alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17

- 11355 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
JIMMY WALTER FUENTES , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:17

- CR

- 59

- 1

Before DAVIS, HAYNES and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Jimmy Walter Fuentes pleaded guilty to illegal reentry into the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(1), and was sentenced to 30 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Fuentes argues that the district court’s judgment incorrectly reflected that he violated § 1326(b)(2). Thus, h e claims that the court believed the statutory maximum sentence to be 20 years, rather than 10 years, and there was “a reasonable probability of a different outcome”

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set f orth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED August 23, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 17-11355 Document: 00514613052 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/23/2018No. 17

- 11355

2 had the court known of the correct statutory maximum. The Government argues that the reco rd does not show that any incorrect understanding of the statutory maximum influenced the court’s sentence, but it concedes that the judgment incorrectly reflects that Fuentes violated § 1326(b) (2). Accordingly, it asks this court to reform the judgment t o show that Fuentes was convicted under § 1326(b) (1). Because Fuentes did not object to the judgment’s reference to § 1326(b)(2), this court’s review is for plain error. See United States v. Mondragon

- Santiago , 564 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2009). To esta blish plain

error, Fuentes must show a forfeited error that is clear or obvious and that affected his substantial rights. See Puckett v. United States , 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If he makes such a showing, this court has the discretion to correct the

err or but only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. The parties do not dispute that the court plainly erred by referencing § 1326(b)(2) in the judgment. As for whether the error affected Fuentes ’s substantial rights, nothing in the record suggests that the
20

- year maximum sentence for a violation of § 1326(b)(2) influenced the district court’s sentencing decision. Moreover, Fuentes’s 30

- month sentence did not exceed the 10

- year statutory maximum under § 1326(b)(1). See Mondragon

Santiago , 564 F.3d at 366

- 69. Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED but REFORMED to reflect conviction and sentencing under § 1326(b)(1). Case: 17-11355 Document: 00514613052 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/23/2018
§ 490.6 Petitions for generally applicable rulemaking. ( a ) *Right to file.* Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 7191 and 5 U.S.C. 553(e), any person may file a petition for generally applicable rulemaking under titles III, IV, and V of the Act with the DOE General Counsel.
( b ) *How to file.* A petition for generally applicable rulemaking under this section shall be filed by mail or messenger in an envelope addressed to the Office of General Counsel, GC-1, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585.
( c ) *Content of rulemaking petitions.* A petition under this section must— ( 1 ) Be labeled “Petition for Rulemaking Under 10 CFR Part 490”;
( 2 ) Describe with particularity the terms of the rule being sought;
( 3 ) Identify the provisions of law that direct, authorize, or affect the issuance of the rules being sought; and
( 4 ) Explain why DOE should not choose to make policy by precedent through interpretive rulings, petitions for exemption, or other adjudications.
( d ) *Determination upon rulemaking petitions.* After considering the petition and other information deemed to be appropriate, DOE may grant the petition and issue an appropriate rulemaking notice, or deny the petition because the rule being sought— ( 1 ) Would be inconsistent with statutory law;
( 2 ) Would establish a generally applicable policy in an area that should be left to case-by-case determinations;
( 3 ) Would establish a policy inconsistent with the underlying statutory purposes; or
( 4 ) For other good cause.
2132.806 Contract clause.       The clause set forth in 2152.232-72 shall be inserted in all FEGLI Program contracts.    **Parent topic:** Subpart 2132.8 - Assignment of Claims
Exhibit 32



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002






I, David A. Conway, Chief Executive Officer of WaterChef, Inc., hereby certify
that the Form 10-Q of WaterChef, Inc. for the period ended September 30, 2003
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in such report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of WaterChef, Inc.





                            /s/*
                            ------------------------
                              Name: David A. Conway
                            President,
                            Chief Executive Officer and
                             Chief Financial Officer
                            Date:


     These certifications are being furnished pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and, except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, shall not be deemed to be filed as part of the periodic
report described herein nor shall they be deemed filed by WaterChef, Inc. for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

     A signed original of the written statements required by Section 906 has
been provided to WaterChef, Inc. and will be retained by WaterChef, Inc. and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
| (logo) WELLS

           FARGO | Commercial Mortgage Servicing

D1086-120, 12th Floor 

550 South Tryon Street 

Charlotte, NC 28202

1-800-326-1334 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

 

Reference is hereby made to that certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of February 1, 2013, by and among GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, as Depositor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer and Certificate Administrator, LNR Partners, LLC, as Special Servicer, Trimont Real Estate Advisors, Inc., as Operating Advisor and U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee, with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2013-GC10 (the "Agreement"). Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement.

 

Pursuant to Section 10.07 of this Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice President of Commercial Mortgage Services do hereby certify that:

 

1.A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015 (the “Reporting Period”), and of its performance per the Agreement during such period has been made under my supervision, and

 

2.To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.

 

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 4th day of March 2016.

 

 

 

/s/ Daniel Bober

Daniel Bober

Executive Vice President 

Wells Fargo Bank

 

 

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A |  (logo) Together we’ll go far

  |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to

the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. T.C. Memo. 2008-27

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

HOI THI HUYNH, Petitioner v . COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 22381-06. Filed February 12, 2008.
Hoi Thi Huynh, pro se. Tracy Hogan , for respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
FOLEY, Judge : The issue for decision is whether petitioner is liable for a section 72(t) 1 10-percent additional tax relating to distributions from a qualified retirement plan.- 2 - FINDINGS OF FACT Until October 2003, petitioner was employed as a math teacher with the City of Chicago. While employed as a teacher, petitioner acquired an annuity account with AXA Equitable, a qualified retirement plan. In 2004, petitioner received distributions from AXA Equitable of $5,478 and $8,961. Petitioner reported, on her 2004 tax return, the distributions as income from pensions and annuities. On July 31, 2006, respondent issued petitioner a notice of deficiency relating to 2004 and determined that petitioner was liable for a 10-percent additional tax with respect to the distributions. Petitioner filed her petition with the Court on November 2, 2006, while residing in Chicago, Illinois. OPINION A 10-percent additional tax is imposed upon distributions from a qualified retirement plan, unless one of the exceptions enumerated in section 72(t)(2) is satisfied. Sec. 71(t)(1) and (2); see also Dwyer v. Commissioner , 106 T.C. 337 (1996). Petitioner failed to meet any of those exceptions. Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s determination.- 3 -

Contentions we have not addressed are irrelevant, moot, or meritless. Decision will be entered for respondent .
* Pursuant to 5th CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the

limited circumstances set forth in 5th CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-20182

Summary Calendar

O.D. VAN DUREN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ELIZABETH WATSON, ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-97-CV-1664

December 29, 1998

Before JOHNSON, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

O. D. Van Duren, Texas prisoner # 667233, appeals from the district

court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(b). Van Duren contends that the district court erred in

finding that his claim was barred by the applicable statute of

limitations. Specifically, Van Duren argues that his cause of action

should accrue from the “denial of his final appeal,” rather than from

the injury itself.

We review a district court’s dismissal of a case under § 1915 for

an abuse of discretion. See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th
2

Cir. 1994). Although Texas law governs the applicable statute of

limitations, we look to federal law to determine when the cause of

action accrues. See Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 257 (5th Cir.

1993). We have held that the statute of limitations begins to run “when

the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the

basis of the action.” Id. Moreover, the cause of action begins to

accrue from the date of the actual injury, rather than from the date the

courts impose punishment. See id. For these reasons, and after a

thorough review of the record and Van Duren’s brief, we find that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case.

AFFIRMED.
Case 2:06-cv-00766-MHT-TFM Document 45 Filed 06/13/2007 Page 1 of 4
Case 2:06-cv-00766-MHT-TFM Document 45 Filed 06/13/2007 Page 2 of 4
Case 2:06-cv-00766-MHT-TFM Document 45 Filed 06/13/2007 Page 3 of 4
Case 2:06-cv-00766-MHT-TFM Document 45 Filed 06/13/2007 Page 4 of 4
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460 

Cytec Industries, Inc. 

c/o Mike Kelley 

Agent for Cytec Industries, Inc. 

7140 Heritage Village Plaza 

Gainesville, VA 20155 

OFFICE OF CHEMICAL SAFETY 

AND POLLUTION PREVENTION 

October 25, 2012 

Subject: . Agency Response to Registrant Letters Regarding DGH Data Compensation 

Dear Mr. Kelley: 

In response to your June 18, 2012 letter written on behalf of Cytec Industries, Inc. regarding 

DGH toxicology data compensation, the Agency has reviewed the appropriate DGH toxicology 

data and determined that the studies referenced in your letter satisfy the data submission 

obligations presented in the Agency's May 9, 2009 letter. The Agency will not be updating the 

risk assessment performed in the Addendum to the 2005 Dodine Reregistration Eligibility 

Decision (RED): Antimicrobial Uses of Dodecylguanidine Hydrochloride (DGH) and, because 

your company has satisfied the data submission obligations, no further citation or offer of 

compensation for additional studies is required. 

Please contact Rebecca von dem Hagen of my staff if you have any questions about this letter. 

She may be reached at (703) 305-6785 or vondem-hagen.rebecca@epa.gov. 

cc: Mark Dyner, Office of General Counsel 

Sincerely, 

~~~/'----· Mike Mendelsohn 

Acting Chief, Risk Management Branch II 

Antimicrobials Division 

Catherine Britton, Pesticide Re-evaluation Division 

Rebecca von dem Hagen and Lance Wormell, Antimicrobials Division
#### §§ 504.3-504.4 [Reserved]
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED August 21, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-21011 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee

v. AGUSTIN MONDRAGON-DIAZ, also known as Augustine Mondragon, also known as Augustine Mondragon-DiazDefendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:06-CR-331-ALL
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Agustin Mondragon-Diaz (Mondragon) appeals his guilty-plea conviction and 30-month sentence for unlawful reentry following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Mondragon asserts that his sentence is contrary to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and unreasonable as a matter of law. HeNo. 06-21011

2 contends that this court’s post-Booker decisions have effectively reinstated the mandatory guideline scheme condemned by Booker

. Mondragon concedes that thisargument isforeclosed by circuit precedent, but he raises it to preserve it in light of the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 551 (2006), and Claiborne v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 551 (2006). However, Rita now has been decided, and the Supreme Court has affirmed that a “court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines.” Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-69 (2007) (quote at 2462). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has vacated the underlying Claiborne decision as moot due to the death of the petitioner. Claibornev. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007), vacating as moot 439 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2006). In light of these decisions, Mondragon’s argument remains foreclosed. Mondragon additionally challenges the constitutionali ty of § 1326(b)’s treatment ofprior felony and aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than elements of the offense that must be found by a jury. Mondragon’s
c onstitutional challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). Although he contends that A lmendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule it in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (20 00), we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Rangel-Reyes v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2873 (2006); U nited States v. Pineda-Arrellano, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 16925 (5th Cir. July 17, 2007). Mondragon properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.No. 06-21011

3 The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
#### LACIER v. JACKSON MOTOR CO.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

June 19, 1914.)

Action by Robert J. Lacier against the Jackson Motor Company.

No opinion. Motion denied with $10 costs. Order filed. See, also, 147 N. Y. Supp. 584.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Leslie J. Kessler, Chief Executive Officer of Water Chef, Inc., hereby
certify that the Form 10-Q of Water Chef, Inc. for the fiscal quarter ended
March 31, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in such report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of Water Chef, Inc.

      Date:  May 15, 2008
                                       ----------------------------------------
                                       Leslie J. Kessler
                                       President and Chief Executive Officer


This certification is being furnished pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and, except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, shall not be deemed to be filed as part of the periodic
report described herein nor shall it be deemed filed by Water Chef, Inc. for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
227 So.2d 598

#### Mrs. Ruby GATTE v. COAL OPERATORS CASUALTY CO.

No. 50091.

Nov. 10, 1969.

In re: Mrs. Ruby Gatte applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Jefferson Davis. 225 So.2d 256.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue ; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.
# 1553.232-76 [Reserved]

**Parent topic:**Subpart 1553.2 - Prescription of Forms
2802.101 Definitions.       Throughout this chapter, the following words and terms are used as defined in this subpart unless the context in which they appear clearly requires a different meaning, or a different definition is prescribed for a particular part or portion of a part.          (a) *Agency* means the Department of Justice.          (b) *Bureau* means contracting activity. (See “contracting activity” in this subpart.)          (c) *Bureau Procurement Chief* or *BPC* means the supervisory official who is directly responsible for supervising, managing, and directing all contracting offices of the bureau.          (d) *Cardholder* means an individual entrusted with a Government Purchase Card.          (e) *Chief Acquisition Officer* or *CAO* means the official appointed to assist the head of the agency and other agency officials to ensure the mission of the agency is achieved through the management of the agency's acquisition activities.          (f) *Chief of the Contracting Office* means that supervisory official who is directly responsible for supervising, managing and directing a contracting office.          (g) *Contracting activity* means a component within the Department which has been delegated procurement authority to manage contracting functions associated with its mission (see 2801.601(a)).          (h) *Department* or *DOJ* means the Department of Justice.          (i) *Head of the Contracting Activity* or *HCA* means those officials identified in 2801.601(a) having responsibility for supervising, managing, and directing the operations of the contracting activity.          (j) *JAR* means the Department of Justice Acquisition Regulation in this chapter.          (k) *JMD* means the Justice Management Division.          (l) *OIG* means DOJ's Office of the Inspector General.          (m) *Suspension and Debarment Official* or *SDO* means the employee designated to impose suspension and debarment for the Department of Justice.          (n) *Senior Procurement Executive* or *SPE* means the official designated to be responsible for management direction of the Department of Justice procurement system, including implementation of unique procurement policies, regulations, and standards of the Department of Justice.    **Parent topic:** Subpart 2802.1 - Definitions
## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S NO. WR-28,344-37

EX P ARTE MARCU S ANTHONY GREEN, AK A MARKU S ANTONIUS GREEN, Appli cant

ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORP US CAUSE NO. D-1-D C-01-904200- W IN THE 167T H DISTRICT COURT

F ROM TRAVIS COUNTY

Per curiam . O R D E R Applicant wa s convicted of prac ticing me dicine without a license and sente nced to f orty y ear s’ imprisonment. The Third Court of Appe als aff irmed his conviction. Gre en v. State, 137 S.W . 3d 356 (Tex. App. — Austin May 27, 2004) (pe t. ref’ d). Applica nt filed this application for a writ of habe as cor

pus in the county

of convic tion, and the district cler k forwa rded it to this Court. SeeT E X . C O D E C R I M . P R O C . art. 11.07. I n the instant application, Applica nt alleg es that his conviction violates the prohibition on double jeopar dy , that his conviction was obtained pur suant to an unconstitutional searc h and seizure, and that he was de nied due pr ocess a nd equal pr otection. Additionally , Applicant cla ims2

that he wa s improperly

denied r elea se to discre tionary mandatory

supervision. This Court has previously cited Applica

nt for abuse of the wr it because Applicant continues to raise g rounds that wer e pre viously reje cted on the me rits or that should have be en raised in pr evious applications. W hen an a pplicant has be en cited f

or abuse of the wr it, we will not consider the me rits of the g rounds in subsequently -filed a pplications unless the applica nt shows that the fa ctual or le g al basis of those g rounds was una vailable in a pr eviously

filed application. This Court has re viewed A pplicant' s claim that he wa s improperly denied r elea se to discretionar

y mandatory

supervision and ha s determined that it is without merit. There fore , it is denied. Applica

nt's r emainingclaims are barr ed fr om review ; as such, they are dismiss ed. Te x . Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07 § 4.

Filed: Apr il 27, 2022 Do not publish
PGI 217.207 Exercise of options.

Before exercising an option for firm-fixed-price contracts containing spare parts, the contracting

officer shall perform a cost or price analysis of the proposed spare parts. The contracting officer

shall use an appropriate sampling technique or request field pricing assistance, and document the

contract file with the results of the cost or price analysis.

Parent topic: PGI 217.2 -OPTIONS