438

Louisiana State Police in New Orleans

Photo © 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 

all rights reserved. Used with permission of the 

Times-Picayune
439

Chapter 25

Public Safety and Security

Among the many enduring images Katrina bequeathed to us was this: rampaging 

crowds wading through fl ooded streets and climbing through broken store windows, gleefully carrying off impossible loads of electronics and other goods they 

could not possibly use in the storm-ravaged city, all while New Orleans police were said to 

be standing by or even in some cases participating.1

 Footage of these events was played over 

and over again on network and cable news outlets during the initial days aft er the storm. 

Stories suggesting a near-total breakdown of law and order in key parts of the city of New 

Orleans soon saturated the media. But as the world watched aghast, many of the stories 

reported and repeated – including some by city leaders – were wrong. 

Th e world saw the full range of events which can occur when law and order break down. 

A September 1, 2005, press report observed, for example, that “At fl ood-swamped Charity Hospital, looters with handguns forced doctors to give up stores of narcotics. Wal-Mart 

gun racks and ammunition supplies were stripped. ... Th ieves commandeered a forklift to 

smash the security glass window of one pharmacy, fl eeing with so much ice, water, and food 

that they left a trail behind them. Brazen gangs chased down a state police truck fi lled with 

food, and even city offi cials were accused of commandeering equipment from a looted Offi ce Depot.2

 New Orleans Police were said to be abandoning their posts in droves. On September 3, the Los Angeles Times reported seeing “dozens of Chinook helicopters dart[ing] 

overhead, transporting desperately ill patients from hospitals that were being evacuated by 

doctors and nurses under sporadic gunfi re.”3

 Charity Hospital reportedly had to suspend 

airlift ing patients to a fi eld hospital set up by the National Guard at Louis Armstrong New 

Orleans International Airport due to sniper fi re.4

 A September 4, 2005, article in the New 

York Times reported that, “at least 200 police offi cers have walked away from their jobs 

and two have committed suicide.”5

 And as late as September 6, then-Police Superintendent 

Eddie Compass expressed frustration about the police’s inability to do anything about the 

“little babies getting raped” in the Superdome.6

 Some of these stories were true; some were 

false; some, partially true; others, infl ated.

While the city was far from peaceful, its occupants were safer and more disciplined than 

it fi rst appeared; some 90 percent of the New Orleans police force stayed on duty;7

 and 

there was only one confi rmed incident of an attempted violent crime at the Superdome.8

Nevertheless, both the perception of extreme threats of violence and the reality of a lesser, 

but still serious, level of disorder had a signifi cant detrimental impact on Katrina’s victims 

and on those who were trying to help them. During the fi rst days aft er the storm, safety 

fears prompted FEMA’s emergency-response team and a medical team to pull out of the 

Superdome, some search-and-rescue crews to suspend their eff orts, and utility workers to 

forestall starting the critical task of repairing downed communications.9

While the magnitude of the storm’s immediate impact on New Orleans, its infrastructure 

and its police force made some disruption of public order inevitable – and while individual 

local, state, and federal public-safety offi cers performed heroically throughout the disaster 

– the Committee’s investigation has found several preventable causes that contributed to 

the real and perceived breakdown in public order. For example, Hurricane Pam, the principal planning exercise for a catastrophic hurricane event in New Orleans, did not include 

any public-safety or law-enforcement components, other than security at shelters.10

At the local level, New Orleans and its police department worked under the most challenging of circumstances. Given Katrina’s impact on the city and its force, given the incredible 

need for assistance that inevitably resulted, and given the tens of thousands of public-safety 
440

offi cers and troops that ultimately were required to assist the city’s eff orts at maintaining 

order, it is apparent that the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) would have been 

overwhelmed under these circumstances. 

Unfortunately, its diffi culties were exacerbated by several factors that better planning could 

have avoided. Th e city and the NOPD had only vaguely worded emergency plans and those 

plans didn’t, for example, direct offi cers to refuges of last resort or provide for specifi c 

high-ground locations to shelter the emergency vehicles police would need to do their job 

aft er the storm passed. Both failures led to signifi cant losses of resources that impeded the 

ability of individual offi cers to do their jobs. Except for ad hoc arrangements with neighboring Jeff erson Parish to detain violent criminals in their jail, the city also lacked a backup site 

to detain those it arrested once the city jail fl ooded; as a result, the police department was 

compelled to release anyone arrested for a non-violent crime. Also importantly, city offi cials 

oft en compounded the public’s fears – and thereby deterred professional and volunteer 

responders from doing their jobs – by repeating sensational rumors as fact.11 On September 

2, for example, Mayor Nagin opined, “What you are seeing is drug-starving, crazy addicts, 

drug addicts, that are wreaking havoc.”12 City offi cials failed to follow their own plans for 

responding to the news media’s rumor reporting and for making sure that no city spokesman repeated a rumor before confi rming it.

So, the NOPD, suff ering from the destruction of its equipment and uniforms, the failure of a 

tenth of its forces to report for duty, the indecisiveness and unpreparedness of its leadership, 

blinded by lack of situational awareness and deafened by the lack of communications, was 

truly overwhelmed by the catastrophe besetting the city it was supposed to protect and serve.

At the state level, the record was mixed. Th e Louisiana State Police (LSP) poured its personnel and equipment into the New Orleans area to reinforce and re-equip the beleaguered 

NOPD. However, at the administrative level, the state struggled with the massive deputization burdens caused by the huge number of offi cers and agents responding to the area. It 

also did not have eff ective control over the Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

(EMAC) process for more than fi ve days aft er landfall, and only then with the organizational aid of federal agencies. Governor Blanco and her senior staff may also have contributed 

to the delays in receiving outside assistance by the manner of their initial requests to the 

federal government and the timing of their requests to other states. However, as discussed 

later in this section, the Committee would fi nd it very troubling if in fact the federal government failed to respond to a request from a state, even though the wrong offi cers signed the 

request, in a triumph of form over intent and urgent need.

At the federal level, the government’s initial response fell far short of what the Gulf Coast’s 

citizens could reasonably have expected. Th e National Response Plan’s (NRP) Emergency 

Support Function-13 (ESF-13) gives the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) joint responsibility for, among other things, leading and coordinating federal eff orts “in situations requiring extensive assistance to provide public safety 

and security and where State and local government resources are overwhelmed or are inadequate.”13 New Orleans’ desperate need for extensive assistance in ensuring public safety 

was apparent – and requested by Colonel Henry Whitehorn of the State Police – within a 

day of landfall. Yet the federal response to requests for assistance there and elsewhere in the 

region was too slow to ramp up under the circumstances, having been severely hampered 

even before Katrina’s landfall by a seemingly complete absence of planning – indeed a lack 

of a basic understanding of the Departments’ roles and obligations – on the part of DOJ and 

DHS. In fact, DOJ did not assign anyone to coordinate the DOJ function until September 2. 

When federal assistance did begin to arrive in force, on Saturday, September 3, and Sunday, 

September 4, it acquitted itself well and provided immeasurable help to the response eff orts. 

Chapter 25
441

But the failure to anticipate, plan for, and then provide adequate assistance in Katrina’s 

initial days had a lasting impact on the response eff orts.

I. The Local Response

A. Hurricane Katrina Delivered a Powerful Blow Against the Poorly Prepared New 

Orleans Police Department

As anywhere in the United States, the job of ensuring public safety and order in New Orleans 

falls in the fi rst instance to the local police department. At the time Hurricane Katrina made 

landfall, the NOPD had a force of 1,668 sworn offi cers.14 By the time the storm had passed, at 

least 147 failed to report for duty,15 while 90 percent of the force remained on duty. But their 

ability to carry out their life-saving and law-enforcement missions was gravely compromised 

by material losses and communications blackouts they suff ered in the storm.

Th e lack of uniforms, cars, weapons, and ammunition impacted the offi cers’ ability to perform law-enforcement activities.16 Th e lack of watercraft and training in water search and 

rescue limited their ability to rescue and move people from the aff ected area.17 Th e loss of 

communications resulted in signifi cantly diminished overall command and control and an 

inability to coordinate law-enforcement activities around the city among NOPD offi cers.18

Th e lack of interoperable communications resulted in an inability to coordinate searchand-rescue operations and diffi culty in coordinating law-enforcement operations with the 

military and with other law-enforcement agencies.19

As one offi cer noted, “Communications failed at the most critical time. Backup systems 

did not work at all. Th e radio system crashed and was not operational. Th is was critical to 

the operations and seriously hampered rescue operations. Lack of communication placed 

offi cers in extreme danger without an avenue for assistance. ... ‘Mutual aid’ channels were 

hardly usable.”20

FBI Special Agent in Charge Kenneth Kaiser graphically described the status of the NOPD 

force:

Th ey were running out of ammunition. Th ey were running out of food and 

water. We were bringing them food and water. And we brought in our medical personnel ... to look at the people. Some of these people had been on duty 

since the hurricane, hadn’t heard from their wife and kids, hadn’t left their 

post. Some of them were very ill. Th ey had fevers. ... A lot of them were wearing the same clothes they’d worn for seven, eight days.21

Even when offi cers were deployed, the fact that many had lost their uniforms decreased 

their eff ectiveness. As then-Chief of Operations Warren Riley noted in discussing NOPD 

presence at the Convention Center: 

So we had some offi cers that still had uniforms, but a lot of them were wearing 

blue jeans and t-shirts and khaki pants and Wal-Mart things that were given to 

us. ... So a lot of people may have said, “Th e police, they aren’t there,” but we 

just weren’t in uniform.22

Th ese losses were the result not only of the storm, but also of the failure of planning and preparedness. Good planning should anticipate the full range of likely problems and breakdowns. 

It should reasonably have been anticipated that communications would have been lost in a 

major hurricane, while the eff ects could have been mitigated had a good plan been in place.

Public Safety and Security
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442

Unlike the New Orleans Fire Department’s (NOFD) Hurricane Guidelines, the NOPD’s 

plan does not include provision for last areas of refuge for hurricanes.23 Th ese refuges are 

multi-level facilities, with a center core stairwell, in strategic locations around the city. Each 

facility’s availability to house personnel and/or equipment is reconfi rmed during preseason 

preparations.24 In addition to providing refuge for fi re personnel, some of the locations in 

the NOFD’s plan are also high-ground staging areas for equipment.25 Th e NOPD’s plan calls 

for all vehicles not being utilized to be relocated to safe locations but does not specify where, 

resulting in responsibility for unit assets being left up to individual commanders.26 Unfortunately, many vehicles were parked in low-lying areas to avoid exposure to high-velocity 

winds and ended up submerged.27

Th e NOPD was unprepared to protect its assets or to provide for acquiring replacement 

equipment, precautions which would seem reasonable in a city built mostly below sea level.

Two issues identifi ed by NOPD Command Staff in the Aft er Action Reports (AAR) concern 

this lack of adequate resources to conduct law-enforcement and search-and-rescue operations 

under emergency conditions. Th e fi rst, “Vehicles appropriate to operate in high water conditions,” included a notation that, “Although some units had Expeditions [Ford SUVs], pick-up 

trucks, or other SUV-type vehicles, the majority of the department did not have access to a 

high profi le vehicle which would allow for movement on streets fi lled with some water.”28 Th e 

second, “Watercraft to conduct rescue operations,” noted, “Once the storm had passed, and 

the levees breached, many offi cers made use of commandeered modes of transportation. Boats 

of all types were put into use as methods of transportation for both offi cers and rescuees.”29

Riley was Chief of Operations during preparations before Hurricane Ivan and Hurricane 

Katrina. Prior to Hurricane Ivan, Riley requested and received from the Louisiana National 

Guard (LANG) high-water vehicles which were staged at each of the police districts prior to 

the storm.30 Before Hurricane Katrina, Riley said he asked for fi ve high-water vehicles and fi ve 

boats to be pre-staged at each of the Department’s eight stations. Some vehicles were provided 

to three or four districts, but no boats were provided.31 Major General Landreneau, head of 

the Louisiana National Guard, disputed the assertion regarding high-water vehicles, but documents he provided the Committee do not show that any boats were sent to district stations.32

Th e NOPD’s own AARs provide evidence of the pervasive lack of preparedness. Th e AARs 

noted that the NOPD did not adequately supply its offi cers with basic provisions, nor did 

it have logistics in place to handle supplies. While some bottled water was distributed to 

offi cers, “Th ere did not appear to be any pre-planning for food, water, weapons, and medical care.”33 As one offi cer noted, “Th e lack of provisions and a quartermaster system forced 

Offi cers to procure needed items from abandoned business locations.”34

Despite challenges facing NOPD offi cers, maintaining and restoring public safety was of 

pre-eminent importance, for without it, those trying to help Katrina’s victims could not 

do their jobs. While media reports may have exaggerated the extent of lawlessness, the fact 

remains that looting and other criminal acts were occurring around the city. Th ere are no 

reliable statistics available due to the fl ooding of NOPD headquarters and the jail, but there 

is signifi cant anecdotal evidence regarding such activity.

Captain Timothy Bayard described an example of looting observed when SAR teams were 

taking people to the Convention Center:

We pulled four or fi ve guys out of an apartment two blocks from the Convention Center. But at the time we didn’t have any jails, didn’t have anyplace to 

bring them, you know? So we pulled them out of burglarizing a guy’s apartment above the store. Th ey had already broken into the store.35
Public Safety and Security

443

Riley described “three hours of mayhem” on Canal Street to which 60 offi cers responded:

Well, there were some points where, for instance, Brooks Brothers was being 

looted. Our offi cers had some confrontations there. Saks Fift h Avenue was being looted. Some other stores along the block, I believe for the most part, like 

places that had athletic wear and tennis shoes, things like that.36

At the Superdome, despite media reports, including comments made by the NOPD’s 

Compass, the number of violent acts appeared limited. Th ere was an attempted assault on 

a young woman in one of the rest rooms.37 Another incident involved the shooting of a 

National Guardsman which appeared to be an accidental shooting by a fellow Guardsman.38

Th ere was one suicide, but no homicides.39

Despite the absence of signifi cant violent crime, there were nonetheless problems at the 

Superdome. FEMA Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) and Emergency Response 

Teams (ERTs) and New Orleans Health Department (NOHD) personnel, decided to withdraw from the Superdome complex because they perceived the situation there as unsettled 

or unsafe.40 Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) personnel curtailed operations until security 

was provided.41 Th e NOPD feared carjackings by those seeking to fl ee New Orleans.42 And 

the delivery of utility repair services apparently suff ered delay until proper security for the 

workers and sites themselves existed.43 Only when a secure environment was restored could 

basic needs truly be addressed.

Lack of readiness and loss of personnel and equipment were major contributing causes to 

the inability of the NOPD to maintain law and order in the devastated city. But they were 

not the only ones.

B. The Effectiveness of the NOPD Was Further Diminished by Command Confusion 

and Lack of Familiarity with Emergency-Operation Plans

Although the NOPD had an emergency-operations manual that included hurricane procedures, the Committee’s investigation has not revealed any systematic training administered on a department-wide basis on its own plan, let alone the city’s plan or the NRP. 

Riley surmised, based on the comments in some of the aft er-action reports done within the 

department, that some of the commanders had not read their operations manuals.44 When 

asked what actions he took during his tenure as chief to ensure that offi cers were familiar 

with their responsibilities under the disaster-operations manual, Compass responded only 

that he “encouraged [his] commanders to make sure that people were very familiar with the 

hurricane plan.”45 Riley said that every commander (but not every offi cer) receives a version 

of the plan and that the plan is “probably reviewed as we have a hurricane approaching.”46

Not all information about procedures to be used during a storm is included within the text 

of the manuals. Alternative reporting locations, for instance, are not included other than a 

general instruction to “report to the nearest District Station or police facility.”47 Instead, the 

Department appears to rely on oral communication among and by commanders immediately before an event to inform the rank and fi le about rally locations.48

Compass recalled that members of specialized units underwent emergency-preparedness 

training conducted by Terry Ebbert, but that not every offi cer did.49 For instance, many 

offi cers did not know what the OEP was.50 Th e lack of familiarity by the department’s rank 

and fi le with the OEP and other hurricane emergency procedures must be attributed in 

part to the department’s leadership, including Compass and then-Chief Danny Lawless, 

the Department’s designee at the EOC and Chief of Policy, Planning and Training. Aft er 

the hurricane, Compass resigned51 and Lawless was demoted because of his performance.52

Riley explained that Lawless did not make an adequate eff ort to communicate information 

and that his successor would be someone trained in the Incident Command System (ICS). 53
Chapter 25

444

Defi ciencies in the NOPD’s manual, lack of training on this manual, lack of familiarity with 

it, or a combination of the three resulted in inadequate protection of department resources. 

One offi cer noted that he had not received training on the hurricane procedures in the 

NOPD’s manual: “In 2004, the police department produced an elaborate hurricane plan and 

issued it to all its commanders. But it stayed on their bookshelves. Th e department didn’t 

run exercises to familiarize offi cers with the plan.”54

Th e Aft er Action Report addressed another area critical to a department’s command and 

control structure – leadership. Th is was the apparent lack of a clearly identifi ed, unifi ed 

command structure, an issue raised by members of the Command Staff :

Unifi ed Command: Although the police department normally has the entire 

command structure in place for normal, everyday operations, the scale of this 

event required the implementation of an ICS, where a unifi ed command for all 

departments was a necessity. Who was the Incident Commander and how did 

we receive instructions from him or her? Where was the Unifi ed Command 

position?55

One captain noted that, “Unifi ed command was never established. Th is, in my mind, was 

the major problem with the response during Katrina” and the “Training in Incident/Unifi ed Command for the department is critical.”56 Another noted that, “Th ere did not appear 

to be an established incident Command, EOC, TOC [Tactical Operations Center] aft er the 

impact of the storm.”57

A related critique was made by eight of the responding Command Staff offi cers of the City’s 

Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), who noted:

Total failure of OEP: Although identifi ed as the point of command for the 

emergency, the OEP was out of communication with a large percentage of the 

department several times during the storm.58

C. The Loss of Detention Facilities to Hold Looters and Lawbreakers Contributed 

to the Public Safety Problem

Shortly aft er Katrina made landfall, fl ooding rendered the Orleans Parish Jail, the detention 

facility used by the city, uninhabitable, and the Criminal Sheriff was forced to evacuate it.59

As a result, there was nowhere to detain most of those caught in criminal acts in Katrina’s 

aft ermath, so police had to release all but those caught committing violent acts.60

Th e breakdown of the detention system, while unavoidable given the extent of fl ooding, 

could have been anticipated. With proper contingency plans, existing prisoners could have 

been evacuated earlier and more easily to detention facilities identifi ed before the storm, 

and new arrests could have proceeded with fewer processing and housing concerns.

Th e task of planning for managing prisoners in New Orleans is complicated by an unusual government structure. Th e jail is operated as a separate entity from the NOPD and 

the city. It is part of Orleans Parish operations, under the direction of an elected sheriff . 

Primary responsibility for planning and coordination of the jail’s evacuation rests with the 

Criminal Sheriff .61 Riley had a general understanding of the jail evacuation planning:

Over the past many years, the prison has always been self-suffi cient as it relates 

to [evacuation of the prison population]. Th ey normally prepared to do two 

types of evacuations. One is to take their most violent off enders and have them 

relocated to another state facility, evacuating them before the storm. Th e other 

was a vertical evacuation ... [for] less violent off enders.62
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445

Th ere was no pre-landfall coordination between the NOPD and the Orleans Parish. Yet, on 

the day following landfall, the prison – like much of the rest of the city – was surrounded by 

water estimated at fi ve to six feet deep. At this time, the sheriff sought manpower assistance 

from the NOPD but was told that none could be spared.63 On possibly Tuesday or Wednesday, the NOPD did agree to lend a few boats to allow the sheriff to move his prisoners to a 

nearby Interstate overpass that was above the water line.64 In pictures seen around the country and the world, prisoners sat on the overpass under the watchful eye of deputy sheriff s 

supported by National Guard troops until arrangements could be made to move them to 

detention facilities outside the city.

With the parish jail closed, the NOPD found itself without the use of the jail’s booking and 

intake-processing center.65 During the fi rst week aft er landfall, the City of New Orleans was 

not able to detain most of those caught in criminal acts in Katrina’s aft ermath. Police could 

only catch and release persons arrested for anything other than violent acts.66 Th e NOPD’s 

disaster-planning document does not address the possibility of the detention facility’s being 

unavailable. Th e NOPD’s Aft er Action Report highlights the impact on law enforcement of 

the loss of the jail and the lack of a backup facility: “Th e repeated announcements from the 

city relative to its intention to, ‘vigorously go aft er looters and prosecute them to the fullest 

extent of the law’ appeared overly ambitious and unenforceable due to the evacuation of the 

jail. Once the facility to intake arrested subjects was made unavailable, arresting subjects 

was not an option,”67 except to the limited extent an ad hoc arrangement with neighboring 

Jeff erson Parish for detaining violent felons was made.68

Th e lack of a detention center and its impact on law enforcement were not lost on the state 

Attorney General and the United States Attorney for Eastern Louisiana.69 By the fi rst weekend aft er landfall, eff orts were underway to identify an alternative location within the city.70

Flooding of the jail and its impact on both the prisoners held there and the detention of new 

arrestees clearly should have been anticipated. Given the NOPD’s dependence on the Criminal Sheriff ’s offi ce to provide critical support, the NOPD leadership should have taken steps 

as it developed its disaster plan to ensure that the plans of other relevant agencies addressed 

the NOPD’s needs. It is not suffi cient for agencies who are interdependent to develop their 

own plans; they must ensure that other agencies’ plans synchronize with their own to meet 

mutual needs. Th e NOPD’s and Orleans Parish’s planning did not appropriately account for 

foreseeable contingencies.

D. Unsubstantiated Rumors of Lawlessness by City Offi cials and the Failure to Have a 

Plan for Verifying and Controlling Such Rumors Contributed to the Perceived Lack of 

Safety in New Orleans

Th e city apparently did not eff ectively plan or manage rumors of unrest, and some of its 

leaders unfortunately repeated them as fact while they were still rumor. Th is had the result 

of fueling unsubstantiated media reports that the city was out of control. NOPD Superintendent Compass, for example, made this comment about the Superdome as late as September 6: “We had little babies in there, little babies getting raped. You know how frustrating 

it is to be Chief of Police knowing inside these things are being done and you don’t have 

enough manpower to go in there?”71 On the same day, Mayor Nagin said: “Th ey have people 

standing out there, have been in that frickin’ Superdome for fi ve days watching hooligans 

killing people, raping people.”72 Fortunately, neither statement turned out to be true; there 

were no confi rmed rapes or murders at the Superdome.73 But these statements, coming as 

they did from those the public would have reason to believe knew what they were talking 

about, created a sense of societal breakdown, and likely added to the sense of danger that 

deterred some fi rst responders from quickly and eff ectively doing their jobs.
Chapter 25

446

Among the responsibilities assigned to the NOPD’s Public Information Offi cer (PIO) in 

the Emergency Operations Manual are: (1) release information authorized by the Incident 

Commander, (2) disseminate media-alert announcements as instructed by the Incident 

Commander, (3) be responsible for establishing rumor control, (4) schedule media briefi ngs 

as necessary, and (5) be responsible for establishing a system to monitor incident rumor 

control.74 Superintendent Riley noted that the standard policy in the department is to refer 

media inquiries to the PIO.75

While that was the policy, the practice was far diff erent. Despite the department’s standard 

policy of referring media inquiries to the PIO and concern expressed by offi cials about the 

impact of unsubstantiated rumors being reported by the media that the city was out of control, Compass fueled such reporting by speaking directly to the media, making sensationalized statements, such as the one noted above, about conditions in the Superdome.76

II. The State Response

A. The Louisiana State Police Substantially Supported NOPD with Personnel and Assets

Despite having a force of only 1,050 troopers,77 the LSP carried out a variety of emergencysupport functions during Katrina, not only by orchestrating the state’s contrafl ow plan,78

but by providing law-enforcement support to the embattled NOPD. As Brigadier General 

Mark Graham testifi ed, LSP played an important role escorting buses during the evacuations of the Superdome and Convention Center.79 LSP troopers conducted 1,300 escort missions within the fi rst few days of Katrina.80 In addition to security escorts for buses, troopers 

were dispatched to provide perimeter security, including a mission to secure the perimeter 

around City Hall, where the EOC was located.81 Th ey helped to secure the Superdome. As 

the population in Baton Rouge grew with the exodus from New Orleans, LSP troopers deployed to provide security at fi eld hospitals and evacuee shelters.82

Among the LSP deployments were Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams. Th e LSP’s 

initial SWAT presence was in New Orleans prior to the storm.83 Additional LSP SWAT 

teams arrived on Tuesday, August 30, with the remainder scheduled to arrive Wednesday, 

August 31.84 While the LSP sent signifi cant numbers of offi cers, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph 

Booth noted that there were some early problems getting offi cers into the city because of 

high water. “I’ve requested watercraft off and on for some eight to 10 years,” Colonel Booth 

said, but those requests had been “Unsuccessful, unsuccessful.”85

Eight hundred troopers were sent to New Orleans during the fi rst few days aft er Katrina.86 Th e 

small LSP force, like their NOPD counterparts, quickly became overwhelmed by the scope of 

the catastrophe and the many services expected of them. Meanwhile, their reassignment to 

New Orleans left a law-enforcement void in other parts of the state.87 Still, more offi cers were 

needed, and on August 30, Colonel Whitehorn wrote to FBI Director Robert Mueller for help:

As you are aware, the city of New Orleans, Louisiana has suff ered massive 

damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. We are currently utilizing all State assets 

to stabilize the situation; however, looting continues to be a signifi cant problem. As the head of Louisiana State Police, I am requesting any assistance you 

can provide to this agency to assist with the issue to include deployment of 

available tactical teams.88

Th e letter was faxed from the FBI on August 31 to Principal Associate Deputy Attorney 

General William Mercer.89
Public Safety and Security

447

Another contribution of the LSP, which had published an 800 number before the storm, 

was fi elding 911 calls from New Orleans residents trapped in their homes, as the 911 system 

in New Orleans failed in the fi rst few days post-landfall. Th e LSP emergency operations center received 22,000 emergency calls over a period of approximately one month post-landfall.90 EOC staff e-mailed and hand delivered the messages to search-and-rescue agencies.91

Th e LSP, from their own supplies, helped to re-equip the NOPD by substantial resources 

including 137 vehicles which the LSP marked with the NOPD insignia, uniforms, ammunition, 300 pairs of boots, and other provisions as basic as socks and underwear, toothbrushes, 

and deodorant.92

B. The State of Louisiana Did Not Ask for Federal Law-Enforcement Assistance as 

Quickly as It Should Have

Consistent with emergency-management and constitutional principles generally, Louisiana 

state government also had a vital role to play in securing law-enforcement help from outside 

the state. As with local and federal governments, Hurricane Katrina exposed distinct shortcomings and signifi cant oversights in the state’s planning and execution of its response.

As with other kinds of assistance, Louisiana’s recourse when its own resources are overwhelmed with respect to law enforcement is through the Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact (EMAC). Th e state is a signatory to EMAC, as provided in the Louisiana Homeland 

Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act of 1993, 93 as amended. According to 

the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) Emergency Operations Plan, if an emergency becomes too widespread or serious for parish or state 

resources, the Director of LOHSEP is supposed to request assistance through EMAC.94

EMAC establishes a process by which states receive mutual aid. Impacted states can request 

assistance over a wide range of services from those other signatory states without having to 

negotiate many of the legalities, which have been worked out through the compact. EMAC 

provided a valuable tool that supported many phases of disaster response, including law 

enforcement. 

Such capabilities involved lending states’ police forces, and, through Memoranda of Understanding arranged by the National Guard Bureau, National Guard forces including military 

police.95 According to Colonel Steven Dabadie, Chief of Staff of the Louisiana National 

Guard, “a large amount of those National Guardsmen that we had in New Orleans were 

performing security missions,”96 including at shelters and commodities-distribution sites.97

During the fi rst week aft er landfall, outside law-enforcement agencies were “showing up”98

in New Orleans, without prior coordination. “It was pitch black in New Orleans,” which 

resulted in “a couple situations” where one law enforcement agency ran into members of 

another when neither agency knew the other was in the area. 99 Th is could be attributed to 

the fi rst responder self-deployment phenomenon identifi ed aft er the September 11, 2001, 

terrorist attacks, and could be a recurring problem in future disasters.100 It could also be 

the result of an EMAC process where both the local sheriff s association and LSP separately 

made EMAC requests. Colonel Whitehorn thought that “one EMAC request rather than the 

sheriff s doing EMAC and then State Police do[ing] another EMAC” made more sense.101

It was not until “around day fi ve [that New Orleans] began to coordinate better.”102 Substantial numbers of military personnel were on the ground, tens of thousands of people 

had been evacuated from the city, and, most importantly, the immediate search-and-rescue 

crisis was winding down. Additionally, substantial numbers of federal law-enforcement 

personnel were fl owing into the state. Organization, largely absent in the fi rst week, was 

established through a single check-in at the State Police facility in Baton Rouge operated 
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in conjunction with a federal Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC) set up on 

September 5. Under the auspices of the lead federal law-enforcement offi cials, the LECC 

brought together representatives from LSP and local law enforcement, among others. 

Th ereaft er, many out-of-state responders came with their own command structures in 

place, including clear lines of authority. Th is made the integration process work even more 

smoothly and allowed out-of-state responders to meet local needs even in areas where they 

were not familiar with the surroundings.103

Th e LSP ultimately oversaw the deputization of more than 400 law-enforcement offi cers 

from other states and more than 3,000 from the federal government.104

At the same time, the State of Louisiana did not request assistance in a form that the Department of Justice found acceptable until days aft er the storm. Governor Blanco sent a specifi c 

request on September 4, stating in part that “the request is made under the Justice Assistance 

Act of 1984 (‘the Act’), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10501-10503, which authorizes the U.S. Department 

of Justice to provide law enforcement assistance to a State.”105 Th e State Attorney General’s 

offi ce has not provided the Committee with any information which has shed light on the 

timing and preparation of this letter, or Colonel Whitehorn’s earlier request for assistance.

Moreover, it is not clear that Louisiana requested law-enforcement assistance from FEMA, 

which, in the fi rst week, assigned hundreds of law-enforcement offi cials to New Orleans.106

Th us, the State waited several days aft er landfall before getting a request for law-enforcement assistance to the other states through EMAC, in a formal request, to the federal government for help in a form DOJ found acceptable. 

III. The Federal Response

A. Neither DHS Nor DOJ Took Any Signifi cant Steps Prior to Landfall to Understand, 

Plan For or Coordinate Their Joint ESF-13 Responsibilities Relating to a Natural Disaster

Th e National Response Plan’s ESF-13 assigns the DHS and DOJ jointly to lead the federal 

government’s public-safety and security eff orts.107 Th is is the only ESF for which two agencies are designated as both Coordinators and Primary Agencies, and the results of that joint 

assignment in Katrina show the wisdom of the unitary assignments for the other ESFs. By 

assigning this responsibility to more than one entity, the NRP eff ectively ensured that no 

one took charge. Because the NRP is silent on resolving leadership issues, DHS and DOJ 

neither coordinated with each other prior to Katrina, nor independently planned for carrying out their ESF-13 functions. As a result, the days immediately prior to and aft er landfall 

were spent fi guring out precisely how to implement the ESF-13 responsibilities, rather than 

actually implementing them in full.

Even the simplest of questions were unresolved prior to Katrina. In the days aft er landfall, 

for example, offi cials at both DOJ and DHS expressed confusion over how the two agencies 

were supposed to coordinate and which of the two was supposed to take the lead. A September 1 memo among several senior DOJ offi cials suggested that “DHS is in the lead,”108

and showing the extent of the confusion, the version of the September 1 DOJ memo 

produced to the Committee had a handwritten note from the Principal Associate Deputy 

Attorney General next to the caption “Responsibilities, ESF Coordinators/Primary Agencies” asking “How are these designated? By Whom?”109 Meanwhile, a September 4 DHS 

e-mail expressed concern that “DOJ is looking to run this whole eff ort.”110 On the same day, 

another DHS e-mail noted that “We have several hundred DHS LEOs [Law Enforcement 
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Offi cials] already there and can mobilize several thousand more if our department can make 

a decision to seriously commit to this eff ort.”111

Matthew Broderick, Director of the DHS’s Homeland Security Operations Center, off ered this 

candid testimony on the extent to which the ESF-13 responsibilities in a Katrina-like situation 

were neither contemplated nor understood: “In most cases in the NRP, the FBI has got the 

lead because it’s a terrorist-related action, and they have to do the criminal investigation. No 

one had thought about a natural disaster.”112 Broderick described the confusion about who 

would be the lead as part of the “growing pains of working through the NRP,”113 saying:

In a natural disaster, there really is no reason for the FBI, there was no investigative part of it to be involved, particularly when the preponderance of the law 

enforcement – Federal law enforcement was all [Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection] owned by us anyway. So, 

if we had – if FEMA was overseeing it as a component, why not let our law 

enforcement component take the lead in doing that? ... I think it was just a 

matter of no one thinking it through. ... I don’t think anybody had thought 

about the natural disaster scenario.114

In addition, neither DHS nor DOJ seems to have resolved which component within each 

agency was responsible for the Departments’ ESF-13 responsibilities.115 To this day, no 

witness interviewed by or document provided to the Committee has defi nitively identifi ed 

the agency or component in charge of ESF-13 at DHS, or who made the decision to activate 

the support function. Senior Department offi cials couldn’t tell the Committee who within 

the Department was in charge.116 DHS Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson, for example, had 

no idea even when the Committee interviewed him which component of his agency was in 

charge of ESF-13, and he was unable to off er any insight into what DHS did as co-lead.117

Instead, he repeatedly suggested pursuing this issue with FEMA, notwithstanding the fact 

that DHS, not FEMA, includes law-enforcement components.118 His answer did not change 

aft er he was informed during this interview that the NRP assigns responsibility for ESF-13 

to DHS as a whole, not to FEMA.119

Th e DHS offi cial who ultimately served as the Department’s lead law-enforcement person in 

Louisiana spoke candidly about his lack of familiarity with the NRP, and the lack of clarity 

in the guidance given him concerning the roles of DHS, ICE, or himself at the time of his 

deployment. Assistant Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE’s) Offi ce 

of Investigations Michael Vanacore told the Committee that, with respect to the NRP, “I 

... had a fl eeting familiarity with it. To be honest, it wasn’t something that was high on my 

radar screen with my particular responsibilities.”120 When he was fi rst put on “standby” on 

September 2, he was told “that I would probably be going down in some capacity for ICE, 

but nobody was sure what that capacity would be.”121 Prior to his arrival on September 4, 

he said there was “nobody who’s stepping up to say ‘I’m in charge,’ and I don’t think any of 

us had the authority to step up and say, ‘I’m in charge.’ Hence, . . . the need for some sort 

of designation.”122 Upon his arrival, he recalled that processes were not in place for coordinating the chains of command among state, local, federal, regular military, and National 

Guard personnel.123 Even as of September 6, two days aft er his arrival, he still did not know 

whether he was there “to coordinate ICE . . . or to coordinate all of DHS.”124

Vanacore admitted that the role ICE played during the Katrina response had not been 

envisioned previously. “While the National Response Plan may call on DHS, it didn’t call 

on ICE. And I think ICE stepped up and took on a role that nobody defi ned for us up until 

that point. Nobody told ICE, ‘Th is is your role.’”125 Vanacore questioned the wisdom of 

ICE’s role as the ESF-13 lead for DHS: “I think we’re primarily a law enforcement investigative agency, and that’s where our focus is. We do investigations. We really did not, up until 
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that point, have, I think, a focused role 

in a natural disaster response.”126 He also 

opined that uniformed offi cers within 

DHS might be better suited to respond 

than ICE investigators.127

In the days aft er Katrina, DOJ leadership 

seemed as confused as the leadership at 

DHS about how ESF-13 was supposed 

to work. Th e previously referenced 

memorandum among top DOJ offi cials 

includes a marginal notation on the 

third page that asks “who activates” 

ESF-13,128 and a September 1 e-mail 

from Senior Counsel James McAtamney 

notes that requests from state and local 

offi cials should be directed to the Joint 

Field Offi ce (JFO),129 even though the 

JFO didn’t exist until well into the next 

week. It also reports that a representative 

from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) had deployed to DHS’s Homeland Security Operations Center,130 even though the NRP calls for such designees to report 

to an entirely diff erent entity, the National Response Coordination Center.131

B. The Departments’ Failure to Understand, Plan for and Implement Their ESF-13 

Responsibilities in Natural Disasters Prior to Katrina Led to Delays in Providing 

Law-Enforcement Assistance

Th e confusion over the meaning of and responsibility for implementing ESF-13 had realworld consequences, because it prevented the federal government from hitting the ground 

running when the magnitude of Katrina’s likely catastrophic consequences became apparent. 

If ever there were a case for the activation of ESF-13, Katrina was it. All indicators prior to 

landfall – from the President’s call to Governor Blanco urging a mandatory evacuation, to 

FEMA Director Brown’s comments on the Sunday, August 28, video teleconference in which 

DHS offi cials participated, that Katrina could be “a catastrophe within a catastrophe” 132– left 

little doubt that Katrina would create, in the words of the ESF, “a situation requiring extensive assistance to provide public safety and security and where State and local government 

resources are overwhelmed or are inadequate.”133 Events immediately aft er landfall –most 

importantly the devastation of NOPD’s capabilities – confi rmed the need for a federal law 

enforcement cadre prepared, trained and ready to deploy to assist.

Yet the lack of advanced planning meant that it took several days aft er landfall – days in 

which the city and those helping it suff ered from a lack of order and protection – for DOJ 

to move into the New Orleans area in force. On September 1 – three days aft er landfall 

– only 45 agents from 4 DOJ components were reportedly in the city, while as many as 215 

were on hand in Baton Rouge.134 Notably, 188 of the 214 FBI personnel assigned to the New 

Orleans offi ce were on administrative leave as late as September 8,135 presumably not participating in the response eff ort.136 Nonetheless, starting on September 2, signifi cant federal 

law-enforcement contingents began arriving in Louisiana. On September 6, there were reportedly 2,326 federal law-enforcement offi cers in the disaster relief area137 – including 694 

from DOJ. Th e combined federal law enforcement deployment was nearly equal to the total 

of LSP and NOPD offi cers in the State of Louisiana before landfall.138

Patrolling a fl ooded city

Army National Guard photo
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In the midst of this time-sensitive need, federal law-enforcement agencies found themselves 

grappling with issues they had not resolved previously, including how their newly assigned 

public-safety and security functions would mesh with military assistance provided for civil 

disturbances.139 DOJ, at least, envisioned its law-enforcement role in Katrina’s aft ermath as 

secondary to that of military troops sent to the aff ected states for these purposes.140 In fact, 

Louisiana offi cials had requested such troops and thousands of military police and Guardsmen available and intended to reinforce the NOPD deployed to the city from August 31 

through September 3.141 Th e deployment of active-duty troops for such purposes, pursuant 

to an invocation of the Insurrection Act, also remained a real possibility.142 Th e extent to 

which DOJ and DHS coordinated the deployment of their personnel and assets with any 

DOD entity remains unclear.

Similarly, it does not appear that DHS law-enforcement personnel, with the exception of the 

Federal Protective Service143 and Customs and Border Patrol,144 were preparing to assist with 

their ESF-13 response with much urgency. Senior Immigration, Customs and Enforcement 

(ICE) leadership, were at an ICE conference in Baltimore from August 29-31 at which Katrina 

merited only “some mention,” and that was regarding plans for recovery of ICE assets, not a 

larger emergency response.145 Among those attending was Mike Holt, the ICE Special Agent 

in charge in New Orleans, who was unable to get back to the city until the following Friday.146

Th ere’s another twist to the timing of the deployment of DOJ resources: although ESF-13 

contemplates a broad role for federal law enforcement,147 DOJ appears to take the position 

that it could only deploy resources to provide law-enforcement assistance to a state pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 10501.148 Th is statute provides a process for federal law-enforcement 

assistance to be provided to a state in the event of a “law enforcement emergency.”149 Th e 

process requires a written application150 from a governor before DOJ can push its personnel 

into a state to provide “law enforcement assistance.”151 Although DOJ appears never to have 

responded to Col. Whitehorn’s letter, it follows from the position it took in its responses 

to HSGAC’s questions in its November 23, 2005, response concerning the applicability of 

42 U.S.C. § 10501 that it found his August 30 request insuffi cient to allow for the dispatch 

of DOJ assistance to Louisiana, because it came from the superintendent of the State Police 

rather than the Governor herself.152 As noted earlier, Colonel Whitehorn wrote asking for 

any assistance the FBI could provide, including deployment of available tactical teams.153

Although Colonel Whitehorn’s letter does not comply with the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 10501, 

the lack of a compliant letter need not have prevented DOJ from deploying law-enforcement offi cers and resources to Louisiana. In the fi rst place, the NRP, to which DOJ is a 

signatory, contemplates the deployment of federal law enforcement personnel and does 

not reference 42 U.S.C. § 10501.154 In the second place, DOJ ended up deploying personnel 

to Louisiana before receiving a compliant request under the statute. Indeed, the bulk155 of 

DOJ’s responding personnel were in the state before Governor Blanco personally requested 

assistance on September 4.156

Another example of DOJ reliance on the absence of a formal 42 U.S.C. § 10501 request from 

the Governor is an exchange of e-mails between DOJ’s Principal Associate Deputy Attorney 

General William Mercer, Senior Counsel McAtamney and Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steve Bradbury, concerning a State request for ATF help with crowd control.157

Bradbury wrote on September 1, “Th ere is not currently a written request from the Governor 

to the AG to provide DOJ assistance to State and local law enforcement. We would not approve this State law enforcement activity until there is such a request and the AG has issued 

an order approving the request. ATF could move forward with preparations and pre-positioning but should not actually begin state law enforcement without such an order.”158
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Again, there is no record DOJ ever advised the Governor of its view of the prerequisite conditions for providing law-enforcement assistance.

On September 1, the Attorney General’s deputy chief of staff , Kyle Sampson, sent an e-mail 

to the directors of the FBI, ATF, U.S. Marshals Service, and others, noting that “Th e AG intends to issue a directive to each of you later today to move additional resources into [Louisiana] in response to Hurricane Katrina and its aft ermath.”159 Sampson also wrote that “the 

President has said publicly that looting and violence and lawlessness will not be tolerated 

and that he has spoken to his AG about it, so we want to ensure that we are bringing all of 

our [law enforcement] assets to bear on this.” Each of the subordinate agencies was directed 

to “provide ... in the next several hours, a rack-up of additional personnel, assets, and other 

resources ... available to be applied directly to this problem.”160 Th e Attorney General issued 

a directive on Friday, September 2, designating DOJ assets to deploy to the aff ected region.161

Despite repeated requests, DOJ has not provided the Committee with suffi cient information 

to determine the cause of the delay between receipt of Colonel Whitehorn’s August 30 letter 

and issuance of the September 2 order directing the deployment of federal law-enforcement 

personnel to Louisiana. However, the Committee would fi nd it unacceptable if the delay 

was caused by the fact that the request from Colonel Whitehorn did not technically meet 

the formula set forth 42 U.S.C. § 10501. Th is is particularly so given that DOJ has provided 

the Committee with no documentation or testimony indicating that it told Louisiana offi -

cials that Colonel Whitehorn’s letter was insuffi cient. At a minimum, the letter should have 

been treated by DOJ with a greater sense of urgency than was disclosed to the Committee 

given the crisis that was still unfolding in Louisiana. It would be equally unacceptable if the 

reason was simply failure to plan for or anticipate the need for federal law-enforcement assistance under ESF-13.

It is also clear that other legal issues that should have been resolved long prior to landfall 

caused confusion and limited what DOJ would allow its personnel to do in the fi rst week 

following Katrina. In the days before landfall, the ATF took the initiative to contact the 

Deputy Attorney General’s offi ce to seek “any guidance that would come from the Attorney 

General to all the Justice components about what authorities we’d be acting under and what 

our response would be.”162

As the law-enforcement situation in New Orleans worsened with the storm’s passing, DOJ 

law-enforcement agencies continued their quest for guidance as to the Department’s plans 

to coordinate and implement a departmental response.163 On the evening of August 31, DOJ 

advised its component agencies that it was still in the process of developing such guidance.164 DOJ lawyers were still reviewing “a number of very sensitive legal/perhaps constitutional issues” with providing assistance on non-federal law-enforcement matters to state 

and local offi cials.165

On September 4, following receipt of Governor Blanco’s offi cial, written request for lawenforcement assistance, U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales issued an order to DOJ 

law-enforcement offi cers authorizing them to assist law-enforcement offi cials in the State of 

Louisiana to enforce the laws of that state.166 Even aft er the order was issued, the deputization 

process which was a state responsibility, proved to be “diffi cult.” 167 ICE Assistant Director 

Vanacore described helping coordinate a deputization process for all federal agents with the 

Louisiana Attorney General’s Offi ce in which agents had to take an oath in the personal presence of a state assistant attorney general.168 Th e numerous, rapid deployments of agents each 

day, combined with the limited number of assistant attorney generals available to conduct live 

deputization ceremonies, made it hard to get people together at the same time and place. Accordingly, they were forced to dispatch non-deputized agents with deputized agents, NOPD 

offi cers, or LSP troopers.169 Th is increased the complexity of taking coordinated action.170
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Similar issues arose regarding agents’ powers to rescue residents trapped in their homes, 

or to conduct street patrols. For example, according to e-mails submitted by DOJ, a message – including an opinion from the offi ce of the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of 

Louisiana – addressing FBI agents’ authority regarding forced entries, forced evacuations, 

and rescues appeared on a password-protected website no earlier than September 10. On 

September 13, DOJ offi cials sought broader distribution of this message. As FBI Agent Kenneth Kaiser said, these kinds of issues “frustrated a lot of the agents,”171 and he felt like he 

“was holding back the reins on a horse.”172

Even today, it is unclear what sort of law-enforcement role DOJ envisions for federal lawenforcement offi cers in a natural-disaster scenario. In answers to the Committee’s questions, the DOJ stated that ESF-13 “does not extend to providing federal law enforcement 

personnel to ... enforce federal, state or local laws.”173 DOJ off ers as an example to illustrate 

the type of support it could provide under ESF-13 that if a state or local law-enforcement 

agency had suff ered the loss of communications equipment, it could submit a request for 

federal law-enforcement assets to the ESF-13 staff , who would evaluate it and then pass it 

on to the senior federal offi cial. In contrast, Michael Bouchard, ATF’s Assistant Director 

in Charge of Operations, believed that the requests would be passed from the NRCC to the 

IIMG.174 Special Agent in Charge of the Boston Field Offi ce Kenneth Kaiser, who has had 

substantial training on the NRP, including appointment as a PFO, expressed another view 

of the type of assistance contemplated by ESF-13, stating, “Th ere’s nothing in the ESF-13 

that says that the FBI or any DOJ or any law enforcement agency is responsible for supplying food and clothing for these people. ... ESF-13 does not address that at all. ESF-13 is 

a law-enforcement function and that’s what we did. Th e other functions, resupplying and 

stuff like that, that is not a law enforcement function.”175

According to DOJ, conferring the authority to enforce state and local laws on federal lawenforcement offi cers requires two steps. First, there must be a 42 U.S.C. § 10501 request for 

such assistance from a governor, and second, they must be deputized in accordance with the 

laws of the requesting state. Of course, federal law-enforcement offi cers could be deployed 

to a state without a gubernatorial request,176 in any event, and could undertake federal missions and provide support to local law enforcement, while their mere presence would go a 

long way towards preserving order and security in a panic-stricken city. In addition, they 

could have performed search and rescue, thus permitting the NOPD and the LSP to focus 

more on traditional law-enforcement tasks such as crowd control. Between September 1 

and September 3, DOJ law-enforcement components were in fact engaged in law-enforcement and search-and-rescue operations, including saving lives.177

 Th e DHS and DOJ’s confusion about their roles and authorities prevented the Departments 

from bringing the full weight of their resources to bear until roughly a week aft er landfall. 

It was not until the beginning of the second week that the federal agencies took action to 

establish a law-enforcement coordination center to track and coordinate arriving offi cers; 

designate offi cials to be in charge of that process; and arrange for deputization of federal 

offi cers by the states.

C. The Departments’ Failure to Designate Senior Federal Law-Enforcement Coordinators 

Until Nearly a Week After Landfall, If They Ever Did, Further Hindered Response Efforts

Further adding to the confusion created by the NRP’s joint delegation to DHS and DOJ of 

its ESF-13 responsibilities is another part of the NRP, which creates the position of Senior 

Federal Law Enforcement Offi cial (SFLEO). According to the NRP, the SFLEO “is the 

senior law enforcement offi cial from the agency with primary jurisdictional responsibility 

as directed by statute, Presidential directive, existing Federal policies, and/or the Attorney 

General.”178 Th e SFLEO directs intelligence/investigative law-enforcement operations in a 
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national incident, such as terrorism, a national-security special event, or disaster. Th e NRP 

states that “In the event of a terrorist incident, this offi cial will normally be the FBI SAC,”179

but it doesn’t specify who takes the post aft er a natural disaster. Th e jockeying for a law-enforcement position refl ects the failure to engage in pre-incident planning for a federal lawenforcement role, at least in response to a national disaster, and played a role in this delay.

Th e NRP off ers no insight into how the SFLEO is supposed to interact or coordinate with 

the ESF-13 agencies, or why two agencies are charged with primary and coordinating 

responsibility under ESF-13.180 Th ese ambiguities, as well as delay by both DHS and DOJ 

in designating a SFLEO, further contributed to the untimeliness of the federal public safety 

response and impeded the strategic coordination of incoming federal law-enforcement 

resources.181 It further refl ects the failure to engage in adequate, if any, pre-event planning 

for a federal law-enforcement role in response to a natural disaster.

Although FEMA and DHS appear to have considered the ESF-13 function activated two 

days prior to landfall, the eventual putative co-SFLEOs –Vanacore and FBI Special Agent 

Michael Wolf – were not identifi ed until September 5, almost a week aft er landfall. While 

the reasons for this delay remain unclear, the shared responsibility for ESF-13 between DOJ 

and DHS, and in-fi ghting within DHS,182 initially played a role.

Th e process by which DHS selected its prospective co-SFLEO is instructive as to the lack of 

defi nition. On September 2, ICE leadership told Vanacore that he would deploy to Louisiana 

to serve in a liaison capacity, though his exact duties remained unclear.183 In this capacity, any 

information he provided was sent to ICE, not to senior DHS leadership.184 He arrived in Baton Rouge late in the aft ernoon on September 4.185 Aft er he arrived in Baton Rouge he learned 

that he was made co-SFLEO, although without written designation.186 Th ough an experienced 

leader, he had no specifi c training on the NRP and no natural-disaster response experience.187

Vanacore determined that he could best contribute by assuming a coordination role.188

DOJ has been unclear in its statements to the Committee on the subject of SFLEO designation. According to Wolf, he assumed co-SFLEO responsibilities on September 4, but 

never received a formal designation; instead, he received his orders by telephone from the 

Bureau’s Executive Assistant Director for Criminal Investigations.189 Yet, William Mercer, 

DOJ’s Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General, stated in his Committee interview that 

the SFLEOs were self-selected.190 During a follow-up interview, he amplifi ed on his earlier 

statements, stating that SFLEOs were not designated during the response, and that the U.S. 

Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana retained coordinating control over law-enforcement assets and personnel in New Orleans pursuant to a memorandum signed by the 

Attorney General dated September 4.191

With the arrival of the co-SFLEOs, the law-enforcement management situation in Louisiana, especially New Orleans, improved signifi cantly, and local authorities were ultimately 

pleased with federal help, once it arrived.192

Vanacore and Wolf fulfi lled their duties ably, in part because they could establish a productive working relationship,193 but both noted that a single chain of command would have 

been more eff ective. Vanacore concluded, “You need one general in command. ... We managed this because everybody agreed to be managed. But that’s not the way to do things. ... 

You don’t run a war with co-generals.”194

D. Conclusion

While federal law-enforcement offi cers eventually provided enormous assistance to state 

and local governments in the Gulf Coast region, more forethought and planning would 
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455

have allowed them to provide greater and critically needed help when it was most needed 

– during the storm’s immediate aft ermath.

Perhaps testimony from Kenneth Kaiser, a former FBI Special Agent in Charge of the New 

Orleans Field Offi ce who volunteered to deploy to New Orleans on August 31, and who 

assumed responsibilities as the Bureau’s on-scene tactical commander, best summed up 

the lack of forethought by federal law enforcement planners. Kaiser had received Principal 

Federal Offi cer training under the NRP, and described himself as having received “as much 

training and crisis management exercis[ing] that probably anybody in the Bureau has ever 

[received].”195 According to this experienced offi cial, “I would have told you that prior to 

Katrina that there would be no way that the FBI would be as heavily involved in a natural 

disaster as we were down there. ... Post-Katrina, I would say there defi nitely is a law enforcement aspect to these natural disasters, in the worst-case scenario.”196

Th e Committee expects that this experience will prompt DOJ and DHS to engage in far better 

planning and coordination in anticipation of the next disaster.

1 Allen G. Breed, “Opportunists Help Th emselves, Sometimes in Front of Police,” BC Cycle, Aug. 30, 2005; “New 

Orleans probes police role in looting,” Th e Associated Press, Sept. 29, 2005, 8:43 p.m. ET. http:// www.msnbc.msn.

com/id/9535751/. Accessed on May 9, 2006. 

2 Scott Gold, Lianne Hart, and Stephen Braun, “Katrina’s Rising Toll,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 1, 2005, Part A, p. 1.

3 Scott Gold, Alan Zarembo, and Stephen Braun, “Katrina’s Aft ermath; Guardsmen Arrive in New Orleans; Pace of 

Evacuations Is Stepped Up,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 3, 2005, part A, p. 1.

4 Gold, Zarembo, and Braun, “Katrina’s Aft ermath,” part A, p. 1.

5 Joseph B. Treaster, “Police Quitting, Overwhelmed by Chaos,” Th e New York Times, Sept. 4, 2005, Section 1, p. 1.

6 Eddie Compass, Th e Oprah Winfrey Show, “Inside the Katrina Catastrophe,” Sept. 6, 2005. http://www.oprah.com/

tows/pastshows/200509/tows_past_20050906.jhtml. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

7 Written Statement of Warren Riley, Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and 

Communications in a Catastrophe, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 8. 

8 Committee staff interview of Lonnie Swain, Assistant Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, conducted 

on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript pp. 75-76; Committee staff interview of Warren Riley, Superintendent, New Orleans Police 

Department, LA, conducted on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript p. 34.

9 Committee staff interview of Jeff Glick, Chief, Critical Infrastructure Protection Division, National Communications 

System, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Feb. 3, 2006, transcript p. 59. See also: Committee staff 

interview of Christopher Guttman-McCabe, Vice President for Regulatory Aff airs, Cellular Telecommunications and 

Internet Association, conducted on Jan. 24, 2006, transcript p. 25.

10 See: Chapter 8: Hurricane Pam: Warning Flag for Katrina.

11 Th e Oprah Winfrey Show, “Inside the Katrina Catastrophe,” Sept. 6, 2005. http://www.oprah.com/tows/pastshows/200509/tows_past_20050906.jhtml. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

12 Mayor C. Ray Nagin, “Transcript of WWL-AM Radio with New Orleans’ Nagin,” Sept. 2, 2005. http://www.cnn.

com/2005/US/09/02/nagin.transcript/. Accessed on Mar. 20, 2006.

13 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 

2004, p. ESF #13–1 [hereinaft er NRP].

14 Written Statement of Riley, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 2.

15 Written Statement of Riley, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 8. According to NOPD offi cials, approximately 65 have been terminated, 60 have resigned, 12 have been suspended, and 37 others were still subject to disciplinary 

proceedings at the time of interview. Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 122; Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 148.

16 FBI Special Agent in Charge Kenneth Kaiser provided a vivid picture of the status of the NOPD force:

Th ey were running out of ammunition. Th ey were running out of food and water. We were bringing 

them food and water. And we brought in our medical personnel to look at the people. Some of these 

people had been on duty since the hurricane, hadn’t heard from their wife and kids, hadn’t left their 
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post. Some of them were very ill. Th ey had fevers. ... A lot of them were wearing the same clothes they’d 

worn for seven, eight days. 

Committee staff interview of Kenneth Kaiser, Special Agent in Charge, Boston Field Offi ce, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript p. 29. See also: Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 75; Committee staff 

interview of Col. Mark Oxley, Chief of Staff , Louisiana State Police, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, transcript p. 253.

17 New Orleans Police Department, Initial (30-day) Aft er Action Report-Summary, p. 6. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er NOPD, Initial Aft er Action Report-Summary].

18 New Orleans Police Department Initial (30-day) Aft er Action Report, Report of Capt. Jeff rey J. Winn, Oct. 10, 2005, 

p. 2; Written Statement of Capt. Timothy Bayard, Commander, Vice Crimes and Narcotics Section, New Orleans Police 

Department, LA, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search and Rescue in a Catastrophe, Jan. 30, 2006, p. 2. Captain Bayard described the problem in 

his aft er action report: “our biggest fl aw is the fact that we failed to communicate. ... Th e instructions and plans that are 

formed at the top are not clearly communicated to the rank and fi le. ... Th is causes confusion and misdirection. In the 

time of crisis our leaders need to be SEEN and HEARD.” New Orleans Police Department, Initial (30-day) Aft er Action 

Report, Report of Capt. Timothy Bayard, Oct. 16, 2005, p. 4. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Capt. Bayard, Initial 

Aft er Action Report, Oct. 16, 2005].

19 New Orleans Police Department, Initial (30-day) Aft er Action Report, Report of Capt. Jeff rey J. Winn, Oct. 10, 2005, 

p. 2. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Capt. Winn, Initial Aft er Action Report, Oct. 10, 2005]; NOPD, Initial Aft er 

Action Report-Summary, pp. 4, 6.

20 Capt. Winn, Initial Aft er Action Report, Oct. 10, 2005, p. 2.

21 Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 29.

22 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 75.

23 New Orleans Police Department, Emergency Operations Manual, 2005, p. 13–3. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er 

NOPD, Emergency Operations Manual, 2005].

24 Committee staff interview of Capt. Paul Hellmers, Captain, Engine 18, Second Platoon, Fift h District, New Orleans 

Fire Department, LA and Capt. Joe Fincher, Engine 18, Th ird Platoon, Fift h District, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, 

conducted on Nov. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 12-13, 16; New Orleans Fire Department, 2005 Hurricane Guidelines, p. 2–1. 

Provided to Committee [hereinaft er NOFD, 2005 Hurricane Guidelines]. 

25 NOFD, 2005 Hurricane Guidelines, pp. A2–1 through A5–2, A7–1. 

26 NOPD, Emergency Operations Manual, 2005, p. 13–3.

27 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Mark Oxley, Chief of Staff , Louisiana State Police, and Lt. Col. Joseph Booth, 

Deputy Superintendent, Crisis Response and Special Operations, Louisiana State Police, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, 

transcript pp. 251-253.

28 NOPD, Initial Aft er Action Report-Summary, p. 6 (Th is was noted by 12 offi cers, or 46.1% of respondents.). 

29 NOPD, Initial Aft er Action Report-Summary, p. 6 (Th is was noted by 10 offi cers, or 38.4% of respondents.).

30 Committee staff interview of Warren Riley, Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, conducted on Dec. 

20, 2005, transcript p. 49.

31 Testimony of Warren Riley, Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee 

on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe, Feb. 6, 2006; Riley interview, Dec. 20, 2006, pp. 45-51.

32 Maj. Damian K. Waddell, memorandum for Joint Force Headquarters Louisiana, Feb. 7, 2006. Provided to Committee. See also: Chad Michael Lynch, Louisiana Army National Guard, sworn statement, Feb. 8, 2006. Provided to Committee; Robert John Th reeton, Louisiana Army National Guard, sworn statement, Feb. 8, 2006. Provided to Committee; 

David S. Silva, Louisiana Army National Guard, sworn statement, Feb. 8, 2006. Provided to Committee; Edward M. 

Knight, Louisiana Army National Guard, sworn statement, Feb. 9, 2006; Louisiana Army National Guard, high water 

vehicle list with assigned drivers. Provided to Committee; Col. Jonathan T. Ball, memorandum for the record, “Request 

for ‘High Water’ Trucks,” Feb. 8, 2006. Provided to Committee.

33 Capt. Winn, Initial Aft er Action Report, Oct. 10, 2005, p. 2; Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 119 (“As it relates to 

food, food has never, ever been an issue. Most offi cers pack their own lunch, bring their own food, and prepare for the 

storm. ... If you talk about a fl ood of this proportion for 14 days, then absolutely food and water was a defi nite issue.”); 

Capt. Bayard, Initial Aft er Action Report, Oct. 16, 2005, p. 2.

34 New Orleans Police Department, Initial (30-day) Aft er Action Report, Report of Capt. Juan Quinton, p. 3. Provided 

to Committee. 

35 Committee staff interview of Capt. Timothy Bayard, Commander, Vice Crimes and Narcotics Section, New Orleans 

Police Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 21, 2005, transcript pp. 93-94.

36 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 25.

37 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 34.
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38 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 77-78 (Mr. Swain related the incident in detail during his committee interview: 

Th ere was a man in one of the locker rooms who was apparently looking for a place to use the rest room. “I think he may 

have had a stick or something in his hand, or whatever. I think the Guardsman went to approach him to determine what 

[he was] doing. ... Th e fl oors were extremely slippery from the water and the much and everything else. ... Apparently 

when the Guardsman approached, there was two Guardsmen, the one in the front, as they approached the guy, I don’t 

know if this guy stood up from a squatting position or whatever. But the Guardsman in the front stepped back. When he 

stepped back , the Guardsman behind him apparently attempted to step back and slipped. As he was slipping, he had his 

gun apparently, his fi nger on the trigger, and his weapon discharged, hitting him in the leg.”). 

39 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 35. 

40 Committee staff interview of Ronald L. Martin, Deputy Commander, Management Support Team, National Disaster 

Medical System, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 92-97; 

Committee staff interview of Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director, External Aff airs, Region I, FEMA, conducted on 

Oct. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 200-201; Committee staff interview of Kevin Stephens, MD., Director, New Orleans Health 

Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 10, 2005, transcript pp. 50-63. 

41 Committee staff interview of David Webb, Program Specialist, Program Offi ce, National Search and Rescue, Urban 

Search and Rescue Response System, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 7, 2006, transcript pp. 58-61; Committee staff interview 

of James Strickland, Team Member, Urban Search and Rescue, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript p. 91.

42 Douglas Crow, e-mail to Matthew Friedrich, Sept. 1, 2005, 6:58 p.m. Provided to Committee (discussing in part alleged carjackings on the road from New Orleans to Baton Rouge. FBI Special Agent in Charge Kenneth Kaiser also spoke 

of such fears in the context of power company trucks sustaining gunfi re; the police also chased one truck involved in a 

highjacking.).

43 Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 59; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Hurricane Katrina DHS SitRep #23, Sept. 

6, 2005, 6 p.m., pp. 9, 12, 14, 20. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS 0001487, 0001490, 0001492, 0001498.

44 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 125.

45 Committee staff interview of Eddie Compass, then-Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, conducted 

on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript p. 31.

46 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 31.

47 NOPD, Emergency Operations Manual, 2005, pp. 2-3, 13-12.

48 Riley interview, Dec. 20, 2005, p. 33.

49 Compass interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 9-12.

50 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 127-128.

51 Compass interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 128. Compass offi cially resigned from the NOPD on Oct. 31, 2005.

52 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 127.

53 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 127-129. 

54 Dan Baum, “Deluged,” Th e New Yorker, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 54; Bayard interview, Nov. 21, 2005, pp. 46, 50. 

55 NOPD, Initial Aft er Action Report-Summary, p. 14. 

56 New Orleans Police Department, Initial (30-day) Aft er Action Report, Report of Capt. Robert Norton, Oct. 10, 2005, 

pp. 2-3.

57 Capt. Winn, Initial Aft er Action Report, Oct. 10, 2005.

58 Capt. Winn, Initial Aft er Action Report, Oct. 10, 2005.

59 Capt. Winn, Initial Aft er Action Report, Oct. 10, 2005.

60 Capt. Winn, Initial Aft er Action Report, Oct. 10, 2005.

61 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 39-40.

62 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 39-40.

63 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 40.

64 Compass interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 126.

65 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 44.

66 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 38.

67 NOPD, Initial Aft er Action Report-Summary, p. 11.

68 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 38.

69 Committee staff interview of James Bernazzani, Special Agent in Charge, New Orleans Division, FBI, conducted on 

Jan. 25, 2006, transcript p. 88.

70 FBI, New Orleans Command Post, Baton Rouge, LA., Daily SitRep, Sept. 4, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates nos. FBI 000000127 through 000000130.
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71 Eddie Compass, Th e Oprah Winfrey Show, “Inside the Katrina Catastrophe,” Sept. 6, 2005. http://www.oprah.com/

tows/pastshows/200509/tows_past_20050906.jhtml. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

72 Mayor C. Ray Nagin, Th e Oprah Winfrey Show, “Inside the Katrina Catastrophe,” Sept. 6, 2005. http://www.oprah.

com/tows/pastshows/200509/tows_past_20050906.jhtml. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

73 Th ere was one attempted rape. Source: Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 34-35. Th ere were 11 deaths at the Superdome, one was determined to have been a suicide. None were determined to be homicides. Th ere was one gunshot injury 

involving a National Guardsman inside the Superdome which was determined to have been an accidental shooting. 

Source: Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 77-78.

74 NOPD, Emergency Operations Manual, 2005, p. 1–6.

75 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 133.

76 Th e NOPD’s plan regarding press conferences and the release of information to the public required two levels of approval. While the PIO, as noted above, is tasked with responsibilities including release of information on authority of the 

Incident Commander and scheduling of media briefi ngs as necessary, the plan also states that, “A media press room ... 

shall issue statements only with the permission from the Mayor’s Public Information Offi ce. Statements and decisions relating to the emergency shall emanate only from the Mayor and may be released only through the Public Information Offi cer.” 

NOPD, Emergency Operations Manual, 2005, p. 15–1 (emphasis in original).

77 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 7.

78 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 14-24; Th e LSP is also the primary agency responsible 

under the State’s plan for hazardous materials, and took steps before landfall to coordinate the removal or protection of 

dangerous materials. Troopers supported search-and-rescue missions, including rescuing 500 victims on their own. Lt. 

Col. Oxley interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 233.

79 Written Statement of Brig. Gen. Mark Graham, U.S. Army, Deputy Commanding General, Fift h U.S. Army, for the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the 

Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, Feb. 1, 2006, pp. 2-4.

80 Committee staff interview of Col. Henry Whitehorn, Superintendent, Louisiana State Police and Deputy Secretary, 

Public Safety Services and Corrections, LA, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript p. 106. 

81 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 240.

82 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 287-288.

83 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 201-202.

84 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 243; Louisiana State Police, LSP Hurricane Katrina Timeline of Events. Provided to Committee.

85 Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 245-246.

86 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 250, 287.

87 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 287-98.

88 Col. Henry Whitehorn, letter to Robert Mueller, Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 

000000001 through 000000002. 

89 Th e Whitehorn letter was faxed to Bill Mercer by Jon Solomon, FBI, on Aug. 31, 2005, at 7:12 p.m. Jon Solomon, 

facsimile to Bill Mercer, Aug. 21, 2005, 7:21 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 000000001 through 

000000002. See also: James McAtamney, e-mail to Bill Mercer and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 8:18 a.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates nos. 000000019 through 0000000020 (enclosing an attached fi le describing the impact on Hurricane Katrina 

on DOJ component agencies. Th e FBI section reports that the “Louisiana State Police (LSP) has indicated a formal request 

for FBI assistance is forthcoming. LSP is assisting the New Orleans PD, which has been signifi cantly impacted. Looting is 

the major problem. Reporting indicates that the National Guard is predominately engaged in search and rescue. We will 

coordinate our response with the Department.”). In an e-mail to McAtamney on Aug. 31, 2005, in which at 8:32 a.m., Edgar 

Domenech, ATF wrote: “I assume the department will be looking to implement a departmental response, let me know what 

you need.” Source: Edgar Domenech, e-mail to James A. McAtamney, Aug. 31, 2005, 8:32 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates. no. DAG 000000014. McAtamney then wrote to Mercer and others, “Deputy Director Domenech from ATF raises 

a good point. Is a plan in place to coordinate the departmental eff ort in support of these offi ces? I think it would be helpful 

to add any information on our plans going forward to the update paper for the AG.” Source: James A. McAtamney, e-mail 

to Paul Corts and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 8:44 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000014.

90 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 237-38.

91 Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 239.

92 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 253, 257, 291.

93 “Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act,” LA R.S. 29:733. 

94 Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 

2005, pp. 14-15.

95 Gov. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, letter to Gov. Jeb Bush, Sept. 1, 2005, attachment “Memorandum of Understanding 

Between Th e State of Louisiana and Th e State of Florida.” As discussed in Chapter 26: Military Operations, other states 
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began sending Military Police on Wednesday, Aug. 31, 2005, at Maj. Gen. Landreneau’s request to the National Guard 

Bureau.

96 Committee staff interview of Col. Steven Dabadie, Chief of Staff , Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Jan. 12, 

2006, transcript p. 146. 

97 Committee staff interview of Col. Earl Santos, Joint Director of Military Support, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 21, 2005, transcript pp. 34, 54, 93.

98 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 90.

99 Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 66.

100 As the 9/11 Commission Report noted:

Yet the Pentagon response encountered diffi culties that echo those experienced in New York. As the 

“Arlington County: Aft er Action Report” notes, there were signifi cant problems with both self-dispatching and communications: “Organizations, response units, and individuals proceeding on their 

own initiative directly to an incident site, without the knowledge and permission of the host jurisdiction 

and the Incident Commander, complicate the exercise of command, increase the risk faced by bonafi de 

responders, and exacerbate the challenge of accountability. ... 

It is a fair inference, given the diff ering situations in New York City and Northern Virginia, that the 

problems in command, control and communications that occurred at both sites will likely recur in 

any emergency of similar scale. Th e task looking forward is to enable fi rst responders to respond in a 

coordinated manner with the greatest possible awareness of the situation.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Th e 9/11 Commission Report. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, 2004, p. 315. 

101 Col. Whitehorn interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 111-112.

102 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 90.

103 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 91-92 (“Everyone who came and worked under the command of NOPD, ranking 

offi cers, all SR team members worked under Captain Wynn, Captain Norton. We basically divided everyone up. ... But 

the State Police, New York State Police, everyone who came in – for instance, some of the offi cers when they came in 

from around the state, they were assigned to districts. And they worked under our district commanders. And their commanders fully understood that if there was ever an issue, then, obviously, their commander would deal with ours. But 

everyone worked at the direction of NOPD commanders, even the National Guard.”).

104 Col. Whitehorn interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 96. Lt. Col. Booth noted that in the State Police EOC, “We had other 

jurisdictions at our request. ... California had, I would say, 24-hour presence ... with us. New Orleans Police Department or the City of New Orleans requested assistance from various other agencies, I think through the EMAC process. 

We had the port authority from New York/New Jersey.” Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 100.

105 Although Governor’s Blanco’s request letter is dated Sept. 3, it was not faxed to DOJ until Sept. 4. Gov. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, letter to Alberto R. Gonzales, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 

000000081 through 000000082. 

106 See e.g.: FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-FPS-05, Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA-0035-0000147; FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-FPS-05, Aug. 31, 2005. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0035-0000148; FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-CBP-01, Sept. 2, 2005. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0000551.

107 NRP, p. ESF#13–1. 

108 McAtamney’s memorandum said, “there have been no additional requests for federal law enforcement assistance 

from state or local offi cials, to my knowledge.” Source: James A. McAtamney, memorandum to Ted Ullyot and Bill 

Mercer, Sept. 1, 2005, routing and transmittal slip. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 0000000101. At the 

time he wrote this, DOJ had already received the LSP Superintendent’s letter to FBI Director Robert Mueller. Th at letter 

reported “massive damage” caused by the Hurricane, that “all state assets” were being used, but that “looting continue[d] 

to be a signifi cant problem,” and it requested “any assistance you can provide.” Source: Col. Henry Whitehorn, letter to 

Robert Mueller, Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 000000001 through 000000002. It is also 

unclear what position DOJ took regarding this request in light of 42 U.S.C. § 10501, which requires that an application 

for law enforcement assistance in an emergency “shall be submitted in writing by the chief executive offi ce of a state to 

the Attorney General.” Source: 43 U.S.C. § 10501(b). Governor Blanco sent such a letter to the Attorney General (dated 

September 3, 2005), via facsimile on September 4, 2005, but the Superintendent’s letter clearly made a similar request 

four days earlier. Source: Gov. Kathleen Blanco, letter to Alberto R. Gonzales, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates nos. DAG 000000081 through 000000083. 

109 James A. McAtamney, memorandum to Ted Ullyot and Bill Mercer, Sept. 1, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates nos. DAG 000000101 through 000000106. Mercer included a question in the margin of the attached excerpt. 

McAtamney sent a memorandum in response to the question on September 12. James A. MacAtamney, memorandum 

to Bill Mercer, Sept. 12, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000100. Th us, Mercer fi rst made note 

of these questions about ESF-13 at some time between September 1 and September 12.

110 Michael Vanacore, e-mail to John Clark and others, Sept. 4, 2005, 7:38 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 
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DHS-ICE1-0001-0000026. See also: John Clark, e-mail to Matthew Broderick, Sept. 4, 2005, 10:34 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-HSOC-0004-0003339 (“Having failed in many aspects on preparation, emergency assistance 

and recovery, if we now turn our homeland security responsibility over to the FBI/DOJ, we might as well all await 3SR.”). 

“3SR” is an apparent sarcastic reference to the “Second Stage Review (2SR),” through which Secretary Chertoff made substantial changes to DHS’s structure and staffi ng. 

111 John Clark, e-mail to Matthew Broderick, Sept. 4, 2005, 10:34 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSHSOC-0004-0003339.

112 Committee staff interview of Matthew Broderick, Director, Homeland Security Operations Center, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 19, 2006, transcript pp. 208-209.

113 Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 208.

114 Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 209.

115 Th e White House report recommends that the NRP be revised to designate DOJ as the sole primary agency responsible 

for ESF-13. U.S. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane 

Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Feb. 2006, p. 102.

116 Secretary Chertoff ’s Chief of Staff , John Wood, did not recall any discussions by or with the Secretary on pre-landfall 

ESF-13 action by DHS and did not know who within DHS was tasked with this responsibility. He only recalled that, at 

some point, apparently post-landfall, there were discussions about how best to utilize DHS law-enforcement assets. Source: 

Committee staff interview of John Wood, Chief of Staff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 27, 

2006, transcript pp. 56-57. A DHS twice daily Sit Rep from the morning of August 30 contains a “Law Enforcement Issues” 

section broken into local, regional, and federal boxes. All list “Nothing to report” Source: U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, Hurricane Katrina DHS SitRep #8, Aug. 30, 2005, 6 a.m., p. 7. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 

00001209. Th e section entitled ESF-13 merely noted the availability of fi ve FEMA “safety offi cers” and the draft ing of a 

document regarding “Dangerous Critters & Plants in the Gulf Coast.” Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

Hurricane Katrina DHS SitRep #8, Aug. 30, 2005, 6 a.m., p. 21. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 0001222 

(Th is same Situation Report includes extensive details of activities undertaken pursuant to other ESFs.). When asked about 

this document, Wood said that he “strongly” suspected that more was being done than was listed, but could not identify 

anything. Source: Wood interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 101-102. 

117 Committee staff interview of Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on 

Jan. 27, 2006, transcript pp. 69-71.

118 Jackson interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 69-71.

119 Jackson interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 69-70.

120 Committee staff interview of Michael Vanacore, Director, Offi ce of International Aff airs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript p. 8. During his fi rst three days in Baton Rouge, “a lot of it seemed to 

be in a foreign language there because that whole National Response Plan had a language all its own, which I had never 

heard up until that point.” Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 35.

121 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 13-14.

122 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 34.

123 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 50.

124 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 89.

125 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 108.

126 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 8.

127 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 108.

128 James A. McAtamney, memorandum to Ted Ullyot and Bill Mercer, Sept. 1, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DAG 000000103.

129 James McAtamney, e-mail to Bill Mercer, Sept. 1, 2005, 2:06 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 

00000065.

130 James McAtamney, e-mail to Bill Mercer, Sept. 1, 2005, 2:06 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 

00000065. DOJ previously designated ATF to serve as the Department’s ESF-13 coordinator in the event of a natural disaster. Source: Committee staff interview of Michael R. Bouchard, Assistant Director for Field Operations, Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, conducted on Jan. 24, 2006, transcript pp. 8-9. While the FBI took the lead in the fi eld, 

this is not necessarily an internal inconsistency, but rather may be an administrative decision about how best to allocate the 

available leadership.

131 NRP, p. ESF #13–3; Committee staff interview of Lt. Cmdr. Brian Penoyer, U.S. Coast Guard, Operations Integration 

Staff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Mar. 2, 2006, transcript p. 68.

132 Michael Brown, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript p. 36. Provided to Committee.

133 NRP, p. ESF #13–1.

134 Kyle Sampson, e-mail to Kimberly Smith, Brian Roehrkasse, William Mercer and Ted Ullyot, Sept. 1, 2005, 6:24 p.m. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000185 (noted eleven FBI agents, zero DEA agents, twenty-fi ve ATF 
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agents, and nine USMS personnel available.). While there were federal law enforcement personnel in Baton Rouge, within 

an hour’s drive or otherwise en route to the area, their readiness and availability for operational missions was severely compromised by the same kind of limitations faced by others in the city. See, e.g.: Bernazzani interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 25-28, 

34. Consistent with an evacuation plan, Agent Bernazzani evacuated all of his agents except for himself and three volunteers 

to protect the fi eld offi ce’s classifi ed information, communications systems, weapons and ammunition. Source: Bernazzani 

interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 19-21. However, as of September 1, fi ft y-one employees of the New Orleans-based Field Offi ce 

could not be located. Source: Bernazzani interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 25-28. Reconstitution eff orts were further hampered 

by local evacuation and continuity of operations plans that relied upon cell phone coordination amongst agents and the 

Field Offi ce’s own telecommunications hub, which was decimated. Source: Bernazzani interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 25.

135 Offi ce of the Attorney General, OAG Request Hurricane Katrina FBI personnel, Nov. 16, 2005. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. SEPS 0000000045.

136 While it was prudent for the agents working in the fi eld offi ce to evacuate in the teeth of the storm in accordance with 

their pre-arranged plan, discussions within the agency that reviewed the FBI’s response aft er the fact focused at least in part 

on the inadequacy of the FBI’s ability to locate its forces in the aft ermath of a catastrophe in the absence of local telephone 

communications. Source: Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 90-91, 97-98. Agents Kaiser and Bernazzani both participated 

in discussions with the Crisis Incident Response Group (CIRG) that evaluated the agency’s response. Source: Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 97; Bernazzani interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 67 (discussing “two or three meetings down at CIRG.”). 

However, the DOJ never provided any aft er action report or similar document to the Committee.

137 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Situation Report for ESF-13, Sept. 6, 2005, 10:08 a.m. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates no. ATF000000002.

138 Th e NOPD had a strength of approximately 1,600 police offi cers. Source: Written Statement of Riley, Senate Committee 

hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 2. Th e LSP has approximately 1,050 troopers. Source: Lt. Col. Oxley interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 7.

139 See: Chapter 26: Military Operations and Chapter 27: Failures in the National Response Plan.

140 For example, when ATF sought guidance on September 1 regarding requests from local offi cials for assistance with 

crowd control and other missions, a senior DOJ leader cautioned the ATF not to act without PFO coordination specifi cally 

because of reported deployment by the National Guard of 4,200 military police for civil duty. James McAtamney, e-mail to 

William Mercer, Th eodore Ullyot, and Jeff rey Taylor, “Requests for Federal Law Enforcement Support,” Sept. 1, 2005, 11:39 

a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG000000290.

141 Committee staff interview of Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, U.S. Army, Chief, National Guard Bureau, U.S. Department of 

Defense, conducted on Jan. 19, 2006, transcript pp. 52-53. According to Lt. Gen. Blum, these deployments restored a signifi -

cant degree of order by September 1, and that things were basically under control by September 2. Lt. Gen. Blum interview, 

Jan. 19, 2006, p. 81.

142 See: Chapter 26: Military Operations; Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Th omas Miller and others, Aug. 31, 

2005, 7:46 a.m. Provided to Committee, fi led as Bates no. MMTF 00088-06 (recommending that Department look at “‘what 

if’ MAC DIS [Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances] required.”). For more discussion of MACDIS and the Insurrection 

Act, see Chapter 26: Military Operations. ESF#13, in fact, includes a provision for “the event that State and local police forces 

(including the National Guard operating under State control) are unable to adequately respond to a civil disturbance or 

other serious law enforcement emergency,” the state may request assistance under the Insurrection Act. NRP, p. ESF #13–2.

143 As of landfall, the Federal Protective Service (FPS), a small force within DHS had deployed 40 offi cers into New 

Orleans to protect federal buildings. FPS’s mission to secure federal buildings and infrastructure and to provide security to 

FEMA during disasters may have prompted the Service to move directly into the city more rapidly than any other federal 

law-enforcement entity. Committee staff interview of Wendell Shingler, Director, Offi ce of Federal Protective Service, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 31, 2006, transcript pp. 17-19, 29.

144 As early as Sunday, August 28, 2005, the Customs and Border Patrol placed a contingent of 100 agents, drawn from its 

Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue (BORSTAR) teams and other specialized units, on standby. Source: Customs and 

Border Protection, Commissioner’s Situation Room Report, Aug. 29, 2005, 2:30 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. DHS-CBP1-0001-0000002 through 00000003. BORSTAR teams are “highly specialized units capable of responding 

to emergency search and rescue situations. ... Th ese teams ... undergo a highly specialized regimen consisting of training 

in physical fi tness and training in various other disciplines, including medial skills, technical rescue, navigation, communications, swift water rescue and air operations.” Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “BORSTAR,” June 9, 2003. 

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/borstar/borstar.xml. Accessed on May 5, 2006.

145 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 9-12.

146 Marcy Forman, e-mail to John P. Clark, Aug. 28, 2005, 12:50 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-ICE1-0002-0000650 (advising him that she has heard from New Orleans SAC Mike Holt and he is “on his way to 

Baltimore.”). See also: George Forman, e-mail to John P. Clark and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 3:45 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-ICE1-0002-0000551 (discussing SAC Holt’s travel plans to return to the New Orleans region 

on Friday, September 2, 2005.); John P. Clark, e-mail to Gary Lang, Matthew Broderick, Bob Stephan and others, Sept. 

3, 2005, 4:38 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-HSOC-0004-0003933 through 0003934 (“SAC Mike 

Holt had been out of the area but got back into New Orleans on Friday [September 2, 2005] and has been designated by 

DHS as the DHS law enforcement coordinator, assigned to specifi cally work with the New Orleans Mayor and Police 

Chief to assist with establishing law and order in the city area.”).

147 NRP, p. ESF #13–1 (ESF-13 “integrates Federal public safety and security capabilities and resources to support the 
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full range of incident management activities associated with potential or actual Incidents of National Signifi cance.” It 

“provides a mechanism for coordinating Federal-to-Federal or Federal support to State and local authorities to include 

non-investigative/non-criminal law enforcement, public safety, and security capabilities during potential or actual 

Incidents of National Signifi cance.” It “generally is activated in situations requiring extensive assistance to provide public 

safety and security and where State and local government resources are overwhelmed or inadequate, or in pre-incident 

or post-incident situations that require . . . capabilities unique to the Federal Government.”). 

148 42 U.S.C. § 10501 provides that a state “may submit an application under this section for Federal law enforcement 

assistance,” and that “an application for assistance under this section shall be submitted in writing by the chief executive 

offi cer of a State to the Attorney General, in a form prescribed by rules issued by the Attorney General.” “Th e Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.” (P.L. 98-473), 42 U.S.C. § 10501. Th e Attorney General may consult as necessary 

with Department offi cials and has 10 days to respond. Despite DOJ’s belief that this statute governed its response to 

Hurricane Katrina, the legislative history suggests that this section is an alternative to the Staff ord Act, to be used in situations that do not satisfy the criteria of a “major disaster” under the Staff ord Act:

For decades, the Federal government has provided emergency assistance in response to natural disasters 

to units of State and local government. Communities devastated by hurricanes, tornadoes, fl oods and 

other similar calamities have benefi ted from coordinated federal response to these emergencies. 42 

U.S.C. § 5152 et. seq. [Staff ord Act]. Th ere is, however, no coordinated Federal response to the existence 

of a man-made disaster. Similarly, Federal law enforcement offi cers are authorized to intervene in riots, 

but there is not [sic] organized mechanism for responding in a less blunt way.

Rep. William J. Hughes, U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Report on the “Justice Assistance Act of 1983,” Report 

No. 98-68, 98th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 8.

149 42 U.S.C. § 10501. Th e term “law enforcement emergency” is defi ned as “an uncommon situation which requires law 

enforcement, which is or threatens to become of serious or epidemic proportions, and with respect to which State and local 

resources are inadequate to protect the lives and property of citizens or to enforce the criminal law.” 42 U.S.C. § 10502(3).

150 Th e fi rst indication in DOJ documents that a governor’s letter was required occurred on Th ursday, September 1, 

2005. Shortly before noon, James McAtamney sent an e-mail to Bill Mercer and others to advise them that the ATF was 

“getting requests for agents for crowd control, etc.” Mercer, in turn, forwarded this e-mail to Steve Bradbury, commenting that he was “not sure how Steve [Bradbury] will view our legal authority to accommodate this request. From an 

operations standpoint, I’d rather have ATF redeploy to other areas to enforce the fi rearms laws.” Source: James A. McAtamney, e-mail to Bill Mercer, Th eodore Ullyot, and Jeff rey Taylor, Sept. 1, 2005, 12:39 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. DAG000000290. Bradbury replied:

Th ere is not currently a written request from the governor to the AG to provide DOJ assistance to state 

and local law enforcement. We would not approve this state law enforcement activity until there is such 

a request and the AG has issued an order approving the request. ATF could move forward with preparations and pre-positioning but should not actually begin state law enforcement without such an order. 

Steve Bradbury, e-mail to Bill Mercer, Th eodore Ullyot, Jeff rey Taylor, Sept. 1, 2005, 12:03 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000290.

151 42 U.S.C. § 10501. See also: Committee staff interview of William Mercer, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney 

General, Offi ce of the Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, conducted on Jan. 26, 2006, transcript pp. 29-30 

(“But I guess if the question is how did the requests come in, let me turn to those. Because that’s a very signifi cant part 

of the Federal statute here. In Title 42 – and I think the provision is 42 USC 10501 – a governor, not a state attorney 

general, not a mayor – a governor can ask the Attorney General of the United States to deploy Federal law enforcement 

resources if the governor makes a proff er saying, ‘We can’t meet the responsibilities that we need to carry out for public 

safety, and I request that you deploy Federal resources to assist.’ And we got a letter from Governor Barbour on Saturday 

the 3rd. And we responded that same day. It was faxed in on the 3rd, we met with the Attorney General on Saturday. He 

issued the order on Saturday. ... And Governor Blanco faxed us a letter the next day.”).

152 Col. Henry Whitehorn, letter to Robert Mueller, Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 

000000001 through 000000002.

153 Col. Henry Whitehorn, letter to Robert Mueller, Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 

000000001 through 000000002.

154 See: NRP, p. ESF #13–1.

155 Internal documents show on the morning of September 6, two days aft er DOJ received, and the Attorney General 

approved, Governor Blanco’s letter requesting law enforcement assistance, a total of 694 DOJ personnel were in the “disaster area.” Source: Situation Report for ESF-13, Sept. 6, 2005, 10:08 a.m., produced by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. ATF000000002. Based on other documents produced 

by DOJ, the committee identifi ed approximately 520 DOJ law enforcement personnel who were deployed to Louisiana as 

of September 3, 2005, the day before DOJ received Governor Blanco’s letter. Th e number of DOJ personnel deployed on 

September 3 represents 75% of the number available on September 6. Source: William E. Moschella, letter to the Honorable Susan M. Collins and the Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman, Response to Request for Information Dated Oct. 7, 2005, 

Dec. 21, 2005; Edgar Domenech, e-mail to Bill Mercer, Sept. 2, 2005, 4:51 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. DAG 000000322 through 000000323; FBI, New Orleans Command Post, Baton Rouge, LA., Daily SitRep, Sept. 3, 

2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. FBI 000000133, 
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156 Even without 42 U.S.C. § 10501 request letter from a governor, the Attorney General has the authority to re-deploy 

federal agents through the states to execute federal missions. In addition, the Staff ord Act authorizes federal agencies, upon 

direction of the President following a major disaster declaration, to “provide assistance,” including “any work or services essential to saving lives and protecting or preserving property and public health and safety,” without a request from a governor 

(Sec. 7170(c)). Source: “Robert T. Staff ord Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.” (P.L. 93-288), 42 U.S.C. § 5170(b). 

Th e DOJ acknowledged in its interrogatory responses that it had authority to provide public safety support under this 

provision. Source: William E. Moschella, letter to the Honorable Susan M. Collins and the Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman, 

Response to Request for Information Dated Oct. 7, 2005, Nov. 23, 2005, p. 3. However, it is unclear whether the President 

contemplated or directed the Attorney General pursuant to this provision to deploy federal law enforcement to the region.

157 James A. McAtamney, e-mail to Bill Mercer, Th eodore Ullyot, and Jeff rey Taylor, Sept. 1, 2005, 11:39 a.m. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000290.

158 Steve Bradbury, e-mail to Bill Mercer, Th eodore Ullyot, Jeff rey Taylor, Sept. 1, 2005, 12:03 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000290.

159 Kyle Sampson, e-mail to Robert Mueller and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 11:56 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DAG00000165.

160 Kyle Sampson, e-mail to Robert Mueller and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 11:56 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DAG00000165.

161 Alberto Gonzales, memorandum for the heads of federal law-enforcement agencies, “Law Enforcement Response to 

Hurricane Katrina,” Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000001.

162 Bouchard interview, Jan. 24, 2006, pp. 61-63 (“Th e discussions before the hurricane hit was myself and Mr. Dhillon, ... 

who works in the DAG’s offi ce. He’s our contact person for ATF. And he was communicating with Mr. McAtamney, who 

also works in that offi ce, about what the overall Justice coordinated eff ort would be. What, any guidance that would come 

from the attorney general to all the Justice components about what authorities we’d be acting under and what our response 

would be. Would there be one Justice agency in charge so that we could all say, almost like your mini ESF 13, let’s all decide 

– and these are things that we talked about – we know this big thing is coming. We’ve been through it on smaller scales. 

Let’s pre-identify all the assets that I’ve got all these emergency vehicles from every agency. Let’s get them all located in one 

place so that we know, so when time comes and we ask for them, we know who the point of contact is. We’re not scrambling 

to fi nd out what do you have, who can do it, and how soon can you get there? ... I believe my fi rst conversation with Mr. 

Dhillon on that – I have it in the log here. It was two or three days before it hit. Beginning August 28th.”). See also: Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity, Aug. 28-30, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. ATF 000000008 (documenting “contact with DAG offi ce on preparing DOJ response to hurricane.”).

163 Edgar Domenech, e-mail to James A. McAtamney, Aug. 31, 2005, 8:32 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DAG 000000003 (“I assume the department will be looking to implement a departmental response [to Hurricane 

Katrina], let me know what you need.”).

164 On August 31, 2005, at 4:07 p.m., Mercer and others at DOJ received an e-mail which said that Bell South’s New 

Orleans’ “offi ce is critical communications infrastructure node that, if damaged by looters or others, would result in loss 

of comms in the area. Th ey’ve asked for USMS assistance in protecting the facility, as the state/local police are overwhelmed. Advised USMS to notify FEMA of the request: DHS has the lead for protection of critical infrastructure. More 

important, DHS/FEMA is responsible for coordinating requests for support and directing capable [federal government] 

assets within the overall context of the NRP and Staff ord Act.” Source: James A. McAtamney, e-mail to Bill Mercer and 

others, Aug. 31, 2005, 4:07 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 000000035 through 000000038. Th e 

internal DOJ approval process would last over four hours. Once the mission was approved, Arthur Roderick, Assistant 

Director, USMS, Operations Support Division, wrote an e-mail to DOJ saying, “I know all component [law enforcement 

agencies] are looking for this authority.” Source: Art Roderick Jr., e-mail to James McAtamney and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 

8:28 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 000000060 through 000000061 

165 Paul R. Corts, e-mail to Bill Mercer and others, including representatives of DOJ’s law enforcement agencies, Aug. 

31, 2005, 6:42 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as DAG 000000042 (“Th anks for your attendance at the meeting today 

at noon. I appreciate the good response, especially given the very short notice. Th anks for the info sharing and thanks 

too for the good spirit that prevailed as we dealt with this horrifi c situation... Here is a quick bit of info following up 

on some of the points discussed today ... Requests from State and Locals to our Law Enforcement (LE) components 

for assistance with non-federal LE matters – OLC is reviewing this. Th ere are a number of very sensitive legal/perhaps 

constitutional issues with this. We are trying to get guidance as quickly as possible. More tomorrow.”). 

166 Offi ce of the Attorney General, Order No. 2779-2005, Sept. 4, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 

000000091 (“Department of Justice law enforcement personnel who are engaged in this mission shall have the authority 

to enforce the laws of the United States and to assist law enforcement offi cials in the State of Louisiana to enforce the 

laws of that State. All such offi cers engaged in this mission shall coordinate with their state and local counterparts to 

make appropriate arrangements as necessary to ensure the most eff ective law enforcement assistance eff orts in the State 

of Louisiana. In addition, all such offi cers shall be subject to the supervision of the United States Attorney for the Eastern 

District of Louisiana, who may delegate operational authority to appropriate Department of Justice offi cials.”).

167 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 77-78 (“Well, it was diffi cult. Louisiana was trying their best. Th e Attorney 

General’s Offi ce was doing a great job. But the problem was our people that needed to be deputized were moving targets. So 

we would send – they would send an Assistant Attorney General down to do a swearing-in. We’d fl y her in, get a helicopter, 

and get her down to New Orleans. And by the time she got there, maybe the SRT team she was going to swear in had been 
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464

deployed. So we were having a little diffi culty getting everybody in one place at one time. So effi cient – I mean, they tried. 

It’s a good process. But I don’t think personal swearing-ins are the process in an event like that.”).

168 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 77-78.

169 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 79-80.

170 Deputization took even longer in Mississippi, despite a simpler procedure, where the appropriate documents were not 

issued until September 9.

171 Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 84.

172 Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 84.

173 William E. Moschella, letter to the Honorable Susan M. Collins and the Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman, Response 

to Request for Information Dated Oct. 7, 2005, Nov. 23, 2005, p. 2 (“In other words, the support provided via the ESF-13 

process does not extend to providing federal law enforcement personnel to engage in actual operational investigative activities to enforce federal, state or local laws. Instead, law enforcement support is provided within the overall umbrella of the 

Department of Homeland Security’s coordination function under the authority of the Staff ord Act or pursuant to inherent 

authority of the individual law enforcement agencies.”). 

174 Bouchard interview, Jan. 24, 2006, pp. 23-24 (“Any assets that would be needed on the ground in the aff ected areas 

would be calling up to Washington, asking for them. Th ey would funnel them through the IIMG and to the ESF 13. At the 

same, people who say I may have these assets that are available in case they’re needed are coming in from the other side 

through the ESF 13 to the IIMG, with the IIMG being the focal point that decides here is what the needs are, here’s what the 

off er is, here’s how we marry those up.”).

175 Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 53 (“Th e other functions, resupplying and stuff like that, that is not a law enforcement 

function. We did do it because they needed it and we were trying to help out, but that’s not a DOJ function whatsoever. 

We don’t do that. We are not a consequence management. We are law enforcement, okay, and consequence management, 

which is what you’re talking about, is strictly by FEMA and those other groups, and they did do it eventually, but in the 

meantime, we did that because, you know, what are we going to do, let them stay in the precincts without ammunition?”).

176 Committee staff interview of William Mercer, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of 

Justice, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006, transcript p. 44 (“And so I know that there were a whole lot of conversations that were 

going on...the ground. And what we had independent authority to do was to add a bunch of Federal resources to the affected area, which is what we did. We had independent authority to do that, and we did that.”); Mercer interview, Feb. 23, 

2006, p. 46 (“[C]ertainly it is very clear from the record that by the time [Governor Blanco’s September 4, 2005] letter was 

submitted, we already had put a substantial number of Federal agents there.”).

177 Th e DEA’s “Hurricane Katrina Events Log” documents federal agents involved in a broad range of traditional and 

non-traditional law enforcement activities throughout the metropolitan New Orleans area. DEA reported that as of 

September 1, “DEA [New Orleans Field Division] agents departed with NOPD offi cers to assist them in their enforcement mission.” Th at same day, “DEA agents provided security to Lt. Col. Leblanc, [LSP] Troop B, in his inspection of the 

New Orleans Superdome,” and other sites within the city. On Sept. 3, Special Agents teamed with NOPD and Rapides 

Parish Sheriff ’s Offi ce SWAT to clear buildings of snipers, conducted proactive patrols and provided security to fi refi ghters putting out fi res. Others built a boat launch in Plaquemines Parish for use in rescue operations; coordinated relief 

mission planning in St. Bernard Parish, and provided law enforcement and relief supplies in Gonzales. Th at same day, 

ASAC Kevin Harrison, New Orleans Field Division, and a team of 9 Special Agents rescued and evacuated over 70 senior 

citizens who were abandoned at a retirement home in New Orleans near the St. Bernard Parish line. Many residents of 

the home had already died as a result of dehydration and a lack of medical care. Water and food was provided to sustain 

them. Th ey were transported to a shelter outside of the City of New Orleans on the West Bank of the Mississippi River to 

safety. Drug Enforcement Administration, New Orleans Field Division, Hurricane Katrina Events Log, Aug. 31- Sept. 7, 

2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 000000141 through 000000142.

178 NRP, p. 35.

179 NRP, p. 35.

180 When ESF-13 is activated, the primary agencies assume responsibility for a series of actions and activities. Signifi cant 

actions at the headquarters, regional and fi eld levels include staffi ng the National and Regional Response Coordination 

Centers, Joint Field Offi ce, and possibly the Emergency Response Team- Advance Element; coordinating with analogous 

regional and fi eld ESF elements; and coordinating all federal activities with the local FBI fi eld offi ce, Joint Terrorism Task 

Force and other DOJ-led law enforcement and investigations and intelligence assessments. Incident management coordination may include: (1) supporting operational and tactical planning activities to prevent or mitigate potential incidents or 

threats to public safety, (2) the deployment of federal resources in response to such incidents or threats, (3) providing technical assistance in planning and assessment eff orts, (4) establishing badging and credentialing processes, (5) helping control 

access to the incident site or critical facilities, (6) conducting traffi c and crowd control, (7) protecting emergency responders 

and other relief workers, (8) protecting the people, facilities and supplies during distribution eff orts; 9) providing surveillance support; and 10) supplying specialized equipment, clothing, and gear as needed. NRP, pp. ESF #13–3 through 13–4.

181 For these purposes, strategic coordination entails the macro-level planning and direction of operational missions 

or resources to achieve broad objectives while aiming to minimize redundancy and overlap and maximize effi ciency, 

eff ectiveness and safety. By comparison, tactical coordination suggests lower level commanders of on-scene, operational 

units eff orts to achieve micro-level ends via communication and cooperation with other, similarly situated commanders 

on the ground.
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182 Michael Vanacore, e-mail John Clark and others, Sept. 4, 2005, 7:38 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-ICE1-0001-0000026 (“DOJ is looking to run this whole eff ort.”); Marc Raimondi, e-mail to William Knocke, Sept. 

4, 2005, 10:33 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-HSOC-0004-0003339 (e-mail entitled “FBI to take 

over?” reports “Th ey [FBI] showed up here last night with a command center on wheels, a bunch of black Suburbans, 

and held a press conference.”); Samuel Neglia, e-mail to Matthew Broderick, Sept. 4, 2005, 8:30 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-HSOC-0004-0003258 (“Need HEAVY Secretary Offi ce Level push quickly w/ FBI to 

ensure the co-lead is DHS per NRP ESF-13.”); Sigal Mandelker, e-mail to Matt Mayer, Sept. 2, 2005, 1:18 a.m. Provided 

to Committee, fi led as Bates no. DHS-FRNT-0010-0000161 (“We’re constantly trying to take the lead with State and 

locals on the Homeland Security mission and now we’re giving DOJ the lead.”). David M. Wulf, e-mail to James A. 

McAtamney and Carson W. Carroll, Sept. 4, 2005, 6:13 p.m. Provided to Committee (“We understand the FBI SAC 

Kiser [sic] will soon assume command of Federal law-enforcement activity at the Joint Field Offi ce that will be set up in 

Louisiana. We feel it would make sense to install an ATF SAC as Deputy law-enforcement commander at the JFO (I suppose, in NRP parlance, he would serve as Deputy Senior Federal Law Enforcement Offi cial). Th is would provide seamless 

coordination on ESF-13 related matters with our folks who are staffi ng the NRCC and IIMG 24/7. Also might make 

sense in view of the large number ATF agents (100+, I believe) on hand to be deployed for Katrina-related missions.”) 

At approximately the same time, Wulf forwarded the e-mail to Samuel Neglia, Robert Shea and others at DHS, asking 

“Is this something you guys could push from DHS side?” David Wulf, e-mail to Samuel Neglia and others, Sept. 4, 2005, 

6:15 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-ICE1-0001-000000026 through 000000027.

183 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 13-14.

184 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 91-95.

185 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 14, 17-18, 24.

186 Vanacore said in his interview that Brian Pennoyer, of PFO Brown’s support staff , called him around midnight 

between September 4-5. Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 32-33.

187 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 6, 8, 35.

188 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 37-39.

189 FBI briefi ng to Committee, conducted by Michael J. Wolf, Critical Incident Response Special Agent in Charge, FBI, 

Dec. 20, 2005.

190 Mercer interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 52-53 (“I think the people on the ground determine[d] that it would be useful to 

have an SFLEO and sort of a centralized process, and then that was created.”). 

191 Offi ce of the Attorney General, Order No. 2779-2005, Sept. 4, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 

000000091 (Authorizing the Deputy Attorney General to Take Certain Actions Related To Hurricane Katrina); Mercer 

interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 63-67. Vanacore said that initially the U.S. Attorney had been designated the law enforcement lead, but that this changed when DOJ recognized that as a prosecutor, rather than a law-enforcement agent, he 

should deal “with the legal issues ... and the little higher level things,” because he was not going to “tell the cops what to 

do.” Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 55.

192 Th e then-Deputy Superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department off ered this praise:

Th e [Immigrations and Customs Enforcement] agents ... stayed far longer than anyone else, working as 

a patrolman, riding around answering calls for service from our people. Th ey were absolutely outstanding. ... Th e FBI [Special Response] team was great. Th e [Drug Enforcement Agency] SR team was great. 

Th e [Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms] SR team was great. 

Source: Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 88-89. NOPD Captain Bayard also praised counterparts at DEA, ATF, the United 

States Marshal’s Service, and the FBI, especially FBI Agent Todd Cox, who helped address a continuing lack of coordination 

weeks later by further establishing a Command Center at the Royal Sonesta Hotel. Source: Capt. Bayard interview, Nov. 21, 

2005, pp. 81-82, 119-120. Th e LSP’s Col. Whitehorn cited the United States Secret Service for establishing a key credentialing 

process, while Jeff erson Parish’s Sheriff Harry Lee generally thought he received good support from federal agencies. Source: 

Col. Whitehorn interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 116-117; Committee staff interview of Harry Lee, Sheriff , Jeff erson Parish, LA, 

conducted on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript p. 108. New Orleans Director of Homeland Security Col. Ebbert had this to say:

I want to go on record as thanking the federal agencies. By later in the week we had tremendous 

response with hundreds of federal agents from all the federal agencies. ... Th e federal agents from all 

those agencies, both Justice and Homeland Security, worked together to help manage those resources 

throughout the city. 

Source: Committee staff interview of Col. Terry Ebbert, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Director, New Orleans Department of 

Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript p. 167. 

193 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 126-127; FBI briefi ng given to Committee, conducted by Michael J. Wolf, 

Critical Incident Response Special Agent in Charge, FBI, Dec. 20, 2005.

194 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 128-129; FBI briefi ng given to Committee, conducted by Michael J. Wolf, 

Critical Incident Response Special Agent in Charge, FBI, Dec. 20, 2005.

195 Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 54.

196 Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 94-95.