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Additional Views 

Senator Carl Levin

Committee Chairman Collins and Ranking Member Lieberman deserve the nation’s gratitude for their determined eff orts in conducting the most detailed Congressional investigation of the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. Congressional oversight is critical if we 

are to learn from the mistakes made in this disaster and strengthen the nation’s emergency 

management capabilities. 

Th e televised pictures of Americans dislodged from their homes and stranded for days at 

the New Orleans Superdome and Convention Center, without adequate food, water, or 

basic necessities, continue to haunt the public and raise questions about the competency 

of government. Th e Committee Report provides needed factual information about what 

actually happened, and important recommendations for reforms. It is clear, as the Report 

recommends, that we need to choose leaders for federal emergency-management programs 

based on experience and qualifi cations, not cronyism. We need to create a central command 

post that gets and disseminates accurate, real-time information during emergency conditions. We need to restore emergency-preparedness and mitigation initiatives in our federal 

emergency-management programs. It is also painfully clear that Presidential leadership is 

essential during an unfolding disaster. 

FEMA Reorganization

One of the Report’s primary recommendations, the proposed reorganization of FEMA, 

raises diffi cult issues. Clearly, FEMA needs to be strengthened. It needs qualifi ed leadership. 

It needs adequate funding. It needs to regain control of the state emergency-preparedness 

grant programs. It needs to address all types of hazards, including natural disasters. 

Whether FEMA should remain in DHS or return to independent-agency status, however, 

is a complex issue that depends to a large extent on how the legislation reorganizing the 

agency will defi ne its mission, its authorities, its assets, and its funding. Giving FEMA 

independent status would not automatically cure its ills. While it performed well under 

President Clinton as an independent agency, under President George H.W. Bush, it lost 

eff ectiveness as evidenced by FEMA’s bungling response to the 1992 Hurricane Andrew. On 

the other hand, keeping FEMA within DHS would require it to continue to compete against 

a host of important programs, including those to promote border security and prevent terrorism. FEMA lost out to those other programs in the past, and the Committee Report does 

not identify reforms that would ensure FEMA would obtain a priority status or be able to 

protect its budget while within DHS.

Another problem involves issues of accountability and the chain of command. Th e Committee Report recommends that, during “catastrophes,” the head of the newly reconstituted 

FEMA report directly to the President.1

 Th e Report does not, however, defi ne “catastrophe,” 

specify when this direct reporting relationship should take eff ect, or clarify the authority 

of the DHS Secretary during such catastrophes. Moreover, the head of FEMA presumably 

continues to report to the DHS Secretary on routine matters such as the agency’s annual 

budget, long-term priorities, and programs to assist states to prepare for, mitigate, and 

recover from emergencies. Th e Report also recommends that the head of FEMA serve as a 

national emergency-management advisor to the President, in a capacity that presumably 

bypasses the DHS Secretary. Th ese alternative chains of command could create confusion 

and blur accountability. 

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For these and other reasons, I plan to wait to see the actual legislative proposals for reorganizing FEMA and consider the pros and cons at hearings before taking a position on this 

issue.

National Guard Coordination

I strongly endorse the fi nding in the Report that the “National Guard and active-duty military response saved lives; provided urgent food, water, shelter, and medical care to many 

hurricane victims; and helped restore law and order, re-establish communications, and 

rebuild damaged roads.” Additionally, the Report fi nds that as soon as the DOD leadership 

recognized the severity of the disaster, it adopted an energetic, forward-looking posture 

that brought critical expertise and personnel to support the beleaguered state and federal 

fi rst responders. I also fully agree with the fi ndings and recommendations of the Report on 

how the response of DOD and the National Guard can be improved in the event of a future 

catastrophe or major disaster. 

In particular, it is imperative that both DOD and the National Guard improve their planning and co-ordination in the event a large military response is needed for another catastrophe. 

With respect to the deployment of National Guard forces, there is a clear need to better plan 

for large-scale deployments. As the Report recommends, the Governors should work with 

the Department of Defense to develop a coordinated, integrated process for the large-scale 

deployment of National Guard forces when such a large-scale deployment is requested by a 

Governor during a catastrophe.

