United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Strategic 

Forces, Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR 

SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION 

Security and Management 

Improvements Can Enhance 

Implementation of the 

NNSA Act 

Statement of Gene Aloise, Director 

Natural Resources and Environment 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 1:00 p.m. EST 

Wednesday, January 31, 2007 

 

GAO-07-428T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

January 31, 2007

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION 

Security and Management Improvements 

Can Enhance Implementation of the 

NNSA Act 

Highlights of GAO-07-428T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Strategic 

Forces, Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives

During the late 1990s, the 

Department of Energy (DOE) 

experienced difficulties with a lack 

of clear management authority and 

responsibility that contributed to 

security problems at the nation’s 

nuclear weapons laboratories and

management problems with major 

projects. In response, Congress 

created the National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA) as 

a separately organized agency

within DOE under Title 32 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2000—the NNSA 

Act. Since its creation, NNSA has 

continued to experience security

problems, such as unauthorized 

access to NNSA computer systems, 

and cost and schedule overruns on 

major projects, such as the 

National Ignition Facility. 

GAO was asked to review the 

extent to which NNSA has taken 

steps to (1) improve security at its 

laboratories and plants and (2) 

improve its management practices 

and revise its organizational 

structure. In January 2007, GAO 

issued a report—National Nuclear 

Security Administration: 

Additional Actions Needed to 

Improve Management of the

Nation’s Nuclear Programs, (GAO07-36)—that addressed these 

matters. 

To carry out its work, GAO

reviewed legislation; NNSA 

policies, plans and budgets; 

collected and analyzed security

performance ratings and 

interviewed current and former 

DOE and NNSA officials. 

While NNSA has better delineated lines of authority and improved 

communication through a reorganization and has made progress in 

establishing critical management systems, especially in the development of 

its Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation process, important 

weaknesses remain with respect to security; the Administration’s 

relationship with DOE; and project, program and financial management.

Although NNSA has begun to build an effective headquarters security 

organization, it still cannot demonstrate that all of its security program 

objectives are being met at all of its sites. Specifically, GAO identified 

weaknesses in physical security at several NNSA sites, including the Nevada 

Test Site, the Sandia National Laboratories, and the Y-12 National Security

Complex; and weaknesses in cyber security throughout NNSA. Four factors 

have contributed to these problems: (1) lack of consistent NNSA 

headquarters leadership and direction for security; (2) security personnel 

staffing shortages at NNSA site offices; (3) lack of adequate training 

resources and opportunities for site office security staff; and (4) incomplete 

security data to gauge the effectiveness of NNSA’s security program. 

While NNSA has focused considerable attention on reorganizing its internal 

operations, it and DOE have continued to struggle with agreeing on how 

NNSA should operate as a separately organized agency within the 

department. This lack of agreement has resulted in organizational conflicts 

that have inhibited effective operations. While there have been continuing 

calls for removing NNSA from DOE and establishing it as a separate agency,

GAO does not believe that such drastic change is necessary to provide 

effective oversight of the nuclear weapons complex. Rather, DOE and NNSA 

need to clearly define their working relationships and determine how 

conflicts will be resolved. 

Finally, GAO identified several other management weaknesses where 

additional NNSA actions could strengthen its ability to manage the nuclear

weapons complex. For example, among other things, NNSA has not (1) 

implemented a plan for improving its project management efforts; (2) 

identified all of its program managers and trained them to a certified level of 

competency; and (3) established an independent analysis unit to review 

program budget proposals and analyze budget alternatives. 

In its recent report, GAO made recommendations to the Secretary of Energy

and the Administrator of NNSA to (1) improve NNSA’s security oversight 

program; (2) clearly define NNSA’s status as a separately organized agency

within DOE; and (3) improve project and program management, and the 

Administration’s planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation process. 

