United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

 

HURRICANES 

KATRINA AND RITA 

Federal Actions Could 

Enhance 

Preparedness of 

Certain StateAdministered Federal 

Support Programs 

HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA: Federal Actions Could Enhance 

Preparedness of Certain State-Administered Federal Support Programs 

(GAO-07-219) 

On page 26, in line 5 of the second paragraph, “see table 5” is revised to 

read “see table 3.” On page 27, in line 3 of the second paragraph, “see 

table 6” is revised to read “see table 4.” On page 28, in line 1 of the third 

paragraph, “Table 7” is revised to read “Table 5.” On page 30, in line 6 of 

the first paragraph, “see table 8” is revised to read “see table 6.” On 

page 38, in line 3 of the last paragraph, “in table 9” is revised to read “in 

table 7.” On page 41, in the last line of the second paragraph, “in table 

10” is revised to read “in table 8.” 

February 2007 

GAO-07-219 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

January 2007

HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA

Federal Actions Could Enhance 

Preparedness of Certain StateAdministered Federal Support Programs 

Highlights of GAO-07-219, a report to 

congressional committees 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

displaced over 1 million people and 

affected some of the poorest areas 

of the country. Many of those 

affected by the hurricanes received

federal assistance from the Old 

Age, Survivors, and Disability 

Insurance (Social Security), 

Supplemental Security Income 

(SSI), Food Stamp, Unemployment

Insurance (UI), and Temporary

Assistance for Needy Families 

(TANF) programs beforehand and

others were newly eligible after the 

storms. Under the Comptroller 

General’s authority, GAO assessed 

the (1) challenges the hurricanes 

created for programs to take

applications and pay benefits, 

(2) factors that helped or hindered

programs’ efforts, and (3) areas 

that warrant further attention and

actions being taken to improve 

programs’ disaster response. To do 

this work, GAO reviewed policies, 

reports, and plans, and interviewed

program officials at the federal 

level and in Alabama, Florida,

Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that HHS take

steps, such as disseminating 

information on promising practices 

and further study of case

management approaches as part of

its efforts to improve delivery of

human services during disasters, as

well as work with states to collect 

information on the need for TANF

disaster planning. HHS agreed with 

the recommendations on actions to 

strengthen its recent efforts but did

not agree to address TANF 

planning specifically. 

The mass destruction and displacement of people caused by the hurricanes 

created new challenges, including an unprecedented demand for services 

from these five programs. The demand for food stamps and UI benefits, and 

the disaster assistance they provide, rose sharply. New evacuee policies 

were created to provide food stamps and TANF assistance to evacuees 

nationwide. In contrast, Social Security and SSI had a significant increase for 

replacement benefits, but did not have a large increase in new applications. 

Disaster plans, flexible service delivery options, and access to contingency 

funding facilitated response, but not all programs had these elements in 

place. The federally administered Social Security and SSI programs had 

service delivery disaster plans in place to meet demand. However, such 

strategies were sometimes lacking for the state-administered Food Stamp, 

UI, and TANF programs. Flexible service delivery options such as 800

numbers and Internet application services and debit cards for issuing 

benefits expedited services. Last, access to contingency funding was key to 

facilitating disaster response. 

Gaps remain in preventing improper payments, easing access to services, 

and improving disaster planning for the state-administered programs,

although new efforts hold potential for addressing these areas. Some 

program officials said they relaxed program rules to better ensure that those 

in need received aid, which may have increased the risk of improper 

payments. Program officials are taking actions to address improper 

payments, although more sharing of information across programs and states 

would be useful. Regarding access to services, disaster victims sometimes

faced difficulties accessing aid from multiple programs, a long-standing 

problem exacerbated by a disaster. The Department of Health and Human 

Services (HHS) has begun a promising effort—with links to state program 

administrators—to improve delivery of human services during disasters. 

This effort would be strengthened by additional actions, including collecting 

and disseminating information on service delivery and improper payments 

during disasters. Finally, to address planning gaps, federal officials are 

working with states to improve service delivery planning for the Food Stamp 

and UI programs, although HHS needs to work more systematically with 

states to assess the need for additional planning for state TANF programs. 

Federal and State Responsibilities for Key Program Functions Vary 

Key functions 

Social 

Security 

and SSI 

Food 

Stamps UI TANF

Funding benefits z z { 

Funding administrative costs z  z 

Establishing eligibility rules z  { 

Supplying program offices and staffing z { { {

Source: GAO analysis.

Legend: z Federal responsibility  Federal and state shared responsibility { State responsibility

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-219.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Barbara 

Bovbjerg at (202) 512-7215 or 

bovbjergb@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

Widespread Devastation and Displacement of People Created

Service Delivery Challenges such as Unprecedented Demand 10 

Disaster Planning, Service Delivery Options, and Access to Funding 

Facilitated Response, but Not All Programs Had These Measures 

in Place 21 

Gaps in Disaster Response Remain; Efforts Under Way Hold

Promise for Improving Human Service Programs’ Disaster 

Response 34

Conclusions 44

Recommendations for Executive Action 45 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 46 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 50 

Appendix II Comments from the Social Security Administration 54 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Health & 

Human Services 56 

Appendix IV Comments from the U.S Department of Labor 61 

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 63 

Related GAO Products 64 

Page i GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Tables 

Table 1: Selected Federal Support Programs 6 

Table 2: Federal and State Responsibilities for Key Functions That 

Support Taking Applications and Issuing Benefits 7 

Table 3: Program Application Options before the Hurricanes, by 

State26 

Table 4: Program Benefit Payment Methods before the Hurricanes, 

by State 27 

Table 5: Lessons Learned about Strategies to Facilitate Response 

and Considerations for Disaster Planning 29 

Table 6: Program Funding 31 

Table 7: Some of the Initiatives States We Reviewed Are Exploring 

to Improve Disaster Preparedness 39 

Table 8: Selected White House Report Recommendations to HHS to 

Improve the Delivery of Human Services during Disasters 41 

Figures 

Figure 1: FEMA Designated Disaster Counties for Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita 11 

Figure 2: SSA District Office in Downtown New Orleans after 

Hurricane Katrina and Flooding 12 

Figure 3: Disaster Food Stamp Recipients under Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita 14 

Figure 4: Food Stamp Recipients in Hurricane-Affected States,

August to December 2005 15 

Figure 5: UI Claims in Hurricane Affected States, August to 

December 2005 16 

Figure 6: DUA Initial Applications Nationwide, January 2001 to

August 2006 17 

Figure 7: States That Requested TANF Contingency Funds 

Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 19 

Figure 8: Nationwide Social Security and SSI Immediate Payments, 

August 31 to October 31, 2003, through 2006 21 

Figure 9: Lake Charles Food Stamp and TANF Program Office 

Damaged by Hurricane Rita 24 

Figure 10: DUA Payment Process 33 

Page ii GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Abbreviations 

ACF Administration for Children and Families 

APHSA American Public Human Services Association 

COOP continuity of operations 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DUA disaster unemployment assistance 

EBT electronic benefit transfer 

EFT electronic fund transfer 

ESF emergency support function 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FNS Food and Nutrition Service 

HHS Department of Health and Human Services 

IG Office of Inspector General 

NASWA National Association of State Workforce Agencies

NRP National Response Plan 

OPHEP Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness

PIN personal identification number 

SSA Social Security Administration 

SSI Supplemental Security Income 

TANF Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 

UI Unemployment Insurance 

USDA Department of Agriculture 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page iii GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

February 7, 2007 

Congressional Committees: 

Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana and Mississippi on August 29, 

2005, and alone caused more damage than any other natural disaster in the 

history of the United States. Hurricane Rita followed less than a month 

later, adding to the devastation. These hurricanes displaced over 1 million

residents in the most directly affected states—Alabama, Louisiana, 

Mississippi, and Texas—and affected some of the poorest areas in the 

country. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided 

cash payments to help individuals and households with immediate disaster 

assistance such as shelter, clothing, and personal necessities. Beyond this

FEMA aid, many in the affected areas were receiving assistance from other 

federal programs before the hurricanes, and others who lost their homes, 

employment, or other forms of support became newly eligible for 

assistance after the storms. Key among these programs are Old Age, 

Survivors; and Disability Insurance (Social Security); Supplemental 

Security Income (SSI); the Food Stamp Program; Unemployment 

Insurance (UI); and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 

programs. Because millions of individuals and families nationwide rely on

benefits and services provided by these programs, assessing these 

programs’ hurricane response could help better prepare for ensuring 

Americans’ income security in future emergencies. 

Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana and Mississippi on August 29, 

2005, and alone caused more damage than any other natural disaster in the 

history of the United States. Hurricane Rita followed less than a month 

later, adding to the devastation. These hurricanes displaced over 1 million

residents in the most directly affected states—Alabama, Louisiana, 

Mississippi, and Texas—and affected some of the poorest areas in the 

country. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided 

cash payments to help individuals and households with immediate disaster 

assistance such as shelter, clothing, and personal necessities. Beyond this

FEMA aid, many in the affected areas were receiving assistance from other 

federal programs before the hurricanes, and others who lost their homes, 

employment, or other forms of support became newly eligible for 

assistance after the storms. Key among these programs are Old Age, 

Survivors; and Disability Insurance (Social Security); Supplemental 

Security Income (SSI); the Food Stamp Program; Unemployment 

Insurance (UI); and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 

programs. Because millions of individuals and families nationwide rely on

benefits and services provided by these programs, assessing these 

programs’ hurricane response could help better prepare for ensuring 

Americans’ income security in future emergencies. 

These programs primarily provide cash or food assistance to replace lost 

employment income or help low-income individuals meet basic needs, and 

represent a significant federal financial investment. In a recent year, Social 

Security and SSI provided $530.3 billion in income support nationwide, 

while the Food Stamp, UI, and TANF programs combined provided over 

$92 billion in benefits and services to eligible individuals during the same 

time period. To assist Congress in identifying what lessons can be learned

to improve federal response following major disasters such as Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita, we prepared this report under the Comptroller General’s

authority to conduct evaluations under his own initiative. Specifically we 

assessed (1) the challenges Hurricanes Katrina and Rita created in the 

immediate aftermath for these programs to take applications and pay 

benefits; (2) what helped the programs expedite applications and benefit 

payments after the hurricanes, and what issues, if any, emerged; and 

(3) which areas warrant further attention, and what actions are being 

taken to address these. 

These programs primarily provide cash or food assistance to replace lost 

employment income or help low-income individuals meet basic needs, and 

represent a significant federal financial investment. In a recent year, Social 

Security and SSI provided $530.3 billion in income support nationwide, 

while the Food Stamp, UI, and TANF programs combined provided over 

$92 billion in benefits and services to eligible individuals during the same 

time period. To assist Congress in identifying what lessons can be learned

to improve federal response following major disasters such as Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita, we prepared this report under the Comptroller General’s

authority to conduct evaluations under his own initiative. Specifically we 

assessed (1) the challenges Hurricanes Katrina and Rita created in the 

immediate aftermath for these programs to take applications and pay 

benefits; (2) what helped the programs expedite applications and benefit 

payments after the hurricanes, and what issues, if any, emerged; and 

(3) which areas warrant further attention, and what actions are being 

taken to address these. 

Page 1 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
To do this work, we reviewed policies, procedures, and other relevant 

documents for the five programs, as well as recent reports on the response 

to Hurricane Katrina.1

 We interviewed headquarters and regional officials 

for each of the four agencies that oversee the five selected federal basic 

support programs: the Social Security Administration (SSA)—Social 

Security and SSI; U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)—Food Stamp 

Program; U.S. Department of Labor (Labor)—UI; and U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services (HHS)—TANF. In addition to regular food 

stamps and UI benefits, the Food Stamp and UI programs also have 

disaster components to provide assistance in response to major disasters. 

In this report, we refer to Social Security and SSI as federally administered 

programs because the federal government establishes key program 

policies, funds all benefit and administrative costs, and operates offices 

primarily with federal employees. In contrast, we refer to the Food Stamp, 

UI, and TANF programs as state-administered because states are 

responsible for operating program offices and, to varying degrees among 

the programs, share responsibility with the federal government for setting 

policies and procedures, and providing funding. 

We conducted site visits in Louisiana and Texas to meet with federal, 

state, and local officials and conducted phone interviews with state 

officials in Alabama and Mississippi and federal officials in Atlanta who 

are responsible for regional program oversight. We also conducted phone 

interviews with state officials in Florida to learn about their experience in

responding to recent tropical storms and hurricanes and in hosting 

evacuees from Hurricane Katrina. To obtain insights on hurricane victims’ 

perspectives on programs’ hurricane response, we interviewed national 

and state advocacy groups for beneficiaries. In addition, we reviewed 

federal, state, and office-specific disaster preparedness plans and 

guidance. To assess the reliability of data on applications filed and 

benefits received, we reviewed relevant documentation, and interviewed 

federal officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined the data 

were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. We coordinated 

with the federal Offices of the Inspector General (IG) and state auditors on

these and other issues. We also spoke with a Department of Homeland 

 1

These reports include U.S. House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report

of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 

Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C: Feb. 15, 2006); The White House, The Federal

Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006); and 

U.S. Senate, Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs. 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May 2006).

Page 2 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Security (DHS) official about plans for the delivery of federal disaster 

assistance. We conducted our work between November 2005 and 

December 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. See appendix I for more information about our 

objectives, scope, and methodology.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused widespread destruction and 

displacement of people, resulting in challenges for federal basic support 

programs, including an unparalleled demand for services. Many 

individuals from the affected region moved to various locations 

throughout the country, and in some areas, the programs had to serve a 

large concentration of evacuees. The demand for disaster food stamps, 

regular food stamps, UI benefits, and disaster unemployment assistance 

rose sharply. Newly available federal TANF funds for evacuees were used 

to provide aid to needy families affected by the hurricanes. In contrast, 

Social Security and SSI did not experience a large increase in new 

applications, but did experience increased demand for the replacement of

lost or missed benefits. 

Results in Brief 

Disaster plans, flexible service delivery options, and access to federal 

contingency funding helped facilitate hurricane response, but not all 

programs had these measures in place. The federally administered Social

Security and SSI programs had service delivery disaster plans in place to 

address an unprecedented demand for replacement benefits. Disaster 

planning at the service delivery level varied across the state-administered 

federal programs, and in some cases, these programs struggled to ramp up 

capacity quickly to try to meet demand. In addition, while some programs 

had preexisting service delivery options that helped expedite services after 

the hurricanes, other programs did not have these options available. For 

example, SSA had the flexibility to shift staff where needed and already 

had a nationwide 800 number and an Internet application process to 

expedite services for Social Security and SSI prior to Katrina. In contrast,

the UI programs in Louisiana and Mississippi had always required in-office 

visits for filing claims. After the hurricane, Labor helped both states route 

calls from their residents to UI claims takers in other states with call 

centers—an innovative action for this program. Access to federal 

contingency funds was also important for expediting services, and 

Congress and agencies acted quickly to address immediate funding needs. 

Gaps remain in the areas of preventing improper payments, easing access 

to services, and improving disaster planning for the state-administered 

programs, although efforts are under way that may address these areas. 

Page 3 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
As program officials relaxed some program rules to better ensure that 

those eligible received aid, the risk of improper payments increased. Some 

efforts are under way to identify improper payments that occurred and 

whether sufficient internal controls were in place. Sharing this type of 

information among programs and states can help reduce programs’ 

vulnerability to fraud and abuse during emergencies. Even though some 

efforts were made to ease individuals’ access to aid, disaster victims still 

faced difficulties accessing aid from multiple programs, a long-standing 

problem even under routine conditions. In addition, to address some gaps 

in service delivery planning, USDA is revising its disaster food stamp 

program handbook and taking other steps to improve disaster planning. 

Labor has similar efforts under way, including developing information for 

states on improving disaster preparedness. HHS officials cited legislative 

restrictions that limit their ability to regulate states, emphasizing that 

TANF disaster planning is a state responsibility. However, HHS has not 

systematically worked with states to get information on states’ TANF 

disaster preparedness or identify promising practices for dissemination. 

The White House study on federal response to Hurricane Katrina, noting 

some of the difficulties in the delivery of human services, recommended 

that HHS take a leading role in improving disaster response in delivering 

human services. In response, HHS has taken initial steps to work with 

states and other federal agencies to explore ways to improve the delivery 

of human services for disaster victims. More attention to specific plans for 

collecting and disseminating promising practices and exploring case 

management approaches would strengthen this promising effort. 

To build on HHS’ recent efforts to improve the delivery of human services

during disasters, we recommend HHS take several actions, including 

drawing on its existing human services network and expertise to explore 

further case management options for service delivery during disasters as 

well as collecting and disseminating information on promising practices 

related to disaster planning, service delivery, and mitigating risks for 

improper payments. Finally, to better ensure disaster preparedness for the 

TANF program, we recommend that HHS work with states to see what 

steps may be needed to ensure key planning elements are in place. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, SSA, USDA, and Labor agreed 

with our findings. HHS agreed with our recommendations related to its 

recent efforts to improve the delivery of human services. However, HHS 

disagreed with our recommendation that it work with states on TANF 

disaster preparedness, stating that it is more appropriate to address TANF 

issues as part of HHS’ comprehensive cross-program planning efforts, 

rather than requiring a separate initiative for TANF, singling it out as a 

Page 4 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
special case, and reinforcing a “siloed approach” to delivering services. 

We agree with HHS that it is essential that its effort to improve human 

services during disasters look across multiple programs and not take a 

fragmented approach. However, we still think that HHS needs to have 

more systematic information about state TANF programs’ preparedness to 

carry out its federal oversight responsibilities for this important income 

support program for low-income families. It can obtain this information 

through its cross program effort or in other ways and we have clarified our 

recommendation language to reflect that. We also provided DHS a copy of 

the draft and incorporated its technical comments as appropriate. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita affected over 1 million people and caused 

extensive damage in the four most directly affected states: Alabama, 

Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Many of those affected depended on 

federal assistance programs such as Social Security, SSI, the Food Stamp 

Program, UI, and TANF before the hurricanes. While all of these are 

federal programs, some are funded, designed, and administered by a 

combination of federal and state governments. 

The Social Security and UI programs pay cash benefits to replace lost 

employment income when individuals stopped working. The Food Stamp, 

SSI, and TANF programs pay cash benefits or provide other assistance to 

help low-income individuals meet their basic needs. Besides the routine 

assistance these programs provide, the Food Stamp and UI programs also 

offer disaster food stamps and disaster unemployment assistance (DUA) 

in the event of a major disaster. Table 1 describes the benefits and services

of each program. 

Background 

Programs Provide Routine 

Services and Some 

Disaster Assistance 

Page 5 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Table 1: Selected Federal Support Programs 

Assistance to help low-income individuals meet basic needs 

Food Stamp Program 

Disaster Food Stamp Program

Provides nutrition assistance to low-income households 

Provides immediate short-term nutrition assistance to households in response to 

major disasters (initiated by states with U.S. Department of Agriculture approval) 

Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Provides minimum cash income to qualified aged, blind, or disabled persons 

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Provides cash assistance and services targeted to needy families including

emergency payments, child care, transportation assistance, and other social 

services 

Assistance to replace lost employment income 

Unemployment Insurance (UI)

Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) 

Provides temporary cash benefits to workers who lose their jobs through no fault 

of their own 

Provides monetary assistance to workers who lost their jobs as a result of a 

major disaster and who are not eligible for regular state UI 

Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance 

(Social Security) 

Provides monthly benefits to qualified retired workers and disabled workers and 

their dependents, and survivors of deceased workers 

Source: GAO analysis of USDA, SSA, HHS, and Labor program information. 

Although the programs serve similar needs, the federal and state 

governments have varying roles and levels of responsibility for each 

program. Table 2 illustrates the federal and state responsibilities for key 

program areas. The federally administered Social Security and SSI 

programs are fully funded by SSA and staffed by federal employees.2

Generally, eligibility rules and benefit amounts are established in federal 

law. During emergency situations, any of SSA’s regional commissioners 

has the authority to invoke disaster procedures to expedite the processing 

of initial claims generated as a result of a disaster. In addition, SSA has 

ongoing “immediate payment” procedures to replace payments to 

beneficiaries who cannot access their monthly benefits by mail or direct 

deposit.3

 Once invoked, the procedures are in effect for all related claims 

taken nationwide. Over 1,300 SSA offices provide Social Security and SSI 

services to the public. 

 2

The states have responsibility for making disability determinations under the standards 

and criteria set forth by SSA and with funding from the federal government. 

3

SSA may issue immediate payments when (1) a recipient’s benefits are delayed, (2) a 

recipient’s eligibility for Social Security or SSI has already been determined, and (3) the 

recipient has a financial emergency.

Page 6 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Table 2: Federal and State Responsibilities for Key Functions That Support Taking Applications and Issuing Benefits 

Program 

Key Program Areas 

Social 

Security SSI

Disaster 

Food

Stamp 

Program 

Food

Stamp 

Program DUA UI TANF

Funding benefits z z z z z { 

Funding administrative costs z z   z z 

Establishing program rules for

eligibility and benefit amounts z z z z  { 

Ensuring quality control z z     {

Supplying program offices and staffing z z { { { { {

Service delivery options for taking 

applications 

z z { { { { {

Benefit payment options z z z z { { {

Source: GAO analysis of SSA, USDA, Labor, and HHS program statutes, guidance, and information. 

Legend: z Federal responsibility  Federal and State shared responsibility { State responsibility

The other programs are all state-administered federal programs in which 

the federal government and states vary in their responsibilities. USDA fully 

funds food stamp and disaster food stamp benefits and generally sets 

program rules and benefit levels nationally. States pay 50 percent of 

administrative costs, have some options to set program rules,4

 and operate

Food Stamp Program offices. The UI program is funded by state and 

federal taxes on employers. Labor oversees and monitors state UI 

programs, and states determine eligibility criteria, benefit amounts, and 

duration of payments, which vary across states.5

 While Labor oversees the 

DUA program, FEMA funds the benefits and administrative costs for this 

program. For the TANF program, states receive funds from HHS in the 

form of a capped block grant.6

 Federal funding levels do not vary based on

caseload, although TANF emergency and loan funds were created by law 

 4

The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 makes available to states various 

options that are intended to simplify food stamp program rules, streamline food stamp 

eligibility and benefit rules, and help ensure that food stamp participants experience as 

smooth a transition from welfare to work as possible. 

5

Most states pay a maximum of 26 weeks of UI benefits, which may be extended in times of 

high unemployment. 

6

To receive its TANF block grant funds, each state must contribute its own funds up to a

specified level. 

Page 7 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
as safety net mechanisms for states to access additional federal resources 

in the event of a recession or other emergency. Within federal guidelines, 

each state determines what aid and services to provide, what eligibility 

requirements to use, and how to deliver the services. As a result, state 

programs vary widely. States typically have local or regional welfare 

offices, and in the states we reviewed, most of the Food Stamp and TANF 

programs are co-located.

Eligibility rules for the disaster food stamp and DUA programs are relaxed 

to allow individuals who might not qualify for regular program benefits to 

receive disaster assistance. For example, a broad range of resources are 

counted to determine eligibility for regular food stamps, whereas only 

accessible resources such as cash and savings accounts are considered for 

disaster food stamps. Based on household size, the Disaster Food Stamp 

Program automatically pays applicants the maximum monthly allotment 

payable under the regular Food Stamp Program. In addition, regular food 

stamp clients may receive a supplemental amount that increases their 

monthly benefit to the maximum monthly disaster benefit allotment. In the 

past, disaster food stamp applications were generally accepted over a 

period of 7 days, and applicants received 1 month of benefits. DUA 

benefits are provided to individuals who were affected by the disaster but 

do not qualify for regular UI program benefits. Eligible individuals may 

include persons who are self-employed or have a short work history. 

Before applying for DUA, individuals must apply for UI and be found 

ineligible. Applicants normally must file for DUA within 30 days and are 

allowed 21 days to submit the required supporting documentation. 

Individuals can receive DUA for up to 26 weeks.

Basis for Federal Support 

Programs Assisting 

Disaster Victims 

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 

(the Stafford Act) primarily established the programs and processes for 

the federal government to provide major disaster and emergency 

assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations, individuals, and 

qualified private nonprofit organizations. Upon a governor’s request, the 

President can declare an “emergency” or a “major disaster” under the 

Stafford Act, which triggers specific types of federal relief. For Hurricane 

Katrina, the President made a major disaster declaration for Louisiana, 

Mississippi, and Alabama on August 29, 2005. For Hurricane Rita, the 

President made the same declaration for Louisiana and Texas on 

September 24, 2005. These declarations authorized the federal government 

Page 8 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
to engage in various emergency response activities, such as providing 

temporary housing and disaster unemployment assistance.7

For purposes of the National Response Plan (NRP), presidentiallydeclared disasters under the Stafford Act are considered incidents of 

national significance. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 

FEMA may activate certain provisions of the National Response Plan 

(NRP) to coordinate federal support for disaster response. One provision

specified in the NRP cites expediting the processing of new claims for 

federal benefits as a goal.

8

 While the NRP specifically mentions Social 

Security and DUA benefits, there are additional federal requirements for 

continuing federal benefit payments during emergencies. 

Federal agencies have been required since 1999 to have plans in place to 

ensure they could continue essential functions such as benefit payments in 

the event of an emergency. FEMA provided federal agencies guidance for 

developing continuity-of-operation (COOP) plans to address events that 

could disrupt normal agency operations and directed them to develop 

plans for their headquarters and subcomponent levels. However, the 

guidance did not explicitly direct federal agencies in the actions they 

should take regarding program services provided by states. 

 7

The Food Stamp Act and the Stafford Act authorize USDA to establish temporary

emergency standards of eligibility and to provide emergency benefits to replace food lost in 

a disaster. 

8

The NRP designates 15 emergency support functions (ESF) that address specific disaster 

response needs. ESF-6, identified as “Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services,” cites

expediting the processing of federal benefits. 

Page 9 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused large-scale destruction and 

displacement of people, resulting in challenges for federal basic support 

programs such as an unparalleled demand for services. Many people in the 

affected areas depended on federal assistance before the hurricanes and

needed help to continue getting their aid. As a result of the hurricanes, 

many others were newly eligible because they had lost their homes or 

jobs, or were temporarily displaced. The demand for food stamps, disaster

food stamps, UI, and DUA benefits rose sharply. Newly available federal 

TANF funds were used to provide aid to needy families affected by the 

hurricanes. In contrast, Social Security and SSI did not have a large 

increase in new applications, but did experience a large increase in 

requests for the replacement of lost or missing benefits. 

FEMA designated 117 counties and parishes across Alabama, Louisiana, 

Mississippi, and Texas as disaster counties. (See fig. 1.) Most people fled

the area as a result of the hurricanes. Homes, businesses, and entire 

communities were damaged or destroyed. According to the U.S. Bureau of 

Labor Statistics, an estimated 1.2 million people age 16 and over evacuated

as a result of Hurricane Katrina. The U. S. Census estimated that the 

population of disaster-designated counties in Louisiana alone decreased 

by almost 345,000 between July 1, 2005, and January 1, 2006. In contrast, 

Mississippi’s population decreased by approximately 42,000, and 

Alabama’s population remained about the same. According to the Red 

Cross, 8 months following the disasters, more than 750,000 persons 

remained displaced across all 50 states. 

Widespread

Devastation and 

Displacement of 

People Created 

Service Delivery 

Challenges such as 

Unprecedented 

Demand 

Hurricanes Caused 

Widespread Devastation 

and Large-Scale 

Displacement 

Page 10 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Figure 1: FEMA Designated Disaster Counties for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

Ala.

Ark.

La.

Tex.

Sources: GAO analysis of FEMA data. Map Resources (map).

Hurricane Katrina (August 23-31, 2005)

Hurricane Rita (September 18-26, 2005)

FEMA designated disaster counties for individual assistance

Miss.

In addition to facing the large number of hurricane victims seeking 

assistance, the programs we reviewed faced challenges providing services

after the hurricanes because of damage and disruption to their own 

facilities. In hurricane-affected areas, records, equipment, and program 

offices were damaged or destroyed. Coastal areas in Louisiana, 

Mississippi, Texas, and Alabama were heavily damaged. Many program 

offices were closed for only a few days, but several damaged facilities did 

Page 11 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
not open for months, and a few were permanently closed as a result of 

the destruction, such as the SSA district office in New Orleans shown in 

figure 2. 

Figure 2: SSA District Office in Downtown New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina and

Flooding

Source: SSA Office of Inspector General.

Demand for Services Rose 

Sharply after the Storms 

In the aftermath of the hurricanes, demand for services increased 

dramatically for all programs. Many individuals in the hurricane-affected

states already depended on federal assistance programs before the 

hurricanes. For example, the Urban Institute estimated that about 

21 percent of the people in Orleans Parish, the county that includes New 

Orleans, were receiving food stamps in 2000.9

 According to SSA data, over 

1.2 million Social Security beneficiaries were located in counties affected 

by Hurricane Katrina. Demand for services rose significantly for the many 

 9

The Urban Institute, Katrina: Demographics of a Disaster (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9,

2005). 

Page 12 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
hurricane victims who were newly eligible, adding to the existing demand 

for services of those already receiving benefits. 

Disaster Food Stamps and Regular Food Stamp Program: Caseloads 

for disaster food stamps and regular food stamps increased significantly 

following the hurricanes. In addition to providing disaster food stamps to 

hurricane victims in the disaster-affected states, USDA—for the first time 

ever—adopted a policy of providing disaster food stamps to evacuees 

nationwide. Usually disaster food stamps are available only in areas where 

the disaster occurred. This new policy authorized states across the 

country to provide the maximum monthly food stamp benefits to Katrina 

victims for up to 3 months.10 Seventeen states, including the 4 hurricaneaffected states—Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas—issued 

disaster food stamps to evacuees. 

With the new evacuee policy and significant need for disaster food stamps 

in the hurricane-affected states, caseloads for the Disaster Food Stamp 

Program far exceeded those of any previous disaster. For example, USDA 

issued $274 million for disaster food stamp assistance during the 2004 

disaster season. In contrast, USDA issued over $680 million for disaster 

food stamp assistance to close to 1.5 million households as a result of 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Figure 3 shows the number of households 

that received disaster food stamps in each hurricane-affected state and in 

all other states. Households who would not normally qualify for regular 

food stamps because of their income or resources could apply for and 

receive disaster food stamps if they met certain program requirements. 

 10USDA revised the evacuee policy after it was issued to include hurricane evacuees who 

relocated to another area within their home state. 

Page 13 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Figure 3: Disaster Food Stamp Recipients under Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Other states

Alabama

Texas

Mississippi

Louisiana

Number of households (in thousands)

Source: GAO analysis of USDA data.

States that provided disaster food stamps

Note: Disaster food stamp numbers for the hurricane affected states include both disaster food

stamps paid to hurricane victims in the hurricane-affected states and to evacuees from other states. 

States were not required by USDA to report the number of evacuees they served. Therefore, these 

totals may exclude some evacuee recipients because some states reported evacuees served and 

some did not. 

Caseloads for regular food stamps also increased following the hurricanes. 

As shown in figure 4, Louisiana and Texas experienced a dramatic rise in 

new recipients of regular food stamps following Hurricane Katrina. The 

number of recipients continued to rise after Hurricane Rita. Alabama and 

Mississippi had smaller but significant increases in their caseloads. 

Page 14 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Figure 4: Food Stamp Recipients in Hurricane-Affected States, August to December 

2005 

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

Number of households (in thousands)

Source: GAO analysis of USDA data.

Year 2005

August September October November December

Texas

Alabama

Louisiana

Mississippi

Note: Numbers reflect recipients of regular food stamps only, not disaster food stamps. 

In addition to new applicants applying for disaster food stamps, in the 

affected areas most regular Food Stamp Program recipients received 

benefits to replace food destroyed in the disaster as well as automatic 

supplements without having to apply at a disaster site. According to 

USDA, Alabama issued $4.3 million in supplemental benefits to almost 

30,000 households. Mississippi provided supplemental benefits to over 

224,000 households, totaling more than $24.1 million. Louisiana provided 

282,626 households with over $33.3 million in supplemental benefits as a 

result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

UI and DUA programs: More than half a million people lost their jobs 

following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita—as a result the UI program had a 

sharp rise in applicants for regular UI and DUA benefits. Regular UI claims 

increased across all four states following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

(See fig. 5.) Louisiana and Mississippi experienced a substantial jump in UI 

claims after Hurricane Katrina. For example, in Louisiana, regular UI 

Page 15 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
claims increased by approximately 134, 000 in September 2005—an 

increase of over 900 percent. 

Figure 5: UI Claims in Hurricane Affected States, August to December 2005 

Texas

Alabama

Louisiana

Mississippi

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

140,000

160,000

8/31 9/30 10/31 11/30 12/31

Number of claims

Source: GAO analysis of Labor data.

The DUA program received a greater number of applications following the 

hurricanes than for any other disaster in the history of the program. Over 

233,000 DUA claims were filed, compared with just over 7,000 filed after 

the September 11 terrorist attacks, according to Labor data. (See fig. 6.) 

In addition, on March 6, 2006, Congress extended DUA benefits for eligible 

individuals for an additional 13 weeks beyond the 26 weeks DUA is 

typically payable.11 As shown in figure 6, this caused an additional surge in 

claims. The majority of DUA claims were filed in Louisiana—almost 

185,000. According to Labor, after hurricanes Katrina and Rita, a total of 

$413.7 million was paid in DUA benefits to beneficiaries from the four 

 11The Katrina Emergency Assistance Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-176. 

Page 16 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
affected states—far more than FEMA paid following any disaster or in any 

other year in the 32-year history of the program. 

Figure 6: DUA Initial Applications Nationwide, January 2001 to August 2006 

Thousands of applications

Source: GAO analysis of Labor data.

Time of national disasters

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

July 2006

Jan. 2006

July 2005

July 200

Jan. 2004

July 2004

Jan. 2005

3

Jan. 2003

Jan. 200

July 2002

2

Jan. 200

July 2001

1

September 11, 2001

Extension of 

September 11 

DUA benefits

Hurricane

Isabel

Hurricanes Charley,

Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

Extension of Katrina and Rita DUA benefits

Although hurricane evacuees may file for UI and DUA benefits in the state 

to which they evacuated, they receive benefits from the state where they 

were employed. Therefore, the increase in UI claims reflects an increase 

in workloads both for the state where the claims were taken, and for the 

state where the claims were adjudicated and benefits paid. For example, 

in Texas 38,000 Louisiana evacuees received UI and DUA benefits during 

November 2005. Almost 300,000 Louisiana evacuees across the country 

received over $1 billion in regular UI and DUA benefits following 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

TANF: The TANF program also experienced an increase in workloads as 

new federal funding became available for evacuees. Congress passed 

legislation on September 21, 2005, to ease states’ access to the existing 

TANF contingency and loan funds.12 We had previously reported that the 

 12TANF Emergency Response and Recovery Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-68. 

Page 17 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
contingency fund, as originally established in 1996, has not proven to be an 

inviting option to states in need for several reasons, including the 

requirement that states use increased amounts of their own funds to be 

eligible for the additional federal funds.13 The post-hurricane legislation 

eliminated this funding requirement and gave all states that were assisting 

hurricane victims immediate access to TANF contingency funds to provide 

short-term, nonrecurrent payments to evacuees from Alabama, Florida, 

Louisiana, and Mississippi. The maximum contingency fund amount each 

state was eligible to receive was 20 percent of its annual TANF block 

grant. In total, 20 states requested TANF contingency funds to provide 

emergency cash assistance to evacuees.14 (See fig. 7.) Information on the 

total hurricane victim and evacuee TANF caseload is not readily available,

however. HHS asked states to report on the total number of newly 

approved evacuee families receiving TANF cash assistance or 

nonrecurrent, short-term benefits through the end of October 2005, but 

reporting did not continue beyond that time. Based on our interviews with 

hurricane-affected states, we have some indication that regular TANF 

caseloads were not affected overall, but the evacuee program contributed

to increased workloads in those states that provided emergency benefits. 

 13Our previous report noted that the usefulness of the contingency fund could be improved 

for hard-pressed states if Congress eliminated restrictive requirements for states to provide 

a share of contingency funding, and limits on the amount of contingency funds to which 

each state has access. (See GAO, Welfare Reform: Challenges in Maintaining a FederalState Fiscal Partnership, GAO-01-828 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 2001) and GAO, Welfare

Reform: Challenges in Saving for a “Rainy Day,” GAO-01-674T (Washington, D.C.: Apr.

26, 2001). 

14Regional HHS officials we interviewed said that some states may not have accessed 

contingency funds because they did not get many evacuees, and some states thought they

had sufficient resources to enroll evacuees in their own TANF program. 

Page 18 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Figure 7: States That Requested TANF Contingency Funds Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

Sources: GAO analysis of HHS data. Copyright Corel Corp, all rights reserved (map).

PA

OR

NV

ID

MT

WY

UT

AZ NM

CO

ND

SD

NE

TX

KS

OK

MN

IA

MO

AR

LA

IL

MS

IN

KY

TN

AL

FL

GA

SC

NC

VA

OH

NH

MA

RI MI

CA

WA

WI NY

ME

VT

WV

HI

CT

NJ

DE

MD

DC

AK

Requested TANF contigency funds for evacuees

In addition, Congress gave Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi access to 

TANF loan funds—a loan in name only, not expected to be repaid—to 

support hurricane victims within their own state. These states were given 

access to an additional 20 percent of their block grant amounts. 

Mississippi and Alabama chose to implement emergency TANF programs 

for hurricane-affected residents of their own states that were consistent 

Page 19 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
with the one time, emergency payments they provided to evacuees from 

other states. Instead of providing emergency payments, Louisiana 

established a contract with Louisiana Family Recovery Corps to provide 

services such as mental health services to families across the state that 

were displaced by the hurricanes. 

Social Security and SSI: SSI and Social Security experienced a 

significant increase in requests for immediate payments following the 

hurricanes, but did not have a large rise in new applicants. From August 

31, 2005, to October 31, 2005, 110,141 immediate payments were made 

nationwide. This is a dramatic increase when compared to similar time 

periods in previous years. For example, in 2004, 23,697 immediate 

payments were issued nationwide during the same time period. While 

Social Security and SSI programs did not experience a large increase in 

new applicants after the hurricanes, these programs may see an increase 

over time. SSA officials we interviewed said that some hurricane victims 

may have long-term health issues, making them eligible for SSI and/or 

Social Security Disability Insurance.15 Others who are eligible may 

eventually choose to retire and apply for Social Security. 

 15SSI is based on financial need and Social Security Disability Insurance is based on having

a Social Security earnings record. 

Page 20 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Figure 8: Nationwide Social Security and SSI Immediate Payments, August 31 to 

October 31, 2003, through 2006 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

2003 2004 2005 2006

Payments (in thousands)

Source: GAO analysis of SSA data.

Disaster planning, flexible service delivery options, and access to federal 

contingency funds helped facilitate programs’ hurricane response, but not 

all programs had these measures in place. Programs with pre-existing 

disaster plans in place were better positioned than other programs to meet 

the unprecedented demand for services. Some programs had flexibility 

and preexisting service delivery options that facilitated taking applications

and issuing benefits. These included call centers, Internet application 

processes, and debit card systems to pay benefits. Some programs put new 

procedures and systems in place to expedite services and pay benefits, but 

in some cases, officials encountered difficulties implementing new 

options. In addition, access to federal contingency funds was also 

important for expediting services, and Congress and agencies acted 

quickly to address immediate funding needs. 

Social Security and SSI were the only programs for which the federal 

government had authority for service delivery and had disaster policies 

and procedures already in place to respond to emergencies and disasters. 

SSA used FEMA guidance to develop COOP plans for the Social Security

and SSI programs. SSA was prepared to set up temporary, full-service 

Disaster Planning, 

Service Delivery 

Options, and Access 

to Funding Facilitated 

Response, but Not All 

Programs Had These 

Measures in Place 

Programs with Disaster 

Plans for Service Delivery 

Were Better Prepared to 

Address Unprecedented 

Demand 

Page 21 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
offices because the agency has an agreement with the General Services 

Administration (GSA) to secure trailers and leased office space on short 

notice. Other plans enabled SSA to communicate with more than 

1,200 SSA employees directly affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. On

a routine basis, SSA employees are given telephone numbers to call to 

receive instructions during emergencies. SSA also provided detailed 

guidance to regional offices and offices that serve the public and required 

them to have plans in place. The regional officials we contacted told us 

they review offices’ plans annually and require managers to review 

procedures with staff periodically. 

While SSA had clear federal lines of authority for all aspects of program 

service delivery during disasters, the other agencies we reviewed did not.

Federal planning requirements and guidance vary across the stateadministered federal programs. The Food Stamp Act requires states to 

have plans to address certain events related to operating a Disaster Food 

Stamp Program. USDA additionally provides states guidance in a number 

of areas such as strategies for issuing food stamp benefits when routine 

procedures cannot be used.16 States must review disaster food stamp 

program plans annually, make revisions as necessary, and submit revisions 

to USDA. According to USDA officials, states generally run a large-scale

disaster food stamp program at off-site locations such as civic centers or 

sports stadiums that can accommodate more applicants than local food

stamp offices could serve. Food Stamp Program officials in Mississippi 

had a partnership with the state emergency management agency to 

provide tents, water, security personnel, and other necessities. In contrast, 

there are no federal requirements for states to develop disaster plans for 

the UI, DUA, and TANF programs, and Labor and HHS officials told us 

they have not provided states guidance on the issue; therefore, states have 

flexibility in developing disaster plans. 

However, even with disaster planning for the Food Stamp Program, we 

found that some local Food Stamp Program and TANF offices in the states 

we reviewed were overwhelmed in the aftermath of the hurricanes. 

Similarly, some local UI programs were also unprepared for a large-scale 

disaster. Local food stamp, TANF, and UI officials we visited in Louisiana 

reported difficulty finding supplies, additional security, and facilities to 

 16Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), USDA, Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) Disaster 

Plan Guide, (Alexandria, Virginia: October 2000) and FNS Handbook 320 Disaster Food 

Stamp Program, (Alexandria, Virginia: 2005). USDA plans to issue an update of the 

handbook in 2007. 

Page 22 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
manage the large volume of people seeking services. In an extreme 

example, Hurricane Rita damaged the food stamp/TANF office in Lake 

Charles, Louisiana, destroying most of the building, furnishings, and 

equipment. (See fig. 9.) After Hurricane Rita, officials relocated to another 

office, but initially did not have any state or federal assistance to find 

supplies and basic office equipment as well as security and other 

assistance to manage large crowds of people seeking disaster food stamps. 

At first, local officials used their personal cell phones to conduct business. 

Page 23 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Figure 9: Lake Charles Food Stamp and TANF Program Office Damaged by Hurricane Rita 

Source: GAO.

Food Stamp Program and 

TANF office damaged by

Hurricane Rita, Lake Charles,

Louisiana

Discarded office furniture

and equipment from

hurricane damage

Flexible Service Delivery 

Options Helped Expedite 

Applications and Ensure 

Payments, but Not All 

Programs Had These 

Options in Place 

Programs that had flexible service delivery options in place before the 

hurricanes or could quickly implement them were better positioned to 

manage increased demand and the mobility of evacuees than other 

programs. These service delivery options included: flexible staffing, 

options for taking applications, and alternatives for issuing benefits. 

Page 24 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Social Security and SSI had greater flexibility than state-administered 

federal programs to shift staffing where needed. SSA deployed 

171 employees from across the country to help out in areas serving large 

numbers of hurricane victims. SSA shifted all workloads from offices 

forced to close to other offices and opened temporary locations in GSA 

trailers or in other federal buildings. The Food Stamp and UI programs 

shifted staff from other duties and other locations within their states to 

address increased demand for services. For example, Florida officials sent 

food stamp eligibility workers from other parts of the state to the 

panhandle area, where evacuees were concentrated. However, even with 

additional staff, some programs in Louisiana and Mississippi did not have 

enough staff statewide to meet demand. 

Flexible Staffing 

State-administered federal programs also relied on temporary workers and 

help from other states, but these arrangements were not always in place. 

UI officials in Texas, who were prepared to hire temporary workers as 

part of routine operations, could quickly recruit workers for call centers. 

While other states offered to help, Food Stamp and UI program officials in 

hurricane-affected states did not have arrangements in place before the 

hurricanes to easily make use of out-of-state workers. USDA, Labor, and 

the American Public Human Services Association (APHSA)—a 

professional association of state and local human services program 

officials—helped recruit workers from other states. This included helping 

to work through agreements and logistics for out-of-state workers, but in 

some cases, these arrangements were cumbersome. For example, it took 

about 5 weeks to work out an agreement for Texas to help take UI claims

for Louisiana, according to regional Labor officials. In total, 15 states sent

about 163 Food Stamp Program workers, and 21 states sent workers or 

helped take UI and DUA claims for the hurricane-affected states. 

SSA had application options in place for Social Security and SSI that 

facilitated its response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Even though these 

programs did not experience a sharp increase in new applications, they 

had the following options in place: 

Options to Take Applications 

• nationwide 800 number,

• call centers, 

• an Internet application process, and 

• electronic data exchanges among states for birth certificates and other 

documents needed for new claims or for reconstructing lost paper files. 

SSA relied on its telephone and Internet services to serve those who were 

newly eligible, as well as those already receiving services. In addition, SSA

Page 25 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
had software in place that enabled its staff to flag applicants from disasteraffected areas for expedited service.

State-administered federal programs with application options that were 

not dependent on in-office visits were better positioned to respond to 

significant increases in applications and to evacuees crossing state lines 

than other programs. Before the hurricanes, application options for the 

Food Stamp, TANF, and UI programs varied by state. (See table 3.) 

Table 3: Program Application Options before the Hurricanes, by State

Program 

State 

Social 

Security SSI 

Disaster Food 

Stamp Program UI & DUA 

Food Stamp 

Program & TANFc

Alabama Call center In person 

Louisiana In person In person 

Mississippi In person In person 

Texas Call center, online In person 

Florida

Online, 

call center, 

in person 

Call center, 

in persona

In person for new 

applicants b

Call center, online In person, call center, online 

Source: GAO analysis of program information from SSA, HHS, USDA, and Labor and states. 

a

SSI applicants can complete disability reports online, but must complete an interview in person or 

over the phone to apply for benefits. 

b

Most supplemental and replacement benefits were done automatically without the need for an 

application form.

c

In Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, some exceptions are made for special needs cases 

to allow individuals to apply via telephone. 

Some states adopted new forms and procedures to expedite processing of 

applications after Hurricane Katrina. Louisiana and Mississippi developed 

an abbreviated, Web-based application form for UI and DUA. Texas 

officials developed an abbreviated application form for the Food Stamp 

Program and implemented an online system to input applications with 

laptop computers. Florida officials also developed a shortened application 

to run an emergency TANF program for hurricane evacuees and changed 

their online application so individuals could self-identify if they did not 

have the required documentation. Food stamp employees in Alabama and 

Mississippi manually completed simplified application forms at sites 

designated for disaster food stamps and sent the forms to a centralized 

data entry location to expedite processing. 

The UI programs in Louisiana and Mississippi adapted call center 

technology to completely change the way UI and DUA claims were taken 

Page 26 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
in their states. Before Hurricane Katrina, both states mainly required inoffice visits for filing claims. After the hurricane, the Mississippi UI 

program set up call centers to take UI and DUA claims. In addition, Labor 

helped Mississippi and Louisiana route calls from their residents to UI 

claims takers in other states with call centers—an action that had never 

been taken before. At the same time, interstate claims presented some 

challenges to the UI program. In Louisiana and Mississippi, phone service 

was disrupted in some areas, and the few operational phone lines, 

overwhelmed with calls, were busy for extended periods. Other states 

taking claims for Louisiana and Mississippi could not easily get applicant

information from program officials. A national client advocacy group told 

us that some hurricane victims grew frustrated and gave up. 

For Social Security, SSI, and the Food Stamp Program, benefit payment 

methods are determined on a federal level and are consistent across 

states. (See table 4.) Payment procedures for the UI program and TANF 

are determined by each state and can vary across states. 

Options for Issuing Benefits

Table 4: Program Benefit Payment Methods before the Hurricanes, by State

Program 

State 

Social Security 

& SSI Food stamps

Disaster 

food stamps UI DUA TANF

Alabama EBTaEBT Checks,

direct deposit 

Checks, 

direct deposit 

EBT 

Louisiana EBT EBT Checks

direct deposit 

Checks, 

direct deposit 

EBT 

Mississippi EBT EBT Checks Checks EBT

Texas EBT EBT Checks Checks EBT

Florida 

Checks, 

direct deposit, 

emergency 

advance 

payments, 

immediate 

payments 

EBT EBT Checks,

direct deposit 

Checks, 

direct deposit 

EBT 

Source: GAO analysis of program information from SSA, HHS, USDA, Labor and states. 

a

Program recipients use electronic benefit transfer (EBT) cards. 

SSA could provide immediate emergency checks nationwide—an 

important measure because Hurricane Katrina disrupted mail delivery of 

monthly Social Security checks, and many SSA and SI beneficiaries in the 

hurricane-affected areas were dependent on this income source. The

emergency payments were not the usual U.S. Treasury checks, but thirdparty drafts drawn on a commercial bank and often completed by hand. 

