a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

March 2006 COMBATING 

NUCLEAR 

SMUGGLING

Corruption, 

Maintenance, and 

Coordination 

Problems Challenge 

U.S. Efforts to Provide 

Radiation Detection 

Equipment to Other 

Countries

GAO-06-311
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2006

COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

Corruption, Maintenance, and 

Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. 

Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection 

Equipment to Other Countries 

Highlights of GAO-06-311, a report to 

congressional requesters 

According to the International 

Atomic Energy Agency, between 

1993 and 2004, there were 662

confirmed cases of illicit trafficking

in nuclear and radiological 

materials. Three U.S. agencies, the 

Departments of Energy (DOE), 

Defense (DOD), and State (State),

have programs that provide 

radiation detection equipment and

training to border security

personnel in other countries. GAO 

examined the (1) progress U.S.

programs have made in providing 

radiation detection equipment to 

foreign governments, including the 

current and expected costs of these 

programs; (2) challenges U.S. 

programs face in this effort; and (3)

steps being taken to coordinate 

U.S. efforts to combat nuclear 

smuggling in other countries. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making recommendations 

to the Secretaries of Energy and 

State to (1) integrate cost

projections for anticorruption 

measures into long-term program 

cost estimates; (2) upgrade less 

sophisticated portal monitors; (3) 

provide maintenance for all 

handheld radiation detection 

equipment provided by U.S.

programs; (4) revise the

interagency strategic plan; and (5) 

compile, maintain, and share a 

master list of all U.S. radiation 

detection equipment assistance. 

DOE and State generally agreed 

with our conclusions and 

recommendations. DOD did not 

provide comments on the report.

Since fiscal year 1994, DOE, DOD, and State have provided radiation 

detection equipment to 36 countries as part of the overall U.S. effort to 

combat nuclear smuggling. Through the end of fiscal year 2005, these

agencies had spent about $178 million on this assistance through seven 

different programs. Primary among these programs is DOE’s Second Line of 

Defense “Core” program, which has installed equipment mostly in Russia 

since 1998. 

U.S. efforts to install and effectively operate radiation detection equipment 

in other countries face a number of challenges including: corruption of some 

foreign border security officials, technical limitations of some radiation 

detection equipment, inadequate maintenance of some equipment, and the 

lack of supporting infrastructure at some border sites. DOE, DOD, and State 

officials told us they are concerned that corrupt foreign border security 

personnel could compromise the effectiveness of U.S.-funded radiation 

detection equipment by either turning off equipment or ignoring alarms. In 

addition, State and other agencies have installed equipment at some sites 

that is less effective than equipment installed by DOE. Since 2002, DOE has 

maintained the equipment but has only upgraded one site. As a result, these 

border sites are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than sites with more 

sophisticated equipment. Further, while DOE assumed responsibility for 

maintaining most U.S.-funded equipment, some handheld equipment 

provided by State and DOD has not been maintained. Lastly, many border 

sites are located in remote areas that often lack infrastructure essential to 

operate radiation detection equipment. 

As the lead interagency coordinator of all U.S. radiation detection equipment 

assistance overseas, State has taken some steps to coordinate U.S. efforts. 

However, its ability to carry out its role as lead coordinator is limited by 

shortcomings in the strategic plan for interagency coordination. 

Additionally, State has not maintained an interagency master list of all U.S.-

funded radiation detection equipment overseas. Without such a list, program 

managers at DOE, DOD, and State cannot accurately assess if equipment is 

operational and being used as intended; determine the equipment needs of 

countries where they plan to provide assistance; or detect if an agency has 

unknowingly supplied duplicative equipment. 

DOD-Funded Radiation Portal Monitor in Uzbekistan 

Source: DOD.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-311.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-5841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 7

Three U.S. Agencies Have Spent About $178 Million to Provide 

Radiation Detection Equipment to 36 Countries, but Future 

Spending Requirements for Some Programs Are Uncertain 11

The Threat of Corruption, Technological Limitations, Maintenance 

Problems, and Site Infrastructure Issues Challenge U.S. Programs 

to Combat Nuclear Smuggling 16

State’s Efforts to Coordinate U.S. Assistance Are Limited by 

Deficiencies in the Interagency Strategic Plan and the Lack of a 

Comprehensive List of Equipment Provided by U.S. Programs 27

Conclusions 31

Recommendations for Executive Action 33

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 37

Appendix II: Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance 

Programs at the Department of Energy 42

Appendix III: Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance 

Programs at the Department of Defense 51

Appendix IV: Additional Information on Radiation Detection Assistance 

Programs at the Department of State 58

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Energy 65

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State 69

74

Table Table 1: U.S. Spending by Program on Radiation Detection 

Equipment and Related Training Provided to Foreign 

Countries through the End of Fiscal Year 2005 12

Figures Figure 1: Radiation Portal Monitors Containing Both Gamma and 

Neutron Radiation Detectors at a Border Site in Northern 

Greece 9

Figure 2: Older Radiation Portal Monitor Able to Detect Only 

Gamma Radiation at a Border Site in Georgia 10
Contents

Page ii GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 3: Handheld Radiation Detector in Georgia Needing 

Recalibration 22

Figure 4: Rail Portal Monitor in Western Uzbekistan with 

Antitampering Protection 24

Figure 5: Radiation Portal Monitor in Uzbekistan with Heat Shield 

Enclosure 26

Figure 6: Map of Countries Where DOE’s SLD-Core Program Has 

Installed Equipment and Signed Agreements to Begin 

Work 43

Figure 7: DOE Spending on the SLD-Core Program through the End 

of Fiscal Year 2005 45

Figure 8: Map of Countries Where DOE Maintains Equipment 

Previously Provided by Other U.S. Agencies 47

Figure 9: Map of Countries Where DOE’s CRITr Project Has 

Provided and Plans to Provide Radiation Detection 

Equipment 50

Figure 10: DOD Spending on Radiation Detection Equipment 

Assistance Programs through the End of Fiscal 

Year 2005 51

Figure 11: Map of Countries Where DOD’s WMD-PPI Program Has 

Provided Radiation Detection Equipment or Signed 

Agreements to Install Equipment 53

Figure 12: Map of Countries Where DOD’s ICP Has Provided 

Radiation Detection Equipment 55

Figure 13: Flowchart of ICP Training Courses 56

Figure 14: State Spending on Radiation Detection Equipment 

Assistance Programs through the End of Fiscal Year 

2005 58

Figure 15: Map of Countries Where State’s Export Control and 

Related Border Security Program Has Provided Radiation 

Detection Equipment 60

Figure 16: Map of Countries Where State’s Nonproliferation and 

Disarmament Fund Has Provided Radiation Detection 

Equipment 63
Contents

Page iii GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Abbreviations

CRITr Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer project

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office

DOE Department of Energy

DOD Department of Defense

EXBS Export Control and Related Border Security program

GBSLE Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program

ICP International Counterproliferation Program

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

NDF Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

RIID radioactive isotope identification device

SLD-Core Second Line of Defense “Core” program

WMD weapons of mass destruction

WMD-PPI Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention 

Initiative

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Page 1 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

March 14, 2006 Letr

Congressional Requesters

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and 

2004, there were 662 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and 

radiological materials, and the number of reported cases has risen 

dramatically since 2002. Many of these cases involved material that could 

be used to produce either a nuclear weapon or a device that uses 

conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a “dirty 

bomb,” or radiological dispersal device). Especially in the aftermath of the 

attacks on September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists 

may try to smuggle nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United 

States. If terrorists were to accomplish this, the consequences could be 

devastating to our national and economic interests. In April 2004, the 

United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling for every 

member state to put in place appropriate effective border controls and law 

enforcement to detect, deter, prevent, and combat the illicit trafficking and 

brokering in nuclear materials and other items related to weapons of mass 

destruction.1

In response to the growing concern about nuclear smuggling, three U.S. 

agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), and State 

(State), have programs that provide radiation detection equipment and 

related training to border security personnel and customs officials in other 

countries.2

 Initial concerns about the threat posed by nuclear smuggling 

were focused on nuclear materials originating in the former Soviet Union. 

As a result, the first major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling 

concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in 

countries of the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Beginning in 

the mid-1990s, DOD and State provided fixed radiation detection 

equipment, known as radiation portal monitors, and handheld radiation 

detection equipment to a number of countries in this region. In 1998, DOE 

1

See S.C.Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).

2

In addition to DOE, DOD, and State’s efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other 

countries, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is installing radiation detection 

equipment at U.S. ports of entry. We recently reported on DHS’s efforts in GAO, Combating 

Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment 

at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns Remain, GAO-06-389 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 

2006).
Page 2 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

established the Second Line of Defense “Core” (SLD-Core) program,3 which 

has primarily worked to help Russia detect illicit nuclear materials 

trafficking by providing radiation detection equipment to the Federal 

Customs Service of Russia. In coordination with State, DOE, through its 

National Nuclear Security Administration,4

 has recently expanded its 

efforts in the SLD-Core program to include countries other than Russia, 

including installing radiation detection equipment at border sites in Greece 

as part of the overall U.S. effort to provide security assistance prior to the 

2004 Olympic Games.5

 In addition to DOE’s efforts through the SLD-Core 

program, six other programs—one at DOE, two at DOD, and three at 

State—have provided radiation detection equipment to assist foreign 

governments in combating nuclear smuggling. Further, State is the lead 

interagency coordinator of U.S. nuclear detection assistance overseas.

As agreed with your offices, this report addresses U.S. efforts to combat 

nuclear smuggling by examining (1) the progress U.S. programs have made 

in providing radiation detection equipment to foreign governments, 

including the current and expected costs of these programs; (2) the 

challenges U.S. programs face in deploying or operating radiation detection 

equipment in foreign countries; and (3) the steps being taken to coordinate 

U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other countries. To address 

these objectives, we analyzed documentation on U.S. efforts to combat 

nuclear smuggling from DOE and its contractors, both at DOE’s national 

laboratories and in the private sector; DOD and its contractors; State; and 

3

We originally reported on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in 2002. For additional 

information, see GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries 

Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning, GAO-02-426

(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002).

4

The National Nuclear Security Administration is a separately organized agency within DOE 

that was created by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 

106-65 (2000), with responsibility for the nation’s nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and 

naval reactors programs.

5

Additionally, in 2003, DOE began implementing a related program, the Megaports Initiative, 

to focus on the threat posed by nuclear smuggling at major foreign seaports. We recently 

reported on this program; therefore, we will not address the Megaports Initiative in this 

report. For additional information, see GAO, Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has 

Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority 

Foreign Seaports, GAO-05-375 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005). Through January 2006, 

DOE had completed installations at four ports in Greece, the Netherlands, Sri Lanka, and 

the Bahamas. DOE anticipates completing an additional port in Spain in April 2006. DOE has 

signed agreements to begin work at ports in seven other countries (China, Honduras, Israel, 

Oman, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates).
Page 3 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

DHS and conducted interviews with key program officials at each of these 

agencies. We also visited six countries (Georgia, Greece, Macedonia, 

Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan), where U.S. agencies have provided 

radiation detection equipment, to observe U.S.-funded radiation detection 

equipment in operation and to discuss the implementation of U.S. programs 

with foreign officials. In addition, we analyzed cost and budgetary 

information from DOE, DOD, State, and DHS; performed a data reliability 

assessment of this data; and interviewed knowledgeable agency officials on 

the reliability of the data. We determined these data were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of this report. More details on our scope and 

methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our review from 

April 2005 to February 2006 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards.

Results in Brief Since fiscal year 1994, DOE, DOD, and State have provided radiation 

detection equipment to 36 countries as part of the overall U.S. effort to 

combat nuclear smuggling. Through the end of fiscal year 2005, these 

agencies had spent about $178 million on this assistance through seven 

different programs. Specifically, as of fiscal year 2005, DOE’s SLD-Core 

program had completed installation of radiation portal monitors at 83 

border sites in Russia, Greece, and Lithuania at a cost of about $130 

million. DOE plans to install radiation detection equipment at a total of 

about 350 sites in 31 countries by 2012 at a total cost of about $570 million. 

A second DOE program has provided handheld radiation detection 

equipment to regulatory agencies and patrol officers in 9 countries at a cost 

of about $1 million. In addition to DOE’s efforts, two DOD programs have 

spent about $22 million to provide radiation portal monitors, handheld 

equipment, and radiation detection training to 8 countries in the former 

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. DOD plans to complete its Uzbekistan 

Portal Monitoring project in fiscal year 2009 at a total cost of about $54 

million. Furthermore, DOD also plans to continue providing limited 

amounts of handheld radiation detection equipment to other countries in 

the future. Similarly, three Department of State programs have provided 

radiation detection equipment and training to 31 countries at a cost of 

about $25 million. However, future spending requirements for State’s 

radiation detection assistance programs are uncertain, in part, because 

State’s Export Control and Related Border Security program provides 

radiation detection equipment to foreign countries on an as needed basis as 

a part of its effort to increase export control enforcement in foreign 

countries. In coordination with DOE, this program also selectively funds 

more expensive radiation portal monitors to certain sites on a case-by-case 
Page 4 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

basis, such as at one site in Armenia, where State believes the imminence 

of a smuggling threat warranted immediate action. 

U.S. efforts to provide radiation detection equipment to other countries 

face a number of challenges that can impact the effective operation of this 

equipment, including: possible corruption of border security officials in 

some countries, technical limitations of radiation detection equipment 

previously deployed by State and other agencies, inadequate maintenance 

of some equipment deployed by DOD and State, and the lack of 

infrastructure and harsh environmental conditions at some border sites.

• According to officials from several recipient countries we visited, 

corruption is a pervasive problem within the ranks of border security 

organizations. DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they are concerned 

that corrupt foreign border security personnel could compromise the 

effectiveness of U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment by either 

turning off equipment or ignoring alarms. To mitigate this threat, DOE 

and DOD plan to deploy communications links between individual 

border sites and national command centers so that alarm data can be 

simultaneously evaluated by multiple officials, thus establishing 

redundant layers of accountability for alarm response. In addition, DOD 

plans to implement a program in Uzbekistan to combat some of the 

underlying issues that can lead to corruption through periodic screening 

of border security personnel. State also conducts anticorruption training 

as part of its overall export control assistance to foreign countries. 

• Some radiation portal monitors that State and other U.S. agencies 

previously installed at foreign border sites have technical limitations 

and can only detect gamma radiation, which makes them less effective 

at detecting weapons-usable nuclear material than equipment with both 

gamma and neutron radiation detection capabilities. Since 2002, DOE 

has maintained this equipment but has not upgraded any of it, with the 

exception of one site in Azerbaijan. According to DOE officials, new 

implementing agreements with the appropriate ministries or agencies 

within the governments of each of the countries where the old 

equipment is located are needed before DOE can install more 

sophisticated equipment. According to DOE officials, these agreements 

are important because they exempt DOE from paying foreign taxes and 

require host governments to provide DOE with data on detections of 

illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Until these border sites receive 

equipment with both gamma and neutron detection capability, they will 

remain vulnerable to certain forms of nuclear smuggling.
Page 5 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

• Regarding problems with equipment maintenance, DOE has not 

systematically maintained handheld radiation detection equipment 

provided by State and other agencies. As a result, many pieces of 

handheld equipment, which are vital for border officials to conduct 

secondary inspections of vehicles or pedestrians, may not function 

properly. For example, in Georgia, we observed border guards 

performing secondary inspections with a handheld radiation detector 

that had not been calibrated (adjusted to conform with measurement 

standards) since 1997. According to the detector’s manufacturer, yearly 

recalibration is necessary to ensure that the detector functions properly.

• Finally, many border sites are located in remote areas that often do not 

have access to reliable supplies of electricity, fiber optic lines, and other 

infrastructure essential to operate radiation detection equipment and 

associated communication systems. Additionally, environmental 

conditions at some sites, such as extreme heat, can affect the 

performance of equipment. To mitigate these concerns, DOE, DOD, and 

State have provided generators and other equipment at remote border 

sites to ensure stable supplies of electricity and, when appropriate, heat 

shields or other protection to ensure the effectiveness of radiation 

detection equipment.

State has taken some steps to coordinate U.S. radiation detection 

equipment assistance overseas, but its ability to carry out its role as lead 

coordinator is limited by shortcomings in its strategic plan for interagency 

coordination and by its lack of a comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation 

detection equipment assistance. In response to a recommendation we 

made in 2002, State led the development of a governmentwide plan to 

coordinate U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance overseas. This 

plan broadly defines a set of interagency goals and outlines the roles and 

responsibilities of participating agencies. However, the plan lacks key 

components we recommended, including overall program cost estimates, 

projected time frames for program completion, and specific performance 

measures. Without these elements in the plan, State will be limited in its 

ability to effectively measure U.S. programs’ progress toward achieving the 

interagency goals. Additionally, in its role as lead interagency coordinator, 

State has not maintained accurate information on the operational status 

and location of all radiation detection equipment provided by U.S. 

programs. While DOE has responsibility for maintaining information on 

previously deployed U.S.-funded portal monitors, State primarily works 

through its in-country advisors to gather and maintain information on 

handheld radiation detection equipment provided by State and other U.S. 
Page 6 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

agencies. However, four of nine in-country advisors we spoke with, who 

are stationed in countries that have received significant amounts of 

handheld radiation detection equipment, said that they did not have up-todate information regarding the operational status and location of this 

equipment. Furthermore, while DOE, DOD, and State each maintain lists of 

radiation detection equipment provided by their programs, they do not 

regularly share such information, and there is no comprehensive list of all 

equipment provided by U.S. programs. Without such a coordinated master 

list, program managers at DOE, DOD, and State cannot accurately assess if 

equipment is operational and being used as intended; determine the 

equipment needs of countries where they plan to provide assistance; or 

detect whether an agency has unknowingly supplied duplicative 

equipment.

To strengthen program management and effectiveness, we recommend that 

the Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National 

Nuclear Security Administration, revise the long-term cost projections for 

the SLD-Core program to account for the cost of providing specific 

anticorruption measures and upgrade portal monitors previously provided 

by other U.S. government agencies and currently maintained by DOE that 

do not have both gamma and neutron detection capability as soon as 

possible. Additionally, to strengthen accountability of U.S. radiation 

detection assistance programs, we recommend that the Secretary of State, 

working with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and the Administrator 

of the National Nuclear Security Administration, ensure maintenance is 

provided for all handheld radiation detection equipment supplied by U.S. 

programs; strengthen the Strategic Plan for Interagency Coordination of 

U.S. Government Nuclear Detection Assistance Overseas by including 

specific performance measures, overall cost estimates, and projected time 

frames for completion of U.S. efforts; and compile, maintain, and share a 

master list of all U.S. radiation detection assistance. 

We provided the Departments of Energy, Defense, and State with draft 

copies of this report for their review and comment. DOE and State 

generally agreed with our conclusions and recommendations. DOD had no 

written comments on our report. DOE provided additional information 

clarifying its prioritization process, anticorruption measures, and 

maintenance efforts. State disagreed with our emphasis on the interagency 

working group and in-country advisors as the primary mechanisms for 

coordination of U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance programs. 

State believes that informal coordination between State program officers 

and their interagency counterparts in Washington, D.C., is the primary 
Page 7 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

coordination mechanism. We have added language that notes the existence 

of such informal coordination. However, State’s own Strategic Plan for 

Interagency Coordination of U.S. Government Nuclear Detection 

Assistance Overseas does not mention such informal mechanisms. Rather, 

State’s plan emphasizes the role of the interagency working group and 

states that such coordination is “vital to the overall success of U.S. nuclear 

detection assistance efforts.” DOE, DOD, and State also provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

Background Since our May 2002 report on nuclear smuggling, the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported 481 additional confirmed cases of the 

smuggling of nuclear and/or radiological materials.6

 One of these cases 

involved nuclear material suitable for use in a nuclear weapon.7 The 

majority of new cases IAEA reported involved radiological sources, which 

could be combined with conventional explosives to create a “dirty bomb.” 

According to IAEA, the majority of all reported incidents with radiological 

sources involved criminal activity, most frequently theft. Radiological 

sources and devices in which they are used can be attractive for thieves 

because of their perceived high resale value or the value of their ability to 

shield or encapsulate illegally shipped materials within legal shipments of 

radioactive materials. Some of the reported cases indicate a perceived 

demand for radioactive materials on the black market, according to IAEA.

From 2003 to 2004, the number of incidents reported by IAEA substantially 

increased. IAEA indicated that improved reporting may, in part, account for 

this increase. As of December 2004, 82 of IAEA’s Member States were 

participating in contributing to the database.8

Detecting actual cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear material is 

complicated because one of the materials of greatest concern—highly 

enriched uranium—is among the most difficult materials to detect because 

6

IAEA’s database includes incidents involving unauthorized acquisition, provision, 

possession, use, transfer, or disposal of nuclear materials or other radioactive materials, 

whether intentional or unintentional and with or without crossing international borders, 

including unsuccessful and thwarted events. These include incidents involving loss and 

discovery of uncontrolled nuclear and radiological materials.

7

According to IAEA, in June 2003, an individual was arrested while attempting to smuggle 

170 grams of highly enriched uranium across the border between Armenia and Georgia.

8

It is important to note that participation in IAEA’s nuclear trafficking database is voluntary.
Page 8 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

of its relatively low level of radioactivity. Uranium emits only gamma 

radiation so detection equipment, which generally contains both gamma 

and neutron detection capabilities, only detects uranium from the gamma 

detector. However, gamma radiation emissions can be shielded by encasing 

nuclear material within another high density material, such as lead. 

Another nuclear material of great concern is plutonium, which emits both 

gamma and neutron radiation. However, shielding nuclear material 

generally does not prevent the detection of neutron radiation and, as a 

result, plutonium can be detected by neutron detectors regardless of the 

amount of shielding from high density material. According to DOE officials, 

neutron radiation alarms are only caused by man-made materials, such as 

plutonium, while gamma radiation alarms are caused by a variety of 

naturally occurring sources including commercial goods such as bananas, 

ceramic tiles, and fertilizer, in addition to dangerous nuclear materials, 

such as uranium and plutonium. 

The most common types of radiation detection equipment are radiation 

portal monitors; handheld equipment, including both survey meters and 

radioactive isotope identification devices; and radiation pagers. The 

radiation detection equipment that U.S. programs provide to foreign 

countries is commercially available, off-the-shelf technology. Radiation 

portal monitors are stationary pieces of equipment designed to detect 

radioactive materials being carried by vehicles, pedestrians, or railcars. 

Radiation portal monitors currently being provided by U.S. agencies have 

the ability to detect both gamma and neutron radiation, which is important 

for detecting highly enriched uranium and plutonium, respectively. 

According to DOE, radiation portal monitors with both gamma and neutron 

detectors cost between about $28,000 and $55,000, plus the additional costs 

associated with installing the equipment and communication systems 

necessary to operate it.9

 Figure 1 shows a picture of radiation portal 

monitors with both gamma and neutron detectors. 

9

The price of radiation portal monitors varies depending on the manufacturer and type of 

monitor, e.g., whether the portal monitor is built to screen pedestrians, vehicles, or trains.
Page 9 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 1: Radiation Portal Monitors Containing Both Gamma and Neutron Radiation 

Detectors at a Border Site in Northern Greece

In 2002, we reported that some U.S. agencies, primarily State, provided 

radiation portal monitors that did not have the ability to detect neutron 

radiation to foreign governments.10 Because this equipment is capable of 

detecting only gamma radiation, it is less effective in detecting certain 

nuclear material, such as plutonium that has been shielded with high 

density material. Replacement cost for similar equipment (capable of 

detecting only gamma radiation), is about $5,000, not including installation 

costs, according to DOE officials. Figure 2 shows an example of such a 

radiation portal monitor.

10See GAO-02-426.

Source: GAO.
Page 10 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 2: Older Radiation Portal Monitor Able to Detect Only Gamma Radiation at a 

Border Site in Georgia

Source: GAO.
Page 11 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Handheld radiation detection equipment, such as survey meters and 

radioactive isotope identification devices, are used by customs officials 

and border guards to conduct secondary inspections,11 the aim of which is 

to localize the source of an alarm and determine the nature of the material 

present. Survey meters can be used to detect the level of radiation by 

providing a count of the radiation level in the area. Radioactive isotope 

identification devices, commonly known as RIIDs, identify the specific 

isotope of the radioactive source detected. In addition, U.S. programs often 

provide radiation pagers, which are small radiation detection devices worn 

on belts by border security personnel to continuously monitor levels of 

radiation in the area. Pagers are considered personal safety devices and, 

therefore, should not be relied upon to implement secondary inspections.12

Three U.S. Agencies 

Have Spent About $178 

Million to Provide 

Radiation Detection 

Equipment to 36 

Countries, but Future 

Spending 

Requirements for Some 

Programs Are 

Uncertain

Since fiscal year 1994, DOE, DOD, and State have spent about $178 million 

to provide radiation detection equipment to 36 countries as part of the 

overall U.S. effort to combat nuclear smuggling. However, because some 

U.S. agencies provide radiation detection equipment to foreign countries 

on an as needed basis, future U.S. government spending requirements for 

such assistance are uncertain. 

11Primary inspections are conducted with radiation portal monitors to determine whether 

there is a presence of radiation. After radiation is detected, a secondary inspection is 

conducted to determine where the source is located and what material is present.

12Handheld radiation detection equipment is generally less expensive than fixed radiation 

portal monitors, in part, because there are no installation costs associated with providing 

handheld equipment. According to DOE, DOD, State, and DHS officials, survey meters cost 

about $1,200 to $7,000; RIIDs typically cost about $3,000 to $18,000; and radiation pagers 

cost about $1,500.
Page 12 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

DOE, DOD, and State Had 

Spent a Combined Total of 

About $178 Million through 

the End of Fiscal Year 2005 

to Provide Radiation 

Detection Equipment to 36 

Countries 

DOE has spent about $131 million to provide radiation detection equipment 

and training to 12 countries and to maintain certain types of equipment 

previously installed by other U.S. agencies in 23 countries. DOD has also 

spent almost $22 million to provide radiation portal monitors, handheld 

radiation detection devices, and radiation detection training to 8 countries 

in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Similarly, State has spent 

about $25 million to provide various types of radiation detection equipment 

and related training to 31 countries. (See table 1.) 

