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Appendix 5

Additional Views

Senator Susan M. Collins, Senator Ted Stevens, 

Senator Norm Coleman, Senator Tom Coburn, M.D., 

Senator Robert F. Bennett, and Senator Pete V. Domenici. 

On White House and Department of Homeland Security Cooperation

Th e Committee’s seven-month investigation into the preparedness for and response to 

Hurricane Katrina, by all levels of government, has been an extraordinary undertaking. Th e 

Committee has held 22 hearings with 85 witnesses, has received and analyzed 838,000 pages 

of documents, and has formally interviewed more than 325 individuals. Th is investigation 

has been the most comprehensive of the Katrina reviews, each of which has been useful in 

advancing the public’s understanding.

Th e Committee has been relentless in its eff orts to secure the information it has needed to 

ensure that the investigation is thorough and comprehensive. And we have succeeded. On 

October 7, 2005, the Committee sent extensive requests for documents and information to 

the White House and the Offi ce of the Vice President. On January 12, 2006, the Committee 

sent another letter to the White House prioritizing the requests and asking for more documents and information. Th roughout the process, we have been in direct communications 

with the White House to secure the documents and information that we required. 

Th e Committee has been similarly adamant in its pursuit of documents and information from 

federal departments and agencies. Th e Department of Homeland Security alone has produced 

350,000 pages of documents and made available more than 70 witnesses for interviews.

Moreover, when one federal entity refused to make key witnesses available for interviews, 

the Committee issued fi ve subpoenas for Department of Justice personnel, who were 

promptly interviewed by Committee staff .

Th e Executive Offi ce of the President has produced more than 17,000 pages of documents. 

Th ese documents include memos, policy analyses, and e-mails with electronic attachments 

sent to individuals in the White House. Th e Committee also has received transcripts of the 

FEMA-hosted video teleconferences, including those in which the President or other White 

House offi cials participated. Collectively, these documents show us the information that the 

White House was receiving from various agencies before landfall and during the response 

phase. Th e production contains documents relating to the White House Task Force Katrina 

and includes lists of individuals attending White House-organized meetings and summaries 

of agency eff orts. Also produced were documents that included information provided to the 

most senior offi cials within the White House during the critical period.

In addition to the documents, the White House has provided two extensive briefi ngs on its role 

in the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina, and a third briefi ng on the White 

House Lessons Learned report. All three briefi ngs were presented by Ken Rapuano, the Deputy 

Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, who was deeply involved in the response to 

Hurricane Katrina at the White House. Th ese briefi ngs included signifi cant question-and-answer sessions where Committee staff had the opportunity to explore issues in depth. 

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In addition to the information the Committee has received from the White House document productions and briefi ngs, the Committee has analyzed the Lessons Learned report, 

which further details the White House’s involvement in – and shortcomings relating to 

– the response to Hurricane Katrina. Th e 125 specifi c recommendations in the report 

include several suggestions that recognize problems with the White House’s role before or 

following the catastrophe.

Th e Offi ce of the Vice President (OVP), too, produced documents that have helped us piece 

together its role, and that of the White House, with respect to Hurricane Katrina. Among 

the more than 6,300 pages of documents produced are substantive e-mails, policy memos, 

and reports on the economic impact of Hurricane Katrina. Some of the e-mails were from 

David Addington, Counsel to the Vice President (and now Chief of Staff ). Th e OVP also 

produced daily reports of the White House Hurricane Katrina Task Force and Homeland 

Security Council agendas.

Finally, the Committee has gained insight into the White House role through the testimony 

and subsequent interview of former FEMA Director Michael Brown. In his February 10, 

2006, testimony before the Committee and interview with Committee staff two weeks later, 

as well as through documents he produced directly to the Committee, Mr. Brown gave us 

his detailed view into the workings and deliberations of the White House during this critical period. As a result, the Committee has a well-developed picture of the White House’s 

interaction with the top federal offi cial on the ground before and during the critical days 

aft er Katrina made landfall. We know that, through Mr. Brown’s communications with 

Deputy White House Chief of Staff Joseph Hagin, the White House was aware, on the day 

of the storm, of the devastation that New Orleans had suff ered. And we know, from documents produced to us by Mr. Brown, that White House Chief of Staff Andy Card was aware 

of what Mr. Brown had told Mr. Hagin.

While, as noted, the Committee has received extensive briefi ngs from Homeland Security 

Council staff as well as more than 23,000 pages of documents from the White House and 

OVP, much of the Committee’s information on alleged communications between Mr. 

Brown and the President and his staff comes from Mr. Brown, and Mr. Brown alone. Th e 

White House staff declined the opportunity to be interviewed, which would have allowed 

for an even more complete understanding of what transpired.

As a result of the Committee’s eff orts, we have a clear window into the functioning and role 

of the White House in the days before and aft er Hurricane Katrina made landfall. Th e Committee had ample evidence to draw conclusions on how to strengthen our nation’s ability to 

prepare for and respond to future catastrophes.

Additional Views