[Cite as State v. White, 2011-Ohio-4089.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 95066

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

ANTHONY WHITE

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-534866 

BEFORE: Celebrezze, J., Stewart, P.J., and Rocco, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 18, 2011 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Robert Tobik 

Cuyahoga County Public Defender 

BY: John T. Martin 

Assistant Public Defender 

310 Lakeside Avenue 

Suite 400 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Melissa Riley 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

The Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.: 

{¶ 1} Appellant, Anthony White, appeals his convictions for drug 

possession of crack cocaine and oxycodone. After careful review of the record 

and relevant case law, we affirm. 

{¶ 2} On December 4, 2009, Cleveland Police Officer Matthew J. 

Slatkovsky observed appellant disobey a traffic sign and initiated a traffic 

stop of his vehicle. As Officer Slatkovsky was exiting his police vehicle, he 

observed appellant lean over toward the passenger side of the vehicle. 
Thereafter, Officer Slatkovsky discovered that appellant was driving with a 

suspended license, and appellant was placed under arrest. Once appellant 

was placed in the police vehicle, Officer Slatkovsky conducted a tow inventory 

search of appellant’s vehicle and discovered 5.62 grams of crack cocaine in a 

plastic baggie. Officer Slatkovsky testified that the plastic baggie was 

wedged between the vehicle’s center console and front passenger seat. 

Officer Slatkovsky also recovered nine oxycodone pills from the vehicle’s 

center console. 

{¶ 3} Testimony adduced at trial indicated that appellant was not the 

owner of the vehicle searched by Officer Slatkovsky. Appellant testified that 

he borrowed the vehicle from a friend shortly before he was stopped and had 

no knowledge that drugs were present in the vehicle. 

{¶ 4} Appellant was indicted on March 12, 2010 under a four-count 

indictment that included the following charges: Count 1, drug trafficking in 

violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) with a schoolyard specification, in violation of 

R.C. 2925.01(P); Count 2, drug possession of crack cocaine in violation of R.C. 

2925.11; Count 3, drug possession of oxycodone in violation of R.C. 2925.11; 

and Count 4, possession of criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24. 

{¶ 5} On April 7, 2010, the matter proceeded to a bench trial, and 

appellant was found guilty of drug possession of crack cocaine and drug 

possession of oxycodone. He was acquitted on the remaining counts. At the 
sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate 

one-year term of imprisonment. 

{¶ 6} Appellant appeals, raising two assignments of error for our 

review: 

{¶ 7} “I. “The indictment fails to allege venue or jurisdiction for the 

offenses alleged in Counts 2 and 3, respectfully.” 

{¶ 8} “II. “The trial court erroneously considered incompetent and 

unqualified testimony from a Cleveland Police Detective regarding 

fingerprint analysis.” 

Law and Analysis

I.

{¶ 9} Appellant first argues that the indictment fails to allege venue or 

jurisdiction for the offenses alleged in Counts 2 and 3. We disagree. 

{¶ 10} In the indictment, Count 1 states, in relevant part: 

{¶ 11} “Jurors of the Grand Jury of the State of Ohio within and for the 

body of the County aforesaid, on their oaths, IN THE NAME AND BY THE 

AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF OHIO, do find and present, that the above 

named Defendant, on or about the date of the offense set forth above, in the 

County of Cuyahoga, unlawfully * * *.” (Italics added.) 

{¶ 12} Counts 2 and 3 state, in relevant part: 
{¶ 13} “Grand Jurors, on their oaths, further find that the Defendant 

unlawfully * * *.” 

{¶ 14} Appellant contends that the language used in Counts 2 and 3 of 

the indictment was insufficient to establish venue or jurisdiction because it 

did not specifically state that his drug possession offenses occurred “in the 

County of Cuyahoga.” 

{¶ 15} Generally, the indictment need only state in general terms that 

the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the offense was 

committed in the territory encompassed by the court. State v. Bragg (Sept. 

5, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 70461. In State v. Williams (1988), 53 Ohio 

App.3d 1, 557 N.E.2d 818, the Tenth District reviewed circumstances similar 

to those presented to this court. In Williams, the court held that where an 

indictment consisted of 12 counts, it was sufficient to allege once that the 

offenses occurred in Franklin County. Id. The Williams court relied on R.C. 

2941.08(F), which provides that an indictment is not invalid for failure to 

allege the time or place of a material fact when the time and place have once 

been stated within the indictment. We find Williams applicable herein. 

