1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 930

Washington, DC 20036

Telephone: 202.466.7820

Fax: 202.466.7826

www.policeforum.org
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM:

The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series

VOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY

Heather J. Davies and Martha R. Plotkin

with

Joshua Filler

Edward A. Flynn

George Foresman

Jacqueline Litzinger

Thomas D. McCarthy

Jane Wiseman
This project, conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), was supported by Cooperative

Agreement #2002-HS-WX-K001 by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services. Points of views or opinions contained in this document are those of the authors and

do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or the

members of PERF.

The opinions expressed are generally those based on the consensus of executive session attendees.

However, not every view or statement presented in this report can necessarily be attributed to each individual participant.

Websites and sources listed provide useful information at the time of this writing, but the authors do

not endorse any information of the sponsor organization or other information on the websites.

Published by the Police Executive Research Forum

U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

Police Executive Research Forum

Washington, DC 20036

United States of America

November 2005

ISBN: 1-878734-90-3

Photos courtesy of (from top to bottom): Federal Emergency Management Agency [1]

Arlington County (VA) Police Department [2-3]

Federal Emergency Management Agency [4-5]

Cover Design by David Edelson, PERF

II
VOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY

III

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Chapters

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

2. The Mission and Responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

3. State and Local Responsibilities and Models for Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

4. DHS Resources, Training and Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

5. Information Sharing, Alert Systems and New Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61

6. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75

Appendices

A. Participants and Observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83

B. About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89

C. Contributing Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91

D. About the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS),

U.S. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95

E. About the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97

VOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY

V

Special thanks must go to the Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) professionals who provided the latest information on joint efforts and

opportunities—and invited the law enforcement

community to offer suggestions for how DHS can

improve the services and resources they provide.

We hope this paper reflects the commitment of all

session participants to find new means for collaboration and coordination, even when it means

giving up a bit of turf to get the job done. We

appreciate the considerable assistance of Director

Joshua Filler, Department of Homeland Security’s

Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, for getting the DHS executives involved and assisting in setting the

agenda. A thanks is also due to then-DHS Under

Secretary for Border and Transportation Security

Asa Hutchinson for his informative presentation

at the session. 

We are, as always, grateful to COPS

Director Carl Peed for his unwavering support for

this project and his dedication to advancing law

enforcement. He and his staff work tirelessly to

help law enforcement build on the successes of

community policing as they take on never-ending

duties in counterterrorism. Project Monitor Amy

Schapiro’s patience and assistance have been

invaluable to the success of the working sessions

and resulting white papers. We appreciate her

work and her ability to brave the publications

process.

We want to thank as well those who contributed to this paper by writing sidebar pieces:

Joshua Filler, Edward A. Flynn, George Foresman,

Jacqueline Litzinger, Thomas D. McCarthy and

Jane Wiseman. Their articles offer interesting

insights and practical perspectives on difficult

issues.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

THIS WHITE PAPER—THE FIFTH IN A SERIES—IS BASED ON THE THOUGHTFUL

contributions of many experts in policing, counterterrorism and other

related fields. We thank those individuals, from every level of government, who came together in an executive session supported by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) to create

the foundation for this writing. Those participants (listed in Appendix A) demonstrated that a tremendous amount of progress could be made when you get the

right people in a room who are candid and tremendously knowledgeable. Any

value this paper has to the field is due to their contributions.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

VI

There were several researchers—Rob

Davis, Jack Greene, David Klinger, Gary LaFree

and Steve Mastrofski—who identified research

concerns based on the session discussion. These

researchers and the National Institute of Justice

grant monitor, Lois Mock, helped transform complex discussions into an informative dialogue for

law enforcement agencies. The research community is grateful for their wisdom.

A project team of PERF staff provided significant support by planning the executive session

and reviewing drafts of this white paper. Executive

Director Chuck Wexler was crucial in getting the

representatives from the various agencies to the

table as well as facilitating the session. Research

Assistant/Event Planner Anna Berke managed the

logistics of the two-day event. We thank Research

Associate Stacy Osnick Milligan for chronicling the

discussions at the session. Legislative Assistant

Steve Loyka not only helped document the session,

but also researched and contributed insights on sections that related to legal mandates and DHS

authority. Research Assistant Alex Hayes also

helped verify statements in this report. Thanks are

also due to Corina Solé Brito, Gerard Murphy and

Lorie Fridell for their willingness to review the draft

white paper. David Edelson deserves kudos for his

outstanding skills in the design of these white

papers, as well as his acumen as a grammarian. 

This series is dedicated to all those in law

enforcement—at the federal, state, local and tribal

levels—who collaborate to keep the nation safe

from terrorism. We hope this paper, and the others

in the series, provide you with information and

guidance that will aid in your partnership and

counterterrorism efforts.
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VII

Leaders within DHS have been among the first to

acknowledge that there is still much more work to

be done—work that depends on the strength of

partnerships with law enforcement at all levels of

government. It is important that readers recognize

that, as one executive session participant put it,

creating and running DHS has been like trying to

put the wings on a plane as it is taking off down

the runway. It is very much a work in progress.

The experts who gathered for the executive

session agreed that steady progress has not always

been easy: duplication of efforts, lack of coordination and sharing, and other challenges must continue to be resolved as the nation develops a more

comprehensive antiterrorism strategy. Defining

and communicating the roles and responsibilities

of each DHS directorate in enhancing terrorism

awareness, prevention, preparation and response

are the first steps in improving how that directorate can work effectively with other federal agencies and local, state and tribal law enforcement. 

This white paper is largely based on the conference proceedings and describes efforts to build on

existing models of collaboration, as well as some suggestions for improving effective interagency coordination at many levels of responsibility. There are no easy

answers to the problems facing the nation’s law

enforcement and intelligence communities. It is hoped,

however, that this paper advances the discussion on

how best to integrate the diffuse resources and expertise of all those engaged in the fight against terrorism.

The COPS Office and PERF are pleased to

present the findings and recommendations that the

executive session on DHS partnerships produced. It is

not surprising that the underlying principles that will

guide our reforms rest squarely on the progress we have

made in employing community-policing concepts to

solve problems and to forge meaningful collaborations.

FOREWORD

A T THE TIME OF THE EXECUTIVE SESSION THAT BROUGHT LEADERS FROM THE

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) together with those from

other federal, state, local and tribal agencies, DHS had just celebrated its

first year in existence. In that year, it had already taken significant steps to restructure and reorganize 22 federal agencies, all of which brought with them their own

distinct cultures, missions and goals. DHS has crafted a strategic plan for this new

agency while making important strides in advancing collaboration among the tens

of thousands of law enforcement agencies engaged in counterterrorism efforts.

Carl R. Peed Chuck Wexler

Director, COPS Executive Director, PERF
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The impediments facing those tasked with creating

a fully integrated agency capable of preventing or

addressing terrorism are staggering. At the heart of

the challenge for DHS has been the need to become

immediately competent in all areas of counterterrorism while retaining component agencies’ original and continuing duties. At the same time, DHS

is being asked to think strategically about how to

network with all relevant law enforcement agencies and the people in their communities.

The critical link between federal authorities and the public is local law enforcement. No

one has better direct ties with the community to

enhance reporting of suspicious activity, to coordinate local preparedness efforts and to guard

against hate crimes and other forms of violence.

If community policing has taught us anything, it is

that engaging the community and collaboratively

solving seemingly intractable problems is the only

way law enforcement will be effective—whether in

controlling crime, reducing fear or identifying terrorists who live and operate in our cities across the

nation. DHS and other federal agencies need to

work with local law enforcement to make that

happen.

Local law enforcement also is uniquely

positioned to protect communities by identifying

critical infrastructure in their jurisdictions that are

vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Yet there are no simple solutions for how DHS or other federal agencies

can effectively coordinate with more than 17,000

decentralized local law enforcement agencies—and

C HAPTER O N E

INTRODUCTION

ON MARCH 1, 2003, SOME 180,000 PEOPLE FROM 22 DIFFERENT FEDERAL

agencies, or components of those agencies, came together to form the

Department of Homeland Security (DHS).1 Many agencies that comprise DHS came with their own astounding number of duties and mandates

unrelated to counterterrorism, as well as new responsibilities in addressing the

terrorist threat. Some came with long histories and cultures that have shaped

their agencies’ responses and approaches, while others were created from whole

cloth. The establishment of DHS was deemed the most comprehensive reorganization of the federal government since the Cold War.2

1 For a history of DHS’s organization see http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=59&content=4081. 

2 White House. 2004. Remarks by the President on the One-Year Anniversary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, March 2, 2004. Washington, D.C.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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myriad state and tribal authorities—and then integrate those efforts with all other relevant federal initiatives. The first step may well be to ensure that

local law enforcement has the necessary resources,

training, technology and means for coordinating

with federal agencies to achieve DHS’s vision. They

must be full partners in the fight against terrorism. 

The Project: Community Policing

in a Security-Conscious World

The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF),3

with support from the U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

(COPS), has convened a series of five executive sessions for law enforcement chief executives, other

policing professionals, government agency leaders

and policymakers to explore, debate and exchange

information. These sessions provide law enforcement practitioners and homeland security personnel with opportunities to share and develop

effective strategies for addressing terrorism while

continuing to enhance community policing. The

discussions are captured in subsequent white

papers that are widely disseminated to law

enforcement and decision makers at all levels of

government. 

Previous executive session discussions

resulted in white papers on Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law

Enforcement. These sessions focused on the following topics:4

• Local-Federal Partnerships (November 2002,

Washington, D.C.);

• Working with Diverse Communities (June

2003, Chicago);

• Preparing for and Responding to Bioterrorism

(July 2003, Los Angeles); and

• The Production and Sharing of Intelligence

(December 2003, Washington, D.C.).

The Fifth Executive Session 

On DHS’s one-year anniversary in March 2004,

PERF convened another executive session, Law

Enforcement Partnerships with the Department of

Homeland Security: Working Together to Address

Terrorism and Enhance Community Policing, in

Washington, D.C. Moderated by PERF’s executive

director, the day-and-a-half session featured

discussions about what is working and what can be

improved between law enforcement and DHS.5

The session was marked by lively exchanges

and frank debate about issues of notification, the

3 PERF is a nonprofit membership organization of progressive policing professionals dedicated to advancing law enforcement

services to all communities through experimentation and national leadership. Its members serve more than half the nation’s

population, and the organization provides training, technical assistance, research, publications and other services to its

members and the profession. More information about PERF can be found at www.policeforum.org.

4 At the time of this writing, the first four white papers in the series are available as a free download at www.policeforum.org

and www.cops.usdoj.gov. There will be a sixth white paper, funded separately by the National Institute of Justice, on partnering to prepare for and respond to critical incidents.

5 All participants’ titles and agency affiliations are listed as of the time of the executive session, unless indicated otherwise.

“This is the first time since

I

’

ve been on the job that

I

’ve been at a forum like

this to talk to folks ... who

do this everyday, and to be

[working on the issues]

with the FBI here too.” 

—General Patrick Hughes,

Assistant Secretary, Office

of Infrastructure

Protection, Department of

Homeland Security
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3

usefulness of general threat warnings, intelligence

and data sharing, community policing principles,

how resources should be spent, issues of trust and

much more. Perhaps one of the earliest indicators

that the forum was a success was participants’

statements that this was the first time authorities

at this level, from such a diverse law enforcement

orientation, came together in a small working

group to identify the means for more effective

partnerships. 

The executive session began with a discussion of the mission and responsibilities of DHS;

the structure of homeland security functions at the

local, state, tribal and federal levels; and the factors

that comprise successful collaboration models.

The participants discussed realistic steps that all

represented agencies could take to improve complementary prevention and response strategies—

strategies and tactics that build on effective

community policing principles.6

The session’s goals were primarily to provide counterterrorism professionals and government policymakers with information about some

of the challenges and approaches to addressing terrorism, and to elicit feedback that could inform

DHS’s long-term planning process and more

immediate efforts. It also was structured to highlight areas in which DHS and other federal agencies may need to reduce redundancy and better

coordinate efforts to provide improved support 

for local law enforcement. As the session closed,

participants agreed to evaluate their approaches, as

well as rethink the best means for contacting and

assisting one another in light of the insights gained

at this forum. 

What’s Ahead

This white paper summarizes participants’ discussions at the executive session. It is written primarily for local, state, tribal and federal law

enforcement agencies that have the potential to

work closely with DHS personnel and their component agencies. It is also meant to provide DHS

leaders with useful information that can guide

their continued efforts to improve agency partnerships. The paper includes several sidebars to provide viewpoints written either by executive session

participants or other individuals on key topics or

concerns raised at the executive session that could

not be fully explored in the time allotted. These

sidebars provide a glimpse of what practitioners

experience in implementing policy, navigating a

labyrinth of government agencies and instituting

reforms meant to ensure greater public safety.

The following chapter, Chapter Two, provides a context in which the remaining sections of

this paper can be considered. It reviews the DHS

components’ missions and responsibilities. It is by

no means exhaustive and only hints at how complex the agency is and the tremendous number of

mandates placed upon it. The chapter also reflects

how difficult it is to determine adequate measures

6 Federal agencies at the table included the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services and the Department of Homeland Security. Representatives attended from the following DHS directorates: Homeland

Security Operations Center, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Federal Emergency Management Agency,

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Domestic Preparedness, Office of Research and Development, Office of

Science and Technology, Office of State and Local Government Coordination, United States Border Patrol, United States

Coast Guard and United States Secret Service.

The local, state and tribal agencies in attendance included Appleton (WI) Police Department, DC Metropolitan Police

Department, Fairfax County (VA) Police Department, Fayetteville (NC) Police Department, Los Angeles Police Department,

Massachusetts Office of Public Safety, DC Metro Transit Police, Miami Police Department, Montgomery County (MD)

Police Department, New York State Office of Public Security, Oregon State Police, Pasadena (CA) Police Department, Prince

William County (VA) Police Department, U.S. Capitol Police and Yavapai-Prescott Tribal Police.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

4

for evaluating success in countering the terrorist

threat and in building a truly integrated national

structure. This chapter reflects the organizational

structure and mandates at the time of the executive session. There have been several reorganizations and proposed reforms as this paper goes to

print that will continue to shape the evolution of

the agency.

Just as it is important to understand and

improve partnerships between local law enforcement and DHS, it is also vital that other partnerships are fostered between local law enforcement

and other nonfederal partners (state and tribal

authorities, private security, community leaders and

countless stakeholders). Chapter Three briefly outlines local and state enforcement responsibilities,

as well as several examples of homeland security

collaborations, to demonstrate that the complex

and highly variable homeland security structures

at the local and state level make a one-size-fits-all

approach to partnerships very difficult. This chapter discusses some of the many stakeholders (e.g.,

transportation systems, the military, tribal police,

colleges and universities, the private sector, building management and others) that law enforcement

at all levels of government must engage to enhance

critical infrastructure protection and public safety.

In reviewing the roles and responsibilities of law

enforcement in these partnerships, Chapter Three

also clarifies the challenges tribal, state and local

law enforcement face in addressing the threat of

terrorism while continuing to handle traditional

crimes, as well as how greater support for their

long-established policing functions can benefit

counterterrorism goals.

Chapter Four offers examples of how local

and state agencies are using DHS resources and

training to enhance terrorism response capabilities. The chapter emphasizes the need for dual use,

flexible grants and resources, and the need for

regional approaches that support law enforcement

efforts. Also discussed are training gaps for streetlevel officers and other needs that have not yet

been fully addressed. Special attention is paid to

local funding challenges and concerns about federal

grant processes.

Chapter Five provides an understanding of

what the remaining problems are regarding information sharing between federal agencies and state,

local and tribal law enforcement; interoperability

and other communication concerns. The chapter

also reviews the DHS alert systems and how that

information is used by local law enforcement.

There is significant consideration of how information-sharing mechanisms can be improved, how

new technologies can be employed, as well as the

need to reduce redundancy and confusion among

all involved agencies. 

The white paper concludes with recommendations for local, state, tribal and federal law

enforcement agencies as they partner with DHS

and navigate their new path in policing communities that are vulnerable to both traditional crimes

and terrorism. 
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5

C HAPTER T W O

THE MISSION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

MANY FEDERAL AGENCIES DEDICATED TO DOMESTIC SECURITY ISSUES ARE

coordinated and overseen by the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the first DHS strategic plan outline the vision and mission statements, core values, principles, strategic goals and objectives that guide daily DHS operations.7 The establishment of

DHS was meant to provide coordinated terrorism threat information for local,

state, tribal and private sector entities. With the first year completed, DHS has

redoubled its commitment to have its component agencies build meaningful partnerships with one another, law enforcement and other first responders.8 These

partnerships are essential to protect the nation from terrorist attacks and to

address criminal acts that plague U.S. communities. But this effort must be reciprocal: law enforcement agencies at all levels of government must fully understand

and accept one another’s resources, mandates and limitations. The executive session participants soon realized that others around the table had assets and guidance that they did not know existed or felt they could not access. It was not long

before connections were made and obstacles to access were overcome. The following section provides a brief overview of DHS resources and functions to provide all readers with a context in which to view the recommendations for sharing

and cooperation outlined in the remainder of the paper.

7 At this writing, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (H.R. 5005) is available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/

hr_5005_enr.pdf. The Securing Our Homeland: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan (February 24, 2004)

is available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/theme_home1.jsp.

8 Secretary Ridge’s One-Year Anniversary Speech, delivered at George Washington University on February 23, 2004, is available online at: http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3204. Highlights of the department’s year-one accomplishments are also available online at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3241.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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DHS Mission

“The primary mission of the Department

is to—

(A) prevent terrorist attacks within

the United States;

(B) reduce the vulnerability of the

United States to terrorism; and

(C) minimize the damage, and assist

in the recovery, from terrorist

attacks that do occur within the

United States.”9

Of note is that while DHS’s primary mission is to

address terrorism, there is no single government

agency dedicated solely to that end. Responsibilities for homeland security are dispersed among

more than 100 different government entities. 

Executive session participants discussed

the DHS mission and agreed that the concept of a

secure homeland should involve more than just

preventing or preparing for terrorism. They contended that homeland security should entail

addressing any criminal act that will destabilize

U.S. communities, citing local crime issues such

as serial shootings, gang violence and drug trafficking that also threaten public safety and create

fear among community members. Terrorists may

also engage in traditional crimes such as money

laundering, identity theft and illegal drugs to

finance and support their activities. Executive 

session participants encouraged DHS to continue

to look for opportunities to more broadly define its

mission to assist local, state and tribal government

entities with crimes that can have an impact on

community and national security. 

The DHS Five Major Directorates

and Responsibilities10

The five major DHS directorates are

1) Information Analysis and Infrastructure

Protection, 

2) Border and Transportation Security, 

3) Emergency Preparedness and Response,

4) Science and Technology, and 

5) Management. 

Collectively these directorates are responsible for reducing America’s vulnerability, preventing

future attacks, and responding to and mitigating

the effects of attacks that do occur. The directorates

assess threats and develop intelligence, guard borders and airports, protect critical infrastructure and

coordinate emergency responses. There are also

several other entities that have been brought under

DHS authority that do not fall within a directorate

such as the United States Coast Guard. At this

writing, DHS is continuing to evolve, and other

agencies may well be created or modified. Each

agency now within DHS is tasked with helping to

provide greater security through improved intelligence, coordinated efforts and cooperation. Below is

a brief overview of each of the directorates and other

9 See H.R. 5005-8 the Homeland Security Act of 2002. At this writing the document can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/

interweb/assetlibrary/hr_5005_enr.pdf.

10 The structure of DHS described in this paper reflects its organization at the March 2004 executive session. As this paper

goes to print, readers can access more information about how DHS will be reorganized by accessing the DHS website (see,

e.g., Remarks by Secretary Michael Chertoff on the Second Stage Review of the Department of Homeland Security, July 13,

2005 at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4597). These organizational changes include “(1) formation of a

new, department-wide policy office; (2) significant improvements in how DHS manages its intelligence and information

sharing responsibilities; (3) formation of a new operations coordination office and other measures to increase operational

accountability; and (4) an important consolidation effort that integrates the Department’s preparedness mission.” 
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7

DHS agencies.11 It is not a comprehensive listing,

but rather a sketch to help put in perspective the

discussions and recommendations that follow.

Information Analysis and Infrastructure

Protection (IAIP)12

Among the IAIP component’s duties are information analysis, infrastructure protection and the

Homeland Security Operation Center (HSOC)

administration. The IAIP directorate identifies and

assesses potential threat information, establishes

relationships with the intelligence community,

issues threat warnings and advisories through the

HSOC, and determines and maps vulnerabilities in

the United States. 

DHS shares with and uses information from

all intelligence-generating agencies. These include

the National Security Agency (NSA), the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) (including the combined efforts of

these and other agencies that run the Terrorist

Threat Integration Center). IAIP aggregates and analyzes information from multiple sources and then

uses the intelligence to help prevent terrorist activities. Its HSOC is a central point of connectivity for

intelligence in and out of DHS. The resulting threat

analysis and warning function is meant to support

U.S. decision makers. Executive session participants

discussed how IAIP’s timely analysis and dissemination of information could provide useful warnings to

local, state, tribal and federal government agencies,

as well as the private sector and others to disrupt and

prevent terrorist acts. 

IAIP coordinates partnerships with government, private and international stakeholders. It

develops awareness programs, information-sharing

mechanisms and sector-focused best practices and

guidelines to support services to these partners. IAIP

serves as the primary contact for coordinating critical infrastructure protection activities within the

federal government, including vulnerability assessments, strategic planning efforts and exercises.13

Within the IAIP, there are many initiatives

to prevent terrorist attacks beyond their intelligence

fusion efforts. For example, the Analytic Red Cell

11 At the time of this writing, more information on the DHS directorates and DHS organizational structure can be found on

the DHS website (www.dhs.gov). The description in this paper of each directorate and other critical agencies was obtained

from DHS presentations at the executive session and from the DHS website.

12 IAIP was one of the new agencies created by DHS that did not previously exist. 13 For example, a cyber-attack on information and telecommunications systems can affect other critical infrastructure sectors, including banking and finance, energy and transportation. Such an attack would likely cause widespread service disruptions, damage the economy and jeopardize public safety. IAIP unifies the cyber-security activities performed by the

Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (previously part of the Department of Commerce) and the National Infrastructure

Protection Center (formerly within the FBI). IAIP enhances those resources with the response functions of the National

Cyber Security Division United States Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT). At the time of this writing, more

information on US-CERT can be found at www.us-cert.gov.

“Having big-city police

departments rotate

through the [HSOC] watch

desk creates relationships

and information sharing

between local agencies and

DHS that fosters important

understandings of each

other’s missions.”

—Richard Russell, Principal

Deputy Director, Homeland

Security Operations Center,

Department of Homeland

Security
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Program uses an approach that exploits the talents

of individuals from various fields—including screenwriters, best-selling authors, psychologists, philosophers, academics, various terrorism experts and

employees of the CIA and FBI—in an attempt to

bring fresh insight to problems outside their respective disciplines.14 Participants draw on their life

experiences to think like terrorists and paint a picture when there are no specific dots to connect. The

Red Cell Program creates products that build on best

practices used by the defense and intelligence communities to help analysts anticipate when, where

and how a terrorist might conduct an attack. 

Border and Transportation Security (BTS) 

BTS is responsible for securing borders and transportation systems, enforcing immigration laws and

ensuring the flow of traffic and commerce. According

to DHS representatives at the session, BTS conducts

immigration enforcement by deterring illegal immigration, preventing terrorists and other criminal

aliens from entering or residing in the United States,

facilitating lawful entry, detecting and removing

those who are living in the United States in violation

of immigration laws and pursuing investigations.

BTS includes 

• the Transportation Security Administration

(TSA); 

• the Bureau of Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (which consolidates the Federal

Protective Services, the Federal Air Marshals

Service and the investigation and enforcement arm of the former Immigration and

Naturalization Service); 

• the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP)

(which consolidates U.S. Customs, the

inspection authority of the former INS, the

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

and the entire U.S. Border Patrol); as well as 

• the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

(FLETC). 

TSA uses intelligence, regulations,

enforcement, inspection, and the screening and

education of security personnel for passenger and

shipping carriers to protect transportation infrastructure. TSA also has statutory responsibility for

the security of more than 400 airports. With so

many duties and responsibilities, TSA looks to

local law enforcement to share information and

help protect transportation systems. It has reimbursed local law enforcement for security assistance at airports and hopes to advance those

partnerships further in the future.

The primary responsibility of CBP is the

control and protection of the nation’s borders. CBP

has authority to provide border security as well as

14 Information on the Analytic Red Cell Program was obtained from the DHS’s Homeland Headlines e-newsletter on July

6, 2004, vol.3, no.5.

“The Information Analysis

and Infrastructure

Protection directorate

issues warnings, but we

need to learn more about

what law enforcement does

with that information and

whether it has value.”

—John Chase, Chief of Staff,

Office of Information

Analysis and Infrastructure

Protection, Department of

Homeland Security
VOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY

9

“As part of the Department

of Homeland Security, ICE

aims to work cooperatively

with state and local law

enforcement agencies to

enhance public safety and

national security. Many

police departments contact

ICE to request assistance

with aliens who commit

crimes while in the United

States illegally while police

departments in other

locations operate under

political mandates, often

issued by city councils,

which discourage or prohibit

cooperation with federal

immigration enforcement

officers. But ensuring

consequences for violations

of immigration laws is an

important tool for disrupting

criminal organizations and

preventing terrorist attacks.

When ICE and local agencies

work together to enforce

these laws, we reduce

criminal threats and

significantly improve public

safety in communities

across the country.”

—Michael Garcia, Assistant

Secretary, Immigration and

Customs Enforcement,

Department of Homeland

Security

screen all shipments entering coastal areas, seaports and all other ports of entry. According to a

session participant, the U.S. Border Patrol has

about 11,000 patrol agents, with 10,000 located at

the southwest border and 1,000 along the northern border at the time the working group convened

(CBP has approximately 41,000 total employees).

With so few resources, and the U.S. history of an

open-border policy, the agency has depended on

contributions from other law enforcement partners with concurrent jurisdiction. Accordingly, the

U.S. Border Patrol created task forces and Integrated Border Enforcement Teams with local, state,

tribal and other federal law enforcement agencies

to act as force multipliers at the borders. The agency

also relies, in part, on state and local agencies’

equipment, technology, personnel and intelligence. 