Communications. I also endorse the Report’s focus on the importance of emergency 

communications. Th e Report states: “Th e problems of operability and interoperability of 

communications were a central part of the failures in the governments’ response to Hurricane Katrina.” To address this problem, I support the enactment of legislation providing 

a dedicated funding source for the purchase of interoperable communications equipment. 

States cannot aff ord to correct this problem on their own; they need federal assistance. I will 

continue to work with Senators Collins and Lieberman to ensure that any legislation arising 

out of this investigation includes dedicated funding for interoperability equipment.

Separated Families

One particularly disturbing aspect of the Katrina disaster involves the failure of federal, 

state, and local governments to deal eff ectively with the problem of family members who 

became separated during the disaster. During evacuation and search-and-rescue eff orts, 

some family members became separated, ending up in diff erent places within the same state 

and sometimes in diff erent states. Over 5,000 children were reported missing by family 

members, as well as over 13,000 adults. While the reported cases of missing children have 

since been characterized as resolved, it took nearly seven months for the last child to be 

reunited with her family.2

DHS and FEMA failed to take the lead in addressing this devastating problem. FEMA, for 

example, failed for a substantial period of time to make use of an existing database to assist 

in reuniting families. It did not set standards for states to use in evacuation eff orts so that, 

for example, the name, origin, and destination of each evacuated individual was recorded. 

Instead, the Department of Justice tasked a single nonprofi t agency, experienced in locating 

missing persons, to set up a hotline for reporting missing children and adults and to devise 

ways to try to reunite them with friends or family. In addition, charitable organizations, 

businesses, ad hoc groups, and even the media set up websites to help persons locate their 

loved ones.

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One Web site identifi ed 52 other Web sites with lists of Katrina survivors and missing persons.3

 Th is Web site explained that it was providing the list of these databases to help people 

fi nd missing friends and family members. It also pointed out the obvious: “Th ere needs to 

be a way to pool this data so that people don’t have to go from database to database looking 

for the information they seek.”

FEMA not only failed to utilize a central database to track Katrina survivors and missing 

persons, it also failed to cooperate fully with the nonprofi t agency tasked with reuniting 

families.4

 Citing privacy issues that could have been resolved, FEMA declined to provide 

needed assistance and allowed the problem to fester for months. 

Some have argued that, during the next disaster, state and local governments should assume responsibility for tracking evacuees, resolving missing-person reports, and reuniting 

separated family members. I disagree. People go missing when there are disasters of such 

magnitude that they overwhelm state and local capacity. Th e Committee Report states in 

the “Conclusions and Findings” section: “During a catastrophe, which by defi nition almost 

immediately exceeds state and local resources and signifi cantly disrupts governmental operations and emergency services, the role of the federal government is particularly important.”

Catastrophic events also oft en aff ect multiple states. Even disasters confi ned to a single state 

may see persons evacuated to multiple states, as in the case of the New Orleans fl ood. It is 

unlikely that states will know ahead of time which of them will be involved in a particular 

disaster or in evacuation eff orts. Even if they did, it is naive to think that multiple states 

facing imminent disaster can work out an eff ective plan for tracking evacuated individuals. 

Logic dictates that DHS should take responsibility for addressing the problem beforehand 

by developing standards and forms for collecting evacuee information, providing a common database or means for linking multiple databases to track evacuees and identify missing persons, and resolving privacy issues. Assigning this responsibility to the states instead, 

without a lead federal agency, is impractical and likely to ensure another round of confusion 

and heartache for misplaced persons and their families.

Th e House Committee report does not address this problem.5

 Th e White House report 

briefl y mentions it, but does not hold anyone accountable for the confused and inadequate 

response during Katrina, nor does it recommend corrective actions.6

 Every day that families 

are separated during a disaster brings loss and sadness. Each separation consumes federal 

resources in the search for the missing. Each lost child, suff ering alone without family or 

friends, is a tragedy. Th is is an issue that deserves our full attention. 

Preventive action can avert much of the problem. Forms to track evacuees and identify 

missing persons, designation of a central database to accept and organize this information, 

standards for resolving privacy concerns, and methods to make appropriate information 

accessible are matters which can be worked out before disaster strikes, and then used to 

prevent tens of thousands of future cases of missing persons during disasters. Th ese systems 

need to be developed before the next emergency. Where necessary, Congress needs to appropriate the funds needed to put these systems in place. I urge DHS to take on and complete this task prior to the upcoming hurricane season.

Unifi ed Command 

I agree with the points made by Senator Lieberman in his additional views, which I have 

joined, that FEMA must share the blame for the absence of a unifi ed command in Louisiana 

during Katrina. It is abundantly clear from the record before the Committee that FEMA 

lacked an adequate number of trained personnel in Louisiana to establish a fully functional 

Incident Command System and a unifi ed command for the response to Katrina. Under the 

National Response Plan, FEMA was the lead federal agency responsible for establishing a 

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720

unifi ed command in partnership with the state; neither FEMA nor the state had an adequate 

number of trained personnel to deal with a catastrophe of this magnitude. Th e absence of 

a unifi ed command contributed to confusion and delays. Among the lessons learned from 

Katrina is the need for FEMA to take stronger action to ensure a unifi ed command in future 

disasters.

Waste, Fraud, and Abuse. I am disappointed that the Committee’s investigation did not 

more fully tackle the issue of contract waste, fraud, and abuse. Our Committee has jurisdiction over federal procurement issues, and multiple examples of procurement failings came 

up during the Katrina hearings, including allegations involving no-bid contracts, infl ated 

prices, unqualifi ed contractors, and wasteful purchasing. More aggressive Congressional 

oversight could have helped identify the many problems and suggest needed reforms. 

Active involvement by this Committee in Katrina procurement matters could still provide a 

signifi cant boost to eff orts to prevent contract problems during the Katrina recovery eff ort. I 

hope the Committee will redouble its eff orts to prevent, expose, and remedy contract waste, 

fraud and abuse during the Katrina recovery.

FEMA and DOD

Finally, I would like to note one matter that merits a clarifi cation. Th e Report’s Executive 

Summary states that even aft er DOD Deputy Secretary England issued a “blank check” to 

Admiral Keating to provide DOD assistance in the Katrina disaster, and the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff , General Myers, directed DOD commanders to move potentially 

useful assets in advance of FEMA requests, “some FEMA offi cials believe that DOD’s approval process continued to take too long.” As the Report implies, however, the majority of 

FEMA offi cials were satisfi ed with DOD’s approval process and the eff orts it made to assist 

FEMA during the Katrina disaster. As FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer William Lokey 

said: “What I will speak to is Colonel Daskevich and his people. Th ey ... [did] anything I 

asked them to do ... everything they could for the people in Louisiana.”7

1 Th e Democratic Staff of the House Committee on Homeland Security recently made a similar recommendation, but 

specifi cally defi ned when the FEMA Director would report to the President. Th e report explains: “We recommend requiring a direct line of reporting between the Director of FEMA and the President of the United States during incidents 

of national signifi cance.” Redirecting FEMA Toward Success: A Report and Legislative Solution, Prepared for Congressman Bennie G. Th ompson, Ranking Member, by the Democratic Staff of the Committee on Homeland Security, Feb. 

2006, page 35.

2 “National Center for Missing and Exploited Children Reunites Last Missing Child Separated By Hurricane Katrina and 

Rita,” press release, Mar. 17, 2006, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids, accessed on May 4, 2006.

3 www.rexblog.com/2005/09/03, accessed on May 4, 2006.

4 “FEMA Restricts Evacuee Data, Citing Privacy,” Th e Washington Post, October 12, 2005, page A01; “FEMA Slows 

Search for Kids From Katrina,” Th e Washington Post, Dec. 23, 2005, page A06; “Coordinated search for the missing; 

Reuniting children separated from families aft er Hurricane Katrina should be a FEMA priority,” Th e Grand Rapids Press, 

Grand Rapids, MI, Dec. 31, 2005, p. A12.; “FEMA stymies Katrina searches: Agency cites privacy laws in preventing efforts to fi nd missing children,” Charleston Daily Mail, Charleston, WV, Dec. 27, 2005, page 7A.

5 A Failure of Initiative: Final Report, U.S. House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Feb. 15, 2006. 

6 Th e White House, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, Feb. 2006.

7 Interview of William Lokey, FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 136.

Additional Views