{¶ 16} Upon review of the indictment as a whole, it is clear that the 

language used throughout the indictment alleged that each of the four counts 

charged in appellant’s indictment took place in Cuyahoga County on 

December 4, 2009. Analogous to Williams, Count 1 of appellant’s indictment 
clearly states that the grand jury found that the offense occurred in Cuyahoga 

County. Since the jurisdiction of the court was once stated, the subsequent 

counts were not required to reiterate it. R.C. 2941.08(F). 

{¶ 17} Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit. 

II.

{¶ 18} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial 

court erroneously considered incompetent and unqualified testimony from 

Detective James Cudo. We disagree. 

{¶ 19} At trial, Det. Cudo, of the Cleveland Police Department, was 

qualified as an expert witness in drug trafficking in Cuyahoga County. 

Based on his training and experience, Det. Cudo testified that crack cocaine is 

often sold out of large clear plastic baggies without any further packaging. 

Det. Cudo further testified that in his 17 years as a police detective, he has 

submitted hundreds of plastic baggies for fingerprint analysis and has never 

received a usable fingerprint back. 

{¶ 20} Initially, appellant contends that Det. Cudo’s testimony regarding 

fingerprint analysis relied on statements made to him by forensic examiners, 

and therefore constituted hearsay testimony. Evid.R. 801(C) defines 

“hearsay” as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 

testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 

matter asserted.” Under the terms of Evid.R. 802, a witness is barred on 
hearsay grounds from testifying as to the statement made by another when 

the statement is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the 

statement, and when the statement falls outside any exception to the rule 

against hearsay. State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 1995-Ohio-104, 651 

N.E.2d 965. 

{¶ 21} “To be inadmissible as hearsay, therefore, the witness must 

testify about a statement. It follows that when the witness merely testifies 

about his own declarations or observations, or actions taken as a result of 

another’s decisions, this testimony does not fit the definition of Evid.R. 

801(C), and it is not prohibited by Evid.R. 802.” State v. Durham, Cuyahoga 

App. No. 94747, 2011-Ohio-2256, ¶33, citing State v. Mills (Mar. 20, 1997), 

Cuyahoga App. No. 69788. 

{¶ 22} In the case subjudice, the testimony of Det. Cudo did not rely on 

the inadmissable statements of others. Rather, his testimony was based on 

his own personal observations and did not involve any statements made to 

him by forensic examiners. Det. Cudo merely testified that, in his 

experience, forensic examiners were rarely able to retrieve a usable 

fingerprint from a plastic baggie submitted for analysis. Therefore, Det. 

Cudo’s testimony does not fit the definition of Evid.R. 801(C), and his 

testimony did not constitute inadmissible hearsay. 
{¶ 23} Additionally, appellant contends that Det. Cudo’s testimony 

relating to the forensic examiner’s inability to retrieve a usable fingerprint 

from the plastic baggie was outside his purported expertise as a drug 

trafficking expert. 

{¶ 24} Evid.R. 702, which controls the admission of expert testimony 

during the course of trial, provides that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other 

specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 

or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 

skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an 

opinion or otherwise.” Ohio courts have allowed the qualification of police 

officers as expert witnesses to expound about drugs and drug practices. 

State v. Hancock, Jefferson App. No. 09-JE-30, 2010-Ohio-4854, ¶48; State v. 

Ross, Montgomery App. No. 19036, 2002-Ohio-6084, ¶14; In re Litterst (June 

26, 1998), Lake App. Nos. 97-L-135 and 97-L-136, fn.3; State v. Campa, 

Hamilton App. No. C-010254, 2002-Ohio-1932, ¶5. 

{¶ 25} It is well established that rulings concerning the admissibility 

and scope of expert testimony are within the broad discretion of the trial 

court and will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear showing of an abuse of 

discretion. Pacific Great Lakes Corp. v. Bessemer & Lake Erie R.R. (1998), 

130 Ohio App.3d 477, 501, 720 N.E.2d 551. An abuse of discretion implies an 

unreasonable, arbitrary, unconscionable attitude by the trial court. Id. 
{¶ 26} In this matter, Det. Cudo’s testimony relating to his experience 

with fingerprint analysis was within the scope of his expertise. Det. Cudo 

was qualified as an expert in the field of drug trafficking based on his 

substantial training and experience in drug investigations. This expertise 

allowed Det. Cudo to testify to matters beyond the knowledge or experience of 

a layperson. As stated, Det. Cudo testified that he has submitted hundreds 

of plastic baggies for analysis over the course of his career and rarely was 

able to secure a usable fingerprint. This testimony was based on Det. Cudo’s 

personal observations in the field of drug trafficking and was admissible to 

assist the jury in understanding that, in Det. Cudo’s experience, the failure to 

retrieve a usable fingerprint from a plastic baggie was not uncommon. 

{¶ 27} Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. 

Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE 

MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., and 

KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR