[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-11249

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-20619-CMA

ROBERTO ARIAS, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MARIA PEREZ, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(February 7, 2019)

Before WILSON, GRANT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Roberto Arias, a state inmate in Florida, appeals the district court’s dismissal 

of his § 1983 complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We affirm.

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I.

Roberto Arias is a Florida prisoner serving a 40-year sentence for aggravated 

assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated battery, and witness tampering. On June 

6, 2016, Arias submitted an informal grievance to the Dade Correctional Institution 

“requesting to be Transfer to another institution” because his “LIFE was in 

DANGER” of gang violence. Arias’s request was approved, and on June 21, he 

was transferred to Desoto Correctional Center.

Arias alleges that, a few days after arriving at Desoto, he verbally requested 

protection from officer Catherine Hays—specifically, that he be placed in a “P.M.” 

(protective management) facility—because he still feared gang violence. He says 

that Hays told him “we don’t do that over here” and told him to speak to another 

individual, officer Rios, who also did not help Arias. About a month and a half 

later, on August 15, Arias suffered various injuries when he was attacked by 

another inmate with a lock inside a sock.

On August 26, Arias submitted a written request form to Hays in which he 

indicated that he was “writing you to let know that I’m in the enfermery because 

[an unknown inmate] hit me with a lock inside a sox in my head. . . . I [] told you 

in my arrived here on my classif. interview that (please) I do request to you to be 

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placed in dorm-M as some kind of protection for me there . . . .”1 Arias wrote that 

he “also wrote a request to Sgt: Quezada and she (denied)” his request. He 

concluded: “Please I need you send me the name of the inmate who hit me in my 

head in (B-Dorm) on: 08/15/2016; and also requesting to you to put him on my 

records inmate’s file in especial review with me.” Hays wrote “It has been done” 

or “This has already been done” on the request form.

Also on August 26 (or possibly September 1), while in the infirmary, Arias 

saw members of the Institutional Classification Team (including the assistant 

warden) in person and asked them for “full Protection.” But “they only offer him 

(A.I.P) Administrative Institutional Protection; and they told him that they will 

Transfer him to another regular institution.” So on August 31, Arias submitted a 

written grievance to the assistant warden “requesting to be transfer to (P.M.-unit) 

under full protection to ‘PREVENT’ more violence against me by another inmate 

in the future.” He stated that it was the Institutional Classification Team’s job to 

“verify inmate records before making a wrongful decision especially when 

inmate’s claim that my life is in danger” and that “[b]ased on my above stated facts 

. . . I ask that my (P.M.-unit) status be correctly evaluated by (I.C.T.) DeSoto; in 

 1 The request form contains a box for inmates to check if the request is an informal grievance, 

but Arias did not check that box.

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accordance to the factors to be consider and my request to be placed on (P.M.-unit) 

be approved and I can saved my life!”

On September 5, Arias sent another written grievance, this time to the 

Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections. He labeled it as a “Request for 

P.M-unit-facility” and the text indicated he was “requesting that my (P.M-unit) 

status be (review) and to be replace in the (P.M.-unit facility).” Arias argued that 

the Institutional Classification Team’s recommendation that he simply be 

transferred to another institution was “an ‘Inappropriate’ solution for my case; and 

I believe this recommendation is Cruel and Negligent Act where incompetent 

staff’s wrong decisions make inmates get (hurt & killed) in prison where they’re 

putting my life in danger in only (remove) and keeping me transfered from one 

institution to another.” He concluded: “I am humbly ask that my request for (P.M.-

unit facility) status be correctly evaluated by Central Office and to be placed back 

on a (P.M.-unit facility) where I can saved my life!” 

An October 4 response stated that the September 5 grievance had been 

“received, reviewed, and evaluated,” but that Arias had “filed this appeal 

prematurely” because he was “approved for placement in a Protection 

Management unit on 09/02/16” and was “now housed in the Protection 

Management unit at Martin Correctional Institution.” Arias had been transferred 

on September 9. Because of that, the grievance was “returned without action.” On 

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appeal, Arias concedes that the new placement was correct, but argues that it “was 

to late” because he was already hurt.

II.

We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies under the PLRA de novo. Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1174 

(11th Cir. 2011). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. Id.

at 1174–75.

III.

A. PLRA Exhaustion

The PLRA forbids suits by prisoners “with respect to prison conditions” 

under any federal law, including § 1983, “until such administrative remedies as are 

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This requirement grants prison 

authorities “time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing 

the initiation of a federal case.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525 (2002). It 

“applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general 

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or 

some other wrong.” Id. at 532. And it serves as a mandatory pre-condition to suit, 

even when seeking the remedies available under the administrative scheme may be 

futile or the remedies inadequate. Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325–26 

(11th Cir. 1998).

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Failure to exhaust “is an affirmative defense under the PLRA,” and “inmates 

are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” 

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Deciding a motion to dismiss for failure 

to exhaust proceeds in two steps: first, looking to the defendant’s motion and the 

plaintiff’s response, the court assesses whether dismissal is proper even under the 

plaintiff’s version of the facts; and second, if dismissal is inappropriate under the 

plaintiff’s version of the facts, the court makes “specific findings in order to 

resolve the disputed factual issues related to exhaustion.” Turner v. Burnside, 541 

F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008). The burden is on the defendant to show a failure 

to exhaust. Id. A prisoner must exhaust each claim that he seeks to present in 

court. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 219–20 (“All agree that no unexhausted claim may 

be considered.”).

B. Florida’s Administrative Scheme

State law “determines what steps are required to exhaust.” Dimanche v. 

Brown, 783 F.3d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Jones, 549 U.S. at 218 

(noting that “it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the 

boundaries of proper exhaustion”). The Florida Administrative Code sets forth the 

steps prisoners must take to exhaust their claims. First, a prisoner must submit an 

informal grievance within 20 days of the incident. Fla. Admin. Code §§ 33-

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103.002(12), 33-103.005(1), 33-103.011(1)(a).2 The Florida Department of 

Corrections has 15 days to respond. Id. § 33-103.011(3)(a). Second, if the 

informal grievance is denied, the prisoner must appeal within 15 days of the denial 

by filing a formal grievance at the institutional level and attaching the contested 

informal grievance. Id. §§ 33-103.006(1)(a) and (2)(g), 33-103.011(1)(b)(1). 

Third, if the formal grievance is also denied, the prisoner must appeal within 15 

days of the denial by filing a grievance appeal with the Secretary of the Florida 

Department of Corrections and attaching the contested grievances. Id. §§ 33-

103.007(1) and (4), 33-103.011(c). If an appeal is filed late or is otherwise out of 

compliance, it is returned to the prisoner without further processing, and the 

prisoner must refile a corrected version. Id. §§ 33-103.014(1), 33-103.011, 33-

103.014(2).

C. Arias’s Grievances

On appeal, Arias identifies four complaints regarding his placement in the 

Florida prison system that could plausibly count as grievances: 1) his verbal 

request to Hays a few days after arriving at Desoto on June 21, 2016; 2) his written 

request to Hays from the infirmary (after he had been attacked) on August 26; 3) a 

written grievance submitted to the assistant warden on August 31; and 4) a written 

 2 For certain emergency and other grievances, a prisoner may skip step one and instead file a 

formal grievance with the warden’s office or a direct grievance with the Florida Secretary of the 

Department of Corrections. See Fla. Admin. Code §§ 33-103.005(1), 33-103.002(5), 33-

103.006(3). Different time limits apply in those circumstances. See id. § 33-103.011(1)(b).

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grievance submitted to the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections on 

September 5. The district court rejected the first complaint because, contrary to the 

Florida Administrative Code requirement that informal grievances be written, it 

was verbal, and because “the alleged failure to respond to Plaintiff’s request for 

protection is the source of later grievances and so cannot also be considered a 

grievance in and of itself.” It rejected the second complaint because it was merely 

“a request for protection” and “not an informal grievance directed at a third-party 

complaining of [Hays’s] failure to respond to a request for protection,” and 

because Arias “did not check the box indicating the request was an informal 

grievance” as the Florida Administrative Code requires. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 

U.S. 81, 83–84 (2006).

The district court construed Arias’s third complaint as a formal grievance—

that is, step two in the process.3

 Arias claims that the Institutional Classification 

Team verbally informed him on September 1—the day after his third complaint—

that they could transfer him to another facility “without placing him in a Protective 

Management Unit.” So he filed his fourth complaint with the Florida Secretary of 

the Department of Corrections on September 5, and the district court accepted 

 3 Arias’s grievance arguably qualified as an emergency one—which would allow him to skip the 

first step, filing an informal grievance—because emergency grievances include “those matters 

which, if disposed of according to the regular time frames, would subject the inmate to 

substantial risk of personal injury or cause other serious and irreparable harm to the inmate.” 

Fla. Admin. Code § 33-103.002(4).

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Arias’s characterization of that fourth filing as an appeal from the third one. But 

the district court found that the appeal did not satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion 

requirement because it was “returned without action” and the response indicated 

that Arias “did not comply with the procedures of [the Florida Administrative 

Code] because he did not wait the time allotted to the [Florida Department of 

Corrections] to provide him with a response to the formal grievance before filing 

an appeal.” In fact, Arias had been approved for placement in a protective 

management unit on September 2, and he was actually transferred on September 9. 

The district court thus concluded that Arias “did not exhaust his administrative 

remedies because his grievance was never denied.”

We agree that Arias failed to exhaust his failure-to-protect claim against 

Hays. A prisoner must exhaust each claim that he seeks to present in court. See 

Jones, 549 U.S. at 219–20 (“All agree that no unexhausted claim may be 

considered.”) The claim that Arias suffered an Eighth Amendment violation when 

Hays failed to protect him is distinct from the claim that he should be transferred to 

a protective management unit. Arias’s filings addressed the latter—indeed, he 

ultimately received precisely the relief that he requested—but not the former. It 

would subvert the PLRA’s purpose of granting prison authorities “time and 

opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a 

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federal case,” Porter, 534 U.S. at 525, if a prison could grant all the relief a 

prisoner asked for and yet still find itself subject to suit.

Our decision in Parzyck v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 627 F.3d 1215 (11th 

Cir. 2010), is not to the contrary. There, we explained that “[n]othing in the 

FDOC’s grievance procedures requires inmates to file new grievances addressing 

every subsequent act by a prison official that contributes to the continuation of a 

problem already raised in an earlier grievance.” Id. at 1219. Here, Arias’s injuries 

were not simply “the continuation of a problem already raised”; they were a 

separate, even if related, problem. None of Arias’s grievances pursued a claim 

against Hays for failing to protect him, as distinct from requesting protection itself.

* * *

Because Arias failed to exhaust his Eighth Amendment claim against Hays 

under the procedures established for Florida prisoners, the district court’s decision 

is AFFIRMED.

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