At this writing, there are an estimated 7

million illegal aliens in the United States, while the

Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(ICE) has approximately 20,000 employees tasked

with identifying, investigating and removing illegal

aliens and contraband.15 Their efforts are meant to

reduce crime and America’s vulnerability to terrorist attack. ICE agents also work on preventing certain financial crimes, commercial fraud and

human rights violations. ICE maintains a number

of partnerships with state and local law enforcement—varying in design and formality. Joint efforts

entail regular communication through various

mechanisms and even formal memoranda of

understanding (MOU) in certain states. In 2002, for

example, ICE, the State of Florida and the Florida

Department of Law Enforcement entered into the

first federal MOU to help improve informationsharing and joint immigration enforcement efforts.

The collaboration is meant to enhance national

15 See www.ice.gov.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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security and augment ICE personnel resources by

creating a cadre of specially trained state and local

law enforcement officers—deputized and organized

into several task forces—under the direction of

regional ICE supervisors.16 

ICE also established the Law Enforcement

Support Center (LESC)—operating 24 hours a day,

seven days a week—to coordinate information

gathered from the National Crime Information

Center (NCIC), the Interstate Identification Index,

and numerous other databases and criminal history indexes. Serving as a national enforcement

operations center, LESC seeks to provide timely

information on the immigration status of foreignborn individuals who are under investigation or

being detained. The LESC is not strictly a function

of ICE, but rather a product of DHS’s larger information-sharing effort. The center also provides a

range of informational and analytical services in

support of multi-agency investigations. In addition

to responding to inquiries from local, state and federal correctional and court systems on immigration status, LESC supports general queries on

potential criminal or terrorist activity, as well as

background checks for firearm purchases and

employment at sites considered to be potentially

vulnerable to terrorist attack.17 

Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) 

The EPR directorate is tasked with continuing the

mission of the Federal Emergency Management

Agency (FEMA)18 and builds on its approach to

prepare the United States for large-scale domestic 

critical incidents, natural disasters or terrorist acts.

EPR coordinates with first responders and oversees

federal response and recovery strategies. EPR

efforts are meant to help prevent or minimize the

loss of life and property and to protect institutions

by using a comprehensive, risk-based emergency

management program. It promotes disaster-resistant communities by providing federal support to

local governments for securing infrastructures and

protecting the public. The “all-hazards” approach

is designed to enable flexibility in response, to

reduce the risk of harm and to coordinate proactively with private industry, the insurance sector,

mortgage lenders, real estate professionals, homebuilding associations, citizens and myriad other

stakeholders. EPR also brings together the Nuclear

Incident Response Team (formerly of the Department of Energy), the National Domestic Preparedness Office and Domestic Emergency Support

Teams (formerly of the Department of Justice), and

the Strategic National Stockpile and National Disaster Medical System (formerly of the Department

of Health and Human Services). It coordinates and

works closely with state and federal response

teams outside the directorate, such as those at the

National Guard and Coast Guard. 

Executive session participants representing DHS stressed the value of their being able to

draw on the expertise of FEMA. FEMA offers a

number of significant assets in their consequence

management role, including expertise in mitigating the impact of emergency incidents. It brings an

array of medical and other resources for disaster

16 More information on the Florida MOU and similar models of cooperation can be found in the second volume of this

series, entitled Working with Diverse Communities. A more detailed discussion of the local law enforcement role in immigration enforcement, and concerns about its impact on police-minority community relations is also included in that paper,

which is available at www.policeforum.org or www.cops.usdoj.gov.

17 At this writing, law enforcement can contact the LESC at 1-866-DHS-2ICE.

18 At this writing more information on the Federal Emergency Management Agency can be found at www.fema.gov/. 
VOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY

11

preparedness and response. At the time of this

writing, state homeland security directors are helping the agency create more detailed plans for

threat-specific responses that integrate various disciplines and levels of government. The Emergency

Management Institute (EMI)—the training division of FEMA—has also developed a national

training and evaluation system aimed at improving

the implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) at the federal, state and

local levels. EMI has also set standards for additional training and is working to determine how

government agencies can review their progress and

performance.19

Science and Technology (S&T)20

The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)

performs the primary research and development

function for DHS. It provides federal, state, local

and tribal officials with information on new technology and the application of existing or declassified technologies to protect the homeland. S&T

also works directly with law enforcement agencies to identify and develop technologies to prevent, detect and mitigate the effects of terrorist

attacks and other hazards. It is involved in the

research, development and testing of vaccines,

antidotes, and diagnostics and treatment plans to

counter biological and chemical warfare agents—

often in collaboration with national laboratories

and academic institutions. 

There were originally four offices within

S&T: the Office of Programs Plans and Budget

(responsible for the planning and coordination of

all of the directorate’s research and development

efforts), the Homeland Security Advanced

Research Projects Agency (HSARPA), the Office of

Research and Development (responsible for the

administration and direction of the directorate’s

laboratories and research centers) and the Office

of Systems and Engineering Development

(responsible for overseeing the development of

advanced technologies systems and their implementation in the field).

In September 2004, DHS launched a fifth

S&T office—the Office of Interoperability and

Compatibility (OIC) to oversee public safety

interoperability programs and their effective integration at the federal, state and local levels.21 The

OIC serves as a central clearinghouse for government agencies to gain information about and

assistance with interoperability issues. It is

“We need to recognize the

exceptional work of DHS

over the past year,

especially in the areas of

response and recovery; I

am also pleased to see

DHS’s increased focus on

prevention, particularly in

the areas of information

sharing and critical

infrastructure hardening.”

—Ronald Iden, Director,

Office of Homeland

Security, California

Governor’s Office

19 More information regarding training and standards for implementation of NIMS and Incident Command Structures can

be found at http://www.fema.gov/tab_education.shtm or http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/.

20 At this writing, more information on the Science and Technology directorate can be found at www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/

display?theme=43&content=1087.

21 See DHS Today, September 29, 2004 or www.dhs.gov for more information on the launch of the OIC.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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responsible for supporting the development of

standards; establishing a comprehensive research,

development, testing and evaluation program to

improve public safety interoperability; coordinating all related DHS grants and ensuring that

states acquire the necessary funding to guarantee

improvement of interoperability; providing technical assistance; as well as overseeing the administration of the NIMS Integration Center. 

Management

The Management Directorate of DHS is responsible for its budget, oversight and human resources

issues, including appropriations, funds expenditures, accounting and finance; procurement; personnel; information technology systems; facilities,

property, equipment and other material resources;

and performance measures. Management is

responsible for ensuring that DHS employees

understand their responsibilities and how to communicate with other personnel and managers.

Within the directorate, the chief information officer and staff maintain the information technology

to keep more than 180,000 employees connected

so they can achieve their goals.

Additional DHS Components

A number of additional offices became part of DHS

after its creation. These other agencies do not fall

under a specific directorate, but instead exist as

independent entities under the larger department.

These components include the U.S. Coast Guard

(USCG); U.S. Secret Service (USSS); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); and the

Office of the Secretary—with the last office alone

comprised of the following: 

• Office of the Chief Privacy Officer 

• Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 

• Office of Counter Narcotics 

• Office of General Counsel 

• Office of the Inspector General 

• Office of Legislative Affairs 

• Office of National Capital Region Coordination 

• Office of the Private Sector Liaison 

• Office of Public Affairs 

• Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness 

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)22

Prior to September 11, 2001, the USCG reported

to the Secretary of Transportation. As of March 1,

2003, the Commandant of the USCG has reported

directly to the Secretary of DHS.23 According to

participants, the move to DHS has been a positive

one for the Coast Guard; the agency moved to

DHS intact, has seen a 60 percent increase over its

pre-9/11 budget, and its missions are now more

closely aligned with the missions of its department

“Those operating around

ports need to be more

aware of security plans.”

—Jeffrey J. Hathaway, Rear

Admiral, Director of

Operations Policy, U.S.

Coast Guard, Department

of Homeland Security

22 The information for this text was obtained from executive session participants and the USCG website (www.

uscg.mil/USCG.shtm).

23 Consistent with existing law, upon declaration of war or when the President directs, the Coast Guard would operate in

the service of the Department of Defense.
VOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY

13

than they were pre-9/11 under the Department of

Transportation.

Executive session participants agreed that

there has been a productive long-term partnership

between local, state and federal agencies and the

USCG to handle maritime homeland security

issues. The USCG focuses its efforts on awareness, protection, prevention and response. 

The USCG provides multimission maritime operational expertise as a military and law

enforcement organization. As one of the five

Armed Services, its missions include protecting

the public, the environment, and U.S. economic

interests—in the nation’s ports and waterways,

along the coast or in any U.S. maritime region, as

well as in international waters—to support

national security. It is important to remember

that the agency continues to have all of its search,

rescue and other nonterrorism-related duties as

well. USCG works particularly closely with local,

state and federal agencies in protecting the

nation’s ports. 

U.S. Secret Service (USSS)24

Since March 1, 2003, the director of the USSS has

reported directly to the Secretary of DHS. The primary mission of the USSS continues to be the

protection of the President of the United States

and other government leaders, but includes other

duties as needed for securing national events, conducting investigations and preserving the integrity of financial and critical infrastructures. The

USSS has such added responsibility as guarding

against counterfeiting and safeguarding citizens

from credit card fraud. 

Executive session participants discussed

the many new challenges for the USSS since September 11, including an increase in the number of

national events in which USSS holds a coordinating role. A governor can ask that an event be considered a “National Special Security Event”

(NSSE) with a formal request from the governor to

the Secretary of the Department of Homeland

Security. The request will then be forwarded to

the NSSE working group, which is made up of representatives from the USSS, FBI and FEMA. The

working group will gather facts and make a recommendation to the Secretary, who will make the

final decision.25

“When I hear you say that

local law enforcement does

not have close contacts

with DHS, I think some

people are forgetting that

when they work with ICE,

the Secret Service or

others, we are DHS. We can

also help you get to the

right person in DHS if you

don’t know who to

contact.”

—Paul Kilcoyne, Deputy

Assistant Director,

Immigration and Customs

Enforcement, Department

of Homeland Security

24 At the time of this writing, more information on the USSS can be found at www.secretservice.gov/ and contact information for field offices could be found at www.secretservice.gov/field_offices.html. 

25 A more detailed discussion of NSSEs can be found on pp. 43-44 in Chapter Four.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

(USCIS)26

While the Border and Transportation Security

Directorate, through ICE, is responsible for

enforcing immigration laws, USCIS provides services to immigrants and assists with their transition to citizenship. The USCIS director reports

directly to the deputy secretary of DHS. Through

the USCIS, DHS administers immigrant and nonimmigrant sponsorship, change of status, work

approval and other permits; naturalization of eligible applicants for U.S. citizenship; and asylum

or refugee processing. 

Office of State and Local Government

Coordination and Preparedness (OSLGCP) 

Among the entities within the Office of the Secretary is the Office of State and Local Government

Coordination and Preparedness. In May 2004,

DHS merged the Office of Domestic Preparedness

(ODP)27 with the Office of State and Local Government Coordination (SLGC) to create the Office

of State and Local Government Coordination and

Preparedness.28 The consolidation is meant to help

DHS accurately evaluate programs, exercise federal

oversight and disperse government-provided

resources efficiently. States and localities benefit

from the reorganization by being able to access a

unified and coordinated support office within DHS.

SLGC is meant to serve as a single point of

contact for first responders and emergency services

to coordinate DHS programs that affect state, local

and tribal governments, as well as nongovernmental organizations and associations. SLGC facilitates information exchange among state, local and

tribal homeland security personnel; identifies

homeland security-related activities, best practices

and processes; and uses this information to

advance counterterrorism. 

The ODP component is responsible for

providing training to federal, state and local first

responders; allocating funds to purchase equipment for counterterrorism responsibilities; supporting and working with state, local and tribal

jurisdictions to plan and execute exercises; and

lending technical assistance to stakeholders to prevent, plan for and respond to terrorist activities. 

26 At this writing, more information on the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) can be found at

http://uscis.gov/graphics/. The fiscal year 2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, which contains a summary of immigration-related data, is available on the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services website at http://uscis.gov/graphics/

shared/aboutus/statistics/ybpage.htm. The yearbook contains statistics and explanatory text covering critical DHS immigration-related activities from border enforcement to naturalization.

27 More information on the Office of Domestic Preparedness can be found at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/. 28 More information on the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness can be found at

www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=38&content=3398.
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15

MEETING THE NEEDS AND ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF 

OUR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

by Joshua Filler, Director, Office of State and Local Government

Coordination and Preparedness, Department of Homeland Security 

Since September 11, 2001, the President and Congress have provided almost $11.4 billion in homeland security funding to states, territorial and local governments. Most of those funds have been

awarded under the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), Law Enforcement Terrorism

Prevention Program (LETPP), Firefighters Assistance Grant Program and the Urban Areas Security

Initiative (UASI). When the President signed the Department’s Federal Fiscal Year 2005 budget it

allowed us to provide another $4 billion in homeland security funding, including $1.1 billion for

SHSGP, $400 million for LETPP, $715 million for Firefighters Assistance Grant program, and $1.2

billion for UASI. We are proud to say that this is the second consecutive year in which the administration has asked for funds in the LETPP program to specifically assist the law enforcement community in their homeland security mission. 

We have come a long way since September 11, 2001, and the subsequent creation of DHS,

but there is much more work to be done. Federal law enforcement has been meeting with its local,

state and tribal counterparts for years in an attempt to build stronger, more effective partnerships

to combat crimes such as drug trafficking and organized crime. With the formation of DHS and the

bringing together of 22 disparate agencies, the need for open lines of communication among the

many agencies involved in protecting our homeland is essential. We have made some impressive

strides already. 

Routinely, officials from DHS are communicating with representatives from local and state

law enforcement discussing policy, operations and intelligence issues. We are constantly assessing

the national situation to ensure that state and local officials have the information and resources to

prevent, and if necessary, respond to threats and terrorist attacks. 

We are providing our state and local partners with the secure communications equipment

(video, voice and data), so that agencies and departments at the federal level can better pass classified and other security information to decision makers and analysts within each state and territory. We provide state and local homeland security officials bulletins and real-time information

through our information sharing portal, the Homeland Security Information Network’s Joint

Regional Information Exchange System (HSIN-JRIES). This and other systems represent the forefront of technological advances in real-time information turned into actionable intelligence and disseminated to agents and officers across the country. The Department is also working with State

Homeland Security Advisors to grant additional Secret-level clearances to state and local government officials across the country.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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Office of Private Sector Liaison29

Executive session participants discussed the critical role the private sector plays in preventing,

responding to and recovering from incidents. The

Office of Private Sector Liaison (within the Office

of the Secretary) provides a direct line of communication between the private sector and DHS. The

office is organized into five components: Border

and Transportation Security, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Science and Technology, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, and

Regulation Review and Analysis. The Office of Private Sector Liaison provides guidance on security

policies and regulations; works with federal labs,

research and development centers and academia to

develop innovative approaches and technologies;

and promotes public-private partnerships and best

practices. Personnel work directly with individual

businesses and through trade associations and

other non-governmental organizations to promote

an ongoing dialogue and to share information, 

programs, resources and partnership opportunities.

Measuring DHS Success 

Executive session participants discussed the work

achieved in DHS’s first year, including a complex

management structure, a new airport security system,

improved border operations and port security and

much more. At the one-year mark, DHS had also

published multiple reports, including the department’s reorganization and strategic plans, as well

as procedures for local and state law enforcement

and other units of government to obtain funding.

DHS executives faced many obstacles: the trials of

working from temporary office space, many

unfilled senior-level positions, union-management

issues, under-funded mandates for DHS component areas and more. 

With the many challenges DHS has faced

in establishing a new department, it has simultaneously had to handle an anxious public and the

immediate needs local, state, tribal and federal law

enforcement agencies have for an integrated

response that draws on competencies not yet

developed. Executive session participants discussed the problems with how the government

would measure DHS success, given the difficulty

DHS is committed to ensuring that the necessary law enforcement, medical, fire and other

first-responder personnel are fully funded, equipped and supported as we work together to secure

the homeland. As new priorities arise with new challenges, it is important that DHS, other federal

law enforcement entities and their local, state and tribal counterparts continue to work together as

we face the ongoing threat of terrorism.

29 As this paper goes to print, more information on the Office of Private Sector Liaison can be found at www.dhs.gov/

dhspublic/display?theme=37&content=3363. 

“The establishment of DHS

was like forming a large

corporation in one year.”

—Chuck Wexler,

PERF Executive Director
VOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY

17

in proving that terrorist acts have been averted

through prevention and other efforts. Assessing a

department with more than 180,000 employees

that answers to 80 congressional committees and

subcommittees and other oversight at this writing

is daunting, particularly because it must address

tremendous immediate needs while starting a new

counterterrorism organization for the long term.

One measure of its success will be the extent to

which it is able to effectively enhance collaborations

with law enforcement at all levels of government.

CONCLUSION

DHS is committed to enhancing local, state and

tribal awareness of the roles and responsibilities of

each directorate and the resources and training

they provide. The relationship is symbiotic, as

DHS also relies on the homeland security efforts

at the local, state and tribal levels, including the

private sector. Executive session participants have

likened DHS’s development to putting the wings

on a plane as it takes off down the runway. First

responders acknowledge that DHS is very much a

work in progress, but also expressed urgency in

receiving federal assistance that reflects their

immediate needs for funding and other forms of

support. It was evident from the session discussion that many state and local agencies are still

unaware of the roles, responsibilities and

resources offered by the DHS component agencies. Furthermore, even the federal agency representatives acknowledged the need to better define

their duties and reduce redundancies and turf

issues. All agreed, however, that much progress

has been made and the benefits they will gain

from further coordination and collaboration will

greatly advance homeland security. A more

detailed discussion of how local law enforcement

has put to use some of the DHS resources described above, as well as other assets, is provided in

Chapter Four.
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VOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY

19

C HAPTER T HREE

STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND

MODELS FOR COOPERATION

J

UST AS LAW ENFORCEMENT AT ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT MUST WORK WITH

DHS and other federal authorities to secure the homeland, similar efforts to

foster partnerships between law enforcement and other nonfederal stakeholders are critical. These partnerships are the focus of this chapter. The following sections reflect executive session participants’ discussions of cooperation

among state homeland security authorities, local and state law enforcement

agencies, and local departments’ initiatives with neighboring jurisdictions and

key stakeholders. The intent is to provide a broad overview of the types of coordinated efforts that can advance counterterrorism work.

This chapter discusses state homeland security

models and plans, which vary considerably to

meet states’ specific needs for homeland security

protection. The differences among the states add

to the complexity of developing effective cooperative and support efforts among all levels of government. State homeland security models are also

considered because of their role in disseminating

grants to police agencies. Based on lawmakers’

premise that the states best understand homeland

security needs, particularly for first responders

and emergency personnel, DHS provides funding

to state homeland security authorities to oversee

and distribute funds for counterterrorism efforts.

DHS also provides states with guidance on

improving their state and local homeland security

plans. Accordingly, local police and state law

enforcement need to continue building stronger

relationships with their state homeland security

authorities to inform the process and foster cooperative approaches. 

The chapter then explores partnerships

among all first responders (fire, police, EMS and

others), as well as law enforcement collaborations

with such key stakeholders as transportation

authorities, the military, tribal agencies, colleges

and universities, private sector and private security, delivery personnel and community leaders.

Finally, local law enforcement concerns

about how to meet counterterrorism duties while

maintaining traditional law enforcement functions are reviewed, with particular emphasis on

how community policing principles can advance

both anticrime and counterterrorism efforts.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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State Homeland Security Models

States, just like the federal government, are designing and implementing homeland security agencies

and functions. Each state is organizing itself in

accordance with its needs and resources, resulting

in a great deal of variation across the states. Immediately after September 11, each governor appointed a homeland security advisor to serve as a liaison

with DHS. Subsequently states have moved in a

variety of directions to meet the day-to-day

demands of homeland security. Some states have

established independent departments of homeland

security; others have designated existing agencies,

such as law enforcement, emergency management

or national guard to assume homeland security

responsibilities. Along with variation in organizational structures, there exist tremendous differences in the backgrounds, expertise and

perspectives of state homeland security directors

and advisors. These individuals come from many

disciplines, including law enforcement, military,

public health, fire, emergency management and

even the private sector. Their professional orientation may well influence how they define homeland

security, organize state resources and develop plans

for allocating federal grant dollars.30

State homeland security directors are still

developing and shaping the scope of their mission,

roles and responsibilities. Each state homeland

security director has developed a state strategic

plan, many of which promote public safety and

protect critical infrastructure. According to a state

homeland security representative at the session,

the priorities of each state may also include such

local crime issues as combating gang violence, car

thefts, drug activity and burglaries. Executive session participants recommended that state homeland security directors focus on an all-hazards

approach to preparedness that would address any

critical incident, whether it is a wildfire, a hurricane or a terrorist attack. The primary focus at the

state level should be to bring all agencies to the

table, have an open dialogue and reach some consensus on implementation. State homeland security directors at the executive session indicated that

they look to other states to replicate models and

best practices. For instance, some states look to

California because it has had extensive experience

in multi-agency and regional partnerships to handle such critical incidents as large-scale fires and

earthquakes. Participants believed DHS could provide valuable resources to facilitate greater information sharing and best practices.

One of the greatest challenges for state

homeland security directors has been trying to

coordinate the many different first responders and

other stakeholders needed to address each potential threat. The homeland security directors often

have inadequate staff to fully meet operational

goals and to handle the inestimable needs of each

jurisdiction.

30 See www.nga.org/cda/files/homestructures.pdf for the document Overview of States Homeland Security Governance,

which gives information on homeland security task forces, state homeland security websites, legislation, executive orders

and other relevant sources. The National Governors’ Association has developed materials that provide a comprehensive

overview of state homeland security governance and a listing of state homeland security organizational structures. 
VOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY

21

HOMELAND SECURITY’S MOMENT IN TIME

by George Foresman, Deputy Assistant to the Governor,

Office of Virginia Governor Mark R. Warner

“Ours is a moment in time” is my favorite phrase to describe our collective local, state, federal and

private sector initiatives in this post-September 11, 2001 era. It is followed closely by “it is not a

case of ‘either or’, but instead it is a matter of ‘and’” when describing what we need to do to make

ourselves safer and more secure. We must ensure the collective improvement of the wide range of

disciplines responsible for safety and security—police, fire, public health and emergency management, to name a few, as well as similar private sector elements. We will not be successful if our

focus is on a single element of preparedness to the exclusion of our broader capability. 

In addition to the trauma and horror associated with the terrorist attacks, first responders

have had to grapple with a new reality in how they police and serve communities at risk of future

terrorist attacks. There has been much angst associated with our national reaction to the events of

September 11, 2001. The angst comes in large part from change. A new organization at the federal level called the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has set in motion a new way of securing the nation. Demands for improved coordination and information sharing “vertically” between

the levels of government and “horizontally” among agencies within each level of government is

requiring entire disciplines and personnel to adjust to various agency cultures. They must reorient

to an approach in which information is gathered during a law enforcement investigation to be widely shared like never before for prevention instead of prosecution.

Change is never easy. It is made even more difficult by a continuing threat environment,

an insatiable national appetite for highlighting the inevitable problems that come with adjustment,

and the desire of leaders and the public to regain the sense of security Americans held before the

September 11 attacks.

Virginia considered these and other factors in charting a course for change as a result of the

“focus on homeland security.” Our approach is simple: provide leadership for a change in culture

among our citizens, our local governments, entire communities, disciplines and state government.

When Governor Warner established the Office of Commonwealth Preparedness in 2002 the

mandate was clear: We must improve Virginia’s preparedness for emergencies and disasters of all

kinds, including terrorism. The idea was not to create a new bureaucracy, but rather to work with

existing successful structures and processes to create an “all-risk” enterprise approach. It needed to

be nimble enough to manage a full range of risks—from the daily event in a single community to

a large-scale occurrence affecting many people, including drugs, gangs, natural disasters and accidents. To be successful, we are reducing the stovepipes and agency turf battles to create a truly

statewide and disciplined approach to keeping Virginians safe and secure.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

22

The approach is one of “and.” Communities and myriad disciplines, the private sector and

government, individuals and families. The effort is not about any one individual or group—but all

those living, visiting and doing business in Virginia.

The enterprise approach, however, has a serious vulnerability—that is, it is only as strong

as its weakest link. The goal is to advance all facets of prevention and preparedness from the ordinary to the extraordinary, responsive to the risks posed by terrorism while still addressing the full

range of other risks facing Virginians every day. Equipment, education, training, exercises and planning are all part of the effort.

Homeland security is less about who gets what and plays which role and more about what

actually gets done. This is our greatest challenge in Virginia and arguably the nation. In the postSeptember 11 environment organizations are confronted with legitimate concerns about missions,

funding and turf. That is healthy. It promotes discussion and competition. If managed effectively,

discussion and competition are powerful tools for improvement. And improvement is what is needed to confront both the threat of terrorism and the need to provide a more effective approach to preventing, responding to and recovering from emergencies and disasters of all kinds.

I remember September 11 vividly. I also remember September 12, 2001. This nation was

united in common purpose. Despite our grief, we stood resolute in our determination to preserve

the values we cherish most. Ours was, and still is, a common purpose. We draw on that common

purpose every day to get beyond the real and very difficult obstacles to setting in motion the cultural change among individuals, disciplines, organizations and levels of government that is needed

for our long-term success. We use this common purpose to move from conflict to consensus in the

hope that we can take concepts for improvement and translate them into completion. 

We must not let the pursuit of perfection get in the way of progress. We have made great

strides, yet there is much more that needs to be done. The effort will go on long after my contributions and that of others. The job right now is to put in place the solid foundation that will support what will certainly be a long-term endeavor. This will not be an easy transition for Virginia.

Homeland security is not a function or an organization. It is a culture. Everyone has a role. We

must define those roles. It is after all “our moment in time.”

State Homeland Security Plans

State homeland security directors are tasked with

determining how to protect the public and infrastructure, while assessing how DHS can assist their

efforts. Identifying the nature and scope of federal

assistance means that states must formulate comprehensive plans and then detail what support is

needed to implement them. To that end, DHS has

requested that each state develop a homeland security plan based on its unique needs, resources and

vulnerabilities. Executive session participants

encouraged DHS to produce standards and detailed

direction on how to best structure these state homeland security plans, and how to evaluate them. 
VOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY

23

Planning is an iterative process in which

information from one level of government continually influences the other. State and local executive

session participants discussed the information

they need from DHS so their agencies can develop

meaningful security plans to prevent or disrupt a

terrorist attack. Many local law enforcement participants reiterated that they need more information on which threats DHS considers the most

urgent for their region (e.g., truck bombs, hijackings, bioterrorism, nuclear weapons), and when

possible for their jurisdiction. They also agreed

that states have to look at the intelligence they

receive from federal agencies to allocate resources

to the areas that draw the greatest threat. Recognizing that this is a fluid process in which threat

levels and targets change, participants believed

DHS could play a greater role in helping states base

their homeland security plans and structures on

known threats. To the extent possible, states are

looking to DHS for guidance that is based on credible information and intelligence.

Local law enforcement agencies are also

requesting more guidance and responsiveness

from, and stronger relationships with, their state

homeland security authority. They want a greater

voice in public safety plans and in how resources

are allocated. In turn, state homeland security

directors are requesting that local law enforcement

agencies be patient while they formulate these

state homeland security plans and develop relationships with DHS and other jurisdictions. State

homeland security directors also request that each

of their localities submit fully completed paperwork when applying for funding to ensure timely

submission to DHS. 

Local Responsibilities and Models

Used for Cooperation

Ultimately, each local law enforcement department is responsible for addressing crime and the

threat of terrorism for its jurisdiction. The local

agency may obtain DHS funding and assistance

from its state homeland security authority, but

decisions on how to allocate the police agency’s

resources and set priorities for terrorism prevention and preparedness (with consideration for

other demands for police services) fall to local law

enforcement. The local police department personnel who perform the homeland security function

largely shape those determinations, so it is important to understand how agencies staff these positions or activities, as well as how that organization

can influence partnerships. 

There are many homeland security structures that can be found in local agencies. In some

local law enforcement departments there is a

homeland security representative who only handles

counterterrorism responsibilities.31 In other local

agencies, an individual fills that position, but also

handles his or her other duties. For instance, the

homeland security representative may be assigned

from the intelligence unit, drug unit, gang unit or

special tactical unit. He or she may also be the Joint

Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) representative for that

jurisdiction. Oftentimes the chief executive assigns

this individual to be the primary contact for the

state homeland security director and for DHS and

other federal agencies. Chief law enforcement executives understand how time-consuming the homeland security representative’s role can be and the

need for adequate staffing and sufficient resources. 

31 In large agencies this function may be coordinated by several people.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

24

Some local police participants stated they

do not have a strong relationship with their state

homeland security director. However, some of

these agencies have positive interactions with DHS

personnel or use their JTTF to obtain information

on issues affecting their area. Some of these local

law enforcement participants reported building

relationships with DHS in Washington, D.C. that

are not utilized by their states. The complexities of

how local agencies are coordinating and planning

with their counterparts in other local agencies,

with their state authorities and with federal agencies will shape how they function and what assets

they have to draw on.

Some local law enforcement agencies are

integrating their homeland security efforts with all

other critical incident planning, such as hurricanes,

fires, earthquakes, riots and more. The Los Angeles

Police Department’s (LAPD’s) homeland security

function was originally organized as the “Counterterrorism Bureau.” LAPD changed the bureau name

to the Critical Incident Management Bureau to

reflect that preparedness for terrorism is largely the

same as it is for many other types of critical incidents. Participants believed the key to success again

rests with sharing information with other jurisdictions and then tailoring elements of best practices

to the unique needs of an agency and jurisdiction.

Partnerships with Other

Jurisdictions and First Responders 

The challenge of homeland security is building

partnerships among diverse disciplines and multiple levels of government. Local law enforcement

agencies, to varying degrees, coordinate counterterrorism efforts with neighboring jurisdictions, state

and tribal agencies and engage other disciplines

such as EMS, fire, public health and the private

sector to enhance public safety. Executive session

participants stated that all agencies should participate in developing a regional threat assessment and

a shared response plan to critical incidents in their

area. In areas where state authorities or local agencies have not already formulated regional

approaches, executives should encourage regional

or statewide law enforcement associations to support meaningful discussions about policies, practices, operations, plans and mutual aid in

anticipation of a multijurisdictional incident. Each

law enforcement agency needs to determine

whether it can develop memoranda of understanding (MOUs) or other mutual aid agreements with

area agencies.32

State homeland security directors can assist

local agencies and regional response teams by coordinating the resources and expertise that could be

directed to problem areas and stated needs. DHS

can also offer assets to these regional partnerships.

Though there are many successful examples, California is among those that use such a strategy for

obtaining funding and deploying resources. It has

long engaged in regional and statewide collaborations for national disasters. Other states—including

Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky—also

require regional coordination for grant applications

and to ensure a statewide plan is supported by individual efforts (see sidebar on p. 55).

32 A resource for planning law enforcement responses that cross agency boundaries is Murphy, Gerard R. and Chuck Wexler

with Heather J. Davies and Martha R. Plotkin. October 2004. Managing a Multijurisdictional Case: Identifying Lessons

Learned from the Sniper Investigation. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum. The guide includes suggestions

for coordinating the media, shift scheduling and other functions with neighboring jurisdictions before an incident occurs.
VOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY

25

Law enforcement executives from neighboring jurisdictions can conduct conference calls

or schedule regular meetings to develop and adjust

regional homeland security plans and to share

what has worked and what has not in other hazardous incidents. Participants also suggested that

executives hold conference calls that include government agencies (fire department, EMS, school

officials) as well as other relevant stakeholder

groups to keep them informed and involved in key

decisions that will affect them. 

Working with Others to Protect

Critical Infrastructure

Protecting critical infrastructure, important assets

and systems is vital to national security, public

health and safety, the economy and citizens’ quality of life. The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate is the

primary DHS component responsible for coordinating critical infrastructure protection, including

vulnerability assessments, strategic planning

efforts, training and exercises.

Executive session participants emphasized that protecting critical infrastructure is the

shared responsibility of federal, state, local and

tribal government, as well as the private sector.

Unprecedented partnerships that support multijurisdictional, multidisciplinary efforts must be

encouraged at every level of government to

address key vulnerabilities across the nation.

These collaborations must include

• transportation systems,

• military assets, 

• tribal authorities,

• colleges and universities, and

• the private sector.

While this list is not exhaustive, these categories represent some of the most compelling needs

for partnerships to address the threats of terrorism.

Transportation Systems

Concern that the terrorist attacks on domestic and

international passenger systems in other countries

(bombings in London and Paris subways, the Tokyo

sarin gas attack, bus bombings in Israel, train

bombings in Moscow and Spain) will be repeated

in the United States has shaken the American public’s sense of security. To grasp the enormity of the

task, one only needs to consider that according to

the Department of Transportation’s Federal Transit

Administration (FTA), in one month, urban rail

transit moves more passengers than U.S. airlines

move in one year.33 Terrorist attacks and other disruptions to transportation systems can yield heavy

causalities, damage the economy and shut down

government and critical operations. 

“There is nobody that

knows critical infrastructure more than the

chief of police and streetlevel officers.”

—William Parrish, Liaison to

the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, Department

of Homeland Security

33 At the time of this writing, more information on the FTA can be found at www.fta.dot.gov. Through the FTA, the federal government provides financial assistance to develop new transit systems and improve, maintain and operate existing systems. It also oversees and provides federal funding for training and security efforts.
The Transportation Security Administration

(TSA) has regulatory authority and security

responsibility for all modes of transportation, and

works with the FTA and 10 other of its component

agencies to safeguard their respective infrastructures. Executive session participants discussed their

perception that TSA is being too aviation-centric

and less visible in port security and cargo protection

in their jurisdictions. They also recommended

making freight and passenger rail transportation

systems a priority. Finally, local and state session

participants called on TSA to clarify its overall

responsibilities and those of its component agencies as they relate to state and local law enforcement.

Executive session participants also recommended

that the DHS Science and Technology directorate

continue to work with transportation security

agencies across the country to provide effective

monitoring, screening and other devices that will

facilitate prevention, response and recovery efforts. 

One executive session participant indicated that some regional funding efforts, even UASI

grant programs, could be hard for urban rail transit

systems to access. Transportation system administrators need to be involved when government leaders and emergency management directors allocate

homeland security resources, particularly when a

transit system crosses jurisdiction and/or state

boundaries. 

Since prevention efforts will not always be

effective, local law enforcement must work with

DHS, transportation industry authorities and

other key players to plan and practice an effective

response to terrorist attacks on passenger and

shipping systems.34 While transportation officers

would most likely be the initial responders to a

critical incident on their system—whether a terrorist attack or an accident—officers from local

law enforcement and other first responders would

also be dispatched to secure the perimeter, preserve the crime scene and transport victims to

PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

26

“Before I joined DHS I’d

take the train from DC to

New York and look out the

window at the sights. After

I joined DHS and had an

appreciation for exactly

what critical infrastructure

is, I was able to see just

how many potential

targets there are on just

that short trip. I don’t think

most people have an

appreciation for how much

critical infrastructure is in

the communities where we

live.”

—John Chase, Chief of Staff,

Information Analysis and

Infrastructure Protection,

Department of Homeland

Security

34 For example, the Washington, DC Metropolitan Transit Authority (WMATA) is the second largest rail transit system in

the United States, with on average more than a half-million weekday riders. Many of these riders’ destinations are stations

located within or near potential terrorist targets. These targets are located within eight jurisdictions that are served by

approximately 25 law enforcement agencies. More information on the WMATA can be found at www.wmata.com/

about/metrofacts.pdf. In addition, in the event of a critical incident on the Metro transit systems, there is a high likelihood

that Amtrak police would also respond because they share equipment and jurisdiction with Metro Transit in several stations located in Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia. Many law enforcement agencies that serve WMATA are

developing a model that can be considered by other transportation systems around the country.
VOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY

27

nearby hospitals. Further, numerous federal agencies (the FBI, DHS, TSA, DOT) and several nonpolice government organizations (CDC, state and

local departments of public health) may also be

involved, particularly if the incident involves a biological or radiological attack. These many players

must plan and practice a coordinated response.

Some local law enforcement participants stated

that they participate in tabletop exercises and

cross-train with transit officers, but they encourage

collaboration that integrates all regional agencies

across disciplines and full-scale practice exercises. 

IMPROVED RAIL SECURITY THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS 

WITH HOMELAND SECURITY

by Jacqueline Litzinger, Commander of Infrastructure Protection, 

CSX Transportation

The infamous terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and subsequent threats have posed enormous challenges to the world’s security forces. Among these forces, the railroad industry recognized

that the ongoing threat of terrorism must be dealt with assertively. CSX Transportation, the largest

rail carrier in the eastern United States has played a leadership role in this war on terror.

CSX Transportation, in conjunction with the Association of American Railroads (AAR),

began working on a comprehensive security plan immediately following September 11 that would

help ensure the safety and security of the U.S. rail infrastructure, its personnel, the communities

through which it operates and the products being delivered to virtually every eastern community,

including vital military shipments to U.S. ports for transport overseas. 

CSX is promptly complying with all federal regulations concerning the shipment of hazardous

materials. Security plans are constantly being revised and amended to ensure all mandates are met or

exceeded. These measures include awareness training for all employees and a plan that addresses personnel security, unauthorized access countermeasures, en route safekeeping of hazardous materials

and a recordkeeping system that is updated often enough to reflect changing circumstances. 
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

28

Information Sharing

CSX employs a railroad police force of commissioned or certified officers with interstate authority

under 49 USC section 28101,35 who work very closely with numerous law enforcement agencies

throughout the rail network. CSX police and other railroad police departments share information

and conduct joint planning activities and operations through the International Association of

Chiefs of Police’s (IACP’s) railroad police section. Personnel also work closely with other first

responders by participating in various local domestic security task forces and intelligence groups. 

At the federal level there is a railroad industry representative serving on the FBI’s National Joint Terrorism Task Force to ensure the flow of vital information to the rail industry. There is

also a railroad industry representative serving at the AAR Operations Center, a 24-hour emergency

response center that acts as a link between the railroads and the national security intelligence community. CSX and other members of the rail industry rely heavily on timely, accurate intelligence

from numerous sources, including the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Transportation (DOT), IACP, DHS, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), FBI, CIA, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), etc. Although these entities contribute

information to the AAR Operations Center, they often share a direct relationship with CSX as well.

Classified information is received through secure communications. 

Special Units

CSX Transportation has further strengthened our rail infrastructure by creating a new Infrastructure Protection Unit (IPU). This unit combines the resources of the railroad’s police forces and hazardous materials professionals, aligning them to deal with the threat of terrorism. This

collaboration will strengthen CSX’s awareness and ability to respond to threats or attacks. 

CSX also created a highly specialized railroad-specific Rapid Response Team. This team is

composed of members within the police department. The team’s primary mission is to protect the

rail infrastructure and assets against terrorist activity. The members are strategically positioned

throughout the CSX rail network for quick response to an incident or deployment for a special security event. Extensive training in such anti-terrorism efforts as tactical and counter-intelligence, as

well as how to work with canine units, hazardous materials specialists and transportation specialists, make this team a highly prepared SWAT force. 

CSX Transportation collects information that could be related to possible international or

domestic terrorism. This information must be processed, analyzed, investigated and stored by the

IPU. Information concerning security plans, threat intelligence and major event planning is

35 State laws differ widely with regard to railroad police authority. Most states grant a special police commission

issued by the Governor. In some states, such as Florida, railroad police take the certification examination prior to

receiving their commission. USC 49, section 28101 allows railroad police who are employed by a rail carrier, and

certified or commissioned under the laws of a state, to enforce the laws of any jurisdiction in which the rail carrier

owns property. This is to protect employees, passengers and patrons of the rail carrier; property moving in interstate

or foreign commerce; and the personnel and equipment moving by rail that is vital to our nation’s defense. 
VOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY

29

disseminated by the IPU to enhance coordination among all relevant departments or agencies. The

IPU and the rapid response team members rely on quality information and make every effort to

contribute any knowledge they have that may be helpful to others. 

The IPU and special teams are also supported by improved surveillance mechanisms. The

CSX Transportation’s Police Communications Center receives and addresses an average of 14,000

emergency and non-emergency calls per month. A sophisticated “real-time” monitoring system

enables these communications personnel, as well as others working to keep the railroad safe and to

maintain a constant surveillance of certain critical infrastructure. The system has received acclaim

from both international and domestic security authorities. 

Partnerships

The keystone of CSX’s security effort is not the sophisticated monitoring systems, or even its comprehensive security plan, but rather the partnerships that CSX shares with homeland security professionals, including local and state law enforcement agencies. The war on terror is one that must

be waged in a concerted and coordinated effort among all law enforcement, security, military and

critical infrastructure industry partners. CSX Transportation has benefited from and contributed to

these essential collaborations. By working jointly with the TSA, security of cargo is enhanced. By

working with the U.S. Coast Guard and the nation’s ports served by CSX Transportation, we are

strengthening and protecting our bridges, waterway accesses and rail lines entering the ports. CSX

is also partnering with U.S. Customs to better secure the shipment of cargo in transit from foreign

shores through an agreement known as Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), a

joint government-business initiative to strengthen overall supply chain and border security.

After September 11, 2001 many communities began performing “vulnerability assessments” to determine the risk they face from terrorists who may be operating virtually anywhere.

CSX Transportation recognized that there was a need for an adequate “rail vulnerability assessment

tool” to allow communities to make informed and realistic evaluations of railroad facilities. CSX

recognizes that the day has long passed when the railroad was a central part of every American’s

life, when railroads were as familiar and well understood as the Internet is today. One of the tools

that the IPU developed while working with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and Florida’s Orange County Sheriff’s Office Homeland Security Team was a rail appendix for the Homeland Security Comprehensive Assessment Model (HLS-CAM).36 This is just one example of how

36 The HLS-CAM was developed by the National Domestic Preparedness Coalition Incorporated (NDCPI). NDCPI

is a non-profit, public/private partnership, whose leadership includes the Orange County Sheriff’s Office, Orange

County, Florida, West Virginia University School of Medicine and the West Virginia National Guard. NDCPI has

entered into an agreement with Datamaxx Professional Services, Inc. (DPS) to provide training on the NDPCI

Homeland Security Comprehensive Assessment Model (HLS-CAM). Under this agreement, DPS will offer nationwide training to public safety officials and private corporations in the application of the HLS-CAM. The HLS-CAM

is a methodology to systematically rank the critical infrastructures, facilities and events of a chosen community,

determine the vulnerabilities of each ranked item and provide the framework for developing a comprehensive plan

to address those vulnerabilities. Agencies and corporations interested in registering for HLS-CAM Training Seminars

can e-mail hlstraining@datamaxx.com or visit the DPS website at www.datamaxx.com.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

30

Working with the Military to Protect Civilians 

Executive session participants discussed the

importance of collaborating with the military to

secure installations and to apply defense technology or other resources, as appropriate, to law

enforcement operations. The BioNet program for

example—a cooperative program between the

DHS and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency

(DTRA)—addresses the critical issues surrounding

the detection and response to biochemical attacks,

and attempts to improve upon consequence management capabilities and military-civilian coordination through coordinated plans and a variety of

standards of practice. BioNet helps the Defense

Department and DHS maintain interoperable systems and manage such resources as monitoring

and detection technologies, personnel and triage

equipment.37 If a biochemical incident occurs,

BioNet will help direct resources as local law

enforcement responds. Though the posse comitatus limits military involvement in domestic law

enforcement actions, the military can serve as a

resource for critical infrastructure protection and

security for high-threat target areas such as military installations and their surrounding communities. Executive session participants recommended

that members of the armed forces should be

included in training and preparedness for localized

consequence management efforts.38

Tribal Issues 

Tribal agencies often feel they are overlooked in

partnerships with DHS and other federal, state and

local agencies. Executive session participants

emphasized the importance of DHS efforts to

include tribal law enforcement in preparing for and

responding to a terrorist attack. To that end, the

Border Patrol is working with local tribal law

comprehensive partnerships with homeland security forces are helping to improve our nation’s 

safety.

Other partnerships feature training and resource sharing. CSX Transportation has provided training for many years and continues to educate emergency responders about the unique nature

of the railroad operating environment and the equipment commonly used. The Railroad Security

Awareness and Operations Course provides a hands-on training opportunity for fire department,

law enforcement and emergency management personnel to acquaint themselves with railroad-specific issues before an incident occurs. 

The task of protecting America’s industrial infrastructure is a daunting challenge to all of us.

With strong partnerships such as those mentioned here, CSX is one step closer to meeting our goal. 

37 More information on the BioNet program can be found at http://bionet.calit2.net/project.php. 38 As an aside, local law enforcement participants also emphasized that many of their employees are in the military reserve

and have been or may be called up for duty overseas. Law enforcement agencies, in cooperation with DHS and the military,

need to better determine how to assist agencies that are struggling with limited resources while these positions are vacant,

particularly during periods of heightened alert when personnel are stretched to the limit trying to conduct both crime- and

terrorism-prevention duties. Local law enforcement is committed to supporting agency personnel on active duty and their

families, as well as working to best reintegrate these men and women when they return to work.
VOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY

31

enforcement to protect tribal lands from unlawful

entry along the more than 250 miles of borders

adjacent to tribal lands.39 Tribal police expressed a

need for an active representative on the relevant

JTTFs. They are eager to participate in partnerships with state, local and federal law enforcement

agencies, as well as with DHS. Executive session

participants discussed coordination issues between

tribal government and law enforcement that must

be addressed. Local agencies too must work with

tribal governments to encourage tribal involvement in homeland security efforts. 

Colleges and Universities 

After September 11, many universities have made

great strides in working with local, state and federal agencies in their region to address potential terrorist threats. The university representative at the

session indicated that colleagues in college and

university security often have a close working relationship with the local JTTF and an FBI Field

Office is assigned to each university for specific

investigations on each campus. DHS encourages

colleges and universities to learn more about the

resources available to assist them in preparing for

and responding to a critical incident, including

FEMA’s Disaster Resistant University (DRU) program.40 DHS also funds the development of training and resource materials at the nation’s higher

learning institutions to be disseminated and used

nationwide.41 The Homeland Security Centers of

Excellence Office of University Programs42 is also

working with the academic community to create

39 The Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson, Directorate of Border and Transportation Security, Department of Homeland Security gave this statement before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, on June

25, 2003.

40 FEMA has released a report, Building a Disaster-Resistant University, to help colleges and universities identify hazards,

assess risks and plan mitigation strategies. For more information on the DRU program, see DHS Today, November 1, 2004. 41 For example, with funding from the Office of Domestic Preparedness, the Louisiana State University Agriculture and

Mechanical College and the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) jointly developed an eight-hour Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Awareness curriculum. This free training course is designed for all

campus public safety personnel who could respond to a WMD incident. The training includes WMD properties, effects and

methods of delivery or dispersal; decontamination procedures and other personal safety procedures; and protection for environment and property. Participants receive a certificate of attendance and documentation for Continuing Education Units.

42 At this writing, more information on the Office of University Programs can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/

display?content=3013. 

“DHS needs to include

Tribal law enforcement in

all their strategies for

several reasons, including

the fact that Tribal Police

protect miles of

international borders.

There must be an education

and awareness of Tribal

Police’s contributions and

the need to enhance our

capabilities. Limitations

must be overcome to

ensure our nation’s safety

is not jeopardized,

including the reality that

close to half of Tribal Police

agencies do not have

access to NCIC or

jurisdictional authority in

cases involving nonIndians.”

—Chief Ed Reina, YavapaiPrescott Tribal Police
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

32

learning and research environments to study areas

critical to homeland security by becoming centers

of multidisciplinary research.

Executive session participants recognized

that university security personnel are valuable partners in homeland security and in safeguarding the

confidentiality and privacy interests of students and

faculty. They offer critical research and training

resources, assistance for translations and cultural

diversity awareness as well.43 

Working with Private Sector Entities 

The private sector is on the front line of homeland

security efforts and is crucial to identifying and

locating terrorists as well as disrupting terrorist

networks. According to DHS, the private sector also

oversees approximately 85 percent of our nation’s

critical infrastructure.44 Its security personnel are

integral partners in local law enforcement efforts to

protect vulnerable targets. It is the guardian of

many critical systems and dangerous materials.

The private sector and its security forces also provide information essential to law enforcement’s

counterterrorism efforts. The benefits of collaboration are evident, but tools that would allow the private sector and the intelligence community to share

information more easily while addressing privacy

concerns are still being developed and enhanced.

(Information sharing issues among law enforcement at all levels of government are addressed in

Chapter Five.)

Department of Homeland Security Information Network. To facilitate information sharing,

the Department of Homeland Security Information

Network (HSIN) was launched in February 2004 as

a counterterrorism communication mechanism

that connects 50 states, five territories, Washington, D.C. and 50 major urban areas to strengthen

the exchange of threat information. This communication system enables private sector representatives, first responders and local officials to share

sensitive-but-unclassified data with each other

through the secure network.

At the end of June 2004, after the 50 states

were connected by HSIN, DHS (in partnership with

the private sector and the FBI) launched the Homeland Security Information Network-Critical Infrastructure (HSIN-CI) Pilot Program45 in Dallas,

Texas, modeled after the FBI Dallas Emergency

Response Network. The pilot program includes private security and expands the reach of the HSIN

program to critical infrastructure owners and operators in a variety of industries and locations. At the

time of this writing, similar DHS programs exist in

Seattle, Indianapolis and Atlanta. HSIN-CI is governed and administered by local experts from the

private and public sector with the support of DHS

Regional Coordinators. The four pilot areas formed

Infrastructure Advisory Panels to help administer

and govern the program, manage information sharing and validate the program applications. As part

of the HSIN-CI pilot program, more than 25,000

network members can access unclassified sectorspecific information and alert notifications 24

hours a day. The FBI Tips Program works with the

HSIN pilot cities by relaying the information it

receives from citizens about suspicious activities.

Information shared with DHS’s Homeland Security

43 See Davies, Heather J. and Gerard R. Murphy. March 2004. Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: The Strategies for

Local Law Enforcement Series, Vol. 2: Working with Diverse Communities. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum. 44 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/sect6.html. 45 At this writing, more information on the HSIN-CI Pilot Program can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?

content=3748.
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Operations Center (HSOC) is also sent to the

HSIN-CI network to deliver targeted alerts and notifications in real-time to local authorities.46 The pilot

programs were scheduled to be evaluated at the end

of 2004 to determine reliability for other cities. 

Working with Building Staff. In some

localities, local law enforcement is working with

building workers, including apartment doormen,

maintenance workers and building owners. These

individuals who staff reception areas, hail taxis,

open doors, fix appliances and manage rents can

identify suspicious activity for law enforcement.

These individuals must be aware of the threat of

and response to suspicious packages, for example.

They can also assist with evacuation plans and

other efforts to support law enforcement.

For example, in New York City, an off-duty

police detective has taught a class to the building

workers’ union.47 Each building worker’s employer

pays $100 for each employee to attend. The building owners’ greatest incentive is to develop a safer

building with trained staff. The building workers

learn, for instance, the potential for an exterminator’s canister to be used for spraying chemical

agents, and appropriate precautionary steps. 

Unfortunately, it is estimated that it took longer

than a year to train 28,000 residential building

workers in New York City. Classes were accelerated

for workers near Madison Square Garden because of

the Republication National Convention held at the

end of August 2004. A one million dollar training

fund created by a contract between the union and

real estate management companies, who represent

owners and renters, paid for the classes. 

Working with Highway and Delivery Personnel. Millions of miles of highways, and a vast

number of bridges, tunnels and overpasses are protected by the transportation system personnel who

drive and repair them everyday. Commercial truck

and bus drivers, school bus drivers, highway maintenance crews, bridge and tunnel toll collectors and

others report suspicious activity to local law 

enforcement. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within DHS augments these efforts

through the Highway Watch48 program, which is

administered by the American Trucking Association

(ATA). This cooperative agreement with ATA trains

professionals to identify and report safety and security concerns. The program also provides guidance on

how transportation professionals should respond if

they or their cargo are the target of terrorist attacks,

as well as how to share valuable information with

DHS. Members of the Highway Watch program

receive alerts from the TSA and information that can

help prevent terrorist activity, communicate road

safety concerns and provide aid in crisis situations.49

TSA encourages local law enforcement to

partner with state trucking associations and others

in the program. Executive session participants also

lauded efforts by local law enforcement to apply

46 The HSIN-CI network does not require additional hardware or software for information to be communicated from the

HSOC to federal, state or local participants. If information needs to be delivered, devices such as wired and wireless telephones, email, fax and pagers are used. 

47 For an example of how New York City is working with doormen, see Moore, Martha T. “Doormen Out Front in the War

on Terrorism,” USA Today, July 11, 2004. 48 At this writing, more information about the Highway Watch Program can be found at http://www.highwaywatch.com/.

For an example of how truck drivers are participating in Alabama, see MacDonald, Ginny. “Truck drivers looking for trouble, reporting it.” The Birmingham News. July 12, 2004. 49 The Highway Watch program links transportation professionals with first responders, including law enforcement, and the

intelligence community via TSA’s Transportation Security Coordination Center (TSCC) in Virginia. A truck driver who witnesses a suspicious event can call the National Highway Watch Call Center, which will in turn immediately alert the TSCC.

Local and national response teams are then alerted if necessary.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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the same principles in partnering with delivery

personnel, including food and mail delivery as well

as contractors, private utilities or communications

workers and others in their localities. Executive

session participants urged program participants to

include procedures that protect the civil liberties

and privacy of the community it serves. 

Local Policing Concerns about Roles

and Responsibilities

Much can be accomplished through the types of

collaborations described in this chapter, collaborations that engage federal, state, local and tribal law

enforcement, as well as those with other disciplines, the community, the private sector and

many other stakeholders. These partnerships and

shared resources help address personnel shortages

and the need for additional assets as local law

enforcement agencies assume their relatively new

roles and responsibilities in counterterrorism

while maintaining crime control efforts.50

Several large-city law enforcement executives indicated that they alone spend approximately 20 percent of their time focused on terrorism

preparedness. These duties have topped already

full schedules that sagged from the weight of

crime-control problems before September 11. The

impact can be even greater on others in the organization. Chief executives have personnel tasked

with monitoring, analyzing and recommending

action—usually in coordination with JTTFs or area

counterterrorism networks. Executives must take

appropriate preparedness steps and assign personnel to handle homeland security—whether it is

patrolling high-risk targets, training staff, conducting exercises, establishing information networks,

appointing specialized personnel to intelligence

and planning or countless other tasks. Some of

these duties are new to agencies and they are

scrambling to develop competencies and networks,

while they try to share other duties with outside

agencies better positioned to provide perspective

and expertise.

Local executives must report to their local

governing authority (such as the city council) on

how resources are being allocated and justify

increases in spending, such as the reasons for

police funds being spent for counterterrorism

efforts instead of handling local crimes. As

described in the chapters on special events, local

50 In 2002, the RAND Corporation conducted a study to assess state and local law enforcement agencies’ current preparedness for terrorism. The RAND Corporation report presents the results of the 2002 survey for state and local law

enforcement agencies conducted one year after the September 11 attacks and prior to the establishment of DHS. See Davis,

Lois M., K. Jack Riley, Greg Ridgeway, Jennifer E. Pace, Sarah K. Cotton, Paul Steinberg, Kelly Damphousse, and Brent L.

Smith. 2004. When Terrorism Hits Home: How Prepared Are State and Local Law Enforcement? Rand Corporation, Prepared for the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism and the Office for Domestic Preparedness, U.S.

Department of Homeland Security. The document can be found at http://www.rand.org.

Also, see Foster, Chad and Gary Cordner. 2004. The Impact of Terrorism on State Law Enforcement: Adjusting to New Roles

and Changing Conditions. Council of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky University (through support from the

National Institute of Justice). The document can be found at http://www.csg.org.

“The focus for local law

enforcement chief

executives still has to be on

local policing issues. We’re

losing citizens everyday in

this country to homicides,

gangs and other crimes.”

—Chief Charles Ramsey,

Washington (DC)

Metropolitan Police

Department
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law enforcement can also expect to expend overtime and other resources when there are major

community events or threat levels rise. And even

some of the crimes that were previously investigated with the help of federal partners now fall primarily to local law enforcement. Federal law

enforcement, such as the FBI, also has had to

reprioritize and has been spending more resources

on terrorism issues than on bank robberies and

drug- and gang-related crime at the time of the 

session. With shrinking budgets, many executive

session participants felt that the focus away from

traditional crimes downplays the connections they

believe the drug networks and other crimes may

have to financing terrorist acts. Criminal intelligence work on these and other offenses also can be

very useful in identifying threats and preventing

terrorist attacks. 

Many executive session participants stated that, though terrorism prevention and preparedness is critical, members of their

communities are dying everyday from gang- and

drug-related crimes, domestic violence and other

offenses. These leaders emphasized that they cannot abandon their commitment to the public to

address safety issues and other problems in favor

of greater vigilance under a constant and vague

terrorist threat. Some executive session participants stated further that the terrorist threats they

are most worried about might originate from ecoterrorism factions, domestic anti-government

groups or political extremists rather than international terrorists. Participants’ perspectives varied

only slightly in areas that are very target-rich.

There was a consensus on this: Local law enforcement must be concerned about terrorism of any

kind, but not at the expense of abandoning their

communities to crime and violence. 

To make the most of existing resources

and expertise, local law enforcement has relied

heavily on DHS, the FBI and other federal agencies to address many homeland security issues,

particularly the intelligence function. Local police

look to federal partners for more specific threat

information. An executive session participant

indicated that when law enforcement agency personnel are already on “high alert” it is difficult for

them to intensify their efforts further without

more detailed information from federal partners.

He and his colleagues are looking to DHS and

other federal agencies to provide threat information that is area-specific and indicates which targets or sectors are most likely to be hit.51 DHS

representatives agreed on this goal but also asked

that their colleagues in law enforcement be aware

that this type of information just may not be within their grasp at the time and that they should be

assured that if it becomes available, area chiefs

will be immediately informed of threats in their

jurisdiction.

Local Law Enforcement as Full Partners

Executive session participants stated that the federal government should be more focused on protecting the homeland against terrorism by building

on local policing efforts. The U.S. Department of

Justice Community Oriented Policing Services has

opened networks between police and the public

that encourage information sharing that could help

federal agencies detect terrorists. Local policing

efforts can disrupt financial networks and help

51 After the session, DHS did this for New York City, Newark, New Jersey and Washington, D.C. financial districts. At this

writing, more information can be found at http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/08/02/terror.threat/.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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identify suspicious behavior by terrorists living in

their communities. Executive session participants

agreed that there must be stronger federal-local

relations and better information sharing.

Local law enforcement has increasingly

reported successful relations with their FBI Field

Offices over the years, but at the time of this executive session understandably had little experience

with DHS yet. Participants called for a more

regional DHS structure that would foster the types

of relationships needed outside Washington. Working together on common problems can yield longterm benefits for terrorism preparedness. For

example, investigators in the Metropolitan (DC)

Police Department worked with the FBI in years

prior to September 11 to discuss the homicide

problem in the city. As a result, the FBI sent agents

to assist the department’s law enforcement investigators in their work. These day-to-day partnerships in crime fighting resulted in improvements

in communication between the two agencies that

carried over into terrorism preparedness efforts.

The terrorist attacks on the Pentagon also brought

together regional agencies in new ways that could

be drawn on again. So, too, did lessons learned

from the 2002 D.C.-area sniper investigation

result in local, state and federal law enforcement

agencies’ having better-organized communication

systems, data-sharing mechanisms, large crimescene processing protocols and improved methods

for addressing community fear. The unprecedented

collaborations in the D.C. area have better prepared law enforcement agencies at all levels of government to work even more effectively if there is

another terrorist attack. Their success was predicated on the principles all participants understood:

every law enforcement agency brings expertise and

experience to the table that is to be valued and

shared. There is no room for turf battles and local

law enforcement must be seen as a full partner in

collaborative efforts.

Executive session participants are looking

to DHS to recognize the unique role law enforcement has in prevention. Locals need significant

support (e.g., resources, funding and plans) from

the federal government to assist them in taking

appropriate steps when the threat levels go up. Participants discussed that dual use for grants is a step

in the right direction, but what is needed is a fundamental shift in recognizing how investigations

in crime-fighting and criminal intelligence can

advance homeland security. There must also be

recognition that local law enforcement has developed the kind of ties with the community that will

yield information of value to federal agencies

tasked with putting all the pieces of information

together to yield the big picture and the specific

threat intelligence everyone is seeking. As discussed

more fully in Chapter Five, local law enforcement

also looks to DHS to be more fully integrated into

the flow of information that is shared, enhanced,

analyzed and returned to the user.

“We in local law

enforcement can be

effective force multipliers.

We searched every public

storage facility in two days

when we received a federal

alert. We just need to be in

the loop.” 

—Chief Charlie T. Deane,

Prince William County (VA)

Police Department
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37

Community Policing and Counterterrorism

Efforts

Since the early 1980s, local law enforcement has

worked hard to establish community-oriented and

problem-solving policing across the country. Jurisdictions have widely adopted a proactive policing

philosophy that draws on police-citizen partnerships to address the underlying problems that affect

citizens’ quality of life and generate repeat calls for

police service. Executive session participants agreed

that local law enforcement agencies committed to a

community-policing philosophy will be more effective in working collaboratively to prevent terrorism

prevention and in garnering public support.52

Session participants advocated for homeland security agencies to adopt a community problem-solving policing orientation that would help

reconcile and better define the local law enforcement role in all public safety matters. Some executive session participants recommended the use of

effective problem-solving tools such as the SARA

model—which advocates that individuals scan all

available resources to better define the underlying

causes of problems, analyze all available information (including citizen and other stakeholder

input), develop responses to the problems and

assess the success of the implementation efforts—

to confront the challenges law enforcement faces

in addressing the threat of terrorism.53

Among its many benefits, community-oriented policing and problem solving assist law

enforcement in gathering information, enlisting

citizen cooperation and dealing with fear in the

community. The focus of such community policing efforts rests properly with the street-level officers—the men and women most likely to detect

suspicious or criminal activity. Street-level officers

engaged in community policing can identify potential terrorist targets and activity in their regular

patrol area. The potential target may be a transit

system hub, a warehouse that stores chemicals or

high-level government officials’ residences. The

officer may well have a relationship with the owners and can work on “target-hardening” through

environmental design or provide other guidance.

With an established trust-based relationship, facility owners, business leaders and residents will be

more likely to bring suspicious behavior to the officer’s attention. 

Accordingly, session participants expressed

an ongoing need for more training for officers on

what to look for, protocols for how to report potential terrorist activity and mechanisms to get information back down to officers. Participants also

expressed concern that the positive effects of community policing on officer morale and effectiveness

are being challenged by the fatigue, considerable

overtime, postponed leave and stress associated

52 Community policing training is available to state and local law enforcement through the U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services’ (COPS) Regional Community Policing Institutes (RCPIs). The COPS

Office established a network of RCPIs to provide comprehensive and innovative community policing education, training and

technical assistance to agencies and individuals throughout the nation. The RCPIs develop cutting-edge curricula on emerging law enforcement issues to challenge and improve traditional training and to advance community policing. More information can be found at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

In addition, the COPS Office funds the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing (POP Center), which produces the ProblemOriented Guides for Police publication series (POP Guides). Resources and publications are available through the POP Center’s website at www.popcenter.org that cover a wide range of information on the problem-solving process, POP projects and

problem types. 

53 For more information on the SARA model, see Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing Crime and Disorder Through

Problem-Solving Partnerships available through the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. PERF’s community policing and problem solving resources can be found at www.policeforum.org.
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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with long-term efforts to combat terrorism.54 DHS

participants agreed that more must be done to help

officers and that they have many efforts in development along those lines. DHS recognizes that

local law enforcement officers have had extensive

experience with developing partnerships with

other government, civic and stakeholder groups to

assess jurisdiction needs and priorities. The

essence of homeland security is the kind of collaboration community policing encourages across disciplines and levels of government.

Community policing encourages law

enforcement’s use of outside resources. Many

agencies, for example, rely on volunteers to support agency efforts. Volunteers help free officers

from administrative tasks, allowing sworn personnel

more time to be more proactive and preventionoriented. Volunteers can also contribute special

expertise and perspectives. Executive session participants suggested that DHS and law enforcement

make better use of citizen volunteers, neighborhood watches, police auxiliaries and other groups

as critical partners in police efforts. Retired military personnel and others with experience in technologies and approaches that apply to both

traditional crimes and terrorism will be tremendously valued, as well as the many individuals who

assist police in other ways.

The integration of terrorism preparedness

and community policing is already reflected in

some DHS programs set in motion during its first

year. With support from FEMA, law enforcement

can help organize Community Emergency

Response Teams (CERTs) to help specially trained

citizens be better prepared to respond to emergency

situations and assist other members of the community.55 CERT staff educates citizens about disaster preparedness and trains them in basic response

skills, such as fire safety, search and rescue and

field medical operations. The program includes 20

hours of classroom and hands-on instruction.

CERT members can give critical support to first

responders, provide immediate assistance to victims and organize others to assist at a disaster site. 

CERT is a component of the DHS Citizens

Corp,56 designed to increase citizen involvement

in security through personal preparedness, training

and volunteer programs. At the time of this writing, the Citizen Corps program was composed of

“Street-level officers are

not at the bottom when we

talk about bottom-up

information flows and they

aren’t privates or foot

soldiers; they are

professionals and the ones

best positioned to find a

terrorist living in the

community if they have the

means to give and get

information effectively.”

—Chief Thomas D.

McCarthy, Fayetteville (NC)

Police Department

54 For an example of how the stress and fatigue during a high alert affects police officers, see Horwitz, Sari. “Working on

high alert strains cops.” Washington Post, Sunday, November 21, 2004. At this writing, the article can be found at

http://www.detnews.com/2004/nation/0411/22/A07-11260.htm.

55 Information on CERT can be found at http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/CERT/. 56 The Citizen Corps website (www.citizencorps.gov) provides more information about establishing CERT and other volunteer public safety programs.
VOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY

39

more than 1,300 active county and local councils

from all 50 states and three U.S. territories. These

councils bring together first responders with volunteers, the private sector, elected leadership and

other stakeholders. Executive session participants

recommended localities plan exercises with members of CERT. An executive session participant

indicated that the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness intends

to include CERT members in the Top Officials

(TOPOFF) 3 National Exercises scheduled for

spring 2005. 

THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN FIGHTING TERROR

by Chief Thomas D. McCarthy, Fayetteville (NC) Police Department

The fight against terror is one of the greatest operational challenges faced by American law enforcement. While it is an awesome responsibility, the police have clearly demonstrated they are up to

the task. A combination of relatively recent reforms—effective community policing, enhanced technology and greater accountability—has helped law enforcement reduce crime significantly throughout the United States. A successful strategy against terror will be realized if local police continue to

enhance the skills and relationships that have made the fight against traditional crime so effective.

Local police must also develop partnerships with state and federal law enforcement agencies unlike any that have existed in American history. The traditional barriers to the free flow of

criminal intelligence among law enforcement agencies must be breached. The nation is demanding

a far greater level of teamwork and far less parochialism than has previously been achieved among

law enforcement at all levels of government. 

The federal, state and local partnership against terror is in its infancy. There have certainly been growing pains. The early intelligence responses to possible threats of terror were often too

vague to have local operational value. At other times, local police learned about terrorist threats

from the media before notification from their federal partners. Despite early systemic glitches, there

is cause for Americans to be optimistic. In its first year, the Department of Homeland Security has

made significant strides in putting systems in place that swiftly provide law enforcement and citizens critical public safety information. The FBI, building on its success with joint terrorism task

forces, has taken the lead in working with local and state police to effectively identify and investigate those who would commit terror within our communities. Still, there is much that remains to

be done if local police are to become effective partners in the war against terror.
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The Local Police 

During the past two decades, the police have developed strong relationships with local community

members interested in fighting crime. Working as partners, the community and the police have

become experts in identifying and solving crime problems. The result has been a measurable reduction in the fear of crime and in crime itself. Those same collaborations can prove to be effective in

the fight against terror.

There are myriad resources and techniques that can further these coordinated efforts.

Operational analysis, once a vague concept in local policing, is now a tool within many municipal

and county police agencies. Technology, employed by a better-educated and trained cadre of employees, has provided the police with the ability to geographically identify crime trends, hot spots and

even criminals. The result has been a better-informed community, increased police performance

and, according to the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, a decrease in reported crime.

In the 1970s, Dr. Herman Goldstein, the father of problem-oriented policing, challenged

the manner in which the United States provided police services. While there was initial resistance

to Goldstein’s vision of problem solving, a small group of police leaders found value in his thesis.

Through their persistence and commitment, policing in the 21st century is much different than it

was 25 years ago. Today’s officers are more than rapid responders to calls for service. They are now

part of the communities they serve. They have demonstrated the ability to think systemically, identifying the sources of and solutions to underlying neighborhood problems. Local police officers, in

conjunction with concerned and informed members of communities throughout the nation, have

shown that thoughtful problem solving and increased operational accountability can reduce crime.

It is on that solid foundation that the local police role in counterterrorism should be built.

Federal Agencies

The leaders of the FBI and DHS openly recognize that if they are going to defeat terrorism, they

must function as a team. While the FBI will remain the federal agency directly responsible for investigating and arresting terrorists, its effectiveness is enhanced by DHS’s assistance in analyzing and

distributing intelligence information. 

Though operational for little more than one year at this writing, DHS’s successes have been

impressive. The agency’s leadership clearly comprehend that true homeland security can only be

realized if local, state and tribal law enforcement are directly involved. That involvement requires

investments in intelligence sharing, training and equipment. To adequately prepare the police it will

require resources from both inside and outside of DHS.

The FBI has created numerous successful joint terrorism task forces. The task forces have

had a positive impact on breaking down some of the historical barriers between federal and local

law enforcement. Federal and local officers are working cases together everyday, building a level of
VOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY

41

trust and respect that could never have been mandated. These task forces should be expanded

throughout the United States. 

For community policing to really contribute to law enforcement counterterrorism efforts,

the following should be considered: 

• Technological advances such as a direct link between terrorist databases and the National

Crime Information Center (NCIC) for instance, should be coupled with a national automated

fingerprint identification system using hand-held wireless technologies in order to get local

law enforcement more involved. A system such as this might result in increased apprehensions and community safety. 

• Community members and police should meet to discuss what suspicious activity looks like.

Dialogues should focus on indicators such as suspicious packages on mass transit systems

and dispel notions of neighbors spying on neighbors.

• There is a need to develop best practices for community reporting on suspicious activity like

911 or alternative systems. And police need to continue to build bonds of trust with the

immigrant and minority communities who might be suspicious of cooperating with law

enforcement.

• Federal law enforcement should consider conducting interviews with community members

jointly or in cooperation with local law enforcement officers. 

• Merging community policing principles with counterterrorism investigation techniques builds

on the existing partnerships and expertise of local law enforcement—they know and are best

equipped to communicate with and understand the community members, heads of religious

organizations, business leaders, and others in their jurisdictions. 

The Training Challenge

Federal responsibility should also include continuous, up-to-date counterterrorism training for

state, local and tribal officers. The FBI has proven to be an outstanding provider and developer of

local law enforcement training, but the vast number of officers to be trained requires additional

resources. Fortunately a logical forum is already available.

DHS and the FBI could partner with the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services’

27 regional community policing training institutes located throughout the United States. Each of

these institutes has qualified staff with significant experience in providing various forms of quality

training to local officers. Providing the institutes with adequate funding and appropriate training

materials would be a cost-effective way of quickly training thousands of local police officers on the

best practices for preventing and fighting terrorism.
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CONCLUSION

The lessons learned from the terrorist attacks in

the United States could not be clearer: Any

attempt to secure the nation will be dependent on

law enforcement’s ability to coordinate not only

among the federal, state, local and tribal levels of

enforcement, but also with all agencies in a region

that have a stake in the prevention of and response

to terrorism. This presents not only the challenges

of coordination and interoperability among first

responders (law enforcement, EMS, fire and others), but also across disciplines that include universities, private industry, business owners,

military base personnel, public health, citizens and

many others. Because state homeland security

authorities and local agencies have different structures, resources and strategies for addressing their

relatively new homeland security functions, these

are formidable tasks.

Local law enforcement is struggling with its

new role and responsibilities in handling counterterrorism issues while maintaining its crime prevention

and control duties. As budgets for traditional crime

control have been tightened, law enforcement faces

significant increases in the type and volume of service it must provide to keep citizens safe from violence and from a vague, ongoing terrorist threat.

Local law enforcement is working to be included in

state homeland security plans and competing for

funds with other first responders, all while developing or coordinating new homeland security efforts

such as creating intelligence functions that will aid

in terrorism prevention.

Executive session participants believe that

the most valued DHS programs are those that

embrace the principles of community policing,

including the recognition of the unique position of

local law enforcement to form the partnerships

needed at the local level to conduct needs assessments and implement responses that will both

generate and make use of information on crime

and terrorism. The types of programs and partnerships described in this chapter are the beginning of

what is needed most: regional and collaborative

efforts that will yield best practices that can be

replicated nationwide.

Conclusion

The prevention of terrorism in America has created unprecedented demands on local police. Success will require an effective partnership among federal, state, tribal and local law enforcement. It

will also require support for enhancing the community problem-solving skills that have worked so

well for reducing violent crime over the past two decades. Those who died on that terrible day in

September 2001, and those who have suffered so grievously, will be honored as law enforcement

rises to each new challenge. It is up to the leaders in American policing to ensure that the principles of community policing are not forgotten along the way.
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Several of the participating local and state law

enforcement professionals have worked with DHS

agencies to implement operational plans for securing national events and conventions. Their experiences, described below, reveal the value of DHS

partnerships and some of the issues or challenges

they have faced in integrating federal assets. This

chapter also reviews the relevance of the National

Incident Management System (NIMS) and how it

may be implemented by local first responders and

emergency managers to detect, deter and mitigate

threats. 

This chapter gives a brief overview of participants’ concerns about the training and

resources needed to respond to terrorist threat

warnings and advisories, including the need for

more high-quality training for street-level officers.

Those concerns are tied, in large part, to reductions in traditional anticrime funding for local law

enforcement and to the difficulties participants

perceive in DHS grant programs not reaching law

enforcement quickly and in response to their

greatest needs. DHS efforts to address those concerns are included as well.

National Special Security Events

In May 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62), which in part

included a classified document dealing with the

coordination of federal counterterrorism assets 

for events of national interest that are deemed

“National Special Security Events (NSSEs).”57 The

C HAPTER F OUR

DHS RESOURCES, TRAINING AND GRANTS

F

AR TOO MANY RESOURCES AND TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES ARE OFFERED THROUGH

DHS and its component agencies to review them all here, and more are

continually being added or revised. Many of these assets were catalogued

in Chapter Two. What follows is a general discussion of how those many assets

and others are integrated and applied at the local level. This chapter outlines the

issues raised by executive session participants on their needs and their experiences with accessing DHS assistance, training and grants.

57 More information on National Security Special Events can be found at http://www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml and the

DHS fact sheet at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0207.xml.

There are only a few NSSE events every year. For events that do not meet NSSE standards, DHS’s Operations Integration

Staff (I-STAFF) established an Interagency Special Events Working Group (SEWG) to develop federal consolidated security

plans. This new system categorizes events into Levels I, II, III and IV, which corresponds with the internal FBI Special Events

Readiness List (SERL). The factors that contribute to the level designation include federal participation, location of event,

available threat assessment, state and local resources available and others. DHS will publish a Special Event Standard Operation Procedure in 2005. 
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES

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designation of a NSSE allows the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), the lead agency for designing and

implementing the operational security plan, to

access ample resources and ensure public safety by

forming partnerships with other federal, state and

local law enforcement and other security and public safety agencies. Local law enforcement agencies

must work with their governor to request this NSSE

designation. As mentioned above, a governor can

ask that an event be considered a NSSE with a formal request from the governor to the Secretary of

DHS. The request will then be forwarded to the

NSSE working group, comprised of representatives

from the USSS, FBI and FEMA. The working group

gathers facts and makes a recommendation to the

Secretary, who makes the final decision.

A number of factors are considered when

designating a NSSE. First, the USSS determines

how many dignitaries are expected to attend the

event. Any event that may be attended by government officials or foreign dignitaries may create an

independent federal interest in ensuring safety and

increasing resources. Second, the size of the event

may increase the need for additional security

measures. Large events may draw the attention of

terrorists or other criminals, increasing the attractiveness of the forum as a target for employing

weapons of mass destruction. Third, the significance of the event may be historical, political

and/or symbolic, which may also heighten concern

about terrorist acts or other criminal activity. 

In 2004, DHS had designated only a few

events as NSSEs. Of these, the session participants

focused on events in their own jurisdictions,

including the Democratic National and Republication National Conventions and the G-8 Sea Island

Summit. These events were good examples of

effective coordination and cooperation among federal, state and local homeland security and law

enforcement resources. The DHS and its many

component agencies have provided tremendous

support to local law enforcement charged with

ensuring the safety of the masses who gather for

these types of large events in their cities. The following event descriptions are provided simply to

demonstrate the range of resources DHS can garner to help prevent terrorist acts.

Democratic and Republican National

Conventions

DHS worked with local, state and other federal

agencies to provide public safety at the Democratic National Convention at Boston’s Fleet Center

located at the city center above train and subway

stations. DHS also partnered with the New York

City Police Department (NYPD) and other agencies to prepare for the Republication National Convention. DHS efforts were similar for both

conventions. The USSS was instrumental in

assisting both cities with securing the convention

by serving as a liaison to all DHS component agencies and developing an overall security plan that

“I thought about sending a

request for our event to be

a National Special Security

Event (NSSE), but the

federal agencies already

were providing such

seamless support, I didn’t

see the need.”

—Chief Bernard Melekian,

Pasadena (CA) Police

Department
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45

drew on all relevant federal agency resources and

expertise, and coordinated it with local authorities.58

During the conventions, the Homeland Security

Operations Center (HSOC)59 provided timely threat

information, intelligence, situational awareness and

operational information. The Federal Protective Services (FPS), drawing on DHS assets, helped ensure

the public’s safety and continuity of operations by

providing such resources as dog teams, weapons of

mass destruction (WMD)/hazmat technicians, intelligence analysts, undercover agents, uniformed officers and emergency response teams. FEMA was

responsible for providing emergency management

coordination and any assets that might be needed

for a response and recovery effort. Several other

DHS component agencies—S&T, ICE, TSA, CBP

and USCG, among others—were involved in securing the convention and screening passengers and

shipments coming to the area.

G-8 Sea Island Summit

The G-8 Summit was held on June 8–10, 2004, on

Sea Island, Georgia. The success of the safety

measures at this event was largely due to the many

DHS agencies that worked with local law enforcement, resulting in no significant incidents. Executive session participants indicated that DHS was a

valuable partner in these types of security operations.60 The U.S. Secret Service led DHS in the

design, coordination and implementation of the

operational plan. The Georgia Office of Homeland

Security was the lead agency that coordinated all

local and state law enforcement resources. ICE

deployed agents for specialized units focused on

different security aspects—providing the second

largest cadre of federal law enforcement personnel

in support of security and public safety efforts at

the G-8 Summit. FEMA—as the lead for consequence management for all NSSEs—was in charge

of emergency management coordination as well as

response and recovery plans. The Coast Guard

provided waterside coverage by coordinating with

state, local and other federal law enforcement,

including maritime. Customs and Border Protection

“Terrorists’ goals are to

shut down the economy

and disrupt transportation

and daily life. Our earliest

security plans were so

intrusive that we were

basically just doing the

terrorists’ job for them by

shutting down public

access around the Fleet

Center. Then we worked

with our federal partners at

DHS and worked out an

effective approach.”

—Secretary Edward A.

Flynn, Commonwealth of

Massachusetts Executive

Office of Pubic Safety

58 DHS prepared a fact sheet on activities its component agencies planned for the Democratic National Convention. At this

writing, this fact sheet is available at www.dhs.gov.

59 The HSOC is DHS’s national-level hub for operational communication and information sharing for handling special

events. The HSOC maintains and provides situational awareness on homeland security matters for the Secretary of Homeland Security, the White House Security Council and the federal community. The HSOC coordinated DHS, state and local

partners to establish full connectivity among security personnel at the event and those personnel with HSOC. More information on the HSOC can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3814.

60 At this writing, more information on the roles of each DHS directorate at the G-8 Summit can be found at

http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3647.
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was responsible for processing the 700 official

international attendees that traveled to the summit. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) provided logistical, training and

contingency support to numerous federal, state

and local agencies. The Transportation Security

Administration (TSA) screeners assisted at various

sites. DHS’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate ensured real-time

connectivity and information sharing among all

DHS components and state and local partners,

making use of the HSOC. The HSOC also dispatched three officials to the summit to establish a

multi-agency command center that could provide

24-hour onsite monitoring.

Other Event Resources 

As part of its Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)61 initiative, DHS announced on May

28, 2004, that its Internet-based counterterrorism

communications system would be used by homeland security officials (including the HSOC mentioned above), state and local leadership, and other

first responders during the G-8 Summit. The HSIN

initiative is supported by the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES), which was originally developed by state and local authorities in

partnership with the federal government. At the

request of some state and local partners, JRIES was

adopted by DHS as the foundation for greater counterterrorism information sharing. This system

allows states and major urban areas to collect and

disseminate information among federal, state and

local authorities. The network is a secure 24-houra-day, seven-day-a-week, real-time collaborative tool

that has interactive connectivity with the HSOC.

This secure system significantly strengthens the

immediate exchange of threat information at the

sensitive-but-unclassified level to all users. 

According to DHS, each state and major

urban area’s homeland security advisor will receive

software licenses, technology and training to participate in HSIN for information sharing and situational awareness. These homeland security advisors

will employ the system to offer a variety of users

access including federal, state and local law enforcement; U.S. Coast Guard; National Guard; State and

Emergency Operations Centers; first responders;

and others engaged in counterterrorism.

Whether a NSSE or other high-profile

event, other executive session participants discussed

the tremendous help they received from DHS and

its agencies for protests, other large events or threat

responses. For example, the Free Trade Area of the

Americas (FTAA) demonstration in Miami raised

concerns about protests, as well as terrorist targets.

It was the area’s first real field test of integrating

DHS, FBI and other resources. In the past, there had

been problems with over-response in engaging multiple federal agencies, but Chief Timoney reported

that the response in this case was well choreographed and essential. D.C. Capitol Police Chief

Gainer also discussed the significant resources and

coordination that federal partners provided during

the ricin investigation on Capitol Hill. General

Matthew Broderick, director of the Homeland Security Operations Center, helped to coordinate all federal agencies including FBI forensics, Department of

Health and Human Services and others. 

Several local law enforcement participants,

however, expressed concern that there is not always

61 At the time of this writing, more information on the HSIN can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3350.
such clarity of command. And costs associated

with preventing terrorist attacks may not always be

assumed by the federal government for incidents or

large events, which presents a challenge for local

governments.

National Incident Management

System

On March 1, 2004, DHS announced the release of

the National Incident Management System

(NIMS),62 the nation’s first standardized incident

management approach that creates a unified structure for a federal, state and local government all-hazards response and recovery effort. NIMS builds on

the existing Incident Command System (ICS) and

principles of unified command. It stresses coordinated communication and information management for

first responders and emergency managers across all

agencies, disciplines and jurisdictions. In July 2004,

FEMA unveiled a new online course to help first

responders understand the concepts and principles

underlying the new system and to begin incorporating NIMS into their planning and policies.63

DHS has also established a National Integration Center (NIC), managed by FEMA, to develop national standards for NIMS education and

training, and to refine NIMS as it is implemented

nationwide. The multijurisdictional, multidisciplinary NIC provides valuable resources to coordinate

the nation’s response to all hazards. The center

coordinates federal, state, local and tribal incident

management entities and emergency responders,

and strengthens the nation’s response capabilities

by identifying and integrating best practices. It also

issues guidelines for mutual aid and resource management agreements. NIC provides a NIMS Implementation Guide to facilitate the adoption of

NIMS principles.64 Through flexibility and the use

of common doctrine, terminology, concepts, principles and processes, responders will be able to

focus more on the operations, instead of organizing

and staffing assignments among all authorities.

DHS believes responses to a significant incident

will be more consistent and coordinated. 

Counterterrorism Training and

Related Resources for Law

Enforcement 

DHS offers training to local, state, tribal and federal

law enforcement agencies as well as other first

responders, including fire and public health agencies.

Resources are intended for use by agencies of varying

size and vulnerability. DHS also promotes multiagency training as essential to counterterrorism 

coordination efforts. 

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47

62 The development of NRP/NIMS was tasked through Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 on February 28, 2003,

(see http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html). DHS released NIMS on March 1, 2004. At the

time of this writing, key elements and features of NIMS are available on the DHS website at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3259. Resources are available on the following websites for local law enforcement agencies to comply

with NIMS: http://www.fema.gov/fema/first_res.shtm or http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=63. The completion

of NIMS follows the October 2003 passage of the Initial National Response Plan (INRP), which proposed an approach for

aligning incident management responses and actions among all federal, state, tribal and local agencies as well as the private

sector and community leaders. A final plan is under development at the time of this writing and will replace INRP. 

63 The training experts at the Department of Homeland Security’s Emergency Management Institute (within FEMA) created the online course, which takes about three hours to complete. The course can be found at: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWEB/IS/is700.asp. 

For more information on recommended compliance, see DHS Secretary Tom Ridge’s letter to the governors at www.nimsonline.com/sec_ridge_letter.htm. Local, state and tribal governments are encouraged to implement NIMS during fiscal year 2005.

These agencies must self-certify by the beginning of fiscal year 2006 and must be in full compliance by fiscal year 2007.

64 This document can be accessed at www.fema.gov/doc/nims/nims_implementation_plan_template.doc.
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Executive session participants discussed

the training opportunities and resources available

for law enforcement, as well as the need to better

share information about what type of training is

effective, what content gaps exist, how to fill them

and how to pay for taking officers and other personnel away from their duties while in training, as

well as other associated costs. The Counter-Terrorism Training Coordination Working Group65 convened by the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s)

Office of Justice Programs examined tools (e.g.,

training, information-sharing databases, funding

sources) available to law enforcement and other

first responders and recommended the establishment of a central website. The working group

reviewed current training offered by DOJ components, identified duplication or gaps, and recommended the most effective mechanisms for

delivering training. These resources will help law

enforcement decision makers develop strategic

plans for training and local emergency response.

Executive session participants recommended agencies browse the Counter-Terrorism Training and

Resources for Law Enforcement website that

includes training listings, related materials and

website links to the relevant federal government,

private and nonprofit organizations.66

Executive session participants reported

that they used their own training forums, as well as

those presented by DHS. Training resources they

used included those provided by ODP,67 FLETC,68

and the Coast Guard Institute.69 A nonprofit

organization, the National Institute for Urban

Search and Rescue (NIUSR)70 also provides training

and public awareness, research and engineering

assistance. Several participants also had employed

training offered by FEMA’s National Emergency

Training Center (NETC).71

One example a participant offered is being

considered for regional application elsewhere in

the country; the NETC, which draws its experts

from both the Emergency Management Institute

(EMI) and the National Fire Academy (NFA),72

“We also need a commandlevel primer on intelligence

as well as more analytical

training in police departments, resources on

profiling versus targeting,

integrating with COPS

training and terrorismrelated concepts.”

—Chief Terrance Gainer,

U.S. Capitol Police

65 Working group participants include the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the National Institute

of Justice, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, the Office of Justice Programs, the Office of the Police Corps

and Law Enforcement Education, the Office of Domestic Preparedness, the U.S. Army Military Police School, the U.S.

Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Labor. Working group membership will expand to include

other federal agencies as well as nongovernmental organizations that represent affected constituencies. 

66 See www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/. 

67 At this writing, more information on the training available at the Office of Domestic Preparedness can be found at

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/training.htm.

68 FLETC serves as an interagency law enforcement training organization for over 70 federal agencies. The DHS supervises

its administrative and financial activities. More information on FLETC can be found at http://www.fletc.gov/.

69 The Coast Guard Institute develops and produces innovative products and advocates, manages and supports a variety of

programs and policies that promote excellence in education within the Coast Guard. More information on the Coast Guard

can be found at www.uscg.mil/hq/cgi/index.html.

70 More information on NIUSR can be found at www.niusr.org/NiusrAndPeople.htm.

71 More information on FEMA’s National Emergency Training Center can be found at http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/.

72 More information on the National Fire Academy can be found at www.usfa.fema.gov/training/nfa/.
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49

offers a variety of terrorism-related courses each

year and holds regular networking meetings for

emergency services personnel from the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan area. NETC, in Emmitsburg, Maryland, hosted a one-day course for 150

participants in the Washington Metropolitan area

in March 2004 to discuss how their respective

organizations could work together to strengthen

overall terrorism preparedness and response in

Washington, D.C., Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Delaware. Attendees included hospital administrators, state and local

emergency management officials and law enforcement officers, college security personnel, Army officers, Secret Service officials and staff from such

other federal offices as the State Department, Environmental Protection Agency and the Department

of Energy. The course reviewed how to identify suspicious circumstances and how to protect critical

assets, as well as what to expect during a federal

response to such an event. Similar courses can be

offered to other regions across the country to

improve their regional and multijurisdictional

response.

Executive session participants suggested

that chief executives should be aware of the training and related assets available regionally and what

role each federal agency can play in a crisis. This

includes knowing how many front-line personnel

are trained in critical incident response. To ensure

a proper multijurisdictional response, agencies

need to collaborate in obtaining funding to maximize preparedness for the region, and then in using

that funding to train and prepare in a coordinated

way. Executive session participants encourage their

colleagues to bring in area agencies when conducting

tabletop exercises. 

Training Street-Level Officers

The previous chapter discussed the importance of

integrating community policing principles into a

sound homeland security strategy and outlined

participants’ assertions that the success of any

counterterrorism effort depends on the proper

training and support of officers on the front lines

of policing. Local, state and tribal law enforcement

have direct contact with individuals who may possess important information about suspicious activities or with terrorists living in their communities.

With more than 17,000 local law enforcement

agencies in the nation, local officers are a critical

force-multiplier for any national antiterrorism 

initiative, provided they are given adequate training and resources. 

Executive session participants emphasized

that the street-level officer is likely to be the first

line of defense in preventing a terrorist attack, but

may well receive only minimal training. Local law

enforcement session participants underscored the

need for DHS to gather and share more timely and

detailed information on terrorist methods and

what to look for on patrol, and to provide that

guidance in a format they can use. They contend

that the law enforcement intelligence community

needs to ensure that high-quality training is provided to street-level officers on how to recognize,

report and react to suspicious activity. For example, one participant noted that a patrol officer who

notices a driver changing a tire near a water treatment plant might not think much of it. But if that

same person is observed changing a tire near

another high-risk facility on the list of critical

infrastructure that same week, the participant

would like that officer to be looking for such an

occurrence. That patrol officer would need to

know not only to look for such a pattern, but how
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to note and share that information. Federal

agency representatives at the session agreed that

the definition of “suspicious activity” needs to be

broadened and clearly communicated as information is received and packaged for state, local and

tribal partners.

Another executive emphasized the need

to continually talk to officers more at the local

level about how “suspicious behavior” may

change based on emerging information (for example, paying particular attention to use of public

storage at odd hours after there has been an alert

that certain dangerous materials have been

stolen). Local agencies expressed the need for federal agencies to coordinate with them in developing the type of awareness scenarios for training

that mesh with intelligence on methods and

threats. 

Progress in DHS Grant Programs to

Help First Responders

DHS, as well as other federal departments and

agencies, offer homeland security and public safety

grant opportunities.73 These grants support critical

state and local efforts to prepare first responders

and citizens, protect public health, enhance infrastructure security and further other public safety

activities. DHS allocated or awarded more than $9

billion to first responders between September 11,

2001 and September 31, 2004. DHS administers

grants for its various programs through the Office

of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and

the Office of Research and Development in the Science and Technology Directorate. Among the

many other federal agency programs related to

counterterrorism are the Department of Health

and Human Services’ public health preparedness

grants, Department of Justice grants for terrorism

and other law enforcement activities, and Environmental Protection Agency grants for improving the

security of the water supply.

The executive session discussion on grants

predominantly focused on ODP and first responder

funding.74 The goal of ODP is to help state and

local jurisdictions prevent, respond and recover

from any terrorism acts involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive weapons

and cyber attacks.75 In 1998, as a part of the

Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) increasing focus

on terrorism prevention efforts (ODP was then an

“We are not listening

closely enough to officers

to see what they need.

They need to be trained

quickly and well, perhaps

using existing structures

like the RCPIs. And they

need to be taught who to

contact and when, which is

not clear now.”

—Chief Thomas D.

McCarthy, Fayetteville (NC)

Police Department

73 See www.dhs.gov/grants. This website provides information on grants, an overview of relevant programs for potential

applicants, provides links for individual grant programs, and information on specific requirements and procedures. Other

search opportunities are available at www.FedGrants.gov and www.Grants.gov.

74 For more information on TSA and FEMA grants, see www.tsa.gov and www.fema.gov, respectively. 

75 For more information on ODP grants, see http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/grants_goals.htm.
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office in DOJ), a number of programs were initiated to provide funds to all 50 states76 to reduce vulnerabilities and increase preparedness. Current

ODP grant programs are more focused and target

specific program areas following the development

of National Preparedness Goals and the National

Strategy for Homeland Security. For example, in

fiscal year 2004, among the grant programs that

ODP offered were the Competitive Training

Grants, Information Technology and Evaluation

Program (ITEP), Urban Areas Security Initiative

and the Homeland Security Grant Program.77

ODP has provided Competitive Training

Grant Program (CTGP) support to fund WMD

training for state and local law enforcement; to

develop capabilities for terrorism prevention including detection, interdiction, intelligence analysis,

critical infrastructure protection and information

sharing; to support training initiatives that develop

and enhance community outreach strategies for

local audiences through existing non-governmental

and volunteer organizations; and to address training

gaps related to prevention and preparedness, including assistance for special needs populations.

The grant programs are continually being

reformed and modified, but the following examples for 2004 offer a glimpse of the range of funding programs. ODP also awarded $9 million in

competitive grants in 2004 to 12 states for information technology demonstration projects as part

of the ITEP effort to foster and evaluate the use of

state-of-the-art technologies for removing barriers

and improving information sharing and integration among first responders.

The Urban Areas Security Initiative

(UASI) grant program provided funding to address

the needs of cities for planning, equipment, training and practice exercises. The funds were distributed to enhance and sustain area capacity to help

first responders and state and local governments

prevent, respond to and recover from the threat of

WMD and other acts of terrorism. This program

also provided funding to mass transit authorities to

protect critical infrastructure and conduct emergency preparedness activities. Funds were awarded

and distributed through the State Administrative

Agency designated by the governor of each state. 

Every state grantee for 2004 was required

to submit a three-year State Homeland Security

Assessments and Strategies (SHSAS) plan to

DHS for approval before any federal funds were

distributed. The plans included the state’s critical infrastructure vulnerability assessment, the

76 Grants were also provided to the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

77 ODP also administered the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program, which was not stressed by participants, as they were

ineligible for the funds.

“We are working with

governors, chiefs and

others to determine how

the grant process is

working and identifying

grant best practices. We

want the money to get into

your hands.”

—Joshua Filler, Director,

Office of State and Local

Government Coordination

and Preparedness,

Department of Homeland

Security
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52

perceived threat to their state, a proposal on how

the state would improve the security of their state

and an explanation of how federal funding would

assist preparedness. 

DHS has also administered the State

Homeland Security Grant program, designed to

prepare all first responders for incidents involving

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and

explosive (CBRNE) devices, as well as cyber

attacks. This program has integrated the State

Homeland Security Program (SHSP), the Law

Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program

(LETPP) and the Citizen Corps Program (CCP) at

the time of this writing.78 SHSP is intended to cover

costs associated with implementing the SHSAS.

The LETPP funds support law enforcement terrorism prevention activities through planning, organization, training, exercises and equipment.

At a time when communities are calling

for immediate readiness, there has never been a

more pressing need for the efficient and effective

delivery of these funds to those who need them to

develop key competencies and to acquire adequate

supplies, tools and technology. Some executive session participants stressed that the funds should be

disseminated based on a national strategy of shared

responsibility, accountability and leadership.

Local Funding Challenges

The executive session included a lively discussion

of perceived challenges with the grant process.

Reductions in federal funding for traditional crime

fighting has stretched police resources to their limits, which puts more stress on the need for efficient

and effective terrorism-related grants. Furthermore, some session participants believe that 

policymakers are failing to recognize the obvious

connection between supporting traditional anticrime initiatives and advancing homeland security

efforts. Many of the participants argued that adequate funding should be allocated to address traditional crime issues (e.g., drug operations, identity

theft, money laundering) that affect national security. As a matter of practicality, when determining

how grants will be spent, it is also not realistic to

carve up a community police officer’s duties into

those that only address terrorism and those that

identify suspicious criminal activity, advance criminal intelligence gathering or many other routine

functions. Many participants expressed the concern that we may be trying to win a war against

terrorism by undercutting our commitment to

communities to address crime, violence and fear.

Local agencies understand that under

counterterrorism grants their requests must fit

into certain funding categories. One participant

“Citizens want immediate

responses to their

problems and fears. I’m not

sure federal agencies have

the same sense of urgency

we have at the local level.

Funding needs to be

quicker and we need a

more decentralized federal

system with more

authority given to those in

the field who support us.”

—Chief Richard Myers,

Appleton (WI) Police

Department

78 As of December 2, 2004, DHS further consolidated first responder grants to include UASI grants, Emergency Management Performance grants and the Metropolitan Medical Response System grants under the State Homeland Security Grant

Program. Further modifications may be forthcoming.
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53

discussed that his SWAT training for any hazard is

the same as that for terrorist attacks. Local law

enforcement has pushed for greater emphasis on

such matters as an all-hazards approach for funding; greater flexibility of spending, particularly for

dual uses (e.g., protective gear that can be used in

meth labs and terrorist attacks); more standards

and guidance on equipment79 and technology; and

more hiring and overtime grants. 

Local law enforcement agencies face keen

competition for funding. Yet unlike EMS and fire,

they have a tremendous emphasis on prevention as

they expend resources to guard infrastructure,

oversee special events and much more, especially

when alert levels rise. Local law enforcement is

increasingly concerned about cuts that will affect

public safety services, personnel and other critical

areas as they struggle to provide proper responses

to terrorism alerts and to develop their own monitoring and prevention efforts. Executive session

participants indicated they are trying to think creatively about how to partner with other federal

agencies, the private sector, local foundations and

surplus programs without lowering standards or

jeopardizing the agency’s independence or integrity. 

Other concerns were much more administrative in nature, though given that DHS started

just one year before, there was recognition that

these challenges are the type found in any emerging organization. Some of the executive session

participants complained that there were delays,

and in some cases no receipt of funding for designated purposes in local jurisdictions.80 Executive

session participants discussed the first year’s technical and logistical challenges. For instance, some

executive session participants indicated that they

have had technical problems when submitting the

79 S&T in partnership with the National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) and the National Institute for Occupational Safety

and Health (NIOSH) adopted in February 2004 standards on personal protective equipment (PPE) to safeguard first responders against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials. The standards provide guidance to state and local procurement officials and manufacturers to provide first responders with the essential PPE. These guidelines also apply

performance standards and test methods to manufacturers.

80 For a discussion of the funding process, see An Analysis of First Responder Grant Funding, prepared by the staff of the

House Select Committee on Homeland Security. At this writing, this document can be found at http://homelandsecurity.

house.gov/files/First%20Responder%20Report.pdf.

According to a February 2005 Government Accountability Office report, ODP established and refined the grant award procedures for states and localities. See United States Government Accountability Office, February 2005. Homeland Security:

Management of First Responder Grant Programs Has Improved, But Challenges Remain. Report to the chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives. The GAO Report # 05-121 can be found at www.gao.gov.

“Los Angeles has lost more

lives to gangs than some

wars, but the funding isn’t

there from the federal

government for the

community policing hiring,

training and approaches we

have used—the same

approaches that would help

address terrorism. [At the

time of the executive

session] there have been

proposals to increase

counterterrorism funding,

which though appreciated,

needs to be used for

traditional crime fighting

as well.”

—Bureau Chief John Miller,

Counter-Terrorism and

Criminal Intelligence

Bureau, Los Angeles Police

Department
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strategic plans through the Internet. Others needed guidelines to write a strategic plan. Some stated

that other federal agencies are asking for similar

information and types of forms, creating redundant paperwork. Still others believed DHS should

pre-approve vendors and establish product standards to facilitate procurement, particularly when

there are requirements that spending be completed

within a relatively short time period. Importantly,

DHS session participants indicated that many of

these problems in the grant process have already

been addressed, and additional improvements and

guidance are ongoing.

Homeland Security Funding Task Force 81

DHS executives at the session indicated that DHS

recognizes that improvements are still needed in

distributing homeland security funds. To address

these problems, in March 2004 the Homeland Security Funding Task Force, composed of a bipartisan

group of governors, mayors, county officials, tribal

leaders and senior officials with experience in homeland security issues, examined the funding process

to recommend ways that DHS funds could move

quickly to local first responders.82 The task force

distributed a report to the Secretary of DHS that

indicates that no single issue or agency is responsible for the delays, but that several complicating factors (procurement rules, backlog of equipment

orders from private sector vendors and others) have

collectively slowed the funding flow. The task force

identifies effective funding solutions for jurisdictions where there are obstacles to the efficient and

effective distribution of state and local homeland

security funds. It also documents best practices in

delivering funds more rapidly to law enforcement

officials, emergency managers and other first

responders, and provides specific recommendations

for reforms. 

As discussed later in this paper, it is apparent that local authorities must work strategically

with their state and federal gatekeepers who obtain

and distribute the funding. Some executive session

participants expressed concern that not all local

executives have the same influence with state officials who administer grants. They also believed

that the current grant process, in some cases, is

divisive in the way first responders from different

disciplines vie for funding and compete with other

law enforcement agencies in the area.

“The unintended

consequences of the way

the grant programs are set

up include fostering

divisiveness among

disciplines and agencies as

they compete for limited

resources. We need a

problem-solving approach

to terrorism, including how

grants are given.”

—Chief Thomas D.

McCarthy, Fayetteville (NC) 

Police Department

81 More information on the task force is available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=38&content=3354. The

task force reports directly to the Secretary of DHS and operates under the guidance of the Homeland Security Advisory

Council (HSAC) and its State and Local Officials and Emergency Response Senior Advisory Committees.

82 As an example of grant reforms, DHS announced in January 2005 that it still had more than $4 billion in funds that had

not been distributed to cities because of federal rules that required the money to be disbursed only to reimburse states and

localities for expenditures they already made on antiterrorism measures. The requirement has been waived for fiscal year

2005 to expedite the flow of funds to those in need. 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF

PUBLIC SAFETY HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROCESS 

by Secretary Edward A. Flynn and Assistant Secretary Jane

Wiseman, Commonwealth of Massachusetts 

Executive Office of Pubic Safety8 3

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts developed a process to allocate its federal fiscal year 2004

DHS funds that prioritizes risks and then relies on regional planning to address those risks. This

innovative approach allows funds to be applied where they are most needed, making most efficient

use of the federal investment in Massachusetts’ homeland security. Our process for developing this

strategy was inclusive of the many different stakeholder groups from law enforcement, fire, emergency management, public health, transportation, public works and general government administration. The pages that follow provide background on the principles applied and how the outcome

was achieved.

The Importance of Risk-Based Allocations of Funds

Massachusetts has often distributed federal or state grant funding to municipalities based on population, often making sure that every community, no matter how small, gets some minimum level

of funding. This “everyone gets something” approach has served to dilute the investment in the

areas most in need of assistance. In 2003,84 Massachusetts implemented a competitive grant program for distributing the funding. This was the first time funding had not been guaranteed to every

community. Instead, only those proposals deemed most meritorious were funded. This resulted in

a number of very disappointed communities as the conventional wisdom was turned on its head.

So, for the 2004 funding cycle, the majority of the dollars were distributed on a risk-based formula

that weighted critical infrastructure and verifiable “potential threat elements” rather than simply

population. The overall breakout of funding was as follows:

• 20 percent for statewide projects and state grant administration

• 10 percent for a program to provide a minimal level of funding for any interested municipality

• 48 percent for risk-based allocation to regional planning groups

• 22 percent for interoperability projects in the regional planning groups

The key innovation here is that our team introduced an information-driven, risk-based approach to

homeland security planning and operations. The foundation of this approach was a statewide

threat, vulnerability and risk assessment performed by the state and local police departments. This

assessment involved the identification of critical assets, special events and potential threat eleVOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY

55

83 Public Safety Secretary Edward Flynn was the Chief of Police in Arlington County, Virginia during the time of the

September 11, 2001 attack on the Pentagon, which strongly influenced the Massachusetts model that came to be

based on a regional approach.

