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PROPOSED SALE OF F–16 AIRCRAFT AND

WEAPONS SYSTEMS TO PAKISTAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 20, 2006

Serial No. 109–220

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

JEAN CARROLL, Full Committee Hearing Coordinator 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable John Hillen, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political Military 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State ...................................................................... 10

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable James A. Leach, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Iowa: Prepared statement ............................................................................... 4

The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York: Prepared statement ............................................................ 8

The Honorable John Hillen: Prepared statement ................................................. 13

APPENDIX 

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 27

(1)

PROPOSED SALE OF F–16 AIRCRAFT AND 

WEAPONS SYSTEMS TO PAKISTAN 

THURSDAY, JULY 20, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:53, p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. The purpose 

of today’s hearing is to review the Administration’s proposal for a 

$5 billion sale of F–16 fighter aircraft and weapons to Pakistan. 

The Administration provided official notice of this sale under section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act on June 28, 2006. 

Typically, the Committee does not hold hearings on arms sales. 

That is because, until now, every Administration and every Congress since the enactment of the Arms Export Control Act in 1976 

has respected the protocols governing the notification of arms sales. 

For more than 30 years, these protocols have provided a process by 

which national security and foreign policy questions could be addressed informally before a notification is submitted. 

They permit the Legislative and Executive Branches to present 

a common position to other nations in this very sensitive area. 

They also provide an important means by which Congress is kept 

informed of sensitive matters and provided adequate notice before 

the commencement of the 30-day period provided in statute for deciding whether to prohibit a sale by enacting a resolution of disapproval. 

The original basis for these protocols is a 1976 exchange of letters between Senator Hubert Humphrey and the head of the Defense Security Assistance Agency at that time. This exchange provided an important underpinning for H.R. 13680, the bill which 

then-House International Relations Committee Chairman, Thomas 

E. Morgan, introduced a few months later in May 1976, which became the Arms Export Control Act, when signed into law in June 

1976. 

For the 30-year period since then, these protocols have constituted a significant understanding between the Executive and 

Legislative Branches as well as an important premise for the congressional review requirements that currently exist in law. Given 

this history, and the sensitivity of arms sales generally, any departure from these protocols might be expected to be approached with 

an abundance of caution. However, this was not the case with the 

2

sale of the F–16 aircraft to Pakistan. Instead, the notification was 

made precipitously and without explanation. 

Yet, this is more than a controversy over protocol and procedures, or a mere act of bad faith. It represents a deliberate and, 

we believe, wholly inappropriate maneuver by the State Department to diminish the Congress’ lawful oversight of arms sales. In 

this respect, we can easily dispense with the rhetoric coming out 

of State about how diligently it consulted Congress. The consultation State refers to is more accurately described as a few highly rehearsed briefings by State during a 2-week period in June. 

Just about the only conclusion to emerge from these briefings 

was the realization that nothing had been done to strengthen the 

security measures which the Committee found woefully inadequate 

when they were first broached to us by the Administration last fall 

before the earthquake delayed the sale. 

As a result, long-standing congressional concerns about the potential for technology diversion remain, and some new concerns 

have emerged, including a concern that State itself may not be 

compliant with important obligations it has under the Arms Export 

Control Act. We met with senior officials from State in a classified 

briefing on July 11 and will continue to pursue these matters in 

closed session and through other appropriate channels. What we 

can say for the public record is that a sequence of actions and inactions by the State Department resulted in a host of serious national security and compliance issues. The State Department cannot persuasively justify its position even now with the statutory period in which Congress must act about to expire next week. 

This Committee is determined to take all appropriate action in 

order to ensure that there will not be a recurrence of this flouting 

of Congress’ role. This could include amending the Arms Export 

Control Act, which Mr. Lantos and I have been discussing. 

I now turn to my friend, Mr. Lantos, the Ranking Democratic 

Member for his opening remarks. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman, and before 

proceeding with my statement, let me commend you on yours and 

let me identify myself with your statement. 

Mr. Chairman, the proposed sale of sophisticated F–16 aircraft 

and associated weaponry to Pakistan is an historic turning point 

in our relationship with that country. I accept the Administration’s 

arguments that these aircraft and munitions are necessary to allow 

Pakistan to meet its legitimate national security interests. I also 

accept the judgment that these additional aircraft and munitions 

will not significantly affect the balance of conventional forces on 

the Indian subcontinent. I, therefore, support the substance of the 

sale to Pakistan. 

But the good news ends there for the Administration. I have two 

extremely serious concerns about how the Administration, especially the Department of State, has handled this proposed sale to 

Pakistan. 

First, I am extremely concerned about the details of the security 

arrangements to be put in place to safeguard these aircraft, their 

associated technologies and munitions, all of which will be of great 

interest to third parties, especially China. It is also an unfortunate 

fact that Pakistani export controls are so lax as to have allowed 

3

A.Q. Khan to provide the crown jewels of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development program to states such as North Korea and Iran. 

The Administration’s plan is inadequate to safeguard United States 

technology properly and to protect United States national security 

against espionage and compromise in Pakistan. 

The Committee was first briefed on the proposed security plan in 

the summer of 2005. At that time, Pakistan wanted to purchase a 

more extensive package of aircraft and munitions. But Pakistan 

canceled the sale over financial issues following the earthquake. 

We found the security plan to be inadequate on several counts. 

Nevertheless, the Department of State ignored our repeated entreaties to reengage on the security plan in anticipation of this current sale. 

The draft security plan for the sale now under consideration was 

not sent to us until June, with the first briefing proposed by State 

on June the 8th. Four subsequent meetings in the next 2 weeks 

were required because State Department officials were unable to 

answer even basic questions about the sale or the security plan. 

My second concern is how this Committee was formally notified 

about this sale. Since 1976, for a period of the last 30 years, there 

has been a procedure for arms sales that has been followed with 

regard to congressional notifications. The purpose of the consultative process is to work out problems before formal notification, as 

it is in no one’s interest for public controversy and confrontation on 

sales of significant foreign policy importance. 

However, the Department unilaterally decided to ignore this procedure, especially the long-standing 20-day review period before 

formal notification of such a sale to this Committee and the Congress. This was a calculated attempt to change the working relationship between Congress and the Administration, to the detriment of this Committee’s proper oversight prerogatives over U.S. 

arms sales. I also believe that it was a calculated attempt to prevent this Committee from insisting on additional changes to the security plan for these aircraft and technology to protect U.S. national security. 

The decision by mid-level State Department officials to send the 

formal congressional notifications on these Pakistani arms sales before problems with the security plan were resolved is extremely serious. 

Let me make this clear: This outrage will not stand. Our oversight of the arms sales process will not be compromised. Both the 

Chairman and I continue to have very serious concerns about the 

security plan to safeguard the aircraft armament and technology 

that we plan to transfer. 

For my part, two things must happen: If the Department of State 

wishes to have a productive working relationship with this Committee, first we must return to the previous consultation and notification procedures that we have used successfully prior to this sale. 

On that, there is no compromise. On that, there is no negotiation. 

Second, the Department of State will make additional changes to 

satisfy the Committee’s concerns with the Pakistan F–16 security 

plan. I intend to provide my requirements for the security plan to 

Under Secretary Nick Burns in a private meeting later this afternoon. 

4

If we can proceed on this basis, then I am sure that the Committee and the Administration can move forward both on these 

sales and to resume our good working relationship on arms export 

issues. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. The Chair will entertain opening statements of 

2 minutes from the Members, and their full statement may be 

made a part of the record, without objection. 

Mr. Leach of Iowa. 

Mr. LEACH. I request unanimous consent to place the statement 

in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leach follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES A. LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this timely hearing. I will be brief. 

I am inclined to be supportive of the substantive case for providing this particular 

aircraft and related weapons systems to our close friends and allies in Pakistan. 

Obviously, in an ideal world we wouldn’t need to contemplate such a sale. Indeed, 

arguably the first order of business for United States assistance in Pakistan should 

be to assist the strengthening of civil society and address issues relating to education, ongoing sectarian violence, the political system, and so forth. 

Having said that, given our desire to forge a stable, long-term relationship with 

Pakistan, as well as, of course, Islamabad’s extensive cooperation in the campaign 

on terrorism, I believe Washington must be sensitive to Pakistan’s assessment that 

its air force needs significant upgrading and modernization. While I do not view this 

proposed sale as integral to ongoing operations against Al Qaeda or pro-Taliban elements along the Afghan border, I also do not believe this proposed agreement would 

materially impact the overall balance of power in South Asia. Indeed, given growing 

power disparities on the Subcontinent, it is possible that it may well have a stabilizing effect. 

It goes without saying, of course, that the Congress looks forward to the continuing cooperation of Pakistan in apprehending the Taliban leadership and militia 

that continue to be engaged in hostile operations against the Karzai government 

and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Likewise, we continue to hope and expect that 

Islamabad will maintain its commitment to the peace process with India, including—as President Musharraf has promised—full cooperation with the authorities in 

Delhi as the investigation into the horrific Mumbai bombings continue. 

Having said all that, Mr. Chairman, I am fully supportive of the position you have 

taken with respect to the prerogatives of this Committee and look forward to the 

testimony of our witness.

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman. This is an historical day, in my humble 

opinion, in the fact that it is the first time in years that I have 

served as a Member of the Committee that we have had two hearings on the same region of the world, the Asia-Pacific region. So I 

think the more attention we pay to this important region of the 

world, the better. 

I also thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing concerning the sale of some 77 F–16 aircraft and weaponry systems 

worth $5 billion. As I have said before, President Bush stated in 

his 2004 inaugural address that it is the policy of the United States 

to seek and support the growth of Democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of 

ending tyranny in our world. 

I trust, Mr. Chairman, that this great mission of American diplomacy includes restoring a full functioning democracy in Pakistan in 

5

which General Musharraf has promised and is supposed to resign 

his presidency and military commission as army chief of staff in 

which free, fair, and transparent elections are held to reverse Pakistan’s historic trend toward unstable governance and military interference in democratic institutions. Neither of these things have 

been done, though both have been promised. 

I am also hopeful, Mr. Chairman, that the Administration will reconsider its decision to sell this $5 billion worth of military hardware to Pakistan. F–16s are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. 

And while Pakistan is an important partner in our campaign 

against international terrorism, Pakistan has a history of using 

United States weapons platforms against India, as in the case in 

1965 when Pakistan launched a war against India using F–104s it 

had purchased from the United States in 1960. 

I remember years ago, Mr. Chairman, in fairness to Pakistan, that there was a proposal of wanting to purchase some $600 million worth of military aircraft. And what happened in that period 

is that we reneged not only in delivering these aircraft, but we 

didn’t even give them back the money. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Unfortunately, I will be chairing a hearing on Angola at 2:30 

that had been scheduled before this Full Committee hearing was 

rescheduled today, so I will not be able to hear the testimony. I 

would like, however, to make a short statement and ask a question 

that I hope our distinguished Secretary will answer. 

In its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2005, the 

U.S. State Department again describes the Pakistani Government’s 

record on human rights as poor, and admits that despite improvements in some areas, serious problems remained. Those serious 

problems include not only widely reported anti-democratic practices, but also extra-judicial killings, torture, and rape, rampant police corruption, lack of judicial independence, political violence, terrorism, and extremely poor prison conditions. 

The State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report

for 2005 also noted serious problems with respect to religious freedom in Pakistan. The U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom’s 2006 report states, ‘‘Sectarian and religiously motivated 

violence persists in Pakistan, and the government’s response to this 

problem, though improved, continues to be insufficient and not 

fully effective.’’

Are these human rights issues and concerns being factored into 

decisions to sell military aircraft and other technology to Pakistan? 

Is it even considered in the discussion? 

And I would hope that question can be answered during the 

question and answer period, or in your opening comments. Thank 

you. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, this breach of protocol cannot be 

addressed just by getting promises that the State Department 

won’t do it to us again. I would hope that you, the Ranking Member, and other colleagues would join with me in a resolution of disVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:26 Nov 22, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\109TH_~1\TEXT_F~1\28787.000 DOUG PsN: DOUG
6

approval. This disapproval would not have to be permanent, it 

could be reversed, after we get some answers and after we get 

some changes. 

I join the Ranking Member in a concern that we improve the security plan, but we also have to look very carefully at each item 

of electronics and avionics that are on these planes. We have to 

look very carefully at the avionics and the electronics on these 

planes because you know that operatives from the People’s Republic of China will be looking very carefully at the avionics and the 

electronics on each of the planes that are delivered. 

Even with the best security plan, and I think we should have the 

best security plan, hundreds of Pakistani engineers and pilots will 

become intimately aware of every aspect of these planes, and every 

one of them can take themselves, their drawings, and their pictures 

into meetings with Chinese operatives. 

It is up to this Committee to make sure that we are not including avionics and electronics on those individual planes. That should 

not be included, in light of China’s likely discovery. 

Finally, I think there is an additional outrage, in addition to the 

protocol outrage. It is outrageous for us to let this deal go through 

without putting it on hold until we know whether Pakistan will 

fully cooperate in bringing to justice those who murdered hundreds 

in Mumbai. For us to approve this deal by letting it go forward 

with just some angry rhetoric directed at the State Department, 

but to let it go forward—in a week when this outrage has occurred, 

and when some indications point to Kashmir and Pakistan—is to 

dishonor those who were victims. 

I think we need to put a hold on this agreement and work it out 

in the weeks and months to come. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Burton of Indiana. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just say I believe the Pakistani Government, under President Musharraf, is 

going to do everything that he can to make sure that those people 

are brought to justice, if the attack did originate in Pakistan. I am 

not so sure that it did. But I am convinced he wants to work out 

his differences with India so that they can solve the problem of 

Kashmir, which has been going on so long. 

I don’t disagree with anything that has been said regarding the 

problems with the State Department. I think the State Department 

realizes it made a mistake, but they are trying their best to make 

sure that the security of this equipment is realized and that there 

is not going to be any problem with it being stolen or given to 

China or anybody else. 

One of the things I think that needs to be said very clearly is 

that Pakistan is a friend of the United States. They have been a 

leader in the war against terrorism. They have 80,000 troops on 

their western border with Afghanistan. Four hundred of their 

troops have been killed, more than all of the troops from the 

United States and NATO combined. They have 700 troops that are 

critically wounded. They have stepped up to the plate. They have 

been with us since day one, and I believe that that friendship 

should be realized and we should show some support for Pakistan 

with this sale. 

7

The security of the aircraft has to be guaranteed, and I agree 

with our leadership in that regard. But I hope this sale is not 

slowed down, because it is going to cost a lot more if it is. We need 

to get on with it and let the Pakistanis know that they are our 

friends and we value their friendship and we value their assistance 

in the war against terror. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Watson. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I support the opposition 

to the sale of F–16s to Pakistan, and I believe anyone who has 

taken a long-term view of America’s interest should do so as well. 

This deal rewards Pakistan’s dictator but does nothing for Pakistan’s people. This is yet another example of President Bush’s lack 

of strategic vision, just more geostrategic bobbing and weaving by 

a President who lacks a clear strategy for winning the War on Terror or for protecting America. 

Now, the President’s argument is essentially that Pakistan’s 

military rulers deserve these F–16s because they have cooperated 

in the effort to fight both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. But this is 

only half the story. Yes, the Government of Pakistan has helped us 

to hunt down individual Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. But Pakistan has not made any effort to stop their moral, if not material 

support for like-minded extremist groups, nor has Pakistan made 

any real effort to combat the poverty, misery, corruption, and lack 

of democracy that fuels such extremist groups. 

President Bush’s second argument is that President Musharraf 

needs our support to beat back his internal opponents, who would 

turn Pakistan away from the United States on fighting terror and 

turn Pakistan into a terrorist state, like Iran or Afghanistan under 

the Taliban. But by propping up Pakistan’s military leaders at the 

expense of its own people, we reinforce the inequities that push so 

many otherwise neutral Pakistanis into the arms of extremist leaders. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First and foremost, we do need to express that we appreciate the role that the 

Government of Pakistan is playing in the role against radical Islam 

and helping us fight the fight against the Taliban. With that said, 

there is some self-interest in those people in the Pakistani Government who have made that stand. Let us note they would be swept 

away by the forces of history if they were not making that stand, 

and others would replace them. 

Let us not forget, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Musharraf was the 

one, and you may correct me if I am wrong, who said in terms of 

Pakistan developing its nuclear weapon system at the expense of 

the well-being of the Pakistani people, our people will eat grass in 

order to accomplish their mission in this life. Let me note that that 

is not the type of attitude that is going to build a better world. 

I don’t believe that spending $5 billion for a sophisticated weapon system, and selling $5 billion worth of weaponry to a relatively 

poor country makes good sense to me. I mean, the fact is that the 

F–16 is an offensive weapon system. It can drop nuclear weapons. 

And it is designed to make war on countries that have sophisticated air forces, not the Taliban and not radical Islam. 

8

We should be helping them, yes, find defensive weapon systems 

that are appropriate and will not bog down their people for generations of debt so that their people will have to eat grass rather than 

live as decent human beings. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me note that I am concerned about 

what appears to be an arrogant disregard for Congress that seems 

to be flowing down from the very top of this Administration. We 

need to be very concerned about this. We have a role to play. People elected us to watch out and help make decisions as well. We 

deserve to have our prerogatives honored, just as the President deserves his. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Berkley of Nevada. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I ask unanimous consent to submit my opening statement. 

Chairman HYDE. Without objection. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Royce of California. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important 

hearing. I chair the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and 

Nonproliferation, so when it comes to Pakistan, with the radical 

jihadist elements in its society, and especially with regard to its 

record of nonproliferation, there is no other country of more importance. To my mind, our Pakistan policy has to be viewed through 

the lens of lessening radicalism in that society. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Royce, if I may interrupt. 

Mr. ROYCE. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. We have two votes that have just been called. 

I think it best to recess until after the vote, so we will do that. But 

I would express the hope that all the Members will return right 

after the vote because this is such an important hearing. 

So the Committee will stand in recess until after the vote. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will unfortunately not be able 

to come back after the vote, and would like to submit my statement 

strongly objecting to the sale in the record at this time, along with 

a resolution of disapproval for the sale. 

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ackerman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GARY L. ACKERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman, thank you and Mr. Lantos for scheduling today’s hearing on the 

sale of F–16’s to Pakistan. It will come as no surprise to anyone here that I am opposed to this sale. I am opposed on substantive grounds and I object strenuously 

to the way the Administration handled the notification of the sale to the Committee. 

First, the substance: I do not believe that Pakistan needs F–16’s to assist us in 

the war on terror. In particular, I do not believe that these planes will help us or 

Pakistan in the war against al Qaeda along the Pakistan/Afghan border, unless al 

Qaeda has suddenly deployed fighter jets of their own. I continue to believe that 

what Pakistan needs are the capabilities to more effectively and more quickly to 

move troops across difficult and dangerous terrain, thereby extending the government’s control over areas that are currently controlled by local tribes. I don’t think 

F–16’s help with this fundamental problem. 

