United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 16-2199

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Richard Lee English

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul

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 Submitted: November 18, 2016

 Filed: January 10, 2017

[Unpublished]

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Before BENTON and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges, and EBINGER, District 1

Judge.

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PER CURIAM.

The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for

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the Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.
Richard Lee English appeals his conviction following a jury trial of conspiracy

to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), and possession

of heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district

court sentenced English to 150 months imprisonment. On appeal, English asserts 2

that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and the district court erred

in denying his motion for acquittal. We affirm.

“We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction,

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and accepting all

reasonable inferencessupporting the verdict.” United States v. Colton, 742 F.3d 345,

348 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Cuevas-Arrendondo, 469

F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 2006)). “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to

support a conspiracy conviction, we will affirm if the record, viewed most favorably

to the government, containssubstantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, which

means evidence sufficient to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citing

United States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977, 987 (8th Cir. 2004)).

In order to convict English of conspiracy to distribute heroin, the government

was required to prove: (1) English and at least one other person reached an

agreement to distribute heroin; (2) English voluntarily and intentionally joined the

agreement; and (3) at the time he joined the agreement, English knew its essential

purpose. See United States v. Bowie, 618 F.3d 802, 812 (8th Cir. 2010). In order to

convict English of possession of heroin with intent to deliver the government was

required to prove “either actual or constructive possession and intent to distribute.” 

United States v. Lewis, 3 F.3d 252, 254 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (citing United

States v. Brett, 872 F.2d 1365, 1369 (8th Cir. 1989)).

The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the

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District of Minnesota.

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At trial the United States presented evidence that from 2012 to 2014 English

was one of the heads of a heroin distribution organization known as “the Crew” that

operated in north Minneapolis, Minnesota. The investigation began when officers

arrested a regular customer of the Crew in possession of a small amount of heroin. 

Officers used thisindividual to make controlled buys from members of the Crew, and

this informant provided information that enabled undercover officers to make buys

from Crew members. Officers learned that two telephone numbers were regularly

used by the Crew in receiving orders from prospective heroin purchasers. After

further investigation, which included interviews with Crew members, an indictment

was returned and filed on September 16, 2014, charging English and seven others

with conspiracy to distribute heroin. A warrant for English’s arrest was issued but

English was not immediately arrested.

It was determined that English traveled to Chicago every 10 to 14 days in order

to obtain a new supply of heroin and that English regularly used a home in Chicago. 

Using a court order permitting law enforcement to track the cell phones associated

with the telephone numbers previously obtained by law enforcement, officerstracked

both cell phones to the Chicago home on the weekend of September 27, 2014. By

tracking these cell phones, officers determined that a vehicle in which English was

a passenger was returning to Minneapolis on September 30, 2014. On that date, law

enforcement officers stopped the vehicle as it entered Minneapolis. English was

arrested on the outstanding warrant and $5,440 in cash was found in his pockets. 

Searches of the vehicle eventually uncovered marijuana hidden in the ceiling above

a visor and 196 grams of heroin wrapped in cellophane and stuffed in a sock

concealed in the back of the driver’s seat. Four cellular phones were found in the

vehicle, two of which were assigned the numbers used by the Crew in receiving

heroin orders.

All of English’s co-defendants entered guilty pleas pursuant to plea

agreements. A superceding indictment wasreturned adding the charge of possession

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of heroin with intent to distribute against English. At trial, government witnesses,

including three of English’s co-defendants, testified that they were participants in the

Crew’s criminal operations. They stated that English was a leader of the Crew who

co-ordinated the enterprise by giving instructions with respect to the Crew’s heroin

distribution network, making regular trips to Chicago to replenish the organization’s

supply of heroin, dividing the bulk quantities of heroin so obtained into smaller

amounts for distribution to the ultimate consumers, setting the price for the heroin

sales, and receiving money from the street sale of heroin.

On appeal English asserts that, although he was a passenger in a vehicle in

which drugs were hidden, neither his fingerprints nor his DNA was found on the

packaging of the heroin discovered in the vehicle; the vehicle was not licensed in his

name nor did he have exclusive control over the vehicle; he was never observed

selling heroin; the two cellular phones used to receive heroin orders which were

found in the vehicle were not listed in his name; he was not in possession of drug

paraphernalia; and he did not live a lifestyle typically associated with that of a drug

trafficker. Therefore, according to English, the government’s case rested solely on

the testimony of co-defendants who were the beneficiaries of plea agreements

providing themwith sentencing concessions, and heroin addicts who testified against

English in exchange for favorable charging or sentencing decisions. He argues that

these witnesses lack credibility and thus their testimony can not support the jury’s

verdict. 

In considering English’s contention we are cognizant of our obligation to

evaluate the evidence to ensure that there is sufficient evidence to prove all the

elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 313-20 (1979). And we have done so. After close examination of the

trialrecord, we conclude that the evidence wassufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

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In conducting an appellate review, “[t]his court does not weigh the evidence

or the credibility of the witnesses.” United States v. Wiest, 596 F.3d 906, 910 (8th

Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Honarvar, 477 F.3d 999, 1000 (8th Cir. 2007)). 

Further, “it is within the province of the jury to make credibility assessments and

resolve conflicting testimony.” United States v. Bower, 484 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8th

Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). And, although English points to a lack of evidence

corroborating the testimony ofthe government’s cooperating witnesses, a jury verdict

may be based solely on the testimony of cooperating witnesses. See United States v.

Smith, 632 F.3d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 2011) (“We have repeatedly upheld jury

verdicts based solely on the testimony of cooperating witnesses.”); United States v.

Thompson, 533 F.3d 964, 970 (8th Cir. 2008) (The “testimony of an accomplice is

sufficient to sustain a conspiracy conviction unlessit isincredible or insubstantial on

its face.” (citation and alterations omitted)); United States v. Whirlwind Soldier, 499

F.3d 862, 870 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[A] conspiracy conviction may be based on indirect

or circumstantial evidence, including solely testimony from co-conspirators.”). 

Accordingly, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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