After Hurricane Katrina hit, SSA asked the vendor to produce a large 

supply of these blank checks quickly and developed a letter for financial 

Page 27 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
institutions to help authenticate the third-party draft checks. SSA also 

worked with the Louisiana Banking Association to help reassure banks 

that the checks were legitimate. 

Programs that had debit card systems before the hurricanes were able to

provide benefits without interruption, but some experienced challenges 

processing and issuing benefits. Food stamp recipients use electronic 

benefit transfer (EBT) cards with personal identification numbers (PIN), 

which work much like debit cards. These cards can be used across all 

states with the exception of cards issued by the state of Wyoming.17 The 

Food Stamp and TANF programs in all the states we interviewed use debit 

card systems for both food stamps and TANF and could continue paying 

benefits to those who evacuated or relocated to other states. However, 

Louisiana experienced some disruption in activating new debit cards 

because the 800 number used to provide PINs was routed through New 

Orleans, where the telephone lines were down. The state’s EBT vendor set 

up a system to issue debit cards with pre-selected PINs until the 800 

number was restored. In addition, some retailers did not know how to 

process EBT transactions manually in areas where telephone service and

electronic communications were disrupted. The Louisiana UI program, 

overwhelmed in efforts to issue unemployment checks, rushed to 

implement a debit card system and encountered a number of challenges. 

For example, it was difficult to distribute debit cards to evacuees located

around the state and country. 

Table 5 presents a summary of strategies we identified that facilitated 

hurricane response for taking applications and paying benefits, as well as 

actions to consider for disaster planning. Some practices were specific to 

planning and preparing for disasters. Others were steps programs were 

taking to streamline procedures and use technology to improve routine 

program operations, such as online applications and call centers. 

 17For this report, EBT cards will be referred to as debit cards.

Page 28 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Table 5: Lessons Learned about Strategies to Facilitate Response and Considerations for Disaster Planning 

Strategies to Facilitate 

Response What Worked Actions to Consider for Disaster Planning

Increasing operating capacity and 

providing basic necessities for 

customers 

• Temporary facilities and mobile units enabled

programs to continue operations in areas 

damaged by the hurricanes 

• The Food Stamp Program operates at 

alternative sites to accommodate a large

number of people while maintaining routine 

services 

• Partnerships with other federal or state 

agencies such as the General Services 

Administration and states’ emergency 

management agencies 

• Have arrangements for alternate office sites 

or mobile units in place 

• Have arrangements for alternate 

communication systems to be available 

during power outages 

• Have procedures for increasing supplies 

• Have agreements in place with other 

agencies and organizations to help with 

security and basic necessities for customers 

Communicating with staff affected 

by the disaster

• Procedures such as 800 numbers to 

communicate with staff for emergencies and

disasters 

• Have procedures to communicate with staff 

before major disruptions 

• SSA has standard procedures and shifted 

staff nationwide 

• Some state-administered federal programs 

shifted staff from across the state or from one

duty to another 

• Train staff with other duties or from other 

programs ahead of time so they will be

familiar with program rules and procedures 

• Retired workers and hurricane affected 

workers who are temporarily unemployed

served as temporary workers

• Identify need and sources for obtaining 

workers before disasters occur 

• Plan for training and other arrangements for 

hiring and accommodating temporary 

workers 

Increasing staffing 

• USDA, Labor, and ASPHA helped recruit 

workers from other states, assisted with 

logistics and in some cases, provided 

reimbursement

• Have agreements to get workers from other 

states, which may address housing, 

reimbursement, and other logistics 

• 800 numbers and call centers helped 

programs handle large increases in 

applications 

• The UI program greatly expanded capacity 

by routing calls to non-hurricane affected 

states 

• Have application options available to 

increase capacity and to rely on when routine

processes are disrupted 

• Online application options helped programs 

handle large increases in applications 

• Have other options available when 

communication via Internet is disrupted 

• Abbreviated forms enabled programs to take

and process applications in a much shorter 

time 

• Have abbreviated application forms 

available that collect key information needed

for computer systems to process applications

Expediting applications 

• Off-site or centralized processing centers 

away from customers helped some programs

more efficiently provide services 

• Have alternative procedures to expedite 

processing 

Page 29 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Strategies to Facilitate 

Response What Worked Actions to Consider for Disaster Planning

• Immediate emergency checks enabled SSA

to expedite payment of benefits 

• Have well-established procedures for 

ensuring quality control 

• Debit cards were portable and could be used

by hurricane victims who moved within their 

home states or to other states 

• Have procedures to address disruption in

service when phone lines and ATMs were 

down 

• Plan for distributing new cards when disaster

victims do not have a stable address 

• Electronic Funds Transfer could be used by 

hurricane victims who moved within their 

home states or to other states 

• May need to have contingencies for 

hurricane damaged areas where electricity 

was out and financial institutions were closed

Expediting and continuing benefit 

payments 

• SSA had partnerships to help with alternative

procedures such as working with financial 

institutions to substantiate immediate 

emergency checks and with the U.S. Postal 

Service to set up temporary mail stations 

• Have agreements and alternative procedures

in place to expedite and continue benefits 

Source: GAO analysis of program information from and interviews with SSA, USDA, Labor, HHS, states, and professional and 

advocacy organizations. 

The availability of federal and state funds to meet the increased demand 

for assistance was key to facilitating program response, although the 

funding structure varied greatly among the programs. Funding varies as to

the source—federal funds, state funds, or a combination—and as to 

whether the funding levels are fixed or open-ended entitlements from 

which eligible applicants are guaranteed receipt. (See table 6.) For Social 

Security and SSI, federal funding was available and there were no funding 

constraints that limited SSA’s ability to deliver services. In contrast, all 

other programs had some role for states to share costs or a new federal 

funding source was made available, creating some uncertainty and 

confusion. 

Additional Funding Was 

Available for Increased Costs, 

but Some Funding Questions 

Remain for State-Administered 

Federal Programs 

Page 30 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Table 6: Program Funding 

Regular programs Entitlement

a

Funding source for benefits Funding source for administrative costs

Food Stamps Yes 100% federal 50% federal and 50% state 

UI Yes 100% funded by state tax on 

employers 

100% funded by federal tax on employers 

TANF No Capped federal funding with required 

state funding 

Capped federal funding with required state 

fundingd

SSI Yes 100% federal

b

100% federal

Social Security Yes 100% federal 100% federal

Disaster programs Entitlement Funding source for benefits Funding source for administrative costs 

Disaster Food Stamp Program Yes 100% federal paid by USDA 50% federal (USDA) and 50% state funding 

DUA Yes 100% federal paid by FEMA 100% federal paid by FEMA 

TANF Emergency Funds No 100% federal paid by HHS 

(Contingency Fund and Loan Fundc

) 

100% federal paid by HHS (Contingency 

Fund and Loan Fund) 

Source: GAO analysis of SSA, USDA, Labor, and HHS program information. 

a

All individuals who qualify for Social Security or UI receive assistance. However, these programs are 

traditionally considered to be different from other entitlement programs because they have work 

history requirements. 

b

Federal SSI benefits are augmented by state funds in some states.

c

Loan funds are loans in name only—states are not expected to repay them. Congress used its 

existing authority to appropriate these funds under the loan program, but the loans were intended to 

function similar to the contingency funds. 

d

There is a spending cap on the amount states may spend of their federal TANF funds and their state

maintenance-of-effort funds on certain administrative activities. 

USDA provided some additional funding to address increased demand for 

disaster food stamps and regular foods stamps. This included paying 50 

percent of the administrative costs to have food stamp workers from other 

states help the hurricane-affected states. In addition, USDA reimbursed 

Florida for sending teams of state officials to Louisiana and Mississippi to 

provide technical assistance on setting up disaster sites. 

Congress provided access to TANF contingency funds for any state to be 

reimbursed for providing short-term, one time payments to evacuees, but

some states may not have been prepared to run such a program.18

According to HHS officials, some states had rules and procedures to run a 

 18By providing cash assistance through short-term, one-time payments, recipients do not 

need to meet federal work requirements or time limits on assistance that are in place for 

ongoing cash aid funded with other federal TANF funds.

Page 31 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
one-time emergency program as part of their regular TANF program and 

others did not. For example, states such as Arkansas modified their state 

TANF plans to operate an emergency program. However, HHS officials 

said that some states may have needed approval from their state 

legislature, which could have prevented them from implementing an 

emergency program for evacuees in a timely manner. In addition, HHS 

officials also said that restrictions associated with the Katrina contingency

funds may have discouraged states from using the funding. For example, 

contingency funds had to be provided directly to hurricane victims, and 

states were prohibited from using the funds to pay third parties such as 

child care providers. Given concerns about potential fraud and abuse, 

states may have considered it more appropriate to pay third parties for 

services rather than giving money to hurricane victims. 

Labor provided funds to hurricane-affected states to help the UI program 

address increased demand, but Labor and state officials we interviewed 

said the payment process for DUA is time-consuming and may not cover

all costs incurred during major disasters. Labor provided additional funds 

to hurricane-affected states that helped them repair damaged facilities, 

hire temporary workers, and reimburse states that helped take UI claims. 

Labor officials said they had some reserve administrative funding available 

because unemployment claims had been lower than expected before the 

hurricanes. However, Labor officials also said that during a normal 

program year, these funds would not have been available. In contrast, 

FEMA funds both benefits and administrative costs for DUA. Labor and 

some state officials we interviewed said that the DUA funding process is 

time-consuming. In some cases, states had to borrow state funds to 

continue paying benefits or withhold disaster benefits while waiting for 

funding. Funding requests go through various levels of approval at both 

Labor and FEMA—ranging from 8 to 32 days—and states may need to 

repeat the process multiple times because funding is provided in small 

increments. (See fig. 10.) In addition, FEMA does not reimburse states for 

the administrative costs of taking DUA claims that are denied. Labor 

officials said that when a large number of DUA claims are taken, states 

have to absorb the costs for denied claims. For example, Alabama UI 

officials said that about 44 percent of their DUA claims for Hurricane 

Katrina were denied. Labor also noted that FEMA does not reimburse 

states for automation of DUA claims processing or DUA-related disaster 

preparedness and said it hopes to work with FEMA on these issues. 

Page 32 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Figure 10: DUA Payment Process 

Source: GAO analysis of Labor information. Art Explosion (images).

1 Presidential 2

disaster declaration

2−11 days

Electronic

transmission

Total time 

to states

8−32 days

via

via

Electronic

PDF files

State UI program estimates

need and submits budget

request to labor regional 

office

Requires four 

signatures plus executive 

office signature

3

1−4 days

Labor regional office reviews

request and submits request

to FEMA headquarters or

FEMA joint field office

4

4−15 days

FEMA reviews and approves

request and prepares letter

of initial obligation

5

1−2 days

Labor headquarters prepares

paperwork to obligate funds

and makes payment available

6 States authorized to

draw down funds

8 States repeat

process if additional

funds are needed

7 States pay 

benefits to disaster

unemployment

assistance claimant

}

Page 33 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Gaps remain in the areas of preventing improper payments, easing access 

to services, and improving disaster planning for state-administered 

programs, although efforts are under way that may address these areas. As

program officials relaxed some program rules to better ensure that those 

eligible received aid, the risk of improper payments increased. Some 

efforts are under way to identify improper payments that occurred and 

whether sufficient internal controls were in place. Even though some 

efforts were made to ease individuals’ access to aid, disaster victims still 

faced difficulties accessing aid from the multiple human service programs 

providing it, a long-standing problem even under routine conditions. In 

addition, federal agencies have taken steps designed to improve states 

planning for service delivery for the Food Stamp, UI, and DUA programs, 

although HHS needs more information on the planning needs of state 

TANF programs. In response to the White House study on hurricane 

response, HHS has taken initial steps to work with states and other federal 

agencies to explore ways to improve the delivery of human services for 

disaster victims. More attention to specific plans for collecting and 

disseminating promising practices and exploring case management 

approaches would strengthen this promising effort. 

Balancing program access with preventing improper payments is a longstanding challenge states face in their daily operations that became more 

apparent following the hurricanes. In the wake of the hurricanes, 

verification rules typically in place for state-administered programs were 

sometimes eased to help individuals who lacked documents customarily 

used to establish identity or eligibility to be assisted by programs. For 

example, USDA allowed states to accept a signed affidavit as proof of 

identity from food stamp applicants who lacked identity documents and 

postponed verifying disaster victims’ eligibility for benefits until December 

2005.

19 Alabama officials we interviewed also said they allowed TANF 

applicants to self-declare their eligibility. Labor waived rules to allow 

states to pay DUA benefits based on applicants’ self-reported employment 

information and allowed applicants 90 days to submit supporting 

documents. To facilitate UI and DUA payments, Louisiana automatically 

gave claimants 12 weeks of benefits and suspended requirements for them 

Gaps in Disaster 

Response Remain; 

Efforts Under Way 

Hold Promise for 

Improving Human 

Service Programs’ 

Disaster Response 

Programs Faced 

Challenges Balancing 

Program Integrity with 

Access to Services after 

the Hurricanes 

 19 Individuals affected by Hurricane Katrina were not asked non-financial questions that 

would affect their eligibility and states’ verification of individuals’ eligibility, unless 

questionable, was postponed until December 2005. States accepting applications from

evacuees were still expected to verify identity and other eligibility factors such as 

residency and resources when possible or when deemed questionable. 

Page 34 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
to make weekly reports to confirm their continuing eligibility.20 Officials 

for these state-administered programs acknowledged that they focused on

easing access to services to meet people’s needs during the disaster while 

at the same time realizing that relaxing controls to provide emergency 

payments may have increased risks for improper payments. 

Immediately following the hurricanes, it was also sometimes difficult for 

states to take their usual preventive measures to screen applicants to 

determine if they were currently participating in or had provided false 

information to the program to which they applied. States sometimes took

special measures to determine applicants’ eligibility for program 

assistance. For example, in Florida, food stamp program integrity officials 

were present at application intake sites to monitor for suspicious activity 

and review questionable cases. Alabama and Florida sent food stamp 

applications to centralized locations for electronic processing where the 

states’ computer systems were used to identify current program 

participation within their respective states.21

States also took measures to identify ineligible individuals after making 

payments. When victims applied to programs in other states, program 

administrators for some of the states we reviewed told us they usually 

contacted the applicant’s home state to determine if the applicant was 

already enrolled in the home state’s program. However, because the 

telephone services were unavailable for prolonged periods in some 

areas—parts of Louisiana were without service for about 6 weeks—state 

officials sometimes could not use routine procedures to determine 

whether out-of-state evacuees were receiving food stamps or disaster food 

stamps in their home states. In such situations, some states used other 

measures to identify ineligible individuals. For example, the American 

Public Human Services Association asked states to send Louisiana lists of 

evacuees receiving food stamp benefits in their state to ensure Louisiana 

knew individuals were receiving food stamp benefits while out of state. 

 20Under state law, Louisiana has the flexibility to suspend certain rules or regulations that 

may prevent or hinder providing necessary services to help cope with an emergency. Labor 

officials said that even though they understood why Louisiana provided 12 weeks of 

benefits and suspended weekly reporting requirements, it advised the state that taking this 

action created a conflict with federal Unemployment Compensation law and DUA 

regulations. 

21As required by the Food Stamp Act, USDA and the states have a quality control system in 

place for regular food stamp payments. The act additionally requires the states to have a 

fraud prevention plan when operating the disaster food stamp program.

Page 35 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
HHS regional officials in Dallas said that New Mexico and Oklahoma took 

the initiative to notify Louisiana when they enrolled evacuees in their 

TANF programs. For the UI program, Labor worked with businesses to 

make sure employers notified Louisiana of workers who returned to work. 

Following the hurricanes, Louisiana began matching its state’s UI 

participant rolls to the National Directory of New Hires to identify 

individuals working in other states and therefore ineligible to receive UI 

benefits.22 As for the TANF program, in 2006 Louisiana began monitoring 

TANF debit card use to identify participants who resided out-of-state and 

were therefore no longer be eligible for TANF. 

Our work and that of the programs’ IG offices have highlighted programs’ 

vulnerability to fraud when providing assistance to disaster victims. In the 

case of FEMA assistance, we reported that the lack of appropriate controls

for confirming disaster victims’ eligibility for assistance resulted in 

millions of dollars in questionable payments.23 Like FEMA, making 

payments to disaster victims increased the programs’ we reviewed risk for 

fraud. The SSA IG and the USDA IG found reasonable controls were in 

place to prevent and detect improper payments for the Social Security and 

SSI programs and for the Food Stamp Programs in Alabama and Florida. 

The USDA IG has conducted a similar review for Louisiana, Mississippi, 

and Texas and plans to issue its report in early 2007. The Labor IG has 

issued several management letters to Labor program officials to assist 

them in reducing potential fraud. These letters reported some potential 

fraud such as individuals receiving multiple UI and/or DUA benefits in 

Louisiana or Mississippi, while also receiving other work-related 

assistance from the same or another state. The HHS IG has not conducted 

or planned any work specifically related to TANF assistance provided 

hurricane victims, although it has looked more generally at improper 

payments under selected states’ TANF programs. Under the TANF block 

grant, states bear the main fiscal risk of improper payments although the 

federal government has an interest in ensuring funds are properly spent.24

 22The National Directory of New Hires is a federal-level database of information on newly 

hired employees nationwide. 

23GAO, Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: FEMA’s

Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and Abuse, 

GAO-06-655 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006).

24GAO, TANF and Child Care Programs; HHS Lacks Adequate Information to Assess Risk 

and Assist States in Managing Improper Payments, GAO-04-723 (Washington, D.C.: June

18, 2004). 

Page 36 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Disaster victims also faced difficulty accessing needed aid from multiple 

programs providing assistance, another long-standing problem even under 

routine conditions. Our earlier work has highlighted the cumbersome 

process that applicants who are eligible for more than one form of aid 

have to go through to apply for each program.25 They typically visit several 

different program offices and repeatedly provide some of the same 

information for each application. The difficulty of seeking aid from 

multiple programs and providers can be exacerbated during disasters. For 

example, we previously reported that when multiple charitable

organizations offered assistance to victims of the September 11 terrorists’ 

attacks, victims faced a maze of service providers and felt that they 

needed help finding and accessing the available assistance.26 

Hurricanes Highlighted the 

Long-standing Challenge to 

Ease Individuals’ Access to 

Multiple Programs 

A review of the overall federal response as well as our work pointed out 

some of the situations faced by those seeking aid after the hurricanes. The

2006 White House study of the federal response to Hurricane Katrina 

reported that some efforts to assist those in need were undermined by 

difficulties victims encountered in their attempts to obtain program 

services. For example, the report noted that the disaster recovery centers 

established to help victims were not always set up to take applications for 

all services needed or to assist victims with services they were currently 

receiving. Similarly, an advocacy group for low-income families that we 

interviewed said it was especially difficult for hurricane victims with 

children or without transportation to visit more than one location to apply 

for multiple programs. 

Our previous work indicates that service delivery challenges posed by 

multiple providers can be mitigated if sufficient attention is paid to 

enhancing coordination among service providers and on easing access to 

aid. As we noted in our report on assistance provided after September 11, 

the existence of established working relationships among relevant federal 

programs and states—with frequent contacts and an understanding of 

each other’s roles and responsibilities—can make a difference in 

performance in the chaos of a disaster. In that report, we also noted that

regarding easing access to aid for those eligible, several strategies can help

improve access. These include the following: 

 25GAO, Means-Tested Programs: Determining Financial Eligibility is Cumbersome and

Can Be Simplified, GAO-02-58 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2, 2001). 

26GAO, September 11: More Effective Collaboration could Enhance Charitable 

Organizations’ Contributions in Disasters, GAO-03-259 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2002).

Page 37 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
1. a clearinghouse of available assistance can help inform victims in need 

of aid; 

2. the provision of case management services can help to identify gaps in 

service, target aid to those most in need, and provide aid over the long 

term;27

3. the adoption of a simplified, one-stop application process that could 

minimize applicants’ burden by streamlining the process and might 

include questions that can help to minimize fraud and abuse; and 

4. data sharing across programs, in addition to easing the application 

process, could help to reduce the risks of improper payments due to 

duplicate payments and reduce the costs of program administration.28

While any data-sharing efforts face challenging privacy issues and inherent 

differences in program requirements, they hold potential for improving 

access for people in need as well as more efficient program 

administration.29

Programs Are Taking Steps 

to Improve Disaster 

Preparedness, but Gaps 

Remain for TANF 

The states we reviewed are exploring a variety of initiatives to improve 

disaster preparedness for the Food Stamp, UI, and DUA programs, as 

shown in table 7. For example, Florida officials said they plan to train UI 

claim takers statewide to take DUA applications as a way to increase 

staffing levels when needed. Also, as a way to expedite disaster food 

stamp processing, Alabama is developing a Web-based application form to 

allow clients to pre-register online and take completed forms to 

application processing sites. On the other hand, initiatives to develop 

formal disaster preparedness plans for the TANF program were not being 

taken by any of the states we reviewed. As discussed earlier, no federal 

requirements exist for TANF disaster planning at the state level. 

 27In some human service programs, program funds may be used for case management 

services. Also, recent amendments to the Stafford Act allow the use of federal funds for

case management under certain conditions. Pub. L No. 109-295. 

28GAO, Human Service Programs: Demonstration Projects Could Identify Ways to 

Simplify Policies and Facilitate Technology Enhancements to Reduce Administrative 

Costs, GAO-06-942 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2006). 

29For more information on data sharing challenges, see GAO, The Challenge of Data

Sharing: Results of a GAO-Sponsored Symposium on Benefit and Loan Programs, 

GAO-01-67 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20, 2000).

Page 38 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Table 7: Some of the Initiatives States We Reviewed Are Exploring to Improve 

Disaster Preparedness

Strategies to facilitate 

preparedness Initiatives states are exploring

Increase physical capacity • Identifying alternative sites for providing food stamp 

and UI call center services 

• Installing back-up generators to ensure UI offices can 

provide services during power outages 

Increase staffing • Training all UI program workers statewide to take 

DUA applications 

• Training all food stamp workers statewide to take 

disaster food stamp applications 

Expedite application taking • Implementing Web-based UI and food stamp 

applications to allow online filing 

Continue benefit payments 

and issue new benefits 

• Implementing a debit card systems to pay UI benefits 

• Devising alternative procedures for issuing food 

stamp customers debit cards and PIN numbers 

during disasters

Improve overall preparedness • Contracting for an independent study of state’s UI 

disaster response 

Source: GAO analysis based on information provided by states. 

At the federal level, SSA headquarters administrators are taking actions to

help improve disaster preparedness for Social Security and SSI program 

services. After responding to an emergency or disaster situation, SSA 

routinely solicits feedback from SSA employees involved in its disaster 

response to identify lessons learned. SSA uses the feedback it receives to 

compile lessons learned and to revise the agency’s disaster strategies. For

example, SSA officials we interviewed noted they sometimes needed a 

means to contact other government agencies outside of normal work 

hours. In light of the recent feedback, SSA formally compiled information 

for contacting key U.S. Department of the Treasury officials around the 

clock if events arise concerning payments to SSA customers. SSA issued a 

memo reminding all regions of the employee emergency 800-number and 

the procedures for providing employees cards that contain the number. 

Also, beginning in 2007, SSA plans to take additional steps to remind 

employees of the importance of knowing the agency’s emergency contact 

procedures. In addition to broadly sharing information within the agency,

SSA also shares its experiences with postal delivery and customers’ 

benefit payments with the U.S. Postal Service and U.S. Department of the 

Treasury, respectively.

Page 39 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Federal officials for the Food Stamp Program are also pursuing initiatives 

to improve disaster preparedness for this program. USDA sponsored a 

national meeting that representatives from all states attended to discuss 

food stamp debit card issues and plans to revise the current Disaster Food 

Stamp Program Handbook to highlight some of the strategies states used 

for Hurricane Katrina and to clearly outline all the waiver choices 

available to states. 

Labor is also taking steps to improve disaster preparedness for the UI 

program. Labor officials said that an assessment conducted after 

Hurricane Katrina found that most states are not adequately prepared for 

emergencies that exceed their processing capacity for the UI program. To 

help states prepare for future disasters, Labor established a new DUA 

coordinator position to assist state coordinators when needed and 

provided recommendations to FEMA to streamline the DUA funding 

process. In addition, Labor has contracted to document federal and state

UI program administrators’ lessons learned, assess state UI disaster 

preparedness, and draw on the disaster strategies of others such as SSA 

and FEMA. The contractor also plans to help Labor develop issue papers 

with recommendations for improving disaster preparedness. Time will tell 

whether these steps will lead to improved preparedness among state 

programs or whether additional guidance from Labor will be warranted. 

HHS has taken some steps to work with states on disaster preparedness 

for the TANF program but does not have plans to work more 

systematically with all states to assess whether additional planning is 

needed. HHS said that officials in its Atlanta office, covering Alabama, 

Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, 

and Tennessee, reviewed these states’ overall state disaster preparedness 

plans, noting how widely these plans varied in the degree of detailed

information included. This region took other actions, including sharing 

practices within the hurricane-affected region. For example, HHS regional 

staff held meetings in 2006 with state commissioners and program 

representatives for TANF and other HHS programs in Alabama, Florida, 

and Mississippi. HHS said it had plans to visit three additional states to 

discuss disaster preparedness if travel funds permit. HHS also said that 

TANF disaster preparedness is a state responsibility and, as we noted 

earlier, there are no specific federal requirements for state TANF 

programs to have plans in place. In addition, HHS has noted its lack of 

authority to regulate states. In creating the TANF block grant, Congress 

emphasized the importance of state flexibility, and to that end, legislation 

restricted HHS’ regulatory authority over the states except to the extent 

expressly provided in the law. With states having flexibility in developing

Page 40 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
disaster plans as well as HHS’ limited role, HHS does not have any 

systematic information on states’ preparedness nationwide for providing 

TANF assistance in disasters. 

Federal Efforts to Improve 

Delivery of Human 

Services during Disasters 

Hold Promise 

In response to the White House study recommendations for improving 

human service programs response to disaster, HHS has taken steps to 

clarify and enhance its national role in coordinating emergency human 

services within the existing structure of the National Response Plan.30

Human services refer to a broad array of federal programs that can 

provide disaster assistance to victims, including the ones we address in 

this report and others. The White House study contained a number of 

recommendations that echo our findings in this report and in our previous 

work related to improving service delivery. Selected study 

recommendations are shown in table 8. 

Table 8: Selected White House Report Recommendations to HHS to Improve the 

Delivery of Human Services during Disasters 

White House Recommendations

• Designate HHS as the single federal coordinating entity for providing human services 

during disasters

• Federal programs should plan and prepare for the delivery of services in a disaster 

environment 

• Develop an inventory of human services programs of the federal government 

• Develop a single, comprehensive enrollment process for all human service programs 

• Identify statutory authorities to waive impediments to delivering services during an 

emergency and to fund administrative costs

• Develop process to assess victims’ needs and process applications at one-stop 

centers 

• HHS should coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop 

deployable interagency teams

• Inventory existing federal infrastructure and resources that could be utilized

Source: GAO analysis of the recommendations contained in the White House study. 

In response to the White House study recommendations issued in 

February 2006, HHS has developed a strategy to facilitate delivery of 

emergency human services at multiple levels within HHS and across other 

 30HHS’ strategy is designed to better integrate the delivery of human services into the 

National Response Plan’s Emergency Support Function 6—the delivery of mass care, 

housing, and human services; the coordinator for this support function is DHS. 

Page 41 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
federal programs providing human services. To oversee its efforts, HHS 

identified human services coordinators within the Secretary’s Office of 

Public Health Emergency Preparedness (OPHEP) and the Administration

for Children and Families (ACF), which oversees the TANF program as 

well as other key programs that provide aid to low-income and vulnerable

individuals and families. HHS has also created an interagency human 

services work group to compile information on ways to improve human 

services programs’ response to a disaster and to establish a mechanism to 

coordinate planning for service delivery among federal agencies. 

HHS’ efforts also include links to state program agencies, which are 

important when states have key service delivery responsibilities that 

determine response. At the regional level, ACF human services 

coordinators will work with state and federal agencies and nongovernment organizations to coordinate planning efforts to address human

services needs during disasters. At the local level, ACF regional 

administrators will coordinate support for state agencies administering 

HHS programs, and to the extent possible, for other federal human service 

programs. 

In addition, other HHS efforts are under way: 

• On the basis of input on major human services needs during the 

Hurricane Katrina response, HHS is creating an inventory of the federal 

infrastructure and resources (such as databases of emergency 

volunteers or federally funded health centers) available to assist 

disaster victims as well as information on existing federal waiver 

authorities that can help human services programs adjust to meet 

disaster needs. 

• For future disasters, HHS is working with states to ensure that they 

have a plan to use disaster recovery centers to enroll individuals in 

HHS programs. HHS plans to have staff on-site at disaster recovery 

centers to help states enroll and re-enroll disaster victims in human 

services programs at a single location. HHS participation at the disaster 

recovery center level would be in response to a state’s request through 

FEMA and would likely entail on-site technical assistance. 

• HHS solicited and received suggestions from state agencies and private 

businesses on the feasibility of using a debit card system as a simple 

and efficient means to deliver assistance to disaster victims. HHS plans 

to convene a panel that includes persons with technical and 

Page 42 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
programmatic expertise to evaluate the suggestions and decide the 

next steps, which officials said could be to pilot debit card use. 

As HHS continues to develop information on options for facilitating the 

delivery of human services to disaster victims, HHS officials say they are 

considering other approaches, including case management. More 

specifically, HHS noted that many of its programs provide case 

management within each program and that its Office of Refugee 

Resettlement operates a case management network that could serve as a

model for the use of a case management system for all federal and state 

programs for major disasters. However, HHS had not developed further 

information on this promising approach, such as a study paper, to 

facilitate further consideration of case management. Also, while HHS’ 

efforts have generally focused on measures program administrators can 

take to deliver human services assistance to disaster victims, HHS efforts 

have not placed as much emphasis on collecting and sharing information 

with program administrators on strategies for mitigating risks for 

improper payments. Sharing information on how fraud occurred and on

the promising practices that can be used during emergencies to reduce 

programs’ vulnerability to fraud and abuse can help program 

administrators and policymakers make informed decisions about 

reasonable controls for emergency payments and provide enhanced 

oversight. 

HHS’ initial approach shows promise and is in keeping with strategies that 

are key to enhancing human services programs’ response to future events, 

discussed earlier, such as involving states and exploring ways to ease 

access, such as through case management. HHS will also face hurdles due 

to the number of programs involved, the variation in program 

requirements, as well as the variation across states and localities in 

program policies and service delivery approaches. At the same time, HHS 

is well positioned to make progress in this area, particularly because of its 

expertise in administering human services programs, experience working

with vulnerable populations typically targeted by these programs, its 

regional presence, and its long-standing working relationships with states. 

In addition to HHS’ efforts focused on human services programs, DHS has 

recently created an interagency task force on disaster assistance 

Page 43 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
coordination, based on an executive order issued in August 2006.

31 The 

task force’s mission is to improve the promptness and efficiency with 

which disaster victims obtain access to federal disaster assistance. Its 

initial plan, due by March 2007, will explore several strategies, including a 

single and streamlined point of application for assistance; a clearinghouse 

that includes information on all forms and sources of disaster assistance 

(federal, state, local, and private sector); as well as controls to reduce 

improper payments. DHS has formed the interagency task force, which 

includes a representative of HHS, and expects to implement all elements 

of the plan by December 2008. 

HHS officials told us that they are participating on the DHS task force and

have provided some information to DHS about the steps they have taken

to improve disaster response across federal programs. HHS officials said, 

however, that the HHS interagency taskforce last convened in August 2006

and will not reconvene until HHS has more clarification on how its efforts 

relate to DHS’ and where coordination is needed. HHS has developed 

timetables for some aspects of the work it plans to do, but these time 

frames may change in order to support and not conflict with DHS’ work. 

The scope and destruction of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita brought 

widespread displacement of residents in affected states, creating 

extraordinary challenges for the federal basic support programs we 

reviewed and testing these programs’ capacities to quickly and effectively

respond. Despite the efforts these programs made to serve those in need,

the magnitude of the challenges exposed differences in programs’ disaster 

preparedness for the federally administered and the state-administered 

programs. While the role of the federal government in disaster 

preparedness is clear for the federally administered Social Security and 

SSI programs, the role of federal oversight varies for state-administered 

federal programs. In these programs, states play an important role in 

preparedness and make key decisions about program operations generally. 

At the same time, because of the large number of people served and the 

significant federal investment in these programs, the federal government 

has an important role to play in ensuring that these programs are taking

Conclusions 

 31The executive order states that it is the policy of the federal government that disaster 

victims eligible for financial or other assistance delivered by any department or agency of 

the executive branch (federal disaster assistance) are to have prompt and efficient access 

to federal disaster assistance, as well as information regarding assistance available from 

state and local government and private-sector sources. 

Page 44 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
appropriate steps to prepare nationwide and in facilitating the sharing of 

information across states. The steps USDA and Labor are taking should 

help state programs increase their preparedness to quickly expand 

capacity and better meet increased demand in the event of a major 

disaster in the future. While we acknowledge certain restrictions on HHS’ 

ability to regulate states, HHS needs to know more about state TANF 

programs’ preparedness to carry out its federal oversight responsibilities. 

Federal agencies and states we reviewed are generally taking actions to 

improve preparedness of their respective programs. In addition, HHS has 

taken a significant step by initiating a broad effort to explore how 

preparedness and response can be improved across human services 

programs. The inherent difficulties of moving forward on issues that 

involve numerous federal agencies as well as states, while at the same 

time changing long-standing ways of doing business, call for sustained 

attention and leadership commensurate with the daunting challenges. 

Sustaining and building upon the existing momentum will not be easy but

could lead to meaningful changes in the future. With appropriate focus and 

follow-through, these efforts could result in useful information on lessons 

learned and promising approaches that could be widely disseminated in 

the near term. In the longer term, these efforts could lead to coordinated 

service delivery approaches that are effective and efficient in getting 

available assistance to those in need, resulting in an overall improved 

response by human services programs in future events. This would benefit 

those directly affected by disasters and lead to improved use of 

government resources. 

In recognition of the importance of HHS’ effort to improve the delivery of

human services in future disasters, we recommend that the Secretary of 

HHS or his designee take the following steps to strengthen its efforts: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Work with DHS and its interagency work group to determine the most 

efficient and effective way to conduct HHS’ work related to improving 

the provision of human services during disasters without duplicating 

efforts. 

• Establish mechanisms for routinely collecting and disseminating 

information on promising practices for delivering human services 

during disasters. These mechanisms should help ensure that 

information can be collected from and provided to state and local 

officials directly involved in service delivery, as well as draw on the 

experiences of other federal programs. Key areas of focus should 

include: 

Page 45 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
• disaster planning, 

• service delivery, and 

• eligibility determination and verification procedures that 

mitigate risks for making improper payments during an 

emergency situation. 

• Develop specific information on options for implementing case 

management services across federal assistance programs during 

disasters, drawing on its human services expertise and in concert with 

other federal agencies as appropriate. 

In addition, to better ensure the disaster preparedness of the TANF 

program, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS, as part of its overall 

efforts or separately as needed, develop a systematic approach to work 

with all states to identify key elements of disaster planning needed for the 

TANF program, share this information among states, and take steps to 

understand the extent to which all states have these key planning elements

in place, and to consider whether additional actions are warranted to 

better ensure disaster preparedness among state TANF programs. 

We provided SSA, USDA, HHS, and Labor with a draft of this report for 

comment. In commenting on the draft, SSA, USDA, and Labor agreed with

our findings as they pertain to their programs. HHS agreed with the three 

recommendations related to its recent efforts to improve the delivery of

human services and disagreed with our recommendation to work with 

states to address disaster planning for state TANF programs. We also 

provided DHS a copy of the draft and incorporated its technical comments 

as appropriate. Written comments from SSA, HHS, and Labor appear in 

appendixes II, III, and IV. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

SSA appreciated being cited for its flexibility and efforts to perform 

needed activities and services in the face of many challenges posed by 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. It also echoed one of the report’s themes, 

acknowledging the importance of easing access to services in future 

emergencies. 

In its comments, Labor noted that it hopes to work with FEMA to address 

some of the funding issues for administering DUA that we identified as 

well as some additional administrative issues and we have added that 

information to the report. Labor also noted that some of the steps one of 

the states took to facilitate eligible individuals access to UI and DUA 

payments created a conflict with Federal Unemployment Compensation 

Page 46 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
law and DUA regulations for issuing payments. We have added that 

information to the report. 

Regarding HHS’ response to our recommendations, it agreed with our 

recommendation about working with DHS and its interagency work group 

to improve the delivery of human services during disasters and noted that 

it is already participating in these efforts. As our recommendation notes, it 

is also important that the HHS and DHS efforts do not duplicate each 

other. In addition, HHS agreed with our recommendation about 

establishing mechanisms for routinely collecting and disseminating 

promising practices for delivering human services during disasters and 

said it has already initiated these efforts. HHS also agreed with our 

recommendation on developing options for implementing case 

management services across federal assistance programs during disasters 

and noted that it will look to engage DHS and its interagency work group 

in collaborating on this effort. 

HHS disagreed with our recommendation that it work with states on TANF 

disaster preparedness. HHS stated that it is more appropriate to address 

TANF issues as part of its comprehensive cross-program planning efforts, 

rather than requiring a separate initiative for TANF, singling it out as a 

special case, and reinforcing a “siloed approach” to delivering services. It 

also cited its belief that TANF disaster preparedness is an appropriate 

state responsibility and that there are no federal requirements for such 

planning, as we have already noted in the report. We agree with HHS that 

it is essential that its effort to improve human services during disasters 

look across multiple programs and not take a fragmented approach. Our 

recommendation did not specify the particular approach HHS should take

to work with states to understand their level of preparedness for TANF. 

HHS can obtain this information through its cross-program effort or in 

other ways and we have clarified our recommendation language to reflect 

that. Also, we focus on TANF among HHS programs because it was the 

HHS program included in this report; we did not review other HHS 

programs. We also understand and believe that we state clearly in the 

report the limitations on HHS’ authority to regulate states. However, we 

remain convinced that HHS, as part of its federal oversight responsibilities, 

should do more to obtain systematic information about all state TANF 

programs to identify whether additional steps are needed to ensure that 

this important income support program for low-income families is 

prepared for disasters. HHS also provided some additional information on 

steps it has taken to explore TANF preparedness with some states and we 

have added this information to the report. 

Page 47 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
We are sending copies of this report to the Social Security Administration; 

the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Homeland 

Security, and Labor; appropriate congressional committees, and other 

interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Please contact me at (202) 512-7215 if you 

have any questions about this report. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Other major contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix V.

Barbara D. Bovbjerg 

Director, Education, Workforce, 

and Income Security Issues 

Page 48 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Congressional Committees 

The Honorable Max Baucus 

Chairman 

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Finance 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Chairman 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable David Obey 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, 

 Education and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Jim McDermott 

Chairman 

The Honorable Jerry Weller 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Income Security and Family 

 Support 

Committee on Ways and Means 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Michael R. McNulty 

Chairman 

The Honorable Sam Johnson 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Social Security 

Committee on Ways and Means 

House of Representatives 

Page 49 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Appendix I: 

Methodology 

Objectives, Scope, and 

Page 50 GAO-07-219 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Our report addresses the efforts of the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability 

Insurance (Social Security), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Food 

Stamp, Unemployment Insurance (UI), and Temporary Assistance for 

Needy Families (TANF) programs to provide individuals with financial 

assistance in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The federal 

agencies that oversee these programs are the Social Security

Administration (SSA)—Social Security and SSI; U.S. Department of 

Agriculture (USDA)—Food Stamp; U.S. Department of Labor (Labor)—UI; 

and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—TANF. The 

focus of our work is the disaster planning that federal and state agencies 

carry out specific to service delivery rather than information technologyrelated disaster planning. We designed our study to provide information on 

(1) challenges the hurricanes created for the programs to take applications

and pay benefits; (2) measures that helped programs take applications and 

pay benefits, and (3) the actions programs are taking to improve future 

disaster responses and what else may be needed. We used a mix of 

approaches that included (1) reviews of related reports, federal 

requirements, and federal and state agency data and (2) contacts with 

state, federal, and private-sector officials. 

Objectives: 

We used data from SSA, USDA, and Labor to quantify the hurricanes’ 

impact on taking applications and issuing benefit payments. To assess the 

reliability of those data elements, we (1) reviewed relevant documentation 

and (2) interviewed federal agency officials knowledgeable about the data. 

We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

report. Additional details on our review are presented below.

We visited program offices in Baton Rouge, Lake Charles, and New 

Orleans, Louisiana, and in Austin, Houston, and Dallas, Texas. We also 

conducted interviews of officials in Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida. We 

conducted our work from November 2005 through December 2006 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

To gain an understanding of the challenges programs faced and to identify

issues key to our work, we reviewed others’ assessments of governments’ 

and private-sector hurricane response.1

 We used previously issued GAO 

reports to provide information on disaster victims’ access to human 

service programs and programs’ attention to preventing improper 

payments. 

We reviewed federal rules for funding program benefit payments and 

administrative costs, including (1) the Stafford Act, (2) the QI, TMA, and 

Abstinence Programs Extension and Hurricane Katrina Unemployment 

Relief Act, and the TANF Emergency Response and Recovery Act of 2005.2

Based on the National Response Plan, Presidential Decision Directive 67,

FEMA Federal Preparedness Circular 65, the Food Stamp Act, and USDA 

guidance to states, we developed information on programs’ disasterrelated responsibilities. These documents spell out federal requirements 

for programs’ disaster-related responsibilities. We used the FEMA and 

USDA disaster planning guidance to identify key strategies for major 

disasters. 

We interviewed state Food Stamp Program, UI, and TANF officials 

responsible for program policy and administration to develop information 

on their states’ disaster response and to obtain related documents. We 

visited Louisiana and Texas—states which have sustained significant 

damage and both sheltered the greatest number of evacuees—to conduct 

in-person interviews with state headquarters officials having policy or 

administrative responsibilities. In Louisiana we visited Baton Rouge, Lake 

Charles, and New Orleans to interview office managers and staff in two 

Food Stamp/TANF3

 and two UI offices to obtain information on their 

experiences in providing services following the hurricanes. We

additionally met with a State Disability Determination Services office 

Literature Reviews 

Review of Federal 

Requirements 

Contacts with States 

and State Advocacy 

Groups

 1

U. S. House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 

for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative. (Washington, D.C: Feb. 15, 

2006); The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006); and Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspector General, A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in

Response to Hurricane Katrina.,OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006).

2

Pub. L. No. 109-91 and Pub. L. No. 109-68, respectively. 

3

The states we reviewed generally provided food stamps and TANF services out of a

common office. 

Page 51 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

manager to obtain information on the hurricanes’ effect on SSA disability 

workload.4

 In Texas, we visited Austin, Dallas, and Houston to conduct 

similar interviews with office managers and staff in two Food Stamp/TANF 

offices and one UI call center. 

Of the states for which major disaster declarations were made for 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we contacted Alabama and Mississippi—the 

other states where individuals received federal cash disaster assistance. 

We conducted telephone interviews with state headquarters officials also

responsible for program policy and administration to similarly develop 

information on their states’ disaster response and to obtain 

documentation. Based on federal, state, and private-sector officials 

identifying Florida as a state employing innovative disaster strategies, we 

conducted telephone interviews with Florida Food Stamp, UI, and TANF 

program administrators to develop information on their recent experience

with Hurricane Wilma and innovative disaster strategies. Our findings are 

limited to the states we reviewed and are not generalizable to other states. 

For each state affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we also attempted 

to contact one organization that advocates for populations the programs 

serve to obtain advocates’ views on programs’ hurricane response and 

areas warranting attention. The advocacy groups we spoke with are the 

Center for Public Policy Priorities, Public Policy Center of Mississippi, and 

Southeast Louisiana Legal Services. Finally, as another effort to obtain 

states perspectives, we contacted by e-mail the state audit agency for each

of the 50 states and the District of Columbia to inquire about any work 

they had ongoing or information they could provide related to our study. 

At the federal level, we interviewed SSA, USDA, Labor, and HHS 

headquarters and regional officials responsible for program policy and 

administration to obtain information on their disaster response and to 

obtain documentation. We conducted interviews with SSA, USDA, Labor, 

and HHS officials in headquarters locations and in regional offices for the 

states we visited. We additionally visited two offices in Louisiana and two 

offices in Texas to interview SSA office managers and staff who provided 

Contacts with Federal 

Agencies and National 

Advocacy Groups 

 4

SSA contracts to have State Disability Determination Services (DDS) evaluate Social 

Security and SSI claimants’ medical disability. DDS staff are state employees, but the

federal government fully funds DDS operations. SSA is State DDS’ only client, and in all 

areas except personnel-related issues (e.g., compensation, employee benefit, etc.) DDS

staff take direction from SSA. 

Page 52 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Social Security and SSI program services to the public in the hurricanes’ 

aftermath. As with the states, we conducted telephone interviews with 

federal regional officials that oversee the federal basic support programs 

in Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida. We met with HHS headquarters 

officials to obtain information on HHS’ plans for responding to the White 

House’s recommendations that it devise and evaluate strategies to 

streamline disaster victims’ access to human services programs. We 

additionally interviewed a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

official to determine DHS’ plan to implement the Executive Order 

requiring it to chair a task force set up to make recommendations for 

improving delivery of federal disaster assistance. At that the time of our 

work, each of the respective federal Offices of the Inspectors General (IG) 

were reviewing the controls programs had in place to prevent improper 

payments. To avoid duplicating their work, we did not assess programs’ 

controls. However, when available, our report includes information on the 

IGs’ findings. 

We also drew on information obtained at a conference we attended 

sponsored by the American Public Human Services Association (APHSA) 

in December 2005, for human service agencies, and telephone interviews 

with representatives of APHSA, the Food Research and Action Center 

(FRAC), the National Association of State Workforce Agencies (NASWA), 

and the National Employment Law Project to obtain additional insights on 

programs’ disaster response and assistance provided victims. We 

additionally met with APHSA officials and NASWA to obtain more details 

of their organizations’ insights on the programs’ disaster response. 

Page 53 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Appendix II: Comments from the Social Appendix II: Comments from the Social Security Administration 

Security Administration 

Page 54 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Appendix II: Comments from the Social 

Security Administration 

Page 55 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Health & Human Services 

Department of Health & Human Services 

Page 56 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Health & Human Services 

Page 57 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Health & Human Services 

Page 58 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Health & Human Services 

Page 59 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Health & Human Services 

Page 60 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S Appendix IV Department of Labor : Comments from the U.S 

Department of Labor 

Page 61 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S 

Department of Labor 

Page 62 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Appendix V: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 63 GAO-07-219 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Barbara D. Bovbjerg (202) 512-7215

In addition to the contact named above, Gale Harris, Assistant Director; 

Laura Heald, Analyst-in-Charge; Jacquelyn Stewart; Maura Hardy; and 

Amanda Mackison made significant contributions to this report. In 

addition, Cheri Harrington, Olivia Herman, and Bill Keller provided 

assistance in data collection; Tovah Rom provided writing assistance, 

Jessica Botsford provided legal assistance, Mimi Nguyen assisted with the 

graphics, and Monika Gomez and Lise Levie provided technical assistance. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the

Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions 

Needed to Reduce Such Problems in Future. GAO-06-1013. Washington,

D.C.: September 27, 2006. 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 

Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington, 

D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Child Welfare: Federal Action Needed to Ensure States Have Plans to 

Safeguard Children in the Child Welfare System Displaced by Disasters.

GAO-06-944. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006. 

Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: 

FEMA’s Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant 

Fraud and Abuse. GAO-06-655. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red

Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712. 

Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006. 

Improper Payments: Federal and State Coordination Needed to Report 

National Improper Payment Estimates on Federal Programs. 

GAO-06-347. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2006. 

Welfare Reform: Better Information Needed to Understand Trends in 

States’ Uses of the TANF Block Grant. GAO-06-414. Washington, D.C.: 

March 3, 2006. 

TANF and Child Care Programs: HHS Lacks Adequate Information to 

Assess Risk and Assist States in Managing Improper Payments. 

GAO-04-723. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2004. 

Means-Tested Programs: Determining Financial Eligibility Is

Cumbersome and Can Be Simplified. GAO-02-58. Washington, D.C.: 

November 2, 2001. 

September 11: More Effective Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable 

Organizations’ Contributions in Disaster. GAO-03-259. Washington, D.C.: 

December 19, 2002. 

Page 64 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Related GAO Products 

Public Assistance: PARIS Project Can Help States Reduce Improper 

Benefit Payments. GAO-01-935. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2001. 

Benefit and Loan Programs: Improved Data Sharing Could Enhance 

Program Integrity. HEHS-00-119. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2000. 

Welfare Reform: Better Information Needed to Understand Trends in 

States’ Uses of the TANF Block Grant. GAO-06-114. Washington, D.C.: 

March 3, 2006. 

(130557) Page 65 GAO-07-219 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
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