. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much. 
18

Mr. BURNS. Mr. Chairman, I will just make a few summary 

points, and I look forward to a good discussion. 

First, Mr. Chairman, let me state the obvious and say that all 

of us were appalled by the reckless behavior of the North Korean 

Government over the past 6 months, first, in the missile tests of 

July 4 and 5, 2006; second, in the nuclear test of October 9. These 

two events clearly speak to the fact that North Korea has violated 

its international responsibilities and has threatened its neighbors 

and it has threatened global peace and global security. 

Our response, the United States’ response, to North Korea’s behavior has been resolute, and it has been very clear. Together with 

China and Japan and Russia, we passed within 5 days of a nuclear 

test a very tough UN Security Council resolution, 1718, that imposes harsh sanctions on the North Koreans; and we are now fully 

and, we hope, effectively implementing those sanctions’ resolutions. 

I do take note of the number of comments made by Members 

here that that is an important piece of business for the United 

States to be leading on. We do not and we will not recognize North 

Korea as a nuclear weapons state, and thus we seek the full dismantlement of all of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs. We 

want to see North Korea rejoin the nonproliferation treaty and return to IAEA safeguards; and we believe that the best way to pursue that objective—the full denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula—is to pursue a dual-track strategy. 

The first of those tracks is pressure and isolation, and that comes 

through the UN Security Council sanctions and the actions of leading countries like the United States. The second of those tracks is 

to keep the door open to discussions and a return to the Six-Party 

Talks, and we are pursuing both of those tracks with purpose and 

with energy. 

I think you know that President Bush and Secretary Rice are in 

Asia. They will soon be arriving in Hanoi, and part of their visits 

this week is to talk to the Chinese and Russian and Japanese and 

South Korean leadership about this problem of North Korea. 

I was in Asia last week at the instruction of the President, in 

Tokyo, in Seoul, in Beijing, trying to work with the five parties. We 

also met the Russians in Beijing to firm up the alliance that we 

have and to make sure we are all sending North Korea the same 

strong message that it cannot be business as usual, especially after 

the nuclear test. 

We do see North Korea’s nuclear capability, combined with its 

pursuit of weapons of mass destruction technology and ballistic 

missiles, as a clear threat to international peace and security; and 

it ought to be obvious to everyone concerned that the United States 

has a special role to play in safeguarding security in the Asia Pacific region. We seek a peaceful solution to the North Korea nuclear 

problem. 

We also realize the very real military threat that North Korea 

poses to its neighbors, particularly our allied partners, Japan and 

South Korea. So, in the wake of the October 9 test, the first thing 

that President Bush did was to reaffirm publicly the security commitment of the United States to Japan and South Korea that are 

embodied in two treaties with the Japanese—one from 1960 with 
19

the South Koreans, one from 1953—that commit us to the defense 

of both of those allies. 

President Bush also warrants that if North Korea transfers nuclear weapons or material it will be considered to be a grave threat 

to the security of the United States and we will hold North Korea 

fully accountable for the consequences of such action. When Secretary Rice was in the region just 3 weeks ago, she reaffirmed 

these security commitments; and I can tell you they made an impact, particularly in Japan. 

As you know, there has been a debate in Japan about the constitution of that country and about how it should act beyond the 

borders of Japan; and we think that this alliance guarantee of the 

United States means that Japan has no reason to build its own nuclear weapons capability, which, of course, is reassuring for our policy in the region and to all of its neighbors. 

So there is a clear threat by the North Koreans militarily to all 

of its neighbors, a clear threat from these nuclear tests as well as 

from the ballistic missile tests of July. 

The Chairman spoke in his opening statement about the position 

of the United States in the Asia Pacific region, and he said that 

he hoped that the United States would continue to be strong and 

to lead in the region. We understand—and I think this is understood, I am sure, by all Members of this Committee—that since 

September 2, 1945, it has been the United States—that it has been 

the guarantor of peace and security in Asia and in the Pacific region that we must maintain a strong American military presence 

in the region to guarantee the peace and security in Asia; and that 

is certainly the ambition and the intention of the United States to 

do that and to maintain the leading role that we play in that region. 

I want to say a word about diplomacy. While we seek to impose 

a significant, very tough sanctions regime on the North Koreans, 

we also seek to keep the diplomatic door open to negotiations. 

I think that most of you know that when my colleague and 

friend, Chris Hill, was in Beijing on October 31, he did meet with 

the North Koreans and Chinese in trilateral format. Then he met 

with North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan bilaterally, and as a result of those discussions the North Koreans had 

agreed to come back to the Six-Party Talks. 

We hope to resume those talks before the end of 2006. I am deliberately vague, Mr. Chairman, because I think it is not possible 

to know at this point what the exact date of the resumption should 

be. It depends on the seriousness of purpose that we believe the 

North Koreans ought to bring to those talks. Because they can’t be 

talks for talks’ sake. We need to make real progress in the next 

round of negotiations. 

And everything that North Korea says it needs is on the table. 

If you go back to the September 19, 2005, joint statement of the 

six parties and read it, it sets out a series of obligations that the 

North Koreans have to meet and it sets out some commitments 

that the United States and the other parties will meet as well. 

Many of the Members in their opening statements talked about 

some of those commitments. 
20

I believe if you read it, if you go back and review it, you will see 

that the United States did make commitments for, ultimately, a 

normal relationship with the North Koreans should they fully 

denuclearize, and that means their nuclear weapons program as 

well as their civil nuclear power systems. North Korea needs to 

demonstrate that it is serious this time about fulfilling these commitments. Because in the wake of September 19, 2005, of course, 

within 24 hours, it, in effect, walked away from those commitments. It disavowed them. So the most important thing we need to 

know is the seriousness of purpose that that country will bring to 

the negotiations. 

Some people are insisting that the United States should negotiate with North Korea solely on a bilateral basis, but the North 

Korean problem, especially its pursuit of nuclear weapons, is a regional problem. It is not just a bilateral issue because this problem 

poses a threat to all of its neighbors. 

South Korea, a country that has a lot invested in, ultimately, a 

peaceful relationship with the North, a country that, of course, 

would be the greatest victim of North Korean militarism, South 

Korea wants to be part of this process. 

Japan, whose security is also imperiled by the missile tests and 

the nuclear tests, wants to be part of the Six-Party Talks. 

Russia has had a historic relationship with North Korea, has had 

some entree into the government there, and has had a lot of experience in the field of nuclear disarmament. Russia seeks a role, as 

does China, North Korea’s leading trade partner and neighbor. 

So we believe the best way to proceed is on this six-party basis. 

North Korea, of course, is seeking to divide the five parties, especially in its intent to negotiate directly with the United States. But 

it can’t be the responsibility solely of the United States to make 

sure that North Korea rolls back its nuclear programs, does a much 

better job of meeting its international commitments on the human 

rights front. It has got to be the work of all of us together. So that 

is the way we proceeded. 

Now from time to time, as you know, in 2005 and 2006, we have 

met with the North Koreans bilaterally. Chris Hill, 2 weeks ago, 

met with Kim Kye Gwan on a bilateral basis. In 2005, just before 

we achieved the joint statement of September 2005, Chris Hill met 

with the North Koreans bilaterally. So we haven’t said we refuse 

to meet with them. We do from time to time, and there is discussion that goes back and forth between our two governments. 

But we have said that you need to seek a regional approach, and 

we do count—and a number of the Members from both sides of the 

aisle said this—on the commitment that China and Russia must 

bring to these talks to use their influence with North Korea to 

push them forward toward negotiations. And, of course, we count 

on the support that Japan and South Korea, our two treaty allies, 

would give this process. 

Mr. Chairman, just two more brief points. 

There is another issue that is related to the North Korea missile 

and nuclear problem, and that is the issue of Iran. As you know, 

we are engaged in the Security Council today trying to convince the 

Russians and Chinese to move more quickly to meet their commitment to us to pass a tough Security Council resolution against the 
21

Iranian regime. These two issues are among the greatest security 

challenges that we face, and they are linked. So what we do on 

North Korea and the seriousness of purpose and the toughness 

with which we approach it has to be a signal to the Iranians that 

what the North Koreans have found in their nuclear adventure is 

isolation, disapproval by the international community, now sanctions under 1718. Iran will find the same fate if it continues, as its 

President said yesterday, to accelerate its nuclear research toward 

a significant enrichment capability at its plant in Natanz. We are 

concerned about that, and we are focused on both of these problems, and we do see the link between both of them. 

I won’t cover any more points, Mr. Chairman. They are all in my 

prepared testimony. But I would like to thank you for the invitation for me to be with you today, and I am happy to respond to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burns follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE R. NICHOLAS BURNS, UNDER SECRETARY

OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lantos, and distinguished Members 

of the Committee for this timely opportunity to discuss U.S. policy toward North 

Korea. 

