United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

BORDER SECURITY

US-VISIT Program 

Faces Strategic, 

Operational, and 

Technological 

Challenges at Land 

Ports of Entry 

December 2006 

 

GAO-07-248 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

December 2006

BORDER SECURITY

US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, 

Operational, and Technological 

Challenges at Land Ports of Entry 

Highlights of GAO-07-248, a report to 

congressional requesters 

The Department of Homeland

Security (DHS) established the U.S. 

Visitor and Immigrant Status 

Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) 

program to collect, maintain, and 

share data on selected foreign 

nationals entering and exiting the 

United States at air, sea and land

ports of entry (POEs). These data, 

including biometric identifiers like

digital fingerprints, are to be used

to screen persons against watch 

lists, verify visitors’ identities, and 

record arrival and departure. GAO 

was asked to review

implementation at land POE 

facilities and in doing so GAO

analyzed: (1) efforts to implement 

US-VISIT entry capability; (2) 

efforts to implement US-VISIT exit

capability; and (3) DHS’s efforts to 

define how US-VISIT fits with other 

emerging border security

initiatives. GAO reviewed DHS and

US-VISIT program documents, 

interviewed program officials, and

visited 21 land POEs with varied

traffic levels on both borders. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS 

improve existing management 

controls for US-VISIT; develop 

performance measures to assess 

the impact of US-VISIT at land 

POEs; and ensure that a statutorily 

mandated report describes how 

DHS will move to a biometric

entry/exit capability and align USVISIT with emerging land border 

security initiatives. DHS generally

agreed and said that it has begun to

or plans to implement GAO’s 

recommendations. 

US-VISIT entry capability has been installed at 154 of the 170 land POEs. 

Officials at all 21 sites GAO visited reported that US-VISIT had improved 

their ability to process visitors and verify identities. DHS plans to further 

enhance US-VISIT’s capabilities by, among other things, requiring new 

technology and equipment for scanning all 10 fingerprints (see photo, left, 

below). While this may aid border security, installation could increase 

processing times and adversely affect operations at land POEs where space 

constraints, traffic congestion, and processing delays already exist. GAO’s 

work indicated that management controls in place to identify such problems 

and evaluate operations were insufficient and inconsistently administered.

For example, GAO identified computer processing problems at 12 sites 

visited; at 9 of these, the problems were not always reported. US-VISIT has 

developed performance measures, but measures to gauge factors that 

uniquely affect land POE operations were not developed; these would put 

US-VISIT officials in a better position to identify areas for improvement. 

US-VISIT officials concluded that, for various reasons, a biometric US-VISIT 

exit capability cannot now be implemented without incurring a major impact

on land POE facilities. An interim nonbiometric exit technology being tested 

(see photo, right, below) does not meet the statutory requirement for a 

biometric exit capability and cannot ensure that visitors who enter the 

country are those who leave. DHS has not yet reported to Congress on a 

required plan describing how it intends to fully implement a biometric 

entry/exit program, or use nonbiometric solutions. Until this plan is finalized, 

neither DHS nor Congress is in a good position to prioritize and allocate 

program resources or plan for POE facilities modifications. 

DHS has not yet articulated how US-VISIT is to align with other emerging 

land border security initiatives and mandates, and thus cannot ensure that 

the program will meet strategic program goals and operate cost effectively at 

land POEs. Knowing how US-VISIT is to work with these initiatives, such as 

one requiring U.S. citizens, Canadians, and others to present passports or 

other documents at the border in 2009, is important for understanding the 

broader strategic context for US-VISIT and identifying resources, tools, and 

potential facility modifications needed to ensure success. 

US-VISIT entry capability set-up with computer and camera (left); nonbiometric exit 

identification readers mounted over highway (right) 

Source: GAO.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-248.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Richard Stana 

at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5 

Background 10

DHS Has Installed US-VISIT Biometric Entry Capability at Nearly 

All Land POEs, but Faces Challenges Identifying and Monitoring 

the Operational Impacts on POE Facilities 23 

DHS Cannot Currently Implement a Biometric US-VISIT Exit 

Capability at Land POEs and Faces Uncertainties as Testing of

an Alternative Exit Strategy Continues 38 

DHS Has Not Articulated How US-VISIT Strategically Fits with 

Other Land-Border Security Initiatives 53 

Conclusions 57

Recommendations for Executive Action 60 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 60 

Appendix I Objective, Scope, and Methodology 65 

Appendix II Visa Waiver Countries 70 

Appendix III Legislative Overview of the US-VISIT Program 71 

Appendix IV The 20 Busiest Land Ports of Entry (POE) by Volume 

of Individuals Entering the United States in Fiscal 

Year 2005 75 

Appendix V Land Ports of Entry (POE) at Which US-VISIT Has 

Been Installed 76 

Appendix VI Actions Taken by US-VISIT Program Office to Mitigate 

Privacy Risks Associated with RFID at Land POEs 81 

Page i GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix VII US-VISIT Test of Radio Frequency Identification 

(RFID) Readers Upon Exit and Re-entry at Selected 

Land POEs 84 

Appendix VIII Comments from the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security 89 

Appendix IX GAO Contact and Acknowledgments 93 

Tables 

Table 1: Summary of the Scope, Schedule for Completion, and 

Intended Functionality of the US-VISIT Increment 

Schedule 13

Table 2: US-VISIT Appropriations Enacted, Fiscal Years 2003 

Through 2007 (in millions of dollars) 13 

Table 3: Land POEs visited by GAO, August 2005 to February 2006 66 

Table 4: Countries Participating in the Visa Waiver Program 70 

Table 5: RFID Read Rate Test Results for Persons in Vehicles and 

Pedestrians Exiting the Country with RFID-Readable 

Documents 85

Table 6: RFID Test Read Rates for Persons Re-Entering the 

Country in Vehicles at Locations Where US-VISIT Tested 

RFID Technology 87 

Table 7: RFID Test Read Rates for Pedestrians Re-entering the

Country at Locations Where US-VISIT Tested RFID 

Technology 87

Figures 

Figure 1: Persons Processed under US-VISIT as a Percentage of all 

Border Crossings at Land, Air, and Sea Ports of Entry, 

Fiscal Year 2004 16 

Figure 2: US-VISIT Equipment (computer, camera, and printer) at a 

Land POE Secondary Inspection Area 18 

Page ii GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Figure 3: Overview of US-VISIT Enrollment at Land POEs for 

Visitors with and without Visas Entering the Country for 

the First Time 20 

Figure 4a: Land POE at Blaine-Peace Arch in Blaine, Washington 21 

Figure 4b: Land POE Facility at the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel in 

Detroit, Michigan 22 

Figure 4c: Land POE Facility at Rouses Point, New York 23 

Figure 5: Nogales-Morley Gate POE, Arizona 28 

Figure 6: Aerial View of San Ysidro, California, POE 40 

Figure 7a: Metal Gantry with RFID Readers and Antennas at the 

Thousand Islands Bridge POE, Alexandria Bay, New York 45 

Figure 7b: RFID Portals Positioned Next to Exit Doors at the 

Blaine-Peace Arch POE in Washington State 46 

Figure 8a: RFID Installation at the Nogales-Mariposa POE in 

Arizona, Facing Toward Mexico 49 

Figure 8b. Two Pedestrians Exiting the Country at the NogalesMariposa POE, Arizona, Walking Toward Mexico 50 

Page iii GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Abbreviations 

AIDMS Automated Identification Management System 

APIS Advance Passenger Information System 

BCC Border Crossing Card 

CBP Customs and Border Protection 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DMIA Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management 

 Improvement Act 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

IDENT Automated Biometric Identification System 

IIRIRA Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 

 Responsibility Act 

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

POE port of entry 

RFID radio frequency identification 

SBI Secure Border Initiative

TECS Treasury Enforcement Communications System 

US-VISIT United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 

 Technology 

VWP Visa Waiver Program 

WHTI Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page iv GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

December 6, 2006 

Congressional Requesters

This report is a publicly available version of our report on the 

implementation of the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 

Technology (US-VISIT) program at land ports of entry (POE).1

 Our 

original report was designated For Official Use Only because, according to 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), it contained specific 

information of a sensitive nature. 

In the years since the 2001 terrorist attacks, the need to secure U.S. 

borders has taken on added importance and has received increasing 

attention from Congress and the public. In an effort to avoid repetition of 

such attacks, and improve overall national security, Congress and the 

Administration have sought better ways to record and track the entry and

departure of foreign visitors who pass through U.S. POEs by air, land, or 

sea, to verify their identities, and to authenticate their travel 

documentation. In March 2003, responsibility for these efforts was 

transferred from the former Immigration and Naturalization Service to

DHS. Pursuant to several statutory mandates, DHS, in consultation with 

the Department of State, established an automated visitor system to 

integrate information on the entry and exit from the United States of 

foreign nationals, called the US-VISIT Program. 

According to DHS, the purpose of US-VISIT is to enhance the security of 

U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and trade, ensure the 

integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and protect visitors’ privacy. The 

program is managed by the US-VISIT Program Office, which is headed by 

the US-VISIT Director, who currently reports to the DHS Deputy Secretary. 

US-VISIT is used in the field by officers with U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), a separate DHS component. US-VISIT processing is one 

of many activities that takes place at POEs, where CBP officers enforce 

U.S. immigration laws governing the admissibility of the millions of aliens

entering and U.S. citizens reentering the country daily; screen cargo for 

 1

 A port of entry is generally a physical location, such as a pedestrian walkway and/or a

vehicle plaza with booths, and associated inspection and administration buildings, at a land 

border crossing point, or a restricted area inside an airport or seaport, where entry into the

country by persons and cargo arriving by air, land, or sea is controlled by U.S. Customs and

Border Protection (CBP). 

Page 1 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
weapons or illegal or dangerous goods; prevent narcotics, agricultural 

pests, and smuggled goods from entering the country; and identify and

arrest those with outstanding criminal warrants. 

US-VISIT is designed to use biographic information (e.g., name, 

nationality, and date of birth) and biometric information (e.g., digital 

fingerprint scans and photographs) to verify the identity of those covered

by the program. The program applies to certain visitors whether they hold 

a nonimmigrant visa or are traveling from a country that has a visa waiver 

agreement with the United States under the Visa Waiver Program.2

 U.S. 

citizens, lawful permanent residents, and most Canadian and Mexican3

citizens are currently exempt from being processed under US-VISIT upon 

entering and exiting the country.4

 Foreign nationals subject to US-VISIT 

who intend to enter the country encounter different inspection processes 

at different types of POEs depending on their mode of travel. Foreign 

nationals subject to US-VISIT who intend to enter the United States at an 

air or sea POE are to be processed, for purposes of US-VISIT, in the 

primary inspection area upon arrival. Generally, these visitors are subject 

to prescreening before they arrive via passenger manifests, which are 

 2

The Visa Waiver Program enables nationals of certain countries to travel to the United 

States for tourism or business for stays of 90 days or less without obtaining a visa. Most 

western European countries participate in this program, along with Japan, Singapore, 

Australia, Brunei, and New Zealand. Appendix II lists all 27 Visa Waiver Program countries. 

