U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

30–898 PDF 2006

TRANSIT ZONE OPERATIONS: CAN WE SUSTAIN

RECORD SEIZURES WITH DECLINING RESOURCES?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 26, 2006

Serial No. 109–198

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

DAVID MARIN, Staff Director

LAWRENCE HALLORAN, Deputy Staff Director

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

DIANE E. WATSON, California

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

MARC WHEAT, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

MALIA HOLST, Clerk

TONY HAYWOOD, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on April 26, 2006 .............................................................................. 1

Statement of:

O’Gara, James F.X., Deputy Director, Supply Reduction, Office of National Drug Control Policy; Rear Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway, Director,

Joint Interagency Task Force South; General Michael Kostelnik, Assistant Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection, Office of Air and

Marine; Michael Braun, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration; Rear Admiral Wayne Justice, Assistant Commandant for Enforcement and Incident Management, U.S. Coast Guard; and Rear Admiral Alvaro Echandia, Chief of Naval Intelligence [N2], Colombian

Navy ............................................................................................................... 10

Braun, Michael .......................................................................................... 36

Echandia, Alvaro ....................................................................................... 60

Hathaway, Jeffrey ..................................................................................... 19

Justice, Wayne ........................................................................................... 52

Kostelnik, Michael ..................................................................................... 48

O’Gara, James F.X. ................................................................................... 10

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Braun, Michael, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 38

Echandia, Rear Admiral Alvaro, Chief of Naval Intelligence [N2], Colombian Navy, prepared statement of ............................................................... 62

Hathaway, Rear Admiral Jeffrey, Director, Joint Interagency Task Force

South, prepared statement of ...................................................................... 21

Justice, Rear Admiral Wayne, Assistant Commandant for Enforcement

and Incident Management, U.S. Coast Guard, prepared statement of .... 54

Kostelnik, General Michael, Assistant Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection, Office of Air and Marine, prepared statement of ............. 50

O’Gara, James F.X., Deputy Director, Supply Reduction, Office of National Drug Control Policy, prepared statement of .................................... 13

Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Indiana, prepared statement of ............................................................... 5

Watson, Hon. Diane E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California, prepared statement of ........................................................... 94

(1)

TRANSIT ZONE OPERATIONS: CAN WE SUSTAIN RECORD SEIZURES WITH DECLINING

RESOURCES?

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY,

AND HUMAN RESOURCES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:52 p.m., in room

2203, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark E. Souder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Souder, Foxx, Cummings, Watson, and

Ruppersberger.

Staff present: Marc Wheat, staff director & chief counsel; Pat

DeQuattro, congressional fellow; Malia Holst, clerk; Tony Haywood,

minority counsel; and Cecella Morton, minority office manager.

Ms. FOXX [presiding]. The subcommittee will come to order. We

can’t control when we are asked to vote, as you know.

Chairman Souder has been called to another committee for a little while, and he asked me if I would preside, and I would like to

read his opening statement for him.

Good afternoon and thank you all for coming. For the 3rd

straight year our joint service, interagency and multinational forces

in the transit zone have seized and disrupted a record amount of

cocaine. A critical element of the strategy to disrupt our domestic

illicit drug market focuses U.S. interdiction efforts on seizing cocaine and other drugs bound for the United States from South

America in the transit zone.

The transit zone is a 6 million square mile area that encompasses Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of

Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific Ocean. Transit zone seizures and

disruptions in 2005 amounted to 252 metric tons of cocaine, compared to 219 metric tons in 2004 and 176 metric tons in 2003.

I am very familiar with the challenges associated with interdicting illicit drugs as they flow through this vast area. My subcommittee has focused extensively on narcotics smuggling activities across

our land and maritime borders, and over the past year I have been

able to visit many agencies and organizations that support these efforts, including recent briefings in Colombia, at Operation Panama

Express, at Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West, and

the Coast Guard Armed Helicopter Squadron in Jacksonville. I am

2

very aware of the critical roles performed by the agencies represented here today in drug interdiction and homeland security.

All of our Federal agencies need a special ‘‘well done’’ from Congress for the record cocaine seizures in 2005. Through effective

casework and coordination, the amount of actionable intelligence

we now develop exceeds our interdiction capabilities in the transit

zone. In other words, the Federal Government knows of specific

boatloads of drugs heading north that we cannot intercept because

of lack of interception assets in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific. The intelligence breakthrough is a recent development resulting from the very successful efforts of Operation Panama Express,

an interagency, intelligence-driven program managed by the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and the continued

success of the Drug Enforcement Administration. Due to their coordinated efforts, Joint Interagency Task Force [JIATF] South now

has improved insight into where, when and how much cocaine will

be smuggled through the transit zones.

Transit zone interdiction is a team effort that relies on the successful execution of several steps in an interdiction continuum, including the collection and dissemination of actionable intelligence,

the detection and monitoring of suspect vessels, and the physical

interdiction of those vessels. Each agency joining us today plays a

critical role in this team effort that supports transit zone interdictions.

I look forward to this afternoon’s hearing to review our recent

string of successes in the transit zone and discuss how we can improve upon these results. I have several concerns about our drug

interdiction programs based on the recently released budget and

the limited information that has thus far been shared with Congress by the administration. Let me now flag some concerns which

worry Members of Congress.

The first and most alarming issue hidden in this year’s budget

proposal is the administration’s attempt to categorize the drug

interdiction mission as a ‘‘non-homeland security’’ mission. When

Congress created the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, it

combined some of the most important drug interdiction agencies in

the Federal Government. While the Coast Guard’s homeland security missions are not new, they were statutorily defined in Section

888 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107–296) as

follows: ports, waterways, and coastal security; drug interdiction;

migrant interdiction; defense readiness; and other law enforcement.

Contrary to this statutory definition, the administration’s 2007

budget request, as noted in the Coast Guard budget, categorizes

‘‘Illegal Drug Interdiction’’ and ‘‘Other Law Enforcement’’ missions

as ‘‘non-Homeland Security’’ missions. This proposed change clearly

runs contrary to the organic statute establishing DHS. How did the

lawyers at OMB and ONDCP sign off on this abdication of duty?

I look forward to hearing an explanation from our ONDCP witness

on how this change has come about, why, and what ONDCP tried

to do to stop it.

A second issue to be discussed today is in the area of transit zone

interdiction assets. As I mentioned, we now know when drug smuggling events will occur in the transit zone, but we don’t have the

assets to respond. This is especially true of Maritime Patrol AirVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:27 Dec 06, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\30898.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
3

craft [MPA]. The previous U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, Roger

Mackin, stated in July 2004 that ‘‘MPA are the linchpin of maritime interdiction operations and play a key role in virtually every

significant maritime endgame.’’ Among the various aircraft capable

of patrolling in the transit zone, the most important are the P–3

airplanes, which have high operational capabilities and a broad

array of sensors used in detecting and tracking drug smugglers.

These aircraft are old and need repair. The Defense Department

has already pulled its P–3s from drug interdiction use, leaving only

the Customs and Border Protection P–3s in the transit zone. These

Customs and Border Protection airplanes won’t be able to carry out

this mission indefinitely without an overhaul or replacement.

So why, then, does the administration propose to terminate the

‘‘service life extension program’’ mandated by Congress for the P–

3s, and spend all of the CBP Air’s procurement funds on small helicopters for the Border Patrol? These helicopters may be fine for

nabbing illegal immigrants, but they cannot replace the P–3s over

the open water in the Caribbean and in the Eastern Pacific. Where

is the plan to repair or replace the P–3s? Within a few years won’t

we be blind at sea when trying to find the drug traffickers?

A third issue which we discussed at this same hearing a year ago

is the idea of a maritime refueling vessel to improve U.S. drug

interdiction capabilities in the transit zone. On two occasions this

past year, the House of Representatives has voted in favor of procuring a drug interdiction refueling vessel. Amendment No. 10 to

H.R. 889, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of

2005, was agreed to by voice vote on September 16, 2005, having

received the support of leadership and the Committee on Transportation Infrastructure. On July 19, 2005, a similar amendment was

agreed to by voice vote and included in H.R. 2601, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007.

Members of Congress are very aware and concerned about the

flow of drugs bound for the United States, and recognize the

unique challenges and vulnerabilities associated with U.S. interdiction efforts in the transit zone. I am interested in getting an updated opinion from today’s panel on whether a maritime oiler vessel remains a needed capability in the transit zone.

A fourth issue to be addressed at this hearing is the impact of

transit zone smuggling on the drug flow through Mexico and Central America. Last year the DEA testified that 90 percent of the cocaine smuggled into the United States comes across the southwest

border. JIATF South drug tracks show that Mexico, Belize and

Guatemala are the transshipment points for most drugs flowing

from South America. Recent staff briefings in Mexico and Guatemala indicate these drug shipments travel through the maritime

routes or by airplane into Mexico and Central America and are

then taken over land into the United States. What impact has

record seizures had on the flow of drugs across the southwest border, and what steps are being taken to address this next stop in

the flow of illicit drugs?

Last, we look forward to discussing recent developments in the

transit zone involving the Colombian Navy. A strong Colombian

interdiction effort, along with robust and effective eradication and

inland seizure efforts are critical to a successful illicit drug control

4

strategy. In a layered system of defense, it makes good sense to

seize drugs in or near the source country, rather than out in the

middle of the transit zone. During my visit to Colombia last month,

I was told that through our strong partnership and cooperation, the

Colombian Navy has achieved record results in 2005, seizing nearly

100 metric tons of cocaine. Additionally, the U.S. Congress recently

identified funds to purchase and outfit several additional close-in

maritime patrol aircraft for the Colombian Navy. I look forward to

discussing these successful efforts and the benefits of a closely coordinated U.S.-Colombian drug interdiction effort.

These are serious questions that Congress needs to ask as it

starts work on the annual appropriations bills.

Today we have a panel of very experienced witnesses to help answer these and other questions posed by the subcommittee. We are

pleased to welcome Mr. James O’Gara, Deputy Director of Supply

Reduction, ONDCP; Rear Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway, Director,

Joint Interagency Task Force South; Mr. Michael Braun, Director

of Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration; Rear Admiral

Wayne Justice, Assistant Commandant for Enforcement and Incident Management, U.S. Coast Guard; Major General Michael

Kostelnik, USAF (ret.), Director of the Office of Air and Marine,

Customs and Border Protection; and Rear Admiral Alvaro

Echandia, Chief of Naval Intelligence, Colombian Navy.

We look forward to your testimony and insight into this important topic.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]

5

6

7

8

Ms. FOXX. I would now like to recognize Mr. Cummings for an

opening statement.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Madam Chairlady.

The past 3 years have seen record amounts of illegal drugs seized

through interagency drug interdiction efforts in the vast transit

zone, that separates the primary source countries in South America

from communities throughout the United States where drugs inflict

such immense harm.

Improved access, actionable intelligence regarding drug shipments entering the transit zone are largely the result of the Interagency Panama Express Initiative, has been a major contributing

factor. Other factors include the deployment of armed helicopters

capable of stopping the go-fast boats that have proved so elusive in

the high level or bilateral cooperation that has been achieved between the United States and the Colombian Government.

Serious concerns have been raised concerning the adequacy of

interdiction assets, including fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft,

ships, helicopters and radars. Without such resources it will be impossible to capitalize on the actionable intelligence we are developing. Indeed, as we will hear today, it is already the case that we

have actionable intelligence on more drug shipments than our existing interdiction resources will enable us to pursue.

Our witnesses will provide their perspectives on the best way to

address the issue of declining resources, so that we achieve maximum success in stopping the flow of drugs into the United States

through the transit zone.

As we address these matters, it is imperative that we look beyond the statistics on drug seizures and keep one eye trained on

the ultimate question, namely, are we keeping drugs off the streets

of America, and reducing drug consumption and its domestic consequences?

According to the DEA, Colombia continues to be the source of

roughly 75 percent of the world’s supply of cocaine, and nearly all

of the cocaine consumed in the United States. Although surveys

show that overall use of illicit drugs among youth has declined in

recent years, we know that this is a reflection of reduced use of

marijuana, the principal target of U.S. drug prevention efforts. The

same surveys show that use of cocaine, a major focus of U.S. supply

reduction efforts, has not declined.

The picture concerning the availability of cocaine in the United

States, as reflected in estimates of drug price impurity, is at best

hazy. Over the past year and a half ONDCP has supplied Congress

with two sets of estimates from different sources. The first, a 100

plus page report, compiled for ONDCP by the Rand Drug Policy Research Center, shows a steady downward trend in the price of cocaine from 1981 through the second quarter of 2003, marked by occasional short-lived spikes. The second, a well-publicized threepage document, consisting of a cover and two graphs, covers a

much shorter period of time, and indicates that the retail price of

cocaine was on the rise from February to September 2005. Unlike

the Rand report, which was posted on ONDCP’s Web site without

fanfare in February 2005, the methodology used to support the

more recent estimates is unexplained. And outside analysts have

noted that the two estimates are impossible to reconcile.

9

At the same time, despite extensive and enormously expensive

aerial eradication efforts in Colombia, recent U.S. estimates show

that coca cultivation in Colombia is not shrinking, but it is expanding.

The hearing therefore raises some important questions. First,

what can Congress do to ensure that our interdiction efforts in the

transit zone are optimally effective and efficient, and is the administration dedicated to making them so?

Second, are anti-drug efforts taking a back seat to anti-terror efforts within the departments and agencies that implement U.S.

interdiction strategy? Are the two missions complementary, as we

like to believe, or are they competing? More fundamentally, I think

we need to ask what level of success in interdicting illegal drug

shipments in the transit zone will be necessary to cripple the drug

producers and drug transporters who are flooding our streets with

illegal drugs? And further, is it realistic to expect that proposals

advocated by our witnesses today will achieve this level of success

if enacted?

This committee has thoroughly documented studies that show

concretely that providing access to treatment reduces drug consumption and related harms, including criminal activity and recidivism, unemployment, poor health and behaviors associates with

these, the spread of HIV/AIDS, hepatitis and other dangerous, communicable diseases. One such study is the Steps to Success Treatment Outcome Study, conducted in my own city of Baltimore by a

Blue Ribbon Scientific Panel convened by the Baltimore Substance

Abuse Systems, Inc.

The President’s drug budget for fiscal year 2007 reflects a continuing trend downward, de-emphasizing prevention and treatment

in favor of supply reduction efforts beyond our borders and shores.

Today’s hearing bears directly on the question of whether that ongoing shift in the allocation of limited anti-drug resources makes

sense.

We cannot afford to address the issues of interdiction effectiveness and adequacy of interdiction assets in a vacuum. Rather, we

must address them in the context of evaluating whether they are

contributing to success in achieving the bottom-line objective of our

national drug control security, namely, reducing drug consumption,

crime and related harms in communities throughout these United

States.

In closing, I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before us

today, and I want to thank the men and women and all the Federal

agencies represented here for their dedication to the mission of reducing the toll of illegal drug use on American society, particularly

those on the front line who put their lives at risk every day for our

benefit.

I also want to extend a warm welcome to Admiral Echandia, who

will testify on behalf of the Colombian Navy.

I look forward to today’s testimony, and with that, Madam Chairlady, I yield back.

Ms. FOXX. Thank you, Mr. Cummings.

A couple of procedural matters we will deal with. I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to submit

written statements and questions for the hearing record, and that

10

any answers to written questions provided by the witnesses also be

included in the record. Without objection, it is so ordered.

I also ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents and

other materials referred to by Members and the witnesses may be

included in the hearing record and that all Members be permitted

to revise and extend their remarks. Without objection, it is so ordered.

I have already mentioned the names of the panel members and

their positions in my opening statement, so I won’t repeat them

here. I will recognize each person as he speaks, but would the witnesses please come forward and remain standing?

It is our standard practice to ask witnesses to testify under oath.

If you will raise your right hands, I will administer the oath to you.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Ms. FOXX. Let the record show that the witnesses answered in

the affirmative.

Mr. O’Gara, thank you for joining us. You are recognized for 5

minutes.

STATEMENTS OF JAMES F.X. O’GARA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, SUPPLY REDUCTION, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL

POLICY; REAR ADMIRAL JEFFREY HATHAWAY, DIRECTOR,

JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE SOUTH; GENERAL MICHAEL KOSTELNIK, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS

AND BORDER PROTECTION, OFFICE OF AIR AND MARINE;

MICHAEL BRAUN, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION; REAR ADMIRAL WAYNE JUSTICE,

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR ENFORCEMENT AND INCIDENT MANAGEMENT, U.S. COAST GUARD; AND REAR ADMIRAL ALVARO ECHANDIA, CHIEF OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

(N2), COLOMBIAN NAVY

STATEMENT OF JAMES O’GARA

Mr. O’GARA. Thank you, Chairwoman Foxx, and Ranking Member Cummings. I would ask, with the committee’s permission, to incorporate my statement into the record, and I will just read a brief

oral statement.

On behalf of Director John Walters, I am honored to appear here

before you today to discuss drug interdiction in the transit zone.

Before I proceed, I want to thank this committee for consistently

supporting the President’s National Drug Control Strategy, which

has been a bipartisan, bicameral success. The strategy harnesses

the mutually reinforcing power of drug treatment, prevention, law

enforcement and drug interdiction. It is my view, and more importantly, it is the President’s view, that these things work best when

they work together.

As Ranking Member Cummings indicated in his opening statement, we know that drug treatment reduces crime, it reduces related social consequences and morbidity. As supporters of drug courts

are well aware, law enforcement diverts users into drug treatment,

makes the system work more efficiently by giving providers leverage over the clients that they serve in drug treatment. Drug treatment narrows the problem for law enforcement by shrinking the

market for illegal drugs. Interdiction, likewise, shrinks the amount

11

of drugs available on our streets, and can force periodic shortages

that push addicts into detox. Prevention programs are affected by

law as well. They work best in a climate where law breaking is

punished and where young people are discouraged from ever trying

illegal drugs in the first place.

Our balanced strategy makes sense and it is working. Drug use

has dropped for the 4th straight year, down 19 percent among 8th,

10th and 12th graders, and that includes marijuana, but also some

of the psychedelic drugs like LSD and MDMA. This is important

work, and this Congress and this subcommittee have been key

partners in sustaining the bipartisan consensus that is the foundation for what we do, including the international efforts that we’ll

discuss today.

The interagency leaders that you see here—and I am sure our

guest from Colombia as well—all appreciate the opportunity to update the subcommittee on the progress to date, as well as the

unique and changing environment that faces our interdictors.

What they have accomplished has been little short of amazing.

So far this year our drug interdiction forces in the transit zone,

under the able leadership of Admiral Jeff Hathaway here to my

left, JIATF South have seized and disrupted more than 60 metric

tons of cocaine headed to the U.S. shores. That represents 10 percent of Colombia’s annual productive capacity.

This achievement, as the title of your hearing alludes to, follows

three successive record-breaking years of cocaine seizures and disruptions in the transit zone.

In the source zone, meanwhile, the Government of Colombia has

significantly upped the ante for traffickers, reporting 2005 seizures

of more than 150 metric tons of cocaine, a single-year record, and

more than double the previous year’s total. Let’s put that in perspective. 252 metric tons seized in the transit zone, 400 tons when

the Government of Colombia seizures are factored in, from a country whose productive capacity, even using our improved estimation

process, for 2005 was 645 metric tons.

It wasn’t always like this. During the late 1980’s and the early

1990’s, in the wake of drug control first becoming a national security mission, the Defense Department darkened the skies, as they

say, with detection and monitoring assets. Seizures followed, but in

nothing like the levels achieved by today’s interagency team of

DOD, the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection and the

Drug Enforcement Administration, not to mention allied nations including France, the Netherlands, the U.K. and Canada. Today we

are getting more bang for our maritime patrol aircraft buck than

ever before.

Why? Better intelligence, what Admiral Hathaway calls the

crown jewel of our program. Intelligence has been a critical enabler

with crucial contributions from DEA, the FBI, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Intelligence has improved not

only on the collection side, but again, to refer to JIATF, it is our

capacity to fuse that intelligence and disseminate it to a large number of end users in a secure manner, in a timely fashion.

We face challenges as we look to the future. You will hear about

some of them today, and we look forward to working with the Congress to address and resolve them. Maritime patrol aircraft and the

12

Coast Guard and U.S. Navy ships have been vital to enabling us

to act on the intelligence we receive. Interdiction in the transit

zone is an administration priority, and we will continue to work

diligently with U.S. force providers and allied nations to ensure

that JIATF receives the appropriate support.

Challenges and change are a constant in this business as traffickers react to what we do and try to ferret out vulnerabilities,

and Mike Braun will speak to this in more detail.

Thank you again for your time and for the opportunity to testify.

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Gara follows:]

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

Ms. FOXX. Thank you.

Rear Admiral Hathaway, thank you for joining us. You are recognized now for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY HATHAWAY

Admiral HATHAWAY. Madam Chairwoman and Mr. Cummings, it

is good to see you again. As I appeared before this subcommittee

last year I thought that I would take just a few moments to characterize what happened during that year in JIATF South since we

last met.

I bring to you today the greetings of General John Craddock, the

U.S. Southern Commander. I am the Director of a very unique national task force, but I also sit before you today as the Department

of Defense witness as well.

Since I appeared before you last year, JIATF South had the

pleasure of evacuating Key West for three hurricanes. We suffered

severe damage, and have recovered from that damage, I can happily report, that was put upon us by Hurricane Wilma. We have

added a very important international liaison officer from the country of Spain, who wears the uniform of the Guardia Civil, who is

going to be able to give us new critical intelligence about increasing

amounts of cocaine that are flowing into the European markets,

being trafficked by the same organizations that are bringing cocaine to the United States today.

We have added three Tactical Analysis Teams in various countries in our joint operating area, to be able to bring us faster and

in more quantity, very critical counter-drug information.

We have assigned LNOs to DEA’s Special Operations Division.

We have recently added a JIATF member to the Organized Crime

Drug Enforcement Task Force in Puerto Rico, both in the spirit of

Department of Defense, working in cooperation with law enforcement.

We have solidified over the last year the return of U.S. Air Force

E–3 AWACS aircraft. Why is that important? They have been able

to take over the primary role of detection and monitoring in support of Colombia’s Airbridge Denial Program, and thus allowing me

to move very important Customs and Border Protection P–3 aircraft, that had been doing that job, out into the maritime region,

where, as has already been stated, we have a lack of persistent

maritime surveillance.

We have had, during the last year, on three different occasions,

Colombian Navy assets operating under the tactical control of Joint

Interagency Task Force South. We are working closer than ever

with our Colombian colleagues, and evidence of that is my good

friend here today, Rear Admiral Echandia, who will speak to that,

I am sure.

Why is that important? It means that we are truly synchronizing

operations with our international partners that have the capability

to be able to work with us. In fact, one of those Colombian frigates

is under JIATF South tactical control today as I sit before you.

We all grieved at the loss of three U.S. naval aviators, whose helicopter crashed in the Eastern Pacific on a pre-dawn morning about

a week before Christmas last year, while they were prosecuting a

counter-drug case.

20

But we closed calendar year 2005 with the seventh consecutive

record year in terms of cocaine disruptions, which disruptions account for seizures and actual destruction of drugs. The last 2 years,

2004, 2005, were remarkable years of a cooperative effort by not

only all the organizations and agencies represented at this table,

but others that are not here today.

Madam Chairwoman, I will stop at that point, and I will welcome your questions in the next few minutes.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Hathaway follows:]

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

Ms. FOXX. Thank you very much.

Mr. Braun, thank you for joining us. You are also recognized for

5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL BRAUN

Mr. BRAUN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member

Cummings. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the transit

zone through which a vast majority of drugs are destined for the

United States.

I spent a great deal of time on the ground in South and Central

America in the mid 1980’s to mid 1990’s, leading teams of specially

trained and equipped DEA agents working shoulder to shoulder

with our host nation counterparts on enforcement and interdiction

operations. We were responsible for seizing massive amounts of cocaine and heroin at remote clandestine laboratories, as well as

clandestine airstrips. We were also involved in seizing large loads

of drugs from some of the first go-fast boats that the traffickers

threw at us. We had far greater resources during that period than

we have today, but we are seizing far greater quantities of drugs

today than we were during those operations.

How is that possible? It really boils down to three things. First,

far greater intelligence, especially human intelligence, is being collected by the DEA and other Federal law enforcement agencies,

and shared quickly with our military through JIATF South.

Second, far greater levels of cooperation between the U.S. interagency community that supports our Nation’s drug interdiction and

enforcement efforts in this part of the world. I would like to mention here as well that we are experiencing tremendous levels of cooperation with most of our host nation counterparts, and we have

no greater ally in this fight than the country of Colombia, represented by Admiral Echandia today.

Third, an enhanced by JIATF South to ingest multi-source intelligence from law enforcement and the intelligence community, and

to quickly fuse and assess that intelligence and coordinate the successful intervention by U.S. military and law enforcement assets.

In essence, we have learned over the years to fight smarter with

less. That is the good news story and something that all of us at

this table are very happy and proud of. I have 32 years of experience in this business serving at the local, State and now Federal

levels of law enforcement. I have never seen cooperation this good.

With that said, there are some things that nag me. Major drug

trafficking organizations are not burdened by bureaucracy. They

can turn on a dime and often do. We are seeing signs that major

syndicates may be shifting on us once again back to the air, we do

not believe in a big way at this point. The real threat remains out

on the water, but we are seeing it as depicted in some of the photographs that are in this room. It is best illustrated in these photographs, I believe, in an area called the aircraft graveyard or bone

yard, in a very remote area of the Petan in Guatemala, which borders the Mexico border. Most of these planes were filled with drugs

that were ultimately destined for the United States.

I am sure you are aware of the DC–9 jet that recently landed in

the Yucatan area of Mexico, laden with 5.6 tons of cocaine. That

37

flight originated from Venezuela. Everyone at this table is working

hard to counter that threat, but it is never easy.

What also concerns me is something I am seeing throughout

Central America and the Caribbean, weak economies and even

weaker institutions. That is a recipe for disaster, considering that

roughly 90 percent of the drugs flowing into our country from

South America transit Central America. The leaders of the major

drug syndicates are exploiting this situation, and they have hundreds of millions of dollars to do it, to corrupt all levels of Government, including law enforcement, prosecutors, judges and even

longstanding military institutions, and that presents us with some

very unique challenges. Factor into that equation the drugs-terrorism dimension, and we have even more to be concerned about.

I mentioned earlier the unprecedented levels of cooperation between all of us at this table and the thousands of coworkers and

colleagues we represent. There is no greater example of that than

what we are now doing and experiencing in the interagency drug

flow prevention strategy. At the direction of Administrator Karen

Tandy, the DEA reached out to the interagency community to determine if there was more that we could do to disrupt the flow of

drugs, money and chemicals between the source countries and the

United States. We all got together, assessed the simple question,

a challenge really, from every possible angle, and we came up with

some very innovative ideas that had not been tried in the past. We

have incorporated those ideas in two recent operations, and I believe we are all surprisingly impressed with the results.

We know that we caused significant disruption and headaches

for the major syndicates and the smuggling infrastructures that

support their operations. Suffice it to say that we know that the

traffickers postponed or canceled their operations, modified methods of conveyance, varied smuggling routes and jettisoned loads, all

of which cost them time and money, and most important, made

them even more vulnerable to law enforcement action.

Our two greatest partners in this strategy, by the way, are

JIATF South and CBP. I would be happy to team up with them

and others and provide you with a classified briefing on this strategy and the results of our first two operations whenever you would

like.

Madam Chairwoman and esteemed members of the committee,

the one thing that the world’s most notorious drug traffickers fear

the most is U.S. justice. I would like for you and the committee to

know that you have DEA’s continued commitment to identify, investigate and bring to justice the world’s most notorious drug trafficking syndicates.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I welcome

questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Braun follows:]

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

Ms. FOXX. Thank you, Mr. Braun.

Major General Kostelnik, thank you for joining us. You are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KOSTELNIK

General KOSTELNIK. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Congressman Cummings. It is a pleasure to be here representing U.S. Customs and Border Protection to talk about our focus in the southeast

region on the counternarcotics part of the transit zone.

As I think you all know, our organization is about 3-years-old,

and are completing a fairly historic merger of various affiliated activities, and now as our focus is on the Secure Border Initiative of

the administration, I want to make it clear that our emphasis remains dedicated in the southeast region. As a matter of fact, Admiral Hathaway has talked about how important the P–3s are in this

overall mission in the transit zone, and we are pleased that 2005

was a banner year for us.

We were very active with our 16 aircraft. We were able to fly our

7,200-hour commitment, and along with the rest of the JIATF

South team, resulted in remarkable results last year.

The P–3 fleet this year, unfortunately, had some grounding problems, and about a month ago we grounded our P–3s. The aircraft

are in many cases 35 to 40-years old. They have in many cases

35,000 to 37,000 hours of flying time, and as the chairman’s comments pointed out, it is clearly time for some attention. The

grounding story was a good news one in the fact that the ongoing

inspections we have were able to identify cracks in the leading

edges, bathtub fittings of the wing, that we are able to fix. In fact,

in a fairly quick time we have returned now almost half of our fleet

back to flight, and while it will be a challenge for us to fly the same

amount of flying time that we did last year, we are certainly back

on track and have already produced some reasonable results with

the 8 aircraft that we have already returned to flight. By the end

of the summer we expect to have another 6 aircraft up, and that

would put us back into our normal operation situation, where the

bulk of the aircraft are flying, and 2 aircraft are down in maintenance.

Our long-term vision, although focused on the border security

and all on just the southwest border—there is so much in the news

today—but the northwest border and the coastal regions as well.

Our focus remains focused in this transit area on the anti-narcotics

area. Not only are we putting these things into our long-range strategic plan, we are in the process of increasing our service life extension activities on the P–3 aircraft. Fortunately, due to the foresight

of Congress, we have investment money in 2006, and plans to transition this into 2007 to create this summer a prototype program to

start dealing with the aging issues to ensure that we can fly the

P–3s for the foreseeable future.

We feel this is a prudent thing to do, and these aircraft and their

sensors are very much attuned to the mission we have, and these

are the things we have in our future.

At the same time, we have other assets in the southeast region

dedicated to this activity, both aircraft and marine units, more

closely associated with the coastal regions and the Caribbean. Over

49

the next several years we do intend to recapitalize, improve these

capabilities as well. We are bringing on the new DASH aircraft

with new sensors to augment the P–3’s smaller, shorter range, a

different aircraft, but one that will replace our C–3 or C–12 aircraft

and give us much more capability in the southeast region.

So as I close and welcome your questions, our focus remains unchallenged. There are a lot of things on our plate as we look to the

southwest border with both immigration and drug issues, but our

laydown in the southeast region, our commitment to JIATF South

and the rest of the partnership remains solid in that regard.

I welcome the chairman’s questions.

[The prepared statement of General Kostelnik follows:]

50

51

52

Mr. SOUDER [presiding]. Thank you. Let me say for the record,

I apologize I was late. We were actually voting over in Homeland

Security on a number of amendments and final passage on Homeland Security.

I thank you all for coming, and let me next recognize Rear Admiral Wayne Justice, Assistant Commandant for Enforcement and Incident Management of the Coast Guard. Thank you for coming.

STATEMENT OF WAYNE JUSTICE

Admiral JUSTICE. Good afternoon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

and distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor to represent the Coast Guard men and women before you here today.

This committee has asked if we can sustain record seizures of cocaine in the transit zone with declining resources. To answer that

question, I would say, no, we probably cannot. The Coast Guard is

providing the same or subtly more resources to join Interagency

Task Force South, and the Coast Guard will meet and/or exceed

our interdiction targets for this year.

However, it is increasingly difficult, as my colleagues have stated, to sustain our current levels of success given the changing battlefield upon which we are now engaged.

Our adversaries are shifting tactics and exploiting the very tools

that have made us successful, expanding the transit zone and trying new and unusual methods of escaping our grasp.

Airborne use of force has given us the ability to stop the go-fast

vessels we find that have been the primary method of smuggling.

Lately, there has been a perceived shift from go-fast to fishing vessels. We see this tactical shift, if in fact it is a shift, as most likely

reaction to the highly successful airborne use of force program.

Prior to fiscal year 2004, there were no Ecuadorian flagged fishing vessels seized with drug loads. Now, for the first time ever, the

number of Ecuadorian flagged fishing vessels seized for smuggling

exceeds the number of Colombian flagged fishing vessels. This shift

is perceived to counter the successes against Colombian flagged

vessels, which come from utility of the U.S.-Colombian bilateral

agreement, as well as the extraordinary coastal and littoral results

by both DEA and the Colombian Navy.

We are maintaining an aging fleet of ships and aircraft. We continue to lose patrol days to maintenance. In fiscal year 2005 the

Coast Guard lost 534 major cutter patrol days due to mechanical

failures. In this current fiscal year we have already lost 333 days.

For perspective, one cutter a year equals 180 days.

Sir, the Coast Guard would never bring you a problem without

bringing a solution. Now more than ever before, I say we—and by

we I mean the entire interagency—are on top of this fight. We

know from classic warfare that if your enemy is reacting to you,

you are being effective, and we are pressing the initiative. On Friday, April 28th, we take a next step by deploying the first U.S.

Navy air crew qualified to employ airborne use of force for the

counter drug mission.

Panama Express and the rest of the intelligence community are

essential to our success. We must continue to support them and

help them develop new sources in countries other than Colombia.

Otherwise, as drug-trafficking organizations move away from the

53

Colombian vessels, the intelligence gained on the ground from

interdictions will decrease.

The United States needs to, and we are, aggressively engaging

the governments of Ecuador and Mexico to foster the same level of

cooperative relationships we are currently enjoying with Colombia

and other partner nations throughout the transit zone.

Finally, we need to replace the aging surface and air fleets that

we are pushing harder, further, and longer each year. Congress responded magnificently last year to the President’s Deepwater funding request, and I thank you for that. The answer continues to be

Coast Guard’s Deepwater program, which would deliver more capable aircraft, cutters, and sensors to supporting the counter drug

mission in the future.

In closing, sir, our counter drug interdiction success is the direct

result of the coordinated team effort. However, as we peek over the

horizon, the counter drug battlefield once again is changing. We

must be agile, respond quickly to develop actionable intelligence,

and have capable assets and international partnerships. We appreciate your extraordinary support over the years, and I ask you to

continue to help drive interagency efforts and the Coast Guard’s integrated Deepwater program to ensure we are ready for the fight.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look forward to questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Justice follows:]

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

We are honored today as well to have Rear Admiral Alvaro

Echandia, who is Chief of Naval Intelligence for the Colombian

Navy. Welcome to Washington, DC, and thank you for testifying

today.

STATEMENT OF ALVARO ECHANDIA

Admiral ECHANDIA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Colombian Navy has a very big commitment in the drug

war, and I would like to start by giving a thank you very much for

the United States and all colleagues at this table.

The Navy has almost all budget of the year dedicated to the drug

war. This year we have seized almost 12 tons of cocaine. That cocaine costs in the United States exactly the same amount of the

budget of the Colombian Navy for 1 year. Last year, it was almost

100 tons of cocaine. I am responsible for the intel, not only for the

Navy part, but the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard, because the

Colombian Navy is just one organization.

We have seen how narcoterrorists move very easily. As Admiral

Wayne says, they react very fast. They can send the drugs from the

Caribbean or from the Pacific. It is very easy to change because the

organizations who make the transportation of the drugs, they are

just illegal UPS. They send drugs from one coast or another. So the

narcoterrorists just take the phone and call one or two organizations to send the drugs. That makes it very hard for us because we

have to do a lot of coordination, especially with JIATF South, who

is the best partner in this war. It is not easy for us to coordinate

to send the assets, the planes, the ships. We use everything, all assets we have possible.

We use the submarines to detect the go-fast, the noise of the propellers. We use old Coast Guard planes—we have only two

planes—and it is very difficult, because a go-fast has a very small

radar reflection, so it is very hard to detect at sea. We have studies

that for a ship at sea, the probability of detection for a go-fast is

only 5 percent. If the ship has a helicopter embark it, the probability rises to 20 percent, but it is still too low, because 80 percent

of the drugs can come through.

So we need airplanes. Airplanes are the solution to detect the gofasts in the transit zone, and MPA, but only an MPA with the right

equipment on board, because most of the events are during the

night hours, so it is very hard to detect a go-fast at sea. They use

all methods of camouflage. They put blue canvas on the top of the

go-fast. They put wet blankets in order to mask the hit of the engines, so it is very hard. But an airplane with very good equipment,

a FLIR system, a synthetic aperture radar, communications, and

electronics can detect those go-fasts.

We think that by using DC–3s with the right equipment on

board we can rise from 20 percent to 70 percent. They pay a very

low amount of money to get the drugs in Colombia, and they get

$25 million for each ton that reaches the United States. That

makes this work very, very difficult. That is why FARC understands that it is a very good business.

61

We do not want to export drugs and we do not want the dollars

from the narco traffic, because that hits our world.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify here, sir.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Echandia follows:]

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much, and let me first say that in

all of our world’s struggles, how much we appreciate the Colombian

Government, from President Uribe to the Department of Defense,

Navy, the CMP, and the entire Colombian operation, to actually request additional assistance, to request cooperation with the United

States, to request and cooperate, because we have so little of that

sometimes in other parts of the world, and sometimes when we actually do cooperate, it is much harder to train and it has been a

much more erratic success rate. What I have seen in my years as

chairman of this committee and participation in this committee, as

I have watched the Colombian Navy get more and more effective,

and we need to help you become more effective.

The CMP are a strong force, but we stood up the antinarcotics

units inside the military. Now we need to realize that a lot of this

is on the water too, and appreciate you coming today and being included in this so we get that into our record that it isn’t just a matter of what we are doing in the jungle to get the labs, that it isn’t

just a matter of transiting to the border.

But also, I know up at Santa Marta, I went a few years ago with

Chairman Davis out in one of your new go-fast boats, where they

got a load—I think it was a million load—that they tried to run

while a congressional delegation was there, and they didn’t realize

you had two boats. [Laughter.]

That the more ability you have to respond, because we know the

decoy business, when you don’t have much assets, if they send one,

you can chase the wrong one. Unless you have the right intelligence, you don’t get the big one, you get the little fish. It is a

standard thing. I appreciate your cooperation.

There are a number of things. I have met with most of you multiple times, and very much appreciate, if you can communicate this,

not only your efforts in antinarcotics, but also those in each of your

agencies because whatever criticism and discussions we have at the

margin, day-to-day, everybody is out there doing whatever they can

to try to get illegal narcotics, and we can never give enough thank

yous. Just like our armed forces in the field, you have another division of our armed forces in the drug field, and we much appreciate

that.

I wanted to just make sure I get a couple things, one thing in

particular, on the record with General Kostelnik. I appreciated our

discussion last night, but one thing we talked about, that I remain

frustrated. I understand some of the difficulties and I am not immediately expecting some formal answers to normal processes

through the letters that—I have been frustrated—I haven’t gotten

the answers to, but we may submit additional written questions

here, and I would appreciate to the degree possible, some responses

there.

But I wanted to put on the record that we had been asking about

what the status of AMOC was in Riverside, and my understanding

is that you intend to keep AMOC, and you see advancing that. Is

that your intention?

General KOSTELNIK. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. As I mentioned to

you yesterday, actually, that was one of the first facilities in the

Air Marine organization that I actually went out to the field to look

at firsthand, because I had heard a lot about the capability. And

73

I can tell you, since I know you have been there, that is a bright

spot in the Government. We have very unique capabilities there.

They provide the backbone for our command and control for a lot

of our activity across the United States, and in supporting JIATF

South as well. Not only is it going to stay as a part of our organization. You know we’re committed to growing that over time, bringing other partnerships in and expanding our capabilities. So, yes,

sir, you can count on that being there.

Mr. SOUDER. I also appreciated that you systematically laid out—

and I think you see a lot of your job as to try to make sure that

you keep your Air and Marine operations up and running, and laid

out some of your intentions for the P–13s and how to get the fleet

up. Your intention is not to cut it back, but to make it flyable and

get the additional hours up, and that for the record, if you run into

problems or need additional dollars from Congress, you said that

you would be direct in telling us in Congress that you need those

additional funds to keep those P–3 hours up.

General KOSTELNIK. Yes, sir. We’re very committed on the P–3

fleet, and, obviously, the example of the grounding gave us rare insight into the internal conditions of the wing, and these aircraft,

on average, have about 37,000 flying hours, and it’s clear they need

some attention.

In fiscal year 2006, we have $16 million, part of which we’re

using to deal with the fixes, half of which are complete, the other

half will be complete by the end of the summer. The remainder of

those funds we intend to develop in partnership with the OEM,

Lockheed Martin, and our current support contractor, L–3 Comm

Vertex, a prototype program for service life extension. I hope to

have that prototype program designed and under way by the end

of the summer. That will then set the requirements definition for

the true funding requirements for a long-term SLEP program.

Mr. SOUDER. I am going to read a statement, and then I would

like each of you to say and express if you have any disagreement

or comment on the question, and this is something we have been

persistent at in Congress, and I am very frustrated.

It appears in the Eastern Pacific that the drug runners are moving further out to sea, possibly outside the Galapagos. This presents a huge challenge to every single agency. It presents—there

isn’t one of you that isn’t—JIATF may not have as much because

it goes into another JIATF zone, but you are dealing with certainly

some of that as you are watching it at even JIATF. That as we

watch coming off the Pacific side, the western side of Colombia, it

is clear that we need an oiler out there, because as they move farther, our ships have to come back into harbor if they can’t reach

them. And they know this, and they are figuring it out more and

more regularly. That it would potentially increase 25 percent of the

on-station time for our ships if we had an oiler, which would

equate, the estimates are, a 22 percent increase in seizures just

with that extra time. Because I have seen all your charts, and

when you count time there, in fact, you have a subzone that says

time to the zone and time back from the zone. The question is, how

much time do we have in the zone? And to the degree we have an

oiler, we have a huge expansion of the time in zone.

74

Here is my two-part question: Do you agree that an oiler would

benefit the drug interdiction operations, and would operational security improve if an oiler ship were there for those operations and

required fewer runs to port for fuel? We will start with Mr. O’Gara

and move through.

Mr. O’GARA. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I think the answer to the

first part is clearly yes, and I am also happy to say that we are

moving toward having some positive news to report to you, as Admiral Hathaway can explain in much greater detail, the naval element of SOUTHCOMM. NAVSOUTH has been working with a

third country toward achieving an oiler capability at some point.

We are not there yet, but we are moving in the right direction.

With regard to operational security, I’m not able to really comment on that.

Mr. SOUDER. Is that a year-round oiler?

Mr. O’GARA. Potentially, yes.

Mr. SOUDER. Because our concern is not for quick fixes. Our concern is to have an oiler that we have resources, not temporary

agreements. I mean, a quick fix is better than no fix, but if it is

a short-term fix, that isn’t calm down, and to the degree there are

third countries, we want to partner with third countries, but something as basic as this, I don’t understand why we can’t address it.

Mr. O’GARA. We take your point. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Admiral Hathaway?

Admiral HATHAWAY. Sir, from a JIATF South perspective, the

area that we’re talking about falls totally within my joint operating

areas, 42 million square miles, and the simple answer to the oiler

question is, yes. It would certainly produce advantageous results

we think. To put it into a tonnage perspective, my professional perspective is it’s probably good for about 30 additional seized or disrupted tons of cocaine a year.

The good news is that traffickers are being forced into these

areas farther and father offshore, and they are exposing themselves

more because their logistics are as stretched as ours. That’s the

good news.

The fact of the matter is that right now the top of the line Coast

Guard cutter and the Navy ships we have can go for about 12 days

between refuelings. That means when we are that far offshore in

the Eastern Pacific, it’s about 4 days to get the ship out there to

respond to intelligence, 4 days to get it back, which leaves you

about 4 days of on-station time, effective time. Right now, very

often, those smuggling ventures do not expose themselves to us intelligence-wise until they’re that far offshore.

Some of the change in trafficker patterns that Rear Admiral Justice alluded to is that traffickers, especially in the Eastern Pacific,

and to use a football analogy, are flooding the zone, in this case the

transit zone, with false positives, false decoy vessels, security vessels, logistic support vessels, and they’re playing a shell game of

who has the drugs, and challenging us to sort them out where we

can have a more robust presence, realizing that if they can get far

enough offshore that we have only a moment in time to be able to

get them. Unfortunately, sometimes we don’t see those drugs. We

don’t see the right, not under the shell, until it’s some 2,500 miles

west of the west coast of South America.

75

An oiler would give us that persistent presence out there that we

need, and again, I would say it’s probably good for a significant additional tonnage of cocaine every year.

We are partnering with the country of Chile right now. Whether

that is a permanent solution remains to be seen. What we’re hoping is that within the next 6 months, we will be able to get a Chilean NATO certified oiler for a 90-day period.

What will that give us? It will give us a proof of concept over a

reasonable period of time to see if, (A) we can get that additional

persistent coverage, and (B) is it really good for something or not,

or will the traffickers simply be pushed someplace else? So I think

that 90-day proof of concept is very, very important. We’re not necessarily looking at it as a long-term solution, but from a——

Mr. SOUDER. So let me ask—I am sorry, because I am kind of

confused. Haven’t we had an oiler out there in the past?

Admiral HATHAWAY. Excuse me?

Mr. SOUDER. Haven’t we had an oiler out there in the past?

Admiral HATHAWAY. There have been oilers out there in the past,

yes, sir, that I say——

Mr. SOUDER. And weren’t they helpful?

Admiral HATHAWAY. They were helpful in an era where we had

very little intelligence to cue us where to go, and so we were able

to keep ships on station, but we didn’t necessarily know where the

bad guys were. What has changed now is we know where they

are——

Mr. SOUDER. Do you believe they were effective at that time or

not effective?

Admiral HATHAWAY. They were able to give us additional unseen

presence out there, and we know we can do that. Those were U.S.

Navy oilers that, unfortunately, are tasked in other parts of the

world today.

Mr. SOUDER. But don’t you think they were effective at the time?

Is there any intelligence suggestion, based on anything historically,

that would suggest that they weren’t effective, and that they won’t

even be more effective? In other words, the idea of this as a pilot

study is kind of silly, because it worked. What you’re really saying

is how effective, in a gradation scale, because it was reasonably effective even before intelligence. Now we have a lot more intelligence, so don’t really need to—the only study we are going to find

is how much more effective it is. It will show us other trafficking

patterns and other potential adjustments, but the conclusion isn’t

likely to be that we don’t need an oiler.

Admiral HATHAWAY. Probably not, unless traffickers change their

patterns such that they’re not trying to go far out and around us.

Mr. SOUDER. So that would be good, though.

Admiral HATHAWAY. That would be a good——

Mr. SOUDER. So the oiler out there, if all that forces—I am trying

to see what possibly could you find from a study that wouldn’t suggest an oiler is useful. Because, what, we’re going to suggest they

are going to go to the Philippines and back in? I don’t think so.

That if we push them closer to shore, that is where we want them.

So if our only purpose is to decoy them in farther, I am trying to

think, if you use the word ‘‘pilot study,’’ presumably you are looking for something that—it will be interesting to see what happens,

76

but it is not a pilot study. We know what works. It is just we are

going to find out how it works and how we adjust off of it.

Admiral HATHAWAY. Pilot study would mean we’re doing it for

the first time, really proof of concept to see if——

Mr. SOUDER. We know——

Admiral HATHAWAY [continuing]. We’ll have the results that

we——

Mr. SOUDER. I am sorry. I am not going to let the record stand

that it is a proof of concept. We know the concept works. The question is what are all the ways it works?

Admiral HATHAWAY. Fair enough, yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. But that is an important distinction because we are

trying to make the point to our U.S. military that we need a permanent solution. We know it works. What you are going to prove

with this is how many ways it works, in what ways it works, but

it is, in my opinion, a potential delaying tactic. It is better than

nothing. I will take a Chilean ship over nothing. The question is

that we need an understanding in our own armed forces that the

United States needs to make a commitment, too, that is more permanent, because we know it works. And for us to sign off that this

is a pilot study to see if it works is just not true. It is to see how

it works. It may push them in different directions. We will learn

information from it. But we know it works because we have done

it.

Mr. Braun, let me ask you a couple questions as I am moving

through on this oiler question. We have seen lots of reports of increases in Guatemala. I presume it isn’t the DEA position that it

is because Mexico has become so tough to get in, they are going

into Guatemala. That suggests if it is indeed rising in Guatemala,

we have an increasing problem, and the zone is getting more flooded than in the past. So at the very least it suggests we have better

intelligence that is showing our failure, or it suggests it is increasing.

Do you believe an oiler would impact this, and what impact

would it have, not only on Mexico, but Guatemala and down?

Mr. BRAUN. Mr. Chairman, I am about as far outside of my lane

with this question as I could possibly get. The last time I was on

a ship was 35 years ago as a young Marine leaving Vietnam.

[Laughter.]

So I would have to defer to the experts.

Mr. SOUDER. Let me ask you the question. Do you believe there

has been an increase up and down the border on the Pacific side?

Admiral HATHAWAY. Yes, I would say that.

Mr. SOUDER. And an increase since the oiler was last out there?

Admiral HATHAWAY. Sir, I’m not sure when the oiler was last out

there, and I would have to look——

Mr. SOUDER. Would you ask the DEA to provide the estimates

now—some of this may be better intelligence—of what the current

estimates are, what is landing from the DEA’s perspective, and

what was landing when we had an oiler and what was happening

before the oiler, understanding we also have an informational thing

that we will go into later on, the coca statistics.

General Kostelnik, do you have any comments on this question?

77

General KOSTELNIK. Sir, I think I’d have to associate my experience with Mr. Braun on this. Ours is the detection game, but to

the extent that more time on station for the surface ships which

provide the endgame would be helpful, I would say yes. And I think

you know that we support this region, which is, I think, fairly active from the work that I’ve been seeing in the last several months.

And of course, we deploy, supporting Admiral Hathaway, out of

Manta Ecuador, and our P–3s are very active out in that area, and

we’ve had some very successful endgames with support from the

Coast Guard and Navy in that region.

Mr. SOUDER. Admiral Justice, do you believe that having an oiler

out there helped the Coast Guard in the past?

Admiral JUSTICE. Oh, yes, sir, it would.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you think there is any doubt that a study is

going to show that it is helpful?

Admiral JUSTICE. No. No, sir. I know when I was on my ship out

there, it would have been great to have one. I’ll put it on that road.

Mr. SOUDER. Where do you think the drug dealers would move

if we put an oiler out there? What do you think is likely to happen?

Admiral JUSTICE. I concur again with Admiral Hathaway. The

challenge would shift. Moving them in or east, is still as challenging.

Mr. SOUDER. But you would like that, wouldn’t you?

Admiral JUSTICE. Oh, yes, sir, absolutely right.

Mr. SOUDER. I mean it would be nice to be closer to shore.

Admiral JUSTICE. Yes, sir. [Laughter.]

Mr. SOUDER. Admiral Echandia, as you look at your challenges

coming from the western side of Colombia and the Eastern Pacific,

have you see patterns too of them going farther out to sea? And

would it help you if you had more assets to be able to track in the

Eastern Pacific?

Admiral ECHANDIA. Yes, sir. The narco-traffickers are very flexible to move. For example, last year most of the events were done

using fishing boats. I mean that the cocaine was actually loaded in

fishing boats. This year they changed because we were very effective last year. So this year they changed. This year they changed

pretty much, returned to go-fast again. So the go-fast is more difficult to detect. And definitely the air assets are very important.

We need first the intel, but we got very much more intel than assets. Many times we have information, but we don’t have the assets

to react. If we have airplanes with the right equipment, we can use

the intel to detect and track those go-fasts.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. I want to make sure that—Admiral

Hathaway has been a strong advocate of trying to make sure we

have more resources out there. I didn’t mean anything in my question to suggest that you weren’t a strong advocate. Better a partial

solution than no solution. It is just that I am working hard and

want to make sure we get a long-term solution as well.

Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And

again, I reiterate, I thank all of you for what you do every day to

make our world a safer place. We really appreciate it.

78

Admiral Hathaway, let me go to you. You talked a little bit earlier about—I think it was you that talked about the storms,

Katrina and—it was you, right?

Admiral HATHAWAY. Yes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. I take it that they had an effect on your operation, a significant effect? In other words, your regular operation,

did it take away resources, manpower?

Admiral HATHAWAY. From a pure JIATF South point of view?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes.

Admiral HATHAWAY. Mr. Cummings, we have a plan in place

such that we’re able to shift our operations to Naval Station

Mayport. I have characterized it to some as a JIATF South minime that we keep in cold storage at Naval Station Mayport. And we

can activate it and continue operations. And to our units in the

field, it’s invisible, that perhaps we have left Key West. The only

thing that atrophies over a period of time, after about 2 weeks, is

that our intelligence picture begins to diminish, but we were never

away for more than 2 weeks, so that was not much of an issue.

In the wake of the devastating Hurricane Katrina, for example,

we did lose, for a multi-week period, most of our Coast Guard cutters, all of our CBP P–3 fleet, actually some of our allies, the Royal

Netherlands frigate that we had working for us, Royal British

Navy frigate that we had working for us, who came to the call of

the United States in its time of need, and to a higher priority mission to this country at that point.

We carried on, working with U.S. Navy assets and other international partners as best we could. To say that we were not affected would be less than the truth. During that period of time, you

could see where our success curve diminished somewhat. Just as

soon as the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and others could get back into the counter drug fight, they did. And again,

could we have achieved even higher successes in calendar year

2005 than the combined force did absent Katrina? We probably

would have, because for last year we were truly inside the decision

loop of those transportation organizations.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I see you shaking your head, Admiral Justice.

Did you have something you wanted to add?

Admiral JUSTICE. Only to concur, sir. Yes, we had to—we moved

Coast Guard assets up into the Gulf. It affected us not only in

counter drug, but also in our counter migrant challenges in the

Florida straits. There was a significant spike in illegal migration

during that time as well post-Katrina, as our resources were directed elsewhere.

Mr. CUMMINGS. When I went down to the Gulf Coast not too long

after the Katrina episode, a lot of people were very complimentary

of the Coast Guard. They were emotional, a number of them, just

saying that if it were not for the Coast Guard, they would not have

been alive. I just wanted to pass that on to your folks.

Admiral JUSTICE. Sir, thank you.

Mr. CUMMINGS. The reason why I was getting into that, I wanted

to make sure that—one of the things that we have been concerned

about is trying to make sure that under all circumstances we have

the resources that we need to not only fight the drug war, but to

fight the war on terrorism, and also to make sure that we take care

79

of the people in this country. It is a hell of a balance, and I guess

you have to have a lot of flexibility to do the things that you all

do.

And I was just wondering, when I listened to you, General

Kostelnik, when you were talking about the vehicles that we have

that are out of commission, it makes me wonder whether we do

have the necessary resources to do all of this. We don’t want to be

in a situation where the American people are of the opinion that

they are in a safe environment or that we have forces that can effectively deal with whatever may come, and the next thing you

know, the problems come. And then they say, ‘‘Well, what happened? Why weren’t we prepared?’’ I think it is part of our responsibility to try to make sure that those resources are present.

I guess I said all that to say, where do we stand? I mean, do you

think we have what we need to do the things that you all need to

do? Mr. Braun, you look like you want to say something real bad.

[Laughter.]

I think you are about to jump out of your seat.

Mr. BRAUN. Well, thanks for picking on me, sir, but I mean, I

like to think that when you are fighting drugs, you are fighting terrorism. When you look at the modern-day drug trafficking organization, and you compare that side-by-side with the modern day terrorist organization, you’re looking at one and the same animal,

with the exception of probably the last block on the checklist, and

that is the motivation, modern-day drug trafficking organizations

are purely focused for the most part on greed. It is a greed-driven

enterprise. Terrorist organizations, on the other hand, as you well

know, are motivated by cultural, political, religious ideology, and

that’s where they differ, but everywhere else along the line, they’re

the same.

What bothers me, what concerns me—and I believe I touched on

it in my opening comments—was, you know, I’m convinced you

can’t fight one without fighting the other and expect to win. Terrorist organizations rely on the same smuggling infrastructures that

support foreign or major drug trafficking organizations. They rely

on many of the same things. They rely on the same money-laundering networks oftentimes, the same arms smugglers. Although they

may be separate and distinct—and that’s a tough comment for me

to make—they often come together for the benefit of both of these

organizations.

I mean, do we have enough? I think we could always use more

resources. But I want to echo one more time what I said, what I

believe everybody said at this table is, you know, with what we’ve

got, we are doing tremendous, tremendous work, and I think we’re

getting better at it all the time.

I mean, quite honestly, I think next year’s statistics will probably

show an increase over this year’s, hopefully so.

Mr. CUMMINGS. When you listen to the line of questioning of

Chairman Souder, I guess what he is getting at is he is trying to

figure out, when he talks about the oiler—and he certainly can

speak for himself—how do we take the resources that we have—

I think this is what he is getting at—and be most effective and efficient with what we have? And I just—you know, I think that we

all have to be very careful to make sure that we are not putting

80

something out to the American people that we can’t do—not can’t

do, but aren’t in a position to do. I think a lot of people had a lot

of high expectations of our country, and then when September 11th

came along—and I know that was a very unique situation, I know

that—but they were a little bit surprised. A lot of my constituents

said they thought we had better operations to protect against that.

Then after September 11th, when they see Katrina come along,

and then they wonder, and I think that—I just want to make sure

that we are doing our part. You follow me?

Mr. BRAUN. Yes, sir, I do. I would like to say too that I referred

to the drug flow prevention strategy earlier, which is a new strategy. I can tell you that everyone at this agency, representatives

from every one of the agencies represented the this table, came together as well as others in the intel community. Basically, all the

Federal law enforcement and the intel community, DOD and others, came together to determine what more we could do to disrupt,

significantly disrupt and interrupt the flow of drugs, chemicals and

money from the source countries into the United States. And we

have concluded our second operation, and it was as successful as

the first, and what we would be more than willing to do, sir, is

meet with you and provide you with a classified briefing. I think

you would be impressed with what you heard.

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. I will do that. I will definitely do that.

Let me go back to Admiral Echandia. One of the things, you

know, you talked about one of the most effective ways to address

the problem of limited interdiction assets and our inability, I think

you said, to act when you have intelligence, but you can’t act on

it, is for us to put more resources into the Colombian Navy; is that

right?

Admiral ECHANDIA. Yes, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Would you elaborate on that a little bit?

Admiral ECHANDIA. Yes, sir. We work very close to JIATF, but

sometimes we have information in the first 12 miles, and we don’t

have sometimes the resources to act, even outside those 12 miles.

The narco-traffickers are using now also submersibles that are impossible to detect from the surface ship because they go behind the

scenes. It’s not detectible even with the sonar because it is not in

the place when the beam of the sonar goes. So the only way to detect those is at night with an airplane, with a FLIR system that

we can detect a hit from this. This is one of those, this year and

last year, which is another one. Sometimes they can carry up to 4,

5 tons of cocaine. So the assets are very important.

If we have the planes we can fly right from the coast. We would

be very effective because sometimes we understand the planes from

JIATF comes from very long distance to a distance when we have

information. If we have the information and we have the planes

right there, we can act very fast.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me ask you this. Have your intelligence capabilities gotten better over the years?

Admiral ECHANDIA. Yes, sir, much, much better. Matter of fact,

we changed the organization of intel a year ago, and I am the first

flag officer in that position. Used to be a captain, an 06, and now

am a flag officer. And the organization is pretty much larger and

has more resources, all kind of resources.

81

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just a last question back to you, Admiral. Considering what Mr. Braun just said and the fact that we have these

limited resources, do you agree with the Admiral with regard to the

resources going into the Colombian military, the Navy, more assets? And I imagine that is very frustrating when you have the intelligence but you don’t have the resources to go after these folks.

One time I think we were having some intelligence problems—and

I am sure they still are—but he just said it has gotten much better,

so I am just wondering.

Admiral HATHAWAY. In regards to the Colombian Navy, sir, there

resides a very capable surface fleet from very large naval ships all

the way down to some of the recently provided, we commonly refer

to them as ‘‘Midnight Express’’ interceptor boats, that are run by

their Coast Guard. And as Admiral Echandia said, the Navy, the

Coast Guard and the Marine Corps work as a combined unit in Colombia. They have fantastic intelligence as compared to 3 years

ago. As Admiral Echandia said, he is the first flag officer to serve

as the Chief of Intelligence, an indication that they have intelligence. Admiral Soto, the head of the Colombian Navy, picked Admiral Echandia personally to make that blossom, realizing that intelligence is really the key to the future.

They have a submarine fleet. What the Colombian Navy lacks is

reliable maritime patrol or aerial surveillance, not only within their

territorial waters, but to help patrol their exclusive economic zone

out to 200 miles. What he says is absolutely true; most of our

JIATF air resources fly from hundreds if not thousands of miles

just to get into a location off the Colombian Coast, either west or

in the Caribbean sometimes. If they had access to more generic

maritime patrol aircraft—or aerial surveillance is really the requirement—I think that the resources that they have in the Colombian Navy today would be much more productive.

We have shown when you have the integrated force package that

you’re successful. Does you no good to have a ship on the ocean

that’s not being supported by someone above you that can see a lot

more than you can. Conversely, it does you no good to have an aerial asset that sees something and there’s nothing there to be able

to respond to it. We have been frustrated both ways. Admiral

Echandia is feeling that today.

The components they have are all coming together. They still do

not have that generic maritime patrol or aerial surveillance in their

littoral regions to truly be a force multiplier for the other very competent capabilities that they have today.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And therefore, we don’t have—and I am finished

with this—but we don’t have the resources to solve the problem

that you just said? That is what I was trying to get to. Is that accurate?

Admiral HATHAWAY. We spread the maritime surveillance that

we have to support U.S. assets at sea, the Colombia Navy, our

other allied assets. When you keep in mind that today some 75 percent of the cocaine moving to world markets comes out of Colombia,

it would probably make sense that a very aggressive and otherwise

well-equipped Colombia Navy has its own generic maritime patrol,

whether it actually—it doesn’t matter where it comes from, but

82

something that can be tasked by the Government of Colombia, and

is much closer to the source of the problem.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. It is fairly safe to say that somewhere around 50

percent of that—it is hard to say precisely—is going to Europe, and

Europe hasn’t been particularly helpful with what is going out of

the north. I want to make sure I get this on the record because you

have certainly shared it with us in the past, and you more or less

hinted there, Admiral Hathaway—would you agree with this statement? We are seeing drug shipments coming, and we don’t have

the assets to interdict them?

Admiral HATHAWAY. The good news is we’re seeing so much

more, and the fact of the matter is that we have intelligence today

that I would love to be able to either have a ship or an aircraft go

check out to see if that is in fact a drug shipment. In some cases

today we are having to forgo that opportunity.

Mr. SOUDER. So the likelihood is we are getting more, but we are

seeing more as well. So both our success and failure rate is increasing because we now know more about it.

Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Well, first, I want to thank you all for

being here. We do have a big problem, I think internationally and

nationally, and that problem is that we have to start reprioritizing

I think in the issue we are talking about here today.

The war against terror is very important, and there are a lot of

assets that are going into identifying information, intelligence that

is necessary, and I am on the Intelligence Committee, so I hear

both sides of what is going on, and Mr. Braun, I have had briefings

from both military and other about where we are from an intelligence point of view.

One of the things that I keep saying is, you know, if you look at

our facts and if you look at what our problems are in the world,

probably drugs clearly are probably our biggest problem. And if you

lay it out on the table how much more drugs impact society versus

terrorism—not that terrorism is not serious—I think just in our

country—and you can correct me, Mr. Chairman—about 85 percent

of all violent crime is somehow drug related.

I think if you look at our borders, especially the Mexican border,

80 to 95 percent—and you correct me where we are—that comes

really basically from Colombia to Mexico. If we put the same resources, just half the resources that we have in Iraq—and I just

came back from Iraq 3 weeks ago—not only just you gentlemen and

what you do here today, but also your CIA, your NSA, and the resources, we could do a lot more with respect to the issue with the

borders.

It seems to me that we really have to start focusing very, very

clearly, that we can do—we can use the same type of equipment

and technology that we use in terrorism, fighting terrorism, to deal

with drugs, and also immigration. I mean a lot of it will come together.

Right now, what I can say—and you can’t say a lot when you are

on the Intelligence Committee it that we are starting to see more

and more, and probably more maybe in Afghanistan, than I would

say the issues that we have in Colombia and Mexico, but we are

83

starting to see more and more that some type of funding that

might be able to go into the terrorism area. But what you said—

I forgot who said it—you know, the terrorism is more ideological,

versus drugs are still money driven, and that is very relevant.

So where do we go from here? First thing, I think the problem

now really lays at the feet of the President, the administration and

Congress, because you can sit here all day and tell us what is going

on and what you are doing and what equipment you are using, but

bottom line, what we are hearing here today is that we now have

gotten to an area of sophistication that we are really developing

what we can do to solve or try to deal with this issue, but we just

don’t have the resources to do it any more. So it is up to us, it is

why we are having this hearing, to try to get the administration

and Congress to refocus.

Now, how do we do that? First thing, I would like to ask, from

a priority point of view, we are not going to have anything. Right

now we are on the bottom of the totem pole, unfortunately, as it

relates to drugs from where I sit. But where are these priorities

and what can we do to maybe do it out—but something that we

need a lot more? I clearly think that intelligence is the best defense

against terrorism, and I see it now with drugs. And, by the way,

I was a former drug prosecutor for about 9 years, and did wiretaps

and international drug rings and that type of thing too, and I

found, you know, you knock out five groups, and five more are

right behind. But it was an easy area to work, because as soon as

you pop or arrest somebody, you usually find that your drug organizations, because they are facing a lot of time, will cooperate, so

you know, we are pretty active there. So you have to go to a source.

You got to go to transportation. You have to go to a border, and

then you deal with some of the street issues too.

From a priority point of view, where you are sitting, from your

perspective, what are your highest priorities so we can argue your

point? Now, one of the things—you see the pictures there about—

what do you call it you are using where the wings are cracked, S

what—P–3s. P–3s. UAVs are, I think, are a tremendous tool that

we have right now, and the sophistication is getting a lot better in

fighting the war against terror, in fighting the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, and I think from a drug perspective, too. And you don’t

have the same kind of problems that you have about our three men

from Northrop Grumman that are still wherever they are in Colombia.

What are your priorities? What would you like to see us

prioritize? And unfortunately, in our system, you are the administration, a lot of you, and you can’t really argue against the President’s budget, which I don’t know if I like that or whatever, but

I understand where you are coming from—so tell us where—and

let’s go down the line real quickly—where would you like, from

your perspective, where would you like us to put the priority so we

can argue that point of view? Because the people here—and Marc’s

father lives and dies this, I mean he really wants to make a difference. We were just in Afghanistan, where the poppy was grown,

and saw the eradication with the United States and Great Britain

and that type of thing. So I think you really have some advocates

here if you let us know where your priorities are.

84

Mr. O’GARA. Mr. Ruppersberger, thank you for the opportunity

to answer that. In the drug control world internationally, I would

say that the intelligence capacity is fairly highly developed. Organizations like the Drug Enforcement Administration have brought to

bear unique and highly sophisticated technical capabilities and

they’ve merged them with their elaborate——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Drug Enforcement has become a part of the

intelligence community to an extent with DNI. That might be another way we can look at where we can——

Mr. O’GARA. I don’t want to steal Mike Braun’s thunder, but he

can talk about that as well.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Well, don’t worry. He will.

Mr. O’GARA. In terms of what Admiral Hathaway and his ilk are

doing in the Transit Zone, that employs things that would not have

been surprising to an Army Signal Corps operator during World

War II on up to very esoteric and cutting-edge technology. And one

of the strengths of JIATF is the ability to merge and integrate all

that overlay, the human picture that they’re getting from PANEX,

and get it out to the field quickly and in a secure manner.

In terms of priorities that go by country, as you know the administration—and you are familiar with this—has a fairly elaborate requirements process. We would be happy to brief you on that separately in a closed session.

And I’ll just leave it there.

Admiral HATHAWAY. Sir, as you will see, we all come at the problem somewhat differently based on what our daily duties are. If the

target set that we’re looking at a shortage in terms of being effective against is today, and for the purposes of this hearing, drug

shipments emanating out of South America, coming toward the

United States, I would say persistent maritime surveillance, given

the modus operandi of the transportation organizations, today remains JIATF-South’s greatest detriment.

And I say ‘‘persistent maritime surveillance.’’ Today it is most

often met by long-range four-engine aircraft, but it could be, in the

future, UAVs. We finished not too long ago a study utilizing Global

Hawk to see if it had applicability in the counter-drug mission. The

results of that are still being tallied. Is Global Hawk available to

be employed by JIATF-South today? Absolutely not. Too high

to——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let me stop you there. Why ‘‘absolutely

not?’’ I mean, what do we have to do to maybe get the administration or to get Rumsfeld or whatever to really start refocusing on

maybe sometimes crisscrossing and sharing this information?

When you need the help of a UAV, it seems to be very effective.

And, you know, UAVs—the good news—are not as expensive as a

lot of other technology that we have. They can be made pretty

quickly and get out to the field right away.

I mean, have you attempted to ask for this and is the response

negative? Or is it all about terrorism and the war in Iraq and Afghanistan? What’s going on there? Because I think that could be

extremely effective on a short-term basis and we get very quick results.

Admiral HATHAWAY. Yes, sir. As was pointed out by Mr. O’Gara,

in the DOD requirements, U.S. Southern Command does have a

85

standing requirement for UAVs that currently cannot be met because of other world demands.

Now, not just any——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK, so then basically you made a request

and it has been turned down? So from my perspective—not yours,

because you are part of the administration, just like the generals

who retire but you can’t speak out when you are there—I mean,

I can. So I am asking you the question. Would a UAV—I mean, do

you think—I am asking for priorities. And I do sit on the Intelligence Committee. In fact, I was late because we have our budget

on the floor today. And so, you know, you might have some input

there.

Would UAVs, which, if we redirected some priorities, be one of

your highest priorities in doing what you need to do?

Admiral HATHAWAY. To the extent that it can provide persistent

maritime surveillance—which means not just any UAV—absolutely. To be able to really get into the heart of the issue, sir, is

beyond the classification level of this open hearing to be able to

talk about exactly the capabilities——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And I understand you can’t go too far.

But——

Admiral HATHAWAY. But absolutely——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Why don’t you get with the chairman and,

if you want, we will be there. And, you know, we go to meetings

all the time, so we don’t need any long meetings. But just your—

I am asking for a list of priorities that, when I am in a hearing

in Intel, and we are doing budget appropriations, that we can start

trying to get these priorities back online. Because this is getting to

be very serious. And when we sit here today saying you are really

gearing up and you are doing the job, but you don’t have the resources to deal with it, that means there are a lot of drugs going

out in the street every day.

And, you know, it is so frustrating—I don’t know about you,

Mark—to sit in these hearings and, you know, you come and you

give your testimony and then nothing happens. And that is why

you are having a second hearing today.

So I can tell you, I mean, there are three of us here today, we

will try to prioritize if you can get us your priorities. And I would

like you to focus on the UAV, because I think that might be a way

we can use technology with less manpower and that might really

help you in that regard, from your perspective. Can you do that for

us?

Yes, sir? No, sir? No excuses, sir?

Admiral HATHAWAY. We can prioritize anything, sir, absolutely.

[Laughter.]

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK, now, any other priority other than

that? I mean, we talked about UAV. Any other priority?

Admiral HATHAWAY. I am going to give the other witnesses an

opportunity because I know they have some things that would also

be on my list. I don’t want to——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Well, if they don’t, come back and give it

to me. OK.

Mr. Braun.

86

Mr. BRAUN. Yes, sir, one of the biggest challenges that we face

today as an agency, the DEA—and I’m speaking for DEA, but I

know that the—and I know that you know—the FBI, ICE, and

other law enforcement agencies, Federal law enforcement agencies,

are facing the same problem. And it is the threat posed by emerging technology, technologies that are advancing so rapidly that

we’re having a tough time even catching up. And I——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. If you are talking about on the street, I will

take a DEA agent any day of the week.

Mr. BRAUN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You do a great job in the field.

Mr. BRAUN. I appreciate that. And I want to assure the community that human intelligence will always be our foundation. But as

an agency——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Do what you do best.

Mr. BRAUN. Thank you, sir. About 20 years ago we did make

some strategic decisions that we weren’t going to buy or bust our

way out of this problem; we had to focus on command and control

nodes. You mentioned wiretaps earlier. Last year as an agency, we

conducted more criminal wiretaps than all of the Federal agencies,

law enforcement agencies, combined.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Good results?

Mr. BRAUN. The results, tremendous results that—I mean, I

could talk about this all afternoon, sir. But we do have tremendous

results. I think most recently the indictment, working very closely

with our Colombian counterparts, the indictment of the 50 highestlevel members of the FARC. Now, getting our hands on them and

getting them into a U.S. courtroom is, you know, going to be tough,

but we have three right now that our Colombian counterparts do

have under arrest that we are seeking extradition for, and they

have worked with us very closely on that.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Are you still using RICO and asset seizures

and stuff like that?

Mr. BRAUN. Yes, sir, CCE, RICO, asset seizures.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Yeah, OK, because that seems to be very

effective.

Mr. BRAUN. And I’m proud to say that about 2 years ago, as an agency, we seized about $400 million in cash. This past year, because of the Administrator’s direction of following the money and

focusing on that, we seized over $1.5 billion in cash.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Good.

Mr. BRAUN. And we’re gaining ground in that respect as well.

But this emerging technology thing, this VoIP, Voice over Internet Protocol technology by which drug traffickers, terrorists are

communicating, I mean, it is extremely difficult. And I am not saying that we need to back off of the strict judicial oversight; we always need that. But we’ve got to—today’s communications-intercept laws were written in the 1940’s and 1950’s, for God’s sakes,

and we’ve got to start focusing on the technology and——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. That is a very relevant point. We are dealing with that same issue, you know, with terrorism and NSA and

everything else. And I think in the end, if we are going to really

be as effective as you need to be, you need NSA in there working

with you to—just like we identify terrorists, we need to identify

87

drug dealers and where they are going. And now that you are a

part of the intelligence community, take it back. I have asked, because I am on the committee, that I think we need to really address the issue you talked about.

So same thing with this new agency in the FBI, the new spy

agency. You know, the FBI’s culture is that of investigate and arrest and then charge or indict or whatever. But, you know, we can

do that all day long, and that is the culture of the FBI, but the FBI

is responsible for our security as it relates to terrorism in this

country. And this new spy agency has to be different than arrestand-convict.

And the good news is that you have some CIA people and FBI

setting up this new agency within the FBI. And one of the things

they have to deal with there is what you just said. A lot of the laws

that we are dealing with in the electronic surveillance in those

areas are laws that were written 20 years ago. But we are a system, a country of laws, so we must have the laws before you can

go out and do things that now is at issue with NSA.

OK. Any other thing?

Mr. BRAUN. Well, sir, just very quickly, one last thing. And I

just, I want to add this, that I am convinced in my mind that by

doing what all of us do at this table, we are providing a defense

in depth, not only on counter-narcotics, but if there are some other

nefarious activity going on out there, OK, we are going to be the

first ones that bump up against it. So any resources that we are

able to have focused in our backyard benefits our Nation—and not

only our Nation’s war on drugs, but our Nation’s war on terrorism.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Just to talk about resources. About 2 years

ago, I think, I was in Chiang Mai, where you have all this methamphetamine coming in from Burma into Thailand. And I think

that used to have maybe 15 people at that station—there is one

DEA agent right now. Where did they go? Where did they go? Do

you know?

Mr. BRAUN. In Chiang Mai, I——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. That is just an example I used. You had

that force there, now you have one, I think, that is going to deal

with all that methamphetamine. There are probably a lot coming

into California and that area, and Indiana, I think.

Mr. BRAUN. Yes, sir. We still have a significant presence in Thailand. We don’t have the numbers that we once had in Chiang Mai.

I would have to——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Well, where did they go?

Mr. BRAUN. Well, I believe they’ve been redirected elsewhere

within Thailand.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. Because of budgetary issues, too, correct?

Mr. BRAUN. Yes.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. That is what I was trying to get at.

General KOSTELNIK. Sir, our highest priorities would be, I think,

the ones that you mentioned. First of all, the P3s, given Admiral

Hathaway’s comments on how important persistent maritime surveillance is and given the fact that our P3s are a significant portion

of that capability. It is important for us to establish a credible longterm service life extension program for these aircraft. They are

88

very capable in what they do. They’re optimal for the mission that

we have. There really hasn’t been that much of an improvement in

aviation that would warrant a new purchase, as new aircraft with

new systems would be very difficult for us to implement in a timely

fashion.

So P3s, I think, are a very credible source. We have 16 of them

in our service dedicated to this mission. That is going to continue.

For 2007 budget, our strategic plan on the future of the P3s was

not complete at the time that was exercised by the administration,

but we did get the foresight of having the money necessary in 2006

to start that program. The initial parts of those funds have allowed

us to fix the problem we currently have and they will provide us

a mechanism of determining what the long-term requirements are.

They may or may not be required in 2007, but certainly we’re

working internal to the administration to plan for this kind of future to keep these aircraft robust—one line for maintaining and

dealing with the effects of aging; a second line for increasing the

capability in terms of improvements in computer software, you

know, command and control features and surface surveillance

radar.

So our highest priority, and the air and marine thing for not only

the drug interdiction but also the antiterrorism approach in the

coastal and these same regions is for, you know, making sure these

aircraft remain safe and effective for the long term. And I think in

that regard we are in very good shape, but if there was a priority,

this would be our first one.

The second one, it is interesting that you note, because we have

been involved in the UAV business, not in the Global Hawk, which

is a pretty large, sophisticated——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Shadow?

General KOSTELNIK. Predator B.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Oh, Predator B. OK.

General KOSTELNIK. And we have not been flying this in the

JIATF-South area. We have been actually flying this in the Arizona

border. And I mention this because that aircraft crashed yesterday

morning on a mission.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Is that the aircraft right there?

General KOSTELNIK. No, sir. I wondered about that when I came

in, but actually ours is laying out in the desert, and I’m sure on

the media this afternoon or tomorrow you will be able to see

photos. But it’s a Predator B. It’s a large and sophisticated UAV.

It is a good value. With all the sensors, which include not only

electro-optical and infrared, but also synthetic aperture radar. It’s

about a $6.8 million asset. We purchased this system last year as

part of a beginning of a UAV fleet which we intend to grow. We’ve

been operating it in the desert.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. So you are getting them now? I mean, the

Navy might not, DOD—you are not there—but you actually are

getting them?

General KOSTELNIK. We’ve been flying one for a year. We’ve purchased a second one, which we accept in August.

Mr. SOUDER. Is the one that wrecked the one?

General KOSTELNIK. This is the one, yes.

Mr. SOUDER. So we have zero, but we have more coming?

89

General KOSTELNIK. Nothing flyable. We get a second one in August, we get our—we have money in 2007, in the budget, to buy

a third. In our long-term future, we would add more of these assets

focused on the U.S. borders, but not just the south; also in the

coastal regions. And these aircraft can fly for 30 hours. They’re not

in the same class as a Global Hawk, but they would have some applications in certain areas, certainly the Caribbean and some of the

closer-in transit area zones.

Mr. SOUDER. When one wrecks like that, do you automatically resubmit for another? Is there a process? Or does this mean you are

just down?

General KOSTELNIK. Well, these vehicles are so popular, actually,

that the supply—General Atomics makes this vehicle. The Air

Force have been users. In fact, you may have seen Predator A’s in

Iraq. There are multiple U.S. users overseas of these vehicles. We

fly the Predator B, which is the newest—it is the larger version,

with a 60-foot wingspan. So this is not an insignificant vehicle.

We’re actually delayed waiting to get our second one in August

because of competition with the U.S. Navy, which is also procuring

these. The Coast Guard have looked at these in the past for the

near coastal region; they’re looking for other types of UAVs in their

mission——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Probably Rumsfeld is more powerful than

Chertoff right now.

General KOSTELNIK. Sir?

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. No. [Laughter.]

General KOSTELNIK. Well, the point is we will certainly replace

this one with one next year. And again, much like the prototype

issue on the P3, this last year of experience has given us unique

exposure to how to use these things. In fact, we started flying this

vehicle on about September 1st. It flies typically from 5 p.m., till

7 a.m. It will do multiple missions. It has a man in the loop mode,

so you can bring the man into the local scenario virtually. So it is

not just a program.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Are you looking mostly for watercraft? Is

that what you are doing? Everything? I mean, location——

Mr. SOUDER. Well, part of the fundamental problem we have

here is they have none, and that they had one and it wrecked, and

we are in line to get the second one.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You didn’t have insurance? [Laughter.]

Mr. SOUDER. But the challenge here is that now we are in line

to get the second one. And as I understood the answer to your

question, that we may, as you mentioned, you may not have the

same clout as the Department of the Defense. And then the fundamental question is do we spend our time trying to—how much

effort do we put into getting one of these? Meanwhile, the P3s can’t

fly. And that while we need to get that program on, the fact is that

we have our existing program sitting while we are trying to get a

new program started and it just went back.

It means that when you get your—if I understand what you are

saying—when you get your next one, we will now be back to where

we were with this one.

90

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And you know what that means? That

means there is a lot more drugs that go back on our streets again.

Right?

Mr. SOUDER. Let me ask a question on the P3s. Is that also a

capacity of repair question, or, if you had more money, could they

all get back up flying faster? Because one of the questions is, can

we meet last year’s drug dumpers? And the general consensus is

that it is going to be tough because we have so many assets down.

The Coast Guard boats are getting older, the P3s are down, and

now we just lost our Predator.

So is this—you said on the Predators it is a supply line problem.

Is that also true on the maintenance of the P3s, or if you had additional money could we get them up, since we just lost our Predator?

General KOSTELNIK. Well, sir, there are limited places in the

country where you can do this kind of work with experienced personnel for these systems. And so it really isn’t an issue of money.

We have more than enough money to fix this problem. And I

understand——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. But you don’t have enough vehicles,

though.

General KOSTELNIK. We have 16 vehicles. And if you looked at—

when everything was—with the people we have and the resources

we have, we are very close between either being limited by the pilots we have to fly the aircraft we have or the money for the fly

time. It is very close. And above that, there is more capacity in flying hours for the 16 aircraft we have. So we could fly more hours

if we had more pilots and the money to go along with that. It’s a

marginal amount, though. If you wanted to increase the coverage

substantially, then that would require——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let’s get into that. Because more pilots—

we have pilots all over the place. I mean, there are National Guard

pilots, there are pilots. I mean, who are your pilots now?

General KOSTELNIK. Well, we have a combination of pilots, depending on the mission. On the Border Patrol, their requirements

are very stringent—Spanish speakers, Border Patrol experience,

Border Patrol graduates. On the P3 side, we typically assess former

military pilots, sometimes the Navy for P3s, and the Army for our

helicopters. And then we send them to law enforcement training

because, realizing we’re in this business, all of our pilots are——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Do you have a program in place that is

dealing with recruiting of pilots right now?

General KOSTELNIK. We do when we are hiring. We have not

been in a hiring mode over the last several years because we’ve

been trying to figure out the merger and the strategic way ahead.

In fact, this year——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. So the bureaucracy is slowing everything

down, is what you are telling me? Come on, that really there is a

system—if you are telling me that we can’t hire now but we are

not sure. And I am not blaming you. I am just saying the system

is broke. Because the drugs are not stopping; they are continuing

to go on. So we really have a lot of work to do, I think, as far as

prioritizing on the resources that you need. And what you are telling me, I think, that aircraft—you are doing well on intelligence

91

because I think, you know, you have more technology and you are

using it.

So we have a lot of work to do in that regard. And again, it is

not your fault. You are getting the money, you have to deal with

it, with what we need to deal with. But it is something that we

have to really, seriously get these priorities together. And if you

could be a little more specific, I would appreciate it.

Do you also have—do you deal with the issue of containers?

General KOSTELNIK. No, sir, that’s the Office of Field Operations.

Those are the port of entry——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK, I just want to—OK.

General KOSTELNIK [continuing]. U.S. Customs——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. But if you do know what percentage is coming in of the drugs, say, into the United States would be through

containers versus, you know, the Mexico or that line, and water

and air and that—all those different areas.

General KOSTELNIK. I would take that question for the record

and provide a response. I don’t know if any of my colleagues here

could answer that question. But I could tell you what we’re

finding——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Ten percent, 15, 20—what?

General KOSTELNIK. I couldn’t hazard a guess. It is not my area

of expertise.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Does DEA or ONDCP have that estimate—

rough, ballpark?

Mr. BRAUN. It’s—I feel safe in saying it’s a great unknown right

now. We’ve got some initiatives under way to try to fill that intelligence gap. But it’s a gap.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Because here we go again. We have all

these different agencies—CIA, NSA, FBI, military—all working on

trying to develop the port security. And, really, a lot of it is about

the port of embarkation and the system we need to put together,

which Customs deals a lot with that and ICE and all those different areas. It seems to me that some of the same things we are

doing in the fight against terrorism, we could do the same thing

and get the same information out to our analysts and then get it

to you all. It could be one group that gets it on the terrorist information, the drug information, because it is all there at the same

time.

Yes?

Mr. BRAUN. Sir, I can add this, and should add this. The intelligence tells us this clearly, that the major drug trafficking organizations, it’s not a preferred method of smuggling because they lose

control, constructive or otherwise, or direct control of the load.

Once it’s placed in that container and until it lands where it’s, you

know—it docks where it’s supposed to dock, they’ve got no control

over it whatsoever.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Right. And the only reason I ask that, I am

trying to find out whether it is worth trying to focus on that, because we are doing a lot in the airport security. And because it was

a big issue, it just called attention to port security. And I think,

hopefully, there will be more money coming in that arena, one that

we could take advantage of.

How about you, Admiral?

92

Admiral JUSTICE. Sir, thank you.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. By the way, I do want to say to the—I

didn’t really work with the Coast Guard until I came to Congress,

and I have a Coast Guard yard in my district and deal a lot with

Sloan, who is your intelligence person. But you really have an outstanding agency. I don’t think the public knows how good the Coast

Guard is. The leadership, the men and women on the front line,

what you have to do in all your areas of jurisdiction, it is amazing

that you do so well. And then when you were put on the line, just

like our men and women throughout the world, say, in Louisiana,

you produced. So I just want to say that.

Admiral JUSTICE. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Now do you want to know the bad news?

Admiral JUSTICE. Oh, yes, sir. We are at year 4 of a 25-year recapitalization. We call it our Deepwater Program. It is no news to

you, sir, but last year was a significant effort to get the President’s

funding request. And we got it, and we’ve moved forward. And I

can talk—in the 2007 budget, as our Deepwater request for this

year is in front of you, there are more C130J hours, more C130H

hours, contracts logistics——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. But what are you using the C130’s for,

then?

Admiral JUSTICE. Those are the four engines, long range——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I know what they are but I mean——

Admiral JUSTICE. I am sorry.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER [continuing]. What are you using them for?

Admiral JUSTICE. Counter-drug, counter-migrant. It is put specifically in the Transit Zone. Alongside the P3s, I would submit,

those are the backbone of our MPA issue.

Mr. SOUDER. They move the Coast Guard boats that have the

helicopters on them; one of the ways they move them is through

the C130’s from Jacksonville down and into the Zone. Is that correct?

Admiral JUSTICE. That’s correct. So we are definitely committed

to moving forward, having more fixed-wing aircraft available. It’s

in our budget to do that. We’re also bringing online our first—

they’re CASA. They’re a new, mid-range type of aircraft which will

allow the remaining fixed-wing larger ones to work down south.

My request is Deepwater funding, at the President’s request, and

it will absolutely support this mission and move it forward.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. Admiral, I am glad you are here from

Colombia. It seems to me from my tour in Colombia about 8

months ago—we have a vote soon—that you have a strong eradication program. You took a bunch of us to a field and I know that

there are a lot of priorities in that regard. Also, that UAVs, based

on your country and the territory, could be extremely helpful, and

especially dealing with the FARC and certain other areas, and then

you have the drug cartels. Where are you right now as far as your

eradication program and what do you feel you need from us from

a priority point of view, after what you have heard these gentlemen

say here today?

Because, what is the percentage coming from Colombia now, in

the United States?

Mr. O’GARA. About 75 percent.

93

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK, cocaine and heroin? Or just cocaine?

Mr. O’GARA. Heroin has been down. We were unable to produce

a heroin estimate for 2005. It’s the majority, typically.

Admiral ECHANDIA. Sir, I’m not an expert in eradication. We’re

more on the coast, on the rivers, and much more in labs, laboratories, and interdiction. But talking with my colleagues from the

National Police, who are the people who run the eradication, they

said that they need more resources, more planes, for spraying the

crops of coca. Now they have plants that give five crops in a year.

It used to be three, then four, now five. So they become more and

more and more efficient.

But for the sea and for the rivers, the solution that we bring

today is a very modest solution. It’s using DC–3s refurbishing its

frame, and with brand-new engines. And the program that we have

here is $26 million for two of those frames, aircraft, with the right

equipment to detect all. The go fast—the fishing boats, the

submergibles. That is the problem. And you see here it’s an idea

that we have in interdiction. We put everything. But if we put

those small planes, the DC–3s, we can fly 10 hours. It’s a very

modest aircraft. It costs only $400 an hour to fly. It’s very cheap

and can fly for 10 hours. So we can stay on a station a long time

and we can control the territorial seas.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I want to ask, Mr. Chairman. We are sitting here testifying, and we talked about priorities, if you could

come together and get information to the chairman and we could

set about priorities and what we can do to try to deal with this

issue, because it is a serious problem. And the way I look at it, it’s

going to get worse, because I see less funding going into this.

Mr. SOUDER. Before I yield to Ms. Watson, I have—I was very

generous on the time here, but now we are up against the wall. We

have two 15-minute votes filed by 5, there is——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Did they call them already?

Mr. SOUDER. Yes. And you have been very patient. So we are

going to have to adjourn the hearing. But I need to make a couple

of things in the record here and then I will yield to Ms. Watson

for a last comment.

Ms. WATSON. Let me just submit my questions. I will submit my

questions for the record.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Diane E. Watson follows:]

94

95

96

97

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much for coming. I thought we

were going to not vote till 6 p.m., so I was being fairly casual. What

I need to do is, first off, for ONDCP, I am going to insert the questions in the record that Senator Grassley sent to Director Walters.

We are increasingly angry at false information that has been

consistently given to us on data. Those of us who go to the House

and Senate floors are getting exasperated that there are a number

of questions—like in Boston on heroin prices—we are told one

thing. David Murray wrote an article. One thing that contradicted

what we had been told here, that the ONDCP submitted a chart

and a footnote that said, not to use—they quoted numbers that

their own reports say not to quote, in order to try to make their

case. These are very specific questions because they relate to a bigger question. We don’t believe anything.

I mean I am saying this as a Republican right now. I am so

angry at going down to the House floor and saying, ‘‘This is what

we are doing in Colombia,’’ and then every year some explanation.

At this point, we don’t know what to believe, that the fact is we

can see more, but then we should have been told point blank that

we couldn’t see it. Instead, we acted like we were getting a higher

and higher percentage of eradication, and we didn’t know. That

should have been noted and led with, and instead, we go make

these different statements, when in fact, now we are being told

that not only were we wrong on this year’s projections by huge

amounts in Colombia, which forces us to go to the House floor with

that, but it is going to increase.

We go to Afghanistan, supposedly our success story, heroin as far

as the eye can see. We are told we are doing hand eradication, and

they got one in and it is not clear they are going to get two more,

the poppies coming off, and the question is, what in the world are

we doing? And they say, ‘‘Well, we thought we were up in the

northern province. We didn’t know it was going all over in the

southern province.’’ Well, then tell us that at the beginning. If you

need more resources, tell us you need more resources. Part of the

argument—and I know this from discussions—is everybody gets sat

on because part of your concern is OMB doesn’t want to come to

Congress and say, ‘‘Oh, we need more money.’’ Look, as a Republican, I am voting for some pretty tough budgets, but I would like

to know when I am trading off.

If I am having to go home and tell the people that I can’t increase their Medicare this much, then I need to be able to say that

it is a tradeoff because Deepwater is this much, and this is how

much cocaine we are missing, versus this, and money doesn’t grow

on trees and I have to prioritize. But if we can’t get what your priorities are and what we are missing, then we as politicians can’t

do the tradeoffs because you are depriving us of the information.

Now, I would like for the record for the Drug Czar’s Office,

ONDCP, to say, are you openly advocating and willing to go on the

record that we need more funds for Deepwater, that we need to

make sure that this Predator gets replaced, and the second that

went down, did Director Walters call over and say, ‘‘I’m going to

battle to see that I get up there because kids are going to die in

the street.’’ While you’re theoretically doing different things in the

narcotics, if we don’t have these type of things, we’re in deep trouVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:27 Dec 06, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\30898.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
98

ble. Or is this just kind of some quiet pre-decisional thing that

ONDCP will never go on record as the drug office, arguing inside

the bureaucracy?

The whole reason we created the Drug Czar’s Office was to be

an advocate for the other areas. We are sitting here on the House

floor arguing for an oiler, and we never hear any back behind us.

We watched the Department of Defense, before September 11th,

put narcotics down below, and we were already having this battle

prior to September 11th, and more and more assets moving out,

and then we don’t have the support.

Now, questions I have—and we will submit in record—for ICE,

because ICE is telling us we had a good discussion about the transit zone, and we may have a few questions on the transit zone. Yesterday we did not talk about the Mexican border. We did not talk

about whether there was going to be Air and Marine support.

ONDCP’s testimony said that ICE is important to the investigation, but in fact, none of the 8 ICE people in Mexico are working

with investigations. The question for the ICE people—and this is

different, because it looks to me, and sounds to me—and this is

kind of the fundamental question will have some things behind it

for the DHS—is in the Air Marine Division, it sounds like you are

holding some of the traditional functions, as much as possible, in

the transit zone question.

The question is: Is Air and Marine, as it relates to the southwest

border—not the southeast—how is it going to be transformed? And

we will have some questions about how the air is going to work

there, how that division, is that going to be picket fence or is it

going to be able to be fungible like the division over in the southeast? Those are fundamental questions.

We may have some additional questions on the Coast Guard as

to what the status of the assets is, where in the East Pacific, how

does Deepwater specifically affect the narcotics efforts in the Coast

Guard? I have a series of questions here.

Also in DEA, some nuances with the different assets that we

need to deploy, and where in the areas particularly in Central and

South America the DEA needs boosting up? In Afghanistan we

kind of know what the problem is, the military owns that. The

DEA is at the mercy, more or less, of the military support, and the

Brits are supposed to be running the operation, and I caused

enough ruckus over in Kabul to last us for a little while. And so

we will continue to push that.

And then watch for emerging areas, that clearly we have to have

the Europeans. We have some followup questions on what happened since the Dutch sold the Germans their P–3s in the Caribbean. Are the Germans going to invest in this? Colombia is out

there, it is us and Colombia, when half of this stuff is going over

to Europe. Where are the Germans? Where are the French? Where

are the other countries in Europe, because it is partly their problem too. So we will have some written questions.

That said, and Congresswoman Watson will too, and others on

our committee.

Thank you for your patience and the start today with the votes.

Sorry we had to cut it off. I am not sure you are all sorry. [Laughter.]

99

But I am sorry that I didn’t get a chance to put some of these,

and we will do these, in the record.

Once again, thank you all for your service. We are all on the

same side here, but we need to be aggressive or we are going to

get squeezed in the competitive funding competition as we move in

for priorities of the United States, and narcotics remain the No. 1

source of crime, the No. 1 source of family violence, and the No.

1 source of death in the United States. And it is not a hypothetical;

it is real, as your agencies full well know.

Thank you for your service. With that, the subcommittee stands

adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:57 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

138

139

140

141

142

143

144

145

146

147

148

149

150

151

152

153

154

155

156

157

158

159

160

161

162

163

164

165

166

167

Æ