Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2082 | May 18, 2023 Page 1 of 15

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Brian A. Karle

Ball Eggleston, PC

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General of Indiana

Daylon L. Welliver

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Adam B. Kenny,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 18, 2023

Court of Appeals Case No.

22A-CR-2082

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court

The Honorable Steven Meyer, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79D02-2110-F2-36

Opinion by Judge Riley.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Pyle concur.

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2082 | May 18, 2023 Page 2 of 15

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Adam Kenny (Kenny), appeals his convictions for 

dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 2 felony, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-

1.1(a)(2)(e)(1); unlawful possession of a syringe, a level 6 felony, I.C. § 16-42-

19-18(a); possession of paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-48-4-

8.3(b)(1); carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 

35-47-2-1; and three Counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a dangerous 

person, Class A misdemeanors, I.C. § 35-47-4-6.5.

[2] We affirm. 

ISSUE

[3] Kenny presents this court with one issue, which we restate as: Whether the trial 

court’s admission of evidence procured from the traffic stop of a taxi-van in 

which Kenny was a passenger was an abuse of discretion because the stop 

violated Kenny’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

FACTS AND PROCEDUAL HISTORY

[4] In October 2021, the Tippecanoe County Drug Task Force (Task Force) was 

investigating Kenny for dealing in methamphetamine and illegally carrying 

firearms. The Task Force had also received information that Heather Boruff 

(Boruff) was using her taxi-van to facilitate methamphetamine deals. On 

October 12, 2021, Task Force officers conducted surveillance of Kenny and

Boruff at the Days Inn hotel off Frontage Road in Lafayette, Indiana. Kenny 

was followed by officers when he left the Days Inn and drove to a Taco Bell on 
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Teal Road, where he parked his car in the restaurant’s parking lot. Shortly 

thereafter, Boruff was observed arriving at the Taco Bell in her taxi-van, 

whereupon Kenny got out of his own vehicle and got into Boruff’s vehicle, 

sitting behind her in the back passenger seat. Boruff drove out of the Taco Bell 

parking lot and was followed by Detective Zachary Hall (Detective Hall). 

Detective Hall observed Boruff drive fifty miles per hour in a thirty-five-mileper-hour zone, and Detective Hall observed Boruff fail to stop at an automated 

traffic signal. Detective Hall broadcast the fact that Boruff had committed two 

traffic infractions over the radio to other Task Force officers, including 

Detective Alix Sliger (Detective Sliger). 

[5] At 2:57 p.m., after learning that Boruff had committed two traffic infractions, 

Detective Sliger initiated a traffic stop of Boruff’s taxi-van at Manitou Drive 

and 18th Street. Detective Sliger had been informed by other officers that 

Kenny was “extremely violent[,]” was known to carry firearms, and had been 

physically combative with law enforcement in the past. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 

19). Detective Sliger had also been informed by other law enforcement officers 

that Kenny did not have a permit to carry concealed firearms. Detective Sliger

approached Boruff’s van from the passenger side and made contact with Boruff 

and Kenny. Detective Sliger observed that Boruff, who immediately lit a 

cigarette, appeared to be nervous, in that her voice trembled and her hands 

shook. Boruff orally identified herself, but Kenny refused to do so. Detective 

Sliger spoke with Boruff about where they were going and radioed back Boruff’s 

information from where he was standing. Detective Sliger chose to stay with 
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the taxi-van instead of returning to his squad car to conduct his investigation 

because of what he knew about Kenny and out of concern for his own safety. 

Detective Sliger saw that Kenny had two “massive bulges” in his front pants 

pockets, one on each side. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 21). While Detective Sliger was at 

the side of Boruff’s van, Kenny pulled his hands in and out of his pockets, 

placing his hands on the bulges. This also made Detective Sliger concerned for 

his safety, and he decided to remove Kenny from the van before proceeding 

with the traffic stop. In preparation for removing Kenny from the van, 

Detective Sliger called for backup, and officer James Jarrett (Officer Jarrett) 

responded at 3:00 p.m. while Detective Sliger was still talking to Boruff. At 

3:04 p.m., Officer Jarrett opened the van’s sliding door and asked Kenny to 

exit. Kenny begrudgingly complied but moved his hands towards his 

waistband and near the bulge in his right front pants pocket. Officer Jarrett and 

Detective Sliger each grabbed one of Kenny’s arms to place him in handcuffs. 

Kenny stiffened his body and briefly resisted the officers. Officer Jarrett asked 

Kenny if he had any weapons on his person, and Kenny stated that he had two 

firearms in his possession for which he had a permit. The officers performed a 

pat-down search and removed two firearms from Kenny’s front pants pockets. 

Kenny was then escorted to Officer Jarrett’s squad car. After Kenny was seated 

in the squad car, Detective Sliger ran Kenny’s information through dispatch 

and checked to determine if Kenny’s firearms had been reported as stolen. 

Detective Sliger then went back to Boruff’s taxi-van and had her exit the 

vehicle. Upon being removed from the van, at 3:09 p.m., Boruff admitted that 

she had “riggs”, which is a slang term for kits for using intravenous drugs, in 
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her van. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 25). At 3:10 p.m., a canine unit arrived, and at 3:11 

p.m., the canine officer alerted to the presence of narcotics in Boruff’s van. A 

black bag containing what was later determined to be 110.08 grams of 

methamphetamine was found under the third row of the van’s seats. The 

search of the van also turned up a set of scales, baggies with suspected 

methamphetamine residue, and suspected Alprazolam. The same canine unit 

deployed at Boruff’s van was then brought to Kenny’s car which had remained 

parked at the Taco Bell. The canine officer performed an open-air sniff on 

Kenny’s car and alerted to the presence of narcotics. A subsequent search of 

Kenny’s car netted an additional firearm, syringes, and a pipe used to smoke 

methamphetamine. 

[6] On October 19, 2021, the State filed an Information, charging Kenny with 

Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit dealing in methamphetamine; Level 2 

felony dealing in methamphetamine; Level 3 felony possession of 

methamphetamine; Level 6 felony possession of a controlled substance

(Alprazolam); Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe; Class C 

misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia; Class A misdemeanor carrying a 

handgun without a license; and three Counts of Class A misdemeanor unlawful 

possession of a firearm by a dangerous person.

[7] On June 23, 2022, Kenny filed a motion to suppress evidence garnered from the 

traffic stop, arguing that he had independent standing to challenge the search of 

the interior of the taxi-van and that the traffic stop had been impermissibly 

prolonged. On July 11, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Kenny’s 
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suppression motion. When asked about preparing traffic citations after 

initiating the traffic stop, Detective Sliger testified that when he initially spoke 

with Boruff and Kenny, he “was simply going through [his] investigation. [He] 

wasn’t up into that point yet.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 29). Detective Sliger could not 

recall if he had any conversations with other officers about issuing traffic 

citations after the stop but stated that, after he believed there was probable 

cause to search the taxi-van, the officers prioritized that task and that they 

would “get to the other stuff later on.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 34). No evidence was 

presented at the suppression hearing regarding the ownership of the taxi-van 

Boruff drove or that Kenny intended to pay Boruff for transporting him on the 

day of the traffic stop. On July 15, 2022, the trial court issued its Order, 

denying Kenny’s motion to suppress, ruling that Kenny, as a passenger, had no 

standing to challenge the search of Boruff’s taxi-van because, in light of the fact 

that there was no evidence that he had hired the taxi-van or paid Boruff, he was 

a “normal passenger in a moving vehicle[.]” (Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 94). 

The trial court further ruled that the traffic stop was valid, even if pretextual, 

Kenny’s detention and pat-down were valid, and the traffic stop was not 

unreasonably prolonged because, during the thirteen minutes between the 

initial stop and the dog sniff, the officers were dealing with “legitimate safety 

concerns presented by Kenny” and because Boruff had admitted that she had 

paraphernalia in the taxi-van. (Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 96). 

[8] On July 19, 2022, the trial court convened Kenny’s two-day jury trial, which 

was bifurcated so that the three misdemeanor charges of unlawful possession of 
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a firearm by a dangerous person were not initially submitted to the jury. The 

jury found Kenny not guilty of Level 6 felony possession of a controlled 

substance but guilty of all the remaining charges. Kenny waived his right to a 

jury trial on the remaining charges. After further evidence was heard, the trial 

court found Kenny guilty of three Counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by 

a dangerous person.

[9] On August 15, 2022, the trial court convened Kenny’s sentencing hearing. The 

trial court vacated Kenny’s convictions for conspiracy to deal in 

methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine. The trial court 

sentenced Kenny to an aggregate sentence of twenty years, with five years 

suspended to probation.

[10] Kenny now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION 

I. Standard of Review

[11] Kenny challenges the admission of evidence after his trial and conviction. 

Therefore, despite the fact that Kenny filed a motion to suppress, the issue is 

framed on appeal as whether the trial court erred in admitting the challenged 

evidence at trial. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013). We will 

review the trial court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of its discretion, which 

only occurs when its decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances. Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017). We do not

reweigh the evidence, considering any conflicting evidence in the light most 
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favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ind. 

2009). We will defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly 

erroneous. Id. However, when a challenge to the trial court’s ruling implicates 

the constitutionality of the search or seizure of evidence, it raises a question of 

law that we review de novo. Id. We may affirm the trial court on any basis 

supported by the record, even if it was not a basis relied upon by the trial court. 

Harris v. State, 19 N.E.3d 298, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. 

II. Standing

[12] Kenny argues that as “a passenger in a taxicab who expected to pay for the 

ride,” he had a protectable Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the taxi-van 

that provided him with “standing” to challenge the search of the interior of the 

vehicle.

1

 (Appellant’s Br. p. 12). The United States Supreme Court has never 

expressly held that taxi passengers have a Fourth Amendment privacy interest 

in the interior of the taxi, and, in support of his argument that this court should 

recognize such an interest, Kenny only cites to non-binding authority from 

other jurisdictions. Kenny makes no separate argument on state constitutional 

grounds regarding standing. 

1 This court has acknowledged that in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the 

United States Supreme Court abandoned the concept of standing, concluding that the issue of whether a 

defendant is asserting his own legal rights, as opposed to a third party’s, is an issue more properly within the 

purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing. Allen v. State, 893 N.E.2d 1092, 

1096 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. 
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[13] Under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the passenger in a car driven by 

its owner does not have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle,

although a passenger in a car whose owner is absent may have standing. See 

Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 598-99 (Ind. 2008) (concluding that where 

both the driver of the car and the passenger, Campos, said the car searched 

belonged to Campos’ brother and it was uncontroverted that Campos had 

permission to use the car, Campos had standing to contest the search). As 

Kenny acknowledges on appeal, no Indiana court to date has concluded that a 

passenger who has paid for a ride in a taxi has a protectable Fourth 

Amendment privacy interest in the interior of the taxi sufficient to allow the 

passenger to contest the search of the taxi’s interior. 

[14] We observe, however, that it is established in Indiana that a passenger in a 

vehicle that is stopped may challenge “any part of a vehicle stop . . . because 

they are essentially seized when the driver is seized.” Id. at 598 (citing Brendlin 

v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2403, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007)); 

Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 2019) (citing Heien v. North 

Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60, 135 S.Ct. 530, 536, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014), in turn 

citing Brendlin). Here, Kenny argues that all the evidence obtained following 

the traffic stop, including the firearms removed from his person and the 

contraband found as a result of the search of the taxi-van, were the products of 

an impermissibly prolongated traffic stop. This court has resolved such 

challenges without determining that the passenger/defendant had separate 

standing to challenge the search of the interior of a vehicle. See, e.g., Powers v. 
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State, 190 N.E.3d 440, 443-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (addressing Powers’ claim 

that evidence was procured from the search of the interior of the vehicle in 

which she was a passenger in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the 

traffic stop was unreasonably extended); Chauncy v. State, 204 N.E.3d 311, 314-

20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence 

found after the search of the interior of the automobile in which Chauncy was a 

passenger, challenging the basis for the initial traffic stop and the prolongation 

of the stop to conduct a dog sniff as violative of the Fourth Amendment). 

Kenny’s only substantive argument regarding the challenged evidence is that it 

was garnered from a traffic stop that was impermissibly prolonged, and a 

determination of his claim of independent standing to search the taxi-van’s 

interior is not necessary to reach some otherwise unavailable argument. 

Because Kenny’s status as a passenger in the car driven by Boruff permits him 

to challenge the prolongation of the traffic stop, and thus to challenge the 

seizure of the challenged evidence, as a matter of judicial restraint, we decline 

to address his contentions regarding standing. 

III. Fourth Amendment

[15] Kenny contends that the challenged evidence was garnered in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment, which states, in relevant part that “[t]he right of people to 

be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 

searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A

traffic stop is a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, one that seizes 

both the driver and any passengers in the vehicle. Guthery v. State, 180 N.E.3d 
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339, 347 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 255), trans. denied. “It

is unequivocal under our jurisprudence that even a minor traffic violation is 

sufficient to give an officer probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle.” 

Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013). In addition to determining 

whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer who has stopped a vehicle after 

witnessing a traffic infraction may make ordinary inquiries incident to a traffic 

stop, such as checking the driver’s license, checking if the driver has any 

outstanding warrants, and inspecting registration and proof of insurance 

information. Curry v. State, 90 N.E.3d 677, 684 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing 

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615, 191 L.Ed.2d 

492 (2015)), trans. denied. However, even a valid traffic stop “can become 

unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete” 

the purpose of the stop. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 

S.Ct. 834, 937, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005)). 

[16] Kenny argues that the traffic stop of the taxi-van was impermissibly prolonged

beyond the purposes of the stop. We do not agree. Detective Sliger stopped the 

taxi-van after another officer witnessed Boruff committing two traffic 

infractions. Detective Sliger approached the vehicle and made some routine 

inquiries about who was in the vehicle and the purpose of their travel, all of 

which was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 

355, 135 S.Ct. at 1615; Curry, 90 N.E.3d at 685 (preliminary inquiries regarding 

reasons for travel did not unconstitutionally prolong the stop). While making 

these inquiries, Detective Sliger observed that Kenny had large bulges in both 
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front pockets of his pants and that Kenny was placing his hands on the bulges, 

making the officer concerned for his safety. Detective Sliger decided to remove 

Kenny from the vehicle before proceeding with the stop, and he radioed for 

assistance. The officer’s decision to remove Kenny from the vehicle, to radio 

for assistance, and to wait for the backup officer to arrive did not unreasonably

prolong the traffic stop for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See Mitchell v. 

State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 780 (Ind. 2001) (analogizing a traffic stop to a so-called 

“Terry stop” and holding that police may order occupants to exit a vehicle 

during a traffic stop, citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 

54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977)); Tinker v. State, 129 N.E.3d 251, 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2019) (holding that delay accrued in waiting for an assisting officer to arrive for 

purposes of officer safety and briefing the assisting officer on the stop was 

reasonable). 

[17] In addition, “[a]n officer may perform a Terry ‘pat-down’ of a driver or any 

passenger if he has reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and 

danergous.” Mitchell, 745 N.E.2d at 780. Here, as the officers removed Kenny, 

who was known to be violent and aggressive with police, from the van, he was

verbally aggressive, he briefly resisted, and he made movements toward his 

waistband and toward the large bulge Detective Sliger had observed in his right 

front pocket. The officers restrained Kenny and performed a pat-down search 

which netted two firearms. See Tawdul v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1211, 1216-17 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1999) (holding that, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, an officer 

has a limited right to briefly detain a passenger at an otherwise valid traffic stop 
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“to ascertain the situation and to alleviate any concerns the officer has for his or 

her safety”), trans. denied. Detective Sliger then returned to the taxi-van to 

remove Boruff, who admitted that she had paraphernalia in the van, providing 

probable cause for the search of the van. Danner v. State, 931 N.E.2d 421, 428 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“One exception to the warrant requirement is probable 

cause to believe an operable vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a 

crime.”), trans. denied. Twelve minutes elapsed between the initiation of the 

traffic stop and Boruff’s admission to the presence of paraphernalia in the van. 

Under these circumstances, we hold that while effectuating a valid traffic stop, 

the officers were engaged in activities that were permitted under the Fourth 

Amendment before Boruff provided probable cause to search the van, and, 

therefore, the stop was not unreasonably prolonged.2

 

[18] Kenny contends that he was unconstitutionally seized because he was the 

subject of a narcotics investigation, Detective Sliger never intended to issue a 

citation to Boruff for the traffic violations, and, in fact, no citation was written. 

Kenny’s argument is essentially that the traffic stop was pretextual and that, 

pursuant to Caballes and Rodriguez, he could not be validly detained for any 

[1] 2 Kenny does not specifically address the gun and paraphernalia evidence gathered from the separate search 

of his car parked at the Taco Bell or explain why it should not have been admitted. We do not address that 

evidence separately except to note that a dog sniff is not a search protected by the Fourth Amendment, and, 

thus, not even reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is required to bring a canine unit to a car to perform 

an open-air dog sniff or to perform the sniff itself. Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1027; State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 

1281, 1286 (Ind. 2010). 
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period of time.3

 However, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the 

reasonableness of a traffic stop does not depend on the actual motivations of the 

individual officers involved. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 

1774, 135 L.E.2d 89 (1996); see also Graham v. State, 971 N.E.2d 713, 715-17 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where an officer 

observed Graham participating in a suspected drug deal, relayed his suspicion 

to another officer, and the other officer stopped Graham’s car after witnessing 

Graham commit a traffic infraction), trans. denied. We also observe that, when 

asked about writing a warning or a ticket for the traffic infractions, Detective 

Sliger testified at the suppression hearing that when he initially approached the 

taxi-van, he “was simply going through [his] investigation. [He] wasn’t up into 

that point yet” and that, after they believed there was probable cause to search 

the van, the officers prioritized that task and would “get to the other stuff later 

on.” (Tr. Vol. III, pp. 29, 34). This testimony is consistent with an intention to 

write a warning or a ticket, and, insofar as Kenny contends it conflicts with 

other testimony on the subject, it is the evidence which we must credit, as it 

supports the trial court’s evidentiary ruling. See Meredith, 906 N.E.2d at 869. In 

addition, in Curry, this court affirmed the admission of evidence garnered from 

3 Kenny also argues that his conviction should be reversed because the State spoliated evidence by 

purportedly failing to preserve Detective Sliger’s body camera footage. Although Detective Sliger testified 

about why his body camera footage was not available, Kenny did not raise this argument in the suppression 

proceedings or object to the admission of any evidence at trial on that basis, and, therefore, he has waived the 

issue. See Meriwether v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (finding an argument not raised in 

the trial court to be waived on appeal), trans. denied; Hart v. State, 578 N.E.2d 336, 337 (Ind. 1991) (“In 

general, a party may not object to the admission of evidence on one basis at trial and for a different reason on 

appeal.”). 
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a traffic stop which Curry, as the passenger in the vehicle, argued had been 

impermissibly extended to facilitate the arrival of a canine unit, even where we 

noted the driver “was released without being given a traffic citation or written 

warning.” Curry, 90 N.E.3d at 682. Therefore, although the issuing of a 

written warning or ticket is relevant to the inquiry, it is not dispositive of 

whether the traffic stop at issue was impermissibly extended. Accordingly, 

because the traffic stop, even if pretextual, was not impermissibly prolonged, we 

do not disturb the jury’s verdicts. 

CONCLUSION

[19] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting evidence resulting from a valid traffic stop consistent 

with the Fourth Amendment.

[20] Affirmed. 

[21] Altice, C. J. and Pyle, J. concur