2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
1-5-2004 

# B i shop v . N ew J e rsey P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 03-1996

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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2004 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min . C a rl s on@l a

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/1117* The Ho nora ble F rank J. M agill, Se nior C ircuit Jud ge, U nited S tates C ourt o f A ppea ls

for the E igh th C ircu it, sittin g by d esig natio n. NOT PRECEDE NTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT 

### No. 03-1996 DARIUS D. BISHOP; ERIC BARNES; CHARLES D. BISHOP; WI LLIE J. BOOKER; JOHN F. BROWN; SAMUEL EVANS; ALVIN C. FLEMING; TODD HAYES; WI LLIAM E. JAMES; CURTIS J OHNSON, Appellants

v. STATE OF NE

W JERS EY; THE NEW JER SEY DEPARTMEN T OF PERSON NEL AND MER IT

SYSTEM BOARD

APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DIST RICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY D.C. CivilNo. 02-cv-05458 Distri ct Judge: The Honorable John W. Biss ell, Chief Judge

Argued November 20, 2003

Befor e: RENDELL, BARRY, an d MAGILL, * Circuit Judges (Opinion Fi led: J anuary 5, 2004)2

Paul I. Weiner, Esq. (Argued) We iner & Ka tz 301 South Livings ton Avenue Suite 101 Livingston, NJ 07039 Atto rney for Ap pellan ts

Barbara A. Berr eski, Esq. (Argued) P.O. Box 112 Office of Attorney Generalof New Jersey Divisi on of Law Richard J. Hughes Justi ce Complex Trenton, NJ 08625 Attorneyfor Appelle es

OPI NION

BA RR Y, Circuit

Judge I. BACKGROUND The parties a re fam iliar with the fa cts of th is case , and, th us, w e w ill provid e but a brief sum mary of those f acts at the outset, incorpo rating additional fac ts only as necessary to our discussion of the iss ues. Plaintiffs/appellants are A frican-A merican f irefighters, employed b y the New ark Fire Department. I n 2000, each pl ainti ff took the New Jersey Department of Per sonnel Fire Lie utenant

/Fir e Captain pr omotional examinati on, an exam admini ster ed by t he1 These thre e are the onlyplaint iffs appea ling t

he District Court ’s order . The other 1 plaintiff s failed the ex amin ation, an d it is clea r that the statute o f limitatio ns ha s run a s to 2 them

. See Bronze Shiel ds, I nc. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Civil Serv. , 667 F.2d 1074 ( 3d 3 Cir. 1981 ). 4 3 State. O n A pril 12, 2 001 , the resu lts we re relea sed w hen th e list of su ccess ful ap plican ts eligible for pr omotion was promulgated bythe New JerseyDepartment of Per sonnel and Merit Sy stem Board. Of the 287 men and women who took the exam, 129 passed and

we re listed in orde r of the ir score , from high est to low est. M unicip alities use this list to pr omote fi re fi ght er s on th e l is t i n t he o rd erin whi ch t heyar e r ank ed a s po si ti ons bec ome

ava ilabl e. T he lis t is va lid an d in use unt il it ex pire s on Ap ril 3, 2 004

. Pl ai nt if fs Dar iu s Bi sho p, Alv in Fl emmi ng, and Joh n Br own e ach pas se d t he e xam,

an d w er e r an ke d 6 6, 5 6, a nd 93 re sp ec tiv ely. 1 Plaintiffs cl aim that the format

and administ rati on of the exam dis criminated agai nst minoriti es as evi denced by the dispropor

tionatelylow numbers of minori ties who passed the exam and t he dispropor

tionatelylower ranki ng of those minoriti es who passed. On April 12, 2001 ( the daythat t he eli gibil ity

lis t was promulgated), Bi shop fil ed an administ

rati ve appeal wit

h the Merit

System Board/Department of Personnel chall enging the format and the administ rati on of the exam. On Januar y 21, 2002, plaintiffs filed a C harge of Discrimina tion with the E EO C aga inst the New ark Fire Department onl y, alle ging that the exam unlawful ly operate d to excl ude them based upon race. O n A pril 9, 20 02, the EE OC issued to Bis hop a Rig ht to S ue letter w ith resp ect to2 Plaintiffs al so all eged viol ations of a 1980 Consent Decree between the Cityof

Newark and the U.S. Department of Justice (“ Consent Decree”) , and vi olati on of the New Jers ey La w A gain st D iscrim inati on, N .J. S TAT . A NN . § 10 :5-1 , et seq. (“LA D”). 4 his c har ge a gain st the Ne wa rk F ire D epa rtme nt. On M ay 7, 2002, pla inti ffs fil ed thei r fir st complai nt in t he U.S. Dist

rict Court for the Dist rict of New Jersey a gainst

the State of New Jersey and the New Jersey Department of Per sonnel and Merit System Board (“Stat e Defendants”) , and agai nst the Cityof Newark and the Newark Fire Department (“City Defendant s”), alle ging viol ations of the Civi l Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S. C. § 1981 (“§ 1981”); Titl e VII of the Feder al Civ il Rig hts A ct, as am end ed, 4 2 U .S.C . § 20 00e , et seq. (“Title VII”); and the Un iform Gui del in es on Emp lo y ee S el ect io n Pr oce dur es is sue d byEEOC. 2 This complai nt all eged that t he nature and administ

rati on of the exam dis proportionate ly excluded pl ainti ffs from promotion bec ause of the ir r ace. On June 3, 2002, Bis hop’s admini strative appeal t o the Merit System Board was denied. On July 9, 2002, defendant s in the firs t action fil ed motions to dismis s, cl aiming sovereign immunity and plainti ffs’ failure t o exhaust administrati ve remedies. On A ugust 2, 200 2, plain tiffs filed a Ch arge o f D iscrimin ation w ith the E EO C ag ainst the State De fend ants, alleg ing tha t the ex am h ad a d ispara te imp act on plaintiff s, that the results were defecti ve, and that plainti ffs were dis criminated agai nst i n the preparati on, admi ni stra ti on, and val id at io n of th e ex am. On Sep temb er 26 , 2002 , the D istrict Co urt gra nted th e State De fend ants’ m otion to3 The Distri ct Court a lso di smissed pl ainti ffs’ EEOC Guidelines cl aim because t he guideli nes do not pr ovide an i ndependent caus e of acti on; dis missed pl ainti ffs’ Consent Decree clai ms for lack of standi ng because they were not parti es to t

hat decr ee; di smissed plaintiff s’ § 19 81 cla im ag ainst the State D efen dants on th e gro und of E leven th Amendment immunity , but s ustai ned thei r § 1981 clai m against t he CityDefendants; and dismissed plainti ffs’ LAD claims against the State Defendants wh ile sustai ning those claims against the City Defendants.

4 Plaintiffs cl aim in their brief t o us that this motion was fil ed on January28, 2003. 5 dism iss plain tiffs’ firs t action as to the m, an d gra nted in part an d den ied in p art the C ity Defendants’ motion to di smiss. Most relevant to thi s appeal, the Dist

rict Court dis missed pl ai nt if fs ’ Ti tl e VI I c la im a gai nst th e St at e Def

end ant s be cau se pl ai nt if fs fai le d t o na me th em i n t hei r f

ir st Char ge o f Di sc ri min at io n fi le d wi th th e EEOC. 3 Claims agai nst the CityDefendants remai n pending in t he firs t action. On Oc tober 9 , 2002 , the E EO C issu ed to p laintiffs a Rig ht to S ue letter w ith respect to the St ate Defendants . On November 14, 2002, pl ainti ffs fil ed thei r Complaint (“Com plaint”) in this action again st the State De fendan ts, alleging violations of T itle VII, LAD , § 1981, and the Consent Decr ee. Pl ainti ffs noted t hat the y fi led a Charge of Discri minati on with the EEOC within 300 day s of the l ast commiss ion of the discriminat ory employment practi ce – namely , thepromotion of applicants fr om the eligi bility list o n Ju ly 20, 2 002

. On December 18, 2002, 4 the S tate D efe nda nts m ove d to dism iss th e C om plain t. On M arch 11, 2003, the Dist rict Court granted the State Defendants ’ motion, concludi ng that pl ainti ffs had not fi led a char ge with the EEOC within 300 day s of the al leged5 The Distri ct Court a lso di smissed pl ainti ffs’ § 1981 cl aim under the doctri ne of res

judicata becaus e it ha d dismis sed that clai m in the fi rst a ction and plaint iffs di d not bri ef the issu e w hen th e mo tion to d ismiss w as pe ndin g. It dism issed p laintiffs ’ LA D c laim because it had dismissed all federalclaims against the defendants.

6 Plaintif fs do not ad dress th e tolling issue in their brie fs, and we do n ot reac h it. 6 discriminat ory act, as mandated by42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(e)( 1); t hat plainti ffs were not entitled to e quitabl e toll ing while Bi shop’s admini strative appeal was pendi ng; and that the use of t

he eli gibil ity

lis t was not a cont

inuing vi olati on. 5 Plaintiffs Bis hop, Flemming, and Brown now appeal. We must decide f rom which da te th e 3 00 d ayst atut e o f l im it atio ns fo r p la in ti ff s t o f il e the ir ch ar ge wit

h the EEOC should run: the dat e of the pr omulgati on of the el igibi lit y l ist , or t

he lat er date s of eit

her the most recent r ound of promotions or the date on which the l ist will expire. 6 The Distri ct Court ha d juri sdiction pursuant to 28 U.S. C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and had sup plem enta l juris dicti on o ver the s tate la w c laim s pu rsua nt to 28 U .S.C . § 13 67. We have juris dicti on pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II . DIS CUSS ION Ou r review of the Distric t Cou rt’s dism issal of a cau se of action for fa ilure to sta te a cla im a s tim e-b arre d is p lena ry. See, e. g. , Anderson v. Consol . RailCorp. , 297 F.3d 242, 251 (3d Cir. 200 2). Plaintif fs arg ue tha t the pro mo tions an d on goin g valid ity of the elig ibility list (until it expires i n April 2004) are continuing di scri minatory acts, and there fore a continuing7 The parti es have bri efed whether t he State and CityDefendants can be cons idered alte r egos such t

hat we should at

tri bute to t

he State Defendants res ponsibi lit y for the promotions made by the CityDefendants. The Distri ct Court t hought legi timat e questi ons of fa ct existe d w ith resp ect to th is issue, a nd d id no t rule on it. But ev en if th e State De fend ants ar e dee med respo nsible f or the p rom otions , these p rom otions , as w e w ill explai n, were the neutraleffects of the al leged di scri minatory acts, and so cannot s erve as triggeri ng dates for the statut e of limitati ons. 7 violatio n of Title V II. The y argue th at each prom otion th ey do no t receiv e is a se parate discrim inatory ac t wh ich trigg ers the runn ing an ew of the statute o f limitatio ns w ithin which theymust fil e a charge wit h the EEOC. Defendants argue t hat the se promoti ons and the ongoi ng validi ty of the el igibi lit y l ist are merel y the non-dis criminatoryeffects of the alleg ed dis crimin atory form at and adm inistration of the exam , wh ich cu lmina ted in the pro mu lgation of the list. We agree with defe ndan ts and the D istrict Co urt, and hold that t he stat ute of l imit ations had run by the ti me plaintiffs fi led the ir charge against the St at e Def

end ant s wi th th e EEOC. 7 W heth er v iew ed s epa ratel y or tog ethe r, Bronz e Shields, Inc. v. N ew Jerse y Dep’t of Civil Serv. , 667 F.2d 1074 ( 3d Cir. 1981) , and Delaware Stat e College v. Ricks , 449 U.S. 250 (1980) mandate our deci sion. In Bronze Shiel ds , the pla intiffs w ere see king to become Newark police offi cers and t ook a written exam administered bythe New Jersey Sta te D epa rtme nt o f C ivil S erv ice. If they passed the exam, the y would have be en placed

on an e ligibility

roster in the order in w hich they scored. W hen N ewark needed to hire new police offi cers, it would s creen appl icant s on thi s rost er, s tarting with t he appli cant with the hi ghest sc ore; appl icant s who passed the s creeni ng were hired. Plaintiffs ei ther8

failed the ex am o r som e asp ect of the scr eenin g pro cess, an d sue d the S tate an d the C ity for hav ing vio lated Title VI I. The Distric t Cou rt dism issed th e com plaint b ecau se plain tiffs ha d no t filed the ir charge with the EEOC w ithi n the st atute of limi tati ons – ther e, 180 day s from the pro mu lgati on o f the list. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that t he eligibil ityroster was a contin uing violatio n of Title V II for a s long as it w as in ef fect a nd, the refor e, that the ir cha rge to th e E EO C w as tim ely be cau se it w as f iled d urin g th e ro ster’ s ef fec tive p erio d. We rejected that arg um ent, an d held that pla intiffs d id no t allege th at Ne wa rk “w ould have foll owed anythi ng but a neutral, non-disc riminatory procedure i n hiri ng from the lis t.” Id. at 108 3. Th e pro mu lgation of the list was the on ly allegedly disc rimina tory act, and the c ont inu ing eff ectiv ene ss o f the list co nstitu ted m erely a neu tral e ffe ct of that a ct. Consequently , the charge fi led with t he EEOC was untimely , and we affirmed the District Co urt’s dism issal of th e co mp laint

. In Bronze Shiel ds , we reli ed on the Supreme Court ’s deci sion i n Ricks , in whic h the Court refused to apply the continuing vi olati on theory . Ricks was a pr ofessor who had been denied tenure, and was inste ad offered a one- year terminal contr act, after which his e mp loym ent w oul d be term inate d. Ricks , 449 U .S. at 252-53. T he D istrict Court concluded that the stat

ute of l imit ations for fil ing a char ge with the EEOC began on the date Ricks was offered the termina l contr act, not, a s Ricks had ar gued, when the terminal

con tract exp ired

. We revers ed, bu t the Su prem e Co urt rev ersed us, ho lding th at to8 We recently applie d Ricks in Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co. , 235 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 2000). The pl ainti ff, Watson, recei ved a letter s tati ng that he was being terminated fr om his cur rent pos iti on, and that he would be t erminat ed from Kodak entir elyif he di d not find ano ther pos ition at K oda k w ithin one mo nth

. Wa tson f iled his E EO C ch arge w ithin 300 days of his act

ual dis charge, but not wit hin 300 day s of the r eceipt of the t ermination letter

. Applyi ng Ricks , we held that Watson’s recei pt of the termination l ette r was the act of d iscrim inati on t hat tr igg ered the 3 00- day sta tute o f lim itatio ns. Even though Watson may have st ayed at Kodak if he found anot her posi tion, his al legation of dis crimination wa s w ith re spe ct to l osin g th e sp ecif ic po sition he h ad h eld. Because the termination letter was unequivoca l as t o Watson losi ng this position, receipt of that letter was the trigg erin g ac t. As in Watson , pla inti ffs here i dentif y the specif

ic dis criminatoryact – the design and admi nist

rati on of the exam, and the promulgation of t he lis t – from which the statute of l imitati ons runs. 9 determi ne the timeli ness of an EEOC complaint, a court must “identifyprecis elythe ‘unlawful e mployment

practi ce’ of which (pl ainti ff) complai ns.” Id. at 25 7. “In order for the l imit ations periods to commence with the date of disch arge, R icks w ould have had to allege and p rove that the man ner in which his employment was termi nated di ffered di scri minatori ly from the manner in which t

he College terminat ed other pr ofessors who also had been den ied te nur e.” Id. at 25 7-5 8. R icks ma de n o su ch a llega tion

. The Suprem e Court also held that because Ricks’ t ermination was carried out i n a neutra l, non- discriminat ory manner, the stat ute of limitation s beg an to ru n w hen th e term ination decisio n w as m ade a nd co mm unica ted to Ricks, “ even though one of t he effe cts of the deni al of t enure – the eventualloss of a teachi ng position – did not occur unti l later.” Id. at 258. Applyi ng Ricks in Bronze Shields , we c onclu ded th at the p rom ulgatio n of the elig ibility roster w as the la st allege dly disc rimi nato ry act b y the d efe nda nts. Bronze Shiel ds , 667 F.2d at 1083-84. 8 Bronze Shiel ds and Ricks comp el our rejection of the continuing violation theory9 Ne ither the charg e filed with the E EO C, no r the C om plaint, alle ge tha t the m anne r in

wh ich in div idu als w ere p rom oted fro m th e list w hen vac anc ies a rose wa s dis crim inato ry. To the contr ary , the Complaint al leges t hat the “dispar ate impactof the 2000 examination continue s up to the present . On or about J uly 20, 2002, t hirt een additional promotions we re m ade utiliz ing the d efe ctive pro mo tion list.” C om plain t at ¶ 4 1 (e mp has is ad ded ). Only i n their

Reply Bri ef do plai ntiff s suggest – albei t it

without expl anati on – that t he promotions themselve s were disc riminatory . This s uggesti on is both belat ed and bereft of sup por t. 10 in thi s case. The discri minatory act that plainti ffs all ege is t he design and a dminist

rati on of the exam and th e con com itant pro mu lgation of the eligibility list. 9 The neutraluse of the list by municipal fire dep artments is me rely the effect of the allege d discriminatory

exam . The refor e, the sta tute of limitation s beg an ru nnin g on the da te that the eligibility lis t was promulgated. Pl ai nt if fs ’ a rg umen t t

hat th is cas e i s di ffe re ntfr om Bronze Shiel ds because the plaint iffs i n that c ase fail ed the exam, wherea s Bishop, Flemming, and Brown passed , is unp ersua sive. B ecau se thes e plain tiffs pa ssed, th eir argu men t goes , the on goin g valid ity of the l ist

untilits expirat

ion date , and the promotions made based upon it , constitute a continuing violati on because plaintiffs are now stuck with their low ranking on that li st and h ave n o no n-disc rimina tory aven ue by w hich to seek a pro mo tion. T o req uire the m to have filed th eir EE OC com plaints 3 00 d ays after th e pro mu lgation of the list, but w hile theysti ll r emained on the e ligibili ty lis t, c ould res ult i n their being promote d after

the fili ng of thei r charges and/or t heir l awsuit – a wast e of judi cial resourc es. Better, they contend, to wait unt

il t he last discriminat ory act – whether that be the most recent r ound11

of p rom otions , or the f ailure to have prom oted th em w hen th e list exp ires – to begin running t he stat ute of l imit ations . While we apprec iate plaint iffs’ concern for t

he

cons ervatio n of judicia l resou rces, tha t conc ern d oes n ot trans form neutra l effe cts into disc rimi nato ry acts . The Sixth Cir cuit ha s come to the same conclusi on we do. In Cox v. Cityof M emp his , 230 F.3d 199 (6th C ir. 2000), the p laintiffs were w hite female p olice officers who passed a promoti ons examination, were pl aced on the el igibi lit y l ist , but were ne ver pro mo ted. The y claimed that the adm inistration of the exam wa s discrim inatory in violat ion of Title VII, but the EEOC dismiss ed thei r charges because they had not been filed wit hin 180 days o f the pro mu lgati on o f the list. The Sixth Cir cuit e valuat ed the plaint iffs’ continui ng violat

ion theor y i n light of thei r passi ng the exam, a nd concluded that t he promotions of others or the fa ilure of plai ntiff s to be pr omoted were the effe cts of pre vio us d iscrim inati on, a nd n ot co ntin uin g ac ts of disc rimi natio n th em selv es. The C ourt emphasized, in res ponse to pl ainti ffs’ ar gument that the fact that t hey pas sed the exa m distinguis hed them from the pl ainti ffs in Bronze Shiel ds wh o faile d, that the m ere po ssibility that on e w ill be hire d or p rom oted d espite a n alleg edly discriminatory ranking does no t mean tha t the failure to prom ote or hire should be t

reate d as a dis criminatoryact separate f rom the ori ginal a ct of discrim ination .... the assign men t of an allege dly discrim inatory ran king is the rele vant d iscrimin atory act ev en w here th e low rank ing is n ot a “c ertain prelude” to an adver se employ ment acti on. Cox , 230 F.3d at

205 (quoti ng Huels v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc. , 121 F .3d 10 47, 10 51 (7 th Cir. 1997) ). We agree wit h both the Si xth Circui t’s reasoning and i ts concl usion.II I. CONCLU SI ON

In sum, we rej ect pl ainti ffs’ contention t hat the continui ng violat ion doctrine applie s. Pl ainti ffs do not al lege anydiscriminat ory acts r elat ed to the select ion of names from the el igibi lit

y l ist for promoti on. These promotions were neut ral, nondiscriminatory

effects of the promulgation of the eligi bility li st. Because plainti ffs’ EE OC cha rge wa s no t filed wit hin 300 days o f this pro mu lgati on, i t wa s tim e-b arre d. Th e O rde r ofthe D istrict Co urt w ill be aff irme d.

TO THE CLERK OF THE CO URT: Kindly file the fore going Opinion.

/s/ M ar yan ne Tr um p B ar ry Circuit Judge

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