2022 UT App 5

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

H. CANDI WADSWORTH,

Appellant,

v.

GUY L. WADSWORTH,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20190106-CA

No. 20200430-CA

Filed January 13, 2022

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Su Chon

No. 104904966

Michael D. Zimmerman, Troy L. Booher, and Julie J. 

Nelson, Attorneys for Appellant

Clark W. Sessions, T. Mickell Jimenez, Marcy G. 

Glenn, and Kristina R. Van Bockern, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion, 

in which JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and RYAN D. TENNEY

concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 This appeal arises from the divorce and division of the 

marital estate belonging to H. Candi Wadsworth and Guy L. 

Wadsworth. Candi1 challenges various aspects of the district 

court’s marital property valuation, its decision to defer the 

 

1. As is our practice, because the parties share the same last 

name, we refer to each by their first name, with no disrespect 

intended by the apparent informality.
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payment of her share of the marital estate, its award of alimony, 

and various other findings and orders. Guy cross-appeals, 

raising challenges relating to terms of the deferred payment and 

the alimony award. In a separate appeal, Candi also challenges 

the district court’s decision not to grant her a security interest in 

her portion of the marital estate, which she will not receive in 

full until December 31, 2024. Because that issue is intertwined 

with various issues raised in the first appeal, we address both 

appeals in this consolidated opinion. 

¶2 We remand for the district court to add certain notes 

receivable to the value of the marital estate, to adjust its alimony 

award to account for Candi’s tax burden, to clarify its decision 

on whether security is required for the alimony award, and to 

grant Candi a security interest in her portion of the marital 

estate. We otherwise affirm the district court’s decision.

BACKGROUND

¶3 Candi and Guy married in 1979. Guy started Wadsworth 

Brothers Construction (WBC) in 1991, and over the years, it grew 

into a multimillion-dollar company. The parties also have 

interests in numerous other business entities, including two 

restaurants, a hotel, and various real estate holdings.

¶4 In 2009, Candi filed for divorce, suspecting that Guy was 

involved in an extramarital affair. Guy denied the infidelity, and 

the couple reconciled. However, a year later, Guy confessed to 

an affair, and Candi again filed for divorce.

Pre-Divorce Proceedings and Temporary Orders

¶5 During the period between these two divorce filings, Guy 

purchased two restaurants, a plane, a cabin, and a yacht. He did 

not discuss any of these purchases with Candi, and she learned 

about them from other people. The yacht cost $2,502,800, but by 
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the time of trial, the yacht was under water—Guy still owed 

$1,175,399, but the yacht was worth only $790,500.

¶6 Without consulting Candi, Guy also assigned fractional 

shares of various marital entities to the Wadsworth Children’s 

2007 Irrevocable Trust (the Trust) in 2009. Although the parties 

had created the Trust two years before, they had originally 

funded it with only $10. By the time of trial in 2017, the fractional 

shares held by the Trust were worth approximately $4 million.

¶7 While the divorce was pending, Guy maintained control 

of the marital estate, apart from $1 million and two interestgenerating accounts that he transferred to Candi early in the 

proceedings. In February 2012, the district court adopted the 

parties’ stipulation regarding temporary orders (the Stipulation) 

stating that, on a temporary basis, Guy “shall pay all of the 

children’s expenses as he has in the past as well as all of 

[Candi’s] expenses as he has in the past.” Because Guy was 

paying these expenses, he was not ordered to pay temporary 

child support or alimony at that time. The Stipulation also 

addressed the use of marital assets during the pendency of the 

divorce proceedings:

1. Based upon the parties’ stipulation, [Guy] shall 

maintain, in the regular course of business, the 

management and control of [WBC], as he has in the 

past.

2. Based upon the parties’ stipulation, neither party 

shall sell, gift, transfer, dissipate, encumber, secrete 

or dispose of marital assets other than in the course 

of their normal living expenditures, ordinary and 

necessary business expenses and to pay divorce 

attorneys and expert fees and costs. [Guy] shall 

have the right to conduct the business hereinabove 

identified as he has in the past, which may include 
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incurring debt, paying expenses and acquiring 

assets. 

¶8 During the divorce proceedings, Candi asked the court to 

hold Guy in contempt based on alleged violations of the 

Stipulation. She asserted that he made numerous financial 

transactions that violated the Stipulation, including selling his 

home, buying a new home, selling a hotel, creating a new 

business entity and loaning it money, investing money in a 

property development company (FDFM), purchasing a jet to 

“flip,” and making an “undisclosed sale” of $697,448.72. The 

court accepted Guy’s and his estate planning attorney’s 

testimonies that “Guy had a history of setting up different 

corporate entities for liability protection purposes” and that he 

“did not create any entity or transfer any asset with the intention 

of hiding it from Candi.” The court found that “the transactions 

Candi complains of were consistent with Guy’s historical 

practice of transferring assets from one entity to another or from 

one form into another” and that those actions fell within the 

Stipulation’s condition permitting Guy “to conduct the business 

hereinabove identified as he has in the past, which may include 

incurring debt, paying expenses and acquiring assets.” The court 

also found that “[t]here is no indication that these transactions 

were out of the ordinary or done with the intent to hide assets.” 

¶9 In September 2014, Guy sought to modify the Stipulation, 

explaining that the parties’ last child had reached majority, that 

he had paid off the mortgage on Candi’s house, and that he had 

purchased Candi a new vehicle, thereby eliminating many of her 

expenses. Guy asked the court to modify its order to require him 

to pay Candi $20,000 per month rather than all her expenses 

without limit. Following a hearing in January 2015, the court 

ordered that Guy pay Candi $20,000 per month in temporary 

alimony. It also ordered that Candi “keep an accounting of how 

the money is spent if she desires more funds.” During the first 

month following the order, Candi exceeded the $20,000 budget 
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and “she had to repay Guy for amounts she had previously 

spent as well as cancel planned travel with the children.” In 

April 2015, the court issued a written order in which it clarified 

that Guy should “reimburse” Candi “as to any payments beyond 

the $20,000” unless he could show it was “an inappropriate or 

excessive expense.” Candi never requested additional funds 

from Guy after the court issued the written April 2015 order. She 

claims this was because she elected to curtail her spending rather 

than ask Guy for extra money; she maintains that she did not 

believe he would comply with her requests and she did not want 

to incur more attorney fees to collect the money. During this 

period, Guy was spending approximately $60,000 per month.

¶10 Guy represented that Candi continued to have access to 

the parties’ boats and planes, a cabin, free dining at the 

restaurants, and a country club and other exclusive resorts for 

which Guy continued to pay the membership fees. However, to 

use the planes and boats, Guy expected Candi to pay for the cost 

of the pilot, captain, and other expenses out of her $20,000 

monthly funds. Candi did not do so because she understood the 

cost to be between $5,000 and $10,000 per trip. Candi also 

alleged that Guy refused a number of requests she made to use 

the parties’ shared assets.

Procedural History of the Divorce

¶11 The parties spent more than six years conducting 

discovery and other pretrial litigation before the matter finally 

came before the district court for an eight-day bench trial in 

February 2017. The court held a second four-day trial in May 

2017 concerning Candi’s attempt to revoke the Trust. See infra

¶ 25.

¶12 The court issued a Memorandum Decision, Findings of 

Fact and Conclusions of Law in September 2017 (the 2017 

Findings). Subsequently, Candi filed a Motion to Clarify, and 

both parties also filed Motions to Amend. The court issued an 
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order addressing those motions in May 2018 (the May 2018 

Order). In response to that order, both parties filed additional 

Motions to Amend, which the district court ruled on in a 

Memorandum Decision and Order in October 2018 (the October 

2018 Order). The court then directed Guy to prepare 

supplemental findings of fact to incorporate the various rulings 

encapsulated in the May 2018 Order and the October 2018 Order.

¶13 Following the October 2018 Order, Guy filed an Ex Parte 

Motion for Expedited Entry of Decree of Divorce. Guy pointed 

out that new federal tax law would change how alimony was 

taxed for any divorce decrees entered on or after January 1, 2019. 

Instead of alimony being taxable to the payee spouse and 

deductible to the payor spouse, alimony would become taxable 

to the payor and deductible to the payee. Since the trial had 

occurred and the 2017 Findings had been entered over a year 

before, “predicated on the application of the existing divorce 

laws,” Guy asserted that it would be inequitable to enter the 

divorce decree after December 31, 2018. Although the court 

indicated that it believed “both parties are to blame” for the 

delays in finalizing the decree, it ultimately did enter 

Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (the 2018 

Supplemental Findings), as well as the Decree of Divorce, on 

December 31, 2018.

¶14 The parties then filed a third set of cross-motions to 

amend the findings and conclusions, and the court held a 

hearing on those motions in early 2019. The court entered a 

Memorandum Decision and Order in May 2019, which it 

subsequently amended in June 2019 (the 2019 Order). The court 

directed Candi to prepare corrected Supplemental Findings of 

Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Supplemental Decree of 

Divorce. The court entered the Amended Supplemental Findings 

of Fact and Conclusions of Law (the 2019 Supplemental 

Findings) and the Amended Decree of Divorce on October 30, 

2019.
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Expert Valuation of Marital Property 

¶15 Both parties hired experts to value the various business 

entities. Three aspects of that valuation and the district court’s 

findings are relevant on appeal: notes receivable, WBC’s 

backlog, and WBC’s equipment.

Notes Receivable

¶16 The balance sheets for three of the entities owned by Guy 

included in their accounting of liabilities loans that they owed to 

Guy—Immobiliare II, Ltd. owed Guy $252,861; Five Diamond 

Hospitality, Inc. owed Guy $706,605; and FDFM owed Guy 

$100,000. These liabilities were considered in the court’s final 

calculation of these entities’ value. However, the notes receivable 

on these loans—which belonged to Guy—were not counted as 

marital assets.

¶17 The court made no mention of the notes receivable in its 

2017 Findings. Candi raised this matter in her Motion to Clarify. 

Candi asked the court to add the value of the notes receivable to 

the value of the estate. In response, Guy did not assert that the 

notes had been included but nevertheless resisted their inclusion 

as part of the marital estate, arguing that Candi had not made 

the “request at trial and did not enter evidence of where the 

funds remain and in which entities or whether the funds are 

being used for business purposes.” The court found that “[t]he 

parties agree that the Court did not consider the three notes 

receivable” but observed that “[n]either party points to the 

record regarding this issue.” The court did not adjust its 

valuation of the estate based on the notes.

¶18 Subsequently, Candi filed her second motion to amend, in 

which she again raised the matter of the notes receivable, among 

other things. In the October 2018 Order, the court found that 

Candi “does not show that those notes were not considered in 

the company valuations” and that it had “already addressed her 
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argument” in the previous order. Guy was then asked to prepare 

supplemental findings based on the court’s order, and that 

version of the findings stated that “all Notes Receivable were 

included in the valuation of the various marital entities by the 

parties’ experts.”

WBC’s Backlog

¶19 As of June 30, 2016, WBC had a backlog of work—

construction contracts that had been signed but for which the 

work had yet to be completed—amounting to an estimated value 

of approximately $75 million. Guy testified that WBC’s profit 

margin on such projects was typically between 5% and 7%. 

Candi’s expert estimated the projected net profit on the backlog 

to be $3,441,733. Guy’s expert estimated that the projects would 

realize a gross profit of $4,676,347, but he also opined that the 

backlog ultimately had “no value” because “the backlog in its 

current state” was not sufficient to sustain the company and 

could therefore be expected to start “absorb[ing] cash flow.” Guy 

also testified that WBC had struggled to make a profit since the 

recession and had to lay off workers and use capital to continue 

operating. He testified that WBC had failed to get some large 

contracts it was hoping for and that its backlog was less than in 

past years. Another witness, who advises large companies on 

marketing and selling their businesses, testified that 

“marketability” and “valuation methodologies” are “all centered 

around current backlog.” He explained that “in a construction 

company, they’re only as good as the backlog in front of them.”

¶20 The court found that “the value of the projected backlog 

profit is $4 million.” However, the court adopted Guy’s expert’s 

valuation of WBC, which had assigned the backlog no 

independent value. The parties addressed the inconsistency in 

their motions to amend. Candi asked the court to adjust the 

overall valuation of WBC upward by $4 million to reflect its 

finding that the backlog profit was worth $4 million. Guy asked 
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the court to change its finding that the backlog was worth $4 

million to conform to its adoption of his expert’s valuation of the 

company, which assigned the backlog no value. In its May 2018 

Order, the court found that Guy’s expert had “testified the 

backlog had no value to a potential buyer, and the Court 

adopted his valuation of WBC.” It also found that the other 

witness had testified that “any potential purchaser would not 

purchase the company based on a backlog.” Finally, it found that 

“Candi did not provide counter-testimony to” the “statements of 

no value in the backlog.” Accordingly, it concluded that “[t]he 

evidence supports that the backlog has no value in the valuation 

of the company” and amended its decision to state that “the 

backlog has no value.” These amended findings were 

incorporated into the 2018 Supplemental Findings. 

WBC’s Equipment

¶21 Both parties hired experts to assess the value of WBC’s 

equipment. Guy’s expert had worked in the construction 

industry for twenty-five years and had been an appraiser for 

Ritchie Brothers Auctioneers for four years. To value the 

equipment, the expert used “internal standards that [Ritchie 

Brothers] has developed over time and experience” based on 

“historical auctions, personal experiences of appraisers, and 

knowledge of the world’s economic conditions.” Guy’s expert 

testified that Ritchie Brothers’ “business is derived primarily 

from stable operators exchanging equipment and updating 

equipment inventories in the normal course of business,” rather 

than wholesalers trying to resell and make additional profit, and 

that “80 percent of [their] sales . . . represent fair market value.” 

Guy’s expert and his team “personally inspected nearly all the 

pieces of equipment at issue”; “[t]hey turned on the machines, 

checked the miles and hours and verified the [vehicle 

identification numbers].” They appraised 569 items and 

estimated that “the entire package of equipment . . . would sell at 

unreserved public auction in the range of $13,890,300.”
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¶22 Candi’s expert is a member of the American Society of 

Appraisers and is an Accredited Senior Appraiser. He conducts 

appraisals based on the Uniform Standards of Professional 

Appraisal Practice (USPAP). He testified that “he evaluated the 

equipment at the fair market value of a ‘going concern’ 

business” and that he believed using “auction values” was more 

appropriate for a business that was trying to liquidate its 

inventory. Candi’s expert received a list of approximately 400 

pieces of equipment with the make, model, description, and 

serial number. He “did not closely inspect each piece of 

equipment,” “did not start any of the equipment, did not look at 

the mileage or hours logged, and did not consider the condition 

of each piece.” He “took photos of the equipment and researched 

the values by contacting manufacturers, contractors, and dealers; 

consulting other sales [online]; and considering his prior 

appraisals and experience.” Ultimately, Candi’s expert valued 

the equipment at $22,499,255.

¶23 The court found that the method used by Guy’s expert 

was “more accurate” and that his team was “more thorough in 

assessing the individual pieces of equipment.” The court rejected 

Candi’s assertion that selling equipment at “an auction house 

has the same connotation as a fire sale,” relying on the expert’s 

testimony that end users regularly buy heavy construction 

equipment at auction. It therefore adopted Guy’s expert’s 

$13,890,300 valuation of the equipment.

Dissipation

¶24 Candi argued to the district court that Guy had dissipated 

marital assets in anticipation of divorce, including spending 

money on his girlfriend; purchasing the yacht, a jet, and a wine 

collection; paying attorney fees for the Trust; and transferring 

money out of the estate into the Trust. Except as to $814,000 Guy 

spent on his girlfriend, for which it compensated Candi out of 

the marital estate, the court found that “Guy did not dissipate 
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marital assets.” Although the court found that the legal fees 

spent on the Trust were not dissipation, it nevertheless allocated 

half of that value to Candi as part of the marital estate. As to the 

purchase of the yacht, jet, and wine, the court reasoned that Guy 

did not dissipate assets by purchasing these items because the 

items were still in the marital estate, and Candi was awarded 

half their value. The court also found that “[i]t was Guy’s 

historical practice to buy planes and boats” and that “[s]ome 

depreciation of” such assets “is to be expected.” The court 

rejected Candi’s argument that purchasing a depreciating asset 

should, as a rule, be considered dissipation. However, the court 

assigned the negative value on the yacht entirely to Guy, 

reasoning that he “unilaterally purchased this boat” and limited 

Candi’s access.

¶25 The parties engaged in extensive litigation regarding the 

Trust, even going through a separate trial to address the validity 

of the transfers and to consider Candi’s attempt to revoke the 

Trust. However, the court ultimately determined that “the Trust 

was validly created,” that the parties intended for it to be 

irrevocable, that the creation and funding of the Trust was “in 

line with the parties’ history of gifting assets to the children as 

part of their wealth management and estate planning strategy,” 

that “there is no evidence that Guy was motivated by a desire to 

divest Candi of marital assets,” and that the transfers were 

completed before Candi filed for divorce so that the Trust 

property was not part of the marital estate or subject to division. 

Accordingly, the court rejected Candi’s argument that Guy’s 

transfer of assets into the Trust constituted dissipation.

¶26 Candi also took issue with Guy’s investment in FDFM, an 

entity “created to develop land in [North] Dakota when the oil 

rush was booming.” Although Guy’s interest in FDFM by the 

time of trial was worth only $734,000, he had invested $1,129,000 

into it. Candi asserted that the higher value should be used 

because Guy did not disclose the investment to her. The district 
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court rejected this argument, explaining that Guy “never 

consulted with Candi on any business decisions that he made” 

throughout the marriage, so making business decisions without 

disclosing them to her was “well within the scope of his 

historical practices.”

¶27 Candi also complained that Guy had used marital funds 

to pay his attorney fees and that his spending on fees had not 

been credited to the marital estate. In examining the funds each 

party had already received, the court recognized that Candi had 

received $1,277,500 in marital funds to pay her attorney and 

expert fees and costs. The court also estimated, based on Guy’s 

testimony, that Guy had spent approximately $800,000 in 

attorney and expert fees and costs. The court equalized these 

amounts in calculating the value of the marital estate. 

Division of the Estate and Equalization Payment

¶28 The district court found that the total value of the marital 

estate was $43,886,329.85 and that each party should receive half 

of that value ($21,943,164.93). The court awarded Candi various 

liquid assets, real property, vehicles, retirement plans, 

investments, and other property totaling just over $4.7 million. It 

awarded the remainder of the marital property, including all 

interest in the parties’ various businesses, to Guy and ordered 

Guy to pay Candi $17,238,018.02 to compensate her for the value 

of her portion of the estate. The court explained that “because of 

the overlapping entities and the numerous assets placed in 

various entities, it would be more appropriate to award Candi a 

sum of money constituting her share of the marital estate.” The 

court found that “shared ownership of the companies” was not 

an option because “Candi does not have the business acumen 

necessary to know how to run these companies” and that it 

would be “a bad idea” for the parties to continue their 

relationship by operating the companies together, “especially 

given Candi’s distrust of Guy.” It also found that “[a] forced sale 
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of marital business assets is not in the best interest of either 

party” because both parties benefit from “Guy’s continued work 

for WBC and other businesses.” 

¶29 Although Candi had argued to the district court that she 

should be given ownership of the two restaurants to help offset 

the portion of the estate owed to her, the court rejected that 

request because it found that “her limited business experience 

would not help her in increasing the value of the business.” In its 

May 2018 Order, the court further explained its refusal to award 

the restaurants to Candi by observing that the restaurants had 

only just begun to be profitable due to Guy’s careful 

management and that the restaurants were partially owned by a 

third party.

¶30 In the initial 2017 Findings, the court did not outline a 

method for Candi to receive her share of the marital estate. 

Candi proposed several options, including appointing a special 

master to oversee the distribution, transferring some of the 

assets to her directly, sharing ownership of the companies, or 

forcing a sale of some of the assets. The court rejected each of 

these proposals. Instead, in the 2018 Supplemental Findings, the 

court ordered Guy to pay the amount owed to Candi “in such 

equal monthly installments as he shall determine.” Any 

remaining amount was to be paid in a balloon payment five 

years from the date of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, which 

made the final payment to Candi due December 31, 2023. The 

court also ordered that Guy pay 10% annual interest on the 

amount owed to Candi. Although Guy contested the high 

interest rate, the court justified it because the court had given 

him “substantial leeway in setting the payment schedule over 

the next five years.” Because Guy would have “exclusive and 

full access to the marital assets,” the court reasoned that the high 

interest rate would give him a necessary incentive to make the 

payments more quickly.
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¶31 In subsequent motions, the parties continued to dispute 

the court’s equalization order. Thus, in its 2019 Supplemental 

Findings, the court again modified the payment schedule. Guy 

was to pay Candi (1) $30,000 per month, to be applied first 

toward interest; (2) $500,000 per year, to be applied first toward 

interest; and (3) a balloon payment of the outstanding principal 

and interest by December 31, 2024.2 The court also modified the 

interest rate to 5% per year. The court explained that the 10% 

interest rate “was appropriate” when the court had “deferred to 

Guy to come up with an appropriate payment plan” but that it 

was excessive once the court “determined the payment plan.” 

Instead, the court set the interest rate at 5% and explained that 

rate was intended “to provide Guy with an incentive to pay the 

Equalizing Balance quickly.”

¶32 After the court issued its ruling, Candi filed a motion 

asking the court to secure her unpaid share of the marital estate. 

She explained that security was necessary to “protect her from 

dissipation, economic uncertainties, or Guy’s death.” She also 

asked for an injunction ordering Guy “not to alienate, waste, 

dissipate, or diminish his share, ownership interest, or the value 

of the entities” without “Candi’s express, prior, written 

permission.” Candi proposed several methods for securing her 

interest, including attaching a UCC-1 lien to the assets of WBC 

or other marital entities or imposing other “conditions and 

covenants” on Guy and WBC. But she also explained that “there 

are a lot of different ways” to give her an effective security 

 

2. Because of the various objections to the payment plan, the 

court changed the commencement date from the date of the 

entry of the Decree of Divorce to the date of entry of the 

Amended Decree of Divorce and changed the balloon payment 

due date from December 31, 2023, to December 31, 2024. The 

court found the change to be appropriate because it could not 

“determine who has delayed the payment plan.” 
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interest, including placing a lien on the restaurants, WBC’s 

equipment, or Guy’s interest in the businesses.

¶33 The court refused to grant Candi any security, reasoning 

that it could not award a lien against the businesses because 

“[t]he businesses were not parties to this suit,” that the 

equalization payments were not subject to the Uniform 

Commercial Code because the division of the marital estate is 

not a commercial transaction, and that Guy was unable to obtain 

adequate life insurance to secure her interest due to his age and 

health. The court did not provide any further rationale for its 

determination that no security was warranted or explain why 

other options for securing Candi’s unpaid interest in the marital 

estate, such as a lien on Guy’s personal interest in the businesses, 

could not be employed.

Alimony

¶34 In its 2017 Findings, the district court found that Candi 

testified “she had more than $20,000 in reasonable monthly 

expenses.” However, the court found that Candi “could not 

testify as to specific details” and “did not prepare a financial 

declaration.” Nevertheless, the court examined standard 

financial declaration items, Guy’s financial declaration, a 

standard of living analysis of the parties’ pre-separation 

spending prepared by one of Candi’s experts, and Guy’s record 

of the expenses he paid on Candi’s behalf while the divorce was 

pending to reach a determination regarding Candi’s monthly 

need. The court included numerous categories of expenses in its 

needs calculation and determined Candi’s reasonable monthly 

expenses to be $27,693.90. However, the court did not include 

taxes in its assessment of Candi’s needs, because Candi “failed to 

provide evidence of her tax liability at trial.” The court imputed 

minimum wage income to Candi at $1,257 per month. The court 

subtracted the imputed income from Candi’s reasonable 
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monthly expenses to determine that her monthly need is 

$26,436.90.

¶35 The court found that Guy had a net income of $141,143 

per month and reasonable monthly expenses of $50,138. 

Accordingly, it found that Guy easily had the ability to pay 

alimony in the amount of $26,436.90 per month to Candi. It 

ordered Guy to pay that amount of alimony for a length of time 

equal to the length of the marriage, effective as of the date of the 

2017 Findings. Alimony was to terminate upon “the death of 

either party” or “remarriage or cohabitation by” Candi. The 

court also indicated that “Guy should provide a life insurance 

policy for Candi to cover alimony for a period of time sufficient 

to cover his obligation should he unexpectedly pass away.”

¶36 While the parties’ various motions were pending 

following the entry of the 2017 Findings, Guy represented that 

he was unable to get life insurance due to a health condition and 

asked the court to remove that requirement. The court denied 

Guy’s request and found in the May 2018 Order, 

Although there was information regarding Guy’s 

health, there was no information whether or not he 

could or could not obtain a life insurance policy. 

The Court wants to ensure that Candi will receive 

the money awarded should he pass unexpectedly. 

The parties may also work toward a mutually 

agreeable solution that will protect Candi and her 

ability to receive said money. 

However, the 2018 Supplemental Findings, drafted by Guy, 

stated simply that “there was no information as to whether or 

not Guy could or could not obtain a life insurance policy for 

such purpose nor the cost thereof.” Candi urged the court to be 

more specific by making its life insurance order mandatory and 

requiring Guy to provide an alternative means of security if he 

could not get life insurance. However, the court declined to do 
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so, stating that “[t]he Court’s ruling in the [May 2018 Order] is 

sufficient.”

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶37 On appeal, Candi argues (1) that the operative dates of 

the Decree of Divorce should be adjusted or, alternatively, that 

the balloon payment should be due on December 31, 2023; (2) 

that she received unequal access to the marital estate while the 

divorce was pending and should be compensated for the 

inequality; (3) that the court erred in its valuation of the marital 

estate, namely, by failing to take into account the value of the 

notes receivable, undervaluing WBC’s backlog and equipment, 

and not crediting the estate for Guy’s alleged dissipation of 

assets; (4) that the court erred in setting the terms of the marital 

estate division and refusing to grant her a security; (5) that the 

court should have included her tax burden in its calculation of 

her need for alimony purposes and required Guy to secure his 

alimony obligation with life insurance or by some other means; 

and (6) that the court exceeded its discretion by not holding Guy 

in contempt for violating the Stipulation.

¶38 For his part, Guy argues, on cross-appeal, (1) that the 

court set too high an interest rate on the balloon payment, (2) 

that the court should have required Candi to share in transaction 

costs that may be incurred if and when Guy liquidates assets to 

make the balloon payment, and (3) that the court should not 

have awarded any alimony to Candi at all. 

¶39 The court’s valuation of the marital property, the manner 

in which it distributed that property, and its alimony 

determination are all subject to the same standard of review. “In 

divorce actions, a district court is permitted considerable 

discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the 

parties, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.” 

Gardner v. Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 18, 452 P.3d 1134 (quotation 
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20190106-CA 18 2022 UT App 5

simplified). “We can properly find abuse [of the district court’s 

discretion] only if no reasonable person would take the view 

adopted by the [district] court.” Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, 

¶ 26, 299 P.3d 1079 (quotation simplified).

Accordingly, we will reverse only if (1) there was a 

misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 

resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; (2) 

the factual findings upon which the award was 

based are clearly erroneous; or (3) the party 

challenging the award shows that such a serious 

inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 

discretion.

Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 18 (quotation simplified).

¶40 The court’s decision whether to hold Guy in contempt is 

also entitled to deference. “The decision to hold a party in 

contempt of court rests within the sound discretion of the trial 

court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court’s 

action is so unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and 

arbitrary, or a clear abuse of discretion.” Barton v. Barton, 2001 

UT App 199, ¶ 9, 29 P.3d 13 (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

I. Operative Dates

¶41 Candi first argues that the court should make the entire 

divorce decree effective on October 30, 2019, rather than 

December 31, 2018, since that was the date the court entered the 

final Amended Decree of Divorce. Alternatively, she asserts that 

the balloon payment should be due on December 31, 2023, 

consistent with the terms of the initial Decree of Divorce. 

However, Candi has not presented us with any substantive 

arguments in support of this contention. Her argument is 
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essentially that it was unfair to put the Decree of Divorce into 

effect before the tax laws changed and yet delay the equalization 

payments until after the Amended Decree of Divorce was 

entered because both results “favored Guy.” But the fact that a 

ruling favors one party or the other does not, by itself, make that 

ruling an abuse of the court’s discretion. In fact, we cannot see 

any meaningful link between these two rulings—one concerns 

the effective date of the entire Decree, whereas one concerns the 

commencement of the payment plan.

¶42 Moreover, the district court had good reason for both 

decisions. As Guy pointed out in his Ex Parte Motion for 

Expedited Entry of Decree of Divorce, “[t]he trial of this matter, 

and the evidence submitted at trial and considered by the Court, 

were all predicated on the application of the existing divorce 

laws.” Thus, entering the Decree of Divorce after the first of the 

year would have, no doubt, spurred even more objections and 

additional hearings regarding alimony. Entering the Decree 

before the law changed was consistent with the parties’ 

expectations throughout the divorce proceedings. 

¶43 With respect to the equalization payments, the court’s 

2019 Supplemental Findings were drastically different from its 

2018 Supplemental Findings. The 2018 Supplemental Findings 

left the equalization payment schedule in Guy’s hands, whereas 

the 2019 Supplemental Findings required him to pay a specified 

monthly amount. Leaving the effective date for those payments 

on December 31, 2023, as outlined in the 2018 Supplemental 

Findings, would have required Guy to come up with the entire 

first year’s payments all at once, as he was not required to make 

monthly or yearly payments under the 2018 Supplemental 

Findings. The court found it appropriate for the equalization 

payments to commence at the same time it issued its 2019 

Supplemental Findings because it could not “determine who has 

delayed the payment plan” and it “believe[d] that both parties 

share the responsibility for the delay in this matter.” Candi has 
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not demonstrated that this was an abuse of the district court’s 

discretion.

II. Access to Marital Estate

¶44 Candi next asserts that the district court should have 

compensated her for “inequities [that] resulted from Guy’s use 

of the marital estate” while the divorce was pending. Candi 

raises three arguments concerning the allegedly unequal access 

to the marital estate: (1) that Guy was ordered to pay her only 

$20,000 per month in temporary alimony while he continued to 

spend around $60,000 per month, (2) that she did not have equal 

access to the parties’ tangible assets and funds while the divorce 

was pending, and (3) that Guy spent more on attorney fees out 

of the marital estate than the $800,000 found by the district court.

A. Monthly Spending

¶45 First, Candi contends that it was unfair for the district 

court to grant her only $20,000 in temporary alimony while Guy 

had an income of more than $141,000 per month and was 

spending over $60,000 per month. 

¶46 “Prior to the entry of a divorce decree, all property 

acquired by parties to a marriage is marital property, owned 

equally by each party.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 126, 459 P.3d 

276; accord Brown v. Brown, 2020 UT App 146, ¶ 23, 476 P.3d 554. 

“For this reason, it is improper to allow one spouse access to 

marital funds to pay for reasonable and ordinary living expenses 

while the divorce is pending, while denying the other spouse the 

same access.” Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 126.

¶47 But this principle does not require that the parties account 

for every dollar spent out of the marital funds and reimburse 

one another for any disparity. Rather, it requires that each party 

have equal access to use marital funds and assets “to pay for 

reasonable and ordinary living expenses while the divorce is 
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pending.” Id. For this reason, Dahl and Brown are distinguishable 

from the case at hand. In Dahl, the district court had ordered the 

wife to repay $162,000 she had received from the husband to pay 

for her living expenses while the divorce was pending without 

requiring the husband to repay the marital funds he spent 

during that time. Id. ¶ 125. The supreme court held that this was 

an abuse of discretion because it “had the effect of allowing one 

spouse to use marital funds to pay for living expenses during the 

pendency of the divorce, while denying such use to the other 

spouse.” Id. ¶ 129. In Brown, the district court ordered the 

husband to pay for the wife’s “expenses insofar as they exceeded 

the income she earned plus amounts [he] advanced while the 

divorce was pending.” Brown, 2020 UT App 146, ¶ 24. This court 

found that order to be appropriate because it gave the wife 

“the benefit of the marital estate to help cover [her] living 

expenses . . . up until the divorce decree was entered.” Id. ¶¶ 27–

28.

¶48 Here, the district court ordered Guy to “reimburse” Candi 

for reasonable monthly expenses “beyond $20,000” unless they 

were “inappropriate or excessive.” And although Candi 

indicated that she voluntarily curtailed her spending to avoid 

fighting for reimbursement, she did not present any evidence 

that she incurred expenses in excess of the $20,000 Guy provided 

each month. Since the court ordered Guy to pay for reasonable 

expenses beyond $20,000, it established a mechanism for Candi 

to have continued access to the marital estate to pay for her 

living expenses. The fact that Candi found it too burdensome to 

request additional funds and was skeptical about Guy honoring 

her request does not mean she lacked meaningful access to the 

marital estate.3 And the fact that Guy spent more each month 

 

3. Had Candi actually attempted to seek additional funds and 

had Guy denied her request, then we may have been faced with 

a different situation. However, the only time this occurred was 

(continued...)
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than Candi does not, by itself, indicate that Candi lacked equal 

access to marital funds while the divorce was pending. Access is 

not the same as use. And we are aware of no principle requiring 

that district courts equalize the parties’ use of marital assets 

during the pendency of a divorce as opposed to reimbursing a 

party for expenses they incurred as a result of unequal access.

B. Tangible Assets

¶49 Our analysis of Candi’s challenge to the unequal use of 

the parties’ tangible assets is similar to our analysis of her 

unequal use of funds: she has not demonstrated that she had 

unequal access to the assets, as opposed to unequal use. It was 

certainly easier for Guy to use the assets, since they were in his 

control. And it is undisputed that Guy told Candi she would 

have to pay the expensive costs associated with using the planes 

and boats. However, Candi never attempted to use the yacht or 

plane due to her concerns regarding the expense. Had she done 

so, she could have requested that Guy reimburse her for these 

costs in accordance with the court’s temporary alimony award. 

Since Guy was using the marital assets to pay for the costs of the 

yacht and plane in addition to meeting his monthly needs, such 

a request would not have been “inappropriate or excessive.” It is 

unfortunate that Candi was deterred from taking advantage of 

this option by the conditions Guy placed on the use of these 

assets. However, since she did not actually incur the expenses or 

seek reimbursement for extra expenses from Guy, Candi does 

not persuade us that the district court should have ordered an 

increase in her alimony or awarded her more of the marital 

 

(...continued)

in the time period between the court’s January 2015 minute entry 

and its April 2015 written order on the subject, and the minute 

entry was not clear as to Guy’s obligation to reimburse Candi for 

reasonable expenses in excess of $20,000 per month.
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estate under Dahl or Brown to make up for the disparity in access 

to the tangible assets.

C. Attorney Fees

¶50 Candi next contends that the district court improperly 

assessed the attorney fees Guy paid out of the marital estate at 

only $800,000. This number was taken from Guy’s testimony at 

trial that he had paid between $700,000 and $800,000 in attorney 

fees at that point. Candi argues that this estimate was made 

before Guy paid for the twelve days of trial and post-trial 

litigation and that “[t]he court should have ordered Guy to 

disclose all his attorney fees and attributed the full amount to his 

side.”

¶51 However, although the Decree of Divorce did not go into 

effect until the end of 2018, the court valued the parties’ marital 

estate based on the information before it at trial in 2017. Because 

this was the “snapshot in time,” see Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 

UT App 38, ¶ 24, 440 P.3d 757, on which the valuation of the 

marital estate was based, spending that occurred after that date 

could not have reduced the overall value of the estate. This 

means that any funds Guy expended on attorney fees following 

trial were necessarily post-division expenses. Even assuming 

that Guy spent more than $800,000 on attorney fees in total—

which he likely did, given that the $800,000 accounted only for 

what he had incurred as of trial—that does not necessarily mean 

that he paid for those fees out of the marital estate as it existed at 

the time of trial. He was obligated to pay Candi her share of the 

estate’s value calculated based on the value proven at trial, 

regardless of any later spending.

III. Valuation of the Marital Estate

¶52 Candi argues that the district court made several errors in 

assessing the overall value of the marital estate. Specifically, she 

asserts that it failed to account for the value of the notes 
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20190106-CA 24 2022 UT App 5

receivable and that it used the wrong method to assess the value 

of WBC’s backlog and equipment. She also asserts that Guy 

dissipated assets and that the estate should have been credited 

for the dissipation.

A. Notes Receivable

¶53 The account ledgers for three of the parties’ entities 

included line items for loans owed to Guy, totaling $1,059,466. 

The district court deducted these amounts from the value of 

those entities in calculating the overall value of the marital 

estate. However, the notes receivable, owed to Guy, were not 

counted as an asset of the marital estate. When Candi brought 

the matter to the court’s attention, it found that “[t]he parties 

agree that the Court did not consider the three notes receivable” 

but rejected Candi’s argument on the ground that “[n]either 

party points to the record regarding this issue.” However, when 

the 2018 Supplemental Findings, drafted by Guy, addressed the 

matter, the court’s finding evolved to “all Notes Receivable were 

included in the valuation of the various marital entities by the 

parties’ experts.”

¶54 Candi asserts that the court’s findings are clearly 

erroneous and that the court therefore erred in refusing to 

include the notes receivable in the valuation of the marital estate. 

We agree with Candi that the trial evidence memorializing the 

accounts payable to Guy constituted record evidence of Guy’s 

notes receivable with respect to those entities. Thus, the court 

erred in finding that Candi had not “point[ed] to the record 

regarding this issue.” Moreover, its finding in the 2018 

Supplemental Findings that “all Notes Receivable were included 

in the valuation of the various marital entities by the parties’ 
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20190106-CA 25 2022 UT App 5

experts” is not supported by the evidence.4 We are aware of 

nothing in the record indicating that any experts added the notes 

receivable to the valuation of the marital estate.

¶55 It was unreasonable for the court to include the accounts 

payable in its calculation of the other entities’ liabilities without 

also crediting the notes receivable to Guy as an asset. The only 

evidence before the court concerning the notes receivable is that 

contained in the owing entities’ ledgers—that Guy was entitled 

to receive the funds. Thus, it is necessary for the district court to 

adjust the value of the marital estate to include the $1,059,466 

owing to Guy from the other entities.

B. Backlog

¶56 Candi next asserts that the district court erred in assessing 

the value of WBC’s backlog. She asserts that because WBC is a 

“viable business,” the court should have recognized that it “has 

future work lined up and future work yet to come.” Specifically, 

Candi takes issue with two of the court’s findings relating to the 

backlog: (1) that “Candi did not provide counter-testimony to” 

Guy’s witnesses’ “statements of no value in the backlog” and (2) 

that one of Guy’s witness had “testified that any potential 

purchaser would not purchase the company based on a 

backlog.”

¶57 Candi points to the testimony of her own expert that the 

backlog would generate a net profit of $3,441,733. She further 

argues that Guy’s expert’s assertion that the profit would be 

 

4. This finding also appears to be inconsistent with the court’s 

previous ruling, in which it found that the values were not

considered. Candi objected to the form of the findings prepared

by Guy, pointing out this inconsistency, but the court rejected 

her objection, stating that it believed the notes were “considered 

in the Court’s decision because the experts testified to the same.”
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20190106-CA 26 2022 UT App 5

eaten up with administrative costs and capital expenditures 

relies on a misguided “assumption that WBC would obtain no

new work.”5 She points out that such an assumption was faulty, 

as “WBC had only one negative year in the . . . five-and-a-half 

years” prior to trial.

¶58 But Guy’s expert’s opinion that the backlog lacked value 

did not rely on the assumption that WBC would never get new 

work, as Candi asserts. Rather, it was based on his assessment 

that the backlog was not large enough to keep up with 

administrative expenses the company would need to incur, such 

as equipment costs, salaries, insurance, etc. Guy’s expert 

explained that in assessing the value of the backlog, he examined 

“the general and administrative expenses in the current 

environment that both a buyer and seller would look at when 

they’re examining whether or not this backlog has any value.” 

Based on this examination, he concluded that “the backlog in its 

current state would start to absorb cash flow from a negative 

performance during the next eleven months”—in other words, 

although WBC could expect to earn a gross profit from the 

backlog, it would have to dip into that profit to make up for its 

negative cash flow and would therefore not earn a net profit. 

This concept was further addressed by Guy in his testimony, 

 

5. Closely related to this argument, and similar to her argument 

regarding the valuation of WBC’s equipment, see infra Part III.C, 

Candi asserts that the court’s determination that the backlog 

lacked value was erroneous “because it reflects a liquidation 

value for WBC rather than its value as a going concern.” But this 

argument rests on Candi’s assertion that Guy’s witness and the 

court assumed WBC would obtain no new work. And as we 

discuss infra ¶ 58, neither the testimony nor the court’s findings 

relied on such an assumption. Thus, we do not agree with Candi 

that either Guy’s expert or the court relied on WBC’s liquidation 

value to conclude that the backlog lacked value.
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20190106-CA 27 2022 UT App 5

where he explained that although WBC had a backlog, at the 

time of the evaluation it did not have as many contracts as it 

needed, had to lay off workers, and had to rely on capital to 

continue operating.

¶59 While Candi’s expert testified that the backlog would 

generate a net profit of $3,441,733, he did not address the details 

about anticipated administrative costs or the state of the industry 

that Guy and his expert addressed in their testimonies, and this 

seems to be the absent “counter-testimony” to which the court 

was referring in its finding. Indeed, the court was clearly aware 

of and considered Candi’s expert’s testimony and valuation, as it 

included that information in its findings. But it nevertheless 

concluded that “Candi presented no other evidence or expert 

testimony in that industry regarding the backlog.” Thus, the 

court’s finding was not in error. And in any event, it was the 

court’s prerogative to credit the testimony of Guy’s expert over 

the testimony of Candi’s expert. See Henshaw v. Henshaw, 2012 

UT App 56, ¶ 11, 271 P.3d 837 (“It is within the province of the 

trial court, as the finder of fact, to resolve issues of credibility.”); 

see also Barrani v. Barrani, 2014 UT App 204, ¶ 4, 334 P.3d 994 

(“Courts are not bound to accept the testimony of an expert and 

are free to judge the expert testimony as to its credibility and its 

persuasive influence in light of all of the other evidence in the 

case.” (quotation simplified)).

¶60 As to the court’s finding regarding Guy’s witness’s 

testimony about a potential buyer, while that finding could have 

been more precise—the witness actually testified that a buyer 

cares only about a “sustainable backlog” and that a buyer would 

rely on “the backlog in front” of the company rather than its 

historic backlog—the imprecision ultimately does not convince 

us that the court relied on an erroneous assumption. The witness 

did not testify specifically regarding WBC’s backlog, and his 

actual statement ultimately supports the district court’s finding

regarding the value of the backlog. If the court applied the 
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20190106-CA 28 2022 UT App 5

principle stated by the witness—that only the backlog in front of 

WBC was relevant—to the testimony it relied on that the backlog 

would not generate a net profit, the testimony was not 

inconsistent with the court’s finding that the backlog lacked 

value. 

¶61 Ultimately, it was within the court’s discretion to accord 

each party’s expert testimony the weight it deemed proper. And 

the testimonial evidence presented by Guy and his expert and 

witness supports the court’s conclusion that the backlog lacked 

value. Even assuming that WBC was a viable company that 

would continue to generate contracts, the evidence supported a 

determination that its current contracts were not sufficient for 

the company to expect to generate a net profit.

C. Equipment

¶62 Next, Candi challenges the district court’s valuation of 

WBC’s equipment. Her argument rests primarily on her 

assertion that the court erroneously used “liquidation value” to 

calculate the value of the equipment rather than valuing WBC as 

a “going concern.”6

 

6. Candi also challenges two of the court’s findings regarding the 

equipment and asserts that misstatements in those findings 

undermine the court’s determination regarding the value of the 

equipment.

First, Candi challenges the court’s finding that Guy 

“testified that auctions are the most common way that heavy 

equipment is bought and sold in the construction business” and 

“that if he needed a particular piece of equipment he would 

check Ritchie Bros. to see what was available.” As Candi points 

out, this finding most closely reflects Guy’s counsel’s recap of 

the evidence, not testimony actually provided by Guy. In fact, 

Guy testified that although Ritchie Brothers had made him an 

(continued...)
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20190106-CA 29 2022 UT App 5

¶63 First, we agree with Guy that Utah law does not support 

Candi’s contention that the court was required to evaluate WBC 

as a going concern. In fact, our case law is clear that courts have 

broad discretion in determining the proper method for 

calculating the value of marital property. See DeAvila v. DeAvila, 

2017 UT App 146, ¶ 12, 402 P.3d 184 (“District courts generally 

 

(...continued)

offer for his equipment, he had not actually done business with 

Ritchie Brothers in the past. Nevertheless, we are not convinced 

that this misstatement undermines the court’s conclusion. Ample 

additional findings supported the court’s determination, 

including its opinion that Guy’s expert had provided a more 

thorough appraisal than Candi’s expert and its reliance on the 

expert’s testimony that auctions are commonly used to buy and 

sell heavy construction equipment and that his appraisal 

represented the fair market value of the equipment.

Second, Candi challenges the court’s finding that there are 

“no approved standards” for appraising equipment. She asserts 

that her expert’s testimony that the USPAP “provides a standard 

of value” and Guy’s expert’s testimony that “the majority of the 

equipment people use” USPAP demonstrates that there are 

approved standards for appraising equipment. But Candi’s 

expert also testified that no specific qualifications are required to 

appraise heavy construction equipment. The fact that the USPAP 

“provides a standard of value” and that many appraisers use it 

does not mean that it is the approved standard that must be 

followed. (Emphasis added.) Ritchie Brothers described its 

valuation method as a “market approach” that took into account 

historical auction sales; “usage, attachments, options, and 

condition”; personal experience over the course of fifty years; 

and knowledge of world economic conditions. The court found 

this method to be reliable, and Candi has failed to point to any 

rule mandating that the USPAP standards be followed in this 

context.
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20190106-CA 30 2022 UT App 5

have considerable discretion concerning property distribution 

and valuation in a divorce proceeding and their determinations 

enjoy a presumption of validity.” (quotation simplified)); cf. 

Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, ¶ 19, 985 P.2d 255 (“[T]rial courts 

have broad discretion in selecting an appropriate method of 

assessing a spouse’s income and will not be overturned absent 

an abuse of discretion.”). Moreover, courts may even reject all 

valuation methods presented by experts and elect to simply split 

the difference between multiple appraisals. See Newmeyer v. 

Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278–79 (Utah 1987) (upholding a 

court’s decision to fix the value of a marital home by splitting the 

difference between the values presented by two experts); Andrus 

v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ¶¶ 12–13, 169 P.3d 754 (upholding a 

district court’s decision to average the value of stock on nine 

different relevant dates to reach the fair value of stock in the 

marital estate); Barber v. Barber, No. 961783-CA, 1998 WL 

1758305, at *1 & n.1 (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 8, 1998) (holding that the 

district court acted within its discretion when it valuated a 

business by averaging four appraisals provided by expert 

witnesses). 

¶64 Generally, we will uphold a district court’s valuation of 

marital assets as long as the value is “within the range of values 

established by all the testimony,” and as long as the court’s 

findings are “sufficiently detailed and include enough 

subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 

conclusion on each factual issue was reached.” Morgan v. 

Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 691–92 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quotation 

simplified); see also Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408, 410 (Utah Ct. 

App. 1989) (upholding a court’s election not to apply a 

marketability discount to the value of stock in a closely held 

corporation, despite several experts recommending that such a 
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20190106-CA 31 2022 UT App 5

discount be applied, because the value the court found was 

“within the range of values established by all the testimony”).7

¶65 Thus, even assuming that Guy’s expert’s valuation was 

“liquidation value,” it would have been within the court’s 

discretion to use that valuation, which was “within the range of 

values established by all the testimony,” so long as the court 

adequately supported its decision with factual findings 

explaining its decision. See Morgan, 795 P.2d at 691–92. Here, not 

only did the court support its determination with detailed 

factual findings, but those factual findings make clear that it 

considered the auction value to represent the fair market value 

of the equipment, not the liquidation value.

¶66 In accepting Guy’s expert’s valuation over that of Candi’s 

expert, the court explained that Guy’s expert was more thorough 

because he examined each individual piece of equipment and 

took into account its condition, mileage, and hours. 

Additionally, the court found it relevant that 80% of Ritchie 

Brothers’ “sales are directly to end users” and credited the 

expert’s testimony that their appraisal was based on fair market 

value, specifically rejecting Candi’s assertion that auction value 

was equivalent to the value in a “fire sale.” The court also 

 

7. The only case Candi cites in support of her contention that the 

court was required to value WBC as a going concern is Hogle v. 

Zinetics Medical, Inc., 2002 UT 121, 63 P.3d 80. See id. ¶ 20 

(pointing out in dicta the general rule that “in the absence of 

actual liquidation a corporation must be valued as a going 

concern”). But that case involved the valuation of stock shares in 

the context of a forced purchase, not the equitable division of a 

marital estate. The rule articulated in Hogle has not been applied 

in the context of marital property division, and Candi has not 

convinced us that it should overcome the general rule granting 

courts wide discretion to assign value to marital assets. 
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20190106-CA 32 2022 UT App 5

pointed out that even Candi’s expert had used some sales data 

from auction houses to assess values. Based on this evidence, the 

court found that “[t]here is no indication that [Guy’s expert’s] 

evaluation does not reflect the actual marketplace price the 

parties could expect to receive upon sale” and adopted the 

$13,890,300 value provided by Guy’s expert. We will not disturb 

the court’s well-supported decision on this issue.8

D. Dissipation

¶67 Candi next contends that “Guy dissipated assets at a time 

he understood that divorce was likely” and that the district court 

should have included the value of additional allegedly 

dissipated assets—over and above the money Guy spent on his 

girlfriend, which the court considered dissipation and accounted 

for as such—in its valuation of the marital estate. 

¶68 “Where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its 

value or otherwise acted obstructively, the trial court may, in the 

exercise of its equitable powers, value a marital asset at some 

time other than the time the decree is entered . . . .” Goggin v. 

 

8. We note that with respect to both the backlog and the 

equipment, our decision should not be construed as a 

determination that the court’s findings were a foregone 

conclusion. Indeed, Candi also presented evidence that could 

have supported different findings regarding the value of both 

assets. However, because the court’s findings fell within the 

wide range of its discretion, we are not in a position to disturb 

those findings. See Gardner v. Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 18, 452 P.3d 

1134; Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 26, 299 P.3d 1079; see also 

Barrani v. Barrani, 2014 UT App 204, ¶ 4, 334 P.3d 994 (“A trial 

court is free to accept or reject an expert’s opinion and may 

accord that opinion whatever weight it deems proper.” 

(quotation simplified)).
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20190106-CA 33 2022 UT App 5

Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 49, 299 P.3d 1079 (quotation simplified). In 

other words, “when a court finds that a spouse has dissipated 

marital assets, the court should calculate the value of the marital 

property as though the assets remained” and give “the other 

spouse . . . a credit for his or her share of the assets that were 

dissipated.” Id. 

¶69 A number of factors may be relevant to this inquiry, 

including

(1) how the money was spent, including whether 

funds were used to pay legitimate marital expenses 

or individual expenses; (2) the parties’ historical 

practices; (3) the magnitude of any depletion; (4) 

the timing of the challenged actions in relation to 

the separation and divorce; and (5) any obstructive 

efforts that hinder the valuation of the assets.

Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, ¶ 33, 440 P.3d 757 

(quotation simplified). Candi’s dissipation argument concerns 

three transactions: (1) Guy’s purchase of the yacht, (2) Guy’s 

investment in FDFM, and (3) Guy’s transfer of assets into the 

Trust.

1. Yacht

¶70 Candi first argues that the district court erred in 

concluding that the purchase of the yacht was not dissipation. 

Candi asserts that although the yacht itself remained in the 

estate, its rapid depreciation meant that it was “cash going out 

the door for no benefit.” She also argues that because Guy used 

the yacht and she did not, any benefit from the use of the yacht 

was individual to Guy rather than to the marital estate.

¶71 Candi acknowledges that Utah law has not held that the 

purchase of a depreciating asset constitutes dissipation. But she 

nevertheless urges us to adopt such a rule, relying on case law 
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from Illinois. However, even if we were inclined to find these 

cases persuasive, most of them appear to be distinguishable 

from the case at hand. For example, in In re Marriage of Thomas, 

608 N.E.2d 585 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), the court held that the 

devaluation of the parties’ business constituted dissipation not 

simply because it had decreased in value but because the 

husband had directly undermined the business through 

“inattention” and “his failure to solicit additional clients or 

through his outright stealing of clients for his new business.” Id.

at 587. In In re Marriage of Schneeweis, 2016 IL App (2d) 140147, 55 

N.E.3d 1280, the court upheld a finding of dissipation where the 

husband had begun making “secretive, risky and progressively 

more destructive” financial decisions that were “inconsistent 

with the parties’ prior practices.” Id. ¶ 28 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). And in In re Marriage of Block, 441 N.E.2d 1283 

(Ill. App. Ct. 1982), where the husband had purchased a racing 

boat that was financially under water, the court held that it could 

be considered “a debt in dissipation” but clarified that “there 

would be no net effect on the marital estate” if “the value of the 

boat is approximately the same as the amount of indebtedness.” 

Id. at 1288–89.9

¶72 Here, the court found that the purchase of the yacht was 

consistent with “Guy’s historical practice” of buying “planes and 

boats” and that there was no evidence “that Guy caused 

 

9. In re Marriage of Hubbs, 843 N.E.2d 478 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006), does 

support the argument that a district court may treat money as a 

dissipated asset when it is used to purchase a depreciating asset 

used primarily by one party. Id. at 485–86. But the case does not 

mandate that a court treat the asset this way, and therefore, even 

if we were to adopt its reasoning, it would not support a 

determination that the district court abused its discretion in this 

case by declining to treat the money used to purchase the yacht 

as a dissipated asset.
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excessive diminution in value.” Additionally, the court assigned 

to Guy all responsibility for the outstanding debt on the yacht, so 

any “debt in dissipation” caused by the yacht’s purchase was 

resolved, see id. at 1288. While the yacht was used primarily by 

Guy, he did make it available to Candi, and he never transferred 

it out of the marital estate. We agree with Guy that the 

depreciated value of the yacht, alone, does not mandate a 

finding of dissipation, particularly where its purchase was 

consistent with purchases made during the marriage and there is 

no indication that Guy’s actions contributed to the 

depreciation.10

2. North Dakota Investment

¶73 Candi next claims that the district court should have 

valued FDFM based on the $1,129,000 Guy invested in it rather 

than its $734,000 value at the time of trial. She asserts that “had 

Guy not unilaterally made that poor investment, more money 

would have remained in the estate.” According to Candi, 

because Guy did not consult her regarding the investment, he 

“acted obstructively” and should therefore be held accountable 

for the diminished value of the asset. See Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 

UT 16, ¶ 49, 299 P.3d 1079 (quotation simplified).

 

10. Indeed, the rule suggested by Candi—that the purchase of a 

depreciating asset constitutes dissipation per se—is unworkable. 

The practical effect of this rule would be that every purchase of a 

vehicle, furniture, appliances, or essentially any personal 

property that does not retain its full value after purchase during 

the pendency of a divorce could subject the purchaser to a 

dissipation claim. We note that the case-by-case factor-based test 

outlined in Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, 440 P.3d 

757, is a much more practical approach to assessing dissipation. 

See id. ¶ 33.
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¶74 However, the mere failure to disclose the investment did 

not mandate a finding that Guy acted obstructively. In fact, the 

evidence here supported the court’s finding that Guy “never 

consulted with Candi on any business decisions that he made” 

throughout the marriage and that making business decisions 

without disclosing them to her was “well within the scope of his 

historical practices.” Moreover, even where a party has acted 

obstructively, the decision whether to “value a marital asset at 

some time other than the time the decree is entered” is a matter 

within the court’s discretion in its “exercise of its equitable 

powers.” Id. (quotation simplified). We are not convinced that 

the court abused its discretion here. To the contrary, though we 

can sympathize with Candi’s desire to be included in financial 

decision-making, the evidence clearly suggests to us, as it did to 

the district court, that the diminution of FDFM’s value resulted 

from changes in the market, and there is nothing to indicate that 

the loss of value resulted from any deceptive or obstructive 

actions by Guy.

3. Transfers to the Trust 

¶75 Finally, Candi asserts that the district court should have 

considered the transfers to the Trust to constitute dissipation. 

She asserts that the timing of the transfers—after she filed for 

divorce the first time and before Guy confessed his affair—

suggests that Guy transferred the funds in anticipation of the 

divorce. See Finan v. Finan, 949 A.2d 468, 475–76 (Conn. 2008) 

(collecting cases and explaining that the “majority” of “states 

allow trial courts to consider a spouse’s dissipation of marital 

assets, that occurs prior to the spouses’ physical separation, in 

determining the allocation of assets to each respective spouse”). 

She argues that even though the money is now beyond the reach 

of the district court, it should have ordered Guy to compensate 

her for the loss in value under a dissipation theory. See Jefferies v. 

Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835, 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
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¶76 While we agree with Candi that the court could have 

compensated her for the marital assets put into the Trust had it 

found dissipation, we do not agree that the court exceeded its 

discretion in finding that the transfers did not constitute 

dissipation. The court found that the transfers did not amount to 

dissipation because Candi had participated in creating the Trust, 

even though it had not initially been funded; transferring assets 

to their children was consistent with the parties’ practices during 

the marriage, beginning as early as 1993; and Candi had deferred 

to Guy to “run the parties’ finances and estate” throughout the 

marriage. The court found “no evidence that Guy attempted to 

withhold information or cut Candi out from the estate planning 

process.” And while the timing of the transfers could provide 

circumstantial evidence of dissipation, the parties’ historical 

practices and the lack of additional evidence suggesting 

obstructive intent on Guy’s part support the court’s 

determination that the transfers were not dissipation.

IV. Division of the Estate and Equalization Payments

¶77 The parties raise various challenges to the district court’s 

division of the estate and its order regarding the equalization 

payments. First, Candi asserts that the court erred by not 

awarding her a greater share of the marital estate directly. 

Second, she argues that the court erred by refusing to grant her 

security to help ensure that she actually receives her unpaid 

share of the estate. Third, both parties challenge the 5% interest 

rate set by the district court. Finally, Guy argues that the court 

should have ordered Candi to share in any transaction costs that 

may be incurred should he be required to liquidate assets to 

make the equalization payment. 

A. Estate Division

¶78 Candi argues that the district court abused its discretion 

by—at least temporarily—awarding Guy the bulk of the estate 

and giving him five years to pay Candi her share. She argues 
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that instead, the court should have done one or more of the 

following: (1) ordered Guy to pay Candi her share immediately; 

(2) awarded her a greater share of cash and retirement accounts; 

(3) awarded her the restaurants; (4) ordered Guy to liquidate 

investments, yachts, planes or spare equipment to pay Candi 

more cash up front; or (5) ordered larger annual payments in 

implementing the equalization payment schedule.

¶79 “When the district court assigns a value to an item of 

marital property, the court must equitably distribute it with a 

view toward allowing each party to go forward with his or her 

separate life.” Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, ¶ 27, 440 

P.3d 757 (quotation simplified). In situations where the marital 

estate consists primarily of a single large asset, such as a 

business or stock, a common acceptable approach for the court to 

take is to award the asset to one party and make a cash award to 

the other party. See Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 56, 379 P.3d 

890; Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah 1984). This avoids 

the necessity for the parties “to be in a close economic 

relationship which has every potential for further contention, 

friction, and litigation.” Argyle, 688 P.2d at 471 (quotation 

simplified).

¶80 In fashioning this type of marital property division, “a 

court has the ability to make equitable provisions for deferred 

compensation”—the keyword being “equitable.” Taft, 2016 UT 

App 135, ¶ 60. One way to assess the equitability of the 

provisions is to examine whether the award affords one party 

“significantly more latitude to go forward with his [or her] 

separate life” than the other. Id. ¶ 61 (quotation simplified). It is 

also relevant whether the party required to pay the deferred 

compensation will be able to use the property to their unfair 

advantage at the expense of the person to whom the 

compensation is owed. Id. ¶¶ 59–60.
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¶81 We agree with Guy that the specific division scheme 

selected by the district court—Guy receiving, on a temporary 

basis, a larger share of the estate, but with the obligation to make 

equalization payments to Candi—is not inequitable, so long as 

adequate security for the unpaid equalization payments is 

included. See infra Part IV.B. While the court may have been 

within its discretion to employ one or more of the other methods 

recommended by Candi, its numerous factual findings support 

its ultimate determination, and the deferred payment provisions, 

coupled with security, are sufficiently equitable to fall within its 

discretion.11

 

11. There were certainly some smaller liquid assets and business 

assets, such as the restaurants, that the district court could have 

awarded Candi to decrease the overall amount of the balloon 

payment. And had we been in the court’s shoes, we might have 

employed some of these methods. We are troubled by the 

district court’s adoption of the paternalistic argument that 

merely because Candi had little business experience, she was not 

capable and should not be awarded any of the business assets. 

Not every business owner has extensive business experience, 

and even inexperienced business owners can succeed, often by 

hiring experienced managers to help run the business. Indeed, 

courts should be cautious about perpetuating inequalities 

established in the course of a marriage—perhaps due to an 

imbalance of power in the parties’ relationship—as the parties 

move forward with their separate lives simply because such 

inequality had been established as the status quo. For example, 

in this case, it appears that Candi’s inability to present evidence 

about what she “could or couldn’t do with respect to 

employment” was based on the parties’ practices while they 

were married. Candi testified that it was Guy who wanted her to 

be a stay-at-home mom and that he “insisted on taking care of all 

the finances.” Although Candi wanted to be more involved in 

(continued...)
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¶82 Candi asserts that the court’s distribution of marital assets 

and its use of the equalization payment plan impermissibly 

gives Guy disproportionate access to the estate. She compares 

the facts of this case to those in Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, 379 

P.3d 890, in which this court determined that a deferred 

payment plan that gave the husband discretion to dictate the 

amount of monthly installments over ten years at a 2.13% 

interest rate was not equitable. See id. ¶¶ 59–60. Candi argues 

that just like in Taft, “the overall dynamics of the court’s award 

more readily allow [Guy], with his immediate ability to use and 

enjoy the property awarded to him[,] . . . significantly more 

latitude to go forward with his separate life than [Candi] is 

afforded.” See id. ¶ 61 (quotation simplified).

¶83 But Taft is distinguishable from the case at hand. First, the 

husband in Taft was permitted to decide the amount of the 

monthly payments to his ex-wife over the course of ten years 

between the time of the divorce decree and the time the balloon 

payment was due. See id. ¶ 59. His discretion was so absolute 

that the court observed he “could conceivably make . . . equal 

monthly payments of $1 for nine years and eleven months before 

making the final balloon payment . . . , thereby forcing [his wife] 

to wait ten years before realizing any real benefit from her 

 

(...continued)

financial decisions, “it just wasn’t worth the fight.” While we 

understand the court’s desire not to penalize Guy for continuing 

to act in a manner consistent with the parties’ historic practices, 

see supra Part III.D; infra Part VI, we caution against perpetuating 

apparent inequalities in marital relationships by relying on 

parties’ historic practices to divide and distribute the marital 

estate. Nevertheless, we are ultimately unpersuaded that the 

estate division structure chosen by the district court in this case 

was outside its wide discretion in such matters, as long as 

sufficient security for the unpaid portion is provided.
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20190106-CA 41 2022 UT App 5

property award.” Id. Here, on the other hand, the district court 

set the terms of the payment plan, ultimately requiring Guy to 

pay Candi $30,000 per month plus an additional $500,000 per 

year. Although the court certainly could have ordered Guy to 

pay more, we are not convinced that the amount ordered was so 

inequitable as to fall outside the bounds of the court’s discretion. 

Unlike the wife in Taft, Candi will not have to wait until the 

balloon payment is due to realize any benefit from her property 

award. Rather, she will receive $860,000 each year in addition to 

the $4.7 million she has already received. While this leaves Guy 

in control of a substantial portion of Candi’s property, she is at 

least able to benefit from her property award in the meantime.

¶84 Second, the interest applied to the property distribution in 

Taft was only 2.13%, an amount this court observed “provides 

very little incentive for [the husband] to substantially pay it prior 

to the expiration of the ten-year period, much less for him to pay 

[the wife] sizeable monthly installments.” Id. ¶ 60. In fact, the 

low interest rate “would almost certainly allow [the husband] to 

invest [the wife’s] money elsewhere and reap the benefit of any 

additional increment of interest—a benefit that in fairness 

should accrue to [the wife].” Id. In this case, on the other hand, 

the district court applied a 5% interest rate, which it 

acknowledged was higher than the statutory postjudgment 

interest rate, to incentivize Guy to pay Candi sooner. See supra

¶ 31; see also infra Part IV.C. By setting interest at a rate 

calculated to discourage any delays in paying Candi, the court 

avoided the type of inequitable deferred payment plan at issue 

in Taft.

¶85 We acknowledge that granting Guy a five-year period in 

which to continue using the bulk of Candi’s property award to 

grow his business does afford him a benefit that may, to some 

degree, come at Candi’s expense. But we are convinced that it is 

not inequitable in light of the entire landscape of the marital 

estate and property division. First, the size of the parties’ estate 
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20190106-CA 42 2022 UT App 5

and the fact that the bulk of it is wrapped up in WBC means that 

gathering the liquid funds to pay Candi’s property award is not 

something that can be accomplished overnight, at least not 

without substantially decreasing the overall value of the marital 

estate. Thus, it was reasonable for the court to allow Guy some 

period of time to gather the funds necessary to pay Candi. 

Second, this time period may allow Guy to keep his larger 

businesses intact and find other ways to pay Candi. Keeping the 

businesses intact will ultimately benefit both parties, as it will 

allow Guy to maintain his income and continue paying alimony 

to Candi. Finally, we take Guy’s point that he may incur 

substantial transaction costs if he ultimately does need to 

liquidate assets to pay Candi. See infra Part IV.D. Thus, it seems 

to us that the hypothetical benefit Guy may incur by using 

Candi’s share of the property to increase the value of the estate 

will be offset by the hypothetical detriment he could incur if he 

has to liquidate the assets. Since the court did not order Candi to 

share in any of these transaction costs, the court’s decision to 

give Guy the use of Candi’s portion of the property during the 

five-year forbearance period does not strike us as inequitable, at 

least so long as adequate security is afforded to Candi.12

 

12. We observe that arrangements such as this should be 

reserved for only the most unusual cases. As we have already 

emphasized, in distributing marital property, courts should act 

“with a view toward allowing each party to go forward with his 

or her separate life,” Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, ¶ 27 (quotation 

simplified), and avoiding the necessity of parties continuing “in 

a close economic relationship which has every potential for 

further contention, friction, and litigation,” Argyle v. Argyle, 688 

P.2d 468, 471 (Utah 1984) (quotation simplified). The estate 

division and equalization payments in this case have the 

unfortunate result of keeping the parties tied together long after 

their divorce and depriving Candi of immediate access to her 

(continued...)
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B. Security

¶86 And this brings us to Candi’s next argument: that the 

district court abused its discretion by imposing this specific 

deferred-payment arrangement without requiring Guy to 

provide adequate security. Candi asserts that the court’s 

arrangement put her in the position—involuntarily—of an 

unsecured creditor and posits that no lender would agree to 

make a $15 million loan without some sort of security interest. 

Without any type of security, Candi argues, she stands to lose 

her ability to collect her share of the marital estate in the event 

Guy passes away before the balloon payment is due or he moves 

his assets into irrevocable trusts. We agree with Candi and 

emphasize that the district court’s chosen arrangement passes 

discretionary muster only if it comes accompanied by an 

adequate security mechanism. 

¶87 The court’s only justification for declining to grant Candi 

any type of security was its determination that it could not 

award a lien against the businesses, that the Uniform 

Commercial Code did not apply, and that life insurance was not 

an option due to Guy’s health. But the court did not explain why 

these limitations prevented it from granting Candi any type of 

security. Candi’s request was broad: she asserted that “there 

needs to be some kind of order or security or lien or whatever 

form it takes . . . that will ensure that those former marital assets 

 

(...continued)

share of the estate. However, though we have reservations, 

because of the unusual circumstances of this case—i.e., the size 

of the estate coupled with the concentration of the estate’s value 

in various non-liquid business entities that are difficult to 

divide—we cannot ultimately fault the court’s resolution, so 

long as it secures Candi’s interest in her share of the marital 

estate.
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are there at the time that . . . the balloon payment needs to be 

made.” “So all we’re asking for is some kind of order to ensure 

that there’s going to be payment down the road.”

¶88 Guy maintains that no security is necessary because he 

has shown himself to be reliable in making payments and does 

not have a history of hiding assets. But we agree with Candi that, 

regardless of Guy’s history, character, or intentions, she should 

not be required to rely solely on Guy’s continued health and 

goodwill to ensure her ability to collect what she is owed. 

Whether Candi’s mistrust of Guy is warranted or not, it was 

unreasonable for the court not to grant her any type of security 

in her half of the marital estate.

¶89 Moreover, Candi has even greater cause for concern in 

light of Guy’s age and poor health. In fact, Guy expressed 

concern that he might pass away before the divorce decree was 

finalized and relied on that possibility to argue that the divorce 

action should be bifurcated. Should Guy pass away before the 

balloon payment is due, Candi would no longer have even the 

benefit of Guy’s goodwill. Instead, she would have to further 

litigate with his heirs (including her own children) to fight for 

her share of the marital estate. It is hard to reconcile why the 

district court considered this to be an adequate legal remedy. 

Candi should not have to take her chances as an unsecured 

creditor should Guy pass away before she can receive her share 

of the marital estate. No reasonable creditor would agree to a 

forbearance on such terms, and it was therefore inequitable to 

impose such terms on Candi.

¶90 Accordingly, we remand this case for the court to fashion 

an equitable security interest that will adequately protect 

Candi’s ability to collect her remaining share of the marital estate 

at the end of the five-year forbearance period.
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C. Interest Rate

¶91 Both Guy and Candi take issue with the 5% interest rate 

the district court imposed on the equalization payments. Guy 

asserts that the interest rate should have been set at the statutory 

postjudgment interest rate, which was 4.58% at the time the 

court entered the 2019 Supplemental Findings. Candi argues that 

the court should have imposed the 10% interest rate originally 

set in its 2018 Supplemental Findings. We reject both parties’ 

arguments and affirm the district court’s imposition of the 5% 

interest rate.

¶92 Guy asserts that the court was bound by the 

postjudgment interest rate established by section 15-1-4 of the 

Utah Code, which provides that “final civil . . . judgments of the 

district court . . . shall bear interest at the federal postjudgment 

interest rate as of January 1 of each year, plus 2%.” Utah Code 

Ann. § 15-1-4(3)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2021). Section 15-1-4 does 

apply to orders in a divorce case “in relation to the children, 

property and parties.” See Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 

207 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) 

(1984) (current version at id. (LexisNexis Supp. 2021) (stating that 

the district court “may include in the decree of divorce equitable 

orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, 

and parties”))). However, section 15-1-4 provides the “minimum

interest allowable.” Id. (emphasis added). The statute “does not 

preclude a District Court, under [section 30-3-5] from imposing 

an interest rate of more than [the statutory postjudgment rate] 

where, under the circumstances, that award is reasonable and 

equitable.” Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d 649, 650 (Utah Ct. App. 

1987) (quoting Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752, 754 (Utah 1978)). And, 

in fact, setting equalization payments at the postjudgment 

interest rate, rather than a higher rate, may be an abuse of 

discretion if doing so is inequitable under the circumstances. See 

Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶¶ 56, 60, 379 P.3d 890 (finding a 

2.13% interest rate, which was the rate provided by Utah Code 
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20190106-CA 46 2022 UT App 5

section 15-1-4 at the time, to be insufficient where the husband 

was granted discretion to determine the amount of payments 

over the course of ten years because it incentivized the husband 

to invest the wife’s money elsewhere rather than paying her 

sooner). Thus, we find no merit to Guy’s contention that the 

court was bound to apply the default postjudgment interest rate

to the equalization payments.

¶93 Candi argues that an interest rate higher than the 5% 

ordered by the court is necessary to “compensate Candi for her 

unwilling forbearance to Guy and incentivize Guy to pay 

quicker.” She argues that 10% is an appropriate interest rate 

because it is consistent with the Utah Code’s default interest rate 

for a “forbearance of any money, goods, or services.” Utah Code 

Ann. § 15-1-1(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2021). However, Candi has 

not provided us with any authority suggesting that the court 

was required to impose this specific interest rate. 

¶94 The court’s decision to impose the 5% interest rate was 

reasoned and supported by sufficient factual findings. The court 

explained that it had considered the 10% interest rate to be 

“appropriate” when the court had “deferred to Guy to come up 

with an appropriate payment plan.” The court opined that had 

Guy been permitted to set the payment schedule, as the husband 

in Taft was, the 10% interest rate would have been needed to 

avoid giving Guy “an incentive to invest the money and reap the 

return instead of paying off” Candi. The court explained that 

once it set the payment plan, rather than leaving it to Guy’s 

discretion, it did not believe the 10% interest would be valid 

under Taft. Nevertheless, it also explained that the interest rate 

was not a postjudgment rate because the deferred payment was 

more akin to a forbearance, and it still wanted to give Guy “an 

incentive to pay the Equalizing Balance quickly.”

¶95 Our case law is clear that as with other aspects of 

property division, equitability is the standard for evaluating the 
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appropriateness of an interest rate set by the district court for 

deferred payments in a divorce. See Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 UT App 

296, ¶ 25, 169 P.3d 765 (“The overriding consideration is that the 

ultimate division be equitable . . . .” (quotation simplified)). We 

are not convinced that the 5% interest rate fell outside the 

reasonable range of equitable interest rates the court could have 

selected. Moreover, the court clearly explained its reasoning. 

Thus, we will not disturb the 5% interest rate the court set.

D. Transaction Costs

¶96 Finally, Guy asserts that the district court should have 

required Candi to share in any transaction costs that he may 

incur in the event he needs to liquidate assets to pay off Candi’s 

share of the marital estate. He points out that taxes and other 

transaction costs associated with liquidating the businesses or 

any other large assets could be significant and that if the court 

does not require Candi to pay her portion of those transaction 

costs, it could substantially eat into his portion of the marital 

estate.

¶97 We do not disagree with Guy that if he is forced to 

liquidate assets, doing so may result in significant taxes and 

transaction costs to him. But it is by no means certain that such 

costs will be incurred. We do not generally expect courts to 

“speculate about hypothetical future [tax] consequences.” See 

Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah 1987) (refusing to 

reduce the value of a “stock-price-tied profit-sharing plan to 

account for tax liability” because the imposition of taxes was not 

certain); see also Sellers v. Sellers, 2010 UT App 393, ¶ 7, 246 P.3d 

173 (holding that the district court was not required to consider 

potential tax obligations associated with a retirement account 

because the tax consequences were “speculative” and assumed 

“massive withdrawals” from the account); Howell v. Howell, 806 

P.2d 1209, 1213–14 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the district 

court “did not err in refusing to adjust property distribution 
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20190106-CA 48 2022 UT App 5

because of . . . theoretical [tax] consequences” of selling a second 

home). The valuation of marital property “is necessarily a 

snapshot in time,” Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, ¶ 24, 

440 P.3d 757, and such a moment does not consider “the myriad 

situations in which the value of [the parties’] property might be 

positively or negatively affected in the future,” Sellers, 2010 UT 

App 393, ¶ 7. 

¶98 Moreover, excessive transaction costs were the very thing 

the equalization payments were intended to prevent. The court 

acknowledged that forcing the parties to immediately liquidate 

assets would significantly cut into the pie that would be 

available to divide between both parties. That is why the court 

awarded the bulk of the estate to Guy and gave him five years to 

pay Candi her portion. The court gave him unfettered discretion 

to determine how to gather the funds necessary to pay Candi. In 

doing so, it gave Guy free rein over the bulk of Candi’s share of 

the estate, which he may use to continue building his businesses 

and wealth over the next five years. The benefit he may derive 

from using Candi’s share of the estate may very well amount to 

much more than the interest Candi will receive at the 5% rate, 

which is all she will have access to until the balloon payment is 

due, yet she will not share in that benefit any more than she will 

share in any transaction costs Guy may incur.13 See supra ¶ 85. 

The entire principal of Candi’s portion will remain in Guy’s 

control until he makes the balloon payment at the end of 2024. 

 

13. Five percent interest on the $17,238,018.02 Guy owes Candi is 

just over $861,900 per year. The $30,000 monthly and $500,000 

annual payments will provide her with $860,000 per year—less 

than the amount needed to cover the interest. Thus, Guy will 

maintain complete control over the principal of Candi’s share of 

the estate throughout the five-year period and will actually owe 

her more than the original judgment by the time the balloon 

payment is due.
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Furthermore, because the assets are in Guy’s control, Candi will 

have no role in deciding how to liquidate the assets or which 

transaction costs to incur.14

¶99 Given the speculative nature of the potential taxes and 

transaction costs, as well as the full discretion Guy was given to 

determine whether and how to liquidate assets, it was not an 

abuse of discretion for the court not to order that Candi share in 

those costs.

V. Alimony

¶100 The next set of challenges the parties raise concerns the 

district court’s award of alimony to Candi. Guy asserts that the 

court exceeded its discretion in awarding any alimony 

whatsoever. Candi, on the other hand, asserts that the court 

should have increased the alimony award to account for her tax 

burden. She also argues that the court should have required Guy 

 

14. Imagine, for example, that Guy found it necessary to sell one 

of the restaurants to satisfy Candi’s deferred judgment. There 

may be any number of reasons, apart from transaction costs, to 

choose one restaurant over the other. Maybe one of the 

restaurants is more convenient for Guy to travel to, or maybe he 

feels that one will be more successful than the other down the 

road and bring him more income. Factors like this may make it 

reasonable for Guy to sell one of the two restaurants even 

though selling the other might result in fewer transaction costs. 

Because Candi will have no input on that decision, she would be 

stuck paying the higher transaction costs even though she would 

have been better off if Guy had sold the other restaurant. And of 

course, it should go without saying that Guy would incur 

minimal or no transaction costs if he decided simply to transfer 

the restaurants (or any of the other businesses) to Candi in 

partial payment of his obligation.
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to either obtain life insurance or provide some other security to 

ensure that she would receive her alimony payments if he were 

to pass away.

A. Alimony Award

¶101 Guy argues that the district court should not have 

awarded alimony to Candi because (1) she did not provide the 

court with sufficient evidence from which it could calculate her 

monthly needs and (2) Candi’s property settlement was 

sufficient to allow her to support herself. In support of both 

arguments, Guy primarily relies on our supreme court’s holding 

in Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 459 P.3d 276. But Dahl neither 

automatically requires a court to deny a request for alimony in 

the absence of documentation nor prevents the court from 

awarding alimony to a spouse who receives a large property 

settlement.

¶102 With respect to documentation of need, the Dahl court 

held only that the district court “acted within its discretion in 

denying” the wife’s alimony request when she failed to provide 

evidence supporting her claimed need, not that the district court 

was required to deny her request. Id. ¶ 117. In fact, the court 

explicitly acknowledged that “the district court could have . . . 

imputed a figure to determine [the wife’s] financial need based 

either on [the husband’s] records of the parties’ predivorce 

expenses or a reasonable estimate of [the wife’s] needs.” Id. ¶ 116 

(emphasis added). Furthermore, we have previously considered 

and rejected the “assertion that failure to file financial 

documentation automatically precludes an award of alimony.” 

Munoz-Madrid v. Carlos-Moran, 2018 UT App 95, ¶¶ 8–9, 427 P.3d 

420. “[A]lthough [Candi’s] expenses may have been difficult to 

discern because she failed to provide supporting documentation 

. . . , there was not a complete lack of evidence to support their 

existence.” See id. ¶ 10. Indeed, the court explained that it relied 

on the list of items in the standard financial declaration, Guy’s 
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financial declaration, evidence concerning the parties’ spending 

during the marriage, and evidence of Candi’s expenses during 

the pendency of the divorce to calculate Candi’s reasonable 

monthly needs.

¶103 Dahl also does not stand for the proposition that alimony 

should never be awarded to those who receive a large property 

settlement. Rather, Dahl merely states that receiving “a 

sufficiently large property award to support a comfortable 

standard of living” prevented “any serious inequity” from 

arising due to the court’s decision not to impute the wife’s need 

in the face of her lack of evidence. See 2015 UT 79, ¶ 116 

(quotation simplified). We acknowledge that if the payee spouse 

has income-producing property, the income from that property 

“may properly be considered as eliminating or reducing the 

need for alimony by that spouse.” Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 

P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988); see also Batty v. Batty, 2006 UT App 

506, ¶ 5, 153 P.3d 827 (holding that the evaluation of a payee 

spouse’s ability to meet his or her own needs “properly takes 

into account the result of the property division, particularly any 

income-generating property [the payee spouse] is awarded”);

Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1170 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 

(explaining that courts should distribute property before 

fashioning an alimony award, so they can take into account 

income generated from property interests). Nevertheless, the 

court in this case did not abuse its discretion by awarding 

alimony despite Candi’s large property settlement.

¶104 Although Candi was entitled to receive a large settlement 

eventually, Guy continued to control the bulk of the parties’ 

marital estate and would do so for the next five years. The court 

noted this in its determination regarding alimony, observing that 

“alimony was needed” because “Guy was unable to pay Candi 

the full value of the marital estate at this time.” The court 

refused to take into account income Candi may derive from her 

portion of the marital assets in the future because that analysis 
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was “too speculative for the Court to consider.”15 However, it 

observed that “at such time as . . . Candi . . . receives income or 

other assets from her share of the marital estate, or from other 

sources, the Court will evaluate the amount, if any, by which 

those amounts may reduce her unmet financial needs and 

thereby reduce or eliminate Guy’s alimony obligation.” Thus, 

the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Candi 

alimony, and any income she derives from the property 

settlement may be considered when she actually has control of 

that property.

B. Taxes

¶105 On the other hand, Candi argues that the district court 

should have included her tax liability on alimony in its 

calculation of her needs. In calculating both a payor spouse’s 

ability to pay and a payee spouse’s needs, courts are generally 

expected to consider the person’s tax liability. See McPherson v. 

McPherson, 2011 UT App 382, ¶ 14, 265 P.3d 839; Andrus v. 

Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ¶¶ 17–18, 169 P.3d 754. In particular, 

 

15. Although Candi was to receive interest payments on the

property settlement, we do not think it an abuse of the district 

court’s discretion not to include those payments in its 

assessment of Candi’s ability to meet her own needs. The court 

classified these interest payments as compensation for Candi’s 

forbearance on collecting her property settlement. To allow Guy 

to offset his alimony obligation with these interest payments 

strikes us as inequitable. Moreover, although Guy raised 

arguments asserting that his alimony should be reduced by 

future income once Candi receives her property, he does not 

appear to have specifically asked the court to include the interest 

payments in its calculation of Candi’s current income and 

therefore failed to preserve any such argument for appellate 

review.
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it is plain error for a court to consider the tax consequences for 

one party in assessing their income and expenses but not for the 

other party. Vanderzon v. Vanderzon, 2017 UT App 150, ¶¶ 45, 58, 

402 P.3d 219.

¶106 In its findings, the court used Guy’s net income to assess 

his ability to pay alimony. However, because Candi did not 

present evidence of her tax burden on any alimony award, the 

court did not consider her tax burden in assessing her need. We 

acknowledge that the court’s ability to estimate Candi’s taxes 

was hampered by Candi’s failure to provide evidence of her 

anticipated tax liability. Nevertheless, it is certain that she will 

incur some tax burden, particularly in light of the fact that she 

will be taxed on any alimony payments she receives.16 And we 

agree with Candi that it was inequitable for the court to consider 

Guy’s tax burden when calculating his ability to pay without 

considering Candi’s tax burden in assessing her needs. Thus, we 

remand the court’s alimony award for the limited purpose of 

having the court make findings as to Candi’s projected tax 

burden and adjust the alimony award accordingly.

C. Life Insurance

¶107 Next, Candi asserts that the district court should require 

Guy to either obtain life insurance or provide a substitute for life 

insurance to secure his alimony payments. She points out that 

the court initially stated in its 2017 Findings that “Guy should 

provide a life insurance policy for Candi to cover alimony for a 

period of time sufficient to cover his obligation should he 

 

16. This especially should have been taken into account given the 

district court’s entry of the Decree of Divorce on December 31, 

2018, the day before a change in the tax laws, to allow Guy to 

receive the benefit of a tax deduction on the amount of alimony 

he pays to Candi.
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20190106-CA 54 2022 UT App 5

unexpectedly pass away.” Although the court initially rejected 

Guy’s argument that he should be required only to “use his best 

efforts to obtain life insurance,” the court ultimately adopted 

Guy’s proposed language in its 2018 Supplemental Findings 

stating that “there was no information as to whether or not Guy 

could or could not obtain a life insurance policy for such 

purpose nor the cost thereof.” Candi asked the court to 

reconsider that finding and make the life insurance requirement 

mandatory. However, the court rejected that request and stated 

that its finding in the May 2018 Order was “sufficient.” But 

while that finding indicated the court’s intent “to ensure that 

Candi will receive the money awarded should [Guy] pass 

unexpectedly,” it did not definitively decide the issue of whether 

Guy was required to obtain life insurance to secure his alimony 

obligation or if he was able to demonstrate an inability to 

comply with the court’s direction. We are left wondering 

whether the court did, or did not, order Guy to obtain life 

insurance and are unable to ascertain the answer to this question 

from the court’s rulings. Accordingly, we remand this issue to 

the district court to clarify its order.17 

 

17. We note that this decision falls within the district court’s 

discretion. Although it is not uncommon for a divorce decree to 

include provisions requiring a party subject to an alimony or 

child support order to obtain life insurance, see, e.g., Kartchner v. 

Kartchner, 2014 UT App 195, ¶ 36, 334 P.3d 1; Robinson v. Baggett, 

2011 UT App 250, ¶ 17, 263 P.3d 411, we acknowledge that such 

security is not mandatory. While Guy indicated to the court that 

he is unable to get new life insurance due to a health condition, it 

does not appear that Candi had the opportunity to challenge 

Guy’s assertion or present evidence to the contrary. Moreover, 

the court ordered that Guy’s alimony obligation would 

terminate upon “the death of either party.” Unlike the property 

award, which belongs to Candi regardless of any circumstances 

(continued...)
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VI. Contempt

¶108 Finally, Candi argues that the district court erred in 

declining to hold Guy in contempt for violating the Stipulation, 

which the parties reached early on in the proceedings, that they 

would not “sell, gift, transfer, dissipate, encumber, secrete or 

dispose of marital assets” but that Guy could continue to 

manage WBC and conduct business “as he has in the past, which 

may include incurring debt, paying expenses and acquiring 

assets.” “As a general rule, in order to prove contempt for failure 

to comply with a court order it must be shown that the person 

cited for contempt knew what was required, had the ability to 

comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so.” Von Hake v. 

Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). In a civil contempt 

proceeding, these elements must be proven “by clear and 

convincing evidence.” Id.

¶109 Candi asserts that the Stipulation’s language allowed Guy 

to engage in business transactions only insofar as those 

transactions related to WBC. She argues that the “business 

hereinabove identified” language in the Stipulation is limited to 

“the management and control of” WBC and that the court 

therefore misread the Stipulation by not holding Guy in 

contempt for any transactions that were not directly related to 

WBC. But as Guy observes, the Stipulation also allowed the 

parties to engage in transactions “in the course of their normal 

living expenditures, ordinary and necessary business expenses 

and to pay divorce attorneys and expert fees and costs.”

¶110 “We interpret language in judicial documents in the same 

way we interpret contract language,” that is, “we look to the 

 

(...continued)

that may change in the future, she is entitled to receive alimony 

from Guy only so long as he is living.
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20190106-CA 56 2022 UT App 5

language of the [document] to determine its meaning.” Cook 

Martin Poulson PC v. Smith, 2020 UT App 57, ¶ 24, 464 P.3d 541 

(quotation simplified). We consider Guy’s reading of the 

Stipulation to be more consistent with the plain language of that 

document. The provision giving Guy “the right to conduct the 

business hereinabove identified as he has in the past, which may

include incurring debt, paying expenses and acquiring assets,” 

properly refers to both the operation of WBC and normal living 

and business expenses.

¶111 Moreover, because contempt requires that the party knew 

what was required and intentionally refused to comply, see Von 

Hake, 759 P.2d at 1172, “for a violation of an order to justify 

sanctions, the order must be sufficiently specific and definite as 

to leave no reasonable basis for doubt regarding its meaning,” 

Cook, 2020 UT App 57, ¶ 26 (quotation simplified). Even were we 

inclined to agree with Candi’s more limited interpretation, we 

could not say that the language is so clearly limited to WBC that 

there could be “no reasonable basis for doubt regarding its 

meaning.” See id. (quotation simplified).

¶112 The Stipulation allowed Guy to continue conducting 

normal transactions as he had in the past, and the district court 

found that “the transactions Candi complains of were consistent 

with Guy’s historical practice of transferring assets from one 

entity to another or from one form into another” and that there 

was “no indication that [they] . . . were out of the ordinary.” 

Candi does not challenge this finding. Thus, we conclude that 

the court did not exceed its discretion in declining to find Guy in 

contempt.

CONCLUSION

¶113 We conclude that the district court erred in failing to 

credit the value of the notes receivable to the marital estate. We 

also conclude that it erred in refusing to grant Candi a security 
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interest to protect her right to receive her unpaid share of the 

marital estate. However, we affirm the district court’s property 

valuation and distribution in all other respects.

¶114 As to the alimony award, we conclude that the district 

court erred in failing to account for Candi’s tax obligation in its 

calculation of her need and remand for clarification of whether 

the court intended to order Guy to obtain security on Candi’s 

alimony award. We affirm the alimony award in all other 

respects.

¶115 We also affirm the remaining orders and findings 

challenged on appeal, including the operative date of the Decree 

of Divorce, the equalization payment schedule, the court’s 

finding that Guy did not dissipate marital assets apart from the 

money he spent on his girlfriend, and its decision not to hold 

him in contempt.

¶116 Consistent with our discussion in this opinion, we 

remand to the district court to adjust the marital property 

valuation, to make findings regarding Candi’s tax liability and 

adjust the alimony award, to clarify whether Guy is must obtain 

security on Candi’s alimony award, and to enter orders 

necessary to adequately secure Candi’s interest in her unpaid 

share of the marital estate.