IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

)

In the Matter of the Extradition of )

MARIA del ROSARIO MORENO-VAZQUEZ ) 3:06-CV-761-MEF-CSC

a/k/a MARIA COONLEY )

)

United States’s Supplemental Extradition Memorandum

The United States files this supplemental extradition memorandum to assist the Court

concerning the background and law pertaining to the Government of Mexico’s second request for

the extradition of Maria Del Rosario Moreno-Vazquez (“Moreno-Vazquez”). Previously, on

August 23, 2006, the United States filed an Initial Extradition Memorandum, which included the

background and law pertaining to Mexico’s first request for Moreno-Vazquez’s extradition for the

trafficking of minors. That memorandum included a general discussion of extradition procedure, the

unique features of extradition proceedings, the standard of proof, the necessary elements, and

evidentiary and procedural rules. This memorandum will focus on the background of the new

charges, provide a condensed legal discussion, and include a discussion of why Moreno-Vazquez

should be extradited. 

The second request for extradition includes a new charge for forging a public document. The

straightforward elements of extradition mandate that Moreno-Vazquez be extradited on this new

charge too. Despite the fact that Moreno-Vazquez’s situation is admittedly sympathetic,

international rules of comity, sovereignty, reciprocity, and non-inquiry require that Moreno-Vazquez

be extradited without further delay.

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 1

 The original of the formal extradition was filed by hand with the Court. The redacted version is located

at Doc. # 8-3, pp. 85-171.

2

I. Overview of the Additional Criminal Charges

1. According to the information provided by the requesting state in the form authorized

by the extradition treaty, Moreno-Vazquez is charged in Mexico with forgery of a Public Document.

The offense is set forth under Article 244, Section I, and is punishable under the first paragraph of

Article 244 of the Federal Penal Code of Mexico. On June 8, 2005, the Third District Judge in

Federal Criminal Proceedings, residing in the Federal District, issued a warrant for the arrest of

Moreno-Vazquez in criminal case number 66/2005. The undersigned has reviewed the arrest

warrant in this matter, located at Exhibit 11 of the formal extradition packet,1

 a translated copy of

which is attached as Exhibit A.

2. As set forth in Mexico’s formal request for the extradition of Moreno-Vazquez, while

Moreno-Vazquez was married to Jose Fernando Castillo-Tapia, the two of them had one child,

known in this proceeding as L.F.C.M., born in 1989. After they were divorced, they had another

child, known in this proceeding as M.F.C.M., born in 1994. The children lived with MorenoVazquez after the divorce at San Jorge, No 15, Lomas Verdes, Naucalpan, Mexico, 53120. 

3. On October 1, 1991, Moreno-Vazquez and Castillo-Tapia entered into a child custody

agreement whereby they each had certain custody rights, referred to as “patria potestad,” relating

to L.F.C.M. After the birth of M.F.C.M., both parents applied all of the benefits and guarantees of

the custody agreement to M.F.C.M.

4. On February 28, 2004, Castillo-Tapia went to visit his children at Moreno-Vazquez’s

home per their custody agreement. When Castillo-Tapia arrived at the residence, MorenoCase 3:06-cv-00761-CSC Document 19 Filed 04/18/2008 Page 2 of 10
3

Vazquez’s mother, Maria Elena Vazquez-Saucedo, informed Castillo-Tapia that the children were

not at home, and she did not know where they were located. Vazquez-Saucedo then handed

Castillo-Tapia a letter from Moreno-Vazquez in which Moreno-Vazquez stated that she and the

children had left the city. She did not mention where they were going.

5. Previously, in October 2003, Moreno-Vazquez informed Castillo-Tapia that she had

married an American that she had met on the Internet. At that time, Moreno-Vazquez asked

Castillo-Tapia if she could take the children out of the country with her. Castillo-Tapia denied her

request and told her that he would reconsider it after her relationship had stabilized. Based upon this

conversation, his children’s disappearance, and the note, Castillo-Tapia suspected that MorenoVazquez had taken the children to the United States. 

6. Later, on March 1, 2004, Castillo-Tapia learned from his children’s schoolmates that

his children had left on a plane to the United States. It was later learned that on February 27, 2004,

Moreno-Vazquez, L.F.C.M., and M.F.C.M. had flown from Mexico to Atlanta, Georgia, on

Aeromexico flight number 636.