Second, it is well-known that A.Q. Khan and his nuclear Walmart transferred 

sensitive nuclear technologies to terrorist states. Allegedly he miraculously did this 

without the knowledge of the government of Pakistan. This technology was Pakistan’s most closely held state secret, yet, somehow, equipment and designs found 

their way out of Pakistan to Iran, North Korea and Libya, for a price. Now we are 

9

on the verge of transferring some sensitive technology of our own to Pakistan. Certainly not the most sensitive we have, but sensitive enough that we don’t want it 

to wind up in the hands of third parties—nations or terrorists. In particular, I think 

we should be very concerned about the closeness of Pakistan’s relationship with 

China. In fact, Pakistan and China are jointly developing a fighter plane. It strikes 

me, layman that I am in these matters, that China would love to get an extended 

look at an F–16 and all the related weapons systems that go with them. I have a 

hard time believing that whatever security arrangements Pakistan has agreed to 

won’t be violated by someone with an interest in earning a little ready cash. After 

all, that has been Pakistan’s experience with its own technology, why would they 

be more careful with ours? 

Lastly, I’d like to address the manner in which this sale was notified to the committee. The Administration’s decision to ignore 30 years of precedent and send the 

formal notification to the Committee last month on a sale of this magnitude and 

sensitivity is nothing short of arrogant. If the Administration is going to unilaterally 

re-write the rules for arms sales, then I think it is incumbent on us to review and 

perhaps change the rules for exactly how Congress approves such sales. 

Instead of the current process, which has the Congress as a passive actor in these 

decisions, I propose that we take a more active role. On arms sales to particular 

countries and of a particular size, I believe that the Congress should vote affirmatively to approve such sales. We could establish an expedited procedure to ensure 

that once a sale is notified, that Congress would act, one way or another, but as 

it stands now, most members who do not sit on this committee have no idea what 

we sell to whom. Just as often such questions go wholly unexamined. And even if 

members did object, the current process leaves them with virtually no opportunity 

to affect the sale one way or another. 

I think the fact that Congress hasn’t seriously challenged an arms sale since 1987 

is not evidence that the process works, but evidence that the Congress has ceded 

too much authority to the executive. 

Mr. Chairman, this circumstance does a disservice to our role as overseers of U.S. 

foreign policy and is a disservice to our constituents. As a result, I am today introducing a joint resolution disapproving the sale. 

Thank you and I look forward to hearing from today’s witness.

Chairman HYDE. The Committee stands in recess until after the 

vote. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. 

The Chair recognizes Ms. McCollum for purposes of an opening 

statement. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will make my remarks 

brief, and I also support what we have heard Members on both 

sides of this aisle speak to. 

In 1976, the Humphrey-Fish agreement, which the Chairman 

mentioned, or the Arms Export Control Act, was enacted. This is 

a 30-year-old agreement. Senator Humphrey was my Senator at 

the time, and I think he had a good idea. He had an idea about 

Congress being consulted and involved in these agreements. 

This Administration far too often, if it does even choose to come 

to Congress, comes to Congress after the fact. We are a coequal 

branch of government. We have a responsibility that comes along 

with our election certificate of doing oversight and asking questions 

and being active participants in this Government. 

We just took a vote on the House Floor. It is a very tragic time 

in the Middle East. It is a tragedy what is happening to the people 

in Lebanon and to the people in Israel. We, our Government, has 

said that there is linkage between Hezbollah and Lebanon and that 

we need to do something to root Hezbollah out of Lebanon. The 

Israel Government has said that they are holding Lebanon responsible for the acts of terrorism that have been committed. 

10

An act of terrorism was just committed in India, and it is very 

likely that the terrorists crossed over from Pakistan. India is to be 

commended in working with Pakistan to resolve this issue. But we 

need to be mindful of the precedent we set on the Floor today and 

the precedent that was set in the past. We need, as a Congress, to 

put forth our congressional oversight. 

Mr. Chairman, my words sound a little frustrated because I am 

frustrated here that at the eleventh hour we are being asked to 

rubber stamp an agreement. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. We, at long last, welcome Dr. John 

Hillen, Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs to the Committee this afternoon. This bureau is the principal 

link between the Departments of State and Defense. 

We thank you very much for joining us, Dr. Hillen, and please 

proceed with your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN HILLEN, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. HILLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos, and Members of the Committee. I, of course, will ask that my remarks be 

entered for the record. 

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. HILLEN. Also, if there is no objection, Mr. Chairman, I would 

like to ask the indulgence of the Committee and ask that a statement by Richard Boucher, our Assistant Secretary For South and 

Central Asia, be included in the record. He is here today with us 

and also happy to answer any questions that have come up about 

the greater geopolitical context of this, some of which we have 

heard some concerns about. 

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, his remarks will be made a 

part of the full record. 

Mr. HILLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, this sale is a Presidential priority 

and a key element of the Administration’s South Asia strategy 

which was unveiled first in March 2005 and aimed at broadening 

the strategic relationships with our key strategic partners; India, 

Afghanistan, and Pakistan. 

A major pillar of the United States national security strategy, as 

laid out in the Quadrennial Defense Review, is to shape the choices 

of countries at strategic crossroads, and Pakistan is one of those 

countries. Our military-to-military relationship is a key vehicle for 

shaping Islamabad’s choices. 

The proposed sale will send a very clear signal of our commitment to a long-term relationship with Pakistan, a major non-NATO 

ally since June 2004, and strengthen the hand of President 

Musharraf and his government in supporting us in the War on Terror, and continuing to make other difficult and strategic choices. A 

confident and secure Pakistan will be a more reliable partner for 

the United States. 

Pakistan’s outstanding support in the War on Terror has not 

come without a cost to President Musharraf and the Pakistani people, as Representative Burton referred to. And despite that cost, 

11

Pakistani counterterrorism efforts have resulted in the death or 

capture of over 800 members of al-Qaeda, including many senior 

leaders. In another example of Pakistani support, the Pakistani 

navy has been commanding the naval combined task force 150 

under Operation Enduring Freedom since April. 

We have been asking Pakistan to make tough choices and to 

show concern for our strategic interest in keeping America safe. 

The sale of the F–16s not only shows our support for Pakistan’s 

tough choices, it bolsters Pakistan’s capabilities in the War on Terror, helps the Pakistan air force better support coalition operations 

in the region, enhances interoperability between the United States 

and the Pakistan air forces, and supports Pakistan’s legitimate 

self-defense needs. This sale will also demonstrate that we are serious about a strategic relationship based equally on a concern for 

Pakistan’s national security interests and security needs. 

With regard to this proposed sale, we take our obligation to consult with Congress on this and other arms sales seriously, and we 

began that consultation process with congressional staff over 16 

months ago. Over that course of time, we have provided congressional staff with two JAVITS briefings, 11 briefings on various aspects of the proposed sale to Pakistan, four intelligence briefings, 

and responded to multiple written questions. We went to great 

lengths to be responsive to the concerns of staffers prior to submitting the formal notification on June 28th. 

Mr. Chairman, I do not think, with respect, that we can so easily 

dispense this interaction as being not meaningful consultation with 

Congress. In the annals of the State Department, the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency, in our records, we consider this unprecedented in a number of ways, and I myself have added on several new layers to the process in order to move forward, including 

for the first time ever the review of very highly sensitive and classified Executive Branch documents that I have shared with your 

staff to make sure they understand our decision-making process. 

Unprecedented. Inviting staff with me on other trips to visit Pakistan and the sites, so they could see that. Unprecedented. 

There is still work to be done, when this was notified, and we 

knew that, and our staffs are working together very well, and I appreciate the support you and Mr. Lantos have given for that process, because we consider this entire period, including the 30 days 

of formal notification, to be a time to continue to get your concerns 

into the record and on the table; and continue to do things that are 

unprecedented, like the U.S. Air Force security brief that we delivered to your staff last November that you referred to; and then taking on board your concerns and interests and continuing to integrate them into what is a living document; and a security plan that 

I will talk a little more about in the future. 

By moving forward with the formal notification of this proposed 

sale in June, the Government of Pakistan will be able to sign a 

contract this calendar year which reinforces United States support 

for a key ally in the War on Terror, and underscores the value we 

attach to Pakistan as a strategic partner, and helps Pakistan avoid 

significant price increases. 

I would also like to take a chance to respond to the concerns that 

both you and Mr. Lantos raised. This is not a calculated attempt 

12

to change a procedure. This is not precedent setting at the State 

Department. We consider this an extraordinary sale. We ourselves 

think the pattern, as outlined in the 1976 letter, to which many 

Members have referred, is an acceptable general pattern. We know 

that we need to work with you and your staff to make sure that 

there is transparency and a conclusion to that deliberative process 

laid out in there, and also accountability within that. 

So we look forward to working with you to make sure that process has a conclusion within it, and yet gives the proper oversight 

that you think you need. So this is not intended, the way in which 

this sale was notified, is not intended to be a pattern going forward 

by any means. I want to assure you and Mr. Lantos of that. 

Also, any additional changes in the security plan will still be considered. We look forward to discussions with Mr. Lantos, we have 

been working with his staff and will meet with him later this afternoon about some other ideas that he has. 

And I would like to say a further word on that. The Administration very carefully considered the potential risk of diversion of 

United States technology and equipment, and we are taking appropriate steps to minimize those risks. Furthermore, the Government 

of Pakistan, including the Pakistan Air Force, has been extremely 

cooperative in responding to our concerns on the security of aircraft 

and technology. 

I think we will discuss this in detail in the closed session further, 

but I would like to note a few things. First of all, the security plan 

greatly exceeds United States Air Force standards for our own security of these weapon systems. I know all the Members have great 

respect for the way in which our Air Force protects its security, but 

I would also like to highlight nearly a dozen new and unprecedented elements of the security plan for Pakistan. 