Table 1: U.S. Spending by Program on Radiation Detection Equipment and Related 

Training Provided to Foreign Countries through the End of Fiscal Year 2005 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD, DOE, and State data.

Note: Figures have been rounded.

DOE Has Spent About $131 

Million Providing Radiation 

Detection Equipment and 

Related Training

Since fiscal year 1998, DOE has spent about $130 million through its SLDCore program to provide radiation detection equipment and training at 83 

border sites in Russia, Greece, and Lithuania and to maintain certain types 

of equipment previously installed by State and other U.S. agencies in 23 

countries.13 DOE recently signed implementing agreements with the 

governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Slovenia, and Ukraine and will begin 

work in those countries in fiscal year 2006. Through its SLD-Core program, 

Dollars in millions

Agency Program Expenditures 

DOE Second Line of Defense “Core” program $129.5

DOE Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer project 1.2

DOD Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention 

Initiative

7.9

DOD International Counterproliferation Program 14.5

State Export Control and Related Border Security program 15.4

State Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 9.1

State Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program 0.2

Total $177.8

13From fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2001, State provided DOE with approximately 

$2.7 million to assist its SLD-Core program with installing radiation detection equipment at 

eight sites in Russia. These sites included an airport near Moscow, six seaports, and one 

railroad crossing. We have included the $2.7 million provided by State under total 

expenditures for DOE. 
Page 13 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

DOE currently plans to install radiation detection equipment at a total of 

about 350 sites in 31 countries by 2012 at an estimated total cost of $570 

million. 

In addition, DOE spent about $1 million to provide radiation detection 

equipment to nine countries through its Cooperative Radiological 

Instrument Transfer project (CRITr), which began in 2004. Through CRITr, 

DOE refurbishes previously decommissioned handheld radiation detection 

equipment located at various DOE sites and provides this equipment to 

foreign law enforcement officers. DOE plans to provide handheld 

equipment to six additional countries through the CRITr project in fiscal 

year 2006.14

DOD Has Spent About $22 

Million to Provide Handheld 

Radiation Detection Devices to 

Eight Countries and to Install 

Portal Monitors in Uzbekistan

Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOD had spent about $22 million 

through two programs to provide handheld radiation detection devices to 

eight countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and to 

install fixed radiation portal monitors in Uzbekistan. Specifically, through 

its Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMDPPI), DOD spent about $0.2 million to provide various types of handheld 

radiation detection equipment to three countries and about $6.4 million to 

install radiation portal monitors at 11 sites in Uzbekistan.15 DOD plans to 

complete installation at 6 more sites in Uzbekistan by the end of fiscal year 

2006 and to finish all associated radiation detection work in Uzbekistan by 

fiscal year 2009 at a total cost of about $54 million. In fiscal year 2006, DOD 

plans to transfer responsibility for maintenance of the equipment it has 

provided to Uzbekistan to DOE’s SLD-Core program.16

Through its International Counterproliferation Program (ICP), DOD has 

spent about $15 million to provide handheld radiation detection equipment 

14Additional information on these DOE radiation detection assistance programs can be 

found in appendix II.

15The program spending total for DOD’s WMD-PPI program is misleading because, in 

addition to about $6 million in expenditures, DOD has obligated over $19 million to three 

contracts for program costs associated with installing radiation detection equipment in 

Uzbekistan, such as communication systems and training. Because DOD only executes 

spending on these contracts after all work has been completed, these contracts were not 

paid until fiscal year 2006 and, therefore, are not included in the program’s expenditure 

total.

16According to DOE officials, DOE’s SLD-Core program has worked with DOD to coordinate 

on the types of radiation detection equipment and specific sites in Uzbekistan that will 

receive assistance.
Page 14 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

and training on weapons of mass destruction proliferation prevention to 6 

countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In addition, DOD 

has provided a variety of training on weapons of mass destruction 

proliferation to 17 additional countries. Through ICP, DOD plans to 

continue to provide limited amounts of handheld radiation detection 

equipment to other countries in the future.17

State Has Spent About $25 

Million to Provide Radiation 

Detection Equipment and 

Related Training to 31 Countries

The Department of State, through three programs—the Export Control and 

Related Border Security program (EXBS), the Nonproliferation and 

Disarmament Fund (NDF), and the Georgia Border Security and Law 

Enforcement program (GBSLE)—has spent about $25 million since fiscal 

year 1994 to provide radiation detection equipment and related training to 

31 foreign countries. State’s EXBS program has spent approximately $15.4 

million to provide radiation portal monitors, various types of handheld 

radiation detection devices, X-ray vans equipped with radiation detectors, 

and training on how to use this equipment to 30 countries mainly in the 

former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Similarly, through NDF, State 

spent about $9.1 million from fiscal year 1994 through 2001 to, among other 

things, install portal monitors in countries other than Russia, provide 

handheld radiation detectors, and provide vans equipped with X-ray 

machines to countries, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. 

Lastly, through its GBSLE program, State spent $0.2 million in 1999 to 

provide border guards and customs officials in the Republic of Georgia 

with 137 radiation pagers. State has not provided any additional radiation 

detection equipment assistance through NDF since 2001 or through its 

GBSLE program since 1999.18

Future U.S. Spending on 

Radiation Detection 

Assistance Is Uncertain

Because some U.S. programs provide radiation detection equipment to 

foreign countries on an as needed basis and DOE has yet to gain 

agreements with all of the countries where it would like to install 

equipment, future U.S. government spending requirements for radiation 

detection assistance remain uncertain. For example, although DOE is the 

primary U.S. agency responsible for installing radiation portal monitors in 

foreign countries, State selectively funds projects to provide radiation 

17Additional information on these DOD radiation detection assistance programs can be 

found in appendix III.

18For additional information on these radiation detection equipment assistance programs at 

State, see appendix IV.
Page 15 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

portal monitors to foreign countries through its EXBS program. State 

officials told us that State coordinates its work in this area with DOE to 

avoid duplication, and it conducts these projects on an as needed basis to 

provide a quick response to emerging nuclear smuggling threats. For 

example, in December 2005, State installed portal monitors and provided 

handheld radiation detection equipment to one site in Armenia at a cost of 

about $0.5 million, in part because it believed that the threat of nuclear 

smuggling warranted immediate installation of this equipment. State 

officials we spoke with told us that they coordinated with DOE to ensure 

State’s work in Armenia is consistent with overall U.S. goals and that the 

specific equipment installed met minimum detection standards. 

Furthermore, State officials also told us that the newly installed radiation 

portal monitors at this site in Armenia provide a redundant layer of security 

with DOE’s planned work to install equipment on the opposite side of the 

border in the Republic of Georgia. 

Because State selectively funds portal monitor projects through its EXBS 

program to provide a quick U.S. government response to emerging security 

threats of nuclear smuggling, it is uncertain how many other projects State 

will fund in this area, in what countries these projects will be conducted, or 

how much they will cost. Additionally, State officials also told us that they 

have yet to determine whether or not they will fund any future projects to 

provide radiation detection equipment assistance to foreign countries 

through the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund or the Georgia 

Border Security and Law Enforcement program. As a result, it is uncertain 

how many other projects State will fund through either of these two 

programs or how much they will cost.

DOE currently plans to install equipment at a total of about 350 sites in 31 

countries by 2012 at an estimated cost of $570 million based on a strategy 

that analyzes and prioritizes countries for receiving installations. However, 

it cannot be certain which countries will be included in the SLD-Core 

program until it signs the necessary agreements with these countries’ 

governments. For example, DOE planned to complete installations in 

Georgia, Kazakhstan, Slovenia, and Ukraine in fiscal year 2005. However, 

installations in Georgia, Slovenia, and Ukraine will not be completed until 

at least fiscal year 2006 because of delays in signing implementing 

agreements with these countries. Additionally, DOE is still in the process of 

trying to reach agreement with Kazakhstan. In fiscal year 2004, DOE 

reallocated a portion of its funding to directly fund its planned work at 

certain border sites in Kazakhstan. However, difficulty in reaching 

agreement with Kazakhstan continues to delay this work. If DOE continues 
Page 16 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

to experience delays in signing agreements with foreign countries, or 

cannot reach agreements with all of the countries where it currently plans 

to install equipment, it may need to alter its planned scope of work and 

overall cost estimates for the program. Furthermore, once DOE reaches 

agreement with a certain country, it still needs to conduct individual site 

assessments to determine at which sites providing radiation detection 

equipment will be cost-effective, as well as the amount of equipment each 

site will require. Therefore, DOE is limited in its ability to determine the 

total cost of the SLD-Core program until it signs implementing agreements 

with the governments of countries where it plans to work and conducts 

assessments to determine which specific sites within those countries 

require radiation detection equipment and in what amounts. 

The Threat of 

Corruption, 

Technological 

Limitations, 

Maintenance 

Problems, and Site 

Infrastructure Issues 

Challenge U.S. 

Programs to Combat 

Nuclear Smuggling 

U.S. programs that provide radiation detection equipment to foreign 

governments face a number of challenges that affect the installation and 

effective operation of radiation detection equipment, including: the threat 

of corruption of border security officials in some foreign countries, 

technical limitations of radiation detection equipment previously deployed 

by State and other agencies, inadequate maintenance of some handheld 

equipment, and the lack of infrastructure necessary to operate radiation 

detection equipment and harsh environmental conditions at some border 

sites. DOE, DOD, and State have taken some steps to address these 

challenges, such as providing multitiered communications systems to 

mitigate corruption so that alarm data can be simultaneously viewed at 

several levels of authority and supplying protective casings for radiation 

portal monitors to prevent damage from vandals or extreme heat. 

Possible Corruption of 

Border Guards Poses a 

Threat to the Effective 

Operation of U.S.-Funded 

Radiation Detection 

Equipment 

According to U.S. and foreign government officials, corruption is a 

pervasive problem within the ranks of border security organizations. 

Specifically, because foreign border guards are often poorly paid and 

geographically isolated, there are concerns that foreign officials could be 

bribed and turn off the radiation detection equipment and allow nuclear 

smuggling to occur. For example, an official might turn off the equipment 

to allow a nuclear smuggler to pass through a border crossing. According 

to a Russian press report, in October 2004, a Russian customs agent at a 

site in western Russia was fired because he was aiding a smuggling ring. 

Additionally, in July 2005, after the newly elected President of Ukraine took 
Page 17 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

office, he reorganized many agencies within the government, including the 

Customs Service, because of concerns about corruption. 

DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they are concerned that corrupt 

foreign border security personnel could compromise the effectiveness of 

U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment by either turning off equipment 

or ignoring alarms. As a result, U.S. programs that provide fixed radiation 

portal monitors are taking some steps to evaluate the degree to which 

corruption is present in the countries and regions where they are working 

or plan to work. For example, DOE’s SLD-Core program commissioned 

three studies to better understand corruption and the challenges that it 

could bring to the program. Additionally, DOE includes countrywide 

corruption assessments as part of its efforts to help program officials 

prioritize countries to include in the SLD-Core program. In addition, DOD 

and State also include anticorruption courses as part of the radiation 

detection training they provide to foreign border security personnel. 

Some U.S. programs also have taken or plan to take other specific steps to 

mitigate the threat of corruption, such as (1) providing multitiered 

communications systems so that alarm data can be simultaneously viewed 

at several levels of authority, (2) implementing programs to combat some 

of the underlying issues that can lead to corruption through periodic 

screening of border security personnel, and (3) installing radiation portal 

monitors on both sides of a particular border if there are concerns about 

corruption of personnel in these countries. For example, DOE and DOD are 

deploying communication systems that link the activities at individual 

border sites with regional and national command centers. By doing so, 

alarm data can be simultaneously evaluated by officials both at the site and 

up the chain of command, thus establishing redundant layers of 

accountability for responding to alarms. As a result, if a local official turns 

off the radiation detection equipment at a site, higher level officials can 

quickly be made aware of the incident and investigate the reasons for the 

alarm. Additionally, DOD plans to implement an Employee Dependability 

Program in Uzbekistan that includes background checks, personal 

interviews of applicants, monitoring of performance and behavior, and 

annual refresher training to combat some of the underlying issues that can 

lead to corruption among border security personnel. DOE officials told us 

that they are considering implementing such a screening program in some 

countries where the SLD-Core program works. Lastly, U.S. programs are 

installing radiation portal monitors on both sides of some borders to create 

redundant coverage to increase the likelihood of detection and 

interdiction. In fiscal year 2006, DOE plans to install radiation portal 
Page 18 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

monitors at a number of sites in Georgia. At one site in Armenia, across the 

border from a planned DOE installation, State installed radiation portal 

monitors in December 2005, in part, because of concerns about corruption 

on both sides of the border at this location. DOE is also considering 

employing this type of redundant coverage at other locations throughout 

Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 

While DOE has taken steps to determine the level of corruption in some 

countries and regions where it works and includes countrywide corruption 

assessments as part of its prioritization model, DOE is still in the process of 

determining in what countries it will provide specific anticorruption 

measures and how much it will cost to do so based on its analysis of the 

corruption threat. For example, DOE estimates that it will spend about $1 

million to provide radiation detection equipment and related 

communications systems at a typical foreign border crossing. DOE officials 

noted that the standard communication systems the SLD-Core program 

provides with radiation portal monitors have some anticorruption value 

because radiation alarms require more than one official to review and close 

out before the system can be reset. However, DOE has not included the 

costs associated with other specific anticorruption measures in the longterm cost estimates for its SLD-Core program.

Some Border Crossings 

Remain More Vulnerable to 

Nuclear Smuggling Because 

DOE Has Not Upgraded 

Less Sophisticated 

Equipment Installed by 

Other U.S. Agencies

In 2002, DOE assumed responsibility for maintaining some radiation 

detection equipment previously installed by State and other U.S. agencies 

in 23 countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. However, 

DOE has not upgraded any of this less sophisticated equipment, with the 

exception of one site in Azerbaijan.19 Through an interagency agreement, 

DOE assumed responsibility for ensuring the long-term sustainability and 

continued operation of radiation portal monitors and X-ray vans equipped 

with radiation detectors that State and other U.S. agencies provided to 

these countries. Through this agreement, DOE provides spare parts, 

preventative maintenance, and repairs for the equipment through regularly 

scheduled maintenance visits. Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE 

had conducted maintenance and sustainability activities for equipment in 

21 of the 23 countries where equipment had been provided. DOE officials 

told us that, although Belarus received a significant amount of radiation 

detection equipment from DOD, DOE is currently prohibited from 

19DOE completed upgrading one site in Azerbaijan in December 2005 at a cost of about 

$86,000.
Page 19 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

maintaining this equipment by restrictions placed on U.S. assistance to 

Belarus.20 As a result, the maintenance status of the 38 portal monitors and 

almost 200 pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment DOD 

provided to Belarus is unknown. Additionally, at the request of the Turkish 

government, DOE no longer maintains 41 portal monitors and over 150 

pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment State previously 

provided to Turkey. 

As we originally reported in 2002, at some sites in foreign countries, State 

and other U.S. agencies installed portal monitors that contained only 

gamma radiation detectors, which are less effective in detecting certain 

nuclear material, such as plutonium, than detectors with both gamma and 

neutron detection capability. Although State’s current policy is to install 

radiation detection equipment with both gamma and neutron detection 

capability, according to DOE officials, because of their configuration and 

sensitivity, these older portal monitors are less likely to detect small 

quantities of highly enriched uranium or nuclear material that is shielded, 

for example, by a lead container or certain parts of a vehicle. When it 

assumed responsibility for maintaining this equipment, DOE conducted an 

initial assessment of these portal monitors to determine whether they were 

functional and what maintenance was required. During the course of this 

analysis, DOE found that much of the equipment was damaged and 

required total replacement or major repairs. In such cases, DOE installed 

similar equipment with gamma radiation detectors but chose not to 

upgrade the equipment with newer portal monitors that would be capable 

of detecting both gamma and neutron radiation. DOE’s policy was to 

replace this equipment in-kind and wait to upgrade the equipment as part of 

a countrywide deployment through the SLD-Core program. However, 

according to SLD-Core program officials, DOE did not have funds 

earmarked for upgrading the equipment in the absence of a countrywide 

deployment through the SLD-Core program. 

Additionally, SLD-Core program officials stated that DOE would need to 

sign new agreements with the appropriate ministries or agencies within the 

governments of the countries where State and other agencies had 

previously installed equipment before DOE could invest “substantial 

resources” to upgrade the equipment. DOE officials noted that replacing 

the less sophisticated portal monitors with similar equipment usually costs 

20State’s Selective Engagement Policy prohibits a variety of U.S. assistance to Belarus and 

was applied to that country beginning in 1997.
Page 20 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

less than $5,000, plus installation costs, while deploying a comprehensive 

system comprised of portal monitors that can detect both gamma and 

neutron radiation, associated communication systems, and related training 

can cost up to $1 million per site. The agreements are important because 

they exempt DOE from payment of host government taxes, customs duties, 

or other charges per congressional guidance. In addition, these agreements 

require the host government to provide DOE with data on detections of 

illicit trafficking in nuclear materials gathered as a result of assistance DOE 

provided through the SLD-Core program. Though the SLD-Core program 

has signed agreements with some countries where the less sophisticated 

equipment was installed, such as Ukraine, DOE has yet to upgrade any of 

the equipment in these countries, with the exception of one site in 

Azerbaijan, primarily because the details of the countrywide installations 

are still being determined. According to DOE officials, as countries with 

older equipment sign agreements with DOE to implement the full SLD-Core 

program, sites in these countries with less sophisticated equipment will be 

upgraded.

In November 2005, DOE completed an assessment of the maintenance 

activities it performs on equipment provided by other U.S. agencies. DOE 

found that equipment failures at many of these sites go unattended, often 

for months. DOE determined that its maintenance of X-ray vans previously 

provided by State was not critical to the mission of the SLD-Core program. 

As a result, DOE is planning to phase out its maintenance of X-ray vans 

after fiscal year 2007. According to DOE officials, the budget of the SLDCore program cannot sustain what DOE considers “non-mission critical 

work.” In fiscal year 2005, DOE bore the full financial responsibility for all 

maintenance activities because State provided no funding to DOE for this 

work. In addition to the X-ray vans, DOE evaluated the sites where portal 

monitors were previously installed by State and other agencies and 

identified those monitors that should no longer be supported by the SLDCore program. DOE assessed each location where less sophisticated portal 

monitors are maintained and prioritized which sites should receive 

upgraded equipment. DOE plans to work with State to upgrade selected 

sites and decommission some sites that have equipment that is not being 

used or is beyond repair.
Page 21 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Concerns Exist About 

Maintenance of Some 

Handheld Radiation 

Detection Equipment 

DOE and State signed an interagency agreement in 2002 giving 

responsibility for maintaining most radiation detection equipment 

previously installed by State and other U.S. agencies to DOE. However, this 

agreement did not make DOE responsible for maintaining handheld 

radiation detection equipment previously deployed by these agencies. State 

has also not assumed responsibility for maintaining about 1,000 handheld 

radiation detectors provided by its programs that are vital to border 

officials for conducting secondary inspections of vehicles and pedestrians, 

and, as a result, much of this equipment is in disrepair.21 For example, at 

one site in Georgia, we observed border guards performing secondary 

inspections with a handheld radiation detector, previously provided by 

State, which had not been calibrated since 1997 (see fig. 3). According to 

the detector’s manufacturer, yearly recalibration is necessary to ensure that 

the detector functions properly. Furthermore, DOE officials we spoke with 

told us that—similar to radiation portal monitors—handheld radiation 

detection devices require periodic maintenance checks and recalibration to 

ensure that they remain operable and continue to meet minimum detection 

standards. 

21In addition to the handheld radiation detection equipment cited above, about 900 radiation 

pagers were also previously provided by State and other U.S. agencies. However, according 

to DOE and State officials, radiation pagers generally require little maintenance and have a 

relatively low replacement cost compared with radioactive isotope identification devices or 

other handheld radiation detection equipment used for conducting secondary inspections. 
Page 22 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 3: Handheld Radiation Detector in Georgia Needing Recalibration

Batteries used in some handheld radiation detection equipment typically 

need to be replaced every 2 years and some types of handhelds are fragile 

and can be easily broken, requiring that replacement devices or spare parts 

be readily available. At the request of State, DOE is currently evaluating the 

costs associated with maintaining this handheld equipment. Specifically, 

DOE has asked its contractor currently responsible for maintaining the 

portal monitors and X-ray vans in these countries to develop a proposal for 

assuming responsibility for maintenance of the handheld equipment as 

well. According to DOE officials, maintenance of handheld equipment 

could be conducted during regularly scheduled visits for maintenance of

Source: GAO.
Page 23 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

portal monitors and X-ray vans.22 As a result, DOE officials believe that no 

additional travel funds would be required for this activity. However, DOE 

officials also told us that if they were to assume full responsibility for 

maintaining the handheld equipment at sites where they are maintaining 

radiation portal monitors installed by State and other agencies they would 

need additional funding for labor and to provide replacement equipment 

and spare parts. 

Limited Infrastructure and 

Harsh Environmental 

Conditions at Some Border 

Sites Pose Equipment 

Problems

Limited infrastructure and harsh environmental conditions at some foreign 

border sites create challenges to the installation and operation of radiation 

detection equipment. For example, many border sites are located in remote 

areas, which often do not have access to reliable supplies of electricity, 

fiber optic lines, and other infrastructure needed to operate radiation 

portal monitors and associated communication systems. Prior to providing 

radiation portal monitors, U.S. programs typically perform site 

assessments to determine the details surrounding how radiation detection 

equipment will be installed at a given site. The assessment includes the 

operational needs of the equipment depending on the infrastructure 

available at the site. To address the needs identified, DOE, DOD, and State 

provide generators at some sites to supply electricity to the radiation 

detection equipment because the electric power supply shuts down 

periodically or may be very low at these remote sites. Additionally, the 

communication systems that are provided to report activities from the 

radiation detectors require fiber optic cabling for their operation. If no 

cabling exists, underground cabling or radio wave operated 

communication systems must be installed to perform this function. Finally, 

at some border sites, the radiation portal monitors are located significant 

distances from the control and communication system center. U.S. 

program officials we spoke with expressed concern that theft could occur 

because of the remote location of this equipment. To prevent such 

interference with the equipment, antitampering measures such as 

protective cages are used to protect the integrity of the portal monitors 

(see fig. 4).

22DOE officials noted that, during regular site visits to conduct maintenance on radiation 

portal monitors, DOE maintenance teams often are asked by the host government to 

maintain handheld radiation detection equipment provided by other U.S. programs. DOE 

officials also stated that although this work is outside the scope of DOE’s responsibility, 

when time and funding permit, DOE maintenance teams have replaced some dysfunctional 

equipment on a case-by-case basis.
Page 24 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 4: Rail Portal Monitor in Western Uzbekistan with Antitampering Protection 

Additionally, environmental conditions at some sites, such as extreme heat, 

can compromise the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment. 

Extreme heat can accelerate the degradation of components within

Source: DOD.
Page 25 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

radiation detection equipment and, as a result, can affect the performance 

and long-term sustainability of the equipment. DOD placed a protective 

casing around the radiation portal monitors it installed in Uzbekistan as a 

heat shield to ensure the effective long-term operation of the equipment 

(see fig. 5). 
Page 26 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 5: Radiation Portal Monitor in Uzbekistan with Heat Shield Enclosure

Source: GAO.
Page 27 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

State’s Efforts to 

Coordinate U.S. 

Assistance Are Limited 

by Deficiencies in the 

Interagency Strategic 

Plan and the Lack of a 

Comprehensive List of 

Equipment Provided by 

U.S. Programs

State coordinates U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance overseas 

through an interagency working group and in-country advisors. However, 

its ability to carry out its role as lead interagency coordinator is limited by 

deficiencies in the strategic plan for interagency coordination and by its 

lack of a comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation detection assistance. 

Specifically, the interagency strategic plan lacks key components, such as 

overall program cost estimates, projected time frames for program 

completion, and specific performance measures. Additionally, State has not 

maintained accurate information on the operational status and location of 

all radiation detection equipment provided by U.S. programs. 

State Coordinates U.S. 

Radiation Detection 

Equipment Assistance 

through an Interagency 

Working Group and InCountry Advisors

As the lead coordinator of U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance 

overseas, State has taken some steps to coordinate the efforts of U.S. 

programs that provide this type of assistance to foreign countries. State’s 

coordination takes place primarily through two methods: an interagency 

working group and State’s in-country advisors. The main coordination 

mechanism for U.S. radiation detection assistance programs is the 

interagency working group, chaired by State, which consists of program 

representatives from DOE, DOD, State, and DHS. According to State, this 

working group holds meetings about once every 2 months to coordinate the 

activities of U.S. programs that provide radiation detection equipment and 

export control assistance overseas. These interagency meetings attempt to 

identify and prevent overlap among the various U.S. programs through 

discussion of such issues as funding, upcoming program activities, and 

recent trips to countries receiving U.S. assistance. Meetings are attended 

by program managers responsible for overseeing and implementing 

radiation detection equipment assistance programs in foreign countries. 

While DOD and DOE officials we spoke with told us that these interagency 

meetings are somewhat beneficial, they stated that meetings primarily 

facilitate coordination at a high level and typically lack the specific detail 

necessary to identify and prevent program overlap within countries and 

regions where multiple U.S. programs provide radiation detection 

equipment assistance. Through this working group, State also maintains an 

interagency schedule that provides information on planned activities, 

training, and site visits of U.S. programs. 

State also coordinates U.S. programs through in-country advisors, 

stationed in more than 20 foreign countries. While State funds these 
Page 28 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

advisors, State officials told us that they work on behalf of all U.S. 

programs that provide nuclear detection assistance in their respective 

countries. According to State officials, these advisors serve as the on-theground coordinators of U.S. export control and border security assistance 

and are the primary sources of information concerning past and present 

provision of U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance in their 

respective countries. State officials also noted that frequent informal 

coordination takes place between program managers at State and their 

counterparts in Washington, D.C., at other federal agencies.