NNSA generally agreed with the report and its recommendations. NNSA 

considered the agency a success but acknowledged there was considerable 

work yet to be accomplished. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-428T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the actions the 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)—a separately organized 

agency within the Department of Energy (DOE)—has taken to improve the

security and management of the nation’s nuclear programs. Specifically, 

my remarks are based on the report we are issuing today—National

Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve 

Management of the Nation’s Nuclear Programs, which was prepared at 

the request of this Subcommittee.1

During the late 1990s, DOE experienced management difficulties with its 

nuclear weapons programs that contributed to security problems at the 

nation’s nuclear weapons laboratories and significant cost overruns on 

major projects. According to a June 1999 report by the President’s Foreign 

Intelligence Advisory Board (the Board), DOE’s management of the 

nuclear weapons laboratories, while representing “science at its best,” also 

embodied “security at its worst” because of “organizational disarray, 

managerial neglect, and ...a culture of arrogance.” The Board urged the 

Congress to create a new organization that, whether established as an 

independent agency or a semi-autonomous entity within DOE, would have 

a clear mission, streamlined bureaucracy, and drastically simplified lines 

of authority and accountability. Responding to the Board’s 

recommendations, the Congress created the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA) under Title 32 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000—the NNSA Act.2

The NNSA Act established NNSA as a “separately organized agency” 

within DOE and made NNSA responsible for the management and security

of the nation’s nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval 

reactor programs. The NNSA Act established the position of DOE Under 

Secretary for Nuclear Security, who was also designated as the 

Administrator of NNSA. The Secretary of Energy and the Deputy Secretary 

of Energy were allowed to establish policy for NNSA and to give direction 

to NNSA through the Administrator; however, other DOE employees were 

prohibited from directing the activities of individual NNSA employees. 

Finally, the NNSA Act required that, among other things, NNSA develop a 

 1

GAO-07-36. 

2

Pub. L. No. 106-65, 113 Stat. 512, 953 (1999). 

Page 1 GAO-07-428T 
planning, programming, and budgeting process in order to ensure that the 

administration operated under sound financial management principles. 

Since its inception, however, NNSA has continued to experience both

security and management problems. For example, with respect to security, 

in 2003 we found that NNSA had not fully defined the roles and 

responsibilities of officials in its security program and that NNSA had 

shortfalls in security staff at the site offices that oversee its contractors. In 

addition, two NNSA studies commissioned in July 2003 found ongoing 

problems with NNSA’s security program, including weaknesses in its 

security culture, organization, and staffing and training. Finally, DOE’s 

Office of Inspector General found security problems with NNSA’s 

contractors, including improprieties in the testing of the officers who 

protect NNSA’s sites and weaknesses in NNSA’s cyber security program. 

With respect to the management of major projects, the National Ignition 

Facility and the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility—two 

major facilities needed to support NNSA’s nuclear weapons programs—

experienced major delays and cost overruns because of problems with 

project management and are still not complete. 

In this context, you asked us to evaluate the extent to which NNSA has 

taken steps to (1) improve security at its laboratories and plants and (2) 

improve its management practices and revise its organizational structure. 

To carry out our objectives, we reviewed the NNSA Act; and NNSA and 

DOE policies, plans and budgets; and interviewed current and former 

NNSA and DOE officials. We also used reports on NNSA’s security efforts 

prepared by GAO, the DOE Inspector General, and outside groups, such as 

a 2005 report on security commissioned by NNSA. Finally, we collected

and analyzed security performance ratings developed by DOE’s Office of 

Health, Safety and Security and NNSA site offices, from fiscal years 1996 

through 2005. We used these performance ratings because there was wide 

agreement among NNSA and DOE security officials that these ratings 

represented the best available information on the overall performance of 

NNSA’s safeguards and security program. We conducted the work for our 

report from March 2005 through January 2007 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards, which included an

assessment of data reliability and internal controls. 

In summary: 

Producing a well-organized and effective agency out of what was widely 

considered a dysfunctional enterprise has been a considerable challenge.

In some areas, NNSA can be viewed as a success. Most notably, through its 

Page 2 GAO-07-428T 
internal reorganization efforts, NNSA has addressed some past problems 

by better delineating lines of authority and improving communication and

has made important progress in establishing critical management systems, 

especially in the development of its Planning, Programming, Budgeting 

and Evaluation (PPBE) process. However, important problems remain 

with respect to security, the Administration’s relationship with DOE, and 

project, program and financial management. 

Regarding security, NNSA still cannot demonstrate that all of its security 

program objectives are being met at all of its sites. Specifically, we found 

weaknesses with physical security at several NNSA sites, including the 

Nevada Test Site, Sandia National Laboratories, and the Y-12 National 

Security Complex, and weaknesses throughout NNSA in the cyber security 

area. Four factors have contributed to problems with NNSA’s security 

program. Specifically, we found 

• a lack of consistent NNSA headquarters leadership and direction for 

security; 

• security personnel staffing shortages at the NNSA site offices that oversee 

NNSA’s contractors; 

• inadequate training resources and opportunities for site office security 

staff; and 

• incomplete security data to gauge the effectiveness of NNSA’s security 

program. 

With respect to NNSA’s relationship to DOE, we found that almost 7 years 

after its creation, NNSA and DOE still have not fully agreed on how NNSA 

should function within the department as a separately organized agency. 

This lack of agreement has resulted in organizational conflicts that have

inhibited effective operations. In our view, DOE and NNSA need to take a 

more active approach to clearly defining DOE and NNSA’s working 

relationships and determining how conflicts will be resolved. While there 

have been continuing calls for removing NNSA from DOE and establishing 

it as a separate agency, we do not believe that such drastic change is 

necessary to produce an organization that can provide effective oversight 

of the nation’s nuclear weapons complex. 

Finally, while NNSA has taken several actions to improve its management 

practices, including developing a PPBE process, we also identified several

areas where management weaknesses remain. Specifically, NNSA has not 

Page 3 GAO-07-428T 
developed a project management policy, implemented a plan for 

improving its project management efforts, and fully shared project 

management lessons learned between its sites. In addition, NNSA has not 

identified all of its program managers and trained them to a certified level 

of competency. Finally, NNSA has not established an independent analysis 

unit to (1) review program budget proposals, (2) confirm cost estimates, 

and (3) analyze budget alternatives. 

In order to improve the management of NNSA and its ability to oversee the 

nuclear weapons complex , in our report to you, we made a series of 

recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator, NNSA 

to (1) improve NNSA’s security oversight program; (2) clearly define 

NNSA’s status as a separately organized agency within DOE; and (3) 

improve project and program management, and the agency’s planning, 

programming, budgeting, and evaluation process. In its comments on our 

report, NNSA generally agreed with the report and its corresponding 

recommendations. NNSA noted that it considers the agency to be a 

success but acknowledged that there was considerable work yet to be 

accomplished. 

NNSA operates three national laboratories that design nuclear weapons—

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California; Los Alamos National 

Laboratory, New Mexico; and the Sandia National Laboratories, New 

Mexico and California; and four nuclear weapons production sites—the 

Pantex Plant, Texas; the Y-12 National Security Complex, Tennessee; the 

Kansas City Plant, Missouri; and parts of the Savannah River Site, South 

Carolina; as well as the Nevada Test Site. 

To implement its programs, NNSA received about $9.1 billion for fiscal 

year 2006, including almost $6.4 billion for its nuclear weapons activities,

about $1.6 billion for its defense nuclear nonproliferation programs, and 

about $782 million for the Naval Reactors program. NNSA’s appropriation 

also included about $766 million to provide security at its sites. NNSA 

requested over $9.3 billion for fiscal year 2007, including $6.4 billion for its 

nuclear weapons activities, $1.7 billion for its defense nuclear 

nonproliferation programs, and $795 million for the Naval Reactors 

program. According to NNSA’s Future Years Nuclear Security Program 

plan, between fiscal years 2007 and 2011, NNSA is proposing to spend 

almost $48.5 billion on its nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and 

naval reactors programs. 

Background 

Page 4 GAO-07-428T 
As noted earlier, for several years before NNSA was established, external 

studies found problems with the organization and operation of what is 

now NNSA’s principal organization—DOE’s Office of Defense Programs. 

These studies cited continuing problems in the areas of overall 

management, organization, priority setting, and maintenance of a viable

infrastructure and workforce. Most influential in the creation of NNSA was 

the study conducted by a Special Investigative Panel of the President’s 

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Prepared in response to a series of 

security problems, including public access to classified documents at the 

Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Board found that DOE was a 

dysfunctional bureaucracy incapable of reforming itself and that 

reorganization was clearly warranted to resolve security and

counterintelligence problems. As noted earlier, the Board urged the 

Congress to create a new organization that, whether established as an 

independent agency or a semi-autonomous entity within DOE, should have 

a clear mission, streamlined bureaucracy, and drastically simplified lines 

of authority and accountability. To correct the problems identified by the 

Board and others, in 1999, the Congress created the NNSA. 

