J-S75038-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

NATASHA QIANA MILLER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1186 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered June 28, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-07-CR-0001023-2012

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED JANUARY 15, 2020

Natasha Qiana Miller (Miller) appeals the order of the Blair County Court 

of Common Pleas (PCRA court) dismissing her petition filed pursuant to the 

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 Essentially, Miller argues that she is 

entitled to relief because she was illegally indicted prior to entering a plea in 

this case. As the PCRA court now recognizes, the order on review must be 

vacated because Miller was not appointed counsel despite being a first-time 

PCRA petitioner.

Miller pled guilty in September 2012 to multiple drug-related offenses, 

including possession of cocaine. The trial court imposed an aggregate prison 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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sentence of 16 to 32 years. On direct appeal, in Commonwealth v. Miller, 

No. 1963 WDA 2012 (Pa. Super. March 3, 2014), this Court vacated the 

judgment of sentence to remedy the erroneous application of a mandatory 

minimum sentence. The trial court, on remand, imposed an aggregate prison 

term of 15 to 30 years. Miller filed another appeal, but discontinued it prior 

to a final disposition.

On June 14, 2019, Miller filed a pro se “Motion for Reconsideration of 

the Sentence, Nunc Pro Tunc,” challenging the legality of the underlying 

indictment against her. The motion was denied. Miller timely appealed and 

both she and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

In its opinion, the PCRA court asked this Court to reverse the dismissal

of Miller’s pro se motion because she had not been afforded counsel:

Upon review of the docket in this case and the underlying appeal, 

the court believes that it should have construed the petition for 

Reconsideration of Sentence Nunc Pro Tunc filed by [Miller] on 

June 14, 2019 as a [PCRA] Petition . . . Accordingly, this court’s 

denial and dismissal of the same on June 28, 2018 was premature. 

For the following reasons, the court respectfully requests that the 

[Superior Court] remand this case for the appointment of PCRA 

counsel.

“We have repeatedly held that . . . any petition filed after the 

judgment of sentence becomes final will be treated as a PCRA 

petition.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 803 A.2d 1291, 1293 

(Pa. Super. 2002). It appears from the docket that Miller’s 

judgment of sentence became final on November 23, 2014, thirty 

(30) days after she discontinued her direct appeal to the 

Pennsylvania Superior Court. Therefore, her petition was filed 

after her judgment of sentence became final and should be been 

construed as a petition for relief pursuant to the PCRA.
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Furthermore, while Miller’s PCRA petition is untimely on its face, 

this court is aware that “[p]ursuant to the rules of criminal 

procedure and interpretive case law, a criminal defendant has a 

right to representation of counsel for purposes of litigating a first 

PCRA petition through the entire appellate process.” 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 970 A.2d 455, 457 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (en banc) (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C), 

(F)(2) (stating that an indigent defendant is entitled to counsel for 

litigation of a first PCRA petition and on appeal).

Moreover, “[a]n indigent petitioner is entitled to appointment of 

counsel on his first PCRA petition, even where the petition appears 

untimely on its face.” Commonwealth v. Perez, 799 A.2d 848, 

851 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted). “In such cases, counsel 

is appointed principally to determine whether the petition is 

indeed untimely, and if so, whether any exception to the 

timeliness requirements of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b) applies.” Id. at 

852 (citations omitted).

Based on the foregoing, the court acknowledges that the entry of 

the order dismissing Miller’s Petition for Sentence Modification 

Nunc Pro Tunc was premature and respectfully request that the 

[Superior Court] remand this case for the appointment of PCRA 

counsel to determine whether any exceptions to the PCRA’s time 

bar apply to this matter.

PCRA Court’s 1925(a) Opinion, 8/6/2019, at 1-2.

In light of the facts and authorities cogently summarized in the PCRA 

court’s opinion, the request for remand is granted so that Miller may be 

appointed PCRA counsel. We make no determination as to the merits of 

Miller’s claims.

Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/15/2020