GAO-07-30R Iraq Reconstruction 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

December 15, 2006 

Congressional Committees 

Subject: Rebuilding Iraq—Status of DOD’s Reconstruction Program

Of the $18.4 billion that Congress appropriated for Iraq relief and reconstruction in fiscal 

year 2004, the Department of Defense (DOD) received the largest share— $13.5 billion.1

 As 

of September 30, 2006, DOD had obligated2

 about $13.1 billion and disbursed about $9.7 

billion—$5.6 billion for construction, $3.6 billion for nonconstruction (e.g., engineering, 

procurement, and the delivery of equipment), and about $480 million for related overhead 

costs. Among the many contracts DOD uses in Iraq, DOD has obligated about $3.7 billion for 

12 large-scale, multiple-year design-build contracts for major construction projects. The 

design-build contracting approach makes one award for both the design and construction of 

a project, thus eliminating the need for a separate bidding process for the construction 

phase. 

To help Congress monitor the current progress and costs of DOD’s reconstruction activities 

in Iraq, this report discusses (1) the status of the current construction work and targeted 

completion dates and (2) the support costs incurred by the design-build contractors in 

DOD’s construction program. 

To identify the status of DOD’s current construction work, we summarized DOD’s work-inplace metrics provided by the Army Corps of Engineers’ Gulf Region Division/Project and 

Contracting Office (GRD/PCO) in Iraq.3

 DOD uses this metric to compare the value of 

completed and planned work for its contractors, including the design-build contractors. 

This metric is a rudimentary measure of earned value, a measure of total value against 

individual contract amounts, including design and procurements made. The work does not 

necessarily have to be “in place” or constructed.4

 To identify the support costs5 incurred by 

DOD’s design-build contractors in Iraq, we analyzed the financial data provided by the Joint 

Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) for each design-build contractor. (See 

app. 1 for details on our scope and methodology.) As part of our work, we interviewed U.S. 

government personnel in the United States and Iraq and traveled to Iraq in November 2005 

and March 2006 to meet with U.S. government officials overseeing DOD construction 

activities. We conducted our review from November 2005 to December 2006 in accordance 

 

1

These funds were appropriated to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund in the Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, P. L. 108-106. 2

An obligation is a definite commitment that creates a legal liability of the government for the payment of 

goods and services ordered or received. 

3

DOD merged GRD and PCO in late 2005. 

4

For the purposes of this report, DOD’s planned work is defined as the total construction value of its projects 

and generally includes design, construction, award fee, security, life support, and administrative costs. 5

Support costs include transportation and mobilization, life support, management, administration, and security. 
Page 2 GAO-07-30R Iraq Reconstruction 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. We prepared this report under the 

Comptroller General’s authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative for Congress. 

Results in Brief 

While financial data show that DOD has obligated most (97 percent) of its $13.5 billion in 

fiscal year 2004 reconstruction funds, work-in-place data show that about 29 percent, or $2.3 

billion, of DOD’s construction program is incomplete, as of October 8, 2006. Continued 

congressional oversight of these activities will be needed since DOD estimates that this 

work will not be completed until mid- to late 2008. The incomplete work varies by sector, 

with 10 percent of planned construction remaining in the security and justice sector and 38 

percent remaining in the communications and transportation sector. Activities in the public 

works and water sector; the buildings, education, and health sector; and the transportation 

and communications sector will not be completed until mid- to late 2008. Although the 

United States has generally not met its goals for reconstruction activities in Iraq, DOD 

projects that its remaining construction projects will enable Iraq to increase its production 

of oil, electricity, and clean water and treated sewerage. As GAO’s past work has shown, the 

challenging security environment, persistent attacks on U.S.-funded infrastructure projects, 

and sustainment challenges could make it difficult for DOD to achieve this progress.6

DOD’s design-build contractors will incur estimated support costs of about $1.2 billion or 

about 33 percent of projected completion costs of $3.7 billion. The support costs include 

estimated security costs of about $359.6 million. In response to higher-than-anticipated 

support costs, DOD officials have pursued alternative contracting strategies. For example, 

DOD officials have contracted directly with Iraqi firms in the electricity and transportation 

sectors rather than relying exclusively on U.S. design-build contractors to complete the 

work. U.S. officials state that the transition to direct contracting with local Iraqi and 

international contractors could lead to cost reductions. Due to the lack of available 

information on the costs of direct contracts, we were not able to establish the extent to 

which support costs could be avoided at the time of our review. The direct contracting 

approach also has the potential of increasing Iraqi ownership of reconstruction efforts and 

employing more local Iraqis. 

