United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

FORCE STRUCTURE

Army Needs to 

Provide DOD and 

Congress More 

Visibility Regarding 

Modular Force 

Capabilities and 

Implementation Plans 

September 2006 

 

GAO-06-745 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2006

FORCE STRUCTURE

Army Needs to Provide DOD and 

Congress More Visibility Regarding 

Modular Force Capabilities and 

Implementation Plans 

Highlights of GAO-06-745, a report to 

congressional committees 

The Army considers its modular

force transformation its most 

extensive restructuring since World

War II. Restructuring units from a 

division-based force to a modular 

brigade-based force will require an

investment of over $52 billion, 

including $41 billion for equipment, 

from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal 

year 2011, according to the Army.

Because of broad congressional 

interest in this initiative, GAO

prepared this report under the 

Comptroller General’s authority 

and assessed (1) the Army’s

progress and plans for equipping 

modular combat brigades, 

(2) progress made and challenges 

to managing personnel 

requirements of the modular force,

and (3) the extent to which the 

Army has developed an approach

for assessing the results of its 

modular conversions and the need

for further changes to designs or 

implementation plans. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Army

develop and submit to Congress 

information about its modular

force equipping strategy, personnel 

initiatives, and plans for assessing 

implementation progress. DOD 

generally agreed with three 

recommendations but disagreed to 

develop and provide to Congress 

risk assessments and evaluation

plans. GAO added a matter for

congressional consideration 

because it believes these actions 

are needed to improve

accountability and transparency. 

The Army is making progress in creating active and National Guard modular 

combat brigades while fully engaged in ongoing operations, but it is not 

meeting its equipping goals for active brigades and has not completed 

development of an equipping strategy for its new force rotation model. This 

raises uncertainty about the levels to which the modular brigades will be 

equipped both in the near and longer term as well as the ultimate equipping 

cost. The Army plans to employ a force rotation model in which units 

nearing deployment would receive required levels of equipment while 

nondeploying units would be maintained at lower readiness levels. However, 

because the Army has not completed key details of the equipping strategy—

such as defining the specific equipping requirements for units in various 

phases of its force rotation model—it is unclear what level of equipment 

units will have, how this strategy may affect the Army’s equipment funding 

plans, and how well units with low priority for equipment will be able to 

respond to unforeseen crises. 

While the Army has several initiatives under way to meet its modular force 

personnel requirements in the active component, it faces challenges in 

achieving its modular restructuring without permanently increasing its 

active component end strength above 482,400, as specified by the 2006 

Quadrennial Defense Review. The Army plans to increase its active combat 

force but doing so without permanently increasing its overall active end 

strength will require the Army to eliminate or realign many positions in its 

noncombat force. The Army has made some progress in reducing military 

personnel in noncombat positions by converting some to civilian positions 

and pursuing other initiatives, but Army officials believe future initiatives

may be difficult to achieve and could lead to difficult trade-offs. Without 

information on the progress of these initiatives and what risks exist if the 

Army’s goals are not met, Congress and the Secretary of Defense lack the 

information they need to understand challenges and risks. 

Finally, the Army does not have a comprehensive and transparent approach 

to measure progress against its modularity objectives, assess the need for 

further changes to modular designs, and monitor implementation plans. 

While GAO and DOD have identified the importance of establishing 

objectives that can be translated into measurable metrics that in turn 

provide accountability for results, the Army has not established outcomerelated metrics linked to most of its modularity objectives. Further, although

the Army is analyzing lessons learned from Iraq and training events, the 

Army does not have a long-term comprehensive plan for further analysis and 

testing of its modular combat brigade designs and fielded capabilities. 

Without performance metrics and a comprehensive testing plan, neither the 

Secretary of Defense nor Congress will have full visibility into how the 

modular force is currently organized, staffed, and equipped. As a result, 

decision makers lack sufficient information to assess the capabilities, cost, 

and risks of the Army’s modular force implementation plans. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-745.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Janet St. 

Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or 

stlaurentj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4 

Background 7

Army Is Well Under Way in Its Modular Combat Brigade 

Conversions, but Its Ability to Meet Near- and Long-Term 

Equipping Goals Is Unclear 10 

Army Faces Challenges in Managing Active Component Personnel 

Requirements for Its New Modular Force Structure 18 

Army Has Overall Objectives and Time Frames for Modularity, but 

Lacks a Long-Term Comprehensive Approach to Assess 

Progress and Monitor Implementation 21 

Conclusions 26

Recommendations for Executive Actions 26 

Matter for Congressional Consideration 28 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 34 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 36 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 41 

Tables 

Table 1: Planned Numbers of Modular Combat Brigades in the 

Active Component and National Guard as of March 2006 8 

Table 2: Army Schedule for Creating Active Component and 

National Guard Modular Combat Brigades as of March 

2006 9 

Table 3: Modular Force Cost Estimates for the Entire Army by 

Function 10

Table 4: Army’s End-strength Authorization History and Modular 

Force Goal 20 

Figures 

Figure 1: Standard Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker Combat Brigades 8 

Page i GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Figure 2: Army’s Force Rotation Model 17 

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Page ii GAO-06-745 Force Structure
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 6, 2006 

Congressional Committees 

In 2004, the Army began its modular force transformation to restructure 

itself from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force—an 

undertaking it considers the most extensive reorganization of its force 

since World War II. This initiative, according to Army estimates, will 

require a significant investment exceeding $52 billion through fiscal year 

2011, at a time when the Army is fully engaged in a high pace of operations 

and is facing many other demands for funding such as the Future Combat 

System program, now expected to cost over $160 billion.1

 The foundation 

of the modular force is the creation of standardized modular combat 

brigades in both the active component and National Guard. The new 

modular brigades are designed to be stand-alone, self-sufficient units that 

are more rapidly deployable and better able to conduct joint and 

expeditionary operations than their larger division-based predecessors. 

The Army plans to achieve its modular restructuring without permanently 

increasing its active component end strength above 482,400, in accordance 

with a Department of Defense (DOD) decision reached during the 2006 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). It plans to achieve this primarily by 

eliminating some noncombat positions in which military personnel 

currently serve, and transferring these positions to its operational combat

forces.2

 The February 2006 QDR also specified that the Army would create 

70 modular combat brigades in its active component and National Guard. 

This represents a 7-brigade reduction from the Army’s original plan of 

having 77 modular combat brigades. However, according to Army officials, 

resources from the 7 brigades that were part of the original plan will be 

used to increase support units in the reserve component, and DOD 

officials believe that 70 brigades will be sufficient to execute the defense 

strategy. 

 1

 The Future Combat System (FCS) is a family of weapons and other systems including 

manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, sensors, and munitions linked by an

information network. The FCS cost estimate is in then-year dollars as of January 2006. 

2

 Army personnel assigned to noncombat positions provide management, administrative, 

training, and other support. Operational combat forces include personnel assigned to the

Army’s combat, combat support, and combat service support units. 

Page 1 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Because of the cost and magnitude of the Army’s transformation plans, 

and broad congressional interest, we have initiated a body of work on both 

the force structure and cost implications of the Army’s transformation to a 

modular force under the Comptroller General’s statutory authority. We 

presented our preliminary observations on the Army’s plan in a March 

2005 hearing before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, 

House Committee on Armed Services.3

 In our September 2005 report on 

the cost of the modular force conversion, we reported that the Army’s $48 

billion total modular force conversion cost estimate was evolving and 

included uncertainties that may drive costs higher. We recommended that 

the Army clarify its definition of modular force costs including equipment 

costs, which constituted $41 billion of the $48 billion estimate.4

 In our 

April 2006 testimony before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land

Forces, House Committee on Armed Services, we observed that the 

Army’s cost estimate through fiscal year 2011 had increased from the 

earlier $48 billion estimate to $52.5 billion, and that the Army faces 

significant challenges in executing its modularity plans to fully achieve 

planned capabilities within this current estimate and the time frames it has 

established for the modular conversion.5

 This report focuses on the Army’s 

plans for implementing the modular force initiatives, with an emphasis on 

active combat brigades, since the Army has already begun to restructure 

its active divisions to the new brigade-based designs. 

We are sending this report to you because of your oversight 

responsibilities on defense matters. Specifically for this report we 

assessed (1) the Army’s progress and plans for equipping modular combat 

brigades, (2) progress made and challenges to managing personnel 

requirements of the modular force, and (3) the extent to which the Army 

has developed an approach for assessing the results of the modular 

conversions and for further adjusting designs or implementation plans. 

To assess the Army’s progress and plans for equipping active component 

modular combat brigades, we analyzed Department of Army data on 

selected equipment that the Army identified as essential for achieving the 

 3

 GAO, Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to Implement and

Fund Modular Forces, GAO-05-443T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005).

4

 GAO, Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of Costs for 

Transforming Army to a Modular Force, GAO-05-926 (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 29, 2005). 

5

 GAO, Force Structure: Capabilities and Cost of Army Modular Force Remain 

Uncertain, GAO-06-548T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006).

Page 2 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
modular combat brigades’ intended capabilities. For these selected items, 

we analyzed the Army’s active component equipment requirements 

obtained from the Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Operations and Training for each of the three brigade variants—

heavy, light, and Stryker. We compared the equipment requirements of the 

brigades to data we obtained from officials from the Department of the 

Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-86

 on the levels of equipment expected to be 

on hand in 2007 and discussed plans for meeting key equipment 

requirements with these officials. We also reviewed unit readiness reports 

from those brigades that had completed or were in the process of 

completing their modular conversion as of February 2006. In addition, we 

visited the first three Army divisions undergoing modular conversions to 

obtain information on the plans for organizing, staffing, and equipping the 

modular brigades. To assess progress made and challenges to managing 

personnel requirements of the modular force, we reviewed documents and 

discussed the implications of force structure requirements with officials 

from the Department of Army Offices of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for 

Personnel, Intelligence, and Operations and Training, and the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. We 

also reviewed the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report. 

Finally, to assess the extent to which the Army has developed an approach 

for assessing the results of the modular conversions and for further 

adjusting designs or implementation plans, we examined key Army 

planning documents and discussed objectives, performance metrics, and 

testing plans with officials in the Department of the Army Office of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training, and the Training and 

Doctrine Command. Also, we met with a panel of retired senior Army 

general officers at the Association of the U.S. Army Institute of Land 

Warfare. In addition, we relied on our past reports assessing organizations

undertaking significant reorganizations. We conducted our work from 

September 2004 through March 2006 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards and determined that the data

used were sufficiently reliable for our objectives. The scope and 

methodology used in our review are described in further detail in appendix

I. 

 6

 This office is responsible for programming, materiel integration, and management of

Department of the Army studies and analyses. 

Page 3 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
While the Army is well under way in creating active component modular 

combat brigades, it is not meeting its equipping goals for these brigades 

and has not yet completed its equipping strategy, which raises 

considerable uncertainty about the levels to which the modular brigades 

will be equipped both in the near and longer term and the ultimate 

equipment cost. The Army established equipping goals in its Campaign 

Plan in which converting units are expected to receive most of the major 

equipment items required by the new modular design within specified time 

frames. However, although the Army is procuring billions of dollars of new 

equipment required by its new modular design, units undergoing their 

modular conversions are not meeting these equipping goals due to several

factors, including the challenges of undertaking such an extensive 

restructuring while managing equipment requirements for ongoing 

operations. In addition, brigades will initially lack planned quantities of 

items such as communications and surveillance systems necessary to 

provide the enhanced intelligence, situational awareness, and network 

capabilities that are essential for creating smaller, more flexible and 

mobile combat brigades. Moreover, the Army will likely face even greater 

challenges fully equipping 28 planned National Guard modular combat 

brigades since National Guard units have historically been underequipped 

and have transferred large quantities of equipment to deploying units. To 

mitigate equipment shortages, the Army is developing a force rotation 

model that will provide varying levels of equipment to brigades depending 

on how close they are to deployment. However, this strategy is not yet 

complete because key details have not been decided, including the types 

and quantities of equipment for brigades in each of the various phases of 

the model. Until the Army completes the development of its equipping 

strategy, it will not be possible to determine which units will be equipped,

or how this strategy may affect the Army’s equipment funding plans. It is 

also unclear how well units with low priority for equipment will be able to 

respond to unforeseen crises. 

Results in Brief 

While the Army has several initiatives under way to manage its modular 

force personnel requirements, it faces significant challenges achieving its 

modular restructuring without permanently increasing its active 

component end strength above 482,400, as specified by DOD’s 2006 QDR 

report. The Army plans to increase the size of its modular combat force 

from 315,000 to 355,000, but doing so without permanently increasing its 

active component end strength is an ambitious undertaking that will 

require the Army to eliminate many positions in its noncombat force. 

Effective strategic workforce planning includes the development of 

strategies to monitor and evaluate progress towards achieving goals. 

However, the Army has not provided DOD or Congress with detailed

Page 4 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
information on the status of its various personnel initiatives and progress 

towards meeting its modular force personnel goals. We found some of the 

Army’s personnel realignment and reduction initiatives may not meet the 

Army’s initial goals or expectations. For example during fiscal year 2005, 

the Army converted approximately 8,000 military positions to civilianstaffed positions within the Army’s noncombat force. However, Army 

officials believe additional conversions to achieve the 19,000 planned 

reductions in the noncombat force will be significantly more challenging 

to achieve. Also, the Army expected that the 2005 Base Realignment and

Closure decisions would free up approximately 2,000 to 3,000 positions in 

the noncombat force, but it is revisiting this assumption based upon 

updated manpower levels at the commands and installations approved for 

closure or consolidation. As a result, it is not clear to what extent the 

Army will be able to meet its modular force requirements within its endstrength goal and what risks exist if these goals are not met. Furthermore, 

without information on the status and progress of these personnel 

initiatives, the Secretary of Defense and Congress lack the visibility 

necessary to assess the challenges and effectively address problems when 

they arise. 

While the Army has established overall objectives and time frames for 

modularity, it lacks a long-term comprehensive and transparent approach 

to effectively measure progress against stated modularity objectives, 

assess the need for further changes to its modular unit designs, and 

monitor implementation plans. GAO and DOD have identified the 

importance of establishing objectives that can be translated into 

measurable metrics, which in turn provide accountability for results. The 

Army has identified objectives and a timeline for modularity, but metrics 

for assessing the Army’s progress on modularity-specific, quantifiable 

goals are extremely limited. Moreover, in 2004, the Army’s Training and 

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) conducted a wide-ranging baseline 

analysis of the modular design using measures of combat effectiveness 

against simulated threats; however, the Army does not have a long-term 

plan to conduct a similar analysis so that it can compare the performance 

of actual modular units with the TRADOC-validated design. Army officials 

maintain that ongoing assessments such as observations of training events

provide sufficient validation that the modularity concept works in 

practice. However, while these assessments are useful, they do not 

provide a comprehensive evaluation of the modular design as a whole. In 

November 2005, we reported that methodically testing, exercising, and 

evaluating new doctrines and concepts are important and established 

practices throughout the military, and that particularly large and complex 

initiatives may require long-term testing and evaluation guided by study 

Page 5 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
plans.7

 Without performance metrics and a comprehensive testing plan, 

neither the Army nor Congress will be able to assess the capabilities of 

and risks associated with the modular force as it is organized, staffed, and 

equipped.

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary

of the Army to develop and provide Congress with detailed information 

about the modular force equipping strategy, the status of its various 

personnel initiatives, and plans for developing an approach for measuring 

and assessing implementation progress. In commenting on a draft of this 

report, DOD fully or partially agreed with our recommendations to 

develop and provide information on its equipping strategy and personnel 

initiatives and to develop expanded performance metrics for assessing 

progress. However, DOD disagreed with our recommendations to develop

and provide assessments of the risk associated with its equipping strategy 

and plans for staffing its modular operational combat force. It also 

disagreed with our recommendation to develop a testing plan for further 

assessing modular unit designs. DOD stated that it is assessing equipment 

risk and is continuing to evaluate all aspects of modular units’ 

performance on a continuous basis. However, while Army officials are 

managing risk in allocating currently available equipment to Army units 

based on scheduled overseas deployments, the Army had not yet 

completed its equipping strategy for its new force rotation model at the

time of our review and therefore had not conducted and documented a 

formal risk assessment of its equipping plans for implementing the new 

model. In addition, although the Army is conducting further evaluation of 

its modular forces through training exercises and modular unit 

deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, it has not developed a plan to further 

test modular unit designs under a range of operational scenarios, such as 

major offensive combat operations. Moreover, it is not clear how and to 

what extent the Army is integrating lessons learned from training 

exercises and deployments into periodic evaluations to assess the need for 

further changes to the designs. Because of the significance, cost, scope, 

and potential for risk associated with the Army’s modularity initiative 

along with the lack of transparency regarding these risks, we continue to 

believe our recommendations that the Army develop and provide Congress 

with additional plans and risk assessments are needed. Therefore, to 

 7

 GAO, Military Readiness: Navy’s Fleet Response Plan Would Benefit from a

Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing, GAO-06-84 (Washington,

D.C.: Nov. 22, 2005). 

Page 6 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
facilitate greater transparency and improve accountability for results, we 

have included a matter for congressional consideration that Congress 

require the Secretary of Defense to submit more specific and complete 

information regarding the modular force equipping strategy, the status of 

its various personnel initiatives, risks associated with its plans, and efforts 

to measure and assess its progress in implementing modularity. 