In addition to State’s coordination efforts, DHS recently created the 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) with responsibilities including 

coordinating nuclear detection research and developing a global nuclear 

detection architecture.23 According to DHS, though DNDO is principally 

focused on domestic detection, its coordinating work will enhance U.S. 

efforts overseas through the design of a global nuclear detection 

architecture implemented under current agency responsibilities. Equally, 

while detection technologies developed by DNDO will be directed 

primarily by operational requirements for domestic applications, many 

technologies developed could have application in overseas radiation 

detection equipment assistance programs. However, DOE, DOD, and State 

officials we spoke with were unclear on what specific future role DNDO 

would play in coordinating activities of U.S. programs that provide 

radiation detection equipment assistance to foreign countries. These 

agencies are working with DNDO to clarify the future role that the office 

will play.

The Interagency Strategic 

Plan to Coordinate U.S. 

Radiation Detection 

Equipment Assistance 

Overseas Lacks Key 

Components

In 2002, we reported that U.S. efforts to help other countries combat 

nuclear smuggling needed strengthened coordination and planning to link 

U.S. programs through common goals and objectives, strategies and time 

frames for providing assistance, and performance measures for evaluating

23According to DHS, other responsibilities of DNDO include the (1) acquisition and supportto-deployment of the domestic detection system, (2) enhancement of effective sharing and 

use of nuclear detection-related information and intelligence, and (3) establishment of 

procedures and training for the end users of equipment developed and deployed through the 

new office.
Page 29 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

the effectiveness of U.S. assistance.24 State, as the lead coordinator of U.S. 

nuclear detection assistance overseas, led the development of a 

governmentwide interagency strategic plan to guide the efforts of U.S. 

programs that provide this assistance.25 The plan broadly defines a set of 

interagency goals and objectives, establishes minimum technological 

standards for radiation detection equipment that U.S. programs provide, 

and outlines the roles and responsibilities of each agency. However, the 

plan does not include several elements necessary to effectively link U.S. 

programs together, prevent duplication, and guide their efforts toward 

completion. 

While the plan provides U.S. agencies with a broad framework for 

coordinating this type of assistance by defining a set of interagency goals 

and outlining the roles and responsibilities of each agency, it does not 

include specific performance measures, overall program cost estimates, or 

projected time frames for program completion. Without incorporating 

these key elements into its plan, State will be limited in its ability, as lead 

coordinator, to effectively link U.S. programs and guide their efforts toward 

achieving interagency goals. For example, a primary goal in its plan is that 

recipient countries possess a comprehensive capability to detect and 

interdict illicitly trafficked nuclear and radiological material. However, 

without incorporating specific performance measures into its plan, State 

has no transparent way to effectively measure the performance of U.S. 

programs in this regard or to determine the degree to which they are 

reaching this or other interagency goals discussed in its plan. Finally, 

without incorporating overall program cost estimates and time frames for 

program completion into its plan, State cannot effectively determine the 

amount of U.S. government resources that will be required to achieve 

interagency goals and objectives or under what time frames these 

resources will be required. If State does not take steps to include these key 

elements in its plan, it will continue to be limited in its ability to effectively 

track the progress of U.S. programs, measure their performance toward 

achieving interagency goals and objectives, and determine the amount of 

24For additional details on the findings and recommendations discussed in our prior report, 

see GAO-02-426.

25The Strategic Plan For Interagency Coordination of U.S. Government Nuclear Detection 

Assistance Overseas is intended to complement the existing program management plans of 

all participating agencies, which include DOE, DOD, State, DHS, and the Department of 

Commerce. DHS and Commerce are implementers of parts of State’s EXBS program and 

thus were included as signatories to the plan.
Page 30 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

funding required to achieve these goals and under what time frames these 

resources will be needed.

State Has Not Maintained 

Accurate Information on All 

Previously Provided 

Handheld Equipment, 

Which Inhibits Its Ability to 

Effectively Coordinate U.S. 

Assistance

State, in its role as lead interagency coordinator, has not maintained 

accurate information on the operational status and location of all the 

handheld radiation detection equipment previously provided by U.S. 

programs. While DOE has taken responsibility for maintaining information 

on previously deployed U.S.-funded radiation portal monitors, State 

primarily works through its in-country advisors and its interagency 

working group to gather and maintain information on handheld radiation 

detection equipment provided by U.S. programs. State, through its EXBS 

program, assumed direct management of the in-country advisors from DHS 

in February 2005. As part of their duties, State’s in-country advisors are 

required to maintain a record of the transfer of all U.S.-provided 

export/border control equipment, including radiation detection equipment, 

within their respective countries and to follow up to ensure it is at the 

locations specified by the recipient government and is properly maintained. 

However, four of the nine advisors we spoke with, who are stationed in 

countries that have received a combined total of about 1,000 pieces of 

handheld radiation detection equipment from U.S. programs, 

acknowledged that they did not have up-to-date information regarding the 

present operational status or location of this equipment. Additionally, five 

of nine advisors we spoke with were unaware that, as part of their duties, 

they are required to maintain a record of all U.S.-provided equipment 

within their country. However, some advisors we spoke with stated that 

they attempt to determine this information but are sometimes limited in 

their ability to do so because other U.S. programs have not always 

coordinated with them before providing equipment in their country. As a 

result, it is necessary for some advisors to follow up with the host 

government to determine the status and location of U.S.-provided radiation 

detection equipment. According to some advisors, however, host 

governments may not always provide accurate information on what 

equipment has been provided in the past, where it is currently located, and 

its current operational status.

According to State officials, there is no comprehensive interagency list of 

radiation detection equipment that has been previously provided to foreign 

governments by U.S. programs. In 2002, we recommended that State, as the 

lead interagency coordinator, work with DOE and DOD to develop such a 

list. Officials we spoke with at DOE and DOD stated that having access to 

accurate information on past provisions of all radiation detection 
Page 31 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

equipment provided by U.S. programs is essential to interagency 

coordination, preventing overlap among programs, as well as appropriately 

assessing a specific country’s equipment needs. During the course of our 

review, program officials at DOE, DOD, and State provided us with lists of 

radiation detection equipment their programs had provided to other 

countries. According to information we received from program managers 

at DOE, DOD, and State, more than 7,000 pieces of handheld radiation 

detection equipment, including radiation pagers and radioactive isotope 

identification devices, had been provided to 36 foreign countries through 

the end of fiscal year 2005. Because much of this equipment was provided 

to the same countries by multiple agencies and programs, it is difficult to 

determine the degree to which duplication of effort has occurred. For 

example, since fiscal year 1994, a total of 17 different countries have 

received handheld radiation detection equipment from more than one U.S. 

agency. However, although DOE, DOD, and State programs each maintain 

their own lists of radiation detection equipment provided to foreign 

countries, officials at these agencies told us that they do not regularly share 

such information with each other. Without the development of a 

comprehensive interagency list of U.S.-funded radiation detection 

equipment, program managers at DOE, DOD, and State cannot accurately 

assess the equipment needs of countries where they plan to provide 

assistance, may unknowingly provide duplicative sets of equipment, and 

cannot determine if the equipment is being used for its intended purpose or 

is in need of maintenance and repair.

Conclusions Since the mid-1990s, DOE, DOD, and State have spent about $178 million to 

provide a variety of radiation detection equipment to countries around the 

world, and it is important that this equipment be properly maintained so 

that it can be effectively used to combat nuclear smuggling overseas. Since 

taking over responsibility for maintaining portal monitors deployed by 

other agencies in 2002, DOE has worked to ensure that this equipment is 

functioning and being used as intended. However, because DOE’s 

interagency maintenance agreement with State did not include maintaining 

handheld radiation detection equipment previously provided by State and 

other agencies, much of this equipment may not be properly functioning. 

Handheld radiation detection equipment is vital for border officials to 

conduct secondary inspections of vehicles or pedestrians. Without taking 

steps to ensure that all previously provided radiation detection equipment, 

specifically handheld equipment, is adequately maintained and remains 

operational, State cannot ensure the continued effectiveness or long-term 

sustainability of this equipment.
Page 32 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Because corrupt officials could undermine the effectiveness of U.S. 

radiation detection assistance programs overseas by turning off radiation 

detection equipment or not properly responding to alarms, it is important 

for U.S. programs to employ anticorruption efforts, such as multitiered 

communication systems for radiation alarms, training, employee 

dependability programs, and redundant installations of equipment when 

providing such assistance. While we are encouraged that DOE, DOD, and 

State employ some corruption mitigation measures in their programs, DOE 

is still in the process of determining in which countries it will provide these 

specific anticorruption measures and how much such assistance would 

cost to implement. 

In addition, though DOE has maintained less sophisticated radiation portal 

monitors previously deployed by other agencies since 2002, it has not 

upgraded the equipment at any of these sites. As a result, border sites with 

less sophisticated radiation portal monitors are more vulnerable to nuclear 

smuggling than sites with equipment that can detect both gamma and 

neutron radiation. We originally reported on this problem in our May 2002 

report. In its official comments on that report, DOE stated that these less 

sophisticated monitors “are not as reliable [as monitors with both gamma 

and neutron radiation detection capabilities], and have limited or no ability 

to detect shielded plutonium.” Although it is encouraging that DOE has 

recently undertaken an assessment of the equipment it maintains that was 

installed by other U.S. agencies, DOE has not yet improved the neutron 

detection capabilities of any of these less sophisticated monitors, with the 

exception of one site in Azerbaijan. As a result, these sites remain just as 

vulnerable to certain types of nuclear smuggling as they were when we first 

reported this deficiency in May 2002. 

Finally, we believe that, unless key components such as overall program 

cost estimates, projected time frames for completion, and specific 

performance measures are incorporated into the interagency strategic 

plan, State will be limited in its ability to determine the amount of 

resources and time needed to achieve the broader interagency goals 

discussed in its plan or to effectively measure U.S. programs’ progress 

toward achieving these goals. Furthermore, without accurate information 

on the current status and location of radiation detection equipment 

previously provided by U.S. programs, State cannot effectively fulfill its 

role as interagency coordinator of U.S. assistance. Because there are at 

least seven U.S. programs at three federal agencies that provide radiation 

detection equipment to foreign countries, program managers at DOE, DOD, 

and State need access to a “master list” that shows the status and location 
Page 33 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

of all U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance to more accurately 

determine the needs of specific countries and to avoid duplication of effort 

among U.S. programs. Without such a list, the potential exists for programs 

to provide duplicative sets of radiation detection equipment to the same 

country.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To strengthen program management and effectiveness, we recommend that 

the Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National 

Nuclear Security Administration, take the following two actions:

• Integrate projected spending on specific anticorruption measures into 

the long-term cost estimates for the SLD-Core program.

• Upgrade less sophisticated portal monitors previously installed by other 

U.S. agencies where DOE has determined this to be appropriate as soon 

as possible and include funding to accomplish this in DOE’s planning 

and budgeting process.

To strengthen accountability of U.S. radiation detection equipment 

assistance programs, we recommend that the Secretary of State, working 

with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and the Administrator of the 

National Nuclear Security Administration, take the following three actions:

• Ensure continued maintenance of all radiation detection equipment 

provided to foreign governments, including all handheld equipment 

previously provided by State and other agencies.

• Strengthen the Strategic Plan for Interagency Coordination of U.S. 

Government Nuclear Detection Assistance Overseas by including in the 

plan (1) specific performance measures to more effectively track and 

measure the progress U.S. programs are making toward achievement of 

interagency goals and objectives and (2) overall cost estimates and 

projected time frames for completion of U.S. radiation detection 

equipment assistance efforts to determine the amount of U.S. 

government resources required to achieve interagency goals and 

objectives and under what time frames these resources will be required.

• To the extent possible, account for all U.S.-funded radiation detection 

equipment provided to foreign governments, especially handheld 

equipment, by creating, maintaining, and sharing among all agencies a 

comprehensive list of such assistance.
Page 34 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

DOE and State agreed in general with our conclusions and 

recommendations. DOD had no written comments on our report. DOE, 

DOD, and State provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 

appropriate.

In its comments, DOE wrote that it does not believe that our report 

adequately reflects the department’s efforts to maintain handheld radiation 

detection equipment provided by State and other agencies because DOE 

has a process in place to identify and replace handheld equipment used at 

sites where DOE maintains radiation portal monitors installed by State and 

other agencies. However, we believe that the extent of DOE’s program is 

fairly presented because this effort does not cover all handheld equipment 

previously provided by State and other agencies—only equipment at the 

selected sites visited by DOE’s maintenance teams is maintained. Further, 

the current operational status of the vast majority of handheld radiation 

detection equipment previously deployed by State and other agencies 

cannot be determined, in large part, because State has not maintained a 

comprehensive list of such equipment.

In its comments, State disagreed with our lack of emphasis on the 

“informal coordination role played by the department’s front-line country 

program officers.” State considers informal consultations between these 

officials and their interagency counterparts to be the “primary means of 

coordination of its efforts concerning radiation detection equipment 

provisions.” State believes that such informal coordination is “much more 

important than coordination through the interagency working group or 

with State’s in-country advisors.” We have added language to our report 

noting the role of informal coordination in these programs. However, 

State’s emphasis on them as its primary means of coordinating radiation 

detection assistance programs conflicts with its own planning documents. 

In its Strategic Plan for Interagency Coordination of U.S. Government 

Nuclear Detection Assistance Overseas, State claims that “a standing subworking group, the International Nuclear Detection Interagency Working 

Group, will routinely coordinate nuclear detection, interdiction, and 

investigation assistance provided by U.S. government agencies.” State’s 

plan emphasizes the role of the interagency working group and states that 

such coordination is “vital to the overall success of U.S. nuclear detection 

assistance efforts.” State’s plan does not, however, emphasize or even 

mention informal coordination mechanisms as a method for State’s 

coordination of U.S. radiation detection assistance programs. 
Page 35 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

State also believes that its in-country advisors are unfairly criticized for not 

maintaining comprehensive lists of radiation detection equipment in 

countries where they are responsible. State cited competing claims on the 

advisors’ time, their many responsibilities within the EXBS program, and 

the limited resources at their disposal. However, State’s own guidance to its 

in-country advisors states that the advisors’ “general duties 

include...maintaining a record of the transfer of all U.S. governmentprovided nonproliferation export/border control equipment, and followingup to ensure that it is operational, being used for intended purposes at the 

locations previously specified by the recipient government, and in 

accordance with U.S. laws and policies.” 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. We will then send copies of this report to the Secretary of 

Energy; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of 

Homeland Security; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security 

Administration; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and 

interested congressional committees. We also will make copies available to 

others upon request. In addition, the report will be made available at no 

charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the 

last page of this report. Key contributors to this report include R. Stockton 

Butler, Julie Chamberlain, Nancy Crothers, Chris Ferencik, Gregory 

Marchand, and Jim Shafer.

Gene Aloise

Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Page 36 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

List of Requesters

The Honorable Susan M. Collins

Chairman

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Norm Coleman

Chairman

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable John D. Dingell

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

House of Representatives
Page 37 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

We performed our review of U.S. programs that provide radiation detection 

equipment assistance to foreign countries at the Departments of Energy 

(DOE), Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), and State (State) in 

Washington, D.C.; Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New 

Mexico; and Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. 

Additionally, we also visited a “nonprobability” sample of six countries 

(Georgia, Greece, Macedonia, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) where U.S. 

agencies have provided radiation detection equipment.1

 We visited these 

six countries to observe U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment in 

operation and to discuss the implementation of U.S. programs with foreign 

officials. We determined which specific countries to visit based on several 

criteria, such as historic U.S. government spending to provide radiation 

detection equipment within that country; countries receiving radiation 

detection equipment from multiple U.S. agencies and programs; countries 

receiving significant amounts of handheld equipment; countries with an incountry advisor stationed at a U.S. Embassy; countries where DOE 

maintains radiation detection equipment previously installed by State and 

other U.S. agencies; the current political environment within the country; 

and our ability to travel from country to county within a reasonable amount 

of time. 

To address the progress U.S. programs have made in providing radiation 

detection equipment assistance to foreign countries, we reviewed 

documents and had discussions with officials from DOE’s Second Line of 

Defense “Core” (SLD-Core) program, Cooperative Radiological Instrument 

Transfer project, and International Nuclear Export Control program; DOE’s 

Office of General Counsel; and DOE’s private sector contractors—SI 

International, Tetra Tech/Foster Wheeler, Bechtel-Nevada, TSA Systems, 

and Miratek. We also reviewed documents and interviewed relevant 

officials from DHS’s Customs and Border Protection; State’s Export 

Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program, Nonproliferation 

and Disarmament Fund, and Georgia Border Security and Law 

Enforcement program; DOD’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation 

Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI), International Counterproliferation 

Program (ICP), and Defense Threat Reduction Agency; DOD’s private 

sector contractor—Washington Group International; Los Alamos National 

1

Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a 

population, because in a nonprobability sample some elements of the population being 

studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample. 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Laboratory; Sandia National Laboratories; and Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory.

In addition, in October 2004, we visited Greece and Macedonia to interview 

Greek and Macedonian officials and to see U.S. radiation detection 

assistance provided in each country. In August 2005, we visited Georgia, 

Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan to see where U.S. agencies have provided 

radiation detection equipment, to observe U.S.-funded radiation detection 

equipment in operation, and to discuss the implementation of U.S. 

programs with foreign officials. We also visited Belgium to meet with 

officials from the European Union to discuss radiation detection equipment 

assistance provided to foreign countries by that organization. During our 

visit to Greece, we spoke with Greek officials from the Greek Atomic 

Energy Commission; the Greek Ministry of Economy and Finance; and 

Customs Directorate General (Greek Customs Service). While in Greece, 

we toured two border crossings where DOE had installed radiation 

detection equipment through the SLD-Core program, SLD-Core 

installations at Athens International Airport, and a small research reactor 

in Athens that received physical security upgrades from DOE prior to the 

2004 Olympic Games. While in Macedonia, we interviewed Macedonian 

officials and toured one border site where radiation detection equipment 

had previously been provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency 

and the Department of State. 

While in Russia, we spoke with officials from the Federal Customs Service 

of Russia, ASPECT (a Russian company that develops radiation detection 

equipment), and DOE officials responsible for implementing the SLD-Core 

program in Russia. During our visit to Russia, we toured DOE installations 

at three airports and one seaport, the Federal Customs Service Central 

Command Center where Russian Customs officials gather and respond to 

portal monitor alarm data, and the Federal Customs Service Training 

Academy in Saint Petersburg. While in Uzbekistan, we spoke with officials 

from DOD’s WMD-PPI program, Washington Group International, State and 

DOD officials at the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan’s Institute of 

Nuclear Physics, and the Uzbek State Customs Committee. While in 

Uzbekistan, we toured the Tashkent Airport and a land border crossing 

where DOD had provided radiation detection equipment assistance 

through the WMD-PPI program. We also toured a small research reactor in 

Uzbekistan that previously received physical security upgrades from DOE, 

such as barbed-wire fences and video surveillance cameras. During our 

visit to Georgia, we spoke with officials from State’s Georgia Border 

Security and Law Enforcement program, Department of Georgian State 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Border Defense, Georgia Border Security Coordinating Group, and 

Georgia’s Andronikashvili Institute of Nuclear Physics. We toured a land 

border crossing where State had previously provided radiation detection 

equipment and visited the Georgian Border Guard Training Academy. While 

in Ukraine, we spoke with DOE, DOD, and State officials at the U.S. 

Embassy in Kiev, Ukraine’s Border Security Coordinating Group, Ukraine’s 

Border Guard Service, and toured a land border crossing where State had 

previously provided radiation detection equipment that DOE currently 

maintains. 

We discussed coordination issues with U.S. in-country advisors stationed in 

countries receiving U.S. assistance, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, 

Georgia, Kazakhstan, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. We 

developed a structured interview guide with a standard set of questions, 

which we asked all of our interviewees. We designed our interview guide 

with the assistance of a GAO methodologist. The practical difficulties of 

asking questions may introduce other types of errors. For example, 

differences in how a particular question is interpreted or the sources of 

information available to respondents can introduce unwanted variability 

into the responses, so we included steps to minimize such errors. We 

pretested the content and format of the interview guide with two 

individuals and made minor changes as appropriate. 

We chose which specific in-country advisors to interview based on several 

criteria that include advisors who are stationed in the countries we would 

be visiting, advisors who are stationed in countries receiving significant 

amounts of radiation detection equipment from multiple U.S. agencies and 

programs, and advisors who are stationed in countries where DOE 

maintains radiation detection equipment previously installed by State and 

other U.S. agencies. Once we determined which specific advisors to 

interview, we created a list, which we then randomly ordered to provide an 

unbiased approach to conducting our interviews. Our goal was to talk with 

all the advisors on the list, but we knew that circumstances might prevent 

that so we used a randomized list to provide the order of contacting the 

advisors. We initiated contact with each advisor from this list, but if we 

could not establish contact with that advisor, we attempted to establish 

contact with the next advisor on our list. In some instances, we slightly 

modified our list due to unforeseen developments. For example, during our 

visit to the Republic of Georgia, we became aware of a Department of State 

project to install radiation detection equipment in Armenia opposite the 

Georgian border. Since this met our criteria for including a country in our 

pool of interviewees, we agreed it was appropriate, for the purposes of this 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 40 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

review, to add Armenia. We then contacted the in-country advisor stationed 

in Armenia to learn more about this project. In addition, we removed the 

responses from the advisor in Russia from our total list of advisors because 

he failed to respond to more than half of our questions and stated that his 

role in coordinating this type of assistance in Russia is nonexistent because 

DOE, through its SLD-Core program, conducts and coordinates radiation 

detection assistance provided to Russia. Lastly, we interviewed the advisor 

responsible for overseeing implementation of U.S. assistance to the 

Republic of Georgia because Georgia has received radiation detection 

equipment in the past from multiple U.S. programs. To obtain responses to 

our structured interview questions, we generally used e-mail and phone 

interviews. However, during our visits to Georgia and Ukraine, we were 

able to meet with the in-country advisors to obtain responses to our 

questions. 

To assess the current and expected future costs of U.S. programs that 

provide radiation detection equipment assistance to foreign countries, we 

reviewed documents from DOE, DOD, State, and DHS detailing program 

expenditures, projected costs, and schedule estimates. We reviewed 

contract data for expenditures through the end of fiscal year 2005 and met 

numerous times with officials from DOE, DOD, State, and DHS to discuss 

the data. We obtained responses from key database officials to a number of 

questions focused on data reliability covering issues such as data entry 

access, internal control procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of 

the data. Follow-up questions were added whenever necessary. Caveats 

and limitations to the data were noted in the documentation where 

necessary. For example, in our discussions with the DOD official who 

manages its financial database, she stated that program support costs were 

prorated between WMD-PPI’s projects based on usage. Therefore, the 

expenditure amount added for the program support cost for Uzbekistan is a 

reasonable approximation but may not be exact. We determined that the 

data we received were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report 

based on work we performed.

To identify challenges U.S. programs face in deploying and operating 

radiation detection equipment in foreign countries, we examined 

documents and spoke with officials from DOE, DOD, State, DHS, Los 

Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Washington 

Group International, and several nongovernmental entities, including the 

Transnational Crime and Corruption Center at American University. 

Additionally, during our visits to Georgia, Greece, Macedonia, Russia, 

Ukraine, and Uzbekistan we spoke with various foreign officials to better 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 41 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

understand the challenges they face in operating radiation detection 

equipment provided by U.S. programs. We also attended a National 

Academies of Science conference on nonintrusive technologies for 

improving the security of containerized maritime cargo and the National 

Cargo Security Council conference on radiation detection and screening. 

To understand the steps U.S. programs take to coordinate radiation 

detection equipment assistance provided by multiple U.S. programs, we 

met with program officials from each of the agencies providing assistance 

and reviewed pertinent documents, including individual agency’s 

assistance plans and State’s Strategic Plan for Interagency Coordination 

of U.S. Government Nuclear Detection Assistance Overseas. We also 

assessed coordination through the interagency group headed by State and 

met with the lead official of that effort—the Director of Export Control and 

Cooperation—and members of his staff. We discussed coordination issues 

with U.S. advisors stationed in countries receiving U.S. assistance including 

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Malta, Moldova, Poland, 

Romania, and Ukraine. Several of these advisors were responsible for 

tracking assistance efforts in more than one country. For example, the 

advisor stationed in Poland is also responsible for Estonia, Latvia, and 

Lithuania. Finally, we relied on our previous reviews of the U.S. 

nonproliferation programs within DOE, DOD, and State. At State, we 

interviewed the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia and 

met with officials from the Bureau of International Security and 

Nonproliferation. We also relied on related prior GAO reports. We 

performed our review from April 2005 to February 2006 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 42 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Appendix II

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of Energy ApendxiI

The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Second Line of Defense “Core” 

program provides comprehensive radiation detection equipment packages 

to foreign countries to combat nuclear smuggling. Its associated 

maintenance program focuses on maintaining equipment previously 

provided by the Department of State and other U.S. agencies. In addition, 

DOE implements another program within its Office of Global Threat 

Reduction that provides handheld radiation detection equipment to foreign 

countries. 

Second Line of Defense 

“Core” Program

In 1998, DOE established the Second Line of Defense “Core” (SLD-Core) 

program, which has primarily worked to help Russia detect illicit nuclear 

materials trafficking by providing radiation detection equipment to the 

Federal Customs Service of Russia. DOE recently expanded its efforts in 

the SLD-Core program to include countries other than Russia. SLD-Core 

activities focus on providing radiation detection equipment, software and 

hardware communications equipment and support, and training/processes 

to foreign countries’ border sites. The radiation detection equipment DOE 

provides is U.S.-made, except in Russia where Russian-made equipment is 

installed. The communication systems DOE installs provide important 

information on the radiation detector alarms, such as the radiation profile 

of the substance detected. In addition to training at sites where equipment 

is installed, DOE provides other training courses at the Hazardous 

Materials Management and Emergency Response training center at Pacific 

Northwest National Laboratory. 

Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE’s SLD-Core program had 

completed installation of radiation portal monitors at 83 sites in Greece, 

Lithuania, and Russia at a cost of about $130 million. In fiscal year 2005, 

DOE planned to complete 29 sites in seven countries: Azerbaijan, Georgia, 

Kazakhstan, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. However, due to delays in 

signing implementing agreements with the governments of some of these 

countries, many of these sites were not completed. As of December 2005, 

DOE had signed implementing agreements with Azerbaijan, Georgia, 

Slovenia, and Ukraine, and plans to commence work in these countries in 

fiscal year 2006 (see fig. 6). Additionally, the SLD-Core program will be 

installing radiation detection equipment at some foreign ports, referred to 

as “feeder” ports, to assist the work done by DOE’s Megaports Initiative.1

1

For more information on the Megaports Initiative, see GAO-05-375.
Appendix II

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of Energy 

Page 43 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 6: Map of Countries Where DOE’s SLD-Core Program Has Installed 

Equipment and Signed Agreements to Begin Work

DOE has been cooperating with the Federal Customs Service of Russia 

since 1998, and, coupled with the large number of sites where Russia has 

installed equipment on its own, the nature of DOE’s work through the SLDCore program in Russia is evolving. DOE is transitioning its activities in 

Russia from installation of new equipment to sustainability of equipment it 

has previously installed. DOE and the Federal Customs Service of Russia 

signed an agreement in April 2005 that details plans for the long-term 

sustainability of radiation detection equipment DOE has provided to 

Russia. DOE is also now supporting other activities in Russia, such as 

regional radiation alarm response exercises and rechecks of previously 

installed equipment.

Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE spent about $66 million installing 

radiation portal monitors at 78 border sites in Russia, 4 sites in Greece, 1 

site in Lithuania, and to conduct preliminary site assessments in other 

countries. DOE spent about $50 million on various program integration 

activities, which are costs not directly associated with installing equipment 

at a particular site within a specific country. Of this amount, about $15 

Greece

Lithuania

Ukraine

Georgia

Azerbaijan Russia

Slovenia

Source: DOE.

Countries where DOE has installed equipment

Countries where DOE has signed agreements

to begin work
Appendix II

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of Energy 

Page 44 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

million was spent on advanced equipment procurement activities, which 

include the purchase and storage of portal monitors and associated spare 

parts for use at future installations. DOE also spent almost $16 million on 

program oversight activities, such as program cost and schedule 

estimating, technical assistance provided by participating national 

laboratories, and translation services. In addition, DOE spent over $5 

million to develop and maintain its prioritization model for the SLD-Core 

program, maintained by Los Alamos National Laboratory, which is used to 

rank foreign countries, as well as specific sites within a country, in terms of 

their attractiveness to a potential nuclear material smuggler. DOE also 

spent about $4 million on equipment testing and evaluation to test the 

effectiveness and performance of the radiation detection equipment that it 

provides through the program. DOE spent over $8 million on the 

development of materials and curricula for training foreign customs agents 

on the use of radiation detection equipment.2

 Finally, DOE spent almost $2 

million on other program integration activities. See figure 7 for more 

information on program integration expenditures.

2

Additionally, some of these funds were spent to pay for training of U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection officials at the Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency Response 

training center at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.
Appendix II

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of Energy 

Page 45 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 7: DOE Spending on the SLD-Core Program through the End of Fiscal Year 2005 

Note: Figures have been rounded.

DOE’s Maintenance of 

Equipment Previously Installed 

by Other U.S. Agencies

In 2002, DOE assumed the responsibility for maintaining certain radiation 

detection equipment, such as radiation portal monitors and X-ray vans with 

gamma radiation detection capability, previously installed in 23 countries 

by State and other U.S. agencies (see fig. 8). Through the end of fiscal year 

2005, DOE has successfully conducted maintenance and sustainability 

activities for this equipment in 21 of 23 countries.3

 DOE contractors service 

these radiation portal monitors annually and X-ray vans biannually. Since 

2002, DOE has spent about $8 million to provide spare parts, preventative

4%

Other countries ($5.4)

Russia, Greece, and

Lithuania ($65.5)

Maintenance ($8.4)

Program

integration

costs ($50.2)

32%

17%

30%

8%

10%

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data.

6%

39%

51%

Advanced equipment

procurement ($15.0)

Program oversight ($16.1)

Training ($8.4)

Prioritization model ($5.1)

Equipment testing 

and evaluation ($3.9)

4%

Other ($1.8)

Dollars in millions

3

DOE officials told us that, although Belarus has received a significant amount of radiation 

detection equipment from U.S. programs, it is currently prohibited from maintaining this 

equipment due to restrictions placed on U.S. assistance to Belarus through State’s Selective 

Engagement Policy, which was instituted in 1997. Additionally, at the request of the 

government of Turkey, DOE no longer maintains radiation detection equipment provided to 

that country by State.
Appendix II

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of Energy 

Page 46 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

maintenance, and repairs for this equipment.4 DOE anticipates that the 

future scope of the maintenance program will be reduced as the SLD-Core 

program expands into countries where equipment was previously installed 

by other U.S. agencies. 

4

State, through an interagency agreement with DOE, annually provides DOE with a portion 

of the funding required to maintain the equipment that State and other U.S. agencies 

previously installed. Through fiscal year 2005, State has provided DOE with approximately 

$3.2 million, which has been about one-third of the required funding necessary to conduct 

these activities. We have included these expenditures in the total expenditures for DOE’s 

SLD-Core program.
Appendix II

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of Energy 

Page 47 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 8: Map of Countries Where DOE Maintains Equipment Previously Provided by 

Other U.S. Agencies

a

DOE has not maintained equipment DOD provided to Belarus.

b

At the request of the government of Turkey, DOE has not maintained equipment State provided to that 

country.

c

State provided Malta with both radiation portal monitors and X-ray vans.

Romania

Moldova

Ukraine

Cyprus

Turkeyb Maltac

Bulgaria

Turkmenistan Kyrgyzstan

Lithuania

Latvia

Belarusa

Estonia

Armenia

Georgia

Slovakia Azerbaijan

Uzbekistan

Kazakhstan

Slovenia

Poland

Hungary

Czech Republic

Source: DOE.

Radiation portal monitors

X-ray vans

Radiation portal monitors and X-ray vans
Appendix II

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of Energy 

Page 48 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

If DOE is notified that there are problems with the radiation portal 

monitors in a certain country, they will add this repair onto a scheduled 

maintenance trip of a nearby country. According to the DOE maintenance 

contractor, this occurs 5-6 times a year. However, DOE officials often are 

not made aware of specific problems with equipment prior to arriving at 

the site to conduct regular servicing. As a result, DOE’s maintenance teams 

must be equipped with a wide variety of components in the event that 

major repairs are required. At times, maintenance teams have had to 

improvise temporary repairs for equipment due to a lack of necessary 

replacement parts. For example, during our visit to a border site in 

Ukraine, DOE’s maintenance team discovered that a truck had struck and 

damaged a pole holding the wiring for the radiation detection equipment’s 

communication systems. The truck’s impact caused the wiring to snap in 

numerous places. Because the maintenance team was unaware of this 

damage prior to our arrival at the site, it had to repair the cable using 

connectors rather than replacing the entire wire as they would have 

preferred to do. DOE officials told us that, during the next scheduled 

maintenance visit to this site, the wiring will be replaced. 

Cooperative Radiological 

Instrument Transfer Project

In 2004, DOE established the Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer 

project (CRITr) within its Global Threat Reduction Initiative.5

 In this 

project, DOE partners with Interpol, which provides knowledge of foreign 

law enforcement to determine the countries to select for assistance and 

coordinates all CRITr training logistics within its member countries.6

Through the CRITr project, DOE collects and refurbishes handheld 

radiation detection devices deemed surplus by DOE national laboratories 

and provides this equipment to first responders in foreign countries. The 

handheld radiation detection equipment DOE provides through CRITr

5

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative consolidated DOE’s efforts to identify, secure, 

remove, and/or facilitate disposition of high-risk nuclear and other radioactive materials 

around the world that pose a potential threat to the international community. Within this 

office, DOE’s International Radiological Threat Reduction program works to locate, identify, 

recover, consolidate, and enhance the security of dangerous radioactive materials outside 

the United States.

6

Interpol is the largest international police organization focusing on cross border police 

cooperation.
Appendix II

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of Energy 

Page 49 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

consists mostly of survey meters and does not include radiation pagers.7 In 

addition to providing radiation detection equipment through the CRITr 

project, DOE provides training for foreign officials on how to use the 

equipment. DOE originally provided assistance through the CRITr project 

in Greece by providing over 100 handheld radiation detection devices prior 

to the Olympic Games in 2004. According to DOE officials, in fiscal year 

2004, with Interpol’s assistance, DOE selected seven additional countries to 

receive assistance through the project: Croatia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Poland, Romania, Turkey, and Uzbekistan (see fig. 9). DOE also provided 

radiation detection equipment to Tanzania in fiscal year 2005. Through the 

CRITr project, DOE spent almost $0.5 million in fiscal year 2004 and almost 

$0.6 million in fiscal year 2005, according to DOE officials. DOE has 

budgeted almost $0.4 million for fiscal year 2006 to supply instruments and 

training to law enforcement officials in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Uganda and to provide 

additional equipment to Tanzania. 

7

In addition to the CRITr project, DOE’s International Radiological Threat Reduction 

program has provided some radiation detection equipment to nuclear regulatory bodies and 

national laboratories in foreign countries. This equipment is intended to help these entities 

locate and identify orphaned radiological sources within their countries, rather than for law 

enforcement purposes. As a result, we did not include this part of DOE’s radiation detection 

assistance in our review.
Appendix II

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of Energy 

Page 50 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 9: Map of Countries Where DOE’s CRITr Project Has Provided and Plans to 

Provide Radiation Detection Equipment 

Croatia

Albania Greece

Poland Bulgaria

Bosnia and Herzegovina Romania

Turkey

Serbia and Montenegro Macedonia

Tanzania

Uzbekistan

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Uganda

Source: DOE.

Countries where DOE has provided equipment

Countries where DOE plans to provide equipment
Page 51 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Appendix III

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of Defense ApendxiI

The Department of Defense (DOD) implements two programs that assist 

other countries in combating nuclear smuggling: the Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI) and the 

International Counterproliferation Program (ICP). As figure 10 shows, 

DOD spent about $22 million on these programs between fiscal years 1994 

and 2005.

Figure 10: DOD Spending on Radiation Detection Equipment Assistance Programs 

through the End of Fiscal Year 2005 

Note: Figures have been rounded.

Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Proliferation 

Prevention Initiative

WMD-PPI was created as a project within the Cooperative Threat 

Reduction Program1

 and is implemented by DOD’s Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency with oversight and policy guidance from the Office of

WMD-PPI ($7.9)

ICP ($14.5)

35%

65%

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Dollars in millions

1

Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-228 

(1991), popularly referred to as the Nunn-Lugar Act, authorizing U.S. threat reduction 

assistance to the former Soviet Union, due to concerns about the safety and security of 

Soviet nuclear weapons. The legislation authorized funding to assist the former Soviet 

Union with its efforts to (1) destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; (2) transport, 

store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and (3) 

establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons. 
Appendix III

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of Defense

Page 52 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. In the 2003 National Defense 

Authorization Act, the Congress created WMD-PPI with a $40 million 

budget to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

and related materials and technologies from the former Soviet Union.2

WMD-PPI seeks to accomplish this mission through three projects: the 

Uzbekistan Land Border project, the Caspian Sea Maritime Proliferation 

Prevention project in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine Land 

and Maritime Border projects. 

• In Uzbekistan, DOD is installing radiation portal monitors at 17 sites; 11 

of which were completed by the end of fiscal year 2005. To date, WMDPPI has spent over $6 million to install radiation portal monitors in 

Uzbekistan. However, this spending total is misleading because DOD 

has obligated over $19 million to three contracts for program costs 

associated with installing radiation detection equipment, such as 

communication systems and training. Because DOD only executes 

spending on these contracts after all work has been completed, these 

contracts were not paid in fiscal year 2005. DOD projects that the 

Uzbekistan Portal Monitoring project will cost about $54 million and be 

completed in fiscal year 2009. Once these portal monitors are installed 

in fiscal year 2006, DOE will maintain the equipment within its Second 

Line of Defense “Core” program. 

• The Caspian Sea project focuses on improving command and control, 

surveillance, detection and interception of WMD, operation, and 

sustainability along the Caspian Sea border by providing training and 

associated equipment, including handheld radiation detection devices. 

In Azerbaijan, the project’s cost is estimated at $63.4 million and, in 

Kazakhstan, it is estimated at $60.6 million.

• In Ukraine, WMD-PPI is implementing a similar project along the Black 

Sea border. The Maritime Border Security Project in Ukraine is expected 

to cost over $39 million and will be finished in fiscal year 2009. The 

Ukrainian Land Border Forces Proliferation Prevention project focuses 

on securing the points of entry and the green border—border that is not 

a formal crossing point between countries—between Moldova and 

Ukraine. It seeks to improve Ukraine’s capabilities to detect and 

interdict WMD and related materials by providing equipment and 

training. Radiation detection equipment, such as pagers, is included in 

2

Pub. L. No. 107-314 (2002).
Appendix III

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of Defense

Page 53 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

this equipment assistance. DOD expects this project will cost over $51 

million and be completed in fiscal year 2008. 

Figure 11: Map of Countries Where DOD’s WMD-PPI Program Has Provided 

Radiation Detection Equipment or Signed Agreements to Install Equipment

International 

Counterproliferation 

Program

The 1995 National Defense Authorization Act directed DOD and the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation to establish a program to improve efforts 

to deter the possible proliferation and acquisition of WMD and related 

materials across the borders and through the former Soviet Union, the 

Baltic region, and Eastern Europe.3

 Similarly, the 1997 National Defense 

Authorization Act directed DOD to work with U.S. Customs to carry out 

programs to assist customs officials and border guards in those regions in 

preventing unauthorized transfer and transportation of WMD and related 

materials.4

 DOD established ICP in response to these requirements. The 

Ukraine Azerbaijan

Uzbekistan

Kazakhstan

Source: DOD.

Countries where DOD has installed equipment

Country where DOD has signed an agreement

to begin work

3

Pub. L. No. 103-337 (1994).

4

Pub. L. No. 104-201 (1996).
Appendix III

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of Defense

Page 54 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

program is implemented by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 

According to DOD officials, ICP policy guidance comes from DOD’s 

Eurasia Department because of its strong ties and contacts within the 

regional scope of the program. Through ICP, DOD provides a range of law 

enforcement and border security training and equipment, including 

handheld radiation detection equipment, to foreign law enforcement 

officials in participating countries. According to an ICP official, the 

program does not currently provide much radiation detection equipment 

because, in many countries, other U.S. programs have already provided 

such equipment. ICP coordinates with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

to conduct training of foreign government personnel. In some participating 

countries, ICP provides both equipment and training, and in others it 

provides only training, depending upon the needs of the country. 

Through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOD had spent over $14 million to 

provide radiation detection equipment and radiation detection training to 

foreign countries through ICP. Of this amount, DOD spent over $0.5 million 

to provide handheld radiation detection equipment to six countries (see fig. 

12). The remaining funds were spent on a variety of training related to 

radiation detection, WMD interdiction, and crime scene investigation.5

Figure 13 shows the flowchart of training DOD provides to participating 

countries through ICP. 

5

Most ICP training courses do not focus solely on radiation detection training but have a 

module during the training on radiation detection. Therefore, according to a DOD official, 

breaking out the specific cost of radiation detection training is difficult. Only one ICP 

training course focuses solely on radiation detection.
Appendix III

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of Defense

Page 55 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 12: Map of Countries Where DOD’s ICP Has Provided Radiation Detection 

Equipment

Kyrgyzstan

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Lithuania

Latvia

Ukraine

Estonia

Armenia

Georgia

Slovakia Azerbaijan

Uzbekistan

Kazakhstan

Slovenia

Hungary

Romania

Moldova

Bulgaria

Serbia and Montenegro

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Croatia

Macedonia

Albania

Source: DOD.

Equipment and training provided

Training provided
Appendix III

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of Defense

Page 56 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 13: Flowchart of ICP Training Courses

According to ICP officials, the program has worked in 23 countries, 

including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia and 

Montenegro, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. In the National Defense

Policy visits

WMD executive seminar

Border security and 

WMD investigations

Counterproliferation 

infrastructure planning

WMD evidence awareness

and management

● WMD executive seminar

● Terrorism and proliferation of WMD

● WMD crisis incident management

● WMD criminal investigations

● Combating WMD proliferation at 

maritime ports

● Counterproliferation awareness

● Dual use and specialized equipment

● International WMD investigations

● WMD investigative analysis

● Counterproliferation data analysis

● WMD detection and interdiction

● Controlled delivery

● Undercover investigation operations

● WMD cyber crimes

● Tracking training

● WMD threat management

● WMD crime scene operations

● WMD crime scene management

● WMD crisis incident management

● Radiological detection and 

response

● Advanced WMD crime scene 

operations

Responding to incidents

at borders exercise Integrated WMD field exercise

WMD crisis:

command center exercise

Expanded integrated exercise

Regional exercise

Follow-up visits and training

WMD crime scene

skills recertification

Source: DOD.
Appendix III

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of Defense

Page 57 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2005,6 DOD was given permission by the 

Congress to expand ICP’s scope outside of the original region. According to 

a DOD official, ICP plans to initiate programs in Malaysia, Singapore, and 

Pakistan. 

6

Pub. L. No. 108-375 (2004).
Page 58 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Appendix IV

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of State ApendxiIV

Since fiscal year 1994, the Department of State (State) has provided various 

types of radiation detection equipment assistance to 31 foreign countries. 

State has provided this assistance, primarily through three programs (1) 

the Export Control and Related Border Security program (EXBS), (2) the 

Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), and (3) the Georgia 

Border Security and Law Enforcement program (GBSLE). As figure 14 

shows, State spent about $25 million from fiscal year 1994 through fiscal 

year 2005 on radiation detection equipment assistance to foreign countries.

Figure 14: State Spending on Radiation Detection Equipment Assistance Programs 

through the End of Fiscal Year 2005

Note: Figures have been rounded.

1%

GBSLE ($0.2)

NDF ($9.1)

EXBS ($15.4)

37%

62%

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Dollars in millions
Appendix IV

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of State 

Page 59 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Export Control and Related 

Border Security Program

State’s Export Control and Related Border Security program, which began 

in 1998, is a comprehensive U.S. government effort to help foreign 

countries improve their export controls and border security capabilities.1

The program provides a broad array of assistance to foreign countries, 

such as workshops to assist foreign countries draft and implement new 

export control laws and regulations, as well as various types of equipment 

and training for foreign border control agencies. Assistance provided 

through the program focuses on five core areas: (1) laws and regulations, 

(2) licensing, (3) enforcement, (4) government and industry cooperation, 

and (5) interagency cooperation and coordination. While the original focus 

of the program was to provide assistance to potential “source countries” in 

the former Soviet Union or to countries that produce munitions or dual-use 

items,2 State later expanded the program’s focus to include states on 

potential smuggling routes in Eastern and Central Europe, East Asia, 

Central Asia, the Caucasus, Latin America, and Africa, as well as potential 

“source countries” in South Asia and countries with major transshipment 

hubs in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Through the 

end of fiscal year 2005, State has spent $15.4 million to provide a variety of 

radiation detection equipment assistance to 30 countries (see fig. 15).

1

State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation manages the Export Control 

and Related Border Security program. In 1998, an export control assistance account was 

established as part of the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-Mining and Related Programs 

account of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. Pub. L. No. 105-118 (1997). In fiscal 

year 2000, this program evolved into the Export Control and Related Border Security 

program. 

2

A “source country” is a country known to possess material that can be used to develop a 

weapon of mass destruction. For example, a country known to possess plutonium or highly 

enriched uranium would be considered a “source country.” 
Appendix IV

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of State 

Page 60 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 15: Map of Countries Where State’s Export Control and Related Border 

Security Program Has Provided Radiation Detection Equipment

Romania

Moldova

Cyprus

Malta

Bulgaria

Jordan

Serbia and Montenegro

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Macedonia

Kyrgyzstan

India

Afghanistan

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Lithuania

Latvia

Ukraine

Estonia

Armenia

Georgia

Slovakia Azerbaijan

Uzbekistan

Kazakhstan

Slovenia

Poland

Hungary

Czech Republic

United

Arab

Emirates

Albania

Source: State.
Appendix IV

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of State 

Page 61 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

In addition, State also provided funding to the Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (formerly known as U.S. 

Customs) to implement certain types of radiation detection equipment 

assistance on behalf of its Export Control and Related Border Security 

program. Specifically, from fiscal year 1999 through 2005, DHS and its 

predecessor organizations spent about $10.5 million to provide radiation 

detection equipment and training to 30 countries. This equipment included, 

among other things, radiation pagers that border officials wear on their 

belts and radioactive isotope identification devices. Training provided by 

DHS included assistance in operating the X-ray vans equipped with 

radiation detectors, hands-on instruction in using radiation detection 

equipment to detect nuclear smuggling, teaching techniques for 

investigating smuggling operations, and tracking the movements of 

smugglers between ports of entry. In addition, DHS also stationed 22 incountry advisors covering 25 countries, on behalf of the program, to assist 

in implementing and coordinating U.S. government assistance in these 

countries. In February 2005, State, through its EXBS program, assumed 

direct responsibility of the in-country advisors from DHS. According to 

State officials, this management change was done to better address 

coordination and responsiveness issues in the advisor program. 

Russian Federal Customs 

Service Central Command 

Center

In addition to providing radiation detection equipment assistance to foreign 

countries, State has also provided other types of assistance designed to 

better ensure the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment previously 

provided to foreign countries through U.S. programs. Specifically, in fiscal 

year 2005, State, through its EXBS program, spent about $1.5 million to 

fund construction of a national command center for the Federal Customs 

Service of Russia. Through this project, portal monitors located at various 

Russian border sites can be directly linked to a national command center, 

located at Federal Customs Service headquarters in Moscow. By doing so, 

alarm data can be simultaneously evaluated by Russian officials both at the 

site and up the chain of command, thus establishing redundant layers of 

accountability for responding to alarms. For example, when a portal 

monitor alarms at a specific land border site, airport, or seaport, 

information will immediately be sent from the site directly to the command 

center enabling Russian officials to identify which specific site an alarm 

occurred at, quickly analyze it, and respond appropriately. Prior to the 

initiation of this project, the Federal Customs Service did not have an 

effective way to coordinate and integrate all of the information at its 

borders. While the total scope of work to be done at the command center 

has not been clearly defined yet, State officials told us that the primary 

activity will be to maintain and respond to alarm data from the various 
Appendix IV

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of State 

Page 62 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

border sites. State officials we spoke with stated that linking alarm data 

from the local alarm station at individual border sites to a centrally located 

command center will enhance Russia’s ability to (1) ensure that U.S. 

provided equipment is being properly operated, (2) mitigate the possibility 

of corruption or other nefarious acts being committed by its border guards, 

and (3) effectively respond to any alarms and/or seizures of illicitly 

trafficked nuclear or radiological materials.

Nonproliferation and 

Disarmament Fund

State’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund spent approximately $9.1 

million, from fiscal year 1994 through 2001, to provide various types of 

radiation detection equipment assistance to 21 countries (see fig. 16). This 

assistance included vehicle portal monitors, mobile vans equipped with Xray machines and radiation detection equipment, handheld radiation 

detectors, dosimeters, and radiation pagers. For example, in fiscal year 

2001, State approved a $1.3 million NDF project to install vehicle portal 

monitors at 16 sites in one country, and a $0.5 million project to assist 

another country’s upgrading its domestically produced portal monitors in 

order to better detect nuclear material. State also provided $0.8 million to 

DHS to provide radiation detection equipment and training to seven 

countries under a project called “Project Amber.” Of this amount, DHS 

spent $0.6 million to implement the project in these countries. In fiscal year 

2001, State began to consolidate its assistance provided to foreign 

countries for the purposes of combating nuclear smuggling under its EXBS 

program. However, State officials told us that they have not yet determined 

whether or not they will fund any future projects to provide radiation 

detection equipment to foreign countries through NDF. As a result, it is 

uncertain how many other projects State will fund through NDF, in what 

countries these projects will be conducted, or how much they will cost.
Appendix IV

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of State 

Page 63 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 16: Map of Countries Where State’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 

Has Provided Radiation Detection Equipment

Georgia Border Security and 

Law Enforcement Program

State’s Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program focuses on 

developing the Republic of Georgia’s border infrastructure by assisting the 

Georgian Customs Administration and Georgian Border Guards in gaining 

control of the country’s borders and seacoast and strengthening its border 

Romania

Moldova

Cyprus

Malta Turkey

Bulgaria

Kyrgyzstan

Lithuania

Latvia

Ukraine

Estonia

Armenia

Georgia

Slovakia Azerbaijan

Uzbekistan

Kazakhstan

Slovenia

Poland

Hungary

Czech Republic

Source: State.
Appendix IV

Additional Information on Radiation 

Detection Assistance Programs at the 

Department of State 

Page 64 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

security against any type of crime. The program primarily focuses on 

establishing a transparent land border regime with Azerbaijan, Armenia, 

and Turkey and strengthening border security against nuclear smuggling. 

As such, the program has provided assistance to enhance the Georgian 

Border Guards’ capabilities to prevent, deter, and detect potential weapons 

of mass destruction smuggling. Through the program, State has provided a 

limited amount of radiation detection equipment assistance. Specifically, in 

fiscal year 1999, State spent $0.2 million to provide 137 radiation detection 

pagers to Georgia. According to State officials, no radiation detection 

equipment has been provided through the program since fiscal year 1999. 

However, State officials also told us that they have not yet determined if 

they will provide any additional radiation detection equipment assistance 

through the program to the Republic of Georgia in the future. As a result, it 

is uncertain what additional equipment State might provide or how much it 

will cost.
Page 65 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Appendix V

Comments from the Department of Energy ApendxiV
Appendix V

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 66 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix V

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 67 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix V

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 68 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling
Page 69 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State ApendxiVI
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State

Page 70 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State

Page 71 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State

Page 72 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of State

Page 73 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling
Page 74 GAO-06-311 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Related GAO Products

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying 

Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns 

Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection 

Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T. 

Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.

Olympic Security: U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides Lessons for 

Future Olympics. GAO-05-547. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2005.

Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in 

Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign 

Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better 

Integration. GAO-05-157. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005. 

Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection 

Equipment. GAO-03-235T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling. 

GAO-02-989T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat 

Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO02-426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.

(360560)
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