Admiral Allen giving Principal 

Federal Offi cer’s views for TV

U.S. Coast Guard photo
551

Failures in National Response 

Plan: Unifi ed Command

Failures in Design, Implementation, and Execution of the 

National Response Plan

The National Response Plan (NRP) aims to be a comprehensive framework for managing domestic incidents, whether terrorist attacks or natural disasters. It seeks to 

delineate the mechanisms for coordinating federal support to states, localities, and 

tribes; for interacting with nongovernmental and private-sector entities; and for directly 

exercising federal authority when appropriate.

Th e Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed the NRP pursuant to Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive-51

 and in accordance with section 502(6) of the Homeland 

Security Act.2

 DHS released the NRP on January 6, 2005.3 It was to be “fully implemented” 

by April 14, 2005; at that date, response plans that had remained in eff ect during the 

implementation period were superseded.4

 Implementation of the NRP (and the associated 

National Incident Management System) was deemed a “national priority” in DHS’s Interim 

National Preparedness Goal.5

Th e NRP was set up to guide the national response to actual and potential Incidents of National Signifi cance – “high-impact events that require a coordinated and eff ective response 

by an appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental entities in order to save lives, minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term 

community recovery and mitigation activities.”6

 Th e NRP applies to all federal agencies that 

may be requested to provide assistance or conduct operations during an actual or potential 

Incident of National Signifi cance.7

 Th e heads of 30 federal agencies and two nongovernmental organizations signed the document. 8

Incidents of National Signifi cance include all Presidentially declared disasters and emergencies under the Staff ord Act, which establishes the most commonly used programs for disaster 

and emergency assistance to states, local governments and individuals.9

 Incidents of National 

Signifi cance can also include incidents not covered by the Staff ord Act, such as high-profi le 

“National Special Security Events” like national political conventions or the Super Bowl.10

Although smaller incidents warranting a Staff ord Act declaration occurred in the months 

aft er the NRP was issued, Hurricane Katrina was the fi rst major test of the NRP. Th e response to Katrina exposed fl aws in the design and pre-storm implementation of the NRP as 

well as in its execution during the disaster. Some of the more prominent of these problems 

are discussed below.11

Failures in the Design and Implementation of the NRP

Insuffi cient Training and Exercises

Th e NRP was publicly issued with fanfare in January 2005. Tom Ridge, then DHS Secretary, 

said, “America is better prepared today, thanks to the National Response Plan.”12 He contrasted the NRP with other plans and reports routinely issued in Washington: “Instead of promising results in the future, it is a deliverable that we believe will bring defi nite results now.”13

Chapter 27
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Th e NRP, however, was not a self-executing document. It is a complex, ambitious, 400-pluspage, high-level plan that was well described in a document produced to the Committee by 

the Offi ce of the Vice President as “a very detailed, acronym-heavy document that is not 

easily accessible to the fi rst-time user.”14 Th e NRP, moreover, entails signifi cant departures 

from the primary plan it replaced, the Federal Response Plan,15 including shift ing leadership from FEMA to the new Department of Homeland Security; introducing a new lead 

coordinating fi gure, the Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO), to supplement the existing Federal 

Coordinating Offi cial (FCO) position; and assigning new emergency-support functions to 

federal agencies, including, for the fi rst time, public-safety and security responsibilities.

Without a systematic training and implementation eff ort, the NRP was unlikely to be widely 

or readily understood, and unlikely to off er eff ective guidance, just four months aft er its 

implementation, for the massive federal, state, and local response necessary for Katrina. 

DHS’s implementation eff ort appears to have been entirely inadequate. Aft er the NRP was 

issued, DHS conducted a wave of training for headquarters staff of component agencies.16

Beyond that, it appears no one at DHS was charged with ensuring that the NRP would be well 

implemented. Th e National Incident Management System (NIMS) Integration Center is responsible for federal, state, and local NRP awareness training as an adjunct to its primary mission of fostering the widespread adoption of the NIMS, a nationwide approach for diff erent 

jurisdictions and levels of government to work together in domestic incidents, but its staffi ng 

(fewer than 10 people) inherently limited its impact.17 Th e Integration Center relies largely on 

self-administered online training, in which sessions could last as little as 15-20 minutes.18

Only one large-scale exercise of the NRP took place before Katrina, the Top Offi cials 3 

exercise (TOPOFF 3) in April 2005, at about the time the NRP was to take full eff ect and 

supersede other plans. TOPOFF 3, sponsored by DHS, involved responders from all levels 

of government. A report by the DHS Inspector General in November 2005 found that “the 

exercise highlighted – at all levels of government – a fundamental lack of understanding for 

the principles and protocols set forth in the NRP and NIMS.”19 It appears that little was done 

to correct this shortcoming, and that widespread unfamiliarity with the NRP persisted.20

In addition, the absence of any other exercises of the NRP meant that there were no further 

formal opportunities to understand and fl esh out the roles allocated by the plan, to clarify 

ambiguities, to identify potential problems, and to incorporate lessons recognized back into 

the NRP as lessons learned. DHS’s lack of substantial and sustained eff ort to familiarize 

offi cials and responders with the NRP and to exercise the NRP under simulated conditions 

meant, as one expert testifi ed, that “the NRP was only a plan – it was not a functioning, 

practiced, operable, system.”21

Principal Federal Offi cial and Federal Coordinating Offi cer Roles

Th e NRP does not clearly defi ne the role of the PFO or distinguish it from that of the FCO. 

Th is was an obstacle to an eff ective, coordinated response to Katrina.

Th e FCO position, authorized by the Staff ord Act, predates the NRP. Th e Staff ord Act 

requires that the President appoint an FCO immediately upon issuing a major disaster or 

emergency declaration.22 Th e FCO is to appraise the types of relief most urgently needed, 

establish fi eld offi ces, coordinate the administration of relief, and take other necessary action to help citizens and public offi cials obtain proper assistance.23 Before the NRP, the FCO 

led the federal response on the ground.

Th e NRP created a new PFO position that is not explicitly provided for in the Staff ord 

Act, so the PFO remains a non-statutory position. According to the NRP, the PFO is to be 

“personally designated” by the Secretary of Homeland Security and is to represent the Sec-
Failures In National Response Plan: Unifi ed Command

553

retary as “the lead federal offi cial.”24 Th e PFO is also, among other things, to ensure overall 

coordination of federal incident-management activities and of resource allocation and serve 

as a “primary, though not exclusive” point of contact for state and local offi cials, the media, 

and the private sector.25 But the NRP also says that the PFO is not to “direct or replace” the 

incident-command structure, and that the PFO does not have “directive authority” over the 

FCO or other federal and state offi cials.26

Tasked with leading the federal response but lacking authority to direct others, the PFO 

position has inherent challenges. Moreover, the division of responsibilities between the PFO 

and the FCO – who leads the federal response in Staff ord Act situations where no PFO has 

been assigned27 – is not clear. Both positions have coordination responsibilities, but they are 

not clearly distinguished.28 Th eir relationship is also unclear: the PFO can “coordinate” but 

not direct the FCO, who is to “work closely with” the PFO.29

Bruce Baughman, President of the National Emergency Management Association and 

Director of the Alabama Emergency Management Agency, testifi ed that “basically, in Louisiana, we had two people in charge. ... And it wasn’t real clear what the roles and responsibilities of each were.30

Comptroller General David Walker, the head of the Government Accountability Offi ce 

(GAO), found that “shift ing roles and responsibilities” of the PFO, FCO and the DHS Secretary (who is to provide strategic, national leadership) resulted in “disjointed eff orts of many 

federal agencies involved in the response, a myriad of approaches and processes for requesting and providing assistance, and confusion about who should be advised of requests and 

what resources would be provided within specifi c time frames.”31 William Lokey, FCO for 

Louisiana during Katrina, and Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy Director of the Louisiana Offi ce 

of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, each testifi ed that problems arose due 

to the unclear chain of command.32

Vice Admiral Th ad Allen of the U.S. Coast Guard, who succeeded then-FEMA Director 

Michael Brown as PFO during Katrina, acknowledged the diffi culties in sorting out the PFO 

and FCO roles: “If you need to invoke the Staff ord Act for whatever reason, you’re always 

going to have an issue with the relationship of the PFO and the FCO together.”33 Approximately three weeks aft er he was designated PFO, Allen accepted an appointment to be FCO 

for Katrina in each of the three Gulf Coast states as well – eff ectively merging the two roles.34

Potentially Overlapping Agency Roles

Another NRP design fl aw revealed by Katrina was the failure to delineate areas of potentially overlapping responsibility among federal agencies. Th e NRP includes 15 Emergency 

Support Functions (ESF), groupings of substantive capabilities – communications or urban 

search and rescue, for example – that may be needed in a disaster. Each of these ESFs has 

a designated primary agency, which is to lead that ESF’s mission in an incident; a list of 

other support agencies, which are to provide support for that mission in an incident; and a 

designated coordinating agency, which coordinates the eff orts and planning of the primary 

agency or agencies and support agencies on an ongoing basis.35

A striking example of the problem of overlapping responsibilities, discussed at greater 

length in the law-enforcement portion of this report (see Chapter 25), is the NRP’s assignment of both the coordinating-agency role and the primary-agency role for ESF-13, public 

safety and security, jointly to DHS and the Department of Justice. Nowhere does the 

ESF-13 Annex to the NRP spell out the respective roles of the two agencies, how they are 

to divide or share responsibilities or circumstances where one or the other is to have 

primacy.36 Compounding this lack of NRP guidance were the agencies’ own failures to 

clarify the ambiguities prior to a major disaster. Such activities should have been completed 
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554

during the initial 60-day “transitional period” aft er the NRP was issued.37 Predictably, this 

led to signifi cant confusion, and ultimately contributed to a delayed federal law-enforcement response in the Gulf Coast. 

Greater clarity in the responsibilities of Primary and Support Agencies for Emergency 

Support Functions (ESFs) might also have helped avoid other confl icts. For instance, the 

NRP assigns lead responsibility for ESF-8, public health and medical services, to the federal 

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).38 But one of the response mechanisms, 

the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), is part of FEMA, a DHS agency that deploys 

NDMS’s Disaster Medical Assistance Teams as FEMA assets. In the response to Katrina, 

FEMA and HHS engaged in minimal coordination on pre-positioning and deploying Disaster Medical Assistance Teams.39

Contingency and Catastrophic Planning

Th e NRP is a high-level plan, with a core set of principles meant to apply to a wide range of 

possible events. It was not designed to address specifi c scenarios or geographic areas, or to 

provide operational details. Th e NRP does contemplate that such plans may be developed, 

but it sets neither a process nor a timetable for doing so.40 More detailed planning, particularly for catastrophic events, might have made possible a more eff ective response to Katrina.

Under the Federal Response Plan, the NRP’s predecessor, FEMA developed plans adapted 

to each FEMA region; each plan could then be tailored to individual states.41 Th e plan for 

FEMA Region VI, based in Denton, TX, and covering Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, 

Oklahoma, and Texas, included a hurricane plan for Louisiana.42 Th is investigation found 

no indication that equivalent work has been done under the NRP, nor any indication that 

earlier regional plans have been updated.43

It also appears that no plans have been developed under the NRP to deal with specifi c risk 

scenarios such as the 15 homeland-security planning scenarios developed by the White 

House Homeland Security Council in 2004, which included a hurricane situation.44 Admiral 

Allen suggested using more specifi c “sub-plans” to fl esh out how plans would actually be 

executed. He observed:

Th is [NRP] is a high-level document. I think as you’re able to establish the parameters of almost a spectrum of an all hazards type of an approach to things 

that you need to be more detailed planning on how you would respond to it ... 

a natural disaster is one thing; a natural disaster with a radiological event is an 

entirely diff erent issue.45

Detailed, more specifi c planning is likely to be particularly important in responding to 

catastrophes. Comptroller General Walker has stressed the crucial need for strong planning 

for catastrophic events, and recommended that the NRP and its Catastrophic Incident Annex – the portion of the NRP that provides for a proactive, national response to a catastrophe – “should be supported and supplemented by more detailed and robust operational 

implementation plans.”46

Certainly the NRP, as it had been implemented and without the necessary associated planning to support it, was found inadequate to the catastrophe of Katrina. Th ough the NRP 

was intended to address a wide spectrum of events of varying size, in an actual situation 

where upwards of a million people were aff ected – tens of thousands of whom continued to 

face serious danger to life, health or safety aft er the storm itself had passed – and in which 

the capabilities of local responders had been decimated, the NRP’s procedures were not yet 

ready for use and simply fell short. As Admiral Allen noted, the NRP as written “doesn’t 

contemplate” an event on the massive scale of Katrina: “When it goes off the scale, you 
Failures In National Response Plan: Unifi ed Command

555

know, you need a separate plan for how to deal with something that massive. In this case, 

there were some things that were unique to this event that can only be handled by an almost 

diff erent approach to what you’re doing.”47

Th e NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Annex and its associated but still-to-be-released Catastrophic Incident Supplement were intended to provide this separate plan for a catastrophe, but, 

incomplete and largely untested, they went unused. Th e Catastrophic Incident Annex sets out 

the broad principles of a proactive response; the Catastrophic Incident Supplement was supposed to fi ll in signifi cant, operational details.48 Unfortunately, when Katrina hit, nearly nine 

months aft er the NRP had been announced, the Supplement still had not been issued. 

According to David Garratt, Acting Director of FEMA’s Recovery Division, who had 

chaired the interagency Catastrophic Incident Planning Group that was charged with developing the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, the Supplement had been 99 percent completed by late 2004,49 roughly the same time the NRP itself was fi nished. Garratt explained that 

when it came time to get the concurrence of the relevant federal agencies to the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, all approved except the Department of Defense (DOD). DOD had 

concerns about a Memorandum of Agreement related to the National Disaster Medical 

System and, in particular, provisions related to reimbursement for certain costs of care in 

a public-health emergency.50 Th e Memorandum of Agreement (to which DOD, FEMA, the 

Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Veterans Aff airs were 

parties) went unresolved and unsigned until approximately September 6, 200551 – eight days 

aft er Katrina made landfall and apparently only aft er the White House’s Homeland Security 

Council got involved.52 Th e Supplement, meanwhile, has never been issued.53

Th e delay in issuing the Catastrophic Incident Supplement – and developing the agency 

plans and procedures that were required to support it – deprived the federal government 

of a potential tool in its response to Hurricane Katrina. Th e heart of the Supplement is an 

Execution Schedule that provides an agency-by-agency (and hour-by-hour) list of the assets 

various federal agencies are to deploy automatically to the aff ected area once the Secretary of 

Homeland Security orders implementation.54 Had it been issued and high-priority resources 

pre-identifi ed and made ready to deploy, the Catastrophic Incident Supplement might have 

sped delivery of supplies and personnel to mobilization centers close to the disaster or, in 

certain circumstances, directly to the incident scene without a need for requests from state 

and local authorities, or from any other federal agency.

Even if the Supplement had been implemented, however, it is not clear that it would have 

been adequate to the task at hand. Th e Execution Schedule is essentially a method of pre-prioritizing a certain set of assets – an important and potentially very useful function, but not by 

itself likely to constitute a suffi cient response to an event of catastrophic magnitude. Garratt, 

chair of the Catastrophic Incident Planning Group, characterized the Supplement as “basically 

just an acceleration model for resources that are already identifi ed under the NRP.”55 Indeed, 

the fact that the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, while complete, has not yet been issued, 

apparently refl ects questions about whether it needs further modifi cation.56 To be truly eff ective, the Supplement would need to move beyond its important but narrowly focused Execution Schedule, and incorporate more robust, catastrophe-focused planning.57

Failures in the Execution of the NRP

Declaration of an Incident of National Signifi cance

Under the NRP, every event that provokes a Presidential declaration under the Staff ord Act 

automatically becomes an Incident of National Signifi cance.58 Th us, when the President 
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556

issued an emergency declaration for portions of Louisiana on Saturday, August 27, 2005, 

Hurricane Katrina became an Incident of National Signifi cance. Despite this, on the aft ernoon of Tuesday, August 30, Secretary Chertoff issued a memorandum “declaring” Katrina 

an Incident of National Signifi cance as well as appointing Brown PFO.59 Th e next day, 

Secretary Chertoff appeared at a press conference at which he reiterated his declaration and 

noted that this was the fi rst time that such a declaration had been made.60

Th e superfl uous Tuesday “declaration” has caused confusion. In testimony before the 

House of Representatives, the Secretary said, “I did it because we were going to have a Cabinet meeting the next day and I wanted to have some kind of a documented notifi cation of 

the steps I had taken. I didn’t have to do it.”61 He echoed this explanation in testimony before the Committee, again citing the pending Cabinet meeting and saying, “In truth, I didn’t 

need to do it. I was told I didn’t need to do it. But I just did it to formalize it.” He also stated 

that “my understanding of the plan and my reading of the plan then and now is that by dint 

of declaring the emergency, it automatically made it an Incident of National Signifi cance.”62

At minimum, the Secretary’s redundant declaration of an Incident of National Signifi cance 

confused an already diffi cult situation and suggested a lack of familiarity with core concepts 

of the NRP within the Secretary’s offi ce. Robert Stephan, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, and the individual who led the Department’s development of the NRP, also 

addressed the Tuesday “declaration.” In an account similar to that provided by the Secretary’s Chief of Staff , John Wood, Stephan explained that his staff produced the initial draft 

of the Tuesday announcement, and that as originally written it only addressed the appointment of Brown as PFO. According to Stephan, the “declaration” of an Incident of National 

Signifi cance was subsequently added to the statement by someone in the Secretary’s offi ce. 

When, in the wake of press coverage raising questions about the declaration, Stephan realized that this language had been added, he contact the Secretary’s offi ce and explained the 

issue.63 Stephan further testifi ed that he “got the sense” that the Secretary’s front offi ce staff 

did not realize the error until he told them, and he noted that the Secretary was “not very 

excited” when informed that the error had occurred.64

Appointment of Michael Brown as Principal Federal Offi cial

Secretary Chertoff also departed from the NRP in his appointment of a PFO. In Chapter 12, 

this report discusses the advantages that might have been gained by appointing a PFO prior 

to Katrina’s landfall. Questions have also been raised about the wisdom of appointing Brown, 

who had little experience as an emergency manager, as PFO. But apart from these issues of 

judgment, Brown’s appointment as PFO violated the literal requirements of the NRP. 

It is inadvisable to appoint any FEMA Director PFO. Th e NRP prohibits the PFO from 

being “dual-hatted” – that is, from occupying another position or having another set of confl icting or distracting obligations at the same time. Specifi cally, the NRP states that, “Once 

formally designated, the PFOs relinquish the conduct of all normal duties and functions. 

PFOs may not be ‘dual-hatted’ with any other roles or responsibilities that could detract 

from their overall incident management responsibilities.”65 Notwithstanding this requirement, at the time of his appointment as PFO, Brown also served as Under Secretary for 

Emergency Preparedness and Response and as the Director of FEMA. Some of his duties 

appeared to be assumed by his Deputy, Patrick Rhode, but he took no formal steps, nor was 

he asked to take any, to relinquish his other responsibilities.66

Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security,67 and Secretary Chertoff defended 

Brown’s “dual-hatted” role, arguing that the PFO and FEMA responsibilities complemented 

each other.68 FEMA Director and PFO responsibilities, however, are far from identical. 

Th e FEMA Director has responsibilities for managing an organization that are distinct from 

overseeing any individual incident, however large. Not only may administrative issues – of 
Failures In National Response Plan: Unifi ed Command

557

personnel, budget, contracting, and the like – arise back in Washington that will either distract 

from the incident coordination or be neglected, but other disasters may occur as well that will 

demand attention from the FEMA Director. Indeed, on September 1, 2005 – three days aft er 

Katrina made landfall – an earthquake struck California.69 Th ough fortunately minor, it demonstrates that potential problems that can occur where the FEMA Director is also assigned the 

day-to-day responsibilities as the PFO for a specifi c incident. Th e development of another potentially devastating hurricane, Hurricane Rita, a mere four weeks aft er Katrina further underscores 

the problems inherent in tying the Director to the management of a single, specifi c incident.

Brown also failed to satisfy the NRP requirement that individuals – except in “extenuating” 

circumstances – must complete a formal training program before serving as PFO,70 as he 

had never participated in such training.71

Another form of “dual-hatting” occurred aft er Coast Guard Vice Admiral Th ad Allen 

replaced Brown as PFO. As discussed above (and at greater length in the unifi ed-command 

section), approximately three weeks aft er his appointment as PFO, Adm. Allen was also 

appointed to be the FCO for Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Th ese dual appointments 

appear to be inconsistent with the NRP, which clearly envisions the PFO as separate and 

distinct from the FCO position. Robert Stephan confi rmed that the “dual-hatting” of the 

PFO and FCO “was never contemplated” by the NRP.72

Non-Implementation of the Catastrophic Incident Annex

In failing to implement the National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRPCIA), Secretary Chertoff ignored a potentially powerful tool that might have alleviated diffi culties in the federal response to Katrina. 

As discussed above, the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, with its detailed Execution 

Schedule, had not been issued at the time Katrina came ashore, but the NRP-CIA, released in 

January 2005, provides important tools on its own for a faster and more eff ective response.73

Th e NRP-CIA explicitly provides for a proactive federal response to catastrophic events.74

Th e NRP defi nes a catastrophic event as “any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely 

aff ecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or 

government functions.”75 Th e Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary’s designee 

may initiate implementation of the NRP-CIA.76 Th e NRP-CIA was not accompanied by 

changes in the Staff ord Act or other legislation and thus does not provide new authority to 

federal offi cials. It does, however, set a policy and tone for an urgent and proactive response 

that moves beyond the usual procedures in responding to an “ordinary” disaster.77 For 

a “typical” disaster, the standard practice is that the federal government does not extend 

aid until a state requests assistance. During a catastrophe, however, NRP-CIA activation 

prompts the government to help without waiting for requests. 

Th e NRP-CIA recognizes that, in a catastrophe, “Federal and/or national resources are 

required to augment overwhelmed state, local, and tribal response eff orts” and therefore 

provides for the identifi cation and rapid deployment of essential resources expected to be 

urgently needed to save lives and contain incidents.78 Upon notifi cation that the NRP-CIA 

has been implemented, federal agencies are to “take immediate actions to protect life, 

property, and critical infrastructure under their jurisdiction, and provide assistance within 

the aff ected area.”79 In addition, the NRP provides that normal procedures for certain Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) may be “expedited or streamlined to address the magnitude of urgent requirements of the incident.”80 And while the federal government must still 

notify and coordinate with states, “the coordination process should not delay or impede the 

rapid mobilization and deployment of critical Federal resources.”81
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558

In short, the NRP-CIA turns what is traditionally a “pull” system, in which the federal 

government waits to receive requests from state and local offi cials, or from other federal 

agencies, into a “push” system, where federal authorities proactively deploy resources to 

mobilization centers close to the disaster or, in certain circumstances, directly to the incident scene to assist in responding to the incident.

When the President issued an emergency declaration in the days before landfall, it should have 

been apparent that Katrina had signifi cant potential to cause a “catastrophe” as defi ned by the 

NRP-CIA. Aft er landfall, it should have been immediately apparent that the catastrophe had 

occurred. Indeed, Secretary Chertoff would eventually describe Katrina as an “ultra catastrophe.”82 But the NRP-CIA was never activated. It is unknown whether DHS leaders ever considered activating the NRP-CIA, although both Secretary Chertoff ’s Chief of Staff Wood, and Garratt, a FEMA employee who headed the Catastrophic Incident Planning Group, were unaware 

of any discussions concerning the NRP-CIA in the days before Katrina made landfall.83

In the aft ermath of Hurricane Katrina, DHS and other federal offi cials have suggested that it 

was not appropriate to invoke the NRP-CIA to respond to the hurricane because the NRP-CIA 

was intended only for “no-notice” events – for which there is no time to go through normal 

procedures – whereas there was notice that Katrina was heading toward the Gulf Coast.84 Th e 

Catastrophic Incident Annex itself, however, does not contain any language that would limit 

it to no-notice events. Th e yet-to-be-issued Catastrophic Incident Supplement was somewhat 

more explicit, stating that it is intended to apply to “no-notice” or “short-notice” events.85

Th ese terms are left undefi ned in the Supplement. While DHS offi cials contend that Hurricane 

Katrina was not a no-notice or a short-notice event, a contrary view is just as plausible. Specifi -

cally, it could be argued that a massive hurricane hurtling towards a major American city with 

two or three days’ notice meets some common-sense defi nition of a short-notice event.

Indeed, the Catastrophic Incident Supplement’s Execution Schedule makes specifi c reference to hurricanes, events for which there is typically some notice, suggesting further that 

these documents would apply to an event such as Katrina.86 Nonetheless, federal offi cials 

have argued that Katrina provided too much notice to qualify as a “short-notice” event.87 Th e 

basis for this argument is respect for the states – with prior notice the normal NRP process 

of consultation with the states about their needs should apply. Th ere are, of course, countervailing considerations: some known events can still be so overwhelming and urgent that the 

NRP-CIA may be the appropriate tool. If it were deliberate policy to exclude an event such 

as Katrina from the purview of the Catastrophic Incident Annex, there may be a signifi cant 

fl aw in the policy underlying the NRP-CIA and the Catastrophic Supplement. As Comptroller General David Walker testifi ed, “the idea that we would be less proactive in dealing with a 

known natural disaster [than with a no-notice event] just defi es common sense.”88

Failures to Establish an Incident Command System Structure or 

Unifi ed Command 

Background: Incident Command System and Unifi ed Command

Emergencies create confusion. Even in the case of a minor incident involving a single 

response agency, response personnel must quickly determine what is happening and then 

coordinate and control many separate activities at the scene to ensure everyone is working 

toward a common, productive goal. If the incident is a disaster or catastrophe, the failure to 

coordinate multiple agencies from diff erent jurisdictions, each with its own internal lines of 

communication and authority, can seriously degrade the capabilities of the government as a 

whole to respond eff ectively. Th e absence of interoperable communications or an eff ectively 

trained and exercised plan will further undermine the response.
Failures In National Response Plan: Unifi ed Command

559

In the event that an emergency or disaster necessitates a response from more than one 

entity or jurisdiction, use of the Incident Command System (ICS) and establishment of a 

unifi ed command will normally greatly improve chances of an eff ective response.

Hurricane Katrina brought about an attempt to establish a unifi ed command among multiple agencies during a signifi cant natural disaster. Th e story of that eff ort points to the need 

for agreement on goals and strategies, for understanding and training, for communication 

and coordination – and illustrates the practical diffi culties of becoming ready and maintaining readiness with the NIMS-ICS doctrine including the concept of unifi ed command. 

Th e NRP, which utilizes ICS as part of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), 

the system that provides a nationwide approach for federal, state, and local governments 

and others to work together in domestic incidents, states that a unifi ed command should be 

established:

when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross political jurisdictions. Agencies work together through the designated members of the Unifi ed Command to establish their designated Incident 

Commanders at a single [location] and to establish a common set of objectives 

and strategies and a single Incident Action Plan.89 

Unifi ed command does not mean that a single person or agency directs others involved in a 

response (an arrangement known as “unity of command”) Unifi ed command, in the words 

of the NIMS manual, “allows agencies with diff erent legal, geographic, and functional authorities and responsibilities to work together eff ectively without aff ecting individual agency 

authority, responsibility, or accountability.”90

Th e challenges faced by the City of New York’s emergency response agencies immediately 

aft er the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, demonstrate the need 

for a common incident-command system and a unifi ed command in a major disaster. As 

reported by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the “9/11 

Commission”), defi ciencies in the City’s unifi ed-command structure signifi cantly impaired 

the ability of the New York Fire Department, the New York Police Department, and the Port 

Authority to coordinate their responses.91 Exacerbating and complicating the lack of a unifi edcommand structure were the poor communications systems and separate command posts 

that failed to eff ectively share information among the various emergency-response agencies.92

To ensure that diff erent agencies work well together in a disaster, the 9/11 Commission 

recommended: 

Emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident Command System (ICS). When multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are 

involved, they should adopt a unifi ed command. Both are proven frameworks 

for emergency response.93

Even before the 9/11 Commission made this recommendation, the federal government had begun developing the NRP, as well as NIMS. Th e Incident Command System, the incident-management component of NIMS, embraces the concept of unifi ed command. Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, issued in February 2003, directed the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to develop a National Response Plan, as well as a National Incident 

Management System “to provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local 

governments to work eff ectively and effi ciently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover 

from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity.”94 Th e Presidential directive 

specifi ed that NIMS should incorporate the concepts of the Incident Command System.95
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DHS issued NIMS in March 2004. NIMS identifi es the advantages of utilizing ICS and specifi cally of establishing a unifi ed command:

• a single set of objectives, 

• a collective approach to develop strategies to achieve incident objectives,

• improved information fl ow and coordination between all jurisdictions and 

agencies involved, 

• all involved agencies have an understanding of joint priorities and restrictions,

• protection from the compromise of each participating agency’s legal authorities, and 

• optimization of combined eff orts through a single Incident Action Plan.96

Unifi ed command is achieved through a team approach to incident management. Th e precise nature of a unifi ed command structure will depend on particulars of the incident, but in 

general, each agency with jurisdictional authority or functional responsibility will participate in a collaborative process.97 Th at is, each of the responding agencies with incident 

jurisdiction shares in the responsibility to establish a unifi ed command. 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 directed federal departments and agencies to 

“make adoption of the NIMS a requirement ... for providing federal preparedness assistance 

through grants, contracts, or other activities.”98

Th e NRP, which incorporates NIMS, was to be “fully implemented” 120 days aft er issuance.99 During this period, which ended April 15, 2005, states and local governments were 

requested to “modify [their] existing incident management and emergency operations plans 

... to ensure proper alignment with NRP coordinating structures.”100 DHS, however, did not 

require states to be in full compliance with NIMS until the fi scal year beginning October 1, 

2006.101 Federal compliance was to have been met by October 1, 2005.102

 Gil Jamieson, Director of the NIMS Integration Center at FEMA, explained the rationale 

for this multi-year, phased approach for the states to adopt NIMS: 

You’re asking for a cultural change in terms of the way that people do business. Th e National Incident Management System and ICS grew up from the fi re 

service [due to the frequent need to coordinate fi refi ghting of wildfi res ranging 

across many jurisdictions]. Th ere’s still a tendency on the part of law enforcement to view it as a fi re-centered process. Health and medical folks, while they 

want to comply with it, are just not familiar with it. So as opposed to having a 

knee-jerk reaction to a very hard-hitting federal mandate, we thought it was 

an appropriate response to phase it in over time, do the cultural awareness, 

migrate; while there were negative incentives in there in terms of provision of 

grant assistance, where we were trying to get to was that we were moving in that 

direction because it was a good idea, not because it was a federal mandate.103

At the time the NRP became eff ective in early 2005, it was apparent that many local, state, and 

federal agencies still were unfamiliar with the plan and NIMS. Th is lack of familiarity was observed in April 2005, during DHS’s Top Offi cials Exercise (TOPOFF) 3, “by any measure the 

most ambitious civilian terrorism response exercise ever conducted.”104 Involving representatives from 27 federal departments, 30 state, 44 local, and 156 private-sector organizations, 

TOPOFF 3 simulated the simultaneous outbreak of pneumonic plague in Union and Middlesex Counties, New Jersey, and the dispersal of mustard gas and high-yield explosives in the 

city of New London, Connecticut.105 TOPOFF 3 was the fi rst national preparedness exercise 

that used the NRP and NIMS as the framework for the incident response and management.106
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561

In a Quick Look Report on TOPOFF 3 issued in May 2005, DHS recognized that the exercise 

had revealed a fundamental lack of understanding of unifi ed command.107 Th e Report noted 

that “confusion at all levels regarding identifi cation and clarifi cation of roles and levels of 

responsibilities.”108 In November 2005, the DHS’s Inspector General found that while “overall, objectives were addressed and met,” the TOPOFF 3 exercise demonstrated “at all levels of 

government – a fundamental lack of understanding for the principles and protocols set forth 

in the NRP and NIMS.”109 Th e Inspector General highlighted “confusion over the diff erent 

roles and responsibilities performed by the Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO) and the Federal 

Coordinating Offi cer (FCO),”110 an issue that also plagued the Katrina response. 

In light of the incomplete understanding of the NRP and NIMS “at all levels of government” 

just prior to the 2005 hurricane season, it is not surprising that a number of the defi ciencies 

in understanding and implementing the NRP surfaced in the wake of Katrina. It was the 

fi rst time that the NRP and NIMS were used in a real-life major-disaster response.111

Diffi culties in Establishing an ICS Structure and Unifi ed Command 

Louisiana

In the days surrounding Hurricane Katrina’s assault on the Gulf Coast, FEMA’s top operatives in Louisiana struggled to establish a unifi ed-command structure with the state and 

other entities. But the eff orts did not succeed. Although FEMA was contending with its own 

staffi ng and training issues, the main problem was the state’s lack of emergency-management capacity. As Deputy FCO Scott Wells put it, “at some point we saw there was . . . nothing for the federal government to stick on to.”112

As envisioned under the NRP and NIMS, a unifi ed command should include:

• the FCO who, in the absence of a PFO, serves as the lead federal offi cial;

• the State Coordinating Offi cer (SCO), the lead state offi cial; and

• representatives of a variety of other entities who have authorities or resources 

important to the response, including the Department of Defense (DOD) 

(through a Defense Coordinating Offi cer (DCO)) and other federal and state 

agencies.113

Together, the individuals in the unifi ed command are to make collective decisions about 

priorities and plans in responding to the disaster. In Louisiana, FEMA’s William Lokey 

served as FCO, Scott Wells was his deputy, and Colonel Jeff Smith of the Louisiana Offi ce of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness served as the SCO.

Lokey, Wells, and Colonel Smith worked alongside one another in the State Emergency 

Operations Center in Baton Rouge. Later, they moved to the Joint Field Offi ce (JFO).114

But a unifi ed command was not achieved. As Lokey frankly noted, “I can pretty much 

honestly say I was not in charge of all the federal operations in the fi eld.”115 Complicating 

the situation, many requests for assistance were addressed outside the unifi ed-command 

structure. For instance, Major General Bennett Landreneau, the Adjutant General and head 

of Louisiana’s National Guard, requested troops through the interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact, the National Guard Bureau, and the commander of the DOD 

forces responding to Katrina, General Honoré. According to the DOD’s DCO for Louisiana, requests for large numbers of active-duty forces did not come to FEMA or to him, as a 

representative of DOD.116 Although Lokey did not think General Landreneau’s actions were 
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inappropriate,117 he was frustrated that, overall, many requests for assistance did not go 

through the unifi ed command and thought this impaired the response to Katrina:

People down there were asking everybody for everything, so when the fi nal analysis is done, and everybody gets all the records of who asked who when, there’s a 

tremendous amount of duplication and there’s a tremendous amount of gaps.118

Th e geographic scope and physical intensity of the devastation, and the urgent human needs 

that faced responders in the immediate aft ermath of Katrina in Louisiana, created a level of 

challenge not seen before in this country. Th e storm’s decimation of much of the incidentcommand structure beneath the state-level unifi ed command also undermined eff ective toplevel command. Th e ICS incorporates the expectation that most incidents will be managed 

at the most local level possible, but the storm and its massive fl ooding largely incapacitated 

local responders. As William Carwile, the FCO for Mississippi, explained, “In a situation, a 

catastrophic disaster, it is very diffi cult to build from the bottom up if there is no bottom.”119

Th is situation was exacerbated by the destruction of vast swaths of communication infrastructure in New Orleans and the surrounding parishes, substantially undermining the 

ability of those in the EOC in Baton Rouge to communicate with responders in the hardesthit parts of the state.120 Th e lack of communication limited the unifi ed command’s ability to 

form an accurate picture of what has happened in the aff ected areas, to receive and act on 

requests for assistance, and to fully understand what some of the goals and objectives for 

response should be.

Th e result was that essential features of a unifi ed command were not achieved. Th e DHS Inspector General found that the FCO and SCO in Louisiana did not establish joint priorities 

and objectives for the response – a requirement of NIMS and eff ective unifi ed command 

– until September 11 and did not develop the fi rst joint incident-action plan until September 14.121 Katrina had made landfall on August 29.

A catastrophe, of course, is exactly when the need for unifi ed command and an eff ective incident-command structure is most acute. Th e failure in Louisiana refl ects not only the overwhelming diffi culties of the moment, but longer-term problems such as insuffi cient training; widespread lack of understanding of the NRP, NIMS-ICS and unifi ed command; and 

an overall lack of preparation. Katrina, like the TOPOFF 3 national preparedness exercise 

just a few months earlier, exposed – at all levels of government – diff ering levels of knowledge, training, and ability to implement the principles of the ICS and unifi ed command. 

During the response to Katrina, these abstract weaknesses became very real liabilities.

Perhaps the most signifi cant reason for the failure to establish unifi ed command in Louisiana is the lack of NIMS and NRP training. While FEMA as an institution must do a better 

job of training its emergency managers,122 the top FEMA offi cials in Louisiana – including 

Lokey and Wells – appear to have been well-versed in the doctrine needed to establish 

unifi ed command. Th e real problem was that Louisiana’s emergency managers were unfamiliar with the NRP and NIMS. Indeed, the state brought in consultants a few days aft er

Katrina made landfall to give basic ICS courses to EOC participants and to members of the 

Louisiana National Guard.123 Both Lokey and Wells expressed frustration with the Louisiana’s lack of training and the problems this caused. As Wells put it: 

Two days aft er the storm hit [Louisiana emergency-management staff ] had 

a consultant come in and show them ICS, explain ICS. In the middle of a 

catastrophic disaster. Th is is how ICS works. Th ere was no unifi ed command 

under the National Response Plan. Th ey didn’t understand it. Th ey had no 

idea. ... My point is we have an architecture, we have [the] National Response 
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563

Plan. Th e states agreed to use NIMS. Th ey agreed to ICS. What does it tell you 

when two days into a catastrophic disaster a state gets somebody in to explain 

ICS to them?124

Louisiana also lacked both adequate staff to support the needed ICS structure and appropriate resources to support the unifi ed command. “Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security 

and Preparedness is a small organization, 44, 47 people,” Tony Robinson, FEMA’s Deputy 

FCO for Special Projects, explained. “So I think this event challenged them to build an ICS 

organization to respond and to fi eld geographic teams or liaisons. ... It stretched their staff 

extremely thin.”125

Staffi ng was a problem for FEMA as well, though it is not clear to what extent the staff -

ing shortfalls impacted the ability to establish unifi ed command. Th e National Emergency 

Response Team (ERT-N) was to form the nucleus of support for the FCO in Baton Rouge. 

Yet, according to Lokey, prior to landfall, only about half of the 25 members of the ERT-N 

team had arrived.126 An internal aft er-action review by FEMA aft er Katrina estimated that 

the ERT team had only 25 percent of the needed staff .127 FEMA’s Chief of Planning, who 

was responsible for producing each day’s Incident Action Plan (IAP) – a fundamental requirement of NIMS-ICS and integral to an eff ective unifi ed command – did not arrive at the 

Baton Rouge EOC until aft er landfall.128

Inadequate physical space also presented obstacles. According to Lokey, lack of meeting space at the Louisiana EOC hindered the ability of state and federal offi cials to work 

together. “We had much better communication and coordination among everybody when 

we could [get everybody around the table], because the State EOC was very crowded and we 

had a lot of our staff meetings in the hallways.”129 Although a JFO is normally set up within 

three days, the JFO established by FEMA in Louisiana was not operational until 12 days 

aft er landfall.130 Brown had reserved “Red October,” the large FEMA tractor-trailer with 

meeting space and communications equipment, for his work, so Lokey and his team were 

rarely able to use it for their meetings with state offi cials.131

Th e combined eff ect of these problems was that unifi ed command and an incident-command structure were not established in Louisiana until, at the earliest, weeks aft er the disaster.132 Th is failure had unfortunate consequences. As put succinctly by Wells, “if we can’t do 

ICS, we cannot manage disasters.”133

Mississippi

Federal and state offi cials in Mississippi, spared the continuing dangers that affl icted southeastern Louisiana even aft er Katrina had passed, were able to successfully implement a unifi ed-command system more quickly, though they confronted some of the same challenges.

Carwile was asked if he had found enough qualifi ed people to staff his command. “Absolutely not,” he said.134 Like Lokey, his counterpart in Louisiana, Carwile attributed these 

defi ciencies to the failure of DHS to approve funding requests for training and exercises. 

Beginning in 2004, according to Carwile, there was “no more money to plan; no more 

money to exercise; no more money for equipment; that money went away.”135 “You know, 

I honestly felt bad,” Carwile told the Committee, “because the [emergency response] teams 

were reported as ready, and I didn’t feel that they really were.”136

Robert Latham, Executive Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, was 

particularly critical of federal agencies’ weak knowledge of the NIMS and the ICS: 

I don’t think most people understood it at all. I don’t think anybody read the 

National Response Plan. ... It’s just too many agencies. Th ey didn’t understand 
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unifi ed command. I mean, you almost had to learn it on the job. Th ey didn’t understand NIMS. I almost hate to bring this up ... but I don’t think people understood what a PFO was, what an FCO was, what the authority of an FCO was.137

Nevertheless, Carwile and Latham both believed that aft er a period of “chaos” that lasted 

two to three days aft er landfall, they were able to establish in Mississippi a successful ICS 

structure and a broadened unifi ed command that included the State’s Adjutant General and 

its Commissioner of Public Safety.138 Carwile and Latham attributed this success, in part, to 

the extensive prior training on the Incident Command System received by state and local 

responders in Mississippi.139 Carwile also had people on his team who had taught ICS; one 

member of his team had written an ICS handbook.140

Carwile also credited his pre-landfall relationship with Latham and Latham’s deputy.141

Latham described himself and Carwile as “joined at the hip from Saturday ... I mean, 

neither one of us did anything or made a decision that the other one didn’t know about.”142

Before Katrina’s landfall in Mississippi, Carwile had also strengthened his coordination 

with the state by assigning a FEMA employee to be with state and local offi cials at each of 

three local EOC sites in areas expected to be hardest hit.143

Th e joint planning pre-landfall served federal and state managers well in the chaos that followed the storm. As in Louisiana, storm damage hindered maintenance of an ICS structure 

for several days. For 48 to 72 hours aft er the disaster, the primary response agencies for Mississippi, MEMA, the National Guard, and the Department of Public Safety, were engaged 

in their own areas of response. Since the diff erent agencies had representatives at MEMA’s 

Mobile Command Center, offi cials at MEMA had some idea of what the diff erent agencies 

were doing, but poor communications prevented them from achieving a fully functioning 

ICS structure and a broadened unifi ed command that included each of these agencies for 

the fi rst few days aft er landfall.144

Latham described the diffi culty of establishing an ICS structure in the immediate aft ermath 

of any major disaster:

I think that it’s important to understand that in any disaster there is a period of 

chaos. And I don’t care how good your plan is. ... And what you hope is that 

at some period of time, as quick as possible, that you can shorten the period of 

chaos and the plan kicks in.145 

Despite his overall conclusion that Mississippi was able to operate an eff ective ICS structure 

and unifi ed command, Latham said that “it wasn’t easy.”146 He echoed Carwile’s observation 

that keeping the other participating federal agencies within the unifi ed command was “like 

herding cats.”147

Moreover, Admiral Allen’s appointment as PFO, aft er which he began to exercise operational command, highlighted the NRP’s ambiguity about the respective roles of the PFO 

and FCO, which had been evident during the TOPOFF 3 exercise. Admiral Allen, Lokey, 

Colonel Smith, and various other observers have commented that the appointment of a 

PFO in eff ect meant that there were “two people in charge” in each state.148

To resolve this ambiguity, approximately three weeks aft er he was designated PFO, Admiral 

Allen was concurrently appointed FCO for each of the three Gulf Coast states as well – effectively merging the PFO and FCO positions. Admiral Allen’s concurrent appointment resulted in the simultaneous revocation of the appointments of the existing FCOs in Louisiana, 

Mississippi, and Alabama; they became Deputy FCOs. From the perspective of Carwile, the 

FCO in Mississippi prior to the concurrent appointment, the appointment of a single PFO-
Failures In National Response Plan: Unifi ed Command

565

FCO created other problems, including the impairment of the unifi ed command where it 

already had been solidly established. Carwile found it “extraordinarily unusual” to designate 

a single FCO for three states, “knowing that at least in my view that a Federal Coordinating 

Offi cer had to be a full participant in the unifi ed command.” Although, according to Carwile, 

an FCO “belongs in a state working closely as part of that unifi ed command,” prior to his appointment Admiral Allen had devoted “none of his attention on Mississippi.”149

Conclusion

Establishing a unifi ed command and incident-command structure can be tremendously 

important in coordinating a large incident that involves offi cials and responders from many 

diff erent jurisdictions and diff erent levels of government.

Th e situation on the Gulf Coast presented many challenges to establishing a broad, unifi ed 

command and eff ective incident-management structure, particularly in the early days aft er 

the storm including: the size and chaos of the situation itself; the severely impaired ability to 

communicate across agencies or with front-line fi rst responders; and the disruption to the 

potential supporting incident-command structure when many responders became victims. 

Th e Gulf Coast experience demonstrated that, despite the many challenges of the incident, 

additional experience with and training on NIMS-ICS, an adequate number of suffi ciently 

trained support personnel, and the discipline in adhering to the doctrine of the incident 

command system made a diff erence in the success of the eff orts to establish a unifi ed command and incident-command structure in the response where these circumstances existed.

1 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Feb. 28, 2003, 

Section 16. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html. Accessed on Apr. 7, 2006.

2 6 U.S.C. § 312(6).

3 Tom Ridge, former Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security 

Tom Ridge at a Press Conference Announcing the National Response Plan,” Jan. 6, 2005. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/

display?content=4301. Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006. As discussed in greater detail below, DHS also developed the National 

Incident Management System (NIMS) as the incident management system to be used for incidents under the NRP. 

NIMS was released by DHS in Mar. 2004. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary Tom Ridge Approves National Incident Management System (NIMS),” press release, Mar. 1, 2004. 

4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 2004, 

p. ix (Letter of Instruction) [hereinaft er NRP]. Although the NRP was released publicly on Jan. 6, 2005, it is dated, and 

was completed in, December 2004. Th e 120-day implementation period provided for in the NRP was calculated based on 

the December date and offi cially ended on Apr. 14, 2005.

5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Preparedness Goal, Mar. 31, 2005, p. 10. http://www.ojp.

usdoj.gov/odp/docs/InterimNationalPreparednessGoal_03-31-05_1.pdf. Accessed on Apr. 6, 2006. Th e Interim Preparedness Goal was prepared pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 and is intended to establish the 

“national vision and priorities” that are to guide preparedness eff orts.

6 NRP, p. 3. Th e NRP bases its defi nition of an Incident of National Signifi cance on the four criteria set forth in HSPD-5 

to describe the situations when the Secretary of Homeland Security is to coordinate the Federal Government’s resources 

in response to or recovery from terrorists attacks, major disaster or other emergencies:

1. A Federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the 

Secretary of Homeland Security. 

2. Th e resources of State and local authorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate State and local authorities. Examples include:

• Major disasters or emergencies as defi ned under the Staff ord Act; and 

• Catastrophic incidents (as defi ned elsewhere in the NRP). 

3. More than one Federal department or agency has become substantially involved in responding to an 

incident. Examples include: 

• Credible threats, indications or warnings of imminent terrorist attack, or acts of terrorism 
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566

directed domestically against the people, property, environment, or political or legal institutions 

of the United States or its territories or possessions; and 

• Th reats or incidents related to high-profi le, large-scale events that present high-probability 

targets such as National Special Security Events (NSSEs) and other special events as determined by 

the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with other Federal departments and agencies.

4. Th e Secretary of Homeland Security has been directed to assume responsibility for managing a 

domestic incident by the President. NRP, p. 4.

7 NRP, p. 3.

8 NRP, pp. v-viii.

9 NRP, p. 7. Note that “emergencies” under the Staff ord Act include “any occasion or instance” for which federal assistance is needed, whether man-made or the result of natural disaster. Source: 42 U.S.C. § 5122 (1). In contrast, “major disasters” under the Staff ord Act include “any natural catastrophe . . . or, regardless of cause, any fi re, fl ood, or explosion,” 

suggesting that events other than natural disasters, including terrorist events, are covered only insofar as they result in 

fi re, fl ood or explosion. Source: 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2). DHS’s Inspector General has raised concerns that the defi nition of 

“major disaster” does not cover all WMD events. See: Department of Homeland Security, Offi ce of Inspector General, “A 

Review of the Top Offi cials 3 Exercise,” Nov. 2005, p. 30. http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/OIG_06-07_Nov05.

pdf. Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006 [hereinaft er “TOPOFF 3,” Nov. 2005].

10 NRP, p. 4.

11 Th e discussion in this section is not intended to constitute a comprehensive assessment of the development and functioning of the National Response Plan. Th e Committee, for example, has not looked at the initial development process 

of the NRP, which reportedly encountered some diffi culties, nor has the Committee conducted a systematic assessment 

of the ways in which the NRP interacts with state-to-state assistance mechanisms such as the Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact (EMAC). Rather, this section is intended to touch on some of the more conspicuous problems that 

came to light in the preparations for and response to Katrina.

12 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge at a Press Conference Announcing the National Response Plan,” Jan. 6, 2005. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4301. 

Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006.

13 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge at a Press Conference Announcing the National Response Plan,” Jan. 6, 2005. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4301. 

Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006.

14 Offi ce of the Vice President, “National Response Plan and Response Structure.” Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. OVP 003422 through 003424.

15 FEMA, Federal Response Plan, Apr. 1999.

16 Committee staff interview of Robert Stephan, Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Infrastructure Protection, 

Preparedness Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 126-128. 

Stephan, who led the development of the NRP at DHS, stated that other agencies that were signatories to the NRP were 

also required, in the NRP’s 120-day implementation period to conduct appropriate training and awareness courses for 

the NRP. Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 126-127. Th e Committee has not investigated to what extent other federal 

agencies carried out such NRP training.

17 Committee staff interview of Gil Jamieson, Acting Director, National Incident Management System Integration 

Center, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), conducted on Dec. 20, 2005, transcript p. 29. Mr. Jamieson 

indicated that the NIC was authorized for 10 employees but that only seven slots were fi lled.

18 Jamieson interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 37-39. Jamieson recognized that such training was not suffi cient and that 

additional training tailored to specifi c jobs, as well as exercises and actual fi eld assignments, were important as well. In 

explaining why more had not been done, Jamieson indicated that they were at the beginning of a gradual process and 

that FEMA needed additional resources. Jamieson interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 8-10.

19 “TOPOFF 3,” Nov. 2005, p. 2.

20 Various offi cials acknowledged to us their lack of familiarity with the NRP. For example, ICE offi cial Michael Vanacore who was sent down to the Gulf Coast to address DHS’s public safety and security responsibilities under ESF-13, 

stated: “I . . . had a fl eeting familiarity with it. To be honest, wasn’t something that was high on my radar screen with 

my particular responsibilities.” Source: Committee staff interview of Michael Vanacore, Director, Offi ce of International 

Aff airs, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, 

transcript p. 8. During his fi rst three days in Baton Rouge, “a lot of it seemed to be in a foreign language there because 

that whole National Response Plan had a language all its own, which I had never heard up until that point.” Source: 

Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 35. Brig. Gen. Graham, Deputy Commanding General for Army North, Fift h U.S. 

Army who worked for General Honoré in Joint Task Force Katrina testifi ed that he read the NRP on his way to Louisiana. Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Mark Graham, Deputy Commanding General, Fift h U.S. Army, conducted 

on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript p. 26.

21 Written Statement of Herman B. Leonard, Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government and Harvard Business 

School, Harvard University, and Arnold M. Howitt, Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 
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567

Recommendations for Reform, Mar. 8, 2006, p. 3.

22 42 U.S.C. § 5143. Pursuant to Executive Order 12148 (July 20 1979 – Sec. 4-203), as amended by Executive Orders 13286 

(68 Fed. Reg. 10619, Feb. 28, 2003), Sec. 52 and 12673 (54 Fed. Reg. 12573, Mar. 29, 1989 – Sec. 1) the responsibility to appoint an FCO is delegated to the Secretary of Homeland Security, though traditionally the President has continued to make 

the initial appointment that accompanies a disaster or emergency declaration, based upon the recommendation of FEMA. 

23 42 U.S.C. § 5143.

24 NRP, p. 33. Depending on the magnitude of the disaster, a PFO need not always be designated for an incident covered 

by the Staff ord Act; if no PFO is designated, then, according to the NRP, the FCO is to serve as the federal lead. NRP, pp. 

29, 34.

25 NRP, pp. 33-34.

26 NRP, p. 33.

27 NRP, p. 34.

28 According to the NRP, the FCO is to “coordinate Federal resource support activities,” while the PFO is to ensure 

“overall coordination of Federal domestic incident management and resource allocation activities.” NRP, pp. 33-34.

29 NRP, p. 34. Not surprisingly, the DHS Offi ce of Inspector General found, in its review of the Department’s Apr. 2005 

TOPOFF-3 exercise that there was confusion over the diff erent roles and responsibilities of the PFO and FCO; the IG 

suggested that developing a better understanding of these roles would enhance implementation of the NRP. “TOPOFF 

3,” Nov. 2005, p. 13.

30 Testimony of Bruce Baughman, President, National Emergency Management Association and Director, Alabama 

State Emergency Management Agency, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, Mar. 8, 2006.

31 Written Statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, for the U.S. Senate, Committee 

on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, Mar. 8, 

2006, p. 11.

32 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript pp. 191-192. See also: Written Statement of Col. Jeff Smith, Deputy 

Director, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), before the U.S. House, Select 

Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 16 (“One of the complaints in the 

testimony before the House that Jeff Smith had was he had three chains of command to deal with. He had the PFOs, he 

had mine, and he had headquarters. Well, I’m working as much as I can with the whole, now that PFO is operational, 

which it wasn’t supposed to be. You know, the ERT-N ought to be working for that person, not having them create a 

separate thing. Th ey were doing their own plans and all that kind of stuff like that and made it very confusing.”).

33 Committee staff interview of Vice Adm. Th ad Allen, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief of Staff , conducted on Feb. 3, 2006, 

transcript p. 76.

34 70 Fed. Reg. 56929 (Sept. 29, 2005) (Louisiana); 70 Fed. Reg. 57308 (Sept. 30, 2005) (Alabama); 70 Fed. Reg. 57309 

(Sept. 30, 2005) (Mississippi). 

35 NRP, pp. ESF–iii through ESF–iv.

36 NRP, p. ESF–13.

37 NRP, pp. ix-x.

38 NRP, p. ESF–8.

39 See: Chapter 24: Medical Assistance for more information.

40 NRP, pp. 60-62. 

41 Committee staff interview of David Garratt, Acting Director of Recovery, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript pp. 170-171.

42 FEMA, Hurricane Plan for Louisiana: An Attachment to the Regional Supplement to the Federal Response Plan, May 

2002. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0058-0001773 through 0001785. 

43 Th e NRP does appear to contemplate that certain regional plans may be developed. Source: NRP, p. 61. David Garratt, 

a 10-year veteran of FEMA who chaired the interagency Catastrophic Incident Planning Group, said he couldn’t say 

whether he had seen a regional supplement for the NRP, but stated that he “would be shocked if there were not regional 

supplements to the NRP.” Source: Garratt interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 174.

44 Homeland Security Council and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Planning Scenarios, Version 20.2 

Draft , Apr. 2005. Provided to Committee; Homeland Security Council and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Planning Scenarios, “Scenario 10: Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane,” Version 20.2 Draft , Apr. 2005. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 17500 through 17511; See also: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research 

Service, Th e National Preparedness System: Issues in the 109th Congress, by Keith Bea, Mar. 10, 2005, pp. 8-10. 

45 Vice Adm. Allen interview, Feb. 3, 2006, p. 122. Elsewhere in the interview Adm. Allen gives an example of a “natural 

disaster with a radiological event” as a disaster that somehow impacted a nuclear power plant. Source: Vice Adm. Allen 
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interview, Feb. 3, 2006, pp. 89-90 (“I think there are a spectrum of hazards that we have to deal with, and I think we need 

better clarity and maybe some more detail about the types of incidents PFOs are likely to encounter, and we need to plan 

against those particular threats rather than just having the three generics, you know, the NSSE, the natural disaster, and 

the terrorist attack.”). Adm. James Loy, former Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, suggested a similar approach 

in a non-transcribed interview with Committee Staff , proposing that more specifi c plans should be developed around 

particular scenarios. Source: Committee staff interview of Adm. James Loy, former Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005 (untranscribed).

46 Written Statement of Walker, Senate Committee hearing, Mar. 8, 2006, p. 13.

47 Vice Adm. Allen interview, Feb. 3, 2006, p. 106.

48 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Catastrophic Incident Annex. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 2004, p. CAT-1 [hereinaft er NRP-CIA].

49 Garratt interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 9-12. In the interview, Garratt initially stated that the fi nal draft of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement was completed in September 2004, but subsequently modifi ed that estimate to “sometime 

approaching the end of 2004.”

50 Garratt interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 12-13; See also: Jamieson interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 24-25; U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Catastrophic Incident Supplement, “National Disaster Medical System, 

Memorandum of Agreement Among the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Veterans 

Aff airs, and Defense,” Draft for Offi cial Use Only, Sept. 2005, p. 2. Both Mr. Garratt and Mr. Jamieson described the dispute as involving payment for defi nitive medical care, defi ned in the Memorandum of Agreement as “medical treatment 

or services beyond emergency care, initiated upon inpatient admission to an NDMS treatment facility and provided for 

injuries or illnesses resulting directly from a specifi ed public health emergency, or for injuries, illnesses and conditions 

requiring non-deferrable medical treatment or services to maintain health when such medical treatment and services are 

temporarily not available as a result of the public health emergency.”

51 Jamieson interview, Dec. 20, 2005, p. 25. Th e signature pages to the Memorandum of Agreement refl ect fax dates of 

Sept. 5 and 6, 2005. Th e version of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement produced to the Committee and attaching the 

Catastrophic Incident Supplement is dated Sept. 2005.

52 Rajeev Vankayya, e-mail to Tom Sizemore and Brian Kamoie, Sept. 2, 2005, 7:36 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. OPHEP 24179. Th is e-mail between the Senior Director for Biodefense at the Homeland Security Council 

and HHS offi cials said in part “Could you give me a call to discuss the MOU [Memorandum of Understanding]? We 

discussed in the DC this morning and there was agreement that it should be signed immediately.” An e-mail from Mr. 

Kamoie to Mr. Sizemore and Robert Claypool of HHS sent approximately one hour later forwarded Dr. Vankayya’s 

e-mail message and said, in part, “I assume from this the Deputies want this document signed immediately. We did not 

get to work through the issues Monday. You will recall our concerns as discussed last Friday. Bob, I suggest you raise this 

with Stewart and get guidance on whether in the middle of all of this he wants us to go to the mat and work through the 

document or wait until response activities allow a meeting.” Source: Brian Kamoie, e-mail to Tom Sizemore and Robert 

Claypool, Sept. 2, 2005, 8:31 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 24179. Th e “DC” and “Deputies” 

referred to in the e-mail messages are presumably references to the Homeland Security Council’s Deputies Committee, 

the “senior sub-cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues aff ecting homeland security” and made up 

of the Deputy Secretaries of Treasury, Defense, Health and Human Services, Transportation, Homeland Security; the 

Deputy Attorney General; the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence, FBI, FEMA, and OMB; and the Chief of Staff 

to the Vice President, as its regular members. Source: Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1: 

Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council, Oct. 29, 2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011030-1.html. Accessed on Apr. 7, 2006.

53 Even once issued, the Catastrophic Incident Supplement was not designed to take eff ect immediately. Instead, it was 

to be phased in over a number of months, to allow agencies to make the preparations necessary to be able to comply with 

the provisions of the Supplement. Garratt interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 37-38; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

National Response Plan, Catastrophic Incident Supplement, Draft for Offi cial Use Only, Sept. 2005, p. 2. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0109-0000003 (providing for a 120-day “process institutionalization period”) 

[hereinaft er Catastrophic Incident Supplement].

54 Catastrophic Incident Supplement, Annex 1. Th e Execution Schedule varies depending on the nature of the catastrophic incident – i.e., whether it is a natural disaster, biological incident, explosion, etc. 

55 Garratt interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 44.

56 Jamieson interview, Dec. 20, 2005, p. 60. Asked what had happened since to the Catastrophic Incident Supplement 

since the Memorandum of Understanding had been signed on Sept. 6, 2005, Mr. Jamieson stated “I think the whole issue 

has been put on hold in terms of the revision of the NRP and whether or not what we’re doing is still relevant in the 

context of the post-Katrina environment.” See also: U.S. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Feb. 

2006, p. 163 (“our experience in Katrina suggests [the Catastrophic Incident Supplement] must now be reconsidered to 

make it more robust in ensuring the Federal assistance arrives as soon as possible.”) [hereinaft er Th e White House, Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned].

57 One possible starting point for such planning may be the 15 National Planning Scenarios which have already been developed under the auspices of the Homeland Security Council. Th e Scenarios represent a diverse array of plausible, high-consequence all-hazards events, ranging from a biological attack to a major hurricane; they are currently used as a preparedness 
Failures In National Response Plan: Unifi ed Command

569

tool to help identify necessary capabilities for fi rst responders. One measure of an eff ective catastrophic plan is that it should 

be capable of addressing these or similar scenarios. See: Homeland Security Council and U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, National Planning Scenarios, Version 20.2 Draft , Apr. 2005; U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research 

Service, Th e National Preparedness System: Issues in the 109th Congress, by Keith Bea, Mar. 10, 2005, pp. 8-10.

58 NRP, p. 7.

59 Sec. Chertoff , memorandum to various DHS offi cials, “Designation of Principal Federal Offi cial for Hurricane Katrina,” Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FRNT-0010-0000768 through 0000769 (“In accordance with the guidance provided in the National Response Plan (NRP), I hereby declare Hurricane Katrina an Incident 

of National Signifi cance.”).

60 Sec. Chertoff , “Press Conference with Offi cials from Homeland Security, the Environmental Protection Agency, and 

the Departments of Health and Human Services, Energy, Transportation, and Defense,” Aug. 31, 2005. http://www.dhs.

gov/dhspublic/display?content=4773. Accessed on Mar. 15, 2006 (“Th e Department of Homeland Security has declared 

this an Incident of National Signifi cance, the fi rst ever use of this designation under the new National Response Plan.”).

61 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e 

Role of the Department of Homeland Security, Oct. 19, 2005. 

62 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security Department’s 

Preparation and Response, Feb. 15, 2006.

63 Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 88-92. Mr. Wood identifi ed Scott Weber, Counselor to the Secretary, as the 

individual who he believed had inserted the language about an Incident of National Signifi cance into the statement. 

According to Mr. Wood, Mr. Weber was the individual responsible for FEMA matters in the Secretary’s Offi ce. Committee staff interview of John Wood, Chief of Staff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, 

transcript pp. 34-38.

64 Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 92-93.

65 NRP, p. 33.

66 Testimony of Patrick Rhode, former Acting Deputy Director and Chief of Staff , FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA 

Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006. Rhode stated: “I’m not certain as I sit here that I was made aware that Mr. Brown’s title as 

Director had been removed, even temporarily. I honestly can’t say that I remember hearing that. ... I’m not aware during the time of the early days of Katrina, as Brown was initially named Principal Federal Offi cer, I’m not aware of any 

additional impacts to me or how I was conducting myself in the offi ce.” Asked if he gave up his role as FEMA Director 

when appointed PFO, Brown replied “Great question. I don’t know. I tried not to, and I tried to keep the FCOs – I tried 

to keep them in the traditional mode of operations; you guys keep doing what you need to do, and when you have policy 

issues or questions, feed those to me, and I will just deal with those, and the same with the NRCC. Everybody just keep 

operating as you think we normally should, and I’ll just try to deal with this PFO designation on my own.” He also stated 

that no one asked him to relinquish his role as Director of FEMA. Source: Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, 

former Director, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 23, 2006, transcript p. 75. When asked whether Michael Brown’s designation 

as PFO was consistent with his remaining director of FEMA, Robert Stephan, who led DHS’s development of the NRP, 

stated “Well you could remain director of FEMA, but you would have had to have passed of the duties associated with 

being the director of FEMA to whoever his deputy was, so that Michael Brown could have focused exclusively on the 

duties as principal Federal offi cial.” Source: Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 123.

67 Committee staff interview of Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted 

on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript pp. 49-50. When asked about the NRP and whether Brown was not supposed to continue on 

as Director of FEMA aft er being named PFO, Jackson stated: “Th ere is this unique relationship ... between the FEMA 

Director managing an event like this and a PFO managing an event like this in which their existing organizational and 

legal responsibilities are aligned very directly and where there is really, it seems to me, not the inherent confl ict that 

might be anticipated by some portion of this text with a diff erent fact set.” 

68 Questions for the Record of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security 

Department’s Response, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 8.

69 69 FEMA Operations Center, e-mail to Michael Brown and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 9:07 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS 003140; “Swarm of Small Earthquakes Shakes Calif,” Th e Associated Press, Sept. 1, 2005.

70 NRP, p. 34.

71 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 132. Vice Adm. Th ad Allen, who replaced Brown as PFO, also had not participated in 

the requisite PFO training prescribed by the NRP. However, Vice Adm. Allen’s many years of experience in response eff orts 

with the Coast Guard makes his lack of specifi c PFO training far less troubling. Vice Adm. Allen interview, Feb. 3, 2006, p. 5.

72 Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 105. Stephan nonetheless declined to criticize the decision to make Allen simultaneously PFO and the FCO of three states, stating “if that’s what [Admiral Allen] said needed to be done and the 

Secretary supported him . . . the dumbest thing I ever did would be to second-guess that.”

73 One expert noted to Committee staff that “only a lawyer” would look at the NRP-CIA, even without the Catastrophic 
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Incident Supplement, and not recognize it as an excellent tool for an emergency response manager to create a “sense of 

urgency.” Committee staff interview of Chuck Mills, Vice President, Emergency Management Services International, 

Inc., conducted on Feb. 14, 2006 (untranscribed). Mills is a 30-year veteran and Type-I Incident Commander with the 

U.S. Forest Service.

74 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–1; NRP, p. 43.

75 NRP, p. 43; NRP-CIA, p. CAT–1.

76 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–1.

77 For an example of the tone set by the NRP-CIA, see Chapters 13 and 24, describing how, even in the absence of the 

formal activation of the Catastrophic Incident Annex, offi cials at the Department of Health and Human Services invoked 

the Annex in requesting assistance from the Department of Defense and in “leaning forward” to begin to deploy signifi -

cant medical assets in anticipation of the needs on the Gulf Coast.

78 NRP-CIA, pp. CAT–1 through CAT–3 (recognizing that “[t]he response capabilities and resources of the local jurisdiction . . . may be insuffi cient and quickly overwhelmed. Local emergency personnel who normally respond to incidents 

may be among those aff ected and unable to perform their duties.”).

79 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–4.

80 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–2.

81 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–4.

82 Sec. Chertoff , House Select Committee hearing, Oct. 19, 2005. 

83 Two days before landfall, David Garratt, the Deputy Director of FEMA’s Recovery Division and the chair of the Catastrophic Incident Planning Group charged with developing the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, told Janet Benini, a 

former Homeland Security Council offi cial who had worked with him to develop the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, 

that he had heard no talk activating of the NRP-CIA. David Garratt, e-mail to Janet Benini, Aug. 27, 2005, 12:36 p.m. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0096-0000395. See also: Wood interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 54-55.

84 See: Altshuler interview, Dec. 15, 2005, pp. 55-59; Wood interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 46-47; Questions for the Record 

of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 3; Jamieson interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 67-71. In written answers to questions posed by the Committee, Secretary Chertoff also asserted that “With regard to Katrina, the 

Department’s analysis suggests that 100% of the assets called for by the [Catastophic Incident Supplement] in the fi rst 

48 hours aft er landfall were, in fact, deployed prior to landfall.” Th erefore, the Secretary stated, “any conclusion that use 

of the CIA would have improved FEMA’s performance in Katrina is mistaken and contradicted by the facts.” Source: 

Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, pp. 3-4 (emphasis in original). A 

table provided by DHS that purports to demonstrate that the requirements of the Supplement had been fully complied 

with, however, contains inaccurate entries and, with respect to certain items, is misleading in its portrayal of the extent 

of DHS’s pre-landfall eff orts as well as the diff erence implementing the Catastrophic Incident Annex (including, if available, the execution schedule in the Catastrophic Incident Supplement) might have made. 

For example, the Supplement specifi es that the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) is to be activated 

within 15 minutes of an incident and a PFO is to be designated within one hour; though these entries are marked as 

completed in the table submitted by DHS, in fact, as described elsewhere in this report, the IIMG was not activated nor 

the PFO designated until Tuesday, Aug. 30, the day aft er landfall. Another entry – juxtaposed against a requirement that 

DHS initiate deployment of 11 Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) – indicates that 18 DMATs were “in theater” on Aug. 25, 2005; in fact, as of late on Sunday, Aug. 28, only four full DMAT teams and two partial DMAT teams 

had been pre-staged and, with the exception of one team in Baton Rouge, these DMATs were outside the aff ected states 

of Louisiana and Mississippi. In addition, in entries corresponding to the Supplement’s requirement that DHS initiate 

action to immediately deploy various quantities of everything from ice and water to tents and sleeping bags, DHS’s 

chart notes that each of these items were “loaded at Logistics Centers and available.” Such items, however, are permanently stored at such logistics centers throughout the country; their inclusion in this table therefore does not refl ect any 

action on DHS’s part in response to Katrina nor does it necessarily indicate items that were quickly transported to the 

Gulf Coast. Source: Committee staff interview of Gary Moore, Director, Logistics, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, 

transcript p. 10. Finally, DHS’s table does not refl ect the many actions that the Catastrophic Incident Supplement would 

have directed other agencies to undertake had it been completed and the Annex activated. 

85 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–5.

86 Catastrophic Incident Supplement, p. 1-1. 

87 Jamieson interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 67-71.

88 Walker, Senate Committee hearing, Mar. 8, 2006. “Because it is possible to respond to incidents maturing to catastrophic magnitude in a more proactive manner than surprise catastrophic incidents, it does not make sense to exclude 

evolving catastrophic incidents from the scope of the annex’s coverage.” Written Statement of Walker, Senate Committee hearing, Mar, 8, 2006, p. 12.

89 NRP, p. 73. Th e NRP also explains that the Unifi ed Command “provides direct on-scene control of tactical operations 

and utilizes a NIMS ICS incident management team organization.” Source: NRP, p. 39. Th e Unifi ed Command concept 

“utilized by civil authorities is distinct from the military chain of command.” Source: NRP, p. 10.

90 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, Mar. 1, 2004, pp. 11-12 [hereinaft er 
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571

NIMS].

91 Th e defi ciencies in unifi ed command reported by the 9/11 Commission included the Fire Department’s inability to 

coordinate excess personnel from West Street to support Fire Chiefs that needed more personnel at the South Tower, 

and the Police department’s inability to control non-Emergency Service Unit personnel inside the towers. National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Th e 9/11 Commission Report. Washington: Government 

Printing Offi ce, 2004, pp. 319-320 [hereinaft er Th e 9/11 Commission Report].

92 Th e 9/11 Commission Report, p. 321.

93 Th e 9/11 Commission Report, p. 397.

94 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Feb. 28, 2003.

95 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Feb. 28, 2003.

96 NIMS, pp. 14, 15. 

97 Th e National Incident Management System explains:

As a team eff ort, [Unifi ed Command] overcomes much of the ineffi ciency and duplication of eff ort that 

can occur when agencies at diff erent functional and geographic jurisdictions, or agencies at diff erent 

levels of government, operate without a common system or organizational framework. All agencies with 

jurisdictional authority or functional responsibility for any or all aspects of an incident and those able to 

provide specifi c resource support participate in the [Unifi ed Command] structure and contribute to the 

process of determining overall incident strategies; selecting objectives; ensuring that joint planning for tactical activities is accomplished in accordance with approved incident objectives; ensuring the integration 

of tactical operations; and approving, committing, and making optimum use of all assigned resources.

NIMS, p. 14. 

98 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Feb. 28, 2003. In 

2004, the 9/11 Commission recommended more specifi cally that DHS “should consider making funding contingent on 

aggressive and realistic training in accordance with incident command system and unifi ed command procedures.” Th e 

9/11 Commission Report, p. 397.

99 Th e National Response Plan is dated Dec. 2004, but was issued – i.e. released – by the Secretary of the Department of 

Homeland Security on Jan. 6, 2005. Th e NRP became eff ective upon issuance but its implementation was phased in over 

a one-year period: 

Phase I – Transitional Period (0 to 60 days): Th is 60-day timeframe was intended to provide a transitional period for departments and agencies and other organizations to modify training, designate staff -

ing of NRP organizational elements, and become familiar with NRP structures, processes and protocols. 

Day 60 was Feb. 13, 2005.

Phase II – Plan Modifi cation (60 to 120 days): Th is second 60-day timeframe was intended to provide 

departments and agencies the opportunity to modify existing federal interagency plans to align with the 

NRP and conduct necessary training. Day 120 was Apr. 14, 2005.

Phase III – Initial Implementation and Testing (120 days to 1 year): Four months aft er its issuance, 

the NRP was to be fully implemented and the Initial NRP, Federal Response Plan, U.S. Government 

Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, and Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan 

were superseded. Other existing plans remained in eff ect, modifi ed to align with the NRP. During this 

timeframe, DHS is to conduct systematic assessments of NRP coordinating structures, processes and 

protocols implemented for actual Incidents of National Signifi cance, national-level homeland security 

exercises, and National Special Security Events. Th ese assessments are to gauge the plan’s eff ectiveness 

in meeting specifi c objectives outlined in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5. At the end of this 

period, DHS is to conduct a one-year review to assess the implementation process and make recommendations to the DHS’ Secretary on necessary NRP revisions. Following this initial review, the NRP 

was to begin a deliberate four-year review and re-issuance cycle. Th e one-year date was Dec. 15, 2005.

NRP, ix. 

100 NRP, x.

101 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program: Program Guidelines 

and Application Kit,” p. 49.

102 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Text of Secretary Ridge’s Letter to National Response Plan (NRP) Federal 

Departments and Agencies Regarding NIMS Implementation in FY 2005.” http://www.fema.gov/doc/nims/nrp_letter_

from_secretary_ridge.doc. Accessed on Apr. 30, 2006 (“All Federal departments and agencies are required to adopt the 

NIMS and use it in their individual domestic incident management and emergency prevention, preparedness, response, 

recovery, and mitigation activities, as well as in support of all actions taken to assist State or local entities.”).

103 Jamieson interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 10-11.

104 “TOPOFF 3,” Nov. 2005, p. 1.

105 “TOPOFF 3,” Nov. 2005, pp. 1, 4.
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106 “TOPOFF 3,” Nov. 2005, p. 5.

107 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Top Offi cials 3 (TOPOFF 3) Full Scale Exercise: Quick Look Report,” 

Draft , May 26, 2005, p. 5.

108 Specifi cally, the Quick Look Report found:

• “... autonomous UCP [Unifi ed Command Post] oft en circumvented the state [Emergency Operations 

Center] EOC and the PFO highlighting the confusion at all levels regarding identifi cation and clarifi cation of roles and responsibilities.”

• “Th e UCP lost track of overall site management and personnel accountability at the site became 

inconsistent.”

• “Th e PFO worked within the framework of the unifi ed command structure however the physical 

separation of the FCO and the Secretary’s Emergency Response Team representative within the JFO 

impacted eff ective communication and coordination.”

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Top Offi cials 3 (TOPOFF 3) Full Scale Exercise: Quick Look Report,” Draft , 

May 26, 2005, p. 5. Similar defi ciencies in establishing an eff ective command had previously been observed in FEMA’s 

responses to Hurricanes Charley, Frances, and Ivan in 2004. See: William L. Carwile III, FEMA White Paper: Th e 2004 

Hurricane Season, Issues and Recommendations, Apr. 2, 2005. 

109 Th e Inspector General’s recommendations included “more emphasis on training and exercising NRP and NIMS; 

developing standard operating procedures to defi ne roles, clarifying Incident of National Signifi cance designations; 

developing systems to track and share information more openly and effi ciently.”

“TOPOFF 3,” Nov. 2005, p. 2. 

110 “TOPOFF 3,” Nov. 2005, p. 12. 

111 Written Statement of William Carwile III, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, 

FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 3. 

112 Committee staff interview of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Nov. 14, 2005, transcript p. 224.

113 NRP, p. 29.

114 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 41-43, 128.

115 Testimony of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, before the 

U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing 

on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, Dec. 14, 2005.

116 Committee staff interview of Col. Anthony Daskevich, U.S. Army, Louisiana Defense Coordinating Offi cer, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript p. 132. Scott Wells, the Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer, related how the separate 

process for requesting and deploying military resources bypassed the unifi ed command:

It was about 6:00 or 7:00 [Wednesday] morning, and [Maj. Gen. Landreneau] says, I called General 

Honore up and asked him for help. I said, what? And he said, yeah, I asked him for help. I said, you did?

And then I talked to Jeff Smith right aft er that. And I said, Jeff , he shouldn’t have done that. And he 

said, why? And I said, the state does not go to DOD directly, you’re supposed to come to Bill Lokey, to 

the FCO, we will go to DOD to get whatever support you need.

Th at breaks – that not only violates protocol, but it breaks the whole unifi ed command approach, when 

you go out to another agency and then this three star general just shows up. 

Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 67. Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux of the Louisiana National Guard, the Joint Director 

of Military Support during Katrina, responded that aft er Lt. Gen. Honore arrived his activities at the Superdome were 

coordinated through the unifi ed command. Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeau, Joint Director 

of Military Support to Civilian Authorities and Branch Chief, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 6, 2006, 

transcript pp. 267-269. 

117 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 67-68.

118 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 81; Lokey attributed these problems in part to the diffi culties in communications, 

noting “one thing that frustrated me was nobody could call the Louisiana Emergency Operations Center, but nobody 

had a problem calling the White House or their Senator’s offi ce.”

119 Testimony of William Carwile III, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, FEMA, before 

the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005. Carwile also noted that, as currently constructed, the NRP “calls 

for unifi ed command only at the top of a few people” but that it was his view that “unifi ed command has to go all the 

way down the structure, and we have got to be able to use State and Federal personnel to prop up local communities that 

have been totally destroyed by something like Katrina.” Carwile, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 8, 2005. 

120 Although the lack of a communications infrastructure does not eliminate the ability to form either an Incident 

Command Post (ICP) at the local level or a Unifi ed Command at the state level, NIMS emphasizes the importance of 
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573

functioning communications infrastructure to support the overall ICS structure which in turn supports the unifi ed 

command. “On activation of a local EOC [Emergency Operations Center], communications and coordination must be 

established between the [Incident Command] or [unifi ed command] and the EOC, when they are not collocated. ICS 

fi eld organizations must also establish communications with the activated local EOC, either directly or through their 

parent organization. Additionally, EOCs at all levels of government and across functional agencies must be capable of 

communicating appropriately with other EOCs during incidents.” NIMS, pp. 26-27.

121 Written Statement of Richard Skinner, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. 

Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations 

for Reform, Mar. 8, 2006, p. 5.

122 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 192. At the time Katrina hit, FEMA had not yet produced an Incident Management Handbook to adapt ICS to FEMA operations. Source: Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 194; FEMA, Draft ERT-N 

Concept of Operations, June 6, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0115-0000010 through 

0000011. Lokey partially attributed the gaps in training to lack of funding. “We’ve had no training dollars. We’ve had no 

opportunity to bring the folks together.” Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 193. 

123 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 193; Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 225-226 (“We didn’t really have a unifi ed 

command in the EOC. Two days aft er – we didn’t have a unifi ed command in the EOC. Two days aft er, the EOC is 

getting training in ICS. Two days aft er the storm hit they had a consultant come in and show them ICS, explain ICS. In 

the middle of a catastrophic disaster. ... Th ere was no unifi ed command under the National Response Plan. Th ey didn’t 

understand it. Th ey had no idea. [State emergency management staff ] were getting training in the middle of a disaster 

response operation. ... My point is we have an architecture, we have [the] National Response Plan. Th e states agreed to 

use NIMS. Th ey agreed to ICS. What does it tell you when 2 days into a catastrophic disaster a state gets somebody in to 

explain ICS to them?”).

Although training individuals on ICS during a disaster may seem like a sign of dysfunction, in fact, William Carwile has 

subsequently recommended that staff at JFOs all receive basic ICS training as a short-term measure. When Adm. Allen 

arrived in Louisiana, he tasked one of his assistants with training those who inevitably arrived without ICS knowledge. 

See: William Carwile III, White Paper, “Th e Response and Initial Recovery to Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi: A Field 

Perspective,” Feb. 22, 2006, p. 19. Provided to Committee.

124 Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 225-226.

125 Tony Robinson also noted there were a number of state offi cials at the EOC who did not appear to be familiar with 

the ICS. Committee staff interview of Tony Robinson, Director, Response and Recovery Division, Region VI, FEMA, 

conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript pp. 42-43. Th e DHS IG also found that Louisiana did not have suffi cient trained 

emergency management staff to be able to provide a counterpart to all federal ICS positions. U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, Offi ce of Inspector General, “A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in 

Response to Hurricane Katrina,” Mar. 2006, p. 21. 

126 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 41-42.

127 FEMA, DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 32.

128 Committee staff interview of William King, Branch Chief, Region V, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 17, 2006, transcript 

pp. 9-11, 95-96.

129 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 25.

130 Committee staff interview of Lucy Brooke, Emergency Management Program Specialist, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 

24, 2006, transcript p. 16. 

131 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 24-25.

132 Vice Adm. Allen interview, Feb. 3, 2006, pp. 27-29. 

133 Testimony of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, before 

the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005.

134 Committee staff interview of William Carwile III, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, 

FEMA, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript p. 76. 

135 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 39, 46. 

136 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 39. 

137 Committee staff interview of Robert Latham, Executive Director, MEMA, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript pp. 

149-50. Th is lack of understanding of the basic principles of the National Response Plan, ICS and the concept of unifi ed 

command surfaced during the Committee’s interview of Patrick Rhode, the Acting Deputy Director of FEMA during 

Katrina and at the same time Chief of Staff to FEMA Director Brown. During the interview, Rhode stated he believed 

“there was diffi culty in establishing a unifi ed chain of command within those early days, particularly within Louisiana.” 

In a unifi ed command involving multiple jurisdictions, however, there is no single “chain of command.” Rhode was unable to elaborate on what he meant by a “unifi ed chain of command:” 

Q. Unity of command and unity of eff ort, are you familiar with the distinction between those two 

concepts? 
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574

A. Maybe, not, No. 

Q. Do you know whether Louisiana, the State, at the time of the incident was trying to establish unity 

of command or unity of eff ort? Do you know in the Emergency Operations Center [whether] they were 

trying to establish a unity of eff ort or a unity of command?

A. I’m not – I’m not certain, going back to your last question, that I understand what you mean by unity 

of eff ort.

Committee staff interview of Patrick Rhode, former Acting Deputy Director, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 22, 2005, 

transcript p. 147.

138 Carwile, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 8, 2005; Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 92-93, 95-96.

139 Carwile, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 8, 2005; Testimony of Robert Latham, Executive Director, MEMA, before 

the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005. 

140 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 49. 

141 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 98-99

142 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 147.

143 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 97-98. State offi cials are sometimes reluctant to allow federal offi cials direct 

access to local offi cials and their operations. Robert Block and Amy Schatz, “Local and Federal Authorities Battle to 

Control Disaster Relief,” Th e Wall Street Journal, Dec. 8, 2005, p. A1.

144 Committee staff interview of Th omas McAllister, Director of Response and Recovery, MEMA, conducted on Jan. 27, 

2006, transcript pp. 87-90.

145 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 95.

146 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 146.

147 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 146.

148 See earlier discussion in this chapter.

149 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 102-104.
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