DOD’s comments are in appendix II and our evaluation of its comments is 

on page 28. 

The Army’s conversion to a modular force encompasses the Army’s total 

force—active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve—and 

directly affects not only the Army’s combat units, but related command 

and support organizations. A key to the Army’s new modular force design

is embedding within combat brigades reconnaissance, logistics, and other 

support units that previously made up parts of division-level and higherlevel command and support organizations, allowing the brigades to 

operate independently. Restructuring these units is a major undertaking 

because it requires more than just the movement of personnel or 

equipment from one unit to another. The Army’s new modular units are 

designed, equipped, and staffed differently than the units they replace; 

therefore, successful implementation of this initiative will require changes 

such as new equipment and a different mix of skills and occupational 

specialties among Army personnel. By 2011, the Army plans to have 

reconfigured its total force—to include active and reserve components 

and headquarters, combat, and support units—into the modular design. 

The foundation of the modular force is the creation of modular brigade 

combat teams—combat maneuver brigades that will have a common 

organizational design and are intended to increase the rotational pool of 

ready units. Modular combat brigades (depicted in fig. 1) will have one of

three standard designs—heavy brigade, infantry brigade, or Stryker 

brigade.8

Background 

 8

 The Army began the formation of Stryker brigades in 2002 and completed the formation of

the first two Stryker brigades in fiscal year 2003. 

Page 7 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Figure 1: Standard Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker Combat Brigades

Sources: GAO analysis of Army data; National War College, National War College, and U.S. Army (images left to right). 

Standard Modular Combat Brigade Designs

Heavy brigade

3,700 Soldiers

Equipped with Abrams tanks

and Bradley Fighting vehicles

Infantry brigade

3,300 Soldiers

Dismounted infantry

Stryker brigade

3,900 Soldiers

Equipped with

Stryker vehicles

Abrams tank Infantry soldier Stryker vehicle

Until it revised its plans in early 2006, the Army had planned to have a total 

of 77 active component and National Guard modular combat brigades by 

expanding the Army’s existing 33 combat brigades in the active 

component into 43 modular combat brigades by 2007, and by creating 34 

modular combat brigades in the National Guard by 2010 from existing 

brigades and divisions that have historically been equipped well below 

requirements. To rebalance joint ground force capabilities, the 2006 QDR 

determined the Army should have a total of 70 modular combat brigades—

42 active brigades and 28 National Guard brigades. Table 1 shows the 

Army’s planned numbers of heavy, infantry, and Stryker combat brigades

in the active component and National Guard. 

Table 1: Planned Numbers of Modular Combat Brigades in the Active Component 

and National Guard as of March 2006 

Modular combat brigades Active component National Guard Total

Heavy 19 6 25

Infantry 17 21 38

Stryker 6 1 7

Total 42 28 70

Source: U.S. Army. 

Page 8 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
At the time of this report, the Army was in the process of revising its 

modular combat brigade schedule to convert its active component combat 

brigades by fiscal year 2010 instead of 2007 as previously planned, and

convert National Guard combat brigades by fiscal year 2008 instead of 

2010. Table 2 shows the Army’s schedule that reflects these changes as of

March 2006.

Table 2: Army Schedule for Creating Active Component and National Guard

Modular Combat Brigades as of March 2006 

FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 Total

Active component 

combat brigades 

2 11 8 14 3 2 1 1 42

National Guard

combat brigades 

— — 7 7 7 7 — — 28

Total 2 11 15 21 10 9 1 1 70

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

According to the Army, this larger pool of available combat units will 

enable it to generate both active and reserve component forces in a 

rotational manner. To do this, the Army is developing plans for a force 

rotation model in which units will rotate through a structured progression 

of increased unit readiness over time. Units will progress through three 

phases of operational readiness cycles, culminating in full mission 

readiness and availability to deploy. For example, the Army plans for 

active service members to be at home for 2 years following each 

deployment of up to 1 year. 

The Army’s objective is for the new modular combat brigades, which will 

include about 3,000 to 4,000 personnel, to have at least the same combat 

capability as a brigade under the current division-based force, which range 

from 3,000 to 5,000 personnel. Since there will be more combat brigades in 

the force, the Army believes its overall combat capability will be increased 

as a result of the restructuring, providing added value to combatant 

commanders. Although somewhat smaller in size, the new modular 

combat brigades are expected to be as capable as the Army’s existing 

brigades because they will have different equipment, such as advanced 

communications and surveillance equipment, and a different mix of 

personnel and support assets. The Army’s organizational designs for the 

modular brigades have been tested by its Training and Doctrine 

Command’s Analysis Center against a variety of scenarios, and the Army 

has found the new designs to be as capable as the existing division-based

brigades in modeling and simulations. 

Page 9 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
The Army’s cost estimate for modularity through fiscal year 2011 is $52.5 

billion as of April 2006. Of this $52.5 billion estimate, $41 billion, or 78 

percent, is planned to be spent on equipment for active and reserve units,

with the remaining $11.5 billion allocated to military construction, 

facilities, sustainment, and training (see table 3). In addition, Army leaders 

have recently stated they may seek additional funds after 2011 to procure 

more equipment for modular restructuring. 

Table 3: Modular Force Cost Estimates for the Entire Army by Function

Dollars in billions 

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Percentage

Equipping $4.7 $5.8 $5.4 $5.9 $6.5 $6.7 $6.0 $41.0 78

Military construction/ 

facilities 

0.3 0.0 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 5.8 11

Sustainment and 

training 

0.0 0.7 0.7 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 5.7 11

Total $5.0 $6.5 $6.6 $7.6 $9.1 $9.2 $8.5 $52.5 100

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

The Army has made progress in creating active component modular 

combat brigades, but it is not meeting its equipping goals for these 

brigades and has yet to complete the development of its rotational 

equipping strategy, which raises concerns about the extent to which 

brigades will be equipped in the near and longer term. Moreover, brigades 

will initially lack planned levels of key equipment, including items that 

provide enhanced intelligence, situational awareness, and network 

capabilities needed to help the Army achieve its objective of creating 

combat brigades that are able to operate on their own as part of a more 

mobile, rapidly deployable, joint, expeditionary force. In addition, because 

of existing equipment shortages, the Army National Guard will likely face 

even greater challenges providing the same types of equipment for its 28 

planned modular combat brigades. To mitigate equipment shortages, the 

Army has developed a strategy to provide required levels of equipment to

deploying active component and National Guard units, while allocating 

lesser levels of remaining equipment to other nondeploying units. 

However, the Army has not yet completed key details of this strategy, 

including determining the levels of equipment it needs to support this 

strategy, assessing the operational risk of not fully equipping all units, or 

providing to Congress information about these plans so it can assess the 

Army’s current and long-term equipment requirements and funding plans. 

Army Is Well Under 

Way in Its Modular 

Combat Brigade 

Conversions, but Its 

Ability to Meet Nearand Long-Term 

Equipping Goals Is 

Unclear 

Page 10 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
The Army faces challenges meeting its equipping goals for its active

modular combat brigades both in the near and longer term. As of February 

2006, the Army had converted 19 modular combat brigades in the active 

force.9

 According to the Army Campaign Plan, which established time 

frames and goals for the modular force conversions, each of these units is 

expected to have on hand at least 90 percent of its required major 

equipment items within 180 days after its new equipment requirements 

become effective.10 We reviewed data from several active brigades that had

reached the effective date for their new equipment requirements by 

February 2006, and found that all of these brigades reported significant 

shortages of equipment 180 days after the effective date of their new 

equipment requirements, falling well below the equipment goals the Army 

established in its Campaign Plan. Additionally, the Army is having 

difficulty providing equipment to units undergoing their modular 

conversion in time for training prior to operational deployments, and 

deploying units often do not receive some of their equipment until after 

their arrival in theater. At the time of our visits, officials from three Army 

divisions undergoing modular conversion expressed concern over the lack 

of key equipment needed for training prior to deployment. 

Army Faces Difficulty 

Meeting Its Goals for 

Equipping Active Modular 

Combat Brigades 

The Army already faced equipment shortages before it began its modular 

force transformation and is wearing out significant quantities of equipment 

in Iraq, which could complicate plans for fully equipping new modular 

units. By creating modular combat brigades with standardized designs and 

equipment requirements, the Army believed that it could utilize more of its 

total force, thereby increasing the pool of available and ready forces to 

meet the demands of sustained rotations and better respond to an 

expected state of continuous operations. Also, by comparably equipping 

all of these units across the active component and National Guard, the 

Army further believes it will be able to discontinue its practice of 

allocating limited resources, including equipment, based on a system of 

 9

 This number does not include the formation of two Stryker brigades in fiscal year 2003.

10 The Army defines this in its Campaign Plan as the effective date on which the new 

modular organizational designs’ equipment requirements formally apply to converting

brigades. The Army calls this a Modified Table of Organization and Equipment, which 

documents the specific types and amounts of equipment Army units are authorized to have.

Page 11 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
tiered readiness,11 which resulted in lower priority units in both active and 

reserve components having significantly lower levels of equipment and 

readiness than the higher priority units. However, because of the need to 

establish a larger pool of available forces to meet the current high pace of 

operational commitments, the Army’s modular combat brigade conversion 

schedule is outpacing the planned acquisition or funding for some 

equipment requirements. The Army has acknowledged that funding does 

not match its modular conversion schedule and that some units will face 

equipment shortages in the early years of transformation. According to 

Army officials, the Army may continue to seek funding to better equip its 

modular forces beyond 2011. 

For example, according to Army officials, funds programmed for the 

Army’s tactical wheeled vehicle modernization strategy will not meet all of

its requirements for light, medium, and heavy tactical vehicles and trucks 

through fiscal year 2011. In 2007, when 38 of 42 planned active component

brigades are expected to complete their modular conversions, the Army 

expects to have only about 62 percent of the heavy trucks it needs to meet

its requirements for these brigades.12 New higher requirements for trucks 

for the modular brigades added to an existing shortage of trucks in the 

Army’s inventory. In addition, battle damage and losses along with higherthan-normal wear and tear on Army vehicles from current operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan are contributing to this shortfall. While the Army 

plans to eventually fill these shortages through a combination of new 

procurement and modernization of its existing truck fleet, Army officials 

told us that the higher requirement for trucks is currently unaffordable 

within its near-term budget authority. Until the Army is able to meet its 

modular combat brigade design requirement for trucks, these brigades will 

not have their envisioned capability to conduct their own logistical 

support operations if necessary without requiring the augmentation of 

external combat and combat-service support forces. 

 11 Under this model, which the Army calls its tiered readiness system, high-priority or firstto-deploy units in the active component received much higher levels of resources than

lower priority or later-deploying active and reserve component units. While some units 

maintained high levels of readiness, a large part of both the active and reserve components 

were in a low state of readiness, with the expectation that there would be sufficient time to

add the required resources prior to deployment. 

12 At the time of this report, the Army was in the process of revising its equipment 

requirements based on the planned reduction in the number of modular combat brigades 

from 43 to 42 in the active component. 

Page 12 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Active modular combat brigades will initially lack required numbers of 

some of the key equipment that Army force design analyses determined 

essential for achieving their planned capabilities. Two primary objectives 

underlying the Army’s modular force designs and concepts are to (1) 

create more combat forces within the Army’s current end strength that are

as lethal as the division-based brigades they are replacing and (2) organize, 

staff, and equip these units to be more responsive, rapidly deployable, and 

better able to operate on their own compared to division-based brigades. 

Army force designers identified a number of key organizational, personnel, 

and equipment enablers they determined must be present for the modular 

combat brigades to be as lethal as the division-based brigades they are

replacing. They include key battle command systems that are intended to

provide modular combat brigades the latest command and control 

technology for improved situational awareness; advanced digital 

communications systems to provide secure high-speed communications 

links at the brigade level; and advanced sensors to provide modular 

combat brigades with their own intelligence-gathering, reconnaissance, 

and target-acquisition capabilities. 

Equipment Shortages 

Include Key Items the 

Army Identified as 

Essential for Achieving 

Modular Force Capabilities 

We reviewed equipping plans for several command and control, 

communications, and reconnaissance systems to determine the Army’s 

timelines for providing active modular combat brigades some of the key 

equipment they need to achieve their planned capabilities and function as 

designed. According to Army officials responsible for managing the 

distribution and fielding of equipment, the Army will not have all of this 

equipment on hand to meet the new modular force design requirements by 

2007, when 38 of 42 active component modular combat brigades are to 

complete their modular conversions. These shortfalls are due to a range of

reasons, but primarily because the modular conversion schedule is 

outpacing the planned acquisition or funding. For example, 

• The Army does not expect to meet until at least 2012 its modular combat 

brigade requirements for Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance 

Systems, an advanced visual sensor that provides long-range surveillance 

capability to detect, recognize, and identify distant targets. 

• The Army decided that it cannot meet design requirements within its 

current budget for Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below 

(FBCB2), a battle command component that provides real-time situational 

awareness information through identification and tracking of friendly 

forces to control battlefield maneuvers and operations. Moreover, because 

it has been in full production for less than 2 years, FBCB2 production has 

not kept pace with the new higher modular force FBCB2 requirements. As 

Page 13 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
a result, the Army plans to provide active heavy and infantry brigades with 

less than half of their design requirement for FBCB2 through at least 2007. 

• The Army plans to meet only 85 percent of its requirements across the 

force for Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, a command 

and control network radio system that provides voice and data 

communications capability in support of command and control operations,

due to a funding decision. 

• The Army’s design requirement for Shadow tactical unmanned aerial

vehicle systems was to have one system composed of seven air vehicles 

per modular combat brigade, but because the Army lacks adequate 

numbers of air vehicle operators and maintainers, it decided to field the 

Shadow systems with four air vehicles instead. 

• The Army’s schedule for the acquisition of Joint Network Node—a key 

communications system that provides secure high-speed computer 

network connection for data transmission down to the battalion level—

could be delayed. According to Army officials, DOD recently decided to

require the Army to have Joint Network Node undergo developmental and 

operational testing prior to further acquisition, which could delay 

equipping modular combat brigades.

The systems discussed above are key to achieving the benefits Army 

officials expect to achieve with a modular force. For example, the Army 

decided to structure its new modular combat brigades with two maneuver 

battalions each instead of three battalions each, even though Army 

analysis showed that brigades with three maneuver battalions have several 

advantages and the Army’s former division-based brigades have three 

battalions. The Army’s decision to approve a brigade design with two 

maneuver battalions was made largely because of affordability concerns. 

However, the Army determined that brigades with two maneuver 

battalions could be as effective in combat as its division-based brigades 

provided they have the right mix of maneuver companies and enablers 

such as the systems discussed above. Until the Army is able to provide 

modular units with required quantities of these enablers, it is not clear 

whether the new brigades are as capable as the division-based brigades 

they are replacing. 

In addition to the challenges the Army faces in providing active 

component modular combat brigades the equipment necessary for meeting 

expected capabilities, the Army will face greater challenges meeting its 

equipping requirements for its 28 planned National Guard combat 

brigades. The Army’s modular force concept is intended to transform the 

National Guard from a strategic standby force to a force that is to be 

National Guard Faces 

Significant Equipping 

Challenges 

Page 14 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
organized, staffed, and equipped comparable to active units for 

involvement in the full range of overseas operations. As such, National 

Guard combat units will enter into the Army’s new force rotational model 

in which, according to the Army’s plans, Guard units would be available 

for deployment 1 year out of 6 years. However, Guard units have 

previously been equipped at less than wartime readiness levels (often at 65

to 75 percent of requirements) under the assumption that there would be 

sufficient time for Guard forces to obtain additional equipment prior to 

deployment. Moreover, as of July 2005, the Army National Guard had 

transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from nondeploying 

units to support Guard units’ deployments overseas. As we noted in our

2005 report on National Guard equipment readiness,13 National Guard 

Bureau officials estimated that the Guard’s nondeployed units had only 

about 34 percent of their essential warfighting equipment as of July 2005 

and had exhausted inventories of 220 critical items. Although the Army 

says it will invest $21 billion into equipping and modernizing the Guard 

through 2011, Guard units will start their modular conversions with less 

and much older equipment than most active units. This will add to the 

challenge the Army faces in achieving its plans and timelines for equipping

Guard units at comparable levels to active units and fully meeting the 

equipping needs across both components. Moreover, the Army National 

Guard believes that even after the Army’s planned investment, the Army 

National Guard will have to accept risk in certain equipment, such as 

tactical wheeled vehicles, aircraft, and force protection equipment. 

Because the Army realized that it would not have enough equipment in the 

near term to simultaneously equip modular combat brigades at 100 percent 

of their requirements, the Army is developing a new equipping strategy as 

part of its force rotation model; however, this strategy is not yet completed 

because the Army has not finalized equipping requirements for this new 

strategy or assessed the operational risk of not fully equipping all units. 

Under the force rotation model, the Army plans to provide increasing 

amounts of equipment to units as they move through training phases and 

near readiness for potential deployment so they would be ready to 

respond quickly if needed with fully equipped forces. The Army believes 

that over time, equipping units in a rotational manner will enable it to 

To Mitigate Equipment 

Shortages, Army Plans to 

Rotate Equipment among 

Units Based on Their 

Movement through 

Training, Readiness, and 

Deployment Phases 

 13 GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment 

Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives, 

GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2005). 

Page 15 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
better allocate available equipment and help manage risk associated with

specific equipment shortages. 

Under this strategy, brigades will have three types of equipment sets—a 

baseline set, a training set, and a deployment set. The baseline set would 

vary by unit type and assigned mission and the equipment it includes could

be significantly reduced from amounts the modular brigades are designed

to have. Training sets would include more of the equipment units will need 

to be ready for deployment, but units would share the equipment that 

would be located at training sites throughout the country. The deployment 

set would include all equipment needed for deployment, including theaterspecific equipment, high-priority items provided through operational 

needs statements, and equipment from Army prepositioned stock. With 

this rotational equipping approach, the Army believes it can have up to 14 

active combat brigades and up to 5 Army National Guard combat brigades

equipped and mission ready at any given time. 

While the Army has developed a general proposal to equip both active and 

Army National Guard units within the force rotation model, it has not yet 

fully developed specific equipment requirements, including the types and

quantities of items, required in each phase of the model. As of March 2006, 

the Army was still developing proposals for what would be included in the 

three equipment sets as well as the specific equipping requirements for 

units. Figure 2 shows the Army’s three-phase force rotation model. 

Page 16 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Figure 2: Army’s Force Rotation Model 

a

The Army’s force rotation model proposes that active component units in the Available phase will be 

available for deployment 1 year in every 3 years, and reserve component units will be available for 

deployment 1 year in every 6 years. 

The Reset/Train phase will include modular units that redeploy from longterm operations and are unable to sustain ready or available capability 

levels. The Ready phase will include those modular units that have been 

assessed as ready at designated capability levels, may be mobilized if 

required, and can be equipped if necessary to meet operational surge 

requirements. The Available phase will include those modular units that 

have been assessed as available at designated capability levels to conduct 

missions. In this last phase, active units are available for immediate 

deployment and reserve component units are available for mobilization, 

training, and validation for deployment. However, this strategy is not yet 

complete because the Army has not yet defined specific equipping 

requirements for units as they progress through the force rotation model.

Therefore, it is difficult to assess the risk associated with decreasing 

nondeploying units’ readiness to perform other missions or the ability of 

units in the Reset/Train and Ready phases of the force rotation model to 

respond to an unforeseen conflict or crisis, if required. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Force rotation and equipping phases

Reset/Train Ready

Baseline

equipment set

In this phase, modular 

units receive minimal 

levels of equipment while 

they are recovering from 

operations, restoring 

equipment, assigning 

new personnel, and 

undergoing individual 

training. 

At the end of this phase, 

units move to the Ready

phase.

Training

equipment set

In this phase, modular 

units conduct unit-level 

training and mission 

preparation. Units share 

equipment located at 

training sites. 

At the end of this phase, 

units move to the 

Available phase.

Available

Deployment

equipment set

In this phase, modular 

units are available for 

immediate deployment 

for operational missions. 

They are provided 

equipment based on 

operational requirements. 

At the end of their 

available time, units

return to the Reset/Train

phase.a

Page 17 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
The Army has made some progress toward meeting modular personnel 

requirements in the active component, but faces significant challenges in

achieving its modular restructuring without permanently increasing its 

active component end strength above 482,400, as specified by the QDR. 

The Army plans to increase the size of its modular combat force but doing

so without permanently increasing its overall end strength is an ambitious 

undertaking that will require the Army to eliminate or realign many 

positions in its noncombat force. While the Army is moving forward with

its personnel reduction and realignment plans through a variety of 

initiatives, it is not clear to what extent the Army will be able to meet its 

overall end-strength goals and what risks to meeting modular force 

personnel requirements exist if these goals are not met. We have found 

that strategic workforce planning is one of the tools that can help agencies

develop strategies for effectively implementing challenging initiatives. 

Effective strategic workforce planning includes the development of 

strategies to monitor and evaluate progress towards achieving goals. 

Without information on the status and progress of its personnel initiatives, 

Congress and the Secretary of Defense lack the data necessary to identify

challenges, monitor progress, and effectively address problems when they 

arise. 

The Army accounts for its congressionally authorized active component 

personnel end strength in three broad categories—the operational combat 

force, the institutional noncombat force, and personnel who are 

temporarily unavailable for assignment. The operational combat force 

consists of personnel who are assigned to deployable combat, combat 

support, and combat service support units; these include modular combat 

brigades and their supporting units such as logistics, medical, and 

administrative units. The Army’s institutional noncombat force consists of 

personnel assigned to support and training command and headquarters 

units, which primarily provide management, administrative, training, and 

other support, and typically are not deployed for combat operations. This 

includes personnel assigned to the Department of the Army headquarters 

and major commands such as the Training and Doctrine Command. In 

addition, the Army separately accounts for personnel who are temporarily 

unavailable for their official duties, including personnel who are in transit 

between assignments, are temporarily not available for assignment 

because of sickness or injury, or are students undergoing training away 

from their units. The Army refers to these personnel as transients, 

transfers, holdees, and students. 

Army Faces 

Challenges in 

Managing Active 

Component Personnel 

Requirements for Its 

New Modular Force 

Structure 

Page 18 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
The Army plans to reduce its current temporary end-strength authorization 

of 512,40014 to 482,400 by 2011 in order to help fund the Army’s priority 

programs. Simultaneously, the Army plans to increase the number of 

soldiers in its operational combat force from its previous level of 

approximately 315,000 to 355,000 in order to meet the increased personnel 

requirements of its new larger modular force structure. The Army plans to 

utilize several initiatives to reduce and realign the Army with the aim of 

meeting these planned personnel levels. For example, the Army has 

converted some noncombat military positions into civilian positions, 

thereby freeing up soldiers to fill modular combat brigades’ requirements. 

During fiscal year 2005, the Army converted approximately 8,000 military 

positions to civilian-staffed positions within the Army’s noncombat force. 

However, Army officials believe additional conversions to achieve the 

19,000 planned reductions in the noncombat force will be significantly 

more challenging to achieve. In addition to its success with the military-tocivilian conversions, the Army has been given statutory authority to 

reduce active personnel support to the National Guard and reserve by 

1,500.15 However, the Army must still eliminate additional positions, 

including reducing transients, transfers, holdees, and student personnel 

utilizing these and other initiatives, so it can reduce its overall end 

strength while filling requirements for modular units. As shown in table 4, 

the Army’s goal is to reduce overall active component end strength from 

the current temporary authorization level while increasing the size of its 

operational combat force. 

 14 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 401

(2006), sets the end-strength level for the Army at 512,400, but stipulates costs of active 

duty personnel of the Army for that fiscal year in excess of 482,400 shall be paid out of

funds authorized to be appropriated for that fiscal year for a contingent emergency reserve 

fund or as an emergency supplemental appropriation. 

15 The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L.

No. 108-375, § 515 (2004) reduces the minimum number of active component advisors 

required to be assigned to units of the selected reserve from 5,000 to 3,500. 

Page 19 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Table 4: Army’s End-strength Authorization History and Modular Force Goal 

End-strength authorizations (in thousands) 

Fiscal year 2000 

Current 

(temporary)

Modular

force goal

Operational combat force 315.0 355.0 355.0

Noncombat force 102.0 94.0 75.0

Other (transients, transfers, 

holdees, students) 

63.0 63.4 52.4

Total 480.0 512.4 482.4

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

Note: End-strength authorizations account for the maximum numbers of positions available in which 

to assign personnel, but do not account for the numbers of personnel actually assigned to those 

positions. 

While the Army is attempting to reduce end strength in its noncombat 

force and realign positions to the combat force via several initiatives, it 

may have difficulty meeting its expectations for some initiatives. For 

example, the Army expected that the Base Realignment and Closure 

(BRAC) decisions of 2005 could free up approximately 2,000 to 3,000 

positions in its noncombat force, but the Army is revisiting this

assumption based upon updated manpower levels at the commands and 

installations approved for closure and consolidation. Army officials 

believe they will be able to realign some positions from BRAC, but it is not 

clear whether the reductions will free up 2,000 to 3,000 military personnel 

that can be reassigned to modular combat units. In the same vein, Army 

officials expected to see reductions of several hundred base support staff 

resulting from restationing forces currently overseas back to garrisons 

within the United States. However, Army officials are still attempting to 

determine if the actual savings will meet the original assumptions. As a 

result, it is not clear to what extent the Army will be able to meet its 

overall end-strength goals and what risks exist if these goals are not met.

