### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

No. 84368 

# LE
OCI 11 2022

BF:nwN CL 'UPREMeCOURT DEPUTY í. RK 

### LUXX LIGHTING, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, INAND FOR THE COUNTYOF CLARK;AND THE HONORABLE NADIA KRALL, DISTRICTJUDGE, Respondents, and FOHSE, INC., Real Partyin Interest. 

# F

ORDERDENYING PETITION This original petition for a writ of prohibition challenges a districtcourt orderdenyingamotionforjudgment onthepleadings. Having considered the petition, answer, and reply, we conclude that our intervention is not warranted atthis time.

Because a writ petition seeks extraordinary relief, the consideration ofthe petition is within our sole discretion. Okada v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 134 Nev. 6, 8, 408 P.3d 566, 569 (2018). When there is no "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," NRS 34.170, a writ of prohibition may be available to "arrest[ the proceedings of any tribunal
. . . exercising judicial functions, when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal," NRS 34.320; Daane v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 654, 655, 261 P.3d 1086, 1087 (2011.).

As a general rule, we will not entertain a writ petition that challenges a district court order denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Chur v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 136 Nev. 68, 70, 458 P.3d 

# 2.i_-5206Z SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA (0) I947.A336, 339 (2020). And we are not convinced that thispetition implicates any

exception to that general rule. See id. (reviewing such orders only where "(1) no factual dispute exists and the district court is obligated to [grant the motion] pursuant to clear authority under a statute or rule; or (2) an important issue of law needs clarification and considerations of sound judicial economy and administration militate in favor of granting the petition"). First,petitionerhasnot demonstratedthat the district courtwas obligated to grant the motion under clear legal authority. Petitioner moved forjudgment on the pleadings on the ground that the district court lacked jurisdiction over petitioner. A defendant may use a motion forjudgment on the pleadings "to raise various rule 12(b) defenses regarding procedural defects." Alexander v. City of Chicago, 994 F.2d 333, 336 (7th Cir. 1993). But thisislimited to "only certainprocedural defenses after the close ofthe pleadings, asauthorizedby Rule 12(h)(2)and(3)." Mussat v. Enclarity,Inc., 362 F. Supp. 3d 468, 472 (N.D. Ill. 2019); see 5C Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367 (3d ed. 2018). Because NRCP 12(h)(2) and (3) do not include the defense of a lack of personal jurisdiction, a motion for judgment on the pleadings cannot be used to assertthat defense. SeeMussat, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 472 (concluding that "the only 12(b)defensesthat mayproperlybe brought after the close of pleadings in a 12(c) motion" include a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, failure tojoin a necessary party, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction); 5C Wright & Miller, supra, § 1367 (explaining "that
r`Federal cases interpretingthe Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure are strong persuasive authority, because the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure are based in large part upon their federal counterparts." McClendon v. Collins, 132 Nev. 327, 330, 372 P.3d 492, 494 (2016) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

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OF NEVADA i0) 1,47A 2C.J. arraguirre

Herndon Sr.J. the defenses of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, failure to join a party under Rule 19 without whom the action cannot proceed, and failure to state a legal defense to a claim may be raised on a motion for judgment on the pleadings"). Second, because petitioner can
move for an evidentiary hearing on personaljurisdiction or challenge it at trial (provided it has not been waived), considerations of sound judicial economy and administration do not militate in favor of granting the petition.2 See Trump v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 109 Nev. 687, 693-94, 857 P.2d 740, 744-45 (1993) (discussing the different manners a defendant maychallenge personaljurisdiction before and at trial). For these reasons,
we ORDER the petition DENIED.3

2The parties dispute whether petitioner waived personaljurisdiction, see Superpurnper, Inc. v. Leonard, Tr.forBankr. Est. ofMorabito, 137Nev., Adv. Op. 43, 495 P.3d 101, 106 (2021) (holdingthat personaljurisdiction is an affirmative defense which is waived if not raised in the responsive pleading), but we do not reach this issue because the district court order does not explicitlyaddressit. See 9352 Cranesbill Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 136Nev. 76, 82, 459P.3d 227, 232 (2020) (providingthat "thiscourt will not addressissues that the district court did not directlyresolve").

3The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the decision ofthis matter under a general order ofassignment.

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### cc: Hon. Nadia Kra11, DistrictJudge Snell &Wilmer, LLP/LasVegas Lamkin IP Defense SimonsHallJohnston PC/Reno Eighth District Court Clerk

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