7. In Mexico, in to order apply for a passport, both birth parents must sign a child’s

application documents. Castillo-Tapia never consented to his children leaving the country and never

signed any documents related to his children’s passport applications. According to the investigation

carried out by the federal attorney assigned to the case in Mexico, however, the regular Mexican

passport applications (OP-5) numbered 6290 and 6289 filed for L.F.C.M. and M.F.C.M. included

what purported to be Castillo-Tapia’s signature and digital fingerprint. Further expert analysis and

reports confirmed that the signature and the digital fingerprint were forged. 

8. Forgery of a Public Document is punishable by the laws of both the United States and

Case 3:06-cv-00761-CSC Document 19 Filed 04/18/2008 Page 3 of 10
 2 See, e.g., Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1369 (9th Cir.) (extradition hearing is sui generis), cert.

denied, 439 U.S. 932 (1978).

 3 The Supreme Court has twice cited with approval the district court’s reasoning in In re Wadge, 15

F.Supp. 864, 866 (S.D. N.Y. 1883). In that case, the district court rejected the argument that a respondent

in an extradition hearing should be given an extensive hearing in the extradition proceedings:

If this were recognized as the legal right of the accused in extradition proceedings, it would

give him the option of insisting upon a full hearing and trial of his case here; and that might

compel the demanding government to produce all its evidence here, both direct and

rebutting, in order to meet the defense thus gathered from every quarter. The result would

be that the foreign government though entitled by the terms of the treaty to the extradition

of the accused for the purpose of a trial where the crime was committed, would be compelled

to go into a full trial on the merits in a foreign country, under all the disadvantages of such

4

Mexico by a maximum prison sentence of no less than one year. As a result, it constitutes an

extraditable offense under Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 3, and Appendix, paragraph 10 of the

extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. See Extradition Treaty Between the United

States of America and Mexico, May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059, 1978 U.S.T. Lexis 317. 

9. Moreno-Vazquez is a Mexican citizen born in 1961 in the Federal District of Mexico.

Deputy United States Marshal Robert Wood is familiar with the identity of the fugitive. 

II. Application of the Extradition Elements to the Supplemental Charge

A. Legal Standards

Although discussed in much greater detail in the United States’s Initial Extradition

Memorandum, some highlighting of certain concepts is necessary for this supplemental brief.

First, it bears repeating that courts have recognized that the statutory hearing required by 18

U.S.C. § 3184 is of a unique nature.2 The purpose of the extradition hearing is limited to a

determination of whether a person is to be surrendered to a requesting country to answer

criminal charges or to carry out a criminal sentence. The hearing is not to try the underlying

case.3

 Moreover, an extradition hearing is not a criminal trial; its purpose is merely to decide

Case 3:06-cv-00761-CSC Document 19 Filed 04/18/2008 Page 4 of 10
a situation, and could not obtain extradition until after it had procured a conviction of the

accused upon a full and substantial trial here. This would be in plain contravention of the

intent and meaning of the extradition treaties.

Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316 (1922) and Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 461 (1913) (both citing In

re Wadge, 15 F.Supp. 864, 866 (S.D. N.Y. 1883)); see also United States v. Linson, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1123,

1126 (D. Guam 2000) (“Generally, evidence that explains away or completely obliterates probable cause is

the only evidence admissible at an extradition hearing . . . .”; citing Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 457-458

(1913)); accord Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 175 (2nd Cir. 1980) (no magistrate error in refusal to hold

hearing on fugitive’s claim that he would be killed if extradited to Italy).

 4 Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901); Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888); Simmons v.

Braun, 627 F.2d 635 (2nd Cir. 1980); Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429

U.S. 1062 (1977). Thus, the person whose extradition is sought is not entitled to the rights available in a

criminal trial at common law. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 461 (1931); Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S.

508, 512 (1911); United States v. Stockinger, 269 F.2d 681, 687 (2nd Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 913

(1959). For example: the fugitive has no right to discovery or to cross-examination witnesses who might

testify at the hearing, Messina v. United States, 728 F.2d 77, 80 (2nd Cir. 1984); his or her right to present

evidence is severely limited, Id.; and the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to a speedy trial, being limited by its

terms to criminal prosecutions, does not pertain to extradition proceedings. Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d

478, 485 n.9 (2nd Cir. 1976).

 5 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply to extradition proceedings. Fed. R. Crim. P.

54(b)(5) (“[t]hese rules are not applicable to extradition and rendition of fugitives”). Also, the Federal Rules

of Evidence do not apply to extradition proceedings. Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3) (“[t]he rules (other than with

respect to privileges) do not apply . . . [to p]roceedings for extradition or rendition”). Moreover, a fugitive’s

right to challenge the evidence introduced against him is very circumscribed; it is “limited to testimony which

explains rather than contradicts the demanding country’s proof.” Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1368 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932 (1978). 

The district court in Sindona discussed the distinction between contradictory and explanatory

evidence and cited the established authority for the proposition that an extradition hearing should not be

transformed into a full trial on the merits:

The distinction between “contradictory evidence” and “explanatory evidence” is difficult to

articulate. However, the purpose behind the rule is reasonably clear. In admitting

“explanatory evidence,” the intention is to afford an accused person the opportunity to

present reasonably clear-cut proof which would be of limited scope and having some

reasonable chance of negating a showing of probable cause. The scope of this evidence is

restricted to what is appropriate to an extradition hearing. The decisions are emphatic that

the extraditee cannot be allowed to turn the extradition hearing into a full trial on the merits.

5

probable cause, not guilt or innocence.4 These general propositions have resulted in special

procedural and evidentiary principles that apply to extradition hearings explained in this

footnote5

 and more fully explained in the United States’s Initial Extradition Memorandum. 

Case 3:06-cv-00761-CSC Document 19 Filed 04/18/2008 Page 5 of 10
Matter of Sindona, 450 F.Supp. 672, 685 (S.D. N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 619 F.2d 167 (2nd Cir. 1980). 

 6 To do otherwise “would defeat the whole object of the treaty.” Yordi v. Nolte, 215 U.S. 227, 231 (1909);

accord Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 517 (1916). 

In Bingham, the Supreme Court rejected the respondent’s claim that ex parte witness affidavits

submitted in support of his extradition to Canada should not be considered because he had not had the

opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses. The Court referred to the applicable treaty language, which

obligated the United States to extradite “upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the

place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment

for trial, if the crime or offense had there been committed.” Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. at 517. As 18

U.S.C. § 3190 does today, its predecessor, applicable in Bingham, provided for the admissibility at the

extradition hearing of depositions, warrants and similar documents upon proper certification by the U.S.

diplomatic or consular officer. In holding that the documents in Bingham were authenticated in accordance

with the statute, the Court also said:

It is one of the objects of § 5170 [today, § 3190] to obviate the necessity of confronting the

accused with the witnesses against him; and a construction of this section, or of the treaty,

that would require the demanding government to send its citizens to another country to

institute legal proceedings, would defeat the whole object of the treaty.

Id. In Yordi, the Supreme Court earlier formulated the same principle when it decided a question slightly

different from the one presented in Bingham. In Yordi, the Court decided a matter of the extradition hearing

court’s jurisdiction. In doing so, it observed:

We do not wish, however, to be understood as holding that, in extradition proceedings, the

complaint must be sworn to by persons having actual knowledge of the offense charged.

This would defeat the whole object of the treaty, as we are bound to assume that no foreign

government possesses greater power than our own to render its citizens to go to another

country to institute legal proceedings. This is obviously impossible. The ordinary course

is to send an officer or agent of the government for that purpose . . . . This obviates the

necessity which might otherwise exist of confronting the accused with the witnesses against

him.”

Yordi, 215 U.S. at 231. That principle of extradition law is as firmly-rooted today as it was in 1916 when the

Supreme Court decided Bingham. See United States v. Zanazanian, 729 F.2d 624, 626-627 (9th Cir. 1984)

(applying Bingham to extradition to Sweden); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 902 (2nd Cir. 1973)

(obviating necessity of confronting accused with witnesses against him is “one of the prime objects of bilateral extradition agreements”); In the Matter of Surrender of Ntakirutimana, 988 F. Supp. 1038, 1042 (S.D.

Tex. 1997), aff’d, 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999).

6

Because of these rules–as well as a long line of Supreme Court and Circuit Court

cases–extradition treaties do not contemplate the introduction of testimony of live witnesses at

extradition proceedings.6

Case 3:06-cv-00761-CSC Document 19 Filed 04/18/2008 Page 6 of 10
 7 Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896); accord Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511 (1916); McNamara v.

Henkel, 226 U.S. 520 (1913); Zanazanian v. United States, 729 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1980). 

 8 Probable cause is evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to

conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief in the guilt of the accused. Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187,

1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 462-463 (1888), the Supreme Court held:

the proceeding before the commissioner is not to be regarded as in the nature of a final trial

by which the prisoner could be convicted or acquitted of the crime charged against him, but

rather of the character of those preliminary examinations which take place every day in this

country before an examining or committing magistrate for the purpose of determining

whether a case is made out which will justify the holding of the accused, either by

imprisonment or under bail, to ultimately answer to an indictment, or other proceeding, in

which he shall be finally tried upon the charge made against him.

See also Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316 (1922); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167 (2nd Cir. 1980);

Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 562 (5th Cir. 1962) (“the extradition magistrate merely determines

probable cause, making an inquiry like that of a committing magistrate and no more”); accord Peroff v.

Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).

7

B. Elements & Application Based on Legal Principles

The elements for extradition are straightforward and have not changed over the last onehundred years.7

1. Jurisdiction (personal and subject matter);

2. Existence of a Current Treaty in Force;

3. Existence of Charges;

4. An Extraditable Offense;

5. Probable Cause (Including Identity).8

 

An application of these elements to the second request for extradition mandate that MorenoVazquez be extradited to Mexico. 

First, the Court has jurisdiction. Moreno-Vazquez was arrested and is currently residing

within the Middle District of Alabama. Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 3184 provides federal courts with

the subject matter jurisdiction over extradition matters. 

Case 3:06-cv-00761-CSC Document 19 Filed 04/18/2008 Page 7 of 10
 9 Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico, May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059,

1978 U.S.T. Lexis 317.

 10 See Exhibit A. 

 11 To the extent identity is an issue, Deputy United States Marshal Robert Wood is familiar with the

fugitive and can identify her. 

 12 See Ex. 2-5 of the Second Formal Extradition Packet.

8

Second, a current and valid extradition treaty exists between the United States and

Mexico.9

 Third, there are forgery of a public document charges currently pending against

Moreno-Vazquez in Mexico. On June 8, 2005, the Third District Judge in Federal Criminal

Proceedings, residing in the Federal District, issued a warrant for the arrest of Moreno-Vazquez

for forgery of a public document in criminal case number 66/2005.10 This is an extraditable

offense. Forgery of a Public Document is punishable by the laws of both the United States and

Mexico by a maximum prison sentence of no less than one year. As a result, it constitutes an

extraditable offense under Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 3, and Appendix, paragraph 10 of the

extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico.

Finally, there is probable cause to believe that the person arrested for this charge is

Moreno-Vazquez11 and that she committed the offense charged in the arrest warrant. In Mexico,

in order apply for a passport, both birth parents must sign a child’s application documents. 

Castillo-Tapia never consented to his children leaving the country and never signed any

documents related to his children’s passport applications. According to the investigation carried

out by the federal attorney assigned to the case in Mexico, however, the regular Mexican

passport applications (OP-5) numbered 6290 and 6289, filed for L.F.C.M. and M.F.C.M. were

applied for and included what purported to be Castillo-Tapia’s signature and digital fingerprint.12

Case 3:06-cv-00761-CSC Document 19 Filed 04/18/2008 Page 8 of 10
 13 See Ex. 6-7 of the Second Formal Extradition Packet.

9

Further expert analysis and reports confirmed that the signature and the digital fingerprint were

forged.13 Additional evidence supporting this charge is located in the second formal extradition

packet and will be presented at the extradition hearing. 

III. Conclusion

In the end, this extradition is a rather straightforward matter. Based upon the evidence

and the applicable law to extradition matters, Moreno-Vazquez must be extradited. She applied

for passports for her children so that they could come to America. She then forged her exhusband’s signature and fingerprint in these public documents. Because all the elements for

extradition have been met, under the terms of the treaty Moreno-Vazquez must be extradited to

Mexico as soon as possible to faces these charges.

Respectfully submitted this the 18th of April, 2008.

LEURA G. CANARY

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

/s/ Christopher Snyder

CHRISTOPHER A. SNYDER

Assistant United States Attorney

131 Clayton Street

Montgomery, AL 36104

Phone: (334)223-7280

Fax: (334)223-7135

E-mail: christopher.a.snyder@usdoj.gov

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Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on April 18, 2008, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk

of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the

following: Ben Elton Bruner. 

/s/ Christopher Snyder

CHRISTOPHER A. SNYDER

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