Furthermore, the Army will face challenges in meeting its new modular 

force requirements for military intelligence specialists. The Army’s new 

modular force structure significantly increases requirements for military 

intelligence specialists. In late 2005, Army intelligence officials told us that 

the modular force would require approximately 8,400 additional active 

component intelligence specialist positions, but the Army planned to fill 

only about 57 percent of these positions by 2013, in part because of efforts 

to reduce overall end strength. In May 2006, Army officials told us that the 

Army had completed its most recent Total Army Analysis (for fiscal years

2008–2013), which balances Army requirements within a projected endPage 20 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
strength authorization of 482,400. Accordingly, the Army revised its earlier

estimate of intelligence specialist position requirements and determined 

that its increased active component requirement for intelligence 

specialists was only 5,600 and that it planned to fill all of these positions 

by 2013.16 However, Army officials acknowledge that meeting modular 

force requirements for intelligence specialists is a significant challenge 

because it will take a number of years to recruit and train intelligence 

soldiers. 

According to Army intelligence officials, intelligence capability has 

improved over that of the previous force; however, any shortfalls in filling 

intelligence requirements would further stress intelligence specialists with 

a high pace of deployments. Since intelligence is considered a key enabler 

of the modular design—a component of the new design’s improved 

situational awareness—it is unclear to what extent any shortages in 

planned intelligence capacity will affect the overall capability of modular 

combat brigades. Without continued, significant progress in meeting 

personnel requirements, the Army may need to accept increased risk in its 

ability to conduct operations and support its combat forces or it may need 

to seek support for an end-strength increase from DOD and Congress. 

While the Army has established overall objectives and time frames for 

modularity, it lacks a long-term comprehensive and transparent approach 

to effectively measure its progress against stated modularity objectives, 

assess the need for further changes to its modular unit designs, and 

monitor implementation plans. A comprehensive approach includes 

performance measures and a plan to test changes to the design of the 

modular combat brigades. The Army has not developed a comprehensive 

approach because senior leadership has focused attention on developing

broad guidance and unit conversion plans for modularity while focusing 

less attention on developing ways to measure results. Without such an 

approach, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress will have full

visibility into the capabilities of the modular force and the Army’s 

implementation plans. 

Army Has Overall 

Objectives and Time 

Frames for 

Modularity, but Lacks 

a Long-Term 

Comprehensive 

Approach to Assess 

Progress and Monitor 

Implementation 

 16 Army officials also told us that some of the earlier 8,400 intelligence specialist positions 

have been reclassified as aviation specialist positions. 

Page 21 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
While the Army has identified objectives for modularity, it has not 

developed modular-specific quantifiable goals or performance metrics to 

measure its progress. GAO and DOD, among others, have identified the

importance of establishing objectives that can be translated into 

measurable, results-oriented metrics, which in turn provide accountability 

for results. In a 2003 report we found that the adoption of a resultsoriented framework that clearly establishes performance goals and 

measures progress toward those goals was a key practice for 

implementing a successful transformation.17 DOD has also recognized the 

need to develop or refine metrics so it can measure efforts to implement 

the defense strategy and provide useful information to senior leadership. 

The Army considers the Army Campaign Plan to be a key document 

guiding the modular restructuring. The plan provides broad guidelines for 

modularity and other program tasks across the entire Army. However, 

modularity-related metrics within the plan are limited to a schedule for 

creating modular units and an associated metric of achieving unit 

readiness goals for equipment, training, and personnel by certain dates 

after unit creation. Moreover, a 2005 assessment by the Office of 

Management and Budget identified the total number of brigades created as 

the only metric the Army had developed for measuring the success of its 

modularity initiative. Another key planning document, the 2005 Army 

Strategic Planning Guidance, identified several major expected advantages 

of modularity, including an increase in the combat power of the active 

component force by at least 30 percent, an increase in the rotational pool 

of ready units by at least 50 percent, the creation of a deployable jointcapable headquarters, the development of a force design upon which the 

future network-centric developments can be readily applied, and reduced

stress on the force through a more predictable deployment cycle. 

However, these goals have not translated into outcome-related metrics 

that are reported to provide decision makers a clear status of the modular 

restructuring as a whole. Army officials stated that unit-creation schedules

and readiness levels are the best available metrics for assessing modularity 

progress because modularity is a reorganization encompassing hundreds

of individual procurement programs that would be difficult to collectively

assess in a modularity context. However, we believe that results-oriented 

performance measures with specific, objective indicators used to measure 

Army Lacks Performance 

Metrics to Measure the 

Results of Modularity 

 17 GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

Page 22 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
progress toward achieving goals are essential for restructuring 

organizations. 

A major Air Force transformation initiative may provide insights on how 

the Army could develop performance metrics for a widespread

transformation of a military force. In 1998, the Air Force adopted the 

Expeditionary Aerospace Force Concept as a way to help manage its 

deployments and commitments to theater commanders and reduce the 

deployment burden on its people. Like the Army’s modular restructuring, 

the Air Force’s restructuring was fundamental to the force, and according 

to the Air Force, represented the largest transformation of its processes 

since before the Cold War. In our 2000 report,18 we found that the Air 

Force expected to achieve important benefits from the Expeditionary 

Concept, but had yet to establish specific quantifiable goals for those 

benefits, which included increasing the level of deployment predictability 

for individual service members. We recommended that the Air Force 

develop specific quantifiable goals based on the Expeditionary Concept’s

broad objectives, and establish needed metrics to measure progress 

toward these goals. In a January 2001 report to Congress on the 

Expeditionary Aerospace Force Implementation, the Air Force identified

13 metrics to measure progress in six performance areas. For example, to

better balance deployment taskings in order to provide relief to heavily

tasked units, the Air Force developed 4 metrics, including one that 

measures active duty personnel available to meet Expeditionary Force 

requirements. The Air Force described each metric and assigned either a 

quantitative goal (such as a percentage) or a trend goal indicating the 

desired direction the metric should be moving over time. These results 

were briefed regularly to the Air Force Chief of Staff. The Army’s 

transformation is more extensive than the Air Force’s in that the Air Force 

did not change traditional command and organizational structures under 

its Expeditionary Concept, while the Army modular force has made 

extensive changes to these structures, and the Air Force did not plan for 

nearly the same implementation costs as the Army. Nonetheless, we 

believe some of the goals and challenges faced by the Air Force that we 

reported in August 2000 may have relevance to the Army today. 

While we recognize the complexity of the Army’s modular restructuring, 

without clear definitions of metrics, and periodic communication of 

 18 GAO, Force Structure: Air Force Expeditionary Concept Offers Benefits but Effects 

Should Be Assessed, GAO/NSIAD-00-201 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 2000). 

Page 23 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
performance against these metrics, the Secretary of Defense and Congress 

will have difficulty assessing the impact of refinements and enhancements

to the modular design—such as DOD’s recent decision to reduce the 

number of modular combat and support brigades reported in the QDR, as 

well as any changes in resources available to meet modular design 

requirements. 

Since 2004, when the Army approved the original designs for its modular 

brigades, it has made some refinements to those designs but does not have 

a comprehensive plan for evaluating the effect of these design changes or 

the need for additional design changes as the Army gets more operational 

experience using modular brigades and integrating command and control 

headquarters, combat support units, and combat brigades. In fiscal year 

2004, TRADOC’s Analysis Center concluded that the modular combat 

brigade designs would be more capable than division-based units based on

an integrated and iterative analysis employing computer-assisted 

exercises, subject matter experts, and senior observers. This analysis 

culminated in the approval of modular brigade-based designs for the Army. 

The assessment employed performance metrics such as mission 

accomplishment, units’ organic lethality, and survivability, and compared 

the performance of variations on modular unit designs against the existing 

division-based designs. The report emphasized that the Chief of Staff of 

the Army had asked for “good enough” prototype designs that could be 

quickly implemented, and the modular organizations assessed were not 

the end of the development effort. 

Since these initial design assessments, the Army has been assessing 

implementation and making further adjustments in designs and 

implementation plans through a number of venues, to include 

Army Lacks a Plan for 

Comprehensively 

Evaluating Modular 

Designs 

• unit readiness reporting on personnel, equipment, and training; 

• modular force coordination cells to assist units in the conversion process; 

• modular force observation teams to collect lessons during training; and 

• collection and analysis teams to assess units’ effectiveness during 

deployment.

Based on data collected and analyzed through these processes, TRADOC 

has approved some design change recommendations and has not approved 

others. For example, TRADOC analyzed a Department of the Army 

proposal to reduce the number of Long-Range Advanced Scout 

Surveillance Systems, but recommended retaining the higher number in 

the existing design in part because of decreases in units’ assessed lethality 

and survivability with the reduced number of surveillance systems. 

Page 24 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Army officials maintain that ongoing assessments described above provide 

sufficient validation that the modularity concept works in practice. 

However, these assessments do not provide a comprehensive evaluation of 

the modular designs. Further, the Army does not plan to conduct a similar 

overarching analysis to assess the modular force capabilities to perform 

operations across the full spectrum of potential conflict. In November 

2005, we reported that methodically testing, exercising, and evaluating 

new doctrines and concepts is an important and established practice 

throughout the military, and that particularly large and complex issues 

may require long-term testing and evaluation that is guided by study 

plans.19 We believe the evolving nature of the design highlights the 

importance of planning for broad-based evaluations of the modular force 

to ensure the Army is achieving the capabilities it intended, and to provide 

an opportunity to make course corrections if needed. For example, one 

controversial element of the design was the decision to include two 

maneuver battalions instead of three in the modular combat brigades. 

TRADOC’s 2004 analysis noted that the modular combat brigade designs 

with the two maneuver battalion organization did not perform as well as 

the three maneuver battalion design, and cited this as one of the most 

significant areas of risk in the modular combat brigade design. 

Nonetheless, because of the significant additional cost of adding a third 

combat battalion the Army decided on a two-battalion design for the 

modular combat brigades that included key enabling equipment such as 

communications, and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Some 

defense experts, including a current division commander and several 

retired Army generals, have expressed concerns about this aspect of the 

modular design. In addition, some of these experts have expressed 

concerns about whether the current designs have been sufficiently tested

and whether they provide the best mix of capabilities to conduct fullspectrum operations. In addition, the Army has recently completed 

designs for support units and headquarters units. Once the Army gets more 

operational experience with the new modular units, it may find it needs to 

make further adjustments to its designs. Without a comprehensive testing 

plan, neither the Army nor congressional decision makers will be able to 

sufficiently assess the capabilities of the modular combat brigades as they 

are being organized, staffed, and equipped. 

 19 GAO-06-84. 

Page 25 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Conclusions The fast pace, broad scope, and cost of the Army’s effort to transform into 

a modular force present considerable challenges for the Army, and for 

Congress as well in effectively overseeing a force restructuring of this 

magnitude. The Army leadership has dedicated considerable attention, 

energy, and time to achieving its modularity goals under tight time frames. 

However, the lack of clarity in equipment and personnel plans raises 

considerable uncertainty as to whether the Army can meet its goals within 

acceptable risk levels. For example, until the Army defines and 

communicates equipment requirements for all modular units and assesses 

the risk associated with its plan to not equip brigades with all of their 

intended capabilities, it will remain unclear the extent to which its new 

modular combat brigades will be able to operate as stand-alone, selfsufficient units—a main goal of the Army’s modular transformation. With 

respect to personnel, the Army’s goal to increase its operational force 

while not permanently increasing its current end strength will require it to 

make the most efficient use of its personnel. Until the Army communicates 

the status of its various ongoing personnel initiatives, the Army’s ability to

meet personnel requirements of its new modular force will also remain 

unclear. Finally, until the Army develops a long-term comprehensive 

approach for measuring progress and a plan for evaluating changes, it 

remains uncertain how the Army will determine whether it is achieving its 

goal of creating a more rapidly deployable, joint, expeditionary force. 

Without such an approach, and clearly defined and communicated plans, 

the Secretary of Defense and Congress will not have the information 

needed to weigh competing funding priorities and monitor the Army’s 

progress in its over $52 billion effort to transform its force. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Army to take the following actions. 

First, in order for decision makers to better assess the Army’s strategy for 

equipping modular combat brigades, we recommend the Army develop 

and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with 

Recommendations for 

Executive Actions 

• details about the Army’s equipping strategy, to include the types and 

quantities of equipment active component and National Guard modular 

units would receive in each phase of the force rotation model, and how 

these amounts compare to design requirements for modular units; and 

• an assessment of the operational risk associated with this equipping 

strategy. 

Page 26 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Second, in order for decision makers to have the visibility needed to 

assess the Army’s ability to meet the personnel requirements for its new 

modular operational forces while simultaneously managing the risk to its 

noncombat forces, we recommend that the Army develop and provide the 

Secretary of Defense and Congress with 

• a report on the status of its personnel initiatives, including executable 

milestones for realigning and reducing its noncombat forces; and 

• an assessment of how the Army will fully staff its modular operational 

combat force while managing the risk to its noncombat supporting force 

structure. 

Third, to improve information available for decision makers on progress of 

the Army’s modular force implementation plans, we recommend that the 

Army develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a 

comprehensive plan for assessing the Army’s progress toward achieving 

the benefits of modularity to include 

• specific, quantifiable performance metrics to measure progress toward 

meeting the goals and objectives established in the Army Campaign Plan; 

and 

• plans and milestones for conducting further evaluation of modular unit 

designs that discuss the extent to which unit designs provide sufficient 

capabilities needed to execute National Defense Strategy and 2006 QDR 

objectives for addressing a wider range of both traditional and irregular 

security challenges. 

Finally, the Secretary of the Army should provide a testing plan as part of 

its Army Campaign Plan that includes milestones for conducting 

comprehensive assessments of the modular force as it is being 

implemented so that decision makers—-both inside and outside the 

Army—-can assess the implications of changes to the Army force structure 

in terms of the goals of modular restructuring. The results of these 

assessments should be provided to Congress as part of the Army’s 

justification for its annual budget through fiscal year 2011. 

Page 27 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

Given the significant cost and far-reaching magnitude of the Army’s plans 

for creating modular forces, Congress should consider requiring the 

Secretary of Defense to provide the information outlined in our 

recommendations including; 

• details about the Army’s equipping strategy and an assessment of the 

operational risk associated with this equipping strategy; 

• the status of the Army’s personnel initiatives and an assessment of how 

the Army will fully staff its modular operational combat force and manage 

the risk to its noncombat force structure; and 

• the Army’s plan for assessing its progress toward achieving the benefits of

modularity, plans and milestones for conducting further evaluation of 

modular unit designs, and a testing plan for conducting comprehensive 

assessments of the modular force as it is being implemented. 

In written comments on a draft of this report provided by the Army on 

behalf of DOD, the department noted that the report adequately reflects 

the challenges associated with transforming the Army to modular force 

designs while at war, but stated that the report fails to recognize ongoing 

efforts and accomplishments to date. (DOD’s comments are reprinted in 

app. II). DOD also stated that citing the views of unnamed sources 

regarding the modular combat brigade design does not contribute to an 

accurate, balanced assessment of the Army’s progress. DOD agreed or 

partially agreed with our recommendations to develop and provide 

information on its equipping strategy and personnel initiatives and to 

develop expanded performance metrics for assessing progress. However, 

DOD disagreed with three recommendations regarding the need for risk 

assessments and a testing plan to further assess designs for modular units. 

As discussed below, because of the significance, cost, scope, and potential 

for risk associated with the Army’s modularity initiative, we continue to 

believe that more transparency of the Army’s plans and risk assessments is

needed in light of the limited amount of information the Army has 

provided to Congress. Therefore, we have included a matter for 

congressional consideration to require the Secretary of Defense to provide 

more detailed plans and assessments of modularity risks. Our specific 

comments follow. 

First, we strongly disagree with DOD’s assertion that GAO used 

anonymous and unverifiable sources which detracted from an accurate

and balanced assessment of the Army’s progress in implementing 

modularity. Our analysis of the Army’s progress and potential for risk in 

implementing modular units is primarily based on our independent and 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 28 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
thorough analysis of Army plans, reports, briefings, and readiness 

assessments, which we used to compare the Army’s goals for modularity 

against its actual plans for equipping and staffing modular units. We 

sought views on modular unit designs to supplement our analysis from a 

diverse group of knowledgeable people both inside and outside the Army 

and DOD, including Army headquarters officials, division and brigade 

commanders, Army officials who played key roles in developing and 

assessing modular unit designs, and retired generals and defense experts

who have studied and written about Army transformation. Our longstanding policy is not to include the names of individuals from whom we

obtained information but to use information and evidence from

appropriate and relevant sources and provide balance in our report. We 

integrated evidence and information from all sources to reach conclusions 

and formulate the recommendations included in this report. Our report 

recognizes the Army’s progress in implementing modular units while fully 

engaged in ongoing operations but also identifies and provides

transparency regarding a number of risks inherent in the Army’s plans so 

that Congress will have better information with which to make decisions

on funding and oversight. The discussion we present highlighting the 

concerns of some current and retired senior Army officers and defense 

experts regarding certain aspects of modular designs is used to illustrate 

the need for further evaluation of modular units as they move from 

concept to reality—an approach consistent with DOD policy and best 

practice in transforming defense capabilities. 

DOD also stated that the report inaccurately (1) asserts that Shadow 

tactical unmanned aerial vehicle systems will be fielded with fewer air 

vehicles due to a shortage of operators and maintainers, and (2) depicts 

the growth of Army Intelligence positions. We disagree with DOD’s 

assessment. As our report clearly points out, based on documentation 

obtained from the Army, the Army’s approved modular combat brigade 

design was for seven air vehicles per Shadow system, which would 

provide 24-hour per day aerial surveillance, but the Army opted to field 

Shadow systems with four air vehicles instead, primarily because it lacks

adequate numbers of air vehicle operators and maintainers. Although the 

Army believes that Shadow systems with four air vehicles are adequate at

this time, we believe it is important to provide transparency by presenting

information which shows that modular combat brigades will not have all 

of the capabilities intended by the original modular combat brigade 

designs (i.e., brigade-level 24-hour per day surveillance operations) 

without Shadow systems composed of seven air vehicles. 

With regard to the number of intelligence positions, our report accurately

notes that the Army decided to increase its intelligence positions by 5,600

Page 29 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
in the active force. However, we also note that this was a revision of an 

earlier higher estimate of 8,400 positions projected by Army intelligence 

officials. Therefore, we do not agree with the department’s comment that 

the report inaccurately depicts the growth of Army intelligence positions, 

nor do we agree with its characterization that the report inappropriately 

focuses on the Army’s manning challenges. We believe that it is important 

for the Secretary of Defense and Congress to have a clear and transparent 

picture of the personnel challenges the Army faces in order to fully 

achieve the goals of modular restructuring and make informed decisions 

on resources and authorized end strength. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Army develop and provide 

the Secretary of Defense and Congress with details about the Army’s 

equipping strategy. DOD commented that the Army recently completed 

development of the equipping strategy for modular forces and that the 

Army has conducted equipping conferences to ensure that soldiers have 

the best equipment available as they train and deploy. We requested a 

copy of the Army’s recently completed equipping strategy but did not 

receive a copy prior to publication and therefore have not been able to 

assess how and to what extent it meets the intent of our recommendation. 

Moreover, DOD did not indicate what, if any, actions it planned to take to 

provide Congress with specific details about the Army’s equipping 

strategy, as we recommended. Therefore, we have highlighted the need 

for more complete information on the Army’s equipping strategy in a 

matter for congressional consideration. 

DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Army develop and 

provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with an assessment of the 

risk associated with the Army’s rotational equipping strategy and said in 

its comments that this action is already occurring on a regular basis. 

Although the Army is considering risk in managing existing equipment, at

the time of our review the Army had not finished developing its equipping 

strategy for its new rotational force model. Therefore, we continue to 

believe that the Army needs to document and provide risk assessments to 

Congress based on its newly completed equipping strategy. This is 

particularly important given other Army priorities such as the Future 

Combat System and near-term equipping needs for Iraq that will compete 

for funding and may cause changes to the Army’s current equipping 

strategy for modular units. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Army develop 

and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a report on the 

status of its personnel initiatives. However, DOD commented that adding 

Page 30 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
another report on this issue would be duplicative and irrelevant and said 

this action is already occurring on a regular basis. However, while Army 

documents present an overview of how the Army is allocating military 

personnel to operational and nonoperational positions, they do not 

provide specific information on the Army’s progress in implementing 

personnel initiatives. Moreover, the department’s comments did not 

address whether the Army plans to provide additional information to 

Congress. We continue to believe that such information is needed by

Congress to inform their decisions on Army personnel levels. 

DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Army develop and 

provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a risk assessment of 

how the Army will fully staff its modular operational combat force while 

managing the risk to its noncombat supporting force structure. DOD 

commented that the Army provided the Office of the Secretary of Defense

with a plan for reshaping the Army, including increasing the active 

operating force and downsizing overall active end strength by fiscal year 

2011, based on several assumptions. However, this document, which 

Army officials provided to us, does not highlight potential risks in 

executing the Army’s plan. Moreover, DOD’s comments did not address 

the intent of our recommendation that the Army improve transparency by 

providing Congress with additional information on its plans and 

assessment of risk. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Army develop and 

provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a comprehensive plan

for assessing the Army’s progress toward achieving modularity goals and

said the Army will explore the development of expanded performance 

metrics. However, DOD stated that plans and milestones for measuring 

progress are unwarranted as such evaluations occur continuously. We 

commend DOD for agreeing to develop expanded performance metrics. 

However, because of the cost and magnitude of the Army’s transformation 

plans, we continue to believe that developing and disseminating a 

comprehensive and formal evaluation plan are critical for providing 

transparency and accountability for results. As discussed in the report, 

the Army is collecting some data on the performance of modular units that 

attend training events and deploy overseas, but lacks a long-term 

comprehensive and transparent approach for integrating the results of 

these assessments to measure overall progress. 

Finally, DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to provide a testing plan that 

includes milestones for assessing modular unit designs as they are being 

Page 31 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
implemented. DOD said the Army thoroughly evaluated modular force 

designs and continues to evaluate all facets of modular force performance 

both in training and combat operations. Nevertheless, we believe that the

Army needs a more transparent, long-term, and comprehensive plan for 

evaluating the modular designs. The Army is still early in its

implementation of modular support brigades and higher echelon 

command and control and support units and further evaluation of these 

designs based on actual experience may demonstrate that design 

refinements are needed. Furthermore, although the Army has gained some 

useful operational experience with modular combat units, this experience 

has been limited to stability operations and irregular warfare, rather than

major combat operations or other operations across the full spectrum of 

potential conflict. To facilitate further assessment of unit designs, we 

have included this issue in our matter for congressional consideration. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), and the Secretary of the Army. 

We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this 

report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-

4402. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to

this report are listed in appendix III. 

Janet A. St. Laurent 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 32 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
List of Committees 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 33 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, obtained and 

reviewed documentation, and interviewed officials from Headquarters, 

Department of Army; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. 

Army Forces Command; and the U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis. We 

supplemented this information with visits to the first three Army divisions 

undergoing modular conversions—-the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions and 

the 101st Airborne Division—to gain an understanding of the Army’s 

modular force implementation plans and progress in organizing, staffing,

and equipping active modular combat brigades. 

To determine the Army’s modular force organizational design 

requirements and supporting analysis, we analyzed Department of the 

Army guidance for creating modular forces, and briefings and other 

documents on the Army’s modular force design and analytical process 

from the Training and Doctrine Command’s Analysis Center. To determine 

the Army’s progress and plans for equipping active component modular 

combat brigades, we analyzed Department of Army data on selected

equipment that Army analysis identified as essential for achieving the 

modular combat brigades’ intended capabilities. For these selected items, 

we calculated the Army’s equipment requirements for active component 

modular combat brigades by multiplying equipment requirements obtained 

from the Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Operations and Training (G-3) for each of the three brigade variants—

heavy, light, and Stryker—by the planned number of brigades in each 

variant. We then compared the sum of equipment requirements in the 

active component to data we obtained from officials from the Department 

of the Army G-8 on the expected on-hand levels of equipment and assessed 

the reliability of the data by discussing the results with knowledgeable 

officials. We determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for 

our objectives. We also reviewed unit readiness reports from those 

brigades that had completed or were in the process of completing their 

modular conversion as of February 2006. For our assessment of Army 

National Guard equipping challenges, we relied on past GAO reports and 

testimony. 

To determine the progress made and challenges to managing personnel 

requirements of the modular force, we reviewed documents and discussed 

the implications of force structure requirements with officials from the 

Department of Army Offices of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel 

(G1) and Intelligence (G2). We also discussed key personnel-related 

concerns during our visits to the divisions undergoing modular 

conversion. To determine the Army’s strategies and plans for meeting its 

modular force personnel requirements without permanently increasing 

Page 34 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

overall end strength, we interviewed officials from the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and the 

Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations 

and Training (G3). We also reviewed the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 

Review as it pertained to Army personnel end strength, and the Army’s 

Future Year Defense Program and supplemental budget requests for fiscal 

years 2005 and 2006 to determine the Army’s personnel funding plans. 

To determine the extent to which the Army has developed an approach for 

assessing implementation of modularity and for further adjusting designs 

or implementation plans, we reviewed our prior work on assessing 

organizations undertaking significant reorganizations. We reviewed and 

analyzed the Army Campaign Plan and discussed it with officials in the 

Department of Army Headquarters, especially officials from the Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Operations and Training (G3). To analyze the Army’s 

approach for assessing the implementation of its modular conversion, we 

examined key Army planning documents and discussed objectives, 

performance metrics, and testing plans with appropriate officials in the 

Department of the Army Headquarters, and the Training and Doctrine 

Command’s Analysis Center. In addition, we met with a panel of retired 

senior Army general officers at the Association of the U.S. Army Institute 

of Land Warfare, Arlington, Virginia. We relied on past GAO reports 

assessing organizations undertaking significant reorganizations. 

We conducted our work from September 2004 through March 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 35 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 36 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 37 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 38 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 39 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 40 GAO-06-745 Force Structure
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 41 GAO-06-745

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402 

In addition to the person named above, Gwendolyn Jaffe, Assistant 

Director; Margaret Best; Alissa Czyz; Christopher Forys; Kevin Handley; 

Joah Iannotta; Harry Jobes; David Mayfield; Jason Venner; and J. Andrew 

Walker made major contributions to this report. 

Force Structure

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(350707) 
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