The Department of Defense provided technical comments on our draft report that we 

incorporated, where appropriate. In its comments, Defense stated that it appreciated the 

balanced report that GAO has developed. Defense also clarified that the work-in-place 

measure used in our report is a rudimentary measure of earned value and measures total 

value against individual contract amounts, including design and procurements made. The 

measure does not only apply to work that is “in place” or constructed. 

Background 

From May 2003 through June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by the 

United States and the United Kingdom, was the United Nations-recognized authority 

responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq and for overseeing, directing, and 

coordinating the reconstruction effort. The CPA used a multitiered contracting approach for 

Iraq reconstruction activities. The CPA, through various military organizations, awarded 1 

lead contract, 6 sector contracts, and 12 design-build contracts in early 2004 (see fig. 1). 

 

6

GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation, GAO-06-1094T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 11, 

2006); and Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges, GAO-06-697T

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2006). 
Under this approach, the CPA used one lead contract to provide overall coordination and 

direction for the rebuilding program. Six sector contractors helped define sector priorities 

and project requirements, and assisted DOD in managing the 12 design-build contractors 

used to perform the on-the-ground construction work. 

Figure 1: DOD Construction Program Carried Out through a Multitiered 

Contracting Approach 

 

On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred power to an interim sovereign Iraqi government, the 

CPA was dissolved, and Iraq’s transitional period began. After the transfer, National 

Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD 36) passed responsibility for the supervision and 

general direction of U.S. reconstruction assistance in Iraq to the Secretary of State. The 

directive also established a temporary organization within the department called the Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office to facilitate the transition in Iraq. The Project and 

Contracting Office (PCO), a temporary organization in the Department of Defense, was 

tasked under NSPD 36 with providing acquisition and project management support. In late 

2005, DOD merged PCO with the Army Corps of Engineer’s Gulf Region Division, which now 

supervises DOD reconstruction activities in Iraq. 

DOD Has Made Some Progress, but Significant Reconstruction Work Remains 

Although DOD has made some progress in restoring Iraq’s essential services, it has not met 

program goals and estimates that it will not complete the remainder of its work until mid- to 

late 2008. While financial data show that DOD has obligated 97 percent of its $13.5 billion 

fiscal year 2004 reconstruction funds, work-in-place data show that about 29 percent, or $2.3 

billion, of DOD’s planned construction activities valued at $8 billion are incomplete, as of 

October 8, 2006. This metric applies to DOD’s Iraq construction activities using these funds 

Page 3 GAO-07-30R Iraq Reconstruction
Page 4 GAO-07-30R Iraq Reconstruction 

and is not exclusive to design-build contractors. Work-in-place data are a measure of 

progress and compare completed to planned construction work. According to DOD, the 

remaining work will enable Iraq to increase the production of oil, electricity, clean water, 

and treated sewerage, among other outcomes. However, the challenging security 

environment, persistent attacks on U.S.-funded infrastructure projects, and sustainment 

challenges could make it difficult for DOD to achieve this progress. 

Of the $18.4 billion that Congress appropriated for Iraq relief and reconstruction in fiscal 

year 2004, DOD received the largest share—$13.5 billion. As of September 30, 2006, DOD 

had obligated $13.1 billion—97 percent. DOD obligated $8.2 billion of these funds on 

construction activities, including those of the design-build contractors; $4.4 billion on 

nonconstruction items (e.g., engineering, procurement, and delivery of equipment); and 

about $520 million in DOD-related overhead costs. 

One way DOD measures progress is to use work-in-place data for its construction 

contractors, including the design-build contractors. These data are reported by the 

GRD/PCO to the Secretary of the Army every two weeks. Work-in-place measures indicate 

that about 71 percent of all of DOD’s planned work has been completed as of October 8, 

2006, including 90 percent in the security and justice sectors, 73 percent of the work in the 

oil sector, and 64 percent of the work in the electricity sector (see table 1). 

Table 1: Comparison of Planned and Completed Work by Sector Using All DOD 

Acquisition Strategies, as of October 8, 2006 

Dollars in billions 

Sector Planned work 

Estimated

 work-in-place

 (completed work)

 Completed 

work relative to

 planned work (percent)

Security and justice $1.46 $1.31 90

Electricity 3.00 1.92 64

Oil infrastructure 1.30 0.95 73

Public works and water 1.36 0.93 69

Buildings, education, and 

health 

 0.50 0.36 72

Transportation and 

communications 

 0.42 0.26 62

Total $8.04 $5.73 71

Source: GRD/PCO. 

 

Note: This measure includes DOD construction activities using Iraq relief and reconstruction funds in these sectors and is 

not exclusive to design-build contractor activities. 

 

DOD reports that it has increased electricity generation, oil production, and water treatment 

capacity, and built or renovated schools, hospitals, border forts, post offices, and railway 

stations. Table 2 shows by sector the planned completion dates and selected reconstruction 

goals for all DOD reconstruction activity, including the design-build and all other contracts. 
Page 5 GAO-07-30R Iraq Reconstruction

Table 2: DOD Reconstruction Goals, Achievements, and Remaining Work, Funded 

by Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds, as of October 2006 

Sector DOD goals 

(estimated 

completion date) Program product 

Program 

target 

Current 

achieved Remaining 

Border posts 252 245 7 

Points of entry 13 9 4 

Military facilities 204 120 84 

Police facilities 398 348 50 

Fire facilities 94 86 8 

Prisons/courts 46 29 17 

Security and 

justicea 

(Dec. 2007) 

Miscellaneous facilities 58 33 25 

Contributed peak generation capacity (megawatts) 1,879 1,420 459 

Hours of power per day (U.S. goal) 10-12 Iraq 

and Baghdad 

10.8 Iraq and 

5.1 Baghdad 

N/A 

Transmission capacity (megawatts) 6,000 5,500 500 

Electricity 

(Dec. 2007) 

Distribution substations 89 48 41 

Crude oil capacity (million barrels per day) 3 2.5 0.5 

Natural gas production 

(million standard cubic feet per day) 

800 600 200 

Oil 

(Apr. 2007) 

Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) production capacity 

(tons per day) 

3,000 1,200 1,800 

Potable water (delivery capacity added) 

(thousand cubic meters per day) 

1,150 419 731 

Sewerage treatment capacity added (thousand 

cubic meters per day) 

48 0 48 

Repair dams, barrages, and canals (number 

repaired) 

2 1 1 

Public works and 

water 

(July 2008) 

Irrigated land (hectares) 387k 31k 356k 

Government building projects 6 5 1 

Hospital projects/public health centers/other 

significant health projects 

25/142/2 14/7/0 11/135/2 

Buildings, 

education, and 

health 

(July 2008) 

Schools built or renovated 810 806 4 

Railway station renovations 99 85 14 

Port projects/aviation projects 7/19 4/13 3/6 

Village roads and expressways (kilometers) 427 239 188 

Advanced first responder network projectsb3 3 0 

Transportation and 

communications 

(Dec. 2008) 

Post offices/major communications institutions 34/2 31/1 3/1 

Source: GRD/PCO. 

 aSecurity and justice sector targets and achievements include projects completed by the Multi-National 

Security Transition Command—Iraq. 

b

For the purposes of analyzing work-in-place numbers, the Advanced First Responder Network was included in 

the communications sector. The network is also sometimes considered to be a part of the security and justice 

sector. 
Page 6 GAO-07-30R Iraq Reconstruction 

 

DOD estimates, however, that the remaining 29 percent of the planned work will not be 

completed until mid- to late 2008. According to DOD, this remaining work will enable Iraq 

to increase the production of oil, electricity, clean water, and treated sewerage by 

• adding 459 megawatts of peak generation capacity, 500 megawatts of transmission 

capacity, and building 41 distribution substations in the electricity sector;7

• increasing crude oil production capacity by 0.5 million barrels per day and increasing 

petroleum gas production by 1,800 tons per day; and 

• adding an additional 731,000 cubic meters of potable water delivery capacity per day, and 

48,000 cubic meters of sewage treatment capacity per day, and 356,000 hectares of 

irrigated land. 

However, the metrics used to report progress make it difficult to determine the impact of 

the U.S. reconstruction effort. For example, we reported previously that in the water 

resources and sanitation sector, little was known about how U.S. efforts were improving the 

amount and quality of water reaching Iraqi households or their access to the sanitation 

services.8

 Reported output measures overestimated the amount of potable water reaching 

Iraqi households because U.S. officials estimate that 60 percent of water treatment output is 

lost due to leakage, contamination, and illegal connections. 

The U.S. mission in Iraq reported in December 2005 that it had developed a set of metrics to 

better estimate the potential impact that U.S. water and sanitation reconstruction efforts 

were having on Iraqi households. However, it acknowledges that it is difficult to measure 

how much water the Iraqis actually receive or whether the water is potable. The mission 

report notes that, without such comprehensive data, mission efforts to accurately assess the 

impact of U.S. reconstruction efforts on water and sanitation services are limited. 

In addition, overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated since June 2003, as 

evidenced by attack trends, growing sectarian violence, and the growth and influence of 

militias. Enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition, its Iraqi partners, and infrastructure 

have continued to increase over time, complicating efforts to rebuild and restore essential 

services. Overall, attacks increased by 23 percent from 2004 to 2005. After declining in the 

fall of 2005, the number of attacks rose to the highest level ever in July 2006 (see fig. 2).9

7

In providing technical comments on the report, DOD stated that over 1,000 megawatts will be sustained by 

various projects in its generation program. 

8

GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures for Assessing Impact 

and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities, GAO-05-872 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005). 9

GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation, GAO-06-1094T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 11, 

2006). The attack data we used provide the best overall assessment of Iraq’s precarious security environment 

and the ensuing challenges in completing reconstruction projects. GAO has requested, but has yet to receive, 

unclassified attack data for September through November 2006. 
Figure 2: Enemy-Initiated Attacks against the Coalition and Its Iraqi Partners, May 

2003 through August 2006 

In July 2006, the State Department reported to Congress that the recent upturn in violence 

had hindered efforts to engage fully with Iraqi partners and noted that a baseline of security 

was a prerequisite for moving forward on the political and economic tasks essential to 

achieving the conditions to withdraw U.S. forces. Unstable security conditions will make it 

more difficult for DOD to achieve its planned construction goals and targets. 

DOD’s Design-Build Contractors in Iraq Will Incur Support Costs of about 33 

Percent 

Our analysis shows that DOD’s design-build contractors will incur support costs of about 

$1.2 billion, or about 33 percent of projected completion costs of $3.7 billion. According to 

agency officials, the design-build contracting model used in Iraq entailed costs such as 

mobilizing, feeding, housing, and protecting an expatriate workforce. These officials 

further stated that these costs are typically incurred on most large-scale international 

construction projects but were higher due, in part, to the poor security environment and the 

difficulties in managing contract costs in Iraq. In response to higher-than-anticipated 

support costs, DOD officials have pursued alternative contracting strategies. For example, 

DOD officials have contracted directly with Iraqi firms in the electricity and transportation

sectors rather than relying exclusively on U.S. design-build contractors to complete the 

work. 

DOD’s design-build contractors will incur estimated support costs of about $1.2 billion, or

about 33 percent of the projected completion costs of $3.7 billion (see table 3).10 These costs 

ranged from approximately 24 percent in the public works and water sector to about 67 

percent in the transportation sector. In the transportation sector, the design-build 

 

Page 7 GAO-07-30R Iraq Reconstruction

10In addition to these design-build contractor support costs, the PCO, lead contractor, and sector contractors

incurred additional costs of $443 million for fiscal years 2004 through 2006 in managing the activities of the 

design-build contractors in Iraq. 
Page 8 GAO-07-30R Iraq Reconstruction 

contractor demobilized and left Iraq shortly after award of the contract in March 2004 

because DOD and the contractor mutually agreed that the overall program costs were too 

high. As a result, the majority of design-build costs for the transportation sector accrued by 

the U.S. were support costs accumulated during the contractor’s brief stay in-country. 

Table 3: Comparison of Design-Build Contractors’ Support Costs by Sector, as of 

October 2006 

Dollars in millions 

Sector 

Design-build

contractors’ 

estimated 

completion costs

Support costs, 

including

security costs

Support costs as a

percentage of

estimated 

completion costs

Security

costs only

Security costs as a

percentage of 

estimated 

completion costs

Security/justice $343.4 $ 97.8 28.5 $ 29.6 8.6

Electricity 732.1 259.9 35.5 105.4 14.4

Oil infrastructure 1,201.3 467.4 38.9 113.8 9.5

Water resources 852.8 207.8 24.4 59.2 6.9

Building, health, and 

education 

 369.2 124.6 33.7 27.6 7.5

Communications 158.1 46.6 29.5 20.6 13.0

Transportation 17.6 11.8 67.5 3.4 19.4

Total $3,674.5 $1,215.9 33.1 $359.6 9.8

Sources: JCC-I/A and design-build contractors. 

Note: Support costs generally include transportation and mobilization, life support, management, 

administration, and security. 

Officials in the electricity and oil sectors encountered challenges controlling support costs 

stemming from the level of contractors’ reconstruction efforts. In the electricity sector, high 

cost estimates by one design-build contractor resulted in the termination of five task orders 

and the resolicitation of that work. After the task orders were canceled, the design-builder 

was slow to reduce overhead costs in accordance with the reduced workload, according to 

agency officials and documents. In the oil sector, DOD officials required the two designbuild contractors to reorganize their management structure and improve their cost reporting 

as a result of concerns regarding high costs.11

 

DOD also estimates that, across all sectors, the design-build contractors will incur security 

costs of about $360 million, or about 9.8 percent of estimated completion costs of $3.7 

billion, during their reconstruction activities in Iraq. According to U.S. officials, the large 

number of project sites in remote locations and increased attacks on infrastructure have 

contributed to increased security costs. 

The security costs we identified are lower than those reported to Congress by the 

Department of State in January 2006. State reported in its January 2006 quarterly update to 

Congress that security remains a critical concern to the reconstruction effort in Iraq. State’s 

analysis indicated that direct and indirect security costs represent 16 percent to 22 percent 

of the overall cost of major infrastructure construction projects in Iraq. According to the 

report, these costs included the reprogramming of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

money to the security sector and to cover those costs stemming from schedule delays and 

 

11To increase transparency over support costs, the oil sector developed four administrative task orders that 

allowed the design-build contractors to more easily report on transportation and mobilization, management 

and administration, security, and life support costs. 
Page 9 GAO-07-30R Iraq Reconstruction

increased maintenance costs. The estimated security costs we identified are unique to the 

design-build contractors and do not include other broader security costs included in State’s 

analysis. 

In response to higher than anticipated support costs, DOD officials have contracted directly 

with Iraqi firms in the electricity and transportation, among other sectors, rather than 

relying exclusively on the design-build contractors to complete the work. For example, in 

the electricity sector, DOD directly contracted with Iraqi firms to reduce the costs of 

reconstruction efforts not requiring advanced technical and management expertise, such as 

erecting electrical distribution projects. DOD officials estimate that the department may 

achieve a cost savings of 20 percent to 50 percent in the electricity sector using direct 

contracting rather than design-build contractors. In the transportation sector, the designbuild contractor demobilized and left Iraq shortly after award of the contract in March 2004 

because DOD and the contractor mutually agreed that the overall program costs were too 

high. DOD then made greater use of Iraqi contractors who were experienced in building 

roads and bridges. However, due to the lack of available data on direct contracts awarded 

by DOD, we were unable to determine the level of actual cost avoidance achieved through 

these contracting efforts. 

Agency Comments 

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense, which provided technical 

comments that we incorporated, where appropriate. Defense stated that it appreciated the 

balanced report that GAO has developed. In its technical comments, the department also 

clarified that the work-in-place measure used in our report is a rudimentary measure of 

earned value and measures total value against individual contract amounts, including design 

and procurements made. The measure does not only apply to work that is “in place” or 

constructed as we stated in our draft report. 

Scope and Methodology 

To determine the construction work completed to date and targeted completion dates for 

construction activities in Iraq, we reviewed documents and obtained data from the 

Department of Defense (DOD), including the Project and Contracting Office of the Gulf 

Region Division (GRD/PCO). Data for U.S. appropriated funds and work-in-place are as of 

September 30, 2006, and October 8, 2006, respectively. We also reviewed Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction and other audit agency reports. Although we have not 

audited the funding and work-in-place data and are not expressing our opinion on them, we 

discussed the sources and limitations of the data with the appropriate officials and checked 

them, when possible, against other information sources. In March 2006, DOD standardized 

the use of its work-in-place measures to serve as an indicator of construction progress 

across all of Iraq’s reconstruction sectors. We determined that the data were sufficiently 

reliable for broad comparisons in the aggregate using the category descriptions we have 

made. 

To determine the support costs incurred by the design-build contractors in DOD’s 

construction program, we focused on design-build contractors’ efforts in the Iraqi security 

and justice; electricity; oil; water; transportation and communications; and buildings, health 

and education sectors. These costs include transportation and mobilization, life support, 

management, administration, and security costs. We compared the design-build contractor’s 

projected support costs to their estimated completion costs of $3.7 billion to estimate the 

level of support costs that will be incurred by DOD’s design-build contractors in Iraq. We 
also used the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) data to compare the 

security costs (one component of support costs) to estimated completion costs to estimate 

the level of security costs that will be incurred by the design-build contractors. Specifically, 

we focused on the costs incurred by design-build contractors participating in the 

construction program and how sectors have adapted to meet these support costs. We 

obtained support costs information directly from the design-build contractors to ensure 

greater reliability of the support costs. We collected design-build cost data from the JCC-I/A, 

including summaries of support costs by sector. These data were based on design-build 

contractor cost reporting to JCC-I/A and GRD/PCO officials. Although we did not audit the 

cost data and are not expressing our opinion on them, we reviewed the data for 

discrepancies and checked them against other sources, when available. We determined that 

the data were sufficiently reliable to report in aggregate for each sector. 

We also reviewed contractor and agency reports and interviewed contractors and agency

officials in Iraq and the United States. Specifically, we reviewed CPA, GRD/PCO, State, 

Army Corps of Engineers, and other reports. We also interviewed agency officials from 

GRD/PCO, Army Corps of Engineers, State, and State’s Iraq Reconstruction Management 

Office in Washington, D.C., and Iraq. In addition, our analysis is based on our completed 

and ongoing reviews of efforts to rebuild Iraq, which we have undertaken since 2004, and 

reports of other inspector generals related to contract management, internal controls, and 

oversight of U.S. reconstruction activities. 

We conducted our review from November 2005 to December 2006 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. In addition to interviews with U.S. 

officials via teleconference and videoconference, we traveled to Iraq in November 2005 and 

early April 2006 to interview U.S. officials in Baghdad. In addition, when possible, we 

interviewed officials when these officials traveled to the United States. 

-------------------------------------- 

We are sending this report to interested congressional committees and to the Secretaries of 

State and Defense. We will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the 

report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 

512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations 

and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this 

report include Stephen M. Lord, Assistant Director; Lynn Cothern; Tim DiNapoli; Charles 

Groves; Micah McMillan; Mary Moutsos; and Adam Vodraska.

Joseph A. Christoff 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

Page 10 GAO-07-30R Iraq Reconstruction 
Page 11 GAO-07-30R Iraq Reconstruction

List of Congressional Committees 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar 

Chairman 

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Chairman 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Jerry Lewis 

Chairman 

The Honorable David R. Obey 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha, Jr. 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 
Page 12 GAO-07-30R Iraq Reconstruction 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde 

Chairman 

The Honorable Tom Lantos 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on International Relations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Chairman 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Christopher H. Shays 

Chairman 

The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

(320402) 
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