VIETNAM STUDIES 

MOUNTED COMBAT 

IN 

VIETNAM 

by 

General Donn A. Slany 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

WASHINGTON. D.C., 2()(}2 
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 

Starry. Donn A 1931-

Mounted combat in Vietnam. 

(Vietnam studies) 

Includes index. 

1. Vietnamese Conflict. 1961·1975-Campaigns. 2. United Slates. 

Anny. Armored Force-History. 3. Vietnamese Conflict. 1961·1975-

United States. I. Title. II. Series. 

DS558.9.A75S73 959.70.-312 78·12736 

First I)nnt(d 197H-CMH [)ub 90-17-1 

Fur �Ih' b) 1111" SUI)l'rinl('mlo'nI or 1.kK·UnlNHS. I·.S. (;""('nllllt'nl I'rm(iul/ Off;"\, 

lntl'rnet: bokswrc.gpo.g<I\' Phone: loll fn:.'(lI866) 512-1800: DC nrell (202) 512-1800 

F!l: (202) 512-2250 Mnil: Slop 5501', Washl1lgton. DC 20�02-0001 
Foreword 

The United Stales Army met an unusually complex challenge 

in Southeast Asia. in conjullction with the other services, the Anny 

fOllght in suppOrt of a n;uional policy of assisting an emerging 

nation 10 dc\'clop go\'crnmclHill processes of its OWI'I choosing, free 

of olltside coercion. In addition to the usual problems of waging 

:trilled conflict, the :lssignmcUl in Southeast A:,ia required superimposing the immensely sophisticated task of a modern army upon 

<In underdeveloped envirollillent and adapting them to demands 

co\'cring a wide spectrum. These involved helping to fulfill the 

basic needs of an agrarian popUlation, dealing Wilh the fruStr<lliolls 

of antiguerrilla operations, and conducting cOllvention:!! campaigns 

against well-traincd and detcrmined rcgular units. 

It iSSlill necessary for the Army to continue 10 prepare for other 

challcnges thaI may lie ahcad. While cognizant that history never 

I"epeats itself exaclly and that no army e,·el" profited from tl"ying 

10 meet a new challenge in terms of an old onc, the Army nevcl"­

theless stands 10 benefit imlllensely fl"om a study of its expericncc, 

its shortcomings no lcss t han its achievcments. 

Awal"C lhat some yc,ll"S muSl elapsc before the official histOries 

will provide a detailed and objL'Ctive analysis of the experience 

in Southeast Asia, we have �ought a fOfum whereby some of the 

more salient aspects of that experience can be made available now. 

At the request of the Chief of Staff. a reprccclHati"e �rOIlIl of 

senior officcrs who sel"ved in important POStS in Vietnam and who 

still carry a heavy burden of day·to·day responsibilities have prepared a series of monogr;'lphs. These slUdies should be of great 

v;'Ilue in helping the Army develop future operational concepts 

while at thc same time contributing to the historical record and 

providing lhe American public wilh an interim report 011 the 

performance of men and officer:. who have responded. a� others 

have through our history. t') exacting and trying demands. 

The reader should be reminded that most of the wriling was 

accomplished while the w;'Ir in Vielllam was at its peak, and the 

monographs frequently refer to events of the past a� if they were 

taking place in the present. 

All monographs ill the serie� are based primarily on official 

records, with additional malcri;1i from published :md unpublished 

secondary works. rrom debriefing rcpol't� and illlcf\,ie\\'s with key 

panicipants, and from the personal experience of the author. To 

'" 
facilitate sccurity clear.mcc, annotation and detailed bibliography 

have been omitted from the published version; a fully documented 

account with bibliography is filed with thc U.S. Army Center of 

Military History. 

The story of mounted combat in Viemam WilS written at Fan 

Knox between 1973 and 1976 by a task force under the direction 

of �Iajor General Donn A. Stany. then commander of the Armor 

Center and commander of the Armor School. General Starry has 

been involved in the planning or direction of armored operations 

and developmclll since he was graduated from the U.S. Military 

Academy in 1948 as a second lieutenant of cavalry. After serving 

in comm,lI1d and staff positions from platoon to battalion in 

armored units in Europe lIntil 1953, he became a staff officer in 

the Eighth Army in Korca and then an instructor in combined 

arms and nucle:!r h'eapons employment at the U.S. Army Imelli· 

gence School. He latcr served as an armored battalion commander 

and staff officer ill U.S. Arm)" Europe. In 1 966 he assumed duties 

in the G-3 SeClion, U.S. Army, Vietnam, and was a member of 

the Mechanized :lIld Armor Combat Operations, Vielllam. study 

group which evaluated armored operations in Vietnam. After servo 

ing in assignllletlls with thc Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and the 

Secretary of Defense. he returned to Vietnam to join the plans 

office of J-3, He:ldquaners, U.S. Military Assistance CoIllTll,lI1d, 

Vietnam, and in 1969 assumed command of the 1 1th Armorcd 

Cavalry Regiment in Vietnam. In 1 970 he rewrncd to the United 

States and sCl'\'cd successively as Deputy Director of the Operations 

Directorate and Director of Manpower and Forces. After twO and 

one-h:df years as the COllunander of the Armor CClllcr, he assullled 

conlln,md of V Corps. U.S. Army. Europe, in 1 9i6. !)romoted 1.0 

full general. in 

.

Iul)' 1977 Gcncral SWlTY bccamc commander of 

the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, 

Virginia. 

Washington. D.C. 

J5 September 1977 

iv 

JAMF.5 C. PENNINGTON 

Brigadier General, USA 

The Adjutant General 
Preface 

This monograph is an aCCOLInt of the operations of armored 

units o( the United States Army in the Republic of Vietnam. The 

tcrm (jrmQreli lillils as Llsed here is generic and includes lank and 

mechanized infantry battalions and companies, armored c<waiTY 

squadrons and troops, and air cavalry squadrons and troops-all 

forces whose primary modus oJJcrtlluii was to fight mounted. 

Of necessity the slory bcgius not wilh the arrival of lhe first 

U.S. armored units in Vietnam in 1965 bUl with annal' in Vietnam 

during the years immediately :.fter World War II. The generally 

unsuccessful experience of French armored forces in Southeast Asia 

from lhe end of World \Val' II to 1954 convinced American mili· 

tary men that armored units could nOI be employed in Vietnam. 

It was widely believed that Viell1am's monsoon climate together 

with its jungle and rice p.1.ddies constituted an environment tOO 

hOSlile for mechanized equipment: it was further agreed that 

armored forces could not cope with an elusive enemy that operated 

from jungle ambush. Thus at the outset of Americ.11l participation 

in the conflict and for some time thereafter. Army planners saw 

lillie or no need for armored units in the U.S. force structure in 

Viel11am. At the same time, hO\\

'ever, extensive American aid that 

flowed illlo Vietnam after the French left the coumry was directed 

in part to developing all armored force for the newly created Army 

of the Republic of Vietnam. 

It was not until 1967, however. when:1 study titled Mechanized 

and Armor Combat Operations. Vietnam, conducted by General 

Anhur L. West, Jr., was sent to the Chief of Staff and Secretary 

of the Army, that the potential of armored forces \.,.as fully 

described to the Army's LOp leaders. Despite the study's findingsthat armored cavalry was probably the most cost·effective force on 

the Vietnam battlefield-there was lillIe that could be done to 

alter significantly either the SlrLlCLUre of forces already sent to 

Vietnam or those earmarked for deployment. l3y that time, can· 

straints on the size of American forces in Vietnam had been im· 

posed by Defense Secretal), Roben S. McNamara and decisions on 

force deployment extending well into 1968 had already been made. 

The armored force of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, meanwhile had been successful enough in fighting the elusive Viet Cong 

that U.S. armored units had been deployed in limited numbers, 

usually as part of their parent divisions. 

v 
U.S. arlllored units participated in virtually every large-scale offensive operation and worked dosely with Somh Vietnamese Army 

and other free world forces. After eight years of fighting over land 

on which tanks were once thought to be inc.1pable of moving, in 

weather that was supposed to prohibit armored operations, and 

dealing with an elusive encmy against whom armored units were 

thought to be at a considerable disadvantage, armored forces 

emerged as powerful, flexible, and essential baltle forces. In large 

measure they contributed 10 the success of the free world forces, 

nOt only in close combat, l.HIt in p<lcification and security oper;Itions 

as well. \Vhen redeployment began in early 1 969. armored units 

were not included in the first forces scheduled for redeployment, 

and indeed planners moved armored units don'l1 the scale time 

and again, holding off their redeployment ullLil the very end. 

In almost equal parts this stud), has drawn from official war 

records of armored units and personal interviews with men of those 

units. The monograph makes no altempt to documcnt every 

armored unit in every battlc. Nor does it list in detail the lessons 

that may be learned from the Victnam conflict. although it does 

call attention to some. In so doing it sometimes isolates and focuses 

on the mounted combat aspects of operations that actually included 

many different Americ;m and other free world units. The reader 

should keep in Illind that the author's intent is to tell the Story of 

mounted units. and not to describe battles in their entircty. 

Docllmenting this story of mounted combat in Vietnam was 

not a one-man job. Of the many people who helped, several deserve 

special thanks. Lieutenant Colonel George J. Dramis . 

.Ir .. director 

of the monograph task force. developed the first topical outline. 

assessed the historical significance of each bit of the wealth of 

information ilvailable, and ran the task force from day to day. 

The members of the monograph lask force, Vietnam veterans 

with firsthand experience, whose collective knowledge contributed 

to the continuity of the slOry were armor officers Major John G. 

Russell, il-fajor Thomas I). Garrett, Captain Rohen M. Engesct. 

C'tpwin John L. Hagar, Captain Gerald A. �lcDonald, Captain 

�faurice B. Parrish, Captain Jeffrey A. Slark. Captain Calvin Tecl. 

Jr .. and Sergeant Major ChristOpher N. Trammell; infantry officers 

Capwin Robert P. Amonillc and Captain John J. Strange: :md 

Captain Dennis M. Jankowski of the QuanermasLer Corps. The 

cOllfriiJulions of the Infantry School, panicularly those of Lieu· 

tenant Colonel \Vayne T. Holes. were invaluable. \Vit houl the 

good work of the administJ';lIive staff. Mr�. Pege R. Bailey. adminvi 
typists. this \olullle would nOt have been completed. Specialist 5 

Elmcr R. Adkins, Jr .. and Specialist 4 Jack O. Travers. who repealedly t)'ped the final drafts, desen'e special melltion. Not 10 be forgotten are the many lieutenants on temporary assignment with the 

lask force who painstakingly researched articles and located officers 

and enlisted men who had sef\'ed in Vietnam. 

This monograph is an accoullling of the stewardship of lhe 

lank crewmen, mechanized infantrymen, armored cavalrymen, and 

air cavalrymen who had a hand in some of the more Significant 

events in the Vietnam \Var. It was their devotion, professionalism, 

\'illor, and dedication thaI brouglH American arms to the conclusion decided upon and ordered by their commander in chief. In 

the end they [e[t liS a largc legacy. The monograph is their Sloryit is dedicated to lhem. 

Fort Monroe, Virginia 

15 September 197i 

vii 

DONN A. STARRY 

General, U.S. Any 

Contents 

I. INT RODUCTION 

111/flll:IICC of Frcllcll Use of Armor ................ . 

U.s. Armored Forit's After 19", ......... . . ..•...... 

3 

3 

6 

Vietnal/! (IS (I field fo), /lrmor . . . . . . . ....... .. . .... !) 

Tlu: Ellcmy in l'iellwllI ..... . . . . . . . ........ ..... 10 

]1. i\R�"OR IN TilE SOUTH VIETNA�IESE ARi\IY ...... 17 

V.S. AdviSI:rs . . . ....... . . . . ..... . ... . . . . . ....... 19 

MII)'s il/ the Ml'kolig Dei/a . . . . . ... ... ........... 21 

Rcorgt111;Ulfi(1II (111(1 Uf'/rellc//mclI/ ......... .. ...... 2-1 

£.>:/)i/llsioll oJ Armor ill the SOIl/h Fie/namcsc ,frllly ... 30 

C'IuLolig/; . . . . . . ... . . ...... ..... . . . . . ... . .... 31 

Time for Corrective II IIn/)'5;5 ••.••••..... .•.•..... 33 

/mj>/"OtlClllclI/l ill Eqlli/)II/(!II . . . . . .. . . ...•.....•... 37 

£lIemy ReM/iOTl 10 Armorel! /'chiclcJ . . . .......... 45 

"COllI) Troo/)s" ............ . . . . . .... ... ....... . . 18 -

III. CROWl'l1 OF U.S. AR.\IORED FORCES IN VIETNAi\1 50 

The MorinI'S Lrmd ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 52 

Decision J\lok;ng ... . ..... . . . . . .... . . . ........ . . . 51 

SCQrlts 0111 ..... ..... ........ .....•.... •••.•.... 58 

Ill) /Jnll B(lIIg ....... . . . . . . ... . .. . .•.. .•.... fiO 

Deploymellts (/lid Em/)foYlllcllb ..... .....•...... .. 63 

Tflslt Forcc Spllr ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . .. fiS 

B(lII/es 011 IIII' Mil/II T/rllrlt RalUl .....•••. , ••...... 66 

The lHacltlrorsc Ncg;IIIl'III ...........•. ..•.. •..... 72 

Mille ami Comrlemrinc . . . . . . .... . ... . ....... . ... 79 

IV. COi\IBINED ARi\IS OPERATIONS .......... ,., ..... 8'1 

TJreMACOf'SlIuf), . ... . ...... .... . ..... . . . . 81 

Ce(/flr Falls-JIIII,-t;mr Cily . . . . ... . . . ........ . .... UI 

J\Icrila7lizl'C1 O/)emli(lIIs ;,r 11i,' Ml'lwlIg Del/a . .... . .. 103 

ROllie Secllril), (Illd COIIVO)' Escort . .... ...... . . . . . . 106 

Air Cavall)' O/)CraliOl/S . . . ... . . . . ......... .. ..... III 

OllieI' Free World Annol' .............•.. ...... .. 112 

V. THREE [KE;\IY OFFENSiVES .......•...... ....... 114 

Encm), Bllilf/IIP ....................•.••••••..... 1 14 

First OUellsivl': Tel /968 . ............... . . . . ..... 116 

/J(llIle 0/ TOil SO'I NIIIIl . . . .. . .. . . .......... 118 

BfIltlc of LOllg IJjn}' (lI/tl Bien 1/0(1 Arcfl . . . . . ....... 123 

Bliities ill ('i,,11 Long 1>rovillce . . . . . . .... . . , ••...... 127 

IX 
Second DUolSivc ....... •..... ....... • ...•. ...... 129 

Third DUelisive . . . .. .......... .... ...... . ...... 131 

A[lerml/III .... . . . .. . .. ........ . . .. ..... . .. ..... 136 

VI. THE fiGHT FOR THE BORDERS . . ........ ........ 138 

Cluwgillg Simiegy ........... ..... .............. 138 

Armored Forces Along Ihe Demililarized Zone .. . .. .. 139 

The Sheridan ............. .............. .... . 142 

"Pile-on" ............ ..... ........ ....... ...... 145 

flome Plows ..... ......... ......... • . _...... 147 

Tanh Versus Tflllk ......... ...... ............. .. 149 

Invading Ihe Ellemy's SlIlIcllUiries ...... .... •...... 153 

Securing Iltc Bordcrs ............ .... . .......... 156 

PacificMiOlI Efforls . ............. ... . ..... . ...... 161 

Viclllllll1/.'SC Forces Taite Ovc)" t/u: War... . . .. ... . .. 164 

VII. ACROSS THE BORDER: SANCTUARIES IN 

CM.,IBODIA AND LAOS ... ............ ....... ... 166 

Eal"iy Oleralions Inlo CfIIlloo(/ia .. ... ..... . .. . .. .. Ifi7 

The Maill A/II/ch /1110 Cambodia..... . ...... 168 

SOlllh Viell//llI/esc Army Allac/IS ConlinllC ...... ... .. 176 

Sccol/dary A /lacks Across Ihe Borde)" ........... .. ... 178 

Cambodia ill PcrslJcClive .............. . .. ... . .... 179 

Mainlwallce and Supply ..... ............... . .. .. 181 

Lam SOli il9 ... ...... ..... ............•.... .... [86 

The SOl/lh I'ieillflmcse Arlll)' Allnch ........•...... 190 

Ai)" Cmll/fry lind T(wlts .. . . .. .. . .. . . ...... ..... . . . 193 

The II'illulrnwal . .. ....... ...... . ... . . .. . 194 

CIIIl LOllg H·02 ............ ............ ....... 197 

VIII. THE El\E;\IY SPRING OFFENSIVE Of 1972 .. . . ...... 199 

Poinl fwd CmU/ferlJoillt . . . . .. ...... . .. . ... . 200 

Thc 20th T(l1I1t Rcgimcnt ..... ..... . . .. . ...... 203 

AlIaclt Across Ihe DcmililaTizctllolle ... ..... • .. .205 

The Hock 0/ Dong HfI . . . . . . . ...... .......•. 206 

The Ellemy AI/Mil in Military /legioll 2 ...... 212 

The A/lcrma/h .......... .... ............ •. . .. 217 

IX. REfLECTIQKS ...... ..... ..... ................ ... 220 

A /JIlClldi . ..: 

A. VIETi'\t\;\! U:,\,IT COi\!i\IANDERS ....... . ......... 227 

B. AIUIOR RECIPIENTS Of THE i\IEDt\L Of HOl\"OR 238 

GLOSSARy ................... . . . .. . . .. . ... 239 

INDEX ... ........... ...... ... .... ..... ....... ......... 243 

x 
U.S. Armored Organil:ttions. 196 5 ... 

No. Maps 

-. 

. • • • • • • • • • • . • . .• !J� 

I. Geographic Regions. South Vietn,un . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 

2. Dry Season. South Vietnam (and tracked \'chide�) .... II 

3. \Vet Season. South Vietnam (and lr;lCked \"ehide�) . . . . . . . 13 

4. Baule of Ap l.hc 1, 2 ./:Lllu:.ry 196 3 . . . . . . . . .. . . ........... 26 

5. Ap Bau Bang I. 11_ 12 November 1965 ................... 61 

6. Ibttlc of �Iinh Thanh Road. 9 July 1966 .... . . •...• . . .... 68 

7. Battlc of Suoi Cat. 2 Dc(.cmber 1966 . . . . ... . . .. . .. . . . ... . is 

8. Expanding U.S. Operations, 196i . . ....... . . • . . . • . . ..... 92 

9. Ap Bau B,Ulg II, 9_20 �I;.rch 196 7 ...... ....•............ 98 

10. Battle of Ap l.hc II, 2 "]a) 1967 ...........• ... •....... 101 

II. Major Armor Balllc�. Tet 196 8 . . ......... . ... ... ....... Iii 

12. Saigon Area, 'I'd 196 8 ......... .............. ..•....... 120 

13. Baltic of the CrescelH, 20 .I:II1I1,u')' 1970 . . . . . . . . . ...• . . ... 15 8 

14. Operations IrHO C;n11bodia. May-June 197 0 . . .... .... _. liO 

1 5. LAM SON i19. 8 Febru;n")'_6 April [9il ...... ..... ,. _ .. _ . . 188 

10. Nonhcl"ll I Gol'pS, i\larch 197 2 .... ....... .......• , . . .. 202 

17. 20th Tank. Regimcm, 1_ 27 April 1972 ........•...•.. " ... 20i 

Diagrams 

I. Capstan and Anchol' Reco\"ery .... . . . ........•.•.•. , .... 39 

2. Push-bar Extraction . . ..... . . . . . . ...... _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 39 

3. Cable and Log Extr:.ctioll ... . , , . . .....•. . . • . . , . .. 40 

4. Block and Tackle ....... .... ,. . ,., ...•....... '10 

5. Tow Cables .......... , ................ , .... ,. 'II 

G. Cloverle:lr Se;m:h Teclmique .... . . . , ............• ...... 88 

IllusL1'ations 

i\l 2·1 (Chaffee) Used by French in Vietnam '. 

T:lnks Firing in Support of French Infant!"} at Dien Bien I)hu . . , 5 

Viet Gong Soldier _....... . . . . . . . .... . . ... ... . . ........ ... 15 

South Vietnamese Reconn:dS!k111Ce Unit Wilh 19 39 French 

Annored Car . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18 

Armored Pcnonnci Canier ;\ 1113 ." ........................ 23 

Balk Bridge Canied by 1\[ 113 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . • . . . . . .. ·1 2 

M 41 in South Viet!l:llHesc Tn.ining Operation ...... , .•....... 44 

�1113 Damaged by Viet Cong Recoilless Rifle . . . ..... .•... . . , . 

'16 
U.S. �l:Irinc Corps FbmClhrowcr Tank in AClion Near Da Nang .. 53 

ACA V .\Iovcs Out to Escort Convo), .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 74 

ACAV's Fonn Defen� Perimeter ........................... 76 

Engineer :\Iineswecpillg Tcam Clears Highway 13 ............ 80 

T:mk·�lounted I\lille Rollcr Prcpares 10 Clc;lr l-lighw;IY 19 ...... 83 

Ilcrrillgbollc Formation ........... ... ................ ..... 87 

1\1113's .md 1\148 A3 Tanks Ocplo)' Bet\\'ccn Junglc and 

Rubbcl' Pbmation ........... , ,. , , .. , ....... , , , , , , , , , ... 94 

Tanks and ACAV's Securc SlIppl}' ROIIlCS ... , , , , , . , . , , ...... , 10 6 

OI-I-6A Observation Helicopter and Two AH-IG Cobras on 

Visual Rcconnaiss:mcc .,' ........ , . . .......... , , .. , , ,. 110 

Troops of 1 st Australi:11l Armor Rcgimclll \Vith Centurion T:mk .. 1 J 3 

Tank and 1\1113 During Enelll) I\wlck on Bien "loa, Tel 19 68 ... 1 25 

1\111 ' of South Vietnamc� Arm}' Ad\ances on Enem} Positions 

in Saigon, :\lay 1 968 . , , .... , ... , ... .. , ....... ,. " ,. ' . 130 

1\1113 Willi PrOlccti\·c Sicel Plankiug ill Action at 

no" C,,; 1'1 ,,,,,,,;on ................. . ............ 1 !3 

Preparing Night Defensive Po�itiolls Along Demilit:II'hed Zone" , 1 41 

Shcrid;m 1\1 551 and Crcw " ... " . ..... .................. 1 '12 

Pilc·on Opcration in I Corps. . . . . .... . .,........ . 1 '16 

Romc Plows With Security Guard of M113's .. . .. . ....... 148 

Russian·made PT7 6 Tank Destroyed at Ben Hct .. . , " , ..... , .. 1 52 

Tank in Position To PrO\ idc St:llic RO:ld Security,., .... " .... 1 62 

The 2d Squadron, 11 th ArmOl'ed C:I\'

:.\r), Enters Snllo\. Cambodia li3 

1\188 Ilea\'Y Reco\'cry Vehiclc Loads D:lluaged APC ..... , ...... 18 5 

Reel De"il Road ............ , ......... " .. , .... , ......... 1 90 

ACAV's of South Vietnamesc 1 st Armored Brigadc in Laos, . 1 91 

C:I]llUred i'\'onh Victnamesc "59 T;lI1k ....... 210 

South Victn;uncsc I\HS Aftcr lIit From Rockcl ........... 213 

UI-I-II\ Helicopter With TOW ,\lis.silcs .. , .. , '.. . .. 214 

ACAV Takes Posilion for CourHel'alt:tck i\'e:II' ;\[y Ch:lIlh ...... , 216 

M48 A3 Tank Explodes Bomb Sel Up as Mine .............. 222 

Engineers Clear Trail of ;\Iillc� ill Cambodia.. . ............. 2 n 

1\[5 78 Light Recovcry Vchicle Works on Sheridan .. , . , ......... 22 5 

All iIIustralions are from DepartmCllt of Defense files. 

xu 
MOUNTED COMBAT IN VIETNAM 

CHAPTER I 

Introduction 

In the aflermath of World War II the French colonial administration returned LO Indochina to resume control o{ French possessions. \Vilh it came units of the French Army, among them 

mechanized and armored clcmCIllS. These units remained in Vietnam for more than len years, IIntil, in compliance with the Geneva 

Accords of 1 954, the last French soldier left the country in April 

1956. The experience of lhe French and their Vietnamese allies 

in those years had a strong influence on concepts developed in the 

SOllth Vietnamese Army for the cmp)oymclll of armored forces. 

Their experience also influenced the thinking of American mili. 

tary commanders and staffs when the U.S. Army evcl1lually set 

aOOUl deciding how many and what kinds of forces to send to 

Vielilam. 

!lIfflltmCe of Frcllch Use of Annor 

The U.S. Army in the early 1 960's had very little information 

on the usc of armor in Vietnam, and most of that came from 

French baule repons and the faCl that the French Army had been 

supplied with \Vodd \Var J I tanks, half-tracks, and seoUl cars. 

Although most of this equipment was American, made originally 

for the U.S. Army, there \\'as lillie reliable information as to the 

amoum, condition, and use of it in Indochina. In 195'1, after four 

years of American :Iid, the French fleet of armored vehicles consistcd of 452 wnks and tank dcstroyers and 1,985 SCOllt cars, half· 

tracks, and amphibious vehides, but this armor was scattered over 

an arca of 228,627 squarc miles. By comparison, in Junc of 1 969 

the U.S. Forccs in Viclllam had some 600 t:lt1ks and 2,000 armorcd 

vehiclcs of othcr typcs dcployed over an area less than one-third 

that size. 

All the American equipmcnt used by thc French was produced 

before 1945. In general the arlllor was not fit for cross-collntry 

movement and because of its age was often inopcrative. The logistical system, with supply delays of six to twclve months, funher 

hampered operations by making maintenance difficult. Helicopters 

were not av:tilable in largc Ilumbers-thcre werc tcn in 1952, fort)'­

tWO in 1954; all wcre ullarmed and were used for resllpply and 

medical cvacuation. To the French command, impovcrishcd in all 

rcsources, figluing with limilcd cquipmelll over a largc area, thc 
1\121 (CIIAFn:t:) AMl:RICAN LIGIIT TANK USED !IV FItENCU IN VIETNAM 

employment of armored forces became a perpellial headache. 

Armored units were fragmented: many small remole pOStS had as 

few as two or three armored vchicles. Such widespread dispersion 

prevented the collection or rClcmion of any armor reserves to support overworked infantry batwlions. \\'hen French armored units 

LOok to Ihe field, they were road bound. Roads prescribed the axes 

of advance. and combat action was undertaken LO defend a road 

and the ground for a hundred mClcr5 or so on either side. The 

enemy was free [0 roam the countryside. Since armored units were 

generally assigned to suppOrt dismounted inf:UllfY. their speed and 

ability LO act indcpcndclllly, ;m imponalll pan of any armored 

uniL's cOJltrilJlllion 10 Ihe banle tcam, were never used, 

All these facts werc duly rcponed by the French in their candid, 

comprehensive, and somctimes hlunt after action reports. In the 

United States, because of restrictive military sccurity regulations 

and a general lack of imcrest in the French operation in Indochina, 

there was no body of military knowledge of Vietnam. What was 

known had been drawn nOI from after action reports but from 

books written by civilians. Foremost among these was Ilernard B. 

Fall's Street JJ!ithollt joy, which greatly influenced the American 

IlLllitary alliul(le toward armored operations in Vietnam. One 

series of b:lltlcs in particular stood out from all the rest, epitomiz· 

ing the French experience in American eyes. Emilled "End of a 
TANKS FIRII'o.'C 11'0.' SUI'PORTO�' FREI'o.'CH 11'0.'.',\1'1111.)' AT Ou:S BIEN rHU 

Task Forcc," Chapter 9 of Fall's widely read book traced a sixmonth period in the final struggles of a French mobile striking 

force, Grollpcmem Mobile 100. The "i\'id and tenifying slory of 

this group's final days seemed to many to describe the falC in store 

for ilny armored unit that tried to fight insurgcnts in the jungles. 

AClllally Grollpemclll Mobile 100 was nOt illl armored unit at 

all. but an infantry task force of 2,600 mcn, organized into foul' 

truck,mounted inrantry battalions, rcinforced wilh one anillery 

bawdioll and ten l ight tiUlks. Restricted LO 1ll0\'emelll on roads, 

deploying 10 fight on foot, it was extremely vulnerable to am· 

bush, and, indeed, a series of ambushes finally destroyed it. 

Because moSl readers did not take the time to understand thc 

organizalion and actions of Croupcmem Mobilc 1 00, its fate cast a 

pall o\'er armored operations in Vietnam for almost twelve years. 

Thc stOry of Ihis disaster became a major source for unfavorable 

references 10 French armored operations in Vietnam, and con, 

tributed much to the growing I11yth of .he impossibility of conduct, 

ing mounted combat in Vietnam.' In fact, the myth was so widely 

, General William C. Wcstmoreland. Ihe U.S. commander in Vietnam from 1964 

10 t9GB. [",ept r.t COJI} of Fall's I>o 011 Ihe table nC':lr his tJcd. lie I3tl'r Aid that the 

dC£ul of Gr()up<:mcnt M()hite 100 ",';as "alwa}. ou 01)' mind." particul�rl)' 50 during 

the earl), U.s. dl'pl())ml'lllS. 
some armored exploits of the Vietnamese Army, and it aeluaJly 

delayed development of Vietnamese armored forces. Unfortunately, 

U.S. commanders were to repeat many of the mistakes of the French 

when Americnn armored units were employed. 

U.S. Armored Forces Afler 1945 

When World War 11 ended the United States Army had an 

armored force of sixteen divisions and many other smaller armored 

units. The bulk of this force-the divisions-included balanced, 

integrated, mobile fighting forces of armored artillery, armored 

infallll'Y. and tanks. Concepts for employment of these combined 

arms forces recognized no limitat ions of geography or intensity of 

warfare. The combined arms idea stressed tailoring integrated 

mobile forces to the situation, taking stock of enemy, terrain, and 

mission. Mechanized Ciwalry units were formed to supplement 

these forces by conducting reconnaiss. .. nce and providing security. 

The employment of U.S. armored divisions exclusively in 

Europe and Africa during \Vorld War 11 caused many to con· 

clude that only in those theaters was warfare with armor possible. 

U.S. military studies of armor in lhe war were based on aCCOUllts 

of combined arms warrare in Europe and Nonh J-\fric. ... MoSt 

American experience with armored units in the Pacific, and later in 

Korea in the early 1950's, seemed to confirm the impression that 

armored unitS had but limited usefulness in jungles and mountains. 

The Army swff therefore concluded that while tanks for the sup· 

POrt of dismounted infantry might be required. there was no possi. 

bility for independclll [;u·g'e·scale combined arms action by armored 

forces such as those of the "'orld \Var II armored divisions. It was 

againsl this backgTolind that the U.S. Army gr:lppled with decisions 

on American troop deployments to Vietnam in the early 1960's. 

Combined \\,jth the misconceptions of the French armored experi. 

ence, this reasoning C:H1sed most planners to conclude thal Vietnam 

was no place for armor of any kind. especially tanks. 

In the war in the Pacific there was slo\\'. difficult fighting in 

island rain forests. No armored di" ision moved toward Japan across 

the Ilacific islands. Neithcr blitzkrieg tactics nor dashing armor 

leaders achieved literary famc in jungle fighting. It was an infantry 

war: armored units were employed, but what they learned was 

neither widely publicized nor often studied. To most mili tary men 

the jungle was a d;lrk, forbidding place, to be avoided by armored 

formations. Even :Ifter American military advisers began to replace 
an image of densc. tropical rain forests. ricc paddies. and s\\'amps.� 

To Amcrican military conceptions of jungle fighting. the Korean 

\Var added SOIllC additional expcrience that weighed in the deliberations on troop dcplo),mcms to Vietnanl. Korea has a monsoon 

climatc. a scasonal change in the prevailing II·ind dircction. which 

is offshore in wimer, onshorc in Slimmer. The deluge of summer 

rains in Korea is a reality that no onc who served therc can forgel. 

Thc rains madc mOllllled combat difficult. if not impossible. The 

extensive flooded rice paddics ill the western Korean 101l'lands were 

added obstaclcs to the movelllCIH of armored I'chicles during the 

rice-growing seaSOIl. \Vhen it becamc knoll'n that Vietnam was a 

country wilh " monsoon climate and a rice culturc, Americans who 

had been to Korea rcmembcred Ihe droll'ning summcr rains that 

made the countryside impossible 10 tl,lverse for almost half a year. 

Actually the Vielllam monsoons are quite different from those in 

Korea and do not impose the same limitations on movement. 

Vieillam's rice cuhure is, morCOI'er, confined to a narrow belt of 

lowlands along the coast and the vast strelches of thc Mekong 

Delta. 

One-half of Vietnam is rnolltltainous. Recalling the impassable 

moulllains of somc of the Pacific islands and Korea, and the extreme 

difficulty that armored vehicles had in operating in both places, 

many planners concluded that Vietnam's mounlains were probably 

at lcan as rugged as those of Korea and werc covered with jungle 

as thick as that of the Pacific islands. These assumptions wcre taken 

as additional evidence that armored vehicles had no place in 

Vietnam. 

YCt another contribution to the growing body of nOlions that 

formed early U.S. Army altitlldes toward armored unils in VietIlam W:IS a singular lack of doctrinc for mOllnted combat in areas 

othcr than Europe and the deserts of Africa. As late as November 

i961. Field i\lanual I i-30, The Armored Division Brigade, in a 

section on combat in difficult terrain, devoted one brief fourteenline paragraph to combat in woods. swamps, and lake areas. Here 

it was Slated that armored unilS should bypass, neutr:l!ize by fire, 

or let infantry clear difficult terrilin. The basic armored tactical 

milllllal, Field i\lanual 17-1, Armor Operation, Small Units, de· 

voted but six skimpy paragraphs to jUllgle operations. 

2]n t9:;·1 Generlll Westmoreland accemled 3 I'enlagon Ilaff briefing on Vietnam 

thai IITOngi)" innuenced Ihe scnior sialf officers. The Surgeon Geller:li of Ihe ,\rm)" 

painled a gloom) piclllre of an clnirOnmelll so SClere Ihal Welterl1l:0 ","ould be 

uII:ll>1e 10 suni'e. In JUI) 1965 31 a simil3r briefing ","hen Ihe Arm)' Chief of Starr 

","as prncnt 3 gellcr�1 f;1I1ker S131e<1 ch;u tanks ","ere not I1L'Cdcd in Vietl1am. 
MAP I 

GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS 

OF SOUTH VIETNAM 

o Oolta 

mTI Coastal plain 

D Piedmont 

D Plateau o Highlands 

o 2S 50 15 lOCI MILES 

I ,

I, ,I " • 

o 2S 50 75 lOCI I:ILOMETER$ 
In fact, Vietnam is not a land totally hostile to rmnored warfare. \Vhen the terrain was examined in detail on the ground. as 

it was in 196i b)' a team of U.S. armor officers, it was found that 

over 16 percclll of the countr), could be traversed all year round 

by armored vehicles. During the Vielllam \Var operations with 

armored units were conducted in every geographic area in Vietnam, 

the most severe restriclions being experienced in the Mekong Delta 

and the cemral highl;mds. 

The Mekong Deltil, often below sea level and rarely more than 

(our meters above, is wet. fenile, and extensively cultivated. The 

area is so poorly drained that the southern tip of the country, the 

Ca �Iau Peninsula. is an expanse of stagnalH marshes and lowlying mangrove forests. l3ecallse the entire delta is criss-crossed with 

streams, rivers, and canals, traffic was forced to follow dikes, dams, 

and the few builHIP roads. 

In contrast to the delta, the highlands arc rugged small mountains of the Annamite chain. with peaks rising to 2,600 meters. 

Heavily forested with tropical evergreen and bamboo. they were a 

difficult but not impossible obstacle for "nHored vehicles. Roads 

were poor "nd population centers sm:d] and sC:luercd. \Vhen first 

introduced into the highlands, armored units cleared roads and 

estoned COl1\'O)'S. Subsequently, as I"rger enemy forces appeared, 

combined arms (ask forces operated in the mountain and jungle 

strongholds. (Mal) I) 

The other regions of South Vietn"m-the co..1.stal plain, piedmont, and plateau-arc characterized generally by rolling or hilly 

terrain. Vegetation ranges from scrub growth :dong the CO"st to 

rice paddies, cultivated fields, and plantations through the sOlilhern 

piedmont, with bamboo, coniferous forcsts, or jungle in the northern piedmont and pl;ncall. These areas could be used by armored 

ground vehicles O\'er 80 percent or the time and were traversed by 

French and Vietnamese armored forces before the arrival of American tl'OOps. 

The we"ther in Vietn"m is cotHrolled by twO seasonal wind 

nows-the summer. or SOUl hwest. monsoon and the wintel', or northeast, monsoon. The stl'onger of these winds, the Slimmer monsoon, 

blows from June through September Ollt of the Indian Ocean, 

causing the wet season in the delr.a, the piedmont, and most of the 

western highlands "nd plateau. The remainder of the country has 

its wet season from November to February during the winter monsoon, when onshore winds from the northeast shed their moisture 

over the northern one-third of South Vietnam. 
dry periods themselves, moullted combat was feasible in most pUIS 

of Vietnam. Even in the II'CI sca:.on, armored units proved able to 

operate with relalivc c;.sc in many areas previously considered 

impasS<1.blc. III 1967 a swel)' under the title Mechanized and Armor 

Combat Operations, ViclIlam (:\IACOV) was undertaken to make 

an cXlcnsil'c cI'aiualiOIl of the effects of ViclIlam's monsoon climate 

on the movement of armored vchicles. Although Arm)' engineers 

had conducted earlier surveys, the engineers were found to be conservative in their estimates. \Vhell there was doubt that armored 

units would be able to m;mClLvcr in certain p1,H:CS these were 

marked impassable by [he engineers, who app:lrently lOok care 

that no commander would find his units slUck in an area that had 

been marked good for land na\'igation. 

The group condllCiing the study 'I])proached the nl:lller positivel),; that is, it indicated :IS feasible for operations any terrain 

where experience showed tl.lcked vehicle.s had gone and could go 

with organic suppOrt. Applying terrain analysis data to the "go or 

no go" concept, the team produced maps of Vietnam for both the 

dry and the wet seasons. (Sce Ma/J5 2 lind J.) �rore definitive and 

more optimistic than the engineers, the group determined that 

tanks could move with organic support in 61 percent of the country during the dry season and in '16 percent during the wet season. 

Armored personnel catTier) could move in 65 percent of Vietnam 

the )'ear-round. 

The study confirmed what was already known to the Vietnamese: major portions of Vietnam were suitable for armored 

operations. But this study was nOt completed until almost twO years 

after the arrival of the first Ann}' ground combat units. During 

those two years many of the units were sent to Vietnam without 

their tanks ,md armored personnel carriers. Some units were even 

converted from mechanized infantry to infantry before deployment. 

The earlier silldies had provided the overriding rationale for the 

decisions of 1 965 and 1966. 

The Ellemy ill Vie/llnm 

By the latc 1950's thc insurgents ill South Vietnam werc known 

as Viet Congo a contraction of a Icrm that meant Vietnamese Communists. Al though the enemy's methods of fighting and his ultimate goals had not rC:l.lIy changed since thc campaign� ag<linst thc 

French, neithcr ViClIIamese nor U.S. military observers recognized 

the fact. Enemy soldiers wcre variously described <IS b:nldits, rebels, 

or political malcontents: closer stndy revealed thal the enemy was 
MAP 2 

THE DRY SEASON 

SOUTH VIETNAM 

.. No Go, Tank. APe 

No Go, Tank 

" ., " 

I I ! 
the Viet Minh against the French. 

Liglllly equipped and operating in a (OUlllfy with a primitive 

road network, fan·moving Viet Cong forces on fOOL prO\'cd more 

lilan a match for South Vietnamese tToopS confined 10 the roads. 

In the first stages, the Vict Cong avoided units of the Army of fhe 

Republic of Vietnam and operated as guerrillas. Sabotage, bombing, terrorism, and assassination were their hallmark. Speed, security, surprise, and deception were keys to their success. 

There were many in the early 1 960's who still believed the 

enemy was a loosely organized body wid1 no staying power against 

a modern army. The truth \\las that the Viet Cong were \\'ell 

organized in regular (Inain) forces, prO\'incial (local) forces. ;md 

village military (guerrilla) forces. This organization did not come 

about o\'erniglll: r:nher the Viet Cong passed through several 

stages that were dictated by various military and administr<lIi\'e 

situalions in differelll p:II"lS of Somh Vietnam. Thus, many U.S. 

observers in ViClIlam and the military in general did not ;It first 

realize the full cxtent of the enemy threat. 

After 1 959 small Viet Cong units began to organize into com· 

panics and battalions: guerrilla operations were a complementary 

tactic. Guerrilla strength grew, and secret bases were established all 

over the Republic of Vietnam, panicularly in the lower Mekong 

Delta. the area north of Saigon, :md the remote highlands of the 

north. Raids and even occasional batlalion·size atlacks became more 

frequent. These lal'ge.sc:de operations were centrally directed by 

the Lao Dong, a branch of the Communist Pany of North Vietnam, 

through the Central Office for South Vietnam, commonly called 

COSVN. 

An important factor in the enemy's imensificalion of the \I'M 

was the establishmelH of rottles for moving men and supplies from 

North Viem;ull. Infiltration roules were in operation by 19GO and 

were improved and expanded during the war. Monsoon weather 

affected the volumc of the flow and produced a pUls;uing effect in 

these arteries of men and matcriel. In dry seasons and transitional 

periods between monsoons the flow increased dramatically, often 

up to four and five times the ordinary volume. The regularity of 

this now in turn determined the intensity of combat that could be 

supported in SOllth Vietnam. This seasonal effect of the weather 

would e"ellluall), be recognized in the late 1960's as a dominant 

factor in the enemy's scheme of operations. 

Enemy supplies were limited at the beginning to relati\'ei), 

unsophisticated wcapons and war material in limited qualllities. 

Troops were usually former residellls of 50lllh Vietnam, indoctri-
MAP 3 

THE WET SEASON 

SOUTH VIETNAM 

� No Go, Tank. APe 

<: No Go. Tank 
lhe supply of SOllih Vietnamese dwindled, North ViclIlilmcsc 

soldiers began (0 appC:lr, first as replacements in Viet COllg unit.s, 

thell as cmire lInit .. of the North Vietnamese Army. The appearance of whole unit.:. marked the tramilian to the last phase of the 

war, which was a clash between modern armies, c\'cn though Viet 

Cong g'ucrrilla activities continucd. 

Viet Cong ;lI1d Nonh Vietnamese haltle t<lClics invariably followed a simple formula, adopted originally from the Chinese COI11-

bat doctrine of l\.fao TSC-11IIIg: \Vlle., the enemy advances, with· 

draw: when he dcfclld�, harass; when he is tired, attack; when he 

withdraws, pursue. To Ihis formula W:IS added a combat technique 

of "one slow, four quick," practiced \\'ith meticulous precision in 

almost every situation, 

The firlll step. one slow, meant prepare slowly; a thorough and 

deliberate pl;lIlning preceded any tactical operation, Each action 

\\'as rehearsed until every leader and individual was familiar with 

the terrain and his specific job. Only when the commander was convinced that the rehearsal was perfect, was the operation auempted. 

Execution was in four quick steps, lhe first of which was advance 

quickly. The Viet Cong 1II0\'ed r.q)idly from a relati\'ely secure 

area to the objcctive and there moved immediately into the second 

step, assault quickly. III the as.·.ault, they tried to insure surprise, 

pouring large voluilles of fire on their objective. They swiftly 

exploited success and pursued the enemy, killing or capturing. The 

third step, clear the h:lltlcfield quidly, consisted of collecting and 

carrying away all wcapons, ammunition, and equipment, and 

destroying anything that could not he carried off. The Viet Cong 

made every cffon to evacuate their wounded and deild. Finally, 

with orderly prccision. the fourth step, withdraw quickly. was 

taken. The IrOOpS moved over planned withdrawal rOUles, with 

large units quickly breaking into sm<lll groups Olnd losing themselves in as large an arca as possible. Llter. the scattered groups 

reassembled in a safe :Irea. 

Perhaps the tllOSl llllusual Viet Cong fighting technique was thaL 

of carrying on a different kind of war in each of Somh Vietnalll'� 

forty-foUT provinces. South Vietnamese defenders in the northern 

highlands were cunfromed with enemy tactics thaI were in sh<lrp 

comr;lSI to tho�e used in the broad southern deltas. Even more 

unllsual ",as the fact th:1I the le\'eI of conflict in each province 

varied surprisingly. Often one province would be simultaneollsly 

subjected 10 large·scale mobile attacks and guerrilla h<lrassmcm. 

while a neighboring province \\'as left entirely alone. This selective 
Vlt:T CO:'-C SOLDlt:R 
obscn'crs, and hid the true nature of the conflkl. The American 

image of the enemy as loosely organized groups of bandits or 

guerrillas was nOl l'Cal. The enemy h<ld a plan and worked his plilll 

well, so well in faci lhat by 1 964 he was ready to make the transi· 

tion to .he lasl phase of the conflict. full-scale mobile war. 
CHAPTER II 

Armor in the South Vietnamese Army 

As modcu as the armored forces were in the SOllth Viclllamese 

Army, they had been in existence almost five years before lhe first 

U.S. advisers arrived. Under French lUtciage, the Vietnamese Armor 

Corps was founded in 1950 by lhe simultaneous eStablishment of 

all armor training sccLion in the Vietnamese i\lil itary Academy at 

Dalal and a Vietnamese reconnaissance company manned by French 

officers and ViclIlamese enlisted men. 

By late 1955, aftcr the division of ViclIlam under the Geneva 

Accords. lhe armored force in the 50Ulh had an armored regiment 

deployed in each of lhe four military regions. E.,ch regiment had a 

headquaTlers company and three reconnaissance companies that 

werc equipped with i\lS :Irmored cars, 1\13 half-lrad:.s, ]\13 SCOut 

cars, and towed 1\18 howitzcrs. From the French the armor troops 

had inherited old equipmcnt, black berets, and concepts of employing armored units that would take years to change. Tactics stressed 

defense, reaction r:nhcr than action, piecemeal commitment of 

armored vehicles and units. the use of armored vehicles as mobile 

pillboxes, and the movement of armored units almost eXclusively 

along roads. 

L. .. te in 1952 an armor course was established at the Tim Duc 

Rcserve Officer's School. III 1955, when the officer's school became 

the Tim Duc �Iililary School Center. the armor branch became a 

separate school. EvcllLUally the Armor School hecame an independem emity under the Armor Command. The first class of the basic 

armor officer course was gr:lduated in I\lay 1 955, :lnd in June Lieutenant Colonel Walter J. L ..

 ndry became the first U.S. adviser to 

the school. I n 195G for the first lime Vietn;lJlleSe officers allended 

the U.S. Arm)' Armor Schuol at Fan Knox, Kentucky. to supplemcnt lheir armor training ill Vietnam. Between 1956 and 1973, 712 

Vietnamese officers attended courses at Fon Knox. 

To oversee armor training and the de\'elopmenl of armor 

tactics for the South Vieln<lI11cse Army, the Vietnamese Armor 

Command. which also served as the office of the Chief of Armor, 

was established on I April 1955. The Chief of Armor, a general 

sta ff officer, t heorct ica 11)' Iud 110 tactical a lIthori I y but advised the 

Vietnamese high cOlllmand on armor matters, panicularJy training. 

Hc also supervised thc armor school, arlllor doctrine, rorce Slruc-
SOUTII VIETNAMESE ARMORED RECONNAISSANCt: UNIT stands jllS/ICC/ioTl 

ill 1952 af 'FilII Due OUlCer�' Sclwul. The vehicle /s (I 19)9 French 

Plltlhard (j)"lIlored car. 

ture, ;md equipment changes. In the carly years the Chief of Armor 

became vcry powerful and ('\en g:wc orders 10 field units, blll lhis 

abuse of the chain of comm:lIld ceased in the mid-1960's. 

Wilh the ere;llion of the Republic or Vietnam in October 1955 

the Vielllamese Armor Corps became a part of the Army of the 

Republic of Vietnam, and hy c;trly 19:16. when the U.S. advisers 

appeared it was :tlre'lely fairly well organized both for training and 

opcralions in the field. The ('xis ling South Vietnamese armored 

units were reorganized tlllder U.S. influence as armored cavalry 

regiments consisting of 1\1'0 reconnaissance squadroll'l, each 

equipped with 1\18 <lrmored «Irs. 1\13 hnl f-trad:.� and i\l3 seOUl cars, 

and one squadron of 1\124 wnks.' The Armor School, swept along 

in the reorganization, was patlcrned after the U.S. Army Armor 

School at Fon Knox. InSIl'U<:Iion emphasized the hands·on method 

lhat characterized the American school, lesson plans and manuals 

were ;Id:q)lcd from those prepared at Fort Knox, and u)urses like 

those at Fort Knox were undertaken to covcr the full rangc o[ 

armor [faming. 

1 A Viemanlese regimen! was «Iui,alen! in site 10 an Americ:lll battalion or 

S(lua(lron. and a ViclI1:1mcse sC[uadrOIl was l"lu;13Icnl !O :In ,\mcl'ican �ompallY or 

troop. 
armored force was )mall; sixleen armor offlcer� were assigned to 

the Milit;lry Assist<lnce Advi�ory Group, ViC[IIam. Only fOllr armor 

officers were assigned LO armored field units, and Ihese assignments 

were 1I0t made until 1959. 1'ot only wcre field .. Jvisers restrictcd 

from panicip,1ting ill combat operations, but before 1962 all returning mililary advisory officers h'ere obliged to sign a certificate binding them to secrecy on the �ubjcct of advi!>ory operations in Vietnam. This policy limi ted discu�sion and the publication of articles 

and hampered the U.S. Ann)' in its own prep;nations for Vietnam. 

it is no wonder theil, considering Ihe lillIe armor there was in 

South Vietnam, the few American advisers, and the seal of secrecy, 

that lhe experiences of ViclIlamese armored units were ignored by 

the U.S. milit:I1'y, e\'cn during U.S. troop depJo}mellls in 196,j and 

1966. Yet this cxperience was gained in the hardest school of all, 

combat against an enelll}'. U l timately, the impre�sion of Vietnamese 

armored forces Ih:H filtered through the screen of secrecy was one 

of a force that had played:1 minor role in warfare in Victnam. True 

or nOt, the impression was created, :Il least in part by lhe U.S. 

advisers. 

U.S. Advisers 

In early 1962, with the formation of the U.S. �Iilitary Assistance 

Command. Vietnam (�IACV) , the tHII11her of American advisers 

grew. In the fall of 1962. ten more ;u'mol' ofllcers aniveci; fOllr 

replaced armored cavalry regimental advisers. lhe others were 

assigned to six newly actiV:l led sqnadrons. The armor advisers who 

came to teach Vietnamese armor commanders and soldiers also 

learned, largely through trial and enol'. ahOllt the land, Ihe war. 

and the enemy. By 196,j the regimental advisory detachment was 

amhol'i)'ed a major as I'eg-imental adviscr, a captain as starr adviser, 

and a company grade officer and twO noncommissioned officers for 

each squadron. As the armored force expanded. each new regiment 

and squadron was assigned an advisory detachment. These detachments prcceded U.S. units into Vietllam and remained behind 

thelll llntil Janu:lry 19i3. 

Advisers formed an excl Llsivc group o( officers and noncommissioned officeI') who were cho�en by the Department of the Army 

strictly bC('ause they were i,vailable for reassignmelll and adviscrs 

were needed ill Vietllalll. There was no sp<.-cial schooling for advisers until e:II'ly 1962 when a six-week course was established at 

Fort Bragg, Nonh Carolina. This advisers' course, under the 

allspices of the U_S. Army Spccial Fortes School. was basically 

infantry oriented and no arlllor training was provided. L'lnguage 
guage schools .. \5 a rC�LlIt , most ad\ iscrs had 110 kllO\dcdge of the 

Vietnamese JanguaA"c-a deficiency I hal continued as long as the w .. r 

lasted. )'\0 adviser W;'IS rC:JIl" prepared for the cllitural, climatic, 

and profcs5ional shot k Ihal awailed him when he joined a SOlllh 

Vietnamese .\nny unit. PalicllLc, pcrsc\,cr:lIlCc, and com111on sense 

\I"cre the most important assetS :l man could have for the job. 

Once ill Saigon, armor advi .. cn. were assigned 10 Vietnamese 

units by the armor adviser all the staff of the i\liJiwry Assistance 

Advisory Croup. I .alcr, Ihese :lssignmcllts were made by the senior 

U.S. adviser 10 the Somh Victmunesc Armor Command. Each new 

adviser W<lS gi\cn a shon briefing on South Vietnamese armor and 

on the unit he was LO advise before he left by helicopter or jecp 

to join his unit. Bccause squadrons were widely separated ulllil 

mid-19GG, the ad\ iscr rarely S<IW his bo�s. the regimental adviscr. 

and seldom operated with other squadrons of the regiment. Dependelll for �upplies. food. ammunition, and his vcr)' exi�tence 011 

his South VietTl<lmese unit, he had to establish himself quickly as 

a team member. 

The dut), of :In ad\ iser can bcst be described as frustr:lting: it 

was complicated by serious d ifferences in culture and com hat 

experience betwecn addser and ;l(h'i�ed and the fact that the adviser 

could not speak the language of t hose he advised. As iI repre�elHa· 

ti\'e of the U.S. Ann". the adviser had access to communic:llion 

and firepower suppOrt \'a�tly superior to that of the Vietnamese 

unit commander .. \!though this <{(h';'Image sometimes helped to 

establish the necessary working relation�hip, the ;lCh·iser achieved 

a good rehlliomhip b\' working all day. seven d:lYs a week, mostly 

in the comp;H1), of the unit (·ollllllander. Although not expected to 

fight, on oper;nions the ad\'i�er weill with the Vietnamese COIllmander, providing <ldvice and American assiSl:lnce with fire suppOrt, comnlllllit';'ItiOllS. <Iud medical e"acu<ltion. 

Until micl-19G5 advisers were the main source of information 

for the AmeriC<ln mililall' on armor operations in Vietnam. \Vhell 

AmeriC;'I1l troops fin:111)' joined the fighting, the adviser's position 

often became more diOiuLit, particularl), in the early years of the 

American t!'Oop huildup \\'hen the Army of the Republic of 

Vietnam was generally regarded hy U.S. units as inferior and a 

security risk. Fre(IUcllth. the adviser himself \\'as ;lIso treated like 

a poor cOllntr" comin. :\l:Jny advisers declared hitterl)' that Ameri· 

(;'In armored unitl> often ignored the experience and knowledge of 

enemy and terrain offered hy the Vietnamese armor oflicers and 

the advisers. As a result of this attitude American units made fre-
course. Evemually, time, improvemelll in the Vietnamese Army, 

and repeated tours by U.S. soldiers altered the situation. in the 

later stages of the W:U', man)' Vietnamese and American armored 

units eswblishcd joilll training. operat iollal, and social programs 

that were helpful to units of hOlh armed forces. 

I\lost arlllor ad\'i�ers were illlpressed hy the technical proficiency 

of their Vietnamese unils. In the Illailllenance of weapons and 

equipment. the Vietnamese armor crewmall was olltswnding: his 

innovations often extended 10 milking repairs 10 his equipment 

with chewing gum. bailing wire. and even b:man<l stalks. In tactics 

and the coordiniltion of fire suppon, SOllth Vieln:ullese armored 

units had much to learn in the early ),e<l1'S from ,\merican advisers. 

The exchange of inform<ltion between adviser and unit g:l\'e the 

adviser a better underHanding of Vielll:III1'S particular problems 

and \\'a5 indireClly usdul in helping 10 prepa.re American units for 

senrice in Vietnam. 

Perhaps the contribution of armor advisers can best be SIIIll· 

marized by saying Ih;n they created an atlllosphere in which ch;lnge, 

innov;lIiOIl. and de\'elopmem could take place. They were in a 

sense responsible for the spirit of aggressiveness and confidence that 

b"'ew in Vietnamese armored units. and e\'entually led to the successes of Vietnamese armor during Tel 19G8 and the enemy offellsi\'e of 1972. 

tU / J)'s il/ tile Me/lOng Delt" 

Despite Ihe efforts of U.S. advisers, South Vietnamese Army 

laClics remained French for some time and reflccted Vieillamese 

political pressures that put a premium on holding down casualties 

in men and equipmelll. Armor was used princip;dly in defense; its 

primary rni�siOJls \I'ere escorting COl1\'O)'S, defending positions. de;lring roads. and aCling as relief forces. Vietname�e equipment had 

been used in the French war and agc had aggravated its shortcomIngs. 

in an effon to introducc more rccent cquipmelll, in late 1961 

the Military Assi�l:IlIce Advisory Croup studied the possibilit), of 

using the i\f 113 armored personnel carrier (APe) in Vietnamcse 

Army units in the Mekong Delta. On I.he basis of recommendations 

growing OLlt of tbis l>wdy. twO 1\1 1 13 companies were organized 

in April 1962 and assigned to the Vi'etn:unese 7th and 21st Infantry 

Divisions. The original plall had been to issue the ilrnlored personnel carriers to two well-trained rifle companies, then instruct Ihe 

troops in mechanized operatiuns. The newly organized units were 
at random. Most I.cy ('omm:md positions were filled with men from 

the South ViclIlilmcsc ,\rmol' Command who had little comhat 

experience, and it \\':15 necessary La extend Ihe six-week training 

program to nine weeks. The companies were joilled by U.S. ad· 

visers Captain James \Y. Brkkcr and Captain Stanley E. I ioltom, 

recent graduates of the first advisers' course :ll FOrl Bntgg. Originally called mechanized rifle comp:lIlics, the new units were modeled ;.ftcr AmcriC:lIl mechanized rifle companies. E:Jeh company 

\\';lS ol'g:nlizcd inlO three rifle p];uoons with three APC's in each 

platoon; a support plol1oon with fOllr A PC's. three GO-mm. monars, 

:lnd three 3.5·inch rockeL launchers: and a <:ompany headquaners 

section with tWO APe's. All c:lrriers I\'ere equipped with a .50· 

caliber m:lChine gUll, :mel eighteen .:W·caliher Browning aLHolllillic 

rifles were distributed throughout the company. 

As I\'ith almost any new organization. Ihe units' first engage· 

ments renected their lack of experience. Because of the limited 

knowledge of :1I'mored tactics :ll higher commands. the lInits were 

also handicapped \\·ith improper a�signmeills or missions that led 

them into impassahle terrain. These early opera lions provoked a 

great deal of unfavorahle comment that was directed chielly al Ihe 

alleged inadequacies of the �11 13. The situation improved. however, when the uilits acquired experience. Between II ,Iunc and 

30 Septcmber 1902. the two companies killed 502 of the Viet C:ong 

and took 184 pri:,ollers at a COSt to themselves of 'I dead and 9 

wounded. 

The first real l>tl(;cess with the new mechanized forces came 

abOllt in a Vielname�c 7111 Infantry Division operation in Septem· 

ber 1962 in tile l'lain of Reeds. After swdying the SOlllh Vict· 

namcse plan, \\·hich involved sever:d regimellt" under division con· 

11'01, Captain Britker. the mechanized unit adviser, recommended 

thal because of (ile [crrain the mechanized company 110t he u:-.ed. 

But since the division commander had personally developed the 

scheme of m;Uleu\,CI' nn l.hanges wcre made and the opcr:llion wa� 

launched as scheduled. 

Although aerial reconnai�sance had confirmed the terrain diffi· 

culties. Ihe mechani/ed company mo,'ed 0111 early on 25 September 

with nine Uillored pehonnd carrier�. For a time all went smoothly 

and mO\'CIllClll W:h r:lpid. The company was ordered to bypass its 

first objeclivc. continue 10 Ihe second. and block the Viet Cong 

escape rOUle along a fOllr·kilometer �cgment of a canal. Shortly 

thereafter i[ \\'as ordered 10 cros� the camd :md altack a group of 

sixty Viet Congo 
ARMOIU:O !'ERSONNt:l. CAII.RII:R, ;\1 1 13, (iring .50·C(l/iber machine gun 

durillg SOl/lh Vietnamcsc Imillillg exarisc, lJl/rrel of side·morlllled 

.30·caliber machine gu" Ctlll bc seCII 011 far side 0/ M J J). 

The company reached the can:tl allom 10-15 and Ihe lead clemelllS, :tr!er a delay in finding a stliwble site, began to cross. \\'hen 

one pIa LOon h<ld re<lched Ihe other side. an observ;nion post spOILed 

fourteen enemy soldier .. and tile Somh Vietnamese company commander, Captain Ly Tong Ha, decided to attack. Although Caplain 

I3ricker had urged that the armored C<lrriers be Il.�ed 10 maneuver 

10 the enemy flank. the APe's charged straight ahead through the 

flooded paddies LOw:trd the point where the Viet Cong had last 

been seen. Suddenly. enemy soldiers :Ippeared all arollnd the APe's, 

some firing automatic weapons and rifles and others running wildly 

ill an "tlempt to evade the armored vehicles. As the APe's scattered 

the enemy. the South Vietnamese soldiers fired in all directions 

from Ihe open h,nches, with the .50-caliber machine gUlls dominating the fight. 

After milch disClls .. ion. Captain Ilricker persuaded Captain Ba 

to order his troops LO disllIOUlll, btu this move proved to be a 

serious mistake. As long as the IroOpS were mOtlnled and moving 

the ViCl Cong had been unable 10 fire well·aimed shots. Dismounted, che soldiers noc only IOSl the advantages of movement, 
themselves bogged down in water that was knee-deep. i\'o sooner 

wcrc lhe armor troops immobilized than aCCUr;'HC enemy lire fOllnd 

them Ollt; the Vict Cong, knowing the terrain, h<ld moved to the 

higher grou nd of an underwater knoll. As squad control disilllcgr;Hcd, C<ISlIallies increased and the operation became disorganized. 

The fighting subsided aftcr an hOUT and SOllth Vietnamese 

troops remounted their vehicles and mo\'cd west. Almost ill once 

the company was engaged by heavy slnnll <lnlH fire from isolated 

groups of Ihe enellly. As the APC's OIIl<lcked, enemy soldiers hiding 

in the reeds were flushed from their concc;dmem and oven-un. It 

was miclaflcrnoon before the enemy began to withdraw. When 

SOllth Vielllamese troops clearcd the baltlefield thcy found more 

than 150 of the Viet Cong dead. They had also captured thirtyeight men and seized twenty-seven wcapons, including an American 

.50-caliber machine gun <lnd tWO Browning automatic rifles. 

Despite difficult terrain and poor tactical decisions this mechanized operation achieved success. Generally the unit performed 

well, sho\\·jng lhal il had made great progress since completing its 

training in June. Its failure to maneuver. howe\·er. prevented the 

rapid destruction of the enemy. and, combined with confusion as 

to \\'hether to conduct the atwck mOl.llllcd or dismounled, demonstrated that both the Vietnamese armor soldier and his adviser 

still had much 1.0 learn. The application of what was then American doctrine. which called for mechanizcd troops 10 dismOllnt and 

aS5.:1.ult the ohjective on fOOL, camed Ihe attack 10 falter. ilecause 

of Ihis experience, attacks in the fUlurc were conducted with troop .. 

fighting from the caHiel's. The �I 1 1 3 quickly became :l comhat 

vehicle, lLsed almost OIS a light [(mk, Eventually, American unitS 

adopted this doctrinc and fOllght Illounted.:! 

Reorg(wiwli01l (11<1 Retrenchment 

The success of the first lwo South Vietnamese mechanized COIllpanics clClllonSII':ncd Ihe value of highly mancll\'erablc, lightly 

armored vchiclcs ill Victtwlll. To supplement these two companies. 

thc newly dcveloped �1 1 1'1 reconnaissance vehicle and additional 

M 1 13's were shipped 10 Vietnam. The first twO M 113 companies 

wcre rcdesignated the IIh and 51h Mechanized Riflc Squadrons of 

the 2d Armored c.,val!"), Regiment and assigned to the IV Corps 

Tactical Zone in the Mckong Delta. Thc armored cavalry regimcnts 

2 Th ..

 �Pllt';lr.ln(:e or Ih .. Kn'I'lI amouflagcd ;\tI 13's. mo\ing r.lpidl} ()\er the w�teT' 

§Oked fields. IJckhlng fire ;lml smoke from their m3(:hille gUlls �lId engines. p .. ! 

rise 10 Ihe nickname "gr<.-et, dl"OI.gons:' 
1962 with lhe addilion of one armored rc<.:onnaissance squadron 

and two mechanized ri/t(! M_luadrons. M 113':. for the new squadrons 

:uTived in hllc 1962 and the squadron:. became operat ional as they 

completed training at the SOllth Vieillamese Armor School. l3y May 

1963 each of the fOllr regimellt:. had one squadron each of �124 

tanks, )\18 armored cars, and ;\1 1 14's, and tWO mechanized rifle 

squadrons with !\1 113's. 

Mechanized rifle squadrons were organized like their predecessors, the mechanized rille companies, except for the supponing 

weapons. During 1962 lhe 3,5·inch rocket 1;IlIllChel' alld the GO-mill , 

mortar were judged ullsati:.factory beulllSe of their limited range. 

Each newly organized squadron \\'as equipped therefore with LInce 

81-mm. mortars and :1 57·mm. recoilless rille, all transported by 

armored persolltlel c;lrriers, 

Unit reorganization and new equipment alone were nOt enough 

to bring about a change in the war. New welics. better le:ldership, 

and i mpro\'ed training were needed to complement the increased 

firepower, \Vhen training lagged, ovcrconfidence and poor leadership combined to teach some costly lessons, Advisers were ohen 

frustrated in their aU(!ll1p tS lO persuade ViCUI:lmese annor leaders 

to lise IIle new APe's properly and aggrcssi\'ely, 

The battle of Ap Ihc, sixty-five kilometers southwest of Saigon 

in the Mekong Della in January 196:S, illustrates the problem, The 

month before, Vietnamese Army intelligen�e had reponed a reinforced Viet Cong company in AI

' Tan Thoi, 1 . .i00 meters nonhWCst of Ap Bac. (Mol) '/) The Vietnamese 7th Division planned an 

operation 10 trap the Viet Cong by landing the 1 1 th InfalHry Regiment 10 the north by helicopter while a provisional regiment of 

tWO b:llwlion-size task forces of Civil Guards (later named Regional 

Forces) mo\'ed in from the south. The -I th I\lcch:ll'lized Rifle 

Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, commanded by Captain Ba, was 

attached to the provisional regiment and was to attack from the 

southwest. Three Vietnamese Ranger and infantry companies were 

in reserve, with artillery and air suppOrt on call. 

In comraSt LO the intelligence estimate, the enemy force acwally 

consisted of three main force companies, reinforced with machine 

guns, GO-I11Ill, mortars. and SC\'eral local guerrilla units. The Viet 

Cong aftcr action report subsequently captured rcve:lied that the 

enemy knew a bailie was imminent and had c;lrefully prepared 

defensive positions along the Cong Luong Can:!l from Ap Tan 

Thoi to Ap Bile. The (;mal. bordered with vegetation, offered concealment and unobstructed fields of fire across the open rice 

paddies. 
I 

Task B 

BATTLE OF AP BAC I 

2 January 1963 

n0110 ,cala 

MAP 4 

� 

Ap Tan Hiep 

VC Direction 

of Retreat 

Task Forco A 
sl:tnecl nonh. while ill three unevclllful trips helicopters lifted the 

Vietnamese 1 1 th Inf;uHry Rcgiment into posilion. AboUl 0730 

Task Forcc A enculITltcl'cd the sOllthern flank of the Viet Cong 

positions along the Cong Luong Canal. During the first momcnts 

of banle, the task force commander was \\"ollnded and a company 

commander killed. Major Lam Quang Tho, commander of thc 2d 

Armored Cavalry Regiment and also province chief, refused LO 

allow the provincial forces to advance, and changed their mission 

to one of occupying blocking positions. Colonel Hui Dinh Dam, 7th 

Division commander, de(iclcd to cOlllmit a reserve force to thc wen 

side of the can:tl that rUlls through Ap naco At 1020 as the helicopters came in for their fourth lift, the Vict Cong antiaircraft crcws 

hidden atong the canal opened fire. Of the Ij helicopters bringing 

in the reserve, 14 were hit. and by noon j had been shot down. 

Lieuten:tl1t Colonel John P. Vann, division adviser, radioed 

C'lptain J:tllles B. Scanlon, senior adviser 10 the 2d Armored Cav· 

aIry Regiment, that the helicopters were down about 1,500 melers 

to the southeast of the regiment. After considerable argument with 

Captain Scanlon, Caplain Ila finally agrced to move across the 

Cong Ila Ky Callal and securc the hel icopters. Three hours later, 

as the first of the APe's :tpproached the helicopters, enemy fire 

suddenly r:tked the twO leading vehides and their dismounted 

infalllrymen. Thc APC's began backing up. abandoning the 

wounded. A few minutes !:tIer they advanced again, firing their 

.50·caliber machine guns, and again they were hit by enemy fire. 

Exposed from the waist up, the machine gunners were 1)'1.nicularJy 

vulnerable; fourtecn of them died berore the day was ovcr. 

Captain Scanlon mn to the aid of the wounded helicopter crews, 

and with the hclp of Sergeant Bowers. anothcr ath'iser. carried [hem 

to the APC's. Ily noll' more APC's had crossed the (;111:11 :tud they 

lOO tried to maneuver forward, but without success. Uecause there 

was no unificd effort, the Viet Cong w:ts able 10 concentrate fire 

on e:lch vehicle ill LUrn as it venturcd forward. 

By midaftemoon when it was apparent [hat the enemy could 

not be ovcrrun, the SOUlh Vietn:lmese Army commanders and the 

advi:.ers decided 10 reqllcst reinforcement by :1I1 airborne baltalioll. 

Despite the vehement ohjections of both Colonel Vann and Colonel 

Daniel n. Panel'. who was the IV Corps Tactical Zonc adviser. the 

corps commander decided 10 drop the South Vietnamese airborne 

battalion to the west, behind the IllCCh:lllizcd squ:tdron, rather than 

cast oE the cana\. where it would have completed [he encirclement. 

At dusk the 8th Airborne H:utalion par:tchutcd into the rice pad· 
over lhe ellemy positions. Taking advantage of Ihe open eastern 

side, the Vict Cong withdrew during the niglll and were gone by 

dayl igill. Early in the morning dismounted troops from lhe APe 

squadron crossed the c;mal, passed the empty enemy positions, and 

swept through most of Ap llac before being ordered to hold. The 

airborne battalion was still organizing and callceLing parachutes 

<llld was not I'c:ldy to auack. Finally. at noon lhe force Sl<Jgcd an 

allack thai was really nothing morc I h;,!11 a walk·throllgh. 

Because of lhe l:.rgc number of Soulh Vietnamese troops 111-

valved, nnc! especially hecause of the l1umber of U.S. helicopters 

downed early 011 the first day, the bal1le of AI' Bnc drew mllch 

auelllion. Although estimates of the results of AI' Hac varied, Colonel Vann considered the operation a failure. Several days later 

he stated: "There were Ihree main cril icisllls. .. First, the failure 

of SOllth Force to move. Second. failure of the APC's to move. 

Third, the paracilllle force. Thev were dropped on the \\Tong side 

of the river. It \"':IS a decision that 1 opposed. The)' w:lIlted to 

reinforce defeat rather than ensure victory." 

The fighting ;1( AI' Bac and more speci fically the employment 

of the mechanized rine squadron, illustr.lles many of the problems 

faced by advisers. Poor coordination and planning were apparcill 

at all levels in the South Vietnamese command: the airborne forces 

were not correctly empio),ed and there was no unity of command 

on the ground. Politics also played a p:lrt. The South Victnamese 

cavalry commander was the political leader of the province, and 

because his polit ical and military future depended on his keeping 

casualties in the Civil Guard and armored cnvalry to a minimulll, 

he was reluctant to havc these forces attack. Fin:llly, strained relations bel\\'ecil the advisers :1I1d the SOllth Vietnamese unit commanders m,llcrially contributed to the lack of cohesion. Ilolitical ly, 

the battle was reponed as ;1 victory, bllt for the armored forces it 

wa$ much less. Only when the news had had further training and 

experience and whell improvements had been made on the equip. 

ment would the APe's he employed to better advantage. 

While the lessons of Ap ilac were slill fresh. the SOlith Vietnamese armored force undertook a series of expansiolls. In December 1963 two regimental-size armored unils were activated. The 

5th Armor Crollp, later redesignaled the 5th Armored Cavalry 

Regiment, and the 6th �Iechanized Bailie Grollp. bter redesignated 

the 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment. were both assigned to the 

Vietnamese high command as a general reserve. Fonned from Ihe 

lank sqll:,drons of other units, the 5th Armor crollp II'as in effect 
19G.J, two more mechanized rine squadrons were formed at lhe 

Armor School and compleled their training in October. These 

additions made a tOlal of fourteen openllional mechanized rine 

sqLladrons. 

Even with additional forces and equipment, however, the com· 

bat record of Smuh Vicmamese armored forecs in 1964 was still 

uneven. One hattie in the PI:lin of Reeds on 3 :lIld " March 

1964 elided in a rcsounding vielOry for the South Vietnamese 

and the caplure of over 300 of thc Viet Congo In contrast., on 

28 Decclnher 1 �)G-1 the 9th Vict Cong Division seized the town of 

Binh Gia. sixty·five kilometers east of Saigon. During a hallie that 

lasted several days. Somh Vietnamese Ranger and Marine bat· 

talions were sC\'erely he.nen. As the fighting continued into the 

first few days of 1965, SOLlth Vietnamese armored relief forces were 

amhu�hed and they too �LlfTered heavy casualties. This battle was 

significalll to hath sides since it marked the beginning of J\fao 

Tse·wng'lO classic and final "mobilc" phase of the war. For the 

first time a Viet Cong division II':1S committed as a whole: the 

b;ntle itself was unusual ill that the enemy unit remained on the 

battlefield for several days instead of resoning to the customary 

Viet Cong h it·and·l'lIn tactics. 

Almost at the same time that the Viet Cong began to appear 

in larger units, Amcric:1Il forces began deploying in Vietnam. Prob· 

ably lhe most publicized campaign of 1965 was thaI of the U.S. 1st 

Cavalry Division in the la Dr:lIlg valley west of Pleiku in the II 

Corps T:lctical Zone. Lillie publicity, however, was given to the 

actions which led up 10 the 1st Cavalry battles in the Ia Orang 

willey. 

FrOIll 19 to 27 Octobcr :1 South Vietnamese armored task force 

of tanks and AP(:'s with Rangers battled through to the relief of 

the 1)lei j\lc Special Forces camp southwcst of Pleiku. Although 

ambushed en route by a North Vietnamese regiment, the lask forcc, 

with U.S. air and artillery suppOrt, reached the camp, established 

a peri meier. and stood ofT a heavy allack. It then coullterallacked, 

killing 148 of the enemy and capturing 5. It was during this cam· 

paign that cnough intelligence information was collected to war· 

rant sending the 1st Cavalry Di\'ision into the la Orang valley. 

The fight to s..we the 1}lei Me Special Forces Camp allowed 

American advisers to observe the Vietnamesc armored task force 

in action. Gunnery was poor in the tank units, which were now 

equipped with �14 1 wnks. There was no cffon to place accurate 

main gun fire; instead, the Vietnamese tankers "shot from the hip" 
Tanks bunched lip. alld troops demonstrated linle aggrclol>i\cness, 

content (0 l>t:llld anti fight as if the\' were in pilll>oxc). StXllrity was 

poor-the unit was :lIllhu:.hcd on the \ cry first day. Coordinated 

action between t:lIll.s. armored personnel carriers. and Rangers \\'as 

almost nonexistent. Leadcf)hip and control were still a long way 

from :ICl.:cpt:lhlc 'l:m(\ards. :\laitllcl1:lllce continued lO be a bright 

spOt in the performance of Vietnamese armored troops: ;111 fifteen 

tanks rCllIrtlcd from the fighl. 

E:.; j)(lIIsiol) 0/ A 1'1110)" i /I I he SOli t II fI ielwullcse II rmy 

In February IOG5 Major Lloyd J. Brown. If;tining :ldviscr 10 

the Vielnamesc Armor Command proposed th:n the armored rorce 

be increased by se\cn lIIcchaniled rifle squadrons. and Ihal lhc firsl 

squadron begin training alm(hl immcdi:llely. 1\ par:dlel plan souglll 

LO increase manpower :uuhorizaliollS and Ihm provide one annm'cd 

Gl\'alr}' regimelll for eadl Vielllamese di\·i .. ion, rClaili a 1:I�k force 

headquaru.'fs. and greatly impr()\c thc efficicm y of administrali,'e 

and logistical suppOrt to thc �quadrons. Subsequelllly approved 

by the Vielll;ullc,e Joint Gcm'ral Staff and complctcd hv mid·1966, 

Ihe exp.1.nsion helped .. ol\e some of the prohlems camed by wide 

dispersion of units. 

Reorganiz:uion of Soulh Vietname .. e armored units in mid1965 brought about a Ch:lIlg"e in lhe t'.S. a(hisory org<lIli7.alion. In 

the early 1960· .. there W;'h no :t{h'isory dCt;lchmcllt :11 Ihe Armor 

Command; an of1i(er as�iglled to the organization and training division of the l\lilitary .. \��i�taIKe Advisory Group .tho :I(i"i,ed the 

Vietn;llllesc Chief of ,\nnor. At fir�t dc,cribed a� �enior advi .. er 10 

the Armor C.omrn:1Ild, he hecame Iraining a{h'iscr when the :Id­

"isory group wa .. supplanted hy the l\lilitary As�isl:1I1te Command, 

Vietnam, and the position (."ame under the Training DiJ"e(�torale of 

that command. In July 19ti:) when the Mil itary Assisl<Ince COIllmand. Vietnam, estilbli�hcd :1II ,\rmor Comm,1nd A(h isory Del:tch· 

mem, �fajor BrO\\'il , the training adviser, became the senior ad\'i�er 

of the Armor Command.l 

Plans for the Viclll:lIne�c :1I"I1I0I"c<:\ force for 196�) called for one 

V·IOO armored car squadron and tcn separate armored car troop ..

 

to be formed. trained, and deployed to replace unit� equipped Wilh 

the M8 and oldcr oh,olctc \ehidc,. Three of these troop� (om· 

pined training in i\f:t". but struCtural naws found in the V·IOO 

� ;\13jor nm"'n .. a� the r,rst \lIwtican 3"';IT<[(:,' the CO\Ned \rm� of the Republic 

of Vietnam -\rmOl- lbtlgc, al'l'fOl',iatch llIH"bcr<'1 l. 
corrected hy [he Vietnamese Army 80th Ordnance Depol. \Vhen 

these units assullled route security missions the M 1 13 units would 

be free for expanded combat opel'mions. 

In the midst of the expansion, the Armor Command was explor· 

ing altern:Hives for fUl'Ihcr increases. In late March 1966 Lieu· 

tcnant Colonel Raymond BallreaJl, senior ndviser [0 the Armor 

Command, directed Major James i\ladole, G·3 adviser, to study 

ways of enlaq.:ing the armored force. After accompanying each of 

the tell Viclnamese cavalry regimcnts on combat operations. Major 

i\ladole recommended that armored regiments be increased from 

ten to sixteen. Two of the new regimcms would be placed in the 

tWO divisions scheduled to ue added to the Vielll:tlnese Army. Each 

of the other foul' \\'ould be placed under comrol of a corps lactical 

zone commander :.s a mobile reserve. Although the l'eCOlllmend,l' 

tions \\'el'e nOI adopted at the time, the study influenced subse· 

quent decisions to enlarge the Vielllamese armored forces. 

A par.lllel study of Vieln,lInese nrmored cavalry was published 

in Febru:.!'y 1966 b)' the U.S. ArlllY COllcept Team in Vietnam. 

This study c\'aluated org;lIIization. equiplllelll, sLippon needs, and 

the best ways 10 use armored units. Aftcr observing lhe six cxisting (,,,'air), l'(.'gimcllls from February to May 1965, the authors of 

the study recommended that each division be assigned an armored 

cavalry regimcnt (Olbisting of a headquartcrs 'Illd at Icast t\\'o 

mechani7ed rirlc sqnadrons. Commenting on the study. the direc· 

tOr of thc Joim Re:.eilrch and Te:.t Acti\'ity in Vietnam, Brigadier 

General John K. Boles. Jr., agreed that additional armor units were 

needed. I lo\\'c\'cr. he considered the necd to be so urgent that he 

suggested the deployment of U.S. or olher free wodd a\'lnored 

lInits. Thus, indirectly, Vietnamese armor influenced the deploy· 

ment of U.S. armor. 

CUll Long 15 

All Free World 1I1ilitary Assistance Forccs in Vietn:nll faced 

the problem of forcing Ihe Viet Cong into an engagelllel1l :11 a time 

of the allies' choosing. The allies' \\'cll-laid ])1;lIIs. based on what 

appeared to be sound intelligence reports. fre(llIetlt l}' led to socalled walks in the sun-because the enemy m:maged to avoid combal. The following is an :lCcoum of olle :Iltelllpt to overcome lhis 

problem. 

In i\ l:Irch 1966 Vietn;lInese ArlllY forces planned to conduct a 

search and destroy opcl'(llioll ncar i\loc I loa ill the dell;'! lIsing the 

6th Armored Cavalry Regiment and infallll'}' elemenu of the 7th 
to attack on 21 :\1<l1"ch without alerting the enemy, ;lTIllored forces 

moved a d.l), earlier 10 AI' Hac. Iwcmy-Ihc kilomeler� �oUlh of ;\IQ( 

I-loa. RC;lChing '\1' B:ll Oil the afternoon of 20 "larch 1 966. Ihe 

6th Armored CavalrY Regiment moved into a previously lI�cd 

assembly "rc:_, resupplied, and ohSlcnsibly prep.lred LO slay the 

nighl. To an ohserver, the cavalry action resembled allY numher 

of earlier oper:Hiom that had 'ill'ep' ea�tward from Ap nile along 

the major ('an;1I net La TUYCIl Nhon. Under the cover of darkness, 

however, Ihe 6,h left Ap Uile :mel marched LO "Joe 110:1, arriving 

there al dawn. 

At fir:.1 light on 2 1 "larch the 6th Armored Cavalry Rcgimelll 

and supporting inf:uHry clcments mo\'ed across the m:ljor Gmal 

nonh of 1\10( I loa and hegan a sweep LO the northeasl. Sinwltane· 

ously. Vietn;un('�e infantry clemellls were lifted h" helicopter LO 

blocking posiLiom hetwecn the canal and the Camhodian border. 

Once acro�s the GlI1a\, the regitnelH deployed its >;quadron� on line, 

with the lead troop of each formation in a wedge form;u ion and 

the two following troop, in c()\umn. At 0900 the hI Squadron. 

commanded hy a C";:lptain Tiell encountered a few Vict Cong eight 

k ilometers nonhea�t of ;\I(x: Iloa. Captain Tien immediately de· 

played hi� squadron on line and, firing rapidly. his men moved 

tOward the enemy. Iligh gra��, hO\\'e\er, limited visihility and the 

Viel Cong llipped away. At ahout noon the squadron began receiv· 

ing small :mllS fire a� it Illo\ed along a canal fourteen kilometers 

east of Moc I loa .. \gain the squadron deployed on line and pressed 

rapidly tow:lrd the enem)' positions. Pushing their way through 

the tall grass, the G\\alry attempted LO force the enemy inlO the 

open with ma('hine gun fire. Thi� time. ho\\'ever. the enellly h:ld 

moved to well·prepared fighting emplacements from which t hey 

fOllght ha<:k with rc('oil!es� rifle. Illortar. and small ;lnns fire. 

The high gra�s pro\'ided Ihe enemy with good concealment and 

hampered coordination among the Vietnamese IInits. The 1st 

Squadron, {jth Cavalry Regimellt, and the supponing: inf;lIllry 

mOllllted 011 armored penollnel curiers found thelllsel"e� heavily 

eng;lged. flanked 011 bmh sidc�. and receiving fire from all direc· 

tions. One APC wa� struck on the gunshield by recoilless rifle fire 

that killed the gunner and wounded three l2.5. :t(h isel's riding in 

the \·ehicle. The cavalry laid down a barrage and withdrew to 

regrOlIJ) ;md evacuate the wounded. \Vhile Captain Jerrell E. 

I lamby, the V.S. adviser, directed the medical helicopters, the 

troopers �et fire to thl' tall gr.t's. burning ofT the vegetation and 

exposing the enemy fighting positions. 
try deployed on linc ;md anacked: this time wilh the grass burned 

away they were able to pinpoilll .md destroy Ihc cncmy with 

machinc gun fire. A running gUll b ... ule last cd ulltil nightfall as 

lhc combined forcc moved slowly eastward along Ihc canal. �Iore 

than 200 of the enemy werc killed, 17 II'ere taken prisoner, and 89 

weapons werc caplllred. The operation dcmollStratcd that with 

proper planning an armored unit could operate effcctively as a 

slJ'ikc rorce, even against elusivc ill�urgenL�. In this inst,ance a combined arms force, aggressively lcd. had proved 10 havc sufficicnt organic combat powcr to overcome a II'ell-armed ;mel II'cll-entrenched 

foe. 

Time /01' Correclive Analysis 

Actions likc CUll Long 15 wcrc the cxception, hOII'cver, for the 

misuse of armor continued to be a problem through 1967. i\lany 

senior Vietnamese cOlllmandcrs either ignorcd or did not understand lhe capabilities of ;m armorcd force. Pan of Ihe misuse was 

due 10 the complex Vicmamese concept of unit of command. In 

pan it also reflectcd the pcrsistent palace guard syndrome that 

caused Viemamese commandcrs LO parcel out their armored forces 

among several province, district, or other hcadquarters as security 

clements. Consequcllll)'. armored units were unable either to take 

the fight to the enem), or to maintain an acceptahle SI:lle of combat 

readiness. For examplc. :H Ban Me Thuot in II Corps Tactical 

Zone the 1st Squadron (lank) , 8th Armored Cavalry Regiment. 

sel"\'cd as the province headquarters guard forcc in 1967. Thc squadron had not fought since earl)' 1966. Soon O'lfter assuming his duties, 

thc unit's senior OIdvher, Captain Joseph Snow, discovered that 

ovcr 60 perccnt. of the troops had nc

'

ver been in combat. An extensive crew training program was immediately hegun. 

Although not all South Vietnamese armored squadrons were as 

incxperienced as the 1st Squadron, Sth Cavalr), Regiment, similar 

situations were frequentl), encountered b)' other U,S. adviscrs as 

I hey tried to improve unit performance. A detailed discussion of 

the problems irl\'ol\"�xl in the use of arlllor look place during an 

armor advisers' conference in March 1967. The advisers reviewed 

events of the past year and presellted their consolidO'ltcd recommend:Hions to the Vietnamese Chief of Armor. Subjects covered the 

entire rangc of armor crnploymem and included doctrine. training, organization, eftuipmelll. weapons, and combat vehicles. 

The advisers' recommendations strongly echoed those set fonh 

in the 1967 U.S. Army study, and included lhe suggestions that 
Operations in Viclllam, be approvcd and distributed to all com· 

mallders. scrvice schools, and Ir.lining centers: 

2. An �1113 hydraulically operated ,·ehicle·launched bridge, an 

�1113 dozcr blade kit, and t he �1 125A I 81·mm. mOTlal" carrier bc 

addcd to the Vietnamc�e ,mnor's table of organiz:nion and equipmcnt; 

3. l\fodern wcapollS including the i\1I6 riflc be issucd and an 

automatic 'IO-mm. grenade ';wncher bc evalu:ned; 

4. Infr;lred equipment (�f8 binoculars and xcnon scarchliglHs) 

be authorizcd ;md training conductcd to improve niglll operations 

and tbe usc of night sighling dcvices. 

The adviscr� also sUPPoTlcd an Armor Command proposal that the 

number of i\l1 1:rs per troop be iuU"e:tscci from threc to five. ;mel 

the rCIll;tining i\l8 armored cal" squadrons be replaced with l\f 113 

squadrons. 

'Vith most formal unit training and the acquisition of equipment complctcd :md with ;t temporary frceze on force levels imposed. advisers b<."gan to pLll more slress on improving the qu:tlity 

of operations. The)' determined that there Ifere sel'era! reasons for 

the poor use of Vietnamese armored forces. SupeTl'ision of sub· 

ordinate clement .. by regimcmal headquarters, for example. was 

difficult because squadrons were widely dispersed. In ;tddition, the 

tendency to employ the squadrons piecemeal frequently left regimental hcadqu:n·terl> as unemployed control elemellls during combat operalions. Inexperienced senior commanders oftcn as!>igncd 

unsuitable missions to armored ItnilS. Armored commanders werc 

often gil'en only the barest instructions for an operation-an objective and a direction of attack. Too many units were poorly led by 

ineffective but politically influential commamiers. 

Advisers were finally obl iged to bring presslLre ag:tinst tile Vietnamcsc high COlllllland 10 improve leadership. In April 1967, for 

example. they suggested that U.S. equipmcnt suppOrt funds be 

withdrawn from the 5th Armored Cavalry Regiment. :tnd in August 

another cavalry regiment \\':'S singled Ollt for the samc purpose. The 

South Vietnamese high command W;tS moved to take corrective 

action. As a follOW-lip . .. dvisers at alJ le,·els cominucd to emphasize 

the proper usc or armored forces, including the excrcise of unity 

of COllllnand and aggressil e leadership. 

In operations the SOHth Vietnamese armored units continued 

to improve upon existing doctrinal guidelines. "Then :unhllshed, 

Vietnamese c;tvalrymen :II \\'a)'s auacked Ihe ambushers diret:tly. 

South Vietnamcse operations were always much shoncr in duration 
unit attachcd to fight on foot if necessary. A squadron usually operated 011 one radio channel so that all \'chiclc cOllllnandcrs were in 

constanl communication and could hear thc unit leader. Combat 

orders werc oral and frequently modified to suit the de\'c\oping 

situation. The line formation was the f;l\'oritc method of Illo\'e· 

menl, although enemy mining later changed this tactic. Superstition even modified dOCirine since Vietnamcse units seldom took 

eleven or thirteen APe's on all opcr.llion because these were considered unlucky numbers. 

In the summer of 1967 General Creighton \V. Abrams, deputy 

commander of the i\lilitary Assist,mce Command. Vietnam, approved the U.S. funding for sevcr-Ii proposals made on behalf of 

the SOlHh Vietnallle�e high command by the Armor Command 

senior adviser, Colonel Baureall. Foremost was a plnn to increasc 

the number of i\1 1 1 3's in a Victnamese cavalry troop (platoon) 

from 3 10 5, and the tOlal number per squadron (troop) from 15 

to 22 withom increasing the number of soldiers. Before this time 

APC squadrons had been organized along the lines of U.S. mct:h­

"nized infantry companies, even though Vietnamese squadron 

taelia as they developed were not those of an infalllry unit, but 

rather those of a tank company in mounted combat. The increase 

in the number of vehicles was accompanied by clllling the number 

of crcwmen to a vehicle to seven men. Crew positions thus saved 

were then used to fill crews on additional vehicles. Among other 

approved proposals was one to disband armored car squndl"Ons and 

issue i\1 1 25AI 81-mlll. morlar carriers. Regimental headquarters 

retained their armored car platoons, which had beell issued V-IOO 

armored cars in 19G7. The �1125AI monar c.1rrier replaced the 

field expedient of moullting 8 1-mm. mortars on the l\1 1 1 3. 

The ;Idvisers' emphasis on training Slowly began to produce 

results. The 4th Armored Cavalry Regiment in I Corps Tactical 

Zone was :lll example of a unit which performed well in combat. 

The 4th developed :11I effective technique for occupying and defending a n ight position. Preferring to engage the enemy in the open 

rather th:m in fortified positions, the cavalrymen set up the night 

location whenever possible in a large open area. Vehicles moved 

into the area at dusk and occupied positions separ:ned from each 

other by thirty-five to forty meters, the bursting radius of an ellemy 

mortar round. The squadron was usually reinforced with an 

infantry h:lllalion, dug in on line with the front of the vehides. 

Barbed wire or claymore mines were placed only on wooded approaches, leaving the rest of the area free for vehicles to maneuver 
distinctive thump produced hv firing ellabled the �qlL;ulroll to 

determine il (01111);"1)') azimuth 10 the mort"l" pmitioll. Fire from 

SI-rnm. mOrtOlI'l> was ,hell WillI-cd lip and dt)11"1l ,11:0 ;"imuth, uMtally 

with good ('ffclI. If the perimeter n'('ci\'cd fire from long-range 

direct fire wc:qxlIls. the squadron cmplo}cd :millen' and monars 

r.Hher than fire from the ,\p(:,), thll!> concealing the "chicles' 

posi t ions. 

To COILIlIcr a p:rollnd attarl... the tracked "chicles wailed until 

the enemy 11': .. ill the open hefOl'c turning on their hc:tdlight� ,wei 

making a moulHcd :l.ss:lll1t \\'I lh all WC:,POIl!> firing. Supported by 

fire from the illfamr\lllCn ill foxholc� and the squadron's monars. 

,hi" tactic uSII:III\' diwllpled Ihc enelllY auack . . \her �lIfrering heavy 

casualties in �e\eral :I\s:luhs agrtin�1 the 'lih C:l\alry. Ihe Viet Cong 

:md :'\onh Victn:lInc�e in the :lrea avoided nighl rtnacks on the 

unit's positions. preferring to :ltt:lck fixed illstalbtions and less 

adept relief force�. Ca\'alry squadron c()mmander� learncd 10 move 

aher dark 10 night loc:nions. with squads of infantry riding the 

personnel carriers. Thc :\11 13', chang'cd dircction se\'eral times 

during the mo\'c, making it \'irtuall" impossible for the enemy 10 

dClenninc their destination. ThLls unable 10 locate the unit exactly, 

the cnemy could 1101 a ttack. 

The tactics jusl dc�cribed paid off for the South Victnamese 4th 

C;l\'alry on 16 September 1907. whel1 the 3d Squadron. stationed 

at Tam Ky. lI'a� alened tn 1ll0\ C smuh 10 Quang l\'gai. (By late 

afternoon the mo\"e lI'as canceled, and the unit remained in iu 

compound.) SlIhSCqllCIlI information re"caled that Ihe Viet Cong 

had pl:lnned a nighl attack h\' six companies 10 sei7e the provincial 

headquanel"� and a m:ljor bridge on Route I sOllth of Tam Ky 

:lnd 10 occupy Tam Kv itself. l .e;"ll"l1ing Ih,lI the �d Squ;"Idron h;"ld 

heen ordered to Qllan� Ngai. tile Viet Cong considered Ihe moment 

oppol'lune and .. cheduled their :lO;"l(k for Ihal night. 

The attack hegan at 0200 ",ith 1110l"lar fire. \\'hieh \\'as followed 

by a massive infantry assault 011 the provinci:d hc:tdqllaners ;"Iml 

the bridge. The 3d Squadron at the arlllor compound, t\\'o kilometers distanl. ;"Ilso heg;tn to ret.ei\'e enemy mOl"t"l" fire. It \\';"IS 

norlllal for the '(Juadroll II) leavc some Iroops ;"II lhe componnd 

\\'hcl1 it was 011 an operat ion. and it W:I� Ihe�e Iroop� that the mOr\;"Ir 

attack was i nlended to hit. Notified of the he,l\'y grollnd :lssault and 

realizing the ur�en("\ of the situalion, C!"e,,' rncmhcrs, dressed in 

steel helmets. (blk \·e�ts. underwear ,HId �Iippen, look only twent\, 

minules to gel their fifteen tr:lcked , chides OUI of the compound 

and on Ihe l"O:Id. The ..

 quadron, in radio COIH:lct ",ilh the pro-
wcre holding their 011'11 but th:u thc h('adqu ,mers 11':"<' in imminent 

danger of being O\·CITUIl. 

The armor \'ehide.) tllrtled left on Ruute I and headed north 

loward the �Ollnd of haule. i{c:llhing the ClllmllfC 10 the headquartcrs. t hey wheeled hard left, \I'i tb ,\1'(;".) coming 011 linc :lIld 

mona I' tracks �etling: up to the rear. The entirc line as)<lultcd. 

machine gUlls opening fire simult,mcou)l) and headlights turned 

on as the .\PC's swept forward. rhe Viet C(mg al lad 

.. 

disintegrated, 

and those \I'ho �llr\'iled fled [rolll the onrushing l ehides. The 

c:I\'alrymell '>tOll red the battkficld for pri�ollel') ;mel enemy equipmenL Thc night coumeratlad, by the ('a\'alry had been dt.!I'astaling: o\'er two hundred of tht.! enemy were killed; three l11emben of 

the squadron were slighlly lI'ouuded. 

The 4th Armored Cavalry, olle of the original South Vietnamese armored units formed ill thc carly fiftics. was by 1967 well 

tr.ained and aggre)�i\ cly led. In addition, it oper.ltcd in an area 

where U.S. forces h:ld 1I0t hccll illlwciuccd. I lowc\·cr. in othcr 

pans of Vicl 11:1lll. II'ith the buildup of U.S, and frce world forccs 

reaching 545.000 by Dccemher 1!)(i7. Vietnamcse units wcrc as­

!>igned Ihe mis.'>ion of "upport ing reH)lutionary dc\c1opmcllt-the 

1 967 Icrm for pacifiratioll. To t arry Otlt thi) diffi( ult ta�k the SOllth 

Vietnamese forcc� wt.!re lll>ually �t;Jtiol1c:d in or ncar popul:ned 

arcas. Sincc U.S. fones were in the field �ceking the largc Viet 

Cong and North Victllamc�e lInit<;, South Vietnamesc troops, illeluding :lrmor. assumed primarily a dcfensil'c rolc: rC;J( lion to 

enemy initiatives 11':" their olll\' soune of action. The rC)lllt was 

prcdictahle; Vielllamcsc armor heGlmC �1;lIic and its COtHaCl� with 

the enem)' infrc(llIellL Armored forces I()�t the aggrc�si\'cnes<; they 

had begun to cilltil'ate, and a{h isers found it h;I1'd to gel armor 

troops into action. The batt1c� uf 19GR 1I'0ul<l cI'ell tu:llly change 

this situation. 

ImlJrovemcIlls i'l Eqllil)mcII' 

Par:dleling org:lI1il:lIional changes in the :1nlt()rcd forcc of the 

50lllh Vietnamc)c .-\rl11Y II'cl'e important changes in matcriel. 1mprO\'cmellts were sometimes made in thc l'nited Statcs and thc 

cquipment was SCIl! to Vietnam for tcsl ing: more oftcn, hO\l"c\cr, 

the idcas originated ;lIld the \\'ork was donc in Vietnam to meet a 

specific need. The 1\111 .3 \\,<1, a m('(e�s but some other armorcd 

"chicles \\'cre tried out and el elHually di\( anlcd. Thc hest cxample 

of thc Jailer was the .\ l lll ;11'I1I()red rccollnais�atHe vehide. which 

was introduced into the U.S. ,\rm}' in I9GJ and 1 !)(j2. 
classes, maill[cnillllC courses, :111(1 demons. rat ions of tbe i\I J 14 for 

SOlLth Vicln<lmc:.c �()Idicr ... Craduate .. of these cour .. cs then orga· 

nized and <.:onduuL'(i da�sc� in their OWIl units and al the SOllth 

Vielllamcsc Armor S( hool. ,\ lOla I of eight)' �1 1 11 rccollnais.'>ancc 

vchides were used to equip fOlLr newly organized armored cavalry 

reconnaissance .'>quadrom. Oilich were i .. sucd to the Armor School 

and tech n ica I service i tlst:l 11:l[iol1:' for i nstTuct iOlla 1 and logis! ie.1I 

purposes. 

For a )'C:l1' the Army Concept Team in Viclnam evaluated th" 

COI'ubat actions of the armored ("lIvalry reconnaissance sqlladron.� 

equipped with the Mil L .\1thollgh the �<tlladrom had a few organi. 

zational ;Hld logi�tkal prohleTlH. their critical problem was [hal the 

I\J II J could not 11I0\-C ' I'()s�·n)tllltr\' and had difficulty entering and 

leaving \\·atcr\\"ay�. Sin(e the .. e dcfeus limited the mcfulness uf 

;\11 14\ in Victnalll, [he arllloreci re"(Jnll:lis�ance vehicles were re· 

placed by 1\11 1 3's. 1\ 10<;[ Vietnarnc;;c rc{:onnai"s;lIIcc squadron" he· 

gan transition training \\'illl Ihe � l I lj in .\pril and fini.,hed hy 

Novemher 19GI. l 'nfol'l lln:Hely for the ser\'ke. the ;\11 1'l's hIck· 

luster Vietnam perfol"lll;lIlcC \\"a� ignored hy U.S. Army deci�ion 

makers and the ,chide with all il� inadequacies hcc:nne �t:lnd:lrd 

issuc for the AmI)' e\·crlwherc but in Vietnam. It was not until 

1973 that Gelleral .\hrams, thell the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, 

branded the \ehidc a failure and ordered it retired from the Army. 

The i\1 11:1, on the mhe,· halld, was [he best land ,chicle devel· 

oped by the United St:llcs. With the aid of the i\11 1 3, armored IIllits 

could abandon the French tactic of sticking \0 the roads. An influx 

of elllhusiastic U.S. :1(1\ i�ers provided the sp:lrk needed for innova· 

lion. No annol"cd \ chic Ie is im III11CI"<lhlc. hUI the i\l l l j proved 10 

be as [ough and rcliahle �l� any. It could ahsorb hits and continue 

opcr<ltiug. Only <lhOlll Olle OIlL of Se\'ell .\PC'� pene[r:ncd by enemy 

fire W:IS destl"oyed. and ( rell' ( :"ua1tic� II'cre fc\\'. Succe��ful a., it 

was, howevcr, thc � l l l j did han� limi[;uions: til CUI dOll'n on these 

and to provide new. more cITecli\'e ways 10 lise thc vchicle, a num· 

ber of modificntions were tested. 

The most ne( e��ary carl\' l1lodific;l lion \I"as the pro\'i�iol\ of a 

gunshicld for the .\llC:" .�,O·caliher machine gun. The de:llhs of at 

le<lst fourtecn m<lchine �tlllncrs at Ap Uac in carl\' 1 96:1 provided 

the incenthe fOI" the 2d .\rmOl"ed C;n'alr\', which fabricated the 

first two·gunners' shields, made of �oft steel plating from the hull 

of a sunken ship. I.:ltcr, \\·hen it was c1i'\CO\'ered that these could 

be penetrated, the .\nnor C:omm:md. the .\(hanced Re�eal'ch Proj. 

ects Agellq-, and lite .-\rlll) C()lU ept Team collahoratcd [0 make 
o 

CAPSTAN 

Diagram L Capstan and anchor recovery. 

o 

Diagram 2. Push·bar extraction. M 1 13 employs a prdabricatcd bar to 

assist mired vehicles or impro"iscs a push-bar from " x <I-inch timbers. 
CABLE 50 or 100 FEET 

( CABLE 

DiaSI"OlIll 3. Cahle and log extraction is used to recover a \'chicle from 

a canal \,'itb steep banks. The c;lblc over \chicle I exerts all upw;lrcl pull 

on the lowed "chide. Vchides 2 and 3 exert forward pull. When the 

bow of the LOwed \'chicle h:l� been r:liscd sufficielltly, ychide 1 moves 

forward. The logs on vchicle 1 SCI vc as bearings. 

Diagram 4. Block and ladle. 

gUllshiclds from lhe annorplate of salvaged vehicles. These worJ.

cd 

\\'cl l, and lI'ilh lhe assist,mec of the 80111 Ordnance Depot ill Saigon 

fony-six shields were distrihuted 10 mechanized riftc squadrons duro 

ing Ihe summer of 1 96:1 .. \flcr 196·1 all APC's for the ViClnnmcsc 

forces wcre filled with IIlesc shields hefore heing i�sucd. The 

French had used similar g\ln�hiclds on armorcd ,'ehide� in ViClllam 

lCII years berorc. l';Hcr, mall)' armored pcr.)onncl carriers werc 
)-0 

Diagram 5. Tow cables. a v;tri:l{ion of the "dais)' chain." uscd to 

extract an 1'1113 mired ill mud arc 50 to 100 rCCI IOllg. Thc yokc con· 

nections at lhe from of c:lch ,"chiclc arc made from 10'£001 cables issued 

with each M 1 13. Poor traction ncar mired ,"chicle ma), require multiple 

tows as illustrated. 

fittcd with turrets mounting twin .30-calibcr machine guns in place 

of the .50-C<ll iilcr machine gUll. Even 20-ml11. guns were tricd but 

were eventually discarded because of thcir mechanical unreliability. 

Although thc APe could travel across country. it did have 

trouble crossing the Ilumerous canals, streams, and riveTS in the 

delta. or the sc\'cral modificalions dcvised. the capstan and anchor 

method of self-recover), proved to be one of the most successful 

techniques for gClling all APe out of a steep-banked canal. t\Jechanized rifle squadrons operating in the della de\'ised several field 

expedicllls for canal crossing and vehiclc reeO\'ery. among them 

thc use of the push-bar. demolition, brush fill, 100-foot cable. and 

block and lacklc. Even more rudimcntary waS the mClhod knO\!Jn 

as thc daisy-chain. A series of APC's wcre hitched togelher with 

cables and all the vchicles then pullcd together. Muddy rice p<lddies were often crossed with as man)' as fifteen AI)e's chained 

together ill parallel columns. 

The average time a squadron look to cross a stream, however, 

was still considered excessive. Regimental cOllllnanders and advisers 

wanted to be able to begin crossing in five millntes 01' less after 

arri\'al. Although it did nOt meet the five-minutc requircment. an 

aluminum balk bridge Ih:1l could be pl"ced over a t hiny-fool S"P 

by an M I 13 was de\'eloped in the latter half of 1 965. With 1\\'0 

additional balks, the bridge could be used by the t\141 lank, Pro. 

duction of twenty-four �1113 balk bridges was undertaken by the 

Soulh Vietnamese Anny engineers. 

Originally, the �11 13, 01' AI)e, was intended merely as a troop 

carrier-" means of transport. Doctrine slaled that the infantry 

were to dismount and engage the enemy, It SOOIl became apparent 
BAl. .. BI!][)(;E CAItItJED tlY i\1 113 is dcwomtm/Pd by IroolH of Soulh 

Vietnamese /lI'1II0r School. 

thal the firepower of the .50-caliber machine gun, coupled with the 

vehicle's armor protection and mobi lity, produced a shock effect 

on the enemy. Some advisers and commanders realized that since 

lhe Viet Cong had no effeClive weapons to figlll armor the 1\1 113 

could be used as CI mounted armored fighting vchicle. Consequemly, ViclIlamcsc troop commanders and U.S. advisers expressed 

a need for still more annamCIll. Al first. more machine gUlls were 

mounted on the sides of Ihe \'chiclc by tying ground-moutH tripods 

10 the tops of APC's, then v;uious f<lhriuncci 1ll0U!HS were tested 

and evaluated. In laiC 1 96;\ it Wit� common 10 sec personnel carriers armed with side· mounted machine guns equipped wit h shields. 

In late 1964, evcn 2.75·inch rocket pods wcre attached to the sides 

of the carriers, hut this scheme was abandoned hecause the fire was 

inaccurate. By 1965 the majority of the SUlIth Vietnamese cavalry 

squadrons used their vehides in this mi"tnner, rarely dismollnting, 

and then only \\'hen forced to do so by the enemy or the terrain. 

The APC's thus functioned as armored fighting vchicles, more like 

tanks Ih;m troop carriers. 

\Vhen the enemy beg<tn to lise weapons that were more effec· 

tive ag�tinst armor, the Americans and the SOllth Vietn<lmcsc attempted to reduce the 1\11 13's vulnerability to penctration. Ammunition boxes, sand bags, and track blocks werc hung on sides or 
of dIe 10th Armored Cavalr), Regiment, and lhe Arm)' Concept 

Team was slated to evaluate their usc. Since no significant engagell1em LOok place during the observation period, however, no con· 

c1usions could be drawn as to whether the bar armor offered pro· 

tection against antitank rockels and gren:ldes. It was, however, 

easily damaged \\·hen strucK by brush and other obstacles. It also 

slowed the vehicle down, ;mel made il less maneuver-Ible. The 

Army Concept Team decided Ihe bar :mnor was inadequate and 

the progr<11ll LO install it \I'as terminated. 

To improve the lroOP prOiection of the �f I 13, firing observa· 

lion pon kits were designed for \\1 1 13's, and six modified vehicles 

were assigned to the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment at Vinh Long 

in IV Corps Tactical Zone. Each MI13 had a total of ten firing 

ports, fOllr on each side and 1\\'0 in the rear. Above each firing port 

was an ohservation visioll hlock. During the twa-month evaluation 

made by the Army Concept Team no significant materiel deficien· 

cies were noted. BeC<tUse of Vietnam's consistently hot days, the 

absence of :Hl enemy air tllI·eal, and Ihe possihility of mines, SOllth 

Vietnamese troops preferred to ride 011 lOp of the vehicle rather 

than inside. \Vhen the enemy was sighted trOOI>S jumped inside 

and fOllght, using chielly m:lchille guns atop the �II I3. After the 

test was completed in OClOber 1966 the evalu:nors concluded that 

the modifications did not handicap the �rI 13, l)tll since the Viet· 

namese IIsu:dly fought frOI1l the lOp with the hatches open there 

was no need fOI" fll·ing ports. 

The lest results were obviously biased by the faCl that the team 

that e\'aluated the "chicles operated mainly with troops who fought 

on the top of lhe 1\1 113's. COlltroversy over the proper positioning 

of 1\1 1 1 3 crews ,mel squ:ltls fOntinucd throughout the Vietnam \Var. 

Several units, Illoslly AlI'1cric:IIl, required crews 10 ride inside their 

1\11 13's; others, pointing 0111 the danger from mine explosions, did 

not. The differences of opinioll remained unreconciled. 

With Ihe early success of the 1\1113 mechanized rifle squadrons, 

it was only a matter of lime until lhe ).1113 was modified for other 

roles. As e:trly as August 1962, a flamcthrower was installed in an 

i\f 1 1 3, bUl it was used only fOLlI" times in combat in a year. In 

December 1 96·1, twO M 132 flamethrower vehicles were sent to the 

1st Armored Cavalry where they were used aggressively in daily 

operations. After an evaluation the Army Concept Team recommended that four 1\1132's plus two �l l 13 service units be issued 

10 each regiment. 

The SI-mm. ground.mounted monar was made organic to the 
., 

, 

• 

,. '-fo �. 

1\111 IN SOL:TII Vn:TSA�IUf. TRAINl:>':C OP •. kATIO:-l. Tlmh hils i6-mlll. gUll, 

light armor, two machine gillIS, and n"/'w of (otlr. 

armored cavalry rcgimclll during the reorgani7;ltion of November 

and December 1962. For the first few Illolllhs of 1963 Ihe lise of the 

monar was limited hcc:msc the enemy fled when faced hv \\11 1 3's. 

As the Viet Cong learned how 10 deal with armor and began to 

engage the armored persollllel "Irriers, monar sections had morc 

opportunities LO support the troops. The need for a mounted 11101" 

lar was soon apparCIH as units fOllnd it dinicuit lO fire mortars from 

sort grolLnd during the rainy season. Setting up gTound mortars 

was also tOO t ime-consuming. 

Afler cvailialing the 8 1-mln. mortar section of the mechanized 

rifle squadron, the Army Concept Team recommended that ;111 

armored Glrrier such as the i\IIQfi with a 4.2-inch mortar be subslilllled. This recommendation II'<lS based on ,he need for ,he 

greater range and hursting radim thal the 4.2-inch shell "fforded. 

In 1\1 ay 1965, r ollr II. II Qfi mon"r carriers were permanent I)' assigned 

to the 2d Armored C;I\':dry Rcgimem <1,\ <I mortar t.roop. Evalwuing 

this organization. the team concluded that altho\lgh cerwin improvemellts Wl'rc needed the weapoll would provide excellclll fire 

suppOrt and that one troop �hould be as.'\igned 10 each regiment. 

Tanks were also a problem. for hy 196-1 most of the :\124 tanks 

left by the Frcnch had dcteriorated into mailllenann' headaches. 

Repair parts, lin longer in the U_S. SIlpp\y system. were difficult to 

obtain. Engines. for cx:nnple, wcre sent to Japan for rcbuilding, 

bllt even this repair lI'a� uneconomic,,!. The mechanical problems, 
makc South Vielllamcsc lank squadrons ineffective, 

In mid-J964 the 1\141A3 t;mk was chosen to replace thc M24, 

and the first 1\141's arri\'cd in January 1965, Instructor training by 

a mobile training team froUl the U_S. 25th Division in Hawaii was 

completed on I i April. Five squadrons wcre equipped and trained 

by the end of 1965. Although the first plan was to turn in thc old 

M24's, the relics bccamc pillhoxes at installations throughout South 

Vietnam, except for :l few under comrol of the Vietnamese Air 

Force at Tan Son NIHIL 

The singularly outstanding and IllOst consistently pr:lised characteristic of South Vietn:1Il1CSe :lrmored troops was their ability to 

perform individual and unit maintenancc on vehicles and wcapons; 

adviscrs commended them for kceping cquipment operational with 

vcry limited support. \Vithout rccovcry vehicles, armorcd units 

bccame cxtremcly invcnti\·c. Since lhe supply system in the South 

Vietnamcse Army was IIniVCrs.1l1y poor, both adviscrs and troopers 

becamc adepi at "scrounging" rCpl<lCCIIlCIll parts. Squ<ldron and 

regimental mcchanics performed such tasks as intcrnal repair of 

starters, gcnerators. radiators, and carburelOrS-iIlaintcn:lIlce normally accomplished hy ordn:lIlce uniL'I. Deprived of aluminum 

welding, troops rep:lired holcs and cracks in Ihe hulls of APC's with 

woodcn pegs and cemcnt. Banana stalks and ponchos were used to 

mend radiators in watcr-cooled vchides. and roadwhcels were 

changed by putting tile damaged whecl ovcr a holc to rclieve the 

grollnd pressure. 

\Vith an inadequate supply SySlem. 110 tuITet or suppOrt unit 

mcchanics, :lnd lhe only rep1acclllclH vehiclcs in Saigon, units still 

managed to field consistclHly ovcr 90 perccnt of ,hcir cquipment. 

Combat unit mainten:mce remained :It a high level throughom 

lhe conflict. 

Ellcmy I?ctlclioll io Armorel/ Vehicles 

Perhaps thc beSt way to judge the success of the MI13 is to 

examine the enemy reaction to it. The Viet Cong were nOt prepared for 1\1 113's whell the South Victnamcse first uscd thcm in 

mid-19G2, as thc following pas�:I�e from ;J c:lplIIl'cd document indicatcs: "The cnemy APe's appeOired while wc were we:lk and our 

antitank weapons werc still rare and l"Iulimelll:lry. \Ve had no 

experience in attacking the APe:. Therefore, the encmy's 1\1113 

APC's were effcctive :md cwscd us many difficulties ;n first." \OVhen 

confronted by armored vchicles, the Vict Cong usually fled rather 

than fight; at first there were fcw allemj)IS, if an)" to engage mech-
M 1 13 AFTER 1-111'$ U�' Vln CONG 57·M:l1. Rt:colI.U:SS RIFLE 
La adjust thcir tactics. the Viet Cong bcg;1II lO tr.lin lO atlack 

mechanized vchicles. The Viet Cong dourine strcs$ed occupation 

of dug.in positions in the face of APC a�sauhs. and enemy soldiers 

were soon IC;ll"Iling crude Illethod� of de:-.troying the ;l.fI 13. I lolc'i 

the size of ,til APC, nicknamcd tiger traps by "dviser�. wcre soon 

found in della roads. Obscn·il1g the diflkull ies that APe units had 

in crossing c.lnals, the Viet Cong moo canals as obstacles in their 

positions, and frequently they mined possible cTOssing sites. 

In 1 965 the Viet Cong l

)lIblished a comprehensive and fairly 

accurate training doculllelH entitled Auad, on i\ 1 1 1 3 APe. Thi� 

document listed charaCI(:rislics of the APe: organization, equip. 

Illelll, and strength of mechanized units: tactics used by APC units; 

methods of attacking an APC: and some training techniques. In· 

clueled were instructions for using the new :1I11itank weapons. In 

the spring of 1963 the Vict Cong had begull to use recoilless rilles 

with 57·mm. high explosive. amit:1I1k 1"01lIld�, and the number of 

hits on �11 13's had incrca�cd dr:llnatically hy the fall of 1963. AI· 

though the rounds often penetrated, they did not usually destroy 

the M 1 13. Late in that year, armor·piercing .:lO·caliher amillunition 

along with a large number of automatic weapons was found in a 

Viet Cong cache in the delta. The extent of the Viet Cong anti· 

armor equipment bec;mle apparent when. in August 1 963, an 

armor·piercing grenade was discovered. The first 75·ml1l. recoilless 

rifle was captured in September, and in December the first 1\1113 

was damaged by a 7j·mm. round. This arms buildup continucd 

into 196J, whell a \·aricty of mines, both pressure and electric:dly 

detonated, accounted for the majority of damageel and destroyed 

vchicles. 

By 1 965 the Viet Cong h'as using armor·defeating \\'eilpOlls as 

loll' as company level among rcgular and provincial uniLS. Newly 

organized weapons platoons, companies, and battalions arllled with 

57·mm. and 75'111111. recoilless rifles and .50·caliber machine gUlls 

were issued the rocket propelled :mtitank grenade. RPG2. For se\'· 

eral years this weapon with its B40 warhead was the principal 

enemy weapon against armor. [\'cJllually, the RPG2 \\'as replaced 

by the RPe7, an improved antitank grenade with a more lethal 

warhead. greater range. and a beuer �ight. This weapon ;llId the 

antivehicubr mine were the enemy's most successful alHiarmor 

devices and were a constant :md persistent problem for South Viet· 

namese and all ied armor throughout the conflict. Ahhollgh many 

measures to defeat these weapons were tri('(\, no :u\eqllale means 

was ever found. 
Any discussion of the armored forces of the Republic of VictIlam in the carl}' 1 9GO's would be ilil ompiclc without sOllle rderence to the cffcn of politics on armored unit:.. Political-military 

relationships in Vietnam had alw:qs heen highly complex, hut 

during 1 963 the South Vietnamese armored units clllerged as an 

import.ull factor in the political-military equation. Sinn' armor had 

been Llsed 10 suppress ;u leaSl three attempted rOl11JS (/'c/al, it was 

believed th;ll armored force'> had the power to uphold or depose 

ally gO\'Cl'IlITICIlL The 1st Armored Cavalry Regiment in Saigon 

and the 2d Armored Cavalry in l\ly Tho, about sixty kilometer'> to 

the sout h, cOllld he comhined Oil shorl 1I0lice 10 support or suppress an allellipt LO o,'enhrow the government. 

I}residelll Ngo Dinh Diem LOok �ICpS early to insure the loyalty 

of his armor leaders. Only [he most trustworthy armor officers were 

assigned LO [he greater Saigon area. Diem abo �e,erelr limited fucl 

allocations, so that 1ll0�[ armored u!li t'i could not rea<.:h Saigon 

without additional fllcl. L'nder this system extended :!fInor oper.[· 

dons against Ihe enemy were ill1po�!>ihle. Herore the Novemher 

1963 coup. Presidelll Diem and his brother l\'lw developed clahor,He means of moniloring IroOP mO\-emcnl�. For cxample, Captain 

Ly Tong Ba, commandcr of all armored unit in ;\I� Tho. had LO 

telephone the palatc frcqllclltly to report his location. 

In spite of Prc�idCIll Oiem's vigilance, on I Nm'emhcr 1!J63 

armored unib from all o,'er South Viclllam, including unils from 

the Armor School. (ol1\-erged on Ihc president ial p:dace [0 rein· 

force the demand th.11 Diem resign. Early the next morning. wnks 

and inf:tIltry ass:H1hed Ihe palace. \I·hich was defended hy wnks of 

the presidcmial guard brigade. The gu:trd� rcsi!>ted valiantly tllllil, 

hopelessly olltllumhcred :mel lI,jth several of their tanks in 

flames, they surrendered. I Diem. llIe:u"1Ivhilc, escaped but 11',1'> C;JP· 

tured in the Chololl �el"lion of Saigon. While en roule 10 Army 

headquarters. he and his brother were assassinated ill all i\ l 1 1 3 

of the 4th Squadron, 4th Cavalry. 

i\lany ltl'lIlOl·ed ofli(:ers were praised for their pankipatioll in 

the coup and rewarded with promotions. The tanks. APC'�. and 

armored cars that pani(:ip .. 'tted in the coup proved the power of 

armored units as supporters of a political group. After the Diem 

downfall, the poliliull situation WitS ullstable, and subsequent go\'· 

ernmen[� kept a dose :l("COUIll of I;.

cy units that could Sl.lppOI"l or 

� Oddt) ellough. Ih.., mmm:lllder of the patace nmon'(1 unit was promot..,d from 

oplain to major on Ihe 'I)QI. an unll�lIal reward for 10)a11) 10 a losing ouse ill a 

reloli. 
in General Kh,llIhs \l"i,urc of power. 

In September, after an abortive coup attempt, [here was a command rcorgani1..nioll that ['c!!ulled in a IllIlJlher of offi(;er reassignmellts alld the imp<hition of restrictions 011 [he Illovemem o[ 

armored \chidc!! and uniu. Afler �e\'eral South Vielnamc!!c Armor 

School oOicers were accused of ilH'olvemcm in another abortive 

<:oup on 19 Fehru,l1-y I !Hjj the school was ordered to move. Leaving 

[he advisers at Tim DUL Ihe sc'hool dep,med fur Van Kiep on 

25 Febru;lrY. The Vi('ll1;IIIlCSe high cOnlm,llId mon rcversed its 

decision, and two weeks !au.'!" [he school rClUrIled to Thl! Duc. 

For some time the!"c;lflcr the number of forces \ocHcd at the Armor 

S<:hool was closely SefU[ illii'crl.� 

Political appointecs as ('Ollllllanders were a fact of lire lImil the 

mid-1960's and had a disa�trnm effect on the dC\elopmcnt and use 

of armor. The�e commander!! \\'ere not always the best leaders. and 

often were completely la<:king in initiative. Since Illan)' of these 

men were <:oncerned only with their own careers, the training and 

combat operations of <ifmored IInits suffered accordingly. If a unit 

had tOO many casualties and 10!!1 too many vehicles, particularly 

during Diem's rule, the commander was likely to he relieved, As 

a result, commanders, even the p,nod ones, werc rcluctalll 10 fight 

the encmy for fear of losing their jobs. Because of the necessity 

to protect politi<:al regimes, :mnored unit!!, p;lfticularly lank squadrons, were seldom allo\\'ed far from the ruling headquarters. Thus, 

e\'en down 10 the provill�e level. the terlll palace guard was applied 

to Illany armored Ullits.' \Vhile the coups were heing planned, 

armored IInilS I,'ere IIOt fighting the enemy, Olily when political 

stability became a reality in 1 9l1S were armored units finally able 

to shed this St igm:t of p:tlacc guard. 

G The \nnor Schoo] "'a� forhldden e\l:n to (ondu(1 tmining in Ihe direction of 

Saigon, One night. ",hen tI,o;. �(hi'iCl'$ ",,,rc bringing in ""'" �1'11 tanks after mirlniglH 

to alo,d Ir=tflic, Geller=tl Kh�llIh was alarmed and ned ",ilh h,s bmit) 10 Vung Tall, 

ol'tr 50 kilomeler! awa). 

tS Annoroo 1111;15 we� often gil en Ihe name "allp troops" by delr:u:tors. In the 

!lamc I(:,n, Ihe tanks ""ere called "Ioling machines" ht."CallliC Ihe) influenced el"el"}' 

cotrh changt" of gl>lernrll"nl. AhhOiliCh the anrlor corps hl:C"'"C nl>llpolil;nl. the U.s. 

fmba�\ 5till "·/)ITie.! that during the 19i1 Vietnamese n;alional eleclions armored 

forces would ,,,tcnene. 
CHAPTER III 

Growth of U.S. Armored Forces in Vietnam 

Thc American elections of ]9GO brollglu John F. Kennedy to 

the \Vhitc House ilnd Raben S. j\lcNamara to the Pentagon. The 

change spelled the end of thc strategy of massive retaliation and of 

the pentomic division with its five battle groups designed to fight 

nucleOlI" wars. The Army rcorgnnii'.mion of 1963 restored the infantry battalion :mel provided a !>lrUCLUre for the whole Army th:u, at 

baltalion and brigade level, was much like the separ:nc ballalions 

within the combat COlllmiuHls of U.S. armored divisions afler \Vodel 

'Val' II. Il was dear that the new policy of flexible " CSpOIlSC clemanded a force that could fight in any kind of war, including socalled wars of nat ional liher.niall. 

In annoTed units there \\'as lillie change, The 1963 Teorgani1.i1' 

lion reduced each tank and mechanized infalllTY hatwlion to three 

line companies, bllt each divi�ion had more battalions and suppOrt 

echelons, No one in armor �eriously helie\'ed Ihal armored unit 

taclics needed to change, In 1957 Field �ranual 17-1, Armor Oper. 

ations, Small Unils, devoted only IWO and one·half pages 10 guer· 

rilla warfare, By the early 1960's Ih .. t co,'erage had been hroadened: 

Field l\lanual 1 7-35, Armored Cavalry Platoon, Troop ;\lld Squad· 

ron, carried an exp;lIlded treatment of guelTilla fighting under the 

tille, Rear Area Security. 

M:my of lhe lactics set forth in the manual for employing 

armored cavalry in rear are;] security missiOIl,\ proved useful in 

Vietnam. Road serurity. hase clefclHc, air reconnaissance. reaction 

forces, and convoy escort werc descrihed. Ficld �lanu.1i 17-1 included discussions of hase C;]lllpS, airmobile forcc�. tailoring of 

forces for specific missions, encirclements, and alllhu�hes. Both 

books stressed surveillance. the usc of the combined arms team, and 

the need for mobility. Yet most coUTHerinsurgency mlining was 

limited to work on patrols. li�telling postS, and convoy security: the 

Army did nOI foresee a whole theater of operations wilhom it rront 

line or a secure rear area. 

Although the helicopter was not spccificallv designed ror COlin· 

terinsurgency warfare. it proved 10 hc one or the IBO'it meflll 

Ill.achines the l'.S .. \rmy brought 10 Vietnam. As carl)' as 19j·, the 

Amly had swdied the lise or helicoplers in cavalry IInits. and later 

experiments with armed helicopters had been conducted at the 
1959 the U.S. Armor School at Fon Knox. Kentucky, and the U.S. 

Army A"ialion School had developed an experimental Aerial 

Reconnaissance and Se{ urity Troop-the fil".)l air cavalry unit. This 

aerial combined :mllS te;II11, composed of scouts, weapons, and infan· 

try, was test<.-'d in 1960 and nx:ommendcd for inclusion as an 

organic troop in divi�ioll;1l ca\palry squadrons. In early 1962 the 

Army's first air cavalry troop, Troop D, 4th Squadron, 12th Cavalry, 

was organizcd at Fon Carson, Colorado, with CapL:lin Ralph Powell 

as its commander. The troop mission was to extcnd thc capabilities 

or the squadron ill reconnai�san(e, security, and surveillance by 

means of aircraft. Ovcr the next three years all divisional cavalry 

squadrons in the .\rrny were provided with air c;.valry troops. 

In mid-I9fi2 Lieutenant General Hamilton II. Howze headed a 

study group to cxamine the possibilities of the helicopter in land 

warfare. The group concluded that helicoptcrs organic to the 

ground forces were an ine\'it:lble StCp in land warfare. The Howze 

Board foresaw air assaults. air cavalry opcrations, aerial artillery 

support, and aerial supply lines, and recommcnded the creation 

of an air :Issaull division. The OUlcome of the study w:.s the {ormalion of the IId1 Air Ass;!ul, Division. latcr to become the 1st 

Cavalry Division (Ainnohile) . The division organi:r .. uion includcd 

one unique unit, an air c:l\'alr)' squadron made lIi> of one ground 

troop and thrce air c:lvalry troops. 

By 1965 whcn the U.S .. \nll)' began LO send units to Vietnam. 

divisional armored cavalry squadrons had three ground cavalry 

troops and an air c:lvalry troop, tank battalions h:.d three idelllical 

L1nk companies, and mecJwnized infantry battalions had three 

mechanized companies mounted in A PC's. (Chart J) Armored units 

werc equipped with a mixture or 1\148 and M60 tanks, 11 113 

armored personnel carriers, and M 109 self-propelled 155-mm. 

howitzers. 

On the eve of the Army's major involvcment in Vietnam, however, most armor soldiers considercd the Vietnam \Var an infalllry 

and Special Forces fight: they saw no pi:lce for armored units. The 

Armor Officcr Advanccd Course of 196'1-1965 ncver formally discussed Vietnam, even whcn American troops wcrc being sent there. 

Armor officers werc preoccupied with traditional concepts o{ elllployment of armor 011 thc fields of Europe: a few attempted to 

focus attcntion on the lise of armor in Vietnam, bUl in the main 

they were ignored. Many scnior armor officcrs who had spent years 

in Europe dismissed the Vietnam conflict as a shon, uninteresting 

interlude best fought with dismounted illfantry. 
REGIMENT 

T 

I HQ�

HQ I ARMD� AIR CAY 

TRP CAY SQN TRP 

T 

& HQ ARMD 00 FA RP CAY TRP CO 

r ARMORED CAVALR� SQUADRON 

� � 

&HQ 

P 

ARMD 

CAV 

TRP 

MECHANiZED 

INFANTRY 

BATIALION 

I AIR I CAV 

TRP 

I 

I

HQ�

HQI TRP 

AIR CAVALRY 

SQUADRON 

AIR 

CAV 

TRP 

TANK 

BATIAUON 

I � � 

I

HQ &

' 

HQI CO � � 

r

HQ � HQI CO � � 

elM!!.,.. u.s. }-\RMORi-;D ORGM�'IZATIO"'S, 1965 

The Mflrilles Lrmd 

By earl" 1965 the American command in Vietnam h:ld COIlcluded dml the Smuh Viclllamesc could nUl hold on the ( ombincd 

Viet Cong and I\onh Viclllamcse .·\rmy force, without U.S. assistance, and in Fcbru:lrY American forces began a limited air and 

sea homhardment of Nonh Vietnam and jet aircr.tft strikes in 

SOllth Vietnam. In latc February General William C. Westmoreland, Commander. U.S. i\lilitary Assistance COlllllland, Vietnam, 

requcstcd twO U.S. l'farinc b:t\wlion I:mding tcams \0 :Issi:.t Soulh 

Viclll:lmCSC forccs in making thc airlicld at DOl Nang sccurc. 

011 9 March 1965 �!arinc Corps Swff Scrgcant John Downcy 
u.s. i\lARINE CoRI'S FIJr.;\U:TIIROWER TAl''' IN ACTION N�:'\R DA NANG. 

The U.S. Arlll)' 110 IOllger I/lld ffrmu:lhrower /rIllks bill III{: Marine Corps 

stmi seuel"lll to Jliettlam. 

drove his :-'148A3 tank off a l<lnding CT<lfL OntO Red Beach 2 at Da 

Nang ,lIld was followed by the reSI of the 3d Platoon, Company B. 

3d Marinc Tank Battalion. the first U.S. armored unit in Vietnam. 

Latcr in :-'Iarch the 1st Platoon, Company A, 3d :-'Jarine Tank 

Baltalion , landed h·ith a sccond Marine team. ami for the rcmainder 

o( thc month (hc.)c two platoons bolstered the defenses of the Da 

Nang airfield. 

On 8 

.

Iuly 1 9fij thc :Id �Ial"ine Tank Battalion, commandcd by 

Lieutenam Coloncl Statcs R. Joncs, Jr.. dcharkcd :11 Ih Nang-the 

first U.S. lank battalion in Victnam. Consistent widl U.S. i\larine 

Corps concepts of tank employment, the battalion 's primary mis· 

sion was to suppOrt Marine infantry. As :\Iarine tilctical areas of 

responsibility exp:lIlded throughout 1965, so did the areas in which 

tank units operated in support of infantry reaction forces, as SUI)­

port for infantry strongpoints, or in sweep and dear oper.ltions. 

U.S. :-'Iarinc Corps tank units took part in the firsl major battle 

involv ing U.S. arTllored tl"oops-Operalion SI"ARl.lH . In mid·August 
RcgimclII \\:I� reponed 10 he preparing 10 aWlCl the Chu Lai air

field, soulhc:ln of Da Nang. To preempt the :Htac).;., a marine 

amphibious operation lIsing helicopters and three batwliOIl teams 

h'as moullled. A lank platoon supponcd each banalion. The oper:,­

Lion I:aSlcd for two days, and was characterized hy shon, biller firefights ;IS the Viel Cong a ttempled to evade encircling forces. \Vhcn 

Operation S,.ARLITE ended. the marines had pushed the Vict Cong 

regiment ag:linst the sea, killing over 700 men. In 1 11'0 days, seven 

lanks had been d:IIl!:lgcd by enemy fire. three so hadly that the 

WITCIS cOLdd 1101 tl';.vcrsc. and on(' 10 the point th:a it had 10 be 

destroyed by a dcmolition team. The Marine tank crews had demolished many enemy fon ific,lI ions, caplUred twcmy-nine weapons, 

and killed sixty-eight Viet Congo 

Unlil their final withdr;'lll';'I1 in late 1969, �r:.riI1C Corps wnks 

continued to �uppOrt U.S. Marine Corps infantry uniLS in Vietnam. 

During this time, �Jarine ;'IflnOr, eventually two full battalions, 

pan icip:lled in the hallies of Khe Sanh and Hue and was the main 

armor defcnse force of the Demilitarized Zone in the nonh. 

DcciJiOll Making 

,Vhen the det'isic)Il to sene! ,\merican ground forces 10 Vietnam 

was finally made after a long. involved debate at high go\'ernmental levels it was londition:d. Troops were rele:bed to Vietnam 

in inl.relllcnis. e;1(11 de .. iglled tl) "llppon one of thc three principal 

ground strategi(

,s that f(,llowed one another in rapid su({es�ion. 

The CllllllLiati\e effect of r:lJ)idly l.hanging lotrategy and the absence 

of a clearly stated lon�·tc ... n go:d with a definite troop commitmcnt 

can he easily seen in relro�pect. hIli ill the heclic days :ll1d months 

of the fir�t h,df of 19G,j there was no (HlC who conld prcdict the 

length of thc war, encmy illlcllIiom and capabilitics. and the extent 

o{ fUlUrc U.S. cOlHmitment. It was in lhi� a tmospherc Ih:n C.cncr:1I 

\Ve�tmo .. el:lIlc\ ;)ml hi� piannc\')o 1;II)()red to develop troop lists of 

units thcy w:1l11cd scnt to Vietnam. 

During the fir:.t half of 1965 the three princip:1I ground �(rate· 

gies were dcsaihed as se<.:urity, enclave. and search and dcstroy. 

Of the fir�t twO, neither required the lise of brgc mobile force� 

nor implied Ihal U.S. t!'Oops would �I<I\' in ViCln,lIn for any length 

of lime. Uncler the securilY strategy American marines werc sell I 

to Vietnam to defcnd an ilirficld and look their lanks along. The 

planners in Ihe ll.S. �Iilita\'y Assistance Command, Vietl1alll. had 

not examined Ihe makeup of a m:lrine hattalion I:mding team and 

therdore did 1101 realize Ih:1( Ihe team had tanks. The marines, for 
were sent to Vielllitlll \\,b, Iherefore. a kind of accidellt, and a nal 

ailogcther popular one. For example, U.S. Amha)�:.dor Maxwell D. 

Taylor was surprised and di,plea-'>ed 10 leaI'll Ihal the marines h:ld 

landed with tank.s and other heavy equipmelll "nol appropri:ltc for 

counterin�urgell(..}' operations." 

The security strategy was defensive in intem and limitcd in 

scope. III neither it nor il\ successor, the so-called enclave stratcgy, 

was the use of armored forces pl<'lnned. The troop\ sent to carry Ollt 

both strategie�-the .\I:trinc�, the U.S. Army 173d Airbornc Brig<'lde. 

and an Australian infamry ballaHon-were therefore disllloullled 

infantry clements who)c �tay ill Vietnam was considered temporary. 

In fact. the airborne Iroop� were selll to Vielll<'lm on lempor:lry 

dut)'. Force planners, trying 10 gel all Ihe combat Iroops on the 

ground the)' could <'Ind still �tay within the limited trOOp ceilings 

and the I'er), re:.tricled capa<.;il), of the logistical hase. chose infantry 

units that were easily deployed and required only minimal suppOrt. 

The third strategy. se<'lrch and destroy. hegan to evolve during 

June :md July of 1!)65. After receil'ing the authority to use U.S. 

ground forces anywhere ill Vietnam in search and destroy opera· 

tions, General \Vestmoreland tried to determine Ihe forces that 

would be ncces.'>:try 10 ddeat the enemy. Throughout 19G5 be personall), studied every unit on the troop lists 10 imure Ihe best use 

of the authorizations, the earliest possible troop deployments, and 

the most appropri::He aplXlnionmelll of troops among the armed 

services. \Vithin Army m:mpo\\'er <'Iuthorizations. he also sought 

an effectivc distrihution aTllong branches. The "lAC" Stedf continuously reevaluated the situation to delennine whether there was 

a need for addition:tI troops. Because of the troop ceilings-the first 

three troop incremellts were only 20,000 each. with no promise o( 

more-the severely limi tcd logi�tical b<'lse. and the many misconceptions :iI)()ut the cOlliury. armored units wcre not seriollsly considered for early employment in Vietnam. 

The first debatc on the use of armored unilS :11'ose during planning for the deployment of the 1st Infantry Division. Directil'es 

from the Dep..1l'tlllent of the Army required reorganization of th� 

divisioll 10 elimin:ue the units designed for Iluclear "':lr, the division's tl\'O tank ball,tl ions. and all the mechanized infantry. The 

mechanized infantry units were 10 be organized into dismounted 

infantry battal ions. The r:uioll<'lle for these decisions lI'a� provided 

by the Chief of St:.ff of the Army, General I laroid K. Johnson, in 

a messagc on 3 July 1 965 to General \Vesl1llorciand. Overruling 

an Army staff proposal ti1:n olle lank battalion be retained, General Johnson gave some of his reasons. 
employ relatively primiti\

e hut extremely cffccli\'c box mines that defy 

detection. EfTccti\'cncss was cspcd:1I1y good in areas where bottlenecks 

occurred on some roules. Our tanks had :t limited usefulness . .. !though 

there arc good examples of cXlI'cmcly profilablc usc. On balance, in 

Vietnam the vulnerability to mines and the abscnce of major combat 

fomulions in prepared posilions where the location is :lcccssibic lead 

me 10 the position that an infantry ballalion will be more useful to you 

than a l:lnk battalion. at this swge. 

B. I have seen few reports all the usc of Ihe light tanks available to 

the Vietnamese and dr:lw the inference thal cOllnn;ll1dcrs :U'C not crying 

fol' thcir attachment for spccific opcrations. 

C. Distanccs and pi;ulIlcd arcas of cmplo}1TIcnl of the 1st Division 

arc such that thc rapid 1ll0\'cmCnt of troops could be slowed to the ratc 

of movemcnt of the tanks, 

D. Thc presencc of lank fornulions tends 10 creatc a psychological 

atmosphere of conventional combat, as II'ell as recalls the image of 

Frcnch tactics in lhe S.11llC area in 1953 and 1954. 

Gcneral Johnson weill on to say (hat the divisional cavalr)" the 1st 

Squadron, 4th Cavalry, would bc allowed 10 kcep its medium 

tanks, i\l48A3's, to test thc effcctivcncss of armor. If circumstances 

required it laler, General Johnson wa,� prepared LO reinforce the 

division with a trlllk battalion, In his answer \0 Lhi� mcssage General \Vcslllloreland declared that "except for a fcw coastal arcas, 

most notably in the I Corps arca, Vietnam is no place for either 

t:J.nk or mcchanized infantry IInits." 

These twO messages cle:lrly show the prevailing altitude among 

American scnior officers W\I'ard the usc of armored forces in Viet· 

nam, and reflect the influence of the French cxpericnce with armor. 

At the staff level, the commander,),' misconceptions werc magnified 

by problems of force sll'uctllre; troop ccilings and the limited logi.stical base became further justification for rejecting annored units. 

For example, when it was noted that a mechanized battalion rcquired more than 900 troops and a dislllOlllllCd infantry hallaJion 

only aboUl 800, dismoulllcd infalllry hecamc the choicc. Further, 

the mechanizcd b .. 1l1alion also needed a dircct maintenance sup· 

pOrl unit of over 150 troops and a S<."ClIl'ity forcc to gll:tnl il.s base. 

Although a tank battalion required but 5;0 men, it.s detractors 

were quick to say that only 220 of these were fighters-the rest were 

SUppOrl troops. To suppOrt the tank ballalion in combat still morc 

maintcnance and secllrit) troops would be needed, This linc of 

reasoning made the tank hattalion an unattracti\'e package, One 

force planner in the i\ l il ital'y Assist;tncc Command, Victnam. commented that while no one was outspokenly prejudiccd :Igainst the 

use of armorcd forccs in Vietn:ull therc II',IS no strong voice calling 

for thcir employment. 
the prohlems f:l(ed by [he commanders of <"Irmor units eann<"lrked 

for Vietnam. I laving lost his !;"Ink and Ille(ilanized infantry units, 

Major General .IoJ1;uhnn O. Seam:m, the 1st Divi:.ion commander, 

wanted 10 make sure Ih�11 his one remaining armon:d unit, the 1st 

Squadron, 4th Cavalry, was properly equipped. General Se:unan, 

!lOling the poor performance of the l\f 1 14 reconnai:.sance vehicle in 

Vietn;llll, nxommended substituting i\11 13's for the squadron's 

j\f 1 1 4'5. After consider.liJlc resi:.t;mce from the Army staff in \Vashington the exchange \\'a:. finally approved. The i\f 1IWs, mudified 

willI additional machine gUllS and gunshields. came frolll the pool 

of vehicles taken from the recemly dismounted mechani .. ed baltal ions. Obtaining trained people was another mailer. Some months 

before when General Seaman had heel) lold thaI only one of his 

brigades would go 10 Vietnam, he had filled the deploying brigade 

with experienced officers amI men from other division units, 

including the 41h Cavalry. Suh�equcntly the remainder of the division was ordered 10 Vietnam. Filled with lIew officers and troop� 

the cavalry had time for only t"'o weeks of unit training before 

it leh. 

\Vhen tile firsl armor units reached Vietnam their lactical employment \\'a� equally rrust)';uing- for the :.quadron and battalion 

commanders: again the experiellce of the 1st Squadron. 4 t h Cavalry. 

is illllstr:uivc. The brigades of the l�t Divi�ion, e:lch with a cOlwllry 

troop altached, were sent to three different loc;uions. The 5qu:ldron 

headquancrs was left with only the air GlV:llry Iroop IInder in 

control. The first operation at squadron le\"el tOok place in early 

1966, over six month:. after the unit rea(iled Vietnam. Cavalry 

tactics during those first six months suffered from the "no tank� in 

the jungle" auilllde. Because General \Vestmoreland saw IHI me 

for tanks. the M48A3's were withdrawn from lhe cav;lIry troops 

and held at the squadron hase at Phu Loi. It LOok six months for 

General Seaman and Lieutenant Colonel Paul A. Fisher, the squad+ 

ron commander, to convince Gener:d \Vestmoreland thal tanks 

could be properly employed on ("om hat operations. Although the 

tank crews sub�equelllly proved them:.elves in comh;H, General 5c:I+ 

man's repeated requests for one of his l:lnk b:ltlalions that h:ld heen 

left at Fort Riley were refused. The same fate befell similar requests by his successor throughout 1966. 

The air cavalry IroOp was also fragmented. Before Ihe unit was 

sent 10 Vietnam it was organized like an armed helicopter company: a troop of two platoons, equipped wit h command and control 

helicopters and gunships. Training was based on experience with 
copters were p.'ln-cled Ola to the units lhat wanted lhem. and the 

aeroriflc plawon was :inachcd to Troop C for lise as long-range 

patTols and base camp sC( lIrilV guards. The troop comilluccI to 

operate ill thi" mal.cshift fashion for o\"cr a year unlil the cxnmplc 

of other air cavalry units brought abOli1 a change in organil,nion 

and faetics. 

As the J

lolilic.::tl and miliUlI"Y power of the enemy continued to 

grow during 196':;, General \Vesunorc]and and hi� planners were 

convinced that the United SlateS would have LO provide additional 

tTOOpS if Ihe governmclH of South Vietnam \\':1S to survive. \Vhell 

the e"olving �tr;Hcgy required ac\dilion;1I American forces, the 

Presidellt of the United Stales increased manpower authoriZ:lliOlls, 

and evel1ll1ally more armored IIl1its were sem to Vietn:lIll. In late 

1965 General \VcsIlllorclancl reqllellted deploymcllt of the 1 1 1,h 

Armored C;n'a!ry and the 2.ilh Infantry Di"jsion. Included in the 

]alter were the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, Ihe 1st H:uwlion, 5th 

Infantry (�lcchaniled) , and the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor. i\bjor 

General Frederick C. \Veyand, the 25th Division commander, 

insisted 011 deploying the armor baualion despite resistance from 

staff planners in both Dep.:ulmem of the Army and Vielllam. 

SCOllts Olll 

In the U,S. cavalry of Ihe late 1 800's, the familiar call at the 

beginning of a campaign was "scoutS out"; so il II'as. tOO, in Viet· 

nam, in 1965. Earlier some gTollnd cavalry units had been used in 

Vietnam, hut in Septcmber the first ail' cal'a!!'y lInit, Ihe 1st Squad· 

roll, 9th Cavalry (Air) , arrived with the lsi Cavalry Division (Airmobile) . While a brigade of the 1 0151 Airborne Division main· 

tained security in the An Khe camp area, the air cav;dry lroopers. 

together with the airmobile infantrymen of the division's tradilional "cavalry" hallalions, wcre al towed a few days to move illto 

and sccure an ,11'ca for hu ilding a division ba�e.l By 18 September 

enough aircraft \I'ere :lVailable for the sql1<ldron to begin aerial 

reconnais5;!Ilcc nf the di\'i�ion ha�e area. 

In late October 1965 reports of increasing enemy 'ilrenglh in 

Ihe cenlral platc<lu brought commitment of Ihe Clllire 1st Ca\,;llry 

Division to an offellsil'c in II'e:,lern Pleiku I}rovince. The lSI Squ;ldI \\Ihollgll b�I1:1lions ;n 111" hi C .. na T)' n;l;sion relained Ihe Ir. .. lilional c:lI:lh) 

namcs. 1h('. "'('1'(' :lCIII:I[[1 disnwunl<.'tl iuranlf}· \",il�. Since Ihe di.·i!ioll W;IS air. 

mobile. IhC5<' "nil! 1110\('d b. hdicopler. The only IInil in Ihe dhi)iou thai fought 

mOUillcd "a5 �he 151 ')Ip,a,lron. 91h C:o .. all), an air c:l\ah') squadron with one 

grouud c:n3lfy troop. 
gi\en the mission of finding the encmy as well as co,ering di"i· 

sional troop movements. Few enemy troops were ",polled from Ihe 

air at finl blll by 30 OCLOber the number of sightinA� began 10 

increase. Troop C lapltLred three North ViclIlamcse soldiers. the 

first di\'isional unit to G'plure North Vietnamese Army Iroops. On 

I November 196:; Troop B's scouts sighted ;mel fired 011 eight North 

Vielllamese soldiers. Shortl), thereafter abOllt fort)' more wcre 

spottcd .md Ihe troop's acrorille pl;nooll, alread), airborne, was 

landed to investigatc. For once thc enemy stood and fought: the 

Amerit;1n plaloOIl killed five of the enellly .md Glptured ninelcell 

OIhers. The troopcr\ found the re;l�on for the enemy COil( el1lration 

whell thc)' moved into a nearhy Slream bed and discovered a hos· 

pital. Fighting arollnd the hospital continued while the captured 

soldiers, medical equipment, and supplies. all IXIl"l of the 33d 

NOl"lh Vietnamcse Army Regimemal Ilospiial. werc c\'acuated. 

L.ne in the ilfternoon the 2d BaualiOIl, 12th C:lvall"\' (Airmuhile) 

landed as rcinfortemelHs, and the 9th Cwalry ;Ierorifle platoon 

was withdrawn. 

Knowing that the enemy was in the area in strength. the In 

Squadron. 9th Ca,-alr), (Air) . with Company '-\' bt n.Htalion. 81h 

Cwalry (Airmobile) . mo\ed to the Duc Co Spcci;t1 F{)n.�es Camp 

and by e\'ening 011 3 November 1 96.:) had begun :1 reu)]1nai�s .. nce 

in force along the Cilmbodian bordel". The S{IU;ldron amhu!.h force, 

consisting of three American aerorifle pl;lIoons, an alla(hed Viel' 

namese platoon, and a monar section of Comp;IllY A, I!.t B;lIwiion, 

81ll Cilvalry. reconnoitered and eSlllblishcd three 'lInhush !.itcs. In 

the early evening the )ooulhcnunosl amhush. manned b)' Troop C's 

aerorifle pl:noon, sighted a large. heavily laden North Viclll:ullese 

Army company. The enemy )oo\diers. easily seen by the light of the 

full moon. were laughing :md lillking and obviomly fdt senlre in 

lhal part of the jungle. The waiting cavalrymen detonatcd eight 

claymore mines set .. long a IOO·meter kill zone, and thc trooper .. 

joined in \\·ith their 1\116 rifles as additional daymorc\ and rifle fire 

from the flank security elements !.ealed off the arca. The firing 

lilSI ed 1\\'0 III in u les. and when there was no a nsweri ng fi re f rolll the 

cncmy the aerorine platoon returned LO the patrol base. 

Olle ambush platoon was still in position at 2200 when the 

lhree pliltoons in the base were ass.lulted b" an estimated enem) 

ball;dion. The fir�t attack was costl), 10 Ihe Nonh Vietnamese. who 

withdrew. Enemy snipers remained in the nearby trees, .111(1, ilided 

by bright moonlight, attempted to pick off the defender). With the 

help o[ the reinforcemellis from Company A, 1st Ibllillion. Sih 
daylight. The defenders then made limited counteratlacks to expand the perimeter and pro\ride a safer landing for the rcst o( Ihe 

battalion. By d,IWIl the enemy began to break away, incoming fire 

slackened. ,lIld t here was only occasional sniper fire from the sur· 

rounding trees. The air cavalry plalOons were then extracted, leaving the 8th C;walry to sweep ,he baulefield. 

For the second lime in a week air cavalry soldiers had successfully b'lll1cd the enemy, later identified as the 66Lil Nonh Vietnamese Army Regiment, .. ecenliy arrived in South Vietnam. These 

combat actions and Ihe scouting activities of the entife squadron 

supplied information on enemy localions Ihal brought major clements of the Isl Cavalry Oi\'

ision into action for almost :1 momh in 

the la Orang valley. The first swge of the la Orang camp.1.ign, 

which was also dlC first major ballie for :11 air cavalry squadron, 

showed how the air C:l\'alry should be used. For those commanders 

who employed it properly. the air cavalry in Vielllam \\,<lS a primary source for gathering intelligence information. 

Ap Ball Bang 

As the 1st Squadron. 9th Cav<llry, was triggenng the la Orang 

campaign, far to the south Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4th C1.\'alry, 

p;micipated in the first major engagement of the 1st Infantry 

Division. The battle at Ap Ban Bang was an early example of a 

combined arllls defense of a night position. The action was important because it occurred during the initial stages of U.S. troop 

involvement and demonstrated the effectiveness of combined arms 

in jungle warfare. 

A task force of the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, consisting OL the 

battalion's three rifle companies, its reconnaiSS<lncc platoon, and 

Troop A (less (he ninc (anks still at Phil LOi) . was ordered to 

sweep and secure I l ighway 13 from the fire base at Lai Khc to Bau 

Long Pond. fiftecn kilometers north. The purpose of Operation 

ROAIJII.UNNEII. was to secure s:lfe passage for a South Vietnamese 

infantry regimelll and provide security for Ballery C, 2d Battalion, 

33d Artillery, which was moving north to support Ihe South Victnamese rcgiment. On 10 and II November 1 965 thc road was 

clcared without incident: medical teams even visi ted the village of 

Bau Bang as part of a medical civic action program. 

During the afternoon of 11 November, Troop A, the artillery 

bauery, the command group. and Company A of the infantry baltalion moved into a defensive position south of Bau Bang. (Mal) ') 

Concertina wire was installed, individual foxholes were dug. and 
• 

o,"�. 0) IOU • 

996� J9qw9"-ON ZL-LL • • 

• • 

I DNV8 nV8 dV • 

• • • 

• • 

, • 

• 

• 

• 

..

)j::)\J�\f A.lepUO:)9S Ol\:.. __
armorcd personnel carrier arollnd Ihe perimeter, Troop A kUOl).;.cd 

down bushes ;lIld young ruhher trees 10 clear fields of fire. The 

night passed with only a J iglu enellly probe. Inn within minutes 

after the carl)' d;\\!l JIIIII(/-to (a tCTm appl ied by ;mnol'cd units [0 

first-light readiness of mcn. vchicles. and radios) fifty to sixty Tllortar rounds exploded inside the perimeter. In the fir�t fel\' minutes 

Troop A had t\\'o men wounded. Half an hour liner a violent hail 

of <lllwmalic wcapom and sllIali ;lrll1� fire was ilddcd 10 the mOrt:1f 

fire. Under co\'er of Ihi� fire. Ihc Vict Cong moved to wilhin fony 

meters of [he dcfcmi\'c pmiliolls. \\'hile the cavalrymen rClunlcd 

the fire .. \11 U'" of the .1d Pl:ltoon roared Out ,H1d :lss:lul!cd the 

enemy. The violence of thi .. unexpeued mounted ("olilltcl'aUack 

di"rupted t he Viet Cong :t[[ad ... :111<1 the .\11 I :\"" relUrned to the 

perimeter. The troop ,uffere<i t hree 1I10l"e ll"OLInded and one k illed 

when ammunitiun in a mOrt;lf r:lrrier exploded after heing hit by 

cnemy monar fire. 

The Viet C:ong made their se(ond ass.1uh from the jungle and 

ruhher treC's sntllh of the ptrimeler. Again �L1pported hy mortar" 

and automatic wC':lpOIl!i. they cr:lwled Ihrough the \\,:li�l-high hushe� 

of a pe:lllut field and ru .. hed the concert iTU wire. One of the �f II j's 

in that section of the perimeter was driven hv Spcciali .. t I \Villiam 

D. Burnet t. a mel h:mic. \Vhen the .50-caliher m:u'hinc gun 011 his 

APe failed to function. Speciali�t Burnelt jumped fwm Ihe covcr 

of the driver's compartment to Ihe tOP of the vehide. de:lred the 

weapon. :md opened fire 011 the ( harging Vict Cong. killing fourteen. For Ihi .. :md Ot her actiom dllring the baulc. Spc<i.tii'}t Burnett 

was all'

anled the Distingui'lhed Sen'ice Cross. The he;II'" fire from 

Burnett's machine gUll :md those of the i\f 1 1 1's lIe,lI' him broke 

Ihe enemy assaull. 

The Viel Cong next allac-kcd we�1 from I l ighway Ij, :111(1 again 

were repulsed hy .:;O·cali\)cr and small :lrms fire. SCI'cr;)1 l imes 

i\fl [3's were moved to weak points 011 the perimeter so th:ll their 

machine gum could fire inlO the enemy's rank� at point-hlank 

range. At 0615 an air �trike directed by an airborne fOT"II":lrd air 

controller dropped homhs and raked the woodcd :Irea north of Ihe 

task force wLth 20'111111. cannon fire. 

AI OiOO tbe Viel Cong- began their m:lin charge from the north 

OUI of Ball Bang. 'Iupported il\' recoilless rifles and aUl()m:ttic wcapOIlS emplaced along all ta:,t-lI"est berm on Ihe sOUlhel"ll edge of the 

village and monars in the \·illage itself. The main attack \\":I� 

stopped at the lI'

ire Ill' the <:omhined firepolI'er of l.ompany .\ and 

Battery C, II'hkh in thirty minllte�, ming two·second deb)' fuzes. 
of steel, one Viet ConK squad penetrated the perimeter and threw 

a grenade into a howitzer position. killing t\\'o artillerymen and 

h'ollnding four olhers. Three infamry cOlllpanies h'ere meanwhile 

ordered by the 1:.1 Inf.mtry Division to movc WII'ard the battle 

and to envelop the Viel Cong from the rear. At the same time, 

armed helicopters nCh' 10 the scene. 

The encmy attacked a�i\ill at 0900. this lime from the nonh· 

west, with recoilless rilles, automatic weaponll, and mortars. Pro· 

tected by the berm. these weapons (Quid not be desnoyed by direct 

.. nillery fire. \"hen all Air Furce pilot reported ,h .. t the villagers 

were fleeing to the north of Ihu Bang, and another pilot sighted 

the mona I' positions \\'i,hin Uall U,mg, pel'Tl1is�ioll was obtained to 

hit the l,jl1age. fighter planes bomhed the enelllY positions and 

armed helicopters disdlarged rockets and strafed, For the next three 

hours, while morwf'S, artillery, and ail' strikes hammered the enemy, 

Ihe task force repelled sllcx:essil'e attacks. 

The banle of Ap Ball Bang went on for more than six hours 

before the enemy withdrew La the nonh\\'est, leaving behind his 

wounded ami dead. Troop A, commanded by Second Lieutenant 

John Garcia, suffered seven killed and thirty·five wounded; tWO 

M I lj's and three i\1 lOG l!lortar carriers lI'ere clestroyed and three 

M 113's were d;lImged. Procedures and techniques learned in training had been prO\'en in bailie. The clearing of fields of fire and the 

pre·dawn stand· to had insured the full applic:llion of Troop A's 

fire·power. The jd Platoon's foray illlo Ihe enemy position anel the 

positioning of i\ll l j's on the perimeter had elemonslrated the 

unit's flexibility, .md artillery and aerial fire suppOrt had provided 

depth to the defense. The enemy had begun the fight: the com· 

bined arms tealll had eneled it. 

DC/JioymclI/s (//(/ Eml)ioymclI/s 

The 1st Squadron. 4th Cavalry, had m,.de lhe case for armored 

forces. Upon the recommendations of General Seaman and others, 

armored units of the 2jth Infallln' Division were sent to Vietnam 

in early 1 966. Before leaving, the 1st Battalion, 5th Infamry 

(Mechanized) . had equipped ilS APC's willl gUllshields and extra 

machine gUlls .md the 1st Battalion. 69th Armor, had exchanged its 

gasoline-powered M'18A2C tanks for diesel·po\\'ered M48Aj's. For 

these units ancl others to folioll', SOlllh Viettl;ullese Armor Command advisers had pl'ep;ll'ed a packet that included information on 

the terrain, suggestions for modifications to equipment, a descriplion of enemy \I'capons and tactics, and suggested countermeasures 
the i\1113 GlpSl"'l rccO\cry device was also dcscril,ed and dClailed 

i llustrations and explanations of South Vietnamese modifications 

LO the 7\1 113, !lotahl)· gUllshields for the machine guns, were included. 

\Vithin dlrCC wcck� aftcr their arrival, the three armored 1I1lilS 

of the 251h Divi�ion participated in the first llluil ibaLtal ion armor 

operation to I:'I;,C place in Vietnam. Operation CIRCL£ PI:-'F'i \\'a� 

carried Out in Ihe jungle and rubher plantations twenty kilomClcr� 

nonh of Saigon. where heavy growl,h [:I\'ol"ed Ihe concealment of 

Vict Cong base camps. In p1:.ccs \ofl. marshy soil impeded lank 

movement, but generally vcgelation did not apprcci;lbly restrict 

eilher wilks or armorcd personnel carriers. By the close of this 

eight-day operation, morc lltltn fifty of the enemy had been killed 

and large :nlloums of anm and suppl ies had been captured. Of 

more imponance was the fact that a large armored force had sue· 

cessfully in";lded a Viet Cong jungle stronghold. forcing the enemy 

to move his base camps. The myth lhal armor could 110l be used 

in the jungle had heen destroyed, and for that alone ClltCU: I't'\lt:S 

will remain �ignificanL 

During April and ;\1:lY the ht Battalion. 5th Infantry (:\Iechanized) . continued operations around the ell Chi region. returning to encmy ba�es in the Filhol PlatH'llion and the Hoi I. .oi and 

1 10 130 '''oods. '''hen (onducting �ear(h and destroy oper:ttions in 

the hase areas, mech:lIli/cd infantry usu;tlly fought mounted, using 

the pcr�nncl carricn as assault vehicles. In the heavily wooded 

terrain the \'chi( les ITIIJVcd it. (Olllllln formation. Incaking p:tlhs 

1I11'ough the trees and thick hrmh and permiuing the infantrymen 

\0 remaiu mOlltlled and ;I\-oid hoohy traps. "Then thc infalllry 

located the Viet COllg the \'ehiclc� were moved rapidly toward 

ellemy po�ition�, \\'itl1 all gUIl'i firing in an altemp' 10 O\'Crl'1I11 the 

enemy before Ihe twop .. cli"nolllHed to make a I horoll�'h sear('h. 

Using Ihese le( hniques. ill two m()nth� ,he battalion found and 

destroyed three ha�e area�. killed 1 30 of the cnemy. :Hld captllrcd 

tlliny-six \\'eapOlIS. 

III early June Ihe h, Baualioll_ :lIh Infantry (Mech:llli1.cd) . 

began Operation ;\(,,,,

11, ,he first test of U.S. mechani7ed infantry's 

ability to operate in III Corp� Tactic;tl Zone during the wet season. 

This mallCIl\'cr 100" the unit had. into the Hao Trai-Dllc Iloa area 

where it had rought in Operation 1I0"OLl'I.U in March. when the 

rice paddie!> were hard and the canals dry. The plan called ror an 

immediate ;tnd I.lpid \weep of the respective company wiles with 

the objcct or finding ;111<1 destroying all enemy rorces_ To gain as 

, 
the bau:tlion (ollllll<Lndcr, had the unit leavc the h;lse camp at Cli 

Chi jll�t early enough 10 re:t<:h the line uf dcparture by 1·I·hour, 

whkh lI'as 1 100 on j June. 

As the ballaliOIl rC<-Oliliaiss.;lllce platoon entered the zone of 

operation, it spollcd and killed 1\\'0 Vict Cong soldiers. Whcn the 

;\111:rs (hurncd O\'cr the dikes, more Viet Cong came Ollt of thc 

water whcre they were <tllcmpting to hide by submerging and 

bre:llhing throug'h hollow ree(k 111 a �hort time twelve of the 

enemy h;lc\ been killeel ;mel nineteen capllIred. For the next thrce 

days the battalion �e;tnhcd the area, occasionally encountering a 

few Viet Cong soldicr�. On 8 June, acting on information from 

prisoner<;, Company C discovered the second largest arms Glche of 

the war to clate-116 weapons and tll'O tons of :nl1mUnilion. The 

battalion learned from Ihis operation thai :\1113's could move 

through paddies covered with more Limn a foot of water hm could 

not n:I\'ig<l le damp. Uludd)' paddies th;1l had no standing water. 

Thc conclusion (11":[11'11 from the mancu\"cr w,,� that most of the 

division area \\"as !;uitablc for methanizcd operations, cven during 

thc rainy season. 

Tusli Force SImI" 

Armored units arriving early in the Vietnam \Var literally had 

to invent [:tctics and techniques, and then convince thc ArTllY that 

they worked. Whilc thcre was hasic doctrine upon which to improl'i�e. for Victnam it nceded expansion, modification, and, in 

some cases, combat ICMing. Not all innovations lame from experienced armor leaders. Frequcllth'. improvisation was nccessit:lled by 

the taCLical silll:!Iion, hut morc often it «nnc from the imagination 

of soldiers. 

Several general Offi{Ch advocated more arlllor. l.eneral Jonathan 

O. Seaman as commandcr of the I<;l Division, and later as COIll· 

mander of I I Field Fon-c, ('olnt,unly rccommended the deploy· 

IIICllt of more ;Irmored Ultil�. Brig:ulier CCller.d Ellb W. William· 

son asked for armor 10 support his 173d Airborne Brigade when 

the tanks of the 1st Squadron, 4dl Cavalr),. \\'cre being held at 

Phu Loi. General Fred C. \Veyand. commander of the 25th Divi· 

sion. insisted on deploying armored units with his division. Briga· 

dier Ceneral William E. DePuy. who as MACV J-3 was convinced 

thai armored units could not be used, laler changed his mind ;lnei 

as comm<'lnder of the 1st Division collStalllly employed his armored 

uniLS to seck out the enemy. 

Not all earl)' lIsers of arlllOI' were generals. In early April 1966 

Colonel Ilaroid C. Moore. Jr.. commander of the 3d Brigade, 1st 
lhe I I Corps T<I<;lic:1I Zone ncar Chll I'ong Mountain, (\\'cilly-seven 

kilometers WCSt of Plei Me. The division was conduCiing Operatioll 

LINCOLN, and infalllry units rcqllcslcd heavy anillcry- l i5-1ll1ll. and 

S-inch-LO provide dose suppOrt. The mission was given to Colonel 

l\!OOl'C. who dcddcd to move self-propelled artillery. escorted by 

Troop C, 3d Squadron. 4th Cavalry, Ihrough lwellly kilometers of 

jungle where no rO:ld� existed. The armored column was to be 

guided and protected by elemellts of the 1st Squadron, 9lh Cavalry 

(A;c) . 

On 3 April Task Force S,'U\l" Wi1l1 nine i\l48A3 lanks, seventeen 

l\f l l:rs, and .he :.c1f.propellcd artillery. struck OUl boldly from I'lci 

Mc ill lo the jungle to the wcst. Tanks of the 3d Squadron, 4th 

Cavalry , guided by S«lIIt.s of thc In Squadron. 9th Cavalry. picked 

their way toward tllc plallllcd :Il·tillcry site with MIIS's, artillcry, 

and c;ugo trucks following in thcir path. Task Force SPUR went 

through thc twcllty k ilometers of jungle in seven hours, and for the 

next two days ('onduclcd search operations in lhe vallcy. \"hcn no 

Viet Collg wcrc found. the ;,rmored unit reLUrncd 10 the artil lery 

position to escort thc guns b:lck to Plei l\le. The cav:lirYlllell had 

CO\'crc..'o ovcr IO� kilolllctcr.s of trad .. less jungle with thc aid of ail' 

cavalry, demonstrating a far greater capacity for cross-coH llIry 

movement in lhc II Corps area than anyone had thought po�ible. 

B(lllfCJ on /he ,\1i/III Tlumh Rood 

In armored b:lttles the mobility and heavy fircpowcr of armored 

units often compensatcd for t:lctical miswkes. Somc hatt1c.s werc 

extrcmely dose. and caused Ch;UlgCS 10 be made ill opcrational procedures. One of t hcsc occurrcd in thc III Corps Tactical Zone in 

1966 as the 1st I nfantry Division, probing into W<lr Zone C. triggered a scrics of cllgtlgcmelllS Oil a din track called the 1\lil1h 

Thanh RO:ld. 

Opcrating with SOllth Vietnamesc forces, the U.S. 1st I nfantry 

Division mOllntcd a series of opcr;llions in castern \Var Zonc C 

during .Junc ;,md jil ly 1 9GG. Thc purpose \\':lS \() open Route 13 

from Saigon to I .oc Ninh in Biuh l.ong Provincc and to destroy 

elemellts of the 9th Viel Cong Division. The 9th was rcponed to 

be massing to scize the provincc capiwl of An Loc and se\'('ral district capitals. By the end of Opcration EL p,\SO II in C<lrly September 1 966, five major cng;lgclllcnt .. had been fought, and all thrcc 

regiments of the 9th Vict Cong Di\'i<;ion had withdrawn into sanctuaries deep in \Val' 7.one C along the C:nllbodian bordcr. leaving 

behind some 850 dcad. Ilighly effeCli\'e COlllllcrambush tactics 
oped during three of Ihe Il\c engagemellls. These baules shO\I'ed 

,hat anw)red cavalry will, "ir and anillcry suppon could marc th"n 

hold its OIl'Il against a tlllll1crkally supcrior lorn:, giving ;Jirmobile 

infanlrymctl time to join for(:e" II'iLl, the GI" dry to defeat an cncmy 

ambush. 

The first of Ihe threc U.S. cngagemelllS look place when Troop 

A, 1st Squadron, 4th C",·alry. was ambushed hy the 272d Viet 

Cong Regiment on 8 JU lie i!J6(j. north of Ihe ,\p Tau 0 bridge on 

National l I ighway 13. (Sf'(' Mal' 6, inset.) The Viet Cong wcre 

deployed along a five-kilol1leter "I reich of road in posilions extending well heyoud the length of Ihe cavalry column_ \Vhell the "Illbw.h was l>pl"llllg InoSl of the American troopers II'ere able to reach 

a small clearing ncar the head of Ihe colulIlJl, where, II-ith the help 

of anillery and air SUppOfl. they de�per;nc1y fOllght off the Viet 

Cong for four hours. \Vhell the haltle cnded, Ihe enemy had lost 

over onc hundred dead and fOllr laken pri�oner. as well as thiny 

individual and lwehe ue\I'·!>cn·ed weapons. Although successful the 

ca,',dry had made mi ..

 takes. SilH�c original estimates of the enemy 

force were low, supponil1g fire was used primarily against lhe Viet 

Cong in the fighting positions near the cavalry force and other 

enemy fon;es were left free to maneuver. .\Ithough an infallll'}' 

reaction fone was committed tOward the end. it did not arrive in 

time to be :l decisive factor. After the COllllnandcr and other principals had analyzed the battle, cavalry communications wcre changed 

and coordinalion of ail' and artillery was improved. Plans for reinforcement by aimlObile infantry were de\elopcd to ensure quick 

arrival of react ion forces designed to fight off I he main au"ck and 

to provide troops for hlocking the enemy withdrawal routes, 

Lessons learned on 8 ,June paid dividend .. all 30 June when the 

271st Viet Cong Regiment :luacked Troops B ilnd C, 1st Squadron, 

4th Cavalry. f:lI'Ihel' north along I lighwa)' 13 ne,,1' Srok Dong, This 

lime. when the ambush hit Troop H, Troop C r"pidly maneuvered 

to reinforce. Coordiu:llion of fire SUppOTI had v;ml}' improved and 

tactical air and anillery were illlllledialely and effectively employed. 

The relief force arrived in time 10 engage the Viet Cong before 

they could withdraw. while cxploitation forces were inserted behind 

the enemy as fill' west. as the Cambodian border. where another 

engagement lOok place. Enemy losses werc heavy-270 dead. 7 taken 

prisoner: 23 crcw-served weapons. and 40 small arills captured. 

Encouraged bv the two earlier successes of the 1st Squadron, 4th 

Cavalry. �lajor General William E. DcPuy. 1st Infantry Division 

commander, dirccted developmcnt of a plan to lure the ellemy into 
11, 

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1st Brigade commander, prepared a twophased flexible plan that 

could be easily modified for attacks on either Route 13 or the Minh 

Thanh R0<1d. Five possible enemy ambush positions were selected 

during the planning. and, as it turned out, the site selected as the 

most likely was where the enemy struck. To increase the chances 

that the enemy would attack, rumors were circulated for the benefit 

of Viet Cong agents thaI a small armored column would escort an 

engineer bulldozer and several supply trucks from Minh Thanh to 

An Lac on 9 July. The true size of the force, called Task Force 

DRAGOON, was a \\'ell-kept secret: actually it was composed of 

Troops B and C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, and Company B, 1st 

Baualion, 2d Infantry. 

Phase I, a deception plan involving an ainnobile feint, covered 

the movement of artillery and supporting forces. The infantry 

forces that were to attack the flanks of the ambush and block withdrawal routes had to be in position to act quickly if the ambush 

occurred. The 1st Brigade began positioning these forces all 7 July, 

with infantry and artillery at Minh Thanh, more infamry and 

artillery just north of Minh Thanh Road, and an infantry battalion 

near An Loc. (Map 6) The trap was set. 

At 0700 on 9 July 1966 Phase II started as the task force moved 

south from An Loc on National Highway 13, turned southwest 

on Minh Thanh Ro.,d, and arrived at Checkpoint Dick at 1025 

withom incident. There were artillery and air preparations on the 

western side of the bridge at Checkpoint Dick to soften up possible 

enemy concentrations_ Following the air strikes, the 3d Platoon, 

Troop C, supported by covering fire, moved across the bridge with 

two engineer minesweeper demolition teams. A quick check was 

made for demolition charges and mines but no evidence of an 

enemy attempt to sabotage the bridge was found. Since the cavalrymen were now only 1 .500 meters from the site selected earlier as 

the most likely ambush location, tension among the troops 

mounted. The Troop C commander directed the 1st Platoon to 

cross the bridge, pass through the 3d Platoon, and advance down 

the road tOward Minh Thanh. 

As the 1st Platoon moved past the 3d Platoon, a planned air 

strike was made near Checkpoint Tom while a CH-47. a helicopter 

with four .50-caliber machine guns, a 40-mm_ grenade launcher. and 

two 7.62-mm. machine guns, struck the area southwest of Check· 

poilll Tom. There was no return fire. At 1 100, midway between 

Checkpoillls Dick and Tom, the crew of the lead vehicle of the 1st 

Platoon spolled ten Viet Cong running across the r0<1d. Minutes 
them with c:lni:'lcr. The tank lire hrought an almost 1l1lhclic\

able 

\'olumc of CIlCIII}' fire 011 the entire Troop C column. The ellemy 

had t:lkel1 the bait. 

At Ihe beginning the 1st Platoon LOok the brunt of the enemy 

fire: the commander of the )c;td lank was killed. Within a few 

minutes the platoon leader reponed his SCOIII section OUI of action, 

and a lillIe l<llcr he himself was wounded. As the p1:1Ioon began to 

dr:l\v back under Ihe heavy pressure, the platoon sergcalU, who had 

wkcJI command, moved to Ihe front of Ihe column 10 get the lead 

lank rcm:lIlllcd and fighting. l ie directed lhe 1'1'132. a namethrower, co scnd liquid fire illio Ihe enemy positions on the north 

side of the road. Two of the 1st IllaLOon's MII :l"s were hit and 

burst into flames. The 1st Platoon now had two tanks and fOllr 

�1 1 1 3's firing at the enemy. The 2d Platoon, leading with an 

�H8A3 tank, closed rapidly on the 1st Platoon and deployed in a 

herringbone formation. concentrating its fire [0 the north side of 

,he road.� The 3d Platoon. hea\·ily engaged as soon a� Ihe first 

rounds were fired. ('ould not move forward 10 join the 1st Platoon 

and a 300-meter gap existed hctween the twO platoons. The Vict 

Cong werc unable to lake advant:lge of the gap, however. Uccause 

of the intense firc_ Tracked vehicles along the entire column were 

firing as rapidly as possible. contilluing 10 jockey for position and 

a"oid lhe enemy antitank firc while arlillery fire and air strikes hit 

the enemy positions. 

The task force commander ordered Troop n forward to relievc 

the enemy presSlIre and called for more aniller" alld air support. 

At first the enemy's main :!nack had seemed to come from the 

sOllth. bUl it was soon app:lrent that the enemy force was con· 

CC11lrilled to the north side of the TO:ld. The plan for infantry reinforccment was pll' into action \I·hile the cavalrymen fought. \Vhen 

Troop B closed on the wil of Troop C. the fighting intensificd. 

\Vithin fony-five minutcs the tanks had fired more than ::'0 percent 

of their C:lnister and the �11 1 3's lI'ere nearly OILI of .50-caliber am· 

munition. SC\'eral Troop B tracked vehicles filled lhe 300·melcr 

g:IP between the 2d and 3d Platoons of Troop C. and one platoon 

was assisting lhe lead clement of Troop C. 

With Troop n well di�posed throughout the lenglh of the 

Troop C column. the squadron cOllllllander ordered Troop C to 

!! The herringbone required all nmored ,ehic!es to $IOP immediate!) in an 

ambush. pi-OI to face 01l\ ... anl al an an�te . ... ith altewate 'chicles facing either side 

of the rood. and lire all ,,·eapolls. Sofukill ,chicks hiJ behind the armored ,ehicl<"l. 

The maneU\er ... as de,etoped b) the 1st Squadron. 4th Canln. It ..

 3$ a blorite of 

theirs and .. 'al used b) man) uniu. 
fantry were by Ihen allacking the fbnks of the ambush force while 

others were flown north ill helicopters to wke blocking positions. 

The battle raged for anmher half·hour, then the enemy began 10 

leave protective cover and run away from the \\'ithering fire of the 

cavalrymen and supporting forces. As the ViCI Cong fled, infantry, 

artillery, and tactical aircraft intercepted and destroyed them. An 

infantry sweep the following day discovered Slllall groups of Viel 

COllg still trying to escape the trap. The searching forces found 

240 of the enellly dead, took 8 prisoners, ;mel caplllred 13 crewserved weapolls and " [ small anm. By 16:10 of 10 July the search 

was complete, and the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, withdrew to 

�rinh Thanh. The enemy plan to seize An Lac failed; the 1st 

Squadron. 4th Cavalry. had reopened Route 13, a vital line of com· 

munications, and had assisted in defeaLing the 9th Viel Cong 

Di\'ision. 

Two significant facts emerge frOIll these engagements. First, 

contrary to tradition, ;lI"Inurcd units werc used as a fixing force, 

while ;.irmobile infantry hecame the encircling maneuver elemcnt. 

Sccond, the :mnored force. led by tanks, had sufficicnt combat 

powcr to withstand the JJl:lSS ambush undl slipponing anillery, air, 

and infalllry could be hrought in to destroy thc enemy. Engagements h'ith armored elcmcnLS forcing or creadng the fight and 

infantry reinforcing or encircling were typical of armor action in 

1966 and 1967. 

Armored forces, like other American units, generally a\'oided 

deliberate night aClions in the early days of the Vietnam War. The 

scarcity of night fighting cquipmcnt, poor 'training of U.S. forces 

ill niglll fighting, the difficulty of crashing through a dark jungle in 

armor at night, fear or ;ullbush, and a general reluctance to fight at 

night, all militated ag;linst pl:tnned night <luiolls. Armorcd operations at night were either react ions lO enemy attacks or defenses 

of night positions. Such tcchniques as the usc of helicopters and 

artillcry flaTes for directing armored units <lnd the employmelll of 

tank searchligills to illumin:ne likely ambush sites werc cventually 

developed, bm for most of the early years the night belonged to 

the cnemy. 

In an effort to change this situation armored IC:ldcrs developed 

sever:ll techniqucs. One, ni(knamed thunder run. involved thc use 

of armored vehicles in all.night road marches using 'l);lchine gun 

and main lank gun fire alollg the roadsidc� lO trigger potential 

ambushes. \Vhile this procedure increased vehicle m ileage and 

mailllenance problems, it ohen succeeded in discouraging enemy 
Ninh became known as Thullder Road because of the frequency 

of these runs and their similarity to those in the Rohert Mitchum 

movie. Ro.1.drunner operations, n;lI11cd after the cartoon character, 

although similar 10 the thunder nlllS were carried Ollt by larger 

units 011 armed route recollnaissance lhal looked for trouble spots. 

These operations look place both d:ly and night. 

The IJlrlcl!.horse Regimenl 

Although armored operat ions in Vietnam were catalysts for new 

concepts and innovations, there seemed to be, at j\IACV swff level, 

a lingering reluctance to deploy armored forces, cspeci;lIly those 

with M18A3 tanks. Nowhere is this better illtlSlr:ncd Ihan in the 

events that preceded the arrival of the II th Armored Cavalry 

Regiment, the Blackhorse Regimen!.:! I)roposals ,,'ere made to move 

the 1 1th Cavalry to Vietn:lIn as early as December 1965, when 

General \VeSlmoreland requested the regiment for the purpose of 

maintaining security along ROllte I. I-lis suhsequent desire to use 

the unit for other missions precipitatcd a discmsion of the rcgiment's table of organization and equipmenl. In latc Dcccmber 

1965, thc �Iilitary Assist:lI1cc Command, Vietnam, requestcd equipmcnl lllodificalions to the 1 1th C;n'alry tables, including substitution of liglll M41A3 wuks for medium tanks in thc tank COIllpanics of the regiment's squadrons ilnd M 1 13's for both lTledium 

tanks and 1\1 1 14 reconnaissance vehicles in the cavalry platoons. 

After cvaluating the proposed changes, tbe Depanmelll of the 

Army concluded that the regiment could nOl be sem as early as 

Ceneral \Vesllnorelancl had requested if all proposed changes wcre 

made. 

The :lllswer of the U.S. Milil:1ry Assistance Command, Victnam, 

th;n a mechanized brigade was required in lieu of the regiment. 

created considerable consternation among armor officers in the 11th 

Cavalry and in the Pentagon. It seemed that the largest armor unit 

yet requested for Vietnam would he eliminated before it h;ld a 

chance to perform, and with it would go the hopes of rn;IIlY who 

believed lh:u more armored forces were needed. The request for 

a brigade prompted a stud)' by the Army staff, which con�idercd as 

allern:uives deploying a mechanized brigade, resh;'lping the 1 1 th 

Cavalry, or sending the 1 1 th Cav;dry as it was then organized.� 

3 Allhough General Weslmoreland lawr slaled Ihat he "'dconled wilh enlhusiasm 

Ihe nrha! of Ihe �1·18A!1 n1(.'diurn !:Ink in the 11th Ca\a1r)·. Ihe factJ hl-ar OUI thai 

nOI all Ihe �IAC" slaff shared his ell1husiaslT1 . 

• The Dcl'anment of Ihe ATIlI) aClion ofcer on Ihi$ stud,· was LieUlenant Colonel 
M I 13s substilUled for the medium tanks and reconnaissance vehicles of the ca,'alry platoons, was considered the best alternative 

in view of Ihe rcgimclll's unusual capability for dcccntr;liized 01" 

erations. The cavalry regimelll had a higher density of amomatic 

weapons, possessed long-rangc radios, and had more aircraft than 

a mechanized brigade_ It had heller means of gathering intelligence, was cap<1.bIe of rapid illlernal reinforcement, and possessed 

its own ;.nillery in its squadron howitzer batteries. 

\Vhen agreemelH on the unit's organization was reached, the 

1 1th Cav;dry began final preparations for Vietnam. Since I\f l l 3's 

were to replace tanks in the cavalry platoons, they were modified 

for use as fighting vehicles by attaching a shield for the .50·caliber 

machine gUll, and pedestals and shields for twO side-mounted �fGO 

machine gUlls. The concept and design wcre exactly thaI adopted 

by the South Vietnamese armor forces three years earlier, and subsequently recommended to American units by the advisers to the 

Vietnamese Armor Command. \Vith the modifications the M I 13 

was called the'armored cavalry assault vehicle, or ACAV, a Ilame 

coined by the II th Cavalry troopers, probably in memory of the 

tanks the M 1 1 3's replaced. 

The IlLh Cavalry arrived in Vielllam in early September 1966. 

Shortly after its arrival the ,\Jilitary Assistance Command welcomed 

its second U.S. Army tank battalion, the 2d Baualion, 34th Armor, 

comlllilnded by LieUlcnant Colonel Raymond L. Stailey. Pan of 

the 4th Infantry Division before being sent to Vietnam, the battalion was allached to II Field Force in the III Corps Tactical 

Zone to repl:lce the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, which had moved to 

the II Corps area. On 19 September Company B was detached to 

the 1st Infantry Division at Phu Loi, and on 5 OctOber Company 

A was dctached to thc 25th Infantry Division at Cu Chi. Finatly, 

Company C was sent nonh to I Corps Tactical Zone until December. The practice of parceling OUt its lank companies \\'as to haunt 

this ballaliOIl throughom its sen'ice in Vietnam; seldom did it 

have more than one tank company under battalion COIHrol. This 

unfonunate practice, so chnacteristic of the French in Indochina, 

was symptomatic of a command with few arlllored units. It reached 

a new high later in the war when, for a period of several months. 

the commander of the 2d Battalion. 34th Armor, again had no tank 

companies to command. The 1 1th Cavalry also suffered from the 

George S, 1':l.Ion. who would laler command Ihe tllh ea'alf)' in Vielnam. Feeling 

in Ihe dCI)anmenl "'a$ lhal if 3 compromise was nOI reached. neilher Ihe Itlh 

ea'aln' nor an) OIlier large annorcd unil "'ould be dcplo}oo. 
ACAV PREPARES TO EscoRT A TRUCK CO:'livOY 

detachment practice, and ,here were periods when the headquarters controlled only the regimclHal air cavalry troop. 

After Operation Arru;nORO in September and October 1966. 

unit.s of the 1 1 th Cavalry returned to Bien Hoa lO continue OpcnHioll A'rl,ANTA, whose mission was to clear and secure tines of 

communication in three provinces near Saigon and 10 seCUfe the 

new lllackhorsc Base Camp. 13 kilometers 50mb of Xuan Loc. AI 

first the operation was limited to clearing and securing ROUle I 

from Xuan Loc to Bien I loa and Route 2 LO the base t;lmp. As 

ATLANTA continucd, however. the I l Ih Cavalry eXlcnded itS operations away from the roads and throughollt the area. 

From lhe slandpoilll of the number of enemy kiJ1ed. and, more 

importam, from the number of roads opened to military and 

civilian traffic, ATLANTA was a Sllccess. Regimental experience 

varied from roadrunner :lI1d convoy escort duties to cordon and 

search operations in which lhe squadrons sealed off :m area and 

then worked, both mounted and dismounted. to drivc out the 

encmy. Throughout. Ihe regiment was able to move at will bOlh 

on and off the roads, and experienced lillie difficulty wilh the ter· 
tered by armored columns that destroyed base 0.1mps, fortifications, 

and supplies. 

It was during Operation ATLANTA that the 1 1 th Cavalry fought 

its first major baulc. Twice the ellemy tried to ambush and destroy 

resupply convoys esconed by units of the 1st Squadron, but in both 

allempLS was defeated by the firepower and maneuverability of the 

cavalr}'. The second of these two ambushes lOok place on 2 December 1966 near Suoi Cat, fifty kilometers ean of Saigon. The steps 

taken in this action illl1Slrate a procedure for dealing with ambushes that became standard in the regiment. 

'When intelligence reporu indiCilled that there was an enemy 

battalion in the vicinity of Suoi Cat, the ISl Squadron conduCted a 

limited zone reconnaissance but found no signs of the enemy. 

Shortly thereafter, on 2 December 1966, Troop A was handling 

base camp security, Troop B was secnring a rock quarry ncar Cia 

Ray, and the balance of Ihe squadron was performing maintenance 

at BJackhorse Base Camp. (Map 7) Early that morning a resupply 

convoy from Troop B, consisting of twO tanks, three ACAV's 

(modified M) 1 3's) and two 2!t2·ton trucks, had traveled the 

BATTLE OF SUOI CAT 

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. 

.. 

..

. 1 

" 

,.' 

.. , 

, . 
TANKS ANO ACAV's FORM DEFl:NS}: PERIM.:n:R ,\T BRIOCE Srn::. Distance 

betweell veil ides was IIIl1eh less thml armor doe/ri"e slaled because of 

,Iced for mutual support Gild to prevellt ;lIji/Il'(llioll. 
incident. 

At 1 600 the cOIH'oy commander, Lieulenam Wilbert Radose· 

vich, readied his cOllvoy for the return trip to Cia Ray. The 

column had a tank in the lead, followed by twO ACAV's, two 

trucks, anmher ACAV, and, finally, the remaining tank. Lieutenanl 

Radosevich was in the lead tank, and arteT making sure that he 

had contact Wilh the forwaTd air contTollel' in all armed helicopter overhead, moved his convoy OUl tOward Suoi Cat. As 

the convoy passed through Suoi C:n, the men in the column 

1l00iced an absence of children and an unusual stil lness. Sensing 

danger, Lieutenant Radosevich was turning in the Lank commander's halch to observe closely both sides of the road when he accidently tTipped the turret control handle. The turret mo\'ed 

suddenly to the Tight, cvidc11lly scaring lhe cnemy into pTematurely firing a comm;lIld dCLOll<llOO mine approximately ten meters 

in from of the lank. I .ieutenant Radosevich immediately sholl ted 

"Ambush! Ambush! Claymore Cornerl"' over I

,

he troop fTequency :l 

and led his convoy in a charge through wh;u had become a hail of 

enemy fiTe while he blasted both sides of the road. Even as 

Lieutenant Radosevich charged, help was Oil the way. Troop n, 

neaTest the scene. immcdi;llcly headed toward the action. At squad· 

ron headquarters, Company D, a lank company, Troop C, and the 

howitzer battery haSlened toh'aTd the ambush. Troop A, on perimeter secuTity at the regimcntal base camp. followed as soon as it was 

released. The gunship 011 station immediately began delivering fiTe 

and called for additional assistance. while the forward air COIltroller radioed for air support. 

,"Vhen the cOllvoy rcached the eastern edge of the ambush, one 

of the ACAV's, already hit t.hree limes, was stmck again and caught 

fire. At this poiTll Troop n arrived, moved into the ambush from 

the cast, and immediately came under intense fire as the enemy 

maneuvered toward (he burning ACAV. Troop B fought its way 

through the ambush, alternately employing the herringbone formation and moving west, and encolilHering the enemy in si7.able 

groups. 

Lieutenant Colonel Martin D. Howell. Ihe squadTon commander, alTived over (he scene by helicopter tcn minutes after the 

first fire. He immediately designated National Highway I a fire 

coordination line, and directed tactical aircraft to strike to the 

� Claymore Comer wu the !Init niclm:l1e for this p3.rlieul3.r point on the roat!. 

E\"f;�l)one in (he squadron tne'" e)(3.(:II)· where it was. e'en without a m3.p. 
pan}' D and Troup C H."H hed "iuoi Cat. he ordered thelll to he�ill 

firing :,' I Ile}, Idl Ihe (-,hI ,ide of the \illage. The hOh'iller biluery 

went into PO�ili()11 in l

.

iuoi Cal. B\' [his lime Troop B had tf,l\ cr,ed 

the emire :uubu,h arca, lILl'ncd around, and was making a second 

trip b:l(k ww,mi lhe C;I.�I. Company D and Troop C followed ('lose 

behind, raking hoth �ide, of [he road with fire as they IIlC)\'cd. 

The wnk, fired !10 mtll. (;lIli�lcr. mowing down the dlarging Viet 

Cong and dc�tr()'illg a ;",i-Illlll. recoilless I'ifle.(l ;\ f idw:l), through the 

am hush zone, Troop n h'lltcd in a herringbone formOltioll. while 

COlllpall} J) :md Troop c: (OlllillllCd to the cast CtJlI'ard the junction 

of ROlLte �t13 and RflIllC I. Troop A, now 10 the \\,CSt of the ambush. entered the area. �lIrprised a scavenging pany, and killed 

fiftccn Viet Congo 

The sq uacll'OII lO1ll1llander halted Troop ,\ 10 the \1'C�t of Troop 

B. Comp:lIl\ J) \\';1\ tllrned :l1'(lIIlId at Ihe eaSlcrn sidc of the :lmbu:-.h 

and positiollcd I() Ihe C;I,I of Troop B. Troop C \\'a� sent SOlllhe:lSI 

on Rome I to Ir:lp Cllellll fon-es if they moved in that direction. 

As Troops A and B :lnd COIllP:lIl� D {'onsolid,ued at t he ;tlnhLl�h 

sile. enemy lire bec:l tne illlcllSe :lrollnd Troop B. Thc Vict Cong 

forces were '>oon (allghl in a de:ldly crossfire when the cavalry 

units cOIl\'crged. h c1arknes� appro.1chec\. the .\mcrir:ltl troops 

prepared niglll defcmi lc pmiliolls itnd anillel'v fire \\'as shifted 10 

Ihe south 10 seal off ellcmv c�("ape relllles" A search of the b:lttlcfield the I1cxt moming r('I(';tlcc! mcr 100 encmy dead. The loll. 

however. was heavier Ihan Ih:u. Enemv dOCllment5 l'apwred in May 

1 96i refonicd the Ims of three Viet Cong ballalioll commanders 

and fOllr (ompany ( ommanders in the Snoi Cat anion. 

Thc �IH'('ess of Ihe 1:IClic� for countering 'lInhmhes developed 

during A'ILA'a,\ resulted in their ;t.doptiOIl as s\;mdal'd procedurc 

for the future. The ta{'tic� Gllled for the ,ttnhu�h('d elemenl 10 elll' 

plov all it\ firepower 10 prolect lhe escorted vehicles :tnd fi�ht ( lenr 

of the enellw killin� zolle. Once dcar. lite ('(lYall'\' would reAToup 

and rcturn to Ihc hilling IOnc. All ;'Ivail;'lblc rcinforcemcnts would 

he rushed 10 Ihe 'irene ;'lS rapidly ;'ls possihle to : :u tal.\';' the flanks of 

the ambush. ;\nillery :mel IM"tic;1l air would be lI'ied 10 the maximum extent. This le[ hni<lIte was !hed wilh success 1)\ the II th 

Cavalry throughom its .. Iay ill Vietnam. 

e I h(' I�nk (11I1'1II�11I1(r who sJ)QII<'11 lhe <'lleUlI (1"<'''" sellin!: ul' the re(oil1� 

Tine thought Ihe lIl<'n "'ele horn <;;Olllh \ iClIIJIIlCse (oleC'S ,,·ho lI:ul (Ollie In help. 

\\"hell th" mill/ie WJS 111);111(:.1 I·ijtht JI him. he Me"" Ihe W(";II'UII ;lIld (f<'W �PJlI at 

pOilH·hlallk r;'InltC wuh rnlli�I<'T. Can;�l<'r is � lank m�in Run round ('onwining 1.280 

shot or :'.60 10 10.000 darll. It is similar in �(IiOIl 10 a shOI!:\ln $hcll. 
Although !:Inks and ACAV's were effective against the enemy 

when he could bc found. they were vulncrable 10 the explosive 

antivchicular mine. For cxample in June 1966, whilc moving back 

into the Doi Lui and 1-10 Do woods in II I Corps Tactical Zone, 

the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (I\lechanized) . lost fourtecn 1\1 1 13'5 

10 mines ill cight days of operation. Only eight 1\11 13'5 wcre cvenwally reUirned 10 service. In Ihc period Jalluary-1\larch 1967 on 

I-lighway 19 cast of Pleiku in II Corps, the 1st Ballalion, G9th 

Armor, found 1 1 5 mines: 27 wcre dctected and dis;mned, 88 exploded and damaged tanks. From June 1969 to June 1970, thc 1 1 th 

Cavalry encountered ovcr 1,100 mincs in the northern III Corps 

Tactical Zone. Only GO pcrccll l were dctecled; Ihc OIhcr 40 percent accoulllcd for the loss of 352 combat vehicles. 

Generally. tank hulls proved cap,:tble of absorbing the shock 

of a mine cxplosion, prevcnting scrious iujurics to the crcws and 

damage to illlcriol' components. Bm when an AIIC hit a mine, 

particularly an APC that \\'as gasoline,fueled, scveral crew members \\'crc usually wounded seriously or killed. Drivcrs wcre cspecially vulncrablc, and crcw members frequent I)' rotatcd this 

dangerous job, For these reasons tanks normally led in de:lring 

operations 01' rcconnaissance in force. A sLUdy of the six-month 

period from NOI'/:mbcr 1968 to i\lay 1969 found that Ihrougholll 

Vietnam 73 pcrcent of all lank losses and i7 percent of all armorcd 

personnel carrier losses \I'ere causcd by mines, Another study conducted in December 19iO found thai mines accounted for ovcr 75 

percent of all combat vchicles losl. This was not ncws to armor 

troopers. 

In paSt wars cOllntel'mine equipment had been chiefly designed 

to clear lalles through minefields where the mines were laid in 

pauerns. III Vietnam, however, such rnindields wcre never encountered: instead, thc enemy planted mines ;11 random all a massive scale, Amilank mines ranged from pressure-detonated to improvised mincs. some as heavy as 250 pounds. The enemy also rcco\'ered unexploded artillery and monar shells and aircraft bombs 

and riggcd them wilh prcssure-detonated or command-detonated 

fuzes. M ines lI'ere set on roads and off ro.tds, in open ficld and 

dense junglc. Therc scemed to be no I"><'luern that applied coulltrywide. 

American units dealt with the mine problem by Irying to prevelll the enelnY from laying mines. b}' trying to detcct implanted 

mines, and by deliberately detonating mines-usually lI'ilh a tank, 

Tradition;llly, cOlllllermine operations were efforts to detect mines 
ENCII\I:ER INI:

SWU .. I'I:-':C TF.A1'>f CLEARS HtCIIWAY 13 

after they weTe clIll>\a<.cd hut in Vietnam, w i t h n o set bfltlic lines, 

the en('II1)' (ould he ilu;ld.cd a'l he attemplcd to lily lIlille�. Ambush 

p.:uTois W(,IC 5Ct LIp at likely enelll\! mining locations, and sensors 

were lIsed to dC1C( t the people cmpl;l('ing mine ... The he .. t W:I)' to 

defeat Tandom mining' wa� to kill the �oldiers II'ho were !:tying the 

Illinc� or destroy the -"upply '1ys,em thai [urni"hcd the mines .. \nything short of that wa'l hound [0 he fruqrating work wilh lillie 

promi'lc of �uC(-C5S. 

Units like [he 2d HanaliOIl. 2d Infantry (�lc('h:lIli7Cd) . mcd 

nighl roadrunner ()pcr:lI i()I1� in an aHempl LO discourage or kill 

those plating lIIille,> "ICIng the road ,II 11i�hL� In ;l(ldil ioll 10 {'onducling nms ;n 1",1IIdo111 i1l1cr\';lls, l hc l'O;ldnlllncrs called for planned artillcry firc ;md l'

t 

__ onlloitcrcd hy fire betwecn friendlv ni�lll 

dcfen�i,'c po�i tions, Thc 1 1 th ,\rnlOl'cd l.avalr\' employcd thllndcr 

runs lI�ing 1:1111;.\, and where pos�ihlc fircd harassing artillcry fire 

on habilllal1y mined seniom of mad, Olher units made cxtemivc 

studies or Ihc latllt;!l area� and dc\'clor>ed mille incidenl charls. 

These studie� pinpointed ;u-e;ls Ihal were con�lant minc problems 

1 rhe 2t! Ibuation, 2,1 'nrantr\ (\I), "'as one of lhrcc iofalnn hallalions Ihal 

hat! ,lepto'ed ,h,moullI(!t1 :lUd "'�, sul)'<C(I"cmh Ineehani/ed in ' ielnanl in carl} 

I%i. I Ill' nlher un;ll .... �'r.., lll.., 2,1 nallal;o". 81h Inranln 1\1), and lhe hh Ral 

lalion, 2�1 Infanl ... (\I) Inll',e\ljn�h, the 2.1 1\'lIlalion, 2,1 Infanln, .. "a. a (Jarl of 

Ihe I .. Infanln I>j" sioll, "hid, ha.1 heen denied il$ m<--<-hallia'(l bJII�llollS before 

tlCI,IO) ing III l'l6j. 
spots were close to areas dominated by the local Viet Cong; all 

afforded the enemy good cover and roules in and out; and ;111 had 

a high rate of mine incidents when armored units were present. 

The information gathered from these studies indicated that the 

use of ambush patrols al night could be a valuable means of preventing mining operations, bm it was limited, particularly in 

armored uni ts, by dte number of men that could be spared from 

olher duties. Since armored unit.s ranged over wide areas it was 

also impossible 10 sludy eilch area long enough to acquire suOicielll 

information 10 act upon. Sensors, used in localions where there 

was repealed mining, were passive in nature but were responded 

to by artillery fire when activated. \'Vhile their use sccmed to reduce incidents, the precise effect was difficult to mcasure, 

JE the enemy could not bc preventcd from laying mines, the 

next SICP was to find the mines by some means other than running 

over lhem with vehicles, A mine sweeping team or troops familiar 

with an area could of len visually locate mines. Informers who 

received olHhe·spot cash payments and a degree of anonymity for 

themselves were a mode1<llely reliable source of information. 

Metallic mine detectors and individual probing were lIseful but 

time consuming. On the whole, more ro.

1.d mines were spoiled by 

alert armor crewmen than were found by mine detectors. Armored 

units were often the security clcment for clearance teams, and in 

most corps tactical zones had a daily mission of ro.1.d cle;mmce by 

probing and by lIsing minesweepers and vehicles. Clearing units 

used onc lank on the road and one on each shoulder; lhe tanks 

on lhe shoulders preceded the roadbound \'ehicle to destroy any 

wires to command-detonated mines in the roacl, The wheeled ,'e· 

hicles carefully followed in the tracks of lhe lead vehide. Even 

fake mine-laying by lhe Viet Cong was successful since it also had 

to be checked. No system of mine detection was markedly effective, 

however, and losses occurred regularly in clearing operations, 

Most armored vehicle crewmen took prevelllive measures to 

reduce mine injury to themselves and damage to their vchicles. 

The men always wore lIak jackets and steel helmets. The floors o[ 

tracked vchides werc sometimes overlaid with sandbags, ration and 

ammunition boxes, or unusable flak jackets to prevelll mine blast 

pcnetr.llion.' In most units troops rode on tOP o( the vehicles, 

8 l.omling the At'e wilh sa'Htbags as .. fabe floor helped, but often created other 

proble"ls. When the 1st Squadron. In Ca,-al..,'. alT;'-oo. the: CiI"alr)"len put 1 ... 0 

ta)ers 01 sandbags in �Il ,\111"5, plus all the: ocher c:quipmcrll, trOOps. and a"umll,i. 

1;011, \\';thin fort),I;,e daIs, the) broke rOllru� rnnsmissions from o'erlooding, MOill 

uniU used a taler or 'wo of ammunition boxes. 
up inside. The Viet Cong WUlHcrcd by pla6ng mint's in 1 fees. 

Some armor leaders c\'en \\'('nl so far as 10 have the aews of lead 

vchicles \\'e:lf caT pillg' to reduce ear d.llnage when a mine was 

delOnaled. T:\nks SlIf\"jl'cci mille damage much better than M 1 1 3'5. 

To reduce mine damage to ;\1 1 1 3'5, "belly armor" kits arrived in 

)969. \Vhen this supplemental arlllor was applied to i\1 1 13's and 

Shcridans, it proteCled lhem from mine blast rupture. saved many 

l ives, and gave thc crew<; added confidence, 1}l1l it did not solve 

the mine prohlem. 

As carly a� 1966 tommandCf'i in lhe field began to :l<;k for belief 

devices to de:t! with the mine d,mgcr. They \\'ere in p<trlicular need 

of a mine deleClor Ihat nndcl he moulHed on a vehicle and that 

was capable of finding any tvpe of mine, metallic or nonmetallic. 

no mailer hoh' fUled. Finallv. in 1969. the U.S. Army, Vietnam, 

asked the Mohility Equipment Re�earch and Devclopment CelHer 

to pl"Ovidc a devi(-e thaI could dctctt 01' destroy low-den�ity mines 

on roads and that ("ould mo\'e faster than a mall carrying the portable mine detf!C101' then in use. The center's answer wa'i the expendable mine roller. a mechalli�m to be mounted on :md pushed 

in front of ;111 :\1 18 LrlnJ.. The roller was tested at Fan Belvoir, 

Virginia. and delivcred 10 Vietnam for com hat ('\'aillation in the 

fall of 1 969. 

Although the 1 1 th C'::I\·alry. which made the first tesi. felt 

slrongly that the device \\'ollid tie down a milch needed vehicle, 

it fitted one tank with Ihe roller and tested for O\'CI' cighty kilometers, but no mine'> were found. E\'entually the de\'ice was damaged when it wa'i taken into the jungle, for which it wa� nOI in· 

tended. The regiment �ot1duded that it was ulls:lli .. fanory, pri· 

marily becnu!>e of its twcnty·ton weight and maintcnance requiremetllS. Again in the fall of 1969 1he 1st Brigade, :lIh Infantry Division (i\lechani7cd) , ((",ted the roller in QU<lng Tri ne:lr the Dcmilitarized Zone, where il provcd umuitablc for the soh s:lndy soil 

of the region :lnd was cventually ruined by <I mine. The 4th In· 

fantry Division made the third test of the mine roller. which was 

mOllnted 011 a combat engineer vchicle in lieu of a lank, In an 

experiment the roUer dctOnated four mines :lnd the 4th Division 

requested more roJ1el">. Eventuallv twemy-se\'en were used in Vietnam. At the end of American p<lnicip..1.tion in the war. the mine 

roller had nOt heel! fully accepted, and there was still need for a 

mille destro)er that \\'ould allow rapid movement. 
• 

TA",,,-lHoUNTED lHINE ROLLER PREPARES TO CLEAR HICHWAY 19 
CHAPTER IV 

Combined Arms Operations 

Armored units fighting in Vietnam by eady 196i included one 

armored cavalry regiment, six mechanized in[antry baualions, four 

armored cavalry squadrons, IWO lank battalions, an air cavalry 

squadron, and five separate ground cavalry troops. By this lime it 

was apparent th;ll armored units of all types were proving [:IT 

more useful in comb:l( than had previollsly been thouglll possible. 

General Johnson, Army Chief of Staff. after disClissions of the lise 

o( armor with General \VCSlmoreland ill lhe summer of 1966, directed the Army swff to determine whether a pallcrn of armored 

operations involving both tanks and armored personnel canier� 

had begun to emerge in ViClIlam. The resulting staff study recommended an analysis by Ihe U.S. Army Combat Developments Com· 

mand for the purpose of suggesting modificaLions in unit organi. 

z:llion, equipmenl. training. and deployment. 

rhe MACOV Stlldy 

In August 1966 General Johnson approved plans for a sllIdy 

titled Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations in Vietnam 

(MACOV) under the direction of �lajor General Arthur L. West, 

Jr. Between January and l\larch 196i a group of over 100 American Army officers :lIld civilian :lIlalysts ex.amined ,he com hat record of armored and mechanized forces in Viemam, gathering and 

sllldying information gle:lIled from the baulefield. The group 

evaluated over 18,000 questionnaires, 2,000 reports, :lIld 83 accounts of combat in which battalions and larger units had participated. Its report did nOt subscribe to the opinion that Vietnamese jungles and swamps would swallow up armored vehicles. 

but concluded that habillial lise o{ armored vehicles against 

insurgents in jungles and swamps necessitated some changes in 

armor tactics. The group foulld that extensive usc had heen 

made of the annored personnel carrier t\f 1 1 3, modified with we;lpons and gunshields to become a tanklike fighting vehicle that was 

known as the ACAV-armored cavalry assault vehicle. The study 

group also found that more often Ihan nOi U.S. mechanized inrantry fought moumed. employing armored personnel carriers as 

assault vehicles LO close wilh and destroy the enemy. and IhaL 

mounted troops gellerally suffered fewer and less serious casualties 
in Vietnam were being used to maintain pressure against the 

enemy in conjunction with envelopment by airmobile infantry. 

Moreover, tanks and APC's frequcntly preceded rather Lhan followed dismoullled infalllry through the jungle. \\,here Lhey broke 

trail, destroyed antipersonnel mines. and disrupted enemy defenses. 

These findings revealed Lhill some depanures from armor doctrine 

had been laking place. 

The study group noted several of the special advantages armor 

possessed in area warfare. described enemy tactics against armor, 

and listed types of ,mnor missions. The group concludcd that while 

tank and mechanized infantry units were playing a significant role 

in Vietnam, cavalry units. hoth ground and air, were essential 

clements 10 the important business of finding. pursuing, and 

destroying the enemy. Among its imponam recommended changes 

for armored and mechanized units was that organi:r 

.. 

tion be stand· 

ardized for ftllure armored forces being sent to Vielllam. This 

recommendation followed the discovery that. because of extensive 

and undisciplined modification of tables of organi1.aJion and equipmem, no two armored units in Vietnam were organized alike. 

Believing it impossible for the Department of the Army to suppOrt 

stich a diverse force structure. the study group recommended that 

the Army strictly enforce conformity will1 modified Siandard tables 

of organization and equipment of units going to Vietnam. 

Major findings of the study were described in a training manual, 

a training film, and an air cavalry text; all were given worldwide 

Anny distribution. The air cavalry training text in panicular was 

used for several years by ail' cavalry units and provided a much 

needed rererence work to explain the air cavalry mission to ground 

commanders unfamiliar with the concepl. It was also useful in 

training troops scheduled to deploy with air cavalry units. 

The training m:Ulual's coverage was vcry broad, and when used 

correctly the manual was a "how to·' book for armored units in 

Vietnam. Considering thal lllost of the information had never been 

published in one book before. the lIlanual was a landmark. General 

,"Venmoreland wrOte the foreward and later commellled that the 

study had prompted him to ask for more armored and mechanized 

units in troop requests. The text discllssed impassable terrain and 

maps showed the areas that CQuid be traversed in the wet and dry 

seasons. (See Maps 2 (lmi J.) In addition, it described the enemy 

and the frustrating nature of area warfare. Various battle formalions and procedures such as herringbone. thunder run, and roadrunner were described in detail. The manual also discussed the 
mOllllled or dismOllnted, 

of a large area. 

when they were making a rapid 

search 

The impact of the study was something less than many hoped 

for. The findings were not surprising to amorcd troops who had 

served in ViCtn;lffi but were regarded with a jaundiced eye by 

others who had nOt scn'cd there. Some data collectOrs believed 

that they were called upon LO justify the existence of armor units 

already in Vietn;llll or scheduled LO go there, but most members of 

the slUdy group were able LO put their task into perspective. and 

nonc expressed the justification for the sllIdy so well as olle who 

said, "Although I did not doubt Ihe \';due of armor in Vietnam, I 

was, myself. ullable to recommend how much, of what lype, and 

where it could be deployed. It would take a study like �IACOV to 

provide a basis for these recommendations." 

The bulk and secllrit), c\assific:uion of the report prevented its 

w idespread dissemination. In seven thick volumes. the official swdy 

was classified secret and was supported hy six classified data supple· 

ments nearly as long as the repon ilSelf. Although its volume and 

classification were necessary. potential readers were overwhelmed. 

Only 300 copies were primed. and few remain in existence today. 

The public'llion of the unclassified training manual and film was 

an effon by the study group to gain wider circulation for the 

infonnation. 

At the U.s. Army Armor School and the Combat Developments 

Command Armor Agency at Fan Knox, changes in troop and 

equipment tables were enthusiastically endorsed, but doctrinal 

changes \\'el'e rejected. \Vhile the report was dearly intended only 

lO supplement worldwide armor doctrine, both the agency and the 

school argued that t he new concept� were not applicable to armor 

comhat ill other parr� of the world. ApP;1rently those engaged in 

formulating doctrine were less concerned with the study group's 

conclusions, which were ba�ed on several years of combat experi. 

ence in Vietnam, th:1I1 t hey were with hypothetical siwations in 

other parts of the world. 

The training establishment under the ComineTllal Army Com· 

mand (CONARC) \\';lS unwilling to accept the study group's 

obser\',uions 011 the unprecedented role of M 113's as assault vehicles 

in Vietnam. The command nOlcd that the term "tanklike" was 

misleading and thal adopting as doctrine the employment o( 

mounted infantry in a cavalry role was neither feasible nor desirable. Justification for its position seemed to be cOllched in comra· 

dictory terms. \Vhile the command agreed that more Vietnam· 
I Tt�KII.I"'GIIO;"'�� FOK�IATION i\SSU�n:D BY 30 SQUADRON. I lnl ARMOR.t:D 

CAVAI.K", Ot IU"G OJ'PKATtO'" CEDAR FALI.s. This forma/ion gaue vehicles 

best nlf·,'ound {i"t'/wlIler w/ten /he}' wCI"e ambushed itl (l res/ric/cd area. 

oricmed training and doctrine were needed by deploying units, it 

refused to heed those findings of the study thai wcrc most :I.lLUned 

to Ihe <lctllal combal sit ll<ltion in Victnam. The Continental Army 

Command decided to le:l\'c lhe matter to the intCrprClalion of 

local commanciel"'i, although thcse were the same commanden who 

had told the sUlcly group th<ll a rcvision of doctrine W<lS needed to 

reAect actual com hat experience in Viclll<llU. 

The COIlT11;lIIci also rejected lhe repon's recommendation that 

the psychological effect of armored and mechanized units upon thc 

enemy be exploited, stating thai any further study of this malleI' 

would prob;d)ly be superfluous. The implication was that the 

psychological adv:ll1Iage was not that great in the first place. "The 

Vielllamese people," stated the Continental Army Command, 

"know too well of the French Armored Mechanized Units' defeat 

aL the hands of the Viet Minh and the destruction that can be 

inAicted on a tTacked vehide by one Viet Cong Wilh a small amount 
,.

-. / ..

 --.. '

, //' , \ I I \ \ I I } I 

- --

\ \ / / 

"., .. \. �-..\ 

\ 

... -' / ,. - --.. 

// / ..

 - -.. '\ 8%\":( / ..

 - -.. ' / '\ 

I '-

- - .. ( , \ II '·W "" . \ .1 'J \:. \1 �/ ,' A� II 

\ \ ' I \ " ..

 1/ 

\ ..

 -1 ., .. � , / \ " �, I I \.

 �_ ./ / 

'-..

 _ .. 

"'-- ,/'I ..

 -- /' I I � _--' 

Diagram 6. Clover lear search technique used by annorcd cavalry troops. 
the command, the shock effect of armor, whether cOllcrete or 

psychological. no longer exi:.ted, at least not in the Glse of the Viet 

Cong or the Nonh Vietname:.e Army. 

The Army's equipnlellt developer, the Army ;\1;lIerial Command, and the doctrine agency. the Combat Del'elopmcnls Command, both commentcd all the report. The Army ;\Iaterial Command endohed the majority of the swdy group's cquipmelll 

recommendations Iml out of necessity qualified the approval with 

cost and time factors: it frequently noted feasibility blll implied 

impraClic;llity. TIle Combat Dcvelopments COInmalHi con(;lucicd 

that, with few exceptions, the recommendaLions should he carried 

Olll for Vietnam. and that ccrtain of them \\'ere applicable LO thc 

Army worldwide. 

The Combat lJc\'clopmcllls Command forwarded to the Department of the Army a strong endohemclll of the swel)' group's 

suggestion that inc:rcased emphasi:. be placed on the lise of armorcd 

forces in \\'arfare such as that ill Vietnam. While the Army staff 

apprO\'ed many speci fic recommendations, it did not agree that 

increased usc of armored units in Vietnam was either necessary 

or desirable. In :.pite of the sllldy group's observations 011 the uscfulness of the ;\1113 as an armored aSS:lult \ ehkle. tile Ann}' staff 

considered the reslIhs of such employment could only lead to a 

pyrrhic vinory at be:'l: "To modify and employ this means of 

transportation as an armored assault vehicle," it noted, "against 

an enemy who is daily improving the lethality and effectiveness of 

his :mnamelll not only decreases the capabilities for which the 

vehicle was originally designed, but can reslIlt in unnecessary 

friendly casualties." This position was LOtally inconsistent with the 

re<ll world �ituatiOIl ill 1967 in which U.S. and Somh Vietnamese 

;mnorcd forces \\'ere habitually and effectively employing their 

APC's and ACAV's as assault vehicles with great success. 

One other circulllstance worked against widespread acceptallce 

of lhe rcconHnend:llions: As the sllldy group wa� preparing to leave 

for Vietnam in November 1 966, Defense Secretary ;\IcNamara 

imposed an :Ihsolutc troop ceiling on U.S. forces in Vielllatll. This 

arbitrary ceiling lI'a:. well below the total numiJer already in the 

proposed troop program of the U.S. ;\filitary Assistance Command, 

Vietnam, and the United States .\rmy, Vietnam. III other \\'ords, 

if more armored forces were wanted, other units had to be given 

lip in order to get them. The situation was complic;tted by the 

fact thal recommendations of an earlier Sllld)'

, Army Comuat Operations in Vietnam, completed in 1 966. had not yet becn acted 
in Vicllmlll in the 1>iUliC detail :h the armor study deal! "illl armor 

problems: they also rC{luired tr:ldc·om., most of whidl h:.d nOI yet 

been decided IIpon. 

The :mnor slUdy group :tpplicd i tself to this prohlem in :, 

str:liglu forward wa\' hy ilKorpOrating the infalllry ';ludy recommendations and slimming lip the cumulative elTel'l of hoth swclies. 

The group then sclcclcd \OI11C 4,000 troop spaces in the propo�ed 

force for the U.S. i\/ililary A, .. iSl<lIlCC Command, Vicltlam. Ihal 

could be tr;ldcd to carry nUl the combined rcnllnmcndal ions of 

both swdies. Since rhe SP'KC� came largely from comhat suppon 

troops, the logi�lics and administrative community vehemelltly 

denounced the trade·ofr. thereby heightening the opposition to the 

swdy group's recomlllendations. 

The armor swdy rai�ed again all the hisLOric arp;ulllems for and 

against the lise of armored forces in Vietnam. It provided a docu· 

memed basis for diSCll.'>sion am\, in facl. influenced the training 

and employment of m:lIly armored units. The DClxlfIlllelll of the 

Army stibsequelllly approved org:mi7.atiollal and equipment 

changes incorporating "Dille of the recommendations. The armored 

cavalry assauh vehide. for example. i .. in the .\rmy today. :md 

fighting mounted from armored \'ehicles is an accepted pranice. 

Vietn:nll rel:lted tr;tilling at the Armor School w:tS incre:t<;ed from 

twO to twenly hOllh in mid-1967. ahhough academic dep:trtmcllI 

heads exprc<;scd COllecn1 Ihal the Army would overemphasize VietIliUll ,u the expense of convcnlional armor employment. This attitude was in striking (Ol1lrast to that of junior officer .. and sl\ldent� 

who knew they were dC�lined for duty in Vietn:tm. 

Armored units scheduled for Vietnam used the ;mnor study 

group's training 1ll:lIlual as a guidc. but topics \\'crc diflicult 10 

obtain: many armor oHicers ne\'er s,m' il. Only a few years bier. 

lInilS ;lIld service schools were harel plU 10 find Ihe copies they had 

received.l Perhaps the mOSl dfeni\'e disseminalion of lhe .. tndy 

findings came through the efrOrts of the group members. some of 

whom wrOle sel'\'ice .. ehool lesson plans. contribtlted article .. to 

periodicals, and made eh;lIlges in lInils in which Ihc)' �cl'\'ed. All 

in all, lhe armor study accelerated change<> in thc t henn- of using 

armored forces ,hal would he lesled and validated by the battles or 

lhe Tel oITensi\e of 1968. 

t 111 t!)7� neither the ,\l1nor Agency nor the .-\rnlC>r School :1.1 ,,'ort Knos h�d � 

COP) of the stud) relKln �ntl on!) a {c,,' copies ol lhe manual could be found. 
Early comh:1I oper:lliolls in 196i that were observed, recorded, 

and anal"'ed by General \Vesl's study group relleeled ;t definite 

change in 'Hralegy for American and other free world forces in 

ViclIlam, Uillil late 1966 General Weslmoreland had employed 

"fire brigade laetics," reacting to enemy iniliali\'cs ",ilh his limited 

troop resuLlrce�. By 1967 the buildup of U.S. forces permitted him 

some flexibility, ;Hld increases in taClical mobility improved lhe 

effeCli\'cnc�� of the reaction forc.;cs. Thus, in 1967 the mission of 

Amcrican :H1d other frec world units changcd to (lne of offcmive 

<lclioll :lgainst the main force enemy units. Smuh Vielllamese forces 

wcre 10 be employed !lrim:n'ily ill pacification. The initiative was 

p<lssing to the free world forces. 

In the III Corps Tactical Zone the first deliber;lIely pJ:mncd 

mult idivisioll operation, C�'I)AR F,\LLS, was begun by II Field Force, 

Vielllam. The largel W:IS an extensive enemy base and logistical 

cemer that became of its geographical shape and slrong defense 

was known as the Iron Triangle. (Ma/l 8) This he,l\'ily jungled 

areOl, I",ellly·five kilometers north of SOIigon, was OIn imponam 

center for the launching of enemy guerrillOi OIml tcrrorist operations; it was frequently referred 10 as "01 dagger poimed at SOIigon." 

The plOiIi was to seal the OIrea. split it in half. thoroughly search iI, 

OInd destroy all base camps OInd enemy forces. 

The Iron Trianglc WOlS sealed by L'.S. armored and airmobile 

units. The 2d B,nlOllion. 22d Infantry (:\Iechanized) ; 1st Hattal· 

ion, 5th Infantry (�Iechanizcd) ; 2d Battalion, 34th Armor. and 

Troop n. 3d Squitdron, 'lIh CavOIlr}', established blocking positions 

west of the Saigon River; the 1st Squadron, 4th C:lv .. lry. E Troop, 

1 7th Clvalry, and Company 0, 16th Armor, were employed cast of 

the Thi Tinh River. I laving moved to OIn assembly area the do!}' 

before. the 1 1 th Armored Cavalry, less ils lSI Squadron, attacked 

\\lest from Ben Cat on 9 JamlOiry to divide thc area in two. 

Throughout the operation. units combed the Iron Triangle, un· 

covering ha�e ramps. food, equipment, and ammllnition. Figluing 

was light and generally limited to scattcred encounters with 

platoon·size or smaller groups. The vOiluc of CEDAR FALLS does not 

lie in the Humher of enemy (;aSllOll ties it produced but in the 

500,000 pages of enemy documents it cOlptured. These exposed the 

command structure and haltle plans of the entire Viet Cong and 

North Vielllamese Army hierarchy. General SeOiman described the 

operation as the largest intelligence breOikthrough in the war. 

Tracked vehicles, which had little difficulty in trOlversing the 

terrain, were assisted in the search by bulldozers. A IOIsk force of 
, 

� 

\ 

'

",-

�APB8eJf 

MAP 8 

I I AREA 

An Loe 
EXPANDING U. S. OPERATIONS 

1967 

V Banle 

War Zone C 

Iron Triangle 

G\'-'" , " " 30 MILES 

I I I I 

, , 

, " " 30 KILOMETERS 

, 

I 

..

.. ,./8 Va Oat 

11 FFV 

I 

4>"'/ 

I 

I 

::t _ ��..

L..

' Chua Cham ,,/ 

� 

Qt , Gia Ray 

Long xx uan Lvc � 

L-<>/.Blackhorse 

KrTTY H.\WI( �A inhY9 /-"'u " 

OPERATIONAL AREA 

SOUTH 

CHINA 

SEA 
I\'fl13's AND M48A� TANKS D�:pI.O\' nt:1'WEEN JUNGLE AND RunnER PLANTATION IN OI'ERATIO:"l CWAR FALl..'> 

fifly-foUT bulldozers with four Rome plows and some l<lnks with 

dozer blades cleared more [han nine square miles of jungle, and 

frcqllcmiy led :mnorcd columns. In an interesting inl1ovation, the 

2d Ballalion. 34th ArTllor, used (;Ink-mOlllHed searchlights to detcct 

Viet Cong night mo\'cmcms along Ihe Saigon River. Several SIICcessful night ambushes were conducted by directing lilnk fire 

against the enemy river T rallle. 

The wisdom of the 19GG decision LO increase the number of 

mechanized infaml'y IXlltalions from twO LO six was allcstcd to by 

Brigadier Ceneral Rich:1rd T. Knowles, Com manding Ceneral. 

196th Light Infantry Brigade, in a SlalemelH concerning the role of 

Illcch:mizcd infalllry in Ct:IMR fALLS, 

i\lechani1;ed infantf)' has pl'o\'en to be highly successful in scarch :md 

destroy operations, With their capability for rapid reaction and firepower, a mechanical batlalion can effecli,'e1y control twice as milch 

terrain as an infamry baualion. Rapid penetrations into VC: areas to 

secure LZs for ;Iirmobile units pl'O\'ide an added security measure for 

aircraft as \\'cll as personncl when introducing unitS into the combat 

zone, The constal1l mo\'cmCIH of mechanized units back and forth 

through an arca keeps the VC 1ll00'ing and creates targets fol' friendly 

ambushes, artillery and air. 
clearly confirmed Ihe soundness of [he units organizalion. The 

regiment:!l commander.. Coloncl \Villialll W. Cobb, reported thai 

the first rapid maneuver inlO lhe :1I'ca and its accomplishment of 

search and destroy, screening, blocking, and security missions 

demOnstr.lled the flexibility of his IIni t. He further stated: 

The search :!nd destroy ponion of Operation C.:oAR FALU was the final 

combat test of [he modified TOE de�igned to !:lilor [he regiment's organization to the requirements of [he counterinsurgency operalions in 

Vietnam. The search and dcslI'o)' operations, plus the allied salUTation 

and sniper p:ltl'ols. and tunnel �carcl\ opcl'alions pl'Oved the validity of 

the �ITOE. There proved [0 be sufficielll personnel in [he basic maneu· 

vcr clemenl-[he Armored Cava!!'Y Platoon-to :dlO\\' for required dis· 

mounted tunnel and pall'Oliing operations while maintaining sufficient 

crew members on the ACAV's to maintain the platoon's mounted com· 

bat cap.1bilities. 

'Vhen Operation CEIMR FALLS ended on 25 January 1967. 

armored forces of II Fidd Force. ViClI1:Hn. werc commilled to 

Operation J UNcnON CITY, the large:>[ operation of the war to that 

date. JUNCl'ION CITY W;lS designed 10 disrupt the Viet Cong Central 

Office for South Vietn;un (COSVN) . destroy Viet Cong and North 

Vietnamese forces. and clear the \Var Zone C base areas in northern 

Tay Ninh I)rovince, eighty·five kilometers nonhwcst of Saigon. 

During the I Inee·phase operat ion. armored units served in road 

security and se:lrch lind clear operiuions :md aCled as convoy 

escorts and reaction forces. 

Phase I. 22 February_1 7 March, consisted of establishing a 

horseshoe blocking position in nonhwestcrn \Var Zone C, then 

attacking into the open end of the horseshoc IOwaI'd the U end of 

the posilion. From Fire SuppOrt Base I at 0600 on 22 February, a 

1st Squ;lcJron. 'l Ih Cavalry. task force began a twenty·kilometer 

move north 011 Provincial Route 4: its mission was to reinforce 

quickly the airborne and airmobile assault clemcnts at the north 

end of the horseshoe. To send the cavalry along an uncleared route 

was a calculated risk, prompted by Ihe hope that the enemy would 

nOt employ mines on one of his few panially paved supply ralites. 

The gamble worked. The 1st Squadron raced unimpeded to reinforcing posi lions sOllth of KalUm, and the landings went without 

incident. As lhe cavalry moved north, the 2d Battalion, 2d In fa ntry 

(Mechanized) . followed with artillery and engineering units to 

establish Fire Support Bases II lind III. 

At dawn on 23 Febmary, the 2d Brigade. 25th Infantry Division, and the II th Armored Cavalry Regiment began sweeping 
fighting :15 the armored units found base camps, hospitals. bunker 

systems, and small groups of ViCl Congo :\ Iint"s and booby traps 

slo\\'cd lhe :'Ittack, and in the center of the horseshoe dense jungle 

made movement difficult. After reaching the northern limit of 

"ell'allee, the 1 1 th Armored Cavalry Regiment pi\'olcd and swept 

west with the other forces. Spor:tdic fighting continued. 

For armored ullits, Ju:-.:cnoN err" was a lask force operation. 

Combined arms operations at ballaiion and squadron level WCfe 

normal, and mobility lI'as stressed. Armored lask forces with attached clements of infantry. artillery. lank, and cavalry roamed 

through the operational area. I nfantry rode on the tracked vehicles 

and wenl into action as tank·infantry teams. 

Allhough enemy resistance gradually stiffened throughoul the 

area, Ihe armored task forces fin:tlly drell" Out the elusive Viet Cong 

on the periphery of the operation. The mobile blocking forces 

were illlerfering with Viet Cong supply operations, and the elwmy 

fought back. The resistance was panicularly e"idelll along Routes 

4 and 13 <IS the enemy shifted eastward to <lvoid the JUSCTION CIT\' 

attacks. In this area three :Irmored baules wok place. each illus· 

traLing a differelll I)'pe of combined arllls actioll. The firs\, at Prek 

Klok II, stressed firepower: the second, al Ban Bang, demollst .. ued 

mobility and staying pOII"er: and the third, at Suoi Tre, emphasized 

mobility and shock action. 

\Vhile mines were 1I0l encollntered in the fiht IhrllSl nOl"lh on 

Provincial Route 4, as operations progressed the enemy began to 

mine the road, hoping to Cut the American force's primary resllpply 

rOil Ie. From random sniping :lIld mining the enemy wen I to mortar 

attacks and night probes of fire bases. On the evening of 10 i\1:lrch, 

Fire Suppon Base I I OIl Prek Klok I I lI'as defended by Lieutenant 

Colonel Ed"':1I"(1 .J. Collins·s 2c1 Ballalion, 2d Infantry (i\lccha. 

nized) , II'hich was minus ils Company B. some engineer troops, and 

two batteries of 10:;·mm. artillery. The base straddled an airfield 

Ihat the engineers were cOllstrucling. Tracked vehides were placed 

around the perimeter at 50·meter intervals, and artillerymen, 

engineers, and infantrymen manned foxholes between the APC's. 

About 2030 a listening post sighted three Viet Cong :lIId immed· 

iately pulled bad. into the perimeter; the base II·elll to ;5 percent 

alert SlaWS. An unearthl}' silence fell. Some thin}' minutes laler it 

was broken by the dull thump of enemy mortars firing. In a maller 

of seconds the entire area erupted with explosions as the enemy 

poured over 200 rounds of monar and recoilless rifle fire into the 

base. When the barrage ended, Colonel Collins ordered thc de· 
mCtcrs bcyond the perimeter.� 

When thc U.S. machinc guns fell silcnt at 2220, thc cncmy 

launched a tWQ·b;ul:llion ground attack from thc cas!. Thc first 

wa"e of the assault came within hand grcnadc rangc, and the 

perimeter was ctl\'eloped in fire as Ihe ddenders answcrcd with 

"chiclc-mOtllHed and ground machine guns, small arms, and anil· 

Icry firc. Intcnse Vict Cong alllitank fire, rockct propelled grenades 

and recoilless rifles. was directed against the APC's. Although the 

"ehiclcs wcrc positioncd behind iI low berm, IInee were struck by 

rocket grenades and one received a direct hit from a monar round. 

To suPPOrt the main attack, smaller enemy forays were launched 

from the nonheast and southeast. Trip flares and listening posts 

had been set out about fifty meters in those areas. According to 

SpecialiSl 4 Thomas L .. rk. when the listening posts \\'crc brought in 

after the mortar :lllack. "\Vc opened up Oil thc ve when thcy hit 

our trip flares and after IIlat we nC\'cr h:td :111)' trouble with the 

VC gelling close to our perimeter." A se('ond;try ;lI liKk was also 

launched frolll the sOnth\\'esl. hilt here the enemy had 10 cross 500 

meters of open ground. Amid explosions of recoilless rifle rounds, 

the defenders held their posidons, pouring 11\:t( hine gun and small 

arms firc into lhe attackers. This sccondary alt<lck never gained 

momentum, althongh heavy enemy fire condnued from lhe woodcd 

area beyond the clearing. Supported hy :lir strikes, artillery, and 

machine gun fire from " Spooky" (a C-4i airnaft with multi-barrel 

machine guns) , the defender!> repclled the brunt of the allack by 

2300. 

The battle of Prck Klok 11 \\'as ol1e·�ided. for the enemy lost 

almost 200 men while the defendcrs lost three. The encmy had 

hoped to achieve a quick victory 10 bolsler his sagging fortunes. 

Instead, :1 combincd :mns tC:tlll of anillel'Ylllcli. mechanized infantrymen and :lil'Cl':l fl, using selcctive fircpO\\'el' and properly 

prepared defensive positions, had dealt him a severc defeat. 

As ju:,\,cTlo;.< ern' continucd into Phasc II. the cnemy lost 

enormollS amounts of supplics and was denied use of his vital 

communic:ttions centers. In an :tltem])t 10 ease Ihe pressure, the 

Viel Cong launched a dc�pcrate :lIt:lck on 19 and 20 1\la1'ch against 

a fire base protected hy the cavalry. The base, sixty kilometers 

north o( Saigon ncar Ap Batt Bang on QL-13, was in flat country 

� A reconnaissance bl' fire. or "mad milllHC" was used to disrupt cuem}' aelion. 

All wcapons fired :n ma:o\irnurn ratc dircct!) OUt of a peTirncter on :til sides Ulltit 

gil'r!1I :1 ceaS(!·fire order. , he \otUIllC QI firc and sound from an armored Ullil was 

OI. .. CSOUIe. and usuaJl)' disoour.lgeU furlhcr cnem)' actil'it)'. 
• 

• 

• 

Com bOI OU�SI 3 

8 Tr�op 

Relief �o ci 

, 

, 

, 

I 

, 

, 

I 

, 

, 

\ 

Vc 

Diversionary AttacK 

• • 

• 

• • 

• • 

• • 

• • 

• L 

, 

• • 

• • • • 

• 

• • 

• 

• • 

� 

• • 

• 

• 

• • 

• • 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

p 

S " 

\ 

• 

• • 

, 

VC Main Attack 1 

, 

, 

• • • • • -

• .. ..

 L • 

• • • 

• • • 

• • 

•• 

• • 

• • 

, 

, 

, 

, 

• • ••• Ap Bau Bang 

AP BAU BANG II 

19-20 March 1967 

nOI 10 IClle 

• 

• • • 

.. .. .. iI. 

.. : .. .. - _ .. 

" , 

C'Troop 

MAP 9 
to the south. (Mill) 9) It was protected by Troop A, 3d Squadron, 

5th Cwalry Regiment, and contained Hallery B. jth Battalion, 9th 

Anillcry (lOj-mm.) . One platoon from the troop occupied Combat 

OutPOSt 3, approximately 2,800 meters north. Troop B of the 3d 

Squadron was located to the nonh, and Troop C and the headquaners troop were protecting the squadron command pOSl to the 

south. 

At 2300 the northe:!st section of the lire suppon base was raked 

by lire from an cncmy machine gUll, but thc gun was quickly 

silenced by reLU1'Il lire from tanks and 'lnllored cavalry assault 

vehicles. Shonly after midnight the basc callle under he:I\')' fire 

frOIll rocket grenades. Ilionars, and recoilless rifles, followed by a 

massed ground assault. �Iain altacks from the sOlllhweSl and sOlllhcast were supponed by a diversionary aHack from the nonheast. 

Troop A defenders at first held their own but requested that a 

ready reserve force be designated for lise if needed. The 1st Platoon 

of Troop H, to the nonh. and the 3rd Platoon of Troop C, in the 

south, were alened to assist. 

The baltIc i ntensified as enemy 1I'00pS reached the vehicles on 

the southwest ponion of the perimeter, Lan \\'ith the help of more 

than 2,500 rounds of sustained anillery lire from all calibers of 

weapons the cavalry held. At lime:. enemy soldiers were blasted off 

AC.-\V·s by 90·mm. canister fire fl'OlI1 nearby tanks. \Vhen the tanks 

ran OUt of canister, they fired high explo:.i\'e rounds set 011 delayed 

fuses into the ground in front of thc encmy. The result was a 

ricochet round that cxploded overhe:ld :lIld showcred rragments 

over the enemy units - a very effective weapon. Several defending 

vehicles were hit and destroyed by rocket grenade fire, and lhe g:lps 

created in the line finally forced the troop to rail back to lighten its 

perimeter. 

At 0 1 15 lhe squadron commander, Lielilenalll Colonel Sidney S. 

Haslard, gave Troop A permission to move its 2d lliatoon from 

Combat OlitPOSt 3 to the fire base, and ordered Troops H and C 

into action. The 2d Platoon had to attack the enemy in order to 

gel throlls"h to the defenders. When the 3d Platoon of Troop C 

arrived, the Troop A commander directed that it sweep sOllth of the 

perimeter along Ihe tree line. COlllillllally firing its weapons. the 

platoon swept the :,ollthwCSI side of the fire base, then doubled back 

and entered the defensi\'e line from the southeast. At the same time, 

while en route to the base at thirty miles an hour, the 1st Platoon of 

Troop B literally ran over a hastily set ambush. JUSt a� the pia loon 

arrived, the enemy launched another attack. The Troop A com-
the outside of the hase with headlights and searchlights flashing and 

weapons firing. the platoon (I"u�hcd the aHack. 

The enemy's next attack, at 0300 from the south, was c,,�ily 

repelled by the rive cavalry platoons in the b .. sc and air support 

that eventually tOialcd cigluy.scvcn sonie.� through the night. 

Troop A then conduCled a series of couTHcrallacks, clearing ;m 

area 800 meier:. dccp around the perimeter and reducing the enemy 

lire. Al 0500 under illumination from flares and scarchlighl�, the 

enemy could be secn massing for ;II1Olher auack from the SOLIth and 

southeast. Tactical aircraft and artillery were quickly employed and 

the al{;lck never gained momcmum. Allhough sporadic cncmy fire 

camillucci, the six·hour b:.ttle ended, leaving over 200 enemy dcad 

on the baufield and three American soldiers killed. 

The success of the defense hinged on the mohility of the 

armored units, the heavy firepower-artillery and air supportand the tactics used. The ;mllored vehicles had not been dug in and 

were not fenced in with h'ire. Throughout the attacks. ACAV's 

and tanks continuously moved backward and forward, often for 

morc than twenly meters. to confuse enemy gunners and meet 

attacks head on. The movement :Idded to the shock effect of the 

vehicles, for nOlle of the enemy wallled to be run over. In addition. 

reinforcing platoons all canied extra ammunition on their vehicles 

and provided rcsuppy during the battle. 

The last major armored action in JU"Cl"Io:-" CITY occurred only 

a day after the AI

' gau B;lng fight, when the enemy launched an 

unpreccdellled d:tylighl a ll:lck :tgainst Fire Support Ihse Gold ncar 

Suoi Trc. The lire hase was occupied by the 3d Battalion, 22d 

Infantry (_) and the 2<1 Ballalion, 77th Artillery (-). The 2d 

Batt:diou, 12th Infantry, the 2d Battalion. 34th Armor, and the 2d 

Bau:tlion, 22d Infantry (�Iechallized) , were conducting search and 

destroy oper;'llions nearby. 

The 2d Battalion, !Hth Armor, commanded by LielLlen;1nt 

Colonel Raymond Stailey, mOl'ed north on 20 �Jarch. led by Company A. 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry. which had been sent 10 link up 

with the tanks. By niA'htfal1 the t\\'o battalions had joined and set 

up camp within two kilomcters of each othcr. Earl icr that aftcrnoon 

the Scout platooll of the mcchanized battalion had cleared a trail 

about 1 ,500 meters to the north but had bcen unable to locatc a 

ford ;1cross the Suoi S;1Ill:'t. Lieutenant Colonel Ralph \V . 

.

Julian, 

commander of the 2d Uallalion, 22d 1 11 fa ntry, decided that the next 

day his unil'i \\'ould move nOl"lh on the trail, then swing east to 

search for a ford across the upper rcaches of the stream. 
northeast of the tank battalions position, infantrymen and artillerymen were improving perimeter defenses at Fire Support Base Gold. 

The next morning at 0630, an ambush patrol from the 3d Battalion, 

22d Infantry, engaged a large force of Viet Cong moving toward 

the base and at the same lime the base came under heavy mortar 

attack. Over 600 rounds pounded the camp as waves of Viet Cong 

emerged from the jungle, firing recoilless rifles, rocket grenades, 

automatic weapons, and small arms. The ambush patrol was quick. 

ly overrun and was unable to return to the base. As the fighting 

grew more intense, {he armored units to the south were ordered 

across the Suoi Samat to reinforce the embattled fire base. Colonel 

Julian immediately moved part of Company C and an attached 

tank platoon north on the trail cleared earlier by the Scout platoon. 

While the remainder of the column closed, conditions worsened 

at the fire base. Colonel Marshall Garth, the brigade commander, 

said "If a vehicle throws a track, leave it. Let's get in there and 

relieve the force." Personnel carriers in the lead straddled each 

other's paths in order to clear a trail wide enough for tanks, while 

lead elements using compasses continued their search to the east in 

an attempt to find t.he Suoi Samat and a ford. 

At Fire Base Gold, counter fire was seeking Ol!t the enemy 

mortars that were pounding the defenders. The enemy concentrated against the east side of the perimeter until, at 0711, Company B reported that its 1st Platoon had been overrun. A reserve 

force of artillerymen helped to reestablish the perimeter, but fortyfive minutes later the enemy had again broken through the 1st 

Platoon. lVithin a few minutes, positions on the northeastern portion of the Company B perimeter were completely overrun by a 

human wave attack. Company A sent a force with desperately 

needed ammunition to assist Company B. Then, on the northern 

perimeter, the Viet Cong swarmed over a quadruple .50-caliber and 

attempted to turn it on the defenders, but the weapon was blown 

apart by the artillery. To make matters worse, Company A reported penetrations in portions of its northern perimeter. 

The urgency o[ the situation was again conveyed to Colonel 

Julian by Colonel Garth's order that the stream was to be crossed 

"even if you have to fill it up with your own vehicles and drive 

across them." Following instructions from a helicopter overhead, 

the armored column finally crossed the stream and moved tOward 

the fire base. To the nonn ... est the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, 

advancing on fOOl, had reached the defenders. From the air, Colonel 

Julian directed Lieutenant Colonel Joe Elliot, Commander of the 
mechanized forces \\CI(' ordered to enter just sOlllh of the 2d 

BaLlalion, 12th Infamry, and s\l·ing around the perimeter, consolidating the remainder. 

On the smokc-co\'cred baulcfield the reinforced defenders were 

still in desperate straits. Artillerymen were firing beehive rounds. 

steel flechcllcs released :Il Ihe muzzle of the weapon. When the 

supply of beehive was exhausted, Ihey switched to high-explosive 

direct fire at point-blank ranges. The ('astern sector of the perimeter 

had fallen b:lck under heavy pressure LO positions around the 

artillery pieces. The Viel Cong were within five meters of the 

baualion aid station and within hand grenade range of the command post. 

Into this ch;los came Ihe tanks and A PC's. crashing through the 

last few trees into the clearing. The noise was avenl'helming as the 

new arrivals opened LIp with more than 200 machine guns :lIld 90-

mill. wnk guns. The ground shook as tracked vchicles Illo"ed 

around the perimctcr throwing lip a wall of fire to their outside 

Rank. They cut through the advancing Viet Cong. crushing many 

o[ thelll under the tracks. The Viet Congo realizing that they could 

not outrun the encircling vehicles. charged them and allemptcd to 

climb abo.1I"d bill were quickly cut down. Even the wnk recovery 

vehicle of Company A. 2d Battalion. 3-1lh Armor. smashed through 

the tl"ees with iu m:lchine gun chaltering. Mosl of the crew. who 

were all mechanics. werc Ihrowing grenades. bUI one calm mech:lIlic 

sat serenely alOp the ,"chicle, his movie camera grinding awa)'. 

Relief was evidcnt in the faces of the defenders as tracked 

vehicles quickly tied in with the 2d Il:lltalion, 121h Inf:tntI"Y. "It 

was," exulted LicUlel1:l1ll Colonel John A. Bender. the fire base 

commander, "just like Ihe laIC show on TV, the U.S. Cavalry camc 

riding 10 Ihe res<.:ue." j\Ia�tel" Sergeant Andrew HutHer recalled, 

"They haven't made the word to describe what we thought when 

we saw those tanks and armored personnel carriers. Il was de-vine." 

\Vith victory almost II.ilhin grasp of the enemy, the tanks and 

APe's had turned the tide. When the smoke cleared, it was apparctll that the enemy had nOl only been defeated but had lost 

more than 600 men. 

jU1\'crtON CITY II ended on 15 April as the enemy faded away. 

Armored units played :1 major role in jUNcnoN CIT'- and proved 

thal in most areas of War Zone C. a cavalry squadl"Otl or mechanized infantry battalion could more effecti"ely control a large arca 

than any other type of L1nit. Although rallies over the difficult terrain had 10 be carefully selected, tracked units moved through most 
through seemingly impenetrable vegetalloll. The ability of 

armored forces to mo\'e rapidly and to arrive at the critical place 

with great firepower gave them a significant advillllage. 

Mech(lnizeci Opem/iollJ ill fhe Mekollg Delt(l 

The extensive rice paddies and mangTove SW:IIUpS of the canal· 

laced delta were vcry different from the jungled areas of Operation 

CEIlAK FALLS-JUNC1'ION Crn' in III Corps Tactical Zone. Bill in 

the delta, with fell' high elevations, 1\I I 1 3's could move as freely as 

rivcrs and major canals permilled. The 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry 

(�Iechanized) , and lhe 5th Ballalion, GOth Infantry (1\Icchanized) , 

of lhe U.S. 9th Infantry Division-two armored units employed 

in Ihis regioll-conducted successful combined American-Vietnam· 

ese operations throughout 1967. Typical missions included reconnaissance in force, route and convoy security, night roadrunner 

operations, cordon and search of villages, and rapid reinforcement. 

Flooded rice p,:lCldies slowed, but did 11m pre\·elll cross-country 

movement. Small canals up to three meters in width were crossed 

with balk bridgillg. In the case of larger canals and rivcrs, which 

were major obstacles because their banks were usually Sleep or 

composed of loose soil, bulldozers or explosives were used to construct elllry and exit routes. l\lechanized units quickly discovered 

thaL when track shrouds were removed 10 pre\'em the buildup of 

mud between track and hull the �1 1 1 3's swimming ability was 

impaired. Navy 1:lIlding craft were therefore required for trans· 

portation across major rivers and canals. Route recollnaiSS;lIlce by 

air W:IS ;Ilways important bUl was essential during the monsoon 

season. 

The delta's open, Icvel terrain permitted ground troops 10 en· 

gage with organic weapons at much greater range than that of the 

point-blank fighting normal in the jungle. One of the hardest bailies 

fought by mech;mizcd infantry in the delta occurred at the village 

of Ap Bac II on 2 May 1967. Ap Bac II was a base area for the 

514th Viet Cong Battalion. and the enemy pattern of movement 

between b;lsc areas had suggested the probability of the battalion's 

presence ncar Ap Bac l i on 2 l\lay. 

The origin:.! plan of the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, was 

to conduct an airmobile search and destroy operation with twO 

battalions of infantry. On 2 l\lay, however, when no hclicopters 

were available the insenion of a blocking force was deleted from 

the plan. MovemelH of two ballalions abreaSt withollt a blocking 

force in the rear was regarded by many as '"forcing tOOthp.lste 
Objective Queen 

2 Mav 1967 g--', nOI 10 , ... ,. 

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 -- 

Ap Sse 1/ 

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3-47� 

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from a tube," and there appeared little likclihood of a significant 

C I!COutHcr. Company C, [lIh Baualiol1, GOth Infalilry (l\lcchanizcd) , 

Ill;'lnned rhc Idr 'bnk under thc control of r,he 3d Battalion. GOth 

Illf;'llltl"Y, (Mill) /0) Fir:.t Licutenant Lany Garner'.� mech:mizcd 

compauy was givcn thc deeper ohjectivc Ix'causc its mobility would 

permit a quick :.c;trch of tile arca. It was hoped thal tracked 

" chicles could makc up for lack of a blocking force. 

By 0830 the l\Il [3's of Company C were :Id\'ancing north, 

crossing paddies surrounded by nano\\', eanhen dikes. l\lostly dry, 

the paddies easily supp0rlcd II-atks, bllt crossing rhe m,lIl)' canals 

;md streams provcd morc dillicuh. Company C found none of thc 

cnemy during itS northward :.\\'ccp: howe\'er. lO [hc elSl, Comp:lIly 

A, 3d Battalion, 4ith Il1f:lI1tl'\", encountcred stiff resisr;IIICC as it 

approached lhe Suoi Salt. Thc �teep banks of the Slfcalll wcre 

dotted h'ilh thatclled Ituts and lincd ",ith dcnse " egctat ion. A squad. 

maneuvcring ac.xvs-" thc :.trcam, was quickly pinned dm\'ll hy heavy 

automatic weapons fire. 'Vithin minutes all ,\'ItO had Cl'ossed the 
Infantry, moved in on the right of Company A, while Company n. 

3d Ballalion. 60111 infallll"Y, moved to block the nonhern escape 

route. At 1 300, with blocking forces in a reversed "C," Company C 

of the 5th Battalion and Company A of the 3d Battalion of the 60th 

Infantry were ordered east to fill the open end of the blocking 

positions. The cleven l\J 1 1 3's of Company C had lO maneuver 

through inundated areas that appeared impassable. Crossing twO 

fairly deep streams, the company chose roll tes that brought it 

abreast of Company A. 3d Battalion, 60th Infamry, 011 a 1 ,000· 

meter assault line by approximately 1530. Under cover of artillery 

and air bombardment, the companies crossed more irrigation 

dilches and by 1700 were poised for the attack. 

On order, artillery fire slOpped and the Wicked vehicles surged 

forward. while blocking units supponed by fire. The mechanized 

company moved rapidly across the open rice paddy, its machine 

gUlls searching out the enemy bunkers along the wood line. At the 

woods infalllrymen dismounted and attacked the enemy soldiers 

who had been pinned dO\\'Il by heavy fire. Although stunned by the 

shock of the aSs.1uit, the Viet Cong comillued to resist. and the 

infantry was forced to move among the bunkers destroying the 

enem}' with grenades. 

Company A. moving on fOOl to the right of Company C, met 

heavy resislance and finally stalled about 100 meters from the 

bunker line. The comp .. 1ny commander requested help from 

Company C, which responded by moving four i\fl I3's to aid the 

dismounted attack. Since darkness h:ld set in, further reinforcement 

was considered ilUpractkal and the LlnilS on hand had 10 finish the 

job. Additional fire support by the M 11:1's, a charge by Ihe al l:l(:k· 

ing comp;ulics, and he;lvy fire superiority finally broke the enemy's 

defense. The companies pre�serl the attack. forcing the Viet Cong 

from their bunkers and <lnnihil:lting t.hose \\'ho tried to esc;lpe. A 

sweep of die battle ilre<l early the next morning indiC:lled that the 

enemy had lost the equivalent of a reinforced company, Two U.S. 

soldiers had died. 

Colonel \Villiam B. Fulton. the brigade comm,lIlder, noted that 

the speed, shock efren. and heil\'\' firepower pro\'ided by the personnel carriers, along with supporting artillery, had ,,"cpt the enemy 

soldiers in their bunkers until the infant!"y \\'a5 l iterally on top of 

them. l .ieUienallt Colonel Edwin \V. Chamherlain, Jr .. commander 

of the 3d Batlaiion, 60th Infantry, stated that since the tracked 

vehicles pl"O\'ed capable of negotiating more terrain than had been 

thought possible. there should always be an initial attempt at 
TANKS AND ACAV's SF-CUlt.: SUI'r>L\' ROUTES IN 25TH INFANTlW DIVISION 

AREA. Slmdbags modify vellicles tor .secllrity role (IS mouablc /Jiflboxes. 

mounted movement in order to capitalize on the additional IIrepower of the vchiClIl:tr-mOlllllcd machine gUlls. 

Mechanized infantry units in the delta were extremely flexible 

and werc used alternately in mech:mized, ainnohilc, and dis· 

mounted infantry operations. First and foremost, however. they 

\\'cre mechanized inf;uHry, capilalizing on their ,'ehicular mobility 

to close with the cnCTny. then dismotinLing and assaulting. Slip' 

paned by a h:lsC of fire frolll the vchicles. This is eX;lctly what 

Company C had done. 

ROlile Secllrity "lid Convoy Escm"l 

The miSsions IIni,'crs;dly shared by armored units throughoul 

ViClIlam werc furnishing routc sccurity and con\'oy escort. Few 

tasks were more important than keeping the roads safc and prolccting the vchiclc,. mcn, and supplies that used thcm. At thc 

s,1.mc timc, no task was more dislikcd by armored soldiers. Whcn 

it was done cOHcel!Y it could be boring, tedious, and in thc minds 

of many, a "';ISIC of timc and armored \'chicles. \Vhen it was donc 

poorly, or whcll thc enemy was dClennincd 10 oppose il. il \\'as 

dangerolls, disorganized, and, again in the minds of many, ;1 oneway ridc to dis,1.stcr. 
roads, making them safe, and using them. Carrying OUt the oreler 

was a different prohlem in each area. In one instance in mid-1966 

the task became an intricate, large-scale operation that led to 

battles along Highway 13 and the :\Iinh Thanh Road involving 

the 1st Squadron, 4th Ca\'alry. In another siwation in the highlands, a significant part of tile 4th Infantry Division's armored 

forces-at firsl lhe bt Squadron, 10th Cavalry, and the 1st Battalion, 

69th AnnoI', and after September 1967 thc 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry 

--continuously secured roaels throughoul the division's area of 

operation in the II Corps Tactical ZOllC;1 In Ihe first three months 

of 1967, almost 8,000 vehicles iI month under armored protection 

traversed Highway 19 to Pleiku withoUI incident. 

The primar)' roUte security technique used in the highlands 

was to establish slrongpoints along Ihe road at critical locations, 

and each morning have a mounted unit sweep a designated portion 

of the rOUle. The unit then returned to the strongpoint \dlere it 

remained on alen, ready to deal with any enemy action in its sector. 

\Vhen forces were insufficient to man strongpoints lwenty-four 

hours a day, each cOllvoy using the road lI'as provided with an 

escon force, a me:ISllrc that caused heavy wcar 011 the .. rmored 

vehicles. Securing roads hy using static positions had the disadvantages thal the Viet Cong quickly noted them and rnincd all logical 

vehicle positions with the result that the protective force soon lost 

vehicles in the strongpoillls. "'hen the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 

was auached to the 4th Infantry Division, the division al).1.ndoned 

lhe strongpoint system in f:'I\'or of offensivc patrolling missions 

several thousand meters from main rOlltes, a tactic that made a 

much more effecti,'c l ise of :lrmor.4 

Sometimes thc sccurity :llld escort missions were given opcra· 

tional names and continucd for six months or morc. One such 

oper:uion, KIlTY HAWK in the III Corps Tactical Zone, required 

a cavalry squadron to secure the Blackhorse Base Camp al1(l the Gia 

Ray rock quarry, to c�con convo),s, and to conduct local reconnaissance in force. (See Mal) 8.) During 1967 the 3d Squadron, 5th 

3 The In Squadron. l0[h C�nlr�. which had arrile<! in Augu5[ 1966, would spend 

mOSI of iu fi,c'year effort in " iclnam I'CJk:liliollSi) 5«uring Ihe road nel in the 

I'lcilu 3rca. The 2t.1 nall3lion. 81h Inf3l11r), "'hidl was rnerhani/ed in 1967. occasion· 

31h shared lhis missioll. 

4 rhc 151 and 2d Squadron�. lSI Ca'3In. bolh arri\cd ill "111:"51 1%7 wilh [hc 

die ..

 1 I)(),,·ert.-d l\I ll�'\1. modified "'ilh AC.'\' kils. Since I\1C5<: Mpmdl'OlIS were n<!\cr 

rclic"cll o£ .hcir n:speC!;"e a.;signlllcnl.1 10 the lsi and 2d ,\,.mOfl"d I)i, isions. person· 

nd from these unils bec;wlc [hc til's[ ,lIId onl) arlllOl'cll erewmen since \Vorl.1 Waf II 

authorized to wear:m armored dhision cornl.l:tl pateh on the righl shoulder of their 

un [forms. 
alternated in this job. � Iissions slich as this were required throughOllt Vietnam because of COIiSIaIll enemy Ihreats. 

Occ.'lsionallY '1I1 escort or security mission was not successful, and 

lIsually intensive after :leI ian investigation revealed lhal the IInil 

had been careless. Such was the case with a platoon of Troop K, 

1 1 th Armored Cavalry Regiment, in i\lay 1967. When the smoke 

cleared from a well-planned Vict Cong ambush, the platoon had 

paid a he;lvy price: se\'en ACAV's had each been hit 10 times by 

antitank weapons and the lone lank had 14 hiLS. or forty-fouf men 

in lhe convoy, neonl), half were killed and the remainder wounded. 

I nveslit,'7llion revealed that the road had been cleared Ihal morning 

by a responsible unit, bUl the fact that an ambush was sel up I;lter 

proved that it was dangerous to assume Ihal one P:lSS along a road 

cleared it of enemy forces. In this case Ihere were fun her errors of 

omission. No planned platoon action was put inlO efrect when the 

enemy attacked; no command and control alternatives were provided in the event of a loss of radio communication; no signals or 

checks were in effect 10 alen troop headquarters to the platoon'S 

plight: no artillery or air suppOrt was planned for the route of 

march. The lesson from this disaster was thaI no mission should be 

considered routine, 

Disasters were uncommon to ro.1.d security missions, but milch 

could be learned from them. On one occasion the law of averages, 

troop turnover, and the horedom of a routine lask cauglll up with 

the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, while it was on road security. This 

inciclem in late Decemher 1967 illuSLnlles how overconfidence, poor 

planning, and lack of fire suppOrt could comhine 10 snip the 

cavalry of its inhere11l advantages. On 22 December the squadron 

was to assume responsibility for Operation KtTry I IAWK. Tile 

squadron staff prepared its plans for convoy escort, with t"onvoy� 

scheduled to move on 27 and 31 Decemher. At the last 1ll0mellI. 

the 3d Squadron's assumption of the Kln',- HAWK mission was 

delayed lImil 28 December and the 1 1 th Armored Cavalry Regi. 

ment performed the escort duty on 27 December. The two-day 

delay caused the stafr or the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry. to be Icss 

allcntive to the second com'oy escort mission on t he 31st. 

On 28 December the 3d Squadron moved into B1ackhorse Base 

Camp. and the next day the squadron operations officer was re· 

minded or the responsibility for the escort on 31 December. Mission 

requirements were discmsed o"er insecure telephone lines by the 

staffs of the scluadroll and the 9th Infantry Division, and were then 

passed to Troop C, which had the mission. The squadron daily staff 
mission and the squadron commander remained unaware of it. The 

Troop C cOllllmulder, familiar with the area, believed the seemr 10 

be relatively quiet, a fatal assumption because combat operations 

had not been conducted in the area for over thirty days. He 

planned a routine tactical road march to Vung Tau, sixty kilometers to the SOllth, to rendezl'ous with the convoy at 0900 on 31 

December. Two plilloon-size clements \\'ere to make the march 

while lhe troop commander remained at Blackhorse with the third 

platoon. ready to assist if needed. The platoons were to leave 

Blackhorse at 0330 on 31 December, moving south on Rome 2. 

One platoon was to SlOp along Route 2. abOlll a third o{ the way to 

Vung Tau. and spend the night running the road back to Blackhorse to prevent enemy interference on the route. The other platoon was to continue to Vllng Tau, pick up the convoy, and escort 

it to Blackhorse. The convoy would be rejoined en route by the 

platoon conducting roadnlnner operations. 

The column moved Out on time to meet the convoy. The lead 

platoon, commanded by the 2d 1)latoon leader, consisted of one 

tank from the 3d Platoon. two ACAV's from the 2d, and the troop 

command ,md maintenance vehicles employed as ACAV·s. The next 

platoon, commanded by the 3d Platoon leader, consisted or one 

tank from the 2d Platoon, two ACAV's from the 3d Platoon. twO 

from the 1st IJlatoon, and the lst Platoon's mortar carrier minus 

its monaI'. The t:lIlks, each leading a platoon, intermitlently used 

driving lights :lIld searchlights to illuminate and observe along the 

sides of the road. 

Abollt nine kilometers south of Blackhorse, Route 2 crested a 

slight rise, ran straight south for two kilometers, and then ('Tested 

another rise. The sides of the road had been cleared out to abOllt 

100 meters. As the le:ld tank started up the southernmost rise at 

0110, the last "chicle in the convoy, the mortar cal'l'ier, W:lS leveling 

off on the straight stretch twO kilometers behind. Suddenly a 

rocket propelled grenade round hit the lead tank, killing the driver 

and SlOpping the tank in the middle of the road. An ambush then 

erupted along the elltire two-kilometer stretch of road. A hail oC 

grenades quickly set the remaining "ehicles of the lead platoon 

afire; intense Slllall arms fire killed most of the Illen riding atOp the 

vehicles. As the u':liling platoon leader directed his platoon into a 

herringbone formalion, the mortar carrier was hit by a command 

detonated mine, exploding mortar ammunition and destroying the 

carrier. The tank with the last platoon was hit by a rocket grenade 

round, ran off the Toad, blew up, and burned. The surprise was so 
OH--6A OnS£R.VAT10� 1-I�:LlCOI'T£R ,\1\'0 Two AH-IG COBRAS EN ROUTE 

TO CONDUCT VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE NEAR PIIUOC Vnm 

complete that no organized fire was returned. \\Then individual 

vehicles al lcmplcd LO rCllIrn fire. the enemy, from positions in OJ 

deadfall some fir.cen meters off the road. concclllr;ned 011 that one 

vehicle until it slopped firing. Within tell minutes the fig-Ill was 

over. 

At daybreak all the last day of 1967, the devastating results of 

the ambush were apparclll in the ballcred and burned hulks that 

lay sC:lucred along the road. or cleven vehicles, four ACAV's ;1I1d 

one lank were destroyed, three ACAV's and one tank severely 

damaged. The twO platoons suffered 42 casualties: app:lrcntly none 

of the enemy was killed or wounded. This costly aclion showed 

what could happen 011 a routine mission in South Vietnam. indifference to unit integrity, breaches of communication security 

beforehand, lack of planned fire Slipport, and wide gaps between 

the vehicles Slacked the dcck in the cnemy's favor. Charged with 

guarding a convoy, the unit leader failed to appreciate his own 

unit's vulnerability. 

Elsewhere in the III Corps Tactical Zone other U.S. units wcre 

performing similiar route and COIl\'oy security missions. The 3d 

Squadron, 4th C .. valr)'. 25th Inf:llllry Division, opct>Jted almoSl 
rons air cavalry trOOp worked wiLil ii, providing first and Ian liglll 

Tcconnai!os.1llCe along main rolltes. By mid-1967 the squadron was 

esconing an average of 8,000 vehicles per month. In latc summer it 

began so-called night thruSl missions sending Olll mock convoy 

escons at night to (CSt the enemy reaclion. After a month-long test 

without significant enemy action, the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 

began esconing night. iogislic.1i convoys from Saigon to Tar Ninh, 

a mission th:ll cOlltinued Linaugh 1967. 

Ail' C(/V(I{ry OJJeraliolls 

As a necessary complement LO grollnd armored forces. alT 

cavalry units brouglll a new dimension to the Vietnam conflicl. The 

first air cavalry unit, the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry 

Division, exploited the concept ;"Ind l iterally wrote the book on air 

cavalry opeutions. Few other air cavalry units, panicularly those 

with divisional cavalry squadrons, were assigned air cavalry roles at 

first; instead, they were used to escon airmobile operations-like 

armed helicopter companies. Aftcr the armor study and the assignment of more expericllced and innO\'ative commanders, air cavalry 

troops finally began to operate in air cavalry missions.� Quite often, 

however, rotation of commalHlers, particularly senior commanders, 

required that lessons be relearned time and again. There was thus 

a continuing discussion on the proper role and the command of air 

cavalry units. 

In units that properly lIsed air cavalry, operations followed a 

d:lily pattern. Upon receipt of information indicating enemy activo 

ity, an air reconnaiss;"Ince was conducted by the troop to determine 

whether or not fun her exploiwtion by ground forces W;"IS required. 

If ground reconnaissance II';"IS desirable, the troop commander 

lIsually commit ted his aerorifle platoon. A standby reservc forcc 

could be called by the troop commander if the situ:ltion required. 

The air cav;"llry trOOp cOllllll;"lnder controlled all reaction forces 

until more than one company from a supporting unit was committed. At that lime conlrol passed 10 the commander responsible 

for the nrea, and the operation was conducted like a typical ground 

or airmobile engagement, oftell with the air cavalry remaining in 

suppon. Major Gelleral John J. Tolson, Commander, 1st Cavalry 

5 The air c:.I":lIr)' HOOp of Ihe 3d Squadron, 41h C.a\'alrr. experienced difficult, on 

arrh:ll in 196, when Ihe 2:'/1, I)ili�ion Aliation Battalion tried to hale it ronl<:rted 

to <In alialion gUll$hip unit in the ,"ialion Battalion. The rolllenion " 

.. u finalh 

rejected. hUI Ihe air c:.n1r) uJed al ialion rompan, lactics muil Scptcml)er t967, 

when it assumt'(l nonnal J(OUI oper.uions :tnd cmployed low·ltld n"jng lechnil:ples. 
emphasize how valuable Ihis unil [ 1st Squadron, 9th C1.valry] has 

been 10 me as division commander. Q,'cr 50 percent of Ollf major 

contacts ha\Ie been initialed by ;lClions of this squadron." 

To be successful, air cavalry operations had to be swiftly fol· 

lowed by ground or airmobile clements of the division or regiment. 

Unfortunately in many units with air cavalry, reponed lCilcls were 

frequcnLly not followed up. Consequclllly, many air cavalry units 

adopted the unofficial praClicc of developing leads lhal could be 

handled by the air eav:!lr), itself. 

In October 1967 tWO air cavalry squadrons. the 3d and 71h 

Squadrons, 17th Cavalry, al'l'ived. Because Lhey were the first units 

of their type to be assigned LO U.S. infantry divisions in Vietnam, 

their integration illio the force was accomplished with some dimcuhy. Most problems reflected a lack of knowledge on the part of 

the division commander and staff concerning capabilities, limitations, and basic sUPI>Ort needs of air cavalry squadrons. There was 

an unfortunate tendency 10 use the aircraft for command and conlrol and for transportation in airmobile operations rather than 

for reconnaissance. At the OUlSet, therefore, air ca"alry was nOt 

lISed to best advantage. and there was some misuse. Only after commanders became more aware of the capabilities of their air cavalry 

squadrons was proper employmcnt achieved, and in somc cases the 

process was slow and painfu1.' 

Oilier Free World Armor 

As early as April 1965, disclissions had been held on the deployment to Vietnam of armored units from other nations. Surprisiugly. 

the impetus for such disClission came from Ambassador [l.laxwell 

Taylor, and cemered on the proposed use of a tank company from 

New Zealand. Al lhe Honolulu Conference in April 1965 this proposal was disapproved, hut by September when the Australian task 

force arrived an ;mnorcd personnel carrier troop was included. 

Equivalem lo a reinforced American platoon, the troop was quickly 

put to work with the U.S. 173d Airborne Brigade. In October free 

world armor strength increased when the Republic of the Philippines sent a security force of seventeen APC-s and twO [1.14 1 tanks. 

The Royal Thai Army forces that arrived in Vietnam in 1967 

brought \,'ilh them an [1.1 1 13 platoon and a cavalry reconnaiSS.'lnce 

'Air caull)' lIe\l:lol,mcnt and emplo)'ment is full)' trealed in a companion monograph of the Vietmlm Studi,"

 Airmobili'>'. 1961_19il. hl' Lieutenant Gencr.l1 John J. 

Tobon. Although air ca'"alr)" is 3 component of mounred warfare, spue limitations 

pre,enl the derailed trCalment of it here. 
TROOPS OF 1ST AUSTRALIAN ARMOR REGIMENT IN FRONT OF AUSTRAUAN 

CENTURIO� TANK receive bricfi"g fl/ flu1lg Tau. 

troop. By 1969 this forcc had been increased to three cavalry troops 

and a LOla I of over G60 armor soldiers. The Koreans asked permission 10 deploy a t:lI1k ballalion, but Ibc request was disapproved 

in midsummer 1965 on the gTounds lhat the area was inappropriatc 

for tanks. L.1Ier, Korean and American Iilnk·infalllry operations in 

the area enabled lhe Korcans to acquire APC's on permanent 1001.n 

from the United Slates, and these \\'ere employed as ACAV's. 

Finally, in 1965. the Australians sent twenty·six Centurion tanks 

and an additional cav:ilry platoon. The Centurions, the only tanks 

othcr than U.S. tanks lIsed in Vietnam by the free world forces, had 

54-nllll. guns and successfully operated cast of Saigon ncar Vung 

Tau. 

Al though lhe armored units \\'ere small, they represented a sig. 

nificant proportion of e:ich country's COlllrihtllion. Their presence, 

morcover, shoh'cd a strong inclination on the p:irt of these coun· 

tries. particularly thosc ill Asia, to lise armored unilS anywhere as 

p.Ut of a combined arms IC'lIn. A balanced combat force was their 

goal regardless of the na III re of the terrain. 
CHAPTER V 

Three Enemy Offensives 

By late 1967 it appeared that the continued pressure of Ameri· 

call and other free world forces in offensive operations and the 

South Vietnamese armed forces in pacification would cvclHually 

prevail. Enemy documents capLUred later indicated that the enemy 

had reached ;Ipproximalcly the S;1Il1C conclusion and was so can· 

cCl'Ilcd abOllt the outcome of his operations that he had decided to 

begin a general offensive to decide quickly the fate of 50mh Vietnam. The new campaigu was designed LO inflict he,,,'y losses on 

free world unitS and LO destroy the 50mh ViclIlamesc Army. The 

first objective was to launch a massive attack on all urban populalion (Clllers and to SCilC and hold as lllallY of them as possihle. The 

enemy expected this offensivc to bc followed by a popular uprising 

that would rcinforcc Vict Cong and North Vietnamese units \\'ith 

desening SOllth Vietnamese troops. 

Enemy Buildup 

As carly as the fall of 1967, illlelligcncc sources had reported 

an increasc in encmy road COllStl"llction along thc infiltration routes 

that crossed the bordcr. III latC fall the free world forces captured 

a dOClImclll that descrihed the enemy plan in general terlllS, but 

did not specify the timing. Large numbers of enemy troops and 

quantities of supplies \\'ere meamdlile being slipped into Saigon, 

Hue, and other cities as the South Vietnamesc prepared to cele· 

brate the lunar New Year, Tel, on �l JlI1uary 1968, welcoming the 

Year of the i'\,fonkcy. Tel is both a solemn and joyolls occasion: it 

is observed each ycar with exploding fireworks. feasts of rice c;tkes 

and other delicacies, and tntdit ional \'isils to home villages. Enemy 

soldiers mingled easily with the crowds of holiday travelers and, 

aided by a well·organized network of agents, entered the cities. 

There wcre other signs of an impending enemy offensive: cap· 

tured members of the Viet Cong stated that the country would he 

"liberatcd" by Tet, and there was a sharp drop in the number of 

enemy deserters. Nearly forty altacks took place against Outposts 

and lowns in the upper Mekong Delta. where the Viel Cong often 

tested nel\" tactics. Uy 24 January General Westmoreland. certain 

that the enemy would violate any Tel truce, had persuaded Ihe U.S. 

and South Viemamese governments LO cancel a truce in the I Corps 
of the II Field Force. Viemam. was also concerned because units 

along the Cambodian border in the III Corps Tactical Zone were 

nOt having as many encoulllers with the enemy as they usually did. 

With General Wesllnoreland's approval. he shifted American forces 

back toward populatcd :lreas to improvc closc-in protecLion. l3y thc 

eve of Tel, twenty-seven U.S. manem'er battalions were inside 

the so·called Saigon circle, within a 45-kilomcter radius of Saigon; 

tWCIHY-IWO maneuver battalions remained outside that radius.1 

On 29 January cancell:lIion of the truce in the I Corps Tactical 

Zone was announced. That night many free world bases in the I 

and II Corps zone� were attacked. The next day the Tel truce was 

officially canceled throughom the country, and commanders were 

ordered to place tl"OOpS on maximum alert and LO resuJlle offensive 

operations. 

l3efore Tel armored units in all four corps tactical zones were 

in position 10 counter possible enemy 'Illacks. American armored 

unit.s had been shirted away from cities and were in position to 

block infihration routes and quickly meet any major enemy attack. 

Vietnamesc armored forces were sJationcd in or near cities to provide protection against anticipated anacks on population centers. 

Although on alen, the troops in Ihe field cxpected nOlhing more 

than the usual ,ltIacks by indirect fire and occasional ambushes or 

probes. 13tH the onc flaw in the prcparations was that no one, nOl 

even the staff at the Military Assistance Command. expccted an 

altack of lhe magnitude and scope thal developed in the first enemy 

offensive of 1968. At high command levels in Vietnam thc attack 

had all the impact of the German Ardennes offensive of \Vorld 

War II. 

For South Victnamcse and free world armored forces the b:lules 

of 1 968 marked the :lcceptance of armor as an asset to the fighting 

fon.:es in Vietnam. That acceptance was won on the battlefield by 

a demonstration of mohility and firepowcr that silenced all critics. 

\Vhen the enemy forced free world forces to move rapidly from 

onc battle area to another, it was the armored forces that covered 

the grollnd quickly and in many cases averted dis.lstCr. Rapid movement was imperative in the carly stages of the enemy attack. and 

the armored units were Ihe first ground forces to reach the batllefield in almost e\'cry major engagement, a lthough the winning of 

thc battles c\'cnwally involved all forces. The story of these ballies 

t One of the taller units. the �d Squadron. t ith Ca'alr) .. uri,·ct' in mid·l>ecembcr 

1967 amI Wil immediatdr prcMClI into action at Song 1k in the northern III Corpi 

7.one. The squadron. equipped with wheeled ,·chiclc� as part of lhe IOlst Airborne 

Division. foughl wL.h distinction during Tel. 
no set plan on the free world side in ,he early stages of ,he enemy 

attack: 10 defend \\,:15 the purpose and armored forces made a sub· 

stantial cOIllTibulion to that defense. The three battles of the 

Tel ofrensive of 19G8 described here serve as illustration of all the 

olhers in which armored units fouglll as the major cOlllllcrauack 

force. One was a U.S. cavalry action, another a U,S. mechanized 

infantry ballle, and Ihe last a South ViClIlamcse cavalry auack. All 

three demonstr<HC the value of mohility and armor-protected firepower when Ihey <lTe aggressively used. 

Firsl 0Uellsive: Tel 1968 

The carly :lllacks in I and II Corps Tactical Zones on 29 January 

signaled to free world forces thal the enemy offensive had begun. 

In northern I Corps. where Khe Sanh was beleaguered. the few 

available armored clements were used inside the base 10 reinforce 

weak points in the perimeter and to repulse enemy ground attacks. 

During the relief of Khe S:mh, air cavalry units played a major role 

in finding the enelllY, adjusting supporting fire. and keeping can· 

tinllOus pressure on the enemy. (Map 11) Air cavalry reconnaissance 

was so slIcccssful that no helicopters wcre lost during the airmobile 

assaults of the relief forces. 

Farther south. the SOUlh Vietnamese armored forces broke up 

an allack on Quang Ngai City; by acting quickly with overwhelm· 

ing firepower they drove the enemy from the city in less than ei�lll 

hours. In a two·day battle in what was known as the Pineapple 

Forest near Tam Ky later in February, ground and air cavalry 

units killed some 180 of the enemy and had only one cavalryman 

wounded. Air cavalry clements found and fixed the enemy forces 

while ground cavalry auacked and destroyed them. 

In i-iue, the ancient capital of Vietnam. air cava try. ground 

cavalry. U.S. Marine armor, and SOIl\h Vietn:nllese armor partici· 

pated in the longest hattie of Tet. which lasted twellly-six days. 

The fighting, confined to a thickly populated area. was sustained 

and intense. Tank crews were so shaken by multiple hits from 

rocket propelled grenades-as Illany as fifteen on sOll1e tanks-that 

crews were changed :ll leasl once a day. Armored unilS were in con· 

stant demand and often expended their vehicle ammunition loads 

in a few hours. Their suppon of Ihe infantry and marines, who 

cleared the cit)', provided the firepower advantage. 

While battles were raging in I Corps Tactical Zone the highlands and coastal plain in II Corps were also under hea,'y auack. 
SIHHW01I)l OOl , 

, I 

S31lW OOl , 

896 � '.1.3.1. 

S31.l. '0'8 t,j 0 l1li t,j '0' t,j 0 r'o'lI

 
to the combined arms lcarn� defending the city. Tankers. cavalry· 

men, artillerymen, and engineers from American IIllits fought !>ide 

by side with S()tlth ViclIlamcsc colwl)ry and inf:IIlITy. NC;'T the 

border between 11 and III Corps. South ViClnamc�c c:lvalrymen 

traveled 100 kilOIllClcr� through ambushes in eleven hours to the 

SC:lcoaSl lilY of Phan Thiel, where they h;Hllcd for eight days. 

501llh Vietnamese c:J":llrymcn fought in Ban l\lc ThuOI, and there 

again their firepower and ag:grcssivclless was iI deciding facIOI'. The 

battlc for the provincial capit:!! of KOlltllm in II Corp .. involved 

both Amcric;1Il and SOlllh Vietnamese cavalry and wnks. Before 

this b:lllle, Troop A. 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, had pl:lIlned and 

rehearsed, down to squad level, v;lrious strategies for the defense of 

KonlUm: several of these w('re s\\·iftly put into effect shortly after 

the attacks began. 

The olle-day waming provided by anacks in the north wcre 

barely enough time 10 alen IIllit� in [he III Corps Tactical Zone 

when [he full fury of [he ofrcnsive eruptcd in the Saigon 'Irea. 

Armored units p.-micip:lled in all major battles in III Corps, and 

in thirty-seven Ollt of the se\'cllI}"-ninc separate engagements. At 

Thu Due, a Saigon suburb. a Gwalry task force of students and 

faculty from Ihe Sout h Vielllamcse Armor School defeated the 

enemy in biller street fighting. On I February U.S. cavalry and 

infantry mel a large enemy force at An My, north of Saigon. In a 

two-day battle tlli� comhined arlllS team mauled elements of a Viet 

Cong regiment. In the batlle of Ben Cat, U.S. cavalry platoons converged on the 101l'1l from t\\'o ciirectiolls during a night auack and 

drove the enemy away. l\lech:lIlized inf:mtrymen cleared the enemy 

from the racetrack in [he celller of Saigon. and in an afternoon :mel 

evening baule in a cemetcry, fighting hand-tO-hand among the 

tombsLOnes, they killed 120 of the enemy. It was in the suburbs of 

Saigon, however, that the fighting in III Corps reached a climax: 

it was there, in the critkal approaches, that cavalry and mechanized 

inFantry decided the faLe of the city. 

Baltic 0/ Tall SO" NIIIIl 

About 2100 on 30 January. Lieutenant Colonel Clellll K. Olis, 

commander of the 3d Squadron. 4lh Ca",lIry. lI'as ordered to send 

one lroop co aid Tan SOil 1\'hlll Air Base on .he nonh side of 

Saigon. (Mtj/J 12) Colonel Otis directed the Troop C commander, 

Caplain Leo B. Virant, to prepare for lhis mission and [Q pUl his 

troops on short notice alen. Troop C was at Cu Chi. twenty·five 

kilometers northwest of Saigon, wilh one of in platoons securing 
Highway 1. 

At 0·1 15 Colonel Otis was ordered to commit Troop C to block 

a Viet Cong l"l-gimelll lh:n had anacked Tan Son Nhut Air Base. 

The tl"OOp was on its way in fifteen minutes and while it was en 

route ,\'as ordered (0 deslroy enemy forces allacking (he air base 

itself. Troop C was to be under (he operational cOIHrol of tllc Tan 

Son Nhut commander: a guide from lhat headquarters was to meet 

the unit ;H the soulh side of the Hoc Mon bridge and lead it to 

the air base. To avoid ambushes along Highway QL-I, Colonel Otis 

flew ovcr dlC unit and. dropping flares to discourage the encmy, 

guidcd it cross·country to the Hoc Man bridge. Troop C thcn 

passed through its own 1st Platoon. which remained at the bridge, 

met the guide from Tan Son Nhut. and moved toward thc air 

base. Colonel Otis relllrned to Cu Chi to refuel and rearm. 

The only inrormation provided to Troop C was that a large 

enemy force had auacked from west to cast across Highway 1 and 

penetrated the airfield defenses. As the troop approached the air 

base abom 0600, it came under heavy small arms, automatic \\·cap· 

ons, and rockct grenade fire. The ca"airymen allacked to split the 

enemy force wherc Highway I passed the southwestern gale of Tan 

Son Nhul. This move isolated approximatcly 100 Viet Cong inside 

the air base and kept the main body outside the gale. The full 

brulH o( the enemy attack now fell on Troop C. In the firSt few 

minutes several tracked vehicles were hit and troop casualties were 

heavy. Captain Viram was seriously wounded in the head. The 

remaining clemcnts of Troop C kept firing and succeeded in slowing the assault, but enemy fire forced some members of the troop 

Ollt of their damaged vehicles into a ditch alongside Highway I. 

Unable to communicate wilh the air base. the troop called the 

squadron at Cu Chi for help. 

Colonel Otis was present when the call came in and immediately 

started back to Tan Son NIHil, calling 25th Infantry Division headquarters for rclease of Troop B from its mission of guarding the 

Trang Bang bridge, fifteen kilometers nonhh'eSl of Cll Chi. InSlead. 

the 1st Platoon, Troop C, was released from the Hoc Mon bridge. 

and Colonel Otis directed it to move to Tan Son Nhut immedi· 

ately. In addition, he ordered the squadron's air cavalry troop to 

suppOrt Troop C. Flying over the :lrea, Colonel Otis observed 

Troop C deployed in an extended column formation along H igh· 

''lay I, with four tanks and five personnel carriers burning. Even 

[rom the air, he could see that the unit was hard pressed. 

Ammunition was running low in Troop C when the air ca":liry 
, 

MAP 12 
0\"-' 

THE SAIGON AREA 

TET 1968 

o Armor engagement 

, 

o 

• 

.. - Axis of armor movement 

o Ii MILES 

, 
tions, firing rockets and machine guns. As the last few hand gre· 

nades were being lIll'OII'1I hy Ihe ground troops, twO helicopters 

from Troop I), under heavy automatic II'capons fire, landed with 

ammunition and look off the wounded. At Oi l5 the 1st Platoon o[ 

Troop C arrived. Colonel Otis directed it OIllO the airfield and 

t.hen SOUlh 10 the left fbllk of Troop C. where il :lltackcd west, 

relieving sOlTle of the pressure. 

Colonel Otis ordered Troop n. commanded by C:lpl:lin �fal· 

colm Otis. 10 IC;I\'c the Trang' Bang bridge :lnd move at lap speed 

down I lighll'ay I to Tan SOil Nhm, fony-seven kilometers dislal1l. 

C,'plain Otis's troop, traveling fast, reached the bilule area in fortyfive minutes. \Vhcn the Iroop ;IlTived, it executed a column right 

IOward the west at thc Vill<HCXCO Textile FaclOry, which put it 

pilra11d to the nonhern flank of the Viet Cong aHack. With all 

vehicles of Troop B off the main road :md strung out in column, 

Colonel Otis directcd a left lIank mo\cment that brought them on 

line on thc flank or what WilS later estimated to be at least 600 

encmy soldiers. Troop U at tackcd with such i11lensity thaI many or 

the enelllY immediately fled to escape the fire. Some attempted to 

reach a trcc line threc kilometcrs to the west across open rice paddies, but C:q)lain Otis sent his 3d Platoon and Troop 0 gunships 

to cut thcm ofT. C;mght in a cross fire bctween Troops B and C 

and heavy :Iir and artillery firc, the Viet Cong \I·cre pinncd in placc. 

The baltic rea(hcd iI climax at abollt 1 000, when Troop B's 

flank attack began 10 take its toll of the encmy. Although fighting 

wenl on until 2200, from 1 300 to 2200 the primary busincss was 

mopping up-hunting down the confused and beaten enemy, Subscquclll swecps of the bailie area produced over 300 enemy deild, 

24 prisoncrs, hundreds of encmy weapons of all kinds, and enough 

equipment and :unmunilion to fill a five-LOn [nick. At 1 '100 on 

31 January, Colonel Otis was finally able to rendezvous willI the 

Tan Son NIHil command. From the time Troop C c:llled, asking 

for hclp, until HOO. the action was completely independenl of the 

Tan Son Nhm command, controlled only by the cavalry sCJlwelron 

commander. 

The movement of Troop C, 3d Squadron. 41h Cavalry, to Tan 

Son NIHIL Air Base was a difficuh night milneu\'er that achie,·ed 

tactical surprise. \Vhen the enemy pro,'ed 10 be more formidable 

than had been expected, timely rciuforcemclH. gunship and artil· 

lery suppon, and "erial resuppl\' hy units under command of Ihe 

S<luadron turned the tide. The fact that the battle was fought by 

one unit and diret:[ed by one COlllmander grcatly facilitated con-
inated the action. 

Colonel Otis's c:l\·alrymen were LO have no rest :lfler Tan Son 

i'\hut, for the 3d Squadron, 4th Ca\'alry. was soon involved in its 

second major baltIc in as many days. This lime it had help from 

Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4il\ Cavalry, which, aher constant fighting 

throughout Saigon, was scm LO Tan Son Nhul under operational 

control of the 3d Squadron, -Ith Cavalry. Shortly after daybreak on 

2 February, the 2d Baualion, 2ith Infantry, the 3d Squadron, 4th 

Cavalry, and Troop A, 1st Squadron. 4th Cavalry. were ordered LO 

conduct a reconnaissance in force through Ap Dong. a village north 

of Tan Son Nhut. Following tactical air strikes and an artillery 

prcparation, lhe operation commcnced shortly before noon when 

Troop A mO\'ed with the infamry LO search the village. After a 

bitter all·da)' baltic. the mOllll led units and the infantry succeeded 

in clearing the village and securing the northern perimeter of the 

air base.: 

Battle of Long Bil/II (HId Rien /loa A rea 

Thc cavalry bailies on thc northwestern side of Saigon blunted 

onc of two major ;tllacks toward the capita1. The enemy made his 

other effort in thc Long Binh-Bien Hoa area, twenty-two kilometers northeast of Saigon. This huge, sprawling. logistical and 

command complex had heen can'ed OUt of a rubber plantation 

early in the \\'al" It cOlltained 11 Field Force headquarters; III 

Corps South Vietnamesc Army headquarters: the U.S. Military 

Assistance Conllll;md. Vietnam, III Corps advisory hcadquaners; 

U.S. Army. Vielnam, headquarters; Bien I-loa Air nase; and lhe 

mammoth Long Binh ( ,ogist ics Depot. (I" (I/J 12) 

On the n ight of 30 J;tnu:lry, Ihe 2d Battalion, 471h Infantry 

(Mechanized) . comtll,H1ded by LiclHcn:ml Coloncl John B. Tower, 

moved to Long ninh as a rC:tClion forcc for thc 199(h Light Infan· 

try Brigade. The ballalion dispersed by companies to screen for 

possiblc Viet Cong and North Vielllamese infil trators. The bat· 

talion was also instructcd 10 he prepared 10 reinforcc critical com· 

mand, cOlllrol, and logistical installations in the giant complex. 

At 0100 on 31 January. ;\1 the same time Tan Son Nhut was 

at tacked, a well·coorditlaled assault was launched :Igainsl the Long 

Binh_Bien Hoa complex from all points of Ihe compass. At least 

four Viet Cong or Nonh Vietnamese Army battalions were in2 For the battles in Saigon during the Tt!l period. the �d Squadron. 4th Ca'·alr),. 

,,'JS a",arded a U.S. ]'rt!sidenlial Unit Citation. Fonr of iu llIembers receh'ed the 

J)islinguished xnice Cros. seven of them the Siher Star. and tnan), the BronTe Star. 
talion was flooded with reports of cnemy actiOIl. All ciemcllls weTC 

placed 011 alen and 011 0145, the b;llIaliOIl was ordered to reinforce 

lhe Long llillh <llnmunilion depot. the III Corps South Vietn,,"mcsc 

Army hc:.dquaners, and the I I I Corps prisoner of war compound. 

Camp,my B, minus one rifle platoon, arrived ;u the ammunition 

dump ill 0630 and, after coordinaling with the ddenclers, moved 

intO the aTca. The company was greeted by sniper fire, , ..

 hich 

knocked several infantrymen off their vehicles and diverted allen· 

lion from the Viet Cong who were placing s:nchcl charges in and 

around the ammunition bunkers. Despite lhe kllOlvlcdgc lhat lhey 

wefe operating in the midst of LOns of explosives, men of the 2d 

Battalion, 47th I nfantry (�lechani7.ed) , ran from bunker to bunker 

retrieving explosive charges, as other troops souglu om and killed 

the snipers ilnd sappers. AI 0750 scver:tI bunkers in the storage area 

blew up and Compauy B suffered four casualties. The remainder of 

the day the comp:lIly continued working through the :!rea, clear· 

i ng bunkers and forcing Ihe enemy to withdraw. The II Field 

Force ordered Comp,1ny B (0 remain in the amlllunition dump as 

a security force, despite Colonel Tower's plea that they be used 

elsewhere. 

Carrying Ollt the battalion's second mission, Company C, 2d 

Battalion, 47th Infantry, arrived at 0554 at the III Corps South 

Vietnamese Army headqu:lrlers, \\·hich was under heavy enemy 

assault. Attacking from m:lrch colul11n, Company C crashed into 

the flank of the Viel Cong forces, pinning them do\\·n with machine 

gun fire while the infantry dismounted and oven,lIl the position. 

The final assault required house·lO·holise fighting before the enemy 

\ ..

 as defe:lled. \Vith the headqU:ll'lers compollnd secure, at thc COSt 

of eight mCn wounded and one APC 10SI, the company moved to 

the prisoner compound cast of Bien Hoa City. Again meeting 

strOllg resistance and fighting from hOllse to house, the dismOllntcd 

troopers finally overran the encmy posi tions in the late afternoon 

with a savage allack supported by the mounted machine guns. At 

1730 the Viel Cong withdrew and Company C rcturned to the 

SOlllh Vietnamese corps headquaners , where it maintained securit), 

lilrollghout the night. 

\Vith lWO companies fi�llling the enemy in widely separ:lIed 

locations, the 2<1 Ibl lalioll , '17th Infantry. \\·:lS givcn a third mission 

-to reinforce a L1nit of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade near the 

\,jllagc of 1 10 l'\ai on National I-l ighway I. Company A and the 

baualion headquarters mmcd north 10 link up with Ihe infan try. 

The enemy allad:. was seriously threatening inS[allalions to the 
--.;.

 

-'-• 

• -

TANK AND MilS DURISC ENEMY ATTACK OS BIEN HOA, Tel 1968 

cast of Bien Ho.'l, and 10 relieve this pressure the mechanized infantry o[ Company A joined element,> of the 4th Banalion, 12th Infantry, and 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry, in an anack nonh of Highway I. The final successful assault was preceded by gunship and 

artillery fire and aided by machine guns from the AI)C's that forced 

the enemy from hastily dug foxholes. \Vhen the smoke and dust 

settled, bodies of fony-two of the Viet Gong were found, along 

with assoned weapom and equipment. At dark Company A, 2d 

Battalion, 47th Infantry, moved to a night position near the post 

of Long Binh. 

The second act in the b:lule for Long Binh and Rien I-loa had 

begun while the 2d BatlaIiO\1, 17th Inf:lntry, was fighling its widely 

separated battles. E"rly on the morning oE 31 Janu:lry, Troop A, 

3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, was "cring as a security force for an 

artillery unit at Fire Support Base Apple, twenty-eight kilometers 

cast of Bien f-Ioa on Nat ion:!! Highway I. At 0100 the troop, commanded by Captain Ralph B. CarrelSon. was alerted to mo\'e. At 

0230 Captain Garretson was directed to leave a pia lOon at the Ilre 

base and move the remainder of his troop toward Bien I-Io:l: he was 

10 receive further instructions while he was en route. Troop A 

moved immediately, leaving the 3d Platoon 10 furnish security for ..

 

I he artillery. 

There were earlv indications of things to come as the troop 

entered the rown of Trang Bam on I-lighw<ly I and r<lll inm a 

company-size amhush. The fight lasted only five minutes as the 

troop, still moving, concentrated ils fire along the roadside and 
along the way. reached a concrete hridge eighteen kilometers cast 

of Bien 1-1001. After the first lank crossed Ihe bridge, a IinmdcrOliS 

explosion dropped the span illlo the Stream. The ACAV's had no 

tTouble fording the stream, but with the exception of the one that 

had already crossed the tanks had lO be left at the bridge. 

Now out of radio conlact with both the squadron headquaners 

and Bien 1-1001, the ITOOp continued on 10 the city LO lind the square 

filled with two companies of Viet Cong and Nonh Vietnamese 

soldiers. The 1st P1:noon chonged through the enemy nOt rea1ir.ing 

\\'110 they werc. By the time Captain Garretson arrived. however. 

the enemy force had dispersed and opened fire, disabling twO 

ACAV's. Thc 2d Platoon pushed aside the disabled vehicles and 

emered Ihe square in a hail of machine gun fire. After this brier 

action the small cavalry force consi�led of one tank and eight 

ACAV·s. 

Continuing 10 move, the troop was joined hy the squadron 

commander. Liellten:mt Colonel 1-llI�h .I. Ganlcy, who dircctcd 

C,plain Garretson to Hicn I-loa Air Base. As he flew o\'er the troop. 

Colonel B •• nley spOt led an enern), amhush just oUlside thc base, 

with se\·er.11 hundred Viel C:ong and North ViclIlarnesc troops in 

the ditches ncar the soulhea�t ellirance. The men quickly moved 

off the 1'0.1(1 some Ihinv lO fony Illeters behind the amhush. firing 

as thcy wcm. and dcstroying the enemv force on on(' side of the 

road_ 

After entering the ha�e, tlH' cav;drv fon-c was al lached to a battalion of the 10lst Airhornc nivi�ion. which W:l� auempting 10 

reduce the enemy force� on the hase perimeter. The c:walrymen 

were split he tween two comp:lnies of infantry :lwlcking :1 position 

at the sOlltheast corncr of the air base. The haltle lasted 1110S1 of the 

day. culminating in a hreakollt ;lItcmpt hv the enemy that was 

SLOpped shon hy the cavalry troop. In this fight the 2d Platoon lost 

two ACAV's: the one l:lnk lost twO crews and took nineteen hits 

from rockel I!ren:1de� hut W:l� still operational. For thc l'e�1 of the 

d:lY the 11'0(1) \1':1� the reaction for('e for the air hase defense. The 

next morning Troop /\ returned to Fire Support Base Apple: it 

h:1d suffered five killed and t\\'enty·three wounded. 

The final clIl·t:.in was nlllg dOh'n on the Long Uinh_Bien Boa 

battle by the 11 th Armored Cavalry Re�iment on I February. 

Although the regiment was conducting operations in the thick 

jungles of \Var Zone C. on the morning of 31 i:lnuan the entire 

unit pulled OUI, consolic!:Jled. and moved o\'er' 103 kilometers 10 

Bien 1-10:1. all in eight holll

'

s. The regiment had completely circled 
day U.S. airoome infamry and the 3d Squadron, 1 1 th Armored 

Cavalry Regimem. swCpt through Bien Ho.'I and clcared the town. 

For the rest of the month the 1 1 th Armored Cavalry remained II 

the Long Binh_Bien I-loa and Saigon areas. 

Ballles hI VillI! Long Province 

The Tel hallies in the IV Corps Tactical Zone were characterized hy the same intensity as t hose in other taClical l.Olles, but in 

most cases they involved South Victn'lmesc Army units. In the 

provincial c<lpital of My Tho, South Viecnamese cavalry rorces 

along with U.S. and South Vielll<lmesc infantry engaged in a bloody 

three-d<lY h<lulc in which ovcr 800 enemy troops were killed. 

Farther somh Vietnamese Army c<lvalrymen were ordered on one 

hour's notice to fight their W<I}' along the fifteen kilometers from 

their base c<lmp to the city of Phl! Vinh (Trn Vinh) . Using massive firepower and withom the aid of supponing infantry. they 

destroyed the enemy resistance in the city in less than twent)'-four 

hours. 

The Tel offensive in Vinh Long Province slarted at 0300 on 

31 January when the Viet Cong at tacked Vinh Long City and the 

compounds of SOllth Vietnamese cavalry unilS. n inety-five kilometers southwest of Saigon in the della. Thc 3d Squadron, 2d 

Armored Cavalry Regiment. swiftly secured its own compound 

and dispatched clement.s to assist the headquarters of the 2d 

Armored Cavalry Regiment, which was under 3uack. The 3d 

Squadron forces crashed through the en em)' force around the headquart.ers perimeter. then (lu:tcked and routed the Vict Congo 

The squadron was then ordered to assist in the defense of Vinh 

Long Airfield, while regimelllal headquarters troops were to provide security for the sotlthll'estern portion of the city perimeter. 

After clearing the outer perimeter of the airfield. the 3d Squadron 

was ordered back into the city where it cle<lred the route from the 

a irfield to the tactic:1! operations center in the middle of the tOwn. 

\Vhen the cavalry sWl'Ied to clear Vinh Long's main street, heavy 

autOm<ltic weapon and rocket propelled grenade fire from buildings Stalled the mounted attack. Finallv. the 3d Squadron linked up 

with a company of the 43d Ranger Battalion of the South Vietnamese Army. but in the face of illlense fire the Rangers retreated. 

leaving the 3d SQuadron to continue the assault on its own. 

A Regional Forces company was sent to figln with the squadron. but it too refused to advance. After a direct order by the 

cavalry commander. the Regional Forces company reluctantly fol-
the company departed and the 3d Squadron pulled back to protect 

secured areas of the city. 

Early the next morning the squadron again attempted to clear 

the main street, still without infantry support. The fighting seesawed back and forth all day through the rubble, but liltle progress 

was made. Evcry move toward the main street had to be fought 

from hOllse to hOllse. E,'etl when the squadron was reinforced by 

fighting elements of the rcgimcma! headquarters, the most that 

could be achieved was security of the (actical operations center and 

the provinci:d administrative center, and even lIMl was a conStant 

baule. 

During the night of I fchmary. South Vietnamese soldiers from 

the 3d Batlalion, 15th Infamry, arrived by bo.:'lt, and the next 

morning thc 3d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regimem, and the 

infantry began clearing the main strcel. For the fourth consecutive 

day there \\,;I� heavy fighting. Wilh U.S. helicopter gunship sup· 

POrt, and after fivc full da)'s of frustration, the combined forces 

charged thc Vict Cong po�itions and broke through. The cavalry 

troopers and a Ranger COIllI"><,ny quickly cleared the western section 

of the cit)' and thc remaining Vict Cong fled. 

In fivc days of intcnS<' fighting SOUlh Vietn:nne�e Army c<1valrymen had a(i<1pt(!d themselves to urhan combat: in the b�inning 

they did nOt evell ha,'c thc aid of supporting infantry. Thc cour· 

agc and tenacity of illdi"idual� and the ahility of the unit to bring 

firepowcr 10 bcar in critic:1I areas kept the Viet Cong 00' halance 

and fin:dly enahlcd the (':!,,<1lrymen to seire the initi:uive from the 

at tilCkers. 

The magnitude of the enemy Tel oO'ensive of 1 9G8 s\lrpri�ed 

the free world r()rCe�. Despite intelligence reports to the contrary, 

the enenty was considered inc<1pable of mOlLnting a coulltrywide 

offensive and such an allac" was not given serious military COIlsideration. That the Viet, Cong and North Victnamesc could attack 

Saigon or seize and hold Huc for twenty-six days was bclievcd impossible. Those who throught that <In allack was coming did not 

foresee <I widespread offensivc. \Vhen the a"<lcks came. armored 

units wcre sent iTllo almost e\'ery significant action in South Vietnam. l\founted troop� hecame quick reaction forces. auacking in 

large cities and dcstroying enemy units or driving them away. 

Armored forces screened the horders. blocking enemy infiltrat ion 

routes, denied the cnemv access to his ohjeclivcs. and illlercepte<i 

units alollg routes of resupplv and withdrawal. Route security and 

convoy escoTt wcre performed by mounted units to keep roads open 
armor paid its way. 

Suomi OUensive 

tn the period immediately after Tel, free world forces struggled 

to son alii units in the resulting confusion. l\lany, particularly 

armored units, were widely spread in defensive missions far from 

their nonn;1\ operaLional areas. Losses, particularly of. equipment, 

had been heavy, and many units needed time LO replace materiel 

and train nell' men. For a time there was a shortage of M4SA3 

tanks, made lip for in part by issuing M48AI tanks to selected 

units. The hull and guns of the tanks were the same, but the 

M48AI used gasoline and its reduced range and sliscepLibility to 

fire diel nOl make it very popular. 

Intelligence analysts indicated that the enemy was also replac· 

ing troop losses and rebuilding supply caches preparatory to launch· 

ing another orrensive. Sweep operations disrupted the enemy time 

schedule for renewed attacks, but larger enemy units remained 

hidden in base areas throughout South Vietnam. Anticip.uion of 

renewed enemy activity, p..rticularly around Saigon and the Capi· 

tal Military Districl, resulted in many false warnings with unitS 

alerted for attacks that never came. 

To relieve the pressure free world forces auacked. with SOUlh 

Vietnamese Army units now participating in strength. In early 

April Operation To,\;.: TII,\;":G I was launched to drive the enemy 

units away from Saigon. Highly decentralized, the operation was 

characterized by small daylight search missions and night ambushes 

involving seventy·nine hattalions in III Corps Tactical Zone alone. 

Intelligence infOl'l1)(lIion gathered in these a('tiom reve<lled the im· 

minence of a second enemy offensive. The Tel altack had suffered 

from poor coordination <lJl)ong the enemy units bec:mse strict se· 

curity measures were employed. This time the enemy \\'idely dis· 

seminated his plans. enabling the free world forces during TOAN 

THANG I to learn of them quickly from c<lptllred documents <lnd 

prisoners. By late April all invasion and infiltration romes into 

Saigon and other key cities were watched and heavily gnarded. 

This alertness, the lar)re·scale allied operations after Tel. ;mel 

heavy enemy losses during Tel weakened the second enemy offen· 

sive in early May. which U.S. forces nicknamed "i\lini·Tel." The 

main enemy elTon \\'<15 made in the Saigon area, where most of the 

combat tOok place. The ht Squadron, 4th Cavalrv. �ot into action 

early when, on 5 Mav 1968. it discovered three North Vietnamese 

soldiers scventeen kilometers north of Saigon and triggcred a two· 
M41 OF SOUTII VIETNAMES.: AR"Il' AD\,AXCES 0:-' E1"EMY POSITIO:-':S IN 

SAICON, MAY 1968 

day haule with a Nonh Vietnamese Army ballalion. After massive 

air, anillery, and air c<lvalry SUppOfl and conSlalll mounted attacks 

by ACAV's and tanks, the combined aTIllS tcam routed the enellY. 

By dark on lhe 6th, the North Vietnamese had gone-leaving over 

400 dead on the baulefield. 

Closer to Saigon. the 5th Battalion. 60th Inf:lI1ll'y (�rcchanizcd). 

and the 2d Battalion, 47th I nfantry (i\fcchanizcd) , ag:l in dosed 

with the enemy in honse-to-house fighting near lhe "Y" bridge on 

the weSl edge of the CiIY,:! The mechanized troops used c\'cry mC:lIlS 

of fire suppon available in six days of intense fighting lhat, curio 

ollsly, was broken ofT each night by the enemy. The final major 

baltic was fought on 10 May by the 5th Battalion. 60th Infantry, 

and the enemy was drivcn away from the city for the last timc. 

�lop'lIp actions continued for a few days, but the baltle for Saigon 

was over. 

3 Shorli) before thi, fight. thn:t> ullk.s and an APC from the Somh Vi('tllall1l'SC 

hi Squadron. 51h C;Haln. h;ul I'IIIr-IRCti hnq eliI'm' fora'S al lhl' uyu oritlgl'. The) 

were unable to COI"in(e Ihe hiRher commands that the, were ill a fight. When one 

entire lane of the four lalle bridge blew up, mechanized reinforcements WeTI' final!) 

sent. 
with the free world forces in pursuit. Another minor anack was 

made against Saigon on 25 �Iay. Inll the attackers were quickly 

routed. Viet Cong and Nonh Vietnamese troops emerged from 

hiding places to surrender. On 18 June the largest number of 

enemy troops surrendered-141 enemy soldiers turned themselves 

o,'er to the South Vietname!le Army forces nonheast of Saigon. 

Scanered and diminished fighting continued till late June. While 

the fighting \\'as still going on, peace talks had begun in Paris on 

13 May. 

The May attacks were hut a shadow of the Tel offensive in February, and had no apparem military objeclive. h .. ppe .. red that 

small groups of enemy soldier!> were dispersed over wide areas in 

an attempt to make their att:lcks appear heavier than they aClllally 

were. A number of rocket :lIlack .. were also employed against the 

capital 10 cre:lte an image of Saigon under seige. The principal 

target was Saigon, with attacb in other arC:lS of the country de· 

signed to dh'en free world forces. It :lppears probable that the 

attacks were intended to influence the peace I:llks rather than to 

achieve a military goal. 

Third ODell5ive 

After Ihe second enemy offensive. just :15 after the first, both 

sides stepped hack to assess the result and repair the damages La 

men and equipment. For the free world forces Ihis interim was 

unlike the pre\'ious one because an air of confidence and optimism 

prevailed. The recuperative means of the free world forces were 

greater than those of the ellenn'. No longer COlllent to sit and wait 

for the Viet Cong and Nonh Vietnamese 10 auack the populated 

areas, units went inlo the bush with a vengeance. Base areas were 

penetrated repeatedly. Thus the third and last enelllv offensive 

during 196R fell nOt on the populalion or on critical areas but 

directly on the free world combat units, who I\'ere well prepared.4 

RecQJ:ni7ing the chang-e ill the free world military position, the 

enen1\' chose obiectil'es thaI differed in tWO \\"a)'s from Ihose of 

earlier offenses. Firs!, ,he offemive had limited goals. Second, t.he 

attacks wcre dirccted "gaillSt U.S. troops, hase camps, and equip. 

ment rather than at Vietnallle�e population centers. Intelligence 

after the .wack re\'ealcd that a prime objective was to inflict heavy 

� One of Ihe most .. ·doome ;IlII'TO\eml:nIS m�('e durin,: Ihis period in U.S. units 

... as Ihe COlncrsion of the �ft " to the ,Iiesel·po ... ered Ml ".\ 1. A main dn. .. h2(1t of 

Ihe MI 13, the danger of Ii�. was now reduced. Other free "·OIld units were scheduled 

for COlli ersion laler. 
logical "ictory. 

The most Slistained fiRlu ing of this third offensive look place in 

the III Corps TaCliG11 Zone in Tar Ninh Province. By August 

16,000 soldiers of the 5th and 9th Vict Cong and North Vietnamese 

Divisions had infiiltratcd inlO \V;tr Zone C, prepared to attack. 

The 1st Brig.-.dc. 25th lnf;HHry Divi�ion. the largcSl free world force 

in the area, indudcd the lSI l\aualion, 5th Infalllry (Mechanized) : 

4th Ballalian, 23d Infalllry (i\fcch;mized) : 3d B;lllalion, 22d Infan· 

try: 2d B;maJion, 34th Armor (-) ; and the 2d Battalion, 27th 

Infalllry. Relying on the mobility of ils armored units, the brig:ldc 

was organized into combined arms task forces with attached tank. 

infantry, and mechanized inf<lntry units heavily supported by artillery. From the lire b;l�es around Tay Ninll City task forces sem alit 

wide·ranging patrols 10 prcvent or break up enemy movement. 

For ten hectic dars and nights beginning 17 AUj:!.ust 1968. the 

1st Brigade fought the enemy m'er an area of 1 .500 square kilo· 

meters in the unfavorahle �ummcr wet weather. The Iiglll started 

when the enemy made a night attack on a lire support l"lsc six 

kilomeler� north of Tal' Ninh. using human wave lanics: the 

altackers wcre stopped �hon of the defemive wire by the over· 

whelming firepo\\'cr nf ';lI1ks. aircraft, artillery, and infantry. By 

daylighl a heal y allack Oil Tar Ninh City was under way, but al 

the end of the day the ellem)' had been bealen back by two armored 

task forces and a Gn·alrr troop. The enemy then shifted thirty 

kilometer .. to the ea�t illlO some ruhher plantations in the hope of 

byp:ming the brigade ,lIul �trikillg f:lrther �Otllh. Bill the mobile 

task force� followed, aud fOI" nine day,> lighting r.ll1ged Ihrough the 

rows of ruhber Iree,>. COllnlerallack followed allack wilh such 

regularity Ihal it hecame difficult 10 tcll \\'hich wa� which. The only 

cenainty wa� Ihat Ihe brigade wn� keeping the pressure on. Move· 

ment and firepower were the keys, aided in strong measure by the 

unity of command within the hri�de. 

In nlmosl every fight. :lnd they lOok place every day and cvery 

night, the enelllY was �everely beaten. Therc wcre exceptions. On 

21 August a Tllechani7ed infnntrv comp'lIly took on twO North 

Vietnamese baualions and for more than an hour held its own. 

After suffering heavy losse� nlld with one officer left alive. the com· 

pany was forced to withchnw under cover of supporting anillery. 

Again. on 25 Augllst a I�isti("al convoy of eighl\'·eight vchicles was 

ambushed south of Tal' �inh. An armored force moved in and 

severely punished the enemy, hm not before till' ('olwoy had lost 

many men and \ ehides. In t hese actions the Viet Cong and North 

Vietnamese prevailed hy lI'eight of numbers. 
MI IS IN ACTIOI'<> AT Bf.1'<> CUI RunnER PLANTATION, AUGUST 1968. Hollow 

steel plmlking 0'1 sides of vehicle oUer protection against shaped ,harges. 

By 27 Augus! [he [hiI'd enemy offensive in \Var Zone C had 

ended in ddea! for enemy uni[s. It was largely the mobility and 

firepower of the bt Brigade combined arms teams that m:,de victory possihle for the smaller American forces. The ability of U.S. 

forcel> to maneuver and mass rapidly to defeat a s[l'ong blll slower 

enemy was the critic:!1 faCIOI'. The at tacks were the last in the liT 

Corps Tactical Zone. For the remainder of the yeM and well into 

the next the enemy stayed in Cambodia refiuing badly beaten units. 

The third enemy offensive, however, was not limited to the 

III Corps area. In I Corps far LO the north the American 1st Squadron, 1st C:n·alry, 23d Infantry Division, blocked the p:!lh of three 

regiments of I he 2d North Vietnamese Army Division that intended 

to allack T;ull Ky City. The squadron had previously fought insignificant b:!ules \\'('5l of Ihe city, and consequently wns maintaining 

protecli\'e securil), :,round Tam Ky by means of daily reconnaissance in force. It was a platoon in one of these sweeps, operating 

with a troop of South Vielilamese cavalry, lilal staned Ihe figilling 

in OIlC of thc hardest battles lhe 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalr}' fought 

against thc North Vietnamese. 

On the morning of 24 August 1 968, I .icutenam Thomas Cuiz, 
pg y p 

3d Squadron, 4th C1.va!ry. At 0925 the South ViclIlamcse ca,rairy 

received illlcnse lire from a dump of ITees on high ground surrounded by rice paddies. In the first few seconds, one APC was hit 

several limes by recoil1ess rifle fire :mel exploded in flames. The 

Vietnamese cavalry, calling for rcinforcemclll from lhe 2d Platoon, 

fired into lhe enemy position. 

Lieutenant Guiz and his platoon responded, but so heavy was 

the enemy fire thoU it lOok \\\'o air strikes and air cav:t!ry support 

before the platoon could maneuver tlbreast of tbe Vicm;u'Ilcse cal" 

airy troop. When the air strikes l ifted, the comhined forces then 

assauhed the hill in a line formation. Several vehicles were hit by 

recoilless rifle lire and the atlack stalled. The enemy force was LOO 

strong to be pllshed off the hill hy frontal assault so the cavalrymen 

withdrew and ,HI'aited reinfon:cmellls from the 1st Squadron. 1St 

Cavalry. Licute!lilll! Colonel R:,ymond O. L1.wrence, commanding 

the 1st Squadron, ordered Troop C and the remainder of Troop A 

into the hattIe. The enlarged cavalry forces prohed the area with 

automatic weapom lire and tried to encircle the high ground, but 

were driven aWOl)' by he<l"Y lire from ami tank weapons. Unable to 

close with the enemy. the cavalrymen dismounted and continued 

the attack 01') foot. but e\'en after 5.wage bunker·ta-bunker lighting 

lillie ground was g:lined. 

Throughout the :,fternoon Colonel Lawrence had repeatedly 

req\le�ted a company of infalllry to as')ist his cavalrymen in the 

fight. At I G!W an infantry company hecame avaiJ:.ble to make a 

combat assault if a secure l:mding zolle could he provided. A land· 

ing zone 2,000 meter') ;I\\'ay Il'as selected. Inn when Troop C moved 

toward il. the Il1l'll 1'<1" inlO the heaviest fighting of the day. "'Ve 

had 10 cross a �rn;dl forest to get to the LZ," Sl;'ltcd Private First 

Class i\lark Belli ... "and :l� soon a� wc lI'ere in the middle. we were 

right up amhu�h alley." The <lu<lck c<lme from <Ill side� and the 

cavalrymcn formed their \'ehide� in <I circle to fire in att directions, 

Again and again. the :'\1'orrh Vietn;lIne�e infantry rushed the circlc 

only to he stopped by the heavy fire. A� darkness approached, Col· 

onel Lawrence re;dizcd that the landing zone could nOt be sccured. 

and the airmohile infantry. now two companies. were therefore 

SCIll to Hawk l I ill. ha�e c:unp of the 1st Squadron. I�t C;,valry. 

Both companie') re:lclied thcm�c1\'c� for anticipated fighting in the 

mornIng. 

Troop c: fought it� 11'01" out of Ihe �m<lll forest area hack to its 

original po�iti()n. <lnel there joined Troop ..-\ after dark. Although 

sltpplies were no\\' critically needed by all units, thc policy of the 
if hostile fire was being received by a ground unit. The cavalrymen, 

therefore, were forced 10 break away from the enemy to secure a 

landing zone. The tll'O troops then set up a single position near the 

baulefield to await resupply. The Somh Vielllamese 3d Squadron, 

41h Cavalry. willHlrew to Tam Ky 10 defend the city. Fighting on 

24 AugliSl had been fierce. with over 200 Nonh Vietnamesc killed, 

bUl lhe enemy W:lS still present and in strength. 

Colonel Lawrence's plan was to place :Ill :ldditional c:lvalry 

troop. Troop 1\, in " blocking position. and to attack with the other 

tWO cavalry lI'OOPS, reinforced with infantry, which would arrivc 

at first ligh1. At 0615 while en rOlLte to the blocking position. 

Troop B came uuder attack from a North Vietnamese force. The 

cav:llrymen. quick I)' gaining fire superiority. left one platoon to 

deal with the enemy as the other two platoons drove on. Reaching 

the proposed blocking position, the cavalrymen found themselves in 

the middle of a North Vietnamese regimental headquarters. They 

drove their vehicles through the position. firing in every direction, 

but enemy fire was so intense that they \\'ere finally forced to 

regroup and form a circle. A� on the pre\'iolls day, the North Viet· 

namese tried to overrun the vehicles but were repulsed. Although 

surrounded, the troop had disrupted the enemy command and 

control facilities. 

'Vhile Troop n's hattIe raged. Troops A and C started to advance toward their assigned positions. Almost as soon as it left the 

night camp. Troop A came under heavy rocket grenade and recoilless rine fire. Ground g:lined in this sectOI" was measul"ed in meters, 

as infantry :lnd c:lv:dry unsuccessfully hallied the enemy for the 

high ground. Troop C, which mel lillie resistance at first, was 

SUllied when its all;[chcd inf:llury W:lS pinned down by heavy small 

arms fire. Thick undergrowth and rough tClT:lin slowed thc cavalry 

allempt to help the infantry. hut after an :lll·day hal.lle both cavalry and infantry managed 10 pull hack. With darkncss approaching, once ag-ain the resupply needs of the armored force and the 

division policy reg:mling CH-47 helicopters forced the cavalry to 

disengage. In positions near Ihe haulefic1d, the U.S. forces remp· 

plied and re:l(\ied themseh'es for more fig-tHing. The day had been 

expensive for the North Vietnamese. who lost 250 killed. 

The plan for 26 August called for the entire force to shift southwest, then a!lack nonh with all three cavalry troops and the 

atlachecl infamry. If the Nonh Vietnamese were still in Iheir 

trenches, the flanking attack was designed to surprise them. Fol· 

lowing a twenty·minute artillery preparation, the squadron and its 

infantry attachments attacked the enemy right flunk: resistance was 
from Ihe hattlefield. During lhe day long scattered figllling that 

followed, Team B caplUred two North Vietnamese soldiers who 

related thaI mer 100 of their troops had fled to the northwest the 

previolls night. Logistical needs once again outweighed tactical 

needs, and Ihe sqll:ldron hailed to resupply. 

Colonel L,1wrcncc selll three teams LO the northwest on 27 

August. Troop F (Air) , 81h Cavalry, screening to the front, reponed Ihe presence of a Nonh Vietnamese antiaircraft unit. A 

prisoner later related Ih:1l the North Vietnamese unit had one 

rocket propelled grenade erell' at tached. and that the opening round 

was to be the signal for everyone to open fire. Te:un A, deployed 

on line, laid down a brlse of fire, and advanced on the enemy at 

(ull speed. The rocket grenadier look aim at the lead American 

vehicle ilnd pulled the trigger-misfire! \Vith no signal g-iven, the 

North Vielname'ie unit panicked. "\Ve JUSt drove right in." stated 

Lieutenant Cuiz. "\Ve captured two caliher .51 amiaircr:lfl ma· 

chine gum and found :I 10l of eneilW packs. The team killed or 

captured all blll lhrec men in the unit." 

The enemy force, estim;ned to number around 1 ,300 men 

before the start of the hattie. had had enough. and in the darkness 

that followed the North Vietnamese melted b .. "!ck illlo the hills. 

The successful { ,Ivalnr �'I'eep oper:uions had intercepted the enemy 

mOl'emelll toward T:lIl1 Ky. and forced a fight hefore the 10nh 

Vietnamese were able to readl their objeClives. Armored firepower 

and air :md artillery suPPOrt had inflicted crippling losses and had 

stopped this pan of the el1emy third offemive as it began. 

Afiermfllll 

Tn the w:lke of t hese enellw orremivcs. the free world forces 

found t helllsdl'es in control of Ihe haHlcfield<;. For :lfmored units 

Ihe ofTcnsi,·es. p:lrticlilarly Tel. had hrotlghl ;\ dernomtration of 

el'el")'thing that :ll"1nor proponents had claimed. The ability or 

armored units to move r:m widl o\'erwhcJming firepower bad heen 

of the 11 t most i mp0rtallcc t hr()lI�llOlI t t he offensive. 

Armored units in ("ombincd arms lask forces would now spend 

most or lheir time in Ihe bu�h pllnuing the weakened Viet Cong 

and North Vieinalllc�e. A new -"meric;1Il armored unit. a mccha· 

nized hrigade. \\'a� heing �ent LO ViCll1am. The South Vietn:lIne�c 

armored force was forming sel'en more ca\'alrv regiments.� Even 

liThe fi rM or Ih� new 'q(imcnl<. Ihe l llh \rmOlcd (".:I,·al"·. wa< deplo\ed on 

18 Jill,. 1968. Out of '<:SllCel 10 SllllCnlilioll Ihere was no 1$lh rq:imCnl The �Ilth 

Vietnamese ;t.nnOlcd fort:(" abo l>cg;11l a change 10 file "PC's per trOOP (US. pl3loon) 
g, 

, g, 

to lcave Victnam bcc;lusc they provided mobility and fircpowcr at 

far less cOst in luau power than any other type of unit. It had taken 

a long lime to convince the Army, but there was no longer any 

doubt about the utility of armored forces in Vietnam's counter· 

insurgency and jungle warfare. The three offensives brought about 

a re;ti change in the acceptance of armored units and ended the 

longambivalancc toward arlllor in Vietnam. 

The campaigns of 19GB-Tel, and the second and third enemy 

offensives-were the laSt concerted enemy offensives against the 

combined frce world forces in Vietnam. In a period of seven 

mOnlhs, the Vict Cong and North Vietnamese forces werc severely 

defeated; over GO,OOO enemy soldiers losl lbeir lives withollt making 

any tangible g:dns on the ground. The free world forces struck 

back both during and aftcl' this campaign with :1 strength that 

carried the battle 10 the borders of SOUlh Vietnam and beyond. 

The soldiers of the Republic of Vielllam gained new confidence 

in the very battles that were dcsigned to persuade them to desert 

to the enemy.' 

a rnO\'e hic , C. ,., (C :-: .. C .. ",C::;- ",, ,,,;C.:-C'd ;�';''n::;;y 

inae:ued firCI)Owcr. 

' BUl they also had to di�ntinue padfication suppon missions unlil late in 1968. 
CHAPTER VI 

The Fight for the Borders 

Cll(lIIgillg Stmlegy 

In the aftcnn:tlh of the 1968 enemy offensives both sides changed 

strategy. For the North Vietnamese, the change was a necessity 

brought on by hc;nr)' losses ill men, equipment, and supplies. ,Vith 

the Vict Cong underground org:1IIi7.,'1tlol1 exposed or destroyed in 

many areas, milin force ullilS shon of men, equipment, and leaders, 

and the logistical system drained of supplies, the enemy had no 

choice blll to retire tn s:lnnll:lrics. On the free world side. U.S. 

Iroop strength. dc�pitc some losses, reached a new high of nearly 

550.000 in April 1 969, and the Soulh Vietnamese Army Wl incd confidence from new wcapom and freedom of action. It was the time, 

therefore, to pursue the eoemy into his sanctuaries and keep lip an 

unrelieved pre:.sure that would prc\ cm his returning. 

The new strategy of the free world forces was applied under 

tlte leadership of Ceneral Creigluon W. Abrams. who succeeded 

General \Ve�tmDreland a" Commander. U.S. Milil<tr\' Assistance 

Command. Viel1l:lIll. in the slimmer of 1968. By background and 

training Gener:1! .\hr:lIll:' was the mall for thc job. One of lhe great 

commander:. of small armored unit" in \Vorld \Var 1 I. he subsequently commanded an ;mllorcd divi:.ion and a corps. and senred as 

Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Arm)". For a year before he ilS�lImed 

command he \\"a� Ceneral \Vesllllorel:md's deputy, and concentrated 

his auention on the Vietnamese Army. Ilis rapport with 50mh 

Viel11:1mesc leader� wa� CX(cI\CIlI. his confidence in the South Vietnamese Arm)' was a p'TC:H hoost to Vietnamese morale. and his COI1-

victim! that. the SOllth Vietllame�e \\"cre capable of a much broader 

panicipation in the wal" tl1an h:lc1 been allowed them in the past 

augured well for the new �tr:lIegy. 

\Vhen the enemy forces fled from the halllefieJds, they reg-rouped 

in base :lTcas inside SOllth Vieillam. \Villl virtually no large Vict 

Cong and North Vielllame'iC units in the field, frec world forccs 

began to engage ill cont illu:d small unit actions to locate and defeat 

the remaining encmy forces. I ncreased .\merican stren�th and the 

growing strength of thc Sotlth Vietnamese .hm\' also allowed frce 

world forces 10 pctlctr:nc and destroy the cncm" base system in 

South Vietnam. A� the tempo of Ihese operations increased, the 

enemy fled once :Igaill-this time 10 sanctuaries in Laos and e,m-
Ollt without intcrference. 

By mid·1 969 Ihe cncmy was operating from these sanctuaries. 

venturing occasioTlally into Somh Vietnam as log-istics permittcd. 

These forays. knowJl as high points, were preceded by enemy logis· 

tical buildups of enough supplies to support the high points. The 

cnemy tactic of sticking 0111 a so-called logistics nose, followed by 

trOOpS who were supported by the buildup, became a familiar one. 

In 1969 ;mel 1970 the free world countertactic was to cut off the 

logistics nose \\,hen possible and thus frustrate the enemy allack 

that was intended LO follow.1 

American and South Vietnamese armored forces in the air and 

on the ground played an important role in the fight 10 prevent a 

logistical buildup and to seal the borders of South Vietnam. Their 

mobility and heavy firepower enabled them to operate in small 

groups with less chance ,hal any single unit would be overwhelmed. 

This Illobilil}' also enabled them to disperse over wide areas, yet 

Illass quickly when the ellemy struck. 

Armorel/ Forces Along the Demilitarized Zone 

In mid·1968 the last major U.S. taclical unit that was 10 be SCIlI 

to Vietnam, the 1st Brigade. 5th Infalliry Division (l\lechanized) , 

was arriving from Fort Carson. By I August 1968 the five combat 

units of the hrigade were in Vietnam: Ihe lst Bau;lIion, 61st Infan. 

Iry (l\lcchanized) : the 1st Baualion, nih Armor; t he lst Batlalion, 

1 1 th Infantry; the 5th Battalion, 4th Anillery (Hi5·mm .. selfpropelled): :md Troop A, 4th Squ:ldron, 12th Cavalry. Within a few 

days they sl:lrtcd cmnb;u operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone. 

immediately south of the Demilitarized Zone between Norlh Clnd 

South Vietll'lIn. 

The Nortb Vietn:nnesc Army units along lhe Demili tarized 

Zone were unaccllstomed 10 fighting U.S. ;mnored forces. The U.S. 

Marines operated in t hi� region, but used their armor in small 

groups whose primary role was support of dismountcd infantry. 

Thus. the 1st Brigade enjoyed some immediate success against 

enemy troops who tried 10 stand and fight, believing themselves to 

be facing lank·supported infantry as before. These cncoul1lers wcre 

usually one·sided. with the North Vietnamese losing significalllly in 

men and equipment. Howe\'er, Ihe enemy quickly learned the 

futili ty of a stand·up fight againsl the consolidated mechanized 

I Cenenl Abrams W3$ the fint IQ ,ecogni�e offieiall)' the enemy laelie and 10 

define the (Qllnterlaetie to CUI off wha[ he [coned "'the enemy', logistics nose." 
formations. 

Emphasizing ofTcmivc action away (rom fixed bases, the 1st 

Brigade auacked the enemy whenever and wherever he could be 

found. After only tWO months of comb,n the brigade received a 

letler of congratulations from C:encral \Vestmoreland, newly ap· 

poimcd Army Chief of SI:Iff. ,\'/10 wrote that the Imil'S :lctiOll5 had 

"dcmOnstr:Hcd the Brigade's readiness to take its place with other 

velcr:lIl 1I1lilS in Vietnam," 

By l;nc 1968 l�t Brigade operations in the J Corps area were 

r .. iT]Y illustrative of Slllall IInit actions throughout the country. The 

brigade concentrated on rooling- OUl the Viet Cong underground 

organi7.<Ilion and hrcnking- up gut'rrilla units by sending battalions 

illlo <lre •• s whme limits correspol1dcd with local Victnamese district 

boundaries. l ,i;li,(1Il ()(Titcr, from .he ,.\Illcric'an hattalions werc 

assigned to each di�Il'icl and direct ('omllluniC'llions h'ere eSlabl ished between baualion and di,rrin. A dose association was thus 

developed helll'een Vielllame�c Regional and Popul:lr Forces :md 

U.S. h:ut:lliolH. Perh:'1)<; mmt imponalll of all. the hrigade hegan 

to de"elop :l nctw()r� of vilbge agellts that was to prove illvalu:lhlc 

in providing timeh infonlJ:ltioli ahout the Vict c.ong organi7.:1tion. 

;\fcch:1ni7('cI ilifallln \I'a� particularly 'iu("c('��ful in ferreting out 

the Viet Congo ;\i( . 

..: h:lIli/ed {"ompanie� could movc rapidl" throllgh 

search areas :Uld quid.'!y cordon orr a \"ill:t�e suspected of harboring 

Vict Congo 1.0(:.1 Viet " amese force� operating with the j\merican 

troops mually (ol1(hl{'tcd the detailed scarch. \Vhel1 it was o\'er lhe 

merh:llli7ed cmHpa,IY \I'ould II100C on. sometimes mrlny Tllile�. to 

pbce a cordon around allnthcr \'illage. 

As thc�e operations bcramc morc successful local government 

improvcd and Vict Cong- village organiz:lliom collapsed. l\ lcmbers 

of the Viet Con� ("Cluld no longer safel\' suhmcrge in village popu· 

lations. and when they fled to the countrysidc they were hounded 

by American infantry and artillery. Although it w:.s certainly not 

the efforts of the mounted infa11lry :l1one that dro\'c the Vict Cong 

from the villages. the mechanized troopers performed a task that 

neithcr police. lo(al militia. nor standard U.S. inr<llltr}' could :lCcampi ish alone. One Vietllame�e di�triCI chief said: "On a good day. 

thc U.S. mechanized inf:nllry may not always get here quite as fan 

as airmobile infantry-but they Slay with liS longer and with more 

firepower." 

After the earlv enCOLllller�. {'omlxtl in the l �t Urig:lde's area of 

operation was light. Since lack of veget<llion made Ihe ;\1 113 visible 

for hundreds of yards, panicularly on a moonlit night. it was a 
PREPARINC NICHT DEFENSIVE POSITIOSS ALONC THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. 

Mell of 1st Battalion, 61st ll1fa'ltry, dig foxholes bill vehicles are left in 

the open to allow maneuver. 

simple maller for the enemy to bypass the vchicles. The brigade 

coulHered this tactic by saturating an area with four-man patrols. 

Each mechanized infantry company was required to have a minimum of twenty ambush patrols of fOllr men each night. Comm:lIlclcrs briefed their troops at the 110011 meal: patrols then 

mOllnted armored personl1cd carriers and were taken on a ground 

reconnaissance of cach position. At dusk. while they werc still 

visible to enemy in the arC:I, the MI13's were :Igain dispatched on 

designated reconnaissance romes. Immediately after dark, while 

the APC's werc 1lI0ving, each four·man patrol dismounted and 

established its ambush position. This technique made it difficult 

for an observing enemy to detect ambush positions because the 

vehides never stopped moving during the rcconnaissance. 

After the patrols were in place, the i\I113's formed platoon night 

defensive positions and prepared to move to the assistance of any 

patrol that ambushed an enemy force. Because amhush patrols were 

close together, usually separated by a rice paddy or a dike, the 

enemy could not bypass all of them. ESlablishing four-man patrols 

was a calculated risk since they had little staying power, but once 

the I><,trols had eng:lged the enemy, reinforremellls moved accord· 

ing to plan. Upon hearing the first !'Ound fired, the vehicles nearest 

the ambush took the mOst direct route to the fight, with headlights 

blazing. Later, a tabulation of all fights during the use of this tech· 

nique showed that the longest dme lapse, from the fir�t round fired 

to the arrival of the armored cavalry assauh vehicles, was less than 

four minutes. II was the speed of the i\l 113 that permitted the 

American forces to take the risk of setting up four·man patrols. 
SIIERIDMoI 1\'1551 AND eRn\' l\r.;r.IlIERS OF TEIF. 3D SQUADRON, 'In! CAVALRY 

rhe Sheri(/llll 

In early 1 969 the L'.S. Army ilurOOllccd a new combat. vchicle 

into its armored forces in Vietn;IIll-[hc Gener:11 Sheridan i\1551. 

Cavalry commanders in Vietnam had long expressed a need for an 

amphibious tracked \'chide \\'ith morc firepower than the armored 

ca,"alry assaull "chide hill will1 the same mohiliIY.� The Sheridan 

was a panial answer; it was to replace M48 tanks in cav;dry p\.ltoons 

of divisional cavalry squadrons :lnd ACAV's that had been substillilcd for tanks in cavnIry platoons of regime]}tal cavalry squadrons. The regimental squ<ldruns of the 1 1 th Annorcd Cavalry reo 

wined their l\148A3 tanks in the squadron tank companic�. 

Dcsigncd as an antitank weapon for airborne forces, thc Sheridan was selll to Victnam without iu prima TV antitank missile equipment aboard. Ils armament consistcd of a 152-mm. main gUll, firing 

comhustible-case ammullitiOiI with SC\'cral different warheads, a 

.50·calibcr �[2 mach inc gun :Il thc commander's nation, and a 

7.62-nun. mach inc gun l1lounlcd with the main gun. Thc Sheridan 

had a spotty dcvelopmclH hi�lOry. (haractcrized by difficultics with 

2 J)eplo, men( of the �herj,lans 3ml in .. �lIalion of ,Heile1 enJ;:iue' in the :'lll :rs 

... ere not the on" effofls to impro\(: !Uohili!). 111 Ma) 1968 Ihrt: :tir tush;nn \ehick, 

... efe tested ;11 the [lelia. :-\id;.name.l the �'lth (,".;l\ah-, 1'13tOOIl. the \t,:hicll.'l were $0 

bc$ct b) maintenance problems that the tC"1 ended ;nconclu$;\c!r 
tem and problelll� with the combustible cases for its main gun 

rounds. The missile syslem was not a problem in Vietnam-it was 

not used-but the combustihle case gave persistent lrouble. 

As early as 1 966 the Army staff in Washington was pressing the 

U.S. Army, Vietnam. to accept the Sheridan for its cavalry units. 

At that time the U.S. commander in Vietnam demurred on the 

grounds that since no main gun ammunition was available the 

vehicle was no more than a 5300,000 machine gUll platform, not 

as powerful and agile ;IS Ihe �J I 13. \Vhen main gun ammunition 

was finally available in 1968, however, plans to equip twO divisional 

cavalry squadrons, the 1st and 3d Squadrons of the 4th Cavalry. 

were approved. Neither squ:ldron wanted the Sheridan because it 

was suspecled of being highly vulnerahle to mines :Illd rocket pra. 

pelled grenades and could not break through jungle like lhe 

M48A3. General Abrams. during a visit to the I l lh Armored Cavalry in late 1968, mentioned this fact to the regimental commander, 

Colonel George S. I'allon. Colonel Palton sllggesled that the vehicle would recci\'(' a heller lest if the Sheridans went to a divisional squadron and a regimcntal squadron. Gencral Abrams 

agreed, and sent Ihe first Sheridans to the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, and the 1st Squadron. 1 1 th Armored Cavalry. 

Both units started tr:'lining in January 1969. The new vehicles 

were accomp.1nied by factory representatives. instructors. and evaluators to assist in the traiuing. Reactions of the two units to the 

Sheri dans were CJuite dissimilar, and in large part :Iffected their 

approach to training. The 3d Squadron. 4th C;lvalry. had elected 

nOi to stand down an entire troop for transition: as a result key 

leaders were often absent from briefings and Iraining. The 1 1th 

Armored Cavalry. on the mher hand, g(IVC an clHire troop seven 

days o( uninterrupted tr<lining. In addition, in Ihe 3d Sqtl<ldron, 

4th Cal'alry. the Sheridan rcplaced the i\l48 lank in cavalry platoons 

one for one, while in the II th Armored Cavalry Ihree Sheridans 

replaced two cavalry platoon armored c<lvalry assault vchicles. Thus, 

one unit exchanged a somewhat less capable armored vehicle for its 

�148 tank. while the olher unil exchanged twO liglllly armed and 

armored cavalry aSS;1lI1t vehicles for three Sheridans-annored vehicles with cOllSiderahl), grc;lter firepower and armor. 

On 15 February 1969. in Ihe first comb;1( action involving a 

Sheridan, one from the 3d Squadron. 41h Cav:!lry, struck a 25-

pound prcssure-detOnated mine. The explosion ruptured the hull 

and ignited the combustible·case ammunition of the main gun, 

causing a deadly second explosion that destroyed the vehicle. 
a similar explosion under an i\f48A3 lank would simply have 

blown off a few road wheels. The feeling that the Sheridan was 

extremely dangerous began to groll', and. in the manner of any 

Tumor, sprc:ld frOIll lIui! 10 unit in Vielllam, and even reached the 

training base in the United States. 

After the mine incident, the effectiveness of the Sheridan "':IS 

continually suspect in the 4th Cavalry. Then, on 10 M<lrch 1969. 

in a night hivouac at a ro:ld injunction east of Tar Ninh City, a 

Troop A listening POSt reported enemy movement and the troop 

went to full alert. Sheridan crews used night observation c1evices to 

scan lhe baulefield. Observing a large group of advancing North 

Vietnamese, lhe Sheridans fired canister into the enemy ranks. Con· 

fused by the ovendlelming volume of fire, the North Vietnamese 

broke and ran. The next morning more than forty enemy dead, 

including a ballalion commander and a company commander, were 

found on the hattlefield. Reports of this action quickly spread 

through Ihe squadron, restoring some measures of confidence in 

the Sheridan. 

In contrast the Illh Armored Cavalry's first combat with the 

Sheridan was succcssfui. Tn carly Fcbruary 1969, anticip.·lIing an 

enemy offcnsivc, the regimclll's 1st Squadron moved to Bien Boa 

as a reaction forcc. Task Forcc Privctic, commandcd by Major 

'Villiam C. Priveuc. the squadron cxecutivc officcr, includcd 

Troops A and I3 of the 1st Squadron. After an enemy mortar and 

rocket auack on 23 February, Task Force Privclle moved Ollt on 

an armored swecp and immediately encollntcred an enemy force. 

Placing the Sheridans on line, the twO cavalry troops moved 

forward, firing canister into the enemy ranks. In the face of this 

firepower, the Viet Cong panicked and fled, leaving behind ovcr 

eighty dcad. This fight dcmonstratcd the dcvasting effcct of the 

152'111111. canister round. The troop� were imprcssed with the Sheri· 

dan's firepowcr as compared with th,tL of the armored cavalry 

assault vehicle. 

By the end of the test period. both units had concludcd that 

the Shcridan had greilter mobility, firepower, range, and night· 

fighting ability than the vchicle it replaced. On lhc strength of this 

conclusion. more Shcridans werc sellt to Vietnam. and the total 

Humber had inrrea�cd to more than 200 by late 19iO. Evcntually 

almost cvcr)' cavalry unit in Vietnilm WilS equipped with thc Sheri· 

dan, blll the faCt remilined thilt the Sheridan's combuslib1e<ase 

ammunition could be detonated by a mille blast or a hit by a 

rockct propclled grcllildc. Consequentl)', the crew of a Sheridan 
lank could and did stay and fight afler several hilS. Another disadvantage was that during the wet season, when vehides \!Jere 

drenched every day, the Sheridan's elcctrical fire-control system 

broke down repeatedly. 

"Pile-on" 

Changing strategy on both sides increased the use of all armored 

units, especially armored cavalry. The ability to movc men and 

vehicles rapidly illlo baule was ideal for small, widely separated, 

independent engagements. Cavalry could move quickly and bring 

heavy firepower to bcar at critical points. Once the enemy was 

located and the cavalry unit engaged, reinforcements were immediately sent in to prcvent the enemy from escaping, thcn maximum 

firepowcr was brought to bear. Rapid reinforcemclll of a unit in 

combat was nicknamed "pile-on." In this period of widespread 

small actions, some form of pile-on became the usual mode of 

operation; it was well illustrated by the action of the 3d Squadron, 

5th Cavalry. during the ballie of Binh An. 

In June 1 968 this squadron was performing reconnaiss.·mce 

missions under operational control of the In Cavalry Division in 

the I Corps Tactical Zone. During one such mission, Troop C, 3d 

Squadron, 5th Cavalry. with Troop 0, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry 

(Air) -the dismounted grollnd troop of the air cavalry squadron 

of thc 1st Cavalry Division-had advanccd from thc northwest to 

within 150 mcters of the village of Binh An, thineen kilometers 

nonh of Quang Tri City on the South China Sea. Suddcnly, small 

arms fire and rocket propelled grenadcs showcrcd the American 

forces as scveral North Vietnamese soldiers withdrew into the 

villagc. Both troops hegan firing to maintain pressure on the encmy, 

whilc seOllL sections from Troop C swung to the north and south of 

the village to Cut off the escape rOUles. H undreds of civilian .. fled 

from thc vil1rlge as Lieutenant Coloncl Hugh .I. Banley ordered 

Troops A and B to reinforce the atlrlcking units and stan the 

pile·on. Shonly, thereafter. a captured i\'onh Vietnamese soldier 

reponed that the 3oo·man Kl4 Batt .. lion of the 8I2th Nonh Vietn .. mese Regiment was dug in at Binh An. Realizing thal hc now 

had an enemy hallalion with its back to the sea, Colonel Bartlcy 

rlcted quickly. Troop B was ordered to positions nonh of Binh 

An. Troop C moved into thc center of a horseshoe-shaped cordon 

along with Troop 0, lst Squadron, 9th C.walry. Bv 1030 the four 

cavalry troops wcre in position around Binh An. The Somh China 

Sea blocked the enemy's cscape east, and a N:lvy Swift boat. a small 
PILE-ON OPERATION IN J CORPS, JUNE 1968. ileA V's a'ld tanks of Troop 

B, 3d Sq Ilociro". 5th Cavalry, aUack Bin" A 11. 

coastal p.1.ITOt craft, was also summoned to seal the seaward escape 

rOUles. 

Colonel Banley's requests for fire support brought tactical air. 

craft. aerial rocket artillery. and IOS-mm. anillery. The cruiser 

BostOll and destroyers 0' Briel! and Edson took station offshore. 

When Colonel Bartley g;wc the order to open fire. the <lrea inside 

the cordon erupted :15 hundreds of shells crashed in on the targel. 

A naval observer reponed the shelling to be so fierce that North 

Vielllilmese soldiers could be seen diving into the sea to escape. 

In order 10 strcnglhen the cordon ,md complete the pile-on, 

Colonel Banlcy reqlLcsled the airlift of t\\·o infantry companies 

[rom the In Cavalry Division. The two companies arl'ived early 

in the afternoon: Company C, 1st Battalion. 5th Cnvalry, reinforced Troop 11. 011 the north side, while Company C of the 2d 

Batlalion joined Troop A on the SOlllll. The supporting fire continued for the rest of the afternoon, and was lifted only long 

enough for a psychological operations team to ny over Binh An, 

urging soldiers to Sllrrender. There was no response. and the shelling was resumed. 

To prevelll Ihe North Vietnamese from escaping by night. the 

enemy command struClllre had 10 be broken up. Colonel Hanley 

ordered Troops C and D 10 attack LOward the sea. The cavalrymen 

assaulted the village htU were stopped short by an impassable drainage ditch. cO\'ered by enemy fire. Troop n, wilh its allached infantry disper<;ed between the tracked \·ehides. then mO\'ed 0111 on 

line to attack the village from Ihe north. To allow Troop B to 
of the cordon climbed inside their armored vehicles. Troop B 

swept forh'arc! until its fire began to ricochet off the Troop A 

vehicles, then turned around and fought its way back to its original 

blocking positions. Colonel Bartley then called for resumpLion of 

supporting fire. 

The attack of Troop B apparently ended any illlelllion the 

enemy had of a mass brei'lkout through the COTdon. Thereafter. 

only small groups 01' individlli'lls tried to escape by sea; tank search· 

liglm illurnin:ued lhe heaches, exposing the fugitives. Along the 

inland sides of the cordon, troops lIsing night vision devices be· 

tween nares occasionally spolted Nonh Vietnamese groping 

through the dark. Small arms fire stopped them or drove them 

back. Aniller}' rounds continued to explode in the village all night. 

Morning brollght an in{'l'ease in the shelling, and when the fire 

was lifted the entire cordon tightened tOwaTd the center of Binh 

An. A shon lime later the final anack by Troop B was mel by no 

more than scattered enemy resistance. Stunned Nonh Vietnamese 

soldiers with hands held high began to slllmble from the wreckage 

toward the American forces. As the search of the village progressed. 

it became apparent that the K 14 Battalion had been eliminated. 

Over 200 bodies were found and 44 prisoners were taken. Among 

the dead were the battalion commander, his staff. all the company 

commanders, and the regimental S-1. Three American soldiers had 

been killed. The executive officer of the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, 

Major Michael D. �Iahler, writing several years later of the figlll 

at Binh An, stated: 

\\'e h:ld once more stumbled into a situation and been :lble to lurn 

it to our advantage. nut it was more than stumbling and it was not 

luck thH brought success. It was soldiers in hot steel \'chicles out in 

the gbring Sfllld looking and poking until thc encmy. North Victnam· 

ese and Vict Cong. ncvcr kncw when or wherc :In amlOred column 

would crop up ncxt. 

Rome Plows 

Not every armored operation carried with it Ihe excitment 

and rlear vinory of a well·exectlled pile-on. i\lany. such as main· 

taining route and convoy security, for example, ilH'olved only occasional meetings with the enemy, but were hard work and were 

often boring. One operation that almosl every armored unit par· 

ticipated in at olle time or another was the protection of engi. 

neer unin dearing large areas of jungle with heav), Rome plows. 

Usually such operations extended over a considerable lime and 

involved as man)' as fifty or morc plows. First tried in the III 
ROl\u: PLO\!JS WITII SECURITY GUARD Of i\I 113's 

Corps Tactical Zone, Rome plows soon became commonplace III 

the twO corps zones to Ihe 1101'lh. ahhough they were not usdul in 

the della. Some jungle clearing was dOlle during opcr:ltions slich 

as CEDAR FALU and Ju:-ocno;.;o CITY; howe\'er, m:ljor land,c!c:lring 

efToris did not begin until the arrival of the 169th Engineer Battalion in l\lay 1967. 

The task of protecting the clearing operations crcated a need 

for techniques for which there were no prccedcllls. One method 

was developed during Ihe slimmer of 196; by the 4th Banalion, 

23d Infamry (i\ledlanilcd) . which clc:lred the Iron Triangle in 

Jll Corps, :m area of thick undergrowth and trees of small to 

medium size. Daily opcr:n,ions werc carried OUI by thrce land· 

clearing teams, cadi composed of cight Rome plows and lWO con· 

venlional lmlldmcr" a security force, and a combined arm� force 

for search and reaninn mi�sions. The security force \I�\I:lJ]v can· 

sisled of a mcchanized infantry COmj);,!l)' (minus onc rifle pl:l[oon) 

and a Iilnk plalooll. Because enemy base camps. IlIllncls, and other 

installations were frequently LIIlCO\'ered, each security force con· 

t:lined a search group (If one infantry platooll and an engineer 

squad. \Vhen an enemy b:lse camp was discO\'ered, the clearing 

team went on working while the se:lrch group gathered informa· 

tion and enemy materiel before destroying the Glmp. The com· 

bined arms force \\'orkecl will' the same plow team IhrolighoUl 

the operation in order w insure dose teamwork. 

Before lhe plow� began dearing, preparatory machille fire, mor· 
f 

firsl swath, outlining the arc .. to be cleared, was completed the 

security force deployed in single file olllside e .. ch plow team, with 

a tank section at the front and rear of the column. To discourage 

ambushes, harassing fire was constalllly delivered on the uncleared 

jungle surrounding the working area. If enemy soldiers were discovered, the security force immediately deployed and assaulted 

while one platoon escorted the plows to safelY. To prepare night 

defenses, plow teams cleared firing lanes and dug positions for the 

tracked vehicles. 

In Rome plow oper .. tions along Route 20 from Blackhorse 

Base Camp to the bOllmlary between III Corps and II Corps, the 

3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry, used a differelll procedure. 

Instead of keeping the bulk of its cavalry wjth the plows, the squad· 

ron first cleared the immediate area to be cut, then left a security 

force of twO to four armored cavalry assault vehicles with the plows. 

The remainder of the squadron conducted search and clear operations around the area being worked to keep the enemy from entering. This method became more common in later years. As emphasis on clearing :lIang m:ljor roads and in enemy b:lse :lreas increased, 

Rome plow security operations became routine for armored units. 

In the absence of established wClics, unilS used methods whose 

variety was limited only by the ingenuity of the commanders. 

T(wk Versus T011k 

Combat between t .. nks, for which U.S. rank crews rraditionally 

train, materialized only once for American armored units in Vietn .. m. Since the Nonh Vietn:llnese h:l<i armored forces in October 

1959, when rhe 202d Armored Regiment was created. their reasons 

for nOl making more usc of them e:lrlier can only be conjectured.s 

Cadre frolll the regimcnt h:ld joined the Central Office for South 

Viclllam staff as ;mnor advisers as early as 1962. The North Vietnamese Army cstablidlcd i . . l armor comlll:lnd in the summer of 

1 965, and by i\farch 19i!i there were more th:ln twelve arlllor uniu, 

ranging in sizc from b:III .. lioo to regiment. The I)eople's Republic 

of Chin .. .. nd the Soviet Union supplied all the armored "chicles, 

which included armored personnel carriers, light tanks, and 

medium tanks. The associatcd armored suPPOrt vehicles, including 

self-propelled antiaircraft weapons, were supplemented by captured 

U.S. i\141 wnks. Alt hough poorly m .. naged in early encounters, 

a The: cadre of Ihi, fCRlme:m studied tank warfare in Communist China and the 

$ol'iet Union il] the mi(\.(9:;O·s. The numerical designation of the regiment wu deriled from the: 202 cadre mem1.lers who had be

l] trained abroad. 
actually spearheaded the final aS5.lulu on Somh Vietnam. 

COlllrary lO American teaching on the subject, the Nonh Vietnamese Army did not advocate Ihe usc of tanks in mass. Its doctrine stated that armor would be employed during an allack, when 

feasible, to reduce infantry caslialLies; ho\\'ever, only the minimum 

number of tanks required to accomplish the mission would be 

lIsed. Battle dril1 diclaleci Ihal lead tanks were to advance, firing, 

and LO be supponed by fire from other tanks and from Olnil1ery. 

Close coordin;nion between [,lI1ks and supponing infantry was 

stressed as a key to success in the auack. Because the North Vietnamese lacked air power, they placed strong emphasis on 

camouflage training in arlllor units: in the spring offensive of 1972, 

tank regiments moved g1'eat distances without being detected. 

Until the end of 1913. North Vietnamese armo1' appeared on 

or nea1' the balllefieids of South Vielllam on only four recorded 

occasions. The fi1'st instance \\'as at L,ng Vei Special Forces Camp 

near Klle S:lIlh in the I Corps area on 6�7 Februarv 1968. lIere. a 

North Vietnamese combined ;1TIl1S allack with I}T16 tanks succeeded in breaking through the camp's defensive positions. In 

1969 at Ben I lel. the Nonh Vietnamese .. gain used armor. Against 

Ihe South Vietnamese Army force thai allacked into Ll0S in 1 971, 

Ihe North Victnamese committed an entire armor regiment and 

staged well-coorclinated tank-infantry attacks. In their spring offensive of 1972 in South Vietnam. the North Vielnamesc used the 

JargeSl tank forces of [he war. Entire lank companies slOnned objectives, with infan[ry Iroops following close behind. 

It was at Ben Hel in March 1969 lhat American and North 

Vietnamese arlllor clashed for the first ;Ind only time. The Ben 

Het Spccial Forces Camp in the central highlands of thc II Corps 

Tactical Zone overlooked the 1 10 Chi �Iinh Trail whcre the 

borders of Lao�, Cambodia. and Vielnam come together. In an 

effort to mask nearhy North Vietnamese trOOP movcmcnts. thc 

enellly had subjected the camp to illlense indirect fire altacks 

during February. 

To counter an apparent enemy buildup. elemcms of the 1st 

Battalion, 69th Armor. were sent 10 the area.� C .. ptain John P. 

Stovall's Company B, the forward unil of the ball:liioll, occupied 

strongpoillis and bridge security positions along the len-kilometer 

4 111 �o\e",ber 1968 3 pilot fro", Ihe ilh Squadron. lilh C:l\aln (Air) . reponed 

four unidentified tanks in Ihi5 ;un bUI Ihe report was nc\(:r confirmed. The �Ih 

Infalllrl Di,;sion had n:pons from \ouiou$ sourccs Ihal cnem} lanks were prelCnl 

in the arn. 
stationed in the camp. Free \\·orld forces at Ben Ilet included three 

Vietnamese infantry companies and their Special Forces advisers, 

an AmeriGI1l 1 75-mm. artillery bauery, and twO i\l42's, tracked 

vehicles mounting 40-mm. twin guns on an 1\14 1 tank chassis. The 

1\1<I2's and the 1 75-mm. battery were in the main camp, while mOst 

of the newly arrived t:lnk pl:ltoon took up dug-in positions on a hill 

facing west toward Cambodia. One tank, located in Ihe main camp, 

occupied a firing position guarding the left flank overlooking the 

resupply rome. Through February the platoon endured he:lvy 

enemy shelling by taking cover in its armored vehicles and moving 

from bunker to hunker during <luieE periods. The crews fired their 

90-mlll. guns at suspected North Vietnamese gun sites and bunkers 

on the rugged slopes. When the lank platoon leader was wounded 

and evacuated, Capt:lin Stovall moved the company command pOSt 

to lien I-let. 

Enemy shelling decreased in l\farch, allowing defensive positions to be strengthened and improved. and making the emire 

camp ready for instant action. For three full clays enemy fire abated, 

but at 2100 on 3 l\farch 1969 the camp once again began 10 receive 

mortar and artillery fire in crashing volleys. Both Sergeant First 

Class Hugh H. I l;wcrmale and Staff Sergcant Jerry \\T. Jones 

heard I he SOllnd of tracks and he:,,'y engines through the noise of 

the artillery. With no free world tanks to the west, the probability 

of an enemy tank attack sent everyone inlO action_ Iligh explosive 

antitank (HEAT) ammunition was loaded into tank guns and 

from hattie stations all eyes strained into the darkness. 

In his I.ank, Sergeant J-IavcrmaJe scanned the area with an 

infrared se:lrchlight. bUl could not identify targets in the log. 

Sergeant Jones, from his tank, could see the area from which the 

tank sounds were coming but had 110 searchligill. Tension grew. 

Suddenly an antitank mine exploded 1 . 100 meters to the southwest, 

giving away the location of the enemy: the battle for Ben I-let now 

began in e:lrnest. 

Although immobilized, the enemy PT76 tank thaI had hit the 

mine was still able to fight. Even before the echo of the explosion 

had died, the PT76 hMI fired a round that fell short of the de· 

fenders' position. The remainder of the enemy force opened fire. 

and sevcn other gun flashes could be seell. The U.S. forces returned 

the fire with IIEAT ammunit iOIl from the tanks :lIld fire from 011\ 

other weapons as well. Specialist 4 Frank Hembree was the first 

American lank gunnel" to fire, and he remembers: '" only had his 

muzzle flashes 10 sight on, but I couldn't wait for a bCller target 
RUSSIAN·:l.fAnE PT76 TANK DESTROYED AT BEN HET 

because his shells were landing real dose to us." The muzzle 

flashes proved 10 be enough for Specialist Hembree; his second 

round turned the enemy lank into a fireball. 

C1pital SlOvall called for illumination from the camp's mortar 

section and in the light of flares spotled another PT76. Unfonu· 

nately, the flares also gave the North Vietnamese tanks a clear view 

of the camp's defenses, and as Captain Stovall was climbing aboard 

Sergeant I lavermale's lank, an ellemy high explosive round hit 

the loader's hatch. The con<:ussion blew Stovall and Havermale 

from the tank, and killed the driver and 10:lder. Damage to the 

tank was slight. 

Sergeant Jones took charge, dismounted, and ran to another 

lank which was nOt able to fire on the enemy Inain avenue of 

approach. Still under hostile fire, he directed the tank to a new 

firing position where the ( rew quickly sighted a PT76 beside the 

now burning hulk of the first enemy lank. The gunner, Specialist 

4 Eddie Davis, LOok aim on one of the flashe� and fired. "1 wasn't 

sure of the target." Spc('ialist Davis said, " hut I was glad to see 

it explode a seond later." Every weapon Ihat could be hrollglll 

to bear all the enemy was firing. Ilaving exhausted their basic 
w frg hgh explsves wth ccretepercg fuzes Grdully, 

the enemy fire slackened, and it became clear that an infantry as· 

sault was not immincnt. In the lull, the crews scrambled LO reo 

plenish their basic load from the ammunition slOred in a ditch 

behind the tanks. Tank rounds were fired at suspected enemy 

locations bUl there was no reHlrn fire. The remainder of the night 

was quiet; the tension of battle subsided, and the wounded were 

evacuated. 

The battle for Bcn Hel had not gone unnoticed by the remainder of the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor. Company A and the 

battalion command POSt moved to Polei Kleng to reinforce gTolind 

elemellls and be in a position to counterattack popUlation celllers. 

The 2d PlalOon of Company B assemblcd and l11o\'ed by night to 

Ben 1·lct, where a search of the battlefield the next day revealed 

tWO PT76 hulls and an enemy troop carrier that had not been 

noticed during the baule but now Jay burned OliL and abandoned 

on the edge o[ the baltlefield. The enemy vehicles were j}<"lrt of the 

16th Company. 4th Battalion. 202d Armored Regiment of the 

North Vietnamcse Army. 

Intelligence later revealed that the main object of the auack 

on Ben Het was to destroy the U.S. 175·mm. gUlls. 'Vhalever the 

enemy's illlemion. the camp was held by American lanks against 

North Vietnamese tanks. Not until March 1971, whcn South Vietnamese 1\[41 tanks l>attled North Vielllamcse tanks in L"los. would 

tanks clash agalll. 

11lvading the Ellcmy'J S(Jllctuaries 

The baule th,tI ended in the defeat of the enemy at Ben Het 

was only one of an increasing number of attacks in which the 

enemy did not achieve milil;lry victory. Free world forces were no 

longer comclll to sit back and wait for Nonh Vietnamcse troops 

to make the first move. Base areas, once safe h:lvens for the enemy, 

were penelraled by large armored formations intelll on disrupting 

the enemy logistical system. Gcneral Abram's strategy of destroying the enemy logistics nose was now in full swing. 

One of these operations was conducted during r.

larch and April 

1969 by elemellls of Ihe 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division in west· 

ern Quang Tri Province of the I Corps Tactical Zone. Operating 

in country long thought to be impenetrable to armored vehicles. 

this combined :mllS tcam, designated Task Force REMAGEN, demon· 

strated again the advantage of mechanized forces. Of special signifi· 

cance during this operation was the lack o[ a grollnd line of com· 
Helicopters supplied the task force with over 59,000 gallons of 

diesel fuel and gasoline and more than 1 0,000 rounds of 1 05-mm. 

anillery ammunition. Although the task force encountered normal 

maintenance problems as it moved through the rough terrain, tank 

power packs weighing over four tons and other major components 

were delivered by helicoptcr, For fony-three days, the task force 

operated in rugged terrain along the Laotian border on an aerial 

supply line, demonstrating that evell remote base areas were vulnerable to auack by arillored units. 

The success of REMAGEN was not an isolated case, for the feat 

was duplicated in the III Corps T<lctical Zone. Operation Mo;\,­

TANA RAIIlE"', conducted from 12 April to 14 May 1969 in the area 

east and north of Tay Ninh City, was aimed at a rear servicc support and transport:lIion zone for cnemy troops and equipment 

entering South Vieillatn from Cambodia. Although the exaCt location and identity of enemy unilS in this region were not known. 

two North Vietnamese divisions were thought to bc present. The 

terrain was nOt rugged, but dense jungle hampered movement. The 

MO;\,TM"A RAmt:R force consisted of one infalllry-heavy and two 

<lrmor-heavy task forces under command of the 1 1 th Armored 

Cavalry. The regiment's air cavalry troop and the 1st Squadron, 

9th Cavalry, the ail' cavalry squadron of the 1st Cwalry Division, 

new in support of the operation. An artillery baualion headquarters under direct control of the regiment coordinated all artillery 

fire. A covcr and deception plan was devised to persuade Ihe enemy 

thaI U.S. forccs were moving north and west of Tay Ninh City. 

Air cavalrymen, nying OVCI' enemy base camps. deliberately lost 

map overlays dearly marking d1e area northwest of Tay Ninh Cil), 

as an objective for the operation. and intentional security breaches 

in radio tr:msmi:,siol1s \\'ere employed to lhe same end. 

At 0800 on 12 April operaL ional contml of the 1 1 th Armored 

Cavalry passed fmlll the 1st Infantry Division LO the 1st Cavalry 

Division, marking the beginning of i\[O:-"TANA RAIDER. In accordance with the deception plan. the armor·heavy task fOl'ce� left Bien 

I-Ioa and mo\'ed past the actual area of operntions. As thc 1 1 1h 

Armored Cwalry's 2<1 Squadmn task fOl'ce neared Dall Tieng. it 

swung northwcst to join Company A of the 1st l\altalion, 8th 

Ca,'alry (Airmobile) . while the 11th Cavalry's 1st Squadmll task 

force moved into another hase and l inked lip with Company C of 

the 1st Battalion. 8th Cavalr}'. The movement through and beyond 

the actual are:. of oper;lIions was designed to suggest further to 

the enemy that the operation would be conducted northwest of Tay 
kilometer move and were ready for aClion. 

On 13 April Colonel James H. Leach, commander of the I l Lh 

Armored Cavalry lOok operational control of an airmobile infantry 

unit, the 1st Bauaiion, 8lh Cavalry. and began reconnaissance in 

force operations east lO Tay Ninh City. The 1 1 th Cavalry's 1st 

Squadron task force elliered the area from the southwest, its 2d 

Squadron task force from the northwest, and the 8lh Cavalry task 

force from the northeast. In order lO give the 8th Cavalry task 

force additional firepower and some ,wHored protection, Troop G 

and one platoon of Company I-I. the tank company of the 2d 

Squadron, l i th Armored Cavalry, were attached. The first unit 

lO clash with the enemy was the regimental air cavalry troop, which 

was assessing bomb damage from a B-52 strike. After the aeroriRes 

and infantry reinforcements were sent in, Troop A of the lst 

Squadron, I l Ih Armored Cwalry, arrived. and in an all-day battle 

in the heavy jungle finally drove the enemy out. The following 

days saw scattered fighling as the task forces converged. Artillery 

and air strikes were used liberally to destroy enemy base camps. 

The longest battle of Phase I occurred on 18 April when Troops 

A and B of Ihe 1st Sqlladron, 1 1 th Armored Cavalry, mel a large 

enemy force. I-I cavy artillery and air strikes were used against the 

enemy, Inll the assauli W;IS delayed \\'hen machine gun tracer ammunition created a fire storm in the bamboo thickets. The enemy 

lost seventy-six men in this battle. 

At the end of Phase J. and after two days devoted 10 mailllenance, Phase II opened with a 1 49-kilomeler road march (or the 

entire regiment to Quan Loi in Binh Long Province, 100 kilometers north of Saigon. Phases II and III saw the combined arms 

task forces of the 1 1th Armored Cavalry ranging throughout eastern \Var Zone C. engaging the enemy in short, biuer fights, almost 

always in heavy jungle. The slress again was on mobility, firepower, and the combined arms leam. 

MOSTANA RAIDER demonstrated lhe versatililY of a large, 

mounted unit. aggressively led and employing conventional 

armored award doctrine in isolated jungle. All three phases of 

l\[osTA1'\A RAIDER again showed the value of combined armsarmored cavalry. infantry, artillery. and air cavalry. Surprising mobility was achieved by tracked vehicles, which covered more than 

1 ,600 kilomelers during the operalion; of that distance, ] ,300 kilometers were in dense jungle. �'rore important was the (act that 

this operalion, RElIIAGEN in Ihe nonh. and others throughout Vietnam put free world forces in possession of the enemy base areas 
Vietnamese pulled back to their bases in Cambodia and Ll0S. 

In the southern part of I Corps Tactical Zone, in the spring of 

1969. a similar uase :lrea operation was conducted in the A Shall 

,'alley along the Laos border. Spearheaded by the 10Ist Airborne 

Division. it included eighty tracked vehicles of the 3d Squadron. 

5th Cavalry, and the 7th Vietnamese Armored Cavalry Regiment. 

These were the first :Irmored forces to operate in the A Shall valley. 

Sewrillg the Borders 

After the sliccess of operations against enemy sanctuaries in 

SOllth Vietnam, the next step was sealing the borders. or at least 

making them reasonably secure. \Vith the growing demands of 

pacification and the prospect of troop withdrawals, which would 

limit the resources available. the task naturally fell to mobile units. 

both ground and ;Iir. Ih:ll could move rapidly and control large 

areas. Armored and airmohile units became the mainstay of border 

operations, panicularly those in the critical III Crops area north 

of Saigon. 

Based at Phuoc Vinh, Ihe 1st Cavalry Division. with three brio 

gades of airmobile infantry and operational eotHrol over the 11th 

Armored Cavalry. was extended among more than a hundred kilo· 

meters of border from cast of BII Dop to northwest of Tay Ninh 

City, opposite enemy base area 354. The 25th Inflllllry Division 

controlled the weslern and southern approaches 10 Saigon. and the 

1st Infantry Division commanded the elllrances to the Saigon Ri\'er 

corridor and the old. now quiet war zones in sOlLthern Binh Long 

and Phuoc Long provinces. 

Border opera l ions of the armored cavalry. the air cavalry, and 

the airmobile infantry of the 1st Cavalry Divi .. ion illustrate the 

tactics of hoth sides in the conflict. As the enemy tried to cross the 

bonier in strength. supported from b:lses heyond South Vietnamese 

boundaries. the defenders attempted to prevent the crossing with 

firepowcr and maneuver. By e:lrly 1970 thc cavalry and airmobile 

infantry forces had developed some sophisticated tcchniques employing Rome plow CUlling. semon, and aUlomatic ambush devices 

10 deny the use of trails to the enemy. These techniques were first 

applied system:uic:llly in the northwestern pan of the III Corps 

area from Bu Dol

' to Loc Ninh along QL·14A. and almost immediately produced good rC�lIlts. (S(!C MIIJ) IJ, illset.) The 2d 

Squadron. II th Armored Cavalry. controlled this region from Fire 

Suppon Base Ruth ollt'iide Btl Dop and patrolled east and west 

along Ihe Cambodian border. 
Colonel Grail L. Brookshire, commander of the 2d Squadron, and 

Colonel Donn A. Starry, the regimental commander, conferred at 

Fire SuppOrt Base Ruth, a deluge of mortar and rocket fire 

descended on the base. 1300h commanders look off in helicopters, 

and while Colonel Brookshire gathered his squadron Colonel Starry 

requested tactical air, air cavalry, and artillery fire support. Two 

batwlions of the 65th North VieUlamese Regiment and part of an 

antiaircraft regiment had occupied a dry lake bed about three 

kilometers west of the base; it was from neal' this cl'escclll-shaped 

opening in the otherwise dense jungle that the indircct firc attack 

on the base began. (Mal) /3) Later it was learned thaI the enemy 

had hoped 10 lure the American forces into an airmobile assault 

into the cie:lring, where carefully sited antiaircraft guns would 

have devastated slich a force. 

As gunship, tactical air, and artillery fire was brouglll in, a 

scout helicopter \,'as shot down, leaving the \!Jounded pilot 

stranded in a bomb crater. The 2d Squadron began to move to the 

location, widl the tanks of Company H approaching from the north 

and the cavalry of Troops F and C from the south. A Cobra pilot, 

Captain C.1rl n. Marshall, located the flaming wreckage and spOiled 

the wounded pilOl, First Lieutenant \Villiam Parris, waving from 

the bomb craieI'. Captain Marshall flew in low and landed nearby 

in a hail of machine gun and mOrtar fire. Lieutenant Parris raced 

lO the aircraft and dove into the frOllt seat, where he lay across 

the gunner's lap, legs danging from the open canopy, as Captain 

l\ofarshall pulled lip, barely clearing the wood line. 

Artillery, fighter bombers, and gunships descended on (he 

enemy, while Troop F hastened up Highway ItlA to link up with 

Troop C. which was already heading north. After crossing a 

meadow ncar Ball 13a Linh and a seemingly unfordable stream, 

Troop C bore illlo the jungle, Ninety minutes and two kilometers 

of single and double canopy jungle later, Troop G arrived, joined 

Troop F, and. on line, the cavalry assaulted. Fl'om the helicopter 

Colonel Starry had meanwhile called for an airdrop of tear gas 

clusters on enemy bunkers toward the north side of the crescent. 

Colonel Brookside hailed the artillery fire long enough for the 

drop, which brought the enemy troops out of the bunkers and 

sent them running north for the border. Colonel Brookshire then 

ordered al'lillcry and gunship fire while Troops C and F attacked 

through the enemy posilions. Company H, in position north of 

the crescent, caught the fleeing enemy wilh canister and machine 

gun fire. 
-, 

" 

1-1�.2-11 

/ 

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,. 

position 

,.- --:.. 

, 

- _I.!.CompaIlY 

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.. 

� THE CRESCENT 

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Bau Oil L1nh � 

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Bu Dol? 

� THE BATILE AREA 

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MAP 13 

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/" THE BATTLE 

.� 

2.11 

I ' OF THE CRESCENT 

F�2'11 20 Jan 1970 

(not to scale) 
fall. Darkness prevell led a detailed search, and the next morning 

the 2d Squadron pulled OUt :ll dawn. The fight had lasted almost 

fourteen hours, with over GOO rounds of aniJlery fired, thirty tactical strikes employed, and fifty Cobra rocket loads delivered. The 

65th North Vielllamese Regiment did not appear again in baule 

for nearly four mOllths. Colonel Brookshire's search of the crescent 

was broken off abruptly as he moved to reinforce the regiment's 1st 

Squadron, fighting near An Loc. 

Early on 21 January 1970, thirty·five kilometers to the west, 

the 1st Squadron, which was operaling in a Loc Ninh rubber plan· 

tation, i ntercepted twO Nonh Viemamese hattalions moving south 

illlo Loc Ninh District. The I Ilil Armored Cavalry piled on with 

Colonel Brookshire's 2d Squadron racing in from the crescent 

bauleground to the nonheast and Lieutenant Colonel George C. 

Hoffmaster's 3d Squadron auacking nonh along I-lighway 13 out 

of An Loc. Over half of the regiment converged all the fight in less 

than three hours and broke the back of the enemy attack. The twO 

North Vietnamese banal ions ran for cover in Cambodia, with 

elements of the cavalry pursuing them to the border. The pursuit 

was aided by a map found on the North Vielllamese commander 

that showed the escape plan. Those fugitives who reached the escape rOlltes were mel by t:lctical ail' and artillery fire. After these 

twO fighLS and a few more with the same Olitcome, the enemy 

showed reluctance to risk a fight with the cavalry, whose mobility 

and firepower had been overwhelming. 

Operations along Ifighwa)' 14A were so sllccessful in drying up 

enemy logistical operations along the jungle trails that it was decided to repeat the scheme in \Var Zone C. The plan was to Stop 

the supply operations or the enemy's 50th Rear Service Group 

operating Olll of the Cambodian Fishhook area into the Saigon 

River corridor through 'Var Zone C. The American rorces were to 

conduct extensive land clearing operations along Route 246, generally east and west across 'Val' Zone C, thus blocking the north 

and south trails from C11llbodia to the Saigon River corridor. 

By mid-February Rome plows had cleared a swath of jungle 

400 to 500 meters wide along Highway 246 from An Lac in Binh 

Long Province to Kallim in Tay Ninh Province, just somh of the 

bordcr. Along this cut the I I th Armored Cavalry began operations. 

The 3d Squadron anchored the east nank near An Loc, the 2d 

Squadron held the middle, and the 1st Squadron covered the west 

in north\\'cstern Tay Ninh Province. Airmobile infantry battalions 

of the 1st Cavalry Division, operating south in War Zone C, fre-
inlcrdiClion force. 

Colonel Starry was convinced that to ell( enemy supply lines 

sliccessfully ground had to be heJd, and that control of the ground 

followed from conswnt lISC of the ground. The operational paucrn 

of the regiment, therefore, was one of extensive p:Hrolling, day and 

night, and the selling up of an intriGlle nClwork of mantled and 

unmanned ambushes all along the trail system. The cavalry soon 

GUllC to know the enemy's Irai[� well. .mel by clevcr lise of alltomalic devices reduced ('nemy logistical operations 10 a Irickle. The 

ambush net cost the enemy len to thirty (<l511:lIlics each night. 

Every site was checked, ;mel electrical devices werc mo\'cd :md rcsct 

each day. It was like l'IInning :l. long tr:l.pline. 

Monitoring enemy radio Ir:lfIlc, the Illh Armored Cavalry 

learned that enemy units 10 the sOllth \\'ere desperate for food and 

ammuuil ion. Enemy relief panics were killed in ambushes or by 

cavalry units th:n LOok advant;lge of information gleaned from ('areless enemy radio operaLOrs. Enemy messellgef'i �ent along the trails 

were killed or captured; their mesS<1ges and pl;ms provided information for setting up more traps. 

The enemy, reluctant to confrolll the ca,·alry directly, a llacked 

only hy fire in \Var Zone C, and tried to outflank the net of ambushes. The 209th i\'onh Vietnamese Army Regiment 10'lt o,'er 200 

men when it ran headlong into Captain John S. C;ddwcll's Troop 

L, 3d Squadron. in the I.ac Ninh rubher plantation in i\larch. 

L1ter, in April. the 95C Nonh Vietnamese Regiment. trying 10 

move west arollnd l11e ambush system. encOIllltered l.iell\enanl 

Colonel James n. Reed's 1st Squadron neal' Katulll. \Vith the 

cavalry and tilnk'l of the 1st Squadron heavily engaged, Colonel 

St,lrry alerted Colonel BJ'()ol.�hire 10 move two troops from \he 2d 

Squadron \\Test 10 join in the fight. The enemy now had 111'0 hattalions locked in combat with the 1st Squadron, while a third 

battalion was escaping LO the north. Realizing he faced the cavalry 

regiment, the encmy commander panicked and hegan broadr;lst,ing 

instructions to his battalions in the dear. As the enemy troop'l tried 

(0 di�eng;lge, intercepts of the instructions the}' were receiving were 

passed to Colonel Reed. Armed with this information, the 1st 

Squadron blocked the enemy. In the ensuing melee the cavalry 

squadrons \'inualJ)' de�l1'()yed the IWO hallaIions opposing Colonel 

Reed. SOllle or the third battalion to the nonh escaped despite air 

strikes and anillel')' fire placed along the escape routes. 

Il was more than six month� berore the North Vietnamese 95C 

Regiment fought again. The extensive system of Rome plow ClItS 
abled free \\'orld forces to choke off enemy supply lines and neutralize bases in \V,lr Zone C. More so Ihan at any other period in 

the war, except when Ihe attacks were made into Cambodia, enemy 

access 10 South Vietnam was cut off. 

Paci{icafiolt Efforts 

While oper:u ions ngainst the sanctuaries and along the border 

were in progress. important steps were taken to win over the people 

in areas long under cnemy comrol. In the spring of 1969 major 

enemy action had diminished to a level that offered an opportunity for large·scale effons in this direction. On 13 April 1969 

the l73d Airborne Brigade began Operation WASIII1"GTON GREEN, 

which would occupy the brigade faT the next nineteen months. 

The mission called for placing one mechanized and three infamq' 

baualions in four densely populated districts of Binh Dinh Province in the " Corps Tactical Zone. Primary emphasis was to be 

given village and hamlet protection in order to enable territorial 

(orces, in conjunction with other government agencies, to conduct 

searches behind a prOlcclive shield of South Vietnamese Army and 

American forces. U.S. troops were usually present at first to supplement weak local security forces until recruilmem and training 

would permit replacement oE American by Vietnamese units. The 

1st Batr.alion, 50th Infantry (Mechanized) , was assigned 10 Phu 

My District for most of this operation. 

Even large units such as the 1st Brigade, 5111 Infantry Divi�ion 

(Mechanized) . became totally involved. In January 1970 the brigade 1,lUnched Oper:n ion GREt:N RIVER, designed to further the 

pacification progr;lIn in the northern I Corps area by conducting 

combined operat ions with the South Vietnamese 1st Infantry 

Division. Reconnaissance in force, search and clear operations. and 

measures against enemy rockets were undertaken throughout 

Quang Tri Province. 

By 1970 many American units were committed to securing large 

areas in the interest of the South Vietnamese government's pacifi· 

cation program, and some armor units had ,hat as a primary mis· 

sion. Extensh'e surveillance operations were cOllducted along thc 

Demilitarized Zone to prevent enemy infiltration, and security 

screens werc established around populated and militarily significallt areas. 

Forces in Operation CREEN RIVER killed over 400 of the enemy 

in six months. J\§ GREEN RIVER ended. units of the brigade began 

Operation \VoLn: MOUNTAIN. which lasted into January 1 971. 
. ' 

. � .. ' .f!�- '��J-! - - • 

A TANK Of' TilE 2D BAlTALlO�. 34TH AR.\fOR, IN POS1TIO:': TO PROVIDE 

STATIC ROAD S£CUII.JTV 

Combined operations were (onduelcd by the brigade, lhe South 

ViclIlamcsc 1st InfaIHry Division, and lcrriLOrial forces through· 

alit nonhcrn Quang Trj Province. The operations included the 

usc of armored forces as security along the Demilitarized Zone, on 

lines of cOllllllllnicOll ioll, ilnd around populated areas. 

Pacification tITans <lnd measures to aid the Vietnamese armed 

forces to aSSlllne dle full burden of the war intensified in mid-1969 

with U,S. troop withdrawals. The South Vietnamese Army under· 

tOok a program to expand lhe armored cavalry from len to seven· 

teen regiments. Even more notc\\'onhy was the activation of twO 

armor brigade headquarter". which allowed South Vietnamese annored units 10 operate in larger formations. Both the I and IV Armor 

Brigades deployed to their respective corps tactical zones during 

1 969, and were soon followed by t\\'o more hrigades. Each armor 

brigade was a highly mobile. independent, tactical headquarters 

that could control ten 10 tll'ch e squadrons. 

On 22 and 23 May 1969. a joim Vietnamese-American armor 

conference convened: attending were the South Vietnamese Chief 

of Armor, wilh his staff and his American adviser!;, and all Somh 
visers. Their purpose was 10 review South Vietnamese armor and 

set g0<1!S for its f\llure de,'elopment. The key question was whether 

currem missions were m'lking full use of armored units. The genera! response was no. Fr:lgmenting of armored units, static missions, 

the use of tanks as pillboxes, and assigning armored forces permanent areas of operation were the most common mistakes singled 

out by South Vietnamese armor leaders. The SOllth Viell1amese 

Armor Command made an honest effort 10 evaluate itself, and took 

positive action to improve its performance. 

In November 1969 the Vietnamese Joint General Staff published a directive on employment of Vietmmese armored units. 

The directive first noted improper uses that had been described 

by the armor commanders, and then added lhal many units had 

failed to provide logistical support for armored units assigned 10 

them. It directed certain corrective actions. 

1. Avoid the use of armored forces in static security missions. 

2. Do nOt divide armored units below troop level. 

3. Give missions of reconnaissance and search and destroy in 

large operational areas. 

4. Use armor brigade :lIld regimental hcadqu<lncrs to direct 

and cOlllrol combined arms operations. 

5. Use armorcd units in night operations with the support of 

organic searchlights, mortars, Aares, artillery, and aircraft. 

6. Develop U.S. and Victnamese combined operations. 

This analysis of the South Vietnamese Army's usc of armor and 

the subsequcnt directivc from the Joint Gencral Staff put hackbone into Soulh VicUlamcse armor doctrine. Allhough it. fumed 

somc feeling� in Ihc ViCl llamesc command. improvcmcnts in field 

use were nOliced immedialcly. In February 1970 lhe 1st Armored 

Brigade conductcd mobile independelll operations along the sea 

in the northern part of the I Corps Tactical Zone. Controlling lip 

to two regiments of cavalry. Rangers, and territorial forces, for two 

months the brigade roamed over the area and succeeded in destroying three enemy battalions. As part of the operation, 5,000 acres 

of land were cleared. The enemy was effectivcly defeated and 

moved away: Regional and Popular Forces uniu moved in and 

established permanent setllements. Almost 900 Viet Cong and 

North Vietmllnesc were killed or captured, white the brigade lost 

sixty-eight men. For success in its first large-scale operation, the 

Vietnamese 1st Armored Brigade was awarded a U.S. Presidential 

Unit Citation. 
In the United States. :as the newly elected president, Richard 

M. Nixon, prepared to tal.

c office in WashingLOIl in late 196ft the 

single moSl vexing prohlem confronting the administnllioll was 

Vietnam. Unable to resolve the issue s:llisfaclorily, Lyndon B. 

Johnson had chmen not to seek ;UlOlher term. In response to instructions from \Vashingtoll, U.S. Amh:rssac1or Ellsworth nunker 

and General Abr:lIllS h:rci privately discussed with President Thiel!. 

Ihe possibility of withdrawing some American forces. By January 

1969 these ronvcJ'�arions had cxpnnded into specific proposal� for 

sending home fir�l one, then two AmcriC:lI1 divisions. Then, in 

April, the !lew adminiSlration issued National Security Study 

MemoranduTll 36, directing preparation of plans for turning the 

war over to the Vietn;nncsc. 

In Vietnam plans were drawn up in strictest secrecy, under the 

carcrul eye of Gcncral Ahrams him�elf hy a very small task force 

headed by Colonel Starry. At the Olltset the idea thai withdrawal 

of a single American soldier would cause the collapse of the whole 

war effort was. 10 me the words of General Abrams "simply UIl· 

thinkable." Ceneral Ahr;lIllS. howe\'er. was firmly cOlwinced that 

the Vietnamese Army could do more. He drew considerable confi· 

dence from the gro\\'ing sllccess of the p.1.cification effort, and, 

always a practical man, he realized, that like it or not, the new 

administration was commiued to withdrawing some or all Amer· 

ican forces. His instructions to Colonel Starry were quite clear: 

" ... do it right, do it in an orderly way . save Ihe armor units 

OUi until last, they can buy LIS more time." ThllS arTllor units. 

specifically excluded from the buildup until late 1 966, would 

anchor the withdrawal of American combat units from Vietnam. 

On 9 June 1969 President Nixon met President Thiell al Mid· 

way Island and they <lgreed 10 the first withdrawal of U.S. ITOOpS 

from Vietn:lIn-25,OOO men. On l!l July Company C, !lei Marine 

Tank Bawdion. became the first U.S. armor unit to le:l\'e Smuh 

Viemam as one haual ion landing team of U.S. marines bo.1.rded it<; 

amphibiom ships. Troop withdrawals cominued at an ever·accelerating pace, even while l<lI'ge·�ale operations. such as the incursion 

imo Camhodia of 1970 and the enemy offensive of earlv 1972 were 

in pr�Te�s. From the beginning, force planners held Ollt armored 

units-tanks, air cavalry. �rollnd cavalry, and mechanized infantry. 

As divisions 01' brigades left the cOllmry. their armored uilits re· 

mained behind. The mobility and firepower of armored units made 

them the logical choice fol' operations over extended are:ls. and 

reargllard, delay, and economy of force roles were traditional armor 
Division dep.1.rtcd in 1 969, the 2d BaualiOIl. 4ith Infantry (�techanized) , and the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, remained behind. 

Almost every air cavalry unit remained in Vietnam until early 

19i2. These armored units provided a maximum of firepower and 

mobilil}' with a minimum of U.S. troops. By the end of 1970, with 

the withdrawal of American units in high gear, founeen armored 

bau:llions or squadrom remained in Vietnam. In December 1971 

armored units represented 54 percelll of the U.S. maneuver battalions still in Vietnam. 

The U.S. armored units that remained supponed and trained 

Vietnamese forces while combat operations were carried Ollt. One 

such unit, thc U.S. 7th Squadron, 1st Cavalry (Air) , supported the 

Vietnamese 7th, 9th, and 2 1st I nfantry Divisions in lhe delta and 

along the Mekong River corridor to Cambodia. On occasion, air 

cavalry units IIscd South Vietnamese troops as aerorifle platoons. In 

addition, the squ:,dron trained Vietnamese pilots in a program calling for three months or 180 hours of flight time for each pilot. 

During this successful program, it was found ill\'aluable to have an 

individual who spoke Vietnamese aboard each American helicopter 

while the aircraft were supporting South Vietnamese operations. 

Troop D, the ground troop of the squadron. provided instruction 

in small unit I.aetics for ViClIlamese Regional and Popular Forces. 
CHAPTER VJI 

Across the Border: 

Sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos 

As c:.rly as 1 965 the North Victn;lIncse llsed areas of Cambodia 

and Laos nC:lf the horders of South Vietnam as sanctuaries in which 

to stock supplies and conduct lfaining without illLcrfcrcncc. It was 

in these countries th;n Ihe Nonh Vietnamese buill the famous Ho 

Chi Minh Trail as their principal supply rOllle lO the south. As 

time wore Oil :wd Ihe tempo of the W;If increased. lhe word trail 

became a misnomer, for a primitive nCI\\'ork of jungle p:uhs had 

grown into a vast system of improved roads alld trails, llIany of 

which could be used the year-round. The image of a North Vietnamese soldier-poneI' trudging south from '-lanai for six lIIomhs 

with twO mortar shells destined for SQUlh Vietn:1I1l could no longer 

be conjured up. Uy linc 1968 thc North Vietnamcsc were moving 

most of thcir supplies by trllck. pipeline. and river barge. 

This relatively sophisticated transportation system terminated 

at depots withill and adjacent to South Vietnam. Comhat units in 

South Vietnam received supplies from these depots by a simpler 

but highly organized system of distrihution that made usc of small 

boats. pack animals. and pOrtcrs. In Lhe late I 960·s. as the free 

world forces extcnded their operations illlo the enemy base areas in 

South Victn:'nll. Thc cnemy regular forces expanded the bases and 

depots across the I)ordcrs in C,mbodia and I.aos. (S('e J\lflP 14, 

inset) . Since for political reasons these base areas were invio1;\le, 

they providcd sanct tt:lrics to which the North Vietnamese and Vict 

Cong IInits could retire periodically from combilt in Somh Vietnam, tr;till and refit, ;lIld retllrn 10 combat. Free world forces «llIed 

these sanclUarics basc areas. since they pro\'ided nOt only supply 

and maintenance facilities l)Hl ;lIso training and lllilneUVer areas. 

classrooms. headquaners, and even housing for families of soldiers. 

The Clmbodian government, under pressure from North Vietnam :lI1d China. had for several years concedcd thesc areas to the 

enemies of SOUlh Vietnam. In �r;.rch 1 9iO. however, Marsh .. 1 

Lon Nol of Cambodia seized control of the government and beg,lIl 

a campaign to restrict the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in 

their use of his country. Lon Nol's efforts hinged on a proposal 

that would allow them 10 continue to use some base areas. 11IIl 

under Cambodi .. n control. Since it would have severely hampered 
from South Vietnam, the proposal was rejened b}' the Viel Cong 

and North Vietnamese, who moved to occupy major portions of 

eaSlern Cambodia. 

The coalition govcrnmCIll of 1.'-1OS had an arrangement with 

North Vietname�e �ympathizers that did not permit it to object 

to Viet Cong :md North Vietnamese openllions in i.."lOS. Base areas 

and their supporting transportation networks in 1..10S therefore 

continued to provide (Titic:d �upport for Nonh Vietnamese forces 

operating in South Vietn:lIn, and were a thorn in the side to the 

free world forces. At one lime or another most free world soldiers 

had seell Viet Cong (lnd Nonh Vietnamese Iroops moving with 

impunity on the o thel" side of lhe ill·defined border. 

Efll"fy O/)(,I"III;o1lS /1110 Cflmuod;fl 

As the C.1mbodian situation hecame worse, the Camhodian government sought military a<;si�tance from the United States and 

SOIllh Vietnam. In re�p(mse the South Vietna11lc�e Army III Corps 

headqLlaners laLLIH.:hcd TOAN TitAN .. 'I I. a t hrcc·day opcrat ion into 

the so-called Angel's 'Vin�, an (lre;1 in C:lInhodia long used by the 

enemy for resting and refitting units. Three SOIlih Vietnamese 

Army lask fones, each nmt;tining armored ca\'alry and Ranger 

units. began the operation at OROO on 14 April 1970. They wcre 

supported in SOlllh Vietnalll hy the U.S. 25th Inf(lillry Division. 

At midday, eight kilomeler<; imide C<1I11hodia, a sharp fight hroke 

Olll, and fierce hand-In-hand com hat continued uTltil late afternoon, 

when the enemy hroke :I\\'ay :lIId ned. The lIext day the capture of 

several base c(lmps rc,'ealed the full extent of enemy log:istical oper· 

ations in CMllbocli:1. PI,lIls (':tiled for the Vietn;unese Air Force to 

evacuate caplLlred supplie�, hili hecause of the inexperience of the 

Vietnamese in large-�(";de IOAi�tical airlift opcrations most. material 

had 10 be c\'acuated hy tr\lck or lI"acked ,'ehicle. \Vh,1l conld not 

be removed was destroyed. In all. 3i8 of the cilemy were killed and 

37 captured. Eight South Vieillamese soldier� werc killed. Success 

brought confidence 10 the South Vietnamese governmclll and the 

army. 

Thus encouraged, ,he South Vietnamese Army decided to ex· 

pand operations into the Crow's Nest area on 20 April 1 970. The 

expedition was planned "l' the SOUlh Vietnamese, :lIld involved 

thrce armored cavalry regiments and three Ranger h:llialions under 

control of the VielllOlllle-'>e 'lth Armored Urig:lde. The altack lasted 

I hree days, and again was conducted without U.S. advi�ers or U.S. 

support once the trOOps were across the border. After two days of 
IUrncd to eV<lclialing I;lrge quantities of captured weapons and 

ammunition. The difficulties experienced in lIsing armored cavalry ass.:luh vehicles to haul C:IPI llTCd equipmelll prom Pled field 

commanders to request that in future operations :uuflIunilion 

caches be destroyed. 

On 28 April the ViclIlamcse 2nd and 6th Armored Cavalry 

Regimcllls and Vietnamese Regional Forces attacked again inLO the 

Crow's Nest. American ad"i�crs werc still not illlowed on the ground 

in Cambodia, but for the fir�l lime U.S. suppOrt was used-comIlland lind control hel icopters and gunships. The aHaek penctr:llcd 

many enemy bases and diverted enemy :tnclllion from the larger 

aHacks in III Corps Tactical Zone. 

These early raids. a prelude to the major effort. helped to im· 

prove SOUlh VielI1amese pnx:cdures and techniques for use in more 

open warfare. They also afforded the hee world forccs a brief but 

eye·opening look at the massivc size of the support fal"ilities located 

across the border. i\IatericJ and illlell igence information confirmed 

in military minds the ahsohlle necessity for large·scale operations 

into all the base areas. As a result of the aHacks, the frustration 

buill up over five years wa� vcnled. "nd success caused confidence 

and morale in the SOlllh Vietnamese Army lO s0.1r. UnfoTlun:nc1y, 

these operations also served to w;ml the Viet Cong and North Viet· 

namese lil"l more altacks could be expened, ;mel a hast)' exodus of 

enemy unilS and headquarters 10 the west aud north began. 

After the enemy offensives of 1 968, the tactics of free world 

forces underwent a change; from defellsive. counterinsurgency taCtics the allies began moving IOwanl the offensive and low:lrd the 

employmellt of more convemional tactics. The operations \0 secure 

the borders and cleat the base areas in SOllth Vietnam heralded 

this change. In the massive attach imo the border sanctuaries. 

which resembled exploitation or pursuit in conventional warfare. 

the change in tactics reached full course, and at all levels of command the difference was perceptible. 

The !UlI;n A/ItICk /1110 Cambodia 

The major attack illlo Cambodia was a series or operations 

jointly planned and conducted hy South Vietnamese and American 

units. directed ;1t the highesl le"els. and involving the headqn:H"ters 

and forces or the 501lth Vietnamese Army in the 111 and IV Corps 

zones ,md tbe U.S. 11 Field Force. ViClIlam. When it heg-an. Opera· 

tion TOAN TII,\;o.G 42. lhe Viet namese ponion. W;"IS proba bly the 

bcst planned SOllth Vie(llamese operatioll to that dale. \Veather 
any delay \\ould invite considerable difficulties since the monsoon 

season \\'ould hegin in late May. The weather in late April and 

early �Iay would be good. The area chosen for the first altack was 

Aat, \\'idl few natural obswcles to cross-collnlry movement. The 

operation was planned I)y III Corps headquarlers under conditions 

o( great secrecy, and the panicipaLing Vielllamese units received 

only sketchy details unLil the plan was released on 2i Apri1.1 Early 

in the planning stage American advi�ers to South Vietnamese units 

acted as coordinators rather than advisers. Once the opennion 

began, adviscrs \I'ere responsible for requcsting and cOllll'olling 

American aid in the form of medical evacuation. close air support, 

and arlillery fire. The a(I\'isers remained with their Vietnamese 

unilS tip to thirty kilometers imide Cambodia; a presidential decree 

banned all U.S. ground p:micipation beyond the thirty-kilometer 

line. 

The operation \\'a� planned so that U.S. and South Vietnamese 

forces were scparalt.'<:1 Iw \\'cll-defined boundaries although they 

allacked simultaneouslv. This ;lI'rangelllelll considerably simplified 

coordination and logistical planning and avoided possible confusion 

on the groulld_ The atlack resembled a large double en\'elopmelll, 

with the South Vietnamese forces forming most of the western 

pincer and the American forces the center and the eastern pincer. 

(Mill) 14) Throughollt the allack Vietnamese forces operated in 

combined arms task forces with infantr)" artillery, and :lrmored 

ca,'alry. The one except ion was in the east in the airmobile assault 

of a South Vietnamese airborne brigade under U.S. control. 

Operation TOA=" TIIAK(: 42 hegan at 0710 on 29 April. less 

thilll fOTly-ei�ht hours after the participating units were informed. 

when Sont h Vietnamese lask forces attacked 10 destroy ellemy forces 

and supplies in C:.mhodia's Svay Rieng Province, The mission 

included opening ami securing National Highway 1 to allow tile 

evacuation of Vietnamese refugees and assisting the hard-pressed 

Cambodian Army to reg-ain control of its terri LOry. 

All three la�k forces moving south and west in the Angel's \Ving 

mCl the enemy during Ihe first two days. The Viet Cong and North 

Vietnamese had anticipated Ihe atlack and fought a stubhorn delaying action, hoping lO e"acllate supplies and equipment. Nonetheless, the first ohjectives were <

luickly achieved, and on 1 May the 

I u.s. ptanninjl: for ('..ambod;a 1'0'35 also n�rv �C:l: un;t.s wc:rc: informed onil' 

1,,·e:llIr·fonr hOllrs br-fore the :tHack. HowcI'e:r. the: l>05il;on;ng or man)' arti1le'1' 

units and the: smhlcn de:mand for Cambodian maps produccd unfonunate: seetlnl,. 

i(':Jk5. As in anI' bi/!: ol>C:falion. the nIppon IInits in the: rear weTC: informed firsl. 

The: enemy definitely kllew of Ihe allack. 
OPERATIONS INTO CAMBODIA 

MAY -JUN 1970 

<: = Dilection 01 attack 

o 40 MILES 

o 40 KILOMETERS 

Kwnpong Cham 

7'- Krel< '\. ' ..

 DOG· u:l E D 

Prey Veng t 

KBmpong 

TnKh 

MAP 14 

Ol l 

Loe: Ninh 

1st CAVALRY 

.. DIV'SIO� FORCES 

0Kat� --.JFIS'HHOOK 

251h DIVISION eTode 

FORCES 

vcmvc BORDER I 

SANCTUARIES �.o. 

1970 

j (rot I) ... 10. 

J 

, 

I 

--� 

CAM8CDIA ;;i) 

'�' 

,,�t,., 

:: i'iJ 

,.t SOUTH 

.De ".J<" VIETNAM 

,_ .P": •• 

SOUlh Vietnamese swept west to the provincial c:lpitaJ of Svay 

Rieng, opening Route I to the cast to Vietnam. The speed and 

success of this attack had in pan been made possible by lessons 

learned in previous rorays. The advance had been preceded by 

heavy air and artillery attacks on key areas inside Cambodia. Unlike 

the procedure in previolls opera Lions, assault units kept on attacking while [ollow-up units were responsible for the removal of 

captured supplies. 

While the enemy's attcntion was riveted on the Angel's \Ving 

region, the eastcrn pincer of the ellvelopment, TOA1\'C TIlt\1\'G 43. 

was to attack under the command uf Brigadier General Robert L. 

Shoemaker. assistant division commander of the 1st Cavalry Division (Air) . His task force included the 3d Brigade of that division. 
(�lechaniLed) . the Somh Vietnamese 3d Airborne Brigade, and 

the U.S. II th Armored C:l\·alry.2 

Following intensive air and artillery bomhardmcnt. the air· 

borne brigade was to 'iwge ,. helicopter a�saull imo the area north of 

the Fishhook lO �cal off eSClpe routes, while ground units auacked 

north. Air cavalry was to conduct screening operations as SOlllh 

Vietnamese cavil1ry screened the cast flank in Vietnam. Task Force 

Shoclll;'lkcr's mission was to locate and eliminate enemy forces and 

equipment. There was :lIso it possibility that the Celllral Office for 

South Vietnam, the clmivc enemy headquarters, would be found in 

the Fishhook :mel could he destroyed. 

At 0600 on I May. U.S. ;millery firc explodcd on the propmed 

helicoptcr landing zoncs: thc 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (Air) , 

began acri:d reconnaissance and was the first unit to find thc enemy. 

Company C. 2d Haaalion. 17th Infantry (�fechanized) . closely followed on lhc WCSt hy the 2d Battalion. j·hh Armor, led thc attack 

of the 3d Brigade. I�t Cavalry Di\'ision (Airmohile) at 0945. To 

the east the 1 1 th ,\rmored Cavalry RegimclH \\'a� hit at the harder 

by elements of two enemy battalions. From their command vchicles 

with thc lead tank ])I:lloon of the 2d Squadron. Colonel Donn A. 

Starry, the rcgimental commander. and Lieutenant Colonel Grail 

L. Brookshire. commanding the 2d Squadron. directed tactical air 

and arlillery fire that immediately suppresscd the enemy fire. The 

II th CI\'alry crossed Ihe harder al 1 000. 

The 2d Battalion, 47111 Infantry (Mechanized) , and the 2d Battalion, 34111 Armor, pn}("eeded '

nol"lh, unoppo�ed, to secure landing 

zones to be u�cd later in the day hy the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry 

Division.8 The 2d and 3d Squadrons. 1 1 th Cav;l1ry, moved north 

with little opposition until I:ne afternoon when Company 1-1 

entered a clearing �ix kilometers inside Camhodia. Overhead, a 

scout hel icopter from the regimelHal air cavalry troop di�covered 

a large cnemy force well entrenched on the edge of the clearing. 

The jungle suddenly empled with enemy fire, and it quickly 

became evident that the enemy was on three sides of Ihe 2d 

Squadron. 

Colonel Starr}' immediately directed Lieutenant Colonel Bobby 

2 To bring thc: t \th Armorc�d C:I.\�lry t�eth�r. the Sci .squadron moved more 

than 300 kilometers ;11 t"'O d3H and arr;'"ed witht e'�I1' n:hide oper:uiotlal, JUSt 

in time to joiu Ih� aU:lCking column. 

3 Th" 2d liaualion, 31th \nnor. was withdrawn hom r.:unhodia after onl) Ii.� 

da,-, because: of c<ro:ccuhc: t�nk hrukdownJ duc: to in:>dequ3le m�inten:tnce. The 

pieccmul emplo.melll of this IInit in thc entire war, togelher ,,·ith iu �ccomp�ll )in& 

IOfI:i5ticai problem" h:>d contributed to this wilhdraw�l. 
enemy defenses. The air C:lvalry hit the enemys rear and his with· 

draw"l fOUles, and al 16·15 lhe enemy force. estimated at a battalion, 

broke "nd ned, leaving fifty-two dead. Two troopers of the 1 1 th 

Cavalry wcrc killed, the only American soldiers t o d i e in Cambodia 

on 1 May. 

By afternoon on 2 May free world forces WCfC fight ing in both 

wings of the envelopment. The SOllth Vicillamese forces in the 

Parrot's Beak attacked sOlllh wilh IWO task forces frolll the III 

Corps Tactic;!! Zone. while three lask forces from IV Corps altacked 

north.� The object was to tnlJ) the enemy with elements of nine cavalry rcgimcllls. The 7th Squadron, 1st Cavalry (Air) , sweeping 

ahead and to the nanks, had one troop credited with ki1ling over 

170 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. The rapidly moving cavalry 

squadrons and U.S. air cover quickly broke the resistance of enemy 

troops and chased them into the guns of the Dlher Somh ViClIlamese 

task forces. The twO SOUlh Vietllamese forces l inked up early on 

the afternoon of 4 �Iay. O\'er 100 of the enemy were killed: 1 , 116 

individual weapons, l i'l crew-served weapons, more than 140 LOns 

of ammunition, and 45 tons of rice wcre capLUred. 

In the eastern wing on 2 �by, the 2d Battalion, '17th Infantry 

(�lech:lIlized) , Cllt Route 7 near Memot (i\lemlll) : the 2d Squadron, 11 th Annored Cavalry, linked lip with the South Vietnamese 

airborne forces. A search for supply caches met lillie re�istance from 

enemy sccurit}, forces. 

I .. ,tc Oil 3 i\[ay the 1 1 th Cavalry W:IS ordered to :lu:lCk north 

fony kilometers 10 take the town of Snuol and its imporwl1t road 

junction. Rotlte 7, le:lding lIonh to Snuol through large rubber 

plantations , was chosen as the :Ixis of advance. and hy early afternoon on the 4th, the le:ld tank .. had broken out of the jungle and 

were on the ridge am'ide t he highway. Once Olt the road the 2d 

Squadron. followed by the �d, r;lCed north at speeds tip to sixtyfive kilometers per hour and reached the first of- three destroyed 

bridges by midafteroon. The cavalry secured the site. placed an 

armored vehicle launched bridge across Ihe stre:lm. and went on.5 

\,vith his regi ment now stl"llng Olll for almost sixty kilometers, 

Colonel Starry decided to consolidate sOllth of the second slream 

4 On 2 Ma)' in IV Corp! Tactical i'onc. 250 ,\C,l\V's from Ihe calalr)' rqzimenu 

lined III' ahrro$1 at 25·metcr intcn-:ats and. whh infantry suppon. auackcd on a 6· 

I:,ilomelcr frorll. Tire hrealhh of the allack ol'eTwhc\med all rcsblance. 

G Whilc the l llh Annorc\1 Cal'alr)" :rllack�'(1 nonh, Tro

p n, lSI Sc]u;,drOll. 9rh 

C-'lI'alry (Air) , fOllnd an euern)' togistics complex in the Fishhook that was so 

e"'ensile it was namcd " Ihe cil)"' II l idded more Ihan t ,;

oo Weal}()llJ. milliOn! of 

rollllt'l of a,mnunitiotl. and IOns of slIppti('$. Thb cache. the 1:ugc51 of Ihe war. 

look sclcra' wccks to search :lnd ClaClIatc. 
THE 20 SQUADRON, II rn ARMORED CAVALRY, ENTERS SNUOL, CAMBODIA 

crossing. Through the night, the 2d and 3d Squadrons closcd on 

the lead elcmcllts, which were now reconnoitering thc twO remaining crossings. The 1 1 th Armored Cavalry R<''gimcnt cominued 

north on 5 May aftcr Company 1-1 and Troop G laid another vchicle 

launched bridge at Ihe second crossing sile. The third crossing 

posed serious prohlems because it would require heavy bridging. A 

flying crane, the CI I-54 helicopler, was requcsted to transport an 

M4T6 bridge to the site. hut by midday when the 2d Squadron 

reached the third crossing site the crane pilots and the engineers 

had made lillie progress. Anxiolls not to lose the momentum of 

the allack, Colonel Starry set out on foot with the section sergealH 

and the bridge Iolllllching vehicle to find a place where the span 

could be used. Afler gingerly testing se\'eral places, they let down 

the bridge, tried it OUI with Troop G, and by 1300 the 2d and 3d 

Squadrons were again rolling north. 

The 2d Squadron paused south of Snuol to bring up artillery, 

organizc air suppOrt, and reconnoiter. Refugecs reported that there 

were many Nonh Vietnamese troops in the town and that the 

civilians had fled. ScoutS from the regimelHal air cavalry troop had 

obsened heavy antiaircraft fire all around the airstrip to the eaSt 

of town. In midafternoon the Illh Cavalry surrounded the city, 

with the 2d Squadron on the east and the 3d Sqlladron on the west. 

As tanks and armored cavalry vehicles rumbled across the Snllol 

airstrip, they were hit by rocket propelled grenades and small arms 
After a brisk fight, the <illliaircraft guns were seized. 

The 3d Squadron, meanwhile. moving through the rubber trees 

to encircle lhe town, triggered an ambush sct to hit Ihe 2d Squadron. Colonel Griffin placed artillery lire behind the ellemy posilion. 

set up gunships to cover the right nank, and aHacked with Troop I. 

As t h e 2 d Squadron moved in from the southeast in a coordinated 

altack, an inexperienced gunship pilot fired rockets into the lead 

cicmcnl.S. This unfortuTlillc incident caused the gunships to be 

withdrawn and opened one side of the Iril!> as an escape roUle for 

the enemy. The two-squadron attack, however, rOll ted the enemy 

troops, who fled in sm3ll groups in all directions. \·Vhen the cavalry 

entered Snllol, the city was deserted. 

Snuol WilS app3rcIllly the hub of an extensive logistical operation. On the following day, 6 �Iay, the 2d Squadron disCO\'crec! 

an improved ro,ld, large enough for trucks and cMefully hidden 

undcr the junglc canopy. Along the ro.ld the cavalry found :md 

destroyed an :.bandolled trllck convoy laden with supplies. The cavalrymcn also discuvere<i in Snuol a fully equipped motor park, 

complete willi gre:.se racks alld spare parts, and a large slOrage site 

containing 85·mm. tank gun ammunition. 

\Vhile American units were .Iltaeking toward Snuol, Soulh Vietnamese armored task forces in the'somhwcst were expanding their 

area of operation 10 the north. Finding only disorganized enelllY 

groups, thc well·('oordin:llcd Vietn:lInese units quickly reached the 

Kampong Spean River and secured Kampong Trach. To the west of 

the town, an aTlnor·he:.vy force overcame stiff resislancc from thrce 

North Victnamese b'llt:lliolls. The attacking armored units werc 

closely followed by dismollnted Rangers who eliminated the by· 

passed pockcts of the enemy. This coordinated combined arms 

att:lck, supported by t:lctical air and .millery. demonstratcd that 

the prohlems encolllllered during earlier South Vietnamese operalions h:.d hccil solved. 

On 7 �Iay Presidelll Nixon announced his satisf<lction with the 

progress of the operations. alld Slated that U.S. troops would hc 

withdrawn from C:lmbodia by 30 June. This ;lIlnouncemcnt 

brought intensified search efforts, prompting additional attacks 

into Cambodia in the Dog's I lead area and toward Krek by units 

of the 25th Infantry Division. The lSI Brigade moved on 11 �lay 

to comc ahrC<lSl of Ihe 2£1 Brigade. which had heen committed 

earlier in the Fishhook area. The move was led hy the 2d Bau;liion, 

22d Infantry (�lcch:lIlizcd) , the 1st Battalion, 5th Inf:lIllry (Mechanizcd) , ;md elemellts of the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry. These 

troops were 10 an as a hlocking force north of Ihe Kampong Spc:ll1 
Svay Rieng west 10 Kampong Trabck. Advancing in twO columns 

on Routc I, and hyp.'lssing scvera] small forces, a South Vietnamcse 

task forcc covcrcd over thiny kilometers to Kampong Trabek in 

slightly ovcr two hours and linked up with South Vietnamcse forces 

from IV Corps who wcre moving north toward Phnom Penh. 

As the 18th Armored Cwalry Regimcnt was moving tOward the 

linkup, the 15th Armored Cavalry Regimcnt collidcd with the 

88th Nonh Vietnamese Regiment, which was about to attack the 

18th Armored Cavalry from the rear. Surprised, thc enemy regimcnt tried to withdraw, but the fast-moving South Vietnamese 

force literally ran ovcr it. A day-long. rUllning bailIe left Nonh 

Vietnamese Army rcsisl:lIlce shauered, the enemy ill flight. and 

thc field covcred with cncmy casual tics and abandoncd wcapons. 

While thc U.S. 25th Infantry Division held the ccnter of the 

potell lial envelopment, a South Vietnamese task force moved north 

on 17 !\lay to securc Rome 15. halfway to the besicgcd (Own of 

Kampong Cham. Othcr South Vietnamese task forces sprcad out 

to secure thc penctration. and Vietnamese district and province 

forces moved in to pcrform the dcrailed search and cvacuation of 

captured material. On 9 May the 1st Squadron, 1 1 th Armored Cal" 

aIry Regiment. which had been securing the linc of communications to Tonie Cham in \Var Zone C, moved into Cambodia to 

search thc rubbcr plantations at �Iemot. Thc C:lvalrymcn discovcred a mOlor park \\'ith t\\'cmy-one Amcrican'Illade 2!h·ton trucks 

of World War II vintage that had been used in Korca (dala pla.tes 

were still on the vchicles) , rcbuilt in Japan. and sold as slLrplus. 

Once thc batlerics werc rcplaccd, thc lsi Squadron had its own 

truck convoy to haul capturcd equipment and supplics back into 

Somh Vietnam. 

As opcrations in and around the Fishhook continued it bccamc 

evident that the free world forccs had scriously underestimatcd thc 

extcnt of encmy logistical bases in Cambodia. Conscquently, the 

1 1th Armored Cavalry Regiment was assigned two engineer land 

clearing companies and along with thc Victnamese airborne brigade began extensive Romc plow operations in the Fishhook. By 

late May the southern Fishhook. which had bccome the most hotly 

contestcd portion of TOAN TIlANe 43, contained two squadrons of 

the 1 1 th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The monsoon had arrived. 

and movemcnt became more difficult every day. A.� June wore on 

the cncmy becamc more persistent, and small daily fi�hts were a 

fact of lire. Helicopters flying over the area habitually reccived 

ground firc. Road-mining incidelHs and ambushes increased. Nonc-
destroyed more than 1 , 100 enemy structures. 

In accordance wi.h the presidential direclivc. plans were made 

to withdraw U.S. forces from Cambodia bl' 30 June. The 2d Squadron, 1 1 th Armored Cavalry. mo\'cd along Highw:.y 13 La Loc Ninh. 

while in Ihe Fishhook the 1st and 3d Squ<ldrons depaned through 

Kalllm. The 3d Squadron was ordered LO remove the hridge seclions somh of Snuol .md 10 destroy .he fire hasc� estahlished along 

Route 7 ncar i\rcmot, a job made more difficuh as the monsoon 

inundated lhe low grolLnd. leaving tl'<lck vehicles virtually roadbound. With considerable difficully the hridge'i were removed or 

desll'oycd by the 3d Squadnm a� it withdrew. Captain Ralph A. 

]\file's Troop L was the last U.S. armored unit 10 le"ve Cambodia. 

SOli/II Viel,uullcu Arm)' Allacks Con/it/lie 

In lale May, with the imrending American wilhclr.lwal from 

Camhodia �tjJJ fO come and the Illonsoon rains incrc:l�ing. Ihe South 

Vietnamese forces. unhindered hy the U.S. political decision, had 

continued attacking LO complete Ihe encirclement. The Chup rubber pl:lIHalion ncar Kal11pong Ch;Ull was selected as the linkup 

point for the converging ta�k forces. The cilY, it key provincial 

capital strategically located on the Mekong Ri\'cr, fifty kilometers 

nonhea�t of Phnom Penh. lI'a� besieged hy the 9th Nonh Vietnamese Division. which had its headquarters in the plantation. 

The 50mh Vielllamese objecti\'c was to attack the plantation from 

the south and east. thus eliminating enemy pressurc on Kampong 

Cham and completely encircle lhe base ;treas. 

At 0730 on 2;'\ �Iay, a �olllh Vietnamese armored lask force 

passed through th(' U.S. forces ncar Krek and ran hCOld on inlo Oln 

emrenched rine comp;IIlY from Ihe 272d Viet Cong and Nonh Vielnamese Regiment. intcnt on Slopping any adv;mce along Route 7. 

The enemy opened with rocket prnpelled grenade and sm;tll OlTllS 

fire on the lead wnks of Ihe 5th Armored Cavalry Regiment, which 

quickly formed on line Olml :II/;1cked. A shon, fierce. close quarters 

light left most of Ihe enemy dead or captured. The action was so 

fast that units in the rear of Ihe advancing column were unaware 

of the battle until fhey pa�sc<1 the enemy dead along the road. 

Another South Vietnamese armored task force moving north along 

H ighway 15 on 25 May ellcountered an enemy ball"lion at the 

Chup plant:llioll. The 15th and IRth Armored Cav:t1ry Regiments 

hit the cnemy positions frol11 two sides, completely disorganizing 

the resist:mce. Fire from the advancing tanks and armored cav:dry 

assault vehicles left O\'CI' 1 1 0 North Vietnamese dead. Three days 
y 

joined on 29 May, breaking the seige of K:llllpOllg Cham and surrounding the enelllY base areas to Ihe south_ 

In mid-Julle. when the 9th North Vietnamese Division reentered the Chup plalllation, again threatening Kampong Cham 

and Prey Veng. South Vietnamese units began a new dri,'e LO dear 

the plantation :md destroy the enemy division, For six days an 

armor-heavy task force chased the enelllY through the rubber plantat ion and south along Rotl1e 15. Finally, tile task force was allacked 

by the 271st Vici Cong and North Vietnamese Regimenl. which 

planned to Cill the road and isolale the task force. The next three 

days saw some of the heaviest fighting of TOAN TUANe 42. The 

enemy was well positioned. bUI repealed attacks by the 15th and 

18th Armored Cavalry Regiments prevented his control of the road, 

Attacks by tanks and armored cavalry assault vehicles wilh attached 

infalllry and Ranger� finally rOll ted the North Vietnamese, and by 

29 .

June the fighting had ended. The final phase of the operation, 

1-22 .July, involved mad security missions and search operations. 

No signific:lIlt fighting occurred, .. nd all Milit:n'y Region 3 unilS 

had left Camhodia by 22 .Iuly 1 !l70.tl 

The SOllth Vietnamcse forces of i>.liliwry Region � periodically 

returned to Camhodia during the next eiglucen months. i\ro�t of 

their operations wcre hil and 1'1111 . .. nd had limiled ohjeClives and 

minor Sllccesses, One opcrillion. TOA=-

TIIANG 01 71. started with 

high hopes on <I Fehruary 1971 and ended in di�lsler four month� 

later, Lillie was onici .. lly reponed aboul this operation since \\'orld 

attention was dram;u icallv focllsed on I,A;\1 SON 71!l to lhe north in 

Ll0S, and no U,S, ground forces or a{h'i�ers could be used in Cambodia, Near the end of i'lay a South Vielllallle�e ta�k force wa� 

Cill off in Cillllhodia �oHlh of Sl1uol on Route I �, Ahhough Ihc 

commander had recei\'ed intelligence reports from South Vielna1l1e�e ,md U.S, sourrc�. including "i�lIal <lerial reconnaissance from 

the 3d Squadron. 1 71h C<lvalry (Air) . he failed to gU:1fC1 against a 

growing enemy t hrcal,1 

The 3d Armored Brig<ldc was ordered nonh 10 link III' with the 

isolated t<lsk force on Route I�, Afler a miSlinderslandin� of orders. 

during which the task force <II first refused to allemp! 10 withdraw, 

e Corps laclical zones were dcsigl1aled mili!an' regiOllJ on t July 1970. 

7 ,\ir cal'alr) SUPPOTI was prOl idcd b)' the largeSl groupiug of air ca"afry e"er 

assembled under one eomm3[[(lcr, The 151 Squadron, 91h C�I'alr)' (,\ir) , �d Squadron, 

lillt Ca,'alr), (Air) , an :aerial rockel arlillerr baualion, anl( 'Dme separate air r.Halrr 

troops were formed ;nlo Ihe lSI Brigade. 91h Ca,'alT)' (Air) , This was the first air 

ca"alry combat brigade el'er formed and used in combat. 
but intense rockel, small arms, and machine gun fire quickly disorganized the auack. �rany infalHTymen ran from exploding or 

disabled vchides: others. tTying to hide from the deadly fire, 

climbed under or onto the vchicles. Some soldiers already on Ihe 

vehicles crawled inside for cover, while more and morc attempted 

to mount the moving vehicles to escape. As the column cominucd 

down the road it became a roUl. 

After two days of massive :11 tillery, air cavalry. and l<lctical air 

strikes, the armor hrigade finally accomplished the linkup. The task 

(orce passed through the brigade with each tracked vchicle carrying 

thiny to thiny-five infantrymen. Both sides suffered heavily, but 

for the South Vietnamcse forces command and control again 

emerged as a serious problcm. ''"hat had begun as an ordcrly withdrawal, llIrned into a rOllt. The collapse of command under stress 

was to plague the SOllth Viemamese forces to the end of the war. 

Secondflry A ttflcks Across rile Border 

In examining the final re:.ld15 of the expeditions illlo Cambodia, it is well to note thal two separate series of South Victnamese 

operations supported the TOA:'> TII.\NG a ttacks. The first, Operation 

Cuu LONG I_III, from IV Corps Tactical Zone, lasted from 9 May 

till 30 June 19iO. and involved five armored cavalry regimenl� as 

well as iufantry. Rangers, c1(:mCIHS of thc Vietnamcsc Navy, and 

units of the Regional Forces and Popular Forces. The operational 

area was more than ninety kilometcrs wide and extcnded nonh to 

Phnom Penh. The ohject was 10 secure thc l\lekong River as far 

north as the Cambodian capital su that the Vielname�c refugces 

g<llhcrcd in thc city (Quid he evat:u,lIcd 10 South Victnam. The 

operation indirectly supported III Corps Tactical Zone forces 

involved in Operation ToA:'� TIIA .. e 42. 

Cuu LONG I began with an assauiL on locations along the 

Mekong by aircraft of the U.S. 164th Aviation Croup which formed 

the largest air armada ever assembled in IV Corps Tactical Zone fOT 

a single operation. By 13 !\lay linkup had been accomplished with 

III Corps forces, and the l\lekong River was secure from Ihe border 

10 the Glpilal of Camhodia. Five hundred of the enemy were killed. 

Fony ships pas�ed S<lfely up the �Ie].ong to Phnom Penh, where 

they e\·acualed over 1 2,000 Vietnamese civilians. Eventually. more 

than 40.000 Vietnamese were C\,:lcuated through this safe corridor. 

Opcr.niotls C:uu I.ow; II and III, from 17 �Iay to :\O June. were 

directed al enemy forces and base camps in southeastcrn Cambodia. 

They werc designed to assist the C1mbodians in constructing bases 
units traveled rapidly for more than fifty kilometers to relieve 

besieged C,mhodian garrisons, and then turned their anemion 10 

searching for supplies. One cache discovered by Troop D, 3d Squadronj 5th Cavalry, yielded millions in National Liberation From 

money printed for lise in South Vielllam a(ler Tet 1968. 

The other series of operations into Cambodia originated in II 

Corps Taclica\ Zone and was designed to suppOrt TOAN TIIANG 42 

by drawing enemy units nonh and cUlling the enemy logistical lifeline north of the ml'tin battle. Operations 13INH TAY I_IV were con· 

ducted from Kontum in the north to Ban Me Thuot in the somh 

and were controlled and executed by the South Vietnamese Army. 

The first three phases of BINI! T,\Y were directed aA"'inst 13;1se 

Areas 701, 702, and 740. long utilized lO support Viel Cong and 

North Vielllamcse units openlling in the central highlands of the 

II Corps :Irea. There was lillie activity by armored units during 

these oper.ltions; South Vielilamese commanders preferred to use 

their armor for security and transportation. Enemy re�istancc was 

light and poorly organized. These first phases, although succe�shll, 

showed clearly Ihal the SOluh Vietnamese commanders in II Corps 

Tactical Zone did not fully appreciate the possibilities for maneuver 

and firepower that armored units possessed. The II Corps cavalry 

regimeIHs were nOl given the freedom of action afforded similar 

units in the III and IV C:orps arcas. 

UINU TAY IV, conducted from 24 to 26 June, was the final II 

Corps operat ion in CamllOdia. I t included the largest aggrc{f<ltion of 

armored forces in the II Corps zone and, unlike other 13tSII TAY 

operations, was not dirCCled toward destruction of enen1\' forces or 

bases bllt t 0",;1 1"(1 I he evacuation of Camhodi;111 and Vielllame�c 

refugees. The arlllor spe:lrhead, catching the enemy units off A"uard, 

moved swiftly illlo Cambodia on 24 June al1d set lip defensive 

positions along thc withdrawal romes. \Vhen the operation ended 

on 26 June 1 970, over 8,500 Cambodians, morc t han 3,800 of them 

military, and over 200 \'ehicles and milch equipment had heen 

removed from the danger of control by the Viet Cong and North 

Vietnamese. 

(;flmboliia ill PerJIJeClive 

13y tile end of June free world forces in Cambodia had captured 

or destroyed almost len thousand tons of materiel and food. In 

terms of enemy needs this amount was cnotl�h rice to feed more 

than 25,000 troops a full ration for an entire year: indi"idua\ 

weapons to equip 55 fllll·strcn�th bau:llions: crew-served weapons 

to equip 33 full baltalions; and mortar, rocket, and recoilless riAe 
units. In all, Il.3G2 enemy soldiers were killed and o\'er 2.000 

captured. 

These SI:UiSlics arc impressi,·c. and without a doubt the Cambodian expeditions had nipplcd Viet Cong and North ViClllamcsc 

operaliom. bUI the mosl imponam results cannOt be measured in 

tangihles alone. The ;mnm-ed·Jed <HI'leks into Cambodia by unils 

from Military Region " had been well planned. well coordinated, 

and well carried out. They were generally conducted without the 

massive U.S. ground suppOrt Iypic .. ' of operations by un;ls from 

Military Region 3, yet l hey severely hun the enemy. The Soulh 

Vietnamese, their morale high, returned 10 re�lIme pacification 

o( the de1t;), a goal which had suddenly come much closer to 

realiz.1Iion. 

In Milil;)ry Region :\ the results of operations TOA1\' TIIA1\'G 42 

and 43 were :do impressive, and had a great pyschological and 

material effeel 011 thc eneilly. Even more important, Soulh Vietnamese forces had opcr;ncd (n'er great distances for long periods 

without direct Amerif:1Il a�sistance and often without advisers. 

This faci provided a gre:1I hoost to South Vietnamese morale and 

imprO\'cd fighting ahility. The Vietnamese forces had temporarily 

strengthened the position of the Cambodian government and 

brought some me,mlre of order to its border provinces. 

On the other side of the ledger. the results of the last expedi. 

tion from �Iililary Region 3 revealed the continued existence of 

command and control problems among South Vietnamese com· 

manders. To overcomc timidity ;Itld blck of coordination :Il high 

command levcls. would, in the final analysis. be more important 

than material g:lins. 

The lack of understanding of :lnnored opera Lions exhihited in 

�lilil:'lry Reg'ion 2 did lIot bode well for the future. alt hough 

eventually ncw ('olllmanders there would hegin the process of correction. The boost gi\'clI to the Camhodi:lI1 government and its 

army W:IS only lemporary. for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese 

forces l'elU1'Ilcd and quid:'!y lOok complete control of all the border 

areas. 

The most important cffect of thc opcrations in Cambodia nHl�t 

be looked for within South ViClllam: here the attacks bought time 

for !itrengthenin� the Viem:llllesc forces and for the lIniled Stales 

to COlllintic its withdrawals.' For the next fourteen months there 

'111 "pril 1970 Ihe firsl balialion'lile lan\:, (';"<ltl')'. and nl«h�niled unin leh 

ViC1nam; Ihe lsi !lallation. 691h "nnor; ht Squadron. ·tlh Ca\3tn': 2.1 Ibttalion. 

2d In(antn' (�Icchaniled) : �nd I$t IhttaliOfl, ]61h Infantry (Mech�niu�d). The.'IC 

l;ut three 1111ill were the armored "rength of the 1st tnf�nll')' J)j, ;5;on. 
pgy 

confidence of Vietnamese armored forces in their ability to \\'age a 

successful and prolonged campaign. h was the most convincing 

evidence since Tel 1 968 of the improvement of Vietnamese armored 

forces. The hi�h morale of the South Vietnamese forces convinced 

American advisers that the Viewamese were well on their way to 

being able LO fight the war on their own. 

J\1aillfell(H/ce mul .fi1l1)1)ly 

One unmual feature of American oper,llions in Cambodia \\'ilS 

the American policy that all "chicles and equipment, no matter 

how badly damaged-even if beyond repair-had to be e,'acu<lted 

to Vietn<lm. While this ruling was made ,It high levels for political, 

intell igence. and propaganda purposes. it calls anelllion 10 a major 

problem thai confrollled armored units throughout the war. 

In an armored unit. the soldier is as dependelll on his armored 

vehicle as the vehicle is on him. In few olher comb.11 units in the 

Army arc maintenance and the supporting supply system so critical. 

Most armored IInil'> found the U.S. Army supply and maintenance 

system in Vietn:ull 10 he less than satisfactory at e"ery level. The 

deficiencies in the system were basic. As the war expanded and 

mobility became more and more imlXJrtant the faults in the system 

became more obvious. 

Two f,IlIlLS were apparent in the early years. and they eventually 

exposed a third. The first was the lack of general support maintenance-heavy repair facilities in the major areas where armored 

vehicles were used. This lack was Ihe result of the deci�ions of 1965 

and 1966 to build up comhat troops at the expense of the logistical 

base. Ahhough it was an expedient meant for a short time. the 

decision was neve I" really altcred. Even more unfonunate was the 

f:lct lhat in many cases tile few support units that were available 

were centralized in areas fal" from the combat units. The obviolls 

solUlion to Ihis prohlem. the use of teams authorized to make major 

repairs at a unit's location. however popular with units was nOt 

popular with logistid:lIls. Thus. comhat units were frequelllly 

forced to send damaged vehicles gre,ll distances for repair. In Military Region 3. vehicles were almost always sent back to the Long 

Binh-Saigon_Cu Chi area. a distance of ninety or more kilometers 

from the horder and base areas where the fighting was. The result· 

ing loss in comhat IXJwcr and the drain on the meager evacuation 

resources of Ihe combat nniLS was a se,'ere hardship. 

In an attempt 10 solve this problem. Colonel Starry had forced 
Armored Cavalry Regiment even before the invasion of Cambodia. 

To help with the crilie<ll prohlem of evacuating maleriel from Cambodia lhe I l lh C:lvalry borrowed six MBS lank recovery vehicles 

from the depot al Long Binh. Organized into recovery pi:uoons 

operating \Ilith the 3d Squadron, these vchicles were invaluahle to 

the regiment's recovery oper,nions. 

The second problem. the tendency of logistical units to stick 

LO base camps, W:lS evident coll'ly in the war and contillucd 10 the 

end. Logistical units. pnTticularly supply and maimcnance elements, 

were unprepared psychologically ;lIlt! in practice to live in the field 

close LO the units they supported. Although Army doctrine stressed 

that this support should be provided in forward arcas, the practice 

was LO cemr;liize suppon facilities in built·up, well·developed, permanent base camps, similar LO installations in the United Stales. In 

Military Regions 2 and 3. this practice placed suppon facilities as 

close to the coast as possihle, often more than 100 kilometers from 

the fighting units, and accessible only by Illeans of tenuous supply 

and evacuation rolltes. 'Vhile this placement was easier for the 

supply and maintenance units. it was a hardship For the combat 

units. 

The most critical problem was the unsatisfactory performance 

of the area suppon system tinder combat conditions. h is amazing 

that the system was expected 10 work in a war of movement. in 

which armored units traveled great distances in shon periods of 

time. In Vielllam, it was not the answer for armored units. IXtTliclIlarly armored cavalry regimcllIs. Accordin.g to Licutenant Ceneral 

Joseph A. i\L I lei�cr, .Ir., fonner commander of the 1st l .agistical 

Command. Vietnam. the II th Armored Cavalry Regiment " ob· 

wined its maintenance support from the 1st Logistical Command 

on an area b;lsis. A .. clements of the regiment relocated, the nearest 

1st Logical Command unit provided service. This mel1\Od of Slip· 

pon proved ulls;lt isfacLOry because of the 1 1 th AeR's high and 

fluctuating maintCl1ance dcm;lIld.�. In the future such organi7 .. ations 

should be assigned :1I1 organic nuintenance unit." 

'Vhile the prohlem was apparent in Ihe 1 1 th Armored C.walry. 

it existed also for the 1st Bri�cle, 5th Infantry Division (t\fcchanized) , in northern i\filitary Region I. Although the mechanized 

brigade operated under control of the 3d U.S. Marine Di\·ision. 

the marines were responsihle for supplying only rations and fuct. 

The 1st Brigade had its own organic supply and maintenance Slipport but relied for wholesale level supply on distant Annv SlIpport 

unils. Several unanticipated maintenance difficulties developed as 
soil of the northern coastal areas caused such excessive track and 

sprockct wear that spare pans were frequently inadequate. To cope 

with thc problem, special brigade cOllvoys \\'erc sent directly to thc 

depots in an effort to shonen the delivery time of parts. Nicknamed 

the Red Ball Express. these convoys evelHually eased many of the 

brigade mailllcnancc problems. 

These were not isolated examplcs, for combined arms operations stressed cross-:lltachmelll at baltalioll level. with the units 

often operating over great distanccs for long periods of time. The 

2d Battalion, 34th Armor, in �filitary Region 3 had two companies detached for ;dmost its Clllire time in the war-four years. 

i\'raimcnancc support of t hese twO companies remaincd the responsibility of the haualion. Since one company was in nonhcrn Mili· 

tary Region I. the silll;lIion hecame ludicroll'> when the battalion 

executivc officer had to search Ihe Saigon area for parts :lIld then 

airlift lhem to thc I luc area, 750 kilometers nonh. The other com· 

(><1ny. in Military Region 3, was often split amon� three locations. 

yet the baualion had 10 find and support them daily. evcn though 

the company was attached to a differclll division. Since the battalion had a limited resupply and mailllcnance system, this silllation was completely unsat isfactory. 

In �fililary Region 2. elemcnt� of the 1st Rattalion, 69th Armor, 

and 1st Battalion. 50th InFantry (i\fechanized) were often at· 

tached 10 Ihe 1st Air Cavalry Division, yCt thc division had no 

means of rep.·tiring armored vehicles. 'Vith the distant parclH bat· 

talion still responsiblc for maintcnancc and logistical support. thc 

tank and mcchanized companics frcquently found thcm�elve� sorely 

pressed for supplies and replacement parts. The l�t Cav:llry Division was ahle 10 repair c'luipment common to both Ihc companies 

and the division: howevcr, if the cquipmenl W:lS nOI ("ommon, long 

resupply delays \\'crc Ilormal. In an :Ittempt to partially solve the 

problem. Company A, 1st Baualion. 69th Armor, used its organic 

vehicles to obtain repair parts directly from the Qui Nhon support 

command. 

Examples of the failure of the rigidly structured area support 

system to sustain adequatcly a constantly changing troop conccntration arc almost endless. Support units requisit ioned parts ovcr a 

9,600·mile supply linc. with attendalll dclays. There werc never 

enough SI:>'1TC parts on hand to repair the armored vehides in any 

givcn area. \\'hen parts werc ordered they oftcn arrivcd after the 

units had movcd to a different suppOrt area, and the requisitioning 

process had started again. 
were not mel because the centralized invclllOry system broke down. 

Depots had spare parts, somc of them importalll ilems, of which 

they were not even aware. Thus was bOTn the system of searching 

for parts that the combat unilS called scrounging. The scrounger, or 

expediter. was an indi" idual or a tcam from lhe combat unit sent 

10 the major sp..rc p<1f1S depot, IIsually in lhe Saigon area, to walk 

through the slOrage areas in an auempt 10 locale spare p:IT!S. \Vhen 

an item was found, it had to be formally released hy supply COIltrol officials, often over the prOlcst� of supply personnel who were 

positive they did not have lhe ilelll-even when it was physica1Jy 

pointcd out. This faCI was recognizcd by the Depal'lment of the 

Army late in the conflict whcn projects such as Stop/See, COllnt. 

Condidon, and Clean \\'ere slilned in an attempt to verify inventories. Onc invelllory team was selll to Okinawa to open twenty-six 

acres of shipping containcrs for which 110 inventory existed. 

In combat units, inexperienced crew membcrs, supcrvisors (officers and noncommi�sioncd oflicers) . :lnd maintcn:mcc personnel 

contributed to the prohlem. P:II·ts wcre oftcn requcstcd and rcplaced 

unneccssarily. Such inst"n('e� hecame morc apparent lale in the war 

as a grcater numher of I 1l1 lr:lll1cd people were a�si!-tned to unit 

maintenance oper:lt ioIlS.D Compounding thi .. problem was the sometimes improper management of the battalion pans system that led 

to inadequate rccords and failure 10 order pans. In 1969 and 19iO 

the 1 1 th Armored Cavalry was ahle to reduce its pre�cribed load 

lists by abont i5 percent. with a dramatic increase in operational 

readiness. The supply system at the unit level was glutted with tOO 

milch unneeded gear. Nonetheless, Coloncl Starry noted that his 

regimelll was obliged 10 l ive off its bailie losses by c:ulIlihalizing 

disabled vehicles: the supply sy ... tcm provided only half the regiment's needs, cannibalization the rest. 

The critical prohlem cont inlled to be with the arca support 

system. Although commentcd upon in Ihe 1967 repon evaluating 

mechanized and armor ('omhat opcrations in Vietn:lIl1. a maintenancc snppon unit dcdic:ncd primarilv 10 the 1 1 th Armored Cavalry RcgimelH was nO! neated until 19iO. and then only after the 

regimcntal commander had (Oll"inced officers :u high�r Ic"els that 

snch a measure was Ilcce��ary. 

E"acnation of damagcd "chides was another prohlem that 

II Mal1l' conunal1de� felt Ihal a periodic SllImi<lown for mainlcnanre was !lCces· 

I.3rr. Olhco fel! Ihal Ihis polic)' rc�u1tcd in Ihe dela)' of (Iail), mair1!en3ucc lasks 

unlit Ihe 5Cheduled sl:1nlldown. The taucr group, which fa"ofed pre,enli,c "'a in Ie· 

nance. recommended (Olmant IIllil mailllcnance in the field wilh Ihe hetp of u:ams 

from mainlenano: support unin. 
M88 HEAVY RECOVERY VEHICLE LoADS DAMACED APe. JANUARY 1971. 

This versalile vehicle was the workhorse of the armor recovery {leet. 

plagued combat uniu. Before the VielOam \VaT the standard practice had been to le'lve damaged vehicles at collecting poillls on the 

main supply route for supporting units 10 dispose of. But in Vietnam no provision for such evacltation was made. and the responsi· 

bility therefore fell elllircly upon the comhat units. In Cambodia, 

for example, comb:1l units cv:tcuated alJ vehicles to Vietnam no 

maller how b;tdly cbmagcd. The II th Armored Cavalry Regimelll 

eventually devoted more than one-third of its combat strength in 

Cambodia 10 this task. 

Recovery of dam:lgcd machines :tt the slll:t11 unit level required 

considerahle ingenuity. Often the vehicle� designed for recovery 

\Vere inadequate, as in the c:lse of the l\I578. 01' were in short supply, like the �f88. No unit ever had these items in the Ilumbers 

required, and there were never enough spare parts to repair them 

on the spot. Because recovery vehicles were frequelllly out of action 

for extended periods, await ing parts. heavy reliance had to be placed 

on the inventiveness of the small unit leader. III mallY cases the 

performance of these leaders was brillant. Such recovery devices as 

the push-bar, log extraction, "d.tis), chain," ;lIld block and tackle 

were field expedients. 

Many of the maintenance problems ciled, particularly the ;\IiLUde of the snpport units, exist today and would create the s.1me 
view o( the renewed emphasis on mobile warfarc and the heavy 

odds thai armored forces must face, a much more responsive supply 

and maintenance system is a neces�ily. Fom'ard location of maintenallce units, forward support, mobile repair tcams, and quick reo 

supply from accurate ilwcnlOries must become as fallLine for COIll· 

bal service suppon lInilS as the usc of combined arms for armored 

units. 

Lam SOIl 719 

After U.S. units withdrew from Cambodia in June of 1970, the 

[ace of the war in Vietnam changed significantly. The remainder 

of the year was a lime of small and infrequent enemy inf;lIltry 

attacks, fire ;'macks, and chance engagemcllls. American forces 

directed their effons toward strengthening the SOllth Vielllamese 

(orces and pacification of the SOllth Vielllamcse people. Mainly 

because of the Cambodian incursions and the resulting disruption 

of the enemy's supply and training bases, both causes advanced 

rapidly. 

American fon:es were relocated in bases farther from the border. 

and the South Vietnamese Army assumed responsibility for the 

security of the border.lo For the first time in many years. the SOllth 

Vietnamese had to shoulder the larger share of combat operationsa dramatic change. South Vietnamese forces moved toward self· 

sufficiency ;lnd achie\'ed considerable sliccess. Regional Forces ;lnd 

Popular Forces took O\'er many of those defensive operations that 

had long tied down the Vietnamese Army. And as U.S. troops were 

withdrawn from Vietnam, South Vietnamese units began large· 

scale operations on their own. 

By late 1971, after extcnsivc destrunion of enemy supplies duro 

ing the Cambociian incursions, enemy logistical and troop move· 

ments along the 1 ,;JOIian trails in the north increased dramatically. 

This fact and the impending withdrawal of U.S. air support 

prompted the South Vietnamese Army to attack into Laos and 

strike the enemy trail network at a junction near Tchepone. 

(A-I(II) 15) The Soulh Vietnamcsc planned to comlllit twO reinforced 

army divisions and their Marine division to this operation, L.AM 

SON 719, commencing early in 1971. The planners considered this 

attack the last chance for cross·border operations IIsing U.S. air 

support. They also believed that the operation, if successrul, could 

IOThe tr.unition aflCT Camhodia ....

 as difficult for armored units sino: Iher had 

beet, u..al 10 respomling 10 enem) aClion with musi\c firepo .. er. In \'iclnam. the 

lX'PuJaciou deusilY a .... a, hom the jungles prc\c:nlcd this and fi� control had 10 be 

again c:\�I)- slIpoervised. 
some prcssure off the Cambodian Army to the sOUlh. 

LA:'II SON 719 demonstrated what can happen when a large 

operation is insufficiently coordinated: connicling ordcrs were 

issued. thc limited amOlint of armor was miSLIsed. unit leadership 

broke down. and the strcnglh of the enemy was either overlookcd 

or disregardcd. That the North Vicmamese kncw of the altack 

be(orchand \\,;IS evidcllt in their placemclll of artillery, mOrlars. 

and ant iaircraft wC;lpom in Ihe area of operatiom choscn by the 

50mh Vietnamcsc. Encmy troop buildups north of the Dcmili· 

tarizcd Zone wcrc nOled as well as an increase in thc movcmCllt of 

supplies along the trails. 

Although American ground forces sllpponed I.A \, SON 7 19. thcy 

were required to rcmain in SOllth Vieillam. A task forcc. p.1.fl of 

Operalion DnvEl' CANYON II, consisting of elements of the 1st 

Battalion. 61s1 Inf;uHry (Mechanized) ,11 Ihe In Baualion. 77th 

Armor. the 3d Squadron. 51h Cavalry. and Troop A, '1Ih Squadron. 

12th Cavalry. had the mission of establishing logi<;lical bases, keep· 

ing Route QI.·9 open to the 1 ..

 1.otian border, and covering the 

withdrawal of thc Soulh Vietnamese. 

At 0100 on 29 Janual')' the task force lefl Quang Tri CilY along 

N;uional lIighway 9 and by nightfall rolled into Fire SUppOTl Base 

V:lIldergrift. Afler:1 shon halt Troop A, 3d Squadron. 51h C:I\'alry, 

commanded by Captain Thomas SleWaTl, and IWO engineer com· 

panics led OUI on foot at midnight Oil 29 ,January. The "chicles 

were lert to Illove wilh the main hody since Route 9 II'as known 

to be in a poor stale of repair. A bulldozer led Ihe column with 

headlights blazing.l!! \Vhenel'er an obstacle such as a damaged 

bridge was encountered. a force of IWO to six cavalrymen and engi· 

neers would SlOp to make repairs while the rest of Ihe team con· 

tinued. The cavalry Iroop, joined hy ils vehicles� arrived :Il Khe 

Sanh al 1400 on 1 l�cbruary. with National H ighway 9 opened 

behind it from Fire SUppOTl Base Vandergrift. The next day the 

road was opencd all the way to the border by the 1st Squadron, 

1st Cavalry (-). 

As a supplemcnt II) this route, the remainder of the 3d Squad. 

ron, 5th Cavalry. and elements of thc 71h Engineer nallaiion can· 

II Urig:ulier Cener.ll John C. Ifill. Jr .. 151 Brigade c:ornmander. had reorganiled 

the m«h:l.lilet! infanu') antI equipped e;Ich plaloon ,,'ith six ,\I'C·,. each mann!!d 

b)' a !ix·man !quad. Tili, organiction increased Ihe firepower of cach platoon and 

dccrcasrtl Ihe tood on cadi Ichide. 

12 Originallr, an :'I

':>::'! Sheridan had !taned 10 lead the column with ilS infr.aretl 

light. bUI the 5l1eri(l3n and an accompallling mortar carrieT wel'e unable 10 nego· 

tiate the rugget! terrain and turned back. 
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RED DEVil. ROAD, an c'lgim!erillg ft:at that ope/led enemy areas never 

be/ore perle/rated. 

SlrUClcd a secondary road, known as Red Devil Road and roughly 

parallel La Route 9, from Fire S\lpport Base Elliott LO Kilc Sanh. 

The 3d Squadron, 51h C;lYatTY, comillucci operations north of Khe 

Sanh along Red Devil RO;ld until 7 April. 

The SOIIIIi Vie(lIlIme�e A rmy A Iltlck 

In LAM 50:-.' 719. the Victn:nncsc hoped to di�rllpt Vicl Cong 

and North Vietnamese supply lines by a combination of airmobile 

and armor ground auacks on three axes westward into Laos. The 

main attack was to he mncluclcd along National Ilighway 9 to 

Atoui by the airborne division and the ISl Armored Brigade, which 

would then cOlllinlic we»! on order. The South Vietnamese In 

Infantry Division, in a series of h:IIl:llion-size airmobile assaulis, 

was to establish fire bases on the high gronnd �()tHh of Rotlle 9 to 

secure the south flank. The South Vietnamese ISl Ranger Croup 

was to conduCl airmobile ass.:IUlt.s lO establish hlocking posilions 

and secure the nonh flank. The Vietnamese �f:triIlC division was 

the I Corps reserve at Khc Sanh. The U.S. 2d Squadron, 17th Cw-
ACA V's OF SoUTH VIETNAMESE 1ST 

ARMORED BRIGADE ON ROUTE 9 IN 

LAos, 1971 

airy, was to locate and destroy antiaircraft weapons, find enemy con· 

celli rations, and carry Olit reconnaissance and security missions, 

which included the rescue of air crews downed in L1.os. The squadron was pcrmitted 10 go into L1.oS only onc hour before the first 

airmobile assaulLs. This constraint precluded early reconnaissance 

of North Vietnamcse anliaircraft positions. and in the beginning 

limited the air cavalry to screening the landing zones just before 

the assaults. 

The 1st Armor Drigade, ",ilh two South Vietnamese airborne 

battalions and the 1 1th and 171h Cavalry Regiments, which had 

{ewer than seventeen l\I'll tanks, crossed the border at 1000 on 8 

February and movcd ninc kilometers west along National High. 

way 9. Intclligence reports had indicated that the terrain along 

Route 9 in L1.oS was favorablc for armored vehicles. In reality, 

ROllle {) was a neglected forty-year-old, single-lane road. with high 

shoulders on bOlh sides and no maneuver room. Moreover. as the 

units mo\'ed fon\'ard they discovcred the entire area was filled with 

huge bomb craters, undetected earlier because of dense grass and 

bamboo. Armored vehicles were therefore restricted to the ro.1.d. 

'Vith armored units moving west on ROllte 9, the airborne division and the 1st Infantry Division made an assault into landing 

lones north and soulh of Route 9. One Ranger battalion came 

down near L1.nciing Zone Ranger SOllth. As the firSl troops arrived 

the air cavalry moved out to rcconnoiter the front and Aanks, seek-
demand for gunships became heavy as units on the ground encoun

tered North ViclIlamese Army forces. In the air cavalry, emphasis 

shifted to locating enemy troop concentrations and indireCl fire 

weapons that posed an immediate threat lo5outh Viclilamese forces. 

Thus, long-range rcconnaiss;lIlce was s.1.criliced for fire support. 

The air cavalry screened Ihe 1st Armor Brigade's adv<lllce along 

Rotlle 9 all the way to Aloui, which the brigade reached in the 

afternoon of 10 FebruaryYl \Vithin three days ViCln:nIlCSC airmobile forces on Ihe ridgclincs 10 Ihe north and south had moved 

abreast of A10ui. Since the nirborne division was unable to secure 

Route 9, the 1st Armor Brigade as well as other ground forces 

had to bc resupplied by air for the duration of LA'\I SON 719. 

Enemy reaction 10 LUI SON 719 was swift and violellt. The 

North Victnamese had elemcllls of three infallll'Y I'egilllelll� as 11'('11 

as an artillery regiment and a tank ballalion in the area, and 

quickly brought in eight more infalllry regime illS and pan of a 

lank regimem. The north nank of the Somh Victnamcsc atlilck 

soon came under heavy aSS-lull. The Ranger battalion at I .. ,nding 

Zone Ranger Nonh \\'as auacked all 20 February. and clements of 

the ballalion withdraw to L1.nding Zone Ranger South the next 

day. In the following days both Ranger South and L1.nding Zone 31 

c.1me under increasing pressure IIlltil, on 25 February, the Rangers 

were evacuated from Ranger SOllth. 

As the SOllth Vietn:nnese command debated whether to con· 

tinue the drive \\'eSI, presslIre on L.mding Zone 31 developed into 

a coordinated enemy lank.infantry atlack with mpporting fire from 

anillery and rockets. Command confusion added to the problems 

of the Vietnamese forces \\'hen conflicting orders from the airborne 

division and fmlll I Corps hcadqu;tr1ers delayed relief of the land· 

ing zone by the ;lI'lllorcd hrigade. On 18 February I Corps ordered 

the 17th Armored Cavalry (-) north from Alolli to reinforce 

Landing Zone 31. At the same lime the airborne division ordered 

it to Stop sOllth of the landing zone and wail 10 see if the sile was 

overrun. Neither headquarters was on the scene. As a resull of the 

confusion. the 17lh Armored Cavalry, with tanks from the 11th 

Armored Cavalry. arrivcd at L1ndin� Zone 31 on 19 February a£ler 

somc airborne elcmcnts had been pushed back. 

In the first battle between Nonh Vietnamese and South VietU During the adnnce Troop C. 2d Squadron. li[h Ca"alry (Air) . discolercd a 

modcrn cncm) oil pipeline ",cst of Aloui and dC$trO)cd 5('\cnt sections b)' Cobra 

fire. E,cntu�II). this I)ipelinc ... al rclwilt by [hc cnemy and cxtcndl'd mall) mitc 

!IOmh into Military Region S. 
lhe 1st Squadron, J J Ih Armored Cavalry Regimen!, destroyed a 

North Vietnamese T54 fank.H The SOlllh Vielll:ullese forces retook 

a portion of the 1:lIlding lOne by the end of the day. Twenty-two 

enemy tanks-six TS4's and sixteen PT76's-were destroyed, with 

none of the South Vietnamese �0J4l 's lost. Direct and indirect fire 

continued to pound the :lirborne troops, and. finally, after six days, 

the enemy overran the emire landing zone. The 17th Armored 

Cavalry Regiment and one airhorne battalion were pllshed to the 

somh. 

After Landing Zone 31 was lost. all airborne elements were 

withdrawn and Ihe lilh Annored Cavalry was isolated southeast 

of the site. Enemy pressure on the cavalry remained heavy. Auacked 

at noon on 27 February the cavalry, supported hy tactical air and 

cavalry helicopter gunships, reported destroying fifteen lankstwelve PT76's and three T54's-and losing three armored cavalry 

assault vehicles. L ater. on I March, slill somheast of lH1nding Zone 

31, the cavalry was attacked again. In this haltle, which lasted 

throughout the night, the c,walry was supported by South Vietnam· 

ese artillery, U.S. Iactical air strikes, and cavalry gunships. Fifteen 

enemy tanks were destroyed; the cavalry lost six armored cavalry 

assault vehicles. 

Despile recommendations from the American adviser of the 1st 

Armor Brigade and the acting adviser of the division. the commander of the airborne division failed either to support Ihe 17th 

Armored Cavalry or to withdraw il. On 3 March, after the cavalry 

was surrounded on three sides by enemy armor and its rome of 

withdrawal was blocked by direct tank gunfire. the South Vietnamese Chief of Armor, with the approval of the 1 Corps com· 

mander, imel'vened hy radio. He oblained air suppOrt from 1 Corps 

and ordered the 17th Cavalry sOllth to more defensible ground. 

From there. Ihe cavalry subsequcntly fouglH a delaying action and 

rejoincd the ht Brigade :ll Aloui. 

Ai,. erlVa{ 1')' "lid T (mkJ 

Fortunate]y for Operation LUI SON 7 19. lhe confusion on the 

gTOllnd did not extend to the air cavalry. The performance of the 

air cavalry rem:lins one of lhe outstanding achievements of the 

operation, panicu1arly since it operated in the most hostile air 

environment of the war. All air cavalry in Laos was controlled by 

14 The South Vielnamese enem), identification books pictured onl), Ihe .so"iel 

I'T1G and T,,, lank •. Thus, all lank! not I'T1G's Wl're identific<i u TH',. In Ihis 

case Ihe T!H was c;orrily idl'llIifird by a photograph of the T54 tank. 
to lhe U.S. XXIV Corps. In addition, lhe cavalry had operational 

control of the reconnaiss'1.nce coml>.1.IlY of the South Vietnamese 1St 

Infantry Division. C'1l1cd the U1:1cK Panthers. or Hac Baa. the unit 

was an elite. 300-man company. cross-trained and organized into 

aeroriftc platoons, and used for ground operations in L1.os. 

The grC<lICSI threat to air cavalry was fire from .51·caliber 

machine guns, which the North Vietnamese Army employed in 

large numhers, loc;uing them in mUlually supporting posilions. 

The 01-l-6A Sf.OUI helicopter was too vulnerable to heavy fire from 

these guns to operate as pan of the reconnaissance team. Instead. 

gTOupS of IwO to six AH_IG Cobr'lS and one command ;md control 

aircrafl were formed. with scout pilOls as front scat gunners in the 

Cobras. Although not designed as a seoUl ship. the Cobra did well 

in the reconnaiss'lIlcc role. hs weapons could immediately engage 

the enemy and it was powcrful enough to make runs at high speed 

through hostile areas without taking unacceptable risks. 

\Vhen the squadron encountered tanks for the first lime. high. 

explosive antitank (1-1 EAT) rockets were not available, and it used 

whatever ordnance was 011 1>O<lrd. The Colna gunships opcncd fire 

at maximum range, using 2.75·inch flechette rockets to eliminate 

enemy troops riding on the outside of the tank and to force the 

crew to close the hatches. ru the gun run continued. high-explosive 

and white phosphorus rockets and 20·mm. cannon fire were used 

against the tank it.�elr. 

Eventually I-I EAT rockeL� became available, but they were not 

always effective. Although these rockets were capable of penetrating 

annorplate, they could do so only in direct hits. Engagements 

therefore had to take place at ranges of 900 to 1,200 meters, distances that cxposcd the gunship to the lank's heavy machine gun 

and 10 supporting infantry wcapons. llel\\'een 8 February and 21 

March. air cavalry teams sightcd 66 tanks, destroyed 6, .md immobilized 8. i\'JOSt of the tanks. however, were turncd ovcr to fixedwing aircraft. which could attack with heavier ordnancc. 

The Withdrawal 

Aftcr the 17th Armored Cavalry withdrew from Landing Zone 

31 and returned. the In Armor Brigade task force continued to 

occupy bascs ncar Alolli. Again hecause of connicling orders from 

the airborne division and 1 Corps headquarters, the brigade did not 

move farthcr west and therefore became a target for intense enemy 

fire: losses in men and equipment mounted. Eventually a point was 

reachcd when the 1St Armor Brigade could not, if it had been 
was ordered La seize Tchepole, and did so on 6 t\larch with an 

airmobile assault into Landing Zone I-lope. 

By early l\!arch enemy forces in the LAM SON 719 area had increased to five divisions: 12 infantry regiments, 2 tank battalions, 

an artillery regiment, and at least 19 antiaircraft battalions. After 

encoulltering enemy armored vehides at L .. ,nding Zone 31, South 

Vietnamese planners had realized that North Vielllamese armor 

was present in strength, and the 1st Armor I3rigade was strengthened with 'Idditional uniu as they became available. The reinforcement was so piecemcal and thc troops came from so tlHlIly different 

units, however, that il W;IS diflicull 10 tell just II'ho or what was 

commiued. Many units never reached Aloui and merely became 

part of the withdrawal problem. Even with all the delachments, 

attachments. additions, and deletions, only one-third of the cavalry 

squadrons and two-thirds of the tank squadrons available to I Corps 

were used in Laos. Numerically, this employment amounted to 

five tank squadrons and six armored cavalry squadrons. 

Faced \\,

jth superior enemy forces, the I Corps commander decided to withdraw. All hough IInits ancl11pted to evacoatc the landing zones in an orderely fashion, constant enemy pressure caused 

several of the sites 10 be abandoned and forced the defenders to 

make their way overland to more secure pickllP zones. Several units 

had considerable dillicuhy breaking away from the pursuing enemy 

and were lifted out only after intense tactical air. artillery, and 

aerial rocket preparation.l� By 21 March the 1st Infantry Division 

had completely withdrawn from L1.oS and major elements of the 

airborne di,!ision had been lifted Ollt. 

The J Corps cOIl1I1l;lI1der ordered the 1st Armor Brigade to 

withdraw on HI !\larch. !-Ie further allocated twO U.s. air cavalry 

troops to lhe airborne division to cover the movc. With the 1 1 th 

Armored Cavalry Regiment as real" gU:ll"d the 1 st Armor Brigade 

began its withdrawal on time, but the brigade reccived no air cavalry support. Both troops had bcen diverted by the airborne division to suppOrt airbonlc hallalions elsewhere. 

At a stream crossing halfway between Aloui and L1.nding Zone 

Alpha, the armored column was ambushed by a large North Vietnamcse forcc. The unit in front of the 1 1th Armored Cavalry 

abandoned four !\I41 tanks in Ihe middle of the stream, where they 

I� Re-aliling !hc $,1f(!ty raCIOU in\"oh·ed in !he U� of 5upponing fire, the enemy 

employed ··hugging·' tactics to a\·oid !he fire. The)" often 5!arC11 a� cI� as 20-30 

meters to friendly unin. The only aerial support accunl!c cnough Ihat dose was 

the helicopter gunship. 
men refused to stay wilh the cavalry and continued east down the 

road. The :lfIllor hrigade commander was informed of the silllalion but selll no rciliforcemcllls or recovery \'chicles 10 clear the 

crossing. Troopcr� of the 11 [il continued to fight alone. and aher 

three hOHrs SIH:cccdcd in moving two of the abandoned , .. nks Ollt 

of the way. The c;l\'alry then (,I'ossed, leaving sc\'cmcen disabled 

vehicles LO lhe west of the stream. The North Vietnamese immediately m:lIlllcd the :lb:lIldoncd vchicles. which they lIsed as machine 

gun positions IIntil tactical air strikes destroyed them 011 25 i\farch. 

\Vhat had begull as ;'Ill orderly withdrawal was rapidly hecoming 

a raul. 

The armor brigade reached I .anding Zone Alpha on 20 March, 

regrouped, and pushed on, slill without benefit of air cavalry. The 

next morning the brigade. with the 1 1th Armored Cavalry leading. 

was again amhushed, this time three kilometers cast of Fire Support 

Base Bravo. In the midst of the firefigill, an air strike accidentally 

hit the Vietnamese column with n:lp:llm. killing twelve and wounding seventy-five. The brigade withdrew west to regroup. 

By that lime the :lrmor brigade had lost approximately 60 percellt of ilS vehicles. and when a prisoner reported that two North 

Vietnamese regiments were waiting farther cast along Rotlte 9 to 

destroy it the armored force wrned south off the ro.1d. The air· 

borne division. also aware of the prisoner's statement, had meanwhile airlifted troops north of Route 9 <lnd cie<lred the :Imbush 

site. The :Irmor hrigade, unaware of the airborne action. found a 

marginal crossing over the Pon River. IwO kilometers soulh of 

Route 9. The hrigade recrossed the river twelve kilometers to the 

east and reached Vietnam through the positions of the 1st B:utalion, 

77th Armor. 

The wit hdrawal of the 1st Armor Brigade is perhaps the mOst 

graphic example of the poor coordination betweell major commands throughout LA,,! SON 719. 'Vhen the brigade left ROllte 9, 

less than 5 kilometers from Vietnam vi" road. it was forced to make 

two river crossing� because its commander was not told that the 

road had heen cleared. It W:IS this lack of coordination at the high. 

est levels. and the app.1relll I:tck of concern for the armored rorces, 

that contributed 10 the poor performance of arlllor. 

In Operation I.A'I SO:O 719, which officially ended on 6 April 

1 971, Somh Vietnamese armor did not appear to aelv'Ultage. In a 

static role at Aloui. armor pro\'ed no more dynamic than a pillbox, 

and became a li:lhility requiring additional forces for its sccmity. 

Command and control problems at all levels were evident, and 
committed at first, and rcinforcemem was piecemeal. Nonc of this, 

howcver, excllsed the performance of some armored units which, 

cspecially during the wit hdrawal, simply abandoned operational 

vchicles in their haste to gel back to 5<1.fClY. 

Some good did come from LA�t SO:"l 719. For example, it helped 

to delay major enemy operations for the remainder of 1971. The 

illlelligence gained cotlcel'lling the North Vietnamese pipeline and 

trail network in L1.oS was used for planning f\llllre bombing raids.te 

The oper;Hion allowed the South Vietnamese forces to lISC U.S. 

aviation and anillery SUppOrL without the assistance of American 

advisers, and thus pavcd the way for the South Vielnamese Army's 

complete operational comrol of U.S. aviation and artillery in midsummer of 197 1. 

Before this operation. the SOUlh Vietnamese in£alllry had little 

or no antitank training. hut thc presence of enemy armor during 

LAM SON 719 led to greater emphasis on antiarmor techniques and 

instruction in the usc of the M72 l ight antitank weapon. Both sides 

in LAM SON 719 lost heavily in men and eqllipmelll and there was 

no clearcllt victory, bllt psychologically the Vietnamese armored 

forces had received a hard blow. 

GIIII LOlIg 44-02 

One other South Vietnamese armored opcration in 1971 was 

significant, :dthough it was not widely publicized. For one reason, 

since it occurred at almOSI Ihe same lime as I.A 'I SON 7 19. it \\'as lost 

in the glare of reporting that operation. For another, penctration 

into Cambodia, the deepe�t of Ihc war. made it politically scnsilive. 

The operation was staged hecause the North Vietnamese had Ctlt 

ROlile 4. the only supply road in Cambodia hetween Phnom Penh, 

the capital, and the POrt of K;tmpong Sam: the Cambodian go\'ernment had requested Soulh Vietnamese assist:lIlce in reopening it. 

Operalion Cuu LONG 44-02 b(.'gan on 13 January 19i1. as the 

4th Armor Brigade with the 12th and 16th Armored Cavalry Regiments, three Ranger hattalions, an anillery haltalion, and an engineer grollp. moved 300 kilomelers from Call Tho to I-Ia Tien in 

founeell hOllrs. For lhe neXl 111'0 days. Ihe bri�ade pushed north 

along ROIIIC� )\ :md 4. The first enem}' encollntered had set lip an 

leThc 2<1 Squadron. lilh Ca\":llr)' (."ir) with the lIac 8:10 Comp::m)' conducted 

:I seriC"S of dcep. successful nidI in C..ambodia and Vietnam o\cr a Ih'e month period 

using thi5 information. The lcdll1iqucs de\eloped in thCiC nids are worlh)' of 

5tud)' for fmure applicalion. 
away by charging on linc. 

A second ambush fanher nonh against the 12th Armored Cavalry also failed. The enemy tried 10 isolate the lead squadron by 

destroying the fir�1 :lIld laSI vchicles. The le .. d commander. how· 

ever, kept his naming vchicle moving and his Ill,achine gun firing. 

Hit three t imes and burning, I he armored cavalry vehicle COlli inned 

north for abotH 150 meters before it blew up. killing the crew. 

Thi� heroic cffon prevented the column from being If<lppcd on the 

road (lnel :dlowcd the cavalry 10 get DilL of the enemy firing l<llles. 

The Ranger hallalion behind the cavnlry squadron stOpped and 

opened fire. The ;lInbll�hcrs were now in OJ deadly cross-fire between 

the cavalry and the Rangers. Two U.S. aerial fire teams se:lled off 

the enemy ese:lpe l'Outes.11 \Vhen the smoke cleared. 200 of the 

enemy lay dead. alld seventy-five weapons, including twO 75-mm. 

recoilless rifles and three heavy machine guns. had been eaplUred. 

The 12th Armored Cavalry Regiment lost five killed, twenty 

wounded. :lnd three tracks de�lroyed. 

On 17 January Cambodian forces. with Vietnamese Marine 

Corps support, fought 10 the outskirts of the Pich Nil Pass and 

secured it. while the armor brigade secured ROllte 4 as far north 

as Route 18. After helping the Cambodians set III' strongpoints. the 

4th Armor Brigade withdrew lOward South Viewam, arriving by 

25 January. 

On several occasions, Vietnlllllese armored units had conducted 

bold operations deep into enemy territory, in both Laos and Cambodia. Three m:ljor operations. Cuu LOl"G 44-02, LA;\I SON 719. 

and TOAN TIIAl"G 01-7 1. all lOok pl:lce simultaneously, with the 

SOUlh Vietnamese hoping to keep the initiali,'e gained in 1970. 

Of the three openltions. only Cuu LONG 44-02 can be regarded as 

a success. and as a result Military Region 4 remained one of the 

most secure arellS in 50lllh Vietnam. The other two operations 

demonstrated that a parity existed in Soulh Vietnamese-North 

Vietnamese strength. The yei'lr 1971 was nOt successflll for either 

side; it ended with Ihe Viet Cong and North Vietnamese as strong, 

i£ not stronger. than the South Vielilamese. 

17 u.s. �\'i�tioll unin in Milit:l'1 RCjlion -I pro\lded g-tln$hip support from b:l!K:s 

in the rqtion ami from Ihe dedl of Ihe USS Cle. .. /lwd which W:lS crubing in Ihe 

bar ne�r K�mpong Som. 
CHAPTER VIII 

The Enemy Spring Offensive of 1972 

The largest military operation of 19iO-1971 in Vietnam was not 

a combat operation but the redeployment of over 300,000 American troops. Although the withdrawal was governed to some extent 

by the fluctuating intensity o[ combat operations, it moved as 

relcllltessiy as an avalanche. Of the 543,000 American troops in 

Vietnam in April 1969, 60,000 had left by the end of that year. In 

accordance with the planning guidance of General Ahrams, only 

a few small armored units were :llllong those withdrawn. 

In 1970, when 1 39,000 American troops-including the fim 

armored bau:dions redeployed-returned to lhe United States, the 

concentration of U.S. armored b:nlalions climbed to fOrly-six PCTcent of the com I>.:, t units that remained in Vietnam. The pace of the 

withdrawal slowed considerably during the Cambodian expeditions but after August 1970, when U.S. operations in Cambodia 

ended, large numbers of units were withdrawn. The highest percentage of armored units leaving Vielllam came from �rilitary 

Region 2, where enemy aclivity was almost negligible. By the end 

of 1970. the 1st Squadron. 10th Cavalry. was the only armored unit 

left in the region. The primary mission of this unit was still road 

security. 

As the number of American troops in Vietnam decreased. the 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam hecame the dominant force and 

began to assume operational comral of U.S. units. One such American unit was the 2d Squadron, 1 1 th Armored Cavalry Regiment. 

L,te in April 1971 increasing enemy resistance to Rome plow operations along ROllte I, nonhwest of Saigon. 1ll:lde it plain thaI 

mechanized forces would be needed if the project was to proceed on 

schedule. Accordingly, the security of the emire Rome plow operation in Hall Nghia Province W:lS placed under the comrol of the 

2d Squ;tdron, 1 1 th Armored Cavalry, which reponed directly to the 

Vietname�e province headquaners. 

Throughout 1971 however, withdrawal was the U.S. mission, 

and 177,000, or 53 percent, of the Americans depaned. Bv year's 

end, troop strength was 1 58,000, the lowest since 1965. Fifty.four 

percent. of the remaining U.S. combat battalions were armored 

units-four air cavalry and two armored cavalry squadrons as well 

as many separate ground and air cavalry troops. Armored units 
COHlllry during I Oil, !(,<lving armored strength evcnly distributed 

from north to south. 

A lull in the Vietnam conflict during the first 1l1ol'Hh� of 1972, 

as U.S. force, COlltinued to disengage. was encouraging. Of al\ 

American IIl1il� rcm:.ining in Vietnam, only <lil" and grollnd cava I ry • perform i ng rCCOllll:t i�sallcc and seen ri 1 y III iS5i0115. cOllli Illlcd to 

enCOlIlllcr lhe enemy widl allY degree of frequency. The immediate 

effect of the withdrawal �(hcdilic Wit, thai mosl llllil� weTC relcg:llccI 

to administrative Slal ll�. or, ,I[ hc�t. to a local �cclll'ily role. \Vhilc 

definite rc�tri{,lion� limi ted the nalllre and �copc of American P<"lTlicipatioll in ground romb:ll. air c;lvalry unilS were under le�s restraint. U.S. ;Iir ( av:llr)' ('omillued 10 perform il� reconnai�s.1nce 

:I!l(1 �ecllrity mis�i()m wilh Iiule reg:lI'd for the departure of other 

U.S. OIlpni7.ation�. 

All American armored and air ca\'alry squadrons still in Viet· 

nam at the end of 1971 were ordered to recleplo\' hefore �O April 

1972. The last V.S. �TOIUlCl <:a\,<llr)' unit 10 conduct oper<lliom wa� 

Troop F. 17th Ca\'alry. which left Da Nang on 6 April. The 1st 

Squadron. In Cavalry, which began ilS reHlrn on 10 April. \\':" the 

last ground cavalr)' unil !O leave Vietnam. Troop D. the 1st Squadron'.; organic air cavalry troop. was redesignated Troop D. 1 7th 

C .. 1\·alry, and as�igned 10 0:. Nang. lL remained in Vietnam IIntil 

after the cease fire and supported the .\rmy of the Republic of 

ViClnlUll ground units in i\lilitarv Region I. 

As the air cav:liry squadrom departed. they left hehincl separ:ue 

ail' cavalrv troop� as the la�1 \'e�tige of U.S. comhat strenglh. Thus, 

Troop C. 16th Cavnlr\', was the sole :lir c<lvalry IInit in Mil itary 

Region 1. When Ihe 71h Sqlladron. 1 7th Ca"n!r\'. lefl 011 29 April 

-the la�l :lir cavalry sqll;l(\l'On 10 redeplov from Vietllillll- it left 

behind 111'0 sCjXlrale :lir c:t\';dry In)op�. Troop II, 10th Cn';dr\,. and 

Troop I I. 1 7th l.:lvalry. The�e two troops operated in l\lili r;II'y 

Region 2 until 2.'1 Fehrllar" 1 9i� and were Ihe la�t (1.<;. ('Oln],at 

l1nil� 10 1e<l"e Vielnam, Air (;1""ln' lInit� with the primarv mi�sion 

of �lIpporting <;ollth Vietnnme�e .\rnl\' forces were the only acti\'e 

Army colllb<ll llnit� in Vielnam in 1972. 

Point tlUfI COIIl/frl'jJoillt 

The Vietname�c Illnar New Year \\'hich began in Febrllar\' 19i2 

was Ihe Ycnr of the Rat. ! .ike Ihe nil, rhe en ell1\' a��umed a lo\\' 

profile dllTing Ihe fir,. week, of 1 972. n" da\' enemy force� avoided 

direct confrontation with free world forces, and by fllni\'c scurry-
border staging areas. 

As early as NO\·cmber 1 97 1 , the intclligencc community, the 

government of South Viclnam, and U.S. and South Vietnamese 

Army commandcrs anticipated a sigllificaTH encmy offensive in 

1972, cxpec1inlt thc main effort to bc made in mid-February. The 

mil itary objectives of the offensive were not known, bill intelli. 

gence sources reponed that its goal would be the destruction of 

the Army of thc Repuhlic of Vietnam. No! evcn at the highcSl 

levcls of government, however. was a major shift in cnemy tactics 

expected. 

ThaI the North Vietnamese were capable of a large-scale offensive equal to the Tel attack of 1968 was apparent. The possibility 

that enemy armor would be a Ihreal was considcred insignificam, 

however, since only three times during Ihe Vietnam War had the 

Nonh Vietnamc�e Army employed armored vehicles in combat. 

Tanks in the North Victnam invenlOrv were cstimated at Illore 

than 300. and wcre Ihought to be organizcd in three regiments. 

Two regiments were known to be operating in 1 .. 10S and Cambodia, 

where intelligence reports indicated that they would remain.! A report prep.1.red by He:ldquaners, U.S. Army, Pacific. in February 

1972, surmised Ih:ll terrain, logistics. and free world firepower 

would limit Ihe sile ,md gcneral location of armor-supponed a�­

sau1cs. Sustained oper.ttions with tank units larger Ihan a company 

were considered impossible without establishment of large fuel and 

supply caches in the border areas. The act ivilY required 10 establish 

these stockpiles would reveal enemy intentions and subject the 

forces and supplies to devastating air attacks. 

In early i\IO'lrch enemy offensi\'e action in Military Regions 1 

and 2 increased :md invoh'ed 100rger units. Continuing illlell if'encc 

from sensors and olher SOurces in the northern part of Military 

Region I focused al lClltioll 011 Ihe A Shill! valley. where free world 

forces had nm opcr:llec! since 1970. (Mal) 16) Ro;td construction, 

enemy logistic,li tl"OOps. heavy artillery, O'lntiaircraft we,lpons, and 

wnks WCre detected with increasing frequency. The cxtelH and intensity of antiflircraft fire almost hflited Ollr air reconmiSS;tllCe in 

the mountainoll� area� we�1 of Fire SuppOrt Base fiastogne. The 

South Vietnamese lSI Infantry Division looked on this buildup 

as a threat to Ilue, and on 5 i\farch started an oper.ttion called 

1 Tread malk, tli§(OH'red b� seoUl helicopTers of Troop F. �th Ca'·31 ... ·. indirntrd 

Ihal ;a nllmber of Ir:lclte" ,·ehides had mo-ed OUI of a rubber pl3nalation northwest 

of Krek. Cambodia. anti al'pal'ellli)' stagrd a praClice assault againsl an abandoned 

fire Sllpporl baJe. 
NORTH VIETNAM 

• 

'-_- 

• 

3d Infanlry ;;,.I.I,�"f 

• 

.f,." 4" C.,.,

o� 

•. ..

 � . J: oCamp C.rroll a 

u Arua of Operal;..,n_ au.ng Tri 

6 Mal Loe Cu,,,bIlJ Uage 

j'( 

( 

\ 

LAOS "'-, 

SOlJTH VIETNAM 

--:---- -'- , 

NORTHERN I CORPS \ 

Mlrch 1972 

.6 Flit IUPport �M 

o Parmln.nl fonlc.llon 

.\lAP 16 

J 

, 

, 

 

Oak To II M.t.h "" 

Hel 0 1�6' to .<0'.' 

r.., C."" 

•• .6 AOCKU 

;. 

"" OGE 

• <. 

o Polel Klen, 

• 

8111108nll 

1\'1111 or Opftrlliions 

en Mong 

LAM SON -15-72 to destroy a logistical base near ell i\[ong Mountain. 

Deliberately launched hefore the end of the wet season, this 

major undenaking was planned as a joint airmobile and ground 

attack, but overwhelming amiaireraf, quickly compelled the South 

Vietnamese Army to advance only on Ihe ground. Heavy fighting 

look place culy, and casualties frol1\ intense artillery fire and daily 

B-52 bomber strikes forced the Nonh Vietnamese Army to commit 

major reinforcemellls hom Ihe 324B Division. A Ihrust by Ihe 7th 

Armored Cavalry Regimclll and all infalllry regilllelll in Ihe 

vicinity of Fire Suppon Base Veghcl stirred up a hornel's nesl. In 

the ensuing struggle Ihe armored Gwalry lost IWO troops. The extent and ferocity of the fighting COII\'

inccd the South Vietnamese 

that Ihe enemy intended 10 attack Ilue in forrc. Pulling back to 

more favol':lble terrain IIcar the Bastogllc base. South Vietnamese 
May. 

In Military Region 2 repons on enemy tank sightings in the 

border areas persisted bUI remained unconfirmed. During March 

the Air Force destroyed significant qu:dities of stockpiled enemy 

supplies detected by the American air cav:liry. South Vietnamese 

cavalry units continued to perfonn route security missions but 

otherwisc staged no offensive operations. 

rhe 20th Tewl< Regime1/t 

Northcrn Milit:lry Region I, a critical area bordered hy North 

Vietnam and I.aos, was protccted in [hc Sltmmcr of 1971 by South 

Vietnamesc infantry, thrcc SOllth Vietnamese armored cavalry 

squadrons, and the U.S. 1st Brigade, 5th Infan!ry Division 

(�fcchanized) . schcduled to Icavc the country in Augns!.:! Analysis 

of tcrrain, the proh:lhlc encmy thrcat. and enemy ;mnored actions 

during LA,,! SON 719 madc it clear that armored units would conlinue to be necded in this area. Consequently, the Vietnamese 

Joint General Staff authorized on 31 July 1971 the formation of the 

20th Tank Regimen!. Eqnipped with :\148A3 tanks, it was the first 

South Vietnamesc t:lnk regiment 

Tailored specifically to fit the needs and cap:lbilities of the 

South Vietn:lmcsc Ann)'. the 20th T:lnk Regiment h:ld :In unllsu:lI 

org:lnil.1tion. During I .. A:I.' So=, 7 19. :lrmored vehicles h:ld proven 

vulnerable to individual alllilank weapons when not protcctcd by 

infantq·. The Joim Gener:ll Staff Iud therefore dirccled :In :lddilion 10 thc rcgimcnl. :1 270-l11an armorcd riflc comp:lny. Nincty 

riflemen werc assigned to each !<Ink squadron and werc to ridc 

on the outsidc of thc wnks, providing local sccurity. 

Other changes in Ihc lank regiment'S org:lniZalion ;1I1c! cquipmCtll includcd the addition of Iracked 1\1548 ammunition and fuel 

C:lrgo vehicles, elimination of the regimelll:tl SCOtit 1'1:1 lOon, for 

which a five-vchiclc sccurity section was substiltlled. :1I1d elimination of the :lrmorcd \'chide-I:lunched bridge section and :tli infrarcd 

fire control cquipment. !.mer six xenon searchlights pcr sqU:ldron 

were aut horizcd :lftcr advisers qucstioncd the wisdom of limiting 

Sl5 million worth of fighting equipment 10 daytime use by rcflls\ng 

� To inn"ell5e " ielname.$C combal po ...

 er and to fill IlIl' gap' tdt b)' fl'<leploring 

U.s . .. nilS. porl;on, of Ihe 50111h Vil'1l1ame-se 1st and 2d lnranln' Oi,isions �nd local 

"niu of Ihl' Regionat and !'oplllar �-or� .. ere (ombin�1 10 CTCJll' Ihe 3(1 Inranlf)' 

1);Ii.sion. The t lill Annored Gna!.-)". 1111I'I"n from the lsi Armor nrig�lIe. became 

the dh ;1;011', organic (:II 311",. rq:iment. 
dispense with the \chiclc-IaIlIKhcd bridge section was not recoil· 

sidercd. and lark of hridging during the enemy otrensi\'c proved 

a Illajor (;Jew)' in the loss of wnks. 

Training for the 20.h Regiment began at Ai Til ncar Quang 

TTi City. bUl proceeded slowly hecause of many problems, p;lf. 

Licularly in maintenance. Ahout 60 percellt of the tanks received 

by the regiment had serious deficiencies beyond the repair Glpa· 

bility of the lank news. Repair parIs :llltl technic:!1 manuals were 

missing and the lang'uag-e harrier preveJlted U.S. instnLClOrs from 

communicating adequately with the Vietnamese crewmen. 

On I November a gunnery progl-:llll based on U.S. tan I.; Slandarcls gOl under way. Unfonunatcly, the inexperienced tanl.; crews 

had difficulty in (,omprehending the integrated functioning of the 

rangcfinder and hall istic COlllputer. In faCl the Vietn;llllcse langllage 

could come no closer lO the lel'lI1 hallistic computer th<ln 10 tl':msi<lte it "adding lIl<lchinc." Partly hecause of their experience wilh 

the i\l41 1:1111.;. which had no r:lI1gefindel'. Vietnamese comlll<luders 

at firsl could not be convinced of the rangefinder's \'allle, R;q)iel 

troop wrnover and manpow{'r shonages <llso <ld\'er�e1y a fl'ected ('rcw 

perrormance, Training therefore made slow headway, with m<llly 

reversions to ha�ic lessons, By 25 January gunnery training ended. 

with 41 of 51 availahle crews Cju<llifying. using test criteria as rigorOliS <lS those lI�ed for U,S, units. 

Unit taC'lical Ir:lining heg<ln in the foothills west of Quang Tri 

City on I Fehruary and was judged successful in its later sta�e�. A 

recurring problem during lactiC<l1 testing W<lS the Vietnamese inclin<ltion to disl'eg:II'd maintenance before, dllring. :mel after an 

oper<ltion. Continued emphasis on lll<limenance reslllled in �ome 

improvemellt. bill standards rcmained helow acceptable 1cveh. even 

after the unit completed it'> [I'ailling. 

The regiment's fin:1! tactical test. <l field training exercise. was 

to be conducted by the South Vietnamese Armor Command :Iiong 

U.S. lines, with the proviso that any portion not completcd cor, 

rectly W<l� to he repeated. Several problems del:1yed the exercise 

p<lst its schcdll[ecl �taning date or [1 i\r .. rch. Poor weather dllring 

thc gunncr), phase. the Il('('essity for some lactic .. [ retraining at the 

troop [evel. and the I:1cl.; of M88 rc<'O\'cry vehicles :md M!J [8 

tr<lcl.;ed carA"o vchicles to carry fuel combined to came setbads. 

Fin<llly, after de\'ming scveral days to vehicle lIl<lintenan('e. the 

regiment hegan it� training lest on 27 i\larch. \Vithin a few days 

the cxerci�e wa� transformed into the ultimate test-survi\'<ll on the 

field of ball[e. 
By the end of io.farch 1972, SOtuh Vieinalllese defenses in �filitary Region I were arr:ulged in a roughly crcM:cnt-shaped pattern 

of fire suppOrt bases ill nonhcrl1 Quang Tri Province, with the 

majority of forces oriented to the north and west in the vicinity of 

the Demilitarized Zone. (See ,\1f1J) 16.) To the south and stretching westward to H ighway I from the sea were a number of small 

Region<ll Forces outposts commanded by province and district 

chiefs. From I lighway QL·I west and south. roughly par:dlcling 

the mountains, was the newly formed Smah Vietn:lIllcse 3d In· 

fantry Division, bolstered in the west hy the Vietnamese Marine 

division. Deployed with the regiments of the 3d Infantry Di" ision 

was its organic c<lvalr)', Ihc I l lh .\rmorecl C .. ,· .. ll'}'. Farther to the 

saluh, gU<lrcling exits from the A Shall \'alley and the approaches 

to Hue, W<lS the South Vietnamc�e lst Inf<lntry Division with its 

organic 7th Armored C<lvalry Regiment. 

In the early morning hours of �O io.f;uch devasting rocket, mortar, and art illery fire fell 011 every fire suppOrt base in Quang Tri 

Province. The bombardment continued :111 day, :md late in the day 

the northernmost bases reponed North Vietnamese Army t:mks 

and infantry moving south across the Demilitarized Zone. �faior 

General Frederick J. Krocsen, Jr., Deputy Commander, U.S. XXIV 

Corps, descrihed the action: 

The arti llery ol"fensive was followed by infantry and armor attacks in 

the cast across the Ben l lai River following' the axis of QL (Roule) 1 

in the west to\\':1I"I1 the district capit�1 of Cam 1.0 and Camp C:m·oll. 

Elements of Ihe 30,l Ih and 308th Di,·isions. three separate inl:lI1try regi· 

mellls of the U5 Front. two t,mk rcgimcnt�. :mel at least olle sapper 

batl .. lion were later identified <lrllong Ihc aHacking forces. Initi .. llv then, 

thc en('my concentrated ,I numerical ac1v<lll tac.e of mol'c th:m three to 

onc over the defending 3d f)i"i�ioll and attacked forces which were 

disposed to counter the infiltration ,md raid tactics heretofore employed 

by the NVA in the D:\IZ area. 

The tactical situation on 30 March was confused: the 3d In· 

fantry Division received vague and conflicting reports from fire 

bases at an astonishing rate. io.fost disconcening were accounts of 

the ferocity and widespread nature or the attacks . .JUSt before noon 

the 20th Tank Regiment received a frantic message from Head· 

quarters, i\lilitary Region I, ordering il to rctul"l 10 Quang Tri 

City. Since no explanation was given, Major General Nguyen Van 

Toall, Chief of Armor, ,mel his American adviser, Colonel Raymond R. Ball1'eal1, 

.

II'., flew to Quang Tri City to see Ceneral Vu 

Van Ciai, the South Vietnamese 3d Division commander. There 
had been overrun in a preclude to what was apl"><uclllly a major 

enemy offensive. Since the main attack had nOl yet been identified, 

and since no one was Slire where Ihe tank regiment would be of 

the mon value. Ceneral TO:lIl persuaded Ceneral Cia; not to commit lhe 20th Regiment prematurely but to hold it as a di" ision 

reserve or for usc as :1 cOtllllcrauack force. I-Ie also convinced Gelleral Gi .. i that he should pennil the unit 10 stand down for maintenance before its conHnitmcnl. 'Vith that determined. the regiment. 

then conducting ils final coordinated assault phase of the tr;lining 

exercise. completed the assault, did a right flank on the objective 

(out of linc formalioll and into:t column) , and, witholll stopping, 

returncd LO Ai Tu Combat Hase. 

The Rock of D01lg fi(l 

By early morning- of I April most of the olltlying fire bases 

along the Dcmilitarized Zone and in wcstern Quang Tri Provincc 

had becn evacuatcd or overWIl, Icaving no fricndly positions nonh 

of the l\Iieu Giang :l1ld Clla Vict rivcrs. Poor weather prc,'elltcd 

air support and contributed to lite relative ease willt which the 

enemy pushcd back the South Victnamese. Thc Nonh Vielllamcse 

forces advanced south with impl.lnil)'. By late afternoon on I April 

j\'f<li Loc and Camp Carroll, sOllth of the l\Iieu Giang River, were 

under heavy attack. 

Frantically rcdeploying the three infantry regiments, one 

cavalry regiment. and two Vietll:lmese Marine brig.tdes at his disposal. Gcnerill Gi;ti estahlished a defensive line along the south 

bank of the �liell Giang. In an effort to st.abilize the sitllalion. he 

commiued the 20th Tank Regimcnt on IItc morning of I April 

with thc mission of rclicving thc cmb;lttled 1 1 th Annorcd Cavillry 

Rcgimcnt and auached infantry units then fighting around Ci1m 

Lo. illong National High\\'ay 9. (MOl) 17) Aftcr joining a South 

Vietnamese M:lt"ine biluillion. the tank regimen! movcd nonh from 

Ai Tu along Highway I to\\';lrd Dong Ha. 

Poor traffic COlllml ilnd refugees congesting the routC forced 

the lank regiment to move cross-country to the sOlllhwest of Dong 

Ha, and in so doing it surprised and routed an cnemy ambush 

;lIang Highway QL-9. Prisoner� takcn during Ihis action were dismounted membcrs of a North Vietnamese tank unit whose mission 

was to seize and man South VielllamCJiC armored vchicles expected 

to be caplUrcd in the offcnsi\·c. \Vith its fony-fouT operational 

tanks. the 20th T.tIlk Regiment 1ll00red on IOw","(1 C.'1l 1.0. which 

was burning. As darkness approached. the unit sel lip a dcfensive 
20th TANK REGIMEN 

1-27 April 1972 

� A'eI of ';"e 

<{ . Enemy 8Kis 01 ,nick 

('fT1') ARVN po.ilion 

I <f(-ARVN lir. 

InOI 10 s.ca l 

MAP 17 

A' Tu Combl' Han' o 

\ 

• 

position southeast of C,m Lo Village, withstanding enemy probes 

throughout the nigh!. 

At daybreak all Easier Sunday, 2 April, the 20th Tank RegimCIll received reports ! l1<1t a large North Vietnamese tank column 

was moving south across Ihe Hen I-Iai River toward Ihe bridge at 

Dong I-Ia. AboUl 0900 the commander. Colonel Nguyen Huu Ly, 

received permission 10 move lO Dong J la, then nonh across the 

bridge 10 engage I he enemy forces. When he re;lched I he IOwn he 

found enemy infantry already occupying positions on the north 

bank of the Mieu Ciang River that pre\'e11 lcd his crossing the 

bridge. He deployed the regime11l around the town of Dong Ha, 

with the 1st Squadron in a blocking position on the high ground 

about three kilometeH 10 Ihe west. the 2d Squ:ulron 10 the south, 

and the 3d Squadron defending positions within the town to prevent enemy elements from cTossing the hridge. 

AboUl 110011 mcn of the 1st Squadron. from their vantage point 

on the high ground to the WC�I, suddenly observed a Nonh VietI

namese lank and infantry column moving south along I-ligh\\'ay I 

IowaI'd Dong I-Ia. i\rO\'ing their lanks into concealed positions. they 

wailed as the enemy tanks moved closer. At a range of 2.500 to 
destroying nine PT76 tanks and two Tj·1 lall"�. The i\'onh Vietnamese unit. which hy its colunm formation showed that it was 

nOt expecting an :luad . was (hrem'lI into confusion. Unable to see 

their adversaries, t he North Vietnamese CT(,WTllCn maneuvered 

their tanks wildly a� the SOlllh ViCUl:lmCSC lank gUllners dc�troyed 

them one b}' onc. The Olccompanying infalllry dispersed, :mel the 

surviving T5-1 lanks (limed and headed north \\·ilhOlit firing a 

single shot. The South Vicllliuncsc regimental hc;.dquaners, monitoring lhe North Vietnamese radio nel at thai l ime, heard the 

enemy comm:lI1dcr cxprc�s surpri�cd disbelief ill losing his lallk� 

to cannon he could not sec. 

The ste:ldy deteriorat ion of the lactica! �illlation arOllnd Dong 

I-Ia was arrest cd h}' the ani,'a! of the 1st Armor Brigadc hcad· 

quaners. Allhough the hrigadc he.-.dqu;1r1ers had hccn in the arc;1 

solely to monilOr thc 20th Tank Regimellt's training cxcrcise, it 

was a wcll trained organization. posscssing lhc armored \'chides 

and radios needed hy Ceneral Ci:li to cstahli .. h ('01111'01 of lhe 

scattered forces and dircct the dcfeme hc hopcd to e�tab1i .. h at 

Dong Ila. General To:m had lII'gcd its emplovmelll. and on the 

afternoon of 2 April the brigade, undcl' 3d Division control, 

assumed command of al1 armored, infantry, and ;"farine forcc .. in 

thc Dong I ia area. lis units included the 20th Tank Regiment, 

twO sqll:ulrom of the lith Armorcd Cwalry Regiment. the 2d ami 

5ith Rcgiments of the !kl I nf<lntry Division, the 3d Battalion of 

the 2581h Marine Corps Brigade, illld the survivors of the 56th 

Regiment from C<lmp Carrol1.3 

The bridge spanning the Mien (';iang Ri\'er :11 Dong 1-1 .. afforded the enemy the apponunity to cross the river unimpeded 

:lIld then drive straight south 10 Quang Tri City. Beforc the armor 

brigade headquaners arri\'C(1, lhc �d Division cngil1eer� had madc 

two unsuccessful attcmpts to destroy the bridge with explosive 

charges. \Vhen Colonel Nguyen Trong I.ual, the hI Armor Brigade 

comm:tnder, arrived he decided to leave Ihc bridge inwct for Ihe 

time being. since the enemy had heen slOppcd and the armor 

brigade force .. werc holding. Colonel ' ,Ilal was prep:l1'in� to IHake 

a cOlllHcr:ltt .. ck to the north across thc bridge when the bridge 

charge� delOnated and dropped the near sp.1n, putting :tn end 10 

any counterattack plans. 

3 A[ 0800 On 2 April. afler 5ucresru1\r Ilcfending the camp ::tg::tinSI three major 

enemr :t"",'ult�. Ihe 561h Ren;menl inexplicabh g::t'e "';1\'. The: 10M of Camp C:nrolt 

made: Ihe: posiliOn 31 �13i I.OC IIIl[cnable, and [hc �Iarine: "nilS U Ihal IlX"alion wen: 

Wilhdr:l.wlI o\er Ihl." III."XI Ihrre dals. 
Ha on the afternoon of 2 April, engaged first by limited tactical 

air strikes aod then by <lnillery, monaI', and tank fire. A large 

search and rescue effort had been L,uJH:hed for the crcw of a U.S. 

aircraft downcd near Cam 1 .0. The U.S. Air Force temporary no· 

fire zone was twenty-seven k.ilometers in diameter, encomp.using 

nearly the entire com hat <lrea <lnd South Victmllnese Army defenders were unable for several hours to call for artillery support 

or tactical air strikes :Ig<linst the onrushing North Vietnamese 

Army. The enemy thcreforc had <Ill opportunity to advance anillery, tanks, and infantry until 2200, when the restriction was lifted. 

During the next sevcral days, enemy activity was relatively 

light, with sporadic attacks by fire <lnd numerous small ground 

actions. The Nonh Vielllamcse anillery fire was extremely accurate, and although South Vietl1<lmesc uniu moved frequently to 

avoid the shelling thc cncmy seemed to be able to locatc ncw posilions very quickly. On 3 April <I NOrlh Vietn:ltlleSe arlillery observer in a SOllih Vielname�e officer's uniform and driving a South 

Vietnamese vchicle with radios was caplUred south of Dong Ha. 

The observer had p.

1pers mpporting sevcral identilies, and spent 

his time driving throughout the area spotting and adjusting anillery fire ror North Vie[muncsc guns ncar the Demilitarized Zone. 

Although Somh Victn;1Il1CSe unilS conducted attacks to eliminate 

pockets of resistance south of the 1I.ricli Giang River, the prcssure 

from the nonh remained intense. 

Thc next tank combat occurred on [he 9[h when all three 

squadrons of the 20th Tank Regiment fought enemy armor. The 

1st Squadron. shifted sevcral kilometers west of Dong Ha six cbys 

earlier, occupied high ground O\'crlooking an important road junction along N:ltional llighway 9. Again thc tank gunnery tl';tining 

1><1id dividend� ;IS thc I:In1.:('rs enga.l-":'ed :In infantry unit supported 

by len tanks :l[ ranges lip [0 2,800 metcrs. A rew :lllswering shots 

rell short, and the enemy tanks scauered. several bogging down in 

the rice 1><1ddies near the 1'0.;1(1. E"entually eighl were destroyed. 

In all, the regiment des[I'O�'eci sixtcen T5'1 wnks and captnred one 

T59 th:ll day, in turn suffering nothing morc than superficial dam­

:lge to se\'eral i\r48's. 

For the next twO weeks the South Vietnamesc carried Out 

clearing operations intcrrupted by fl'cqllclH enga�cmcnu with 

North Vielllamese arlllor and infantry which normally withdrew 

in the laIC afternoon. Nights were punctuated hy artillery, mOrtar, 

and rocket allacks on South Vielllamese positions throughout the 

area. The defensive lines eHablishcd on 2 April continued to hold, 
NORTU VUITNAMf.S.: T59 TANK captured by SOIl/II Vietnamese 2011, 

Ta'lk Regime'll sOlllh of Dong Ha. 

,md on 11 April the lSI Armor Brigade \\';1S :lllgmcnlcd by the 

arrival of Ihe 181h Armored Ca,'alry Rcgimcm from �Iitit:lry 

Region 3. By 14 April the 3d Division controlled fi\'c rcgimcllwlsize South ViCln;lIllesc task forces, including units of the 41h, 

11th, 17th, and 18th Cavalry Regiments and the 20lh Tank Regiment. 

On 23 April. several kilomclcl"i WCSI of Dong I b, the 2d Squ<ldron o[ Ihe 20th Tank Rcgimcll l \\'a� attacked by <In inf;lIltl'),-lallk 

force Il�ing a nell' WC:lpon. For the fir�1 lime the enemy employed 

the Soviet AT3 Saggcr wire-guided missile, destroying :111 1\148A3 

{;Ink and an armored cavalry assault vchicle. A second ;lssauh 

vehicle W;lS d:un;lp;cd. At fir .. t the SOllth Vietll;lmese Army t;lnkers 

seemed f;lscin;ltcd hy the missile's \101\' ;lnd erratic flight. Through 

trial and error, howe\'er, the troops soon learned to engage the 

lallnch site or the ATj with tank main gun fire and to move their 

\'ehicles in cvasi\e maneuvers. 

I-Ieralded by m:ls�i\e arlillery a!lacks with 122·mm. rockel� and 

1 30-mm. gllns, Oil 2i April a IICW enemy offensive began against 

SOlith ViclIl:lInese ArlllY positions all along the !\Iicu Gi:lIlg_ClIa 

Viet River dercnse line. The barrage was quickly followed by 
mined resistance on the 1"><1ft of the South Victnamesc defenders. 

The 3d Squadron, 20lh Tank Regiment, supponing thc 5lh Ran· 

ger Croup. l't.'Cci"ed the brunt of the allack and wa� soon he,l\,jly 

engaged. By midmorning all officers of the 3d Squadron had hecn 

killed or wounded, and three 1\148A3 tanks had becn destroyed by 

Sagger missiles. 

All along Ihc defensive line, lIniLS were being ovel'l'un or 

pushed biKk. Forced LO yield grollnd. Ranger and t:lIlk clements 

gradually withdrew to the southeast. Allholigh losses were heavy on 

both sides, the numerically superior North Vieltl:lll1ese ronl iullet! 

their drive, :lnd by nightfall had pushed almost fOllr k ilometers 

south of Dong I la. In the early morning of 28 April, Ihe 20th T,wk 

Regiment had eighteen operation:l! 1\148A3 tanks, During Ihe 

South Vicwamese withdr:lh'al the accurate gunnery of the 3d 

Squadron COSt tile North Vietnamese five T54 tanks, 

At that poim Ihe South Vietnamese found large enemy forces 

to their rear and for the armored units the withdr:lwal became an 

atwck to the south. The 2d Squadron of the [:lnk regimen!, allack· 

ing south 10 secllre the bridge over the Vinh l'huoc Ri,'cr at mid· 

morning on the 28th. was badl}' bal tered in an enemy amhush, The 

commander losl control of his unit and Ihe sllrviving vchicles, after 

crossing the hridge, continued to the sOllth in dis..uray. 

It wa$ thcn ohviollS to Colonel Luat that 1st Armorcd Brigade 

units were threatened ,,'i,h encirclcment. so 'he elllire force began 

moving south. All along the way fighting \\'as heavy for the next 

t\\'o d:lYs. The lerrain a� \\'cll :IS thc enemy took its toll of vehicles. 

At the Vinh Philo<" Rivcr scven vehicles were stranded on the 

norlh shore when thc bridgc, struck by encmy artillery fire. col· 

lapsecl.� F:lnhcr sOllth at the Tharh I-Ian River ne:I1' Quang Tri 

City, the bridges werc already destroyed. Two tanks were lost therc 

in fording the rivcr on thc gOth. 

ny then the t:lnk :lnd cavalry units II'cre beginning their fifth 

day of ;dmost constant lighting. SOllth of Quang Tri re�lIpply of 

fuel and ammunition W:lS nonexistent as the armored force con· 

tinucd its atl:lck. Fon'cd from the highway by .. dctermined enemy. 

the tanks and aS�:HIIt vehicles mOl'ed cross·country, falling victim 

to the man}' rice paddic�. r:lnal crossin�, and streams a� well as the 

antitank rockets and artillery, On the first day of I\lay thc vehicles 

bcgan to run OUl of gas. 

4 Two Mit 3 command ,'ehideJ. appr();lchinlt Ihe bridtte ami unable 10 JIOp in 

lime, nil ul' Ihe S,1!:8ing. inclined span and hunled Ihrough the air for nearly a full 

"chide Iel'glh. !anthng �fcl) in lhe pan of the bridge that was still intaCI. Seconds 

later the span collapYXI. 
enemy units. the baltered survivors of the armor command, intermingled with the remnants of other army units. reached Camp 

Evans at midaflcrnoon. Only armored cavalry assault vchicles were 

IcCt; lhe cavalry rcgimclHs and Ihe rank regiment had lost all their 

tanks. The once proud 20dl Tank Regiment was reduced to a demoralized, dismounted. and defeated unie Employed primarily in 

a stalic, defensive role in frontline areas, the unit had steadily lost 

men and equipment wilhom receiving replaccmcllIs. AlLhough 

vasily oll1llumbcred, cavalry, infantry, lank, and Marine units of 

the 1st Armor Brigade, as \I·cli as tenaciOliS Regional Forces and 

Popular Forces to the cast, IKld succeeded in slowing tile momentum of the massive North Vietnamese invasion. \Vith assistance 

from U.S. and Vietnamese tactical air forces, they provided the 

resistance that delayed the enemy until enough reinforcemellls 

could be brought lip to hah the offensi\'e. 

The Em'my A I /tlell ;u Mili/(I)Y Regioll 2 

In i\lilitary Region 2 essemiaJly the same preliminary enemy 

aClivity look place that had heen seen in Region I. As early as 

mid·December 1971, air cavalry reconnaissance con finned reports 

of large.scale II'00P movemCnlS in the horder :u'cas of Cambodia 

and L"los. The 7th Squadron, 17th U.S. Cavalry (Air) , engaged 

twO tanks and sighted fOllr others west of KontUill on 25 January 

1972, but the advisory staff of �fililary Region 2 failed to recognize the importance of the repons. Enemy units were reportedly 

staging for a campaign against population centers like Kontum and 

Pleikll, to be supported with ilttacks by local Viet Cong units in 

the coastal lowlands designed to draw off SOllth Viet namese forces. 

To COHmer what appeared to be a growing tiue:lt to KonUlm, 

the regional commander, Lieutenant General Ngo Di'u, moved the 

bulk of the 22d I nfantry Division to Tan Canh :lnd D:lk To 11, 

including the division's organic 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment 

as well as reinforcing clements from the 1st Squadron (tank) , 19th 

AmlOred Cavalry Regiment. (Sec MajJ 16, iuset.) �fost of the i\I41 

tanks of both regiments were in position at Ben I lel by order of 

the 22d Division commander, against Ihe advice of the 2d Armor 

Brigade commander, who argued thal cavalry should bc used in a 

mobile role. In mid·March encounters \\'ilh large enemy units 

along Rockel Ridge and near Ben Hel, intelligence and prisoner 

repons indicated thal a full·scale offensive supported hy trlnks was 

being planned for the period April to September. 

By 23 April Tan Canh rind Oak To II were effectively Sllr· 
DISABLED i\f18 OF TIlE SOUTI VII:.INAM£.SE 20TH TANK REGIMENT. Roml 

wheds received hi/ /I'om l'ocHe/ neal' My GhanI! River. 

rounded by Nonh Vietnamese forces, and in the afternoon of that 

day an M41 tank of the 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry, returning 

through the main gate of the compound at Tan Canh, was hit and 

deslroyed by a Sagger missile. \Vithin moments additional missiles 

hit the reinforced bunkcr til;}t served as the tactical operations 

center for the 22d I nfantry Division, killing or wounding several 

members of the staff. Shorrly thereafter the remaining I\f41 tanks 

, .. it/lin the Tan Canh compound were also dcstroycd by missiles. 

At 2100 it column of eighteen North Victnamese tanks was re· 

poned moving south toward Dak To. Shortly aftcr dawn on 24 

April, enemy t:lnks and infantry a[lacked tWO sides of the Tan 

Canh perimeter, causing confusion and panic among South Viet· 

namese Army suppOrt troops. These troops fled, followed not long 

after by the remaining South Vielnamcse Army combat troops, who 

had been surprised and demoralized by the suddcn onslaught of 

the T5'1 tanks. 

AI Dak To II, fivc kilometers to Ihe \\'cst, North Victnamesc 

infantry and T54 tanks pCllctralcd thc perimeter in several places. 

By midaftcrnoon both bases were in cncmy hands. and the seal· 
UH-I B HELICOPTER. WITII TOW MISSILES lifts 00 strip at Pleiku. 

tcred, disorganized Tcmllalll:; of the 22d Infimtry Division were 

evading capwre in the jungle. 

The North Vietnamese spent the next several days consoiid:Hing 

their positions and tallying lip the massive arsellal SOlllh Vietnamese units had abandoned inIac!: twenty-three IDS-mill. howitzers. 

seven 155-nll11. howillcrs, a number of i\f<l1 tanks, and about 15,000 

rounds of artillery ammunition. 

011 25 April !iollih Victnamc�c forces abandoned their precari. 

ously positioned fire hases along Rockel Ridge, thereby allowing 

the enemy to proceed unhindered down Highway QI.-14 toward 

Kontulll City. The city, meanwhile. was being hastily rortified hy 

clements of t.he South Viet namese 23d Infalllry Division, which 

had been given (Dntrol over 0111 forces in KOlHum Province. Between 25 April ,lIlel f) l\l:ty. enemy attacks were m .. de against Hen 

I-let and Polei Kleng Ranger camps located astride Nonh VicLn:ullese supply l"Outes. While Polci Kleng fell on 9 May, Uen I-let 

stood firm against repeated l:!llk and infantry attacks throughout 

the campaign. Uy this time :Hlad.ing enemy units had been identi· 

fied as elemellls or the 2d 'lI1d :\20th Nonh Vietnamese DivisiollS, 

5t1pponoo hy the 203d Tank Regimen!. 

The 23d Inralllry Division commander. Colonel l.y Tong Ua. 

who had commanded the original [\1 1 1 3 mechanized rine romp.mv 

in 1963 as a captain. now worJ.ed feverishly to prepare his troops 

both physically and psychologically to withstand an enemy attack 

spearheaded by :lrInor. I-Ie instituted an imensive program to train 
wcapon, and tried to instill confidence in the individual soldier 

thaL hc could destroy an encmy tank with thc weapon. Artillery 

concentrations werc planncd and coordinatcd with B-52 bomber 

strikes, and practice countcrallacks werc made in are'ls of possible 

penetration. All in all, the time the South Vietnamese gained by 

the enemy failure 10 follow up the overwhelming victory at Tan 

Canh was put to good use. 

At this lime a new weapon, destined to change the complexion 

of armored warfare, appeared on the baulefield in �.'lilitary Region 

2. On 24 April the 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team arrived in 

Saigon. Organized to participate in an experiment at Fan Ord, 

California, the team \\las alerted on 15 April for deployment to 

Vietnam to conduct an extension of the original test under combat 

conditions. Thc IC;1Il1 consiSlcd of thrce cre\\lS, two UH-I B heli· 

copiers mounting the XM26, a tube·launched, optically tracked, 

wire.guided missible (TOW) , and lechnical representatives from 

Bell Helicopter, Hughes Aircrafl. and the U.S. Army Missile Command. \Vhen Ihey :lrrivcd in Vietnam, the team moved to Pleiku 

for gunnery training, and after 2 1\Jay made daily fliglHs in search 

of enemy armor. On !) i\lay. during a North Vielllamcsc attack on 

the Ben Het Ranger camp, the TO\\' team destroyed its first three 

PT76 tanks and broke up the enemy assault. 

On 13 May intercepted enemy radio traffic confirmed earlier 

reports by air cavalry SCOUtS that there was a large buildup of North 

Vietnamese armor and infantry ncar Vo Dinh, a signal that an allOUl attack on Kontulll was imminent. At dawn on 14 May the at· 

tack began. Remembering the case with which they had taken Tan 

Canh, the North Vieillamesc dispensed with an artillery preparation and attacked south along Highway QL·14 with twO regi· 

mental·size task forccs slIpponed by lanks. A third regiment advanced from the nonheast, and a fourth probed the city's sOUlhern 

defenses. 

Thc 23d Inf:llllry Division's illlensive antitank training paid off 

on the morning" of 14 i\lay. Tank killer teams equipped with the 

LA\V quickly destroyed most of thc atlacking tanks, leaving U.S. 

tactical aircraft and the TOW team the joh of picking off the 

remainder, which \\'ere attempting to flee back up H ighway 14. 

The TO\V team destroyed t\\'o T54 tanks. Uy 0900 thc atlack had 

been repulsed. allilOugh sporadic ground probes and anillery and 

mortar fire continued throughout the day and night. 

For the next few days, KOIlLUIll City was pounded by indirect 

fire and occasionally assaulted by small units. On 21 �ray the 2M 
ACAV o�' SOUTtt VII:."TNA�II:y' 17TII ARMORED CAVALRV takes liP position 

near My Chanli lor collnterattack, }ltly 1972. 

Infantry Division directed :1 lask force composed of twO Ranger 

groups and the 3d Armored Cavalry RcgimclH to clear Highway 

QL-14 north from Pleiku to Konlum. Clearing was successful as 

fOiT as the Chu I'ao Pass, about 15 kilometers SQuth of KOlllum, 

where it was stalled by determined enemy resistance and lhe loss 

of severa I veh ides. 

At 0100 on 26 �lay lhe North ViclI1amese Army �t;lncd a second 

determined ,ntcmpt to overrun KOlltUIll City. Tank and inf:ullry 

tcams attacked frOIll the north under cover of hC;I\'Y artillery 

bombanlmcl1l and soon made several pcnclralions between defending Soulh ViClIlaTllCSC elements. TQ\V aircraft were brought from 

Pleiku at first light and arrived ovcr KunlUnl to find enemy t:mks 

moving almost :ll will through tbe northern sections of lhe city. 

Tactical air and gunships could nOI be uscd \\'ilhoUl risk to fricndly 

forces but the TOW proved ideal for the delicate task of picking 

off enemy tanks. 

The first TOW crch', Chief Warralll Ofl'icers Edmond C. Smith 

and Danny B. Rowe, flew I Inee sonies, destroying five T54 tanks 

and one PT76 tank, and damaging a IlTiG lank. On the second 

sonic the TO\V missile's pinpoint accuracy was demonstr.lled when 

it destroyed an enemy machine gun emplaccment alop a concrete 

waleI' tower. The second crew, consi:.ling of Chief Warram Oflicers 

Dong1<ls R. Hixson :lnd Lester F. Whiteis. in two sonies destroyed 
that had replaced thc gun on thc samc watcr lOwer. 

After bombarding Konlllm with artillery during the night, the 

North Vietnamese att,!eked <lgain on the morning of 27 May "'ith 

tanks and infantry. The defenders wcrc aided by TOW-equipped 

helicopters, <lir cavalry teams, U_S. Air Force and South Vietnamese Air Force tactical aircraft, <lnd planned B-52 strikes that 

pounded the <luacking enemy. On the ground, South Victnamese 

in(amry supported by wnks from the 8th Armored Cavalry Regiment fought to dislodge the enemy from the northern part of the 

CilY, and fierce house-to-house fighting wenl on in the sOllthern 

p."lrt. The bailie continued through 30 May with neither side making visible progress. By midday on 31 �Jay cnemy troops, needing 

resupply and baltered by several days of attack from both air and 

ground forces. withdrew, leaving behind nearly 4,000 dead. 

The stranglehold all the supply line to Kontuill was finally 

broken on 19 JUlle when [he 3d Armored Cawdry Regimcnt succeeded in reaching the (·ilY, After several weeks of bloody fighting 

along I-lighway QL-I'I at [he Chu Pao Pass, the 3d Cavalry turned 

the entrenched North Vietnamese position by m:lIlellvering west. 

There could be no doubt that the enemy had suffered a resounding defeat in ;\·lilitary Region 2. 

The Aftermath 

In Military Region 3 [he North Vielliamese atlacks were just 

as fierce as those in the olher two regions. but they were less successful because of massive fire suppOrt ,lIld a very determined defense by Somh Vietnamese inf:mtl"ymen. Armored units panicipated in the counter:lllacks and relief columns bllt were nOl employed effcctively as hard-hilling offensi\'e forces. Only i\lilitary 

Region " escapcd a forlilal attack. June, -July. and August 1972 

were months of reassessment and realignmcnt of forces and ideas 

in South Vietnaill. Scattered units were re-formed, new units were 

organized, and plans were made for a cOlllllcroffensi\·c to restore 

national boundaries. The SOllth Vietnamese made these preparations knowing only minimal U.S. suppOrt would be avail:-tblc. In 

keeping with previollsly anllounced redeployment schedules, American troops continued to withdraw, with the exception of Army and 

Air Force aviation units. The sep."lrate air cavalry troops I"cm:lining 

in the country p.·l1"ticipatcd in varying degrees during the counter· 

offensive period. Typical missions included homb damage assessmenL, visual reconnaissance in SuppOr! of South Vietnamese ground 

unils, and rOll tine security missions. 
moderate in Miliwry Region I hut inneascd sharply as the enemy 

fell back tOward Quang Tl'i City. Auacking forces were the Marine 

and Airborne Divisions, supported by ;mnorcd units from the In 

Armor Brigade (Ihe rccomlitUICd 20th Tank Regiment and the 

11th, 17th. and 18th Armored Cavalry) . and some Ranger units. 

During the auack and capLUre of Quang Tri City on 16 September 

and afterward, small unit combined arms operations were used 

successfully by sc\'cral commanders. Of len Ihese operations were 

110l directed by h igher headquarters but were planned and carried 

out by commanders at baualion levei. For this reason, their SIICcesses were more notewonhy. 

During the final mOlllhs of 1972 both sides prep.lred for peace. 

These preparations included a massivc infmion of arms and equipment by both sidcs. In an elevcnth-hour American effon in latc 

November, 59 tanks, 100 arlllored pcr�onnc1 carriers. and ovcr 500 

aircraft were shipped LO South Vict n:un.1I North Vietnam attempted 

a similar buildup for North Vict namese forces in the sOllth. bill 

had to comend \\'ith ma�ive 13_52 bomber raid� along their supply 

routes. 

A peace accord was scheduled to become effective in Vietnam 

at 0800 on 28 j;lTIu;lry 19B, afler nearly five years of on-again, 

off-again negotiat ions between 1 1anoi and the United States. Afler 

several false �lart� and many month� of false hopes, peace seemed 10 

be at h;md. In fact, the bloodlet ting was far from over. 

\Vith the 28 January cease fire. the last U.S. ad"i�er� left the 

Country, and for the first time 501uh Vietn;lmc�c division� and 

corps were truly on their 011'11. Not onl}' werc t here no adviser:; 

to summon and coordinate the once "a�1 U.S. taClic;1i and strat(,gic 

ail' power, naval gunfire. and on-call resuppl)' hlu ! hese rcsour('c� 

t hcmselves no longcr existcd. BUI alt hough somc South Vic[ll;lIl1c)c 

comm:mdcrs \1'Cl'e fon'cd to rcadjmt thcir halliefieid techniques. 

most armored cOJll1ll:mders hacl nol hecome overly dcpendcnt on air 

support. Thc organic firepower ;t\':lilahle 10 armored unit cOllllllanders generally had IHade them more �clr-'mflicient and self·confidclll 

than commandcr� or other grounci Itllil�. Conscquclllly, the departure (If adviscrs from tank and f:lvalry units, whidl ill most GISCS 

h:ld already (x'cllrred by Illid-19il. did nOl have 11111Ch imlxlCl. 

'Vith the cease fire came ;"Ill overdue change in the role of 

liThe onl, hindrance "':lS tlemon'lrnlnn in J:lpan ... ho b)' do ... n in the streets to 

Ilre\elll Ihe 13n'" from IIIming from \he .lepot tn the pOri. F.\cntnall) an oper.ttion. 

much like a cornhal onc. "'as rnounlc.! 10 rno\e the !au"s ;n the dead of night. 11 

inc!".ktl an open telephone line 10 the I'eiliagoll and "'a5 grccted .. ilh cheers in 

Wa5hingcon, D.C., when il succeeded. 
a purely tactical role as frollliine troops for maneuver and fire 

suppon. In practically every oper.uion of size or note, cavalry was 

there, slugging it out alongside infalllry or spearheading ,Ill offensive againsL an enemy sanClllary. Blll the convelllional warfare and 

large-scale operations iniLiated by the Nonh Vietnamese during 

their spring offensive of April 19i2 had dictated a substantial 

change in Lhis employment. Continuous frontline exposure of 

armored units in static defensive posilions soon resultcd in unacceptably high losses ill men and vehicles. Fortunately, there appeared LO be groll'ing awarcness among high level commanders and 

staff officers of Ihe need LO lise armored and cavalry forces as mobile 

reserves. 

The experiences of April 1972 made it immediately apparent 

lhal using armored units in a Sl<llic role. \\'here inherent advantages 

of firepo\\'cr, mobility, and shock effect could not be exploited, invited piecemeal destruction. The tactical situation th<lt existed 

immediately before and for some time after the cease fire was ideal 

for lhe employment of <lrmored forces as mobile reserves. 
CHAPTER IX 

Reflections 

h is always difficult to draw lip a list of lessons to be inferred 

from the experiences of any war. Il is even morc diflicuh, perhaps 

preslimpli,re, to cxtrapol<llc the lessons of one war, and, invoking 

some rule of universality, correct ly claim their relevance to another 

war-especially to one in the fUlIlre. It is obviolls that we do not 

readily learn from our own mistakes, and (hat we learn even less 

from lhe mislakcs of 01 hers. For example, the pench;uH of lhe 

French for piecemeal usc of armored units and how that practice 

worked to their disadvantage in Vielnam had been rC(Qrcicd. In 

addition, C:lllliollS against pcaccllIcai lise of armored units had 

been an imponam part of U.S. military doctrine since \\'orld \V;lr 

II. These h'ords of caulion came after a long and bitter struggle 

between a handhll of American cavalrymen who saw in armored 

forces something more than support for dislllollllled infantry and 

American infantrymen who clung tenaciousl)' 10 the idea (IKlt 

arlllored forces were merely support for infantry. nut mallY Amer· 

ican comhat leaders, hoth young and old. never heeded the cau· 

tion. despite the experiences of armored units in 'Vorld ,Var 11. 

'Ve weill o n t o make the same mistakes again in Vietnam. with air 

cavalry, ground cavalry. mech:lIlized infalllry. tank b;lI Ialions. and 

olher units. \Ve simply had not learned our lessons. 

In Vietnam the cost 10 U.S. forces of commiuing armol' piecc· 

meal was not noticeably high. hill on anothcr battlefield, against 

a marc powerful enemy-one lhal could capilali7e on the mistake 

by destroying any fragmented force-thc mistake could be fatal. 

,"Vas it recognition th;n the enemy in Vietnam was unlikely to be 

able to destroy the fragmelllcd forces that persuaded senior U.S. 

commanders 10 split their :lrmored units? Or was it a serious mis· 

L.1.ke reflecting the failurc of the military to learn from Ihe Pilst? 

Annor soldiers would argtle for the laller-that it wa-; a mistakc. 

a typical and freCjllelllly rcpeatcd mislake in any war gener;dly 

v ie\\·cd by senior cOlllmanders as an infantry war. II was made in 

Korca. it wa.; made in Vietnam. In the case of Vietnam. a(h'ice 

based on a considerablc body of experience was available from 

American officers who had scrved as adviscr!> to South Vietnamcse 

armored units earl)' in the war. For a numhcr of reasons this advicc 

either was nOt alTered to the right people or was nOl heeded by 
ment of armor. \Ve cannot afford to make this mistake again. 

The second lesson of Vielllam has LO do with finding lhe enemy. 

to which was closely tied possibly the most exciting development 

of the Vietnam era: the fielding of air cavalry. Although the prob· 

lem exists to some extent in any war, in Viemam the need to find 

the enemy before he could assemble and organize his forces was 

critical. Especially important in a future war will be an early 

knowledge of where the enemy has massed those weapons that will 

be vital to success in the battle. The special mobility of air cavalry 

will provide a badly needed means of reconnaissance and surveillance. 

In the latcl' stages of (he war in Vietnam. when air cavalry was 

confronted with sophisticated enemy air defenses, it became apparent that the reconnaiss.ance could still be performed if the commander was willing to pay Ihe price of knocking Ollt enemy air 

defenses. If informal ion on (he enemy is necessary, then the price 

must be paid. \Ve must not dispense with air cavalry on the theory 

that it can only survive against an enemy possessing liule or no air 

defense. The scouting mission-reconnaiss..nce-is still critical. Air 

cavalry adds a new dimension to reconnaissance, one complementary to reconnaiss<lllce by ground scouts in armored c<lvalry units. 

That armored cavalry units in Vietnam were widely llsed as CO!llbat maneuv("r forces should not be allowed to obscure the faCl that 

they arc still a part of the celli rOll core of the reconnaissance team. 

The air c:,valry-ground comhination can give a much needed advantage LO the force commander who lIses it wisely. 

In Vietnam there was considerable usc of air cavalry troops and 

squadrons as divisional, corps. or field force troops: in some cases 

gunships from air cavalry were used for armed escort and scout 

helicopters for stafF visits. These practices, while iI boon to senior 

headquaners, did all too little for tactical commanders at brigade 

level and below. Only in the 1 1 th Armored Cavalry were air and 

ground cavalry integrated inLO a single operationill team under a 

brigade level commander. Colonel George S. Patlon once said that 

the operation of the 1 1 th C:I"all'}, \\'hen he was in command really 

depended on the eyes of those nine warrant officers riding as scouts 

in his regimental air cavalry troop. The employment of integrated 

air and ground cavalry mmt he fully developed and expanded if 

we are to re:dize the full potential of the new reconnaissance team. 

Third among the Icssons tall�ht by VielTlall,l is what can be done 

in area and rOllle sC<'ul'ity. especially in an area traditionally considered the rear. In Vietnam of course there was no rear arca: the 
M48A3 TAN" EXPLODES A 750'POUND BOl<f8 SET Up AS A l\hNE. Turret 

W/lS hurled from tank, which was blow" Ollt 0/ ils tracks. 

enemy was all around. Such a �illlation could be encountered in a 

fast-moving war. Usually the U.S, Army has used armored cavalry 

and other armored units for rear ;.rca security. 

In the JI Corps Tactical Zone for most of the war the 1st 

Baualion, 69th Armor, and 1st Squ:ldron, 10th Cavalry, acted as 

reaction forces. At one point in 1970 the 1 1 th Gawlil'y in the III 

Corps Zone was daily clearing mines from and pro\ iding security 

for almost 100 miles of logi'>l kal resupply routes and farm'IO-lllarkcl 

roads. \Vhile for lll'IIlY reasons armored units are good at this work, 

Ihe practice can be, and indeed was in Vietnam, a (9nsiderable 

drain 011 combat forces capable of accomplishing mlllh more for 

their comrnander lh,m clearing l"O"ds and protecting logislic<ll units. 

\Vith limited combat forces at our disposid, it \\'ould seelll far 

beller to cquip ;md train logi�tir:d units to pl'Olen themselves, 

and 10 furnish area se(lIril)' hy providing mili t;Iry poli<.:e or other 

uniu mounted in armored GIl'S and firing weapons designed for 

the form of enemy resistal1(e they call expect to encounter. In Vietninn SOUle military police units were equipped with armored caTS 

for this purpose, but the �)'stem was ne\'cr widely used. Province 

chiefs late in the war had their own provinci,,[ rCt'onnaissance uniLS 

mounted in armored cars, and these essentially performed rear area 

and rOUle security operations. From the slandpoint of reLUrns for 

m"npower and equipmclll invested, it was a far morc cO�t effective 

operation than assigning a t:lIlk, a mechanized infantry. or an 

armored ca,·alry unit the sallle ta5k. The concept of furnishing 

protection for real' areas and resupply routes in pan with the units 
EKG1NEERS CLEAR TRAIL OF MINES 

IN CAMIlQI)IA 

stationed in the area and in part with a military police lype of unit 

equipped [or this purpose nceds full eXplOl'illion and development. 

Fourth among the lessons the Vietnam \Var ofrers us is the proof 

lhal we still need to find hener ways of dealing with land mines. 

Because of the nallire of the war, the enemy was able LO do great 

damage with random mines, some of which were relatively simple. 

Historically, antbrmor land mines have been ;1 persistent and vcxing problcm for \\'hich no really satisfactory soliltion has ever been 

found. Qur failure to solve the problem of mines I:lid in patlcrns 

has been aggr:lvated by our similar failure LO cope with random 

mining tactics. We Illllst capitalize. therefore. on the experience the 

U.S. Army gained in dealing with cnemy random mining techniques in Vietnam. \Ve IIlliSt h'ork out a system for lIsing random 

mines against armor ourselves. And, finally, since random mining 

call be used against us again. we should de\'elop equipment for 

swift search and elimination of such land mines. Since \Vorlel \Var 

II almost nothing has been done in this field. The mine rollers selll 

La Vietnam were not as effective as some 1!)15 equipment. 

The body of experiellce in logistical suppon for armored units 

in Vietnam has useful lessons in maill Len;uKc. supply, and balllefield recovery. i\[;.il1tenance units tended to oper;llc well to the rear. 

Considerable pressure \\'as required ill many cases to persuade them 
and ballalion, making repairs on the site al company, troop. and 

bauery level. The ahcrnative was a long haul of damaged equipllIent back to:, maintenance calllp and a long haul of repaired equipment back to the unit-a vcry expensive procedure. At one pOilll, 

the I l lh Armored Cavalry was hauling its damaged Sheridans ncar· 

ly 150 kilometers rOllnd trip. The fan that such a situation existed 

calls for some reexamination of tradiLional direct and general suppon relationships. Some way must be found 10 provide belleT 

security for rca I" area suppor! units and the roUles to and from their 

customers. Otherwise lhe cUSLQmer pays the price to secure the rear 

and the rOllte�. This cannOI go on. Perhaps we have too mallY intermediate levels of maintenance to operate effectively any longer. 

\Vhether or not this is true, we need to find out. 

U.S. Army logistical policy calls for area support by maintenance and supply units. III short, suppOrt units provided maintenance and supply so long as lhe using unit was in the geographic 

area the supporting Llilit was assigned to slIppon. \Vhell the unit 

moved to another area. its suppOrt then came from a unit charged 

with suppOrt in the nell' area. The problem is thaI the parts supply 

system functions on equipmelll densities and spare p.·1fts usage rates. 

There is not now" and never has been. any satisfactory way to 

transfer along with the customer unit its experience factors and 

supply stocks. huilt lip in the supporting unit on the basis of the 

Cllstomer usage factor ... The result-in the eyes of the using unitwas that support hroke dOWI! completely when the unit moved to a 

new area. At best the "p;lI·e pans �uppl)" system was capahle of filling 

no more than 50 to 60 percelll of unit demands: the remaining 40 

to 50 percem were filled hy cannihalization of machines no longer 

useful in comhat and by g-oing- out�ide the 1I0rmal �Ilpply systemin o[her lI'ord� hy s{ rOlLtlging \Xlrts. On a ban1clield ill mobile 

warfare. even this s)'siem breaks down. Arlllored units must have 

immcdiately availahle cliren support maintenance and .�upply as 

well as adcql1:ne hackup. III any e\"ent. the maintenance and supply 

method'i arc in need of dme su"l1Iiny and change. 

The �upply \'chide fleet provided for American armored units 

in Vietnam lI'a� gcner;dly umuitcd to its t;lsks. In a (ountry with 

few and poor secondary roads. it was Ileccss;lry 10 replace wheeled 

cargo carriers with fu!l-Ir<lfkcd cargf) \"ehides-M5-IS"s. These 

\"ehiclcs weI"(" cs�elllial to the opcrations of armored units in wide 

areas ;lIong the horders; the Camhodi:m expedition" for example. 

could not have heen undertaken without them. They were nOI. 

however. prO\'icied in �lIffiriclll numhers in Vietnam and their 

maintenance reliahilit), was Silspert. 
.� 

.-

M578 LIGIIT RECO\'ERY VEIICU: WORKS ON SIIERJDAN 

Armored units have always been plagued with the problems of 

whether their supply Heel sluHlld be cap .. 1.ble of operming on roads or 

cross·country, or hath. In an attempt to design \'ehicles that would 

do bOlh, neither Cal:h1.bility was provided satisfaclOrily. In forward 

areas, espC<'ially in COUll tries will1 limited road nets, tracked re· 

supply vehicles :1\ unit level are essenti;d. On the other hand, 

somewhere there Illilst be a vehicle lIeet which can move large 

volumes of supplies quickly ovel" rOilds-even if those roads are 

secomi:.ry by some standilnls. This is primarily an organizational 

and equipment problem. 1 10II'e\'el", the 1\1548 \\las the last of its 

kind: therefore the U.S. Army needs to look seriously at the tracked 

cross-country resupply ('apability in forward areas, as well as the 

long-haul fleet that backs it up. 

Recovery of d:lInagcd or inoperative vehicles has :liways been 

a difficult prohlem for armored IInits, and so it was in Vietnam, In 

respect to hoth Ilumber and reliability of vehicles used. the recovery 

syslem was inadequ;lIe. The ;\1578 and the i\188-lhe hulk of Ihe 

recovery flee I-were in short sllppl), for C:l.\·alry units. and the M578 

was not well de"igned for its job. The 1 1 th Armored C.walry at· 

tacked into Camhodia with its organic reco"ery fleet holstercd by 

almost a do/en MRS's horrowed for the occasion Out of depol slocks. 

For almost two weeks, regimental maintenance operations li,'ed 

on the guts and Slaying power of these " ch icles and their crews. 
and a doclrinal problem. Normally unit recovery equipmellt evacu· 

ated vchides lO a callceling point where Ihe vehicles were picked 

lip by suppOrt lInilS that moved along behind the forward elements. 

\Vith suppOrt units immobilized far to the rear, the burden of 

baulefield recovery fell to the fighting unils-a sil\l:uion quite 

likely to recur on a banlclicld in the fUlme. There is, therefore, 

a need for bener recovery equipment and morc of it at uni, level, 

and a close look at how Ihe Army intends to recover and evacuate 

disabled vchicles in future wars. 

Much useful experience W<lS gained in the Vietnam \Var. We 

have secn thal lhe combined aflllS tcam is essential and that fighting 

with troops moullled is advantageolls. It is also plain that the 

American advisers 10 the 50mh Vielllamese Army were important 

but that their preparalion for the [asks that confronted them was 

poor. All these experiences and many more mUSl be carefully 

analyzed. 

As we look to the fU[lIre it is esselllial not only that we kno\\' 

the lessons of Vietnam, but Ihal we underst:lIld them as well. 

Understanding them, in their correct context, and relating that to 

the future will take more time and space than we ha\'e had avail· 

able for this monograph. But it must be clone. \Ve Gm no more 

IlIfil our backs on our experiences in Vietnam than we can take 

those experiences, relale thelll direclly to our next balliefield, and 

so in the end get re:ldy [0 fight heller Ihe \\'ar we have just left 

behind. The wisdom 10 learn from experience, without merely 

getting better prepared 10 relive Ihal experience. is not easily won. 

BUl win it we must. \Ve owe it 10 ourselves and our counlry. �Iore 

however, we owe it 10 Ihe brave men who went. helped us learn the 

lessons, .. nel paid the price of learning. They left liS a large legacylarger perh;tps [han \\'e deserve. 
Appendix A 

CO.\IMA:-:OERS OF CAVALRY, AR.\IOR. ANO 

fl,IECHA1'IZED l:":FA1\TRY U"ITS 

The list that follo\\'5 includes all commanders of ,lI'morcd units of 

the U.S. Arlll)' in Vietnam at battalion and squadron level :uld :Ibove 

and the org;lI\i/,ation to which the ;.nllorcd unit was assigned or at· 

tached. 'Vllen an :ll1llorcd unit WitS permanently attached or assigned 

as ;111 indcpcndcllt unit below thai level, as in the (:lSC of a separ:llC 

cavalry troop attached to an infantry brigade. the commanders have 

also been included. 

Ground Cavalry Units 

1st Squadron. [st Ca\,:llry I (23d [nramr), Division-Americal) 

Lt. Col Rirhard I larrington. August 196i-January 1968: Lt. Col. 

Waher C. Cousbnd. January-July 1968: Ll. Col. Richard D. Lawrence, j uJy-:-\ovcmbcr 1968: Lt. CoL Philip L nolte, November 

1968-�lay 1969: Ll. Col. John H. Dure. May-!\'ovcmber 1969: Lt. 

Col. Richard G. Cravcs, Dcccmber 1969-July 1970: Lt. CoL Crosbic 

E. Saint, Jtli) ·Ocwbcr 1970: Lt. CoL Sheldon J. Burnelt, October 

1970-�larch 1971: Lt. Col. Gene L. Breeding. i\brch-Jul), 1971; 

Lt. CoL Richard E. Larix, July 1971-Apdl 1972. 

Troop E, 1st Ca\'alry (1I1h Inf:lIltry Rrigadc, 2!k1 Infantry DivisionAmeric:1l) 

C:1pt. Terry L Alexander, October 1967_;\I:1Y 1968: C<lpt. James R. 

Oley, i\Jay-No\·cmbcl" 1968: C<lpt. Kcnneth R. Breeden. No\'cmbcr 

1968-1\101)' 1 969: 1st Lt. Tony E. Varda. i\lay-.June 1 969: CalK Joe 

F. Galle, June 19G9_i\larch 1970; Clpl. Robcn P. Scng, i\1<lrch-ltlllc 

1970: Capt. Kcnncth P. Lord III, J uly-September 1970; Capt. Rich· 

ard A. Williams, September-No\'embcr 1970: Capt. .

James L. Wilson, 

Novembcr 1970-Septembcr 1971; C:1pt. i"olich<lcl V. Fostcr. Septem· 

ber-October 1971. 

2d Squadron, 1st Cavalr), 2 (4th Inf:1lllry Division) 

Lt. Col. Joseph M. Gay, Jr., August 1 967-J1IIHl:lrY 1 968; Lt. Col. 

Charles P. Graham. J:lIlual"y-Junc 1968; Lt. Col. Donald W. i\loreau, 

I Although �tt3(hed 10 l.h� 23d Inf�ntl)' Dhi$ion, this unit rem�ined �Sljglled to 

lh� 1st Anno'ttl Ohision. and troops who seneJ wilh it may wur �n �rmored 

dhision palch 011 the right shoulder of their uniforms. Th�} and the men of th� 2d 

Squ:adron ($('e next fn.) ,,·ere tJ,e first to ;\chic\c this distinction since World W�r II. 

2 Although au:ached to the 1th Inf:am'1· Oi\isiOl" this unit rcm�ined 3S1igned 10 

th� 211 Anntlrttl l)i';Jiol1, �nd troops wh0 5Cn'oo "'ilh it may wcar Ih� 2d Armored 

Dhillon p�tch on the righl shoulder. 
June 1969; LI. Col . .Iohu i'li. F:,ircy. J une-December 1969: LI. Col. 

Robert C. noml. December 1969-June 1970; Lt. Col. L:IIU\OIl P. 

Whitelaw, J Ulie-October 1970. 

lSI Squadron, 4th Cavalry (1st Infantry Oi\'ision) 

Lt. Col. P;lui 1\1. Fisher, Octoher 19G5-April 1966; Lt. Col. Leonard 

L. Lcw:l.Ilc, April-Decemher 1960; Lt. Col. Thomas W. Fire. December \966-i'lI;I)' 1967: LL Col. John W. Seigle. i'llay 1967_Fcbruary 

1968; Lt. Col. Thomas B. Tyree, February-July 1968; Lt. Col. John 

C. F;lilh, luly 196B-I:nlll:ll )' 1 969: Lt. Col. William C. I l:iponski . 

.

January-July 1 969; Lt. Col. John T. i'llurchinson. J uly_December 

1969: Ll. Col. Frederic J. Brown. J:l1luary-April 1970. 

3d Squadron, 'hh Cavalry (251h Inbntry Di\'il>ion) 

Lt. Col. John R. I lendl'Y, Febl uaq_No\'embcr 19fifi; Lt. Col. Georgc 

S. Webh. 1\'ovcmbel' 19{j6-�lay 19li7; Maj. George N. Slenehjem, 

i\l:ly-June 1967; Lt. Col. fohn M, Shea, j lme-No\'emhel' 1967; Lt. 

Col. Glenn K. Oli�, December 1967-�1a) 196B; �Iaj. J;ulles G. JOI" 

dan. Ma)-June 1968; Lt. ('.01. Clemens A. Riley, lune-Novemher 

196B: Lt. Col. Roben S .. \lcGowan. NO\'ember 1965-AuguSl 1969; 

Lt. Col. Joseph R. 1�:.Juh. AugusI_:\'ovembcr 1969; Lt. Col. Corwin 

A. Mitchell, ;\.'o\·ember 1 969-�b)' 1970: LI. Col. Noel O. KnottS, 

May-October 1970; Lt. Col. Dan L. Drury. OctOber 1970. 

�d Squadron. 5th Ca\'all') (9th Infantry Di\'ision) 

LI. Col. Sidllc) S. I bS/anl. January-July 1967; LL Col. Howard R. 

Fuller. Jr., Jul), 1 967-Jalluar) 1968: LI. Col. Hugh J. Bartle),. Jan· 

ual'}'-August 1968; Lt. Col. Angelo Grills. t\ugust-Dccember 1968: 

Lt. Col. Thomas E. Carpenter. December 19GB-June 1969: Lt. Col. 

Joseph L. 11:1<1:1\\':,)'. July 1969-January 1 970: LI. Col. William N. 

Bradberry, .

11' .• .J;IIHWI'),-Iuly 1970: LL Col. Harold R. Page . .lulyDecember 1 970; Lt. Col. Robert B. Osborn. J,muary-OCtobcr 1971. 

1st Squadron. 10th C:walry (4th Inrantry Division) 

Lt. Col. W:tlbce I I. Nutting. September ]96G-Febru;!!') 1967: LI. 

Col. Thomas F. Cole. February-AugUSt 1 967: Lt. Col. Ch:u-Ics K. 

Heidcn, Au�usl 19fi7_February 1968: LI. Col. John F. Ilrownflcld. 

FebruarY_l uly 1 968: LI. Col. Roben W. Noce. July 1968-Janu:lf), 

1969; Lt. Col. Roderick D. Renick. Jr .. January-June 1969; Ll. Col. 

Cl)dc II. 1>"tterSOIl. June-July 19fi9: Lt. Col . 

.

/"mes T. Br:lmletl. 

.

J uly-Septembel· 1969: Lt. Col. William 1- l\!or:lIl. September 1969-

l\l:trch 1970: Lt. Col. Scr\'etlls T. Ashworth III. �I;"'ch-August 1970: 

Lt. Col. John ;'I. la!>Oll. August 1970-Fcbrual') 1971: Lt. Col. Peter C. 

Hains. Februar}-,.\ugust 1971; ;\I:lj . .fohn D. George. Jr .. AugustSeptember 1971; Lt. Col. John W. Hudachck, September-November 

1971. 
Col. William W. Cobb, Septcmber 966May 1 967; Col. Ro) W. 

Farlcy, May-Decemocr 1967; Col. Jack ;\lacFarlane, Dccemocr 1 967_ 

March 1 968; Col. Leonard D. Holdcr, March 1968; Col. C harles R. 

Gordcr, March-July 1 968: Col. George S. Pallon, Jul), I 96S-April 

1969; Col. James H. Leach, April_Dccemocr 1 969; Col. Donn A. 

Starry, December 1969-lune 1 970: Col. John L. Gerrity. June-De· 

cember 1970; Col. Wallace H. Nutting. December 1 970-i\larch 1 971. 

1st Squ;ldron, 11th Armorcd C avalry 

Lt. Col. , \!arlin D. Howell. Septembcr 1966-Scptcmbcr 1967; 

Lt. Col. James II. I loit. Septcmber IOG7-January 1968: Lt. Col. 

Jack W. N ielscn, January_August 191i8: Lt. Col. Ill'iggs H. Joncs. 

August_No\'emher 1968; Lt. Col. i\lerriue W. Ireland. No\,em· 

ber 1965-ApriI 1969: i\ laj. John C. Bahnsen, Jr .. Apri1-Scptember 

1 969; Lt. Col. John "I. :'\·orton. Septcmber 1960-January 1970; 

Lt. Col. .lames It Rced. January-Septcmber H170: Lt. C ol. Donald 

A. i\lcKnight, Scptember 1970-March 1971. 

2d Squadroll. 11th Armored C :I\'alry 

Lt. Col. Kibbcy "I. 1·lome. Scptcmber 1966_February 1967: Lt. 

Col. Bcnj:lmin F. Hannon III. Fcbruary-August 1967: Lt. Col. 

Gari;lIld i\ lcSpadden. August 1967-April 19G8; Lt. Col. .John P. 

Prillam;m. I\pril-Scptcmbcr 1968: Lt. Col. Lee D. Duke, OClObcr 

1965-April 1969: Lt. Col. James H. Aarestad. April-Septembcr 

1969: Lt. Col. Co"ail L. Brookshirc, Scptcmbcr 1969-June 1970; 

Lt. Col. Richard L. Coffm:lIl. Junc-July 1970: Lt. Col. John L. 

Ballant)nc, August 1 970-June 1971: Lt. Col. William i\1. Stokcs 

III, June 1 971_April 19i2. 

3d Squadron, 11th AmlOl'cd C a\'aII'Y 

Lt. Col. Palmer A. I)ctcrson. Septembcr- Dccembcr 1 966; LL Col. 

Arthur F. Cochran. Deccmbcr 1966-July 1967; Lt. Col. Hillman 

Dickinson. July 1967-January 1968: Lt. Col. Neal C reightoll. 

Janu,IJ·y-.Iuly 1968: Lt. Col. John W. McEnery. July 19G5-June 

1969; LI. Col. David K. Doyle. J unc-Dcccmber 1969: Lt. C ol. 

George C. I loffmastcr, .

11' .. Dcccmhcr 1969-;\larch 1970: Lt. Col. 

Bobby F. Griflin. i\l:Irch-October 1970; Lt. Col. Frank E. Varljcn. 

October 1 970_�'darch 1971. 

Troop A, 4th Squadron, 12th C avalry (lst Ihigadc, 5th Infantry 

Oi vision-i\ (echa nil.ed) 

Capt. Errol D. Alexandcr. July-Octobcr 1968: C apt. Kcnncth G. 

C 'II·lson. Octobcr 19GR-i\ larch 1969; Cap!. Larry R. Robinson. 

i\ hrch-Scptembcr 1969: Capt. William C. Kaufman. ScptembcrNovembcr 1969: Cq)t. i\ lalthias A. Spruill. Novcmber 1969_Febru· 

ary 1970; Capl. John L. B. Smith. Jr., Fcbruary_;\lay 1 970; Capl. 
p. p; p, p

October 1971. 

Troop n. 1st Squadron. 17th Cavalry (82d Airborne Oi" i5ion) 

Capt. Dennis P. Malcor, Fcbruar}'_�Ia)' 1968: Capt. William R. 

Porter, i\hy_No,"cml>c1' 1968: Capt. Rae W. Ochnckc, No,'cmbcr 

19GB-June 1969: Capt. John R. Cushing. June 1969-Fcbru:lry 1970. 

2<1 Squadron, 17th Cav::J!ry!\ (1Olst Airborne Division) 

Lt. Col. .Julius W. Becton, JI' .. December 1967-.Iullc 19GB; Ll. Col. 

Egben B. Clark III, June-December 1968. 

Troop A. 2d Squadron. 17th Cavalry 4 (1Olst Airbol'llC Division) 

Capt. William R. Wilsoll . .luI), 1965-January 1966: Capt. George A. 

Hamilton. January-Julle 1 9G6: In LI. Doye W. Adams. June-July 

1966; Capt. Richard R. Maglin, July-No\'ember 1966: Capl. Dale N. 

W;lgner, Novembel' 1966-�lay 1967: Capl. James R. Harding. I\lay_ 

December 1967. 

Troop D, 17th Cavalry 5 (1991h Infalllry Brigade (Light)) 

Capt. !\Iichael C. Small, Dccember 1966-Novcmhcr 1967: Capt. Alroy 

Wahl, Novembcr 1967-!\lay 1968: Capt. Keith J. Phillips. !\Iay_ 

October 1968: Capt. William n. Garher, October 19G8-March 1969; 

Capt. P:wl J. PCtcrson, M:lrch_Augusl 1969; Capl. I\lichacl A. Doyle, 

Augusl 1969-April 1970; Capt. David F. Rathje, !'Ilay-October 1970. 

Troop E, 17th Cavalry (l73d Airborne Brigade) 

Capt. David G. Moore, i\lay 1965-April 1966: !'Ilaj. Ury:1I1 J. Sulton, 

April 19G6-April 1967: Maj. David E. I)erson, April-Scptember 196i; 

Capt. Corless W. I\litchell, Septemher 1967_ApJ"i1 1968: Capt. James 

Ording. April-November 1968: Capt. William 

.

I. I ( ude)" NO\'ember 

19G5-Apdl 1969: Capt. I\I:ISOII It Sesler, Jr., !\Iay-August 1969: Capt. 

Frederick N. Suttle, August-OCtober 1969; Capt. John 1\1. Weaver, 

October 1969-April 1970: Capt. Alfred W. HakeI', April-JUlie 1970: 

Capt. .Iohu C. Johnston. July-August 1970: Capt. David F. Cunning· 

ham, Scptember-Deceml>CI' 19iO: Capt. Rand L. Allen, December 

19iO-Februal)' 1 971; Capt. Edward A. Boles, Febrll:u')' 19i1_August 

1971. 

:t Oudng Ihe period DecemOer 1!J68 10 June 1969. Ihis $CllIa,tron wa� conn'rled 10 

au air cavalry 5(luadron as Ihe IOlsl /\irborne Oi. i$ioll COUleru.'t\ 10 an airmobile 

dhision. 

4 ThiJ trOOP deployed wilh Ihe lSI Brigade. IOlst Airhorne Dh ision , ;n Jill) 1005 

and rcjoinc,1 Ihe 2d Sqll:l.llron, 171h C:n:.!ly, when I.he sqlladnm deplo)cd in Decem· 

ber 1%7. 

o Troop 0 was ;naCI;,"aICd on 12 October l!:liO. bUI reaclivalCd April 1!:l72 as an 

air CHaIr), HOOp "';Ih ctilliprnl.'ni and troops rrotll Troop 0, 151 5<luadron. lSI Ca,"all)·. 
Americ:ll) 

Capt. Clydc W. Roan, Scptember 1965-December 1966: Capt. Ron· 

aid A. L:me, January-August 1967; Capt. Richard C. Stubbs, August 

1 967-February 1968; Capt. Rich;ml 1'\. D;wis, Febnliu'y_i'lJay 1968: 

Capt. James E. Owens, Jr., May 196B-May 1969; Capt. AI£red I. 

Stober, Junc-ScplcllIber 1%9: Capt. Klicil S. I I:lrrisol1, September 

1969-January 1970: 011

'1. Roscoe Cartwright, Fcbruary-Scptcmber 

1970; Capt. Timothy A. Fishcr, October 1970-January 1971; Capt. 

Chestci' W. Fctner, January-April 1 971: 1st Lt. Willi;,uu H. Clarke 

JlI, Apl'il-i\lay 1971: Cap .. Gcorge A. Lynn, .11'., i\lay-July 1971; 

Capt. Charles F. Brower IV, July 1971-April 1972. 

Troop H, 17th C:I\'all), ' (1981h Inf:lntry Brig:ldc, 23d Infantry D[" ision) 

Capt. Walter E. Reasor, October 1967-July 1968: Capt. AI£rcd R. 

Chioffe, August 1968-i\larch 1969; aq)t. Jamcs W. WaltS, �IarchMay 1969; Capt. John R. DelilOnl. i\lay_No\'clllbcr 1969: Capt. Max 

K. Natzct, Novcmbcr 1969-February 1970: 1st LI. Danicl E. Good· 

ing, March-June 1970: Capt. Oli\'cr L. Croom, .Ir., J une-Novcmber 

1970: Capt. Ronald L. Bamable, Novcmber 1970_February 1971; 

Capt. Paul R. Davis, Februar}'_April 1971: Capt. St;mlcy F. Cherrie, 

April-i\lay 1971; Capt. Ibndall F. J:lrmon, i\l:!y_August 1971; C:lpt. 

D:lI1iel J. Cox, August-October 1971. 

Air Cavalr), Units 

Troop D, IS( S'Iu:ldron, 1st Ca":ll'1' 1 (1Olsl Airborne Division) 

M:tj. Connic D. [ad), J ulr-Novcmbcr 1968; Maj. Robert E. Wolfe, 

Novcmber 196B-July 1969. 

7th Squ:ldroll, ISL Cav:llry (IG'llh A\'iation Group, 1st Avi:ltion Brigade) 

LL Col. Charles E. Cancd)" Februar)'-�f;l)' 1968: Ll. Col. Roberl W. 

Mills, i\la}'-No\'cmbcr 1968: Lt. Col. Georgc R. Crook, Novembcr 

1968-�lay 1969: Lt. Col. George E. Derrick, i\la},-OcLOber 1969: Lt. 

Col. Ronald 1'. Walkcr. OCtober 1969-April 1970; Lt. Col. John W. 

Woodmansee, J\pril-OclOber 1970: Lt. Col. Jamcs D. i\larctt, Oc· 

tober-No\'clllbcr 1970: Lt. Col. George \V. Shallcross, Novcmber 

1970-Septembcr 1 971; Lt. Col. Francis U. i\f:lrtin, Septcmber 1971-

April 1972. 

'Thi� troop wu inacli.al�"(1 in OClober 1971 bm rcaelj.·au::d in April 1972 a� an 

air OHaIr)' Iroop "'ith IrOOp$ ami equipment from Ihe 71h SI\u:tdron, 17th Ca\"ahy 

(Air). 

1 Troop D was dcp]o)cd in jul)' 1968 a nd auached 10 Ihe IOhl Airborne Division 

until 1969, when it rejoined iu parent unit, the ht Squadron, lSi C;l\alr),. 
�Iaj. Thomas R. Ilami lton, February

June 1971; Capt. Richard A 

Bell, june_July 1971: Capt. Roc:lolfo Gutierrez, July-September 1971; 

�.raj. Billy F. Hatch, September 19i1-February 1972: Maj. John J. 

Spencer. Jr., Fcbru;tf)'--Scptcmbcr 1 972: Maj. Kermit E. Larson. Jr., 

ScptcmlJcr I 972-February 1973. 

Troop F, 8th Cavalry (23<1 Inralllry Division-America1) 

M:lj. Richard H. "ferriu. October 1967_Apl'il 1968: Maj. Harold 

J. Earwood, Jr., April- Scptcmber 1968: Maj. Lawrence Ziur:lin, 

September 1965-Fcbnl;lry 1969: i\bj. Jessie \\T. Watson, JI' .. February-August 1969: j\laj. Charles E. h-c),. Scplcmbcl' 1969-]\l;)l'ch 1970: 

Maj. Paul R. Stalker. "larch-October 19iO: �i;!j. George W. Sibert, 

October I 9iO_A pri I 1971: Maj. Alrred S. Rushatl., April 1971-Jan· 

uary 1972; Maj. William J. Head, January-March 1972; Maj. John 

P. Kcnnedy. �rarch-October 1972; �!:Ij. William D. Dantzler, Oc· 

tober 1972_February 1973. 

1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (lst Cavalry Division- Airmobile) 

Lt. Col. John B. Stockton, September_Decembcr 1965: Lt. Col. Robert M. Shoemaker. December 1965_May 1966: Lt. Col. James C. 

Smith, i\lay-No\'cmbcr 1966; Lt. Col. A. T. Pumphrcy, Novcmber 

J96G-April 1967; Lr. Col. Robert H. Nevins, April-Dccember 1 967: 

Lt. Col. Richard W. Diller. Dccember 1967-July 1968; Lt. Col. William C. Roussc, July 1968-Januaq' 1969: Lt. Col. James i\f. !'eterson. 

January-June 1969: Lt. Col. James W. Booth. June-August 1969: 

Lt. Col. Edward B. Covington, AuguSt-Seplcmbcr 1969; Lt. Col. 

James W. Booth, September-Decembcr 1 969; Ll. Col. Clark A. Burnett, December 1969-August 1970: Lt. Col. Rohert I-I. Nevins. August 19iO-January 1971; Lt. Col. Cad i\l. PUW:Ull, January-June 

1971. 

Troop F, 9th Ca"alry � (12th Aviation Group. lst /\viation Brigade) 

Capt. John E. Shields, Junc-September 1971; Maj. Coleman J. 

McDevitt. October 197 1_April 1972; I\laj. George P. Hewlell, May 

1972-February 1973. 

Troop 1-1, 10th Cavalry 10 (17th Aviation Group. ISl Aviation Brigade) 

Maj. Edll'ard )\1. Brown, April-Ju1)' 1972: Maj. Sidney F. Lyons, Jr., 

July 1972-March 1973. 

8 Troop }' ,,';U redesignated hom Troop D, 3d Squadron, 4th Cal·alr,.. when the 

4th Ol\ah) rctJcplo)"ed. 

o Trop }' "'33 formed in JU!1e 1971 as Troop II, 161h Cal'all1'. a dco;ignation nel'er 

:II'prol'<"d hy the Department of the Arm)'. It was rCII31l1<.,<I Troop F. 9th C.: .. :.1t)· in 

Mar 1972. 

10 .-\cth·ated in April 1972 with troops and equipment from the itlt SquatJron, lith 

Caulr)" (Air). 
jpJy j

Jul}-Deccmlx:r 1970: Maj. Leslie J. Va louche, December 1970-June 

1971; Maj. John R. Crist. June-September 1971; Maj. Sandcrson A. 

Woods, September 1971_April 1972; Maj. Thomas H. Craft. April_ 

September 1972: Maj. Donald J. Fritschc, Scptember 1972-February 

1973. 

2d Squadron. 1 7th Cavalry I

I (1Olst Airbornc Division. Ail'mobile) 

Lt. Col. WillLtm W. De LO;ldl. December 1968-Septembcr 1969; 

Lt. Col. Lavere W. nindrup. Scptember 1969-i\larch 1970: Lt. Col. 

Robert F. i\folinelli, March 1970-i\larch 1971; Lt. Col. Archic A. 

Rider. March_October 1971; Lt. Col. Alman 1. Butler, October 

1971_February 1972. 

3d Squrldron. 171h Cavalt1' (12th A"iatioll Group, 1st Aviation Brigrlde) 

Lt. Col. Christopher n. Sinclair. Jr., October 1967-Febnlal1' 1968; 

LI. Col. William W. Brannon, Jr., March-July 1968: Lt. Col. John 

H. Phillips, July 1965-January 1969; Lt. Col. John B. Fitch, Janu· 

ary-Scptember 1969: LI. Col. Robert A. Arnet, September 1969-

Febru:lry 1970: Lt. Col. Gorrlon T. Carey. February-Scptember 1970; 

Lt. Col. Billie C. Williams. September 1970-�'larch 1971: Lt. Col. 

Carl J. Haaland. i\hrch-Oclober 1971: Lt. Col. John E. Dugan. 

Octobcr 197 1_March 1972. 

7th Squadron, lith C;I\'alry (17th Aviation Group. 1st Aviation Brigade) 

Lt. Col. Lawrcncc H. Johnson. OClobcr 1967_March 1968; Lt. Col. 

Stephen F. Cameron. �l:Irch-Scptember 1968; Lt. Col. Robcn M. 

Rcutcr, Septcmber 1965-March 1969; Lt. Col. Calvin R. Bcan, 

March-Scptembel' 1969: Lt. Col. Georgc S. i\lurry. Seplembcr 1969-

J\larch 1 970: Lt. Col. Rudolph B. DcFrance. March-Scptember 

1970; Lt. Col. Ernest A. Smart, Scptember 1970-Seplcmbcr 1971; 

Lt. Col. Jack W. Anderson. Jr., October 1971-July 1972. 

Troop D. 17th Cavalry 12 (11th Aviation Group. 1st Aviation Brigade) 

Capt. .lames W. Bryant. Jr.. April-June 1972: Maj. Robert FairwCrlthcr, June-Seplember 1972; Maj. Wilbcrt W. Sorenson, Septcm· 

bel' 1972-Fcbl"Ual1' 197!1. 

Troop H. 171h Cavalry 13 (17th A"iation Group, 1st A\'btion Brigadc) 

II Originally deployed in December 1967 as a ground CU'alry squadron. thiJ unit 

.... as com'ertl-d into an air Q.\·alr)· squadron from D«embcr 1968 10 June 1969. 

I2 Troop 0 ..

 3.5 inili�1I1 dCI'IO)ro as a ground Q.\·alT)· troop in Dcttmbcr 1966 and 

inacli'3.lcd in OClobcr 1970. RC3.cliulctI April 1972 as an air ("'.,I,·alry Iroop. 

n Trool' II "':lJ inili311)' dl'plo)l'd as 3. ground a"all1' Iroop in OClober 1967 and 

[nacli.-alcd in Ocloher 1971. It ..

 as rcacli.-alcd with 1T0ps and equipmenl from Ihe 

71h Squadron. lith Ca"alT)' (Air). as an air C3.''3.iry troop. 
Fishburn, September !972

Fcbru:lty 1973. 

i\fec/ulIIiz.ed 11/lalltry VI/ils 

2d Battalion. 2d Infantry 1 1 (lsI Infanll,}' Division} 

LI. Col. Edward .J. Collins, December J966-i\lay 1967: Lt. Col. John 

D. Pelton, May--Scptcmber 1967: LI. Col. Henry L. Da\·isson. September 1967-July 1968: LI. Col. George D. Creer, July-December 

1968; Lt. Col. j:I111C5 A. i\fichicm.i. DcccmbCl' 196B-June 1969; 

LI. Col. Newell E. Vinson, June-December 1969: Ll. Col. Lee D. 

Brown, December 1969-1\pril 1970. 

1st Brigade. 51h Inblllry Division-i\lcch:mizcd (XX IV Corps) 

Col. Richard J. Glikcs, JUly-OcLOber 1968: Col. .lames i\f. Gibson. 

October 1965-Julle 1969: Col. John L. Osteen, Jr.. June-December 

1969: Bdg. Cen. William A. Ilurkc. January-July 1970: Urig. Gen. 

John G. Hill, Jr., July 1970-M:I}' 1971; Brig. Gen. Harold H. 

Dunwoody, May-July 1971. 

1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (25th Inf;lIlIry Division) 

Ll. Col. Thomas U. Grecr. ./anuary-August 1966: LL Col. Victor F. 

Dial., August 1966-J:llluary 1967: Ll. Col. Richard C. Rogers, .!anu· 

ary-i\fa}' 1967: Lt. Col. Chandler Goodnow, May-October 1967: 

LL Col. Fremont n. 1 ladson, October-Dcccmber 1967: �Iaj. Ralph 

K. I-look. Deccmbcr 19G7-.Ianuary 19u8; LI. Col. Henry B. i\lurphy . 

.

/r., January_Fcbruary 1968: Ll. Col. Thomas C. Lodge, FebruaryJune 19G8: Lt. Col. Andrew 1-1. Anderson. June-October 1968: Lt. 

Col. William E. Klcin. October 19u5-Junc 1969. Lt. Col. Robert A. 

Kurck . ./unc-October 1969: Lt. Col. Fredcrick C. Delisle, October 

1969-Janu'lry 1970: Lt. Col. Ted G. Westerman, January-July 1970; 

Lt. Col. Oliver n. Combs . ./r., .July-November 1970: Ll. Col. I)atl"ick 

J. Moore, November 1970-April 1971. 

2d Battalion. 8th Inramll' 1$ (4th Infantry Division) 

Lt. Col. Gordon J. Duqucmin. NO\'cmber 1966-i\lay 1967: Lt. Col. 

.John p, Berres. J Ullc-December 19G7: Lt. Col. John D. Edgerton, 

December 1967-Septcmber 1968: Lt. Col. David I). Thoreson, Scptember 1 965-Febrllary 1969: Lt. Col. William S. DeCamp. february-July 1969: LI. Col. Alfred G. Sapp . .Iu1y-Scptcmber 1969; Lt. 

Col. Charles E. Thomann, Scptember 1969-January 1970: Lt. Col. 

H Originallr ucplo)"l'tl in OClober 1%:' a� a dismoullled infantrl' battalion, IIIis 

unil wa$ n\echanil.ed in J3nuary 196i. 

1$ Originally deployed in AllgU$1 1 96 as a disllIoumc:tI infanl!) ballalion. Ihis 

unit W3$ mecllaniloo in March 1967. 
1st Battalion, 16th Infantry 1& (1st Infantry Division) 

Lt. Col. Roben C. Lewis, October_November 1968; Lt. Col. Donald 

C. Shuffstall, No\'ember 19GB-April 1969; Lt. Col. Kenneth G. 

Cassels, April-September 1969; LI. Col. David C. Martin, October 

I 969_A j>ril 1970. 

2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (25th Infantry Division) 

Ll. Col. Richard W. Clark, October 1966-February 1967; Lt. Col. 

Ralph W. Julian, February-Septembcr 1967; Lt. Col. Awbrey G. 

Norris, September 1967_February 1968; Ll. Col. King J. Coffman, 

February-August 1968; LI. Col. James A. Damon. August-December 

1968; Ll. Col. Ralph M. Cline, Jr .. December 196B-May 1969; Lt. 

Col. John C. Eitel, May-August 1969; Lt. Col. Bruce F. Williams, 

August-Novcmber 1969; Lt. Col. John R. Parker, November 1969-

Jl,o(ay 1970; Lt. Col. Nathan C. Vail, May_November 1970. 

4th Battalion, 2�1 Infantry 17 (25th Infantry Division) 

Lt. Col. Walworth F. Williams, December 1966-June 1967; Lt. Col. 

Thomas A. Ware, Jr., June-December 1967; Lt. Col. Avery S. Fullerton, December 1967-May 1968: LI. Col. Clifford C. Neilson, MayNo\'ember 1968; Lt. Col. Alben C. Butler, December 196B-March 

1969; Ll. Col. Gcorge E. Taylor. March-Sel)tcmber 1969; Lt. Col. 

James E. Coggins, September 1969-March 1970; i\hj. Frederick S. 

Stanley. March-April 1970; Lt. Col. Edward M. Bradford, AprilNovember 1970; Maj. Jerry D. Blackwood, Novcmber_December 

1970. 

2d Ballalion, 47th Inrantry (9th Infantry Division) 

Lt. Col. 'vVilIiam B. Cronin. January-April 1967: Ll. Col. Arthur D. 

Moreland, April_Dccember 1967; Lt. Col. John n. Tower. JanuaryJune 1968; Ll. Col. Frederick F. Van Deuscn. June-July 1968; Lt. 

Col. James L. Scovel. luly 196B-January 1969; Lt. Col. Douglas S. 

Smith, January-July 1969; Lt. Col. James W. Rowe, July-January 

1970; Lt. Col. John H. Claybrook, January-July 1970; Lt. Col. Gary 

C. Williams, July-October 1970. 

1st Battalion. 50th Infantry (I Field Force, Vietnam) 

Lt. Col. Albert L. Hutson, Jr., Septembcr 1967-January 1968; Lt. 

Col. Cheney L. Bertholf, Jr., Februar)'-July 1968; Lt. Col. John B. 

1& OcplO)'ed, in Dt

ember 1966 as Ihee 51h Battalion. 60th Infantry. Ihi, unit was 

reassigned and redC'Jignatcd as the ht Battalion, 161h Infantry. 

11 This unil was originally deeplo)'ed, in April 1966 as a dismounted, infantry bulalion but was mechanilM In January 1967. 
yJ: j. Cp

l

>pcr. JuJuy 1: C. 

John M. Gilbert. July 1969-January 1970: LL Col. Roben I-I. Luck, 

January-June 1970; Lt. Col. Richard D. Hooker, June-December 

1970. 

51h Battalion, 60th Infantry 18 (9th Infantry Division) 

Lt. Col. Lucian K. Truscott III, December 1966-March 1967: Lt. Col. 

Allan S. Flynn. March_August 1967: LI. Col. William It Steele, 

August J967-March 1968; Lt. Col. Eric F. Amiia, March-Scptcmber 

1968. 

lst Battalion. Glsl lnrantf)' (1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division­

�lcchilllilCd) 

Lt. Col. Bernard D. Wheeler, July-December 1968: Lt. Col. David 

E. I-Iartig;lll. januarY_luiy 1969: Lt. CoL John W. SwarClI, Jr., July 

1969-June 1970; LI. Col. Richard A. Scholtes. June 1970-february 

1 971; Ll. Col. Arnold S. Stallman. Februar),-Jul)' 1971; Lt. Col. 

Roben ;\1, Brumback. July 1971. 

Compau)' D. 16th Armor (173<.1 Airborne Brig;tde) 

Capl. Josef C. Jordan. Jr.. i\la),-Scptember 1965; C:tpt. John E. 

Dunlop. Jr., September 1965-April 1966: Capt. Karl F. Nehammer. 

April-October 1966: Capt. John K. W .. ters. October 1966-May 1967: 

Capt. Rober! D. Macke)'. May_November 1967: Capt. Robert F. Hel· 

mick. November 1967_April 1968: Capt. James S. Hicks. April_ 

December 1968: Capt. Ronald A. Bogue. Decembel' 1968-Jul), 1969. 

Capt. John J\1. Weaver, July-October 1969. 

2d Balta lion. 34th Annm' I II (25th Inf;ltltry Division) 

LI. Col. Raymond L Stailey. September 1966-Augusl 1967; Lt. Col. 

Hal n. Rhyne. August 19G7-February 1968: Lt. Col. John II. Tipton. 

February-July 1968: LI. Col. The(Xlore E. O'Connor. July 1968-

January 1969; Lt. Col. Du:me R, Tague. January-June 1969: Lt. Col. 

Tommie G. Smith, june_November 1969: Lt. Col. William i\1. 

Greenberg, December 1969_J\b}' 1970; Lt. Col. Binrun S. Kidwell, 

J\fay-Oclober 1970. 

18 Rca"igned 10 the LSI Infantr)' Dil ision in Seplclllber 1968 aud TeI1csigna1ed a, 

Ihe 1$1 lIallalion. 161h Infanlrr. 

19 OriginaIJ}' assigned 10 Jml dcplol.:d wilh Ihe -ilh Infanlr), Oi, i5ion. this unit 

was unvcr control of II Field FOTC('$, Victnam. and then anached 10 the 251h Inbl1lT)' 

Dhision. 
JJJyp

Clyde O. Clark, September 196G-March 1967; LL Col. Paul S. 

Williams, J .... March-September 1967; Lt. Col. William D. Cranl, 

September 1967_Felll'uary 1968: Lt. Col. Theodore S. Riggs. Jr., 

Feb .. uary_August 1968: LL Col. Stan R. Sheridan, September 196BJanuary 1969; Lt. Col. Leo M. Brandt. January-May J969; Maj. 

Gcorgc J. Lattlll"ncr, i\lay-July 1969; Lt. Col. Donald J. Pagel, JulyNovcmbcr 1969; LL Col. James L. Marini, Deceml>cr 1969_April 

1970. 

1st Battalion, 77th Armor (1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Di"isionMcchani1.cd) 

Lt. Col. John i\1. Pickarts, July-Dccember 1968: LL Col. Carmelo P. 

Milia, Dccember 196B-May 1969; Lt. Col. Thomas A. Miller, Jr., 

June-Decembcr 1969: Lt. Col. Ni"en J. Baird, December 1969-June 

1970: LL Col. John T. i\fcNamara, July-Novembcr 1970; Lt. Col. 

Richard i\1. i\lcycr, Novcmber 1970_April 1971; Lt. Col. Raben £. 

Butler. April-July 1971. 

SPecial Armored Unit 

39th Cavalry Platoon (Air Cushion) �I (9th Inranlry Division) 

Maj. David G. Moore, May 196B-April 1969: Maj. Edward R. 

Szcman. April_Dccember 1969; Maj. Duane B. Root. December 

1969-June 1970; Maj. Barry F. Graham. July-August 1970; 1st Lt. 

George E. Rogers. August-Septcmbcr 1970. 

::0 Originally aMigned 10 and deplo)'ed with the 25th Infantr,. Dh·ision. this IInil 

was attached 10 thc 4th lnfantr)' Di,·ision. 

�I This Ullit was formed in Viemam IIsing three Sritish·built !-Io,·crerar!. The 

unit name. ne"er offidall)' apllrO\'cd b)' the Departmcnt of the Arm),. was dC\'c:lopcd 

frOIll thc nUTl\cf�ls of the 3d Brigadc. 9th Infantr)' Dio'ision. !o ..

 hich the HO\'creraft 

... cre attached. 
ARMOR RECIPIENTS OF THE i\IEDAL OF HONOR 

BO"'DSn'):L, S. SGT. JAMES L. Co A, 2d Bn (]\f) , 

2d InL 1st Inf Oi\' 

Dolo Nt:, 1ST LT. STF.pm::-: 1-1., Co n, 1st Bn (M). 

5th Inf. 25th Inf Oil' 

FEltNANI>El, Sp4c. DANa:!., Co C, 1st Bn (�f). 

5th Inf, 25th Ilif Oiv 

Fl'r.lMAURICE, SI'4c. i\llCIiAEI. J .. Trp D, 2d Sqdn 

(Air), 17th Cal', 101s1 Aidlol'ne Oiv (Ambl) 

FRITZ, 1ST LT. H .. ROLD A., Trp A. 1st Sqdn, 11 th 

Arm C;I\' Regt 

jOIiNSON, Sp5c. DWIGHT 1-1., Co 8, 1 st Bn, 69th 

Arm, 4th Inf OJ,, 

LANCIIORN. PI'C. GARFIELD 1\1., Trp C, 71h Sqdn 

(Air). 17th Ca\,. lsi Aviation Udc 

LAPOINn:, SI>4C. JOS.:I-II G., .Ill., I-Iq Trp, 2£1 Sqdn 

(Air) , 17th Ca\', JO[st Airborne Oil' (Amul) 

LoNG, SeT. OO:'\'AI.I) R., Trp C, 1st Sqdn, 4th Ca\', 

1st Inl Oil' 

McKInIlEN, SeT. RAY, Trp B. 7th Sqdn (Air) , 

17th C,1\', 1st Aviation fide 

PAITf.RSO:>o, $cT, ROBERT i\I., Trp n. 2d Sqdn. 

17th COl\', IOlst Airborne OJ\' 

POXON, 1ST LT. RonUT L., Trp fi, 1st Sqdn 

(Air) , 9th COl\', 1st Cal' Oi\' (Ambl) 

$K[I)(:':[., Sc'r. DO:>OAUJ S .. Trp O. 1st Sqdn (Air) , 

9[h Ca\,. 1st Cal' Diy (Ambl) 

Sn�[N[)AM, 1ST LT, RUSSELl. A., Trp B. 3d Sqdn. 

4th Cay, 25th Inf Div 

TAYI,OR. CAPT. JAMES A.. Trp n, 1st Sqdn, 1st 

Ca\,. 23d Inf Diy 

WARREN, 1sT LT, 'OliN E .. JR., Co C, 2d fin (M), 

22(\ Inf. 25th Inf Oi\' 

WICtOl":.!, CI't., jERR\' W,' Trp E, 2<1 Sqdn. 1 1 th 

Arm Cal' Regt 

YANO, SI'C. RODNEY J. T, Air Cay Trp. 1 1 th Arm 

Cav Regt 

YOU/"c, S. SGT. i\!MWIN R .• Co C, 1st I3n (M) , 5th 

InC, 25th In( Oil' 

Province 

An Loc 

21 May 1969 

Hau Nghia 

25 i\larch 1 969 

Hau Nghia 

18 February 196€ 

QuangTri 

23 i\la rdl 1971 

Ilinh Long 

11 January 1969 

Kontum 

15 J ;Uluary 1968 

Plciku 

15 january 1969 

Quang Tin 

2 JUlle 1969 

Binh Long 

30 Junc 1966 

Ilinh Timan 

6 Dccembcr 1968 

Thua Thicn 

6 i\lay 1968 

Tar Ninh 

2jullc 1969 

ninh Thu,m 

11 Septembcr 1969 

Tay Ninh 

I Fcbruary 1970 

Quang Naill 

9 Novcmbcr 1967 

Tay Ninh 

H J:lIluary 1969 

Binh Long 

6 January 1968 

Bien J-Ioa 

I janual'Y 1969 

Hau Nghia 

21 August 1968 
Abn 

ACAV 

ACR 

Acrorinc platoon 

Ambl 

AI)C 

Arca warfare 

ARVN 

Base area 

Base camp 

Canister rounds 

Cle:lr and secure 

Cloverleaf 

Cobra 

COSVN 

Glossary 

Airborne 

Armored cavalry assault vehicle 

,\rmored cavalry regiment 

A platoon of fony-four enlisted men and onc 

officer organized as light airmobile infantry 

and transported to mission areas b)' helicopter_ The platoon was specifically organized liS an organic elemelll of every lIir 

cavah-y troop. 

Ainnobile 

Armored personnel carrier 

That condition of war in which forces orient 

excJusi\'ely on the destruction of enemy 

forces with no intention to seize and hold a 

succession of telTain features. Area warfare 

is Ilonlineal and multidirectional and has 

no continuous front or line of demarcation bct\,'ccn opposing forces. 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

A section of terrain which contains logistical 

installations, defensh'e fortifications, or 

other physical structures used by the 

enemy. 

The location which provides a semipermanent 

home for tactical organizations. 

Short range antipersonnel projectiles, loaded 

wilh submissiles such as necheltes or steel 

balls. The casing is designed 10 open just 

heyond the muzzle of the weapon, dispel'S' 

ing the suhmissilcs_ 

A military mission to lind and capture or destroy all enemy forces within a speCified 

area and then pre\-ent enemy forces from 

reentering. 

A formation used in search operations that 

allowed a r.tpid search of a large arca. 

Nallle gi\'en to the attad:. helicopter AH-I C. 

Gemral Office fOT South Vietnam (Communi�t 

headquancrs) 
CTZ 

Dais}' cuttet" 

FFV 

FSB 

Go/No Co 

Corps tactical zone 

A 15,QOO-pound bomb used to create a landing 

lOne in thick jungle. 

Field Force, Vietnam 

Fire suppOrt base 

The term applied to the trafficability of 

tracked vchicles in the Republic of Vietnam. 

Gunship A helicopter armed with air-ta-ground arma· 

mcnt. 

HEAT ' Iigh explosive, antitank 

Herringbone fOrmalil')n A formation used by mechanized and armor 

unitS in which armored \'chides turn alternately to the sides of the direction of m;lrch, 

placing their main armament and heaviest 

armor obliquely toward the n:lnks. The ccntel' is lch dear to prO\tidc freedom of movement within the column and as a h:l\'cn for 

vchicles without armor. 

1-10 Chi �rinh Trail 

LAW 

LTL 

LZ 

M 

i\I/\COV 

� IACV 

;\Iinigun 

i\fR 

QL 

Recoilless rifle 

RCCOllllnissancc in force 

An infihr:llion routC used cxtcnsively by the 

Nonh Vic(ll:lmese /\rmy to move troops :Ind 

supplies from North Vietnam through L .. os 

and Cambodia to all regions of South 

Vietnam. 

Light antitank weapon 

Interprovincial route 

Landing 70ne 

Mechanized 

�Iechanii'ed :lIld Armor Comb<lt Operations 

in Vietnam. a study. 

;o.Iilitary Assistance Command. Vietnam 

A six bal'relcd 7.62·mm. machinc gun using a 

system of rapidly rotating ban'cls which 

produces a high ralC of fire. 

i\[ i Ii tary region 

National highway 

"'capon in which the rcarward movement resulting from firing is cssclllially eliminated. 

A limitcd objcctivc opcration by a mili tary 

forcc to diSCO\'cr and tcst the cnemy's disposi tion and strength or to dcvelop other 

illtcll igtllce. 
hicles thaI tra\el a ro:.d for the purpose of 

keeping the enel1l}' ofT balance ,lIul making 

the presence of friendly forces fell among 

the local populace. 

Rome plow A special bulldoler hlade manufactured by the 

Rome Plow Company and LL�ed for clltting 

brll�h and small and medium trees. 

RPC Rockel propelled grenade 

Sensor Equipmelll which detects and indicates terrain 

configuration. the presence of military tar· 

gets, and other natura] and man·made ob· 

jects. and acdvities by me,IIlS of energy 

em is�ions 01' reflect ions. 

Sianddown Relief from combat operations. usually in 

preparation for rcdeploymclll or for mainlenance. 

Swift boat A small modified Navy patrol boat used for 

close in offshore security and inl,md waterway patrolling. 

T;lclical ;.ir support The employment of air forcc elemcnts in 

com hat in conjunction with ground 0pc",· 

lions. 

Tet A cclcbr:llion of the new year based on the 

TF 

TL 

TOe 

TOW 

US�IC 

lunar calendar. This date fl"cluales each 

year. 

T:ld:. force 

Provincia] route 

Tactical operations ccnter 

Tube·launched, optically tr:lcked, wire·guided 

missile 

Uui ted States Marine Corps 

Index 

A Shau I'alley: 156,201, 205 

Abrams, General Creighlon W.: 15,38, 

138, 139/1, 143, 153, 164, 199 

Advisers: 17, 19-25,27-31. 33-35, 37, 151, 

162-63, 168-69, 177. 180-81. 193, 197, 

205, 218, 220-21, 226 

Ai 'I'll: 20<1, 206 

Air AU.1ul! Division, 11th: 51 

Air ("alalry; 51,57... 84-85. 111-12. 1 16. 

130. " 'I. 193-!N. 200. 217. 221 

Air cushion vehicles: 142" 

Air $trik«: 52, 202. 215, 217-18 

Air suppl)': 122, 15�. 192 

Air support of ground operations: 62-63. 

67, 69, 78, 97. 100. 108. 122-23. 130, 

I'�, 136, 116. 155, 157. 170-71. 174. li8, 

19', 195. 2()9, 212. See abo Helicopters 

Airborne Brig�l{le. 1i3d: 55. 65. 112, 161 

Airborne Dilbion. IOht: 58, 115n, 126. 

156 

Airborne operation,: 27-28.!l2 

Aircraft: B-52, m.215, 217-18; C-H 

(Spo) , 97 

,\irmobile forces: 50.67, ii, 85, III, 116, 

''' 

,\loui: 190. 192-96 

Ambush actions, enem): 5. 108-10, 13�. 

19J-96, 198 

Ambush/c:omlterambush actions: 34. 50, 

59, 6lMii. 69-71, 75. 77-i8, 81. 94. 101. 

12J-26, HI, 156. 160 

Amphibious operatiollJ: 5� 

Amphibious lracked "ehlcle, M551 

(General Sheridan): 82. 142-0\5, 187/!, 

22'1 

An Khe: 58 

An LOC: 66. 69. ii, 159 

An :'1)': 118 

Angel's Wing: 167. 169-70 

Annamite moumains: 9 

,\ntiaircraFt, ellem): 27, 191-92,201-2 

AI> Ibc: 25. 27-28, 32.38 

Ap lIac II: 10' 

Ap Ib.u Bang: 60, 63.97. 100 

AI' Dong: 12' 

Ap Tan Thoi: 25 

Ap Tau 0 bridge: 67 

Armor: 6. 64, 66-67. 69-71, i5. 77-78, 8i: 

lirepo"'er and mobilit)', 42. 75, 96-97. 

100, 10'. iO,Hj, 1 15-16. 132, 136-37, 

139, 1-14. 155, 164-65. li9, l86n, 219: 

opinion on need for, 7. 51. 5H8. 65, 

72.90: Iroop withdrawal. 164-65. 199. 

See abo French Army 

Amior doctrine: 7, 17. 24, 33-'4, 41-12. 

50-51,5'. 65. 84-87, 90. 95. 220 

Armor roles aud missions: blod:.ing. 95. 

190; border sealing. 156; cordon alld 

search, 74, 103, 140: enclave Slrategy, 

5'1-55: mobile resen·c. 219: reaction 

fon::e, 50. 53. 67, 95. 1 15-16. 128, 222; 

reconnaiss:ance. 97. 10'. 161. 221; rood 

and com'o), security. 50, 5'1-55, 58, 74. 

81. 95. 103. 106-11. 128. 1�7, 177, 191. 

199.221-22: screening, 95: seardl and 

destrol'. " , 53-55, 64. 91. 94-95. 100, 

103. 161. Iii: sun"eillance, 50. \61 

Armor taclia: clo"erleaf JnaneuI·er. 86: 

herringbone formation. 70, 77-78, 85, 

109; pile.on, 145, 147; roadrunner 

operations. 72. 70\, 80. 85. 103; thunder 

run technique, il-i2. 50, 85 

Armored ballalions and companie5: 

Campan)' D, 16th Armor. 91: 2d 

Hallalion, 34th Armor. 73. 91. 90\, 100. 

102, 132, 171. 183; 1st Ballalion. 69th 

Armor. 58. 6'. 73, 79. 107, 150-5', 

IBOn. 18'. 222: 1st Ballalion, 77th 

Armor. 139. 18i, 196 

:\nnored cars: 17-18. 25, 30-31. 34-'5 

Armored cal'�lr)': 50-51.67. 72, 84-85. 

95, 102, 116, 118. 123. 142-13, 145. See 

,,/.so eal'alry uniu 

Armored elI"alry aHaul1 I'ehide (ACAV): 

73. 84. 89, 107/1, 143-44; emplO)'TlelH 

of. 95, 99-100. 102. 100. 126, 130. 142. 

149. 1i211: lo»cs. 79. 82, 1 10, 126. 193. 

210. Su also Annon::d pel'5Onnel 

(anier. MI13 

,\rnlored CavalT')' Regiment, 11th: 58. 

72-i5, i7-80. 82, 91. 95-96. 108. 12G. 

142. 182, 184-85. 19:>-96. 221-22. 22-i2.5; 1st Squadron. 143-4·1. 15H5, 159-

60. 175-76: 2nd SquadrOIl, 15+-n, 

159-60, Iii-H. liG. 199: 'd Squadron, 

127. 149. 159. 171-71, li6 

Armored dilisions: 1st, 107/!: 2d, 107n 

Armored pcrSOlI1lt:i earrier, Mil': ,.5. 

211n. 214; emplo),menl of. 21-24. 25. 

27-29, 'I-'2,3�. 36-'7, �2�5. 62-6', 

66. 72-7'. i5, 77, 85-36. 90, 105. HI. 

143-44: I�. 63, 70. 79, 119. 134; 
64, 73, 84, 89: problems with. 24, 41

4'. 47.�. 79, 81n, 82, 97, 103-5. 

Sec also Armored a..-airy assault 

I'chicle <ACA V) 

Armored personnel carrier, M 113A1; 

10711, 13111, HZn 

Armored persollnei carrien: 10, 45. 51, 

64, 112-15. 136n, 187 

Armored reconnaissance "chicle. Mil>!: 

24, 25, 57-'8. 57, 72-73 

Army Combat Operations in Vietnam 

study: 89-9() 

Artillery; a·inch, 66: I05·mm .. 146: 175· mm .• 66, 151, 153 

Artillery battalions: 5th. 41h "rliJIe.,·, 

139: 7th, 91h Anillery. 99: 2d, 'Sd 

Arlillery, 50, 62�': 2d. 77th Artillery, 

100 

Artillery JUpport of ground operations: 

63. 66-67. 69. 78. 80-81, 97. 99-100, 

102. 105, 108, 110. 122-2'. 125. L30. 

132, ISS-56. 154-55, 157. 159. 170-71. 

lB. 178, 193. 195, 209, 215.217 

ATLASTA Operation: 7+-75.78 

A1TI.EWRO Operation: 74 

Australian forces: 5:;. 1 12-1' 

Avialion Croup. I&hh: 178 

Ba. Colonel Ly Tong: 2'.25.27,48,214 

Ban Me Thllot: '3. 118, 1i9 

Bao Tri: 64 

Bartlc)·. LielHeilant Colonel Hugh J.: 

126. 14:;-'17 

Base areas and Qmps. tllemy: 64.91. 96, 

131. 138, H8, 155. li9. SuDlJO 

Sancllluit'S. tntmy 

Banldield illuminalion: 71. 94 

Baulcfield feCOltry: 45,64, 182, 185. 223. 

225-26 

Danreal, Colonel Rarmond R .. Jr.: 31. 

35, 205 

Ball Sa Linh: 157 

Bau Bang: 60,62-63.96 

Bau Long Pond: 60 

Bell Helicopler: 215 

Bellis. Pril'ale Fint Cl3ss Mark: 134 

Ben Cal: 91. 118 

Ben Hai Rh'er: 205. Wi 

Ben Het: 15�5'. 212. 214-15 

Bender. Lieulenanl Colond John A..: 102 

Berry. Colonel Sidne)' B .. Jr.: 69 

Bien Hoa: 74, 123-27. 144. 15·1 

Binh An: 145-7 

Uinh I)illh I'rovince: 161 

Uinh Cia: 29 

Binh Long l'rOI;n«: 66, 155-56. 159 

Bl�ck anttu: 1 

noi Loi Woods: 64, i9 

(kilt'S. Brigaditr Ctntr.ll John K., Jr.: 31 

BOlton; 146 

lIowers. Scrgeam: 21 

IIricker. Caplain J�mc$ W.: 22-25 

IIridges: IS7: b�lk. 41. 103: M4T6. 113; 

\·thic1t·l�unched, 34, 172. 20H 

Urookshirt. Lituttnant Calono::! Crail 

L.: 157, 159-60. Iii 

Brown. Major Lloyd J.: 30 

nu Dop; 156 

U"lIdolers: 91, 94. HS. IS7 

UUllker. Ellsworth: 164 

Burnell, Specialist 4 William D.: 62 

Ca Mau Ptninsula: 9 

Caldwtll, Caplain John S.: 160 

Cam Lo: 20:'-7, 209 

Cambodia: bordtr operations, 59. 66. 6i. 

115. lSI, 156: oper.llioll5 in. 164. 167-

74. 1 77-82, 185. 197-99.224-25; troop 

withdrawal, 174. 176-71, 186. Su 01$0 

Sanctuarits. tntmy 

Cambodian forc�: 169, 180. 181 

Camuodian gOI·trnmenl: 166-61. 180, 

197 

Camounagt: 150 

Camps: Blackhorso:. 74-75, 77. 107-9. 1<19: 

Carroll, 205-6, 208: Evans. 212: Hawk 

Hill, I'" 

Can Tho: 191 

Cannon. 20·mm.: 62, 194 

Capital Milit:llY District: 129 

Cargo carritr, M54S: WH, 224-25 

Calalry baua.lions: lsi Battalion. 5th 

Cal'alry, 146; 2d Battalion. 5th Caval. 

l")", 146; 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry. 

59-60. 154-55; 2d Banalion. 12th 

CaI'alry, 59 

Caulry Brigade. 1st, 91h Cal'alry: l77n 

Cal'alry 

65-

I);"ision, lit; 29. 51, 58. 60, 

, 1 11. 145-'16. 154, 156, 159. 

1;�71. 183 

Cavalry Plaloon (air emhion \·ehicle). 

391h; 112n 

Cal'alry squadronl: ht Squadron. ht 

Canlry. 81n. 107n. 133-36. 187, 200: 

2d Squadron, 1st Cal'all")', 107, 118: 1th 

Squadron. hi Cnalry. 165. li2: 1st 

Squadron. 4th Cavalry, 56-57. 60-6�, 

65.67, 69-11, 91, 95, 107, 123. 129, 143. 

ISOn; 3d Squadron. 4th Cavalry. 58, 

66. 91, 110-11. 1 18-19. 122-23. I�", 

14H4, IH; 3d Squadron. 5th Cavalry, 

99-100, 107-10, 125-26, 145-'17, 156. 
172n, liin: ht Squadron, 10th Cayal, 

ry, 107, 199, 222; 2d Squadron, 17th 

Cal'alr)', 115n, 190-91, 192n, 194, 197n: 

so. Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 112, 177; 

7th Squadron, 17th Cal'alry, 1 12, 150n, 

200, 212 

Cavalry troops: Troop F, 4th Cal'alry, 

201n; Troop F, 8th Cavalry, 136; 

Troop H, 10th Cal'alry, 200: Troop A, 

4th Squadron, 12th Cavalry, 139, 187: 

Troop D, 4th SquadrOIl, 12th Cavalry, 

51: Troop C, 16th Cavalry, 200; Troop 

D, 17th Cavalry, 200: Troop E, 17th 

Cavalry, 91: Troop ", 17th Caval!,)', 

200; Troop H, 17th ea"alr)', 200 

Cf.OAR FALLS Operation: 91, 94-95, 103, 

'<8 

Central Office for South Vietnam 

(COSVN): 12,95, 119, 171 

Chamberlain, Lieutenant Colonel Edwin 

W., Jr.: 105 

Chu uk 54 

Chu I'ao Pass: 216-17 

Chu Pong Mountain; 66 

Chup rubber plantation: 176-77 

CIIlCU; PINES Operation: &I 

CiyiI Guards, Republic of Vietnam; 25, 

27,28 

Claymore: Comer: 77 

CIIW(/and: 198n 

Cobb, Colonel William W.: 95 

Collins, Lieutenant Colonel Edward J.: 

" 

Combat Aerial TOW Team, ht: 21S-17 

Combilled arms team: 50. 50, 63, 84-85. 

97, 99-100, 102-." 113, 130, 132-33, 136, 

155, 169, 174, 221. 226 

Combustible·caSl:' ammunition: 14H4 

Command and (Olllwl: 35,67, 108, 112. 

See a/10 Republic of Vietnam Arm)' 

Cong Da ii.), Camtl: 27 

Cong Luong Canal: 25, 27 

Corps, XXIV: 19-1, 205 

Corp$ lacticallOnes; 117n; I Corps, 3,5,*, 

73, 1 11-16. 133, 139-10, lotS, ISO, 153, 

15(;, 161-63. 190. 192-95; 11 Corps, 29, 

'3,66,73,79, 107, 11S-16. 118, 119-5(1, 

161, 179. 222; III Corps. &I. 66. 73, 79, 

91, 103, 107, 110, 115, 1 18, 12"'24, 129, 

132-33, 147 .. 9. 154. 156, 167�9, 172, 

178-79, 222; IV Corps, 21, 27, 13, 115, 

127, 162. 168, li2. 175. 178-79. See also 

Military regions 

Crow', Ncst: 167-68 

Cu Chi: 6of-65, 73, 118-19. 181 

Cuu Long 15: 33 

CUlJ LO!>'G I-III Operations; 178 

Cuu LOSG 4� Operation: 197-98 

Da i'<ang: 52-51, 200 

Oak To: 151 

Dak To II: 212-13 

Dalat: 17 

Dam, Colond Bui Dinh: 27 

Dan Tieng: 151 

Da"i5, Specialist 4 Eddie; 152 

Demilitarized Zone: 54, 161-62, 187, 

20H, 209 

DcPu)', Major General William E,: 65, 

67 

D£\O'£Y CAl\\'O!>' II Operation; 187 

Diem, Ngo Dinh: 48--19 

Distinguished Service CrO:!l

: 62, 123n 

Dog's Head; 171 

Dong Ha: 200-11 

DOYo'ne)'. Staff Sergeant John: 52 

Due Co Special Forcel Camp: 59 

I)ue Iloa: &I 

DIU, Lieutenant General Ngo: 212 

£41011: 146 

EL PASO II Operation: 66 

Ellioll. Lieutenant Colonel Joe: 101 

Engineer battalions: 7th, 187; 169th, 118 

Engineer operations: 69, 147 ...

 8, 187 

Fall, Bernard B,: 4-5 

Fidd I'orce, II, Vietnam: 65, 73, 91, 95. 

115. 123-24, 168 

Filhol Plantation: &I 

Fire support bas-es: I, 11,111, 95-96; 

Apple, 125-26: Dastogne, 201-2; Bra"o, 

196: EltiOll, 190: Gold, 100-101; Ruth, 

156-57: Vandergrift, 187: Veghc:1, 202 

Fisher. Lieutenant Colonc:l l>aul A.; 57 

j.'ishhook: 159. 171. 172'1, 174-76 

Flamethrower l'ehicie, M 132: 43, 70 

Flares: 71, 97, 1�7. 152 

Free World Milit.ary Assiltance Forces in 

Vietnam: 31.91. 114-16, 129, 131, 136-

3i. 138, 153. 155. 161, 168 

French Army: 10, 12: armor experience. 

3-6. 8-9, 17, 21, 38. 40, 11,�, i3, 87, 

220: Groupt:ment Mobile 100.5 

j.'uiton, Colonc:l William B,: 105 

Garcia. Second Lieutenant John: 63 

Garller, j.'irst Lieutenant Larry: 104 

Garretson, Captain Ralph D.: 125-26 

Garth. Colonel MaT5hall; 101 

Gene"a Aetord, or 1951: 3, 17 
Giai. General Vu Van: 2056, 208 

" Cn:ell dragons"; 2411 

Gkn' .. '" RlI'n Operation: 161 

Creer. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas U.: 

" 

Grenade launcher. 4O·mm.: '4, 69 

Griffin, Lieutenant Colond Jl.obb)' t',: 

li l-i2, 1i4 

Gui(, Lieutenant Thomas: 1''-'4, 136 

Guns: 20·mm.,41: -IO-mm. (twin). 151 

Gunshicltls: !l8. 40, 57. 63. 64. 73. 84 

l-Ia Ticn: 197 

I-Iall.tracks: 3, 17. 18 

Hamb) .. uptain Jerrell t',: 32 

fla5J:ard, LieUII:nant Colonel Sidney S.: 

99 

Hall �!lhia "fOI ince: 199 

1-laH:rmalc. Sergeant First Class !lugh 

1-1.: 151-:i2 

Heiser, Lieuu::nant General J05Cph A. 

M .. Jr.: 182 

I-Ielicol'u:u: 3.50-51.58,71: AH-IG 

(Cobn) . 157, 159, 192n, 19�, CH-'l7. 

69, 135: CII-!o4. li3: OH-6,\, 19·1: 

Ull-J n. 215; airlift and supply, 2:', 27. 

32. 122. 154: command and control. 57, 

IGI, 194: firc support of ground operation!, 54, 6S, i7, 125, 128, 157, 159. IGI

, 

171, 174, 192-95. 198,,: losses, 27-28. 

Stt also Air ca,-alr)' 

Hembree. Spccialist 4 Fr.mk: 151-52 

Iligl1""")I: High"""y l. 36-S7, n, H, 17-

i8, 111. 119, 122, 124-25, 169-iO. li5, 

199, 205-7: Iligh .. 'ar 2, i4, 109: High· 

""a}' S, 197; High""ay 4, 9�. 197-98; 

lIigln.'a}' i, 172, 176; Highwar 9, 187, 

190-92. 1%, 206, 209: Highwar 13, 00, 

62,66, 67, 69. ii, il 96-97. 107, 159, 

li6-i7: Highway 14, 156-57, 159,214-

17: I-ligh""a), 15. 175-17; Highw,,)' 18, 

198: IIighwa)' 19, i9, 107: Highway 20. 

149: High""a)' 246, 159: High"'a)' 55S, 

;. 

!Iii!. Brigadier Gcnrral John G .. Jr,: 

187 .. 

Ilixson. Chief Warrant Officer Douglas 

R.: 216 

110 Bo Woods: 64, i9 

Ho Chi Minh Trail: 150, 166 

1-10 Nai: 124 

Hoc Mon bridgc: 119 

Hoffmastcr. LieU\enalll Colont! Gcorge 

C.: 159 

Hoitom, C;iptain Stanlcy E.: 22 

Honolulu Conference. 1965: 112 

Ilowell, Licutenant Calont! Marlin D.: 

77-78 

Howitzcrs: is: M8, 17; MI09, 51 

How�c, Lieu[enalll General I-bmilton 

�I,: 51 

11m.'1!e Board: 51 

Huc: 54. 114, 116. 128. 18S. 201-2. 2Q5 

!lughes Airern!t, 215 

Hlllucr, Masler Sergeant Andrcw: 102 

la Dr .. ng \'alle)': 29, 60 

I"ranlr)' ballalions: ht Ilallalion, 2d 

Infantry, 69: 2d !latta lion, 2d I!I!antq', 

60, 80, 95-96. 180,,: 2d !laltalion. 3d 

Infantrl', 125: lit Battalion, 51h Infan· 

Ir)', 58, 6Hi>. 79, 91. 132, 174; 2d 8:;n· 

lalion. 81h Infantr)" 80 ... 107,,; lsi 

l.Iattalion, IlIh Infantr)', 159; 2d Bu· 

laliol1. 121h Infanlr)" 100-102: �Ih Bal' 

lalion. 121h Inbnll')', 125: 151 Ballaliol1. 161h Infantr,', ISO,,: 2d 8altalion,22d Infantry, 91, 100: Sd 8at· 

talion, 22d Infantry, 100-101, 132, 1i4; 

oIlh Battalion, 23<1 Infantry, 80", 132, 

" 18: 2d 1.I:lItal;ol1, 271h In!antr)', 123, 

132: 2d Satiation, 471h In£anu')", 103, 

123-25, 130, 165, 1 71-72; 'd Uattalion, 

471h Infanll')', 10+-5; 1$1 lIattalion, 

50lh Infanlr)', 161, 183: 3d Battalion, 

60th Infamr}" 104-6: 5Lh lIallalion, 

60Ih luf:I.I1[I')', 103-5, 130: 1st natlalion, 6ht In!anlT)', 1S9. 18i 

Infantr}' brigades: 151 Ihigade. 51h Di"i· 

sion, 82. 139-011. 15S, 161-62, 182, 187n, 

2OS: 2d 8rigade, 9th Di\'ision, lOS; 3d 

8rigade, 9th Di\'ision, 171: 1st Brigade, 

251h Division. 132-53, 174; 2d Brigade, 

25th Dhision, 95, 17'1; 1961h Brigade 

(Ugh!). 94: 1991h l.lrigade (Light). 

12S-24 

I n!anlry di\'isioIl5: lsI J)i"i5ioll, 55-57, 

00, 6S, 65-67, is, 8On, 154, 156, ISO,,; 

41h Oi, ision, is, 82, 107. 150,,: 9th 

Dhision, lOS, 108. 165; 23<1 Dhision, 

ISS, 1S5: 251h Di,;!ion, �5, 58. 6!-65, 

is, 110, Illn, 1 19, 156, 167, 174-75 

I nldligenee opera lions and reports: 25, 

29. SI, 60, 7S, 81, 91, 1 10. 114, 128. lSi, 

140, 154. 159-00, 168, 187, 197,201, 

212,215 

Iron Triangle: !H, 1�8 

Johnson, General !larold K,: 55-56, 84 

Johnwn, LIndon n.: 58, 1&1 

Joint ReS('arch and Tesl ACI;'it)' in Viel· 

nam: 31 
JJ

" 

Julian, Li('ut('nant Colonel Ralph W.: 

100-101 

JU�CTro� CrTY 0P<'ration: 9';'-97. 100, 

102-3, 118 

Jungk lighting: 6-7, 60. 64, 84-85 

Kampong Cham: 17.;.-77 

Kaml)()tlg Som: 197, 198n 

Kampong SpC'an Riler: li1 

Kampong Trabc:k: 175 

K:unpong Traeh: 174 

Katum: 95, 15�. 176 

K('nnedy, John F.: 50 

Khanh. Major Cenenl �gU)'en: 49 

Khe Sanh: 54. 116, ISO, 187, 190 

KrTn HAW" Operation: 10i-8 

Knowles, Brigadier C('neral Richard T.: 

94 

KOlllum: 118, 179,212, 21<1-17 

Korean fOITes: 113 

Korun War: 6-7, 56, 220 

Krek: 174. 1i6,201n 

Kroesen. Major Celleral Frederick j., Jr.: 

205 

Lai Khe: 60 

LAM So� 45-72 Ope:r:llion: 202 

LAM So� 719 OpC'13tion: 177, 186-87, 

190. 192-93, 195-, 203 

Landing lonel: LZ 31. 192-95; Alpha. 

195-96: Flope:, 195: Ranger North, 

191-92; Ranger South, 191-92 

Landry. Lieutenam Colonel Walter J.: 17 

wing Vei Special Forcn Camp: 150 

Lao Dong Party: 12 

LaO$: 150. 15H4. 156, Iii, 186. 190-91, 

193. 195, 198. See also Sanctuaries, 

en('rny 

Lark, Spc:cialist 4 Thomn: 97 

LAW,M72: 197,215 

Lawrence:, Lieutenant Colonel Ra)rnOlld 

D.: 13<1-36 

1.ach. Colonel James H.: 155 

Lessons IUnled: 22-24, 28, 33, 67, 71, 

lOS. I II, 163, 170, 220-26 

LINCOLN Operation: 66 

Lbtening po5u: 50, 97 

Loe Ninh: 66, 72, 156, 159-60, 176 

Logbtial Command, Vietnam, lSI: 182 

Lon Nol: 166 

Long Uinh: 123-27, 181-82 

Luat, Colonel Nguyen Trong: 208, 211 

Ly. Colon('1 Ngu)-en Huu: 207 

7.52·mm" 69, 142: MOO, 73 

Me:-lall'la13, Robert S.: SO, 89 

Madole, Major James: 31 

Mahler, Major Michael D.: 147 

Mai, &rgcant Ngu)'en Xuan: 193 

Mai Lac: 206.208., 

Maintenance 3nd repair: 21, 30. 44-45, 

171n, 181-56,204. 206.223-24 

:-'loIKlI Openllion: 64 

Mao Tse.lung: 14.29 

Marshall. Captain Carl n.: 157 

Materi('i losses: 27-28. 5�, 63-{;S. 70. 79. 

82. 108-10, 119. 126, 129, 134, 138, 167-

68, 172. 179, 193-5. 2O',2Q8-17 

.\lcch3nized and Armor Combat Opera· 

lions in Vi('tnam (MACOV) study: 10, 

33, 54-87. 89-91. 184 

Mcchanhed infantry: 51, 56, &I. 72. 8�. 

94. 96. 102, 118, 136. 140-11. 18in 

Mckong Delta: 7,9.12.21, 24, 25. 10'. 

106. 114. 165 

:-'Iekong River: 165, 176, 178 

MemOI: 172. 17.;.-76 

Midway Island: 164 

Mieu Giang Rh'er: 206-10 

Miles, Caplain Ralph A.: 176 

MiliI1r)' regiorn: Region 1, 182-83. 200-

201. 203. 205. 212. 218; Region 2, lBO, 

182-8'. 1�20, 203, 212. 215, 21;; 

Region ', 17i. 180-83. 192 ... 210.217: 

Region 4. lBO. 198,200, 217. See 01$0 

Corps taetieal zoncs 

Mine (leleeton: 81-82 

Mine wll(,f"1: 82.223 

Mines, cla),mon;; 59 

Mines, enemy: 35, 47, 56, 77. 79-82, 9� 

96. 109, I4H4. 223 

Mineswt"Cpcr teams: 69, 81 

Minh Thanh Road: 66, 69. 71, 107 

Moe l-1oa: '1-32 

MONTA.'", RAron. Opc:ration: 15+-55 

Moore, Colonel Harold G .. Jr.: 65-66 

Morlar carri('n: 34-36.44, 63 

Mortan: 4.2·inch, 44; 6O·mm .. 22, 25; 

81·mm .. 25. 35-36, 43-44 

Mortan. enemy: 36,62-63, 96,97, 99 

My Tho: 48. 127 

Nap1lm: 196 

Narional Securit)· Study Memonlldum 

36: 164 

New Zealand forces: 112 

Nhu, Ngo Dinh: 48 

:-light operations: 3<1-37, 71-72. 94, III, 

122. 129, 141, 153 
North Vietnamese Arl1ll: 9], 114, 128, 

132, 135: annor unill nlll! doctrine. 

149-:.0, 19:;,201: casualties, ]36-37, 

138, ISO. 2]7; offcnsilc of 1972,21, 1;'0, 

164. 201-2. 205-6. 219; So,iet and 

Chinese cquipmcot, 149. 193. 208-] 1, 

213. 215-17: suppl)' opcnuiolls, 12, 9:>-

96, 139. 153, \59-61, 1(;6-68. 1i2. li4-

75. 18(;. 190. 192, 197. ZOI. 203. 218. 

&c alJo Sanctuaries, cncmr: Tet 

olfcllsi,c 

North Vietnamese Army units: 2d Dj"i· 

sion. 133. 2H; !lIh Dhision, 176-71: 

»hh Dj,'ision, 205: 5081h Dh'isioo, 

205; 3ZOlh Oil ision, 214; 324B Oil'i· 

SiOIl, 202: B5 Front. 205: 3-'d Regi· 

mental Uospital, 59: 6;'lh Regimtnt. 

157, 159; 66lh Regimen!. 00: 88th 

Regiment. 175: 95C Regiment. 160: 

202d Armored Regiment. 149. 153: 

20311 Tanl:. Regiment, 214; 20!hh Regi. 

men!, 160; 27111 Regiment, Iii: 272d 

Regiment. 176: 8121h Regiment, 14::', 

'41 

sonh Vietnamese gOlC'fnmem: 218 

O'Rric,,: 116 

Okinawa: 181 

Ot;$. Lieutenant Colonel Glenn K.: 118-

19, 12:2-23 

Oti$, Caplain Malcolm: IZ2 

I'acifitalion o!loCr:llions: 37. 91. 114, 13711, 

1::.6. 161-62, 164, ISO, 186 

l'ani5, First Lieuten:,uu William: 1::'7 

I'arrot's Beak: 172 

Patton, Colonel George S.: 73-14 ... 143, 

221 

People's Republic of China: 1<19 

I'han Thiel: 118 

I'hilippine forces: 112 

" /1110111 I'enh: 175-76, li8. 197 

I'hu Cllong: i2 

I'hn Lui: 57. 60. W, 73 

I'hu My Districl: 161 

I'hu Vinh: 127 

I'huoc Long " rovincc: 156 

I'huoc Vinh: 156 

I'ich Nil "au: 198 

Pineapple Foresl: 116 

l'lain of Rtt

b: 22, 29 

" Id �Ie Special "OT«1 Camp: 29.66 

I'Jciku: 29, 107, 118. 212.21[>-16 

I'\ciku "rO\';nce: 58 

I'olci Kleng: 1:;3. 214 

140. 163. 165. 178. 186, 203 .. , 212 

I'orter. Colonel Daniel n.: 27 

1'0,,'c\1, C.'lplain Ralph: 5\ 

I'rel:. Klol:. II: %-97 

I're)idential Unit Citalion, U.s.: 123 .. , 

'63 

I'rey Veng: I i7 

l'rh·Clle. Major William C,: 1014 

I'J)chological operatIOns leam: 1016 

Quail 1.oi: 1::'5 

Quang Ngai: 36. 116 

Qu:mg Tri Cil): 82. 145. 187, 204-5. 208, 

211,218 

Quang Tn PrOl ince: 153, 161-62. 205--6 

Qui shon: 183 

Radosclich, Lieutenalll Wilbert: i7 

Rceoille§s rines: 25, ,17, 62-63, 78, 96, 97. 

99, 101 , 1 3'1-35 

Recol'err "ehicles: .\188, 182, 185, 204, 

22:;: �15i8. 185, 22::' 

Red nail Express: 183 

Red Dcl'il Rood: 190 

Reed. Lieuten:mt Colonel James D.: 160 

Rdugees: 169, 171J-i9. 200 

Regional Forces. RellUblic of Vielnam: 

2:;, 127, 140, 163, 1(;5, Hi8, 178. 186, 

203 ... 205, 212 

RqlUblic of Vietnam Air Force: 4::'. 167 

R�public of Victnam Arm)': 41. 186. 197. 

199.218: Armor Command, 17-18, 20, 

22, 30-31. 33-35, 38, 63, 162-63, 193, 

20-1-5; armor t:mplo) menl. 9, 21, 24, 

28,33,37,45, I I(i. 118. 127-28, 137. 

179, 195-97, 217-19: armor organiza· 

tion, 3, 6, 17-22, 24-25, 28, 30-31, 33-

35. 3i-38, 136, 162-63, 203: Amlor 

School. 1i-18, 25, 29, 38, 4H9, 90, ll8; 

wmmand and wntrol problems. 28. 30, 

33-31. I i8, 180, 192, 196-97, 211: Joint 

Gene .. 1 Staff, 163, 203: morale, 137-38, 

167-68. 1 80-81. 197: political role, 28, 

3'1,18-49: lraining, 17-18, 21. 25, 28. 

33-34, 165, 197. 204. 211-15. Sce of so 

Corps tactical 7.onl:$: Mililar)' region.: 

I'acificalion opcr�tions 

Repuhlic of Vietnam Arm)' airborne 

unils: :\irborne dil'ision, \90-96.218: 

3d IIrig:adc. lil: 8th Uallalion. 27-28 

Republic of Vielnam Arm)' armor unilS: 

5th Armor Croup, 28-29; 6th Mceha· 

nited lIatlle Groul), 28: 1$1 Brigade, 

162-63. 19()..96. �>()3u, 208, 2\CH2, 218: 

2d nrigade, 212: 3d nrigade. Iii: 1tll 
Republic of Vietnam Army armored 

cal'al ..

 ,. unit5; lst Rtogimcnt. 43. 48; 2d 

Regimcm. 24-25. 21. 38. O. 44. 48, 

127-28. 168: .5<1 Regiment. 216-11; 41h 

Regiment. ,.s-'7. 48. "5.2]0: 51h 

R(;giment. 28. M . .,Ou. ]76. ]79: 6th 

Regiment. 28. ,]-". 168; 7th Regi. 

ment. 1;'6.202. 205: 81h Regiment. 3'. 

217: 10th Regiment.43: 11th Regiment. 

1'6 ... 191-9'. 203 ... 205-6. 210.218: 

]2th Regiment. 197-98; 11th Regi· 

ment. 2]2-13; 15th Regiment. 17!)-77; 

Wlh Regiment. 197-98; 17th Regi· 

ment. 19]-9·1. 208. 210. 218; 18th Regi. 

mellt. 175-77. 210.218 

Republic of Vietnam Arm,. infantr,. 

Unil$: ht Division. 161-62. 1�91. 

194-95.201. 203,t. 205: 2d Divi5ion. 

203,,; 3d l)iviJion. 203". 205. 208. 210: 

7th I)i"ision, 21-Z2. 25. 27. 31-32, 165; 

91h Dh·ision. 163; 21st Dh'ision, 21. 

165: 22d Dil·ilion. 212-14; 2� Dil'i· 

sion. 214-16: 2d Regiment. 208; 11th 

Regiment. 2.5. 27; 15th Regiment, 128; 

56th Regiment, 208; 57th Regimenl. 

208; Hac Bao Compan)" 19"" 197n 

Republic of Vietnam Army Ordnance 

IkIJO(. 801h: 31. 40 

Republic of Vietnam Army Ranger 

units: 2::;, 29-!O, 128. 16'. 167. 174. 

177-78. 191-92. 197-98, 216,218; 151 

Group, 190; 51h Group. 21 I; 4Sd !lat· 

lalion, 127 

Republic of Vietnam Marine units: 29. 

200.212: Mariue dil'ision. 186. 190. 

218; 258th Hrigade. 208 

Republic of Vietnam 1'\al''': 178 

Rine. MIG: "I.:;9 

ROj\nRtJNN�R Operation: 60 

Rocket launcher, 3.5·ineh: 22.25 

Rocket propelled grenades, encmy: 47, 

97. 99. 101. 109. 1 16, 126, 135, IU-4�. 

l'I3. 176 

Roctet Ridge: 212.214 

RocketS: 42, 131. 146. 159. 16t. 177. 192,1, 

194, 210 

Rome plo .. ' operations: 91, 141-49, 156. 

160. 17.s-76. 199 

Rowe, Chief Warrant Officer Dann)' 8.: 

2" 

Sagger milSile, AT3: 210-11.213 

Saigon: 48. 4!}rr, 91, 111. 1 14-15. Jl8-19, 

123. 127-31. 156, 181, 183-84 

Saigon Rivl:r corridor: 91, 9-1, 156. 159 

li8. 201. 212: Laos, 138-39, 156. 161. 

166-68. 197. 201. 212 

Sca.nlon. Captain James n.: 27 

SeOUl cars: 3. 17-18 

Seaman. �Iajor General Jonathan 0.: 57, 

63, 65, 91 

Searehlighu: 34. 71. 9�. lOG, 147. 151, 

187 .. , 203-1 

Sensors: 80-81. 156,201 

Shocmakcr. llrig�dier General Robert 

L.: 170-71 

Smith. Chief Warrant Officer t:drnond 

C.: 216 

Snow, C;tptain Joseph: 33 

Snuol: 172-74. 17&--77 

Song llc: 1 1511 

Sol'iel Union: 149 

Spare pans. SUI Maintenance and repair 

Srot Dong: 67 

Stailcy, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L.: 

73. 100 

STMtLITJ: Operation: 53-54 

Start')', Colonel nonn A.: 157. 160, 164. 

m-n. 181. 184 

Stc .... art. Captain Thomas: 187 

Sto\'all. Captain John P.: 150-52 

SlrCl':I lVii/tOld Joy; 4-5 

Suoi Cat: 75, ii-78 

Suoi Samat: 100-101 

Suoi Sau: 1M 

Suoi Tre: 96. 100 

Supp!)' operation: 122, 154, 192, 218. 

22-1-25. Sec Illso Maintenance alld 

repair 

S"a)' Rieng I'rOlinel:: IG9-70, 175 

Tam Ky: 36. I Hi. 133-36 

Tan Canh: 2]2-13, 215 

Tall Son Nhut: 45, ] 18-19, 122-23 

Tant ammunition; canister, 78, 99, 102. 

144, 157. 174; concretc.piercing fu�e. 

153; HEAT. 151·53 

Tank gullS: 84'111111., 113; 9O.1II11l .. 151: 

152·lIIm., 142 

Tants: 3, 10, 72-73, 81, 94: O:nlllrion. 

113; M24. 18, 25, 44-45: M41. 29. oil. 

4911. 112, H9. 151, 153, 191, 193, 195. 

2lH. 212-13; M41.4.3, "S: M"8. 51, 82. 

142-43,209; M48A1. 129; M48A2C. 63; 

M48A3, 53, 56, S7. 63, 66. 70. 12, 129. 

142-45. 2Q3. 210-11; M80, 51: in com· 

bined arms team. 85, 97, 99-100. 102-3. 

130; loucs, 54. 79. 108-10, 119. 195, 

210-1'; in tank. "5. tank combat, 149, 

IS3. 2Oi-9. SCI': Illso Armor 
16: T59, 2()9; !O$S, 19,.94. 208-9, 211. 

21S-li 

Tuk forces: DR'-COOS, 69; RElotAGf.S. 

153-55; Srult, 66 

Ta)' Ninh: 111, 132, 141, 154-56 

Ta)' Ninh l'rO\'ince: 95, 132. 159 

Tal'lor. Max .... ell D.: 55, 112 

Tchepone: 186, 195 

Tear gas cluster,: 157 

Terrain, effect on operations: 7. 9-10. 

2'2, 2�. 41. 64. 74-75, 85, 102-3. 1011, 

ISS-54. 169, I!}J, 211 

Tel olfensh'c: 21, 90, ] 14-16, 12511. 127-

29. 136-38. 168. 179, 181, 201 

Thach Han River: 211 

Thailand force$: 1 12-U 

Thl Tinh River: 91 

Tlileu, Ngu)'en Van: 164 

Tho, Major Lam Quang: 27 

Thu Due: 49. 118 

Thu Due Mililu)' School Center: 17 

Ticn, Caplain: 32 

1"0»11. Major Ceneral Ngu)'cn Van: 205-

6, 208 

TOAS TltAS(; Operations: 129, 167-70. 

175, li7-80, 198 

Tolson. Major General John J.: 111-12 

Tonic Cham: 1i5 

TOW missile. XM26: 215--17 

Tower, Lieuten;ulI Colonel John B.: 

12$-24 

Tra Vinh: 127 

Trang Bang bridge: 1 19, 122 

Trang Born: 125 

Troop ceilings and strength: 55--56, 58, 

138, 199 

Troop withdrawal operations: 16+-65, 

174, 176. 180. 199-200,217 

TUfen Nhon: 52 

U.S. Advanced Research Projects 

Agenc),: 58 

U.S. Army Armor Agency: 86,90>1 

U.s. Army, Pacific: 2()1 

U.S. Arm),. Vietnam: 82, 89. 143 

U.S. Army Armor School: li-18. 51, 86, 

"', 

U.S. Army A"iation School: 51 

U.S. Army Combat De\'elopmenu Com· 

mand: 84. 89 

u.s. Army Conce:pt Team in Vietnam: 

31. 38. 4$-44 

U.S. Army !>Ialerici Command: 89 

and OC\'elopment Center: 82 

u.s. Arm)' Spc:cial Forcc:s School: 19,22 

U.s. Continental Anny Command: 86-87 

U.s. Marine Corps: 54, 116. 139; 3d Oivi· 

sian, 182; 5d Tank Ballalion, 52-53, 

16. 

U.S. Militar)' Assistance: Advisory Group. 

Vietnam: 19-21, 30 

U.S. Mililary Assistance: Command, Viet· 

nam (MACV) : 19. 30. 35. 52. 54-56, 

65. 72-73. 89-90. 115. 138 

U.S. Navy: 52. 103. 145--16 

Vall Kiep: 49 

Vann. Lieutenant Colonel John J>.: 27-

28 

Viet Cong: 5. 10. 12. 14. 16,25, 29, !l2, 

45-47. 49. 60. 62-65, 97. 1 14. 128, 140. 

Su /llso North Vietnamese Army; 

Sanctuaric:s. enemy 

Viet Cong unlu: 5th Oi"ision, 132; 9th 

Division, 29, 66. 71, 152; lsi Regimen!. 

54; 2ilst Regiment.6i, 177; 272d 

Regiment, 67. 176; 514th Ballalion, 

'03 

Viet Minh: 12,87 

Vinalex-co Textile Factory: 122 

Vinh Long; 45, 127-28 

Vinh Long Province: 127 

Vinh Phuoc River: 211 

Virant. Captain Leo 8.: 1 18-19 

Vo Dinh: 215 

\lullg Tau: 49>1, 109, 1 J5 

War loue C: 66. 95, 102. 132-3'. 155, 

159-61, 175 

WASIHSCTOS GR£ES Op<:ration: 161 

Weather. effect on operations: i, 9-10, 

12. 65. 145. 168-69. ]76 

Wes!. Major General Arthur L.: 84.91 

Westmoreland, General William C.: 5'1. 

in, 52. 54-58, 72, 84-85, 10i, 114-15. 

!!I8. 140 

We)'and. Lieulenant General Frederick 

C.: 58, 65, 115 

Whilei$, Chid Warnnt Officer Le$tCT F.: 

216 

Williamson, Brigadier General Ellis W.: 

65 

WOI.IFt.: !>IOU:-''TAI:'' Op<:ralion: 161 

World War II: 3,6-i, 115, 138, 175, 220 

Xuan Loc: H 

'" U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 2(10] O· 481·08S