For the last several years, we have monitored NNSA’s actions to 

implement the NNSA Act for this Subcommittee and the Special Oversight 

Panel on Department of Energy Reorganization, House Armed Services 

Committee. For example, in April 2001, we testified that NNSA’s efforts to 

establish a new organization looked promising. However, we highlighted 

the need for NNSA to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of 

headquarters and field staff and to establish clear lines of authority 

between NNSA and its contractors, among other things. In May 2001,

NNSA announced plans to reorganize its headquarters operations. In 

December 2001, however, we found that NNSA’s plans for the 

headquarters reorganization did not contain a clear definition of the roles 

and responsibilities of the headquarters organizational units.

In addition to reorganizing its headquarters, in February 2002, NNSA 

proposed reorganizing its entire operation to solve important, longstanding issues. In February 2002, we testified that, with the proposed new 

organizational structure, resolution of NNSA’s long-standing 

organizational issues appeared to be within its grasp. However, we noted 

that NNSA’s lack of a long-term strategic approach to ensuring a wellmanaged workforce precluded it from identifying its current and future 

human capital needs, including the size of the workforce; its deployment 

across the organization; and the knowledge, skills, and capabilities needed 

to fulfill its mission. In December 2002, the Administrator of NNSA 

implemented the proposed reorganization. 

Page 5 GAO-07-428T 
Our May 2003 report on the management of NNSA’s security program 

identified similar concerns about NNSA’s security organization and 

management. Specifically, we found that NNSA (1) had not fully defined 

clear roles and responsibilities for its headquarters and site security 

operations and (2) had shortfalls at its site offices in the total number of 

staff and in expertise, which could make it more difficult for the site 

offices to effectively oversee security activities. We therefore concluded 

that NNSA could not be assured that its contractors were working to 

maximum advantage to protect critical facilities and material from 

individuals seeking to inflict damage.

Finally, in June 2004, we found that NNSA’s reorganization had addressed 

some past problems by better delineating lines of authority and improving 

communication. However, we also found that NNSA’s reorganization had 

not ensured that the agency had sufficient staff with the right skills in the 

right places because it had downsized its federal workforce by about 17 

percent without first determining the critical skills and capabilities needed

to meet its mission and program goals. 

Although NNSA has begun to build an effective headquarters security 

organization, it still cannot demonstrate that all of its security program 

objectives are being met at all of its sites. Specifically, we found that the 

results of internal and independent security oversight assessments have 

identified weaknesses in physical security at several NNSA sites, including

the Nevada Test Site, the Sandia National Laboratories, and the Y-12 

National Security Complex; and weaknesses in cyber security throughout 

NNSA. The following factors have contributed to this situation: 

Additional Action 

Needed to Improve 

NNSA’s Security 

Program 

• Lack of consistent leadership and direction for its security activities. 

For several years, the NNSA headquarters security organization 

experienced turnover in the position of Chief of the Office of Defense 

Nuclear Security. Specifically, four individuals have occupied the position 

since NNSA’s creation, often in an acting capacity. In addition, these chiefs 

have reported to different levels within the organization. The current Chief 

is a permanent appointee, reporting directly to the NNSA administrator, 

and he has taken a number of steps to develop an effective headquarters 

security organization. 

• Security personnel staffing shortages at site offices. Having sufficient 

staff to oversee the security programs of its contractors continues to be a 

problem. For example, since NNSA became operational, key site offices, 

such as the Los Alamos Site Office, have experienced staffing shortfalls. 

Page 6 GAO-07-428T 
As a result, sites are limited in their ability to effectively oversee 

contractors’ security activities. 

• Lack of adequate training resources and opportunities for site office 

security staff. NNSA has not implemented a training program that 

provides NNSA federal security officials with the skills needed to 

effectively oversee contractor security programs. In addition, NNSA site 

offices often do not have all the resources needed to meet training needs. 

For example, according to site office officials, the Los Alamos Site Office 

did not receive training funds for fiscal year 2006 and the Nevada Site 

Office received a minimal training budget for its security staff.

• Lack of data to gauge program effectiveness. NNSA does not have 

complete data for tracking security deficiencies identified by security 

oversight reviews and, as a result, does not have information regarding the

overall effectiveness of its safeguards and security program. NNSA 

officials told us that while they believe security across the weapons 

complex has improved, NNSA does not have sufficient data to support this 

assertion. In addition, NNSA has not implemented a formal process for 

sharing best practices or lessons learned to guide security improvements. 

While best practices and lessons learned have been communicated 

informally, a formal process could help ensure that previously identified

security deficiencies, such as the retrieval of badges from terminated 

employees at one NNSA site, are reviewed and corrected as necessary at 

other NNSA field locations. 

While NNSA has focused considerable attention on reorganizing its 

internal operations, it and DOE have continued to struggle with 

establishing how NNSA should operate as a separately organized agency 

within the department. Several factors have contributed to this situation. 

First, DOE and NNSA did not have a useful model to follow for 

establishing a separately organized agency in DOE. The Board’s June 1999

report suggested several federal agencies, such as the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration in the Department of Commerce, which 

could be used as a model for NNSA. However, we found that none of the 

officials from these agencies considered their agency to be separately

organized or believed that their agency’s operational methods were 

transferable to NNSA. Second, DOE’s January 2000 implementation plan, 

which was required by the NNSA Act, did not define how NNSA would 

operate as a separately organized agency within DOE. Instead reflecting 

the opposition of the then DOE senior leadership to the creation of NNSA, 

the implementation plan “dual-hatted” virtually every significant statutory 

position in NNSA with DOE officials, including the Director of NNSA’s 

DOE and NNSA Have 

Not Yet Fully 

Determined How 

NNSA Should Operate 

as a Separately 

Organized Agency 

within DOE 

Page 7 GAO-07-428T 
Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence and General Counsel. As we 

testified in April 2001, this practice caused considerable concern about 

NNSA’s ability to function with the independence envisioned in the NNSA 

Act. Dual-hatting was subsequently forbidden by an amendment to the 

NNSA Act.3

As a result, although some NNSA programs have set up procedures for 

interacting with DOE, other programs have not, resulting in organizational 

conflict. For example, DOE made a commitment to issuing NNSA-specific 

acquisition procedures in its January 2000 implementation plan for NNSA, 

but it has not done so. According to DOE Office of General Counsel 

officials, the department subsequently determined that NNSA-specific 

procedures were inconsistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the 

NNSA Act, and the January 2000 implementation plan. According to both 

DOE and NNSA officials, since 2004 the department has blocked NNSA’s 

efforts to issue its own acquisition regulations. As a result, according to 

NNSA officials, NNSA has had to issue a series of deviations to the DOE 

acquisition regulations to carry out NNSA acquisition policies in areas 

such as negotiating a more effective contract fee arrangement and 

awarding additional years to a contract’s term. 

Even where formal procedures have been developed, interpersonal 

disagreements have hindered effective cooperation. Most notable in this 

regard has been the longstanding conflict between NNSA and DOE 

counterintelligence offices. Specifically, as our report documents, NNSA 

and DOE counterintelligence officials have disagreed over (1) the scope 

and direction of the counterintelligence program, (2) their ability to jointly 

direct staff in the headquarters counterintelligence program offices, (3) the 

allocation of counterintelligence resources, (4) counterintelligence 

policymaking and (5) their roles and responsibilities in handling specific 

counterintelligence matters—in particular with regard to the department’s 

handling of the well-publicized mid-2005 intrusion into an unclassified 

NNSA computer system and removal of the names and social security 

numbers of 1,502 individuals working for NNSA. Subsequently, the 

Congress amended the NNSA Act to consolidate the counterintelligence 

programs of DOE and NNSA under the Department of Energy. 

 3

Pub. L. 106-398, § 3157, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A-468 (2000) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 

§ 2410). 

Page 8 GAO-07-428T 
In this environment, concerns about NNSA’s organizational status have 

persisted. Most notably, a January 2006 report by the Defense Science 

Board called for the removal of NNSA from DOE and the creation of a 

new, independent National Nuclear Weapons Agency. However, former 

senior DOE and NNSA officials with whom we spoke generally did not 

favor removing NNSA from DOE. 

In addition to identifying the underlying issue of NNSA’s relationship to 

DOE, we identified the following four other management areas where 

additional NNSA actions could strengthen its ability to manage the nuclear 

weapons complex if it took further action. 

• Human capital. NNSA has made progress in developing a human capital 

strategy. However, DOE and NNSA have not conducted a systematic, 

detailed analysis of how many staff NNSA needs in relation to DOE. As a 

result, we identified areas where potential staff imbalances have affected

NNSA’s ability to operate separately from DOE. For example, NNSA’s 

Office of General Counsel has 35 attorneys, including the General Counsel, 

to provide NNSA legal analysis, while the rest of DOE has 277 attorneys. 

According to NNSA’s General Counsel, his office would need 15 to 20 

additional attorneys to fully handle NNSA’s legal workload with minimal 

assistance from DOE. Currently, NNSA relies on DOE’s Office of General

Counsel to perform a significant portion of its legal work. 

Several Management 

Issues Need to be 

Resolved for NNSA to 

Become Fully 

Effective 

• Project management. While both DOE and NNSA have initiated efforts to 

improve project management, NNSA reported in November 2006 that 

about 16 percent of NNSA projects were at risk of breaching their cost 

baseline, schedule baseline or both. We identified seven areas for 

improvement that would foster a stronger culture for effective project 

management. For example, DOE’s Project Assessment and Reporting 

System—a Web-based system for keeping DOE senior managers apprised 

of the performance of projects costing more than $5 million—does not 

include four major NNSA projects, estimated to cost over $100 million 

each. Consequently, these projects do not receive the senior management 

oversight that can be provided through that system. 

• Program management. NNSA program managers are responsible for 

completing a set of activities by employing a working knowledge of such 

diverse areas as contracting, budgeting, and engineering. Recognizing the 

important role of program managers, NNSA has taken several actions, 

such as developing a program management policy. However, NNSA has yet 

to identify all of its program managers or train them to a certified level of 

competency. Indeed, DOE’s most recent performance and accountability 

Page 9 GAO-07-428T 
report for fiscal year 2006 showed that NNSA fully met only about 52 

percent of its program goals while the rest of DOE achieved about a 79-

percent success rate. 

• Financial management. NNSA has made significant progress in 

implementing its PPBE process over the last 4 years, as mandated by the 

NNSA Act. However, several areas of improvement still have not been fully 

addressed. For example, NNSA has issued policy letters on PPBE, but 

some of these letters are still in draft form because, in part, NNSA is 

waiting to obtain DOE’s views on certain matters. In addition, NNSA’s 

PPBE mechanism for centralized resource allocation relies on collegial 

decision making among senior NNSA managers, with the Administrator 

resolving disputes and deciding on the final resource allocation. However, 

the Administrator does not have an independent group to review program 

proposals, confirm cost estimates, and analyze alternatives. According to a 

2003 DOE Inspector General report, most senior managers believe that 

such an analytical group would be of value. While NNSA has taken some 

action in this direction, it is not clear when such a group will be 

established.

As discussed earlier, while there have been continuing calls for removing 

NNSA from DOE and establishing it a separate agency, we do not believe 

that such drastic change is necessary to produce an organization that can 

provide effective oversight of the nation’s nuclear weapons complex. 

Rather, we believe NNSA can provide comprehensive oversight of the 

operation and security of the nation’s nuclear weapons programs by 

addressing a variety of lingering, often unrelated, but important 

management issues. These issues include providing sufficient, qualified 

staff to conduct program and operational oversight, especially in the 

security area, and developing and implementing improvements needed to 

support effective project, program, and financial management. 

Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be 

happy to respond to any questions that you or Members of the 

Subcommittee may have. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-

3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 

statement. James Noel, Assistant Director; Robert Baney; Preston Heard 

and Jonathan Ban made key contributions to this testimony. 

GAO Contacts and 

Staff 

Acknowledgements 

Page 10 GAO-07-428T 
Page 11 GAO-07-428T 

Related GAO Products 

Department of Energy: Views on DOE’s Plan to Establish the National 

Nuclear Security Administration, GAO/T-RCED-00-113 (Washington, 

D.C.: March 2, 2000). 

Department of Energy: Views on the Progress of the National Nuclear 

Security Administration in Implementing Title 32, GAO-01-602T

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2001). 

NNSA Management: Progress in the Implementation of Title 32, GAO-02-

93R (Washington, D.C.: Dec.12, 2001).

Department of Energy: NNSA Restructuring and Progress in

Implementing Title 32, GAO-02-451T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2002).

GAO, Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards 

and Security Program, GAO-03-471 (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003). 

National Nuclear Security Administration: Key Management Structure 

and Workforce Planning Issues Remain As NNSA Conducts Downsizing, 

GAO-04-545 (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2004). 

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Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

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