IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mary Jane Schneider, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 2196 C.D. 2015

: Submitted: March 11, 2016

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Public School Employees’ :

Retirement Board, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: July 14, 2016

Mary Jane Schneider (Claimant), pro se, petitions for review of an Order of 

the Public School Employees’ Retirement Board (Board) rejecting Claimant’s 

request to purchase service and receive credit for 1.94 years of prior out-of-state 

school service. Claimant argues that the Board erred when it determined that the 

two years she spent teaching in Ohio through the Teacher Corps program was not

“school service” purchasable under the Public School Employees’ Retirement 

Code (Retirement Code), 24 Pa. C.S. §§ 8101 - 8536. Discerning no error, we 

affirm.
2

I. Background

Claimant retired on June 20, 2011, after teaching in Pennsylvania schools 

from 1976 to 1980 and again from 1993 to 2011. (Board’s Op., Findings of Fact 

(FOF) ¶¶ 57-58, 70.) Prior to retiring, Claimant submitted two applications with 

the Public School Employees’ Retirement System (PSERS) to purchase out-ofstate service (together, “Application”) related to the time she taught at the Meigs 

Local School District (MLSD) in Pomeroy, Ohio from 1974 to 1976. (Board Op. 

at 2; FOF ¶¶ 71-72.) Claimant received her teaching certification in Ohio in April 

1974 and taught full-time as a “teacher-intern” at the MLSD high school through 

the federal Teacher Corps program from the fall of 1974 to the summer of 1976

while she was attending graduate school at Ohio University. (FOF ¶¶ 4, 7, 20.) 

The Board made the following findings of fact regarding Claimant’s participation 

in the Teacher Corps program.

5. Beginning in July 1974, Claimant attended graduate school at 

Ohio University, seeking a master’s degree as a reading specialist. 

(N.T. 119-120)

6. Claimant graduated in May 1976 with a Master’s Degree as a 

Reading Specialist. (N.T. 120, 151)

7. In conjunction with her enrollment in graduate school at Ohio 

University, Claimant became an intern with Teacher Corps from 1974 

through 1976. (PSERS-1 at p. 4).

8. The Teacher Corps program was created by federal statute, 

namely the Higher Education Act of 1965 (the “Act”),

[1]

for the 

 

1 Higher Education Act of 1965, Title V, §§ 511-17, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219,

1255 (1965). While Title V of the Higher Education Act of 1965 was never formally repealed, 

the Teacher Corps program was dissolved and consolidated into a block grant program effective 

October 1, 1982 pursuant to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 

95 Stat. 357 (1981). See House Conference Report No. 97-208, H.R. Rep. No. 97-208, 733

(Continued...)
3

purpose of “strengthen[ing] the educational opportunities available to

children in areas having concentrations of low-income families and to 

encourage colleges and universities to broaden their programs of 

teacher preparation by . . . (2) attracting and training inexperienced 

teacher-interns who will be made available for teaching and inservice 

training to local educational agencies in such areas in teams led by an 

experienced teacher.” (P.L. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, at § 511(a))

9. The Act authorized arrangements between the local educational 

agencies and institutions of higher learning to provide, among other 

things, “teaching teams, each of which . . . consist[ed] of an 

experienced teacher and a number of teacher-interns who, in addition 

to teaching duties, shall be afforded time by the local educational 

agency for a teacher-intern training program . . .” and for “institutions 

of higher education to provide training for teacher-interns while 

teaching in schools for local educational agencies . . . leading to a 

graduate degree.” (P.L. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, at §§ 513(a) and (b))

10. The Act authorized a program to “recruit, select and enroll 

experienced teachers and inexperienced teacher-interns who have a 

bachelor’s degree or equivalent, in the Teacher Corps for periods of 

up to two years.” (P.L. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, at § 513(a)(1))

11. The Act authorized “an arrangement made with a local 

educational agency . . . [to] provide for compensation . . . [to] a 

teacher-intern . . . at a rate which is equal to the lowest rate paid by 

such agency for teaching full time in the school system and grade to 

which the intern is assigned.” (P.L. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, at § 

514(a)(3))

12. The Teacher Corps program through which Claimant worked as 

an intern was operated by Ohio University. (N.T. 137).