Mr. Chairman, let me first wish you the best in your retirement and express my 

deep appreciation for your leadership of this important committee. As the last World 

War II combat veteran from the Pacific theater serving in the U.S. House of Representatives, you are taking with you into retirement a valuable and irreplaceable 

perspective on our relations with East Asia. We all have benefited greatly from your 

experience and wisdom. On behalf of all of my State Department colleagues, I wish 

to thank you for your support for American diplomacy and for the American Foreign 

Service. 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, with its reckless July 5 missile launches and October 9 nuclear 

test, the unpredictable North Korean government has reminded us again of the danger its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and nuclear programs pose to U.S. national security, to our allies, and to peace and security in Northeast Asia. The North 

Korean government has broken its international commitments and threatened its 

neighbors and the world. 

Our response to North Korea’s objectionable behavior has been resolute. Together 

with China, Japan, and Russia, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1718 on October 14, just five days after the nuclear test, imposing harsh sanctions on the North Korean government. At the same time, we continue to seek a 

diplomatic way forward to gain North Korea’s full adherence to the September 19, 

2005 Joint Statement, which if implemented will lead to the complete, verifiable, 

and irreversible dismantlement of that country’s nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. 

We do not and will not recognize North Korea as a Nuclear Weapons State. We 

thus seek as our most important objective the full dismantlement of all North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs. We want North Korea to rejoin the NPT and return to IAEA safeguards. We believe the best way to achieve these ends is for the 

U.S. to continue to adhere to our dual-track strategy by:

1) implementing fully the UN sanctions to penalize and isolate the regime; and

2) keeping the door open to discussions and a return to the Six Party Talks.

We are pursuing these objectives with a clear purpose and considerable energy. 

Just last week, I traveled to Japan, South Korea, and China with Under Secretary 

Robert Joseph on the instructions of President Bush. We also met with senior Russian diplomats in Beijing. Our aim was to coordinate a common position on both 

the sanctions and the diplomacy with the four governments—our close partners in 

the Six Party Talks. We were met with a very positive reception in each capital, 

and a recognition of the need to work together to put maximum pressure on the Kim 

Jong-Il regime. 
22

This week, President Bush and Secretary Rice are in Hanoi for the APEC Summit 

meetings. There, they will meet with leaders from across Asia to discuss what the 

world community should do to bring North Korea to full implementation of its commitments to all of us. Their goal will to be to reach agreement with our partners 

on a way forward toward reviving and achieving success at the Six-Party Talks, and 

to reaffirm with our partners our mutual commitment to fully and effectively implement Resolution 1718. 

Mr. Chairman, North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons, coupled with 

its pursuit of other WMD programs and ballistic missiles, is a clear threat to international peace and security. The DPRK has also laundered money and distributed 

counterfeit U.S. currency, and has engaged in illegal trafficking of narcotics, cigarettes, and other goods. Overcoming the threat posed by North Korea is one of our 

Government’s highest foreign policy priorities. 

As we pursue our dual-track approach, we are also strengthening our strategic relationships in Northeast Asia and reassuring our allies. While we seek a peaceful 

solution to the North Korea nuclear problem, we also realize the very real military 

threat posed by North Korea. Our policies remain anchored by our alliances with 

key security partners Japan and South Korea. On the day of the nuclear test, President Bush made a public address reaffirming the full range of the United States 

deterrent and security commitments to Japan and South Korea, including the U.S.-

Japan Mutual Defense Treaty of 1960 and the U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953. 

President Bush also warned that the transfer of nuclear weapons or material by 

North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to 

the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable of the consequences of such action. During her October trip to Asia, Secretary Rice reiterated 

our security commitments while on the ground in Tokyo and Seoul. Our alliance 

guarantee to Japan means that there is no reason for that nation to build its own 

nuclear weapons capability—which is a welcome reassurance to China and other 

Northeast Asian nations and serves to minimize regional tensions. To further support Japan’s defense, we are also expanding missile defense cooperation with that 

government, as we are doing with other partners. 

As we continue our efforts to deal with this challenge, we look forward to support 

and guidance from this Committee and the Congress. 

THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT

North Korea’s July 5 missile launches, including its test of a long-range TaepoDong 2, flouted international norms and violated a standing, self-imposed moratorium on ballistic missile tests to which the North committed in 2000. The United 

States, China and other countries immediately urged the DPRK to refrain from further provocations, and the United Nations Security Council responded on July 15 

by unanimously adopting Resolution 1695, which condemned North Korea’s actions. 

Unfortunately, the North’s response to the international community was its October 3 threat to conduct a nuclear test. This threat flagrantly violated the commitments it made over the years not to pursue nuclear weapons, including its signing 

of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, an inter-Korean agreement on 

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1992, the 1994 Agreed Framework with 

the United States, and the September 19, 2005 Six Party Joint Statement. The 

President, Secretary Rice, and our entire diplomatic team worked closely with Security Council members and our key partners in the region to send an unambiguous 

message to Pyongyang: Do not test. We also warned the North Koreans directly 

through their UN Mission in New York. However, despite these clear warnings, 

North Korea on October 9 detonated a nuclear device. 

The international community’s response was again swift and clear. On October 14, 

the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1718, a Chapter VII resolution with binding obligations on all UN Member States. This unprecedented resolution—made possible by strong leadership from the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia—

condemned the nuclear test and requires Member States to implement specific sanctions related to the DPRK’s nuclear, WMD, and missile programs. 

The G8, ASEAN, the EU, and many other international groups, as well as numerous individual nations, have also spoken out to condemn the North Korean nuclear 

test and ballistic missile launches. 

EAST ASIA: A VITAL REGION WITH IMPORTANT U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS

Mr. Chairman, North Korea’s self-isolating behavior, which has contributed to the 

country’s poverty, stands in dramatic contrast to the impressive, positive trends in 

East Asia, one of the most prosperous and successful regions in the world today. 
23

The East Asia-Pacific region accounts for nearly a third of the earth’s population, 

a quarter of global GDP, a disproportionate share of global growth, and a quarter 

of U.S. exports, including about 37 percent of our agricultural exports. In all, there 

is some $810 billion in two-way trade with the United States. In every regard—geopolitically, militarily, diplomatically, economically, and commercially—East Asia is 

vital to the national security interests of the United States. 

Today, the East Asia-Pacific area is largely at peace and the future for the region 

looks brighter than the past. The region has not seen a major military conflict in 

more than 25 years, and there has been widespread rejection of terrorism. Yet there 

is a glaring exception to this sea of good news. The Korean Peninsula unfortunately 

remains divided more than 50 years after the Korean War. There is a truce, an armistice line, but not a peace. North Korea still amasses its forces along the demilitarized zone and does not formally recognize the existence of South Korea. North 

Korea’s bellicose government routinely threatens conflict with our ally, the Republic 

of Korea, and has troubled relations with all its neighbors. 

The US has played a leading role to help stabilize Northeast Asia since the end 

of World War II and will continue to do so. We are committed to maintaining the 

60-year period of relative peace and security, made possible in large measure by the 

presence of U.S. military forces in the region. We seek to maintain that peace by 

working with other countries to isolate North Korea. At the same time, our greatest 

ambition remains achieving the lofty but reachable goals outlined in the September 

2005 Joint Statement, including the full denuclearization of and a permanent peace 

settlement on the Korean peninsula, normalized, peaceful relations between North 

Korea and its neighbors and between North Korea and the United States, and new 

opportunities for the people of North Korea to build better lives. 

DUAL-TRACK STRATEGY

Mr. Chairman, as I said at the outset, we have a clear strategy for dealing with 

North Korea. This is a dual track approach comprised specifically of (1) sanctions 

aimed at penalizing and isolating the North while pressuring them to pursue diplomacy, and a (2) diplomatic track aimed at a negotiating North Korea’s 

denuclearization. The sanctions also protect the U.S. and our allies from North Korea’s nuclear, WMD, and missile threats, including its proliferation of nuclear, 

WMD, and missile technologies. 

DIPLOMACY

We are pursuing a diplomatic solution through the resumption of the Six-Party 

Talks. This process was energized with the breakthrough Assistant Secretary Chris 

Hill achieved in Beijing on October 31, when, in meetings with his Chinese and 

North Korean counterparts, the North agreed to return to the Six Party Talks, and 

renewed its commitment to the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and to the 

denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. 

Let me stress that the world will not accept merely the resumption of the Talks 

for talks’ sake. We need to make real progress in the next round. Everything that 

North Korea seeks is on the table. Our goal is straightforward and spelled out clearly in the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement: a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, 

which includes North Korea’s complete and verifiable dismantling of its nuclear programs and its return as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and 

IAEA safeguards, including the Additional Protocol. Equally important, the Joint 

Statement envisions a better life for the people of North Korea through economic 

and energy assistance; greater integration into the prosperous region around it; 

fuller participation in the international community; a path toward diplomatic recognition; and a road map toward a full peace treaty to end the Korean War. 

Regrettably, within 24 hours of its signing of the Joint Statement, the DPRK 

chose to reinterpret the agreement radically and unilaterally. We welcome the 

North’s renewal of its commitment to the Joint Statement which was made during 

Assistant Secretary Hill’s October 31 meetings in Beijing. But North Korea will 

need to demonstrate that it is serious this time about fulfilling its commitments. We 

believe that full implementation of the Joint Statement remains the best path for 

a better future for North Korea and its people. In Assistant Secretary Hill’s October 

31 meetings, we also assured the North Koreans that within a resumed Six-Party 

process, we would be willing to form a working group to discuss and address financial issues, including the Banco Delta Asia case. 

Some insist that the U.S. should negotiate with North Korea solely on a bilateral 

basis, but the North Korean problem—especially its pursuit of nuclear weapons—

is not just a U.S.-North Korea bilateral issue. Rather, North Korea’s nuclear weapons pose a regional threat to all its neighbors. South Korea must be part of the solu-
24

tion, as must Japan, China and Russia. That is why we are addressing this issue 

in the Six-Party framework, with all the regional stakeholders that have the most 

leverage on North Korea afforded a place at the table. As host of the Six-Party 

Talks, China played a central role in the success of last September—the unanimous 

adoption of the Six-Party Joint Statement. As a neighbor of North Korea, Japan has 

important security and bilateral interests at stake, including the abductee issue. 

Tokyo played the lead role in drafting UN Resolution 1695 in response to the July 

5 missile launches, and continues to lead in the multilateral diplomatic track. South 

Korea has unique considerations and an interest in a comprehensive resolution of 

the DPRK nuclear issue, and its security is threatened most directly by North Korea’s militarism. Finally, Russia, with its historical ties to North Korea and long experience with disarmament, is a critical partner in the Six Party process. Secretary 

Rice and I have consulted closely with Moscow throughout this crisis. 

North Korea seeks to divide the five parties and desires, especially, to negotiate 

directly with the U.S. It should not be the responsibility of the United States alone 

to achieve denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. It is rather in our clear interest to have China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia pulling on the same oar with 

the U.S. 

The unprecedented level of cooperation that has emerged among Northeast Asian 

countries on this issue would not have been possible had we adopted a bilateral approach. That said, the United States has held bilateral discussions with North 

Korea within the Six Party talks since 2002 and we would have every expectation 

to continue to do so in the future. 

SANCTIONS

Concurrent with the diplomatic track, we are working to fully and effectively enforce the sanctions against North Korea in UNSC Resolution 1718, and to get our 

international partners to do the same. 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 is binding on all UN Member 

States. 1718 condemned the nuclear test and expressed the Council’s grave concern 

that the test posed a danger to peace and stability in the region. The Security Council demanded that North Korea refrain from conducting any additional nuclear or 

missile tests, retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT and return to 

NPT and IAEA safeguards, and suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile 

program. It also decided that North Korea must abandon all of its nuclear weapons 

and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. 

UNSCR 1718 required Member States to prevent the direct or indirect supply, 

sale or transfer to the DPRK of a specified list of conventional weapons, and items, 

material, equipment, goods and technology, which could contribute to the DPRK’s 

nuclear, ballistic missile, or other WMD-related programs. UNSCR 1718 additionally banned the transfer of luxury goods to North Korea. 

The United States has taken steps to implement Resolution 1718 expeditiously. 

Many were already U.S. policy. The United States has a total prohibition on the export to North Korea of any items that could contribute to North Korea’s nuclear, 

missile, biological and chemical programs. This includes all of the items designated 

by the 1718 Sanctions Committee. In addition, we have previously acted under Executive Order 13382 to designate twelve entities and one individual as being engaged in proliferation activities related to North Korea. Under E.O. 13382, the 

United States has frozen the funds, assets and economic resources of these entities 

and individuals. We have also proposed that the 1718 Sanctions Committee designate these entities and individual, under the provisions of the Resolution. 

Further, we have defined a list of luxury goods banned for transfer to North 

Korea. The U.S. currently sends very few, if any, of these goods to the DPRK, but 

these new regulations will ensure that we are in full compliance with Resolution 

1718. 

In pressing all UN Member States to fully and effectively implement Resolution 

1718, our intent is not just to sanction for sanction’s sake. North Korea needs to 

be punished and isolated for its reckless actions that threaten peace and security. 

At the same time, we want to convince the North Koreans to pursue the diplomatic 

path and agree to denuclearize. China, North Korea’s largest trading partner and 

main conduit to the outside world, has committed to enforce 1718. As China follows 

through, the North Korean regime will feel the pain. It will be deprived of hard currency it earns from exporting WMD and missile technology and conventional arms. 

And the North Korean elite will lose access to prized luxury goods. We are hopeful 

this pressure will convince the North to do the right thing. But should the North 

not take advantage of the opportunity to resume and achieve progress at the Six 

Party Talks, the sanctions will continue to protect the U.S. and our international 
25

partners by limiting the advancement of the North’s nuclear, WMD, and missile programs, and by preventing the North from proliferating nuclear, WMD, and missile 

technologies to other regimes and to non-state actors. 

In addition to pressing for full and effective implementation of Resolutions 1718, 

we are making great efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. First, 

through initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI, countries 

work together to stop illicit shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related 

materials on the ground, in the air, and at sea, to and from states and non-state 

actors of proliferation concern. Eighty states already participate in PSI, and we are 

urging all Member States to endorse the Statement of Interdiction Principles and 

participate in PSI activities. Second, we are bringing India into the non-proliferation 

regime, with a pioneering agreement that gives the IAEA access to India’s civil nuclear facilities and gives India access to civilian nuclear power. We are grateful for 

the support this Committee and the entire House of Representatives gave to this 

effort. Third, we are rallying the world behind a UN Security Council Resolution 

that requires all countries to criminalize proliferation activities. Along with Russia, 

we have launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. 

OUR ALLIES IN ASIA

What we found in the region last week was a unanimous recognition that North 

Korea’s nuclear test is a ‘‘game changer,’’ that this is not a time for business as 

usual. This is why the Japanese have imposed their own unilateral sanctions, including barring North Korean imports. This is why the South Koreans have promised to become more actively involved in PSI and have suspended aid to the North 

and frozen expansion of their joint North-South economic projects. This is why the 

Chinese took the unprecedented step of supporting Security Council resolutions 

1695 and 1718. All our partners are committed to implementing Resolution 1718 

and to the effort to reach a diplomatic agreement with the North on 

denuclearization. 

IRAN

How the world responds to North Korea is likely to affect the calculations of other 

aspiring nuclear powers, including Iran. Through our firm multilateral diplomacy 

confronting the North Korean threat, we are also sending a strong message to Iran: 

The path North Korea is choosing is not leading to more prosperity and security—

it is, in fact, leading in the opposite direction. Iran should heed this message, and 

meet the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1696 by fully and 

verifiably suspending its enrichment and reprocessing activities. If Iran chooses this 

correct path, rather that facing punitive measures like North Korea, Iran could get 

a wide range of economic, political, and technological benefits, as promised in the 

P5+1 incentive package, and the U.S. will engage in direct talks with Iran. 

The permanent members of the Security Council have a special responsibility to 

stop these two countries—North Korea and Iran—from advancing their nuclear 

weapons programs. If we can succeed, the world will be a measurably safer place. 

If we cannot, we will face a critical challenge to our basic security. This must be 

one of our nation’s top foreign policy objectives—to stop Iran and North Korea. 

NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS

Our concerns about the behavior of the DPRK extend well beyond 

denuclearization. The regime subjects its citizens to rigid controls over many aspects 

of their lives and maintains an extensive prison camp system, with reports of prisoners’ involuntary labor, torture, forced abortions, starvation, and execution. Citizens are denied basic human rights such as freedom of expression, religion, movement, assembly, and association. The government attempts to control all information; there is no freedom of the press. Since 2001, the U.S. has designated North 

Korea as a country of particular concern for violations of religious freedom. The U.S. 

has made clear to North Korea that discussion of its human rights record will be 

part of any future normalization process. 

The DPRK’s behavior towards its citizens, including its human rights failings, 

have led to a stream of refugees. The United States is extremely concerned about 

the plight of North Korean refugees. As you are aware, President Bush was the first 

world leader to invite some of these refugees into the Oval Office. We are deeply 

troubled by reports of the involuntary return of North Koreans from China to the 

DPRK, as these returnees may face serious abuses, including torture and execution 

in some cases. The U.S. regularly discusses its strong concerns with China and 

other governments, as well as with the highest levels of the Office of the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and concerned non-governmental and private 
26

groups. The U.S. values the role of organizations dedicated to promoting the human 

rights of North Koreans. The U.S. also has great sympathy for the Japanese families of those innocent people abducted by the North Korean regime. 

The Administration appreciates Congress’ support for our efforts in this area, and 

is successfully implementing the 2004 North Korean Human Rights Act. We will 

continue to closely consult with Congress on this important issue. 

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

We are watching carefully as we implement UNSCR 1695 and 1718 that the humanitarian situation does not worsen for the North Korea people. The President has 

made clear that passage of UNSCR 1718 is not intended to make humanitarian 

work more difficult to conduct. 

The United States continues to support the efforts of the World Food Program to 

provide assistance to the DPRK’s most vulnerable populations. Since 1995, when the 

magnitude of the crisis in North Korea was first identified, the United States has 

generously supported WFP’s activities in that country, providing over 2 million tons 

of food assistance, valued at over $700 million. 

We will base any decision on whether to contribute food to WFP’s new Protracted 

Relief and Recovery Operation for North Korea, as always, on assessed needs, competing needs elsewhere, and the ability to monitor the distribution of that assistance, to assure that our food gets to its intended recipients. 

Our objective in providing food aid to North Korea has been and will continue to 

be to help relieve the suffering of the North Korean people, despite our concerns 

about the North Korean government’s policies. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, in my consultations with Japanese, South Korean, Chinese, and 

Russian officials last week, it was clear that our Six-Party partners share our grave 

concerns about the North Korea nuclear problem and our commitment to a dualtrack approach. They agree on the need to send a strong international message to 

Pyongyang that there are consequences to its irresponsible actions, and that measures such as UNSCR 1718 will remain in force until North Korea meets all of the 

requirements of this important resolution. In Hanoi this week, President Bush and 

Secretary Rice will reaffirm our policy and firm resolve with the leaders of APEC 

nations. 

Working closely with the international community and our Six-Party partners, the 

United States will continue to press on all diplomatic fronts and will use all policy 

tools and legal authorities at its disposal, consistent with international law and the 

mandates of the Security Council, to achieve the complete denuclearization of the 

Korean Peninsula. 

Our message to Pyongyang remains clear: abandon nuclear weapons, move to implement the Joint Statement, and join your neighbors as a responsible member of 

the international community and the prosperous region of Northeast Asia. 

Thank you very much.

Mr. LEACH [presiding]. Thank you, Ambassador Burns. We are 

appreciative of your statement and your public service. 

We will begin with Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me ask you, Ambassador Burns, on the human rights issue 

again—and I know you and I have had many discussions in the 

past about the linkage, and let’s not forget that the demise of the 

Warsaw Pact countries and the Soviet Union itself didn’t happen—

arms control was important. Containment was important. Trying to 

mitigate the threat with regards to the nuclear arsenal that the Soviets possessed, obviously, was an ongoing, almost ever-present 

concern of all Presidents and Congresses. But it was the human 

rights issue, beginning with the labor rights issue with Lech 

Walesa, religious freedom, and eventually that led to the amelioration of that terrible vexing threat. 

There is a report that just came out, as I am sure you have seen, 

Failure to Protect, a call for the UN Security Council to act in 
27

North Korea, which has been commissioned by three very eminent 

persons: Vaclav Havel; Bondevik, the former Prime Minister of 

Norway; and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Elie Wiesel. It makes a 

number of recommendations for a United Nations nonpunitive resolution to bring heightened focus on all of these human rights 

issues. 

They point out in the report that it is estimated that at least 

200,000 people are in gulags in North Korea today. The famine, 

while it has abated a bit with some recent harvests, remains a serious problem. Thirty-seven percent, I think, was the number I saw 

of the children of North Korea who are malnourished. 

We know that if you look at the xenophobic behavior of Kim 

Jong-il and previously that of his father, they are living in a world 

of fantasy, but it is a very dangerous fantasy, and it seems to me 

that the more emphasis that is put on human rights, the more the 

nuclear crisis abates over time—and I laud you for the efforts you 

are doing, the Six-Party Talks, the conversations that Chris Hill 

and others are having in Pyongyang, but it seems to me that while 

we work that issue, the real way to create an atmosphere that 

peace can take hold and the diminishment of this terrible threat 

of nuclear weapons, first to South Korea and then to everywhere 

else, will be to really robustly push the human rights issue and do 

it now. 

This report, I think, is an additional rallying call to the world 

community to pay much more attention to the human rights issue, 

and I know that we have—I know our State Department raises it 

frequently. You know, I have read the country reports, International Religious Freedom Act, and Ambassador Hanford raises it. 

But we raise it through resolutions. We do it through hearings. But 

I think this needs to be seen as the way, as the pathway to undermining the threat of nuclear weapons, and you know this could be 

done, I think, much more than it has been. So I would appreciate 

your thoughts on it. 

Mr. BURNS. Mr. Smith, thank you very much. I just want to laud 

your leadership on this issue of human rights worldwide. You have 

been a great friend to the efforts that many Administrations have 

made to promote human rights in the world, and you are right to 

single out North Korea. 

We are very concerned and we are never going to forget or stop 

talking about the grave human rights problems in North Korea, 

and you have mentioned some of them: The imprisonment of people 

because of their political views, the famines, the multiple famines 

that have taken place in that country over the last 15 years, the 

fact that there have been so many refugees that have had to make 

their way out of that country, some to China, some to the shores 

of the United States, and we try to bring in as many as we can 

because of the totalitarian nature of that society, of that government imposed on North Korean society. 

The President has appointed Ambassador Jay Lefkowitz to be his 

envoy for human rights matters, and he is very actively working 

in concert with Ambassador Chris Hill to promote this issue, to 

talk about it and to shed light on it. I can assure you that we will 

not forget this issue, and we will continue to push it forward, both 

directly with the North Koreans as well as with the Chinese Gov-
28

ernment, because there are so many refugees on Chinese soil. We 

have taken the position that none of them should be sent back, of 

course, to North Korea if they make their way to China. It is a very 

serious issue, and thank you for pointing it out, and I can assure 

you of our good faith in putting this issue forward. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. I appreciate it. 

If I could just add, the report—and it just came out October 30—

does call for a United Nations Security Council resolution, and I 

would hope that would be taken seriously under advisement. And 

Jay Lefkowitz has been where you sit. Chairman Leach and I have 

Co-Chaired hearings where he has testified. All of that is well and 

good, but we need to get these other nations as well, I think, much 

more engaged if we are to make progress. 

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Leach. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. 

Mr. Crowley. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Burns, good to see you again. Thank you for your 

testimony today. And I know with your past portfolio and the 

issues that you are engaged in, how one person is able to juggle 

what you are able to do is in itself incredibly admirable, so I thank 

you again for your participation today. 

I guess in terms of just, you know, an observation, and this is 

not—don’t take this in the wrong way, because I think what you 

are doing in terms of the Six-Party Talks is incredibly admirable 

and the overall goal here in terms of suppressing the development 

of nuclear weapons within North Korea and beyond, but in terms 

of the Six-Party Talks as they move forward now, what exactly are 

your goals? What are the expectations, if you can talk about that 

or elaborate on that? 

Clearly, I think one who would make an observation would look 

at what took place in North Korea now that they have detonated 

a nuclear device, albeit a small one in relation to others and other 

nations that have done so. What are the expectations as you move 

forward? What are we trying to do now? Is the genie not out of the 

bottle? And if it is, is it rational to think that we can ever put it 

back in the bottle? 

I think other nations are looking very closely, in particular Iran, 

as to how we are reacting to this. Has there been any discussion 

or thought of a change in direction in terms of dealing with North 

Korea, moving from not solely a six-party engagement, which I 

know took an incredible amount of time to bring about? 

I was in Hong Kong 4 years ago, met with Ambassador Kelly 

when we were trying to engage the Chinese in this and in convincing them it was in their regional interest to be engaged here. 

It took so long to get to that point. 

One could make the argument while that was going on that it 

gave the North Koreans the ability to cover—yeah, we are moving 

toward Six-Party Talks—but, at the same time, develop, obviously, 

what they have done now. Any further discussion about further bilateral discussions? I know you mentioned a lower level. Any in 

terms of a higher level, allowing for either yourself or someone 

close to you to actually engage directly with Pyongyang? 

Mr. BURNS. Mr. Crowley, thank you. 
29

Our goals in returning to the Six-Party Talks are very clear. We 

want to see the full and complete denuclearization of the Korean 

Peninsula; and we want the North Koreans to go back to the September 19, 2005, agreement—they signed up to it—and to fulfill it. 

Now that agreement has mutual commitments, many by North 

Korea, to dismantle their nuclear weapons, their nuclear energy 

programs, to not threaten their neighbors to rejoin the NPT, to invite back in the IAEA inspectors. 

It also entails responsibilities, commitments on the side of the 

United States and the other parties. We are willing to fulfill the 

commitments we made, and they are vast, and going back to read 

that document lets you know what an important process this is. 

But we need to see that North Korea is serious about it. 

Mr. CROWLEY. I mean, it is arguable they have violated every 

one of those commitments, have they not? 

Mr. BURNS. Unfortunately, their track record is abysmal. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Every single one of those commitments they have 

violated, right? 

Mr. BURNS. If you look back to the agreed framework of 1994 and 

negotiated by the Clinton Administration, the North Koreans violated that agreement in spades, and they essentially rhetorically 

walked away from the September 19 agreement within 24 hours, 

and so we need to verify that they actually are going to implement 

that agreement. 

We haven’t closed the door to diplomacy. So we have this dualtrack policy of enforcing the sanctions resolution of October 14, 

Resolution 1718, which in relative UN terms is a very tough resolution, and we led the fight for that and, at the same time, to keep 

the door open to the negotiations. 

That is why we agreed to have Ambassador Hill return to Beijing 

on October 31, meet with the North Koreans and Chinese and then 

meet, as I said, bilaterally with the North Koreans to get a sense 

if they were serious this time. They say they are. We will test that 

proposition when we return to the talks at some point before the 

end of the year. 

And we do require—in addition to direct engagement with North 

Korea, which we have from time to time, we do require the assistance of other countries. China has influence as a neighbor and a 

leading trading partner with North Korea. The Russians and the 

South Koreans do as well. 

Japan has a great interest in this. Japan, of course, has been a 

victim of these missile tests both in the late 1990s and again in 

July. Japan has had to suffer through the abduction issue since the 

1970s, and we have great sympathy with the Japanese people and 

Government for that. 

So it does take all of these countries together to send the right 

signals to the North Koreans; and we want to see the complete and 

verifiable dismantlement of all of their nuclear programs, full implementation of that September 2005 agreement. I don’t know if it 

is possible to go back to the talks just for talks’ sake and to think 

we made any progress. We wouldn’t have made progress. So we 

want to see demonstrable progress in that first round of talks. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one last question? One 

very quick question. 
30

Mr. LEACH. A very quick question. 

Mr. CROWLEY. It is pointed, but in your estimate, do you think 

this is a diplomatic failure? 

Mr. BURNS. I think it has been a diplomatic success of this Administration to achieve the September 2005 agreement, and now to 

convince the North Koreans that the only way forward for them is 

negotiation, and that is a return of the Six-Party Talks, it is a tactical success. It is not a complete strategic success, because we 

haven’t actually convinced them yet to fulfill the terms of that 

agreement, and to do that in a verifiable way. So that is the test 

that is ahead of us in 2006 and 2007. 

But, you know, you don’t want to leave yourself with only one option when it comes to North Korea, you do want to leave a diplomatic door open, and that is what we have done, but in a way that 

protects the interests of our country. At the same time as we negotiate, we have got the sanctions regime; we are, of course, talking 

about missile defense with our ally, Japan; we have a very tough 

counter proliferation regime in place in East Asia, all designed to 

make sure that North Korea doesn’t proliferate. 

It has been a serial proliferator, unfortunately, in its most recent 

history over the last 15 years or so. And the resolution does give 

member states, including the U.S., the right to inspect ships, and, 

of course, under the Proliferation Security Initiative, we think also 

on a limited basis, if necessary, we have the right to interdict shipping as well, we, the United States, and some of our allies. And so 

we have to pay attention to those measures as well as the diplomatic process. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Have there been any 

initiatives begun by this Administration to educate the people of 

North Korea as to the nature of their government over the last couple years? Have we done anything, any specific initiative? 

Mr. BURNS. Mr. Rohrabacher, we are mindful of the fact that 

North Korea is a totalitarian government, and the government has 

imposed extraordinary prohibitions on freedom of discussion, openness—or freedom of information going into the country. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the people of North Korea have no idea 

how oppressed they are and how deprived they are? And a lot of 

the strength of the government—in fact, it is a weak government, 

but the strength, to the degree they really have strength, is to the 

degree that their own people are ignorant? 

You talk a lot about initiatives from the outside, from the region, 

what about from the inside; have we launched any new program 

aimed at trying to support those people from the inside? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, we certainly have made use of Voice of America 

and of other radio and TV——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I take it you mean the answer is no, then. 

Voice of America was before; we have had that all along. Is there 

any new initiative? 

Mr. BURNS. I will try to complete my answer. 

We have certainly tried, as best we can, to get basic information 

to the North Korean people about the nature of their own govern-
31

ment and about the reality of the conditions under which they 

live——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How have we done that? ‘‘As best we can,’’ 

what does that mean? 

Mr. BURNS. And the problem that we face, Mr. Rohrabacher, as 

you know, is that this is the most closed society on earth. There 

are no American Government officials there, we don’t have formal 

diplomatic relations, and we don’t have a consulate or Embassy in 

place. So we are very limited in what we can do, but we are interested in the objective that you are interested in, I can assure you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I understand you can’t do it, I understand 

you are telling me it is difficult, if not impossible, but we have no 

new initiatives by your answer. 

In terms of the great—the sanctions. Now, a tough resolution by 

the United Nations, I don’t think means anything to the North Koreans, anything more than condemnation by anybody else. But you 

mentioned the harsh sanctions. Maybe you could let me know, 

what are—could you give me a specific list of those harsh sanctions? 

Mr. BURNS. I actually think that if implemented fully and effectively, this particular resolution, 1718, the one passed on October 

14th, can be useful in building pressure on the North Korean regime, because if you look at the terms of that resolution and read 

through it, it deprives them of the normal type of investment, 

intercourse trade, in ballistic missile technology in a nuclear 

sphere, in other aspects of its commercial development that a normal state would have. And so if we can convince the Chinese Government, the Russian Government and the other East Asian states 

to implement this fully and effectively, we think this can be useful. 

I would also agree with you that the action we took in designating Banco Delta Asia got the attention of the North Korean regime because it hit at the heart of what that regime does prize, and 

that is money, to run its military——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That was a unilateral action? 

Mr. BURNS. That was a unilateral U.S. Government action under 

the PATRIOT Act. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now, in terms of the UN resolution, so we 

are all together now, and we are not going to give them defenserelated technologies and trade and commercial activity, but we actually didn’t isolate them from other business activities; is that correct? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, you know, I would like to just say a word in 

defense of that resolution, because it is not going to be possible for 

the United States alone, through unilateral action—and we have 

pursued unilateral action, we have been right to do so in terms of 

the Executive Orders available to the President in designating individuals and entities that are involved in their WMD program; we 

have done that, we have designated 12 entities and one individual. 

And we have, as you know, sanctioned Banco Delta Asia. That is 

important. 

But if you are looking for a way to, in essence, try to cut off all 

normal trade and investment that they could use to fuel their 

WMD and missile programs and their nuclear programs, you have 
32

to have other countries involved; and the way we have done that 

is through the UN Security Council. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Actually, the UN Security Council resolution 

did not do that, it only accomplished it in terms of defense-related 

relationships, not the overall economic situation. So I would suggest that harsh sanctions is not a proper designation as to what 

the UN resolution did. 

Are we ending our subsidies? And are our friends ending the food 

subsidies that have been feeding the North Korean people while 

their government has used their own money to produce these nuclear weapons? Have we ended that policy at least? 

Mr. BURNS. I would just like to say in the first part of your question, Congressman Rohrabacher, I am just looking through the resolution now. This is a tough resolution, and the test of a resolution 

like this will be its implementation. And when I was out with 

Under Secretary Bob Joseph in Asia last week, we spent a lot of 

time talking to the Russians, Chinese, and South Koreans especially, about full implementation. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. To be fair to you, I believe what we presented 

originally was a very harsh resolution, would have had harsh sanctions, and the intent was to do that. But when you start acting 

multilaterally, things get watered down, and I consider it not 

harsh, but a watered-down resolution. 

But in terms of, are we still providing the subsidies that we provided in terms of humanitarian subsidies to permit the North Koreans to use their own money to develop weapons? 

Mr. BURNS. I think that multilateral action can be successful, I 

just want to address this point. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. As long as we can address the last one, 

too. 

Mr. BURNS. And I will address the last point, too. 

I think it is important that we acknowledge, whether it is on 

Iran or North Korea, we cannot be successful alone, we do need the 

cooperation of other countries, and that is where a lot of our focus 

of our diplomacy is. 

On the humanitarian issue——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. 

Mr. BURNS. There have been times during the Clinton Administration as well as during this Administration that we have supported the World Food Programme, food donations to the North Korean people, we have done that purely for humanitarian reasons, 

and that was the right thing to do. The people of North Korea, as 

you suggested in your first question, are the victims of this regime 

in Pyongyang. And we don’t want to subsidize the North Korean’s 

ability to build a nuclear weapon system, we don’t think we have 

done that, but when there is evidence of famine and massive food 

shortages, we believe we have a humanitarian imperative to help 

deliver food aid——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Does that mean we are still continuing to 

subsidize these people——

Mr. BURNS. To help deliver food aid to the people of North Korea. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. This is absurd, this is totally absurd. And let 

me just note for the record, Mr. Chairman, we are taking the pressure away from the North Korea Government to comply with us in 
33

these other areas by feeding their people and permitting them to 

use their own resources, which should be going to feed their people, 

to go instead into nuclear weapon development. It is absurd to 

think anything else. And that is not just your problem, but it is the 

problem of the last Administration as well as this one. 

And I find it not only harsh, but totally unrealistic. And we 

shouldn’t be surprised when vicious dictators end up not caring 

enough about their own people, and then use that money for developing nuclear weapons. 