We, of course, have had a U.S. Government security site survey 

of their bases and facilities. We have put into the deal that they 

must comply with the approved security plans for their F–16 related bases and facilities before we will release any systems in the 

sale. We will have a U.S. presence to monitor compliance with the 

security plan requirements. A very enhanced end-use monitoring 

program. Semiannual inventories of all F–16 aircraft equipment 

and munitions, including related technical data. More frequent inventories for other systems. There are separate and distinct and restricted areas for the F–16 aircraft equipment and munitions. And 

no mixing with third-country origin aircraft equipment and munitions, and all of this will be monitored. Routine access to F–16 aircraft and munitions is in restricted areas and limited to Pakistan 

Air Force personnel that are preapproved for such. There is a twoman rule, so to speak, for access to this equipment and restricted 

areas. And F–16 flights outside of Pakistan and participation in exercises and operations with third nations must be approved in advance by the United States Government. The maintenance is limited to remove and replace line replaceable units and shop replaceable units. And Pakistani Air Force personnel must perform the 

maintenance. No Pakistan contractors, industry, or third-country 

nationals. We have also mandated that the F–16 maintenance and 

parts storage must be in dedicated facilities. Also part of the overall surveillance plan. 

13

There, of course, will be, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Lantos, no delivery of F–16 aircraft equipment and munitions until Pakistan is 

fully compliant with the security plan requirements, and we will 

continue to seek and solicit, as we have aggressively, from your 

staff, any additional ideas. And the ones that have been shared to 

date are good, and I think have made the plan stronger. 

So thank you for allowing me to testify before you this afternoon 

about the proposed sale, and I would be more than happy to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of John Hillen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN HILLEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 

BUREAU OF POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Good afternoon Chairman Hyde, Representative Lantos, and other distinguished 

members of this Committee. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you 

today to discuss the proposed sale of F–16 aircraft to Pakistan. 

This sale is a Presidential priority and a key element of the Administration’s 

South Asia strategy, unveiled in March 2005, aimed at broadening our strategic relationships with our key regional partners—India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. 

A major pillar of U.S. strategy, as laid out in the QDR, is to shape the choices 

of countries at the strategic crossroads. Pakistan is one of those countries, and our 

military-to-military relationship is a key vehicle for shaping Islamabad’s choices. 

The sale will send a very clear signal of our commitment to a long-term relationship with Pakistan, a Major Non-NATO Ally since June 2004, and it will strengthen 

the hand of President Musharraf and his government in supporting us in the war 

on terror and in continuing to make other, politically difficult, yet strategic choices. 

The consultation process with Congress on this F–16 sale has been unprecedented. Never before have such extensive arms sales consultations taken place, in 

the history of Congressional notifications. 

During the past 16 months, we have consulted with Hill staffers on numerous occasions (including two JAVITS briefings), briefed staffers in detail 11 separate 

times, not including four intelligence briefings, and responded to multiple written 

questions. We went to extraordinary lengths to respond to the concerns of staffers 

before submitting the formal notification on June 28, 2006. A larger version of this 

proposed sale was first included in the March 2005 Javits Report. 

By moving forward with the formal notification of this proposed sale in June, the 

Government of Pakistan (GOP) will be able to complete the sale this calendar year, 

which reinforces U.S. support for a key ally in the war on terror, quells concerns 

in Pakistan about U.S. intentions and reliability as a strategic partner, and helps 

Pakistan avoid significant price increases. 

The Administration has carefully considered the potential risks, and we are taking appropriate steps to minimize those risks. Furthermore, the GOP and the Pakistan Air Force have been very cooperative in responding to our concerns on security 

of the aircraft and technology. In order to discuss this in further detail, we should 

move into a closed session. 

Thank you for allowing me to testify before this Honorable Committee and its Distinguished Membership this afternoon about the proposed sale of F–16 aircraft to 

Pakistan. I look forward to working with the Congress on this sale, and I am happy 

to answer any questions.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Dr. Hillen. 

Mr. Lantos. 

Mr. LANTOS. Well, Secretary Hillen, I read your testimony, and 

while I was struck by the contention that State has gone to extraordinary and unprecedented lengths to consult with our Committee on this sale, I am concerned that the centrifugal force of this 

spin threatens to fling the facts right out the window. 

The consultations on this unique sale, the sale you notified on 

June 28th, began only on June 8th. The consultations on a security 

plan began last summer with answers to a few, but certainly not 

all, of the Committee questions in September. There was nothing 

from then until June 8th, despite repeated Committee requests. 

14

You claim that State answered multiple questions, but State, 

nevertheless, refused to answer critical questions posed by this 

Committee, and vital information was not provided to us until as 

recently as last month, despite our repeated requests for such information. 

I want to come back to a fundamental question that I asked you 

in a closed session. And there was nothing secret about it, so I will 

ask it again. 

Are you aware of the fact that for some 30 years, there was a 

20-day prenotification period on such sales that had to be submitted to this Committee? 

Mr. HILLEN. Yes, Mr. Lantos. 

Mr. LANTOS. Was such a 20-day prenotification provided us this 

time? 

Mr. HILLEN. We asked three times, Mr. Lantos, for that period 

to be waived. One of the things——

Mr. LANTOS. May I ask you: Was there such a 20-day 

prenotification provided the Committee this time? 

Mr. HILLEN. There was not, Mr. Lantos. 

Mr. LANTOS. Did Mr. Hyde or I authorize the waiver of that period? 

Mr. HILLEN. You did not, Mr. Lantos. 

Mr. LANTOS. And the Chairman? 

Mr. HILLEN. Did not. 

Mr. LANTOS. Did not. So you took it upon yourself, you arrogated 

to yourself the responsibility of the Chairman and the Ranking 

Member to waive a 20-day prenotification period; is that correct? 

Mr. HILLEN. Mr. Lantos, the 1976 letter to which you referred—— Mr. LANTOS. I asked a very simple question. Since the Chairman 

did not waive the 20-day prenotification period and I did not waive 

it, did you arrogate it to yourself to make that decision? 

Mr. HILLEN. We decided, for the reasons I stated in my testimony, Mr. Lantos, and the amount of work that went into the consultations prior to that, to notify the deal. 

Mr. LANTOS. I will ask the question the third time and hope I 

get a straight answer. 

Since the Chairman and I did not waive this to 20-day 

prenotification period, did you arrogate it to yourself to waive this 

requirement? 

Mr. HILLEN. We notified the deal on June 28th without the 20-

day prenotification. 

Mr. LANTOS. What authority did you have for doing that? 

Mr. HILLEN. Well, Mr. Lantos, we recognized the traditions and 

protocols in the letter. We also recognized that over the course of 

years, things not referred to in the letter, which simply adds 20 

days, such as a preagreement to even get to the 20-day period, had 

been creeping into the process. And under the strategic urgency 

that we thought we needed, and the many, many months of consultations and our commitment to continue having ongoing substantive consultations, we decided to go ahead and notify in accordance with the enumerated system. 

And after not getting permission to waive the protocols and the 

traditions, we decided to move forward with notifying the deal and 

15

redouble our efforts to make sure we satisfied the concerns of the 

Committee within that 30-daytime period. 

Mr. LANTOS. You are incapable of admitting that this was a colossal mistake that makes both the Chairman and me infuriated at 

this arrogation of congressional authority by an Executive Branch 

official. 

Mr. HILLEN. Mr. Lantos, we are very interested, as I said, in 

honoring those protocols in that system. And as you have heard 

from other seniors officials in the Department, we want to work 

very closely to make sure that that system actually has transparency and conclusion, and that it does not turn into an ongoing 

and unaccountable system in which Presidential priorities can be 

held forever without a system to work through it. 

So by no means—— Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Hillen, there is no Committee on Capitol Hill 

that works on as bipartisan and cooperative a basis as this Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Hyde. You created a degree 

of opposition and monumental problems that were not there; that 

did not need to become problems. And you still are incapable of 

saying mea culpa, mea maxima culpa. 

You still believe that what you did was the correct thing to do. 

You still think that your taking upon yourself waiving a 30-year 

procedure that both the Chairman and I respect and expect the Department of State to follow, you take it upon yourself to waive that 

and you still cannot say that that was a colossal mistake. 

There are people on this Committee who don’t like the sale. 

There are some, like myself, who approved, in principle, the sale; 

who wanted to go ahead with the sale. But this arrogant usurpation of congressional authority sours the whole procedure, which 

should be obvious to a 6-year-old child. But you still don’t seem to 

be capable of absorbing what the Chairman, in his opening statement, and what I, in my opening statement, said. 

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to certainly associate myself with you, Mr. Chairman, and our Ranking 

Senior Member of the Committee regarding the concerns that you 

have expressed earlier concerning this ongoing relationship that we 

now have with the Administration referencing this proposed sale of 

some 77 F–16s and other military equipment worth $5 billion total. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to complete the rest of my statement, now 

that I have a little more time, and I will then raise another couple 

of questions to Secretary Hillen. 

Pakistan also has a history of nuclear proliferation. Mr. A.Q. 

Khan, the popular father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, 

confessed to selling nuclear technology abroad to North Korea, 

Libya, and Iran, and President Musharraf then pardoned him for 

doing so, a big, big world-wide scale. You couldn’t have asked for 

a better breach to talk about the dangers that it has wrought, especially from countries like Korea, that now, I suspect, have nuclear 

technology, thanks to Mr. Khan. 

Given last week’s terror attacks against India, in which it is alleged that a Pakistani-based group, LET, designated a terrorist organization by our own country, may be to blame, I am deeply conVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:26 Nov 22, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\109TH_~1\TEXT_F~1\28787.000 DOUG PsN: DOUG
16

cerned at the Administration’s decision to sell these F–16s and 

other military hardware to Pakistan at a time when our country 

has no assurances that these weapons will not be used to strengthen non-democratic forces in Pakistan. 

My question to Secretary Hillen is, just as it was possible for Mr. 

Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons system, who sold 

this nuclear technology to North Korea, to Libya and to Iran, for 

which he was later, pardoned in this huge breach, what assurances 

do we have that we may not have another Mr. Khan in Pakistan 

who may also breach this very sensitive military equipment and 

which then may be used, and it may not necessarily be, but just 

the fact that it may be used outside the parameters of what we 

agreed upon in principle? I just wanted to ask Secretary Hillen 

that. 

Mr. HILLEN. Thank you, Congressman. And as we go into closed 

session, I will get into more detail on the security plan, but I would 

note here that we have, precisely to combat unauthorized proliferation, we have this extraordinary security plan put into place. 

I would also note that the Pakistani Air Force has a very solid 

record with our security. They have had F–16s since the 1980s, and 

certainly have not had issues anywhere related to or associated 

with the A.Q. Khan network. 

I would also note, on the terrorist incidents in Mumbai, that 

President Musharraf came out very strongly with a statement condemning that, and has himself been fighting terrorism in his own 

country. And I think our support and our building of a strategic relationship, and the F–16s are an iconic symbol of the strategic and 

military-to-military relationship between United States and Pakistan, will allow our access and influence in that country to be even 

more influential in helping them win the War on Terror that they 

face in their own challenges. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I note with interest my colleague, Mr. Rohrabacher from California, made a comment to the fact that this is 

a $5 billion package that Pakistan is willing to buy, this military 

equipment, from our country. I guess our military industry here is 

laughing all the way to the bank, with $5 billion worth of military 

hardware for Pakistan. 

My question is: What percentage of that is the budget that Pakistan spends for its defense purposes? You know, in the recent 

earthquake, the whole world was burdened with the idea that we 

had to come and save the lives of thousands of people. And I mean, 

we don’t want an earthquake in any country, but economically does 

Pakistan have the capability in using $5 billion for defense purposes that could be used maybe for things to help sustain the lives 

of its 150 million people living in that country? 

Mr. HILLEN. Congressman, this is a national decision about national defense funds and legitimate self-defense needs made by the 

Government of Pakistan. In fact, as we noted, because of the earthquake, the scale of their request has come down dramatically because of their need to spend funds on the earthquake. 

But because it is a national decision about their defense funds 

and their defense spending, I don’t think it is so much in their 

minds a difference of F–16s versus other national priorities; it is 

17

their modernizing their air forces, and it is F–16s versus modern 

aircraft from other nations that would otherwise be bought. 

But it is a national decision for how they have decided to spend 

their funds, and we think it definitely goes toward legitimate selfdefense needs. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I notice my time is up, Mr. Chairman. I will 

wait for the second round. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Before we get to Mr. Rohrabacher, 

I wonder if I might ask a question. 

Hezbollah has started what they would like to think is World 

War III, and, of course, we are surprised by the sophistication of 

some of their weapons. So we must think about who is arming 

Hezbollah, and you can go through the food chain and you end up 

with China. 

I don’t want to have to go up to an executive session, but suffice 

it to say, I think we agree that China has access to Pakistan’s military development. They are an ally, and they have a presence in 

Pakistan. So if this sale goes through, I am wondering how much 

China will be advantaged by this sale to Pakistan and, through 

China, Hezbollah? 

In other words, in a roundabout way, are we not arming our 

enemy? And I don’t speak of Pakistan in these terms at all, but I 

am talking about the interrelationships in that part of the world 

and China’s close relationship to Iran and Pakistan. And so I am 

troubled by that aspect of it. I wasn’t early on, until Hezbollah 

began its assault. But now I am concerned that Hezbollah will continue to be armed by China and some of this very sophisticated 

weaponry will be in unfriendly hands. 

Have you a comment on that? 

Mr. HILLEN. I do, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the thought 

you put into that. 

We don’t think China would be advantaged by this sale at all. 

In fact, the best thing that could happen for the Chinese military 

is for a sale like this not to go through, because then it is they who 

will have access and influence with the Pakistan military as opposed to the United States, and Pakistan wants very much for the 

United States to be its preeminent and closest strategic and military-to-military partner. 

China won’t be advantaged because of the extraordinary security 

plan that I outlined some elements of before, and we can go into 

deeper in closed session. But I do think that one of the reasons why 

we want to have access and influence into Pakistan, and other nations like Pakistan, through this building of this strategic and military-to-military relationship, is precisely to prevent China from 

having that kind of relationship. 

Because of your strong support, and others, we have the gold 

standard for arms export control use. We place all sorts of conditionality onto getting arms sales from the United States, and that 

protects American Security interests and protects exactly this sort 

of proliferation problem you alluded to. 

So I think this sale works exactly the opposite. I think it will 

give us access and influence in a country, and we will be able to 

see if there are any dynamics of that sort and be able to be inVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:26 Nov 22, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\109TH_~1\TEXT_F~1\28787.000 DOUG PsN: DOUG
18

volved in a leadership position rather than just standing by if this 

happens. 

Chairman HYDE. Well, that is a cheery interpretation and I hope 

you are right, and I don’t say that you are not. I think it is entirely 

possible, but I just am concerned about the access to this advanced 

technology finding its way to people like Hezbollah, and it all depends on the security, as you say, of the aircraft in Pakistan and 

other aspects of security. 

All right. Thank you. 

Dr. Rohrabacher. I have just promoted you to a Ph.D. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Does an F–16 have the capability of carrying a nuclear weapon? 

Mr. HILLEN. Mr. Rohrabacher, these F–16s specifically will not 

be sold to Pakistan to be capable of carrying a nuclear weapon. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The ones that will, of course with mechanics 

or engineers they won’t be able to alter that at all? 

Mr. HILLEN. The F–16s we are giving them, Mr. Rohrabacher, 

will not be nuclear capable. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There is no little tweaking that could be done 

to the underside that could permit them to carry that type of weapon? 

Mr. HILLEN. That of course is certainly possible. One of the 

things that we gain from doing this deal, Mr. Rohrabacher, is exactly that access and influence I have talked about. So if Pakistan 

wanted to make a move like that, which we would think imprudent, we have this extraordinary security plan with United States 

personnel, we have monitoring, we have leverage to convince them 

not to do this. They have given no indications that they want to 

do this. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Tell me, when we sold all the modern aircraft 

to the Shah of Iran, we had that same kind of leverage on him, 

didn’t we? 

Mr. HILLEN. We did, Mr. Rohrabacher, and precisely because 

Iran has those aircraft as opposed to the French aircraft, others 

with whom they have a vigorous relationship, Iran is not capable 

of using those American aircraft; spare parts necessity; no relationship with us for upkeep and all that. It allows us even in this period without Iranian relations since 1978——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That was a good thing that we sold the Shah 

those modern—the cutting edge American avionics technology just 

before the Shah was overthrown by the mullah regime that currently controls Iran. 

Do you think that was a good thing? Is that what you are saying? 

Mr. HILLEN. That was the policy of the Administration at the 

time, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We all know what that answer means. 

How much debt does Pakistan have right now, how much debt 

is it carrying? 

Mr. HILLEN. I will get you that answer, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

[The information referred to follows:]

19

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE JOHN HILLEN TO QUESTION

ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE DANA ROHRABACHER

Pakistan’s bilateral debt with the United States currently stands at approximately $2 billion. The latest U.S. Treasury report on debt levels dated December 

31, 2004, listed $2.492 billion for Pakistan (details below in millions), but does not 

include the $490 million of fiscal year 2004 debt relief.

Guaranteed private loans (AID, EXIM) $ 368

Concessional credits (AID, USDA) $1.384

Undisbursed concessional credits $ 11

Non-concessional credits (AID, USDA, DoD, EXIM) $ 729

llll

$2.492 billion

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you think that the F–16 is the appropriate weapon system needed in the fight against global terrorism 

and the Taliban, et cetera, or is the F–16 a weapon system that 

is designed for some other fight? 

Mr. HILLEN. Mr. Rohrabacher, when I was out in Pakistan and 

all other United States officials that have been out there, we talked 

at length with the Pakistanis about our desire for them to continue 

to play a greater role in the War on Terror. They have moved up 

to 80,000 troops into their own areas where they have terrorist 

problems. They are using F–16s and close air support in that, hundreds of missions in the Global War on Terror, and they know it 

is our intent to give them capabilities to continue——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Military experts don’t suggest there might be 

other weapons that would be much more suitable for that type of 

fight rather than what the F–16 provides? 

Mr. HILLEN. We are working on all those fronts, Mr. Rohrabacher. In fact, we are talking about everything from the small to 

the large and so the F–16 is just a piece of a comprehensive security package to let Pakistan get even more and more involved in 

the Global War on Terror, especially in their own country. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Especially in their own country the F–16 

would be better than perhaps an airplane that costs half as much 

and had the ability perhaps not to fly as far but would cost half 

as much and deliver the same package. 

Mr. HILLEN. That was a question for the Pakistan—the modernization air forces. I would note, Mr. Rohrabacher, that in our 

structure, the sale, I referred to before a set of documents never before shared in an arms notification process between the Executive 

Branch and Congress, and I made the decision to share and it enumerated the technologies were not, that would usually go with an 

F–16, are not part of this deal and they include ones that would 

allow the F–16 to be used in an offensive way to penetrate air 

space of another country that was highly defended. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I sure hope the Chinese that gave the nuclear weapons technology to the Pakistanis don’t go and try to alter 

those F–16s. They might have some technical capabilities that 

might put us at a disadvantage. 

When you say what they are doing here in this F–16 here, this 

$5 billion in debt for a very poor country, was a decision made by 

the Pakistani people, can you tell me if Mr. Musharraf was elected 

or not? 

Mr. HILLEN. I think we know the answer to that. 

20

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think we do. So what we are doing is piling 

on debt onto a very poor country that is being—but the debt, the 

decision for that debt is being made by an unelected leader. 

Mr. HILLEN. Mr. Rohrabacher, we are framing a relationship 

with Pakistan, and the Secretary has been very clear, including 

when she was out there last month, to continue to work with Mr. 

Musharraf and let him know the United States’ desire and to also 

liberalize the political and economic situation. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. One last thought, Mr. Chairman, then I 

know my time is up. 

When you are really a friend to somebody and he is doing something self-destructive, you don’t just go along with it. You try to 

convince him to do something else. This decision and this insistence, this arrogance about having to have the F–16s has symbolic—is so extraordinarily self-destructive for such a poor country, 

I think that the United States of America as a friend should have 

tried to give them some guidance in the opposite direction. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Leach. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t know if I have 

questions. I do have a couple of observations. First, I think on the 

whole, as awkward as it is in world affairs, I think this particular 

sale is probably a compelling sale. On the whole I think the Chairman is exactly correct in objecting to certain of the procedures that 

have taken place. 

If I were in the Administration’s shoes what I would be thinking 

about right now in a very serious way is the symbolism of the Indian subcontinent, the two attitudinal national approaches of profound dimensions. One relates to this concept of American 

exceptionalism under international law. And we have taken a decision to allow India to breach the NPT, and there is a case for that 

and it is a case that has been well-presented to this Congress. And 

this Congress is going to buy it. 

But vis-a-vis India is one thing. Once you take a position of an 

American exceptionalism in international law, all of a sudden you 

have to look at all the other countries that are going to be making 

a case for exceptionalism, too. And when you break from law, you 

cause precedents that become very awkward. 

In the Indian case the President makes a decision, it takes 

months for Congress to think about it, but instantaneously Putin 

has already adopted the American position and certain sales have 

been committed. 

Now you take this issue of Pakistan and a sale of aircraft. Again, 

the issue is exceptionalism. This Administration has a very difficult 

time not wanting to be Executive authority-oriented. And so it 

breaks precedent. With the NPT you have a situation now for the 

future it is going to be very hard to put international law back in 

the box. 

Here, the Administration is holding a hearing that needn’t have 

been held. This is an embarrassing hearing. And it is being held 

because of Executive arrogance. And you ought to think that 

through. That is what this Administration has to think through. 

You break the law on one hand, now you break congressional precedence on another because you don’t want shared accountability. 

21

This Committee was willing on a traditional basis to work very 

carefully with you. There was no efforts of the Chairman of this 

Committee to be untidy, anti-America’s interest, and yet you moved 

in a direction that might call into question law itself. You have the 

distinguished Ranking Member suggesting he might change the 

law to make it tougher on you guys. 

And so all I am suggesting is there are some lessons in this and 

they ought to really be taken back and thought through. 

I have no question for you, but just to think. I want to be as supportive as I can of the Chairman in his efforts. I also think the case 

of the Executive Branch is probably compelling in this instance. 

But you have put all of this in a process that has created a degree of chaos and a degree of uncertainty for the future that you 

needn’t have done. And that is all I would like to contribute at this 

time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Royce of California. 

Mr. ROYCE. Yes. Thank you, Chairman. 

Earlier this year the International Terrorism and Nonproliferation Subcommittee that I chair held a hearing looking at the A.Q. 

Khan network, and all the witnesses that we had testify agreed on 

one point and that was access to A.Q. Khan in Pakistan was essential in terms of a full understanding of exactly all that was done 

with his network on WMD. 

I wondered if the United States ever made an attempt to connect 

access to A.Q. Khan with this deal. In other words, I am wondering 

what does the United States get here. Do we get some kind of ability to really find out what was done on the proliferation front by 

Pakistan or are we able to get access to Dr. Khan and find out exactly what were the arrangements with these countries? 

Mr. HILLEN. Mr. Royce, in a broad sense, and certainly our intent in this deal is to grow this relationship I was talking about 

and gain access and influence with a strong relationship with the 

Government of Pakistan, which will allow us to do a lot of things. 

I would note that in the period in which we did not have a strategic 

relationship with Pakistan, among the things that happened during that period in the 1990s were the growth of their relationship 

with China, the events to which you referred to and the network 

you referred to, and we were out, we were out. We want to be in 

precisely to have that kind of influence, to answer those kind of 

questions, to influence the direction of this country at a strategic 

crossroads to get to the points about democracy and human rights 

and political liberalization that have been brought up by other 

Members. 

So I can only add at this point in a broad sense that we hope 

exactly that this sale and our other multi-faceted efforts, we are 

doing a lot on the social and economic and educational from with 

Pakistan as well, give us that relationship. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask that, because the point you just made 

was a point the 9/11 Commission made with regard to Pakistan but 

I am not sure they intended F–16s. They singled out three countries as key in our struggle against Islamist terrorism. They said 

Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

22

The Commission said it is hard to overstate the importance of 

Pakistan in the struggle against Islamist terrorism, and they recommended that the United States support Pakistan’s Government 

with what they called a ‘‘comprehensive effort that extends from 

military aid to support for better education so long as Pakistan’s 

leaders remain willing to make difficult choices on their own.’’

I guess the question is, has that support been comprehensive? Do 

you believe in your mind that an F–16 sale is what the commission 

had in mind when it was talking about military sales to stabilize 

Pakistan? 

Mr. HILLEN. Mr. Royce, the President absolutely believes—as you 

know, this sale was a Presidential priority—that it would serve exactly that purpose, I do believe. That is why I am here. We have 

already seen in simply working the beginning pieces of the deal in 

this relationship with the Government of Pakistan an extraordinary thing that we briefed Members in closed session in some of 

these intelligence briefings to which I referred earlier, the change 

in the way in which Pakistan is being aggressively involved on the 

Global War on Terror. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me finish with one other question I had. The notice says that the aircraft, the F–16s, will be used for close air support in ongoing operations contributing to the Global War on Terror. I would like to ask when United States forces are operating in 

Afghanistan and they need close air support, is it the F–16, the 

most advanced version, including advanced weapons and avionics, 

or is it something more like the A–10 or AC–130 in these kinds of 

operations that are most helpful for that type of support for the 

troops in the field? 

Mr. HILLEN. Well, in close air support we use a lot of different 

aircraft. I, myself in battle, have called in fire from F–16s and A–

10s and all sorts of other aircraft. So there is a whole range in the 

U.S. inventory. 

In Afghanistan of course we will continue to rely on the ISAF 

and United States and coalition forces for air support, and certainly not what is being done with Pakistan, but I would note that 

Pakistan has used their F–16s in the Global War on Terror and we 

want to continue to build this relationship with them. We want 

their students to go to our close air support schools so their army 

and air force can learn to work closely together as ours have to use 

these sorts of capabilities in close air support and support of the 

80,000 troops they have fighting in the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas in the Pashtun tribal belt. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Faleomavaega for the final question. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, we have Mr. Sherman here. 

Chairman HYDE. Oh, Mr. Sherman is back again. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. I am usually so innocuous and soft-spoken. 

Chairman HYDE. We have certainly missed you. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. 

We will get to you, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just wanted to make a correction for the record and not to give 

any misrepresentation of my views. 

23

Mr. Chairman, one is that I am absolutely in support of the good 

people of Pakistan. It is just that some of the policies that emanate 

from the Government of Pakistan that I have problems with. 

Mr. Secretary, India’s recent allegations made that the Pakistanbased terrorist groups were responsible for the barbaric Mumbai 

bombings were most disturbing. Will the Administration agree not 

to deliver any aircraft or weaponry system until the President certifies to this Committee that Pakistan has halted all support by 

any governmental elements for terrorist groups and has taken all 

possible actions to eliminate such groups? 

Mr. HILLEN. Congressman, I think President Musharraf has been 

quite clear on that in condemning the action and by no means supports any terrorist groups in Pakistan, in our opinion, and we want 

to build this relationship precisely to help him get better at combating terrorism. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I realize all the technicalities and all that 

has been made in terms of putting together this $5 billion package. 

The train is moving and it is for us to make this decision whether 

or not to conduct the sale. 

I take my President’s statements very seriously, Secretary 

Hillen, and I want to restate again my President’s statement that 

he made at his inaugural address, and I quote: ‘‘It is the policy of 

the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic 

movements and institutions in every nation and culture with the 

ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.’’

You realize in the height of the Cold War, our national policy, 

we didn’t care if that country had a military dictator that murdered 

and tortured thousands, even millions of its citizens, so long as 

they were in our camp, them and us, the Russians and us. 

And as I understand it, Pakistan did elect a President, his name 

was Sharif, I believe, then there was a military coup. I met President Musharraf. He is a good man, I am sure, with all intents and 

purposes, but the fact of the matter, Mr. Secretary, is I have a very 

serious problem. Pakistan is not a democracy. Don’t we have a Federal law somewhere that says when a country commits a military 

coup that our country is supposed to place sanctions against the 

country? 

Chairman HYDE. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. I don’t think it is quite that simple. The President of Iran has been elected. They had an election in Algeria and 

the bad guys won and the army had to throw him out. Hamas just 

won an election in the Palestine Authority region. 

So being elected is desirable but sometimes democracy doesn’t 

produce the best office holder. I just simply say it is not quite that 

simple that Mr. Musharraf wasn’t elected. He is in office and he 

is an ally of ours and we ought to express some gratitude and hope 

some day that they can have a nice democracy like we have, but 

in the interim we have to struggle for freedom. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the Chairman for his statement, 

and I just want to say that I commend the Chairman for his observation on this issue, but I still have to say, yes, maybe we can say 

democracy can also be dictatorial in that sense. We have discovered 

that we advocated very strongly for the people of Palestine to conVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:26 Nov 22, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\109TH_~1\TEXT_F~1\28787.000 DOUG PsN: DOUG
24

duct an election knowing possibly a group like Hamas is now elected into office, which has totally contradictory policies against what 

is in our national interest. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your comment and 

your observation on this issue but I still have to believe that the 

good people of Pakistan should have a democracy, and I think on 

that basis we should do everything we can to assure that President 

Musharraf makes a serious commitment in conducting free elections and making sure the people of Pakistan have a duly elected 

President to work with. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. I just want to suggest one more idea. I don’t 

know if you were serving in Congress when the Shah was near the 

end of his reign in Iran. I was here and I remember the beating 

he took on the Floor because of the hated SAVAK, his secret police, 

and he was a bad guy, little realizing that his successor would be 

the Ayatollah Khomeini, who was far worse in terms of a relationship with the United States. 

So the process by which someone gets elected is very important 

but the quality of the person who is elected and their attitude and 

their background and their vision and their expectations are all 

very important, too. 

So, anyway, if you and I ran the world, Mr. Faleomavaega, everybody would be a democrat. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I would guarantee you that 

the world would be in tremendous peace. 

Chairman HYDE. That’s a small D. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 

Secretary. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Sherman, the finale, the grand finale. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Hillen, I want to congratulate you. It took 230 

years to create a country with different branches of government 

and you have succeeded in making sure Congress will have no role 

in conditioning the sale or limiting the sale or even perhaps stopping the sale. You have demonstrated clearly how irrelevant those 

of us up here are, although we put on a good show. 

Correct me if I am wrong, if Congress fails to act next week then 

we have no legal right to disapprove, stop, limit or condition these 

sales in any way, correct? 

Mr. HILLEN. I believe that is the law, yes, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. I know you are not going to invite me to 

the celebratory party and I know you have got to deny that you are 

actually going to have it. But you have just shown how easy it is 

to ignore us as long as you go through the charade of showing up 

at these hearings and letting us vent. You have eviscerated us and 

now you have allowed us to vent. 

I know that Mr. Ackerman has introduced a resolution of disapproval. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that instead of a resolution 

of disapproval that could hurt our relationship with Pakistan, that 

we could consider on an extremely expedited basis a bill that would 

just make ineffective the notification that we have received from 

the Department of State on this sale so that we can go back and 

do it right. 

25

But first let me ask whether the State Department has any intention of doing that themselves. Are you going to withdraw the official notification and start the pre-notification process, or are you 

going to continue the charade? 

Mr. HILLEN. Mr. Sherman, as I outlined in my comments and my 

outline of some of the consultative process, and I would like to say 

on the record that we in the Administration profoundly disagree 

with the characterization of these consultations. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, you are doing your job; the celebration will 

follow. So you are not going to withdraw. You are not going to go 

through the pre-notification process. 

Mr. HILLEN. We did a pre-notification process. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Sir, I am asking a simple question. Are you going 

to withdraw or not going to withdraw? 

Mr. HILLEN. We are going to continue to move forward with 

the——

Mr. SHERMAN. And you are going to contain your laughter about 

Congress until you at least leave our building, and I thank you for 

that. 

Mr. HILLEN. Mr. Sherman, I have taken this process quite seriously as a custodian——

Mr. SHERMAN. Your job is to disenfranchise our constituents and 

to make sure that nothing that comes from Congress affects this 

deal in any way, and you have done it spectacularly well. Now the 

second part of your job is to hide that you are actually trying to 

do the first part of your job, and you are doing that very well, as 

well. You deserve our commendation. If someone was trying to 

make sure that Congress would play no role in the conditions, limitations, approval or disapproval of this agreement, this is exactly 

how they would do it, and you did it very well. 

You are doing your job. We are not doing our job. Our job is to 

make you go back and do it right. Our job is to make sure that this 

deal reflects the best thinking in Congress, not only on whether it 

should go forward but, as Mr. Lantos said, what kind of security 

requirements are imposed. 

I commented upon looking not just at how many planes but what 

avionics, what electronics. We are not going to do our job. We are 

going to vent. I guess this is the final part of the venting, is Sherman’s comments, and I vent with the best of them. 

So we are going to vent, you are going to pretend that you have 

involved Congress. You have not, in fact, given us a chance to affect this deal in any significant way. And you are doing your job, 

we are not doing our job. Instead, we will not disapprove, and even 

if we do, that is not the best outcome from our country because I 

know that will get bad press for us in Pakistan. 

And it seems unlikely that we are going to pass emergency legislation to vitiate your phony—well, your inappropriate notification 

of us. So you are doing your job, and when people look back and 

ask why Congress ceased to play a role in foreign policy, they will 

take note of how we failed to do our job today. 

I yield back. 

Chairman HYDE. Well, I guess we all go to the woodshed. 

Thank you, Dr. Hillen, for this ordeal, but it has been constructive and we appreciate it and we appreciate your work. Thank you. 

26

The Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD A. BOUCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: Thank you for inviting me to 

speak to you today. It is an honor to address this Committee on an issue of great 

significance to our nation. 

Pakistan is a key country and a strategic partner in South Asia—a region of critical importance to the United States. As you know, the South Asian region is one 

of our highest priorities in the War on Terror. It is equally important to the struggle 

against the spread of weapons of mass destruction. And it is enjoying rapid economic growth. If peace and stability prevail and the region’s economic expansion 

continues, we believe this region will become an international economic powerhouse. 

We want to support Pakistan’s success as a moderate Muslim democratic nation. 

This is the course President Musharraf has set. Achieving this goal would stabilize 

the nation and the region against terrorism and give the people of Pakistan new 

opportunity in the modern world. Its economic potential is as great as its neighbors. 

Its ports and transportation links could play a major role in the prosperity of the 

region as a whole. We see Pakistan as one end of a land bridge extending across 

Afghanistan and into Central Asia. 

Pakistan’s role in the struggle against al-Qaida is well known but bears repeating. 

Almost every senior al-Qaida leader now in custody was captured by Pakistan. Pakistan has put almost 80,000 troops on its border with Afghanistan and has conducted 

large-scale military operations aimed at flushing al-Qaida and its allies out of the 

remote border country. These operations have been costly. Pakistan has lost several 

hundred soldiers while conducting them. 

The political cost has been high, too. Al-Qaida and its extremist allies assail the 

Pakistani Government regularly for allegedly doing America’s bidding with no benefit to Pakistan. These same extremists have also sought to foment rebellion in the 

tribal regions along the border. 

The personal price paid by Pakistan’s leaders has also been great. President 

Musharraf has survived two assassination attempts by al-Qaida and its allies. 

Prime Minister Aziz has survived one such attempt, and senior army officers have 

been targeted as well. The leaders of Pakistan have demonstrated great personal 

courage while supporting our common struggle against terrorism. 

The 9/11 Commission suggested that ‘‘if President Musharraf is prepared to support us at the risk of his life,’’ we should make the difficult decisions needed to establish a long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan. We are following the 

Commission’s advice, and the F–16s are an important part of that effort. 

The United States is working with Pakistan to establish the basis for a stable, 

broad-based relationship. During President Bush’s recent visit we agreed to highlevel dialogues on everything from energy to education to economics to science and 

technology. We are using our assistance money to improve education and health in 

Pakistan. We are also assisting Pakistan to recover and rebuild from the catastrophic earthquake which destroyed large areas in northern Pakistan last October. 

This was the most popular and welcome program we have provided Pakistan since 

we resumed providing assistance in 2001. 

We cannot focus exclusively on Pakistan’s economic and development needs, however, and ignore its basic national security concerns. We are asking Pakistan to do 

difficult things to protect Americans, and we must show concern in return for Pakistan’s security. The F–16 sale provides a clear and concrete signal to all Pakistanis 

that Pakistan’s security is important to the United States. A confident Pakistan that 

feels secure is more likely to pursue peace and cooperation with its neighbors. Conversely, a Pakistan that feels vulnerable is more likely to rely on nuclear weapons 

and non-conventional tactics to ensure its security. I am sure we all agree that this 

is not the direction in which we want Pakistan to go. I believe it is in our national 

interest to proceed with this sale. I hope you will approve this transfer. 

With that let me conclude and take your questions. Thank you. 

31

WRITTEN RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE JOHN HILLEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 

BUREAU OF POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT COMPLIANCE

Question: 

The Committee is very troubled by the Department of State’s failure to make any 

report to Congress on certain information, which you have been aware for some time, 

having a bearing on this sale, a report which State was legally bound to make under 

the Arms Export Control Act. Please provide for the record a detailed explanation of 

why this report was not made. Please detail any such reports relating to Pakistan 

that have been made in the last 10 years. 

Response: 

Assistant Secretary Hillen has provided classified answers to the Committee. 

Question: 

With less than one week remaining in the 30 day period for Congress to act under 

law on this arm sale, why has the Department of State failed even now to make this 

legally required report? 

Response: 

Assistant Secretary Hillen has provided classified answers to the Committee. 

PAKISTAN-CHINA MILITARY TIES

Question: 

You stated during your July 20 testimony in response to questions about technology 

transfer to China that ‘‘We don’t think China will be advantaged by this sale at all 

. . . In fact, the best thing that could happen for the Chinese military is for a sale 

like this not to go through because then it is they who will have access to influence 

the Pakistan military as opposed to the United States.’’

• Given (1) information you are aware of which could not be discussed in public 

session; and (2) the Committee’s understanding that the Pakistan Cabinet already decided coincident with the F–16 purchase to order an unspecified number of additional Chinese fighters to complement those currently in production 

with Chinese technical assistance in Pakistan, do you believe in retrospect that 

this answer was accurate? 

Response: 

Yes. A strategic, long-term military and diplomatic partnership between the 

United States and Pakistan balances the potential for Pakistan to become too reliant on China. The sale of F–16 aircraft to Pakistan (1) enhances our strategic relationship with Pakistan by proving our reliability through appreciation of Pakistan’s 

legitimate self-defense needs, and (2) balances out the access and influence of China. 

Furthermore, without this sale, we would undermine those Pakistani officials who 

support a strong U.S.-Pakistan relationship, and bolster Pakistan’s reliance on 

China. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DELIVERY

Question: 

Please provide a copy of any document for the Committee where Pakistan has 

agreed that the new and upgraded F–16 aircraft will never be used for the delivery 

of nuclear weapons. Please also advise if the State Department has obtained Pakistan’s specific agreement to this same prohibition with respect to older F–16 aircraft 

already in service? 

Response: 

Assistant Secretary Hillen has provided classified answers to the Committee. 

IRAN POLICY

Question: 

Please advise whether the State Department has communicated to Pakistan the 

view that any transfer of defense articles or services to Iran could result in a cutoff of U.S. Government assistance? 

32

Response: 

Assistant Secretary Hillen has provided classified answers to the Committee. 

ESTIMATE OF U.S. PERSONNEL

Question: 

In accordance with section 36(b)(1)(B) of the Arms Export Control Act, what is the 

estimate of the number of officers and employees of the United States Government 

and of United States civilian contract personnel expected to be needed in Pakistan 

to carry out the proposed sale? 

Response: 

During the site surveys after the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) is signed, 

the U.S. survey teams will assess the requirement at each proposed Pakistan Air 

Force F–16 base. Based on the findings of the site survey teams, the proposed number of officers and employees of the USG and U.S. civilian contract personnel, as 

well as their assigned duties, will be discussed with Embassy Islamabad and presented to the Pakistan Air Force. The security plan for the Pakistan F–16 program 

is unprecedented. There is no previous case on which to base an estimate of the 

manpower required to implement enhanced end-use and security monitoring. The 

U.S. Air Force will provide a reasonably accurate estimate after the required site 

security surveys are conducted. 

SCOPE OF USG ‘‘PRESENCE’’ IN SECURITY MEASURES

Question: 

What is the nature and scope of the ‘‘USG presence’’ on Pakistan installations referred to in the draft letters of offer and acceptance (‘‘LOA’’) provided to the Committee on or about July 18? 

Response: 

Once the LOAs are signed, we will ensure the appropriate teams of subject matter 

experts are assembled to conduct the required site surveys. Experts from the USAF 

Security Forces will develop a site survey plan to assess all aspects of security delineated in the LOA security plan. The site surveys will determine the nature and 

scope of USG presence required on Pakistan installations to safeguard U.S. technology and technical data. 

Question: 

Why are so many fundamental security matters left up in the air, such as—

a. Who will be ‘‘solely’’ responsible for in country transfers of aircraft for purposes of repair, as provided in paragraph 7a? 

b. Who will develop the site survey plan referred to in paragraph 4a? 

c. Who will implement the two-man security rule referred to in paragraph 9c?; 

and 

d. Whether Pakistan industry will be permitted to perform AMRAAM maintenance functions, as implied in paragraph 10b? 

Response: 

a. USAF personnel will assist the Pakistan Air Force in developing the transportation plans for the transfers of F–16 aircraft, armaments, related equipment and 

technical data within Pakistan for the purposes of repair and return or distribution 

of equipment in base-to-base transfers. The USG holds the Pakistan Air Force solely 

responsible as the executive agent for the Government of Pakistan for the protection 

of these assets during transportation, as well as in restricted parking areas, sensitive equipment storage areas, and maintenance areas for the F–16 aircraft, armaments and related equipment when work is being performed. 

b. Once the LOAs are signed, we will ensure the appropriate teams of subject 

matter experts are assembled to conduct the required site surveys. Experts from the 

USAF Security Forces will develop a site survey plan to assess all aspects of security delineated in the LOA security plan. 

c. The two-man rule is a requirement to be imposed on and implemented by the 

Pakistan Air Force. The intent is to mitigate the possibility that a single Pakistan 

Air Force individual would knowingly or intentionally compromise U.S. information 

to an unauthorized recipient. U.S. monitors will periodically and randomly check to 

ensure the Pakistan Air Force complies with the requirement. 

d. AMRAAM maintenance will be performed by military or civilian employees of 

the Pakistan Air Force at Pakistan Air Force facilities that comply with the security 

requirements in the LOA and other applicable guidance provided by the USAF. The 

33

security plan does allow for case-by-case consideration of proposals for outsourcing 

AMRAAM maintenance to providers that are acceptable to the USG, offer a more 

cost effective alternative, and do not present an increased risk. 

RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS AND USE

Question: 

Why do the draft letters of offer and acceptance (at paragraph 9) merely prohibit 

F–16 related ‘‘transfers . . . to foreign countries, or to industry (domestic or foreign)’’

when section 3(a)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that the foreign country:

‘‘. . . shall have agreed not to transfer title to, or possession of, any defense 

article or related training or other defense service . . . to anyone not an officer, 

employee, or agent of that country....’’

Response: 

Earlier versions of the Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) had included the 

language ‘‘transfers . . . to foreign countries, or to industry (domestic or foreign)’’. 

However, the current and final version relating to these transactions contains the 

standard terms and conditions language consistent with the Arms Export Control 

Act (AECA). The standards terms and conditions language is as follows:

‘‘The Purchaser will not transfer title to, or possession of, the defense articles, 

components and associated support materiel, related training or other defense 

services (including plans, specifications, or information), or technology furnished 

under this LOA to anyone who is not an officer, employee, or agent of the Purchaser (excluding transportation agencies), and shall not use or permit their use 

for purposes other than those authorized, unless the written consent of the USG 

has first been obtained. The Purchaser will ensure, by all means available to 

it, respect for proprietary rights in any items and any plans, specifications, or 

information furnished, whether patented or not. The Purchaser also agrees that 

the defense articles offered will not be transferred to Cyprus or otherwise used 

to further the severance or division of Cyprus, and recognizes that the U.S. Congress is required to be notified of any substantial evidence that the defense articles sold in this LOA have been used in a manner that is inconsistent with this 

provision.’’

Question: 

Similarly, please explain how the letters of offer and acceptance are compliant with 

the requirement in section 3(a)(2) that the foreign country shall have agreed ‘‘not to 

use or permit the use of (a United States defense) article or related training or other 

defense service for purposes other than those authorized’’? 

Response: 

As indicated in the answer to QFR #9, the current and final version relating to 

these transactions contains the standard terms and conditions language consistent 

with the Arms Export Control Act. The standards terms and conditions language 

is as follows:

‘‘The Purchaser will not transfer title to, or possession of, the defense articles, 

components and associated support materiel, related training or other defense 

services (including plans, specifications, or information), or technology furnished 

under this LOA to anyone who is not an officer, employee, or agent of the Purchaser (excluding transportation agencies), and shall not use or permit their use 

for purposes other than those authorized, unless the written consent of the USG 

has first been obtained. The Purchaser will ensure, by all means available to 

it, respect for proprietary rights in any items and any plans, specifications, or 

information furnished, whether patented or not. The Purchaser also agrees that 

the defense articles offered will not be transferred to Cyprus or otherwise used 

to further the severance or division of Cyprus, and recognizes that the U.S. Congress is required to be notified of any substantial evidence that the defense articles sold in this LOA have been used in a manner that is inconsistent with this 

provision.’’

INFORMATION SECURITY

Question: 

Given the interagency briefing team’s response to Committee staff concerns about 

the lack of information security measures in the draft security plan provided on June 

8—to the effect that such measures were not needed since Pakistan’s installations 

34

where the F–16 aircraft would be located did not have computer systems—please explain:

a. Why the draft LOAs now provide for a wide assortment of electronic processing, storage and transmission of F–16 and weapons design information? and 

b. Whether NSA or an NSA expert firm will be employed (and when) to conduct a site survey of any Pakistan work stations, servers, networks and routers 

that may be utilized for U.S. furnished technical data in electronic media and 

to assess the Pakistan Air Force’s ‘‘procedures for electronic processing, storage 

and transmission of F–16’’ related information? 

Response: 

a. The Pakistan Air Force does not currently use classified networks for F–16 support and has only limited unclassified electronic connectivity for the same. Processing of classified electronic information is accomplished on stand alone systems. 

The new F–16 Block 52 aircraft requires increased use of electronic processing, storage, and transmission. For example, pilots create their mission profile and program 

the aircraft weapon load and the electronic warfare order of battle via a mission 

planning data system. Similarly, maintenance information and actions are tracked 

through an automated logistics information management system (ALMS). All the 

U.S.-supplied electronic systems required to support the new F–16 Block 52 aircraft 

are proven and certified systems. It should be noted that although the new F–16s 

require increased use of electronic processing, storage, and transmission, there is no 

intention to make the information available over computer networks. All the F–16 

information will be contained within specific data systems. 

b. Completion of the site surveys will determine the infrastructure and security 

requirements the Pakistan Air Force will need to put in place to support the new 

data systems. As for NSA certification, information obtained as a result of the site 

security surveys will be used to determine the appropriate course of action.

Æ