IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON No. 53033-3-II

Respondent,

v.

MATTHEW CHRISTIAN CALDWELL, UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant.

MELNICK,J. — Matthew Christian Caldwell appeals his conviction for unlawful possession 

of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a school. 

He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the contraband found on him 

and inside his vehicle because the stop that led to the discovery of these items was pretextual. We 

affirm. 

FACTS1

Longview Police Detective Calvin Ripp was standing outside of a hotel during the 

execution of a search warrant when Caldwell pulled into the hotel’s parking lot. Ripp could hear 

that the vehicle obviously did not have a muffler. Caldwell appeared to be heading to a parking 

spot near the room the officers were searching. The hotel was in a high crime area. Caldwell went 

from “calm to panicking” when he saw the officers at the hotel. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 42. 

 

1 The following facts rely in part on the trial court’s CrR 3.6 findings of fact, which are 

unchallenged and therefore verities on appeal. State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 571, 62 P.3d 489 

(2003).

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

July 8, 2020
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Ripp decided to contact Caldwell for the infraction of driving a vehicle not being 

equipment with a muffler.2 Ripp also wanted to contact Caldwell because he was in a high crime 

area, he appeared to be going to the hotel room where officers were serving a search warrant, and 

Caldwell’s reaction when he saw police. 

Ripp approached Caldwell and asked for his license and registration. Ripp discovered 

Caldwell had an outstanding arrest warrant. In a search incident to arrest, Ripp found $5,269 in 

Caldwell’s pocket. In Caldwell’s vehicle, officers found plastic bags, a digital scale, and 

methamphetamine.3 The hotel had a school within 1,000 feet of it. 

The State charged Caldwell with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver 

within 1,000 feet of a school. Caldwell filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the 

search. Caldwell argued that Ripp did not have probable cause to stop Caldwell. During the 

motion hearing, Caldwell also argued that the stop was pretextual. 

The trial court denied the motion, concluding “Ripp had probable cause to believe that 

[Caldwell] had committed a traffic violation by driving a vehicle with no muffler.” CP at 42. 

During its oral ruling, the court also concluded the stop was not pretextual because an infraction 

first occurred in front of the officer and then other suspicious activity occurred giving rise to the 

stop. The court stated that this situation is different than if the officer first “had the suspicion and 

then . . . followed [Caldwell] out onto the streets until he had . . . actually observed the infraction.” 

Report of Proceedings (Oct. 17, 2018) at 27. 

 

2 Under RCW 46.37.390(1), “Every motor vehicle shall at all times be equipped with a muffler in 

good working order and in constant operation to prevent excessive or unusual noise.

3 The search of Caldwell’s vehicle was based on community custody violations. 
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Following a bench trial based on stipulated facts, the court found Caldwell guilty as 

charged. Caldwell appeals. 

ANALYSIS

Caldwell argues that the trial court erred by concluding Ripp’s encounter with Caldwell 

was not an unlawful pretextual stop. We disagree.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Following a suppression hearing, we review challenged findings of fact to determine 

whether they are supported by substantial evidence. State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 571, 62 P.3d 

489 (2003). Unchallenged findings are verities on appeal, and challenged findings supported by 

substantial evidence are binding. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d at 571. We review the trial court’s 

conclusions of law following a suppression hearing de novo. State v. Homan, 181 Wn.2d 102, 

106, 330 P.3d 182 (2014). We affirm conclusions of law that are supported by the findings of fact. 

State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 116, 59 P.3d 58 (2002).

II. Legal Principles

Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of 

the Washington State Constitution, a police officer generally cannot seize a person without a 

warrant. State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 249, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009). Warrantless searches are 

presumed unreasonable subject to a few exceptions that are narrowly drawn. State v. Tyler, 177 

Wn.2d 690, 698, 302 P.3d 165 (2013). A lawful Terry4stop is one of the exceptions to the warrant 

requirement. State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 349, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). 

 

4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
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“For a Terry stop to be permissible, the State must show that the officer had a ‘reasonable 

suspicion’ that the detained person was, or was about to be, involved in a crime.” State v. Z.U.E., 

183 Wn.2d 610, 617, 352 P.3d 796 (2015) (quoting State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747, 64 P.3d 

594 (2003)). If an officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a suspect is involved in 

criminal activity, the officer may detain the suspect, request him or her to produce identification, 

and ask him or her about his or her activities. State v. Little, 116 Wn.2d 488, 495, 806 P.2d 749 

(1991). Terry stops have been extended to traffic infractions. State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 

173-74, 43 P.3d 513 (2002). 

But the stop must not be pretextual. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 358. A traffic stop is pretextual 

when an officer relies on some legal authorization as a mere pretext to justify the seizure when the 

true reason for the seizure is not constitutionally justified. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 358. “[A] traffic 

stop is not unconstitutionally pretextual so long as investigation of either criminal activity or a 

traffic infraction (or multiple infractions), for which the officer has a reasonable articulable 

suspicion, is an actual, conscious, and independent cause of the traffic stop.” State v. Arreola, 176 

Wn.2d 284, 297, 290 P.3d 983 (2012). When determining whether a stop is pretextual, we 

“consider the totality of the circumstances, including both the subjective intent of the officer as 

well as the objective reasonableness of the officer’s behavior. State v. Boisselle, 194 Wn.2d 1, 15, 

448 P.3d 19 (2019) (quoting Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 359). “When an unconstitutional search or 

seizure occurs, all subsequently uncovered evidence becomes fruit of the poisonous tree and must 

be suppressed.” Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 359.

Here, based on the unchallenged findings of fact, Ripp stood outside a hotel while other 

officers executed a warrant. Caldwell pulled into the hotel parking lot with a loud vehicle that did 

not have a muffler. This is a traffic infraction. RCW 46.37.390(1). Ripp decided to contact 
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Caldwell based on the traffic violation. Ripp lawfully asked for Caldwell’s identification. Little, 

116 Wn.2d at 495. Ripp then learned about a warrant for Caldwell’s arrest. An arrest and 

subsequent search incident to the arrest were lawfully conducted. See State v. Rothenberger, 73 

Wn.2d 596, 599, 440 P.2d 184 (1968) (after learning Rothenberger was wanted on a felony charge, 

police officer had “not only . . . the right but the duty to pursue Rothenberger and arrest him.”). 

Caldwell relies on Boisselle to argue the stop was pretextual, but that case is 

distinguishable. There, law enforcement arrived at a home based on two anonymous tips of 

criminal activity, smelled what they thought was a decomposing body, and then waited 2 hours to 

enter the home. Boisselle, 194 Wn.2d at 15. Officers justified their warrantless entry on the 

emergency aid community caretaking function. Boisselle, 194 Wn.2d at 15. The trial court denied 

Boisselle’s motion to suppress evidence found inside the home and the court of appeals affirmed. 

Boisselle, 194 Wn.2d at 7-8. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because “the officers used 

the emergency aid community caretaking function as a mere pretense for an evidentiary search . . 

. the officers’ warrantless search of Boisselle’s home was pretextual.” 194 Wn.2d at 16. The facts 

in Boisselle are distinguished from the facts of this case. Ripp did not approach Caldwell to justify 

a suspicion that he was involved in drug activity; rather, Ripp approached him because he 

witnessed a traffic violation. Ripp then discovered a valid arrest warrant. He conducted a search 

pursuant to Caldwell’s arrest on the warrant. That search resulted in the seizure of the contraband. 

The findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusion that the stop was not pretextual. 

Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Caldwell’s motion to suppress. 
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We affirm.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

Melnick, J.

We concur:

Worswick, P.J.

Sutton, J.