Def endant I RS has not joi ned De fenda nt United States’s motion to di smiss. As 1 explained below, the I RS cannot be name d as a pr oper de fenda nt in this action. F or consistenc y with the parties’ filings, howe ver, the Court shall use “De fenda nts” to ref

er to both the United States and the Interna l Revenue Ser vice a nd “De fenda

nt” to ref er solely to the United States as th e m o v i n gp arty. KY L E W. L AU KU S, Plaintiff,
v . UNI TED STATES, e t al

. , De fe nd ants . UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT

F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 09-475 ( CKK)

MEMORAN DUM OP INION (Mar ch 8, 2010) Plaintiff Kyle W. L aukus filed this ac tion ag ainst the United States and the I nterna l Revenue Service (“I RS”) (collec tively , “De fenda nts”) cla iming that the g overnme nt has eng ag ed in unlawful tax collection activities. Def endant United States ha s moved to dismis s the
c omp la int fo r i mpr op e r v e nu e , la c k o f s ub je c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n, and fa ilure to s tate a

c la im upon which re lief ca

n be g rante d. As explained below, L aukus has f ailed to re but, and there by 1
c on c e de d, De fe nd ant’ s argume nt t hat ve nu e is i mpr op e r i n th is d istri c t, a nd the Court fi nd s th at a transfe r in lieu of dismissal is not i n the intere st of justice. Alternatively , even if venue w ere proper , the Court would dismiss L aukus’s c laims for either lack of subject matter jur isdiction or failure to state a c laim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d. Acc ording ly , the Court shall GRANT De fe nd ant’ s [6] M oti on

to D ism iss the Com

pla int
.2 I. F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND The followingfac ts are dr awn f rom the alleg ations of the Complaint. Plaintiff Kyle W. L aukus maintains an a ddress at 4209 Red ArrowHig hway in Be nton Har bor, Michig an. Compl. at 1. From 1998 to 2003, L aukus re ceive d compensation for his labor in the form of w ag es. Id. ¶ 3. L aukus conte nds that he did not ear n or re ceive compensation as “income, gross income or tax able income ” in the amount of $334,204.96 dur ing the se y ear s and does not have an existi ngtax l iability to the United States. Id. ¶ 6. L aukus fur ther c ontends that he has f ully satisfied and pa id all income taxes for tax y ear s 1998 throug h 2003. Id. ¶ 7. L aukus
asser ts that he “did not rec eive a ny profit or g ain for c ompensation rec eived f or tax y ear s 1998 thr ou g h 2 00 3 a

nd do e s N OT ow e the UN I TE D ST AT ES, or any e mpl oye e s w or

kin gon its behalf , the fruit of his labor

proper ty .” Id. ¶ 8. F ro m Augus t 12 , 2 00 4 thro ug h M ay 16 , 2 00 6, L a

uk us re c e ive d c op ie s o f f

our I RS F or

ms 66 8( Y) (c ) - “ No tic e of

F e de ra l T a x L ie n” (“NF TL ” ). Com pl. ¶ 9 . L a

uk us atta c he d th e se fo rm s
a s E xhibi t B to h is C omp la int and c on te nd s th at th e y

we re “ pr oc e dura lly

imp ro pe r” and

“ le g a lly unenfor cea

ble.” Id. The fir st NFTL was issued a g ainst tax pay er A merica n Pride Trust for $82,231.31 and wa s signe d by the I RS on August 12, 2004. Id. , Ex . B ( 8/12/2004 NFTL ). The second N FTL

was issued a g ainst tax pay ers Rene e L . and Kyle W. L aukus for $99,419.93 and was sig ned by

the I RS on May

9, 2006. Id. , E x. B (5 /9/ 20 06 NF TL ). Th e thi rd and fo ur th NFT L s were issued ag ainst tax pay er K yle W. L aukus for

$301,215.59 and we re sig ned by the I RS on May

11 and 16, 2006, re spectively
. Id. , Ex . B ( 5/11/2009 NFTL , 5/16/2009 NFTL ). On August 7, 2006, L aukus re ceive d copies of two I RS Forms 668-A(I CS) - “Notice of L evy” issued to Chemical Ba

nk Shoreline in Be nton Harbor , Michig an: one a g ainst tax pay er A merica n Pride Tr us t f or tax y e ars 19 99 -2 00 1 in

the amou nt o f $ 18 1, 93 6. 34 and

the oth e r a g a ins t taxpay e r K yleL aukus states that he serve d these for ms on the Cincinnati Service Center , Are a 6 2 Direc tor and the Compliance Tec hnical Support Manag er. Compl. ¶ 14. 3 W. L aukus for

tax y ear s 1999-2001 in the amount of $334,204.96. Id. ¶ 10 & Ex . C (Notices of L evy ). L aukus conte nds that the Notice of L evy ag ainst him disclosed his “return infor mation” to an unauthorized third par ty . Id. ¶ 10. Around thr ee da y s later, L aukus re ceive d two letters fr om C he mic a l B ank

inf or min ghim that th e y ha d r e c e ive d th e No tic e s o f L e vy a g a ins t hi s Americ an Pride Tr

ust acc ount and his persona l acc ount and that $3164.99 and $13,816.47 ha d been se ized from those ac counts, respe ctively
. Id. ¶ 1 1. On or a bo ut Augus t 28 , 2 00 6, the I RS issued a F orm 668-B (I CS) - “L evy” ag ainst America n Pride Trust in the amount of $111,077.81. See Compl. ¶ 12 & Ex. D (L evy ). On or a

bout Aug ust 30, 2006, a Notice of Seizure was issued to America

n Pride Trust per

taining to c erta in property situated in the Township of B enton, County of B err ien, Michig an. Id. ¶ 13 & Ex . D (Notice of Seizure). L a uk us su bs e qu e ntl y

fi le d nume ro us fo rm s w ithva ri ou s I RS pe rs onne l w hic h h e c la ims have r esulted in no response from the I RS. See Compl. ¶¶ 14-18. Fr om about November 17, 2006 throug h J uly

31, 2007, L aukus ser

ved complete d For

ms 12661 - “Disputed I ssue Ve ri fi c atio n” and

84 3 - “ Re qu e st f

or Ab ate me nt” c on te sti nga lle g e d p e na lty a sse ssm e nts in response to multi ple “Notice s CP504” rece ived re fer encingthe amount due f or tax y ear s 2001- 2003. Id. ¶ 14. On or a

bout Febr uary 12, 2007, L aukus ser

ved a c ompleted For

m 12203 - 2

“ Re qu e st f

or Ap pe a ls R e vie w” atta c he d to an a ff ida vit of “ No tic e of

Inte nt t o Re ma in i n Compli ance with the Interna l Revenue L aws” in reponse to “ L etter 3176C.” Id. ¶ 15. Around April 18, 2007, L aukus ser ved anothe r complete d For m 12203 - “Reque st for Appe als Review” attache d to a notice that c ontested and disputed a lleg ed tax liabili ties in response to thre e “Notice s CP15” dated April 2, 2007, that re fer ence d $1500 as pena lty assessments for

tax y ear s4

2001-2003. Id. ¶ 16. L aukus also ser ved F orms 12203 - “Reque st for Appe als Review” on or about May

31, 2007 and Jul y

13, 2007. Id. ¶¶ 17- 18. On or a bout J uly 11, 2007, the seized proper ty in Be nton Township was sold at auc tion for $27,000. Compl. ¶ 19 & Ex . D (Cer tificate of Sale of Seized Property

). On Oc tober 15, 2007, the I RS sent a letter to Americ an Pride Tr ust indicating that the proce eds fr om the sale ha d been a pplied to its t ax li ability

and that its outstanding ba lance , including a ccr ued intere st and penalties, wa s $90,735.62. See Compl., Ex . D (L etter 3047)
. On J anuar

y 25, 2008, L aukus sent a le tter to the I RS captioned “Ve rified Notice of Administrative Claim, Demand to Release or Withdraw the L eg ally Unenf orce able Notice s of Fe dera l Tax L ien and Notice s of L evy , and Return Seized Property .” See Compl. ¶ 20 & Ex. A (Administrative Claim L etter) . L aukus asse rts that this letter satisfied the re quirements of 26 C.F.R. § 301.7433-1(e )(1) , which provide s proce dures f or filingan administrative c laim for damag es for

cer tain unauthorized collec tion actions. Id. ¶ 2 0. In h is A dmi nis tr ativ e Cla im L etter, L aukus cla imed, inte r a lia , that “The [I nterna l Revenue] Code And I RS Empl oy ees F ailed To Impose A Tax L iability CreatingThe B asis For

An Assessment,” a

rguing that the fede ral law s do no t de fi ne wh at c on sti tut e s “ taxab le inc ome ” and the re fo re I RS e mpl oye e s f a ile d to e sta

bli sh that L aukus had a

ny tax l iabilities. Id. , Ex . A (Administrative Claim L etter) at 7-8. On F ebrua ry 1, 2008, L aukus filed a

n Application for Withdrawa l of Filed F orm 668(Y) , Notice of Fe dera l Tax L ie n, a lle g ingthat th e fo ur NF TL s w e re fi le d p re matur e ly or no t in a c c or da nc e wi th I RS proce dures. See id. , Ex . A (Applica tion for Withdrawal). L a uk us a sse rt s th at D e fe nd ants have “ e ng a g e d in un lawf ul c oll e c tio n a c tiv ity

be c a us e the y did no t e sta bli shwh e n, wh e re or

ho w [L a uk us ’s ] pe rs on a l c omp e ns atio n r e c e ive d f ro m hi s labor prope rty

was involved, used, or

intended to be use d, in violation of the internal re venue5

laws. Id. ¶ 23. L aukus conte nds that he “w as not then and is not now see king to r estrain the lawful a ssessment or collec tion of any internal re venue tax , but is disput ing the unlawful collection ac tivity

and takingof per sonal proper ty ” by Def endants. Id. ¶ 24. II. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW A. Motion to Dismiss for Improper Ve nue Under Rule 12( b) ( 3) Def endant a rgues that the District of Columbia is an improper venue f or this case and that i ts h o u l d b e d i s m i s s e d

p ur s u an tt o F e d e r a l R

u l e o f C i v i l P r o c e d

ur e ( “ R u l e ” ) 1 2 ( b ) ( 3 )
. “ In consideringa Rule 12(b) (3) motion, the cour t acc epts the plaintiff’s w ell-pled fa ctual alleg ations reg ardingvenue a s true, dra ws all rea sonable infe renc es fr om those alleg ations in the plaintiff’s favor , and re solves any

fac tual conflicts in the plaintiff’ s favor .” Darby v . U.S. Dep’ t of Energy , 231 F. Supp. 2d 274, 276 (D.D .C. 2002). Neve rtheless, a plaintiff “be ars the bur den of establishing that venue is prope r.” Varma v. Gutierre z , 421 F. Supp. 2d 110, 113 (D.D .C. 2006) (i nte rn a l qu otatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o Fr e e ma n v . F all in , 254 F. Supp. 2d 52, 56 (D.D .C. 2003) (“[b]ecause it is the plaintiff’s oblig ation to insti tute the ac tion in a permissible forum, the plaintiff usually

bear s the burden of

establishing that venue is prope r”)
. B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject M

atter Jurisdiction Under Rule 12( b) ( 1) A cour t must di smiss a case pur suant to Rule 12(b)(1) when it lacks subjec t matter jurisdiction. I n deter

mining whe ther ther e is jurisdiction, the Court may “conside r the c omplaint supplemented by

undisputed fac ts evidence d in the rec ord, or the c omplaint supplemented by undisputed fac ts plus the court’s re solution of disput ed fa cts.” Coalit ion for Underground Expansion , 3 33 F .3 d at 19 8 ( c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o Jerom e Stev ens Pharm., Inc . v. Food & Drug Admin. , 4 02 F .3 d 1 24 9, 12 53 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 5) (“ [T]he dis tr ic t c ourt may c on sid e r mate ri a ls outside the pleading s in decidingwhether to gr ant a motion to dismi ss for lac k of jurisdiction.”).6

“ At the mot ion

to d ism iss sta g e , c ouns e le d c omp la int s, a s w e ll a s pr o s e complaints, are to be construed w ith sufficient libera lity to affor d all possible infere nces f avora ble to the pleade r on alleg ations of fa ct.” Settles v. U.S. ParoleComm’n , 4 2 9 F
. 3 d 1 0 9 8 , 1 1 0 6 ( D
. C
. C i r . 2 0 0 5 )
. In spite of the fa

vorable infere nces that a plaintiff re ceive s on a motion to dism iss, it remains the plaintiff’s burde n to prove subjec t matter jurisdiction by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Am. Farm Bureau v . Envtl. Prot. Agency , 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.D .C. 2000). “Although a cour t
mus t a c c e pt a s tr

ue a ll f a c tua l a lle g atio ns c on ta ine d in the c omp la int

wh e n r e vie wi nga

mot ion to dis mis s p ur su ant t o Ru le 12 (b )( 1) , [a ] pla int if f[’ s] f a c tua l a lle g atio ns in t

he c omp la int

. . . w ill bear closer sc rutiny

in resolvinga 12(b) (1) motion than in resolvinga 12(b) (6) motion for f ailure to state a c laim.” W

right v. Foreign Serv. Grievanc e Bd. , 5 03 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 63 , 1 70 (D .D .C. 2007) (inter

nal citations and quotation marks omitted). C. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Clai m Under Rule12( b) ( 6) Th e F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure re qu ir e that a c omp la int

c on ta in “ ‘a

sh or t and pla in statement of the c laim showing that the pleade r is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘ g ive the defe ndant fa ir notice of what the . . . cla im is and the g rounds upon which it re sts.’” Be ll A tl. Cor p. v . Two mb ly , 5 5 0 U. S
. 5 4 4 , 5 5 5 (2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Conley v. G ibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); accord Eric kson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (pe r cur iam). Althoug h “deta iled fac tual alleg ations” ar e not nec essar y to withstand a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dism iss, to provide the

“ g ro un ds ” of

“ e nti tle [me nt] t o r e lie f, ” a pla int if f m us t f ur nis h “ mor e tha

n la be ls a nd c on c lus ion s” or “a formulaic r ecitation of the elements of a cause of ac tion.” Id . at 19 64 -6 5; see also Papasan
v . A lla in , 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Instead, a complaint must contain sufficient f actua l matter,
acc epted a s true, to “state a cla im to relief that is plausible on its face .” Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 570. “A c laim has fac ial plausibilit y when the pla intiff pleads fa ctual conte nt that allows the7

court to dra

w the re asonable infere nce that the defe ndant is liable for the misconduct alleg ed.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , _

_ _ U. S
. _ _ _ , 1 2 9 S
. C t . 1 9 3 7 , 1 9 4 9 (2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 556). In e va luatin ga

Rul e 12 (b )( 6) mot ion

to d ism iss fo r f

a ilure to s tate a

c la im, the c ourt

mus t
c on str ue the c omp la int

in a light m os t f

avo ra ble to t he pla int if

f a nd mus t a c c e pt a s tr

ue a ll
rea sonable fa ctual infe renc es dra wn from we ll-pleade d fac tual alleg ations. In re United M ine W orkers of Am. Em

ployeeBene

fit Plans L itig. , 8 54 F . Su pp . 9 14 , 9 15 (D .D .C. 19 94 ); se e als o Schuler v . United States , 6 17 F .2 d 6 05 , 6 08 (D .C. Cir . 1 97 9) (“ Th e c omp la int mus t be ‘l ibe ra lly construed in f

avor of the plaintiff,’ who must be g rante d the bene fit of all infer ence s that can be derive d from the f

acts a lleg ed.”) . Howeve r, as the Supre me Court rec ently made c lear , a plaintiff must provide more than just “a sheer possibili ty

that a def endant ha s acte d unlawfully .” Iqbal , 12 9 S. Ct. at 19 50 . Wh e re the we ll- ple a de d f a c ts s e t f or th i n th e c omp la int

do no t pe rm it a

c ourt , draw ing on its judicial experienc e and c ommon sense, to infer mor e than the “ mere possibili ty of misconduct,” the c omplaint has not shown that the pleade r is entitled to relief. Id. at 1950. Where, a s here , the ac tion is brought by a pro se plaintiff, the Court must take par ticular
car e to construe the plaintiff’s f ilings libera lly , for suc h complaints are held “to less string ent standards tha

n formal plea dings dr afte d by lawy ers.” Haines v. Kerne r , 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). III . D ISC USS ION A. Improper Ve nue De fe nd ant m ov e s th e Court to d ism iss thi s a c tio n f

or imp ro pe r v e nu e purs ua

nt t o Ru le 12(b)( 3). To the e x tent that L aukus bring s this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346 for theSe c tio n 1 34 6( a ) p ro vid e s th at f e de ra l c ou

rt s h ave or ig ina l juri sd ic tio n o f “ [a]ny c ivi l 3 action ag ainst the United States for the rec overy of any internal-r evenue tax allege d to have be en err oneously

or illeg ally

assessed or

collecte d, or any

penalty claimed to have been c ollected wi tho ut a uth or ity or any sum a lle g e d to have be e n e xce ssi ve or in a ny mann e r wro ng fu lly collecte d under the internal-r evenue laws.” 8 rec overy of interna l reve nue taxes alleg ed to have been unla wfully assessed or

collecte d, venue

3 is proper only

in the district where L aukus re sides. See 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1) . Fr om the fac e of the Complaint and the attac hed exhibits , it is apparent that L aukus re sides in Michiga n. See Com pl. at 1- 2 ( lis tin gma ili nga dd re ss i n B e nto n H arb or , M ic hig an) ; id. , Ex . B ( 5/11/2006 NFT L ) (indicating L aukus re sides in Be nton Harbor , Michig an). I n his Compl aint, L aukus contends that ve nue is proper in the District of Columbia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(g)
. See Compl. at 2. However , § 1391(g ) is clea rly inapplicable be cause it only g overns ve nue in ca ses wh e re the jur isd ic tio n o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is b a se d o n 2 8 U .S. C. § 13 69 , whic h d e a ls w ith multiparty , multiforum lit igation. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1369, 1391(g)
. L aukus does not ar g ue in his opposition brief that venue is prope r in this District. See Pl.’s Opp’n ¶¶ 44- 46 (ar g uing only that jurisdiction does not depend on prope r venue and that the action may

be tra nsfer red if ve nue is improper) . “It is well understood in this C ircuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive moti on and addr esses only cer tain arguments raised by the def endant, a court may

treat those arguments that the plaintiff fa iled to addre ss as
conce ded.” See H

opkins v. W

omen’ s Div., Ge n. Bd. of Global Ministri es , 284 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003), aff’d , 9 8 F e d. Ap px. 8 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 4) ; Da yv . D .C. De

p’ t of Con su me r & Re gu lator yAf fai rs , 191 F. Supp. 2d 154, 159 (D.D .C. 2002) (“I f a pa rty fails to counter

an argument that the opposing party makes in a motion, the cour t may treat that argument asBe cause L aukus has br oug ht this action pr o s e , th e Court iss ue d a n o rd e r p ur su ant t o 4 Fox v . Strickland , 8 37 F .2 d 5 07 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 8) , a dv isi ngL a uk us that if he fa ile d to re sp on d to Def endant’ s motion t o dismiss , the Court might tre at the motion as conc eded. See [7] Orde r (June 25, 2009). 9 conce ded.”) Acc ording ly , the Court shall treat De fenda nt’s argument that venue is improper as 4
conce ded. When fac ed with an a ction laying ve nue in the wr ongdistrict, the court must either dismiss the ac tion or, “if it be in the intere st of justice, transfe r such c ase to a ny district or division i n which it could have been br oug ht.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The decision of whe ther a transfe r or dismissal is in the interests of justice re sts with the sound discretion of the district court. Naa rte

xCon su lti ng

Cor p. v . W att , 722 F.2d 779, 789 ( D.C. Cir. 1983). The intere st of justice g ener ally

require s transfe rringsuch ca ses instead of dismissing the m. See G oldlawr, Inc. v. He iman , 369 U.S. 463, 466-67 (1962). H oweve r, if no cour t would have subjec t matter jurisdiction over a c laim, the court must dismiss beca use there is no appropriate transf ere e cour t. In addition, dismi ssal may be appr opriate where there are obvious substantive problems with the plaintiff’s cla ims. See Phillips v. Seiter , 1 73 F .3 d 6 09 , 6 10 -1 1 ( 7th Cir . 1 99 9) (h old ingthat it is
a pp ro pr iate fo r d istri c t c ourt s to take a “ pe e k at th e me ri ts” wh e n d e c idi ngwh e the r a tr ans fe r i s in the intere sts of justice); Buchanan v . Manley , 145 F.3d 386, 389 n.6 ( D.C. Cir. 1998) (findingno abuse of discretion whe re district c ourt conc luded that transf er w ould not be in the interests of justice wher e ther e we re “ substantive problems” with the plaintiff’ s claims). De fenda nt urg es the Court to dism iss rather tha n transfe r this action bec ause it conte nds that any court would lac k jurisdiction over most of L aukus’ c laims and that the re maining c ounts fail to state a c laim upon wh ic h r e lie f c an b e g ra

nte d. Ac c or din g ly , th e Court sh a ll r e vie w D e fe nd ant’ s c on te nti on s w ith
re sp e c t to e a c h o f t

he c la ims a sse rt e d b y

L a uk us in o rd e r t o d e te rm ine wh e the r a tr ans fe r i s10

appropr iate in the intere sts of justice. B. Claims for

Quiet Title Under 28 U.S.C. § 2410 In Counts I , I I , and I I Iof the Complaint, L aukus bring s claims for quiet title under 28 U.S.C. § 2410, which provides that the “ United States may be name d a par

ty in any civil action or suit in any

district court . . . havingjurisdiction of the subject matter . . . to quiet titl e to . . .
rea l or persona l property

on which the United States ha s or claims a mortg ag e or othe r lien.” 28 U. S.C. § 2 41 0( a ). “ I t is e le me nta ry that th e Un ite d St ate s, a s so ve re ig n, is i mmune fr om s uit
save a s it consents to be sued, and the terms of its consent to be sue d in any court de fine that court’s jurisdiction to enter tain that suit.” Un ite d S

tates v . M itc he ll , 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (citation omitted). Moreove r, “a waiver of sover eig n immunit y

‘ca nnot be implied but mustbe unequivoca lly

expressed.’” Id. (c i t i n g United States v. King , 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)). Sec tion 2410 “wa ives sovere ign immunity in case s that challeng e the pr ocedur al re g ularity of a tax lien.” W hite v . U .S . G ov ’t De p’ t of Tre as ur y , 969 F. Supp. 321, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1997) . Howeve r, § 2410 does not authorize a c halleng e to the under lying tax assessment itself. See P ollinger v. United States , 539 F. Supp. 2d 242, 251 (D.D .C.) (“[T]he principle that a tax pay er c annot use sec tion 2410(a) to challeng e the e x tent of, or e x istence of , substantive tax l iability

is well-settled.”) (qu o t i n g Robinson v. United States , 920 F.3d 1157, 1161 ( 3d Cir. 1990). Thus, § 2410 “constitutes a wa iver of sove reig n immunit y to a suit broug ht by

a taxpay er a g ainst the United States which cha lleng es the va lidity of a f eder al tax li en and sa le so long as the taxpay er r efr ains from conte sting the me rits of the under lying tax assessment itself.” Aqua Bar &Lounge, Inc. v
. U. S. De p’ t of Tre as ur y , 539 F.2d 935, 939- 40 (3d Cir. 1976). In Counts I , I I , and I I I , L aukus see ks quiet titl e to ce rtain re al and pe rsonal prope rty which has bee n subjected to the N FTL s and Notice s of L evy filed by the I RS. See Compl. ¶¶ 25-67.11

L aukus alleg es that the liens and le vies are proce durally invalid beca

use the I RS failed to make
an asse ssment, send a pre -asse ssment notice of de ficienc y , make notice and dema nd for pa y ment b e f o r e i s s u i n ga

N F T L , p r o v i d e a

p r e - l e v y a dm i n i s tr at i v e h e ar i n g , an d p r o v i d e n o t i c e b e f

o r e l e v y, all with respec t to tax y ear s 1999 throug h 2003. See Compl. ¶¶ 32-35, 46-49, 62-65 ( alleg ing violations of 26 U.S.C. §§ 6203, 6212-13, 6303, 6330 and 6331). De fenda nt argues that L aukus is actually

makinga de f

acto c halleng e to the mer its of the underly ing tax assessment and there fore his quiet tit le claims ar e not ac tionable under § 2410. See Def

.’s Mem. at 7. L aukus argues in his oppositi on that he is only attackingthe proc edura l validity of the liens and le vies and disclaims any

attack on the validity

of the a ssessment. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 5-8. Whe re a pla int if f m ake s c le ar, thr ou g h th e ple a din g s o r o the r p a pe rs fi le d w iththe c ourt , that his quiet tit le ac tion is really a suit to challeng e tax liabili ty , the cour t may find it to be outside the scope of

§ 2410 and not within the waiver of sover eig n immunit y . See H arrell v. United States , 13 F.3d 232, 235 ( 7th Cir. 1993). This Court has previously held that wher e a plaintiff is challeng ing his tax liabili ty based on the failure to assess taxes, there is no wa iver of
sovere ign immunity

under § 2410. See P ollinger , 5 39 F . Su pp . 2 d at 25 0- 51 ; Boritz v. United States , C i v . Ac t i o nNo
. 0 9 -5 4 2 , 2 0 1 0 W L6 2 1 8 4 5 , at* 7 (D
. D. C
. Fe b
. 2 3 , 2 0 1 0 ). Al th o u gh L aukus has identifie d purportedly proce dural de fec ts in the lien, it i s clea r fr om his Com plaint that he believe s no valid assessment could have bee n made be cause he believe s that his wag es do not constitute tax able income
. See Com pl. ¶¶ 3- 8; id. ¶ 2 3 ( “ De fe nd ants have e ng a g e d in
un la w f u l c o ll e c ti o na c ti v it

y b e c a u s e th e y d id n o t e s ta b li s hw h e n , w h e r e o r

h o wPl a inti f

f K yle W. L aukus’ pe rsonal compe nsation rec eived f rom his labor prope rty

was involved, used, or

intended to b e us e d, in v iol atio n o f t he int e rn a l r e ve nu e laws .” ) M or e ov e r, in t he Ad min istra tiv e Cla im L etter L aukus filed with the IRS and attache d to the Complaint, L aukus explains his belief that12

the interna l reve nue code imposes no tax liability on him because it fails to define what constitutes tax able income and that “a t no time has [L aukus] ever be en made liable for a ny tax imposed by

[t he Interna l Revenue Code].” See Compl., Ex . A (Administrative Claim) at 7-8. Be cause L aukus has not “r efr ain[ed] from contesting the merits of the unde rly ing tax assessment itself,” the f

eder al cour

ts lack jurisdiction over L aukus’s quiet title claims. In a dd iti on , th e Court

la c ks jur isd ic tio n o ve r C ounts I Iand I I Ito t he e xtent th at L a

uk us is
s e e k i n gqu i e tt i t l e t o p r o p e rty th ath a s a l r e a dy

b e e ns e i z e d

b y th e g o v e r n m e n t . InC o un tII, L aukus see ks quiet titl e to $334,204.96 that he e arne d as wa g es and a g ainst which the I RS filed Notices of F eder al Tax L iens and Notice s of L evy and which w ere seized in part. See Compl. ¶¶ 42 -4 5. In Co un t I I I , L a

uk us se e ks qu ie t ti tle to c e rt a in r e a l pr op e rt y that w a s le vie d a

nd se ize d to satisfy a Notice of F eder al Tax L ien ag ainst America n Pride Trust. See id. ¶¶ 56- 67. L aukus’s
c la ims wi th r e sp e c t to se ize d p ro pe rt y do no t f a ll w ith in t

he wa ive r o f s ov e re ig n immun ity in § 2 41 0 b e c a

us e the g ov e rnme nt h a s n owa c qu ir e d ti tle to t hat pr op e rt

y and no lon g e r “ c la ims a mortg ag e or othe r lien” on it. Se e Ha rre ll , 1 3 F .3 d at 23 4; W hite , 969 F. Supp. at 324. Ac c or din g ly , th e Court

mus t g ra nt D e fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to dis mis s w ithre sp e c t to Counts I, II, an d III
. C. Cla im s fo r D am ages fo r U na uth or ize d Co lle c tio n A c tio ns Un de r 2 6 U .S .C. § 7433 In Counts I V, V, VI , VI I , X, XI , and XI I Iof the Complaint, L aukus bring s claims under 26 U.S.C. § 7433, which provides the e x clusive re medy for damag es ar ising out of una uthorized
c oll e c tio n a c tio ns , e xce pt f or c la ims br ou g ht u

nd e r § 74 32 fo r d ama g e s a ri sin gout of

fa ilure to rele ase a lien. See 26 U.S.C. § 7433(a). Sec tion 7433 provides that “[i] f, in conne ction with any collection of F eder al tax with respect to a taxpay er, a ny office r or e mploy ee of

the Interna lL aukus does not cle arly delineate the extent to which he is seekingdamag es on beha lf of 5 Americ an Pride Tr

ust as opposed to himself. 13 Revenue Service rec klessly or intentionally , or by

rea son of neg lige nce disre g ards a ny provision of [the I nterna l Revenue Code], or any regulations promulgated under [t he Interna l Revenue Code], such tax pay er ma

y bringa civil ac tion for damag es ag ainst the United States.” Id. Def endant a rgues that L aukus is barr ed fr om obtaining r elief unde r § 7433 bec ause the statute of limit ations has run on his claims or, a lternatively , beca use he la cks standingto assert them. See Def .’s Mem. at 7-8. Adefe ndant may raise the aff

irmative def

ense of statute of limitations on a motion to di smiss when the fac ts that give rise to that def ense a re c lear from the f

ace of the complaint. Sm ith -T

ho mp so n v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 657 F. Supp. 2d 123, 130 (D.D .C. 2009). I t is clear that L aukus lac ks standing to br ing a claim under

§ 7433 for damag es incurr ed in connec tion with the collection of taxes from Amer ican Pride Tr ust. Section 7433 confer s standing only

on the taxpay er whose taxes are collecte d. Allied/Royal Parking L.P. v. United States , 1 66 F .3 d 1 00 0, 10 04 (9 th C ir . 1 99 9) ; W ittmann v. United States , 869 F. Supp. 726, 731- 32 (E.D. Mo. 1994). T here fore , to the extent that L aukus asse rts claims on beha lf of Amer ican Pride Trust, his claims must be dismis sed for lack of subject matter jur isdiction. 5 Withre sp e c t to the statut e of lim itatio ns , § 74 33 re qu ir e s th at a c tio ns be br ou g ht w ith in two y ear s after

the rig ht of ac tion accr

ues. See 26 U.S.C. § 7433(d)(3). Acause of ac tion under § 7433 acc rues on the date of the a lleg ed adve rse a ction by the I RS. See D avis v. United States , 56 9 F . Su pp . 2 d 9 1, 97 (D .D .C. 20 08 ). Th e a lle g atio ns in C ounts I V- VI I , X -X I , a nd XI I Ipe rt a in to activity that occur

red “ [o] n or about August 7, 2006, or soon therea fter.” See Compl. ¶¶ 69, 73, 77, 81, 95, 98, 110. This action was f iled on Marc h 9, 2009. There fore , it appear s that the statute of limitations bars L aukus’s § 7433 c laims. L aukus complete ly failed to a ddress the14

statute of limitations i ssue in his oppositi on to Defe ndant’s motion to dism iss. Accor dingly , as explained above, the Court may treat this arg ument as conc eded. There are also other pr oblems with some of L aukus’s § 7433 c laims. For e x ample, Count V alleg es that De fenda

nts failed to make a

tax assessment pursuant to the proce dures in 26 U.S.C. § 6203. See Compl. ¶¶ 72-75. Howe ver, this claim is not actionable under § 7433’ s waiver of sover eig n immunit y

for da mag es re sulting fr om unauthorized collection ac tivity . As thi s Co ur t ha s p re vio us ly

he ld, § 7 43 3 is lim ite d to a lle g e d v iol atio ns of law b y the I RS in
c o n n e c ti o nw it

htax collection and “‘ does not provide a cause of ac tion for wrong ful tax assessment or othe r ac tions that are not spec ifically related to the collec tion of income tax.’” Pollinger , 5 39 F . Su

pp . 2 d at 25 5- 56 ; Bo rit

z , 2010 WL621845 at *10-11 (holdingthat violations of § 6 20 3 d o n ot f

a ll w ith in § 74 33 ); see also Jae ger v. U nited States , 524 F. Supp. 2d 60, 63-64 (“[S] ection 7433 does not provide a ca use of a ction for wr ong ful tax assessment, the absenc e of a tax assessment, or other ac tions not related to the collec tion of income tax.”). Count XIalleg es that Def endants violated 26 U .S.C. § 6103 by unnece ssarily

disclosing L aukus’s c onfidential return inf ormation in the Notice of L evy that was issued on L aukus’s prope rty . See Compl. ¶¶ 98-100. Howe ver, a s this C ourt explained in Pollinger , a notice of levy does not g ive rise to an
un a uth or ize d d isc los ur e a c tio n b e c a us e the statut e and

its imp le me nti ngre g ulatio ns pe rm it disclosure to the e x tent nece ssary to levy assets. See 539 F. Supp. 2d at 253. B e c a us e of the fo re g oin gpr ob le ms w ithL a uk us ’s § 7 43 3 c la ims , th e Court fi nd s th at it

is not in the interests of justice to transf er the se cla ims to another district. Acc ording ly , the Court
s h a l l g r an tD e f

e n d an t ’ s m o t i o nt o d i s m i s s w i thr e s p e c tt o C o un t s IV , V , V I, V II, X , X I, an d X III
. D. Claims for

Damages for Failure to Rele ase Lien Under 26 U.S.C. § 7432 Counts VI I Iand IX ar e brought under 26 U.S.C. § 7432, which provide s a re medy for15

damag es re sulting fr om the I RS’s failure to re lease a lien. Specif ically , L aukus alleg es that the I RS f a ile d to re le a se the lie n a g a ins t hi m in vio latio n o f 2 6 U .S. C. § 63 25 a ft e r h e fi le d h is Application for Withdrawa l and his Administrative Claim L etter in 2008. See Compl. ¶¶ 85-93. Section 6325(a) provides in per tinent part that “the Secre tary shall issue a ce rtificate of re lease of any lien imposed with respec t to any internal re venue tax not later than 30 da y s after the day on which . . . [t] he Secr etar

y finds that the liability

for the a mount assessed, tog ether

with any interest in re spect ther eof, ha s been f ully satisfied or ha s become leg ally unenfor cea

ble.” 26 U.S.C. § 6325(a). The applicable Trea sury Regulation expl ains that § 6325 requir es the g overnme nt to relea se a lien a fter the “satisfa ction of the tax in full or . . . the expi ration of the statutory period for

collection.” See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6325-1(a ). B eca use there is no alleg ation that the lien was f

ully satisfied, L aukus’s c laim is necessa rily based on the premise that the lien was leg ally

unenfor cea

ble. Def endant c ontends that L aukus’s c laims are a ctually an attac k on the validity

of the tax
a sse ssm e nts a g a ins t hi m and the re fo re are no t e nc omp a sse d b y the wa ive r o f s ov e re ig n immun ity in § 7432. See De f. ’s Me m. a t 8- 9. Th e Court

a g re e s. As wi th L a

uk us ’s qu ie t ti tle c la ims , Counts VI I Iand

IX a re pr e mis e d o n th e the or

y that th e lie ns are le g a lly

un e nf or c e a ble be c a us e the I RS had no authority

to impose a lien on him in the first place. See Compl., Ex . A (A dmi nis tr ativ e Cla im) at 7- 8 ( dis c us sin gL a uk us ’s the or y that f e de ra l la w d oe s n ot s pe c if

ic a lly define what constitutes “income ” and the ref ore the I RS cannot impose tax liability for L aukus’s
wa g e s) . Se c tio n 7 43 2, ho we ve r, “ sim ply wa s n ot e na c te d to a llo w t a xpay e rs to l iti g ate the me ri ts of asse ssments.” PCCE, Inc. v. U nited States , 159 F.3d 425 ( 9th Cir. 1998). Taxpay ers se eking to challeng e the va lidity

of their tax assessments must do so accor ding to the pr oper statutory proce dures f

or doingso, such as pe titioni ngfor a rede termination in Tax C ourt or filinga re fund16

action under

26 U.S.C. § 7422. Morell v. United States , 185 F.R.D. 116, 119 (D .P.R. 1999). Be cause L aukus is attempting to use the damag es provision in § 7432 to circumvent the tax code’ s proce dures f

or protestinghis assessment, his claims must fail. Accor dingly , the Court must dism iss Count s VI I Iand IX of the Complaint for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction. E. Claim for Review Under the Adm inistrat ive Proc edure Ac t Count X I Iof

the Com pla int se e ks re lie f u

nd e r t he Ad min istra tiv e Pr oc e dure Ac t, 5 U. S.C. §§ 500 et seq. Spe c if

ic a lly , L a uk us c on te nd s th at D e fe nd ants e xce e de d th e sc op e of the ir statutory authority under 26 U .S.C. § 6331 when they issued Notices of L evy

on L aukus’s proper ty and that the Court should awa rd dec laratory

and injunctive re lief. See Compl. ¶¶ 103- 08; 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“The re viewingcourt shall . . . hold unlawf ul and set aside a g ency

action . . . found to be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority , or limitations, or short of statutory
r i g h t. . . . ” ) D e f

e n d an tar g u e s th atth e C o urtl a c k s s u b j e c tm at t e r

j ur i s d i c t i o no v e r

C o un tX II be c a us e the APAdo e s n ot p ro vid e a wa ive r o f s ov e re ig n immun ity wi th r e sp e c t to su its
conce rningtax assessment or collection. See De f. ’s Me m. at 9. De fe nd ant i s c or re c t. Claims for injunctive relief under the APA that conce rn the a ssessment or collec tion of fede ral taxes are barr ed by the Anti-Injunction Act, which pr ovides that except for suits broug ht under c erta in provisions not applicable her e, “no suit for the purpose of

restra ining the assessment or c ollection of any tax s hall be maintained in a ny court by any person.” 26 U.S.C. § 74 21 (a ); Ross v. United States , 4 60 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 39 , 1 49 (D .D .C. 20 06 ); see also Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 174 ( D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Cong ress ha s prese rved the immunit y of the United States from dec laratory

and injunctive re lief with respe ct to all tax controversies except those pe rtaining to t he c la ssi fi c atio n o f o rg anizatio ns un de r § 50 1( c ) o f t he [I RC].” ) B e c a

us e L a uk us ’s APA claim clea

rly relates to the I RS’s tax collection ac tivity , it is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.17

Wit hout a waive r of sove reig n immunit y , the Court lacks subjec t matter jurisdiction and th e r e f o r e mu s td i s m i s s C o un tX II. F. Defendant I

nternal Reve nue Serv ice De fe nd ant I

nte rn a l Re ve nu e Se rv ic e ha s n ot j oin e d in De fe nd ant Unit e d St ate s’ mot ion to dismiss . Howeve r, as this Court has pre viously explained, the I RS cannot be sued eo nominefor claims relating to tax collection under 26 U .S.C. §§ 7432 and 7433. See P ollinger , 539 F. Supp. 2d at 250; 26 U.S.C. §§ 7432-33 (providingthat taxpay ers may only “bringa civil ac tion for damag es ag ainst the United States.”) Simi larly , the statutory waiver of sover eig n immunit y

for quiet title actions provides that only “the United States ma

y be name d a par

ty .” 28 U.S.C. § 24 10 . A lth ou g h th e I RS ma y be a pr op e r d e fe nd ant i n a

n a c tio n b ro ug ht u

nd e r t he APA , th e I RS share s the sovere ign immunity of the United States, whic h, as explained above , has not bee n waived w ith respec t to claims relatingto tax collection ac tivity
. Murphy , 493 F.3d at 174-75. There fore , L aukus’s c laims ag ainst the I RS m ust be dismissed. IV . C ON CL USI ON The Court finds that L aukus has f ailed to re but, and there by conce ded, De fenda

nt’s argument that venue is improper in this Dist rict. Upon e valuation of L aukus’s substantive claims, the Court finds that transfe r in lieu of dismissal is not i n the intere st of justice. Al te rn ativ e ly , to the e xtent th at ve nu e may be pr op e r, the Court

fi nd s th at di smi ssa l is a

pp ro pr iate b e c a u s e th e f e d e r a l c o urt s l a c k

s u b j e c tm at t e r

j ur i s d i c t i o no v e r

C o un t s I, II, III , V III , IX , an d X II in their entirety

and Counts I V, V, VI , VI I , X, XI , and XI I Ito the extent they asser t claims on behalf of Amer ican Pride Tr

ust. The Court also finds that L aukus has c oncede d that Counts I V, V, VI , VI I , X, XI , and XI I Iare untimely and ther efor e may

be dismissed on that alternative basis. F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e Cou rt sh a ll G RA

NT De fe nd ant’ s [6] M oti on to D ism iss18

and dismiss thi s case in its entirety . An appr opriate or der sha ll accompa ny this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: Ma rch 8, 2010 / s / CO LLEEN K OLLA R- K OTEL LY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge