a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

November 2006 DARFUR CRISIS

Progress in Aid and 

Peace Monitoring 

Threatened by 

Ongoing Violence and 

Operational 

Challenges

GAO-07-9
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

November 2006

DARFUR CRISIS 

Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring 

Threatened by Ongoing Violence and 

Operational Challenges 

 

Highlights of GAO-07-9, a report to

congressional requesters 

In 2003, violent conflict in Darfur, 

Sudan broke out between rebel 

groups, government troops, and 

government-supported Arab 

militias, known as the Janjaweed.

The conflict has displaced about 2

million Darfurians and has so 

affected over 1.9 million others that 

they require assistance. Since

October 2003, the U.S. government 

has provided humanitarian 

assistance in Darfur and supported 

African Union Mission in Sudan’s

(AMIS) efforts to fulfill a peace

support mandate. This report 

reviews (1) U.S. humanitarian 

assistance provided to Darfur and 

the challenges that have been 

encountered and (2) African Union 

efforts to fulfill its mandate and 

challenges that have affected these 

efforts. 

What GAO Recommends

This report recommends that the 

Secretary of State encourage the

Chairperson of the African Union 

Commission to ensure that a 

“lessons learned” assessment of 

AMIS operations is conducted in 

order to (1) strengthen future 

African Union peace support

planning and operations and (2) 

optimize future donor assistance.

The Department of State supports 

this recommendation. 

The United States has been the largest donor of humanitarian aid to Darfur, 

obligating nearly $1 billion from October 2003 through September 2006. 

Although more than 68 percent of this assistance consisted of food aid, U.S. 

assistance has also supported other needs, such as water and sanitation, 

shelter, and health care. Since 2003, humanitarian organizations have made 

significant progress in increasing the number of people in Darfur receiving 

aid. In addition, malnutrition and mortality rates in Darfur dropped, a trend 

that U.S. and other officials attribute in part to humanitarian assistance

efforts. However, USAID and the entities providing U.S. humanitarian 

assistance have encountered several challenges that have hampered delivery 

of, or accountability for, humanitarian services in Darfur. These challenges 

include continued insecurity in Darfur; Sudanese government restrictions on 

access to communities in need; the timing of funding; and an incapacity to 

ensure monitoring of, and reporting on, U.S.-funded programs. 

U.S. Food Aid in South Darfur; AMIS Troops in North Darfur 

Source: GAO.

AMIS has taken several positive actions in Darfur to pursue its mandate, 

although some actions have been incomplete or inconsistent. For example, 

to monitor compliance with a 2004 cease-fire agreement—one mandate 

component—AMIS investigated alleged cease-fire violations and identified 

numerous violations; however, the resulting reports were not consistently 

reviewed at higher levels or made fully publicly available to identify those 

violating the agreement. The U.S. government, via private contractors, 

provided about $280 million from June 2004 through September 2006 to build

and maintain 32 camps for AMIS forces in Darfur, according to the 

Department of State. Numerous challenges have been identified by African 

Union or U.S. officials, among others, as negatively affecting AMIS’s efforts 

in Darfur. These challenges include inadequacies in AMIS’s organization, 

management, and capacity, such as inconsistent interpretation of the AMIS 

mandate; its relatively small forces; limited or poorly allocated resources; 

and a lack of intelligence regarding, and cooperation from, the parties to the 

conflict. A transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation is being 

considered, although the Sudanese government has rejected such a 

transition. A possible NATO-assisted review of AMIS operations has not 

been conducted. Meanwhile, insecurity and violence continue in Darfur. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-9.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact David Gootnick 

at 202 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-07-9 Darfur

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

United States Primarily Contributed Food Aid; Meanwhile, 

Assistance Provision Grew and Other Conditions Improved 22

Numerous Challenges Have Hampered U.S. Assistance Efforts and 

Oversight 38

African Union Has Taken Actions to Meet Mandate, but Some 

Actions Have Been Incomplete or Inconsistent 45

Numerous Factors Have Complicated AMIS Efforts 59

Conclusions 69

Recommendation 70

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 70

Appendixes

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 72

Appendix II: Timeline of Darfur Events 77

Appendix III: Evolution of AMIS 83

Appendix IV: NGOs and UN Agencies Receiving U.S. Nonfood Assistance 

Funding during Fiscal Years 2004–2006 86

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State 88

GAO Comments 92

Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 

Development 93

GAO Comments 95

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 96

Bibliography 97

Table Table 1: U.S. Food Aid to Darfur in Metric Tons (MT) and Millions 

of Dollars in Fiscal Years 2004–2006 25

Figures Figure 1: Map of Sudan 7

Figure 2: Darfur Preconflict Population Density Map 10

Figure 3: Timeline of Darfur Events, January 2003–October 2006 12
Contents

Page ii GAO-07-9 Darfur

Figure 4: Darfur IDP Camps Dispersion and Estimated Affected 

Population, October 2005 16

Figure 5: Process for Monitoring Cease-fire Agreement 

Compliance 18

Figure 6: Total Humanitarian Assistance Pledged or Obligated for 

Darfur by International Donors, as of June 1, 2006 22

Figure 7: U.S. Obligations for Food and Nonfood Humanitarian 

Assistance to Darfur by Fiscal Year, Including 

Supplemental Appropriations 24

Figure 8: U.S. Commodities at a World Food Program Storage 

Facility in South Darfur 28

Figure 9: Food Distribution in Zam Zam IDP Camp in North 

Darfur 29

Figure 10: U.S. Nonfood Humanitarian Assistance to Darfur in Fiscal 

Years 2004-2006 by Sector 31

Figure 11: Health Clinic in Al Salaam IDP Camp in North Darfur 32

Figure 12: Water Pump in Abu Shouk IDP Camp in North Darfur 33

Figure 13: Income Generation and Protection Activities in Various 

IDP Camps 34

Figure 14: Affected Population Compared with Recipients of 

Humanitarian Assistance, April 2004–July 2006 36

Figure 15: AMIS Confidence-Building Patrol Near Kabkabiya in 

North Darfur 50

Figure 16: AMIS Firewood Patrol Near Kass in South Darfur 51

Figure 17: AMIS Camps 56

Abbreviations

AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan

DOD Department of Defense

IDP internally displaced person

JEM Justice and Equality Movement

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGO nongovernmental organization

SLM/A Sudan Liberation Movement/Army

SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army

UN United Nations

UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
Contents

Page iii GAO-07-9 Darfur

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-07-9 Darfur

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

November 9, 2006 Letr

The Honorable Tom Lantos

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on International Relations 

House of Representatives

The Honorable Mike DeWine 

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

United States Senate

In 2003, violent conflict broke out in the Darfur region of western Sudan 

when rebel groups, believing that the region was marginalized by the 

Sudanese government, led attacks against the government. In response, the 

government armed and supported local Arab tribal militias, commonly 

known as the Janjaweed, to defeat the rebels. Attacks on the civilian 

population by these militias, sometimes in conjunction with the Sudanese 

armed forces, have resulted in the deaths of many thousands. These attacks 

have also displaced approximately 1.85 million people within Darfur—

internally displaced persons (IDP)—most of whom now live in camps in 

Darfur and have affected an additional 1.91 million Darfur residents 

(affected residents) so that they now require humanitarian assistance.1

 In 

addition, the attacks have forced about 220,000 Darfur refugees to take 

shelter in Chad.2

Since fiscal year 2004, the United States has provided humanitarian 

assistance to Darfur through various implementing partners—international 

nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and United Nations (UN) 

agencies—with funding from the U.S. Agency for International 

1

The United Nations (UN) defines IDPs as “[p]ersons or groups of persons who have been 

forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as 

a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized 

violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not 

crossed an internationally recognized border.” Affected residents are defined as “habitual 

residents or returnees, not including IDPs, seriously affected by the recent conflict and as a 

result in need of humanitarian assistance.” Together these groups are referred to as the 

affected population.

2

According to U.S. law (8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A)), a refugee is any person who is outside 

his or her country of nationality and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or 

unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution 

or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership 

in a particular social group, or political opinion. 
Page 2 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Development (USAID) and the Department of State (State). Over the same 

period, the U.S. government, through State contracts with two private 

sector firms, provided funding for building and maintaining 32 camps 

throughout Darfur for African Union forces involved in monitoring a 2004 

cease-fire agreement.3

 Since May 2004, the African Union Mission in Sudan 

(AMIS) has deployed more than 7,000 personnel (comprising military 

observers, protection force troops, and civilian police) throughout Darfur 

on a peace support mission to respond to a three-part mandate: (1) monitor 

compliance with the cease-fire agreement, which was signed in April 2004 

by the three parties to the conflict; (2) assist in “confidence building”; and 

(3) contribute to improving the region’s security environment. AMIS’s 

mandate will expire on December 31, 2006, and a UN peacekeeping mission 

is currently under consideration. Meanwhile, a peace agreement signed by 

the government of Sudan and one rebel group in May 2006 gives AMIS new 

responsibilities, such as verifying disarmament of the Janjaweed and 

monitoring demilitarized zones around IDP camps.

We were asked to review and assess, among other things, U.S. assistance in 

Darfur aimed at promoting health, peace, and security in Sudan. This report 

examines (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to help relieve the 

crisis in Darfur, (2) challenges that USAID and its implementing partners 

have encountered, (3) the African Union’s efforts to fulfill its peace support 

mandate in Darfur, and (4) factors affecting the implementation of this 

mandate.4

To answer our first two objectives, we reviewed all USAID Darfur grants 

and cooperative agreements with UN agencies and NGOs for fiscal years 

2004 to 2005 and the first 8 months of fiscal year 2006; UN humanitarian 

information profiles for Darfur; and international standards for 

3

The African Union, headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, was launched in 2002 as the 

successor to the Organization of African Unity. The African Union has 53 member states, 

including Sudan. Its objectives are, among other things, to achieve greater unity and 

solidarity between African countries and the people of Africa; to defend the sovereignty, 

territorial integrity, and independence of member states; to accelerate the political and 

socioeconomic integration of the continent; and to promote peace, security, and stability on 

the continent.

4

Simultaneously with the release of this report, we are issuing a separate report evaluating 

various estimates of deaths attributable to the crisis in Darfur; identifying general 

challenges involved in making such estimates; and suggesting measures that the U.S. 

government can take to improve death estimates in the future. See GAO, Darfur Crisis: 

Death Estimates Demonstrate Severity of Crisis, but Their Accuracy and Credibility 

Could Be Enhanced, GAO-07-24 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2006).
Page 3 GAO-07-9 Darfur

humanitarian assistance. To answer our third and fourth objectives, we 

reviewed State contracts, task orders, and expenditure information as well 

as documents prepared by the African Union, State, and a key U.S. 

contractor. For all four objectives, we discussed U.S. assistance with 

appropriate Sudanese, USAID, State, and Department of Defense (DOD) 

officials and advocacy groups in Washington, D.C., as well as UN officials in 

New York, NY. Further, we interviewed appropriate U.S., European Union, 

Sudanese, UN, NGO, African Union, and contractor officials in Khartoum, 

Sudan, and in the northern and southern Darfur states. We also visited 

seven IDP camps and discussed events in Darfur with IDPs, including the 

leaders of those communities. Although we reviewed data on U.S. 

humanitarian assistance to Darfur refugees in Chad, we did not assess this 

assistance in detail. Finally, we visited eight African Union camps within 

North and South Darfur and met with officials at African Union 

headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. (See app. I for a detailed discussion 

of our scope and methodology.) We conducted our work from September 

2005 to November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards.

Results in Brief In fiscal years 2004 through 2006, the United States provided nearly $1 

billion in humanitarian assistance for Darfur, with over $275 million of this 

amount provided through supplemental legislation that augmented initial 

funding levels.5

 USAID provided more than 68 percent of the total 

assistance as food aid, primarily by providing commodities to the UN World 

Food Program and to the International Committee of the Red Cross. U.S. 

assistance to Darfur has also supported other vital needs, such as water 

and sanitation, shelter, and primary health care services. Since 2004, NGOs 

and UN agencies increased their presence in Darfur by several thousand 

staff and made significant progress in increasing the number of IDPs and 

affected residents receiving aid. In addition, malnutrition and mortality 

rates in Darfur dropped between 2004 and 2005, a trend that U.S. and other 

officials attributed in part to international humanitarian assistance efforts.

5

In addition to the U.S. assistance provided for Darfur, an additional $197 million has 

supported Darfur refugees located in Eastern Chad from fiscal year 2004 through September 

2006. For this report, we did not evaluate the U.S. assistance to refugees in Chad. State has 

emphasized that insecurity in Darfur has negatively affected the humanitarian situation in 

Eastern Chad.
Page 4 GAO-07-9 Darfur

NGOs and UN agencies implementing humanitarian activities and 

programs in Darfur have faced three key challenges in providing 

humanitarian assistance. First, continued insecurity, such as attacks on 

NGOs and UN agencies and banditry of aid convoys, has made it difficult 

for humanitarian agencies to provide assistance throughout the region. 

Second, NGOs’ and UN agencies’ efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance 

have been constrained by Sudanese government restrictions on access to 

IDP communities. Third, according to NGO and UN agency officials, the 

timing of U.S. funding in fiscal years 2006, as well as delays in funding from 

other international donors, hampered the provision of humanitarian 

assistance for 2006. For example, because more than half of U.S. food aid 

funding was not provided until late in fiscal year 2006, the UN World Food 

Program cut Darfur food rations to half the minimum daily requirement in 

May 2006; as of October 2006, the ration had not been fully restored. In 

addition, USAID’s oversight of U.S. humanitarian assistance has been 

limited by a reduction of USAID program staff in Darfur since 2004—

despite growing numbers of NGO and UN humanitarian staff and displaced 

and affected Darfurians—as well as incomplete reporting by implementing 

NGOs.

Although the African Union has taken positive actions to fulfill its mandate, 

some of these actions have been incomplete or inconsistent. According to 

U.S. and other officials, AMIS is viewed as having lessened large-scale 

violence in the region through the deterrent effect of its presence. To 

monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreement—the first part of the 

AMIS mandate—AMIS military observers in Darfur have actively 

investigated alleged cease-fire agreement violations and have identified 

numerous violations since 2004. However, the resulting reports have not 

been consistently reviewed at higher levels according to established 

procedure or made publicly available to identify parties who are violating 

the agreement. To build confidence and to improve security—the second 

and third parts of the mandate—AMIS troops have taken actions such as 

conducting patrols and escorting IDP women foraging for firewood outside 

IDP camps, to protect them from violent attacks. AMIS troops have also 

intervened to stop impending violence against civilians; however, AMIS has 

not intervened in other instances where attacks were imminent. Further, 

AMIS civilian police have worked with Sudanese police to improve law 

enforcement, although they have encountered difficulties, such as an 

inability to obtain information regarding Sudanese police activities. To 

support AMIS’s efforts to fulfill the mandate, the U.S. government, via 

private contractors, provided about $280 million from June 2004 through 

September 2006, primarily to build and maintain the 32 camps that house 
Page 5 GAO-07-9 Darfur

AMIS forces throughout Darfur, according to State sources. Meanwhile, 

other international donors, such the European Union, the United Kingdom, 

the Netherlands, and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 

supported AMIS with funding, goods, and services.

Numerous factors have been identified by African Union or U.S. 

government officials, among others, as contributing to AMIS’s difficulties in 

meeting its mandate in Darfur. These challenges include 

• inadequacies in AMIS’s management, organization, and capacity;

• the relatively small size of the AMIS force responsible for monitoring 

and patrolling Darfur;

• constrained and inefficiently allocated AMIS resources; and

• a lack of intelligence regarding, and cooperation from, the parties to the 

conflict.

The challenges AMIS has faced have been magnified by the new 

responsibilities assigned to AMIS in the May 2006 peace agreement, such as 

the requirement to verify the eventual disarmament of the Janjaweed by the 

Sudanese government. As AMIS has faced challenges, the U.S. government 

and other parties have supported a transition of AMIS’s responsibilities to a 

UN peacekeeping operation when AMIS’s mandate expires at the end of 

December 2006. However, as of October 2006, the Sudanese government 

had rejected the proposed transition. In June 2006, following a NATO offer, 

the African Union formally requested assistance from NATO in, among 

other things, identifying lessons learned from AMIS operations; however, 

according to a State official, African Union headquarters had taken no 

further action to pursue this review as of August 2006. Meanwhile, 

insecurity and violence have continued in Darfur. 

In this report, we recommend that the Secretary of State encourage the 

Chairperson of the African Union Commission to ensure that an 

assessment of AMIS operations is conducted so that “lessons learned” can 

be used to strengthen future African Union peace support planning and 

operations and future donor assistance can be provided in a manner that 

will minimize the difficulties experienced by AMIS.

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Defense 

as well as USAID. We received comment letters from the Department of 
Page 6 GAO-07-9 Darfur

State and USAID. The Department of State supported our recommendation 

and noted that the report presents a balanced and accurate picture of the 

situation in Darfur. The department also suggested that the report provide 

additional details or characterizations regarding certain, primarily AMIS, 

issues. We incorporated such information into the report as appropriate. 

See appendix V for a reproduction of State’s letter and our response. 

USAID commented that in general, it found the report to be a 

comprehensive assessment of USAID’s involvement in Darfur but felt that 

we should include additional information in our discussions of areas such 

as staffing levels and grant monitoring. We made adjustments as 

appropriate. See appendix VI for a reproduction of USAID’s letter and our 

response. DOD provided no comments on the draft report.

Background Sudan is the largest country in Africa (see fig. 1), and its population, 

estimated at about 40 million, is one of the continent’s most diverse. 

Sudan’s population comprises two distinct major cultures, Arab and black 

African, with hundreds of ethnic and tribal subdivisions and language 

groups. More than half of Sudan’s population lives in the northern states, 

which make up most of Sudan and include the majority of the urban 

centers; most residents of this area are Arabic-speaking Muslims. Residents 

of the southern region, which has a predominantly rural, subsistence 

economy, practice mainly indigenous traditional beliefs, although some are 

Christian. The South contains many tribal groups and many more 

languages than are used in the North. Darfur is another distinct region of 

Sudan, located in the west, and was an independent sultanate for most of 

the period between 1600 and 1916, when the British captured it and 

incorporated it into the Sudanese state. Darfur’s population is 

predominantly Muslim.
Page 7 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Figure 1: Map of Sudan

0 350 mile 175 s

Ye m e n

Uganda

Sudan

Somalia

Saudi

Arabia

Red

Sea

Libya

Kenya

Ethiopia

Eritrea

Egypt

Dijbouti

Democratic Republic of Congo

Chad

Central

Africa Republic

Khartoum

El Obeid

Umm Durman

Wad

Medani

Port Sudan

Gedaref

Ed Dueim

Wadi Halfa

Nimule

En Nahud

El Odaiya

Juba

Nyala

El

Geneina

El Fasher

North

Darfur

South

Darfur

West

Darfur

White Nile

Nile River

Blue Nile

Source: GAO based on Map Resources (map).
Page 8 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Sudan’s North-South War For most of its existence since gaining independence from Britain and 

Egypt in 1956, Sudan has endured civil war rooted in cultural and religious 

divides. The North, which has traditionally controlled the country, has 

sought to unify it along the lines of Arabism and Islam, whereas nonMuslims and other groups in the South have sought, among other things, 

greater autonomy. After 17 years of war, from 1955 to 1972, the government 

signed a peace agreement that granted the South a measure of autonomy. 

However, civil war began again in 1983, when the President of Sudan 

declared Arabic the South’s official language, transferred control of 

Southern armed forces to the central government, and, later that year, 

announced that traditional Islamic punishments drawn from Shari’a 

(Islamic law) would be incorporated into the penal code. The South’s 

rebellion was orchestrated by the Sudan People’s Liberation 

Movement/Army (SPLM/A). In 1989, the conflict intensified when an 

Islamic army faction, led by General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, led a coup of 

the government and installed the National Islamic Front.6

In 2001 President Bush named former Senator John Danforth as his 

Presidential Envoy for Peace in Sudan, assigning him to explore a U.S. role 

in ending the civil war and enhance the delivery of humanitarian aid to 

Sudan’s affected population. On January 9, 2005, the Sudanese government 

and the SPLM/A signed a set of agreements called the Comprehensive 

Peace Agreement, providing for a new constitution and new arrangements 

for power sharing, wealth sharing, and security applicable throughout 

Sudan. On July 9, 2005, Bashir assumed the presidency under the new 

arrangements, with the SPLM/A Chairman assuming the office of First Vice 

President. In 2011, Southern Sudan will hold a vote to determine whether to 

become independent. To assist in implementing the peace agreement, the 

UN Security Council established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which 

currently has a force of more than 7,000.7

6

According to a State document, as a result of this coup, the U.S. government suspended 

official development assistance to Sudan. In addition, although Sudan has provided 

concrete cooperation against international terrorism since September 11, 2001, the Bashir 

government had previously provided sanctuary to terrorists such as Osama bin Laden. As a 

result, Sudan remains on the U.S. list of states that sponsor terrorism, and comprehensive 

economic, trade, and financial sanctions have been imposed on Sudan by the United States 

since 1997. In addition, in 1998 the U.S. government launched cruise missiles to destroy a 

pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum in retaliation for attacks on the U.S. embassies in 

Tanzania and Kenya earlier that year; the attack was justified on the grounds that the plant 

was involved in producing chemical weapons and had ties with al Qaeda.

7

UN Security Council Resolution 1590, adopted March 24, 2005. 
Page 9 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Conflict in Darfur While the North-South agreement was nearing completion, a rebellion 

broke out in Darfur, located in western Sudan with an estimated preconflict 

population of about 6 million (see fig. 2).8

8

Estimates for the preconflict population of Darfur range from about 4 million to close to 7 

million. Experts that we have interviewed noted uncertainty regarding the population 

estimate for Darfur due to the lack of a current census and the fact that migration in this 

region occurs even during nonconflict times.
Page 10 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Figure 2: Darfur Preconflict Population Density Map

0 - 2

3 - 5

6 - 25

26 - 50

51 - 100

101 - 500

501 - 2,500

2,501 - 5,000

5,001 - 160,345

Population density

(pre 2002)

value: approx. 1x1km

Populated places

State capital

Major location

State boundary

International boundary

Khartoum

N Sudan

Chad

Libya

Central 

African 

Republic

West 

Darfur

South 

Darfur

North 

Darfur

Sudan

El Geneina Kabkabiyya

Kutum Mellit

El Fasher Umm

Kaddadah

Habilah

Zalingel

Kas

Nyala

El Da’ein

Buram Tulus

Rihed Al Birdi

Source: GAO from UN OCHA.

Attribution: Map provided courtesy of the Humanitarian Information Centre Darfur, United Nations Office for the Coordination 

of Humanitarian Affairs. 

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or 

acceptance by the United Nations.
Page 11 GAO-07-9 Darfur

The South’s success motivated rebel groups in Darfur to fight for a similar 

outcome. In early 2003, Darfur rebels attacked Sudanese police stations 

and the airport in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur (see fig. 3 for an 

interactive timeline of key events associated with Darfur and app. II for a 

related description of events). In El Fasher, the rebel groups destroyed 

numerous military aircraft, killed several Sudanese soldiers, and kidnapped 

a Sudanese general. After the government armed and supported local tribal 

and Arab militias—the Janjaweed9

—fighting between the rebel groups and 

the Sudan military and Janjaweed intensified during late 2003.10 The 

principal rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and 

the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), represent agrarian farmers who 

are black African Muslims.11 The SLM/A has recently split into two 

factions—one faction, with the larger military force, led by Minni Minawi 

and the other led by Abdulwahid El Nour.

9

In the past, the nomadic Arab Muslims known as the Janjaweed had grazed their cattle, 

camels, and other livestock on the land of farmers, with occasional conflicts that were 

managed through a traditional dispute resolution process. However, as desertification in the 

northern region of Darfur led to southward movement by nomadic herders, such conflicts 

increased in frequency, straining relations between the two groups prior to the intense 

conflict that began in 2003.

10Attacks by the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed have been targeted at the Fur, 

Zaghawa, and Massalit ethnic groups in Darfur.

11Although the various Arab and African tribes of Darfur have historically intermarried, 

creating fluid ethnic identities, the hardening of these identities is a recent phenomenon, 

resulting from the Arabization undertaking by the Sudanese government in Khartoum.
Page 12 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Figure 3: Timeline of Darfur Events, January 2003–October 2006

Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.

2003 2004

Save the 

Children-UK 

withdraws

after death of 

four staff.

Donors

provide $890 

million in 

humanitarian 

assistance.

First 

African Union 

observer 

mission to 

Darfur.

African 

Union’s Mission 

in Sudan 

established with 

3,320 personnel.

Sudan and 

rebel group 

sign cease-fire; 

agreement 

later collapses. 

Three 

negotiating 

parties

sign 

cease-fire. 

Three parties

sign two protocols

to improve 

humanitarian and 

security situation.

Both houses

of Congress

pass resolutions

declaring 

atrocities to be 

genocide.

UN Under-Secretary 

General calls

humanitarian 

situation “one of the 

worst” worldwide.

Sudan commits

to facilitate 

assistance and 

disarm 

Janjaweed.

UN calls for 

cooperation 

from Sudan and 

disarmament 

of militias.

USAID 

establishes

Disaster 

Assistance 

Response 

Team. 

President 

Bush and 

Secretary 

Powell declare 

that genocide 

is occurring. 

U.S. company 

begins building 

camps for 

African Union 

troops. 

Secretary 

of State 

Powell 

visits

Sudan.

202 

humanitarian 

staff 

working in 

Darfur.

Humanitarian 

assistance 

events

African Union 

Mission in 

Sudan (AMIS) 

events

Darfur conflict 

begins

Peace 

negotiation 

efforts

Major 

U.S.

actions

Major 

UN 

actions

To read more information,

please roll your mouse

over the EVENT

(on-line only;

otherwise see app. II)

Affected residents

Displaced residents (IDPs)

Conflict-affected population (in millions)

0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

Apr.

2004

Months

May

2004

June

2004

July

2004

Aug.

2004

Sept.

2004

Oct.

2004

Nov.

2004

Dec.

2004
Page 13 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Over 3 

million 

people 

affected 

by crisis. 

Humanitarian 

staff

increase

to almost 

14,000.

Donors

provide $675 

million in 

humanitarian 

assistance.

GOAL 

suspends

operations

in Jebel 

Mara.

WFP 

announces

cuts in 

Darfur food 

rations.

Donors

provide $331 

million in 

humanitarian 

assistance.

AMIS

deployment is over 

7,200, but below 

authorized level of 

about 7,700.

AMIS

mandate is

extended to 

December 31, 

2006.

African Union 

supports, 

in principle, 

AMIS transition 

to UN.

AMIS

forces

increase 

to 

7,731.

Violence 

against 

AMIS

personnel 

increases.

Three 

negotiating 

parties sign 

declaration 

of principles.

Sudan and

the largest 

faction of 

SLM/A sign 

Darfur Peace 

Agreement.

Secretary Rice 

reaffirms that 

Darfur 

violence 

constitutes

genocide.

U.S. President 

signs Darfur 

Peace and 

Accountability 

Act of 2006.

UN reports

that Sudan has

not pursued a

policy of 

genocide.

UN requests

planning 

to transition 

AMIS

|to UN. 

UN calls for 

UNMIS

deployment 

to Darfur.

UN 

establishes

UN Mission 

in Sudan.

UN refers

Darfur 

situation to 

International 

Criminal Court.

2005 2006

Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.

Humanitarian 

assistance 

events

African Union 

Mission in 

Sudan (AMIS) 

events

Peace 

negotiation 

efforts

Major 

U.S.

actions

Major 

UN 

actions

Source: GAO.

0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

Affected residents

Displaced residents (IDPs)

Conflict-affected population (in millions)

Apr.

2005

Months

May

2005

June

2005

Jan.

2005

Feb.

2005

Mar.

2005

July

2005

Aug.

2005

Sept.

2005

Oct.

2005

Nov.

2005

Dec.

2005

Jan.

2006

Apr.

2006

July

2006

To read more information,

please roll your mouse

over the EVENT

(on-line only;

otherwise see app. II)

As of July 2006:

Affected residents in Darfur 1.91 million

IDPs 1.85 million

Total affected residents and IDPs 3.76 million
Page 14 GAO-07-9 Darfur

In addition to disrupting the lives of almost 4 million Darfurians, Janjaweed 

and Sudanese government attacks in Darfur have resulted in many 

thousands of deaths.12 The Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire was 

signed by the Sudanese government, the SLM/A and the JEM on April 8, 

2004, in N’Djamena, Chad. In signing the agreement, the parties agreed to 

accept an automatically renewable cessation of hostilities; to refrain from 

any military action and any reconnaissance operations; to refrain from any 

act of violence or any other abuse on civilian populations; to ensure 

humanitarian access; and to establish a Ceasefire Commission to monitor 

the agreement, along with a Joint Commission to which the Ceasefire 

Commission would report. The African Union was to monitor cease-fire 

compliance. Peace negotiations continued under African Union auspices 

with Chadian participation, and additional interim agreements were also 

reached. However, after a relatively calm 2005, cease-fire violations and 

violent incidents reportedly began to increase in the final months of that 

year and into 2006. 

On May 5, 2006, the government of Sudan and the Minawi faction of the 

SLM/A signed the Darfur Peace Agreement, establishing agreements in key 

areas such as power sharing, wealth sharing, and security arrangements.

• Power sharing. The Darfur Peace Agreement creates the position of 

Senior Assistant to the President—the fourth-highest position in the 

Sudanese government—appointed by the President from a list of 

nominees provided by the rebel movements. The Senior Assistant to the 

President will also serve as Chairperson of the newly created 

Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, which is responsible for the 

implementation of the agreement and coordination among the three 

states of Darfur. Further, a referendum will be held by July 2010 to allow 

Darfurians to decide whether to establish Darfur as a unitary region 

with a single government or to retain the existing three regions.13

• Wealth sharing. The Darfur Peace Agreement creates a Darfur 

Reconstruction and Development Fund to collect and disburse funds for 

12State has estimated the total number of deaths in Darfur, between March 2003 and January 

2005, at 98,000 to 181,000. Estimates prepared by other parties for varying periods of time 

range up to about 400,000. See GAO-07-24.

13Unlike the agreement between the North and the South, the Darfur Peace Agreement does 

not provide an option allowing citizens of Darfur to eventually determine whether the region 

will become independent.
Page 15 GAO-07-9 Darfur

the resettlement, rehabilitation, and reintegration of internally and 

externally displaced persons. The government of Sudan will contribute 

$300 million to the fund in 2006 and at least $200 million annually in 2007 

and 2008. Further, the government of Sudan will place $30 million in a 

fund for monetary compensation for those negatively affected by the 

conflict in Darfur.

• Security arrangements. The Darfur Peace Agreement calls for the 

verifiable disarmament of the Janjaweed by the Sudanese government 

by mid-October 2006.14 This disarmament must be verified by the 

African Union before rebel groups undertake their own disarmament 

and demobilization. Demilitarized zones are to be established around 

IDP camps and humanitarian assistance corridors, into which rebel 

forces and the Sudanese military cannot enter, and buffer zones are to 

be established in the areas of the most intense conflict. Rebel group 

forces will be integrated into the Sudanese military and police: 4,000 

former combatants will be integrated into the armed forces; 1,000 

former combatants will be integrated into the police; and 3,000 will be 

supported through education and training programs.

The UN estimates that displaced and affected persons are located in more 

than 300 locations, including camps and other gatherings, with populations 

up to 90,000 people. Figure 4 shows the camp dispersion and estimated 

population at many of the camps throughout Darfur, as of October 2005.

14According to a State official, very little, if any, real disarmament had occurred as of 

November.
Page 16 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Figure 4: Darfur IDP Camps Dispersion and Estimated Affected Population, October 

2005

North

Darfur

Central 

African 

Republic

Chad

500 - 10,000

10,001 - 20,000

20,001 - 50,000

50,001 - 70,000

70,001 - 100,000

0 25 50

Kilometers

100

South

Darfur

West

Darfur

Kalma

El Da’ein

Sheriya

Gereida

El Fasher

Town

Umm 

Baru Umm 

Keddada

Malha

Edd Al 

Fursan

Abu

Ajura

Kass

Kebkabiya

Kutum 

rural

Seleia

Mome

Forabaranga

Saraf 

Omra

Town

Zallingei

Affected population

North Darfur: 1,237,645

South Darfur: 1,131,984

West Darfur: 1,213,976

Total: 3,583,605

IDP gatherings

State

International

West

Kordofan

Bahr al 

Ghazal

Kenya

Ethiopia

Sudan Sudan Darfur

Uganda Democratic Rep. of the Congo

Central African Republic

Chad

Eritrea

Libya Egypt

Source: GAO from UN OCHA.

Attribution: Map provided courtesy of the Humanitarian Information Centre Darfur, United Nations Office for the Coordination of 

Humanitarian Affairs. 

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 

by the United Nations. Locality boundaries are not complete for South Darfur. Affected population numbers are based on the October 

Humanitarian Needs Profile (HNP). For more information, please refer to the October HNP published by the OCHA Darfur Cell 

(located in the UNDP compound Khartoum). Printing date February 09, 2006.
Page 17 GAO-07-9 Darfur

African Union Mission in 

Sudan

Since 2004, the African Union has been responsible for peace support 

operations in Darfur through AMIS.15 Subsequent to its establishment of an 

African Union observer mission in Darfur in May 2004,16 the African Union 

Peace and Security Council established a specific mandate for AMIS in 

October 2004 (see app. III for a discussion of the evolution of AMIS).17

AMIS’s mandate has three components:

• To monitor and observe compliance with the April 2004 humanitarian 

cease-fire agreement and all such agreements in the future;

• To assist in the process of confidence building; and

• To contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian 

relief and, beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes, 

in order to assist in increasing the level of compliance of all parties with 

the April 2004 cease-fire agreement and to contribute to the 

improvement of the security situation throughout Darfur.

Regarding the first component of the mandate, per the terms of the ceasefire agreement, related agreements, and African Union Peace and Security 

Council guidance, military observers were to investigate and report on 

allegations of ceasefire violations, with a protection force presence as 

needed. Final investigation reports, prepared by the Ceasefire Commission 

headquartered in El Fasher, Darfur, were to be submitted to the Joint 

Commission. The Joint Commission was mandated to make consensusbased decisions on matters brought before it by the Ceasefire Commission. 

According to a senior African Union official, the Joint Commission was to 

submit Ceasefire Commission reports to African Union headquarters in 

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for appropriate action. (Fig. 5 illustrates the 

established process for investigating, and reporting on, cease-fire 

agreement violations.)

15According to a State official, State encouraged African Union involvement in Darfur, in 

part, in order to support the concept of “African solutions for African problems.”

16African Union Peace and Security Council, 10th meeting, communiqué dated May 25, 2004.

17African Union Peace and Security Council, 17th meeting, communiqué dated October 20, 

2004.
Page 18 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Figure 5: Process for Monitoring Cease-fire Agreement Compliance

The council determined that AMIS would, in the framework of its mandate, 

“protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the 

immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood 

that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the 

government of Sudan.”18 The council also determined that AMIS would 

have, in addition to military observers and protection force troops, civilian 

police, to monitor the actions of Sudanese police and interact with IDPs 

and civilians, as well as appropriate civilian personnel. The AMIS force 

authorized and deployed in Darfur to execute its mandate has grown 

incrementally over time from several hundred personnel in 2004 to 7,271 

personnel (military observers, protection force troops, and civilian police) 

deployed as of April 30, 2006. Numerous studies by the African Union, the 

UN, and others reviewing the performance of AMIS have been conducted 

AMIS military observers

in field investigate 

alleged ceasefire 

violations, report to 

Ceasefire Commission.

Ceasefire Commission 

assesses investigation, 

makes determination, 

reports to Joint 

Commission.

Joint Commission 

reviews Ceasefire 

Commission reports, 

makes final decision.

Joint Commission 

forwards Ceasefire 

Commission reports to 

African Union in Addis

Ababa, Ethiopia.

Ceasefire Commission 

comprising Chairman, 

Deputy Chairman, and 

representatives from 

Chadian mediation, the 

Sudanese government, 

the SLM/A, and the 

JEM; other international 

representatives from the 

UN, the European Union 

and the United States

invited to participate as

observers.

Field investigation 

teams comprising 

African Union, Chadian, 

and U.S. or European 

Union representatives, 

as well as a member 

from each of the parties

to the conflict and a

translator.

Source: The 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and related modalities agreement, Ceasefire Commission reports, and State

and African Union officials.

Joint Commission 

comprising two senior 

members from each of 

the following: parties to 

the conflict, Chadian 

mediation, African 

Union, European Union, 

and the United States.

18African Union Peace and Security Council, 17th meeting, communiqué dated October 20, 

2004.
Page 19 GAO-07-9 Darfur

that discuss the operations of this effort undertaken by the newly created 

African Union (see the bibliography for a listing of these reviews).

The May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement establishes several new 

responsibilities for AMIS, such as verifying the eventual disarmament of 

the Janjaweed by the Sudanese government. The 2006 agreement also 

designates AMIS as responsible for actions such as designing and running 

awareness programs in Darfur to ensure that local communities and others 

understand, among other things, the AMIS mandate; patrolling and 

monitoring demilitarized zones around IDP camps; patrolling buffer zones 

established in areas of the most intense conflict; and developing and 

monitoring implementation of a plan for the regulation of nomadic 

migration along historic migration routes.

U.S. and UN Policy 

Responses to the Darfur 

Conflict

The U.S. government has been active in addressing the Darfur conflict.19

After the conflict began, senior State officials traveled to Sudan on a halfdozen occasions, stressing the need to end the violence. On July 22, 2004, 

the U.S. House and the Senate each passed separate resolutions citing 

events in Darfur as acts of genocide.20 Further, on September 9, 2004, in 

testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the U.S. 

Secretary of State announced that “genocide” had been committed in 

Darfur, and noted that the Sudanese government had supported the 

Janjaweed, directly and indirectly, as they carried out a “scorched earth” 

19The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 

defines genocide as any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 

in part, a national ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the 

group, (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, (c) deliberately 

inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 

whole or in part, (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, or (e) 

forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. The U.S. government ratified 

the convention in 1988. Sudan is not a party to this convention. The convention requires 

parties to enact domestic legislation to give effect to the provisions of the convention and to 

provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide. The convention also requires 

parties to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force. Furthermore, 

while the convention grants parties the authority to call upon the competent organs of the 

UN to take action for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide, it does not specify 

further requirements on the parties.

20H. Con. Res. 467, 108th Cong. (2004); S. Con. Res. 133, 108th Cong. (2004).
Page 20 GAO-07-9 Darfur

policy toward the rebels and the African civilian population in Darfur.21 In a 

press release the same day, President Bush stated that genocide was 

occurring and requested the UN to investigate events in Darfur, as the 

Secretary of State had also done. On October 13, 2006, President Bush 

signed into law the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, which 

imposes sanctions against persons responsible for genocide, war crimes, 

and crimes against humanity; supports measures for the protection of 

civilians and humanitarian operations; and supports peace efforts in 

Darfur.

Although the UN has not identified the events in Darfur as genocide, it has 

repeatedly expressed concern over the continuing violence. In July 2004, 

the UN, with the government of Sudan, issued a communiqué emphasizing 

a commitment to facilitating humanitarian assistance to the region and 

establishing a commitment by the Sudanese government to disarm the 

Janjaweed. In September 2004, the UN Security Council adopted a 

resolution stating that the UN Secretary-General should “rapidly establish 

an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate 

reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights 

law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of 

genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations 

with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable.”22 In 

January 2005, the UN issued a report stating that “the Government of Sudan 

and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international 

human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under 

international law.”23 The report concluded that a policy of genocide had not 

been pursued but noted that “the crimes against humanity and war crimes 

that have been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous 

than genocide.”

The UN Security Council has also adopted resolutions establishing a travel 

ban and asset freeze for those determined to impede the peace process or 

21According to a State official, the key factor in the genocide determination was the intent of 

the Sudanese government regarding its actions in Darfur (i.e., its intent to destroy, in whole 

or in part, a specific group of people); the number of deaths attributable to the crisis was not 

a critical factor. 

22UN Security Council resolution 1564, adopted September 18, 2004.

23United Nations, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the 

United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 

September 2004 (Geneva: 2005).
Page 21 GAO-07-9 Darfur

violate human rights24 and referring the situation in Darfur to the 

prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and calling on the 

government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict to cooperate with 

the court.25 Further, in creating UNMIS to support implementation of the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the council requested the UN SecretaryGeneral to report to the council on options for the mission to reinforce the 

effort to foster peace in Darfur through appropriate assistance to AMIS.

International Response to 

Darfur Humanitarian Crisis

Large-scale international humanitarian response to the displacement in 

Darfur did not begin until fiscal year 2004. In October 2003, USAID’s Office 

of Food for Peace began to contribute food aid to the UN World Food 

Program for distribution in Darfur and USAID set an internal goal of 

meeting at least 50 percent of Sudan’s food aid needs as assessed by the 

World Food Program. In addition, USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster 

Assistance established a Disaster Assistance Response Team in Darfur to 

respond to the humanitarian needs of the population affected by the 

conflict once the cease-fire agreement was signed. The United States was 

the largest donor of humanitarian assistance for Darfur in fiscal years 2004 

to 2006, providing approximately 47 percent of all humanitarian assistance 

to the region (the UN has reported $1.9 billion in total pledges and 

obligations of assistance from all donors).26 The European Union and the 

United Kingdom provided the largest amounts of assistance pledged or 

obligated by other international donors. Figure 6 shows the percentages of 

24UN Security Council resolution 1591, adopted March 29, 2005. UN Security Council 

resolution 1672, adopted April 25, 2006, identified four individuals subject to these 

sanctions.

25UN Security Council resolution 1593, adopted March 31, 2005. In June 2006, the 

International Criminal Court’s Prosecutor briefed the UN Security Council and noted that 

the International Criminal Court had gathered significant evidence on crimes committed in 

Darfur, but no conclusions will be drawn regarding allegations that some of those crimes 

had been committed with specific genocidal intent until the completion of a full and 

impartial investigation. According to the UN, the Prosecutor stated that identifying those 

with greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes was a key challenge for the 

investigation, and the complexity of the Darfur conflict exacerbated that challenge, given 

that it involved multiple parties, varying over time throughout the different states and 

localities.

26The assistance reported by the UN as provided by other donors includes both pledges and 

obligations. According to the UN, a pledge is a nonbinding announcement of an intended 

contribution or allocation by the donor. An obligation represents a contractual obligation of 

funding by the donor against which agencies can begin spending. 
Page 22 GAO-07-9 Darfur

total humanitarian assistance pledged or obligated for Darfur by 

international donors.

Figure 6: Total Humanitarian Assistance Pledged or Obligated for Darfur by 

International Donors, as of June 1, 2006

United States Primarily 

Contributed Food Aid; 

Meanwhile, Assistance 

Provision Grew and 

Other Conditions 

Improved

In fiscal years 2004 through 2006, the United States provided almost 

$1 billion for food and other humanitarian aid in Darfur. More than 68 

percent of the U.S. obligations as of September 30, 2006, supplied food aid 

in the form of commodities provided to the UN World Food Program and 

the International Committee of the Red Cross. In addition, the United 

States provided assistance to meet a range of nonfood needs, such as 

health care and water. During this period, humanitarian access and 

coverage for IDPs and affected residents of Darfur improved significantly. 

In addition, IDP malnutrition and mortality rates decreased over time, a 

trend that U.S., UN, and other officials attribute in part to humanitarian 

assistance. 

Source: GAO analysis of UN Resource Tracking Service data.

European Union

Other donors

United States

United Kingdom

10%

15%

28%

47%
Page 23 GAO-07-9 Darfur

United States Provided 

Nearly $1 Billion in 

Assistance, Partly through 

Supplemental 

Appropriations

U.S. obligations for food and other humanitarian aid in Darfur totaled 

approximately $996 million in fiscal years 2004 through 2006 (see fig. 7). 

From 2004 to 2005, obligations for food and nonfood assistance increased 

from about $186 million to $444 million, or by 58 percent. In fiscal year 

2006, obligations decreased to about $366 million, or by 18 percent. Funds 

provided in supplemental appropriations accounted for about $71 million—

16 percent of the total—in 200527 and $205 million—56 percent of the 

total—in 2006.28

27The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, 

and Tsunami Relief for 2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005) appropriated $40 

million for international disaster and famine asssistance, $48.4 million for migration and 

refugee assistance, and up to $240 million for food aid for Darfur (see H.R. Rep. No. 109-72 

at 128, 130, and 134). According to USAID and State officials, from this supplemental 

appropriation, $40 million of international disaster and famine assistance, $6 million of 

migration and refugee assistance, and $25 million of food aid assistance was obligated for 

Darfur.

28The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of Defense, The Global War on Terror, 

and Hurricane Recovery of 2006 (Pub. L. 109-234, 120 Stat. 418 (2006) appropriated $161.3 

million for international disaster and famine assistance and $350 million for P.L. 480 Title II 

grants. USAID and State officials told us that from these supplemental appropriations, 

$66 million of international disaster and famine assistance, $2 million of migration and 

refugee assistance, and $137 million of food aid assistance was allocated for Darfur.
Page 24 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Figure 7: U.S. Obligations for Food and Nonfood Humanitarian Assistance to Darfur 

by Fiscal Year, Including Supplemental Appropriations

U.S. Assistance Focused on 

Food Aid

For fiscal years 2004 through 2006, USAID provided $681 million (over 68 

percent) as food aid for Darfur—approximately $113 million in 2004, $324 

million in 2005, and $243 million in 2006 (see table 1).

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data.

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Supplemental appropriations

Initial appropriations

2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006

Food Nonfood Total

$113

$25

$299

$137

$106 $73

$46

$120 $123

$243

$324

$74

$46 $68

$55

$68

$186

$444

$71

$373

$366

$205

$161
Page 25 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Table 1: U.S. Food Aid to Darfur in Metric Tons (MT) and Millions of Dollars in Fiscal Years 2004–2006

Source: USAID Food For Peace.

a

Includes commodities and funds approved for non-Darfur programs but transferred to Darfur at the 

beginning of the crisis in 2003. USAID did not transfer funds to the International Committee of the Red 

Cross in 2004. 

b

Includes Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust contribution of 200,000 MT valued at $172 million. Fiscal 

years 2004 and 2006 did not include such contributions.

Note: The dollar amount of the food aid includes the cost of the commodities; ocean and air freight; 

and internal transport, storage, and handling.

As table 1 shows, after rising from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2005, U.S. 

food aid funding for Darfur decreased from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 

2006 by approximately 25 percent and the quantity of food provided 

decreased by almost 13 percent.29 The UN World Food Program planned 

assistance to Sudan also fell by more than 16 percent between calendar 

years 2005 and 2006,30 while the food aid component of planned assistance 

Dollars in millions

2004a 2005b 2006 Total

Aid provided to MT

Dollar 

amount MT

Dollar 

amount MT

Dollar 

amount MT

Dollar 

amount

UN World Food 

Program 118,400 $112.9 369,170 $318.2 308,140 $227.4 795,710 $658.5

International 

Committee of the Red 

Cross 0 $0 7,710 $6.3 19,770 $16.5 27,480 $22.8

Total 118,400 $112.9 376,880 $324.5 327,910 $243.9 823,190 $681.3

29The quantity, or tonnage, of food aid fell by less than the funding amount due to the fact 

that the 2006 funding does not include the value of some commodities provided for Darfur in 

fiscal year 2006. According to a USAID official, these commodities, originally intended as 

aid for another African country, were transferred to Darfur after the other country’s program 

ended in November-December 2005.

30UN Work Plans for the Sudan, including midyear revisions, show that the World Food 

Program’s planned assistance to Sudan decreased from $1.08 billion for 2005 to $900 million 

for 2006. According to World Food Program and USAID officials, the lowered appeal for 

2006 reflected (1) a larger harvest in Sudan in 2005 than in 2004, resulting in greater food 

supplies for some of the nondisplaced communities in Darfur in 2006, (2) a significant 

amount of food aid carried over by the program from 2005 to 2006, and (3) the World Food 

Program’s use of UN internal funding mechanisms to cover urgent food needs in Darfur in 

2005.
Page 26 GAO-07-9 Darfur

decreased by 29 percent.31 According to World Food Program and USAID 

officials, in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, USAID supplied at least half of the 

2005 and 2006 food aid assistance requested for Sudan by the UN World 

Food Program. A World Food Program official in Washington, D.C., stated 

that the U.S. government provided essential food aid contributions in fiscal 

year 2006 and that the reduction in the level of U.S. funding did not 

negatively impact the food situation in Darfur.

USAID Food for Peace obligated aid for Darfur for fiscal years 2004 

through 2006, primarily for commodities intended to meet minimum 

nutritional requirements, to the UN World Food Program and the 

International Committee of the Red Cross.

• Obligations to the UN World Food Program. As table 1 shows, USAID 

Food for Peace obligated $658.6 million for commodities, including 

transportation and other shipping costs, to the World Food Program to 

address emergency food needs in Darfur in fiscal years 2004 through 

2006.32 According to a USAID official, this assistance included 

commodities previously allocated for assistance to southern Sudan, 

which Food for Peace and the World Food Program reallocated to 

respond to the emergency situation in Darfur before the official 

emergency program began. World Food Program officials said that U.S. 

food aid funding allowed the program to preposition food in various 

storage facilities in Darfur, enabling the program to avoid costly air 

drops. World Food Program officials indicated that prepositioning food 

helps avoid shortfalls during rainy seasons resulting from the typical 6-

month time lag between confirmation and distribution of food aid 

donations.

• Obligations to the Red Cross. USAID Food for Peace obligated $22.8 

million for commodities to the International Committee of the Red 

Cross. This assistance was intended particularly for rural village 

31The World Food Program activities included in the UN Work Plan for the Sudan include 

food aid, as well as other activities such as basic infrastructure and development, education 

and vocational training, and food security and livelihood recovery.

32This amount includes $172 million of commodities that USAID transferred through the Bill 

Emerson Humanitarian Trust—a USDA-managed reserve of commodities for unanticipated 

emergency needs in developing countries—to address Darfur food needs in fiscal year 2005. 

USAID Food for Peace provided the food aid for Darfur through funding provided by Public 

Law 480, Title II.
Page 27 GAO-07-9 Darfur

residents who had not been displaced by the ongoing conflict and whose 

needs had not been addressed by other agencies in the region.

During our field work in Darfur, we visited World Food Program 

warehouses outside Nyala, in South Darfur, built to expedite the 

distribution of food aid during the rainy season; we observed local staff 

repackaging U.S. wheat from bags that were damaged in transit to the 

storage facility in Nyala (see fig. 8).
Page 28 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Figure 8: U.S. Commodities at a World Food Program Storage Facility in South 

Darfur 

Source: GAO.
Page 29 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Additionally, we witnessed NGOs distributing rations in Zam Zam IDP 

camp (although the funds and commodities are transferred to the UN 

World Food Program, NGOs operating in Darfur distribute the rations in 

IDP camps), where U.S.-provided sorghum, vegetable oil, lentils, and wheat 

were distributed as part of the monthly rations (see fig. 9).

Figure 9: Food Distribution in Zam Zam IDP Camp in North Darfur

U.S. Assistance Addressed 

Range of Other Needs 

In addition to providing food aid, as of September 30, 2006, the United 

States had obligated approximately $315 million for other humanitarian 

assistance in a range of sectors, including shelter, water and sanitation, 

health care, and nutrition. This assistance was provided through USAID’s 

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Office of Transition Initiatives as 

Source: GAO.
Page 30 GAO-07-9 Darfur

well as State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration.33 The U.S. 

government has provided nonfood assistance to the affected residents of 

Darfur through 31 NGOs and 10 UN agencies, which implement programs 

and activities to aid the people of Darfur (see app. IV for a list of NGOs and 

UN agencies that received U.S. nonfood assistance funding for fiscal years 

2004 to 2006). Of this assistance, the largest amounts have been obligated 

for health care, water and sanitation, logistics, protection, and food 

security/agriculture (see fig. 10).34

33About $47 million of humanitarian aid was also provided to the International Committee of 

the Red Cross for all of Sudan, including Darfur, in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 by State’s 

Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. However, according to a State official, there 

is no way to accurately determine the funds provided solely to Darfur. This contribution is 

therefore not included in the total amount.

34Protection activities are intended to enhance the safety and basic rights of vulnerable 

persons affected by the conflict in Darfur, including protecting women from violence and 

rape outside of the camps. Logistics activities include humanitarian air transport and 

logistical support for humanitarian agencies and activities in Darfur. Food 

security/agriculture includes activities intended to increase food production and access to 

food, thereby reduce dependency on food aid, such as farming assistance and provision of 

seeds.
Page 31 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Figure 10: U.S. Nonfood Humanitarian Assistance to Darfur in Fiscal Years 2004-2006 by Sector

Note: “Other sectors” includes information management, rehabilitation, capacity building, 

monitoring/evaluation, staff salaries, stockpiles, travel, and disaster assistance programs.

Health. The United States obligated $57.4 million for the health sector, 

supporting activities such as medical clinics, immunizations, and maternal 

health care. We visited five NGO-operated health clinics in Darfur IDP 

camps. These clinics, which served between 110 to 1,200 IDPs per day, 

provided basic medical examinations, referring serious illnesses to 

Sudanese hospitals. The clinics also provided vaccinations, reproductive 

health services for pregnant women, and medical services for victims of 

gender-based violence (see fig. 11).

Source: GAO analysis of data from USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, and State’s

Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.

Humanitarian assistance sector

U.S. obligations (in millions)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Other sectors

Shelter

Transportation

Income generation

Administrative 

support

Relief supplies

Coordination

Nutrition

Food security/ 

ag

Lo

riculture

gistics

Protection

Water-sanitation

Health
Page 32 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Figure 11: Health Clinic in Al Salaam IDP Camp in North Darfur

Water and sanitation. The United States provided about $53.5 million for 

water and sanitation activities, which consisted of building and 

rehabilitating wells, installing hand pumps and latrines, and conducting 

hygiene programs. According to NGO officials, the Kalma camp water 

facilities we visited served approximately 45,000 IDPs and dispensed 

approximately 18 liters of chlorinated water per person per day (above the 

Sphere standard of 15 liters)35 to provide for IDPs’ personal needs and to 

allow them to water their animals. According to NGO officials, in Abu 

Shouk camp, a water tank and hand pumps provided 13.5 liters of water per 

person per day (see fig. 12).

35Sphere, launched in 1997 by a group of humanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross, developed 

standards to be attained in disaster assistance in five sectors, water supply and sanitation, 

nutrition, food aid, shelter, and health services. 

Source: GAO.
Page 33 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Figure 12: Water Pump in Abu Shouk IDP Camp in North Darfur

Protection and income-generation activities. The United States provided 

about $28.6 million for protection activities and $9.1 million for incomegeneration activities, which USAID and NGO officials indicated helped 

protect women and girls by minimizing their exposure to violence. We 

observed women building fuel-efficient stoves, which, by requiring less 

wood, are intended to reduce the frequency of women’s wood-collecting 

forays outside the camp and, thus, their vulnerability to attacks (see fig. 

13). We also observed IDPs preparing goods that could be sold—including 

making baskets and other goods, preparing fresh pasta, and sewing 

garments—to provide sources of income that would reduce their need to 

go outside the camps to earn money. Literacy and educational training was 

also provided to IDPs in camps in conjunction with income-generation and 

protection activities.

Source: GAO.
Page 34 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Figure 13: Income Generation and Protection Activities in Various IDP Camps

Source: GAO.
Page 35 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Provision of Assistance 

Grew and Health Indicators 

Improved, but Risk Remains

Since fiscal year 2004, when the United States and other international 

donors began providing humanitarian assistance, the numbers of 

humanitarian organizations and staff have grown, and the amount of 

humanitarian assistance and the coverage for IDPs and affected residents 

have increased. Also, since 2004, malnutrition and mortality rates among 

IDPs and affected residents have diminished. 

• Increased presence of humanitarian organizations. According to UN 

and NGO officials, U.S. assistance contributed to growth in the number 

of humanitarian organizations and staff in Darfur. UN humanitarian 

profiles show that from April 2004 to July 2006, the number of 

international and national humanitarian aid workers in Darfur expanded 

from 202 to about 13,500 staff of 84 NGOs and 13 UN agencies.36 NGO 

and UN officials in Darfur indicated that the U.S. contribution was 

essential to their operations, in some cases making up the totality of 

their budget, and that they would be unable to provide services inside 

and outside the camps without U.S. funding.

• Increase coverage for affected residents and IDPs. Each aid sector in 

Darfur provided humanitarian assistance to increasing numbers of 

affected residents or IDPs between April 2004 and July 2006 (see fig. 14). 

The total affected population receiving assistance such as food, water, 

and health care increased, although substantial numbers of affected 

persons did not receive assistance, especially in inaccessible areas, 

owing to continued security concerns. In addition, after August 2005, the 

percentage of the targeted population receiving such assistance began 

to decrease, according to the UN, as continued conflict and insecurity in 

Darfur limited access to, and distribution of, humanitarian aid. 

36UN humanitarian profiles, developed by the UN Office for the Coordination of 

Humanitarian Affairs, are intended to provide a comprehensive overview and analysis of the 

number and locations of the conflict affected population in Darfur, the humanitarian 

assistance provided, remaining gaps in assistance, humanitarian presence in the region, and 

sectoral issues. Information on IDPs and humanitarian assistance is provided monthly by 

NGOs and UN agencies implementing humanitarian assistance. 
Page 36 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Figure 14: Affected Population Compared with Recipients of Humanitarian Assistance, April 2004–July 2006

NGOs and UN agencies reported that assistance provided only to IDPs also 

expanded.37 For example, the number of IDPs receiving sanitation 

assistance increased more than sixtyfold, from about 21,000 IDPs in April 

2004 to more than 1.4 million IDPs in July 2006. 

Source: GAO analysis of UN humanitarian profiles.

2004 2005 2006

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

Secondary health care

Basic drug supplies

Primary health care

Clean water

Food

Affected population

Number of people (in millions)

Recipients

Month

April

January

Nov

December

ember

October

September

August

July

July

April

May

June

March

February

January

December

November

October

September

August

July

April

May

June

37According to UN officials and the UN profiles, because UN officials assume that most 

affected residents have access to sanitation at a level that does not require additional 

emergency assistance, the target populations for sanitation include only IDPs. However, the 

other aid sectors target all affected residents and IDPs.
Page 37 GAO-07-9 Darfur

• Reduced malnutrition and mortality rates. Since 2004, malnutrition 

rates recorded in Darfur have decreased significantly. A UN World Food 

Program survey in Darfur showed that malnutrition rates were 

significantly lower in 2005 than in 2004. In addition, although nutrition 

among IDPs in Darfur remains precarious, UN nutritional reports show 

improvement since 2004 and attribute the improvement partly to 

external assistance and large-scale food aid. According to UN 

Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessments, the prevalence of 

global acute malnutrition in Darfur was reported at 11.9 percent in 

March of 2006, a significant decrease from the 21.8 percent reported in 

October 2004.38

Furthermore, several mortality surveys have concluded that mortality 

rates in Darfur decreased from 2004 to 2005. For example, surveys 

conducted by the World Health Organization and Médecins Sans 

Frontières (also known as Doctors Without Borders) reported mortality 

rates ranging between 1.5 to 9.5 deaths per 10,000 people per day in 

2004. In September 2005, the UN World Food Program reported that the 

crude mortality rate in Darfur had dropped below the emergency 

threshold of 1 death per 10,000 persons per day, as defined by Sphere.39

Humanitarian assistance provided for Darfur by the United States and 

other international donors has been cited as contributing to improved 

mortality rates in Darfur. Experts and NGO, UN, and U.S. officials noted 

that other factors, such as reduced violence, can also contribute to a 

decrease in mortality rates.

Despite the efforts of the humanitarian organizations to increase the 

numbers of people receiving humanitarian assistance, as well as provide 

38According to the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster 

Response (Geneva: Switzerland, 2004), also known as the Sphere Handbook, Global Acute 

Malnutrition refers to wasting or the thinness of children between the ages of 6 to 59 

months.

39According to the Sphere Handbook, the daily crude mortality rate—that is, the rate of 

death for the entire population, including both sexes and all ages—is the most specific and 

useful health indicator to monitor in a disaster situation, when mortality may change 

significantly during a short time interval. The Sphere standards report that a doubling of the 

baseline crude mortality rate indicates a significant public health emergency requiring an 

immediate response; if the baseline rate is unknown, health agencies should aim to maintain 

the crude mortality rate at below 1.0 per 10,000 per day. The normal crude mortality rate in 

the United States is about 0.25 deaths per 10,000 per day. Typically, both the crude mortality 

rate and mortality rates for specific groups (such as those younger than 5 years or of a 

specific sex) are reported.
Page 38 GAO-07-9 Darfur

assistance to help reduce malnutrition and mortality rates, the situation in 

Darfur remains precarious. Continued insecurity restricts humanitarian 

organizations’ access to IDPs and affected residents of Darfur. In addition, 

NGO and UN officials indicated that mortality and malnutrition rates would 

likely rise above emergency levels if necessary funding were not continued.

Numerous Challenges 

Have Hampered U.S. 

Assistance Efforts and 

Oversight

Since the beginning of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, entities delivering 

U.S. humanitarian assistance to affected residents and IDPs have faced 

numerous challenges. Continued insecurity in the region has limited the 

ability of NGOs and UN agencies to access parts of Darfur and reach all 

affected residents and IDPs. In addition, the Sudanese government and 

rebel groups have placed restrictions and requirements on NGOs that have 

severely limited the NGO staffs’ ability to travel to and in Darfur and to 

provide services to affected residents and IDPs. Further, the late timing of 

U.S. funding in 2006 initially limited the operations of NGOs and UN 

agencies and threatened to force some reduction in services in Darfur. 

Meanwhile, the large size of Darfur and the large quantity of U.S. 

humanitarian assistance have challenged USAID’s ability to ensure 

accountability for the assistance provided. In addition, targeting of 

humanitarian assistance for IDPs is complicated by the difficulty of 

counting and managing the numbers of people who receive assistance and 

their use of the goods provided. 

Insecurity in Darfur Has 

Limited Mobility and Access 

of Humanitarian Staff

The frequent violence and continued conflict within all three Darfur states 

have negatively impacted the ability of NGOs and UN agencies to provide 

humanitarian assistance within Darfur. Attacks on, and harassment of, 

humanitarian staff, as well as banditry and theft of humanitarian convoys, 

have increased throughout Darfur since the beginning of the humanitarian 

response; and according to the UN, violence, sexual abuse, and 

displacement have dramatically increased since May 2006.

NGO, UN, and U.S. personnel have been injured, abducted, and killed in 

attacks against the humanitarian community, and humanitarian staff have 

regularly reported harassment from Sudanese government officials. 

According to UN and USAID reports, UN and NGO humanitarian staff were 

attacked and harassed with increasing frequency in 2005, and NGO staff 

members were attacked and abducted. In several instances, drivers and 

other humanitarian staff were abducted or killed during attacks on 

humanitarian aid convoys. USAID reported more than 200 incidents of 
Page 39 GAO-07-9 Darfur

harassment, arrest, or attack against UN, NGO, or AMIS personnel in 2005. 

USAID and the UN also reported that increasing violence had resulted in 

the deaths of nine humanitarian staff in July 2006—more than the number 

of staff killed in the past 2 years. Further, in August 2006, the UN reported 

that attacks against humanitarian staff were at a record high.

In addition, banditry and looting of NGO convoys occur with regularity, 

according to UN and USAID reports. USAID reported and some UN 

officials confirmed the theft of vehicles, cash, food, and other humanitarian 

aid. However, many NGO and UN officials told us that the banditry has 

mainly resulted in the theft of communications equipment and cash, rather 

than the humanitarian aid in the convoy. A World Food Program official 

estimated that less than 1 percent of total food aid in Darfur was lost to 

banditry, but that the incidents typically resulted in the theft of petty cash, 

fuel, or the trucks carrying the World Food Program supplies. 

Furthermore, humanitarian access to affected residents and IDPs has been 

curtailed as a result of continued conflict, especially in rural areas. USAID, 

NGO, and UN officials in Darfur stated that the lack of security has forced 

humanitarian organizations to limit access to insecure areas. For example, 

in response to continued attacks and insecurity in West Darfur, in January 

2006, the UN Department of Security and Safety announced the withdrawal 

of UN staff from most of West Darfur for 2 months, and USAID also 

removed its staff from West Darfur. (Although UN access was restricted, 

some NGOs did not evacuate the area and were able to continue 

operations.) According to USAID, the situation dramatically curtailed the 

ability of organizations to access the affected residents and IDP population 

in the area and to implement life-saving programs in West Darfur. 

Additionally, the UN reported that, as a result of significant insecurity in 

North Darfur, approximately 460,000 Darfurians were cut off from 

emergency food aid in July 2006, and in August 2006, 355,000 Darfurians 

remained blocked from receiving food aid. According to the UN, as of 

August 2006, humanitarian aid organizations’ access to IDPs and affected 

residents in Darfur was at its lowest levels since 2003, and areas of 

inaccessibility were expanding. Meanwhile, an estimated 50,000 people 

were displaced between June and August 2006. 
Page 40 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Sudan Government and 

Rebel Groups Have 

Restricted NGO and UN 

Staff Movements

The government of Sudan and, to a lesser extent, the rebel groups have 

hindered the humanitarian community from accessing affected residents 

and IDPs in Darfur. According to UN and NGO officials and USAID, as well 

as UN reports, the government of Sudan has restricted access to Darfur for 

NGOs and UN agencies since the initial international humanitarian 

response by delaying or denying visas and travel permits. NGO officials 

noted that issuance of visas for staff is often delayed or denied without 

explanation. In addition, according to NGO officials, although the 

government of Sudan requires NGO officials to purchase travel permits for 

all travel within Darfur, government police and other authorities do not 

always accept the permits and often deny access to NGO staff. According 

to USAID officials, in September 2006, the government of Sudan restricted 

movement of U.S. government personnel to within 25 miles of the 

presidential palace in Khartoum, which has forced USAID to remove all 

personnel from Darfur. This travel ban remained in place as of October 20, 

2006. Rebel groups also place requirements on NGOs that delay 

transportation of humanitarian aid or services into rebel-controlled areas. 

For example, NGO and UN officials stated that they must contact 

numerous rebel leaders to safely transport humanitarian aid into a rebelcontrolled area. 

Sudanese government officials in Darfur deny NGO and UN officials 

allegations that the government restricts access and travel in Darfur and 

insist that the government attempts to help NGOs and UN agencies provide 

assistance to the people of Darfur. However, USAID, NGO and UN officials 

indicated that although the Sudanese government has an official policy of 

cooperation with humanitarian assistance in Darfur, the government’s 

actions have severely limited humanitarian assistance within the region.

Timing of 2006 U.S. Funding 

Impacted Humanitarian 

Operations in Darfur

Delayed provision of more than half of U.S. humanitarian aid for 2006 

limited NGO and UN agency partners’ ability to supply needed food 

assistance and negatively affected their ability to plan for nonfood 

assistance. The initial U.S. appropriation for fiscal year 2006 supplied 

approximately 44 percent of the total U.S. humanitarian aid funding for 

Darfur in fiscal year 2006. With the passage of the supplemental 

appropriation on June 15, 2006—9 months into the fiscal year—total U.S. 

food and nonfood assistance for 2006 reached the intended levels, 

including meeting at least half of the World Food Program’s appeal for 

Sudan. However, because NGOs and UN agencies in Darfur did not receive 
Page 41 GAO-07-9 Darfur

the funds until late in the fiscal year, they were forced to reduce food 

rations and temporarily interrupt some humanitarian aid services.

• Impact on food assistance. The provision of approximately 56 percent 

of 2006 U.S. food aid funding late in the fiscal year made it difficult for 

the UN World Food Program to distribute supplies throughout Darfur in 

a timely fashion. In particular, because of the 6-month lag between 

confirmation and distribution of donations, the delay made it difficult 

for the program to preposition food prior to the rainy season, according 

to a World Food Program official. Owing in part to this delay, the 

program announced in April 2006 that, beginning in May, it would 

reduce rations in Darfur to half the minimum daily requirement (from 

2,100 calories to as few as 1,050 calories per day) to extend limited food 

stocks. In response, the Sudanese government donated sorghum, and 

the President of the United States directed USAID to ship emergency 

food stockpiles to Darfur, raising the rations to 84 percent (1,770 

kilocalories) of the daily requirement for Darfurians receiving food aid. 

In June, the cereal component of the ration was fully restored. However, 

as of October 2006, the World Food Program continued to face gaps in 

food aid, and, according to program officials, it planned to maintain the 

84 percent ration through the end of the calendar year.

According to a World Food Program official in Khartoum, if the current 

level of funding had been available earlier in the year, the ration cuts 

could have been avoided entirely. A USAID official told us that, although 

the reduction in 2006 U.S. funding did not significantly decrease the 

food aid contribution for Darfur, the delay of $137 million (56 percent) 

of the 2006 U.S. food aid funding until late in the fiscal year negatively 

affected the food situation in Darfur earlier in the year. This outcome 

aligns with previous GAO findings that lack of sufficient, timely 

donations contributed to food aid shortfalls in other emergency 

situations.40

• Impact on nonfood assistance. The delay of U.S. nonfood humanitarian 

assistance, as well as a reduction in funding from other international 

donors, led NGO and UN officials to anticipate a negative impact on 

40See GAO, Foreign Assistance: Sustained Efforts Needed to Help Southern Africa Recover 

from Food Crisis, GAO-06-644 (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 25, 2003), and Foreign Assistance: 

Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan’s 

Stability, GAO-03-607 (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 30, 2003).
Page 42 GAO-07-9 Darfur

nonfood humanitarian operations in Darfur. In February 2006, these 

officials told us that the initial U.S. funding for the year had been less 

than planned for and needed to ensure continued levels of assistance to 

Darfur’s affected residents and IDPs. As a result of the funding delays, 

the NGO officials said, their organizations would be forced to make cuts 

in the services and programs they provided or to reduce their 

humanitarian aid staff in Darfur. For example, one NGO official 

indicated that the reduction in funding had forced the organization to 

downsize its health program and to transfer responsibility for the clinics 

to the Sudanese government. Several NGO and UN officials also 

indicated that without additional funds, key indicators such as the 

malnutrition and mortality rates, which had improved in 2005, would 

likely rise again above emergency levels. USAID officials told us in 

October 2006 that after receiving the supplemental funding, USAID’s 

partners had been able to restore humanitarian programs in Darfur to 

their previous levels and coverage.

Oversight of Assistance Was 

Limited by Reduced Staff 

and Incomplete Reporting

USAID’s ability to provide oversight and measure the impact of U.S. 

humanitarian assistance in Darfur has been limited by reductions in its staff 

who could directly monitor U.S. assistance or ensure that implementing 

partners fulfilled reporting requirements. 

From April 2004 to July 2006, as NGO and UN humanitarian staff in Darfur 

significantly increased—from 202 to 13,500—USAID’s staff in Darfur 

decreased. During the first 2 years of the conflict, USAID staff ranged 

between 10 and 20 personnel; within the last 9 months, that number has 

been reduced to 6 to 8 USAID personnel. USAID officials believe that the 

remaining number of USAID personnel is adequate to oversee the 

implementation of U.S. humanitarian assistance and USAID grant 

agreements, among other responsibilities.41 USAID officials indicated that 

other, external factors, such as UN and U.S. Embassy security requirements 

and restrictions imposed by the government of Sudan, limit the number of 

staff in Darfur. In addition, USAID officials indicated that they visited 

camps and communicated with NGO and UN agency officials regularly to 

discuss operations and difficulties and to assist in delivering humanitarian 

41USAID routinely draws on technical, security, and communication specialists to supports 

its efforts in Darfur to conduct assessments on humanitarian assistance. USAID has 

deployed staff to conduct food assessments and for missions covering administrative, safety 

and security, and disease prevention tasks.
Page 43 GAO-07-9 Darfur

assistance. However, USAID officials told us that owing to limited time and 

staff in Darfur, security restrictions throughout the region, the size of 

Darfur, and the scale of U.S. assistance provided, they could not monitor 

compliance with all of the grant agreement indicators at locations in Darfur 

that were targeted for assistance. 

Furthermore, required NGO reporting has been incomplete. As a result, 

USAID lacks information to evaluate NGO operations, monitor their 

performance, and measure the impact of the assistance provided.42

According to USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 

Guidelines for Proposals and Reporting, NGOs must submit proposals 

outlining the indicators and outcomes expected from the humanitarian 

activities and services provided for with U.S. funds. Each grant agreement 

also specifies that 90 days after the agreement’s expiration, the NGO must 

submit a final report that includes the cumulative achievements and a 

comparison of actual accomplishments against the goals, objectives, 

indicators, and targets established for the agreement. Examples of 

indicators used by NGOs in proposals include, for example, the crude 

mortality rate in the target population or the number of latrines 

constructed. However, we found that 6 of 15 final reports that NGOs were 

required to submit by June 1, 2006, had not been submitted to USAID. 

Moreover, most of the reports that NGOs submitted did not include all 

required information. 

USAID’s Darfur Program Manager stated that because officials maintain 

constant communication with NGOs and conduct evaluations of activities 

in Darfur, the agency is aware of implementing partners’ accomplishments, 

or lack thereof, in Darfur, despite the incompleteness of most NGO reports. 

However, the reports and indicators are essential in monitoring and 

evaluating humanitarian operations, given that USAID staff are often 

constrained by limited access due to insecurity and violence throughout 

Darfur. In response to our observations USAID acknowledged the 

importance of obtaining required reports and has taken efforts to ensure 

reporting compliance from its NGO partners. As a result, USAID reported 

that in July 2006 it received all quarterly reports from current NGO 

partners.

42According to USAID, the UN is not subject to reporting requirements, thus the 

requirements apply only to a small portion of the total U.S. assistance to Darfur.
Page 44 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Difficulties Existed in 

Ensuring that U.S. 

Assistance Was Used as 

Intended

Challenges in accurately counting the populations of IDP camps have made 

it difficult for NGOs and UN agencies to ensure that all U.S. humanitarian 

assistance was provided to the intended recipients. In addition, some IDPs 

used humanitarian assistance for purposes other than those for which it 

was intended.

• In part because the IDP camps’ large size makes it difficult to control 

who receives assistance, some assistance has been distributed to 

recipients other than those targeted. For example, UN humanitarian 

profiles show that between December 2004 and October 2005, IDPs in 

Kalma camp, the largest camp in Darfur, were estimated at between 

103,000 and 163,000. The World Food Program distributed food aid for 

IDPs based on these estimates. Prior to October 2005, several efforts to 

count the actual number of IDPs in Kalma camp were determined to be 

invalid because of problems with the counts and an inability to stop nonIDPs from participating. An October 2005 count was completed by more 

than 400 staff from six NGOs, with help from USAID staff, and with 

assistance from Sudanese government troops—who surrounded the 

camp to stop non-IDPs from entering—and AMIS civilian police, who 

provided security inside the camp. On October 4, 2005, a count of 87,000 

was declared accurate, approximately 70,000 IDPs less than the 

previous estimate. According to a USAID official, residents from the 

nearby state capital of Nyala had previously received improper food 

distributions at the camp. According to USAID, without accurate counts 

of camp populations, the humanitarian community struggles to 

distribute food aid appropriately to the populations with the greatest 

need.

• Not all resources and assistance are being used as intended, although 

USAID and NGO officials indicated that this is typical of any emergency 

situation, especially one of this size and duration. For example, in Abu 

Shouk camp, we observed IDPs using treated drinking water to make 

bricks, either for their own shelters or for sale on the market. According 

to a UN official, IDPs in the camp used approximately 30 percent of 

available water in the camp to make bricks and, as a result, 8 of the 30 

water pumps in Abu Shouk dried up.
Page 45 GAO-07-9 Darfur

African Union Has 

Taken Actions to Meet 

Mandate, but Some 

Actions Have Been 

Incomplete or 

Inconsistent

Although the African Union’s peace support operation has reportedly 

contributed to a reduction of large-scale violence in Darfur, AMIS’s actions 

to fulfill its mandate in Darfur have been taken in an incomplete or 

inconsistent manner. To monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreement, 

the first component of its mandate, AMIS military observers in Darfur have 

actively investigated alleged cease-fire agreement violations. However, the 

resulting reports have not been reviewed according to established 

procedure or widely publicized to identify parties who have violated the 

agreement. To build confidence and to improve security, the second and 

third components of its mandate, AMIS troops have taken actions such as 

conducting patrols and escorting IDP women who leave camps to forage 

for firewood. In addition, AMIS troops have intervened to stop impending 

violence against civilians and provided escorts for NGO convoys in some 

instances, although AMIS has not intervened in other instances. Further, 

the AMIS civilian police are working with Sudanese police to improve law 

enforcement, but the civilian police have encountered difficulties with the 

Sudanese authorities. To support AMIS’s efforts to meet its mandate, the 

U.S. government provided about $280 million from June 2004 through 

September 2006, according to State, primarily to build and maintain the 32 

camps that house AMIS forces throughout Darfur.

AMIS Is Seen as Having 

Made Important 

Contribution

AMIS is viewed by many as having made an important contribution in 

Darfur. U.S. and other officials cite AMIS as responsible for decreasing 

large-scale violence simply by the deterrent effect of its presence in the 

region. State officials have emphasized that AMIS participants have a 

strong desire to be effective and make the AMIS initiative work and that the 

presence of AMIS’s patrols has had a positive impact. Further, a senior UN 

official told us that AMIS “jumped into Darfur” with few resources in a 

genuine attempt to “put out this fire” and that AMIS’s presence has had a 

notable impact. Further, State and UN officials noted that AMIS forces 

were deployed to Darfur quickly in comparison with other international 

peacekeeping missions.
Page 46 GAO-07-9 Darfur

AMIS Has Taken Actions to 

Meet Mandate, but Some 

Actions Have Been 

Incomplete or Inconsistent

AMIS has taken a number of positive actions in Darfur in response to its 

mandate to (1) monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreement, (2) 

assist in confidence building, and (3) contribute to improving security.43

However, some of these actions have been executed in an incomplete or 

inconsistent manner, limiting the extent to which AMIS has been able to 

fulfill its mandate.

AMIS Has Monitored Cease-fire 

Compliance, but Monitoring Has 

Been Incomplete 

To address the first component of its mandate, AMIS military observers in 

Darfur investigated and identified a number of violations of the 2004 ceasefire agreement. However, the Joint Commission has not consistently 

reviewed the resulting Ceasefire Commission investigation reports. 

Further, the publicly available record of recent cease-fire violation 

investigations is incomplete, making it impossible to establish how many 

total cease-fire violations have been identified by the Ceasefire 

Commission since its creation in 2004 and which parties have been 

responsible for recent cease-fire agreement violations. 

Ceasefire Commission reports provide specific information regarding 

violations.44 The commission found that all three parties to the conflict had 

committed violations, many of which occurred in South Darfur. Of the 80 

allegations of cease-fire agreement violations that we reviewed,45 the 

Ceasefire Commission was unable to make a determination in 30 instances, 

often because an outside party (such as the Janjaweed) had allegedly 

committed the violation. These cases involved acts such as the killing of 

numerous civilians at a time and attacks on villages. In several cases, the 

Sudanese government was accused of fighting alongside the Janjaweed. In 

three of the cases we reviewed, the Ceasefire Commission determined that 

43Our assessment does not include the changes made to AMIS responsibilities and activities 

included in the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. For example, in June 2006, a Darfur 

Ceasefire Commission was inaugurated to implement and monitor the cease-fire provisions 

of the peace agreement and other previous agreements between the Sudanese parties. We 

are not reviewing the activities of this newly created body.

44These reports, covering allegations received between July 2004 and September 2005, were 

available on the African Union Web site (http://www.africa-union.org/DARFUR/CFC.htm) as 

of June 2006. According to a State official, this Web site is the only public source of the 

reports.

45We were able to open 79 reports on the African Union Web site that contained 88 claims of 

possible cease-fire violations. Eight of these reports were incomplete with respect to 

determinations, leaving 80 claims for us to assess. 
Page 47 GAO-07-9 Darfur

no violation had occurred. For the remaining 47 allegations of cease-fire 

agreement violations, the Ceasefire Commission found 54 violations.46

• Sudanese government. The commission found that the Sudanese 

government had committed 27 cease-fire agreement violations. Among 

these violations, 9 involved civilian deaths; 10 involved village attacks; 7 

involved attacks, harassment, or intimidation of civilians; and 7 involved 

Sudanese troop movements into new territory without proper 

notification to the Ceasefire Commission.

• SLM/A. The commission found that the SLM/A had committed 25 ceasefire agreement violations. Among these violations, six involved attacks 

on Sudanese facilities (e.g., military camps, police stations, convoys); 

seven involved abductions of civilians, local political representatives, or 

Sudanese government personnel; two involved village attacks; and two 

involved civilian deaths.

• JEM. The commission found that the JEM had committed two cease-fire 

agreement violations, both of which involved attacks on Sudanese 

facilities. 

The Ceasefire Commission’s recommendations in the reports vary from 

general to specific. General recommendations include urging the parties to 

the conflict to adhere to the cease-fire agreement; reminding them that they 

are required to give the commission prior notice of any administrative 

troop movements; and requesting party leaders to educate their members 

about the provisions of the agreement. More specific recommendations 

include those recommending that the Sudanese government disarm, 

neutralize, or restrain the Janjaweed and that SLM/A stop looting, or return 

looted goods, and release those whom it had abducted. In reports issued 

after November 2004, the Ceasefire Commission frequently appealed to the 

Joint Commission to become more involved in various aspects of the 

monitoring process.

However, although the reports provide detailed information regarding 

parties that violated the cease-fire agreement and the nature of the 

violations, African Union and U.S. officials told us that the Joint 

Commission had not met regularly, had been ineffective in reviewing 

46In seven cases, the Ceasefire Commission determined that two parties were in violation of 

the 2004 agreement. 
Page 48 GAO-07-9 Darfur

reports, and had no means of forcing the violating parties to take action 

based on report results. Further, although the Joint Commission has 

condemned cease-fire violations by the parties to the conflict and asked all 

parties to end all attacks, a DOD official noted that officials at African 

Union headquarters were not pushing the Joint Commission to review or 

approve Ceasefire Commission reports. 

African Union and U.S. officials emphasized that because the reports are 

available on the African Union’s Web site and publicly identify violators of 

the cease-fire agreement, the reports pressure the parties to the conflict to 

improve compliance with the agreement. The officials viewed this 

transparency and resulting pressure as a central benefit of the reports. 

However, we found that the public record of investigated cease-fire 

violations is incomplete, making it impossible to establish the total number 

of alleged or confirmed violations and to identify all responsible parties. 

For example, we were unable to open 37 of the 116 Ceasefire Commission 

reports listed as available on the African Union’s Web site. Further, we were 

unable to locate any reports subsequent to September 2005 to validate 

other claims regarding violations. For example, no Ceasefire Commission 

reports are publicly available to substantiate or refute a January 2006 

report, which was prepared by the Chairperson of the African Union 

Commission and submitted to the Peace and Security Council, stating that 

cease-fire violations had escalated since October 2005 and that some of the 

most serious violations had occurred since that time.47

Confidence-Building and 

Security-Improvement Efforts 

Have Been Sporadic

To fulfill the second and third components of the mandate, AMIS forces 

have provided patrols and escorts for IDPs, NGOs, and U.S. contractor 

staff; intervened to prevent violence; and collaborated with Sudanese 

government police. However, in some instances, AMIS patrols and escorts 

have not been able to prevent attacks or to provide needed services; AMIS 

forces have not intervened consistently to prevent violence; and AMIS 

civilian police have had difficult relations with the Sudanese police.

47According to a DOD official, the African Union will only release Ceasefire Commission 

reports that have been approved by the Joint Commission. The inactivity of the Joint 

Commission over the past several months is a likely explanation for the lack of available 

reports subsequent to September 2005.
Page 49 GAO-07-9 Darfur

AMIS Has Provided Patrols and Escorts but Has Not Prevented All 

Attacks or Provided All Needed Protection

To build confidence among affected residents and IDPs and create a more 

secure environment, AMIS troops have taken actions such as conducting 

patrols and providing escorts for vulnerable groups. However, AMIS 

escorts and the escorted groups have sometimes encountered violent 

attacks, and AMIS has had insufficient resources to provide all needed 

escort services.

• Patrols. AMIS officials at several AMIS camps we visited told us that 

AMIS military observers or civilian police try to conduct about two 

patrols each day, for example, to make AMIS’s presence known and to 

interact positively with local communities, collect information, or 

investigate an alleged cease-fire agreement violation. We accompanied 

one confidence-building patrol near the North Darfur town of 

Kabkabiya; AMIS military observers interviewed local residents and a 

community leader to identify any problems that required AMIS 

attention. (See fig. 15.)
Page 50 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Figure 15: AMIS Confidence-Building Patrol Near Kabkabiya in North Darfur

• Escorts. To further build confidence and improve security, AMIS troops 

have also provided escorts for groups of women foraging for firewood 

outside IDP camps. According to African Union and U.S. officials, the 

presence of AMIS troops has prevented these groups from being 

attacked. We accompanied an AMIS escort of a group of women as they 

walked more than 9 miles outside the town of Kass in South Darfur to 

find firewood for the next several days. Escorted by AMIS protection 

force troops and civilian police, as well as Sudanese government police, 

the 79 women went about their activities freely and without incident 

(see fig. 16). AMIS officials also told us that they have escorted NGO 

convoys to prevent theft and banditry. 

Source: GAO.
Page 51 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Figure 16: AMIS Firewood Patrol Near Kass in South Darfur

Source: GAO.
Page 52 GAO-07-9 Darfur

However, in several instances, AMIS troops or those being escorted have 

been threatened or killed. For example, several people were killed in rebel 

attacks on convoys, including four Nigerian soldiers and two local 

contractor staff in October 2005.48 In July 2006, 32 AMIS soldiers escorting 

a fuel convoy in North Darfur were abducted by one SLM/A faction; 

although the soldiers were eventually released, two fuel tanker drivers, the 

fuel tankers, and four AMIS vehicles were not released at that time. 

According to a senior U.S. contracting official working in Darfur, the 

drivers and tankers were released in October 2006, and the vehicles have 

not been returned. According to a December 2005 African Union-led 

assessment of AMIS (with participation from the UN, European Union, and 

United States), such incidents “undermine the Mission’s credibility in the 

eyes of civilians and embolden those who may target AMIS.”49 Further, a 

UN official emphasized that AMIS’s ability to provide services such as 

firewood escorts is limited and that AMIS cannot begin to cover all 

instances where such escorts would be useful. 

AMIS Has Intervened to Prevent Violence in Some Cases but Not in 

Others

AMIS troops have also intervened to protect civilians under imminent 

threat of violence, as directed by the African Union mandate. For example, 

according to the December 2005 assessment of AMIS, AMIS troops were 

deployed to Zalingei in West Darfur to prevent retaliation against IDPs 

when there was heightened tension following the kidnapping of civilians by 

the SLM/A. Another AMIS deployment to Muhajariya halted a Sudanese 

military advance on the town that could have resulted in the substantial 

displacement of IDPs. In addition, following attacks on the town of Labado 

in South Darfur in late 2004, a deployment of AMIS troops in January 2005 

deterred further attacks and led to the return of many town residents, who 

began to repair their homes and rebuild their lives.50

48In addition, a Senegalese soldier was killed and 10 other AMIS troops were injured in 

January 2006.

49[African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10–20 December 2005, p. 3. 

50William G. O’Neill and Violette Cassis, “Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced: The 

Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in Darfur,” Occasional Paper, The 

Brookings Institution–University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, November 2005 

(available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/news/200511_au_darfur.htm).
Page 53 GAO-07-9 Darfur

However, in other instances, AMIS has not intervened to prevent violence. 

For example, according to UN and U.S. documentation, AMIS did not 

maintain a regular presence around Mershing and its surroundings in South 

Darfur despite concerns about security in the area and repeated requests 

from the international community for a continuous AMIS presence. 

Ultimately, armed militia attacks resulted in the death of several IDPs and 

subsequent displacement in early 2006.51 In addition, an NGO official told 

us that AMIS was slow in responding to requests for assistance from NGOs 

caught in a battle between SLM/A and Sudanese government forces in the 

Jebel Marra area; however, AMIS did help evacuate NGO staff from the area 

24 hours after the conflict began. According to an AMIS commander, 

although AMIS has taken preemptive action to stop attacks or skirmishes, 

the territory is too large for AMIS to be able prevent such violence overall.

AMIS Has Collaborated with Sudanese Police, but Relations Have 

Been Difficult 

AMIS has worked with the Sudanese police to improve security,52 but some 

of its relations with the Sudanese police have been problematic. AMIS 

civilian police officers reported to us that they were working to ensure that 

the Sudanese police are acting on cases provided by the AMIS civilian 

police.53 AMIS civilian police also noted that, where appropriate, they have 

encouraged the use of village councils to resolve disputes, rather than 

referring every case to the Sudanese authorities.

However, some AMIS civilian police officers reported that relations with 

the Sudanese police had at times been difficult. AMIS civilian police 

officers told us that Sudanese police had been slow to act on cases 

provided by AMIS, that these cases often do not result in convictions or 

adequate punishment, and that it can be difficult to obtain information 

51AMIS reportedly increased the frequency of its patrols, and the civilian police established a 

base in Mershing subsequent to this event.

52AMIS civilian police are deployed in Darfur to build confidence and monitor the activities 

of Sudanese police, who are ultimately responsible for ensuring that Darfur citizens are 

adequately protected. AMIS civilian police have no authority for direct involvement with 

Sudanese police matters.

53AMIS police provide an avenue for civilians—many of whom distrust the Sudanese 

police—to report crimes. In particular, women can report cases of rape and violence, many 

of which would not be reported without the presence of the civilian police and its female 

officers. AMIS police refer these cases to the Sudanese police.
Page 54 GAO-07-9 Darfur

from the Sudanese police regarding the status of referred cases. In 

addition, AMIS civilian police mentioned that Sudanese police have at 

times perpetrated violent acts against citizens of Darfur and AMIS police. 

Moreover, the civilian police have had difficulty gaining access to some 

areas that are controlled by rebel groups and lack an official Sudanese 

police presence.

Further, the limited and misunderstood role of AMIS’s civilian police 

frustrated IDPs and NGO staff, who expressed the view that these police 

provided limited useful services. IDPs and NGOs told us that they did not 

understand why civilian police did not get involved when problems arose. 

Their frustration was heightened by the fact that civilian police have visible 

stations adjacent to IDP camps.54 AMIS and UN officials also noted that 

because the civilian police are unarmed, they require AMIS protection 

force escorts, which are not always available. 

U.S. and Other External 

Donors Have Supported 

African Union’s Efforts to 

Fulfill Its Mandate

The United States has supported AMIS primarily by funding the 

construction and maintenance of AMIS camps in Darfur by a contractor, 

PAE Government Services, Inc. (PAE). Other international donors have 

provided funding or goods and services to support AMIS’s peacekeeping 

operations.55

U.S. Government Has Funded 

AMIS Camps

To support AMIS’s efforts to carry out its mandate, the U.S. government 

expended about $240 million from June 2004 to August 2006 and obligated 

another $40 million in September of 2006, primarily to build and maintain 

the 32 camps that house AMIS forces throughout Darfur, according to a 

State official who tracks this funding.56 African Union and U.S. officials told 

us that camp sites were chosen to be near population centers and known 

conflict areas. State contracted with PAE to build and maintain the camps 

54Currently, 26 such stations exist, and another 39 stations to be built by the Norwegian 

government, are planned.

55We were unable to locate a comprehensive list of all donor assistance that has been 

provided for AMIS. According to a U.S. Embassy official in Addis Ababa, the donor 

community meets weekly to discuss AMIS resource needs, with this effort coordinated by 

the European Union.

56Of the total of $240 million expended, over 20 percent ($50 million) was provided via 

emergency supplemental legislation. According to a State official, the Fiscal Year 2006 

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and 

Hurricane Recovery provides about $173 million for AMIS-related activities.
Page 55 GAO-07-9 Darfur

as well as to maintain AMIS vehicles and communication equipment (see 

fig. 17).57 PAE is also maintaining armored personnel carriers provided by 

Canada; the Canadian government has provided State with more than $20 

million for fiscal year 2006 for this purpose. Finally, PAE is responsible for 

hiring, housing, and compensating U.S. military observers (referred to by 

State officials in Darfur as “U.S. representatives” owing to their range of 

contributions to AMIS beyond observing activities).58 Although 16 U.S. 

military observers are authorized, only 11 were on the ground in Darfur 

during our February 2006 visit.59

57According to a senior PAE official, PAE’s contract provides time and materials for labor, 

and cost plus reimbursable for materials and equipment and other direct costs. Another U.S. 

company, DynCorp, won bids to provide troop equipment and strategic transport for U.S. 

efforts to build AMIS camps. According to a State official, DynCorp has received 

approximately $23.5 million of the total funding that has gone to support AMIS.

58For example, one U.S. military observer told us that, in addition to being an observer, he 

provides advice on operational issues to AMIS commanders and their staffs, with a goal 

toward building capacity. He also provides training to AMIS leaders who in turn pass on this 

training to lower levels. Further, he works as a coordinator to facilitate collaboration 

between AMIS components, local agencies, PAE, parties to the conflict, and NGOs.

59According to a State official, the number of U.S. military observers in Darfur has ranged 

from about 4 to 16 at various times during the past 2 years.
Page 56 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Figure 17: AMIS Camps

Sources: GAO (photo), PAE (photos), and MapInfo (map).

South

Darfur

West

Darfur

North

Darfur

Sortoni

Kabkabiya

Shangil Tobaya

Tawila

Kutum

Khor Abeche

Zam Zam

El Fasher Sarif

Umra El Geneina

Kulbus

Misteria Mournei

Mukjar

Nyala

Zalinje

For A Buria

Kass

Marla

Labado

Sheiria

Muhajeria

Askanita

Graida

El Daein

Millit

Tine Malha

Nertiti

Umm Barro 

Um Kadada

Nyala

Forward Operating Base 

and Transient/Overflow

Shangil Tobaya Camp

Nyala Camp

Um Kadada Camp
Page 57 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Construction of the 32 camps, between June 2004 and December 2005, 

involved a number of challenges. According to a senior PAE official in 

Darfur, key costs associated with building the camps included supplying 

generators and, particularly as construction was beginning, transporting 

supplies and equipment via aircraft. Construction of the camps, which 

together can house 9,300 people,60 was complicated by the difficulty of 

finding international staff willing to come to Darfur and local staff 

possessing adequate skills. In addition, the remote locations of camp sites, 

combined with the inadequate condition of roads throughout the region, 

made it difficult to transport building supplies to the sites; PAE officials 

told us that in some cases, supplies were transported across insecure areas 

via donkeys. Further, the various augmentations of AMIS over time 

(including the introduction of the civilian police component) had to be 

incorporated into preexisting building plans. Moreover, the relatively small 

size of some of the land parcels provided by the government of Sudan made 

it difficult for PAE to, for example, construct sufficient perimeter 

protection around camps. Other sites provided by the government are in 

vulnerable locations; for instance, PAE officials identified one camp that 

was built in a natural “bowl,” making protection problematic, although 

steps were recently taken to relocate portions of this camp.

According to PAE and State officials, PAE’s current costs for maintaining 

the camps, as well as AMIS communications equipment and vehicles, are 

about $7.8 million per month.61 PAE faces additional challenges in 

maintaining AMIS facilities, with the provision of water a key difficulty. 

According to a PAE situation report dated May 5, 2006, there are significant 

concerns regarding the provision of an uninterrupted supply of water to 

60PAE also maintains a forward operating base in Nyala that can house 300 transient and 330 

overflow AMIS personnel. In addition, the AMIS camp in Zam Zam can house 400 transient 

AMIS personnel.

61The Department of State’s Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative in Darfur is the 

principal U.S. government official responsible for oversight of PAE’s activities in Darfur. 

State Department officials told us that it can be difficult to determine whether PAE’s costs 

are appropriate and reasonable. One State official noted that PAE’s costs on a “per soldier” 

basis (which he placed at approximately $30 per soldier per day) are similar to other 

initiatives to build camps for peacekeeping efforts. This official noted that State reviews 

weekly “situation reports” submitted by PAE and interacts frequently with PAE staff in 

Washington, D.C. State officials who have experience with past similar peace support 

efforts are also involved with the Darfur initiative and can provide insights based on their 

historical experience. Further, during our visit to Darfur, the Technical Representative told 

us that he reviewed PAE invoices over $15,000 and had imposed a freeze on increases in 

employment and vehicle numbers.
Page 58 GAO-07-9 Darfur

several AMIS camps.62 In some cases, unprotected water bore holes have 

been sabotaged. In the past, PAE also experienced the theft of jet fuel. A 

PAE official noted that other environmental challenges to maintaining the 

camps include heat, ultraviolet rays, and sand.

Other International Donors Have 

Provided Cash, Goods, and 

Services

The European Union, also a key AMIS donor, has provided about $200 

million as direct budget support for AMIS operational costs such as per 

diem63 and food, according to a State official. Many other donor 

contributions have been “in kind”—that is, goods and services rather than 

direct funding. For example, the Canadian government loaned AMIS 25 

helicopters and 105 armored personnel carriers; the British government 

provided vehicles and ground fuel; the Dutch government provided 

communications equipment; and the Norwegian government is building 

civilian police stations near IDP camps.64 Further, since October 2004, the 

UN has provided assistance to AMIS via a technical assistance cell working 

in Addis Ababa and funded by the UN Mission in Sudan. According to an 

official in the cell, it has provided services such as technical support 

(including an August 2005 UN-led exercise to prepare AMIS for troop 

deployments and identify areas where capacity building was required) and 

training (such as arranging training for military observers and bringing a 

financial officer to African Union headquarters for 3 months to assist with 

financial management). NATO has also provided training for AMIS 

personnel and has assisted with troop rotation efforts.65

62Differences in water usage between AMIS camps have been substantial. For example, 

according to PAE data for the last week of April 2006, water usage per person in Umm Barro 

camp was about 53 liters per day, while at Sarif Umra camp, water usage per person was 

about 237 liters per day. PAE has had difficulty convincing AMIS leaders to encourage AMIS 

personnel to use less water.

63According to a European Union official, military observers and civilian police receive $80 

per person per day, while protection force troops receive $25 per person per day (after $10 

is deducted for rations/food).

64According to contractor documents, AMIS has, for example, over 750 vehicles, 675 

Motorola handheld radios, and 100 Thuraya satellite telephones.

65According to a DOD official, DOD’s direct contributions to address the Darfur crisis have 

been limited to staff expertise, military observers, training and the provision of airlift to 

move troops in and out of Darfur. This official noted that U.S. military assistance has been 

funneled through NATO since July 2005. State officials emphasized in particular U.S. 

government efforts to train and equip Rwandan and Nigerian battalions through the African 

Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program.
Page 59 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Numerous Factors 

Have Complicated 

AMIS Efforts

Numerous factors have been identified by AMIS and U.S. government 

officials, among others, as contributing to AMIS’s difficulties in meeting its 

mandate. These factors include inadequacies in management, organization, 

and capacity; a relatively small force; resources that have been constrained 

or inefficiently allocated; and a lack of information regarding, and 

cooperation from, parties to the conflict.66 As AMIS has faced operational 

and other challenges, the UN has approved a UN peacekeeping operation in 

Darfur when AMIS’s mandate expires; however, as of October 2006, the 

Sudanese government had rejected the proposal. In June 2006, following a 

NATO offer, the African Union formally requested assistance from NATO 

in, among other things, identifying lessons learned from AMIS operations; 

however, according to a State official, African Union headquarters had 

taken no further action to pursue this review as of August 2006. Meanwhile, 

instability and violence have continued in Darfur.

Inadequacies in 

Management, Organization, 

and Capacity Have 

Hampered AMIS 

Deployment

AMIS has reportedly experienced numerous difficulties in its management, 

organization, and capacity that have limited its ability to carry out its 

mandate. 

Inadequate and Inconsistent 

Management 

Regarding AMIS management, U.S., UN, and other sources have commonly 

expressed the view that AMIS’s command and control has been inadequate 

and confused.67 A UN-led assessment of AMIS in August 2005 stated, “The 

66A detailed discussion of challenges that have faced UN peacekeeping missions, some of 

which are similar to what AMIS has experienced, can be found in the UN’s August 2000 

“Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” (available at 

http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations). This document was prepared by a 

panel convened by the UN Secretary-General to assess the UN’s ability to conduct peace 

operations effectively, and to offer recommendations for ways in which to enhance that 

capacity.

67“Command and control” generally refers to the exercise of authority and direction by a 

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a 

mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of 

personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a 

commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in 

the accomplishment of the mission. For a discussion of command and control in peace 

operations see GAO, United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to 

Restore Peace, GAO/NSIAD-97-34 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 1997).
Page 60 GAO-07-9 Darfur

evolution of the mission has been such that it has depended on individual 

components conducting their own planning rather than tackling problems 

from a mission perspective. This has led to considerable disparity between 

components, duplication of effort, and the potential for planning at cross 

purposes.”68 A State official emphasized that AMIS has had no clear lines of 

authority between Addis Ababa, El Fasher, and the field and that a lack of 

coordination has made a rapid response to crisis situations problematic. A 

Refugees International study reported that “AMIS has suffered from 

language and cultural barriers between officers from various countries, 

confusion in procedures, limited future planning, and ineffective 

communications systems. Much of this stems from lack of peacekeeping 

experience.”69 The Brookings Institution–University of Bern study also 

stated that AMIS command and control had been slow and cumbersome 

and that “[t]he unwieldy bureaucracy at African Union headquarters 

hampered all aspects of deployment; there is no institutional expertise for 

peace operations yet in the [African Union].”70

Moreover, AMIS leadership has demonstrated inconsistency in interpreting 

the AMIS mandate, creating confusion among AMIS troops and civilians 

and limiting its protection of civilians within its capabilities.71 AMIS 

leadership’s willingness to take certain actions to meet the mandate—for 

example, to protect civilians—has varied throughout Darfur, as already 

noted. State officials have observed that AMIS’s willingness to actively 

protect Darfur residents to the extent provided for in the mandate has been 

“uneven.” A U.S. official we met with in Sudan noted that in some cases, the 

68African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), MAPEX Exercise AMIS Renaissance After 

Action Review, August 2005, p. 3.

69Sally Chin and Jonathan Morgenstein, “No Power to Protect: The African Union Mission in 

Sudan,” Refugees International, November 2005 (available at 

http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/publication/detail/7222), p. 9.

70O’Neill and Cassis, “Protecting Two Million,” p. 50.

71AMIS has a responsibility to “protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat 

and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability” and does not have what is 

known as a “Chapter VII” mandate, which refers to Chapter VII of the UN charter entitled 

“Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” 

According to UN documentation, aware of the dangers of deploying peacekeepers in 

situations where there is no real peace to keep, the UN Security Council now provides, 

when it deems necessary, UN peacekeeping operations with more “robust” mandates based 

on Chapter VII. These mandates allow and in fact require peacekeepers to “use all necessary 

means” to protect civilians, prevent violence against UN staff and personnel and deter 

armed elements from ignoring peace agreements.
Page 61 GAO-07-9 Darfur

degree to which AMIS’s mandate was robustly interpreted seemed to 

depend on leadership personalities.72

Lack of Coordination According to the December 2005 African Union-led assessment of AMIS, 

“military and police mission components are not operating in a sufficiently 

joint and coordinated manner.”73 The Brookings Institution--University of 

Bern study noted a similar problem, stating that the civilian police “rely on 

the AMIS protection force for their movements, but they are not currently 

integrated into military planning structures.”74 Many parties, including U.S. 

and UN officials, have called for the creation of a joint operations center 

that would serve as the focal point for the coordination and integration of 

AMIS military and civilian police operations; however, such a unit has not 

yet been created. On the other hand, a joint logistics operations center has 

been established to improve the logistical coordination of the AMIS 

components.75

Limited Capacity African Union, U.S., and other sources have identified problems with the 

capacity and experience of African Union and AMIS as a key factor 

negatively affecting AMIS performance. According to the Brookings 

Institution–University of Bern study, “For many commanders, this African 

72Adding to the concern over AMIS’s actions is the belief among some organizations that 

AMIS should have a stronger mandate that allows for more active protection of civilians and 

IDPs, given, among other things, the Sudanese government’s apparently limited willingness 

to protect its own citizens. The International Crisis Group, the Brookings Institution, and 

Refugees International have called for a strengthened AMIS mandate. The December 2005 

African Union-led joint assessment proposes that AMIS’s current mandate is adequate but is 

not clearly understood by commanders at all levels. It further notes that a robust 

interpretation of the mandate is required to maintain force credibility and to provide the 

necessary degree of protection to civilians within capabilities. It states that mandate 

training at the commander level, as well as rules of engagement to ensure consistent 

interpretation, are needed. The study noted the importance of maximizing existing 

capabilities through a robust interpretation of the AMIS mandate when protection of 

civilians is at issue. U.S. officials stated that the AMIS mandate is sufficient but that, to 

maximize AMIS performance, improvements in command and control are needed.

73[African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10–20 December 2005, p. 8.

74O’Neill and Cassis, “Protecting Two Million,” p. 54.

75The creation of a joint logistics operations center is intended to improve resource 

management between the various AMIS components and reduce problems such as unequal 

resource allocation to the civilian police. However, the December 2005 African Union-led 

assessment of AMIS noted that “there is limited support for the concept from the military 

component of AMIS and the joint logistics operations center lacks sufficient authority to 

fulfill its role.”
Page 62 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Union mission is their first operational experience.”76 Troops are also 

viewed as having limited experience. For example, according to a Human 

Rights Watch report, “[African Union] troop–contributing countries have 

sometimes struggled to identify and deploy properly trained staff officers, 

particularly those with appropriate language skills.... Most troopcontributing countries have previously contributed to UN missions that 

were often western-led operations, thus leaving the [African Union] troops 

with limited operational experience above the tactical level.”77 An African 

Union official and a U.S. official noted separately that, although AMIS has 

training standards, little is done to verify that AMIS troops arriving in 

Darfur have received appropriate training. Further, according to the 

Brookings Institution–University of Bern study, the quality of AMIS police 

is not adequate, with limited screening prior to deployment to Darfur.78

Small Size of AMIS Force 

Has Limited Its Ability to 

Patrol and Protect

The AMIS force, with its 7,271 personnel, has been characterized as a 

relatively small contingent that cannot effectively monitor and patrol all of 

Darfur, an area almost the size of France with a punishing environment 

(however, some regions in Darfur, such as the far north, are largely 

unpopulated [see fig. 2]).79 According to State officials, the small size of the 

force has limited AMIS’s ability to patrol such a large, difficult region and 

sufficiently interact with residents and other parties in Darfur. Further, 

according to a Refugees International report, “AMIS doesn’t have enough 

troops to sufficiently protect itself, let alone protect displaced civilians and 

humanitarian organizations.”80 In addition, an International Crisis Group 

document stated in July 2005 that as many as 15,000 troops were needed in 

Darfur to protect villages and IDPs, provide security for humanitarian 

76O’Neill and Cassis, “Protecting Two Million,” pp. 50-51.

77Human Rights Watch, “Imperatives for Immediate Change, The African Union Mission in 

Sudan,” January 2006 (available at http://hrw.org/reports/2006/sudan0106), p. 41. 

78O’Neill and Cassis, “Protecting Two Million,” p. 31.

79A lack of troops to carry out mandates has been an issue with other peacekeeping efforts. 

See GAO, Issues in Implementing International Peace Operations, GAO-02-707R

(Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2002).

80Chin and Morgenstein, “No Power to Protect,” p. 7.
Page 63 GAO-07-9 Darfur

operations, and neutralize militias.81 The December 2005 African Union-Led 

Joint Assessment of AMIS reported that the absence of an authorized 

battalion had a significant operational impact and overstretched existing 

personnel.82

Constrained and 

Inefficiently Allocated 

Resources Have Restricted 

AMIS Operations

African Union and other parties have stated that AMIS does not have 

sufficient resources, including equipment and translators, to conduct the 

activities necessary to fulfill its mandate.83 A senior African Union official 

told us that AMIS’s reliance on outside donors has resulted in a lack of 

control for the mission because basic operational elements, such as 

facilities, logistics, and funding rest in the hands of other parties. According 

to January 2006 African Union documentation, the African Union has not 

been able to provide critical resources, such as vehicles and 

communications equipment, in a timely fashion; as a result, AMIS has 

functioned with about half of the needed logistical capacity. U.S. officials 

have countered that the African Union has at times been slow to respond to 

offers of assistance or to prioritize resource needs. During some periods, 

donor support for AMIS has been less than what the African Union had 

expected, with African Union documentation stating that a lack of funds 

has been a major constraint. 

According to African Union officials, a lack of resources such as vehicles 

and long-range communications equipment has complicated AMIS 

operations. For example, one AMIS commander told us that AMIS has 

inadequate transportation equipment84 and communications equipment, as 

well as a lack of night vision equipment. AMIS officials whom we 

interviewed expressed their concern that the lack of adequate 

communications equipment limited their ability to interact with different 

81International Crisis Group, “The [African Union]’s Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps,” 

Africa Briefing No. 28, July 2005 (available at 

http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3547), p. 1. 

82[African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10–20 December 2005, p. 10.

83Sufficiency of resources has been a long-standing concern for peacekeeping efforts. For 

example, see GAO, “UN Peacekeeping: Issues Related to Effectiveness, Cost, and Reform,”

GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 1997).

84This official emphasized the importance of 105 armored personnel carriers recently 

provided by Canada. One AMIS official emphasized to us that virtually all ground vehicles 

are useless in Darfur during the rainy season, which runs from June through September.
Page 64 GAO-07-9 Darfur

camps in the region. Further, an AMIS civilian police official noted that the 

civilian police often receive less equipment than the military component of 

AMIS, which has resulted in situations such as the need to rely on military 

colleagues’ equipment to communicate with their civilian police 

colleagues. One AMIS commander also noted that AMIS required more 

printers, computers, and photocopiers. However, a DOD official noted that 

until AMIS makes the most efficient use of its current resources, such as 

vehicles and communications equipment, it is unclear whether more 

resources are needed.85 Further, the December 2005 African Union–led 

report on AMIS notes that, where civilian police matters are concerned, 

equipment is both insufficient and incorrectly distributed.86

A lack of translators who can facilitate discussions between AMIS and the 

residents of Darfur has also been repeatedly cited as a central problem 

hindering AMIS’s ability to monitor compliance with the cease-fire 

agreement or build confidence. According to an official from the African 

Union’s Darfur Integrated Task Force, AMIS needs about 200 interpreters; 

however, as of February 2006, AMIS had only about 70 interpreters. The 

lack of interpreters has been attributed to the difficulty in finding people 

who speak both Arabic and English. One U.S. military observer told us that 

many uneducated people in Darfur speak only their tribal language, further 

complicating AMIS’s ability to ensure effective communication. In addition, 

we were told that at times, AMIS patrols used representatives of the parties 

to the conflict as translators, which meant that AMIS officials could not 

verify that translators were conducting the interview in an objective 

fashion, asking the required questions, or reporting responses accurately. 

In one example provided by an AMIS civilian police official in El Daein in 

South Darfur, an SLM/A translator stated that a woman had said she was 

“helped” in a particular instance, when in fact she had stated that she had 

been violently attacked. Someone within the investigative team was able to 

discern that this mistake had been made and communicate it to the rest of 

the team. IDPs also voiced frustration over the lack of civilian police 

translators able to communicate with IDPs and respond to IDPs reporting 

violence in the camps.

85According to this official, when AMIS received a donation of 100 Thuraya satellite 

telephones, the majority of them were kept at AMIS headquarters in El Fasher for AMIS 

leadership, instead of being distributed to the field where the telephones were most needed. 

86[African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10–20 December 2005, p. 13.
Page 65 GAO-07-9 Darfur

AMIS Has Had Limited 

Information on, and 

Cooperation from, Parties to 

the Conflict

Several analyses of AMIS have commented on its lack of capacity to collect 

needed intelligence regarding the situation in Darfur. The International 

Crisis Group has noted that “AMIS does not have an intelligence apparatus 

or collection capacity and does not actively analyze or disseminate 

intelligence.” The Brookings Institution–University of Bern study further 

stressed that “[g]ood intelligence is vital in Darfur, yet AMIS’s capacity to 

gather, analyze and act on information has been very weak.”87 According to 

a former U.S. military observer to AMIS, “The African Union does not 

understand the importance of having an ‘intelligence cell’ and of having 

good information on the command structure, for example, of the 

Janjaweed.” The December 2005 African Union-led assessment of AMIS 

emphasized, “If AMIS operations are to be effective, the use of intelligence 

is essential,” and further noted that the lack of intelligence collection, 

analysis, and dissemination seriously reduces the effectiveness and focus 

of operations.88

The December 2005 African Union-led assessment also noted:

The effectiveness of AMIS is directly related to the level of cooperation it receives from the 

parties to the conflict. Thus far, that cooperation has been extremely inconsistent. The 

[Sudanese] government continues to create bureaucratic obstacles to AMIS’s ability to 

operate freely. These include curfews, early airport closings, and long delays in issuing 

permits and visas. AMIS has not, as they should have, protested against these restrictions on 

movements, notably the curfew. The government’s use of white vehicles and aircraft (which 

resemble AMIS) in military operations is also inconsistent with its commitments to support 

the [African Union] Mission.... The [SLM/A] and JEM bear an equal responsibility for 

accepting and supporting the presence of AMIS. Ongoing obstruction of [African Union] 

activities by the rebels has included obstruction of movement, threatening patrols, 

harassment, theft of equipment, and even abduction of personnel.89

U.S. and UN officials emphasized an instance where the government of 

Sudan detained the 105 Canadian armored personnel carriers at the border 

and released them only after intense external pressure. A U.S. embassy 

official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, noted that Dutch communications 

equipment had been in Khartoum customs for months, demonstrating how 

the Sudanese government can obstruct, rather than facilitate, AMIS 

operations.

87O’Neill and Cassis, “Protecting Two Million,” p. 53.

88[African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10–20 December 2005, pp. 11, 16.

89[African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10–20 December 2005, pp. 2-3.
Page 66 GAO-07-9 Darfur

In addition, all parties to the conflict—the Sudanese government, the 

SLM/A, and the JEM—have been cited several times for violating the 2004 

cease-fire agreement. Representatives of these parties to Ceasefire 

Commission investigations, particularly the Sudanese government, 

routinely file objections to final report conclusions. According to an 

International Crisis Group report, “AMIS was born out of the N’djamena 

agreement [2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement], which lacked a true 

enforcement mechanism and was based on the assumption of compliance 

and goodwill by the parties. International pressure on those parties to 

respect their commitments has been ineffective, thus undermining the 

[African Union] mission.”90

UN and NATO Offers of 

Assistance Have Not Been 

Acted On; Meanwhile, 

Violence in Darfur 

Continues

While AMIS has faced challenges in Darfur, the UN and NATO have offered 

to assist the African Union in, respectively, supplying a peacekeeping force 

when AMIS’s mandate expires at the end of December 2006 and identifying 

lessons learned from AMIS operations. The U.S. government and other 

parties have supported the proposed transition of AMIS responsibilities to 

a UN peacekeeping operation. In January 2006, the African Union’s Peace 

and Security Council officially declared its approval, in principle, for the 

transition of AMIS to a UN operation.91 In March, the council reaffirmed 

this position, and in May it declared that “concrete steps should be taken to 

effect the transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation.”92 The UN 

Security Council subsequently adopted a resolution endorsing this African 

Union decision to transition AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation and 

emphasizing that a UN operation would have, to the extent possible, a 

strong African participation and character.93 In August 2006, the UN 

90International Crisis Group, “The [European Union]/[African Union] Partnership in Darfur: 

Not Yet a Winning Combination,” Africa Report No. 99, October 2005 (available at 

http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3766), p. 4.

91African Union Peace and Security Council, 45th meeting, communiqué dated January 12, 

2006.

92African Union Peace and Security Council, 46th meeting, communiqué dated March 10, 

2006.African Union Peace and Security Council, 51st meeting, communiqué dated May 15, 

2006.

93UN Security Council Resolution 1679, adopted May 16, 2006.
Page 67 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Security Council adopted a resolution expanding UNMIS’s mandate and 

calling for an UNMIS deployment to Darfur.94

According to a State official, a UN operation would be expected to build on 

AMIS efforts. Some portion of troops already participating in AMIS would 

be “bluehatted”—that is, could transition to UNMIS. According to a State 

official, under this scenario, the UN mission would have a unified 

command for the entire operation, with separate commanders for UNMIS 

efforts in southern Sudan and Darfur. According to the Department of State 

fiscal year 2007 budget request and a State official, this UN effort in Sudan 

would cost the U.S. government about $442 million in fiscal year 2007; a 

State official roughly estimated that the Darfur portion of this operation 

would cost the United States between $160 million and $180 million for the 

year.95

As of October 2006, the Sudanese government had refused a transition to a 

UN force in Darfur. However, in October the Sudanese president expressed 

support for a September offer by the UN Secretary-General to provide 

assistance to AMIS. The UN assistance package consists of equipment and 

personnel dedicated to supporting AMIS in the following ways: logistical 

and material support, military staff support, advisory support to civilian 

police, and other staff support in the areas of assistance in implementing 

the Darfur Peace Agreement, public information, mine action, and 

humanitarian coordination.

In addition, in June 2006, following an offer by NATO, the Chairperson of 

the African Union Commission requested that NATO provide, among other 

things, assistance in reviewing AMIS operations in Darfur to identify 

“lessons learned,” which could help the African Union better execute any 

future peace support efforts. However, a State official reported that, 

94UN Security Council Resolution 1706, adopted August 31, 2006. The expanded UNMIS 

mandate includes, among other things, supporting the implementation of the 2006 Darfur 

Peace Agreement and the 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. The resolution also 

states that, per Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNMIS is authorized to use all necessary 

means, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to, for 

example, protect UN personnel, humanitarian workers, and assessment and evaluation 

commission personnel. The resolution states that UNMIS shall be expanded to as many as 

17,300 military personnel and an appropriate civilian component, including up to 3,300 

civilian police. 

95This cost is reportedly less than if UN operations in Darfur were starting up without a 

presence already established in Sudan; the current presence of the UN in Sudan would 

result in economies of scale for the Darfur component that would lower costs.
Page 68 GAO-07-9 Darfur

although the Chairperson of the African Union Commission formally 

accepted NATO’s offer of this assistance, as of August 2006, the African 

Union headquarters had taken no further action to pursue the review.96

Such reviews are typically conducted after peacekeeping operations are 

completed; for example, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation’s 

Best Practices Section undertakes such reviews following UN 

peacekeeping efforts.97

Meanwhile, instability and violence continued in Darfur, furthering calls for 

UN involvement. According to a report prepared by the Chairperson of the 

African Union Commission, as of May 2006, “the region has continued to 

witness persistent insecurity, with ceasefire violations, banditry activities, 

hijacking of vehicles, attacks on villages and killing of unarmed civilians by 

the various parties, particularly the janjaweed.” One NGO reported 200 

sexual assaults around Kalma camp in South Darfur within 5 weeks during 

the summer of 2006 and the African Union reported that two AMIS soldiers 

were killed in mid-August. In August 2006, the environment in Darfur 

remained insecure, with attacks and displacement continuing and, during 

some periods, worsening over time. State has noted that the Sudanese 

government offensive that began in August 2006 against parties that did not 

sign the Darfur Peace Agreement has directly impacted the ability of AMIS 

to conduct operations, the African Union’s ability to implement the 

agreement, and the delivery of humanitarian aid. A senior State official 

reported that “Darfur is on the verge of a dangerous downward spiral. The 

parties are rearming and repositioning to renew their fighting.” The level of 

acceptance of the peace agreement overall in Darfur is uncertain, owing to 

a general lack of information throughout the population regarding the 

terms of the agreement as well as concern over the fact that the smaller 

SLM/A faction and the JEM declined to sign the deal. UN officials have 

warned that continued militia attacks on IDPs are affecting implementation 

of the peace agreement and emphasized that successful implementation of 

the agreement is key to peace in Darfur, in the Sudan, and in the wider 

region. In September 2006, an African Union Peace and Security Council 

communiqué noted that “the security situation remains volatile and 

continues to deteriorate even further in some parts of Darfur, consequently 

96State regularly works with the African Union to facilitate NATO assistance, according to a 

State official.

97A DOD official reported that by capturing “lessons learned,” relevant parties learn from 

past experiences, prevent repeating avoidable mistakes, adapt quickly to new and equally 

complex situations, and can share constructive criticisms with other interested parties. 
Page 69 GAO-07-9 Darfur

worsening the humanitarian and human rights situation, and the current 

build-up of forces by all the parties poses further risks and challenges to 

the peace efforts.” On September 19, 2006, the U.S. President named former 

USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios as a Presidential Special Envoy to 

lead U.S. efforts to resolve outstanding disputes in Darfur.

Conclusions As the primary donor of humanitarian assistance for Darfur, the United 

States has provided essential aid for the people of Darfur and improved the 

health and livelihood of IDPs and affected residents. Without U.S. 

assistance, the humanitarian organizations responding to the crisis would 

likely have been incapable of providing coverage to many of the affected 

population. The U.S. contribution to building and maintaining all AMIS 

facilities has also been essential, along with other donor assistance, to 

AMIS’s ability to pursue its mandate. As insecurity continues in Darfur, 

such support may be required well into the future.

At the same time, delayed humanitarian assistance has hindered NGO and 

UN operations, jeopardizing these USAID partners’ ability to provide 

services to affected and IDP communities needed to maintain improved 

levels of health. Further, continued resistance and lack of cooperation from 

the government of Sudan, as well as continued insecurity and conflict 

within Darfur, have made it nearly impossible for humanitarian 

organizations to provide consistent and complete coverage to the affected 

residents and IDPs throughout Darfur. Although USAID has taken steps to 

ensure more complete reporting, the limitations in its oversight of U.S. 

assistance have made it difficult to accurately determine the impact of U.S. 

humanitarian assistance. The fact that the violence in Darfur has not 

abated, and has even worsened in some instances, indicates the region’s 

need for continued assistance. 

Although AMIS is seen as having contributed, through its presence in 

Darfur, to decreasing large-scale violence, its fulfillment of its mandate has 

been limited by the incompleteness or inconsistency of some of its 

actions—such as efforts to protect civilians—in addition to numerous 

operational challenges. Some of these challenges—for example, AMIS’s 

small size, its resources constraints, and the lack of cooperation from the 

parties to the conflict—have remained beyond its control. However, other 

challenges, such as AMIS’s inadequate management, organization, and 

capacity, may stem from the African Union’s lack of experience with peace 

support efforts. At the same time, the ongoing and increasing violence in 

Darfur, as well as AMIS’s added responsibilities under the May 2006 peace 
Page 70 GAO-07-9 Darfur

agreement, make it likely that the challenges AMIS has faced will intensify. 

The proffered NATO assistance in reviewing AMIS operations---a typical 

“lessons learned” activity following a peacekeeping initiative—could 

provide a useful critical analysis of these challenges and their root causes. 

The resulting insights could assist the African Union in strengthening 

AMIS, if its mandate is renewed, as well as in planning and executing any 

future peace support efforts. Absent a stronger AMIS or intervention by 

another international party such as the UN, the conflict in Darfur could 

continue indefinitely to disrupt and destroy the lives of Darfurians. 

Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of State encourage the Chairperson of 

the African Union Commission to ensure that an appropriate body, such as 

NATO, provide assistance for an assessment of AMIS operations to identify 

the key challenges AMIS has faced and the reasons for those challenges. 

Such a “lessons learned” assessment would provide information necessary 

to allow (1) the African Union to strengthen its future peace support 

planning and operations and (2) the donor community to support future 

African Union peace support efforts in a manner that could minimize 

difficulties such as those encountered by AMIS.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Defense 

as well as USAID. We received written comments from the Department of 

State and USAID. The Department of State supported our recommendation 

and noted that the report presents a balanced and accurate picture of the 

situation in Darfur. The department also suggested that the report provide 

additional details or characterizations regarding certain, primarily AMIS, 

issues. For example, State suggested that the report should (1) emphasize 

the speed with which AMIS forces were deployed to Darfur and (2) note 

that the Sudanese government's offensive against parties that did not sign 

the Darfur Peace Agreement has directly impacted the ability of AMIS to 

conduct operations. We incorporated such information into the report as 

appropriate. See appendix V for a reproduction of State's letter and our 

response. USAID commented that in general, it found the report to be a 

comprehensive assessment of USAID’s involvement in Darfur but said that 

we should include additional information in our discussions of areas such 

as the number of USAID staff working in Darfur and the variety of efforts 

used by the agency to monitor grants. Specifically, USAID stated that our 

reference to reduced staff in Darfur was incomplete and felt that our 

discussion of incomplete reporting did not highlight other monitoring 
Page 71 GAO-07-9 Darfur

efforts, such as site visits and meetings with NGOs. We made adjustments 

as appropriate. See appendix VI for a reproduction of USAID’s letter and 

our response. DOD provided no comments on the draft report.

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the 

date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the 

Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of U.S. Foreign 

Assistance and USAID Administrator, relevant congressional committees, 

and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3149 or at gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. Other contacts and major contributors are listed in 

appendix VII.

David Gootnick, Director

International Affairs and Trade
Page 72 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

This report examines (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to help 

relieve the crisis in Darfur, (2) challenges that the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) and its implementing partners have 

encountered, (3) the African Union’s efforts to fulfill its peace support 

mandate in Darfur, and (4) factors affecting the implementation of this 

mandate. 

We collected data on international contributions (in dollar amounts) for 

Darfur provided by the UN Resource Tracking Service from September 

2003 through June 2006. The amounts provided by the UN contain both 

amounts committed and amounts pledged for Darfur by international 

donors. We did not include pledges and commitments from international 

donors that support the refugees located in Chad, because we did not 

review U.S. obligations to refugees in Chad. We made this decision because 

(1) security restrictions and conflict in the area prevented us from 

observing U.S.-funded activities in Chad and (2) the support for refugees in 

Chad was small in comparison with assistance provided to Darfur. We 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of 

broadly comparing the United States’ contributions with those of other 

international donors. We noted several limitations in the data, notably, that 

the data include verbal pledges that were self-reported to the UN Resource 

Tracking System by the donors. According to a UN official, the data may 

exceed other, similar UN data on donor contributions, because they include 

verbal pledges that have not been formally submitted to and verified by UN 

sources. Furthermore, we were unable to determine the reliability of 

financial records and the dollar amounts reportedly pledged by donors. 

To review U.S. funding of humanitarian assistance—our first objective—we 

collected and reviewed U.S. obligations data for assistance for Darfur from 

USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Office of Transition 

Initiatives, and Office of Food for Peace, as well as The Department of 

State (State) Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. To assess the 

reliability of these data, we interviewed State and USAID officials regarding 

their methods for managing and tracking the obligation data, and we 

compared these data with the amounts listed in State’s and USAID’s 

agreements with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and UN agencies. 

According to a USAID official, expenditure data for the Office of Foreign 

Disaster Assistance are not tracked in the office’s reporting system, but the 

data are reconciled on a daily basis and include any amounts that may have 

been de-obligated. A USAID Food for Peace official also indicated that the 

office’s tracking system is also reconciled on a regular basis. Therefore, we 

concluded that the data we collected on obligations from each agency are 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 73 GAO-07-9 Darfur

sufficiently reliable for the purpose of reviewing U.S. humanitarian 

assistance for Darfur from October 1, 2003, through September 30, 2006.

To review the activities and programs undertaken with U.S. humanitarian 

assistance, we reviewed USAID grant agreements. We interviewed USAID 

and State officials in Washington, D.C., as well as UN officials located in 

New York who were involved in humanitarian assistance for Darfur. In 

February 2006, we traveled to Khartoum and Darfur, Sudan, to examine the 

activities supported by U.S. humanitarian assistance. In Khartoum we met 

with U.S. implementing partners from NGOs and UN agencies, as well as an 

official from the government of Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 

addition, we visited seven camps for internally displaced persons (IDP)—

Abu Shouk, Al Salaam, El Serif, Kalma, Kass, Otash, and Zam Zam—located 

in North and South Darfur to observe activities and programs implemented 

with U.S. funds. We observed a variety of programs and activities 

supported by U.S. assistance, including food distribution, medical clinics, 

clean water and sanitation facilities, income-generation activities, 

provision of shelter materials, and nutritional feeding centers. We spoke 

with officials from the NGOs and UN agencies implementing these 

activities programs in Darfur. We also spoke with IDPs in the camps to 

obtain their perspectives on the provision of humanitarian assistance in the 

camps. Restrictions placed on our travel by the State Regional Security 

Officer in Khartoum because of security concerns limited the area in which 

we traveled and observed NGO and UN operations in Darfur. 

To examine the results of the humanitarian assistance activities, we 

reviewed the 15 final reports submitted by NGOs to USAID’s Office of 

Foreign Disaster Assistance. We reviewed the original NGO proposals to 

identify the indictors used to identify performance, and we also reviewed 

USAID guidance for reporting. We compared the indicators included in the 

original proposals to the reported indicators in each final report and 

identified the indicators that were absent from the final reports. We 

interviewed USAID officials to identify USAID’s efforts to monitor and 

evaluate NGO and UN activities in Darfur as well as efforts to motivate 

NGOs to submit final reports. We also reviewed the Office of Food for 

Peace performance review questionnaires submitted by implementing 

partners providing food aid for Darfur. In addition, we spoke with an 

official from the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives to discuss an 

ongoing program review. We also reviewed UN Humanitarian Profile 

reports that provide an overview of humanitarian assistance from April 

2004 to July 2006. These reports were also used to identify the IDP and 

affected resident population in Darfur, by month. According to UN officials 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 74 GAO-07-9 Darfur

and the profiles, NGOs and UN agencies operating throughout Darfur 

submitted the information from the reports to the UN on a monthly basis 

until January 2006, and now submit it quarterly. Although the data 

contained in the reports are self-reported, UN officials indicated that they 

confirm data to the extent possible and update the data each month. 

Furthermore, the UN Humanitarian Profiles are the only source of 

information regarding the total number of IDPs and affected residents in 

Darfur and the number of IDPs receiving assistance in each sector. We 

determined that the population data and the data regarding the population 

receiving assistance were reliable for the purposes of presenting a general 

overview of assistance in Darfur.

To determine the obstacles and challenges facing NGOs and UN agencies—

our second objective—we reviewed UN and USAID reports and cables 

discussing humanitarian operations and problems in Darfur. We 

interviewed USAID, UN, and NGO officials in Darfur to discuss the 

challenges they face in implementing assistance program and activities in 

Darfur. We also met with officials from the Sudan government 

Humanitarian Assistance Committee to discuss the obstacles and concerns 

of NGOs and UN officials operating in Darfur and obtain the perspective 

and input of the Sudan government regarding these issues.

In order to identify African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) efforts and the 

operational challenges AMIS has faced—our third and fourth objectives—

as well as resources available to AMIS to pursue its mandate, we used 

numerous African Union sources. We reviewed African Union Peace and 

Security Council communiqués, as well as reports prepared by the 

Chairperson of the African Union Commission that were submitted to the 

council. We also reviewed African Union-led reviews of AMIS, conducted in 

March and December 2005, as well as a UN-led assessment of AMIS 

performance conducted in August of that year. In February 2006, we met 

with AMIS leadership (military and civilian police) at AMIS headquarters in 

El Fasher and the following AMIS group sites in North and South Darfur—

Zam Zam, Kabkabiya, Sarif Umra, Um Kadada, Nyala, Kass and El Daein—

where we discussed the AMIS mandate and AMIS activities at each 

location. We also discussed AMIS efforts with the U.S. representative to the 

African Union-led Ceasefire Commission, as well as U.S. representatives 

(military observers) in four locations. We were unable to travel to AMIS 

sites in West Darfur owing to security concerns. At African Union 

headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, we met with senior African Union 

officials, including the Commissioner for the African Union’s Peace and 

Security Council and the head of the Darfur Integrated Task Force in 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 75 GAO-07-9 Darfur

February 2006. To assess reports prepared by the AMIS Ceasefire 

Commission, we analyzed the contents of all publicly available reports 

from the African Union’s Web site, www.africaunion.org/DARFUR/CFC.htm.

We also discussed the African Union’s initiative in Darfur and external 

donor efforts with officials from the Departments of State (in Washington, 

D.C.; Khartoum and El Fasher, Sudan; and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) and 

Defense (DOD). At State headquarters in Washington, we discussed the 

situation in Darfur and AMIS efforts with the following bureaus and offices: 

Administration, African Affairs; International Organization Affairs; 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Population, Refugees, and 

Migration; and War Crimes Issues. At DOD, we met with the staff from the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense. Further, we reviewed UN Security 

Council resolutions, UN reports that addressed the situation in Darfur, and 

a UN August 2005 report that assessed AMIS operations. We met with 

officials from the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New 

York. We also met with European Union and UN officials at African Union 

headquarters in Addis Ababa. In addition, we met with officials from, and 

reviewed reports prepared by, expert and advocacy groups such as the 

International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, and Refugees 

International. Finally, we met with Sudanese government officials in 

Khartoum and Washington, D.C.

To review the U.S. government’s support for AMIS, we discussed this 

support with officials from the African Union and Departments of State and 

Defense. To identify contractor activities, we reviewed the contract 

documentation defining the terms for tasks performed by PAE Government 

Services, Inc., (PAE) in Darfur. Further, we reviewed PAE weekly situation 

reports, describing events related to camp construction and maintenance 

and submitted to State, and met with officials from PAE in Washington, 

D.C., and North and South Darfur. We also discussed PAE’s efforts with an 

official who was working on contract in Darfur as State’s Contracting 

Officer’s Technical Representative. PAE and State officials accompanied us 

on our visit to AMIS camps, providing tours of each AMIS site, as well as to 

the logistics operating base in El Fasher and the forward operating base in 

Nyala, explaining the process for constructing and maintaining AMIS 

facilities. We determined that data obtained from PAE were sufficiently 

reliable for inclusion in our report. To identify the amount of U.S. funding 

that has been provided to construct and maintain AMIS camps, we spoke 

with State officials from the African Affairs and Administration bureaus. In 

particular, we had detailed discussions with a key official from the African 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 76 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Affairs Bureau who provided information on funding, provided by fiscal 

year, and the funding source. The official prepared a calculation of U.S. 

funding for PAE efforts independently. All figures addressing State funding 

to support AMIS provided in the report are attributed to this State official 

and were not independently verified. However, after discussions with 

multiple State officials knowledgeable about State support for PAE who 

cited the State official as a key source within State for this information, 

combined with a review of State’s information by PAE officials, we have 

determined that the funding information provided is sufficiently reliable for 

inclusion in our report with appropriate attribution. We discussed oversight 

regarding this funding with State officials in Darfur and Washington.

We conducted our work from September 2005 to November 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 77 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Appendix II

Timeline of Darfur Events ApendxiI

Topic Date Summary Description

Beginning of 

conflict

Early 2003 Darfur conflict 

begins

In early 2003, Darfur rebels attacked Sudanese police stations and the 

airport in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. In El Fasher, the rebels 

destroyed numerous military aircraft, killed numerous soldiers, and 

kidnapped a Sudanese general. In response, the government armed and 

supported local tribal and other militias (the Janjaweed). Fighting between 

the rebel groups and the Sudan military and other armed militia intensified 

during late 2003. The principal rebel groups are the Sudan Liberation 

Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

Humanitarian 

assistance events

April 2004 202 humanitarian 

staff working in 

Darfur

In April 2004, there was limited humanitarian presence in Darfur, with only 

202 humanitarian staff working in the region. In addition, some of the 

nongovernmental organizations (NGO) operating in Darfur provided only 

limited humanitarian assistance, since their primary focus was on 

development assistance.

Humanitarian 

assistance events

December 

2004

Save the ChildrenUK withdraws after 

death of four staff

On December 21, 2004, Save the Children-UK announced that it was 

discontinuing humanitarian operations in Darfur following two incidents in 

October and December that resulted in the deaths of four staff members. 

Save the Children had operated in Darfur for 20 years.

Humanitarian 

assistance events

End of 2004 Donors provide 

$890 million in 

humanitarian 

assistance

At the end of 2004, total pledges and commitments for Darfur from 

international donors in 2004 totaled more than $890 million. The United 

States committed or pledged more than $271 million (31 percent).

Humanitarian 

assistance events

July 2005 Over 3 million 

people affected by 

crisis 

The population of Darfur estimated to be affected by the violence, both 

internally displaced persons (IDP) and affected residents, rose to more than 

3.2 million people, 1.9 million of whom are IDPs.

Humanitarian 

assistance events

October 2005 Humanitarian staff 

increase to almost 

14,000

The number of humanitarian aid workers in Darfur grew to a total of 13,715 

workers from 13 UN agencies and 82 NGOs.

Humanitarian 

assistance events

End of 2005 Donors provide 

$675 million in 

humanitarian 

assistance

Total pledges and commitments for Darfur in 2005, from all donors, totaled 

almost $675 million. The United States committed or pledged nearly $365 

million (54 percent).

Humanitarian 

assistance events

January 2006 GOAL suspends 

operations in Jebel 

Mara 

Following an escalation of violence in the Jebel Mara area of West Darfur, on 

January 25, 2006, GOAL, an international NGO, evacuated all staff in the 

region and abandoned operations. During the evacuation of staff, a 

helicopter crash resulted in the death of one GOAL aid worker.

Humanitarian 

assistance events

April 2006 World Food 

Program (WFP) 

announces cuts in 

Darfur food rations

On April 28, the UN WFP announced that shortages in funds would force 

WFP to begin reducing the daily food rations for the people of Darfur in May. 

WFP indicated that the reduced rations would extend limited food stocks 

during the “hunger season,” when needs are greatest. Owing to contributions 

by the U.S. and Sudanese governments, the rations were only cut to 84 

percent of the daily requirement. 

Humanitarian 

assistance events

June 2006 Donors provide 

$331 million in 

humanitarian 

assistance

As of June 2006, international pledges and commitments for Darfur in 2006 

totaled almost $331 million. According to the UN, this amount was 

approximately $320 million less than the required funding for 2006. The 

United States committed almost $240 million (72 percent).
Appendix II

Timeline of Darfur Events

Page 78 GAO-07-9 Darfur

African Union 

Mission in Sudan 

(AMIS) events

May 2004 First African Union 

observer mission to 

Darfur

On May 25, 2004, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council issued a 

communiqué stressing the need for the three parties to the conflict—the 

government of Sudan, the SLM/A, and the JEM—to implement the April 2004 

Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. Further, the Peace and Security Council 

authorized the initial deployment of an African Union Observer Mission to 

support the work of the newly created Ceasefire Commission.

AMIS events October 2004 African Union’s 

Mission in Sudan 

established with 

3,320 personnel

On October 20, 2004, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council issued 

a communiqué that established an AMIS presence in Darfur of 3,320 

personnel. These personnel were to include 2,341 military personnel, among 

them 450 observers, and up to 815 civilian police as well as appropriate 

civilian personnel. Further, AMIS was given a specific mandate to monitor 

and observe compliance with the ceasefire agreement, assist in the process 

of confidence building, and contribute to a secure environment for the 

delivery of humanitarian relief. This was the first time the council called for a 

civilian police presence.

AMIS events April 2005 AMIS forces 

increased to 7,731

On April 28, 2005, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council issued a 

communiqué praising AMIS efforts and noting improvements where the 

mission was deployed in Darfur but concluding that the current force was 

overstretched. The communiqué increased AMIS’s strength to a total of 

6,171 military personnel, with an appropriate civilian component, including 

up to 1,560 civilian police personnel, for a total force of at least 7,731.

AMIS events August 2005 Violence against 

AMIS personnel 

increases

From August 2005 on, 35 AMIS personnel were abducted; 4 Nigerian 

protection force soldiers were killed; and vehicles, communications 

equipment, weapons, and ammunition were lost. According to an African 

Union assessment of AMIS, these attacks on AMIS undermined the 

mission’s credibility in the eyes of civilians and emboldened those who might 

target AMIS. In July 2006, 32 AMIS personnel were abducted.

AMIS events March 2006 African Union 

supports, in 

principle, AMIS 

transition to UN

On March 10, 2006, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council 

confirmed its January 2006 expression of support for a transition of AMIS to 

a UN operation. The council requested that the African Union Commission 

vigorously pursue its efforts toward reaching, as quickly as possible, the 

authorized AMIS strength of 7,731.

AMIS events April 2006 AMIS deployment is 

over 7,200, but 

below authorized 

level of about 7,700

On April 30, 2006, AMIS deployment reached 7,271 (755 military observers, 

5,086 protection force troops, and 1,430 civilian police). In addition, another 

155 personnel were serving as air crew or interpreters or in other roles. Of 

total AMIS deployment, 312 were women. Protection force troops came from 

Rwanda, Nigeria, Senegal, Gambia, and South Africa. AMIS deployment 

was below the authorized level of about 7,731, primarily because an 

expected contingent of South African troops was never deployed.

AMIS events September 

2006

AMIS mandate is 

extended to 

December 31, 2006

On September 20, the African Union Peace and Security Council extended 

the mandate of AMIS from September 30, 2006 to December 31, 2006.

Peace negotiation 

efforts

September 

2003

Sudan and rebel 

group sign ceasefire; agreement later 

collapses 

The initial cease-fire agreement between the parties to the conflict (the 

Sudanese government and SLM/A) and mediated by the government of 

Chad, is signed; the agreed collapsed by December of 2003. 

(Continued From Previous Page)

Topic Date Summary Description
Appendix II

Timeline of Darfur Events

Page 79 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Peace negotiation 

efforts

April 2004 Three negotiating 

parties sign ceasefire 

On April 8, 2004 the three parties to the conflict signed the “Agreement on 

Humanitarian Ceasefire on the Conflict in Darfur” in N’djamena, Chad. The 

parties agreed to, among other things, refrain from any act of violence or any 

other abuse on civilian populations. The parties further agreed to establish a 

cease-fire commission to, among other things, plan, verify, and ensure 

implementation of the cease-fire agreement provisions.

Peace negotiation 

efforts

November 

2004

Three parties sign 

two protocols to 

improve 

humanitarian and 

security situation

On November 9, 2004, the three parties to the conflict signed two protocols 

in Abuja, Nigeria. (1) “Protocol Between the Government of the Sudan 

(GOS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and 

Equality Movement (JEM) on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation 

in Darfur” commits the parties to, among other things, guarantee unimpeded 

and unrestricted access for humanitarian workers and assistance to reach all 

needy people throughout Darfur and take all steps required to prevent all 

attacks against civilians by any party or group, including the Janjaweed. The 

protocol also requests the UN to expand the number of human rights 

monitors in Darfur. (2) “Protocol Between the Government of the Sudan 

(GOS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and 

Equality Movement (JEM) on the Enhancement of the Security Situation in 

Darfur in Accordance with the N’djamena Agreement” commits the parties to, 

among other things, recommit themselves to ensuring an effective cease-fire 

by refraining from all hostilities and military actions, submit to the cease-fire 

commission all information needed to carry out its mandate, and release all 

persons detained in relation to the hostilities in Darfur. The Sudanese 

government also agreed to implement its stated commitment to neutralize 

and disarm the Janjaweed.

Peace negotiation 

efforts

July 2005 Three negotiating 

parties sign 

declaration of 

principles

On July 5, 2005, the three parties to the conflict signed the “Declaration of 

Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur.” This 

declaration established 17 principles to guide future deliberations and 

constituted the basis for a settlement of the Darfur conflict. These principles 

address issues such as 

• respect for the diversity of the Sudanese people,

democracy, political pluralism, rule of law, independence of the judiciary, 

and freedom of the media;

• effective representation in all government institutions by the citizens of 

Sudan, including those from Darfur;

• equitable distribution of national wealth;

• provision of humanitarian assistance;

• return to places of origin for IDPs;

• rehabilitation/reconstruction of Darfur; and

• broad security arrangements.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Topic Date Summary Description
Appendix II

Timeline of Darfur Events

Page 80 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Peace negotiation 

efforts

May 2006 Sudan and the 

largest faction of 

SLM/A sign Darfur 

Peace Agreement

On May 5, 2006, the Sudanese government and the SLM/A faction with the 

largest military force signed the Darfur Peace Agreement. This agreement 

has provisions on 

• power sharing (including the creation of the Senior Assistant to the 

President, the fourth-highest position in the Sudanese government, 

appointed by the President from a list of nominees provided by the rebel 

movements); 

• wealth sharing (including the creation of a Darfur reconstruction and 

development fund that will receive $700 million in funds from the Sudanese 

government between 2006 and 2008); and

• security arrangements (including a requirement for verifiable disarmament 

of the Janjaweed militia by the Sudanese government).

The smaller SLM/A faction and JEM did not sign the agreement.

Major U.S. actions April 2004 USAID establishes 

Disaster Assistance 

Response Team 

In 2003 and 2004, USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) 

deployed field staff to Sudan to assess the extent of the Darfur crisis. In April 

2004, responding to the growing humanitarian emergency, USAID/OFDA 

mobilized a Disaster Assistance Response Team. USAID continued a 

phased deployment of humanitarian personnel as official access and 

improved security allowed for its increased presence in Darfur.

Major U.S. actions June 2004 Secretary of State 

Powell visits Sudan

Secretary Powell visited Sudan, the first U.S. Secretary of State to do so in 

26 years. Powell met with Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir, emphasizing 

the need to dismantle the Janjaweed to restore security to the region and 

enable IDPs to return home. The government of Sudan agreed to this 

objective as well as to removing restrictions on humanitarian aid and 

participating in a political resolution of the Darfur crisis facilitated by the 

African Union.

Major U.S. actions June 2004 U.S. company 

begins building 

camps for African 

Union troops 

PAE, a U.S. company, via a contract with the U.S. Department of State and 

with assistance from another U.S. contractor, began building camps for AMIS 

troops in Darfur. PAE initially constructed five camps (in El Fasher, Nyala, El 

Geneina, Tine, and Kabkabiya) for AMIS troops. Significant challenges were 

identified in building these camps, such as transporting materials to building 

sites and providing water to AMIS personnel. PAE eventually built a total of 

32 AMIS camps.

Major U.S. actions July 2004 Both houses of 

Congress pass 

resolutions 

declaring atrocities 

to be genocide

On July 22, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate 

unanimously passed separate resolutions [H.Con.Res. 467, 108th Cong. 

(2004); S.Con.Res. 133, 108th Cong. (2004)] declaring the crisis in Darfur to 

be genocide, based on articles of the Convention on the Prevention and 

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. These resolutions declare 

that the government of Sudan has violated the Convention and call upon the 

member states of the United Nations to undertake measures to prevent 

genocide in Darfur from escalating further. The resolutions also commend 

the administration’s efforts in seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict and 

in providing humanitarian assistance and urge it to continue to lead an 

international effort to stop the genocide in Darfur. 

(Continued From Previous Page)

Topic Date Summary Description
Appendix II

Timeline of Darfur Events

Page 81 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Major U.S. actions September 

2004

President Bush and 

Secretary Powell 

declare that 

genocide is 

occurring 

On September 9, 2004, Powell testifies before Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee and declares atrocities in Darfur to be genocide, based on 

evidence collected by the Department of State. Further, he states that the 

government of Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible and that the United 

States, as a contracting party to the Genocide Convention, will demand that 

the UN initiate a full investigation. President Bush made similar statements 

that day.

Major U.S. actions May 2006 Secretary Rice 

reaffirms that Darfur 

violence constitutes 

genocide

On May 9, 2006, addressing the UN Security Council Ministerial on Sudan, 

Secretary of State Rice reaffirmed the administration's declaration that the 

violence in Darfur constitutes genocide. Additionally, Secretary Rice stated 

that the Darfur Peace Agreement is an opportunity to end the crisis in the 

region and allow people to return to their homes, emphasizing a role for UN 

troops to implement the peace agreement. Secretary Rice also stated that 

the United States had provided nearly all of the support that the WFP's 

mission in Darfur had received. 

Major U.S. actions October 2006 U.S. President signs 

Darfur Peace and 

Accountability Act of 

2006

On October 13, 2006, President Bush signed into law the Darfur Peace and 

Accountability Act of 2006 which imposes sanctions against persons 

responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; supports 

measures for the protection of civilians and humanitarian operations; and 

supports peace efforts in Darfur.

Major UN actions December 

2003

UN UnderSecretary-General 

calls humanitarian 

situation “one of the 

worst” worldwide

On December 5, 2003, the UN Under-Secretary-General in charge of the UN 

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs stated, “The humanitarian 

situation in Darfur has quickly become one of the worst in the world.”

Major UN actions July 2004 Sudan commits to 

facilitate assistance 

and disarm 

Janjaweed

On July 3, 2004, the government of Sudan and the UN signed a joint 

communiqué in which the Sudanese government pledged to remove 

obstacles to humanitarian assistance in Darfur and committed to disarming 

the Janjaweed and other armed outlaw groups. 

Major UN actions July 2004 UN calls for 

cooperation from 

Sudan and 

disarmament of 

militias

The UN Security Council called for the Sudanese government to fulfill its 

commitment to facilitate humanitarian relief in Darfur and remove restrictions 

that might hinder humanitarian aid to Darfur. In addition, the council called for 

the government to disarm the Janjaweed militias and bring perpetrators of 

human rights and international humanitarian law violations and other 

atrocities to justice.

Major UN actions January 2005 UN reports that 

Sudan has not 

pursued a policy of 

genocide

On January 25, 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry, established by 

the UN, issued a report stating that the government of Sudan has not 

pursued a policy of genocide. However, the commission reported that the 

Sudanese government and the Janjaweed, have committed international 

offences such as crimes against humanity and war crimes that may be no 

less serious and heinous than genocide.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Topic Date Summary Description
Appendix II

Timeline of Darfur Events

Page 82 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Source: GAO.

Major UN actions March 2005 UN establishes UN 

Mission in Sudan

On March 24, 2005, the UN Security Council established the UN Mission in 

Sudan (UNMIS) after determining that the situation in Darfur continued to 

threaten international peace and security. UNMIS was mandated to support 

implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; to facilitate and 

coordinate the voluntary return of refugees and IDPs and humanitarian 

assistance; to contribute to international efforts to protect and promote 

human rights in Sudan; and to coordinate international efforts to protect 

civilians. The council also called on all Sudanese parties to take immediate 

steps to achieve a peaceful settlement to the Darfur conflict and take all 

necessary action to prevent further violations of human rights and 

international humanitarian law.

Major UN actions March 2005 UN refers Darfur 

situation to 

International 

Criminal Court

On March 31, 2005, the UN Security Council referred the situation in Darfur 

to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, taking note of the 

International Commission of Inquiry report on violations of international law 

and human rights in Darfur.

Major UN actions March 2006 UN requests 

planning to 

transition AMIS to 

UN 

On March 24, 2006, the UN Security Council called for preparatory planning 

for a transition of AMIS to a UN operation. The plan was to include options for 

reinforcing the Darfur peace effort through additional appropriate transitional 

assistance to AMIS, including assistance in logistics, mobility and 

communications. 

Major UN actions August 2006 UN calls for UNMIS 

deployment to 

Darfur

On August 31, 2006, the UN Security Council commended the efforts of the 

African Union for the successful deployment of AMIS but reaffirmed its 

concern that ongoing violence in Darfur might further negatively affect the 

rest of the Sudan as well as the region. The UN Security Council expanded 

UNMIS’s mandate and determined that UNMIS should deploy to Darfur. As of 

October 2006, the Sudanese government had refused a transition to a UN 

force in Darfur.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Topic Date Summary Description
Page 83 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Appendix III

Evolution of AMIS ApendxiI

The African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS) evolved as the African Union 

has authorized the incremental deployment of thousands of personnel to 

carry out its responsibilities in Darfur. In May 2004, after three parties 

signed the April 2004 humanitarian cease-fire agreement, the African 

Union’s Peace and Security Council authorized an observer mission to 

Darfur.1

 This mission began operations in June 2004 with 60 military 

observers and 300 protection force soldiers as well as observers from the 

Sudanese parties. In July, the Peace and Security Council called for a 

comprehensive plan to enhance the effectiveness of the mission, including 

the possibility of transforming the mission into a full-fledged peacekeeping 

mission to ensure the effective implementation of the cease-fire 

agreement.2

 In October 2004, in conjunction with the issuance of an African 

Union report that discussed the status of the mission and described the 

situation in Darfur,3

 the council decided to enhance AMIS to a total of 3,320 

personnel, including 2,341 military personnel (military observers and 

protection force troops), among them 450 observers; up to 815 civilian 

police personnel (the first time that a civilian police component was 

formally established); and appropriate civilian personnel.4

The African Union Peace and Security Council provided AMIS II with the 

following specific mandate for its peace support efforts: (1) to monitor and 

observe compliance with the 2004 humanitarian cease-fire agreement; (2) 

to assist in the process of confidence building; and (3) to contribute to a 

secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and, beyond 

that, the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes, and to contribute to 

the improvement of the security situation throughout Darfur. In working to 

meet this mandate, the council decided that AMIS II would, among other 

tasks, “protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in 

the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood 

that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the 

government of Sudan.” 

1

African Union Peace and Security Council, 10th meeting, communiqué dated May 25, 2004.

2

African Union Peace and Security Council, 13th meeting, communiqué dated July 27, 2004.

3

African Union Peace and Security Council, 17th meeting, “Report of the Chairperson of the 

Commission on the Situation in the Darfur, the Sudan,” dated October 20, 2004.

4

African Union Peace and Security Council, 17th meeting, communiqué dated October 20, 

2004.
Appendix III

Evolution of AMIS

Page 84 GAO-07-9 Darfur

In early 2005, the African Union decided to augment AMIS once again. In 

April 2005, the Peace and Security Council authorized increasing the size of 

AMIS to 6,171 military personnel, in addition to an appropriate civilian 

component, including up to 1,560 civilian police personnel (for a total of 

more than 7,700).5

 This further expansion is referred to as AMIS II-E. These 

AMIS personnel operate throughout eight sectors in Darfur that have been 

established to help organize AMIS efforts. A Darfur Integrated Task Force 

was established at African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to 

assist with planning, force generation, procurement and logistics, and 

administrative support and to interact with AMIS donors. 

The African Union did not call for an AMIS civilian police presence until 

AMIS operations were well under way. The civilian police component was 

added to AMIS in October 2004 to, according to a senior UN official, further 

the “rule of law” by working with Sudanese police. The European Union 

was a strong proponent of a civilian police component, and European 

Union officials told us that the civilian police gave European Union 

member states the opportunity to play a direct role in AMIS by providing 

police staff. Specifically, the role of the civilian police is, among other 

things, to establish and maintain contact with the Sudanese police, observe 

and report on Sudanese police service delivery, and monitor the security of 

IDPs.

As of April 30, 2006, AMIS had 7,271 personnel in Darfur (755 military 

observers, 5,086 soldiers/protection force, and 1,430 civilian police).6

According to a UN official, AMIS deployed its troops much faster than the 

UN could have done (although UN efforts have higher standards regarding 

aspects of deployment such as required troop skills and equipment). The 

majority of AMIS soldiers have come from Rwanda and Nigeria, with 

additional troops from Senegal, Gambia, and South Africa.7

 Military 

observers from more than 20 countries (numerous African countries and 

the United States, the European Union, and the three parties to the 

conflict) and civilian police are participating in AMIS. The total number of 

5

African Union Peace and Security Council, 28th meeting, communiqué dated April 28, 2005.

6

This information is taken from a situation report prepared by PAE, the U.S. contractor 

responsible for maintaining all AMIS camps, and submitted to the Department of State. This 

report also notes that an additional 155 personnel were serving as air crew, interpreters, or 

in other roles, and of the total AMIS deployment 312 were women.

7

Kenya has contributed a small number of military police.
Appendix III

Evolution of AMIS

Page 85 GAO-07-9 Darfur

the AMIS force deployed in Darfur is far less than the authorized AMIS size 

of more than 7,700—according to African Union sources, primarily because 

expected South African troops were never fully deployed to Darfur.

In January 2006, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council officially 

declared its approval, in principle, for the transition of AMIS to a UN 

operation.8

 In March, the council reaffirmed this position, and in May it 

declared that “concrete steps should be taken to effect the transition from 

AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation.”9

 The UN Security Council 

subsequently adopted a resolution commending AMIS’s role in reducing 

large-scale, organized violence in Darfur; endorsing this African Union 

decision to transition AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation; and stressing 

that a UN operation would have, to the extent possible, a strong African 

participation and character.10 In August 2006, the UN Security Council 

adopted a resolution expanding UNMIS’s mandate and calling for an 

UNMIS deployment to Darfur.11 The mandate of AMIS expires on 

December 31, 2006. 

8

African Union Peace and Security Council, 45th meeting, communiqué dated January 12, 

2006.

9

African Union Peace and Security Council, 46th meeting, communiqué dated March 10, 

2006. African Union Peace and Security Council, 51st meeting, communiqué dated May 15, 

2006.

10UN Security Council Resolution 1679, adopted May 16, 2006.

11UN Security Council Resolution 1706, adopted August 31, 2006. The expanded UNMIS 

mandate includes, among other things, supporting the implementation of the 2006 Darfur 

Peace Agreement and the 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. The resolution also 

states that, per Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNMIS is authorized to use all necessary 

means, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to, for 

example, protect UN personnel, humanitarian workers, and assessment and evaluation 

commission personnel. The resolution states that UNMIS shall be expanded to as many as 

17,300 military personnel and an appropriate civilian component, including up to 3,300 

civilian police, and that elements of UNMIS shall begin to be deployed in Darfur no later 

than October 1, 2006. 
Page 86 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Appendix IV

NGOs and UN Agencies Receiving U.S. 

Nonfood Assistance Funding during Fiscal 

Years 2004–2006 ApendxiIV

NGO/ UN agency

Action Contre le Faim 

Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development

American Refugee Committee

CARE 

CHD 

Coalition for International Justice 

Community, Habitat, Finance

CONCERN 

Catholic Relief Services

Development Alternatives, Inc.

Freedom House

GOAL 

Harvard School of Public Health

Halo Partnership

International Committee of the Red Cross

International Medical Corps

International Rescue Committee

Internews Network

Mercy Corps

MEDAIR 

MERLIN 

Relief International 

Samaritan's Purse 

Save the Children-UK

Save the Children-US

Solidarites 

Tearfund 

Tufts University 

United Methodist Committee on Relief

United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

United Nations Department of Safety and Security

United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

United Nations Children's Fund

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Appendix IV

NGOs and UN Agencies Receiving U.S. 

Nonfood Assistance Funding during Fiscal 

Years 2004–2006

Page 87 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Source: USAID and State.

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

United Nations World Food Program 

United Nations Joint Logistics Center

United Nations World Health Organization 

World Relief

World Vision - USA 

(Continued From Previous Page)

NGO/ UN agency
Page 88 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Appendix V

Comments from the Department of State ApendxiV

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.
Appendix V

Comments from the Department of State

Page 89 GAO-07-9 Darfur
Appendix V

Comments from the Department of State

Page 90 GAO-07-9 Darfur

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.
Appendix V

Comments from the Department of State

Page 91 GAO-07-9 Darfur

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

See comment 7.
Appendix V

Comments from the Department of State

Page 92 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter dated 

October 2, 2006.

GAO Comments 1. We have added the U.S. contribution of training and equipping 

Rwandan and Nigerian battalions through the African Contingency 

Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program to footnote 65.

2. We have added State’s perspective regarding the quick deployment of 

AMIS troops, as well as a similar view expressed by a senior UN official 

working in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

3. The report’s discussion of rebel group control over humanitarian 

access reflects the views of UN and NGO officials. Further, the report 

cites banditry and looting, as well as more violent acts, such as attacks 

and the killing of humanitarian workers.

4. Owing to scope and time limitations, our review of specific AMIS 

operations did not cover the period subsequent to the signing of the 

Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006. However, we have added State’s 

point regarding Sudanese government actions against parties that did 

not sign the agreement.

5. As noted above, our review did not assess AMIS operations subsequent 

to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006, although we 

have identified instances of violence against the AMIS civilian police 

since that time, such as (1) the burning of a civilian police station and 

three vehicles by IDPs in Hassahisa IDP camp at Zalengei and (2) the 

killing of a civilian police language assistant and the attack of eight 

civilian police officers by IDPs in Kalma IDP camp at Nyala. Such 

incidents appear contrary to the portrayal of the relationship between 

the civilian police and IDPs provided here by State.

6. The report states that the improvements in mortality in Darfur have 

been attributed, in part, to the humanitarian assistance provide by the 

United States.

7. We have added this point to footnote 5.
Page 93 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Appendix VI

Comments from the U.S. Agency for 

International Development ApendxiVI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.
Appendix VI

Comments from the U.S. Agency for 

International Development

Page 94 GAO-07-9 Darfur

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.
Appendix VI

Comments from the U.S. Agency for 

International Development

Page 95 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Following are GAO’s comments on USAID’s letter dated October 17, 2006.

GAO Comments 1. The current number of USAID staff in Darfur has been reduced from as 

many as 20 people to the current number of 6 staff in Darfur, although 

the crisis in Darfur has resulted in increased number of IDPs and 

affected residents that require assistance and a greater number of 

NGOs and UN agencies operating in Darfur. We understand that USAID 

does not always have control over staffing decisions and is sometimes 

limited by staff ceilings set by State. However, we believe that in the 

absence of complete reporting by NGOs, a reduction in USAID staff, 

complicated by the current inability of these staff to work in Darfur, 

affects USAID’s ability to provide comprehensive oversight of U.S.-

funded humanitarian assistance in Darfur.

2. We determined that 6 of the 15 required final reports were not 

submitted by USAID partners and that most of the reports did not 

provide all required information. The lack of required reporting 

prevented USAID from fully monitoring NGO performance and 

measuring the impact of U.S. humanitarian assistance to Darfur. 

However, we report additional USAID monitoring and evaluation 

efforts, such as regular communication with NGOs, performed by 

USAID in Darfur. In addition, we note that such efforts can be limited 

by issues identified in our report such as travel restrictions imposed by 

the Sudanese government and continuing insecurity throughout the 

region. We also have added information to the report noting recent 

USAID efforts to collect reports from its implementing partners that 

reportedly resulted in 100 percent compliance with quarterly reporting 

requirements in July 2006. USAID’s recent emphasis on collecting 

required reports may improve its ability to conduct oversight of U.S.-

funded humanitarian operations in Darfur.

3. In late October, we identified a UN humanitarian profile for July 1, 2006, 

that had become available to the public. This document stated that the 

number of IDPs stood at 1.85 million as of July 1, 2006.
Page 96 GAO-07-9 Darfur

Appendix VII

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiVI

GAO Contact David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to the person named above, Emil Friberg, (Assistant Director), 

Martin De Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Leslie Holen, Theresa Lo, Reid Lowe, 

Grace Lui, John F. Miller, and Chhandasi Pandya made key contributions to 

this report.
Page 97 GAO-07-9 Darfur

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Operations 

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Renaissance After Action Review, August 2005.

The [African Union] Assessment Mission to Darfur, Sudan 10-22 March 

2005: Report of the Joint Assessment Team.

Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Imperatives for Immediate Change, The 

African Union 

Mission in Sudan,” January 2006 (available at 

http://hrw.org/reports/2006/sudan0106).

International Crisis Group, “The [African Union]’s Mission in Darfur: 

Bridging the Gaps,” Africa Briefing No. 28, July 2005 (available at 

http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3547).

International Crisis Group, “The [European Union]/[African Union] 

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99, October 2005 (available at 

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Union Mission in Sudan,” Refugees International, November 2005 

(available at 

http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/publication/detail/7222).

William G. O’Neill and Violette Cassis, “Protecting Two Million Internally 

Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in 

Darfur,” Occasional Paper, The Brookings Institution–University of Bern 

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