And one last point, if you would indulge me, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. With this point. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The last point is that multilateral approaches, including China, after this report that we just received 

that China is actually helping the North Koreans develop nuclear 

weapons is, again, a very irrational, perhaps hope, but it is not 

something that I think is going to bear fruit because China is part 

of the problem, not the solution. Thank you. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Fortenberry. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for coming today. I did not have the 

benefit of the earlier testimony, so please forgive me if this is a little bit redundant, but in light of Mr. Rohrabacher ’s last comment, 

it might be germane as well. 

You say in your statement that we continue to see a diplomatic 

way forward to gain full adherence to the Joint Statement. Would 

you unpack for me some diplomatic linkages, first between China 

and North Korea? Because obviously China is in the strongest position, certainly in the short term, to effect a positive outcome in this 

regard. 

And secondly, our diplomatic linkage to China to, again, help us 

position China or compel China or admonish China or cajole China 

into using their strength toward the resolution, particularly in regards to the Joint Statement. 

Mr. BURNS. Mr. Fortenberry, what I said in my testimony and 

in my opening statement is that we are pursuing a dual-track 

strategy. The first part of that strategy is to isolate the pressure 

of the North Korea Government through sanctions, our own United 

States sanctions—which have been in place for decades—and UN 

Security Council multilateral sanctions, which we believe are absolutely necessary to have an impact. If the United States just acted 

alone toward North Korea, we wouldn’t have the type of impact 

that we need. And you are right to suggest that China is a big part 

of this. 

And that gets to the second part of your strategy, which is diplomatic. The Chinese have a major role to play here, they are the 

leading trade partner, they are the country probably with the 

greater political influence in Pyongyang on the Kim Jong-il regime, 

and we have consistently asked the Chinese to use that influence. 

After the nuclear test of October 9th, the Chinese acted very 

quickly with us in New York to pass that Security Council resolution. There was obviously a great deal of frustration in Beijing toward the North Korean regime, and I would say, based on my conversations last week in Beijing, even a little bit of anger, which 

was totally justified. We would like to see the Chinese Government 
34

continue to have a tougher attitude toward North Korea, and we 

would like to have the Chinese Government use its influence to 

produce the type of agreement that we want. And it is very simple, 

the North Koreans have committed to dismantle their nuclear 

weapons programs and their entire nuclear industry, but they 

haven’t done it. 

So in pursuing diplomacy, we are not pursuing talks for talks’ 

sakes, we are not going to agree to endless rounds of talks that 

don’t produce results. And so we are carefully trying to prepare the 

ground for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, maybe in the 

month of December, so that we get some action out of the North 

Koreans. And China is key to that, and I think you are right to 

suggest that. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. And how far are we willing to go? Obviously 

we encourage, we talk, we admonish, with the Chinese to develop 

that linkage to the North Korea situation. In other words, we have 

strength of relationship with China, certainly an economic 

strength, there are very great weaknesses in our relationship, but 

how far are we willing to go in terms of that relationship to, again, 

encourage or compel the Chinese to use perhaps even more aggressive influence on the North Koreans? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, I think that there is no question that North 

Korea is now the major issue in the United States-Chinese relationship concerning foreign policy and security policy, particularly 

in East Asia. I know it will be on the agenda when President Bush 

sits down with President Jong-il in a few days in Hanoi at the 

APEC summit, it will certainly be on the agenda when Secretary 

Rice meets Foreign Minister Le Cong Phung in Hanoi on Friday of 

this week. The Chinese know that. 

In fact, the President sent Under Secretary Joseph and I to 

China last week, expressly for the purpose of spending 2 full days 

there, I think a total of 13 or 14 hours of discussion on this North 

Korean issue, and we made it abundantly clear, I certainly did, 

with my talks with Foreign Minister Lee and other Chinese officials that this issue is front and center in the United States-China 

relationship. 

There is nothing more important in terms of America’s security 

in East Asia than stopping the North Korean nuclear program and 

removing that threat from Japan and South Korea, our two treaty 

allies in that particular part of Northeast Asia. And so we take it 

very seriously. A major objective of ours. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. 

Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I didn’t read the report that was alluded to—welcome, Ambassador. I am not familiar with the report that was alluded to by my 

friend and colleague from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, about the 

assistance being provided by the Chinese Government to the development of a nuclear weapon program by North Korea. Could you 

bring me up to date on that report? 

Mr. BURNS. Congressman Delahunt, I am aware of the report, 

but I have not read it in full, so I don’t want to——

Mr. DELAHUNT. Could you tell me who authored the report? 
35

Mr. BURNS. I don’t know the authors of the report. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If the gentleman will yield, we are talking 

about a report that will become public tomorrow by the U.S.-China 

Economic Security Review Commission, which is a bipartisan commission established to look at Chinese policy in relationship to the 

United States. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, again, I am unfamiliar—maybe you can tell 

me who this particular group is, and is it an authorized—was it established by an act of Congress, or is it an advisory group to the 

Administration? 

Mr. BURNS. Mr. Delahunt, I am aware of the fact of this report, 

but I have not read it; so I think I should withhold judgment on 

it until I can read it. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I am not asking about the substance of the report. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If the gentleman would yield, it was a commission established by the United States Congress Bipartisan Commission. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I will read that with great interest because—and please correct me, Ambassador, but obviously, the national security of the United States is implicated by what has occurred recently in North Korea, but it may be drawing the incorrect inference. But I would presume that the national security of 

the People’s Republic of China was put at risk by the developments 

recently in North Korea. 

You indicated that in your conversations with Chinese officials, 

they expressed anger. Did they express concern about their own 

national security, given the developments in relationship to the nuclear test and what we presume to be the development of nuclear 

weapons by North Korea? 

Mr. BURNS. Mr. Delahunt, there is no question that the Chinese 

Government has communicated with the United States its outright 

opposition to the fact that North Korea has nuclear weapons and 

that they have conducted a nuclear test. And I understand Chinese 

policy to be that they would like to see a full dismantlement of 

North Korea’s nuclear industry as well as its nuclear complex, because China is a neighbor and does not wish to live next door to 

a nuclear-armed North Korea. That is how I understand Chinese 

policy, that is how they expressed it to me. And I am not aware, 

personally, of any effort by the Chinese Government to assist the 

North Korean nuclear program. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Because that would just seem illogical to me, 

from the perspective of the national security interests of the Chinese, you know, to have a program, let alone participate in helping 

the development of a nuclear weapons program. Again, I am not 

disputing my friend and colleague’s concern or what he is reporting 

that will be stated tomorrow, but that just—I find that shocking, 

because I would hope that we don’t have to go to great lengths to 

compel the Chinese Government, to influence the Chinese Government. I am sure they are very adroit at recognizing their own national security interests. I would hope that they would take a leading role in persuading the North Koreans to desist and to 

denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Do you have a comment? 
36

Mr. BURNS. I would just say, Congressman Delahunt, that what 

unites the five parties in these talks is our agreement that we are 

not going to recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, we 

are going to look for a complete dismantlement, and we are going 

to use our combined influence to achieve that under the terms of 

this agreement that was negotiated 14 months ago, the September 

19, 2005, agreement. And in my 2 days of discussions in Beijing 

last week, the Chinese Government did exhibit a great determination to see that agreement fulfilled now. And that is the rationale 

for leaving the diplomatic door open to the resumption of these SixParty Talks, which we deliberately have done. And in fact we have 

announced we are going to go back to the talks. 

What we need to do in the next few weeks is to work with the 

Chinese, the Russians, the Japanese, the South Koreans, and all 

send a common message to North Korea, when the North Koreans 

show up at the talks, they have got to deliver this time, and they 

have got to implement this agreement from September 2005. That 

is very important, and that is the crux of our diplomacy over the 

next few weeks. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Ambassador. 

And before I conclude, I would like to extend my good wishes to 

the gentleman behind me who is chairing the Committee. Jim 

Leach has been an extraordinary contributor to the dialogue and 

to the conversation, the public conversation on issues of profound 

concern to all of us. He will be sorely missed. 

Jim, I think you know that you command deep respect from this 

side of the aisle. So let me add my kudos to those that have already been stated, and that will continue, justifiably, to go your 

way as you depart. Best of luck. 

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Delahunt, I appreciate that. 

I want to comment on a couple of things that have been said before, and then ask a couple of questions. 

First, the food assistance issue has been raised. There clearly is 

a case of, all assistance of any kind is in a sense fungible and can 

be used in other ways; but on the other hand, there is a distinction 

between humanitarian aid and other more strategic articles. And 

as a general proposition, I think the United States makes a great 

error to cut off food assistance to almost any country, unless we are 

in war. And I think we have been quite proper in our assistance 

of food to North Korea. And we may well have to upgrade that 

rather than retard that. And I do not think the United States Congress should go on record against food assistance, I think it should 

be the exact opposite. 

Secondly, with some concern, I listened to one of your comments, 

and I want to be very careful about this, Mr. Secretary. I believe 

you set up a bit of a straw man argument. I know of no serious 

commentator or observer of North Korea that favors solely bilateral 

discussions, which is the way you phrased it. A number of us have 

come to the conclusion that the Six-Party process, which has a lot 

of advantages, should be complimented by more direct negotiations, 

and that is a distinctly different flavor. 

The advantage of the Six-Party process, as you have noted, is 

that it involves other parties who have a terrific interest in the 
37

issue, it also makes clear to the North Koreans that they are not 

dealing with the United States exclusively, they are dealing with 

the international community, which is largely united in opposition 

to certain North Korean policies. But one of the disadvantages of 

an exclusive Six-Party process is that, while it is true that our representative can deal with their representative in Beijing, Mr. Hill 

and Kim Jong-il, the disadvantage is we cannot deal at the decision-making level with North Koreans. 

And there is a—we have a professional diplomatic in the SixParty process of our own, they have, by their standards, a professional diplomat, but not a decision-making individual. 

In addition, there is an extraordinary psychological dimension to 

this. I am often impressed that in international relations, as in personal relations, there is a role of psychology, and we have taken a 

position that we will only deal with them in the context of the SixParty process, although we will deal with them in a direct way at 

these talks, but they have taken the position that they want to 

meet with the United States. Given the fact that this is the most 

isolated country, possibly, in the history of man, and certainly in 

the modern world, I don’t understand how it is in the United 

States’ national interest to keep them isolated from an American 

representation in their capital. 

And so my sense is, given where we are, that we should be willing to put on the table, once they return to the Six-Party Talks, 

once we receive the kind of commitments, vibrations, whatever 

they might be, at these talks, that hopefully we will reconvene, as 

you suggest, before the end of the year, we ought to weigh anew 

whether or not we ought to respond in a direct way as well as within the Six-Party Talks. And I think we can—there is no reason that 

we can’t wait and review this. 

But a number of aspects of this. When I was in North Korea with 

Congressman Lantos 15 months or so ago, I really stressed the 

model that I believed they ought to be looking at seriously, which 

is the model of Vietnam, a country we were at war with 31⁄2 decades ago—North Korea 51⁄2 or so decades ago—and that it is impressive to me how far we have come in a direct way in dealing 

with Vietnam. In fact, it is maybe the one country in the world 

that has a substantially more improved relationship with the 

United States in recent years, and that there is no reason whatsoever that North Korea should not look at this Vietnamese model 

very seriously. But an aspect of the Vietnamese model is the willingness of the United States to deal directly with North Korea. 

Now, there obviously may be timing aspects to this, but I think we 

should be very careful not to make it psychological on our part to 

refuse. 

And I do not understand that dimension of the circumstance, and 

whether it be meeting with significant North Korean figures in 

Pyongyang, or possibly in the United States, I cannot think of anything more likely to lead to a change in the psychology of the country. 

And here, let me just conclude with an observation, that all of 

us know so little about the decision making in North Korea, although we certainly believe that it is closely held. But when one 

travels in North Korea, one is certainly left with the impression 
38

that there is very little analogy to Eastern Europe, that is, their 

public is not pro-American, just as the government isn’t pro-American, and in the Cold War era, Poles and Hungarians and Czechs 

were incredibly pro-American, the government wasn’t. These people 

aren’t. 

And so it strikes me that our strategy should be aimed at the 

people as well as the Government of North Korea. And we have a 

non-government policy to the North Korean people, and that, to 

me, is absolutely astonishing. And I think we should be thinking 

very much in these terms. 

The other aspect of this is, when you look at North Korea, it is 

very clear that there are no social institutions like in Eastern Europe; I mean, there is no Lech Walesa leading a labor movement, 

no Vocklahavam leading an intellectual movement. The only alternative to Kim Jong-il is the military. And I think strategies that 

they perceive to be aimed at regime change are the exact type of 

thing that may be counterproductive to the United States’ national 

interest. 

And so I think you deal with it by being as respectful as possible 

to leadership, no matter how out of step it is and no matter how 

out of sync it is with reality. And respect doesn’t have to go to policy, but it can go to process. And one aspect of directly talking to 

people is you have a respectful process. 

And so I would only leave you—and I don’t need to search for responses to theoretical questions because you point out pretty well 

where the Administration stands, but with the notion that one of 

the strengths the United States has in the world is a peculiar kind 

of American openness, one of the strengths that we have underutilized in recent times is an incredibly professional United States Department of State. By chance, we have—or I shouldn’t say by 

chance—by consideration, we have one of the truly fine diplomats 

in America today, Secretary Hill, leading our delegation. Why we 

shouldn’t utilize these strengths, I don’t completely understand. 

Now what I do understand is that we don’t want to be put in the 

position of North Korea suggesting that this is all North Korea 

with issues vis-a-vis the United States or vis-a-vis the world. But 

I don’t think direct talks slant as much in that direction as people 

seem to think. And I hope when you say you are leaving a door 

open—you very precisely in negotiations have said you are leaving 

the door open to returning to the Six-Party Talks, and you are not 

suggesting you are leaving the door open to direct talks. And I 

would hope that there would be two doors, and that this country 

can think anew about this circumstance, perhaps based upon some 

forthcomingness that we are hoping for at the next round of the 

talks. 

Does that fit the State Department’s perspective, or is that in obverse to it? Please. 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you, Congressman Leach, for those very 

thoughtful questions. Let me just make three comments in response, if I could. 

The first is to share your assessment of my good friend Chris 

Hill, who is one of our finest diplomats, and we are very fortunate 

to have him. And he is the point person for the North Korea talks, 

as well as our assistant secretary the entire region. 
39

Second, on food assistance. In my response to Congressman 

Rohrabacher, I was simply trying to suggest that there are times 

when the United States has to meet a moral imperative and a humanitarian imperative, and we can’t allow the North Korean Government to victimize its own population so much that we turn 

away from extending food assistance during a famine. 

And so I think both of the last two Administrations, the Administrations of President Bush and President Clinton, have elected 

from time to time to extend food aid, normally through the World 

Food Programme, which is a highly efficient and effective UN organization. We haven’t given food aid since 2005. We have had some 

real concerns about our ability to effectively monitor how the aid 

is distributed. We don’t want the North Korean Government or 

military to steal the aid or steal the food, we want it to go to people 

who are truly affected, but I certainly didn’t want to close off the 

possibility that we might choose to—the President might choose to 

resume aid, should there be that humanitarian imperative. That 

was the point I was trying to make. 

Secondly, I think you have asked very good questions and made 

good comments about the difficulty of deciding how you move forward diplomatically. And I would say this; I think we are pursuing 

a number of channels here. We have the Six-Party Talks. And what 

I meant to say in my opening remarks was there has been criticism 

of our Administration for pursuing the Six-Party Talk format, and 

I was trying to answer that criticism. It just seems logical that 

China, Russia, Japan and South Korea have as much interest as 

we do, in closer proximity to North Korea, to stop a nuclear program. We want to build on that strength in a multilateral format. 

That is why we have chosen the Six-Party format. 

We have not denied the possibility of direct contacts; in fact, 

there was a direct face-to-face bilateral discussion/negotiation 2 

weeks ago by Chris Hill and Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju in 

Beijing. In 2005, I think it was July 2005, there was a similar 

meeting. 

So from time to time, we have elected to deal with the north bilaterally. The North Koreans have a mission in New York at the 

United Nations, and from time to time, we speak to them directly 

from the State Department, from other offices of the Executive 

Branch directly to the North Koreans. So we have not disavowed 

direct contacts, but we are putting the emphasis on the Six-Party 

format because we believe that has the best chance to be effective 

and to bring the result that we want, which is dismantlement of 

the nuclear programs and denuclearization of the Peninsula. 

I would also say just to conclude my response, the North Koreans 

have effectively isolated themselves here. Had they chosen to implement the September 2005 agreement, as opposed to disavowing 

it within 24 hours, then I think it is logical to assume that over 

the last 14 months we would have had a variety of engagements 

with them. And if you look at the September 19th agreement, it 

does talk eventually about fully normal relations, but that is the 

end of the process, once they have affected a denuclearization. And 

I think it is an interesting point of comparison with Vietnam, but 

a very different situation. 
40

We normalized in August 1995 because the major issues that 

separated us had been resolved, and there had been a lot of active 

Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue in particular. We 

haven’t seen that in North Korea. The major issue of nuclear weapons is unresolved. The other issue of human rights is out there, too. 

So we have a lot of business that needs to be transacted with the 

North Koreans and a lot of impediments to overcome before we can 

have that type of relationship, a lot of business indeed. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I would ask that the Chair recognize Mr. 

Delahunt first. I believe he has a brief comment. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I will be very brief. I just want to associate myself in full measure with the observations of Mr. Leach. And I 

would encourage the Administration to secure a copy of the transcript to review that, to take it to heart. I think you are going to 

be hearing much of that in the course of the next 2 years. And I 

would encourage extending those remarks, whether it be Latin 

America or wherever it be, because the concept of respect and respect for process in contact is important. 

I was very impressed with the former Secretary of State, Jim 

Baker, when he reminded us that it was 16 trips to Syria that finally resulted in an unsuccessful—but did result—dialogue between Syria and Israel relative to Golan Heights, and I thank the 

gentleman for yielding. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

First I would like to add some additional praise to Mr. Leach. I 

didn’t hear all of his comments, but I have heard him for 10 years 

now, and I am quite disappointed that I won’t continue to hear him 

at least in the exact same capacity. I think that Congress will benefit from his wisdom no matter how he chooses to express it. 

Mr. Secretary, North Korea has demonstrated that it is willing 

to endure significant pain in order to have nuclear weapons, and 

it will continue down this path as long as it retains at least some 

significant economic aid and at least some diplomatic support from 

China. So the key is China. 

The facts on the ground observable from Beijing are that they 

don’t want North Korea to have nuclear weapons, but they put a 

greater emphasis on preventing North Korea from imploding. 

When Beijing looks toward the United States, it sees facts on the 

ground as well, namely, the United States will not link China’s activity toward North Korea in even the tiniest way toward our trade 

policy toward China, and the United States won’t sign a nonaggression pact with North Korea, though we will author a personal 

promise from an individual who will continue to guide our affairs 

for 26 months. 

And so they look at the facts on the ground, and they have decided to adopt the policy that they have adopted, which has been 

favorable enough toward North Korea for North Korea to continue 

its program. Now we send Secretary Hill to Beijing to try to convince China that they misunderstand the facts on the ground or 

have miscalculated their own national interests. And we all pray 

that at some point, Beijing will recognize Secretary Hill’s brilliance 
41

and change their policy, even though there are no changes in the 

facts. 

I have tremendous faith in the power of prayer, but perhaps we 

ought to consider changing the facts that are observable from Beijing in order to get Beijing to change its policies. We could change 

the facts in a number of ways. We could have some tiny aspect of 

our trade relationship or of the general atmospherics of the trade 

relationship dependent on China’s behavior toward North Korea. 

We could offer a nonaggression fact toward the North Koreans. 

We could promise China that our troops will never go north of the 

38th Parallel, even if North Korea implodes, or we could even offer 

China that we would withdraw from the Korean Peninsula, should 

that peninsula ever be unified under a single government. We 

could probably do some other things as well. We could, in effect, 

change the facts observable from Beijing. 

And so believe it or not, I do have a question, and that is: Are 

we going to change the facts observable from Beijing, or will we 

continue to simply show China or try to show China that they 

haven’t understood the facts or haven’t really calculated correctly 

what is in their own national interests, given the facts that they 

can observe? 

Mr. BURNS. Congressman Sherman, I would argue that there has 

been a reaction from China, which has been, from our point of 

view, positive, particularly after the missile test of July 4 and 5, 

and most especially after October 9——

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Secretary, if I could amend my question, I 

should have recognized that, China has taken a step forward. The 

premise of my question is that they haven’t taken enough steps so 

as to change North Korean behavior. Now I may be wrong on that 

assumption, but I at least ought to state it. 

Mr. BURNS. In our discussions with the Chinese over the 

month—it has been just over a month since the nuclear test—the 

Chinese have exhibited, as I said to other Members, real frustration and, indeed, anger at what the North Koreans have done. But 

more importantly, they were a leading partner in the effort to craft 

and then pass in the Security Council Resolution 1718 5 days after 

the nuclear test. And that was important because we have seen, for 

instance, on the Iran UN Security Council resolution, what happens when countries want to slow down the process, and that is exactly what is happening now in New York. 

In the case of North Korea, the process was facilitated by China, 

and we considered China to be a lead partner, along with Japan, 

in the negotiations over that resolution. So we were impressed by 

that. 

Now, there are two other ways that China can be helpful. The 

first is in implementing 1718. And what the Chinese told us last 

week in Beijing is that they will implement that resolution by the 

letter of the resolution, and we respect that and we expect that to 

happen. 

Secondly, the diplomacy ahead is going to be very challenging. 

We are not interested in going back to the talks just to talk and 

have no result. There is a specific outcome that all the five parties 

have agreed on, and that North Korea says it has agreed to, and 
42

that is, they will finally implement this agreement from September 

2005. And so China is going to be important. 

Now, it is my judgment—this gets to the heart of your question, 

I think, Congressman Sherman—it is our judgment that China has 

influence, perhaps more influence than any other country, on North 

Korea. But I think it is at least worth debating whether China has 

ultimate influence. The Chinese will tell you they don’t, and that 

they have some influence, but not influence to dictate the behavior 

of the North Korean regime. I think that stands to reason. China 

doesn’t want to see a nuclear-armed North Korea, but a nucleararmed North Korea has emerged. 

So the challenge to our diplomacy is to affect a better working 

relationship with China and to have North Korea and the resolution of the problem be a point of common ground. In the recent discussions we have had, there are many indications that the Chinese 

see this in the same fashion, therefore, we wouldn’t agree that 

somehow we would link China’s behavior on this issue with other 

aspects of our bilateral relationship, however challenging they 

are—and we are concerned about some of the same issues that you 

are—because we do think that China is heading in the right direction with North Korea and has been a good partner, especially over 

these last months, since the missile and nuclear tests over the last 

6 months. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I comment that the one fact that has been 

changed on the ground was changed by Kim Jong-il, when he tested, and that that has caused a change in fact, did cause China’s 

behavior. China’s behavior, though, is not yet optimal. And I think 

our success depends upon persuading China to adopt an optimal 

behavior, and also offering carrots that we can offer. We need more 

carrots. We are capable of providing the carrots, but only China 

can provide the sticks, that is to say, adverse changes in the status 

quo to the North Koreans. 

So I will continue to pray that China will reach optimal policies 

without us doing anything to change the facts, that Kim Jong-il’s 

change of the facts will be sufficient, and at the same time I will 

continue to urge you, just in case my prayers are not fully heard, 

to do everything possible to change the facts that the Chinese can 

observe both our policy toward China and our willingness to provide carrots to North Korea. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you——

Mr. SHERMAN. Unless the Secretary has further comment. 

Mr. LEACH. One final question, and then we will bring the Committee to a close. 

Do you have any update on the Banco Delta Asia situation, and 

are we close to resolution of that? 

Mr. BURNS. Yes, I do, Congressman Leach. And it is in my prepared testimony, but I will deal with it briefly. 

When Ambassador Hill met with Ambassador Pak Gil-yon on October 31, they agreed that we would form a working group on financial measures within the format of the Six-Party Talks, and 

that some of the outstanding issues—and we have a lot of them—

pertaining to North Korea’s behavior would be addressed in that 

working group. There is the issue of the activities of the money 
43

laundering by the North Koreans through Banco Delta Asia, there 

is the illegal North Korean counterfeiting of the American dollar. 

And as you know, there are legal processes underway in our Government to address some of those issues. And so we felt that this 

was a proper way to bring this issue forward with the North Koreans. 

Now, it was my understanding from Ambassador Hill that the 

North Koreans did not make this a condition of a resumption of the 

Six-Party Talks, but it was clearly an issue of concern to them. It 

is an issue of concern to us. And the easiest way to resolve this is 

for the North Koreans to stop money laundering in the North 

Korea Government, and stop counterfeiting American currency. 

Mr. LEACH. I appreciate that very much. And let me just conclude by saying that, of all the issues between North Korea and the 

United States, there appear to be misunderstandings, to me, the 

largest is the counterfeiting issue. To this extent, no country should 

countenance any other country where hoodlums in that country are 

counterfeiting the currency of another country. And this is something we have to take seriously as a people. And the Administration is exactly correct in raising this issue in the manner it has. 

Now hopefully it can be resolved, but there should be no misunderstanding on the North’s part that the counterfeiting issue is 

of fundamental significance. And in many circumstances it would 

be considered an act of extraordinary national interest significance. 

And so I want to strongly side with the Administration on this 

issue. 

In any regard, thank you for your testimony, Mr. Secretary. We 

appreciate your public service, thank you. The Committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:34 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(45)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Although we already knew it to be true, Kim Jong-Il has proven once again that 

he is more than willing to put his own maniacal ambitions ahead of the needs of 

his countrymen. Last month, North Korea’s rogue regime announced the test of a 

nuclear device, in spite of loud protests from the world community. 

We can take no comfort in the fact that the test results show a low-yield device. 

North Korea’s intentions are clear. 

As the world responds to another act of aggression, the consequences of these actions will only create greater hardship on the people of North Korea. The North Korean people have been shouldering the burden of this brutal regime’s policies for 

many years. And with every defiant act ordered by Kim Jong-Il, it is his countrymen 

that will unfortunately pay the price. 

None of us here question our duty to serve the American people. However, as a 

madman continues his quest to obtain the most powerful weapons known to man, 

we must also remember that the fate of 23 million people inside the borders of a 

despotic North Korea hangs in the balance.

Æ