IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

J.B., a minor child, by and )

through his next friend, )

Addie Ward, on behalf of )

himself and all others )

similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:06cv755-MHT

) 

WALTER WOOD, in his )

individual capacity, )

)

Defendant. )

J.B., a minor child, by and )

through his next friend, )

Addie Ward, on behalf of )

himself and all others )

similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:06cv908-MHT

) (WO) 

WALTER WOOD, in his )

individual capacity, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION
2

Plaintiff J.B., a minor child, brings this lawsuit,

by and through his next friend and great-grandmother,

against Walter Wood, Director of the Alabama Department

of Youth Services (DYS), in his individual capacity,

under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution (as

enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and Alabama law.

J.B. claims that, when he was detained by court order in

a county youth facility pending placement by DYS into a

rehabilitative and drug-treatment program, he was denied

his right under the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment that such placement take place within a

reasonable period of time. He also brings common-law

claims of negligence and wantonness based on the statelaw requirement that DYS “accept all children committed

to it within seven days of notice of disposition.” 1975

Ala. Code § 12-15-61(c); see also id. § 12-15-71(j). As

relief, he seeks compensatory and punitive damages and

attorney’s fees. Jurisdiction over his federal claim is

proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 28
1. J.B.’s Brief in Support of Opposition to Summary

Judgment (doc. no. 38), Exhibit 14.

3

U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights); jurisdiction over his

state-law claims is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1367

(supplemental jurisdiction).

This case is currently before the court for

resolution on the record of the issue of Wood’s

liability. For the reasons that follow, the court

concludes that Wood has qualified immunity from J.B.’s

federal claim and that the state-law claims should be

dismissed without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

The problems with delayed placement of juveniles by

DYS is longstanding and began to receive judicial

attention in the 1990s. In 1996, this court issued an

order granting preliminary-injunctive relief to a class

of juveniles in a suit against James Dupree, the former

DYS Director. A.W. v. Dupree, No. 92-H-104-N (M.D. Ala.

1996) (Hobbs, J.).1

 In that order, the court held that
4

the failure to provide timely evaluations and placement

of juveniles taken into DYS custody violated prior

consent orders of the court and infringed upon the

constitutional rights of plaintiff class members. 

Focusing on a state law that requires DYS to “accept

all children committed to it within seven days of notice

of disposition,” 1975 Ala. Code § 12-15-61(c), the court

found that there were “scores of juveniles held in

detention centers throughout the state awaiting

rehabilitative services from [DYS]” and that the court

“was concerned that evaluations for these juveniles

[were] routinely not initiated within seven days, nor

completed within fourteen days, as required by the

Interim Consent Order [of August 25, 1994].” Id. at 3.

The court recognized that DYS was operating under

financial constraints but concluded that this was an

inadequate defense to the plaintiffs’ claims. The court

concluded that the “unreasonable delay in getting

[juveniles] evaluated, [and] subsequent unreasonable
5

delay in getting [them] placed in an appropriate program,

[led] to unjustifiably prolonged restraints on juvenile’s

liberty” and was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Id. at 6. 

In October 2001, Wood entered into a settlement

agreement with a juvenile, S.S., in which he agreed,

without accepting liability, that DYS would accept

children committed to its custody in compliance with the

seven-day state-law requirement. Nonetheless, delays in

placement of juveniles persisted. 

On May 18, 2005, after being adjudicated delinquent

for first-degree burglary, J.B., the plaintiff in the

present case, was committed to the custody of DYS by

order of the Juvenile Court of Montgomery County,

Alabama. Pending J.B.’s transfer to DYS, the state court

ordered that he be detained at the Montgomery County

Youth Facility. His detention at the youth facility

lasted for 41 days without rehabilitative or drugtreatment services. On June 28, 2005, he was placed at
6

the 28-day Autauga High Intensive Treatment (HIT)

program, located in Prattville, Alabama. Subsequent to

completion of the HIT program, he was placed at the 64-

day Bridge program, located in Mobile, Alabama, for drug

treatment, where he completed the program and was

released. 

On April 4, 2006, after being adjudicated delinquent

for violation of after-care, J.B. was committed a second

time to the custody of DYS by order of the Juvenile Court

of Montgomery County. The court specifically noted that

he was “committed for inpatient drug treatment” and

further directed that he be detained at the Montgomery

County Youth Facility pending transfer to DYS. J.B.’s

detention at the youth facility on this occasion lasted

for 35 days without rehabilitation or drug-treatment

services. On May 10, 2006, he was placed at a drugtreatment facility in Mobile. 
2. The Eleventh Amendment states: “The Judicial

Power of the United States shall not be construed to

extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or

prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens

of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any

Foreign State.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI. 

7

II. FEDERAL CLAIM

J.B. brings his federal claim against Wood in his

individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He claims

that Wood caused him to suffer unjustifiable restraint on

his liberty and acted with deliberate indifference to his

right to placement within a reasonable time in a

rehabilitative and drug-treatment program in violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Wood responds that he is

immune from this federal claim pursuant to the Eleventh

Amendment and the doctrine of qualified immunity. 

A. Eleventh Amendment

Wood argues that J.B.’s federal claim, although

brought against him in his individual capacity, is barred

by the Eleventh Amendment because the State of Alabama is

the real, substantial party in interest.2

 He contends
8

that, if J.B. is successful on this claim, it would force

DYS to conform its conduct to state law. This argument

lacks merit.

It is well settled that so long as a parties seek

damages against public officials in their individual

capacities, “the Eleventh Amendment does not restrict

their ability to sue in federal court.” Hafer v. Melo,

502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991). The Supreme Court has recognized

that “imposing personal liability on state officers may

hamper their performance in public duties,” id., but

“such concerns are properly addressed within the

framework of [the Court’s] personal immunity

jurisprudence.” Id. 

In this case, because J.B. seeks only monetary relief

from Wood in his individual capacity and because J.B. is

bases his claim on federal and not state law, J.B.’s

federal claim is not barred under Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity. 
9

B. Qualified Immunity

Wood also contends that he is immune from the federal

claim pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity.

The doctrine insulates government employees, sued in

their individual capacities, from suit and liability for

civil damages for actions taken pursuant to their

discretionary authority. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

200 (2001). In determining whether a public employee is

entitled to such immunity, a court must undertake a twostep analysis. Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972

F.2d 1239, 1236 (11th Cir. 1992). First, a court must

determine whether the evidence establishes a

constitutional violation. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

377 (2007). If the evidence adequately alleges a

constitutional violation, the court must then determine

whether the defendant’s acts or omissions transgressed

clearly established federal statutory or constitutional

law of which a reasonable person would have known. Hope

v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002). 
10

Preclusive Effect of A.W. v. Dupree: J.B. relies

exclusively on the unpublished opinion in A.W. v. Dupree

to support his contention that the delay in his

placement into rehabilitative and drug-treatment programs

violated his clearly established Fourteenth Amendment

constitutional right to substantive due process of which

a reasonable person would have known. He contends that

this court’s decision in A.W. collaterally estops Wood

from relitigating the issue of whether he was deprived of

his right to substantive due process as a result of the

delay in his placement. For this reason, J.B. argues,

Wood is not entitled to qualified immunity. 

As the plaintiff, J.B. can “seek[] to foreclose the

defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has

previously litigated unsuccessfully in an action with

another party.” Parklane Hosiery Co., v. Shore, 439 U.S.

322, 326, n.4 (1979). Four conditions must be met in

order for issue preclusion to apply: “(1) the issue at

stake must be identical to the one alleged in the prior
11

litigation; (2) the issue must have been actually

litigated in the prior litigation; ... (3) the

determination of the issue in the prior litigation must

have been a critical and necessary part of the judgment

in that earlier action;” and (4) “the party against whom

the earlier decision is asserted must have had a full and

fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier

proceeding.” Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.,

763 F.2d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 1985). The party

asserting issue preclusion bears the burden of

persuasion. 

J.B. seeks to have precluded from relitigation the

constitutionality, under the Fourteenth Amendment due

process clause, of the delay in his placement into a

rehabilitation or drug-treatment program. In his briefs

to this court, he never addresses, however, how the four

conditions for establishing issue preclusion have been

met. Instead, he merely attaches the opinion in A.W.

The mere attachment of this opinion as support for the
12

contention that the issue of the constitutionality of the

delay in placement is precluded is insufficient. J.B.

“bears the burden of showing with clarity and certainty

what was determined by the prior judgment.” Clark v.

Bear Stearns & Co., 966 F.2d 1318, 1321 (9th Cir. 1992).

“[I]t is not enough that [he] introduce the decision of

the prior court, rather, [he] must introduce a sufficient

record of the prior proceeding to enable the trial court

to pinpoint the exact issues previously litigated.” Id.

In terms of ascertaining the exact issues previously

litigated and particularly whether the parties litigated

the issue of the constitutionality of the delay in

placement of juveniles, the A.W. opinion provides limited

clues. The A.W. court addressed a motion for

preliminary-injunctive relief filed by a class of

juveniles. The opinion describes the juveniles’ claim as

follows: “The plaintiffs claim that the defendant has,

and continues to, violate prior consent orders of this

court relating to the provision of evaluations and
13

services to juveniles committed to the Department of

Youth Services.” A.W. v. Dupree, No. 92-H-104-N, at 1.

The claim, as described in the opinion, does not raise

the issue of the constitutionality of the delay in

placement. However, the court, after finding that the

practices of the department violated prior consent

orders, goes on to state “that said practices infringe

upon the constitutional rights of plaintiff class

members.” In elaborating on the reasons why the

constitutional rights of the juveniles were infringed,

the court never lays out the competing contentions as to

the constitutionality of the department’s practice.

Therefore, it is impossible to assess whether the parties

in fact actually litigated the issue. 

Even assuming that the A.W. opinion is sufficient to

demonstrate that the parties actually litigated the issue

of the constitutionality of the delay in placement of

juveniles under the due process clause, the court is not

convinced that J.B. has shown that this finding was
14

necessary to the decision. In order for the court in

A.W. to grant a preliminary injunction, the juveniles had

to show: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the

claim that DYS continued to violate prior consent orders

relating to the provision of evaluations and services to

juveniles committed to the department; (2) the threat of

irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction were not

granted; (3) such injury outweighed the harm that the

preliminary injunction would cause to the opposing party;

and (4) the preliminary injunction would be in the public

interest. GSW, Inc. v. Long County, 999 F.2d 1508, 1518

(11th Cir. 1993). Although the court did address the

constitutionality of the delay in placement in passing,

the resolution of this issue was unnecessary to the

determination of whether the juveniles were entitled to

injunctive relief as a result of the department’s

violation of a prior consent order. If the department

violated a consent order, the court could have granted

the preliminary injunction irrespective of its resolution
15

of the issue of the constitutionality of the delay in

placement. See I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat’l

Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1551 (11th Cir. 1986). Therefore,

the prerequisite for applying issue preclusion (that the

determination of the issue in the prior litigation have

been a critical and necessary part of the judgment in

that earlier action) has not been met. 

Finally, J.B.’s federal claim is against Wood in his

individual capacity; whereas A.W. brought suit against

Wood’s predecessor, Dupree, in his official capacity. In

this case the issue is Wood’s own personal conduct and

whether he can be held liable for that conduct. That

issue simply was not litigated in A.W.

Applicable Constitutional Standard: Given the

inapplicability of issue preclusion to this case, this

court must, in accordance with the qualified-immunity

doctrine, determine whether the evidence in this case

establishes a constitutional violation. The court must

first address the question of what constitutional
16

standard applies to the issue of the constitutionality of

the delay in placement of a delinquent juvenile in a

rehabilitative or drug-treatment program. J.B. argues,

consistent with the opinion in A.W., that the delay in

his placement should be addressed under the Fourteenth

Amendment due process clause. He maintains that the

delay would violate the due process clause if he can show

that it was unreasonable and unjustifiable restraint on

his liberty and that Wood was deliberately indifferent to

the delay. See D.W. v. Rogers, 113 F.3d 1214, 1218-19

(11th Cir. 1997) (finding that a juvenile committed a

mental health facility had a substantive due process

right to treatment); Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d

1579, 1582 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (applying the Fourteenth

Amendment due process clause to a pretrial detainee).

Wood contends that the delay in the placement of J.B.

should be addressed as a condition of confinement case

under the Eighth Amendment. In accordance with the

Eighth Amendment, such delay would violate J.B.’s
3. In Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th

Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions

of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the

close of business on September 30, 1981.

17

constitutional rights only if he can show that Wood was

deliberately indifferent to his objectively serious

medical need. See Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998-

999 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying the Eighth Amendment

deliberate-indifference standard to the denial or delay

in the provision of medical-treatment services to

juveniles);3

 see also Hill v. DeKalb Reg’l Youth Det.

Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1185-92 (11th Cir. 1994) (applying

the deliberate-indifference standard to a claim brought

by a juvenile detained in a youth detention center),

overruled in part by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).

However, regardless as to the constitutional

amendment deemed applicable, J.B. must show deliberate

indifference on Wood’s part. See Marsh v. Butler County,

268 F.3d 1014, 1024 n. 5 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“the

standard for providing basic human needs to those
18

incarcerated or in detention is the same under both the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments”). This he has not

shown.

Deliberate-Indifference Standard: The deliberateindifference standard has two components, “an objective

component, which inquires whether the alleged wrongdoing

was objectively harmful enough to establish a

constitutional violation, and a subjective component,

which inquires whether the officials acted with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Sims v. Mashburn,

25 F.3d 980, 983 (11th Cir. 1994). 

To meet the objective component in a denial or delay

of treatment case, a plaintiff must first demonstrate the

existence of an “objectively serious medical need.”

Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003).

“Because society does not expect that prisoners will have

unqualified access to health care, deliberate

indifference to medical needs amounts to [a] violation

only if those needs are ‘serious.’” Hill 40 F.3d at 1186
19

(quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)).

“[A] ‘serious’ medical need is one that has been

diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one

that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily

recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Id.

at 1187 (citation omitted). As explained by the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals, “[a] ‘serious’ medical need

exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition

could result in further significant injury or the

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin v.

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)), overruled on

other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104

F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)).

Objectively Serious Medical Needs: J.B. contends

that during the two commitments by the juvenile court he

was harmed by Wood’s delay in placing him in a

rehabilitative or drug-treatment program. In his first

commitment for first-degree burglary, the Juvenile Court
4. Classification Manual, Exhibit 12. Juveniles

with a risk-assessment score above ten are considered to

be in the high-risk category and are considered to

require the type of housing that includes an

institutional bed or medium-secure bed.

5. Service Plan Evaluation, Exhibit 17

20

of Montgomery County placed him with DYS with a referral

to a Counseling and Psychiatric Service program.

Nonetheless, it took approximately 20 days before he was

referred by the staffing and placement committee at DYS

for placement in a rehabilitative and drug-treatment

service program. According to the Screening and

Placement Staffing Report, J.B. had a risk assessment

score of 11, which was in the high-risk category.4

 His

service plan evaluation completed a week after the

staffing report determined that he had scored a 52 on the

adolescent-alcohol-and-drug-involvement scale, indicating

that he was chemically dependent.5

 

Serious drug and alcohol addiction has been found by

courts to constitute an objectively serious medical need.

See, e.g., Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686, 688, 695 (7th
21

Cir. 2006) (holding that a drug and alcohol addiction

requiring methadone maintenance program was a serious

medical need); Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d

1419, 1425-26 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that acute

alcohol withdrawal that causes seizures to be a serious

medical condition and holding that “a jail officer who is

aware of but ignores the dangers of acute alcohol

withdrawal and waits for a manifest emergency before

obtaining medical care is deliberately indifferent to the

inmate’s constitutional rights”); Morrison v. Washington

County, Ala, 700 F.2d 678, 686 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding

that a person suffering from acute alcohol-abstinence

syndrome to be seriously ill). In particular, drug and

alcohol addictions that have been found to constitute an

objectively serious medical need are those that result or

have the potential to result in serious injury or pain.

See, e.g, Davis, 452 F.3d at 688 (death); Lancaster, 116

F.3d at 1425-26 (seizures and death); Morrison, 700 F.2d

at 686-87 (death). 
22

Although there is no evidence that J.B. suffered

serious injury or pain, the court concludes, in light of

the greater vulnerabilities of juveniles to the physical

stresses associated with chemical dependency relative to

adults, that J.B.’s dependency without treatment had the

potential to result in serious injury or pain. The court

therefore finds that J’B’s level of drug addiction

created an objectively serious medical need. 

Deliberate Indifference: The subjective component of

the standard requires a determination that Wood was

deliberately indifferent to J.B.’s chemical dependence

and that this deliberate indifference caused the delay in

J.B.’s placement into a rehabilitation or drug-treatment

program. 

Deliberate indifference entails more than mere

negligence. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

A prison official cannot be found deliberately

indifferent “unless the official knows of and disregards

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v.
23

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Specifically, “the

official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.” Id. Thus, “deliberate indifference has

three requirements: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of

serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct

that is more than mere negligence.” Farrow v. West, 320

F.3d 1235, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003).

In order to better assess the deliberate indifference

claim, it is necessary to address the context of

juvenile-placement decisions at the department. DYS has

the authority to make placements of delinquent juveniles

without the approval of the committing court. At DYS,

placement decisions are made by the placement and

staffing committee and ultimately approved by the

director, in this case Wood. The committee has meetings

once a week in which it places juveniles in the

appropriate rehabilitative or drug-treatment program. 
24

The department has a practice whereby it will not staff

a committed juvenile until it has received the necessary

information to make the placement decision. This

includes the court order, a social summary, risk and

needs assessment, school transcripts, social security

number, and immunization records. This practice of

waiting to receive all the necessary information prior to

placement is based on the placement and classification

manual, which requires that placement decisions be made

that are in the child’s best interest.

Delays in placement are caused, in part, by this

staffing process. With regards to most juveniles, there

is a delay in receiving the necessary information, and,

even in cases in which it is received, delays are caused

by the fact that staffing takes place only once a week.

During this delay, juveniles are held in detention at DYS

without receiving credit, notice of when they will be

placed, or the necessary rehabilitative or drug-treatment

services.
25

In the case of J.B., he was first committed to the

custody of DYS on May 18, 2005. The service plan

indicating his drug dependency was not completed by the

Montgomery Area Mental Health Authority until June 17,

2005. Eleven days after receiving the service plan, he

was placed at the 28-day Autauga HIT program. Subsequent

to completion of the HIT program, he was placed at the

64-day “Bridge” program for drug treatment where he

completed the program and was released. Therefore, it

took DYS 11 days to place J.B. after being informed of

his drug dependency. 

J.B. was next committed to the custody of DYS on

April 4, 2006. He has not presented any evidence as to

when a service plan was completed after this commitment

or any other indicators of when the department determined

that he was chemically dependent. Thirty-five days

later, on May 10, 2006, he was placed in a drug-treatment

program in Mobile. There is also no evidence that he

received credit for the time served at DYS detention,
26

notice of when he would be placed, or the necessary

rehabilitative or drug-treatment services. 

J.B. contends that Wood was deliberately indifferent

to his delays in placement without rehabilitation or

drug-treatment services. He contends that there is no

statutory or regulatory requirement that the staffing

committee wait to receive all of the necessary

information prior to placing juveniles, such as himself,

or that there be only a once-a-week staffing schedule.

In addition, he argues that Wood could have pursued

alternatives such as sending him home with electronic

monitoring or to a group or foster home while he awaited

placement into a rehabilitation or drug-treatment

program. 

J.B.’s deliberate-indifference contention fails

because the evidence is insufficient to support the

conclusion that Wood had subjective knowledge of the risk

posed by J.B.’s drug dependency. As stated, in order to

be held liable for deliberate indifference, Wood had to
27

have subjective knowledge of the risk of harm. Farmer,

511 U.S. at 841. Subjective knowledge can be

demonstrated by showing that Wood had actual knowledge or

inferred when a risk is obvious, such as in cases in

which the risk is “longstanding, pervasive, welldocumented, or expressly noted by ... officials in the

past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant

... being sued had been exposed to information concerning

the risk and thus ‘must have known’ about it.” Id. at

842. 

In this case, there is no evidence that Wood had

actual knowledge. In his deposition, Wood stated that he

did not personally review J.B.’s file. He was not a part

of the staffing committee that reviewed J.B.’s case and

therefore did not review J.B.’s screening and placement

report or his service plan evaluation that revealed

J.B.’s drug dependency prior to his placement. Although

he was the ultimate decision-maker regarding J.B.’s

placement, in this case members of the screening and
28

placement committee affixed his signature to documents

related to the juvenile’s placement, without his review.

In addition, while the delay in placement of

juveniles is long-standing, pervasive, and welldocumented as demonstrated by the history of litigation

on this issue, the risk of harm to J.B. as a result of

this delay was not so obvious that Wood should be held

liable. A delay in placement of an otherwise physically

and mentally healthy child does not create a risk of

harm. Instead, only when juveniles suffer from

objectively serious medical needs does the risk of harm

rise to the level of a constitutional violation. J.B.

has not presented any evidence of long-standing,

pervasive, or well-documented delays in placement of

children with objectively serious medical needs. Wood,

therefore, did not have subjective knowledge of the risk

from the delay in placement of J.B. in a rehabilitation

or drug-treatment program. 
29

Even assuming that Wood had subjective knowledge of

the risk, the deliberate indifference claim still fails

because J.B. has not shown that Wood acted with anything

more than mere negligence in his failure to place J.B. in

a rehabilitation or drug-treatment program without

unreasonable delay. 

Wood has successfully argued that a source of the

delay in J.B’s placement was the lack of bed spaces in

the rehabilitation and drug-treatment facilities. This

lack of capacity is systemic. Juveniles are placed in

detention by committing courts. The intake of juveniles

in treatment facilities is then determined by the number

of beds available for particular classifications of

juveniles compared to the number of commitments in these

classifications. Delays occur when there is insufficient

capacity in certain classifications at certain times.

Wood concedes that occasionally he has been able to

reallocate DYS resources to eliminate or minimize, within

applicable categories of placement options, wait lists
30

when they have occurred. However, there is no evidence

that in this instance Wood deliberately failed to

eliminate or minimize the wait list for J.B.’s placement

in a drug-treatment program.

J.B. contends that Wood deliberately disregarded the

risk of harm resulting from his drug dependency by not

seeking alternative placement, such as at home with

electronic monitoring or in a group or foster home. He

argues that Wood had the authority to send him home with

electronic monitoring or to a group or foster home. The

court agrees that Wood had this authority; however, it is

not clear that such courses of action would have been in

J.B.’s best interest. 

J.B.’s service plan evaluation showed that he lived

with his grandparents. While at home, he and his friends

used drugs and committed crimes such as breaking and

entering and robbery. In particular, J.B. experimented

with alcohol, marijuana, mushrooms, and Xanax pills. He

was a member of the Crips gang and had been expelled from
31

school for possession of marijuana. A decision by Wood

to send J.B. home, even with electronic monitoring, would

have placed him at risk of continued drug abuse prior to

his placement in a rehabilitation or drug-treatment

program. Therefore, the decision of Wood to not pursue

home placement as an alternative to detention did not

demonstrate deliberate indifference to J.B.’s chemical

dependency. 

In addition, J.B. has not shown that the alternative

options of group-home placement were available at the

time of his commitment. In particular, he has not shown

that there was space available at particular group homes

that could have served as an alternative to his detention

at the Montgomery Youth Facility or that Wood was aware

of these alternatives. Even assuming that there were

places available in group homes, J.B. has not shown Wood

was aware that a group home would be better positioned to

address the risk of harm associated with his chemical

dependency as J.B. awaited placement in a rehabilitation
6. In any event, based on the facts before the

court, even if Wood did violate J.B.’s constitutional

right, the court cannot say that that right was clearly

established.

32

or drug-treatment program. As a result, the failure of

Wood to place J.B. in a group home does not demonstrate

deliberate indifference to J.B.’s chemical dependency.

In sum, the delay in placement of J.B. into a

rehabilitation or drug-treatment program after his

commitments by the court did not amount to a

constitutional violation. In the absence of a

constitutional violation, Wood is immune from suit on

J.B.’s federal claim.6

 

III. STATE-LAW CLAIMS

J.B. also asserts that Wood was negligent and wanton

in breaching his duty to place him within seven days from

notice of disposition as required by Alabama law. This

court declines to reach the merits of these claims.

A district court has discretion to decline

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim when it “has
33

dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Factors to be

taken into account include “the values of judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” CarnegieMellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). Courts

are strongly encouraged to dismiss state claims when the

federal claims have been resolved prior to trial. See

id. (concluding that “federal court[s] should decline the

exercise of [supplemental] jurisdiction by dismissing the

case without prejudice” when the federal law claims have

been dismissed prior to trial). 

In the case, the court has found against J.B on his

federal claim prior to trial. His Alabama state-law

claims will be dismissed without prejudice. The period

of limitations for filing the state law claims in state

court will be tolled “for a period of 30 days after it is

dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling

period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

***
For the foregoing reasons, this court concludes that

Wood is entitled to qualified immunity on J.B.’s federal

claim and that his remaining state-law claims should be

dismissed without prejudice. 

An appropriate judgment will be entered.

DONE, this the 25th day of March, 2010. 

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE