Filed 5/15/15

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

MICHAEL WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES 

COUNTY,

Respondent;

MARSHALLS OF CA, LLC,

Real Party in Interest.

 B259967

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. BC503806)

Petition for extraordinary writ. William F. Highberger, Judge. Petition is denied.

Capstone Law, Glenn A. Danas, Robert Drexler, Stan Karas, Liana Carter for 

Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent. 

Littler Mendelson, Robert G. Hulteng, Joshua J. Cliffe, Emily E. O’Connor, Scott 

D. Helsinger for Real Party in Interest. 

_______________
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Background

Beginning in January 2012, plaintiff Michael Williams was an employee at a retail 

store operated by Marshalls of CA (Marshalls) in Costa Mesa, California. On March 22, 

2013, after a little more than one year of employment, he brought a representative action 

against Marshalls under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) 

(Lab. Code, §§ 2698-2699.5), alleging Marshalls failed to provide its employees with 

meal and rest breaks or premium pay in lieu thereof (Lab. Code, §§ 226.7 & 512),

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to 

provide accurate wage statements (§ 226, subd. (a)), to reimburse employees for 

necessary business-related expenses (§§ 2800 & 2802), and to pay all earned wages 

during employment (§ 204). 

On February 5, 2014, plaintiff served special interrogatories seeking production of 

the names and contact information of all nonexempt Marshalls employees in California 

who had worked for the company beginning on March 22, 2012. Marshalls objected to 

the discovery on the ground it was irrelevant, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and 

implicated the privacy rights of its employees. Plaintiff met and conferred with 

Marshalls, offering to address its privacy concerns with a “Belaire-West notice,”

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but 

Marshalls rejected the offer. 

Plaintiff moved to compel the discovery, arguing the contact information was 

routinely discoverable in representative employee actions and vital to the prosecution of 

his PAGA claims. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion in part, compelling 

Marshalls to produce contact information for the employees only at its Costa Mesa store 

and denying production of the contact information of employees at Marshalls other 128 

stores statewide. The court ordered that plaintiff could renew his motion to compel the 

remaining information after he had been deposed “for at least six productive hours.” The 

court also ruled that in opposition to any such motion, Marshalls could attempt to show 

plaintiff’s substantive claims had no factual merit. 

 

1 Undesignated statutory references will be to the Labor Code.

2

Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554.
3

In these writ proceedings, plaintiff seeks a writ of mandate compelling the 

superior court to vacate its discovery order and enter a new order granting plaintiff’s 

motion to compel production a list of all nonexempt employees who worked for 

Marshalls beginning on March 22, 2012. 

Discussion

1. Standard of Review

The standard for determining the scope of discovery is set forth in Code of Civil 

Procedure section 2017.010, which provides that “[u]nless otherwise limited by order of 

the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any 

matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action

or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself 

admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 

admissible evidence. . . . Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of 

persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter . . . .” However, “[t]he court shall 

limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of 

that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to 

the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020, subd. (a).)

“For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it ‘might reasonably assist a 

party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement.’ [Citation.] 

Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might 

reasonably lead to admissible evidence. [Citation.] The phrase ‘reasonably calculated to 

lead to the discovery of admissible evidence’ makes it clear that the scope of discovery 

extends to any information that reasonably might lead to other evidence that would be 

admissible at trial. ‘Thus, the scope of permissible discovery is one of reason, logic and 

common sense.’ [Citation.] These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery.” 

(Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612.)

Management of discovery lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. A 

discovery order is therefore reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (Krinsky v. 

Doe 6 (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161.) “Where there is a basis for the trial court’s 
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ruling and it is supported by the evidence, a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion 

for that of the trial court. [Citation.] The trial court’s determination will be set aside only 

when it has been demonstrated that there was ‘no legal justification’ for the order 

granting or denying the discovery in question.” (Lipton v. Superior Court, supra, 48 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1612.) 

Novel, important discovery issues may be reviewed by prerogative writ. (See 

Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 169.)

2. Discovery of Marshalls’ Employees’ Contact Information Statewide is 

Premature

“Although the scope of civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless.” (Calcor Space 

Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223.) Discovery devices 

must “be used as tools to facilitate litigation rather than as weapons to wage litigation.” 

(Id. at p. 221.) A party seeking to compel discovery must therefore “set forth specific 

facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 

2031.310, subd. (b)(1); see Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 53 at p. 

223.) To establish good cause, a discovery proponent must identify a disputed fact that is 

of consequence in the action and explain how the discovery sought will tend in reason to 

prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove 

the fact.

Plaintiff argues immediate discovery of the contact information of Marshalls’

employees statewide is clearly germane to and necessary for progress in his PAGA 

action. We disagree.

At this nascent stage of plaintiff’s PAGA action there has as yet been no 

discovery—plaintiff has not even sat for his own deposition. The litigation therefore 

consists solely of the allegations in his complaint. But plaintiff alleges therein only that 

at the Costa Mesa store, he and perhaps other employees at that store were subjected to 

violations of the Labor Code. Nowhere does he evince any knowledge of the practices of 

Marshalls at other stores, nor any fact that would lead a reasonable person to believe he 

knows whether Marshalls has a uniform statewide policy. That being the case, it was 
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eminently reasonable for the trial judge to proceed with discovery in an incremental 

fashion, first requiring that plaintiff provide some support for his own, local claims and 

then perhaps later broadening the inquiry to discover whether some reason exists to 

suspect Marshalls’ local practices extend statewide.

Further, a trial court must consider the costs of any discovery and take reasonable 

steps to promote efficiency and economy. Statewide discovery that includes the mailing 

of Belaire-West notices and tabulation of responses is costly. By staging discovery 

incrementally, the trial court delayed the incursion of potentially unnecessary costs until 

it becomes clear they are warranted.

Plaintiff’s proposed procedure, which contemplates jumping into extensive 

statewide discovery based only on the bare allegations of one local individual having no 

knowledge of the defendant’s statewide practices would be a classic use of discovery 

tools to wage litigation rather than facilitate it. We conclude bare allegations 

unsupported by any reason to believe a defendant’s conduct extends statewide furnishes 

no good cause for statewide discovery.

Plaintiff argues that in a PAGA action such as this, he stands in as a proxy for the 

Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE), and should thus be entitled to all 

discovery to which that agency would be entitled, including “free access to all places of 

labor” (§ 90). We disagree.

It is true that pursuant to section 90, “The Labor Commissioner, his deputies and 

agents, shall have free access to all places of labor. Any person, or agent or officer 

thereof, who refuses admission to the Labor Commissioner or his deputy or agent or who, 

upon request, willfully neglects or refuses to furnish them any statistics or information, 

pertaining to their lawful duties, which are in his possession or under his control, is guilty 

of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000).” 

But nothing in the PAGA suggests a private plaintiff standing in as a proxy for the DLSE 

is entitled to the same access. On the contrary, the PAGA states only that a private 

individual may bring a “civil action” to enforce labor laws, not that the individual may 

access “all places of labor” or demand unlimited information upon pain of criminal 
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conviction. Discovery in a civil action is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. We 

think it prudent that absent any express direction from the Legislature to the contrary, 

discovery in a civil action brought under the PAGA be subject to the same rules as 

discovery in civil actions generally.

Plaintiff also argues the trial court’s order that at some future date Marshalls might 

resist further discovery by making a showing that plaintiff’s claims have no factual merit 

constitutes an added burden on discovery not contemplated by the Code of Civil 

Procedure. We disagree. We read the court’s order as paraphrasing the common 

requirement that discovery not be ordered absent a showing of good cause.

3. Employee Privacy Interests Outweigh Plaintiff’s Need for Disclosure at This 

Time

Even if Marshalls’ employees’ identifying information was reasonably calculated 

to lead to admissible evidence, their right to privacy under the California Constitution 

would outweigh plaintiff’s need for the information at this time.3

The California Constitution provides that all individuals have a right of privacy.

(Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) This express right is broader than the implied federal right to 

privacy. (American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 326.) The 

California privacy right “limits what courts can compel through civil discovery.”

(Rancho Publications v. Superior Court, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1547-1548.) 

“[W]hen the constitutional right of privacy is involved, the party seeking discovery of 

private matter must do more than satisfy the section 2017[.010] standard. The party 

seeking discovery must demonstrate a compelling need for discovery, and that 

compelling need must be so strong as to outweigh the privacy right when these two 

competing interests are carefully balanced.” (Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 

Cal.App.4th 1839, 1853-1854; see Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Superior Court

 

3 Marshalls possesses standing to assert its employees’ constitutional rights. (See 

Rancho Publications v. Superior Court (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1541 [a nonparty to 

civil litigation may assert the constitutionally protected right of another to remain 

unknown].) 
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(2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 347, 367 [courts must balance the privacy interests of the person 

subject to discovery against the litigant’s need for discovery].) A discovery proponent

may demonstrate compelling need by establishing the discovery sought is directly 

relevant and essential to the fair resolution of the underlying lawsuit. (Planned 

Parenthood Golden Gate v. Superior Court, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 367; Johnson v. 

Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1071.) 

Applying this balancing test we conclude Marshalls’ employees’ privacy interests

outweigh plaintiff’s need to discover their identity at this time. Those interests begin 

with the employees’ right to be free from unwanted attention and perhaps fear of 

retaliation from an employer. On the other hand, plaintiff’s need for the discovery at this 

time is practically nonexistent. His first task will be to establish he was himself subjected 

to violations of the Labor Code. As he has not yet sat for deposition, this task remains 

unfulfilled. The trial court could reasonably conclude that the second task will be to 

establish Marshalls’ employment practices are uniform throughout the company, which 

might be accomplished by reference to a policy manual or perhaps deposition of a 

corporate officer. The trial court could reasonably conclude that only then will plaintiff 

be able to set forth facts justifying statewide discovery. 

The courts will not lightly bestow statewide discovery power to a litigant who has 

only a parochial claim. Here, the trial court’s measured approach to discovery was 

reasonable. Therefore, plaintiff’s petition is denied.

Disposition

The petition for writ of mandate is denied. Marshalls is to recover its costs on the 

original proceeding.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. JOHNSON, J.