84 Unless indicated otherwise, years are for the federal fiscal year (October to October), rather than a calendar year. 
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ments and then combining those lists to develop current threat intelligence identifying those potential targets that are at the greatest risk of attack. While we conducted this assessment originally to

support the adoption of information-driven and performance-based protective and response planning efforts, during the process we discovered that some of the data collected and submitted to ODP

was flawed. As a result, we worked with our local partners to validate all they had submitted. The

validation process was critical because it allowed us to use comparable standards. Based on the validated information contained in the threat, vulnerability and risk assessment, we developed a corresponding quantitative score for each municipality. Once the statewide validation process and

scoring was completed, funding was allocated to the regional groups based on the collective score

of the municipalities in that region. In this way, the dollars could truly be applied to real threats,

and the decisions about how to protect those threats using federal funds can be made at the local

level. 

The Challenge to Regionalism 

Massachusetts is composed of 351 municipalities, many of which were established in the 17th century. Compared with other states, Massachusetts is exceeded by only one in the number of individual governmental jurisdictions. There is a long and rich history of local control by these small

government agencies, some of which have fewer than 1,000 people to govern. Each municipality

has its own government, and most have their own police department, fire department, schools and

the like. 

Yet, no single entity can handle alone the challenge of responding to a large incident in the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Our largest city, Boston, asked scores of municipalities in the

region and half a dozen state agencies to help during the 2004 Democratic National Convention.

Creating a sense of regionalism may be a formidable task, but the response to any terrorist attack

requires a multijurisdictional approach. 

Massachusetts engaged in a six-month process of developing appropriate boundaries for the

homeland security planning regions. We began by creating an inventory of the many different ways

other agencies had used to divide the state:

• 4 regional law enforcement consortia provide mutual aid and other specialized law enforcement

services to agencies through formal working relationships

• 24 fire districts provide support to municipal fire departments

• 7 public health regions support bioterrorism preparedness

• 14 counties have their own sheriff 

• 11 district attorneys prosecute criminals in the 14 counties

• 8 HazMat teams cover regional areas with their equipment and staffing
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57

• 5 emergency management regions provide support to local emergency management efforts by

helping to keep local emergency plans updated to changing circumstances

• 39 state police barracks provide highway patrol and other law enforcement support to communities and citizens

• 8 regional re-entry centers provide supervision to offenders returning to our communities

A series of meetings was conducted with key stakeholders to discuss the various ways that

the state could “draw the lines” for the homeland security regions. The eventual consensus was that

the existing emergency management regions would be modified to accommodate the Boston-area

homeland security planning region created for the Urban Area Security Initiative grant program

funded by DHS. To the extent possible, other regional efforts are being aligned or at least coordinated with the existing homeland security footprint. 

The Importance of Building in Intelligence: The Fusion Center

As we learned from the risk assessment, 351 municipalities may have 351 different ways of identifying, describing and analyzing potential threats. We decided to create a centralized, standardized

source of information analysis and referral. To that end, our state police have developed an information fusion center that is our single source of homeland security information analysis and 

dissemination. We have worked with all levels of government in developing this effort—including

the FBI, the United States Attorney, and the first responders in all our municipalities. 

The importance of the fusion center is that information and data form the core of our strategy, and our operations. Threat, vulnerability and risk-related information drive all of our activities—whether the allocation and disbursement of funds or the development and implementation of

protective, response and continuity plans. This approach stems from our philosophy that it is not

possible to protect every potential target from every conceivable type of attack; there needs to be a

system of prioritization and that is what we are developing.

Strategic Management and Oversight of Funds

Massachusetts forged a meaningful partnership between the first responder community and existing regional planning agencies to ensure federal funds would be effectively used for multijurisdictional and multidisciplinary readiness. While this seems completely logical on its face, it is a leap

across many government “stovepipes” that had never worked together before. Regional planning

agencies have long partnered with multiple jurisdictions on common interests in urban and regional plans for housing and economic development. But never had the law enforcement or other first

responder community participated directly with the regional planning agencies. This new collaboration brings the regional planning agencies’ expertise in federal grant management to the challenge

of supporting homeland security efforts in the newly designated regions. 
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CONCLUSION

Many local and state agencies reported having

recent successful experiences with DHS when

implementing operational security plans for

national events and conventions. They have seen

tremendous progress in how the federal agencies

work together and applaud efforts to further reduce

redundancy and turf issues among federal partners. Training resources and other support were

similarly appreciated by executive session participants, though there was consensus that additional

resources are needed, as well as more standards

and guidance for evaluating the type and quality

offered to local law enforcement. Though many

representatives were unaware of NIMS at the time

of the session, efforts to provide uniform guidance

were also given kudos. There was some question as

to how local law enforcement would operate within the NIMS structure.

Though agencies appreciate federal support for equipment, technology and other purposes, the greatest concerns voiced at the session were

from local law enforcement representatives who

focused on the funding limitations for crime and

terrorism prevention. Executive session participants stressed that local law enforcement is

Planning as a Precondition for Spending 

Funding was obligated to the municipalities in the regional planning councils in a timely fashion.

Modeling the process on the federal Urban Area Security Initiative, we mandated that funds could

not be spent on major projects until the planning phase was completed. Regional planning councils were given several months to complete their strategic plan for funding priorities, working with

their designated regional planning agency. The regional planning agencies (RPA) have served as

fiduciary agents and taken the lead for developing the plans. The RPAs are the existing agencies that

have done work on economic development and the like. They are new to homeland security but

have done federal grant work for local government for a long time.

In particular, funds for any communications or interoperability projects could not be spent

until the state completed its interoperability strategy. In summer 2003, Massachusetts communities

participated in a survey that identified the existing infrastructure for first responder communications. Based on that picture of the environment, a committee was created and tasked with developing a consistent, long-term statewide strategy for interoperability of voice and data

communications. Communities were asked to hold off on any communications-related projects

until they could certify that the project was consistent with the statewide strategy. 

Continuous Improvement

No system or process is perfect when it is first created. We continue to learn of ways to improve

both the process and the way we communicate with our stakeholder community. Frequent meetings of all relevant stakeholders have kept a meaningful dialogue moving, and we hope to develop

an even more refined strategy for the funding year ahead. 
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59

uniquely positioned to prevent attacks through

proactive law enforcement work with community

members; by drawing on trust relationships with

diverse groups; through information collection and

analysis that builds on previous criminal intelligence work; by providing a visible presence at

potential targets; by identifying which infrastructure is most at risk and how to protect it; as well

as myriad other functions. And while crime has

decreased overall, many chiefs are concerned about

what they see as worrisome emerging crime problems such as gangs, youth homicides and the rise

of methamphetamine production and abuse—all of

which also require significant resources. Yet law enforcement is competing with other first responders

and one another for limited funding that does not

adequately address some of their greatest needs:

overtime, hiring, greater dual use resources and

more.

Again, participants lauded the statements

of federal agency colleagues at the session to redouble their efforts to ensure that money is getting to

local law enforcement and that changes to the

grant processes and parameters will reflect their

commitment to addressing local police needs.

Importantly, some of the issues are beyond their

reach to fix immediately as congressional mandates, state processes and other factors can influence the success of the grant-making programs.

The latter will require an education process that

could take significant time.
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61

The discussion that follows offers some insights into

possible solutions and directions that will improve

the processes already begun by DHS. There was consensus that there are too many systems at work and

that state-of-the-art secured technologies are needed

to facilitate coordinated information sharing among

local, state, tribal and federal agencies. Further, executive session participants stressed that new relationships and training must complement the advances

being made with emerging technologies. 

The Homeland Security Advisory System

(HSAS) is perhaps the most visible information

sharing mechanism that has been implemented by

DHS to alert law enforcement to potential threats.

This chapter reviews how local agencies perceive

the system and discusses their recommendations

on how it and other information sharing systems

can be improved. Also provided below is a brief

overview of how existing and new technologies can

enhance prevention, detection and response efforts.

C HAPTER F IVE

INFORMATION SHARING, ALERT SYSTEMS

AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES

T HERE IS PERHAPS NO MORE DIFFICULT ISSUE IN FEDERAL-LOCAL RELATIONS

than information and intelligence sharing.85 Just as the FBI dealt with

these issues for many years, DHS now faces formidable challenges in

getting information down to local law enforcement and back up again as the

process continually evolves to include new material and analysis from all

involved players. The challenges include the growing pains associated with any

new endeavor in which bonds of trust must be developed, the technical issues

related to interoperability and funding for systems, the need to address redundant

functions, the related privacy and security concerns and many others. Though

these kinds of communications problems are expected in an agency that is just

one year old at the time of the session, the good news is that these are issues recognized and being addressed by DHS.

85 PERF’s previous white paper, Protecting Your Communities from Terrorism, Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Volume 4: Production and Sharing of Intelligence is dedicated to exploring issues in intelligence development and sharing and

provides detailed discussions on related topics. The report can be downloaded for free from www.policeforum.org or

www.cops.usdoj.gov. 
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Information-Sharing Mechanisms 

Executive session participants discussed the full

range of mechanisms DHS and other federal agencies use to share information with law enforcement partners and other government agencies.

Several of the key issues included hearing about

new developments in the media before being contacted by federal partners; information being too

vague to guide any particular local action, while

increasing citizen fear; and there being too many

federal sources of sometimes-conflicting information. Participants’ discussions at the executive session focused largely on the last concern: Local law

enforcement representatives emphasized the

importance of coordinating the timing of the

release of information (without delaying it) and

eliminating overlapping responsibilities at the federal level to prevent contradictory information

from coming to them from several federal sources

and sometimes weeks apart. Some local law

enforcement participants reported that they would

get an alert from one federal agency, then they

would contact a second federal agency only to find

out it was the same information the second agency

had released weeks earlier and then dismissed as

lacking credibility. Others said they have been confused about whether the information from DHS or

another federal agency was old, whether a new

similar threat had arisen, or was inaccurate given

interim information from other sources. Some of

the confusion seemed to stem from the fact that

three or four federal agencies might be analyzing

the same information at different tempos and

releasing the findings at different times. These

issues are explored further in the section, “Timely

and Accurate Information.” later in this chapter.

Though participants agreed that the federal

intelligence community has made significant

progress since September 11 and that greater effort

has been made to produce actionable intelligence,

some expressed concern that remaining obstacles

to information sharing were draining scarce

resources and confounded more than clarified.

Executive session participants discussed the need

for federal agencies to do an analysis of all information-sharing mechanisms to identify gaps and

overlapping areas, as well as to improve processes. 

DHS has employed a number of information-sharing approaches and expressed appreciation

for executive session participants’ feedback on how

effective they have been and how recipients used the

information. The federal participants reiterated that

sometimes there was a misperception that they

were withholding specific information or actionable

intelligence when, in fact, that information has not

existed. Examples of the ways in which DHS has

“DHS should be the

intelligence newsroom for

locals. The alerts should

take terrorism information

from around the world and

then translate what the

TTIC, Ops Center and other

analysts are talking about

into meaningful

information for local law

enforcement, with priority

items sent over

Blackberries and cell

phones.”

—John Miller, Bureau Chief,

Counter-Terrorism and

Criminal Intelligence

Bureau, Los Angeles Police

Department
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kept law enforcement and others informed of

threats and other information include email

updates; monthly conference calls; Internet resource

sites; law enforcement networks; screening and

integration center feedback; as well as the HSAS

color-coded system’s advisories, bulletins and alerts.

These are described below, as well as law enforcement’s concerns about using the information for

resource allocation and other decision making.

Distributing an Electronic Publication

DHS uses email to distribute an electronic publication, DHS Today, with information for law

enforcement partners and other first responders.

DHS Today is distributed to approximately 1,700

individuals at this writing. The newsletter contains current DHS news, press releases and information on upcoming events. The Office of State

and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP) also sends the information to

other state, tribal and local government officials.86

Homeland Security Information Bulletins

DHS and the FBI also issue joint information bulletins—the Homeland Security Information Bulletin. They communicate issues that pertain to the

critical national infrastructure and are for informational purposes only.87

Monthly Conference Calls

The SLGCP also hosts monthly conference calls

with national organizations that represent state,

tribal and local law enforcement, as well as other

first responders. The purpose of the conference

calls is to maintain open lines of communication

with law enforcement partners, and to provide an

opportunity to inform national organizations of

current DHS initiatives. First responders can use

these conference calls to relate their concerns, priorities and efforts in communities around the

country to DHS. The monthly conference calls

were not designed to provide a secure means of

communication for actionable intelligence or

threat information. Clearly other instant communication mechanisms have been developed to meet

this important operational necessity.

State Emergency Information Sharing Web

Portal

Executive session participants emphasized that

learning about others’ successes and failures is one

of the greatest contributions DHS can make to

advancing state initiatives. On April 19, 2004,

DHS launched a web portal, Lessons Learned

Information Sharing System, to enable first responders and homeland security professionals to share

information and best practices.88 Access is granted

to authorized homeland security officials and first

responders at the local, state and federal levels to

share expertise on effective planning, training and

operations. The directory of responders and homeland security officials provides users access to contact information for networking. The web portal

serves as a central repository for homeland security-related documents and events. The site also

includes peer-reviewed after-action reports, exercise and emergency drill examples (e.g., tabletop,

full scale), best practices and other resources. 

86 To receive this publication, requests should go via email to Sarah Fulton at sarah.fulton@dhs.gov or call 202-282-8054. 

87 More information is available about the bulletin on p. 67. 88 DHS launched the web portal in 2004 that was developed by the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) www.mipt.org and DFI International (http://www.dfi-intl.com/). At the time of this writing, the Lessons

Learned Information Sharing System web portal can be found at www.llis.gov.
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Interactive Communications Systems

Available to Law Enforcement

DHS uses existing communications systems traditionally employed to share crime information

among local authorities, such as the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), Law Enforcement

Online (LEO) and Joint Regional Information

Exchange System (JRIES).89 The participants

expressed concern that there is a tendency to continually introduce new and better systems instead of

improving on existing structures. They recommended that DHS and other federal agencies continue to use existing local and state networks,

databases and mechanisms instead of introducing

new systems when possible. There was a call, however, to integrate some of these systems to provide

single-query capabilities. Session participants also

recommended better use of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) system, accessible to frontline officers across the country, for limited purposes. 

Terrorist Screening Center90

Participants emphasized the need for a full and

comprehensive picture of the terrorist intelligence

that informs the actions of DHS and other federal

agencies. Executive session participants discussed

how multiple databases used to screen for terrorists in the United States and abroad has created

confusion and problems for state and local authorities. They anticipated that once the Terrorist

Screening Center (TSC) has been fully operational

for a longer period it would improve information

sharing and reduce duplicative services provided by

federal agencies.

The TSC was established on September

16, 2003, and became operational on December 1,

2003, to merge terrorist watch lists and provide

real-time operational support for officials and entities. The mission of the TSC is “to consolidate the

government’s approach to terrorist screening by

creating a single comprehensive database of known

or appropriately suspected terrorists, and to make

this consolidated list available to local, state and

federal screeners through the TSC’s 24/7 Call 

Center.”91 The TSC is overseen by the FBI and

receives identity information about terrorists and

suspected terrorists from two sources: international terrorist information comes from the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) (see

section below about TTIC and the newer National

Counterterrorism Center) and information about

known or suspected domestic terrorists comes

from the FBI, based on their respective sources.

89 The RISS Program operates a secure intranet, known as RISSNET, to encourage law enforcement communication and

the sharing of criminal intelligence information nationwide among local, state, federal and tribal law enforcement member

agency personnel. RISSNET provides information on offender criminal activity including address, phone numbers, weapons

used and other useful information. It is now being expanded to help disseminate and share terrorism-related sensitive-butunclassified information. More information on the RISS Program can be found at http://www.rissinfo.com/. 

On September 1, 2002, RISSNET interconnected with the LEO system to create a single log-on system for the exchange of

sensitive-but-unclassified homeland security information. More information on the LEO system can be found at

http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/leo.htm. 

JRIES serves as a secure virtual private network, connecting data sources using encrypted communications via the Internet.

JRIES relies upon commercial, off-the-shelf technology and web-based software that enables users to access database and

analysis applications; send secure email, including maps and graphics; and collaborate in real time. JRIES is also used to

exchange sensitive-but-unclassified information. DHS is planning to upgrade the network security to allow the exchange of

classified information at the secret level. For more information on JRIES, see http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/

press_release/press_release_0354.xml.

90 At the time of this writing, more information on the Terrorist Screening Center can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/

dhspublic/display?content=1598.

91 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorist Screening Center brochure, 2005.
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At the time of the executive session, the

TSC consolidated information from approximately

12 databases into a single resource that federal

security screeners, state and local law enforcement

officers, U.S. consular officials stationed abroad,

and in limited cases, even foreign governments

could query. The database has improved such

processes as accessing information for consular

officers to determine whether to grant a visa, or for

immigration officials to decide whether a person is

eligible to enter the United States. The TSC

ensures screeners are using the same unified data

set of suspected terrorists and their associates. 

The U.S. Attorney General implemented

procedures that are meant to safeguard information about U.S. persons, in coordination with the

Secretary of DHS, the Secretary of the State

Department and the Director of the CIA. The TSC

was established to be consistent with law and constitutional requirements that protect privacy interests and other liberties. The TSC does not have the

authority to collect intelligence, only to amass the

identity information that is already being captured

by the intelligence community and other agencies.

Terrorist Threat Integration Center and

National Counterterrorism Center

At the time of the executive session, the TSC

received the vast majority of information about

known or suspected international terrorists from

the information and intelligence amassed by the

Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). In

August 2004, President Bush announced plans to

create a National Counterterrorism Center

(NCTC) in an effort to build upon the work of the

Terrorist Threat Integration Center. The NCTC

was formally established in January 2005 as part of

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention

Act of 2004. TTIC’s analytical capabilities were

folded into NCTC upon the new center’s creation.

The NCTC is also now responsible for analyzing

and integrating intelligence acquired from all U.S.

government departments and agencies with terrorism-related responsibilities—except intelligence

pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and

domestic counterterrorism. NCTC also has the

authority to assign roles and responsibilities to

departments or agencies for counterterrorism

responsibilities as part of its strategic operational

planning duties. The NCTC, however, cannot

direct the execution of any resulting operations. 

The NCTC has no independent authority

to collect intelligence but plays a central role as a

fusion center for the analysis of counterterrorism

information. NCTC integrates all raw data from

the intelligence communities to be analyzed and

provides assessments of intelligence that are relevant to foreign and domestic terrorism. NCTC

officials analyze information and determine who

in the intelligence community needs the resulting

analysis. The information provided by NCTC personnel to the TSC can be critical for ensuring that

street officers who stop individuals will be in the

loop to identify and hold suspected terrorists. Local

law enforcement agencies can also participate on

the TSC watch desk.

With the information that TSC merges,

personnel then incorporate the records in the

National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database. The implications for local law enforcement

include more ready access to information about

suspected terrorists. For example, when a law

enforcement officer runs a NCIC check on a suspect during a routine traffic stop or criminal investigation, the terminal message may indicate for the

officer to contact the TSC Call Center and then it
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guides the officer on how to handle the stop. TSC

will guide the officer through a number of steps

depending on TSC’s level of interest in the individual.92 All positive or inconclusive matches of

individuals to the TSC database are forwarded to

the FBI Counterterrorism Watch (CT Watch). The

CT Watch directs the police response and can 

dispatch the local JTTF to provide a coordinated

response and to report back to the TSC and originating agency. 

The TSC receives calls daily from local

and state officers receiving NCIC messages. The

TSC is staffed 24-hours-a-day to aid in the identification of these individuals. At the time of the

executive session, if an officer wished to contact

the TSC outside of an official hit, they could do so

by contacting the Homeland Security Information

Network (HSIN), contact their FBI field office, or

contact their local JTTF. Many of the executive

session participants stressed that they would like

to have a single point of contact for this function

in the future. 

At the executive session, participants

expressed concern that established relationships

with various federal agencies with whom they are

comfortable sharing suspect information and intelligence might be undermined with the emphasis

on the TTIC/NCTC approach. They were concerned about how they might affect the existing

decentralized system of information sharing with

the FBI and others. State and local law enforcement also prefer to have direct access to information from federal information systems.

It is important to note that DHS’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection

(IAIP) unit also fuses information from many

sources as a full partner and consumer of intelligence from such sources as the CIA, the NSA 

and the FBI. While it acts as a fusion center, the

information is used to protect critical infrastructure.

NCTC, in contrast, is an intelligence fusion center

than helps ensure all federal agencies have the

same set of data and intelligence from which to

work. (IAIP and NCTC personnel share information with one another, as well.) DHS representatives indicated that they are trying to work with all

intelligence agencies to provide local, state and

“The Fairfax County Police

Department maintains a

positive and growing

relationship with our

federal partners and DHS,

largely due to our

commitment to the [HSOC]

watch center. This

assignment encourages

the passage of critical

information to troop-level

users.”

—Acting Chief Suzanne

Devlin, Fairfax County (VA)

Police Department

92 The TSC brochure outlines four categories of instructions found within the text of the NCIC response. The first indicates the officer should arrest the individual thought to be a terrorist and to contact the TSC. The second asks the responding officer to detain the individual who is of investigative interest for a reasonable time and to contact the TSC for more

direction. The third indicates that the person MAY have terrorist ties and to call the TSC for additional help in making that

determination, but not to notify the person of the notice or arrest him or her unless there has been a criminal violation.

The fourth category carries the same admonitions but asks the officer to collect identifying information, which the TSC

may request at a later time, and to contact the TSC if questioning raises suspicions about possible ties to terrorist activity.
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tribal agencies with timely and accurate threatspecific warning information. 

Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)

The IAIP established in March 2002 a nationwide

Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS),93 to

facilitate the federal government’s efforts to communicate information quickly to local and state

officials and the public on national threats. The

HSAS was designed to set in motion protective

measures when intelligence agencies receive credible and/or corroborated information regarding a

specific industry sector or geographic region. The

alert that is provided to public safety officials and

the public is based on threat information and vulnerability assessments. Executive session participants discussed the progress made in improving

the HSAS threat warning process, as well as the

steps that would make it more effective. The HSAS

encourages appropriate preparedness and preventive measures at the local, tribal, state and federal

levels through three means of communication:

Homeland Security Threat Advisories, Homeland

Security Information Bulletins and a color-coded

threat level system.

Homeland Security Threat Advisories.

(This category includes products formerly named

alerts, advisories and sector notifications.) During

an emergency, IAIP develops and issues national

and sector-specific (water treatment facilities,

nuclear plants, ports) threat warnings and advisories through the HSAS. Threat advisories are

meant to provide actionable information about an

incident involving, or a threat targeting, critical

national networks, infrastructures, national or

large-scale events or strategic U.S. assets. These

advisories can also communicate recently developed procedures that can improve security or protection. The advisories may also recommend a

change in readiness or response. Advisories are targeted to federal, state and local governments; private

sector organizations and international partners.

Homeland Security Information Bulletins. An “alert” is a more serious and specific

threat warning, whereas a “bulletin” is a more general update. Bulletins include information for public safety officials that does not meet the

timeliness, specificity or significance thresholds

needed for alerts. Bulletins provide statistical

reports, periodic summaries, incident response or

reporting guidelines, common vulnerabilities and

other information. It also may include preliminary

requests for information. A bulletin can be distributed to a specific audience or more broadly, usually transmitted electronically or via fax. At the time

of the executive session (one year after the establishment of DHS), a DHS participant indicated

that there had been 70 issued warnings through

bulletins. 

Color-Coded Threat Level System. The

color-coded threat system spans five colors and

corresponding threat levels, including green (low

threat risk), blue (guarded), yellow (elevated),

orange (high risk) and red (severe threat risk). The

color-coded threat system is meant to facilitate a

uniform and consistent response among all agencies engaged in counterterrorism. This system also

alerts the public to take suggested protective measures to reduce the likelihood or impact of an

attack. But different states and jurisdictions have

varying protocols for acting on a change in threat

level. Some executive session participants stated

93 More information on HSAS can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=29.
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that there was a need for greater specificity in the

information that is disseminated during heightened threat periods. DHS responded that work is

underway to make the system more responsive to

sector or area alerts, so that the entire nation does

not need to escalate its response, sometimes with

very costly measures, if the threat is unlikely to affect

them. Based on threat information, the system can

place specific geographic regions or sectors on a higher alert status than other areas or industries.94

Coordinated Response to Threat Warnings

The issuance of a DHS advisory or a change in the

threat level is meant to trigger a strong coordinated response among law enforcement agencies at all

levels. DHS requests that all relevant federal agencies develop a general protocol to correspond with

each color-coded level and develop more detailed

response strategies to some of the more specific

threat advisories that are disseminated in coordination with the raising of the threat level.95 DHS

also encourages those local, state and tribal agencies with their own area alert system to adopt one

that is compatible with the HSAS system and the

federal response.96 DHS urges each locality to develop detailed actions for threat-specific warnings or

for a change in the color-coded threat level that is

consistent with the DHS response. DHS executives at the session indicated they are developing

recommendations for more tailored regional

responses.

Local and State Concerns with the HSAS and

Sharing Issues

Executive session participants agreed that the

HSAS has laudable goals, but more needs to be

done to meet their needs. Law enforcement executives value threat and target-specific warnings but

do not have sufficient details to guide responses to

a change in threat level or issued advisories or

warnings. Among the concerns are that alerts

must be more specific to jurisdictions; that there is

no detailed protocol universally adapted by police

agencies (shift schedules, visible patrols and other

measures may be taken by one police agency, but

not the neighboring agency); that there is no circumstance that would drop it below “elevated” and

so it is effectively only a three-tiered system; there

needs to be more information about what drives an

advisory status change; and more. Participants also

expressed concern that community fear levels were

being raised with insufficient information to guide

them on how to act. They wanted to be privy to

what was likely to be released to the public to prepare what advice they would offer to help their own

officers and community members handle the

information. 

94 See footnote 51 regarding area-specific threat warnings to East Coast financial districts. 95 DHS provides guidelines to federal agencies at the following website http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_

release/press_release_0046.xml.

96 At this writing, the Major City Chiefs (MCC) Association is working on developing a protocol consistent with best practices in security preparedness and response, as well as methods to address different threat level updates. An interim report

was released by MCC in June 2004 and is available at http://www.neiassociates.org/.

“We’re concerned that you

can’t stand at attention

forever.”

—Chief Charles Ramsey,

Washington (DC)

Metropolitan Police

Department
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Some of the confusion related to alerts to

date has resulted in what some perceive as inaction

by local law enforcement. Local police executives

indicated that their jurisdictions do not always

respond with increased activity to warnings. There

were two primary reasons: Executives decided

warnings were not specific to their jurisdiction and

law enforcement leaders felt they could not be any

more vigilant than they already were given the

vagueness of the threat.

It has also been difficult to gauge local

reactions to threat warning changes because one

agency may provide an all-out response at one

color level and another agency responds the same

way at only a higher level. There is no consistency

across agencies for a specific detailed protocol.

Some agencies also have a city threat system that

does not always track national alerts. For instance,

since September 11, New York has always been on

orange alert even though it does not necessarily

mean their response is similar to other jurisdictions that are on orange alert. The local response to

a national alert change may be affected by other

intelligence it is receiving, whether from its own

intelligence bureau, that of larger neighboring

agencies, the FBI field office and JTTF in the area,

or regional or state homeland security offices. 

DHS representatives understand the frustration law enforcement has experienced trying to

translate the change in the HSAS threat level (and

corresponding colors) to actionable information.

The DHS executive session participants indicated

that IAIP is working with national law enforcement organizations to assess and improve the

value of the alert systems and advisories.

Who Should Be the Primary Federal Contact

Many executive session participants stated that

when DHS issues a warning, the chief executive

“We need a shared view of

the threat and a clear

understanding of our roles

and responsibilities in

countering that threat.

Terrorists clearly have a

shared understanding of

the goal and the roles in

attaining it.”

—Executive Assistant

Director Maureen Baginski,

Office of Intelligence, FBI

contacts their FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC)

or the JTTF representative to discern whether the

information is accurate and timely. Local law

enforcement, in particular, felt partnerships with

the FBI have been long established and they turn to

them first for sharing information between federal,

state, tribal and local law enforcement agencies.

Many reported significant improvement over the

years between local law enforcement and the FBI,

particularly since September 11. Some local law

enforcement representatives said they are now

unclear whether DHS or FBI is the federal government’s primary conduit for information regarding

potential terrorist activity in their jurisdiction. For

some, the establishment of TTIC prompted the

need to sort out the roles of each agency because

many local police departments have traditionally

worked with the FBI for some time and the inclination is to view them as the first point of contact.

Chiefs also were accustomed to working with

someone in their region, as with area field offices.

However, police agencies recognized that DHS had

been given an important national mission and

operational coordination role. 
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Most of the chief executives reported that

they know their FBI SAC or resident agent but are

unaware of who their DHS representatives might

be in their area. Participants believed decision

makers in each region should help determine how

DHS fits into the area response. Many participants

agreed that federal agencies should consider a onestop contact at the federal level to eliminate confusion and facilitate joint efforts. 

Executive session participants agreed that

federal agencies have made progress in analyzing and

sharing information with relevant local, state and

tribal agencies since the first executive session on

Local-Federal Partnerships (see white paper one in

the series).97 Participants attributed this change to

open dialogue and efforts to build stronger relationships. Session participants agreed that the same

relationship-building process will occur with DHS

once confidence and mutual trust is strengthened

over time with local, state, tribal and other federal

agencies.

Timely and Accurate Information

Many of the concerns described above regarding

information sharing generally also apply to alert

systems specifically. Local law enforcement

emphasized that while there has been some

improvements, threat advisories for the most part

are still vague. To some degree, this is the nature of

most intelligence. DHS representatives reported

that there often is not a lot of good quality information to share with local and state partners.

Local participants suggested, however, that warnings also be better coordinated among the federal

agencies so that they come from one federal source

at one time, not in stages that make the age and

relevance of the data unknown. 

DHS representatives explained that the

source of some of the problems with warnings,

alerts and other information sharing is quite 

complex. In part, the issues arise from congressional authority. Homeland security legislation

gave DHS authority to collect and share information, as well as other activities, but did not rescind

authority for other federal agencies already

engaged in various aspects of intelligence sharing.

This has created overlapping jurisdiction. There

are also limitations on DHS sharing intelligence

that the FBI or non-DHS agencies hold. DHS participants expressed their desire to make their systems more integrated and complementary, while

trying to guard against federal-centric views. They

“We need to have a clear

point of contact for local

law enforcement. It has

been the JTTF and field

office, but now there is a

DHS Operations Center. To

avoid confusion and

duplication, the JTTF should

be the initial point of

contact for law

enforcement on all

terrorism matters. We

need to better sort out the

overlapping jurisdictions.”

—Chris Swecker, Special

Agent in Charge, Charlotte

(NC) Field Office, Federal

Bureau of Investigation

97 Murphy, Gerard R. and Martha R. Plotkin. March 2004. Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: The Strategies for

Local Law Enforcement Series, Vol.1: Local-Federal Partnerships. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.
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71

are also considering the need to better define when

federal agencies communicate at the state homeland security level and when they should go directly to the local level. They invited local law

enforcement to help define how DHS can add

value to intelligence sharing efforts. Executive session participants from DHS agencies expressed a

strong commitment to trying to get information

pushed down faster and in a more usable format to

local law enforcement.

Local law enforcement participants also

encouraged DHS and other federal agencies to

consider when information they are holding will

be of importance to local law enforcement, even

when no immediate threat of terrorism exists. For

example, when the federal agencies were aware

that President Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti

would need U.S. assistance and protection when

he resigned in the face of growing unrest and violence in Haiti, local law enforcement officials with

large Haitian populations believed that they

should have been informed. This information

would have helped them prepare for any problems

at planned large events at the time the United

States intervened, as well as for any disturbances

or demonstrations. 

The local law enforcement participants

also urged their federal partners to focus more on

longer-term analyses that would help them build

their department capabilities and structures to

face threats in the future. They are looking for

more insights into what implications foreign intelligence has for their domestic policing efforts. For

example, more information on what was learned

from the ricin incidents in other countries could

have value for U.S. efforts. Whether through alerts

or other information sharing, local law enforcement is also looking for more information on

trends, techniques and operations that could be

presented to officers in roll call trainings or daily

briefings.

In sum, many law enforcement representatives indicated that they have the primary

responsibility for preparedness and response activities in their jurisdictions, but are operating without strategic information that comes from a

timely, coordinated federal effort. Law enforcement agencies are eager to obtain threat assessments for their jurisdiction, prevention tips to

decrease vulnerability, guidance on responding to

warnings, and information on what other agencies

are doing to respond. They expressed that DHS

has made significant progress and is trying to be

receptive to their needs, recognizing the agency is

still in its infancy.

Technologies

Executive session participants emphasized that

agencies should take advantage of both existing

and emerging technologies to prevent, detect and

respond to terrorist acts. There are significant

challenges, however, to integrating new technologies (information networks, detection technology

and many others) with existing infrastructure and

systems. The reality seems to be that it will take

time to fully integrate technologies that advance

information sharing and interoperability in an

environment that demands instant solutions.

Executive session participants discussed

how local and state agencies have existing technologies that are sometimes overlooked, but that can easily be enhanced—rather than re-inventing systems

that may not be compatible with current systems,

networks or related needs. Participants encouraged

DHS’s Science and Technology (S&T) directorate to

assess and improve existing technologies as well as
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develop new and innovative capabilities. The technologies should be capable of nationwide application with full compatibility and sustainability. 

On June 7, 2004, the DHS S&T directorate launched the Regional Technology Integration Initiative (RTI) to facilitate the application of

innovative technologies and organizational concepts to regional, state and local counterterrorism

efforts.98 DHS chose Anaheim, Cincinnati and

Memphis as the first three pilot cities to share in

the RTI’s $10 million funding. All of the pilot sites

are participating in the Homeland Security Urban

Area Security Initiative to adopt advanced and

innovative concepts for emergency preparedness.

The RTI purpose is to help these cities investigate

private-sector technology that will affect efforts to

combat terrorism and neutralize biological and

chemical attacks. These pilot sites will test hardware and organizational concepts that will provide

the science and technology community with information on how to choose, deploy and manage

these technologies.

Executive session participants indicated

that many local agencies are unaware of new technologies or do not have the funds to purchase, integrate and operate these systems. Planners must

overcome obstacles such as cost and sustainability.99

Prior to implementation, measurable objectives and

plans for continuous evaluation also need to be

set.100 The process should include integrating and

sharing the lessons learned and best practices from

other communities. Many local law enforcement

executives encouraged DHS to aggressively compile

promising practices and to offer training to localities

on these technologies.

Executive session participants briefly discussed the different types of technologies available,

including the biodetection and biometric identification systems described below.101 Participants indicated that more technical assistance and education

on these technologies is needed at the local level.

Biodetection Systems

Since the beginning of 2003, DHS’s BioWatch102

early-warning biodetection system has been operating

in many cities. Specific city and site locations and

other system details are not publicized to avoid

compromising the system. This tool is used by

public health agencies to notify first responders

and citizens of the existence of harmful biological

agents. BioWatch is based on the sample analysis

technologies demonstrated successfully by the Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System

(BASIS) developed by Livermore and Los Alamos

98 At the time of this writing, more information on RTI can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_

release/press_release_0430.xml.

99 For an overview of issues to consider in funding new technology, see Bartosh, Douglas. 2005. “Ways to Fund Technology” in Issues in IT: A Reader for the Busy Police Chief Executive. Ronald W. Glensor and Gerard R. Murphy (eds.) Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

100 As part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, Congress enacted the SAFETY Act to provide risk

management and litigation management protections for the sellers and others in the supply or distribution of qualified antiterrorism technologies. The Act is intended to encourage the development and deployment of anti-terrorism technologies

that will substantially enhance the protection of the nation. A seller must formally apply to DHS for a potential anti-terrorism technology to be awarded SAFETY Act protections. DHS will perform a comprehensive evaluation to determine eligibility of SAFETY Act Designation or Certification. For more information see https://www.safetyact.gov/DHS/

SActHome.nsf/Main?OpenFrameset&67AB24. 

101 Describing the many federal efforts to leverage technology to facilitate information sharing and for myriad other uses

are beyond the parameters of this paper, but those interested in learning more about the Science & Technology Directorate’s

efforts should visit their website www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0531.xml.

102 DHS’s BioWatch fact sheet can be found at https://www.bids.tswg.gov/hsarpa/bids.nsf/F32FE3B1449E699D

85256DC70065EB27/$FILE/BioWatchFactSheetFINAL.pdf.
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laboratories that were deployed at the 2002 Winter

Olympic Games in Salt Lake City and other highprofile events.103 The BioWatch system detects

trace elements of biochemical agents in the air that

may be due to either intentional release or to small

quantities in the environment. Air samples are

routinely collected—daily or as frequently as needed. However, executive session participants

emphasized that BioWatch is only as good as the

assays they use to detect the pathogens, and

stressed the importance of working closely with

experts at the state and local levels. DHS developed sampling devices that are placed in key locations nationwide. These devices are used in many

of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Air

Quality Monitoring Network sites in partnership

with state and local environmental agencies. 

The system assists public health experts in

determining whether a biological agent has been

released and in directing federal, state and local

responses; medical care; and consequence management needs. DHS employs several federal response

assets, such as the Strategic National Stockpile and

the National Disaster Medical System—which

include mobile medical units, vaccines and other

medications—to support the public health infrastructure of an area with a positive detection.

BioWatch is a partnership between local, state and

federal agencies, and includes DHS, Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the EPA

and the Livermore and Los Alamos national laboratories.104 These laboratories provide technical

expertise and training in biological detection to

local and state agencies. 

Biometric Identification System 

DHS, in a joint effort with the Department of Justice (DOJ), announced September 21, 2004, the

integrated 10-print biometric identification technology that is operational in all U.S. Customs and

Border Protection (CBP) Border Patrol stations

throughout the country.105 This capability allows

CBP Border Patrol agents to search the FBI’s fingerprint database at the same time as DHS immigration status databases. The Integrated

Automated Fingerprint Identification System

(IAFIS) and DHS’s Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) help identify individuals

with criminal warrants by comparing electronic

submissions of 10-print digital finger scans against

a nationwide database of the fingerprints of individuals with outstanding criminal warrants. 

Other Technologies

Countless other technologies are under consideration to compile data on suspected terrorists, highrisk sites, signs of bio-, chemical or nuclear activity

and other information of interest to local law

enforcement. Yet many local law enforcement

agencies still lack the systems to share information

even across jurisdictions or states. Obstacles

remain on accessing many sources of information,

maintaining the quality of the data and supporting

the regional fusion centers that can make sense of

the inputs to yield usable intelligence. Local, state

and tribal law enforcement are increasingly looking

103 More information on BASIS can be found at http://www.lanl.gov/worldview/news/pdf/TRCounterTerror_BASIS.pdf. 104 More information on these laboratories can be found at http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/labs/. And for more information on the Homeland Security Organization at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), see

http://www.llnl.gov/hso/about.html.

105 At this writing more information on the biometric identification system can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=43&content=4030.
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to DHS for standards, grants, other resources and

training, and new technologies to address these

issues.

CONCLUSION

There is a critical need for local law enforcement

agencies to analyze their information-sharing

mechanisms to identify gaps, obstacles and redundancies, and to improve processes in working with

their state, tribal and federal partners. Participants

expressed concern that there are too many

stovepipes for intelligence and too many databases

and other sources that make it difficult to judge the

credibility, relevancy and timeliness of information. While executive session attendees generally

agreed that federal agencies have made significant

progress in DHS’s first year, there is still much to

be done to improve coordination among federal

agencies to produce actionable intelligence and to

reduce overlapping jurisdiction. While some session participants acknowledged that there is some

value to redundancy in checking the value and

credibility of information before it is released, that

value is lost when so much duplication leaves local

law enforcement with a confusing series of alerts

and advisories from multiple federal sources with

varying views. Local law enforcement called for a

single point of contact at the federal level for intelligence and information sharing. 

DHS efforts to use various means of communications ranging from email alerts to terrorist

screening center feedback were applauded. Participants encouraged DHS to continue working with

the other federal agencies to produce as much

regional and threat-specific information as possible

to better guide local initiatives. Information and

intelligence must be packaged in ways that are useful to local law enforcement and better links street

officers to the information sharing loops that

should exist among all federal, state, tribal and

local law enforcement.

Local law enforcement wants information

to flow from street officers to federal agencies and

then down again. This is particularly important

when there are new threat advisories. They also

called for flexible protocols (what to do—not how

to do it) that would provide some guidance as to

how agencies might deploy officers under various

color alert changes or other heightened alerts.

These protocols would allow local law enforcement

agencies to have a better sense of how colleagues

across their state and region are responding in

terms of overtime, shift schedules, resource allocation and other key decisions. Consideration should

also be paid to how alerts affect community fear

levels and subsequent demands on law enforcement.

Executive session participants also recommended that there be more education on the various available technologies and how they may 

be used. There was an emphasis on the need for

dual-purpose solutions that could work effectively

in a regional approach. The participants also

stressed the advantages to building on existing

structures and systems when possible, instead of

creating more and more new ones. 

The challenges faced in creating interoperable, effective information systems and new technologies that will link law enforcement at all levels

of government are formidable. Executive session

participants, however, demonstrated a firm commitment to taking them on to reduce federal

redundancies and to promote other measures that

would facilitate effective information exchanges. 
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The recommendations that emerged from the fifth

executive session reflect a theme that has run

through every preceding white paper in this series

on protecting our community from terrorism. It is

simply this: Any advances in securing our nation

from terrorism must build on the successes of

community policing and embrace its underlying

principles. Creating and sustaining partnerships

with law enforcement agencies at all levels of government, with other disciplines and with the public is essential in all efforts to prevent, prepare and

respond to terrorism. For more than 20 years, community policing has encouraged law enforcement

agencies to form bonds of trust with its partners, to

engage in problem solving, to address fear and

community priorities and to think creatively about

crime. Local, state, tribal and federal agencies are

concerned that some policymakers have lost sight

of how crime and terrorism connect and how community-policing approaches can advance efforts to

address both.

DHS has engaged thousands of agencies to

improve the preparedness and response to terrorist

threats, and is continuing the vital task of clarifying each agency’s role and responsibilities in

homeland security. There is growing recognition

that local law enforcement performs a critical function in counterterrorism and that community

policing can promote effective prevention and

response strategies. DHS has made tremendous

progress in its first year, building a mammoth

bureaucracy while developing immediately needed

competencies, collaborations and structures. Still

there is much work to be done, and local, state and

tribal law enforcement must support the process.

Law enforcement agencies will continue to work

with DHS to assess and communicate their communities’ risks and vulnerabilities to a terrorist

attack. They must clearly convey their information

and intelligence needs, their funding problems and

other issues. And just as it took time to develop

contacts within FBI field offices and JTTFs, local

jurisdictions need to work with DHS and other

federal agencies to ensure that regional efforts are

coordinated. Together law enforcement at all levels

must identify priorities for prevention, preparedness

and response that recognize that local police cannot abandon their traditional crime problems. A

comprehensive and cooperative strategy is essential

to addressing the responsibilities and resource 

C HAPTER S I X

RECOMMENDATIONS

“One thing that has come of this session is that DHS and FBI

must have a summit to clear up any confusion about our

multiple sources of information and how we coordinate.”

—Executive Assistant Director Charles Prouty, 

Law Enforcement Services, FBI
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allocations that DHS and law enforcement agencies

must determine. The executive session participants

concluded that coordinated regional approaches

that build on best practices and that are based on

the competencies each agency has to offer is vital. 

The participants at the executive session

provided many suggestions on how DHS and other

federal, tribal, state and local agencies can

strengthen their working relationships to secure

communities across the nation. Highlights of

these recommendations include the following:

DHS Component Agencies’

Missions and Responsibilities 

➔ DHS must continue to build on the significant

progress made in its first year by aggressively marketing its capabilities and resources to all local,

state and tribal law enforcement agencies, regardless of jurisdiction size or threat level. 

➔ DHS must continue work with other federal

agencies to identify and reduce redundancies in

resources, services and programs, particularly

where agencies have been granted concurrent jurisdiction by Congress. Federal agencies with overlapping jurisdiction, especially in intelligence, should

hold a summit to more clearly define their roles,

reduce overlapping efforts and determine the best

way to connect with local, state and tribal law

enforcement.

➔ DHS, in its work with state and local law

enforcement, must recognize the connection

between traditional crimes and terrorism. Initiatives should reflect that local law enforcement’s

criminal intelligence/information collection efforts,

training, equipment and many other functions

work to address both terrorism and traditional

crime. Accordingly DHS should share information

and support traditional local law enforcement

efforts that also benefit counterterrorism. DHS

should provide grant support for law enforcement

efforts to combat serious crimes that destabilize

U.S. communities (e.g., serial shootings) or help

support terrorist acts (e.g., money laundering,

identity theft).

➔ Participants recommend that DHS create a

regional structure that would improve coordination with state and local law enforcement

resources. These regions should be consistent with

the regional efforts by other federal agencies to

address terrorism and support existing task forces.

➔ Session participants called for DHS to redouble its efforts to assemble and disseminate best

practices from across the nation. After-action

reports from other jurisdictions, promising

approaches for infrastructure protection, strategic

planning and any number of protocols were also

requested with constant updates.

State and Local Homeland Security

Structures and Functions

➔ Each state and many local jurisdictions have

some type of a homeland security office, director or

function. DHS should provide guidance to state

and local homeland security offices by collecting

and sharing promising models and approaches for

developing and implementing homeland security

plans. These models should reflect a coordinated

and regional structure that recognizes the unique

responsibilities of local law enforcement as the primary prevention coordinators and information collectors at the community level.
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➔ Executive session participants urged DHS and

states to promote an “all hazards” approach to preparedness and response for a broad range of critical

incidents that includes terrorism, natural disasters

and serious crime issues.

➔ State and local homeland security officials

must work with local law enforcement agencies to

help them meet homeland security demands and

local crime problems. Funding for overtime and

additional officers can alleviate some of the strain

of responding to both demands. Problems with

meeting these responsibilities must continue to be

communicated to DHS.

➔ State homeland security authorities should

continue to foster strong relationships with local

law enforcement leaders to ensure they have a

voice in public safety plans, resource allocation and

other aspects of homeland security strategies.

Building Capacities for Homeland Security

through Partnerships

➔ Local law enforcement should use communitypolicing principles to help them meet the demands

of homeland security. Forging partnerships with

other emergency-service disciplines, working with

neighboring law enforcement agencies, reducing

fear, educating citizens about emergency preparedness and strengthening relationships with minority populations are all strategies of community

policing that can help fulfill homeland security

challenges. 

➔ Local law enforcement agencies must work with

emergency service providers, such as fire, emergency

management and public health, to build multidisciplinary teams capable of preparing for and responding to a multitude of terrorist incidents. 

➔ Local law enforcement agencies must work

with neighboring jurisdictions to build regional

capacities capable of preparing for and responding

to a multitude of terrorist incidents. This includes

developing mutual aid agreements and joint policies, procedures, plans and training.

➔ Local law enforcement agencies must develop

relationships with private sector interests to develop a comprehensive program to protect critical

infrastructure and to prepare for and respond to

terrorist incidents. Information sharing with the

private sector and the use of private sector databases must consider privacy issues and include a

public education effort that will clearly communicate how the information will be used, the limitations on its use and any impact on civil liberties.

➔ Local agencies should continue to develop

partnerships with and training for business leaders, facility owners and building staff (maintenance, doormen, front desk personnel), including

residential complexes to support counterterrorism

work. The partnerships could include target hardening through environmental design and other

guidance and response procedures for building staff

to handle suspicious people and packages.

➔ Transportation security protocols should be

applied to rail and bus systems, ports and cargo

protection. Rail and bus transit systems often cross

jurisdictional and state lines and present special

challenges in coordinating protection and response

efforts. Participants stressed the need for greater

security measures, multidisciplinary exercises and

training, funding and technology resources to better safeguard these systems.
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➔ Local law enforcement agencies with military

bases or facilities in their jurisdiction should develop partnerships with these resources for protecting

critical infrastructure (both technology/equipment

and personnel). In addition, local agencies should

try to ascertain when, and to what extent, military

resources can be used to support civil responses to

critical incidents. 

➔ Local agencies should work with military commands to develop protocols for re-integrating

police personnel returning from active duty, as well

as for supporting their families during call-ups.

➔ Law enforcement at all levels should support

efforts to address legal issues that hinder coordination and limit tribal enforcement authority to carry

out counterterrorism duties. Tribal law enforcement is essential to the protection of more than

250 miles of borders. Obstacles to tribal law

enforcement accessing NCIC and other basic services or resources also must be addressed.

Engaging the Community in Homeland

Security

➔ Local law enforcement should remain committed to using a problem-solving approach to both

crime and terrorism that builds on successful partnerships with citizens. Community partnerships

and volunteers, including neighborhood watch,

retired military and law enforcement personnel,

Volunteers in Police Service members, police auxiliaries, and other individuals can provide valuable

assistance in homeland security initiatives.

➔ Police should engage in community education

and awareness programs to discuss law enforcement initiatives to prevent terrorist incidents. This

could include discussing what suspicious activity

looks like, suspicious packages on mass transit

systems, police information-gathering and intelligence procedures and more.

➔ Law enforcement should share best practices

on investigatory stops, engaging the community

when threat levels rise, protocols on what community members should report to police and how that

information is handled, employing 911 or alternative systems and more.

➔ Federal partners should work closely with local

agencies when conducting interviews of members

of their community or investigating within their

jurisdiction.

➔ DHS should continue to develop the Citizen

Corps and Community Emergency Response

Teams to increase volunteer involvement in preparedness and response efforts, including their

inclusion in some training and practice exercises.

Law Enforcement Role and Responsibilities

➔ Local law enforcement participants stressed

that a national response to terrorism must consider

local law enforcement a full partner in homeland

security work, particularly given the networks they

have established through community policing. They

would also like more support for their unique role

among first responders in prevention work through

information collection and target security.

➔ Adequate direct federal funding to local law

enforcement should be considered, which has been

reduced over several years, for traditional law

enforcement personnel and services that not only

advances crime-fighting efforts, but also furthers

counterterrorism work. 
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79

➔ DHS, the FBI and other federal agencies must

work with state and local law enforcement to support and train street-level officers to gather information and detect suspicious activity. Officers need

further insights into terrorists’ goals and methods, as

well as the indicators of potential terrorist activities. 

➔ Local agencies must take appropriate steps to

prepare and assign personnel to handle homeland

security functions—or to enter into agreements

with area agencies and others who may be able to

provide needed support—while continuing to handle regular demands for service. 

➔ State and local agencies should have a

response plan to address any officer fatigue issues,

overtime concerns and limited resources, particularly when the threat level rises or in response to a

terrorist incident. 

➔ Local law enforcement stressed that national

response plans must consider designating a single

federal coordinator to oversee all federal agencies

during preparedness efforts and responses to critical incidents.

DHS Resources and Training

➔ DHS should educate state and local law

enforcement about National Special Security Events

(NSSEs), including criteria for NSSE designation,

and the roles and responsibilities of participating

agencies. 

➔ DHS should provide law enforcement with

additional technical assistance and guidance for

implementing the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The National Integration

Center should provide clear direction for local law

enforcement as well as answers to ongoing implementation questions.

➔ DHS should solicit law enforcement guidance

when making decisions about training programs.

There must be an ongoing analysis of training

needs to identify gaps and redundancies. Consideration should be given to problems in covering

travel or other costs associated with sending personnel to training and to assess effectiveness.

Ongoing needs assessments must be made for

local law enforcement-specific resources and

equipment shortages, as well.

➔ Local law enforcement needs training at all

levels—from line officers to command-level to the

chief executive level. Training should address

street-level indicators of terrorism, the nexus

between traditional crime and terrorism, information analysis, targeting and profiling issues,

privacy concerns and other important concepts.

➔ DHS and local agencies must work together

to improve awareness of DHS training resources

and opportunities. DHS should better promote its

training programs, and local agencies should regularly browse the DHS website and the CounterTerrorism Training and Resources for Law

Enforcement website to find needed training and

related material for their jurisdiction.

➔ Participants encouraged DHS to make use of

existing training facilities and programs, such as

the Regional Community Policing Institutes

(RCPIs). The RCPIs and other regional facilities

can be used to deliver programs and identify

experts to institute standards and evaluations for

training.
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➔ DHS and law enforcement must work together

to foster a greater dual use orientation for training.

Grant Programs

➔ DHS must continue to work with state and

local governments as well as Congress to rectify

obstacles to the quick, effective and flexible use of

homeland security grants. 

➔ Participants agreed that funds should be distributed based on a national strategy of shared

responsibility, accountability and leadership. The

grants should emphasize the need for coordinated

regional systems and address law enforcement’s

greatest needs.

➔ DHS should continue to work on improving

electronic grant filings; working with other federal

partners to develop standards for equipment, training and technology purchased with grants; and providing technical assistance for strategic plans.

➔ Local law enforcement encouraged lawmakers

and federal grants administrators to remain cognizant of law enforcement’s unique responsibilities

for security and prevention that increase workload

demands, particularly during elevated threat levels

or large-scale community events.

➔ State agencies must work with localities to

improve strategies for developing plans and distributing funding to local agencies. Both state and

local governments must be prepared to make

changes in appropriations and procurement laws.

➔ DHS should place a greater emphasis on an

all-hazards and all-crimes approach for funding,

including greater focus on dual use, and flexibility for spending for counterterrorism efforts that

include handling local crime issues that affect

public safety.

➔ Local agencies should consider seeking support

from other sources including the private sector,

local foundations and surplus programs for homeland security needs.

Information Sharing and Alert

Systems

➔ Session participants called for a summit for

DHS, FBI and other intelligence producers and

consumers to more clearly define roles in information collection, sharing, analysis and dissemination, including eliminating federal redundancies

and obstacles to sharing.

➔ Though ideally local law enforcement agencies

would like DOJ and DHS to designate a single federal contact for receiving information from and

disseminating intelligence to local law enforcement, they understand the realities of the federal

structure. At minimum, closer coordination

among the federal agencies would improve the consistency and timeliness of information they

receive, which would increase their confidence in

the product. 

➔ DHS must cultivate relationships and build

trust with state and local law enforcement agencies

that have a long history of working with the FBI

and other DOJ resources.

➔ Local law enforcement recommends an allcrimes approach to intelligence and information

sharing—an approach that considers domestic and

international terrorists, criminal activity that may

be used to support or finance terrorism efforts, as
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81

well as any other crimes and disturbances that

threaten communities. 

➔ Federal officials must work with local law

enforcement to more fully engage street-level officers as partners in the information-gathering and

intelligence-generating functions. Street officers

are uniquely positioned to interact with suspected

terrorists or to gain information of value to intelligence analysts. Officers’ value can be increased if

they have a better understanding of indicators of

terrorist activity.

➔ To promote compatibility and interoperability,

federal agencies, to the extent possible, should

build on existing networks, databases and systems.

➔ Federal, state and local law enforcement must

ensure that any information sharing initiatives

fully consider the civil rights and privacy issues of

citizens. A public education effort should precede

and continue after the launch of new systems that

are used to collect, store and disseminate information on individuals gathered to further public safety initiatives.

➔ Participants urged DHS to widely disseminate

the evaluation of the Homeland Security Information Network-Critical Infrastructure Pilot Program

to determine whether it is suitable for replication

in other areas to facilitate coordination among the

public and private sector.

Alert Systems

➔ DHS must continue work on the Homeland

Security Advisory System to quickly identify

regions and/or industry sectors at greater risk; to

provide an explanation and specific information or

criteria for a change in the threat level; and to

share exemplary practices used by law enforcement

in response to various threat levels. 

➔ Local, state and tribal agencies in jurisdictions

with their own citywide or statewide system

should ensure there is compatibility with the

national system. 

➔ Federal agencies should include in alerts a

clear, single point of contact if local, state or tribal

law enforcement have additional information

related to the warnings.

➔ Threat or warning information communicated

to citizens should consider the potential effects on

community reactions and the subsequent effect on

state and local law enforcement agencies, including public education and community preparedness.

➔ DHS and DOJ must develop clear protocols for

communicating threat information with law

enforcement and political authorities. Information

releases should follow those protocols and should

be coordinated through JTTFs or other established,

immediate communication systems.

Technologies

➔ DHS should work with local, state and tribal

agencies to increase their awareness of the availability, capabilities and funding options for new

technologies, especially regarding interoperability,

biodetection and biometric identification systems.

➔ DHS should work with local and state agencies to identify existing technologies that can be

enhanced or adapted for homeland security needs.

DHS should solicit suggestions for new applications, and how to address funding and sustainability concerns.
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CONCLUSION

The executive session was marked by a strong

commitment to work together to solve complex

problems and organizational issues. One recommendation was that working groups should be

formed to resolve each of the more complicated

issues participants raised. Though DHS made significant progress in its first year, and in many ways

the challenges were unprecedented, the agency is

committed to long-term improvements that meet

the needs of law enforcement at all levels. Participants at the executive session recognized that like

any new major corporation there will be inevitable

growing pains and hurdles that must be navigated

together. 

Some of the remaining challenges will be

addressed with time, collaborative efforts and the

implementation of best practices. Others will

require major changes in jurisdiction, organizational structure and ways of thinking about what

constitutes a secure homeland. Many of these

reforms can build on the success of community

policing—innovative partnerships, problem solving and community involvement. Local law

enforcement is uniquely positioned to detect and

address possible terrorist threats, but cannot do so

in a vacuum. They are looking to federal agencies

for a coordinated approach to information sharing,

intelligence dissemination, support and assistance.

As roles are more clearly defined, it will become

apparent that limited resources must address both

traditional crimes and terrorism. 

Though participants placed a high premium on new technologies, grants and training

opportunities, the greatest hope for advancement

was premised on better communications, trust and

respectful collaborations. Many participants indicated that this series of executive sessions provided some of the first opportunities for key players to

openly discuss and propose changes based on recommendations for addressing homeland security

issues. Local, state, tribal and federal agencies,

including DHS representatives, challenged one

another to continue these or similar forums to discuss homeland security issues and take on the

tough issues that thwart effective, integrated

efforts. They also challenged their colleagues to

conduct the same types of forums at the local or

regional level to confront turf issues, delineate

roles and responsibilities and to ensure that limited resources are being used to their fullest to serve

all our communities.

In the final analysis, the events that

prompted the development of DHS have created an

urgent need for a sustainable partnership among

local, state, tribal and federal law enforcement

agencies to focus all of our energies and abilities on

preventing the next terrorist incident. It is our

hope that this publication advances those efforts.
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Participants106

Assistant Secretary Parney Albright

Directorate of Science and Technology

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Executive Assistant Director

Maureen Baginski

Office of Intelligence

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, DC

Associate Chief Todd Birdsong

United States Border Patrol

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Director General Matthew Broderick

Homeland Security Operations Center

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Chief Security Officer Douglas Callen

Transportation Security Administration

Department of Homeland Security

Chief of Staff John Chase

Information Analysis and Infrastructure

Protection

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Chief Gustavo De La Vina

United States Border Patrol

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Chief Charlie T. Deane

Prince William County Police Department

Prince William, VA

Acting Chief Suzanne Devlin

Fairfax County Police Department

Fairfax, VA

Director Joshua Filler

Office of State and Local Government

Coordination and Preparedness

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Secretary Edward A. Flynn

Executive Office of Public Safety

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Boston, MA

Deputy Assistant to the Governor

George Foresman

Office of Commonwealth Preparedness

Office of Governor Mark Warner

Richmond, VA

Chief Terrance Gainer

U.S. Capitol Police

Washington, DC

Assistant Secretary Michael Garcia

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Chief Polly Hanson

Metro Transit Police Department

Washington, DC

106 Participants’ ranks and agency affiliations are listed as of the time of the executive session.

PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVERS

A PPENDIX A
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Director Rear Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway

United States Coast Guard,

Operations Center

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Program Manager Wendy Howe

Directorate of Science and Technology

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Assistant Secretary General

Patrick Hughes

Information Analysis

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Undersecretary Asa Hutchinson

Border and Transportation Security

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Director Ronald Iden

Office of Homeland Security

Office of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger

Sacramento, CA

Deputy Assistant Director Paul Kilcoyne

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Assistant Secretary Robert Liscouski

Infrastructure Protection

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Branch Chief Michael Lowder

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Chief Noel March

University of Maine

Orono, ME

Director Maureen McCarthy

Office of Research and Development

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Chief Thomas D. McCarthy

Fayetteville Police Department

Fayetteville, NC

Deputy Assistant Director

E. James McDermond

United States Secret Service

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Director James W. McMahon

New York State Office of Public Security

Albany, NY

Chief Bernard Melekian

Pasadena Police Department

Pasadena, CA

Director Sue Mencer

Office of Domestic Preparedness

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Bureau Chief John Miller

Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence

Bureau

Los Angeles Police Department

Los Angeles, CA

Director Gerard Murphy

Homeland Security and Technology Division

National Governors Association

Washington, DC

Chief Richard Myers

Appleton Police Department

Appleton, WI

Director Frank F. Navarrete

Arizona Office of Homeland Security

Arizona Division of Emergency Management

Phoenix, AZ
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Liasion to the FBI William Parrish

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Director Carl Peed

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, DC

Executive Assistant Director John Pistole

Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence

Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, DC

Executive Assistant Director

Charles Prouty

Law Enforcement Services

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, DC

Director Louis Quijas

Office of Law Enforcement Coordination

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, DC

Chief Charles Ramsey

Metropolitan Police Department

Washington, DC

Chief Edward Reina

Yavapai-Prescott Tribal Police

Prescott, AZ

Deputy Director Richard Russell

Homeland Security Operations Center

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

SAC Chris Swecker

FBI Charlotte Field Office

Charlotte, NC

SAC Charlene Thorton

FBI Phoenix Field Office

Phoenix, AZ

Chief John Timoney

Miami Police Department

Miami, FL

Deputy Assistant Director

James Tomsheck

United States Secret Service

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Assistant Chief Deirdre Walker

Montgomery County Police Department

Rockville, MD

Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Willeford

Oregon State Police

Salem, OR

Observers107

Director of Research Rob Davis

Police Foundation

Washington, DC

Liaison to Bureau of Transportation and

Security Anneva DeConto

State and Local Government Coordination

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Senior Advisor for Law Enforcement

Steven Edwards

Bureau of Justice Assistance

U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, DC

Associate Deputy Director Eileen Garry

Bureau of Justice Assistance

U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, DC

Dean Jack Greene

College of Criminal Justice

Northeastern University

Boston, MA

107 Observers’ ranks and agency affiliations are listed as of the time of the executive session.
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Lieutenant Colonel Bart Johnson

New York State Police

Office of Counter Terrorism

Albany, NY

Professor David Klinger

Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice

University of Missouri-St. Louis

St. Louis, MO

Professor Gary LaFree

Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice

University of Maryland

College Park, MD

Director Steve Mastrofski

Department of Justice

George Mason University

Manassas, VA

Senior Social Science Analyst

Lois Felson Mock

National Institute of Justice

Washington, DC

Senior Law Enforcement Coordinator

Ron Parthemore

Office of State and Local Government

Coordination

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC

Senior Research Associate Tony Pate

COSMOS Corporation

Bethesda, MD

Director Steve Rickman

Homeland Security

CNA Corporation

Alexandria, VA

Senior Information Technology Specialist

Clark Smith

U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, DC

Senior Fellow Chips Stewart

Domestic Safety

CNA Corporation

Alexandria, VA

Special Assistant to the Assistant Director

Kathleen Timmons

Federal Bureau of Investigations

Washington, DC
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87

Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services Staff

1100 Vermont Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20530

Phone: 1-800-421-6770

Fax: 202-616-2914

Website: www.cops.usdoj.gov 

Carl Peed

Director

David H. Andelman

Management Analyst

Karl Bickel

Senior Policy Analyst

Michael Dillon

Grant Monitoring Specialist

Ward Knowles

Management Analyst

Frank Mathers

Grant Monitoring Specialist

Katherine McQuay

Senior Project Manager

Amy Schapiro

Senior Social Science Analyst 

Michael Seelman

Senior Social Science Analyst

Police Executive Research Forum Staff

1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 930

Washington, DC 20036

Phone: 202-466-7820

Fax: 202-466-7826

Website: www.policeforum.org

Chuck Wexler

Executive Director 

Anna Berke

Conference Coordinator

Corina Solé Brito

Research Associate

Heather Davies

Research Associate

Joshua Ederheimer

Senior Research Associate

Don Faggiani

Senior Research Associate

Lorie Fridell

Director of Research

Alex Hayes

Research Assistant

Clifford Karchmer

Director of Program Development

Steve Loyka

Research and Legislative Assistant

Stacy Osnick Milligan

Research Associate

Martha Plotkin

Communications Director

Melissa Reuland

Senior Research Associate
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A PPENDIX B

ABOUT THE AUTHORS108

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89

Heather J. Davies, Ph.D. 

Research Associate

Police Executive Research Forum

Davies is responsible for managing national-level

research and policy development projects. She is

the project director of the white paper series, Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement, and the project on

Community Policing in a Security-Conscious

World. Davies is lead author of the second white

paper in this series, Working with Diverse Communities, and co-author of the third white paper,

Preparing for and Responding to Bioterrorism. She

is one of PERF’s representatives for several terrorism research working groups. Davies was also the

project coordinator and contributing author of the

Bureau of Justice Assistance-funded project, Managing Multijurisdictional Cases: Lessons Learned

from the Sniper Investigation. 

Prior to joining PERF, Davies was a senior

research associate with the American Bar Association’s Center on Children and the Law and the

Criminal Justice Section. She was the principal

investigator on a project evaluating parental

involvement practices of juvenile courts, and one

on improving legal and judicial responses to

parental kidnapping. Davies assisted in the analysis of legal services provided by the District of

Columbia’s Office of Corporation Counsel to the

Child and Family Services Agency. In addition, she

served as the project associate on such studies as

the implementation of the Michigan LawyerGuardian Ad Litem Statute, a national assessment

of law enforcement and community partnerships

for helping children exposed to domestic violence,

and an evaluation of domestic violence no-drop

policies. Davies is the co-author of a National Center for Missing and Exploited Children monograph, Child Pornography: The Criminal Justice

Response. Davies holds a bachelor’s degree in

sociology from Virginia Tech, and a master’s

degree and a Ph.D. in justice, law and society from

American University. Her dissertation addressed

Understanding Variations in Murder Clearance

Rates: The Influence of the Political Environment.

Martha Plotkin, J.D. 

Director of Communications and Legislative

Affairs

Police Executive Research Forum

Plotkin directs PERF’s publications, media and legislative programs. She has had extensive experience researching and writing on law enforcement

matters, as well as defining and implementing a

national policy and legislative agenda for police

professionals. She regularly has provided information to congressional leaders and the national

media on matters of public safety. Plotkin has edited more than 50 publications in her tenure and

has written myriad op-ed articles, briefings and

testimonies on issues ranging from gun safety to

funding police services. She is the co-author of the

108 The authors’ and contributing authors’ titles and agency affiliations are as of the time of the executive session.
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first volume in this series, Local-Federal Partnerships. Her other work includes being the author of

A Time for Dignity and other articles and training

materials on the police response to elder abuse.

She is also the co-author of Police and the Homeless: A Status Report and the editor of Under Fire:

Gun Buy-Backs, Exchanges and Amnesty Programs. Plotkin was also a contributing author of the

publication Managing Multijurisdictional Cases:

Lessons Learned from the Sniper Investigation.

An attorney, she also works on amicus

briefs and other legal issues affecting police agencies.

Plotkin has managed and continues to contribute to

research projects on homeland security issues and

the police response to special populations and victims. She completed the legal studies program at

Brandeis University where she received her bachelor’s degree in psychology. She earned her law degree

from The George Washington University Law

School.
A PPENDIX C

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

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91

Joshua Filler

Director of the Office of State and Local 

Government Coordination

Department of Homeland Security 

Filler is the primary point of contact for state, local

and tribal homeland security leaders and is responsible for coordinating the programs and policies of

DHS as they relate to state, tribal and local governments including funding issues, information sharing

and incident management. As such, he works regularly with other senior DHS officials on a wide variety of topics including intelligence matters, grants,

national preparedness, and antiterrorism operations

within the United States and its territories. 

Prior to joining DHS, he was director of

local affairs for the White House Office of Homeland Security. As director of local affairs, Filler was

responsible for coordinating with local governments around the country on homeland security

matters. This included information sharing, incident management and response, as well as legislative and budget issues.

Before joining the White House, he served

in the Cabinet of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in New

York as director of legislative affairs for the Mayor

and chief of staff to the deputy mayor for operations. There he coordinated the city’s operational

agencies and all legislative and oversight issues for

the city administration, including the NYPD,

FDNY and the public health agencies. After September 11, he was responsible for emergency operational issues and managing contacts with local,

state and federal officials on behalf of New York

City in connection with the attack on the World

Trade Center.

Prior to his government service Filler was

an attorney in private practice in New York. He

graduated from Boston University with a B.A. in

political science. He received his law degree from

St. John’s University School of Law.

Edward A. Flynn

Secretary of Public Safety

Commonwealth of Massachusetts Secretary of

Public Safety

Secretary Flynn was appointed Secretary of Public

Safety by Governor Mitt Romney in January 2003.

He is responsible for the management and administration of a variety of public safety agencies, boards

and commissions including the Massachusetts State

Police, the Department of Corrections, the National

Guard, the Department of Fire Services and the

Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency.

The Executive Office is also responsible for homeland security in the Commonwealth. The Executive

Office of Public Safety has a budget totaling $1 billion, and employs more than 10,000 people. 

Prior to his appointment as secretary of

public safety, he served for five years as the chief of

police in Arlington County, Virginia. In his capacity as chief, Flynn was instrumental in the recovery effort at the Pentagon after the September 11

terrorist attack, and in 2002, he participated in the

sniper-shootings investigation in the Washington,

D.C. area. 
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His early career was spent in the Jersey City

Police Department, where he served for 15 years, rising to the rank of inspector. He has been the chief of

police in Braintree, Massachusetts, where he was

credited with modernizing the department. He subsequently became chief of police in Chelsea, Massachusetts, where he helped lead the city out of

state-imposed receivership to designation as an “All

American City.”

Flynn is a past recipient of the prestigious

Gary P. Hayes Memorial Award for Police Leadership

from the Police Executive Research Forum. He is on

the board of directors of the national bipartisan anticrime organization Fight Crime: Invest in Kids.

He holds a B.A. in history from LaSalle

University in Philadelphia, a master’s degree in

criminal justice from John Jay College of Criminal

Justice in New York and completed all course work

in the Ph.D. program in criminal justice from the

City University in New York. He is a graduate of

the FBI National Academy, the National Executive

Institute and was a National Institute of Justice

Pickett Fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School of 

Government.

George Foresman

Assistant to the Governor for Commonwealth

Preparedness

Commonwealth of Virginia

George W. Foresman serves Virginia’s citizens and

Governor Mark R. Warner as Assistant to the Governor for Commonwealth Preparedness, a Cabinet-level

position. In this capacity he is the principal advisor

and overall coordinator for homeland security, preparedness, and relations with military commands and

installations throughout Virginia. Foresman chairs the

Secure Commonwealth Panel and leads the Governor’s related initiative responsible for strengthening

Virginia’s security and preparedness for emergencies and disasters of all kinds, including terrorism. He serves as Virginia’s principal liaison with

the White House, Congress, U.S. Department of

Homeland Security, and other federal entities to

coordinate homeland security policy and programs as well as obtaining resources.

Maintaining a productive relationship

with the Department of Defense and Armed Services remains a priority for Governor Warner.

Foresman serves as the Governor’s direct Cabinet-level liaison with top defense and military

officials, commands and installations. He is the

vice-chair of the Virginia Military Advisory

Council that serves to foster civil-military communication and pro-military policies across Virginia. Foresman also provides oversight of the

Commonwealth’s activities relative to federal

base realignment and closure process.

He is a nationally recognized expert on

emergency preparedness and homeland security,

and was a member and vice-chair of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities Involving Terrorism, established by

Congress in 1998 to evaluate America’s readiness for terrorism. The Panel delivered five

annual reports to the Congress and President

before completing its work in December 2003.

More than 125 of the Panel’s 144 recommendations have been adopted in part or whole. He frequently is solicited for consultation on national

policy issues.

A native of Lexington, Virginia, Foresman joined state government in 1985. He possesses more than 20 years of experience in

emergency management, law enforcement, fire

and emergency medical service organizations

ranging from operations to executive-level
leadership. He is a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute as well as the Virginia Executive

Institute.

Jacqueline Litzinger

Commander of Infrastructure Protection

CSX Transportation

Litzinger has 24 years experience in law enforcement, having held positions in both the public and

private sectors. Her experiences include positions

held in the Baltimore City Police Department, the

University of Arizona Police Department (nationally accredited) and CSX Transportation Police

Department. Litzinger holds a Florida Law

Enforcement Certification. She has previously held

law enforcement certifications in both Maryland

and Arizona.

Litzinger has been with CSX Transportation since 1994. She is responsible for the security

planning, deterrence and mitigation of terrorist

threats and other hazards affecting CSX Transportation. Litzinger’s former position with CSX

involved the supervision of railroad police special

agents in the Jacksonville Division, whose jurisdiction included the States of Florida, Alabama,

Louisiana and Mississippi. She participates in various law enforcement networks such as serving on

the Executive Security Committee of JAXPORT

and the Northeast Florida Domestic Security Task

Force. 

Litzinger earned a master of science degree

in management with a concentration in community development from the Johns Hopkins University at Baltimore. She is a graduate of the Police

Executive Leadership Program at Johns Hopkins

University. Her undergraduate degree is a bachelor

of science in public administration from the University of Arizona.

Chief Thomas D. McCarthy

Fayetteville Police Department

Chief McCarthy began his policing career in the

1970s with the Newport News (VA) Police Department. During his tenure in Newport News he had

the good fortune of working with Chief Darrel

Stephens and the Police Executive Research Forum

with one of the initial problem-oriented policing

projects. While there, he attained the position of

commander, leaving in 1987 to become the police

chief of the Gaston County (NC) Police Department. He left in 1993 to become the Fort Lauderdale police chief. In 1994, at the request of the

Gaston County Manager, he returned to Gaston

County to become the deputy county manager and

police chief. In 2001, he was selected as police

chief in Fayetteville, North Carolina.

McCarthy has a B.A. in education from

Southwestern College in Kansas, and a master’s

degree in public administration from the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. He is a graduate

of the 145th Session of the FBI National Academy

and the 25th Session of the FBI LEEDS program.

He is also a veteran of the United States Coast

Guard. He has served as an adjunct faculty member

at Thomas Nelson Community College, Methodist

College and the University of North Carolina at

Charlotte. At this writing, he is an adjunct professor at the University of North Carolina at Pembroke’s Master of Public Administration Program.

Jane Wiseman

Assistant Secretary

Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive

Office of Pubic Safety

Wiseman is responsible for overseeing $100 million in federal and state grant funds for public safety

and homeland security in Massachusetts. In this

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position, she oversees grant making for programs

funded by the Massachusetts state legislature, the

U.S. Justice Department Office of Justice Programs,

the Office of Domestic Preparedness, the Department of Education and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. She previously served in

management consulting with Accenture. During

her first year at the Executive Office of Public Safety, Wiseman initiated electronic grant making and

has automated several components of the back-end

processing of grants. Her previous experience

includes nearly five years at the United States

Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice. During that time she worked for one budget

season, on detail from the Justice Department for

the U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations

Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,

State and Related Agencies. She has also served in

the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. Wiseman holds a bachelor’s degree in government from

Smith College and a master of public policy degree

from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at

Harvard University. 
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Since 1994, COPS has invested over $11.9 billion

to add community policing officers to the nation’s

streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support

crime prevention initiatives, and provide training

and technical assistance to help advance community policing. COPS funding has furthered the

advancement of community policing through community policing innovation conferences, the development of best practices, pilot community policing

programs, and applied research and evaluation initiatives. COPS has also positioned itself to respond

directly to emerging law enforcement needs. Examples include working in partnership with departments to enhance police integrity, promoting safe

schools, combating the methamphetamine drug

problem, and supporting homeland security

efforts.

Through its grant programs, COPS is

assisting and encouraging local, state, and tribal

law enforcement agencies to enhance their homeland security efforts using proven community policing strategies. Traditional COPS programs such as

the Universal Hiring Program (UHP) give priority

consideration to those applicants that demonstrate

a use of funds related to terrorism preparedness or

response through community policing. The COPS

in Schools (CIS) program has a mandatory training

component that includes topics on terrorism prevention, emergency response, and the critical role

schools can play in community response. Finally,

COPS has implemented grant programs intended

to develop interoperable voice and data communications networks among emergency response agencies that will assist in addressing local homeland

security demands.

The COPS Office has made substantial

investments in law enforcement training. COPS

created a national network of Regional Community Policing Institutes (RCPIs) that are available to

state and local law enforcement, elected officials

A PPENDIX D

ABOUT THE OFFICE OF COMMUNITY

ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES (COPS),

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

T HE OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES (COPS) WAS

created in 1994 and has the unique mission to directly serve the needs

of state and local law enforcement. The COPS Office has been the driving force in advancing the concept of community policing, and is responsible for

one of the greatest infusions of resources into state, local, and tribal law enforcement in our nation’s history. 
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and community leaders for training opportunities

on a wide range of community policing topics.

Recently the RCPIs have been focusing their efforts

on developing and delivering homeland security

training. COPS also supports the advancement of

community policing strategies through the Community Policing Consortium. Additionally, COPS

has made a major investment in applied research,

which makes possible the growing body of substantive knowledge covering all aspects of community

policing.

These substantial investments have produced a significant community policing infrastructure across the country as evidenced by the fact

that at the present time, approximately 86 percent

of the nation’s population is served by law enforcement agencies practicing community policing. The

COPS Office continues to respond proactively by

providing critical resources, training, and technical

assistance to help state, local, and tribal law

enforcement implement innovative and effective

community policing strategies.
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97

• the exercise of strong national leadership,

• the public debate of police and criminal justice issues,

• the development of research and policy, and

• the provision of vital management and leadership services to police agencies.

PERF members are selected on the basis of

their commitment to the organization’s objectives

and principles. PERF operates under the following

tenets:

• Research, experimentation and exchange of

ideas through public discussion and debate

are paths for the development of a comprehensive body of knowledge about policing.

• Substantial and purposeful academic study is

a prerequisite for acquiring, understanding

and adding to that body of knowledge.

• Maintenance of the highest standards of

ethics and integrity is imperative to the

improvement of policing.

• The police must, within the limits of the law,

be responsible and accountable to citizens as

the ultimate source of police authority.

• The principles embodied in the Constitution

are the foundation of policing.

Categories of membership also allow the

organization to benefit from the diverse views of

criminal justice researchers, law enforcement of all

ranks and other professionals committed to advancing law enforcement services to all communities.

A PPENDIX E

ABOUT THE POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH

FORUM (PERF) 

PERF IS A NATIONAL PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVES OF LARGE

city, county and state law enforcement agencies. PERF’s objective is to

improve the delivery of police services and the effectiveness of crime

control through several means:
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Additional color copies of this report can be downloaded for free at www.policeforum.org and

www.cops.usdoj.gov/.
1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 930

Washington, DC 20036

Telephone: 202.466.7820

Fax: 202.466.7826

www.policeforum.org