97-475

 No. 97-475

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

 1998 MT 127

 IN RE PETITION OF SUTEY OIL COMPANY, INC.,

 Petitioner and Appellant,

 v.

 ANACONDA-DEER LODGE COUNTY PLANNING

 BOARD and THE ANACONDA-DEER LODGE

 COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT,

 Respondents and Respondents.

 APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Third Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Anaconda-Deer Lodge,

 The Honorable Ted L. Mizner, Judge presiding.

 COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Leonard J. Haxby; Haxby & Somers; Butte, Montana

 For Respondents:

 Michael B. Grayson; Anaconda-Deer Lodge County Attorney;

 Anaconda, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: March 26, 1998

 Decided: May 28, 1998 

 Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice Jim Regnier delivered the opinion of the Court.

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 1 In June 1995, Sutey Oil Company, Inc., filed a petition for a writ of

certiorari in the District Court for the Third Judicial District in Anaconda-Deer

Lodge County, asking that the court review the Anaconda-Deer Lodge County

Planning Board's and the Anaconda Deer Lodge County Board of Adjustment's

denial of Sutey Oil's application for a special use permit. The District Court

issued a writ of certiorari, and on July 3, 1997, issued an opinion and order

affirming the denial of Sutey Oil's special use permit. It is from the court's

July 3, 1997, order that Sutey Oil presently appeals. For the reasons stated

below, we affirm. 

 2 The sole dispositive issue on appeal is whether the District Court

abused its discretion in concluding that the Board of Adjustment did not abuse

its discretion in denying Sutey Oil's application for a special use permit.

 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 3 Sutey Oil owns a business establishment known as the Thriftway Super

Stop #7, located in Anaconda, Montana. In early 1994, David Sutey, the

president of Sutey Oil, became interested in expanding his business by adding

a room with four or five gambling machines. Sutey contacted the Anaconda-Deer Lodge 

County Planning Department, and spoke with permit official Scott

H. Hurley about the possibility of adding gambling machines to his

establishment. The record indicates that the two did not, however, discuss the

possibility that Sutey might seek a beer and wine license. 

 4 On April 5, 1994, Hurley wrote to Sutey and advised him "that

Thriftway Super Stops would not be required to file for and obtain a special

use permit for the establishment of gambling machines" because the

"establishment is deemed as an expansion of an existing retail and service

use." Although Hurley did not specifically address the possibility that Sutey

might be required to obtain a special use permit were he to seek a beer and

wine license, Hurley did note that Thriftway would have to adhere to "all

county and state requirements . . . before the commencement of any type of

construction." 

 5 Sutey obtained a building permit and began remodeling his facility. On

January 9, 1995, Sutey submitted an application to the State Liquor Division

for a retail on-premises consumption beer and wine license. In March 1995,

the State Liquor Division notified Anaconda-Deer Lodge County of Sutey's

application to provide the county with "the opportunity to evaluate whether the

applicant has met all laws and ordinances your office is responsible for

regulating." It was upon receipt of this notice that the Anaconda-Deer Lodge

County Planning Department first learned that the expansion proposed by

Sutey would not only include gambling machines, but would also involve the

issuance of a retail on-premises consumption beer and wine license. 

 6 On March 20, 1995, James Manning, the Planning Director of

Anaconda-Deer Lodge County, advised the State Liquor Division that the

county "would strongly protest the issuance of a on-premise license for

Thriftway Super Stop of Anaconda #7." Manning explained that "an on-premise 

consumption license for this location would constitute a change in use

for the premises," and that "to be in compliance with Zoning regulations, a

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Special Use Permit would need to be approved by the Planning Board." Sutey

received a copy of Manning's letter, and filed an application for a special use

permit with Anaconda-Deer Lodge County on March 30, 1995.

 7 On April 20, 1995, the Anaconda-Deer Lodge County Planning Board

held a public hearing to address Sutey Oil's application for a special use

permit. Following public comment, the Planning Board denied Sutey Oil's

application. On April 21, 1995, Manning wrote a letter to Sutey Oil,

explaining that the Planning Board had denied its application for a special use

permit, and advising it of its right to appeal to the Anaconda-Deer Lodge

County Board of Adjustment. Sutey Oil pursued an appeal, and on May 17,

1995, the Board of Adjustment held a public hearing during which it voted to

uphold the Planning Board's decision.

 8 On June 7, 1995, Sutey Oil filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in

District Court, asking that the court review the Planning Board's and the Board

of Adjustment's denial of its application for a special use permit. The District

Court issued a writ of certiorari on October 11, 1995. On November 25, 1996,

following review of the record and oral argument, the court issued an opinion

rejecting Sutey Oil's equitable estoppel argument, but remanding the case "to

the Planning Board for determination of the basis for denial of Petitioner's

Special Use Permit."

 9 The Planning Board met on December 2, 1996, and explained its

"reason for denying the Special Use Permit for Sutey Oil, Thriftway West, to

acquire an on-premise beer/wine license, is that it would be incompatible to

neighboring land which is designated single family residential land use." On

July 3, 1997, the District Court issued a second opinion and order in which it

affirmed the Planning Board's denial of Sutey Oil's application for a special

use permit.

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

 10 Pursuant to 27-25-102(2), MCA, the district court may grant a writ

of certiorari, or writ of review

 when a lower tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial

 functions has exceeded the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board, or

 officer and there is no appeal or, in the judgment of the court,

 any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.

 11 Ordinarily, the district court's scope of review upon a writ of certiorari

"cannot be extended further than to determine whether the inferior tribunal,

board, or officer has regularly pursued the authority of such tribunal, board,

or officer." Section 27-25-303, MCA. In a case involving an appeal from a

decision by the Board of Adjustment, however, 76-2-327, MCA, provides

the district court with a broader scope of review than that generally available

upon a writ of certiorari. For example, 76-2-327, MCA, provides, in

pertinent part, as follows:

 (1) Any person or persons, jointly or severally, aggrieved

 by any decision of the board of adjustment or any taxpayer or

 any officer, department, board, or bureau of the municipality

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 may present to a court of record a petition, duly verified, setting

 forth that such decision is illegal, in whole or in part, specifying

 the grounds of the illegality. . . .

 (2) Upon the presentation of such petition, the court

 may allow a writ of certiorari directed to the board of

 adjustment to review such decision of the board of adjustment

 . . . .

 (3) If, upon the hearing, it shall appear to the court

 that testimony is necessary for the proper disposition of the

 matter, it may take evidence or appoint a referee to take such

 evidence as it may direct and report the same to the court with

 his findings of fact and conclusions of law, which shall

 constitute a part of the proceedings upon which the

 determination of the court shall be made.

 (4) The court may reverse or affirm, wholly or partly,

 or may modify the decision brought up for review.

 12 Although 76-2-327, MCA, contemplates relief by certiorari, it

simultaneously authorizes the reviewing court to hold a hearing and reverse,

affirm, or modify a decision made by the Board of Adjustment. In so doing,

 76-2-327, MCA, clearly provides the district court with a broader scope of

review than that generally available upon a writ of certiorari. See Bryant

Development Ass'n v. Dagel (1975), 166 Mont. 252, 257, 531 P.2d 1320, 1323

(interpreting identical language in 16-1706, RCM (1947)). Thus, the District

Court in this case was bound to review the Board of Adjustment's decision for

an abuse of discretion.

 13 Having identified the standard by which the District Court is bound to

review the Board of Adjustment's decision, we must now determine the

standard by which we are bound to review the District Court's decision. In so

doing, we turn first to the terms of 76-2-327, MCA, which specifically

empower the district court to "take evidence" if "necessary for the proper

disposition of the matter." In Lambros v. Board of Adjustment of Missoula

(1969), 153 Mont. 20, 26, 452 P.2d 398, 401, we held that "upon review of a

determination by a district court where it is hearing a petition for variance and

takes additional testimony the question for this Court to determine is whether

the court committed an abuse of discretion." Indeed, in cases where the

district court exercises its statutory option to take additional evidence, we have

consistently reviewed the district court's decision for an abuse of discretion

and to determine whether that decision is supported by substantial evidence. 

 See, e.g., Whistler v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co. (1987), 228 Mont. 150,

155, 741 P.2d 422, 425 (noting that district court "received evidence indicating

that the decision itself was reasonable," and holding the district court's

conclusion was "supported by substantial, credible evidence"); Cutone v.

Anaconda Deer Lodge (1980), 187 Mont. 515, 518, 610 P.2d 691, 693 (where

district court "allowed the appellant a full hearing and testimony was

introduced by both parties," we reviewed the court's decision for an abuse of

discretion).

 14 In the present case, review of the record indicates that the District Court

did not take any additional witness testimony during the oral argument held on

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September 18, 1996. Although the court did not take any additional evidence

during the parties' oral argument, the parties did supplement the record with

affidavits from David Sutey and Brian Bossard. Because the District Court

exercised its statutory option and took additional evidence before making its

decision, we review the District Court's decision for an abuse of discretion. 

 DISCUSSION

 15 Did the District Court abuse its discretion in concluding the Board of

Adjustment did not abuse its discretion in denying Sutey Oil's application for

a special use permit?

 16 On appeal, Sutey Oil argues the District Court erred in upholding the

Board of Adjustment's decision on several grounds. Sutey Oil first argues that,

pursuant to Chapter XII of the Anaconda-Deer Lodge County Development

Permit System, its proposed gaming facility was a permitted use, and it was

thus not required to obtain a special use permit. Even assuming it were

required to secure a special use permit, however, Sutey Oil argues the District

Court erred in affirming the Board of Adjustment's decision in the absence of

any evidence that the proposed expansion would materially or adversely

impact any of the zoning regulation criteria set forth in 76-2-304, MCA, and

recognized by this Court in Lowe v. City of Missoula (1974), 165 Mont. 38,

41, 515 P.2d 551, 552-53. Finally, Sutey Oil argues Anaconda-Deer Lodge

County was equitably estopped from denying Sutey Oil's application in light

of permit official Hurley's initial opinion that Sutey Oil "would not be required

to file for and obtain a special use permit for the establishment of gambling

machines." Based on the foregoing, Sutey Oil argues the District Court erred

in affirming the Board of Adjustment's denial of its application for a special

use permit. 

 A. Necessity of special use permit

 17 As noted, Sutey Oil first argues the provisions of the Anaconda-Deer

Lodge County Development Permit System did not require that it obtain a

special use permit in this case. Sutey Oil points specifically to Chapter XII of

the County's Development Permit System which governs development in the

Highway Commercial Development District in which Sutey Oil's Thriftway

Super Store is located. Sutey Oil argues that the expansion it proposed

constituted a permitted use pursuant to the provisions of Chapter XII, and

asserts it was thus not required to obtain a special use permit. Because it did

not need a special use permit, Sutey Oil argues, that the Planning Board

subsequently denied its application "should have no legal effect upon Mr.

Sutey's right to operate a gaming room and acquire an on-premise beer and

wine license at his present commercial location." 

 18 In response, respondents note that Sutey Oil did not appeal the

Development Permit System administrator's decision to require a special use

permit in this case, but instead "agreed to follow the process and submitted an

application for a special use permit." Respondents assert that, because Sutey

Oil did not appeal from the Development Permit System administrator's

decision requiring that it obtain a special use permit, Sutey Oil failed to

exhaust its administrative remedies on this issue.

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 19 Neither the District Court's initial order remanding this case to the

Planning Board, nor its final decision affirming the Board of Adjustment's

decision contain a discussion regarding the propriety of the Development

Permit System administrator's decision requiring that Sutey Oil obtain a

special use permit to proceed with its proposed expansion. Moreover,

nowhere does Sutey Oil dispute the respondents' assertion that it failed to

exhaust its administrative remedies and is thus precluded from objecting on

appeal to the requirement that it secure a special use permit. In light of the

foregoing, we decline to address Sutey Oil's argument that it should not have

been required to secure a special use permit under the circumstances of this

case. 

 B. Review of Planning Board and Board of Adjustment decisions

 20 Sutey Oil next argues the District Court erred in affirming the Board of

Adjustment's decision denying its application for a special use permit because

there existed no evidence that the proposed expansion would materially or

adversely impact any of the statutory zoning regulation criteria set forth in 

76-2-304, MCA, and recognized by this Court in Lowe, 165 Mont. at 41, 515

P.2d at 552-53. 

 21 Sutey Oil argues it was incumbent upon the Planning Board, in making

its decision regarding Sutey Oil's application for a special use permit, to

consider and comply with the following statutory provisions: 

 76-2-304. Purposes of zoning. (1) Such regulations shall be

 made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed to

 lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic,

 and other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to

 provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of

 land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate

 the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage,

 schools, parks, and other public requirements.

 (2) Such regulation shall be made with reasonable

 consideration, among other things, to the character of the district

 and its peculiar suitability for particular uses and with a view to

 conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most

 appropriate use of land throughout such municipality.

 22 Relying on our decision in Lowe, Sutey Oil argues the Planning Board

was compelled to consider and comply with the criteria set forth in 76-2-304, MCA, 

in making its decision regarding Sutey Oil's application for a

special use permit. In Lowe, we concluded the district court had abused its

discretion in upholding a decision by the Missoula City Council to adopt a

rezoning ordinance. Lowe, 165 Mont. at 41, 525 P.2d at 553. In so

concluding, we considered the twelve criteria set forth in 76-2-304, MCA,

and held the factual information upon which the Missoula City Council had

relied in adopting the rezoning ordinance at issue was so lacking, that its

action, as well as that of the district court, constituted an abuse of discretion. 

Lowe, 165 Mont. at 41, 525 P.2d at 553. 

 23 In the present case, Sutey Oil argues the Planning Board's decision to

deny Sutey Oil's application for a special use permit on the grounds that the

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proposed use "would be incompatible to neighboring land which is designated

single family residential land use," does not take into account the statutory

criteria set forth in 76-2-304, MCA. Sutey Oil asserts "[t]here has been

absolutely no evidence that the operation of on-premises gambling of the type

that was to be used in this convenience store would materially or adversely

impact any of those mandatory criteria outlined in 76-2-304, MCA." In light

of the foregoing, Sutey Oil suggests, the Planning Board abused its discretion

in denying Sutey Oil's application for a special use permit and the District

Court erred in affirming the Board's decision. 

 24 Upon remand, the Planning Board explained that it was denying Sutey

Oil's application because the proposed expansion "would be incompatible to

neighboring land which is designated single family residential land use." 

Moreover, the Planning Board noted that "[t]he Public Hearing, held on April

20, 1995, clearly indicated that the adjoining neighborhood did believe that the

beer/wine license would have a detrimental impact on the neighborhood

designated for single family residential."

 25 As discussed above, we review the District Court's order upholding the

Board of Adjustment's decision for an abuse of discretion. Lambros, 153

Mont. at 26, 452 P.2d at 401. In its order affirming the Board of Adjustment's

decision, the District Court rejected Sutey Oil's argument that it was necessary

for the Planning Board to specifically evaluate each of the twelve criteria set

forth in 76-2-304, MCA, before making a decision with respect to Sutey

Oil's application. Instead, the court noted that the Planning Board had acted

in accordance with the terms of its authority pursuant to the Anaconda-Deer

Lodge County Development Permit System, which provides in pertinent part

that:

 The purpose of the special use permit procedure is to implement

 the plan by requiring intensive public review of any

 development that may have a significant impact on the

 landscape setting, neighboring land uses, or public facilities and

 services, and requiring that such developments comply with

 performance standards designed to assure their compatibility

 with the landscape setting, neighboring land uses, and the

 capacity of public facilities and services.

 26 By its terms, the County's Development Permit System required that the

Planning Board ensure that proposed developments "comply with performance

standards designed to assure their compatibility with . . . neighboring land

uses." In denying Sutey Oil's application on the grounds of incompatibility

with neighboring land use, the Planning Board was thus acting within its

authority pursuant to the express terms of the County's Development Permit

System. 

 27 In its order upholding the Board of Adjustment's decision, the District

Court improperly identified its scope of review as that traditionally available

upon a writ of certiorari, and thus primarily discussed the question of whether

the Planning Board had acted legally and within its jurisdiction in denying

Sutey Oil's application for a special use permit. Although the court set forth

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the incorrect standard of review, it nevertheless concluded that the Planning

Board "had sufficient information upon which to base its denial of Petitioner's

Special Use Permit." That the court so concluded indicates it additionally

reviewed the Planning Board's decision for an abuse of discretion. 

 28 Although the District Court did not discuss the basis for its

determination that the Planning Board had sufficient information upon which

to base its decision, review of the record indicates the court did not abuse its

discretion in so concluding. More specifically, the minutes from the Planning

Board's April 20, 1995, public meeting chronicle testimony from a number of

citizens concerned about the impact of the proposed expansion. For example,

citizens voiced concerns regarding property values, increased traffic, parking

problems, and raising their children in the vicinity of an establishment licensed

to serve alcoholic beverages. Having reviewed the record, we conclude the

District Court did not err in holding the Planning Board had sufficient

evidence before it upon which it could base its decision denying Sutey Oil's

application for a special use permit. Accordingly, we hold the District Court

did not abuse its discretion in upholding the Board of Adjustment's decision.

 C. Equitable estoppel

 29 Sutey Oil points to the District Court's November 25, 1996, order and

argues the court erred in concluding Anaconda-Deer Lodge County was not

equitably estopped from denying Sutey Oil's request for gaming machines in

light of permit official Hurley's initial opinion that Sutey Oil "would not be

required to file for and obtain a special use permit for the establishment of

gambling machines."

 30 Respondents, in contrast, argue that the District Court's review upon a

writ of certiorari "cannot be extended further than to determine whether the

inferior tribunal, board, or officer has regularly pursued the authority of such

tribunal, board, or officer." Section 27-25-303, MCA. Respondents thus

assert that "equitable estoppel is not an available remedy" in light of the

limited scope of review available pursuant to a writ of certiorari. 

 31 Having already recognized that the scope of review available upon an

appeal from a decision by the Board of Adjustment is broader than that

generally available upon a writ of certiorari, we will turn to the merits of Sutey

Oil's argument. 

 32 In its November 25, 1996, order, the District Court held that, were it "to

consider equitable estoppel, it would find in favor of Respondent." More

specifically, the court determined that Sutey Oil had failed to demonstrate

"conduct, acts, language, or silence amounting to a representation or a

concealment of material facts," and had thus failed to demonstrate the first

element of equitable estoppel. 

 33 In Dagel v. City of Great Falls (1991), 250 Mont. 224, 234, 819 P.2d

186, 192, we indeed recognized that one of the six essential elements of

equitable estoppel is that "there must be conduct, acts, language, or silence

amounting to a representation or a concealment of material facts." In the

present case, although Hurley initially advised Sutey Oil that it "would not be

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required to file for and obtain a special use permit for the establishment of

gambling machines," he also instructed Sutey Oil to adhere to "all county and

state requirements . . . before the commencement of any type of construction." 

Moreover, as the District Court noted, "there is nothing in the record about

beer or wine on-premises consumption until March of 1995." Based on the

foregoing, we hold, as did the District Court, that "[t]he record does not reveal

any conduct, act, language, or silence on the part of Anaconda-Deer Lodge

County which would lend itself to estoppel."

 34 Affirmed. 

 /S/ JIM REGNIER 

We Concur:

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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