Contrafl ow evacuation map 

Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
243

Pre-Storm Evacuations

Louisiana

Louisiana’s successful evacuation of about one million people from greater New Orleans 

through phased movements and the one-way “contrafl ow” use of highways was a great 

improvement over the Hurricane Ivan evacuation a year earlier. Still, offi cials expected that 

100,000 to 150,0001

 persons would be unable or unwilling to evacuate the region before 

Hurricane Katrina struck.

Th is included those with special needs, such as the elderly and infi rm; the poor, those lacking means to leave; and those simply refusing to evacuate, regardless of reason or means, 

and choosing to take their chances in “hurricane roulette.”2

Some of those responsible for the evacuation argue that those who wished to leave the city 

prior to landfall did so. Th e Director of Homeland Security for the City of New Orleans, 

Terry Ebbert, stated that of the “100,000 left behind, most of that 100,000 chose to stay 

behind. Th at’s a big diff erence.”3

 Th is view seems to depend on an expansive defi nition of 

“evacuation.” As Joseph Matthews, Director of the New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) noted, offi cials may have considered “transporting [people] to the Superdome” evacuation as well.4

In any case, there was long-standing recognition that 100,000 to 150,000 people would 

remain in the city following an evacuation order, and that some of them would remain only 

because they could not move themselves. Offi cials explored means of moving people out 

of the city, but the issue took a back seat to plans to use the Superdome as a special-needs 

shelter and a refuge of last resort.

Before Landfall, Louisiana, Mississippi, and the Aff ected Southeast Louisiana 

Parishes Agreed to and Successfully Executed Louisiana’s Contrafl ow Plan 

Even before catastrophe strikes, evacuations are not simple. 

Careful planning is essential to a successful pre-landfall evacuation because of the problems 

that traffi c congestion and timing pose for the evacuees. Evacuation from the greater New 

Orleans area faces unique challenges for at least four reasons. First, evacuating the area requires at least a 45 to 80-mile trip (as compared to the 10 to 15-mile trip out of the aff ected 

areas in Mississippi). Second, there are only two or three ways out of the area. Th ird, one 

of those ways out of the area runs into Mississippi, requiring that state’s cooperation. And 

fourth, because of the limited number of ways to exit the metropolitan area, the northernmost parishes within the area (Orleans and Jeff erson) must wait patiently for the southernmost parishes within the area (St. Bernard and Plaquemines) to evacuate fi rst; otherwise, 

the northern parishes will choke off the southern parishes’ ability to evacuate. When these 

problems go unaddressed, thousands of people might be precluded from evacuating or 

delayed in Hurricane Ivan- or Rita-like traffi c jams extending for hundreds of miles.

Aft er the pre-landfall evacuation for Hurricane Georges fi rst exposed these problems in 

September 1998, the 13-parish Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Task Force asked the Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness5

 (LOEP) to solve these problems by creating a 

“contrafl ow” plan.6

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Generally speaking, contrafl ow turns all highway lanes in one direction, creating additional 

roadways for the execution of evacuation. Louisiana’s contrafl ow plan applied to Interstates 

10, 12, 55, and 59, so that all lanes of those highways would be heading out of New Orleans 

either upstate or east to Mississippi. 

Louisiana did not use its contrafl ow plan until the pre-storm evacuation for Hurricane Ivan 

in September 2004. In that initial experiment, the state and the parishes encountered serious 

problems with the execution of the contrafl ow plan, including disagreements among parishes 

as to which parishes should evacuate fi rst and the emergence of traffi c choke points in Baton 

Rouge and Slidell, Louisiana.7

 Th ese problems resulted in delays of 12-15 hours for people 

evacuating from the New Orleans metropolitan area,8

 as well as the deaths of nursing-home 

residents who died on the road in the heat and chaos of evacuating for Hurricane Ivan.9

To address the problems with contrafl ow that arose before Hurricane Ivan made landfall, 

the Governor ordered the Louisiana State Police (LSP) and the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) to develop a better evacuation plan.10 Th ose agencies 

assembled a task force and worked with private consultants, traffi c engineers, parish leaders, 

and local law-enforcement organizations in the relevant communities and conducted focus 

groups with residents to revise the plan.11

What resulted from this eff ort was the state’s 2005 contrafl ow plan, known as the Southeast 

Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan (LEEP). Th e plan resulted from cooperation between 

the governors and state police forces of Louisiana and Mississippi, as well as the state’s successful brokering of an agreement signed in April 2005 by the 13 parishes of the Southeast 

Louisiana Hurricane Task Force.

Th e LEEP addressed the problems identifi ed during Hurricane Ivan by (1) directing as 

much traffi c as possible away from what had been chokepoints at Baton Rouge and Slidell,12

(2) creating special procedures for coordination between Louisiana and Mississippi,13 and 

(3) requiring Jeff erson and Orleans Parishes to wait to evacuate their residents until aft er 

their neighboring parishes announced the evacuation of their residents.14

As to the last point, the LEEP seeks to manage the order in which parishes evacuate by 

establishing three phases for the pre-storm evacuation, based on geographic location and 

the time in which tropical storm force winds are forecasted to reach the aff ected area. Under 

the plan, Phase 1 of the evacuation begins at the 50-hour mark before landfall of a Category 

3 or higher hurricane, but contrafl ow only begins in Phase 3, once Jeff erson and Orleans 

Parishes have ordered evacuations, at around the 30-hour mark before landfall and aft er.15

Once the Governor fi nalized the plan in the spring of 2005, the state initiated a media blitz 

and public education campaign, with media outlets, the American Red Cross, and businesses like Wal-Mart, Home Depot, and Lowe’s all helping to distribute more than 1.5 million 

copies of the “Louisiana Citizen Awareness & Disaster Evacuation Guide.”16

Governor Blanco initiated contrafl ow at 4 p.m. on Saturday, August 27, and ended it at 5 p.m. 

on Sunday, August 28, with no vehicles waiting in queues to leave the potential impact area.17

By all accounts, Louisiana, Mississippi, and the Southeast Louisiana parishes successfully 

executed the 2005 LEEP, before Hurricane Katrina made landfall. With that plan, Louisiana 

evacuated approximately 1 million people before landfall.18

Th e post-Ivan revisions to the plan also contributed to the success of the pre-landfall evacuation, as traffi c jams exceeded two to three hours at most before Katrina made landfall, compared to the 12 to 15-hour traffi c jams evacuees experienced before Ivan made landfall.19
Pre-Storm Evacuations

245

Th ere was also close consultation between Louisiana and Mississippi offi cials, including 

conversations between Governor Blanco and Governor Barbour, which resulted in coordination between the two states on the execution of the pre-landfall evacuation.20 

Despite the success of the revamped contrafl ow plan, some offi cials saw opportunities for 

more improvement. Major John Miller, from the Mississippi Department of Public Safety, 

said that he would have state troopers stand farther back from the road next time: “[E]very 

third or fourth car has to stop and ask him a question,”21 snarling traffi c. Other suggestions 

included diverting some traffi c to avoid the bottlenecks at the northern ends of I-55 and I59,22 and working for better state-to-state communications interoperability.23

St. Bernard, Plaquemines, St. Tammany, and Jeff erson Parishes successfully followed and 

executed the LEEP. 

In St. Bernard Parish, Larry Ingargiola, the Director of Homeland Security and Emergency 

Preparedness for St. Bernard Parish, stated that he called for an evacuation of St. Bernard 

Parish – albeit something short of an actual mandatory evacuation – during the late evening 

of Friday, August 26.24 He recalled mentioning on the news that “We strongly recommend 

that you leave now because I don’t believe I have enough body bags to cover the people that 

stay.”25 Th e following evening, Saturday, August 27, the parish “called for mandatory evacuation, strongly recommended evacuation.”26 Between Friday and Saturday, he said, all television channels in Orleans, Jeff erson, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard Parishes ran scrolling 

news “zippers” noting the type of evacuation called for at the time.27 Moreover, Ingargiola 

described some of his parish’s concern about issuing a mandatory evacuation as follows:

Th e big decision on mandatory evacuation is monetary, the businesses themselves. When you do a mandatory evacuation, the businesses are required to 

close down. Th e refi neries are required to close down. We have three very large 

refi neries down [here]. ... It takes them roughly 8 to 12 hours to close down 

the refi nery. Every time they close it down, it’s over a million dollars to close it 

down and another million to bring it up. ... It’s not something you do easy.28

Furthermore, when asked whether St. Bernard’s evacuation of Saturday night was coordinated with other parishes, Ingargiola responded that it was not, because of concern that 

other parishes would act unilaterally:

No. We had a problem with Ivan because Jeff erson Parish pulled the plug before everybody else for mandatory evacuation and contrafl ow was in [eff ect] ... 

If the other parishes, Orleans and Jeff erson, pull the plug and we get contrafl ow, we are stuck. We can’t exit because we have one exit, Parish Road. You 

can’t go. You are not going to send your people through New Orleans because 

they are doing the same thing you’re doing. Th ey are going to sit in another 

parking lot.29

Despite these challenges, Ingargiola noted that St. Bernard Parish was able to successfully 

evacuate 92 percent of its population30 of approximately 66,000.31 When asked whether he 

felt his Friday night call for evacuation was early enough, Ingargiola said it might have been 

wiser to do so on Th ursday.32 But Th ursday, he noted, was a sunny day – had he called for 

an evacuation then, “Th e people would have thought I was crying wolf. Th at is your biggest fear, believe me. Somebody in my position, you will call it and somebody will just not 

believe what you call.”33

In Plaquemines Parish, Jesse St. Amant, Director of the Plaquemines Parish Homeland Security Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, described its pre-storm evacuation policy and results:
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246

People like myself, as emergency managers, should not be thinking, if I make a 

mandatory declaration and I make that recommendation to the governor, that 

he hesitates to do that because it might cost too much, you’re putting a dollar 

value on [a life].

And in my business, if you ask how much it costs to do something, you’re in 

the wrong business cause you could in fact cost someone their life.

You have to do what you must do to save life, and promise, and I take it very 

seriously. I’ll give you an example. By declaring a mandatory evacuation, it cost 

Philips Conoco millions of dollars to safely shut down a petrochemical facility, 

and then it cost millions of dollars to start it up. Th e two most dangerous kinds 

of petrochemical facilities is the shutdown and the start-up of that facility. Very 

dangerous; very costly. Yet I don’t hesitate to advise parish presidents. He does 

not hesitate to support me. I have his ear. He has – since I’ve been here, he has 

– he hired me. And let me suggest this to you ... I will relate success. We had 

a 93 percent evacuation rate, one [of] the highest in the area, probably in the 

whole state. But we know we’re also the most vulnerable. So the options aren’t 

that great. You have to be out of this high-risk area.

Th e other issue that we do is we do – we’re probably the fi rst jurisdiction in the 

State of Louisiana to [start the evacuation process] that because we extend in 

the Gulf of Mexico.34

Plaquemines Parish issued a mandatory evacuation on Saturday, August 27.35

In St. Tammany Parish, Dexter Accordo has been the Director of Emergency Management 

and Homeland Security since July 18, 2004.36 He said St. Tammany used the EarthCall notifi cation system – a “reverse 911 [system] where you can dial up people by geographic area, 

and you can broadcast an audio message to them, giving them directions of what’s going 

on”37 – to warn residents to leave. When you order a mandatory evacuation, Accordo said, 

“At no point for the most part is it logistically feasible to go and knock on everybody’s door, 

reach in and grab that person and yank them out of their house.”38 So a broader program of 

education is called for:

We reinforce it with the brochure [of evacuation maps], we reinforce it with 

the phone calls, we reinforce it with the outreach program training, we reinforce it with other forms of media ... If I tell you, you need to do this, you’re 

going to probably hesitate, but if you know why because we educate you why 

you need to do it, then there’s a stronger probability you’re going to do it.39

Accordo also spoke to the unique geography of St. Tammany Parish. He stated that the 

parish “represent[s] about two-thirds of the evacuation routes” for the metropolitan area, 

specifi cally the twin spans (I-10), the Causeway, and the “old highway” (highway 90) on 

the east side of St. Tammany and Orleans Parishes.40 Th ese plans have a large impact on St. 

Tammany Parish:

We get the biggest push probably through our area. We have to be cognizant 

of that because long before that 30-hour moment [i.e., the third phase of the 

State’s evacuation plan], we’re starting to feel the impacts of all this traffi c.41

Th e number of evacuees from St. Tammany parish is uncertain. Accordo estimated that 

several hundred people were evacuated to a large special-needs shelter at Covington High 

School,42 that 4,000 to 6,000 more were housed in other parishes’ shelters,43 and that about 
Pre-Storm Evacuations

247

127,000 were evacuated from the parish entirely, subject to check against a University of 

New Orleans post-storm study.44

In Jeff erson Parish, Walter Maestri, Ph.D., is the Director of Emergency Management and 

Homeland Security.45 Maestri recalls that Jeff erson Parish President Aaron Broussard announced to the parish residents on late Friday aft ernoon, August 26, “that they should be 

ready to go [i.e., evacuate] Saturday morning.”46 He believes that about 70 to 80 percent of 

the residents of Jeff erson Parish evacuated prior to the storm,47 a “successful evacuation.”48

Maestri noted that Broussard’s call for a parish evacuation on Friday aft ernoon to take eff ect 

the following Saturday morning was not a call for a mandatory evacuation:

None of the Southeast Louisiana parishes, the larger ones, Orleans, Jeff erson, 

St. Tammany, make mandatory evacuations. Th e reason for it, guys, is it’s unenforceable. You can’t do it. ... Now as you know, Mayor Nagin later changed 

that. He went to mandatory, aft er fi rst going to recommended. But the bottom 

line is that we did not and never will in Jeff erson call mandatory because you 

can’t do it.49

With respect to the 20 to 30 percent of persons who did not evacuate the parish, Maestri 

thinks “they got extremely lucky,” because the parish only got a “glancing blow.”50 He notes 

that what hit Jeff erson parish was primarily a “wind event ... and that’s why the fatalities 

are as low as they are. But the water is the killer. And we didn’t get the water in Jeff erson.”51

Moreover, Maestri said about half of the residents that did not evacuate before the storm 

moved to refuges of last resort within the parish, and the other half stayed in their homes.52

Lastly, Maestri indicated that the parish’s refuges of last resort were stocked with food, water, and fi rst-aid supplies.53 Maestri noted that he has a professional level, full-time person 

on his staff – the Shelter Coordinator – who has the responsibility to oversee and operate all 

of the parish shelters and refuges.54 

Th e City of New Orleans Failed to Prepare a Draft Mandatory Evacuation 

Order Before Katrina Approached the Gulf Coast

Although it can never be known what impact earlier issuance of a mandatory-evacuation 

order would have had on the pre-landfall evacuation of New Orleans, it is clear that the city 

did not resolve all issues incident to a mandatory-evacuation order and did not have one 

prepared before Katrina approached the Gulf Coast.

On Friday, August 26, Mayor Nagin held a press conference at City Hall to announce that 

city offi cials were monitoring Hurricane Katrina. 

On Saturday, August 27, Mayor Nagin joined Governor Blanco, and other offi cials for 

a press briefi ng at 1 p.m., during which the Mayor advised, according to talking points 

prepared for that briefi ng, that citizens should prepare for the storm, to include checking 

on neighbors and particularly the elderly, and announced the city would be calling for a 

voluntary evacuation later that aft ernoon or the morning of August 28 to coincide with the 

initiation of contrafl ow.55

According to a press report, Mayor Nagin said, “Th is is not a test. Th is is the real deal. 

Th ings could change, but as of right now, New Orleans is defi nitely the target for this hurricane,” later adding, “We want you to take this a little more seriously and start moving 

– right now, as a matter of fact.”56 Th e Mayor also recommended that residents of Algiers, 

the Lower Ninth Ward, and low-lying areas begin evacuating. Citizens were also advised 

that there were two special-needs shelters open in the state in Alexandria and Monroe.
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When Mayor Nagin issued a mandatory-evacuation order on Sunday, August 28, at approximately 9:30 a.m. CT,57 it was the fi rst time the City of New Orleans had ever issued a 

mandatory-evacuation order, 58 even though state law authorizes any parish to issue one.59

He had ordered his staff to begin working on the order at noon on Saturday, August 27. According to witnesses, the city took nearly 24 hours to issue the order because it fi rst needed 

to resolve legal and logistical questions.60

Chief among the issues to resolve was the determination of which classes of individuals would be exempted from the order. As initially draft ed, there were four categories of 

exceptions: essential personnel of the city, regulated utilities, hospitals (including patients), 

and operating hotels (including guests).61 Aft er this draft was circulated to senior staff for 

review and comment, the list of exceptions was expanded to include the media and essential personnel of nursing homes (including residents). But then Colonel Terry Ebbert, New 

Orleans’ Director of Homeland Security and Public Safety, recommended that the city not 

except nursing homes.62

Th e fi nal order included the following exceptions: essential personnel of the United States 

of America, State of Louisiana and City of New Orleans; essential personnel of regulated 

utilities and mass-transportation services; essential personnel of hospitals and their patients; 

essential personnel of the media; essential personnel of the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff ’s 

Offi ce and its inmates; and essential personnel of operating hotels and their patrons.63

In addition to these issues, the city was also concerned about how it would enforce the mandatory-evacuation order, and what transportation resources it had at its disposal to facilitate 

execution of the order.64

Long-term planning and preparation by the city before Katrina approached the Gulf Coast 

could have obviated this nearly 24-hour eff ort to resolve these issues. 

Nevertheless, Governor Blanco insisted that Mayor Nagin’s planning had been adequate, 

pointing out that evacuation was well underway before the mandatory-evacuation order 

was issued.65

Th e New Orleans Health Director, Who Initiated Draft Agreements to 

Provide Transportation for New Orleanians Without the Means to Evacuate, Deserves Credit for His Ingenuity and Eff ort, but the City’s Director of 

Homeland Security and Public Safety Should Have Finalized Th ese Agreements Before and During the 2005 Hurricane Season

Although the city’s emergency plans anticipated at least 100,000 people without the means to 

evacuate aft er a catastrophic natural disaster,66 the city’s top offi cials failed to plan and prepare 

adequately for the pre-landfall evacuation of this less-mobile segment of the population. 

When Terry Tullier, the former Director of the New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, who served in that position from May 2001 to his retirement in 2004, realized “that 

the city did not have the resources and at the time ... perhaps not even the political will”67

to move this segment of the population, he began exploring other transportation options. 

One was a volunteer program called Operation Brother’s Keeper, which would enlist private 

citizens to help those who lacked transportation to evacuate.68 A second involved informal 

discussions with the Regional Transportation Authority (RTA), the Orleans Parish School 

Board, and Amtrak to determine whether they would agree to provide transportation for a 

pre-landfall evacuation of New Orleans.69

Operation Brother’s Keeper (OBK) was a faith-based initiative developed in collaboration 

with Kay Wilkins, the area’s local Chapter Director of the American Red Cross. Th rough 
Pre-Storm Evacuations

249

the program, churches would identify those within their congregations who did not have 

the means or ability to leave the city and match them with those who could help. Tullier 

recalled briefi ng Mayor Nagin and Col. Ebbert, with Wilkins, about the initiative: “Mayor 

Nagin said in no uncertain terms, anything that the city can do to support you, I’m all 

for this initiative.”70 Th ere was apparent fi nancial support for OBK, including a grant of 

$216,000 from a private organization.71

Although Operation Brother’s Keeper was in place before landfall, it was not fully developed as logistical issues such as rally points and destinations had not been determined.72

Th e second of these initiatives, seeking alternative transportation from a variety of providers, was developed in late 2004, when Dr. Kevin Stephens, Director of the New Orleans 

Health Department, resumed Tullier’s work aft er he stepped down as the City’s Director of 

Emergency Preparedness (OEP), leaving the post vacant for almost six months.73 Between 

Tullier’s retirement in December 2004 and the appointment of Chief Matthews in March 

2005, the OEP director’s position was vacant. During this time, Dr. Stephens entered the 

breach and went to work on securing transportation for an evacuation of the city. Dr. Stephens explained why he saw the need to contract for transportation and shelters:

All of our plans had primarily been [to] evacuate [to] the Superdome. And so 

I just thought that maybe as a general shelter, refuge of last resort, we should 

probably try to get some places outside the city and not at the Superdome because of the limitations of the Superdome. ... So I called Amtrak and I called the 

school board and RTA and other guys ... and asked them would they be willing 

to transport people out of the city, and they said sure, we’d be happy to.74 

Dr. Stephens prepared draft memoranda of understanding (MOUs) among the City of New 

Orleans and Amtrak, the RTA, the Orleans Parish School Board, and the Cities of Baton 

Rouge and Hammond, Louisiana, contemplating use of various transportation resources to 

evacuate people from New Orleans prior to a hurricane. Th ese draft s, with the exception of 

the Amtrak MOU, were internal documents, not shared with the other named entities.75

Responsibility for the MOUs returned to the City’s OEP shortly aft er the Mayor appointed 

Chief Matthews to replace Tullier as Director in March 2005.76

Th roughout the spring and summer of 2005, logistical obstacles dogged planning for the 

MOUs. Once people were evacuated from the city, was there enough shelter space to accommodate them? Once Amtrak delivered them to the Hammond train station, how would 

they be moved to state shelters? Most importantly, in the view of Chief Matthews, there was 

a shortage of drivers qualifi ed to participate in an evacuation.77

However, the City’s OEP, part of the City’s Offi ce of Homeland Security and Public Safety, 

did not follow through suffi ciently to ensure execution of a single one of those agreements.78

Shortly thereaft er in June 2005 – three months before Katrina made landfall – the City’s 

Director of Homeland Security and Public Safety, Colonel Ebbert, eff ectively decided to halt 

the negotiations on these MOUs, based on the following rationale: “June starts the hurricane season. You can’t go to war still draft ing you[r] plan, so you have to make decisions of 

what you’re going to do this season.”79 With that decision, Colonel Ebbert lost opportunities to push his subordinate, Chief Matthews, to close these deals, and to ask the Mayor, the 

state, and the federal government for assistance in brokering these agreements.80 Th e Committee disagrees with Colonel Ebbert that the city would be incapable of continuing work 

on long-term preparations for a catastrophic storm in the midst of hurricane season, as was 

evidenced by the city’s participation in a July 2005 workshop on transportation staging and 

distribution of commodities.
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Th e Director of the City of New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness 

Turned Down Off ers of Assistance With the Pre-landfall Evacuation From 

the Regional Transit Authority (RTA)

Using federal funding granted in 2004,81 the New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness 

composed a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (the plan) to establish procedures to prepare the city for an emergency such as a hurricane. Th e plan divided emergency 

response into the standard Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), designating the Regional 

Transit Authority (RTA) as the primary agency82 for transportation during an evacuation.83

Specifi cally, the plan required the RTA to: “Supply transportation as needed in accordance 

with the current Standard Operating Procedures; place special vehicles on alert to be 

utilized if needed; position supervisors and dispatch evacuation buses; and if warranted by 

scope of evacuation, implement additional service.”84 Th e plan listed the following entities as supporting agencies under ESF-1: Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB), Louisiana 

Department of Transportation, Louisiana National Guard, and Amtrak.85

It was the understanding of James Tillie, RTA’s Chief Operating Offi cer, that the city would 

direct the RTA “to transport the citizens of the city from one location to safe harbor,” although for Katrina that meant the Superdome and not shelters outside of New Orleans.86

Th e city’s plan required the New Orleans OEP to coordinate and facilitate preparedness 

and planning for the plan’s designated response agencies, such as the RTA.87 Th e plan also 

required the OEP to direct and control those agencies with ESF responsibilities, such as 

the RTA, during emergency response operations.88 Although RTA is not a city agency, the 

Director of the Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Chief Matthews, acknowledged that 

the RTA, as the primary agency for ESF-1, would answer to and receive direction from the 

City’s OEP.89

Before Katrina made landfall, the RTA owned 372 buses and employed 650 drivers.90 RTA 

offi cials estimated that each bus could transport 40 people and their luggage out of the city 

during an evacuation.91 Of the drivers, approximately 100 volunteered for evacuation duty. 

(Th e number who remained in the city post-landfall was slightly lower, because some were 

prevented from returning to the city aft er driving special-needs evacuees to Baton Rouge 

because, consistent with the contrafl ow plan, the roads were closed a few hours before 

landfall.)92

Notwithstanding the RTA’s role under the City’s Emergency Operations Plan, RTA assets 

were not fully utilized in the pre-landfall evacuation because the Director of the New Orleans OEP, Chief Matthews, turned down the RTA’s off ers of assistance on the Saturday and 

Sunday before landfall, citing a lack of identifi able shelters as the reason.93

Th e City of New Orleans, the State of Louisiana, and the Federal Government 

Failed to Retain Drivers for the Pre-landfall Evacuation, Aft er City Offi cials 

Informed State and Federal Offi cials of Th is Need Over a Month Before 

Landfall

Although the New Orleans OEP Director, Chief Matthews, informed state and federal 

offi cials – over a month before Katrina hit – that New Orleans lacked bus drivers for a prelandfall evacuation,94 that need went unaddressed before landfall. 

Th e city had apparently designated buses from the RTA and the Orleans Parish School 

Board (the School Board), but the City’s Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness was having diffi -

culty getting them to agree to provide the city with bus drivers for the evacuation.95 Both the 

RTA and the School Board are independent creatures of state law and do not report directly 
Pre-Storm Evacuations

251

to the city, although the city – through its majority representation on the School Board 

– has the opportunity to exert control over it.96

At the July 2005 transportation, staging, and commodities distribution workshop (which 

was part of the Hurricane Pam planning project), Chief Matthews alerted state and federal 

offi cials of this hole in the city’s planning for the pre-landfall evacuation.97 Although he did 

not request assistance from the state and federal offi cials for buses or drivers,98 the federal 

offi cials who participated in the workshop understood that the city needed drivers: FEMA 

representative Jules Hurst recalled the local offi cials reporting that “they didn’t know if 

they could get the drivers to report.”99 A U.S. Department of Transportation representative, 

Dan Prevo, also recalled, based on the Pam discussions, that there was “no certainty that 

the drivers – if the buses would be made available, that the drivers would be available . . . a 

whole lot of research had to be done with regard to how many drivers would be available, or 

the liability issues that might be faced for the buses and for the drivers.”100

Informed of this need for drivers for over a month before Katrina hit, state and federal offi -

cials failed to explain why they did not take steps to recruit and retain drivers to participate 

in the pre-landfall evacuation. Th is inertia on the part of the state and federal government, 

which had been on notice of the city’s inability to muster drivers on their own, added to the 

city’s failures and resulted in a paucity of drivers available to participate in the pre-landfall 

evacuation – indeed, only 100 RTA drivers volunteered for duty. 101

Th e State’s Lead Agency for Transportation, the Louisiana Department of 

Transportation and Development, Failed to Meet its Responsibility Under 

the State’s Emergency Operations Plan for Identifying, Mobilizing, and Coordinating Transportation to Assist With a Pre-Landfall Evacuation

Th e state failed to provide any transportation to New Orleans for the pre-landfall evacuation mainly because the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Transportation and 

Development (LA DOTD) chose to ignore the Department’s responsibility under ESF-1 

(transportation) of the April 2005 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan to take the lead for 

coordinating transportation for the evacuation of at-risk populations.102

In January 2005, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 

(LOHSEP) offi cials explicitly told Gordon Nelson, LA DOTD Assistant Secretary for Operations, and Joseph Modicut, the Department’s emergency services coordinator, that primary 

responsibility for Emergency Support Function 1 (ESF-1) would likely be shift ed from the 

Louisiana National Guard to the LA DOTD to make the state’s plan consistent with the National Response Plan, which in December 2004 assigned the U.S. Department of Transportation to be the lead agency for ESF-1.103 Th ey also told the LA DOTD offi cials that their role 

in an emergency would be to coordinate obtaining buses from other sources, recognizing 

that LA DOTD did not maintain a fl eet of its own.104 Despite this notice and despite having 

signed the state plan in April, thereby binding the Department to assigned responsibilities 

within it, LA DOTD Secretary Johnny Bradberry and his Department took no steps to fulfi ll 

that responsibility. Bradberry said he assumed, albeit incorrectly, that the National Guard 

would handle mass bus transportation.105

Testifying before the Committee, Secretary Bradberry attempted to defend his agency by 

saying that the plan was “in transition,” and that he signed the plan to “keep things moving,” meaning he did not want to hold up the state’s overall emergency-operations planning 

process because of this issue. Nevertheless, he didn’t “necessarily agree with the idea that the 

Department of Transportation needs to have this transportation function.”106
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Because he felt that the city was addressing the evacuation of its citizens,107 Secretary Bradberry said that he had never had a conversation with Mayor Nagin, Colonel Ebbert, or Chief 

Matthews, about the evacuation of New Orleans residents without their own means to do 

so. Secretary Bradberry said: “We have done nothing to fulfi ll this responsibility ... we put 

no plans in place to do any of this.”108

Despite the January meeting with LOHSEP offi cials and the April signing of the plan by 

Secretary Bradberry, Nelson claimed he did not learn about the Department’s new responsibility until a July 2005 workshop, and Modicut said he did not learn about the new duty 

until the weekend before Katrina made landfall.109 Nelson disagreed with the assignment 

because the Department did not have an in-house stable of transportation resources, but 

he said nothing at the time.110 Th e Committee fi nds no reasonable explanation of why, for 

more than four months, the Department’s Assistant Secretary for Operations and Chief of 

Emergency Services were unfamiliar with a fundamental shift in the Department’s operational responsibilities under the state’s revised plan. Th ese offi cials, like Secretary Bradberry, 

did not advise state offi cials that DOTD signed a plan that it did not intend to follow, choosing to remain silent. 

In a letter to the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee, 

Secretary Bradberry commented on his Department’s lack of ESF–1 planning: 

To criticize the Louisiana Department of Transportation for failure to have a 

plan in place for transportation assets which were never requested is wholly 

unfair and unjust. Yes, DOTD should have acted sooner transitioning into the 

new responsibilities under the 2005 State Emergency Operations Plan, but the 

fact remains that DOTD did not receive any requests for transportation prior 

to Hurricane Katrina.111

Secretary Bradberry’s defense that there were no requests for transportation prior to Katrina rings hollow. Th e city discussed their lack of buses and drivers needed for a successful evacuation with state and federal offi cials at the July 2005 transportation, staging and 

commodities distribution workshop. Had LA DOTD taken meaningful steps to develop a 

plan, they would quickly have seen the inability of local government to manage its evacuation needs as a potentially catastrophic hurricane approached. Moreover, the state was not 

required to wait – and should not have waited – for a request from the city before off ering 

assistance, particularly when a catastrophe was imminent. 

As Katrina approached, some state offi cials were “leaning forward in the foxhole with 

[their] fi nger on the trigger.”112 Secretary Bradberry was not one of those offi cials. 

Th e Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 

Did Not Exercise Suffi cient Oversight to Ensure that Louisiana Department 

of Transportation and Development Would Fulfi ll its Responsibilities Under 

the State’s April 2005 Plan

Th e Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan assigned LOHSEP primary responsibility for “all 

emergency activities conducted by state, local and parish governments ... before, during 

and aft er natural and technological disasters.”113 Included within the scope of this charge 

is “planning and preparations before emergencies.”114 Th is imposed the duty on LOHSEP 

to ensure that other agencies carry out their assigned responsibilities under the plan.115

LOHSEP failed to discharge this duty in the case of LA DOTD’s ESF–1 responsibilities for 

transportation under the state plan.
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253

As noted earlier, LA DOTD offi cials Modicut and Nelson met with senior LOHSEP and 

Louisiana National Guard offi cials in January 2005 to discuss a possible shift of assigned 

responsibility for ESF–1 from the Louisiana National Guard to LA DOTD.116 At this meeting and in subsequent correspondence, LOHSEP’s Chief of Planning, Sean Fontenot, said 

that LA DOTD understood the responsibilities it would be accepting, and he attempted to 

provide some initial guidance regarding expectations for planning:

DOTD, the biggest concern ... was they had no resources. Th ey didn’t own 

buses. Th ey didn’t own [trucks], but the Guard owns trucks. ... You go to the 

Guard and say, “We need trucks,” the Guard will give you trucks if they have 

them to give you. Th e buses, I mean, DOTD has relationships with organizations and agencies like Louisiana Motor Transit Authority Association. Use 

some of your – this is what I told them, use some of your contacts, use some of 

your relationships to build these databases, and things of that nature, and they 

agreed and they understood that, and we moved on.117

Based on Fontenot’s statement that Modicut and Nelson were at the meeting, both should 

have been aware of the issue and, presumably, aware that the state was going to be looking 

to DOTD to meet this need.118

Despite this meeting and subsequent correspondence, once the plan was signed in April 

2005, there was no substantive follow-up by LOHSEP offi cials to ensure that DOTD was 

undertaking planning to fulfi ll the new responsibilities assigned to it under the plan. As 

Flooded school buses, New Orleans

AP/Wide World Photo
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254

Louisiana National Guard commander Major General Bennett Landreneau acknowledged, 

the need for LOHSEP to ensure that DOTD met its planning responsibilities “slipped 

through the cracks.”119

Governor Blanco Did Not Request Transportation Resources From the Federal Government for Pre-landfall Evacuation

Although it is unclear precisely what transportation assets the state could have mobilized 

over the weekend to assist the city with the pre-landfall evacuation, neither the Governor 

nor any other state offi cial off ered to provide transportation to assist with the pre-landfall 

evacuation or requested federal assistance.

On August 27, the Governor sent President Bush a letter, requesting $9 million for assistance for emergency protective measures under the Staff ord Act, the federal law that coordinates federal disaster assistance to states.120 Although the Governor, in this letter, requested 

that $2.5 million be directed to evacuation needs, she did not specify a need for transportation.121 Th e President issued an emergency declaration the same day, eff ectively granting the 

Governor’s request.

During video teleconferences with local, state, and federal offi cials on Saturday, August 27, 

and on Sunday, August 28, state offi cials discussed the success of contrafl ow,122 but did not 

raise the issue of additional transportation assets, despite the long-standing realization that 

100,000 people in New Orleans lacked transportation. Although LOHSEP Acting Deputy Director Colonel Jeff Smith noted on that call that the Governor “is very appreciative of the federal resources that have come into the state and the willingness to give us everything you’ve 

got because, again, we’re very concerned with this,” neither he nor the Governor made a 

specifi c request of the federal government for transportation resources before landfall.123

Th is lamentable failure by the Governor to request transportation resources shows not only 

a lack of initiative, but also a failure of leadership. 

Mississippi

Before Katrina reached the Gulf Coast, thousands of Louisiana and Mississippi residents 

evacuated to other states, including Texas and Oklahoma. In Mississippi, localities declared 

mandatory evacuations as the hurricane approached. Th ese were carried out relatively well, 

but some residents chose to disregard the orders. Many had already complied with two falsealarm evacuations over the last year.124 Others had disagreeable evacuation experiences. Still 

others, approaching the end of the month, no longer had enough money to support themselves and their families on the road. State and local governments performed their roles well 

in evacuating those who agreed to leave, but must do better by those without the means.

Evacuations of General Population Went Relatively Well

Th e Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) and the Mississippi Department 

of Transportation (MDOT) worked together to develop a hurricane evacuation guide that 

provides residents with a hurricane disaster checklist, information on evacuation routes, 

contrafl ow plans,125 traffi c control information, and emergency contact information.126

Th ough local governments must ultimately decide whether to order an evacuation,127 the 

state participates in the decision making process.128 Th is coordination is critical because 

once the city or county declares an emergency evacuation, the state becomes responsible 
Pre-Storm Evacuations

255

for managing traffi c fl ow and maintaining shelters.129 In preparing for Katrina, state offi cials 

worked with: the liaisons MEMA dispatched to the lower six counties along the Mississippi 

Gulf Coast; the Forrest County Emergency Operations Center in Hattiesburg; and the Louisiana Emergency Operations Center (because of contrafl ow agreements between Mississippi 

and Louisiana that provide for evacuations out of Southeast Louisiana to Mississippi).130 

Th e Mississippi Emergency Management Agency began monitoring the storm’s path and 

strength on August 24 – fi ve days before landfall – and issued its fi rst hurricane situation 

report that day.131 Two days later, another MEMA report notifi ed state and local agencies 

that the storm was now projected to make landfall near the Alabama/Mississippi border 

on Monday morning as a Category 4 hurricane.132 As a result, Governor Barbour declared 

a state of emergency which, according to Darryl Neely, the Governor’s Policy Advisor, 

prompted locals to begin evacuating coastal residents. State agencies met that aft ernoon 

at the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Jackson, Mississippi,133 and MEMA 

informed the three coastal counties of the storm’s path and projected landfall.134

When Robert Latham, the Executive Director of MEMA, which is located in Jackson, headed to the coast on August 27 to meet with county emergency managers to discuss storm 

preparations, he was worried that many would ignore evacuation orders.135

Latham and other state offi cials, who had reports of low traffi c counts on many evacuation 

routes and of residents having hurricane parties on the beach, 136 encouraged local offi cials 

to begin issuing mandatory, coordinated evacuation orders.137 Th ough many local governments had already issued strongly recommended,138 or mandatory evacuations,139 and were 

beginning to evacuate areas threatened by Hurricane Katrina throughout Friday evening 

and Saturday, some cities and counties were “slow to get them to come around,”140 according to the MEMA’s Response and Recovery Director: 

We were trying to make them understand that this was a bad storm and they 

didn’t want to move aggressively enough with the evacuation orders ... they 

should have called for a mandatory evacuation much earlier ... based on the 

information ... they had ... we felt that they should have called for mandatory 

evacuations of a larger area earlier and gotten the people out of there.141

According to Latham, emergency managers had a tough call to make in terms of evacuating 

residents: 

Th ey did understand how serious [the storm] could be ... aft er you’d already 

been through two or three evacuations, ... you go to your mayor or your 

supervisor and say, we’ve got to do this evacuation, ... then it falls back on the 

mayor or the board to ... stand up to public scrutiny when ... nothing happens. ... Th ey have to get reelected ... that’s just an unfortunate part of it.142

Because Katrina continued to intensify, National Hurricane Center Director Max Mayfi eld 

personally began calling state and local offi cials in the evening of August 27 to emphasize 

the threat.143 Mayfi eld also briefed Governor Barbour,144 comparing Katrina to Camille, 

the Category 5 storm that struck Mississippi in 1969. Governor Barbour and Latham felt 

the comparison to Camille would resonate, and asked Mayfi eld to convey the gravity of 

Katrina to the public.145 According to state and local offi cials, Mayfi eld and the Governors’ 

press and public announcements had the desired eff ect. Traffi c counts on evacuation routes 

began increasing.146
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Mandatory Evacuations Declared

Five Mississippi counties – Hancock, Jackson, Harrison, Stone, and Pearl River147 – issued mandatory-evacuation orders on or before August 28 for specifi c areas148 or zones in 

their counties and/or those living in mobile homes.149 Residents were told to travel north 

or northeast to avoid incoming traffi c from Louisiana and to use public shelters north of 

I-10.150

Many Residents Disregarded the Mandatory Evacuation Orders Due to 

Complacency, Poor Evacuation Experiences, and Insuffi cient Financial Resources to Support Th emselves and Th eir Families on the Road

State and local offi cials issued news releases, made appearances on local television and radio 

stations, used public address systems and, in certain neighborhoods, even went door-to-door 

to inform coastal residents about evacuation orders. Major Wayne Payne, Harrison County’s 

Deputy Sheriff , said that offi cers were particularly concerned about residents in the Henderson Point and D’Iberville areas, where the houses are built on stilts or are near water:151

Henderson Point here, we went door to door. We said, this is a bad one, you all 

need to get out. ... Th ese are houses on stilts. I mean, they’re 10, 15 feet off the 

ground and they’re gone. Th ey’re wiped out.152

Because offi cers did not have the authority to “drag people out of their homes” in places 

like Gulfport,153 they were forced to resort to more psychological forms of persuasion. If 

a resident refused to evacuate in Harrison County, an offi cer asked him to fi ll out a form 

indicating next of kin, which seemed to have the intended eff ect.154 In Waveland and Bay 

St. Louis, fi rst responders asked holdouts to make sure to have Social Security numbers on 

their body in permanent marker for easy identifi cation aft er the storm. Police compiled lists 

of locals who were determined to stay in their homes, recording names, birth dates, Social 

Security numbers, and next of kin.155 Th ese tactics proved eff ective in persuading residents 

to leave their homes.

Several factors contributed to resistance to evacuation. Evacuations earlier in the summer 

preceding a tropical storm and Hurricane Dennis, which largely turned out to have been 

false alarms, fostered skepticism.156 Others who had made it through 1969’s Hurricane 

Camille, the Category 5 storm that was the region’s benchmark for catastrophic storms until 

Katrina hit, thought they would see no worse. Harrison County’s Deputy Sheriff , Major 

Payne, explained:

I had a cousin that stayed in his house, and he said, Well, Camille only put a 

foot of water in my house. He stayed ... and had to climb in the attic to survive. Water got within six inches of his attic ... During Hurricane Camille, the 

tracks [railroad embankments] pretty well stopped the water. [With Katrina] 

we had storm surge on the Interstate.157

More than two-thirds of Katrina’s casualties in Mississippi were of retirement age, complicating evacuation. Others feared that looters would strike if they abandoned their homes.158

As the end of August neared, some residents had insuffi cient resources to support their 

families on the road. Latham explained:

People on fi xed income had ... paid their rent, they paid the utilities, bought 

their food for the month. ... I mean, a lot of people live check to check. And 

this is the 29th. And people ... said, look I don’t have money to evacuate.159
Pre-Storm Evacuations

257

Th e average cost of evacuation for three days for a family of four, including lodging, food 

and transportation, could easily exceed a thousand dollars. Many county residents had 

already evacuated several times that summer and simply could not aff ord it. Colonel Joe 

Spraggins, Director of Harrison County’s Emergency Management Agency recalled the 

explanation of one resident:

I’m single and have two children. ... I already evacuated ... twice when you 

all called before. And I had a choice. Because I am behind on everything now 

because I had to pay to go do that, and I have low income, and I had a choice, 

do I feed my children next month and pay the house rent or do I evacuate?160

State and local offi cials say that negative evacuation experiences in the past also contributed 

to residents’ reluctance to leave. Th e evacuation before Hurricane Ivan had stalled in and 

around Hattiesburg, where major evacuation routes converge, tripling the three-hour drive 

from the Gulf Coast to Jackson.161 As a result, Governor Barbour had asked Mississippi 

Public Safety Commissioner George Phillips to develop a plan that would provide additional law-enforcement offi cers to expedite evacuations, especially in the Hattiesburg area.162

According to state offi cials, the plan,163 completed prior to the 2005 hurricane season, was 

executed fl awlessly when residents evacuated during Katrina.164

By late Saturday and early Sunday – the day before landfall – Mississippi Department of 

Transportation offi cials reported “consistently high” traffi c counts and a “continuous increase in traffi c” in contrafl ow areas (I-55 and I-59).”165 By late Sunday evening, traffi c along 

the evacuation routes had decreased substantially.166 MDOT and MEMA offi cials stated that 

the evacuations went relatively well. According to MDOT’s Law Enforcement Coordinator, the biggest problem was residents’ waiting until the last minute to evacuate and then 

expecting traffi c to be minimal.167

Residents who, for a variety of reasons, ignored evacuation orders faced a greater set of 

problems than those evacuating. State and local governments performed effi ciently and effectively in evacuating those residents who agreed to leave, and persuading those who were 

undecided. Nevertheless, these agencies could have done better by the many residents of 

their communities who didn’t make it out not because of intransigence, but because they 

didn’t have the means. State and local offi cials have an obligation to help evacuate those 

who need assistance and should have specifi c plans to do so.

The Federal Government

Th e Federal Government Did Not Reach Out to State or Local Authorities 

About Transportation Alternatives for Th ose Lacking Means for Pre-Landfall Evacuation

In public-hearing testimony, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael 

Chertoff acknowledged the critical importance of pre-landfall evacuation: “In a situation 

like a fl ood in Katrina or an earthquake, the critical, the number-one most important thing 

is to get people out of the area in advance. Once the event has occurred, it’s going to be very 

diffi cult to rescue people.”168

As noted earlier, while Governor Blanco asked President Bush for and received the government’s help in paying the costs of contrafl ow, among other pre-storm needs, she did not 

ask for transportation from the federal government to assist the state with the pre-landfall 

evacuation. Th us, in an eff ort to obtain transportation assistance, the Governor did not 
Chapter 16

258

initiate the longstanding practice of making a formal request of the federal government for 

assistance. 

Th e federal government played no role in providing transportation for pre-landfall evacuation. Both in the run-up to Katrina and subsequent interviews, federal offi cials provided the 

same explanation: they were accustomed to the longstanding practice of generally deferring 

to the primary emergency response to state and local governments.169 Although the National Response Plan (NRP) does not specifi cally address evacuations, a “basic premise of the 

NRP is that incidents are generally handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible,” and 

that in “some instances, a Federal agency in the local area ... may provide direction or assistance consistent with its specifi c statutory authorities and responsibilities.”170 (See Chapter 

12 and 27 for a fuller discussion of the NRP and the specifi c statutory authorities.)

Th roughout the weekend of August 27 and 28 it had become increasingly clear to federal, 

state, and local offi cials that Hurricane Katrina would be a catastrophe. Mayor Nagin took 

the unprecedented step (albeit with some hesitation) of calling for a mandatory evacuation 

of New Orleans. Both President Bush and Governor Blanco actively encouraged that step. 

Th ere was no question that evacuation before landfall was the highest priority.

While the widespread support for mandatory evacuation is laudable, it is unfortunate that 

the federal government did not take a greater interest in the practicality of that evacuation 

in a city widely known to have made no arrangements for evacuation of the thousands of 

its citizens lacking personal transportation. Federal offi cials had participated actively in the 

Hurricane Pam exercise (See Chapter 8), which predicted that some 100,000 New Orleanians would lack means of evacuation.171 Federal offi cials did not need to wait for a request 

before off ering help. 

Although time would not have been on their side in the last two days before landfall, the 

DHS had a window – however slim – within which to act. But it does not appear that DHS 

leaders asked about what the state and the city were doing to evacuate the 100,000 people 

without transportation. Nor did they ask whether it would be useful for the federal government to mobilize and deploy buses or drivers to Southeast Louisiana.172 Nor did they ask 

whether it would be helpful to use the weight of the federal government to urge railroads, 

airlines, transit systems, or cruiselines to become engaged in the pre-landfall evacuation. 

Further, as the Committee found in Chapters 12 and 27, Secretary Chertoff failed to activate 

the Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) to the National Response Plan before landfall. Had 

Secretary Chertoff activated the CIA, it would have sent a clear message to federal agencies 

that they should be pushing assets, including transportation assets, forward to mobilization 

centers close to the disaster or in certain circumstances directly to the incident scene.

During the Hurricane Pam exercise, and follow-up July 2005 workshop, federal offi cials had 

heard state and local offi cials openly discuss their shortage of buses and other resources to 

evacuate that population.173 While there is some disagreement as to the fi rmness of federal 

commitment, federal offi cials evidently discussed at least the possibility of providing the 

buses that the state lacked.174 Participants in the July 2005 Pam workshop on transportation, 

staging, and commodities distribution even agreed on a timetable to pre-stage buses ahead 

of landfall, to be prepared for post-landfall evacuation needs.175 Even though this planning 

wasn’t complete by the time Katrina struck, federal offi cials were aware of evacuation challenges for state and local governments.

With no plans to supplement state and local transportation resources, federal options were 

limited. Getting buses from distant sources to New Orleans, as it did aft er landfall, may not 

have been realistic, depending on when the eff ort was initiated over the weekend. On the 
Pre-Storm Evacuations

259

other hand, there were many transportation assets either in the area (such as municipal 

buses, riverboats and cruise ships) or accessible (such as trains and airplanes) that the federal government could have helped to make available. Th e post-landfall resourcefulness of 

many offi cials who arranged for transportation alternatives suggests what could have been 

easily attempted before landfall.

Th ere is other evidence that the federal government can mobilize transportation resources 

for evacuation when it chooses to do so. Pursuant to a request from the State of Louisiana, 

the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) contracted for 1,100 buses and two drivers 

per bus for post-landfall evacuation during Katrina. Federal offi cials also staged a major air 

evacuation.176 Later, in preparation for Hurricane Rita, DOT reached out to transit agencies 

from Texas to Georgia to Florida.177 Four days before Hurricane Rita made landfall, FEMA, 

through DOT, ordered immediate staging outside of New Orleans of 650 buses “for use in 

evacuation of New Orleans and Southern parishes.”178 Also before Hurricane Rita made 

landfall, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) evacuated 1,204 patients and people with 

special needs before landfall, between 7 a.m. on September 21, when they received the mission assignment and noon on September 23.179

Th e DOT’s Federal Transit Administration (FTA) is in a uniquely strong position to coordinate privately and publicly owned buses. Th e FTA has close relationships with regional 

transit authorities through emergency preparedness operations. For instance, New Orleans’ 

RTA is a 92 percent federally funded agency and has extensive relationships with the regional 

offi ce of DOT.180 Also, DOT situation reports show that the FTA was keeping close tabs 

before landfall on the Baton Rouge transit system buses.181 Although the state was late asking 

the Baton Rouge transit system to participate in the post-landfall evacuation of New Orleans, 

it appears that the DOT did not ask the Baton Rouge transit system to participate at all.

Federal offi cials were both aware of state and local shortfalls, and had both the capacity and 

opportunities to help. But in the absence of adequate plans and policies, federal offi cials 

were paralyzed to act.

At 10:15 a.m. Sunday, August 28, the day before landfall, FEMA’s Acting Deputy Director 

Patrick Rhode, sent an e-mail to other FEMA offi cials, conceding that time had run out to 

help New Orleans with pre-landfall evacuation.182 Contrafl ow ended at 5 p.m. that day.183

Whether that seven-hour interval off ered any opportunity for useful federal action is unclear, but federal offi cials did not engage state and locals on the issue.

During a noon video-teleconference call the same day, then-FEMA Director Michael Brown 

asked Colonel Smith if there were “any unmet needs, anything that we’re not getting to 

you that you need” to which Colonel Smith responded, “Mike, no.” Brown testifi ed that he 

was seeking information from the state on what it needed at that moment only.184 As with 

Rhode’s e-mail, by noon on Sunday, time was limited for the federal government to help 

New Orleans with its pre-landfall evacuation. 

Secretary Chertoff was right when he said that evacuation was the primary mission before 

landfall.185 A concentrated eff ort by the federal, state, and local governments to eff ect a more 

complete evacuation of New Orleans before landfall would have likely reduced the number 

of people to care for at the Superdome, the Convention Center, and other collection sites; 

eased the burden of the search-and-rescue eff ort; lessened the challenge of the post-landfall 

evacuation; and reduced the number of critical supplies, medical support, and law enforcement that were needed in New Orleans aft er landfall. 
Chapter 16

260

Th e Federal Government Had the Authority to Assist With Pre-Landfall 

Evacuation, Even in the Absence of a Request for Assistance from State and 

Local Governments

Due to disagreement among offi cials as to whether, when, and to what extent the federal 

government could assist with a pre-landfall evacuation, it is helpful to examine the law and 

policy directing the way in which federal offi cials could have assisted with the pre-landfall 

evacuation.

 Federal law imposes no requirement for the federal government to aid pre-landfall evacuations. Such a requirement would be inconsistent with the principle that local and state authorities have primary responsibility for emergencies, receiving federal assistance only when 

their own resources are overwhelmed. However, federal law does not prohibit the federal 

government from extending assistance, even without a request from the state, when preparing for or responding to an imminent catastrophe such as Hurricane Katrina. 

Th e Robert T. Staff ord Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Staff ord Act) 

gives the federal government the authority to assist the state and local governments with an 

evacuation. Congress made clear in the Staff ord Act that its purpose was to “vest responsibility for emergency preparedness jointly in the Federal government and the states and 

their political subdivisions.”186 Included within the Staff ord Act’s defi nition of “emergency 

preparedness” is any measure “undertaken in preparation for anticipated hazards,” such as 

“the non-military evacuation of the civilian population.”187

Th e Staff ord Act also authorizes the President – and, through Executive Orders, the Secretary of Homeland Security188 – to direct federal agencies to “provide assistance essential to 

meeting immediate threats to life and property resulting from a major disaster,” including 

but not limited to the “movement of supplies or persons” and the “reduction of immediate 

threats to life, property, and public health and safety.”189 A common-sense reading of this 

language would indicate that the Staff ord Act authorized the President to direct a federal 

agency to help state and local governments move people out of New Orleans both before 

and aft er landfall to meet the “immediate threat” of Katrina.

Th e Homeland Security Act of 2002 enumerates FEMA’s functions which include assistance with evacuations. Under the Act, FEMA’s mission is “to reduce the loss of life and 

property and protect the Nation from all hazards by leading and supporting the Nation in 

a comprehensive, risk-based emergency management program,” including the responsibility for mitigation of risk to people and property, planning, and responding “to save lives ... 

through evacuating potential victims.”190

FEMA’s mission under the Homeland Security Act was to take steps to mitigate the risks to 

people that could arise from Katrina; plan to help offi cials prepare for Katrina and similar 

catastrophic storms; plan for an evacuation in the event of a catastrophic storm; respond to 

Katrina by “evacuating potential victims”; and coordinate eff orts by other offi cials.191

Th e Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) to the NRP delineates federal policy on a more 

proactive response to catastrophes. Th ese issues are discussed in Chapters 12 and 27. 

Provisions for Household Pets

Hurricane Katrina revealed that consideration of the needs of those with pets should be a 

factor in emergency planning for evacuations and sheltering.
Pre-Storm Evacuations

261

Th e City of New Orleans’ plans do not refer to pets, but the State of Louisiana’s EOP 

includes an appendix entitled, “Animal Management in Disasters,” which directs veterinarians, animal control personnel, and humane society volunteers to, among other things, “coordinate with the Louisiana Shelter Task Force on the sheltering of companion animals.”192

Th e NRP does not address the implications of evacuation and sheltering for pets, but has 

scattered references to animals. Most of these references relate to preventing outbreaks of 

disease through animals.193

More than 50 percent of U.S. households have pets.194 In the aft ermath of Katrina, the media 

brought to light many stories of individuals who refused to evacuate without their animals.195 One study revealed that childless households with pets were twice as likely to fail to 

evacuate as households with children. In other words, in childless households, owners “were 

apparently willing to jeopardize their lives to stay with their pets.”196 In his aft er-action 

report on Hurricane Katrina, Captain Mark Willow of the Homeland Security Division of 

the New Orleans Police Department wrote that “Some of the fatalities in New Orleans and 

surrounding areas may be attributable to the fact victims would not leave their pets at home 

or would not consider leaving without them.”197

Evacuation with pets before the storm was diffi cult for many since emergency shelters usually prohibit animals. Th e American Red Cross did not allow animals in its shelters.198 Animals can cause allergic reactions for some residents of the shelter, increase hygiene problems, and may become dangerous or unruly in the stressful setting of a shelter.199 Even aft er 

the storm passed, the media reported on many individuals unwilling to leave their homes 

despite dangerous conditions unless rescuers agreed to rescue their pets as well.200

Th e national organization of the American Red Cross works cooperatively with animal 

welfare organizations to develop procedures for stationing animal shelters close to its own 

shelters.201 In this way, owners are able to evacuate with their pets and maintain contact 

aft er arrival at the shelter. Th e American Red Cross implements this policy by encouraging 

local chapters to work with animal organizations to establish local agreements.202 However, 

Gulf Coast victims did not have pet accommodations inside or in close proximity to many 

of the available shelters.203 In particular, the New Orleans Superdome, the city’s refuge of 

last resort, had no pet shelter facilities inside or close by, and the Committee has seen no 

evidence of formal arrangements for Superdome refugees’ pets.204

During Katrina, the Lamar-Dixon Expo Center in Gonzales, Louisiana, (approximately 30 

miles from Baton Rouge) was designated as an animal shelter. Typically used for 4-H events 

and rodeos, it has almost 1,000 horse stalls and thus was able to serve both large and small 

animals.205 During Katrina, the Center handled approximately 8,500 rescued animals.206

For Katrina, FEMA activated all four of its Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams (“VMAT”) 

to the Gulf Coast.207 Th is involved more than 200 veterinarians and was FEMA’s largest 

simultaneous deployment of veterinary relief.208 Th e National Guard and Louisiana State 

Police assisted in collecting stray dogs.209 On September 2, 2005, the American Society for 

the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) and the Humane Society of the United 

States (HSUS) began a coordinated campaign with a dozen local organizations and volunteers from across the country to rescue animals from the aft ermath of Katrina. 

For Katrina, no standardized system for tracking rescued animals was in place. Th e website 

Petfi nder.com came to play an important role in allowing owners to fi nd rescued pets. 210
Chapter 16

262

1 Th e number 100,000 is cited during numerous interviews including: Committee staff interview of Terry Tullier, then 

Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, LA, conducted on Nov. 22, 2005, transcript p. 18. See also: 

City of New Orleans, Emergency Response Shelter/Plan appropriations request, FY2006, p. 1 (Col. Terry Ebbert is the 

point of contact, “Th e city of New Orleans faces the reality that it is impossible to conduct a mandatory evacuation in 

advance of a Category 3, 4, or 5 hurricane, as well as respond to other disasters including terrorism. Even under the 

best conditions that currently exist in terms of emergency response in the New Orleans region, evacuation would leave 

150,000 people in harm’s way.”).

2 Some attribute the reason for choosing not to leave as cultural. Both Col. Terry Ebbert and former Offi ce of Emergency 

Preparedness Director Terry Tullier expressed this sentiment in interviews. Col. Ebbert noted: “But these people hadn’t 

seen a Cat 3 since Betsy, 1965. So you’re talking about people who don’t think it’s going to hit them. Ivan last year bored 

down on us until it got to the mouth of the Mississippi and it turned. ... And I think it’s a cultural thing that’s been 

brought along.” Source: Committee staff interview of Col. Terry Ebbert, Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland 

Security, LA, conducted on Oct. 13, 2005, transcript p. 97. Tullier said, “Th e fi rst thing is a public offi cial has to convince 

this cultural masses [sic] that have accumulated this cultural philosophical viewpoint over 40 years, has to convince them 

it is in their best interests [inaudible] to leave.” Source: Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 216. 

3 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 44.

4 Committee staff interview of Joseph Matthews, Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, LA, conducted on Nov. 23, 2005, transcript p. 193.

5 In 2003, the state renamed this offi ce the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. 

6 Committee staff interview of Sean Fontenot, former Chief, Preparedness Division, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland 

Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 108-109 (“Aft er Hurricane Georges in ’98, local government in Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Task Force, which is comprised of the thirteen 

parishes in the southeast corner of the state ... went to the state and said, ‘we need help with this. We need Contrafl ow. 

We need you to do this.’”).

7 During the Hurricane Ivan evacuation, traffi c ground to a halt in Baton Rouge as I-10 and 1-12 converged. Sheila Grissett, “Evacuation decision expected today for metropolitan area,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, July 8, 2005. http://www.

nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-3/1120800310204660.xml. Accessed on May 15, 2006.

8 Committee staff interview of Sec. Johnny Bradberry, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, 

conducted on Nov. 17, 2005, transcript pp. 38-39.

9 Committee staff interview of Joseph Donchess, Executive Director, Louisiana Nursing Home Association, conducted 

on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript pp. 64-65.

10 Committee staff interview of Henry Whitehorn, Superintendent, Louisiana State Police, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, 

transcript p. 19.

11 Whitehorn interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 20-21.

12 Th e plan established three corridors out of New Orleans on I-55 North, I-10 West, and I-10 East and excluded I-12 

as a route to Baton Rouge, with hopes of directing as many people away from Baton Rouge as possible. Source: Committee staff interview of Bob Chapman, Emergency Services Manager, Mississippi Department of Transportation, and 

William Huff , Director, Enforcement, Mississippi Department of Transportation, conducted on Dec. 14, 2005, transcript 

pp. 28-30. Starting contrafl ow requires stopping traffi c in the lanes heading into the evacuation area. Th is process takes 

about 30 minutes. Once contrafl ow is initiated, the routes leading out of the area are limited to help alleviate congestion 

caused by people who might otherwise try to turn or change routes. At a specifi c point, on I-10 West, I-10 East, and I-55 

North, traffi c must follow designated routes which end up either west of Baton Rouge or in Mississippi. As depicted on 

the Louisiana Citizens Awareness & Disaster Evacuation Guide, I-10 West will have eight lanes of traffi c leading out of 

New Orleans, but at mile marker 209, those traveling on the eastbound lanes will be diverted onto the westbound lanes 

of I-10 and will continue west on I-10 toward Baton Rouge; those on the westbound lanes will be forced to go on to I-55 

North to travel to Mississippi. If evacuees take I-10 East, they will also eventually wind up on I-51 traveling to Mississippi passing through Slidell. To alleviate congestion caused by entering or exiting traffi c, traffi c is “laned,” meaning that 

once on the route the evacuee is dedicated for some extended period of time. Source: Louisiana State Police, Louisiana 

Department of Transportation and Development, and LOHSEP, Overview of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan, 

2005 [hereinaft er Overview of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan].

13 Under the plan, if contrafl ow into Mississippi is needed, the Louisiana governor will contact the Mississippi governor, 

who will make the decision whether to implement contrafl ow. Source: Chapman and Huff interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 

69-71. Th e improved LEEP has two possible contrafl ow route operations: Option 1, Louisiana contrafl ow to state line, 

which is full-lane reversal only within the borders of Louisiana; and Option 2, Mississippi contrafl ow to I-59 mile marker 

and to I-55 mile marker 31. Mississippi requests four hours advance notice for contrafl ow to the state line, three additional hours advance notice to start I-55 and I-59 contrafl ow operations if the state line operation is already in place, and 

seven hours notice to go straight into I-55 and I-59 contrafl ow operations. Th ese points were chosen to end contrafl ow 

because of concerns about manpower and the desire to get traffi c fl owing normally prior to arrival at a major metropolitan area, particularly Hattiesburg. Source: Mississippi Department of Transportation, Contrafl ow Plan for Interstate 

Hurricane Evacuation Traffi c Control, Aug. 2005, pp. 7, 20, 22, 37, 39; Chapman and Huff interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 50. 

14 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Mark Oxley, Chief of Staff , Louisiana State Police and Lt. Col. Joseph Booth, 

Special Projects Deputy Superintendent, Louisiana State Police, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, transcript pp. 33-34. Phase 
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three of LEEP includes areas on the East Bank of the Mississippi River in the New Orleans metropolitan area, which are 

within the levee protection system but remain vulnerable to a slow moving Category 3 or any Category 4 or 5 storm. 

Source: Overview of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan. Following Hurricane Dennis, during which Jeff erson Parish evacuated out of plan order, Jeff erson Parish President Aaron Broussard sent a letter in July 2005 to Governor Blanco 

criticizing part of the state’s evacuation plan. According to the Jeff erson Parish Director of Emergency Management, 

Dr. Walter Maestri, the plan put a tremendous burden on local law enforcement to get people through parish neighborhoods and onto the Interstates. Further, because of Jeff erson Parish’s geographic boundaries, citizens of the parish, 

depending on what part of the parish they reside, fall in Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3 zones. So, “If we follow the State 

plan perfectly one of our three groups has got to leave at night in the dark.” Source: Committee staff interview of Walter 

Maestri, Ph.D., Director, Jeff erson Parish Offi ce of Emergency Management, LA, conducted on Oct. 25, 2005, transcript 

pp. 90-92. It should be noted that Jeff erson Parish followed the State Plan for the Katrina evacuation, although it helped 

matters for Jeff erson Parish that the state operated the evacuation on a “compressed time line.” While a “compressed 

time line” was in place for Hurricane Katrina, Jeff erson Parish was criticized in Hurricane Dennis for compressing the 

time line of their evacuation. Source: Maestri interview, Oct. 27, 2005, pp. 20-21. 

15 Th e LEEP is based on a phased evacuation process which calls for specifi c action by specifi ed location at certain designated times before the scheduled landfall of a Category 2 or greater hurricane: (1) Phase 1 – at 50 hours before the onset 

of tropical storm winds, areas south of the intracoastal waterway may evacuate; (2) Phase 2 – at 40 hours before the onset 

of tropical storm force winds, areas south of the Mississippi River which are levee protected but remain vulnerable to 

Category 2 or higher storms may evacuate; (3) Phase 3 – at 30 hours before the onset of tropical storm force winds, areas 

along the East Bank of the Mississippi River in the New Orleans metropolitan area which are within the levee protection 

system but remain vulnerable to a slow moving Category 3 or any Category 4 or 5 storm may evacuate. Th e contrafl ow 

plan, reversing highway lanes so that all traffi c can fl ow away from the potential impact area, is implemented during 

Phase 3. Overview of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan. 

16 Whitehorn interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 18-22.

17 Oxley and Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 167, 203.

18 Mayor Nagin, in testimony before the Committee on Feb. 1, 2006 stated, “Our region had one of the most successful 

mass evacuations in the history of the United States. Over 90% of our residents evacuated. Over one million people left 

the region within 24 hours.” Source: Testimony of Mayor C. Ray Nagin, City of New Orleans, LA, before the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and 

Evacuating New Orleans Feb. 1, 2006. In testimony before the Committee on Feb. 2, 2006, Governor Blanco stated that 

“1.3 million people” were moved to safety “through our contrafl ow plan.” Source: Written Statement of Gov. Kathleen 

Blanco, Louisiana, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of Governors in Managing the Catastrophe, Feb. 2, 2006, p. 1.

19 Bradberry interview, Nov. 17, 2005, pp. 38-39. 

20 Testimony of Gov. Haley Barbour, Mississippi, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina Preparedness and Response by the 

State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005.

21 Committee staff interview of Maj. John Miller, Highway Safety Patrol, Public Safety Department, MS, conducted on 

Dec. 14, 2005, transcript p. 18.

22 Maj. Miller interview, Dec. 12, 2005, p. 19.

23 Maj. Miller interview, Dec. 12, 2005, p. 31.

24 Committee staff interview of Larry Ingargiola, Emergency Manager, St. Bernard Parish, LA, conducted on Oct. 26, 

2005, transcript p. 69-70.

25 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 69.

26 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 64.

27 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 79.

28 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 65.

29 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 68.

30 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 66. Mr. Ingargiola noted that it is his belief that it takes between 36 to 48 hours 

to evacuate that percentage of people from St. Bernard Parish. Source: Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 73. Additionally, Mr. Ingargiola stated that he was happy with this percentage, noting that, “I would have loved to see more 

people get out, but I don’t think we would have been able to get more people out than what we did.” Source: Ingargiola 

interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 100. “Th e ones that were left that we had to evacuate wouldn’t have left no matter what. I 

don’t think. We would have had to personally drag them out.” Source: Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 153.

31 U.S. Census Bureau, “QuickFacts: St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana,” 2004. http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/

states/22/22087.html. Accessed on Mar. 27, 2006.

32 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 75.

33 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 75.

34 Committee staff interview of Jesse St. Amant, Director, Plaquemines Parish Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, con-
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ducted on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript p. 23-25.

35 Louisiana, Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina Integrated Timeline, p. 13. Provided to Committee.

36 Committee staff interview of Dexter Accordo, Emergency Manager, St. Tammany Parish, LA, conducted on Nov. 10, 

2005, transcript pp. 3-4.

37 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 47.

38 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 50.

39 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 50.

40 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, pp. 94-95.

41 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 95.

42 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, pp. 96-97.

43 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 97.

44 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, pp. 108-109.

45 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 7.

46 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 102.

47 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, pp. 75-76; Committee staff interview of Walter Maestri, Ph.D., Director, Jeff erson 

Parish Offi ce of Emergency Management, LA, conducted on Oct. 27, 2005, transcript p. 37. Maestri stated that this 

estimation is based on the analysis conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of New Orleans. Maestri 

interview, Oct. 27, 2005, p. 37.

48 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, pp. 98-99. Moreover, Maestri stated, “We defi ne that as everybody who wanted to go 

had the opportunity to go in Jeff erson [parish]. So from my perspective that was a success.” Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 

2005, p. 99.

49 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, pp. 102-103.

50 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 76.

51 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 76.

52 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 166.

53 Maestri interview, Oct. 27, 2005, pp. 49-51.

54 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 20.

55 City of New Orleans, Mayor’s Press Room, Katrina Update, Talking Points, Aug. 27, 2005, 1 p.m. Provided to Committee.

56 “Mayor Urges Storm Preparations,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, Aug. 27, 2005. http://www.nola.com/newslogs/

breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_Times-Picayune/archives/2005_08.html. Accessed on Mar. 21, 2006.

57 Gordon Russell, “Nagin orders fi rst-ever mandatory evacuation of New Orleans,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, Aug. 

28, 2005. www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_Times-Picayune/archives/2005_08.html. Accessed 

on Apr. 15, 2006. When announcing the mandatory evacuation, the Mayor said, “I am this morning, declaring that we 

will be doing a mandatory evacuation,” and “I wish I had better news for you. But we are facing a storm that most of us 

have feared. I do not want to create panic. But I want the citizens to understand that this is very serious. ... We sent out 

a fax to all the churches that we could this morning, basically alerting them to exactly what we’re doing, and asking them 

to buddy up, to fi nd members in their congregations, to check on the senior citizens or a citizen who may not ... have 

the means and is totally reliant upon public transportation to get around.” Th e Mayor noted that the Superdome would 

open to the general public as a refuge of last resort at 12 p.m. Th ere were 12 locations identifi ed by the Regional Transit 

Authority (RTA) and announced by the Mayor as designated pick-up points for individuals in need of transport to the 

Superdome. Th e locations were: (1) E.J. Morris Senior Center, 1616 Caffi n Ave.; (2) Frantz, 9th Ward, 3811 N. Galvez St.; 

(3) Warren Easton, Mid-City, 3019 Canal St.; (4) Augustine, Mid-City, 425 S. Broad St.; (5) S. Williams, Uptown, 5712 

S. Claiborne Ave.; (6) Rabouin, CBD, 727 Carrondelet St.; (7) Arthur Monday Center, 1111 Newton St.; (8) O. Perry 

Walker H.S., West Bank, 2832 General Meyers; (9) Abramson, New Orleans East, 5552 Read Blvd.; (10) N.O. Mission, 

1130 Oretha Castle Halley Blvd.; (11) McMain Uptown, 5712 South Claiborne; (12) Sarah T. Reid High School, New 

Orleans East, 5316 Michoud Blvd. Mayor C. Ray Nagin, “New Orleans Mayor, Louisiana Governor Hold Press Conference,” Aug. 28, 2005. http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/28/bn.04.html. Accessed on Mar. 27, 2006. 

58 Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006.

59 Louisiana Statute 29:724D(5) authorizes the Governor to direct and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or threatened area within the state if he deems this action necessary for the preservation of life 

or other disaster mitigation, response, or recovery. Louisiana Statute 29:727F(5) authorizes parish presidents to direct 

and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or threatened area within the boundaries of 

the parish if he deems this action necessary for mitigation, response, or recovery measures.

60 Th e policy of the city’s previous mayoral administration was to shun mandatory evacuation orders because they 

would be “diffi cult to enforce” in a city the size of New Orleans. Source: Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 16. But 

Mayor Nagin testifi ed that his main concern with issuing a mandatory evacuation order was whether the city would have 
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adequate legal authority to do so. Source: Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006. According to Sally Forman, communications Director for Mayor Nagin, the Mayor made a decision on Saturday morning, Aug. 27, to call for 

a mandatory evacuation: “Th e Mayor said it in the Saturday morning meeting, make it happen. Saturday morning. He 

said if there is any way to make this happen, make it happen. I don’t care what you have to do, make it happen.” Source: 

Committee staff interview of Sally Forman, Communications Director, Offi ce of the Mayor, City of New Orleans, LA, 

conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript p. 18.

61 Sherry Landry, e-mail to Mayor Nagin and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 11:31 p.m. CT. Provided to Committee. Th e subject 

line is: Mandatory Evacuation Order and the text reads, “Th is is just a draft of a mandatory evac order. Please review. 

Are there any other exceptions that should be made?” Th e text of the draft follows this question. Another copy of the email, a response from Col. Terry Ebbert to Sherry Landry and others, dated Aug. 27, 2005, shows the time of the Landry 

e-mail as 22:30:32 hours (or 10:30 p.m.). Th e reason for this time stamp discrepancy is not clear. 

62 About an hour aft er the nursing-home exception was added to the draft order, Col. Terry Ebbert sent an e-mail to the 

city attorney to warn, “Many of the facilities are in single level buildings with marginal electrical back up. I recommend 

we not give them a opportunity to stay.” Terry Ebbert, e-mail to Sherry Landry, Aug. 28, 2005, 12 a.m. CT. Provided to 

Committee. 

63 Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Promulgation of Emergency Orders, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee.

64 Testimony of Col. Terry Ebbert, Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland Security, LA, before the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Challenges in a Catastrophe: Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, Jan. 31, 2006 (“Th e delay was basically designed in 

and occurred because of the diffi culties with doing something that [we had not] done before. And that is one of the 

challenges that we face this year is we have to, ahead of time, one, decide, what mandatory evacuation means. Two, what 

measures, legal measures, are we going to utilize to carry it out? Are we going to force people with police out of their 

particular homes? And then, three, ensure that when we issue that, that we have the capability to move these people.”). 

65 Testimony of Gov. Kathleen Blanco, Louisiana, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate 

the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by 

the State of Louisiana, Dec. 14, 2005; Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 109 (“[Th e Mayor of New Orleans] has a large 

population that doesn’t have the resources to evacuate on their own. Th ey either don’t have vehicles or their vehicles are 

not roadworthy. And that’s a real problem, if you take non-roadworthy vehicles onto the interstate and onto the evacuation plan you stop it, you halt it. Nobody is going to be able to get out if these cars all start breaking down. So you have 

got to have this plan to deal with that.”).

66 Mayor Ray Nagin, letter to the Honorable Mary Landrieu, Oct. 1, 2002 (“As many as 100,000 residents of New 

Orleans have no means of transportation, rendering it impossible for them to evacuate the City.”); City of New Orleans, 

FY2006, Funding Request to Congress, Emergency Response Shelter/Plan Homeland Security Appropriations, Attachment: “Th e Louisiana Superdome: Refuge of Last Resort.” Provided to Committee. 

67 Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 18. Tullier served as Interim Director beginning in May 2001 and became Director 

shortly aft er Mayor Nagin was elected to offi ce. Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 5-6.

68 Our Brother’s Keeper (OBK) was a faith-based initiative developed in collaboration with Kay Wilkins, local chapter 

director of the American Red Cross. Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 18-20, 78-80.

69 In addition to OBK, Tullier had informal conversations with representatives from the Regional Transportation 

Authority, the Orleans Parish School Board, and Amtrak about using their transportation assets to move people out of 

high-risk areas. Source: Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 22. No formal agreements emerged, but in preparation for 

Hurricane Ivan, RTA buses had been staged to deliver citizens to the Superdome from assembly points throughout the 

city. Source: Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 20.

70 Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 81.

71 Committee staff interview of Kay Wilkins, Chief Executive Offi cer, Southeast Louisiana Chapter, American Red 

Cross, conducted on Dec. 20, 2005, transcript p. 27.

72 Wilkins interview, Dec. 20, 2005, p. 92 (“You had to fi rst identify a lot of other intricacies. How are we going to meet, 

where are we going to go, how are we going to be sure who picks them up at the right time, bring them back at the right 

time? What about food, sitting in traffi c? All of that takes a very simple solution and makes it extremely complex and 

challenging.”).

73 Committee staff interview of Kevin Stephens, M.D., Director, New Orleans Health Department, conducted on Nov. 9, 

2005, transcript p. 25.

74 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 21-22. In addition to Amtrak, RTA, and the Orleans School Board, also 

made contact with the Delta Queen river boat.

75 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 26-28.

76 Recognizing that the city would need to make contact with other parishes regarding the MOUs, in April or May 2005, 

Dr. Stephens provided the draft s to the Director of the Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Joseph Matthews. Source: Dr. 

Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 23-24. Th e draft MOUs became part of the discussion on a larger, comprehensive 

evacuation plan for the city. Matthews said he started conversations with various agencies, including Amtrak, RTA, and 

the school board, sometime between March and May 2005, adding, “It was basically my offi ce taking the lead.” Source: 
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Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2005, pp. 14, 30. Matthews did not know whether conversations with these entities had 

begun before his tenure. Source: Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2005, p. 13. 

77 Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 43-44.

78 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 44

79 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 44 

80 Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 36 (“We brought the state in on the end. ... Th e state – we were planning on 

bringing other entities in as we went along. First we were going to try locally, then reaching out, getting the MOUs, and 

then moving forward.”). Also, the record is not clear as to the level of contact Dr. Stephens made with the state government to help the city execute these MOUs. Once the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) became aware in late May 2005 that the city was working on a plan to obtain outside transportation, 

LOHSEP offi cials sought to meet with the City’s Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness. Source: Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 

2006, pp. 133-135 (indicating that Dr. Stephens had discussed these MOUs with Dr. Jimmy Guidry, Medical Director, 

Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, and the State Health Offi cer for Louisiana). According to the then-Chief 

of Planning for LOHSEP, Sean Fontenot, the newly appointed New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness Director, 

Matthews, told LOHSEP offi cials in late May that he was not aware of what Dr. Stephens was doing. Source: Fontenot 

interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 133-135.

81 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Detailed Project Report by Project Type, Aug. 22, 2005, pp. 3, 13.

82 New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, May 2005 [hereinaft er 

New Orleans CEMP]. Th e Plan defi nes the role of the primary agency as follows:

 An ESF primary agency is responsible for:

1. Coordinating response eff orts within the functional area in order to achieve the specifi ed desired 

outcome;

2. Providing an appropriate level of staffi ng for eff ective operation;

3. Activating and subtasking support agencies;

4. Managing mission assignments and coordinating tasks with support agencies; 

5. Supporting and keeping other ESF primary agencies and organizational elements informed of ESF 

operational priorities and activities;

6. Obtaining equipment, supplies, and services as required following established regulations, policies, 

and procedures;

7. Coordinating response eff orts with appropriate regional, state, and federal responders and support 

agencies, and volunteer support organizations;

8. Supporting planning for short and long term emergency and disaster operations. 

New Orleans CEMP, Appendix: Emergency Support Functions. 

83 New Orleans CEMP, Appendix: Emergency Support Functions, p. 3. 

84 New Orleans CEMP, Annex I: Hurricanes, p. 18.

85 Th e Plan defi nes the role of a supporting agency as:

An ESF support agency is responsible for:

1. Supporting the ESF primary agency by conducting operation using its authority, capabilities, and 

resources;

2. Supporting the ESF primary agency mission assignments;

3. Providing status and resource information to the primary agency; 

4. Supporting planning for short and long term emergency and disaster operations. 

New Orleans CEMP, Appendix: Emergency Support Functions, p. 3.

86 Committee staff interview of James Tillie, Safety Director, Regional Transit Authority, City of New Orleans, LA, 

conducted on Dec. 19, 2005, transcript p. 18. As a political sub-division of the State of Louisiana, the RTA does not 

report directly to the Mayor. As a quasi-governmental agency, it is funded by local taxes, fares collected on the buses and 

federal funding sources. Committee staff interview of William Deville, General Manager and Chief Executive Offi cer, 

Regional Transit Authority, City of New Orleans, LA, conducted on Nov. 22, 2005, transcript pp. 5-6.

87 New Orleans CEMP, pp. 2-3.

88 New Orleans CEMP, pp. 9-10.

89 Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 9-10.

90 Deville interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 40, 42. 

91 Tillie interview, Dec. 19, 2005, p. 11. 

92 Deville interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 64. 
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93 James Tillie, e-mail to William Deville, Oct. 23, 2005, 11:29 a.m. Provided to Committee. Th e e-mail had a cc to Pat 

Judge and was in regard to RTA Activities for Hurricane Katrina.(“Nothing signifi cant occurred on Saturday, August 27, 

2005 as it relates to the RTA. I asked Chief Matthews, Director of the OEP if RTA would be required to evacuate citizens 

from the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS. Chief Matthews stated that shelters had not been identifi ed. Th erefore, RTA was 

not needed on Saturday, August 27, 2005. On Sunday, August 28, 2005 at about 9:00 a.m. I had another conversation 

with Chief Matthews relative to evacuating citizens from the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS. I advised him that RTA had approximately 100 operators and buses at Canal Station available to evacuate citizens out of town. Chief Matthews advised 

me that they still had not identifi ed shelters to receive evacuees.”). Th e Orleans Parish School Board (the School Board) 

designee to the EOC reported that he left a voice-mail message for the Director of the Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness on Friday, August 26, to ask if the School Board’s buses and drivers would be needed to evacuate the city, but said 

he never heard back and assumed the School Board’s buses weren’t needed. Source: Committee staff interview of Ed 

Johnson, Safety and Training Manager, New Orleans Public Schools, LA, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 

10-11, 20-21. It is unclear how useful the School Board’s off er on Friday would have been since that same School Board 

employee reported that the school buses were not moved to high ground because there were too few bus drivers working 

on a pay-day Friday aft ernoon. Source: Johnson interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 33-34.

94 Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 20-21, 44 (“It was a well known fact that drivers were the impediment.”); Col. 

Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 50 (stating that the city’s need for evacuation drivers “was always a constant discussion”).

95 Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 43-44 (“Q: Did you have buses? A: Well, yes, that’s what we were told by RTA 

and the New Orleans public school system that there were busses. Th ey had identifi ed a number of buses, but as always, 

drivers were the problem. I think it was like 350 buses or something like that that were identifi ed.”). Despite this assertion, as noted in above endnote, RTA and OPSB offi cials assert that they off ered buses and drivers.

96 Under Louisiana law, the Orleans Parish School Board (the School Board) is a constituted corporate body, and is 

funded by local taxes and state and federal funding sources. Source: La. R.S. 15:51. Th e School Board had 324 functional 

buses and approximately 250 drivers, available at least on a part-time basis. Source: Committee staff interview of Marva 

White, Director, Transportation Department, Orleans Parish School Board, LA, conducted on Nov. 23, 2005, transcript 

p. 12. Approximately 260 buses were lost to fl ooding. Source: White interview, Nov. 23, 2005, p. 14. Th ese resources 

presumably could have been utilized if emergency planners had arranged for drivers, fuel, and destinations for evacuees, 

and resolved liability issues, employment contract concerns, and logistical issues. 

97 Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 22-25 (“We have buses, we have everything but drivers.”). However, other state 

and federal offi cials, who participated in that workshop, recalled the city informing them of a need for buses, as well: 

According to the notes from the July 2005 workshop, Don Day of the U.S. Department of Transportation said, “We’re 

less than 10% done with this trans[portation] planning when you consider the buses and the people,” and Col. William 

Doran of the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness said, “buses we are tapping will be 

from the Parish. Might not be able to get a driver. Orleans Parish might be RTA buses. Drivers not provided.” Source: 

IEM, Inc., notes from Unifi ed Command Final Briefi ng, July 29, 2005, p. 4.

98 Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 22-25 (Interview question: “At any time prior to Hurricane Katrina did you 

make a request for assistance from the state or federal government for drivers?” Matthews answer: “No.”).

99 Committee staff interview of Jules Hurst, Transportation Supervisor, Logistics Branch, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 27, 

2006, transcript p. 37. 

100 Committee staff interview of Dan Prevo, former Region VI Regional Emergency Transportation Representative, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, conducted on Jan. 17, 2006, transcript pp. 12-14. 

101 Deville interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 50.

102 Under the state’s plan, LA DOTD was responsible for “identifying,” “mobilizing,” and “coordinating” transportation 

for the evacuation of at risk populations. Under the LA EOP ESF #1, DOTD is charged with the following:

Under ESF #1, I. Purpose: ESF 1 provides transportation out of a disaster area for people in need, and provides transportation essential to support emergency response in the event of a disaster.

Under ESF #1, II. Scope: Th e State services provided under this ESF will include the identifi cation, mobilization and coordination of available state owned, private industry and volunteer transportation equipment, manpower and technical 

expertise to meet the requirements of providing essential emergency response in the event of an emergency or disaster.

Under ESF #1, III.A. Concept of Operations, Mitigation: Th e Secretary of [DOTD] will designate an ESF 1 Emergency 

Transportation Coordinator to organize and coordinate transportation services.

Under ESF #1, III.B.1. Concept of Operations, Preparedness: Th e Coordinator will develop plans and procedures to 

mobilize transportation to support emergency evacuation for at risk populations and to support other operations of 

State Agencies.

Under ESF #1, III.B.2. Concept of Operations, Preparedness: Th e Coordinator will maintain information about transportation resources, with particular emphasis on resources in or near state risk areas.

Under ESF #1, III.C.1. Concept of Operations, Response: Th e Coordinator will process requests for transportation and 

arrange for National Guard, state agency, private industry and volunteer resources to be allocated to the highest priority 

missions.

Under ESF #1, III.C.2. Concept of Operations, Response: Th e Coordinator will continue to acquire, allocate and monitor 

transportation resources as the emergency continues.
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268

Under ESF #1, IV.A. Organization and Responsibilities: Th e [DOTD] has the Primary Responsibility for Emergency 

Transportation. Th at responsibility includes coordinating with support agencies to make sure that they develop and 

maintain plans and procedures.

Under ESF #1, VIII. Plan Maintenance: Th is ESF 1 Transportation Coordinator is responsible for developing, maintaining and coordinating plans, procedures, arrangements and agreements in support of this ESF. Louisiana Offi ce of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, ESF-1 [hereinaft er Louisiana 

Emergency Operations Plan].

It should also be noted that DOTD is listed as a supporting agency under the New Orleans OEP Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan. New Orleans CEMP, Emergency Support Functions Appendix, p. 3. 

103 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 22-23.

104 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 25-26.

105 Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 2005, p. 68.

106 U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Challenges in a Catastrophe: 

Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, Jan. 31, 2006.

107 Sec. Bradberry interview, Nov. 17, 2005, pp. 47-48 (“I had a confi dence level that the city was addressing that issue.”).

108 Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 2005, pp. 84-85.

109 LA DOTD’s Assistant Secretary for Operations, Gordon Nelson, said he fi rst became aware that the State was 

expecting LA DOTD to be responsible for ESF-1 Transportation, specifi cally, buses for an evacuation, at a July 2005 

meeting of the Southeast Louisiana Task Force in St. Charles Parish. Committee staff interview of Gordon Nelson, Assistant Secretary for Operations, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, 

transcript pp. 52-55. Committee staff interview of Joseph Modicut, Emergency Services Coordinator, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, conducted on Jan. 5, 2006, transcript pp. 38-39.

110 Nelson interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 58-59.

111 Sec. Johnny Bradberry, letter to the Honorable Susan Collins and the Honorable Joseph Lieberman, Re: Supplemental Testimony, Feb. 14, 2006. Provided to Committee.

112 Committee staff interview of James Ballow, Senior Operations Offi cer, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 4, 2006, transcript p. 151.

113 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, p. ESF-5–1.

114 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, p. ESF-5–1.

115 Ballow interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 154.

116 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 22-23 (Discussing Jan. 2005 meeting, attended by Modicut, Nelson, LOHSEP 

Acting Deputy Director Col. Jeff Smith, and LOHSEP Chief of Planning Sean Fontenot, regarding LOHSEP’s intention 

to reassign ESF-1 responsibilities to LA DOTD.).

117 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 24-25.

118 As Col. Jeff Smith stated, “Well, they [DOTD] signed off on the plan, so you know, the assumption has to be that 

they understood that that was the role or I would assume they wouldn’t have signed off on the plan.” Committee staff 

interview of Col. Jeff Smith, Acting Deputy Director, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 171-172.

119 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau, Adjutant General, Louisiana, conducted on Jan. 11, 

2006, transcript p. 154 (Responding affi rmatively to a question whether LOHSEP’s discharge of its duty to ensure that 

LA DOTD met its responsibilities under ESF-1 “slipped through the cracks.”).

120 Gov. Kathleen Blanco, letter to President George Bush, Aug. 27, 2005, pp. 2 and Enclosure.

121 In the letter to President Bush, Governor Blanco sought the following distribution of funds to assist the state with 

the coordination of the evacuation, but she did not specify a request for transportation resources: 

Louisiana State Police (LSP): Costs to support evacuations (Providing support for the phased evacuation of the coastal areas) – $300,000 for a non-direct landfall.

Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (WLF): Costs to support evacuations (Supporting the 

evacuation of the aff ected population and preparing for search and rescue missions) – $200,000 for a 

non-direct landfall.

Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD): Costs to support evacuations 

(Coordinating traffi c fl ow and management of the evacuation routes with local offi cials and the state of 

Mississippi) – $2,000,000 for a non-direct landfall. 

Letter from Governor Blanco to President George Bush, Aug. 27, 2005, pp. 2 and Enclosure. 

122 Col. Jeff Smith, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, p. 17. Provided to Committee (“I’ll just tell you 

that the evacuation process is going much better than it did during Hurricane Ivan. Nobody anticipated that it would be 

easy. Nobody anticipated that there wouldn’t be traffi c jams. But by and large, it has gone much better than it did with 

Ivan.”). 
Pre-Storm Evacuations

269

123 Col. Jeff Smith, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, p. 16. Provided to Committee.

124 Committee staff interview of Darryl Neely, Policy Advisor, Offi ce of the Governor, Mississippi, conducted on Jan. 

21, 2006, transcript p. 12-14.

125 Contrafl ow is a program designed for quick emergency evacuation of an area. Some incoming highway lanes to a 

city are changed to outbound lanes.

126 Mississippi Department of Transportation, Mississippi Hurricane Evacuation Guide, 2006. http://www.mdot.state.

ms.us/cetrp/ms_coastal_hurricane_05_01_06.pdf. Accessed on May 5, 2006. 

127 Harrison County, Standard Operating Procedures for Hurricane Evacuation, May 2003, p. 1. Harrison County’s 

Standard Operating Procedures for Hurricane Evacuation state that a number of factors must be considered in deciding 

whether to order an evacuation. Among them are “the characteristics of the hurricane itself. Magnitude, intensity, spread 

of onset, and duration are all signifi cant elements to be considered. Th ese will determine the number of people to be 

evacuated and the time and distance of travel necessary to insure safety. Another important facet is the availability of 

evacuation routes, their capacities, and their vulnerability to hurricanes. Mode of transport is also very signifi cant and 

provisions must be made for those persons unable to supply their own transportation.” 

128 Committee staff interview of Robert Latham, Executive Director, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 

(MEMA), conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript pp. 51-52, 56.

129 Committee staff interview of Robert Chapman, State Transportation Emergency Coordinator, Mississippi Department of Transportation, conducted on Dec. 13, 2005, transcript p. 32. Testimony of Robert Latham, Executive Director, 

MEMA, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005. 

130 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 25. Latham, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005.

131 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report, Aug. 24, 2005, 10 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA0010808.

132 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report, Aug. 26, 2005, 4:30 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA0010828.

133 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report, Aug. 27, 2005, 12 noon. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA0010834. State agencies also began preparing for the evacuation of Louisiana residents. On Saturday, Louisiana’s 

Department of Transportation informed Mississippi’s Department of Transportation that it would begin implementing 

contrafl ow (which reverses the fl ow of traffi c on some inbound highway lanes) later that aft ernoon. State law enforcement offi cers were deployed along the routes and in communities to assist evacuation operations. Mississippi had revised 

its evacuation plan aft er encountering traffi c problems during Hurricane Ivan in 2004. Chapman and Huff interview, 

Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 12-20; Neely interview, Jan. 21, 2006, pp. 5-7.

134 Robert Latham, e-mail to various Mississippi offi cials, Aug. 26, 2005, 3:46 p.m. Provided to Committee.

135 Robert Latham, e-mail to various Mississippi offi cials, Aug. 26, 2005, 3:46 p.m. Provided to Committee (“Th e big 

question now is will our citizens evacuate if they are asked to do so? I plan to go to the coast tomorrow.”).

136 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 37-39. 

137 MEMA’s emergency operations plan emphasizes the importance of coordinating evacuations within and among 

counties. Source: MEMA, Mississippi Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, 1999, Section ESF-1–4. MEMA’s 

Executive Director, Robert Latham, told committee staff that aft er Hurricane Dennis, he was concerned about lack of 

clarity in evacuation orders. Offi cials, particularly in Harrison County, had considered evacuating by fl ood zone, whereas 

many coastal residents didn’t know in which zone they lived. Latham met with coastal emergency management offi cials 

to streamline the process. “If you are doing a mandatory in one area and the county next to you or the city next to you is 

only doing a recommended ... it gets confusing.” Source: Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 32-33.

138 Local governments currently make evacuation decisions without criteria on the conditions that need to be in place 

for a “recommended” evacuation, “strongly recommended” evacuation and “mandatory” evacuation.

139 MEMA, Hurricane Katrina Situation Report, Aug. 28, 2005, 4 p.m. 

140 Committee staff interview of Tom McAllister, Director, Response and Recovery, MEMA, conducted on Jan. 27, 

2006, transcript p. 37.

141 McAllister interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 36-40.

142 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 43.

143 Committee staff interview of Max Mayfi eld, Ph.D., Director, National Hurricane Center, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, 

transcript p. 56.

144 Mayfi eld said that he had only made such a call to warn a governor once before in his career. He stated that “I just 

wanted to be able to go to sleep that night knowing I had done everything I could do.” John Pain, “Federal Forecasters 

Got Hurricane Right,” Associated Press Online, Sept. 16, 2005. 

145 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 36. 54.

146 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 36-37. Committee staff interview of Maj. Wayne Payne, Deputy Sheriff , Harrison County, MS, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript p. 25.
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270

147 Th e three Mississippi coastal counties are Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson, commonly referred to as the “Mississippi 

Gulf Coast.” Pearl River, Stone, and George lie directly to the north.

148 Since many residents weren’t sure in what zone they lived, Jackson County decided to call for evacuation by 

topographical area. Committee staff interview of Butch Loper, Emergency Management Director, Jackson County, MS, 

conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 39-40.

149 MEMA, Director’s Brief, Aug. 29, 2005, 5:02 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 0010700.

150 See Chapter 24, Medical Assistance, for a discussion of nursing home evacuations.

151 Maj. Payne interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 5, 25. 

152 Maj. Payne interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 25.

153 Committee staff interview of Paul Bennett, Deputy Chief of Police, City of Gulfport, MS, conducted on Dec. 8. 2005, 

transcript p. 8.

154 Ryan LaFontaine, “Police Issued Life-or-Death Directive,” Sun Herald, Feb. 18, 2006; Joshua Norman, “Why Did 

Th ey Stay,” Sun Herald, Feb. 18, 2006.

155 Ryan LaFontaine, “Police Issued Life-or-Death Directive,” Sun Herald, Feb. 18, 2006; Joshua Norman, “Why Did 

Th ey Stay,” Sun Herald, Feb. 18, 2006.

156 Neely interview, Jan. 21, 2006, pp. 13-14.

157 Maj. Payne interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 23-27.

158 Ryan LaFontaine, “Police Issued Life-or-Death Directive,” Sun Herald, Feb. 18, 2006; Joshua Norman, “Why Did 

Th ey Stay,” Sun Herald, Feb. 18, 2006.

159 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 39. 

160 Committee staff interview of Col. Joseph Spraggins, Director, Harrison County Emergency Management Agency, 

MS, conducted on Nov. 17, 2005, transcript, pp. 65-66.

161 Chapman interview, Dec. 13, 2005, pp. 39-40.

162 Latham, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005. 

163 In addition, MDOT now publicizes alternative routes, coordinates the traffi c signals on Highway 49, and has published a brochure on evacuation guidelines. Chapman interview, Dec. 13, 2005, pp. 38-40.

164 Chapman interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 34. Chapman interview, Dec. 13, 2005, p. 33. Latham, House Select Committee 

hearing, Dec. 7, 2005. 

165 MEMA, Director’s Brief, Aug. 28, 2005, 7 p.m.

166 MEMA, Director’s Brief, Aug. 29, 2005, 4:30 p.m..

167 Committee staff interview of Willie Huff , Law Enforcement Coordinator, Mississippi Department of Transportation, 

conducted on Dec. 14, 2005, transcript pp. 34-35.

168 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before U.S. House, Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e 

Role of the Department of Homeland Security, Oct. 19, 2005. 

169 During an interview with HSGAC staff , the Federal Commanding Offi cer for Baton Rouge affi rmatively responded 

that the federal government did not begin evacuations until the state made the request. Committee staff interview of 

William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, 

transcript p. 124. At the Orleans Parish level, Col. Terry Ebbert noted, “Pre-landfall evacuation was a city, state, region 

function.” Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 109.

170 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 

2004, p. 15 [hereinaft er NRP].

171 IEM Inc., 2004 Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Exercise, Executive Summary. Provided to Committee.

172 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 62.

173 U.S. Department of Transportation, Regional Transportation Representative, Region 6, Don Day, transcript of Unifi ed Command Final Briefi ng, July 29, 2005, p. 4 (“600 buses needed just to move people from collection points. ... We 

need to pre-identify the sources for these buses and have them lined up and ready. Th ere are plans to evacuate buses and 

operators out before the storm. Requires forethought, prior action. We have never looked into what it takes to make a bus 

staging/dispatch area. ... We’re at less than 10% done with this trans planning.”). It also became known to DOT offi cials 

that the city lacked drivers for the buses. Source: Prevo interview, Jan. 17, 2006, pp. 12-14. (Stating that based on the Pam 

discussions, there was “no certainty that the drivers — if the buses would be made available, that the drivers would be 

available ... a whole lot of research had to be done with regard to how many drivers would be available, or the liability 

issues that might be faced for the buses and for the drivers.”); Hurst interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 37 (Recalling that local offi cials in the Pam follow up workshops reported “they didn’t know if they could get the drivers to report.”). From discussions at the transportation working group, state and local offi cials expected that the federal government would help the 

state and locals with the evacuation. Source: Committee staff interview of Dolph Diemont, Region X, Regional Emergency 

Transportation Representative, U.S. Department of Transportation, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, transcript pp. 30-31 (“Th e 
Pre-Storm Evacuations

271

people that were involved in that work group must have sensed the same thing that I did, that there was a large reliance 

on the federal team coming in and fi xing everything. ... Th e state and locals had some plan in place for evacuation with 

buses, school buses and other buses, and they knew that FEMA would have to augment that in some way.”). 

174 Diemont interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 30-31.

175 In September 2005, aft er Katrina had made landfall, IEM (FEMA’s contractor for the Hurricane Pam exercise) 

published and distributed a transportation annex to the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, and this 

transportation annex refl ected the upshot of conversations had during the Hurricane Pam July 2005 transportation 

working group meetings. Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, prepared by IEM, Inc. for LOHSEP and 

FEMA, Sept. 2005, Appendix 1, p. 1(Noting that “local/state/federal” offi cials “pre-landfall” should “identify/validate ... 

600 buses [and] 1,200 drivers”). 

176 U.S. Department of Transportation, Hurricane Katrina-Situation Report, Sept. 3, 2005, 5 p.m., p. 2. Provided to 

Committee; U.S. Department of Transportation, Actions for Hurricane Katrina, Annotated Chronology of Signifi cant 

Events, Oct. 6, 2005, p. 8. 

177 Committee staff interview of Vincent Pearce, Manager, National Response Program, Department of Transportation, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, transcript p. 46 (“We looked at Atlanta. We actually – they actually called and talked 

to transit fl eets, the phrase I remember was “all the way East to Jacksonville,” and I know all the way West to El Paso, to 

determine what those fl eets had, what their plans were, how they might be able to participate in an evacuation if it were 

to be needed.”).

178 FEMA, MA Task Order Form, Sept. 20, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee.

179 Air Mobility Command, Aeromedical Evacuation Inputs NDMS Patient Movement AAR, briefi ng slides, Dec. 12-

13, 2005. http://www1.va.gov/emshg/page.cfm?pg=111. Accessed on Mar. 15, 2006. 

180 Deville interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 136, 143 (“Th ey’re responsible for oversight on all of our grants and our 

projects. Th ey meet with us quarterly to review all of our projects and the way we – plus they’re also responsible, doing 

procurement reviews and fi nancial reviews, triennial reviews. I mean, they’re really reviewing the books. We see ’em 

quite oft en. So I got to know Bob [USDOT] pretty well in that regard.”).

181 U.S. Department of Transportation, Hurricane Katrina-Situation Report, Aug. 29, 2005, 5 p.m., pp. 5-6. Provided to 

Committee.

182 Patrick Rhode, e-mail to Edward Buikema, Michael Lowder and Ken Burris, Aug. 28, 10:16 a.m. Provided to Committee (“Have we asked all eoc’s via emac or esf (transportation) to make transportation assets available to assist New 

Orleans today with evacuations? I know we need 72 hours to do this – we don’t have it – not sure what state is applying 

if someone can get some granularity on this issue.”).

183 Oxley and Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 203.

184 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 

62-67.

185 Sec. Chertoff , House Select Committee hearing, Oct. 19, 2005. Others agreed: FEMA’s logistic branch transportation supervisor Jules Hurst, who recalled having a discussion about pre-landfall evacuation during the Pam planning 

sessions, testifi ed: “Pre-landfall is defi nitely desirable to post-landfall, because the population being evacuated obviously 

doesn’t suff er the eff ects of the storm, at least hopefully.” Source: Hurst interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 54. Th e city’s Director 

of Homeland Security and Public Safety similarly testifi ed that in a catastrophe, “evacuation is the number one priority.” 

Source: Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 41.

186 42 U.S.C. § 5195 (“Th e Congress recognizes that the organizational structure established jointly by the Federal government and the States and their political subdivisions for emergency preparedness purposes can be eff ectively utilized 

to provide relief and assistance to people in areas of the Untied States struck by a hazard. Th e Federal government shall 

provide necessary direction, and guidance, and shall provide necessary assistance, as authorized in this title so that a 

comprehensive emergency preparedness system exists for all hazards.”).

187 42 U.S.C. § 5195a(3)(A).

188 On February 28, 2003, President Bush modifi ed Executive Order 12148, delegating most presidential responsibilities 

under the Staff ord Act to DHS (rather than to FEMA, as had previously been the case). 68 Fed. Reg. 10619 (Feb. 28, 2003), 

Sec. 52. (“Executive Order 12148 of July 20, 1979 (‘Federal Emergency Management’), as amended, is further amended by: 

(a) striking ‘the Federal Emergency Management Agency’ whenever it appears and inserting ‘the Department of Homeland Security’ in lieu thereof; and (b) striking ‘the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’ wherever it 

appears and inserting ‘the Secretary of Homeland Security’ in lieu thereof.”). See also: Executive Order 12673, 54 Fed. Reg. 

12573 (Mar. 28, 1989), Sec. 1 (amending Executive Order 12148). 

189 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(a)(3).

190 6 U.S.C. § 317(a).

191 6 U.S.C. § 317(a).

192 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, Appendix 3, Animal Management in Disasters.

193 NRP, pp. 14, 41, ESF-11. Neither the Hurricane Pam exercise nor the resultant Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic 

Hurricane Plan contemplated the shelter and transportation of pets. 
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272

194 Sebastian E. Heath, Phillip H. Kass, Alan M. Beck, and Larry T. Glickman, “Human and Pet-related Risk Factors for 

Household Evacuation Failure During a Natural Disaster,” American Journal of Epidemiology, 153:7, p. 659.

195 See e.g.: Stephen Nohlgren, “Without Fido, some won’t fl ee,” St. Petersburg Times, Aug. 26, 2005. http://www.

sptimes.com/2005/08/26/news_pf/Weather/Without_Fido_some_wo.shtml; See also: “Katrina survivors face dilemma 

over pets,” Reuters, Sept. 8, 2005. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9260578/did/9260578/print/1/displaymode/1098/; 

Maryann Mott, “Katrina Pet Rescue Eff orts Off er Lessons for the Future,” National Geographic News, Sept. 21, 2005. 

(http://news/nationalgreographic.com/news/2005/09/0921_050921_disaster_pet_tips.html. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006.

196 Sebastian E. Heath, Phillip H. Kass, Alan M. Beck, and Larry T. Glickman, “Human and Pet-related Risk Factors for 

Household Evacuation Failure During a Natural Disaster,” American Journal of Epidemiology, 153:7, pp. 662-663.

197 New Orleans Police Department, Initial (30-day) Aft er Action Report-Summary. Provided to Committee. See also: 

Matthews interview, Oct. 14, 2005, pp. 37-38 (“A lot of people would not evacuate because a pet is part of their family. If 

their pet can’t go with them, then they chose not to leave.”).

198 American Humane Association, Summary Report of the National Emergency Animal Management Summit, Jan. 8-9, 

2006, p. 11.

199 Maryann Mott, “Katrina Pet Rescue Eff orts Off er Lessons for the Future,” National Geographic News, Sept. 21, 2005. 

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/09/0921_050921_disaster_pet_tips_2.html. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006. 

Quoting Red Cross spokesman Nick Shapiro, “Th e Red Cross shelters must be designed to accommodate everybody. ... 

We can’t add the risk of animal bites, fl eas, other insects, and hygiene issues to an already stressful environment like a 

mass care shelter.” See also: American Humane Association, Summary Report of the National Emergency Animal Management Summit, Jan. 8-9, 2006, p. 6 (Discussing the risk of disease and contamination for volunteers at animal shelters 

and the need to periodically assess the likelihood that particular animal will bite.). 

200 “Katrina Survivors Face Dilemma over Pets,” Reuters, Sept. 8, 2005. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9260578/

did/9260578/print/1/displaymode/1098/. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006; Maryann Mott, “Katrina Pet Rescue Eff orts 

Off er Lessons For the Future” National Geographic News, Sept. 21, 2005. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/

news/2005/09/0921_050921_disaster_pet_tips_2.html. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006.

201 American Humane Association, Summary Report of the National Emergency Animal Management Summit, Jan. 8-9, 

2006, p. 11.

202 American Humane Association, Summary Report of the National Emergency Animal Management Summit, Jan. 8-9, 

2006, p. 11.

203 “Katrina Survivors Face Dilemma over Pets,” Reuters, Sept. 8, 2005. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9260578/

did/9260578/print/1/displaymode/1098/. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006.

204 Matthews interview, Oct. 14, 2005, pp. 37-38.

205 Stu Hudson, “Katrina’s Stranded Pets Spur Massive Aid Eff ort,” National Geographic News, Sept. 9, 2005. http://

news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/09/0909_050909_katrina_petrescrue.html. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006.

206 William Wan, “A Lesson from Katrina: Pets Matter; Disaster Plans Include First Aid, Evacuation Options for FourLegged Victims,” Th e Washington Post, Jan. 2, 2006, p. B01.

207 VMAT is part of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and “will supplement the relief eff orts already underway by local veterinarians and emergency responders.” American Veterinary Medical Association, “Animal Health.” 

http://www.avma.org/disaster/vmat/default.asp. Accessed on May 8, 2006.

208 William Wan, “A Lesson from Katrina: Pets Matter; Disaster Plans Include First Aid, Evacuation Options for FourLegged Victims,” Th e Washington Post, Jan. 2, 2006, p. B01. 

209 Carl Sullivan, “Pets in Peril,” Newsweek, Sept. 15, 2005. www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9326408/site/newsweek/print/1/

displaymode/1098/. Accessed on May 8, 2006.

210 American Humane Association, Summary Report of the National Emergency Animal Management Summit, Jan. 8-9, 

2006, p. 5.
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