IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-10052

JUDY B. KILLEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, OWEN, Circuit Judge, and MORGAN, District 

Judge.

∗

CARL E. STEWART, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Judy Killen (“Killen”) worked as an ultrasound 

technician for Covenant Health Systems (“Covenant”) beginning in 2002. She 

ceased working in March 2009 due to neck, shoulder, and upper back pain. She 

was awarded 24 months of benefits from Covenant’s long-term disability 

insurance plan, which Defendant-Appellee Reliance Standard Life Insurance 

Company (“Reliance Standard”) administered. After three internal decisions 

by Reliance Standard rejecting Killen’s request for extended long-term 

disability benefits, she brought suit in federal court. The district court held 

∗ District Judge of the Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 8, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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that Reliance Standard did not abuse its discretion in finding that Killen could

perform sedentary work, and granted summary judgment to Reliance 

Standard. For the reasons discussed herein, we AFFIRM.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Killen worked for Covenant from 2002 until March 2009, when she 

claimed that neck, shoulder and upper back pain made it too difficult for her 

to continue. Reliance Standard administered Covenant’s long-term disability 

plan (the “Plan”)—which is governed by the Employee Retirement Income 

Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.—and also paid benefits 

under the Plan if it found an employee disabled.

Killen collected benefits from June 2009 to June 2011. During this time, 

Killen separately qualified for Social Security disability benefits. To continue 

receiving benefits under the Plan after two years, a claimant must be “totally 

disabled” such that she is incapable of performing the material duties of any

occupation for which she is qualified by way of education, training, or 

experience. Under the contract, an insured is totally disabled if “due to an 

Injury or Sickness he or she is capable of only performing the material duties 

on a part-time basis or part of the material duties on a Full-time basis.” 

At the outset, Killen’s primary care physician—Dr. Steven Crow (“Dr. 

Crow”)—treated her. Dr. Crow treated Killen on over twenty separate 

occasions over the next four years and addressed a variety of maladies she 

experienced beginning in late 2008. In August 2010, Killen seriously injured 

her right shoulder by exacerbating an apparently pre-existing tear in the 

rotator cuff. Dr. Crow found in September 2010 that Killen “had severe pain 

in the shoulder since that time,” and that she was experiencing “[s]hooting pain 

towards her neck.” Shortly thereafter, Dr. Crow referred her to Dr. Kevin 

Crawford (“Dr. Crawford”), an orthopedic surgeon who determined in October 

2010 that Killen had a “high-grade full-thickness rotator cuff tear” in her right 

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shoulder. The tear was further corroborated by a radiologist’s report. In a 

follow-up appointment in January 2011, however, Dr. Crawford found that 

Killen’s “function is good, even though she has some discomfort.”

In May 2011, Reliance Standard’s internal vocational staff—evaluating 

the reports outlined above after Killen requested continued benefits—

performed a residual employability analysis and listed five sedentary 

occupations appropriate for Killen. Consequently, Reliance Standard 

determined that, while Killen could no longer work as an ultrasound 

technician, she “appear[ed] capable of sedentary work activity.” Reliance 

Standard thereafter decided to discontinue Killen’s benefits. 

This first denial apparently crossed in the mail with additional 

documents Killen sent to Reliance Standard, among them a treatment report 

from Dr. Crow and a letter from Dr. Crawford. Dr. Crow’s letter noted Killen’s 

“severe anxiety.” Dr. Crawford’s June 2011 letter, however, is the subject of 

dispute by the parties and is ambiguous about Killen’s condition. He wrote 

that Killen was “reasonably functional despite the findings on MRI,” but 

elaborated that “[w]hen I say functional, I mean that she still can get by with 

activities of daily living and can get her hand to her mouth and fix the back of 

her hair to some extent.” Reliance Standard evaluated these additional 

documents apparently as a courtesy; it would otherwise have had to open up a 

more probing internal appeal. The company again denied continued coverage.

Subsequently, through her attorney, Killen filed an internal appeal with 

Reliance Standard, relying on an August 2011 letter from Dr. Crow that 

repeatedly emphasized how she was “incapable of holding down a job” due to 

her medical issues. At Reliance Standard’s urging, she submitted to an inperson evaluation and independent review conducted in February 2012 by Dr. 

Mary Burgesser (“Dr. Burgesser”), a physical medicine and rehabilitation 

specialist. Dr. Burgesser, while crediting Killen’s chronic, irreparable right 

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shoulder pain and acknowledging Dr. Crawford’s diagnosis, concluded in a 

detailed report that the injury did not prevent her from performing sedentary 

work. A subsequent (second) residual employability analysis conducted in 

March 2012 by Reliance Standard, this time taking into account Dr. 

Burgesser’s report, came to a similar conclusion as the first: Killen was capable 

of performing sedentary work in at least three alternative occupations. 

Relying on these reports, Reliance Standard denied Killen’s appeal in March 

2012. In its letter, Reliance Standard noted that Killen had been receiving 

disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)—benefits 

which offset Reliance Standard’s own obligations to Killen—but explained that 

the SSA may have used a different standard in evaluating benefits decisions 

and also did not have Dr. Burgesser’s report when it awarded Killen benefits.

Nearly four months later, Killen sought to supplement the record with a 

letter from Dr. Crow adhering to the contents of his August 2011 letter: he still 

believed, he wrote, that Killen was “unable to work due to her medical issues.” 

Reliance Standard responded, notifying Killen that it had closed her file and 

would not supplement it with the letter.

After Killen exhausted her administrative appeals, she filed suit in 

August 2012 in federal court under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). In December 

2013, the district court granted summary judgment to Reliance Standard.

Killen timely appealed, arguing that Reliance Standard: (1) lacked 

substantial evidence supporting its denial; (2) failed to give Killen a full and 

fair review of her claim; (3); issued a decision tainted by a conflict of interest 

because it both administers and pays benefits; and (4) inappropriately refused 

to allow Killen to introduce the letter from Dr. Crow after it made a final 

decision to terminate her benefits. 

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II. Standard of Review

Review of summary judgment decisions in the ERISA context is de novo, 

and we apply the same standard as the district court. Schexnayder v. Hartford 

Life & Accident Ins. Co., 600 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 2010). Because the Plan 

gave Reliance Standard discretion to determine benefit eligibility as well as to 

construe the Plan’s terms, the court reviews Reliance Standard’s denial under 

the Plan for abuse of discretion. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 

U.S. 101, 115 (1989); Holland v. Int’l Paper Co. Ret. Plan, 576 F.3d 240, 246 

(5th Cir. 2009). “A plan administrator abuses its discretion where the decision 

is not based on evidence, even if disputable, that clearly supports the basis for 

its denial.” Holland, 576 F.3d at 246 (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). “If the plan fiduciary’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 

and is not arbitrary and capricious, it must prevail.” Ellis v. Liberty Life 

Assurance Co. of Boston, 394 F.3d 262, 273 (5th Cir. 2004).

Killen argues in her briefs repeatedly that the summary judgment 

standard requires that the evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence 

be viewed in the light most favorable to her since she is the nonmovant. She 

points to cases reciting the boilerplate language of the summary judgment 

standard. However, she misapprehends the nature of appellate review of 

summary judgment decisions on ERISA benefits cases where the plan at issue 

vests discretion, as this one does, in a plan administrator.1 In that case, “[t]he 

fact that the evidence is disputable will not invalidate the decision; the 

evidence need only assure that the administrator’s decision fall [sic]

somewhere on the continuum of reasonableness—even if on the low end.”

1 The parties do not dispute that the Plan vests discretionary authority with Reliance 

Standard. The Plan states that Reliance Standard “has the discretionary authority to 

interpret the Plan and the insurance policy and to determine eligibility for benefits.”

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Porter v. Lowe’s Cos., Inc.’s Bus. Travel Acc. Ins. Plan, 731 F.3d 360, 363–64 

(5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The case on which Killen primarily relies, Baker v. Metropolitan Life 

Ins. Co., 364 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 2004), is inapposite. While Baker does explain 

that appellate courts review district court decisions in the ERISA context de 

novo and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmovant, id. at 627–28, Killen’s 

selective citation to the case leaves out Baker’s later clarification: “when an 

administrator has discretionary authority with respect to the decision at issue, 

the standard of review should be one of abuse of discretion.” Id. at 627. A court 

must “give deference to the decision of the plan administrator and may not 

substitute its judgment for the decision of the fiduciary.” 1A Couch on Ins. § 

7:59 (3d ed. 2014). 

III. Discussion

A.

Killen first challenges the district court’s finding that substantial 

evidence supported the plan’s denial of benefits. Substantial evidence is “more 

than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Killen claims that the Plan 

language requires Reliance Standard to show that she can perform all of the 

job duties of a sedentary vocation on a full-time basis before discontinuing 

benefits. While it might have shown she could perform sedentary work, she 

argues, Reliance Standard never showed she could do so full time. 

Additionally, she claims the district court misconstrued the medical evidence 

and ignored objective documentation of her pain.

“[M]ost disputed claims for disability insurance benefits are awash in a 

sea of medical evidence, often of contradictory nature,” 10A Couch on Ins. § 

147:33, and this case is no different. Indeed, counsel for Killen admitted as 

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much at oral argument. Courts frequently hear cases, like this one, where the 

plaintiff’s own treating physicians generally support a finding of disability and 

the defendant’s vocational specialists and independent medical examiners 

disagree. 

In Holland, for example, a former paper machine specialist who had 

experienced a heart attack sought long-term disability benefits. See 576 F.3d 

at 243. The Plan’s language closely tracked the applicable language in this 

case. See id. at 244. The employee’s primary care physician equivocated, but 

supported a finding of total disability, and a specialist’s statements about his 

health were ambiguous: the specialist noted that the plaintiff had serious 

airway damage, but was improving. Id. The administrator had a third and 

fourth doctor conduct a paper review of the medical records, and a fifth doctor 

conducted a physical examination: all three agreed that the employee was not 

totally disabled. See id. at 244–45. The administrator never consulted a 

vocational expert. Id. at 249. The internal claim for benefits was denied twice. 

This court held that there had been no abuse of discretion; the existence of 

contradictory evidence, the court noted, “does not . . . make the administrator’s 

decision arbitrary. Indeed, the job of weighing valid, conflicting professional 

medical opinions is not the job of the courts; that job has been given to the 

administrators of ERISA plans.” Id. at 250 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted); accord Wade v. Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co., 493 F.3d 533, 540–

41 (5th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Hardt v. Reliance Standard 

Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242 (2010) (upholding a denial of benefits where 

plaintiff’s two treating physicians supported a disability finding but an 

examining neurophysiologist in a separate assessment found otherwise).2

2 There is no obligation to weigh treating physicians’ opinions any differently than 

those of other doctors or specialists. The Supreme Court recently clarified that “courts have 

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When we find an abuse of discretion, the discrepancies between the facts 

and the administrator’s findings are often stark. In Lain v. UNUM Life Ins. 

Co. of Am., a claimant had experienced serious chest pains and esophageal 

problems documented by multiple treating physicians. See 279 F.3d 337, 340–

42 (5th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 

554 U.S. 105, 115–19 (2008). Based on two internal reviews of the claimant’s 

medical files—one of which seemed to actually substantiate the individual’s 

complaints—and without an independent physical examination,3 the 

administrator denied benefits. See id. at 341–42. This court found an abuse 

of discretion, noting that there was a “complete absence in the record of any 

‘concrete evidence’ supporting [the administrator’s] determination.” Id. at 347.

In this case, substantial evidence supported Reliance Standard’s decision 

to deny long-term disability benefits to Killen. While there is evidence in the 

record to support Killen’s claim for disability—which the district court 

recognized—there is also more than enough evidence supporting a denial to 

insulate the decision from reversal, particularly under our narrow review for 

abuse of discretion. 

First, Reliance Standard’s vocational expert and examining physician 

provided sufficient evidence—including evidence of Killen’s ability to perform 

full-time sedentary work—to justify the denial. A vocational expert employed 

by Reliance Standard identified between three and five sedentary jobs Killen 

could perform. Additionally, Dr. Burgesser wrote in her report that Killen was 

no warrant to require administrators automatically to accord special weight to the opinions 

of a claimant’s physician; nor may courts impose on plan administrators a discrete burden of 

explanation when they credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating physician’s 

evaluation.” Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 834 (2003).

3 ERISA does not mandate an independent medical examination prior to a denial. See, 

e.g., Hobson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 75, 91 & n.3 (2d Cir. 2009) (collecting cases).

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“capable of performing at a sedentary work capacity . . . . The sedentary work 

would involve sitting most of the time and walking or standing for brief 

periods.” On a separate form, Dr. Burgesser listed a series of activities that 

Killen could perform “on a regular basis in an 8-hour workday.” The form 

noted that Killen could sit “frequent[ly],” and that she could “occasional[ly]” 

stand, walk, climb stairs, and drive. Contrary to Killen’s position that Reliance 

Standard never showed she could perform full-time work, these findings—

taken together—demonstrate that Killen could perform full-time work. 

Second, Killen’s own treating physicians equivocated at different times 

about the extent of her disability, even after the rotator cuff tear. Though her 

primary care physician ultimately concluded that she was totally disabled, her 

orthopedic surgeon’s reports are ambiguous at best on the issue. Indeed, in a 

follow-up appointment to address her right shoulder rotator cuff tear, he stated 

that her “function is good, even though she has some discomfort.” 

The evidence in this case is comparable to that presented in Holland and 

Wade. In both of those cases—as in this one—there were conflicting medical 

opinions, with the plaintiffs’ treating physicians generally supportive of a 

finding of disability and the defendants’ internal reviews or independent 

examining physicians determining otherwise. See Holland, 576 F.3d at 244–

45; Wade, 493 F.3d at 535–37. As the district court here acknowledged, it is 

the role of the ERISA administrator, not the reviewing court, to weigh valid 

medical opinions. See Holland, 576 F.3d at 250; Wade, 493 F.3d at 541. And 

unlike in Lain, it cannot be said in this case that there is a “complete absence 

in the record of any ‘concrete evidence’” supporting a denial. Lain, 279 F.3d at 

347. Reliance Standard’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.4

4 Killen argues also that some of the district court’s discussion of statements she made 

to her physicians—for example, telling Dr. Crow that she wanted to get on disability—

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B.

Killen next argues that Reliance Standard failed to provide a full and 

fair review of her claim because (1) the company did not provide sufficient 

evidence in support of its initial May 2011 denial of benefits and (2) the 

company brought forward its strongest evidence of Killen’s continued ability to 

perform full-time sedentary work during the final appeal without giving her a 

meaningful opportunity to respond.5

When denying claims, ERISA-covered employee benefit plans must: (1) 

provide adequate notice; (2) in writing; (3) setting forth the specific reasons for 

such denial; (4) written in a manner calculated to be understood by the 

participant; and (5) afford a reasonable opportunity for a full and fair review 

by the administrator. Wade, 493 F.3d at 540 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1133).

Killen’s first argument is foreclosed by our decision in Wade. In Wade, 

the administrator failed to comply even with the basic requirements of § 1133

during its initial internal review. While we found that the administrator’s

errors at least arguably reflected a failure to substantially comply with ERISA 

and its accompanying regulations, we stated that “[t]he statute and 

regulations do not require compliance with Section 1133 at each and every level

improperly contributed to its substantial evidence finding. Killen is correct that some of 

these statements are not especially germane to the substantial evidence inquiry, but the 

district court’s mere mention of those details, particularly in light of its recognition of the 

importance of the opinions of Dr. Burgesser and the vocational analyst to Reliance Standard’s 

denial, does not disturb our holding that substantial evidence supported the denial. Killen’s 

argument that neither Reliance Standard nor the district court considered the objective 

reports of her pain are also belied by the record. Both the district court and Reliance 

Standard’s independent medical examiner acknowledged Killen’s pain.

5 Killen, in her briefing, alternatively characterizes these alleged ERISA violations as 

“procedurally unreasonable.” But the doctrine of procedural unreasonableness is a “separate 

concept that is a subset of our conflict of interest analysis.” Truitt v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of 

Am., 729 F.3d 497, 509 n.4 (5th Cir. 2013).

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of review of a Plan’s internal claims processing,” and found that the claimant 

had been provided a full and fair review. See id.

Here, by contrast, Reliance Standard substantially complied with ERISA

at every step, including its initial denial. In its May 2011 initial written denial, 

Reliance Standard addressed: (1) medical records about Killen’s right shoulder 

injury, crediting her right rotator cuff tear but highlighting Dr. Crawford’s 

observation that her function was “good even though you have discomfort”; (2) 

the myriad medical issues—unrelated to the right shoulder problem—that 

Killen experienced, including those related to her neck and shoulder pain, 

heart problems, and depression; and (3) the internal vocational rehabilitation 

specialist’s finding based on submitted records that “while unable to work in 

your normal occupation, you appear capable of sedentary work activity.” 

Killen’s view that these findings do not permit the inference that she could 

perform full-time sedentary work takes too narrow a view of the evidence. 

Killen also argues that Reliance Standard unfairly brought forward its 

strongest evidence—the independent medical examiner’s report—only in the 

final stage of her appeal, thereby preventing her from engaging in the 

“meaningful dialogue” contemplated by § 1133. See Lafleur v. La. Health Serv. 

& Indem. Co., 563 F.3d 148, 154 (5th Cir. 2009). 

Circuits that have addressed the issue have generally determined that 

ERISA does not guarantee claimants an opportunity to rebut an independent 

medical examination report generated during an appeal prior to a denial of 

benefits. See Metzger v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 476 F.3d 1161, 1167 (10th 

Cir. 2007) (holding that ERISA and its implementing regulations do “not 

require a plan administrator to provide a claimant with access to the medical 

opinion reports of appeal-level reviewers prior to a final decision on appeal”); 

see also Pettaway v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am., 644 F.3d 427, 436 

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (same); Midgett v. Washington Grp. Int’l Long Term Disability 

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Plan, 561 F.3d 887, 895–96 (8th Cir. 2009) (same); Glazer v. Reliance Standard 

Life Ins. Co., 524 F.3d 1241, 1245–46 (11th Cir. 2008) (same). 

Citing Metzger, this court in an unpublished opinion adopted a similar 

stance. Shedrick v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 500 F. App’x 331, 339 (5th Cir. 2012) 

(“Further, there does not appear to be relevant case law or regulations for the 

proposition that Aetna violated ERISA’s full and fair review requirement by 

failing to consider evidence submitted after [the claimant’s] appeal was closed 

or by not allowing [the claimant] to rebut the report by Dr. Wallquist.”).

Killen does not dispute the force of this precedent. Rather, she contends 

that it is inapplicable where the first-stage denial did not provide evidence that 

she could call into question. But here, even assuming arguendo that Reliance 

Standard did not provide Killen with sufficient evidence justifying the initial 

denial for her to rebut, the underlying justification for each denial remained 

constant. Each letter rejected Killen’s claim for benefits on the same ground: 

her ability to perform sedentary work. This takes the facts out of our line of 

cases where the insurer impermissibly uses a “bait-and-switch” tactic, 

providing one justification at the first stage and then, during the review, 

changing the grounds for the denial. See, e.g., Rossi v. Precision Drilling 

Oilfield Servs. Corp. Emp. Benefits Plan, 704 F.3d 362, 366 (5th Cir. 2013); 

Robinson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 443 F.3d 389, 394 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Aetna’s 

shifting justification for its decision and failure to identify its vocational expert 

meant that Robinson was unable to challenge Aetna’s information or to obtain 

meaningful review of the reason his benefits were terminated.”). 

