NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JAMIE F., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, D.S., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 20-0316 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD 527578

The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rueter, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa

By Suzanne W. Sanchez

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Dawn R. Williams

Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety

FILED 3-23-2021
JAMIE F. v. DCS, D.S.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge David B. Gass and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

Jamie F. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order finding 

her son, D.S., dependent.

1 She also appeals the court’s disposition order. 

For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Mother’s parental rights to an older child, R.F., were 

terminated in 2015 on grounds of neglect due to substance abuse, as well as 

nine and fifteen months in an out-of-home placement. D.S. was born in 

2017. Mother was on probation in December 2019 when her probation 

officer visited her home and found D.S. outside unsupervised. During 

another home visit, a probation officer found a pipe and white powder, 

later identified as methamphetamine (“meth”), on the microwave. D.S. was 

in daycare at the time, and Mother claimed the items belonged to a friend 

who had visited earlier that day or a family member who was staying in the 

home. The probation department did not petition for a violation; instead,

Mother was directed to participate in drug testing and the Department of 

Child Safety (“DCS”) was alerted about the incident. 

Over the next month, Mother failed to take several drug tests. 

After completing a TERROS intake, she told her counselor she planned to 

stop using meth just long enough to get off probation, and would then start 

using again to control her weight. In April 2020, DCS held a team decisionmaking meeting and recommended services and a substance abuse 

assessment for Mother. Three weeks later, Mother stated she was 

“appealing the decision to do services” because she was already enrolled in 

services for probation. Around the same time, Mother took her first drug 

test for probation services and tested positive for meth; shortly thereafter 

DCS removed D.S. from Mother’s custody. 

1 D.S.’s father was also part of the dependency proceeding, but he is 

not a party to this appeal. 
JAMIE F. v. DCS, D.S.

Decision of the Court

3

In its dependency petition, DCS alleged Mother was unable 

to parent due to her substance abuse and neglect. After a contested 

dependency hearing, the juvenile court found D.S. dependent on both 

grounds and Mother appealed. The court later held a dependency 

disposition hearing, finding a continuing need for out-of-home care, and 

confirming the case plan of family reunification. Mother also appealed that 

ruling. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), 12-

2101(A)(1); Lindsey M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 212 Ariz. 43, 45, ¶ 8 (App. 

2006) (concluding that a dependency disposition order is a final, appealable 

order).

DISCUSSION

We review a dependency order for an abuse of discretion. 

Louis C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 484, 488, ¶ 12 (App. 2015). We will 

not disturb the juvenile court’s determination unless reasonable evidence 

does not support its factual findings. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 

223 Ariz. 547, 549, ¶ 7 (App. 2010). The juvenile court is in the “best position 

to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of the parties, observe the 

parties, and make appropriate factual findings.” Pima Cnty. Dependency 

Action No. 93511, 154 Ariz. 543, 546 (App. 1987).

As pertinent here, a child is “dependent” if adjudicated to be 

“in need of proper and effective parental care and control,” and without a 

“parent or guardian willing to exercise or capable of exercising such care 

and control,” or if the parent’s “home is unfit by reason of . . . neglect.” 

A.R.S. § 8-201(15)(a)(i), (iii). Neglect includes the “inability or 

unwillingness of a parent . . . to provide that child with supervision, food, 

clothing, shelter, or medical care if [it] causes unreasonable risk of harm to 

the child’s health or welfare.” A.R.S. § 8-201(25)(a). DCS has the burden of 

proving a dependency by a preponderance of the evidence, A.R.S. § 8-

844(C)(1), and “the juvenile court is vested with a great deal of discretion”

because the primary concern is the best interests of the child. Willie G. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 231, 235, ¶ 21 (App. 2005) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted).

Reasonable evidence supports the court’s dependency 

finding based on abuse and neglect. The court first noted Mother’s history 

of substance abuse, going back at least seven years, and that her previous 
JAMIE F. v. DCS, D.S.

Decision of the Court

4

termination proceeding involved substance abuse.2 At the dependency 

hearing, Mother conceded she uses meth for weight loss, but she claimed 

the meth did not impair her parenting skills. She missed many drug tests 

and failed others, including a positive test for meth in September 2020.

Mother claimed she never uses or stores drugs around her son, but 

probation officers found meth and paraphernalia in her home, sitting on the 

microwave, in February 2020. The court found that Mother’s “drug use has 

already exposed the child to dangerous situations” and yet her 

participation in substance abuse treatment and visitation with the child 

have been inconsistent. And, although only two years old, D.S. was found 

outside the home unsupervised—an incident similar to what occurred in 

Mother’s prior termination case. Mother nonetheless failed to take steps to 

meaningfully participate in parenting and substance abuse services, and 

continued to test positive for meth. 

Mother counters that reasonable evidence does not “support 

a conclusion that drug use impacted parenting during the last three months 

that Mother had D.S. in her care or at the time of the trial.” She also 

contends DCS failed to show evidence of neglect after the incident when 

meth was found in her home. But the juvenile court was not required to 

document additional events before it could reasonably conclude there were 

continuing risks to D.S.’s health and welfare created by Mother’s repeated 

substance abuse. Cf. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 

379, ¶¶ 28–29 (App. 2010) (finding a father’s temporary abstinence from 

using drugs did not outweigh his consistent inability to abstain, which 

meant his chronic drug abuse was likely to persist for a long period and 

continue to negatively affect his parenting duties).

Although the juvenile court must consider the “circumstances 

existing at the time of the adjudication hearing,” the conditions for 

dependency “need not be continuous or actively occurring at the time of 

the adjudication hearing to support a finding of dependency on these 

grounds; the substantiated and unresolved threat is sufficient.” Shella H. v. 

Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 47, 50–51, ¶¶ 12, 16 (App. 2016); see also Pima 

Cnty. Juv. Dependency Action No. 96290, 162 Ariz. 601, 604 (App. 1990) 

(explaining that when “conditions creating the dependency . . . pose an 

imminent risk of harm,” DCS is not required to wait for further injury to be 

inflicted). This is “particularly true” in cases where the parent denies 

2 We need not address the arguments Mother raises in her opening 

brief concerning her use of medical marijuana because the juvenile court 

findings focused solely on meth use. 
JAMIE F. v. DCS, D.S.

Decision of the Court

5

responsibility for the conditions of dependency. Shella H., 239 Ariz. at 51, 

¶ 16.

To the extent Mother challenges the disposition order, she 

does so only on the basis that if we vacate the adjudication order, we must 

also vacate the disposition order. Because we uphold the adjudication 

order, Mother’s challenge fails. 

CONCLUSION

We affirm the juvenile court’s orders.