13. Claimant first became aware of the Teacher Corps program 

through John Mangieri, a professor at Ohio University and the head of 

the Teacher Corps program at Ohio University. (N.T. 136-137)

 

(1981) (Conf. Rep.) (“The Conference Agreement would limit appropriations for the Teacher 

Corps to $22.5 million in fiscal year 1982. Effective October 1, 1982, the Teacher Corps would 

be consolidated into the Block Grant”).
4

14. The Teacher Corps program through Ohio University consisted 

of three requirements to be performed by “teacher-interns:” (1) taking 

courses in furtherance of a graduate degree with Ohio University, (2) 

performing in-classroom instruction at MLSD, and (3) performing 

community service. (PSERS-1 at p. 4, N.T. 135-136, 149-150)

15. Participation in the Teacher Corps program in which Claimant 

took part was only open to Ohio University graduate students. (N.T. 

138, 139-140)

16. Claimant was one of the twenty graduate students at Ohio 

University who participated in the Teacher Corps program between 

the summer of 1974 and the spring of 1976. (N.T. 137, 139, 215-216)

17. MLSD encompassed all grades from kindergarten through 

twelfth grade. (N.T. 124)

18. When Claimant applied for the Teacher Corps program, she 

interviewed with Dr. Mangieri and a group of teachers from MLSD.

(N.T. 137-138)

19. To take part in the Teacher Corps program, a student had to be at 

the top of his or her class and have an undergraduate degree with a 

teaching certification. (N.T. 137-138, 157, P.L. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 

at § 513(a)(1))

20. While Claimant was a graduate student at Ohio University, she 

taught full-time at MLSD high school as a teacher-intern in the 

Teacher Corps program, from the fall of 1974 until the summer of 

1976. (N.T. 16-17, 29-30, 150-151)

21. Claimant had no prior teaching experience or classroom 

instruction prior to graduate school other than her student teaching 

experience while an undergraduate student. (N.T. 47, 118-120, 123, 

209)

22. While in the Teacher Corps, Claimant taught reading in grades 9-

12 at MLSD. (N.T. 142) 

23. Claimant’s team leader was Jeanne Bowen, an MLSD employee, 

whose duties as team leader were for secondary education reading 

teachers of grades 9-12 at MLSD. (N.T. 142, 144)
5

24. Claimant’s direct supervisor at MLSD was Jeanne Bowen with 

her next line of reporting to the principal of MLSD, James Diehl, who 

was in charge of the entire high school. (N.T. 124-143, 160, 214)

25. While most reading specialist students earned their degree in a 

single year, the twenty students selected to take part in the Teacher 

Corps program were placed into a two-year track where professors 

from Ohio University traveled to MLSD to hold graduate classes for 

the Teacher Corps students on-site at MLSD. (N.T. 146-147)

26. Ohio University professors would teach Claimant and the other 

teacher-interns the graduate reading courses at MLSD, with classes 

usually occurring in the evening during the school year, and in the 

summer. (N.T. 139-140, 146-147, 157-159, 216)

27. As part of the course work, these graduate classes specifically 

employed the students’ teaching experiences at MLSD for case 

studies, and required regular meetings with Dr. Mangieri to discuss 

those teaching experiences as the students progressed through the 

graduate program. (N.T. 147-148)

28. The graduate courses Claimant took through Ohio University at 

MLSD after school hours and in the summer were for credit and to 

fulfill the requirements to earn a graduate degree as a reading 

specialist. (N.T. 48, 216)

29. Claimant would not have been paid if she failed to take graduate 

courses at Ohio University. (N.T. 149-150)

30. Claimant performed required community service as a part of the 

Teacher Corps program, where she visited families of students and did 

parent involvement programs such as “make-it, take-it” workshops.

(N.T. 144)

31. Community service was a required part of Claimant’s 

participation in the Teacher Corps program. (N.T. 144-145)

32. If Claimant did not perform the community service component, 

she would not have been a part of the Teacher Corps program. (N.T. 

144-145)

33. Teachers at MLSD who were not a part of the Teacher Corps 

program were not required to do community service. (N.T. 145)
6

34. Claimant would not have been paid if she failed to perform the 

community service required for the Teacher Corps program. (N.T. 

145)

35. Claimant’s salary was not negotiated when she taught at MLSD. 

(N.T. 140)

36. The salary for all twenty graduate students who were teacherinterns at MLSD under the auspices of the Teacher Corps program 

was set by the Act, which required that “a teacher-intern shall be 

compensated at a rate which is equal to the lowest rate paid by such 

agency for teaching full time in the school system and grade to which 

the intern was assigned.” (N.T. 140, P.L. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, at § 

514(a)(3))

37. Claimant’s salary was a similar salary to that of a first year 

teacher. (N.T. 37, 148)

38. Claimant’s salary at MLSD was paid by federal grant monies 

from the Teacher Corps program. (N.T. 149, 160-161, PSERS-3)

39. The federal grant monies from the Teacher Corps program were 

given to MLSD, then combined with MLSD funds, with checks issued 

by MLSD to the teacher-interns based on the federal grant monies and 

not MLSD’s own funds. (N.T. 25-26, 30-31, 109, 148-149, 160-162, 

PSERS-3)

40. Claimant’s salary at MLSD was not a part of a financial aid 

package, institution waiver or housing waiver. (N.T. 38-39)

41. Following her graduation from Ohio University with a master’s 

degree, Claimant did not obtain employment with MLSD. (N.T. 151)

42. If Claimant had not done all of the requirements of the Teacher 

Corps program she would not have been paid. (N.T. 149-150)

43. Claimant did not have a contract with MLSD. (N.T. 140)

44. Claimant did not have a contract with the Teacher Corps 

program. (N.T. 140)
7

45. Claimant’s teaching service at MLSD through the Teacher Corps 

program was for two years. (N.T. 140-141, P.L. 89-329, 79 Stat. 

1219, at § 513(a)(1))

46. Claimant was required to remain with the Teacher Corps program 

for two years. (N.T. 140-141, P.L. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, at § 

513(a)(1))

47. Claimant did not receive health insurance from MLSD or Ohio 

University. (N.T. 141)

48. The only benefits received by Claimant while at MLSD were 

“vacation, holiday and sick days.” (N.T. 219-222)

49. Claimant received no information from MLSD concerning 

contributing to the State Teachers’ Retirement System of Ohio 

(“STRSO”). (N.T. 141).

50. Claimant was not part of a teachers’ union while at MLSD. (N.T. 

141)

51. Claimant’s time in the Teacher Corps program ended with her 

earning a graduate degree from Ohio University as a reading 

specialist. (N.T. 151)

52. Upon the completion of her internship with the Teacher Corps 

program, Claimant does not recall being reimbursed for any unused 

sick time or vacation/personal time. (N.T. 220-221)

53. Claimant’s plan after graduate school was to find a job. (N.T. 

120)

54. Claimant was the head coach for girls’ basketball and the 

assistant coach for girls’ track at MLSD while she participated in the 

Teacher Corps program. (N.T. 107, 122, 155)

55. Claimant was not required to be a coach of any sport to be a part 

of the Teacher Corps program. (N.T. 156, 163)

56. Claimant received no scholarships, grants or financial aid to 

attend graduate school. (N.T. 122)
8

(FOF ¶¶ 4-56 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted).) 

PSERS notified Claimant by letter dated May 20, 2011, that it had denied 

Claimant’s Application. (Id. at ¶ 87.) Claimant appealed the denial of her request 

to the Executive Staff Review Committee (ESRC) of PSERS by letter dated June 

13, 2011. (Id. at ¶ 91.) The ESRC denied Claimant’s appeal on the grounds 

Claimant’s work with the MLSD was not in the context of an employer-employee 

relationship and that the STRSO indicated that the service does not qualify for 

service for participation in STRSO. (Letter from ESRC to Claimant, March 5, 

2013, PSERS-6, C.R. at Item 12; FOF ¶ 94.) Claimant subsequently filed a timely

Appeal and Request for Administrative Hearing with the Board. (FOF ¶ 95.) 

Hearings were held before a Hearing Examiner on August 27, 2014 and 

November 13, 2014, where Claimant and Steven Wolf, Retirement Administrator 

over the purchase of service refunds for PSERS, testified.2 Prior to the first 

hearing, Claimant “submitted a document to PSERS purporting to show that, as of 

May 2013, STRSO now permitted Claimant to purchase 1.94 years of service with 

MLSD.” (Id. at ¶ 96.) While PSERS initially objected to the consideration of the 

document by the Hearing Examiner, the parties stipulated at the November 13, 

2014 hearing that STRSO would certify to two years of service, which means that 

Claimant’s service in Ohio met the one-year of service requirement of receiving 

out-of-state service pursuant to Section 8304(c) of the Retirement Code, 24 Pa. 

C.S. § 8304(c).

3

 (Hr’g Tr., November 13, 2014, at 320-21, C.R. at Item 12.) The

 

2

The transcript of the August 27, 2014 hearing can be found at Item 11 of the Certified 

Record. The transcript of the November 13, 2014 hearing can be found at Item 12 of the 

Certified Record.

3

Pursuant to Section 8304(c) of the Retirement Code, 24 Pa. C.S. § 8304(c), school 

service in a public school of another state can only be credited if the service was conducted for at 

least one school year.
9

remaining issue before the Hearing Examiner was whether the service conducted in 

Ohio through the Teacher Corps program is of the type that is purchasable under 

Section 8303 of the Retirement Code, 24 Pa. C.S. § 8303. The Hearing Examiner 

issued an Opinion and Recommendation on July 6, 2015, concluding that 

Claimant’s service at the MLSD through the Teacher Corps program was “school 

service” and recommended that the Board grant her request to purchase 1.94 years 

of out-of-state service. (Hearing Examiner Recommendation at 38-39.) 

PSERS filed a brief on exceptions asking the Board to reject the Hearing 

Examiner’s Opinion and Recommendation and find that the service Claimant 

performed through the Teacher Corps program was not purchasable for service 

credit. (PSERS’ Br. on Exceptions at 5-6, C.R. at Item 22.) Claimant filed a 

responsive brief but did not file her own exceptions. (Claimant’s Br. in Response 

to PSERS’ Br. on Exceptions at 1, C.R. at Item 23.) PSERS argued that the 

Hearing Examiner misunderstood the relationship between Claimant and MLSD 

when it concluded that Claimant’s service was school service. According to 

PSERS, Claimant was a graduate student taking part in a program directly tied to 

her studies, not an employee of the school. (PSERS’ Br. on Exceptions at 15.) 

Claimant argued in response that she was a certified teacher when she worked at 

MLSD and taking classes in the evening with Ohio University did not render her 

any less of a teacher. (Claimant’s Br. in Response to PSERS’ Br. on Exceptions at 

1.) Claimant contended that “it is the substance of the work that defines one’s

employment, not the administrative detail.” (Id.)
10

II. Board Decision

The Board independently reviewed the entire record and the briefs filed by 

the parties and concluded that Claimant was ineligible to purchase out-of-state 

service credit for the time she spent working at the MLSD under the purview of the 

Teacher Corps program. The Board first reviewed the relevant provisions of the 

Retirement Code and its interpretation thereof through PSERS’ Business Rules and 

relevant precedent. According to the Board, 

An active member of PSERS may purchase credit and receive 

eligibility points toward retirement for previous creditable or 

noncreditable “school service” under [Section 8303(c) and (d) of the 

Retirement Code,] 24 Pa.C.S. § 8303(c)[,] (d). [Section 8102] of [t]he 

Retirement Code defines “school service” as “[s]ervice rendered as a 

school employee.” 24 Pa.C.S. § 8102. It defines “school employee”

as “[a]ny person engaged in work relating to a public school for any 

governmental entity and for which work he is receiving regular 

remuneration as an officer, administrator or employee. . . .” Id.

. . . .

Consistent with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s analysis in 

Simmonds v. State Employees’ Retirement System, 696 A.2d 801 (Pa. 

1997), PSERS employs the rule that if service is to fall within the 

definition of “school service,” and therefore entitled to service credit 

under the Retirement Code, the person who provides it must be an 

employee in the bargained-for exchange that exists in typical 

employment relationships.

. . . .

[T]he Commonwealth Court expanded on the Supreme Court’s 

determination in Simmonds, ruling that Simmonds “sends a clear 

message that a court must examine the purpose of the program” in 

which a student is enrolled to determine if the student is an employee 

within the meaning of the Retirement Code. [Donovan v. State 

Employes’ Retirement System, 701 A.2d 310, 313 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1997).]

(Board Op. at 16-18 (fifth, sixth, and seventh alteration in original).) 
11

Consistent with Simmonds and Donovan, the Board next assessed the 

purpose of the Teacher Corps program and concluded: 

The Act had two stated purposes. While the language of the Act did 

speak to helping meet the needs of underserved school districts, it 

equally discussed a desire to train inexperienced teachers. 

Undoubtedly school districts such as MLSD that took part in this 

program were understandably concerned more with their staffing than 

with the education of the teacher-interns. Claimant, however, was a

teacher-intern – and the Act was clear that, at least regarding the 

“teacher-interns,” the focus of the program was on training 

inexperienced individuals to become better teachers. . . . Claimant’s

entire participation in the program, including her in-classroom 

instruction at MLSD, consisted of training – either through hands-on 

experience in the classroom or through coursework specifically 

tailored to the program.

(Id. at 21-22 (emphasis in original).) 

The Board further concluded that Claimant’s tenure at MLSD was that of a 

student, not a teacher. (Id. at 24.) In support of this conclusion, the Board pointed 

to the fact that Claimant was placed at MLSD by the Teacher Corps program and 

that Claimant did not have a contract with MLSD. (Id. at 23.) The Board further 

noted that Claimant was paid with federal grant money and did not receive 

employment benefits other than sick and vacation days. (Id.) Finally, the Board 

found it to be especially relevant that in order to participate in the Teacher Corps

program, Claimant was required to take courses through Ohio University and 

perform community service in addition to teaching in the classroom. (Id.) 

According to the Board:

Claimant testified that graduate studies at Ohio University, inclassroom instruction and community service were not optional, and if 

she failed to perform any of the three activities, she would not have 

been paid. Tying Claimant’s compensation to all three requirements 

of her participation in this Teacher Corps program, including two

requirements that had nothing to do with MLSD, exemplify the fact 
12

that Claimant was not in the same position as any other full-time 

teacher at MLSD during that time, as she has argued, and therefore 

did not have a bargained-for exchange typically present in an

employment relationship. Instead, Claimant was a student taking part 

in a program offered by her graduate school.

(Id. at 24 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).) Accordingly, the Board denied 

Claimant’s request to purchase 1.94 years of service. Claimant now petitions this 

Court for review.

4

III. Claimant’s Appeal

On appeal, Claimant argues that the Board erred by: (1) misunderstanding 

the purpose and function of the Teacher Corps program; (2) misapplying the 

Supreme Court’s holding in Simmonds and this Court’s holding in Donovan to 

conclude that her work was not purchasable service; and (3) interpreting the 

relevant provision of the Retirement Code through Business Rule POS-2008-01 

(Business Rule), which was in effect at the time of Claimant’s Application, when 

the Business Rule is inapplicable to the facts of her case, and even if the Business 

Rule is applicable, it was misapplied.

Section 8303 of the Retirement Code permits active members of PSERS to 

purchase “credit and receive eligibility points” toward retirement for previous 

creditable (Section 8303(c)) and noncreditable (Section 8303(d)) school service. 

24 Pa. C.S. § 8303(c), (d). “School service” is defined by Section 8102 of the 

Retirement Code as “[s]ervice rendered as a school employee.” 24 Pa. C.S. § 

 

4 Our review of the final adjudication of an administrative board is limited to determining 

“whether the board committed an error of law, whether constitutional rights were violated, or 

whether necessary factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Dowler v. Pub. Sch. 

Employes’ Ret. Bd., 620 A.2d 639, 642 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). 
13

8102. A “school employee” is defined by Section 8102 of the Retirement Code as 

“[a]ny person engaged in work relating to a public school for any governmental 

entity and for which work he is receiving regular remuneration as an officer, 

administrator or employee excluding, however, any independent contractor or a 

person compensated on a fee basis.” Id. School service in a public school of 

another state can only be credited if the service was conducted for at least one 

school year. Section 8304(b) and (c) of the Retirement Code, 24 Pa. C.S. §

8304(b), (c). The Board interpreted Section 8303 according to PSERS’ Business 

Rule and relevant precedent. (Board Op. at 16-17.) The Business Rule provided, 

in relevant part:

Purchase of Service Eligibility: Student wage positions

Service should not be automatically denied because the member was a 

student at the time the service was rendered. Following are the 

guidelines to be used to determine if a member is eligible to purchase 

service rendered while a student at a university or state college. Note 

- no one bullet point is dispositive; all information will be considered 

in rendering determinations of eligibility.

Student service should be approved if:

- The position was not available to students only but was open to 

any qualified person 

- The relationship was employer/employee and was not 

teacher/student

- The service was not part of the students’ curriculum

- The member has detailed Social Security earnings (the Office of 

the Governor as the employer is equally valid as having listed the 

State System of Higher Education, or the University, or State 

College itself as the employer of record.)

Student service should be denied if:

- The position was part of a financial aid package.

- The member received a tuition waiver for the employment

- The service was part of the student’s curriculum

- The member received academic credit for the employment
14

- The employment was only available to students, and no one from 

the outside workforce could fill the position in the absence of 

student applicants for the position(s)

- The position is that of a Graduate Assistant or a Resident Assistant

The member has the responsibility to provide proof of the position 

type. Such proof may come from the employer, or may be supplied 

by the member from [the member’s] collection of employment history 

documents.

(Business Rule POS-2008-01, Ex. PSERS-A, C.R. at Item 13 (emphasis in 

original).)

The above interpretation of the Retirement Code has been adopted by the 

Board. “It is well settled that” the Board’s construction of the Retirement Code in 

both its Business Rules and decisions “is entitled to great weight and should not be 

disregarded or overturned except for cogent reasons, and unless it is clear that such 

construction is clearly erroneous.” Kirsch v. Pub. Sch. Employees’ Ret. Bd., 929 

A.2d 663, 668 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), aff’d, 985 A.2d 671 (Pa. 2009). 

A. Teacher Corps Program

Claimant first argues that determining whether a student is an employee 

within the meaning of the Retirement Code requires an assessment of the purpose 

of the program in which the student is enrolled. Claimant contends that the 

Teacher Corps was intended “‘to strengthen the educational opportunities available 

to children in areas having concentrations of low-income families’” and that her 

work was focused on teaching these children. (Claimant’s Br. at 3 (quoting 

Section 511 of the Act, P.L. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 1255, at § 511(a)).) 

Claimant is correct that determining whether a student is an employee under 

the Retirement Code requires an assessment of the purpose of the work performed. 
15

Simmonds, 696 A.2d at 803. While we agree with Claimant that strengthening 

educational opportunities of students in underserved communities was one of the 

purposes of the Teacher Corps program, Claimant omits the other, equally 

important, purpose of the program as detailed in the Act itself. The Act states two 

purposes: (1) increasing educational opportunities available to children in 

underserved communities; and (2) “encourag[ing] colleges and universities to 

broaden their programs of teacher preparation by . . . attracting and training 

inexperienced teacher-interns who will be made available for teaching and 

inservice training to local educational agencies in such areas in teams led by an 

experienced teacher.” Section 511(a) of the Act, P.L. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 1255, 

at § 511(a). The Board correctly explained the Teacher Corps program as follows:

The Act authorized arrangements between the local educational

agencies and institutions of higher learning to provide, among other 

things, “teaching teams, each of which . . . consist[ed] of an 

experienced teacher and a number of teacher-interns who, in addition 

to teaching duties, shall be afforded time by the local educational 

agency for a teacher-intern training program . . .” and for “institutions 

of higher education to provide training for teacher-interns while 

teaching in schools for local educational agencies . . . leading to a 

graduate degree.” Id. at §§ 513(a) and (b) (emphasis added). The 

Act permitted enrollment in the program for up to two years, failing to 

mandate or discuss placement of its teacher-interns in full-time 

positions following the completion of the program. Id. at § 513(a)(1).

(Board Op. at 20-21 (emphasis in original).) Because the Teacher Corps program, 

at least as it pertained to Claimant, was inextricably linked to the pursuit of a 

graduate degree, we agree with the Board’s interpretation of the Act and conclude 

that the purpose of the Teacher Corps program is to both serve disadvantaged 

communities and to train teacher-interns who already have a bachelor’s degree and 

are pursuing a graduate degree.
16

B. Application of Simmonds and Donovan

Claimant next contends that the Board misapplied the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Simmonds and this Court’s decision in Donovan in concluding that the 

time she spent with Teacher Corps program was not purchasable under the 

Retirement Code. In Simmonds, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed a 

claim by a medical resident at the Milton S. Hershey Medical Center of 

Pennsylvania State University (Medical Center) seeking a certification in 

oncology. Simmonds, 696 A.2d at 801.5 The resident provided patient care for 50 

to 60 hours per week under the supervision of an attending Medical Center 

physician. Id. at 802. The resident received a small stipend of $16,932.00 to cover 

her expenses and received employee benefits, though the benefits were less 

generous than those received by other Medical Center physicians. Id. at 802 & n.3. 

After completing her residency, the resident became an assistant professor at the 

Medical Center, “enrolled in the State Employes’ Retirement System (SERS),” and 

sought to purchase state credit for the one year of service she performed at the 

Medical Center as a resident. Id. at 802. SERS and the State Employes’ 

Retirement Board (SERB) denied the claimant’s request. Id. This Court reversed, 

holding that medical residents were state employees. Id. On appeal, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and reinstated SERB’s decision. The 

Supreme Court’s holding relied upon its understanding of the purpose of the 

resident’s work at the Medical Center. According to the Court:

 

5

This Court may utilize cases interpreting the State Employees’ Retirement Code when 

interpreting similar provisions of the Retirement Code. Krill v. Pub. Sch. Employes’ Ret. Bd., 

713 A.2d 132, 134 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
17

[Medical residents] are not primarily seeking monetary 

gain, but rather are attempting to fulfill educational 

requirements, either to initially practice medicine, or 

obtain certain specialties in the medical field. . . . .

[Phila. Ass’n of Interns & Residents v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 369 

A.2d 711, 714 (Pa. 1976)]. 

We agree with Appellants and find that this reasoning is equally 

applicable to the question of whether medical interns are employees 

pursuant to the Retirement Code. Here, Appellee was enrolled in an 

accredited educational program to obtain certification in the subspecialty of oncology. The services rendered by Appellee were not 

structured solely to meet the hospital’s needs but rather were to ensure 

that Appellee obtained the education and training required by the 

accrediting organization as a prerequisite to her certification. The 

stipend of $16,932.00 in exchange for the extensive medical services 

Appellee provided is clearly not the bargained-for exchange that 

exists in typical employment relationships. 

Id. at 803-04 (footnote omitted).

Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Simmonds, this Court 

in Donovan addressed an appeal of a SERB decision denying a member’s request 

to purchase credit for the time he attended the United States Military Academy at 

West Point (Academy) as a cadet. The claimant there attended the Academy for 

four years and obtained a bachelor’s degree and was subsequently “commissioned 

as a second lieutenant in the United States Army.” Donovan, 701 A.2d at 311. We

applied the Supreme Court’s holding in Simmonds by assessing the purpose of the 

claimant’s time spent at the Academy. Id. at 313. We held that the claimant’s time 

was not purchasable because it “served an educational purpose so that he could 

take his place as a member of the active military service in a position as a 

commissioned officer. Without his bachelor’s degree from the Academy, [the 
18

claimant’s] commissioned officer status upon entry into active military service 

would not have been assured.” Id.

Claimant argues that her case differs from Simmonds, and should lead to a 

contrary holding. Claimant argues that unlike her, the claimant in Simmonds: (1) 

did not attend school at night in addition to her day job; (2) needed the program to 

receive a certification; (3) was paid less than a market rate; and (4) participated in 

the residency program at the Medical Center solely to obtain a certification, and 

her primary motive was to teach. Similarly, Claimant contends that the factual 

differences between her case and Donovan should lead to a different result. 

According to Claimant, the claimant in Donovan sought to purchase the time he 

was actually in school at the Academy, not the time he worked outside of his class 

time. 

Based on the facts in this case as found by the Board and the language of the 

Act, we agree with the Board that Claimant’s role within MLSD is analogous to 

the claimant’s role at the Medical Center in Simmonds. Like the claimant in 

Simmonds, Claimant here already had a basic certification to engage in her career, 

and enrolled in a program to obtain specialized training – here, a reading specialty 

through Ohio University, and in Simmonds, an oncology certification. Further, 

Claimant’s compensation was set by statute and paid entirely by a federal grant, 

indicating that, like the claimant in Simmonds, there was no bargained-for 

exchange between employer and employee. Also like the claimant in Simmonds

who spent her time at the Medical Center treating patients under the supervision of 

a physician, Claimant here spent her time at MLSD teaching under the supervision 

of another teacher. In both Simmonds and here, the work performed served two 

purposes: first, benefiting the population and institution the student served; and 
19

second, furthering the claimant’s educational goals. We therefore conclude that 

the Board did not err in determining that the purpose of Claimant’s participation in 

the Teacher Corps program was educational and did not include the bargained-for 

exchange typically present in an employment relationship.

As in both Simmonds and Donovan, the purpose of the program at issue here 

was primarily educational. The fact that Claimant’s subjective primary intent in 

joining the Teacher Corps program may have been to teach is not dispositive when 

the purpose of the Teacher Corps program includes providing educational 

opportunities to Claimant, and Claimant’s relationship with MLSD was not that of 

an employer-employee. Thus, we observe no error in the Board’s application of 

rules of law discussed in Simmonds and Donovan to the facts in this case. 

C. The Board’s Interpretation through the Business Rule

Finally, Claimant argues that the Board should not have applied the Business 

Rule because it does not apply to her case, and even if it does apply, she should be 

considered an employee under the Business Rule.

We disagree that the Board should have not utilized the Business Rule. The 

Business Rule applies to situations where a claimant was a student at the time the 

service was rendered. There is no dispute that Claimant was a graduate student 

while she was teaching at MLSD under the purview of the Teacher Corps program

and we concluded above that, based on the language of the Act, Claimant’s 

teaching at MLSD was directly linked to her studies at Ohio University. 

Further, we see no error in the Board’s application of the Business Rule. 

The Board stated:
20

Consistent with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s analysis in 

Simmonds . . . , PSERS employs the [Business Rule] that if service is 

to fall within the definition of “school service,” and therefore entitled 

to service credit under the Retirement Code, the person who provides 

it must be an employee in the bargained-for exchange that exists in 

typical employment relationships. 

(Board Op. at 17.) The above passage, the only time the Business Rule is 

mentioned in the Board’s analysis, notes that the relevant Business Rule is 

consistent with Simmonds in that the touchstone of the analysis focuses on the 

presence of a bargained-for exchange between the employer and the claimant. 

Relevant to this case, the Business Rule states that service should be denied if “the 

service was part of the student’s curriculum,” or if “the employment was only 

available to students.” (Business Rule POS-2008-01, Ex. PSERS-A, C.R. at Item 

13.) The Board found that Claimant’s service at MLSD was related to her studies 

and that Claimant could not have taught at MLSD through the Teacher Corps

program if she was not also a student and did not attend evening and summer

classes. (FOF ¶¶ 25-29.) Because we conclude above that the Board did not err by 

concluding that Claimant is not eligible to purchase credit pursuant to Simmonds

and Donovan, the Board’s interpretation of the Retirement Code through PSERS’

Business Rule is not clearly erroneous. 
21

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Board is affirmed.6

________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

 

6 Due to our disposition, we need not address the Board’s request that we strike 

Claimant’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law from her brief. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mary Jane Schneider, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 2196 C.D. 2015

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Public School Employees’ :

Retirement Board, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

NOW, July 14, 2016, the Order of the Public School Employees’ Retirement 

Board, entered in the above-captioned matter, is hereby AFFIRMED.

________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge