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LEWIS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION—CONCURRENCE

PRESCOTT, J., concurring. I agree with the conclusions and the analysis set forth in the majority opinion.

I write separately only to explain further why I think

that the present appeal was not rendered moot by the

release of the petitioner, Prince Lewis, from prison during its pendency and by the transfer of his probation

supervision to the state of New York.1 See footnote 5

of the majority opinion.

As our Supreme Court noted in State v. Ovechka,

292 Conn. 533, 538 n.8, 975 A.2d 1 (2009), an appeal

challenging a criminal conviction is not rendered moot

by a defendant’s release from incarceration because of

the collateral consequences that attend a conviction, as

well as the fact that the defendant in that case remained

subject to a period of probation. Thus, our Supreme

Court implicitly concluded that a successful criminal

appeal that results in vacating the conviction renders

the entire sentence, including any remaining probationary period, void. Applying that reasoning to this habeas

case, the petitioner could still obtain practical relief

from an adjudication of this appeal, despite having been

released from prison, because he remains on probation.

In the present case, if the petitioner successfully prevailed on his claim in this appeal that the state of Connecticut waived jurisdiction over him by failing to seek

his reincarceration over many years, he would no longer

be obligated to serve any portion of his sentence, including the period of probation.

The respondent contends that because the petitioner’s probation is being supervised by the state of New

York, any relationship between the parties has ended.

Nevertheless, even though the petitioner’s probation

has been transferred to the state of New York, a favorable ruling in this appeal would benefit the petitioner by

eliminating his obligation to serve probation anywhere

and, if violated, to potentially serve the suspended portion of his sentence. Moreover, under the Interstate

Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, the ‘‘sending

state’’ typically reserves jurisdiction to conduct probation revocation proceedings if the probationeris alleged

to have violated the terms of his probation, unless it is

clear that the sending state has relinquished all jurisdiction. See, e.g., Scott v. Virginia, 54 Va. App. 142, 149–50,

676 S.E.2d 343 (2009). The respondent has not called

our attention to any evidence that Connecticut has relinquished all jurisdiction over the petitioner-probationer.

Thus, the fact that he is allegedly being supervised on

probation by the state of New York has no bearing on

whether he can obtain practicalrelief from adjudication

of this appeal. Accordingly, because a successful appeal

would have afforded the petitioner some practical

relief, his appeal is not moot.

1

In response to the motion to dismiss this appeal as moot filed by the
respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, the petitioner filed an opposition and a motion seeking an evidentiary hearing. Each contained an ‘‘offer

of proof,’’ in which the petitioner set forth facts he expected to prove at

the proposed evidentiary hearing. In its opposition to the motion for an

evidentiary hearing, the respondent stated that it was not disputed that ‘‘the

petitioner is released from the custody of the respondent Commissioner of

Correction and is on probation in New York state pursuant to the Interstate

Compact for Adult Offender Supervision. See [General Statutes] § 54-133 et

seq.’’ Because the central facts regarding mootness are not disputed, I

assume them for purposes of deciding whetherthe petitioner can be afforded

practical relief.