IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

CLARENCE D. SCHREANE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County

Nos. 264982 and 283882 Rebecca J. Stern, Judge

No. E2012-00954-CCA-R3-CO - Filed October 2, 2013

In this consolidated appeal, the pro se appellant, Clarence D. Schreane, appeals as of right

from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s orders denying relief from his 2004 convictions

of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Prior to this court’s consolidation

of the case, the State filed motions to dismiss the appeals or, alternatively, to affirm the trial

court’s denials of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal

Appeals. In light of the complexities of the issues raised in this appeal, we conclude that the

State’s motions should be treated as responsive briefs. Following our review, we affirm the

orders of the Hamilton County Criminal Court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JOSEPH M. TIPTON,

P.J., and NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., joined.

Clarence D. Schreane, Allenwood, Pennsylvania, Pro Se.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; John H. Bledsoe and Deshea Dulany

Faughn, Assistant Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

In 2004, a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant of the 1991

first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery of Marcus Charles Edwards. The trial

court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus 60 years for

the offenses. This court affirmed the appellant’s conviction and sentences on direct appeal.

State v. Clarence David Schreane, No. E2004-00520-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at

Knoxville, Apr. 5, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 28, 2006).
Hamilton County Criminal Court Case Number 264982

Following this court’s affirming the convictions on direct appeal, the appellant filed

a petition for post-conviction relief in Hamilton County Criminal Court case number 264982

alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by counsel’s failing to

seek a dismissal of the indictment for pre-indictment delay, failing to seek dismissal of the

indictment for violating the Interstate Compact on Detainers, and failing to seek suppression

of his statements to investigators on the basis of a denial of his right to counsel. The trial

court denied relief, and this court affirmed the trial court’s denial on appeal. Clarence David

Schreane v. State, E2009-01103-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 7, 2010),

perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2011).

On March 23, 2012, the appellant filed a pleading entitled “Federal Rule [of] Civil

Procedural Rule 60(b) Motion to Reopen.” In this motion, the appellant reiterated the

argument concerning counsel’s handling of the motion to suppress his statements to

investigators, which was previously raised in the post-conviction petition. Although the

motion referenced the federal rule of civil procedure concerning a motion seeking relief from

judgment, see Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court treated

the motion as a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings, see Tennessee Code

Annotated section 40-30-117, and, alternatively, as a petition for a writ of error coram nobis,

see Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105. The trial court ruled that the allegation

of the motion did not present cognizable grounds for relief under either theory and summarily

denied relief.

On May 9, 2012, the appellant filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of

Appellate Procedure 3 from the trial court’s order. On appeal, the appellant contends that

his conviction resulted from a violation of his rights pursuant to the Interstate Compact on

Detainers. On October 24, 2012, the State filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to

affirm pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing

that the appellant failed to properly seek discretionary review from the denial of a motion to

reopen post-conviction proceedings, see Rule 28 section 10 (B) of the Tennessee Supreme

Court Rules, and that the trial court’s denial of coram nobis relief should be affirmed.

Because of the complexities of the issues raised, we choose to treat the State’s motion as a

responsive brief.

When viewed as a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings, the State correctly

notes that the appellant should have filed an application for permission to appeal from the

trial court’s denial of the motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. See Tenn. S. Ct. R.

28 §10(B). The appellant, however, failed to seek permissive review of the motion to reopen

pursuant to Rule 28, and “[a] petitioner has no appeal as of right from a lower court’s denial

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of his motion to reopen a post-conviction petition.” See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b); Charles W.

Elsea, Jr. v. State, E2012-01661-CCA-R3-PC, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville,

Mar. 28, 2013). That being said, this court has no jurisdiction to review the action of the trial

court relative to the denial of a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings.

The appellant fares no better, however, when his pleading is viewed as a petition for

writ of error coram nobis. A writ of error coram nobis is available to a defendant in a

criminal prosecution. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105. A writ of error coram nobis is an

“extraordinary procedural remedy,” filling only a “slight gap into which few cases fall.”

State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 672 (Tenn. 1999) (citation omitted). “The purpose of this

remedy is to bring to the attention of the court some fact unknown to the court which if

known would have resulted in a different judgment.” Freshwater v. State, 160 S.W.3d 548,

553 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) (quoting State v. Hart, 911 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1995)). The decision to grant or deny a petition for writ of error coram nobis rests within the

sound discretion of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105; Hart, 911 S.W.2d at 375.

The writ may not be utilized to relitigate claims previously raised via other avenues

of relief. Matthew Jackson v. State, M2012-01063-CCA-R3-CO, slip op. at 7 (Tenn. Crim.

App., at Nashville, Dec. 26, 2012). Therefore, the trial court correctly denied coram nobis

relief based upon the allegation contained in the March 23, 2012 pleading. Furthermore, to

the extent the appellant attempts to argue on appeal that a violation of the Interstate Compact

on Detainers occurred in his case, we note that this court previously ruled that the appellant’s

“transfers between federal and state custody were done pursuant to writs of habeas corpus

ad prosequedum and not by detainers. These writs do not qualify as detainers under the

Compact and did not trigger its protections.” Clarence David Schreane v. State, No. E2009-

01103-CCA-R3-PC, slip op. at 11 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 7, 2010), perm. app.

denied (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2011). For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief

in case number 264982.

Hamilton County Criminal Court Case Number 283882

On May 10, 2012, in case number 283882, the appellant filed a petition for a writ of

error coram nobis challenging his conviction of first degree murder and especially aggravated

robbery on the basis of newly discovered evidence concerning the trial court’s admission of

his statement at trial. On May 18, 2012, the trial court denied coram nobis relief. The

appellant filed a notice of appeal on June 14, 2012. On appeal, this court affirmed the denial

of relief. Clarence D. Schreane v. State, No. E2012-01202-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App.,

at Knoxville, May 7, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 4, 2013).

On June 28, 2012, while the appeal of the trial court’s denial of coram nobis relief was

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pending, the appellant filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment. The trial court overruled the

motion, and the appellant filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s denial of the motion.

The State filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to affirm pursuant to Rule 20, arguing

that no appeal as of right lies from the denial of a Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment.

See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b). Because of the complexity of the issues raised, we choose to treat

the State’s motion as a responsive brief.

The Rules of Civil Procedure are not applicable to a petition for writ of error coram

nobis filed pursuant to Code section 40-26-105. State v. Harris, 301 S.W.3d 141, 153 n.17

(Tenn. 2010). Accordingly, we conclude that the appellant’s motion seeking relief from

judgment was inapt and that the trial court correctly denied relief.

Furthermore, the State correctly notes that an appeal as of right does not lie from the

trial court’s denial of such a motion. Rule 3(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate

Procedure provides, in pertinent part:

In criminal actions an appeal as of right by a defendant lies from any judgment

of conviction entered by a trial court from which an appeal lies to the Supreme

Court or Court of Criminal Appeals: (1) on a plea of not guilty; and . . . . The

defendant may also appeal as of right from an order denying or revoking

probation, an order or judgment entered pursuant to Rule 36 or Rule 36.1,

Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, from a final judgment in a criminal

contempt, habeas corpus, extradition, or post-conviction proceeding, and from

a final order denying a request for expunction.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b). The appellant does not have an appeal as of right from the denial of

a motion for relief from judgment filed in a criminal case. The judgment of the trial court

is affirmed.

Conclusion

In case number 264982, the appellant failed to perfect an appeal from the denial of

a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. The trial court also correctly denied the

appellant’s petition for writ of error coram nobis. In case number 283882, the appellant does

not have an appeal as of right from the denial of a motion seeking relief from judgment

inaptly filed in a coram nobis case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the Hamilton

County Criminal Court.

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D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE

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