While the information provided in Dr. Burgesser’s report might have 

further bolstered Reliance Standard’s position, there was nothing in the report 

that altered the company’s original position. Therefore, Killen was not 

“sandbagged” by a report containing unanticipated factual findings. She was 

on notice beginning with the initial May 2011 denial that she needed to bring 

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forward evidence of her inability to perform sedentary work. Reliance 

Standard provided her an adequate opportunity to do so.

C.

We turn to Killen’s argument that Reliance Standard’s decision was 

“procedurally unreasonable”—that is, that the company’s conflict of interest as 

both the administrator of the Plan and the payor of benefits tainted its denial—

because of its failure to adequately distinguish the SSA’s disability finding.

The Supreme Court has held that a “plan administrator [who] both 

evaluates claims for benefits and pays benefits claims,” as Reliance Standard 

does here, has a conflict of interest. See Glenn, 554 U.S. at 112. But the Court 

purposefully avoided enunciating a precise standard for evaluation of the 

impact of the conflict. See id at 119. In Glenn, and in a post-Glenn case in this 

court with similar facts, Schexnayder, the defendant-administrators denied 

disability benefits, but not before the claimants successfully applied for

disability benefits before the SSA. See Glenn, 554 U.S. at 118; Schexnayder

600 F.3d at 471. The administrators financially benefitted from those 

decisions (payments from the SSA offset their own obligations) and then 

ignored the agency’s findings of total disability entirely; the result was a 

reversal of those benefits decisions. See Glenn, 554 U.S. at 118; Schexnayder

600 F.3d at 471.

Here, by contrast, Reliance Standard twice addressed the SSA benefits 

awarded to Killen, once distinguishing its denial in detail. Compare 

Schexnayder, 600 F.3d at 471 n.3 (“It is the lack of any acknowledgement which 

leads us to conclude that Hartford’s decision was procedurally unreasonable.”). 

We find no procedural unreasonableness on these facts suggesting that we 

should accord the conflict of interest factor any special weight.

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D.

Killen’s final argument is that Reliance Standard improperly failed to 

allow her to supplement the administrative record with a letter from Dr. Crow 

submitted four months after the third denial.

When assessing factual questions in benefits cases, “a long line of Fifth 

Circuit cases stands for the proposition that . . . the district court is constrained 

to the evidence before the plan administrator.” Vega v. Nat’l Life Ins. Servs., 

Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 299 (5th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases), overruled on other 

grounds by Glenn, 554 U.S. at 112. Before filing suit, “the claimant’s lawyer 

can add additional evidence to the administrative record simply by submitting 

it to the administrator in a manner that gives the administrator a fair 

opportunity to consider it.” Id. at 300. Such a “fair opportunity” must come in 

time for the administrator to “reconsider his decision.” Id.

Here, the file was already closed and Killen had exhausted two internal 

appeals. We cannot say that such a late submission of evidence, only four 

weeks before Killen filed suit, gave Reliance Standard the “fair opportunity” 

contemplated by Vega. Although Dr. Crow rebuts Dr. Burgesser’s opinion 

directly in the letter, he does so by repeating a position he had already taken. 

Indeed, he explained in the supplemental letter that “nothing has really 

changed in her condition.” The letter, therefore, would not have changed the 

outcome here. Cf. Keele v. JP Morgan Chase Long Term Disability Plan, 221 

F. App’x 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2007) (“We need not decide this question of Vega’s 

precise requirements today, because we conclude that the documents in 

dispute do not change the disposition of the case.”). We decline to find an abuse 

of discretion in Reliance Standard’s decision not to supplement the record, and 

we find no fault in the district court’s choice not to consider the letter.

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IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision 

granting summary judgment to Reliance Standard on the ground that it did 

not abuse its discretion in denying Killen long-term disability benefits.

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