3

To visit the United States, Mexican citizens generally need either a Mexican passport and 

U.S. visa, or a Border Crossing Card (BCC), which is issued to Mexican visitors who wish

to enter the country for business or pleasure for no more than 6 months. The BCC contains

machine-readable biographic and biometric information. Mexican citizens with BCCs who 

are traveling within 25 miles of the border, (75 miles in Arizona, if entering through certain

POEs near Tucson) and who plan to stay no more than 30 days, are generally not subject to

US-VISIT processing upon entry. A Mexican citizen is subject to US-VISIT requirements, 

however, if a CBP officer determines that the entrant intends to stay more than 30 days or 

travel beyond the 25- or 75-mile limit. 

4

On July 27, 2006 DHS issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that, if finalized, would 

expand the scope of US-VISIT to include, among others, lawful permanent residents, aliens

seeking admission on immigrant visas, refugees and asylees, and certain categories of 

Canadians. DHS did not report how many additional persons would be covered by USVISIT if the rule were adopted. 

Page 2 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
forwarded to CBP by commercial air or sea carrier in advance of arrival.5

By contrast, foreign nationals intending to enter the United States at land

POEs are generally not subject to prescreening because they arrive in 

private vehicles or on foot and there is no manifest to record their pending

arrival. Thus, when foreign nationals subject to US-VISIT arrive at a land 

POE, they are directed by CBP officers from the primary inspection area

to the secondary inspection area for further processing. At all POEs, 

visitors covered by US-VISIT who are determined to be admissible are 

issued an I-94 arrival/departure form, which, among other things, records 

their date of arrival and the date their authorized period of admission 

expires. The requirement that arriving nonimmigrants admitted to the 

United States, unless otherwise exempted, be issued an I-94 as evidence of 

the terms of their admission predates implementation of US-VISIT and was 

incorporated into US-VISIT processing.6

Many aspects of US-VISIT program implementation have been driven or 

defined by various legislative mandates. These include a 2001 statutory 

requirement to focus particularly on the use of biometric technology in 

developing the integrated entry-exit system subsequently named US-VISIT; 

a 2002 statutory requirement to develop biometric identifier standards to 

be used to verify the identity of persons seeking to enter the United States

at POEs; and a requirement to install at all POEs equipment and software 

to allow biometric comparison and authentication of U.S. visas and other

travel and entry documents issued to aliens, as well as Visa Waiver 

Program participant passports. In addition, by law, an integrated entry and

exit data system was to be implemented at all U.S. POEs, including land 

POEs, by December 31, 2005, but there was no specific requirement to 

collect any new data on foreign nationals departing at land POEs by that 

 5

Under the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-

173, § 402(a), 116 Stat. 543, 557-59), commercial air and sea carriers are to transmit crew 

and passenger manifests to appropriate immigration officials before arrival of an aircraft or 

vessel in the United States. These manifests are transmitted to CBP through the Advanced 

Passenger Information System (APIS), which helps officers identify (1) those arrivals for 

which biometric data are available and (2) foreign nationals who need to be scrutinized 

more closely. 

6

Visitors traveling on nonimmigrant visas are issued Form I-94 and visitors from Visa 

Waiver Program countries are issued Form I-94W. Both forms show the date of arrival, port 

of entry, and date the authorized period of admission expires. Whereas passengers arriving 

on commercial air or sea liners are to fill out portions of an I-94 or I-94W arrival and 

departure form on the carrier in advance of arriving, visitors subject to US-VISIT at land 

POEs are to provide information for I-94s and I-94Ws during the inspection process, and

the forms are issued after the process is completed. 

Page 3 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
date. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, on 

the other hand, did require the collection of biometric exit data for all 

individuals subject to US-VISIT, but it did not set a deadline for 

implementation of this requirement. 

The United States shares over 7,500 miles of land border with Canada and 

Mexico and currently, CBP operates 170 land POEs on the northern border 

with Canada and the southwest border with Mexico. These POEs are 

diverse in nature, with some operating in urban areas, such as Detroit, 

Michigan, and others operating in remote areas, such as the northern 

plains in Montana or along the southwest border. Taken together, land 

POEs process the largest number of visitors to the United States each year 

among all POEs (about 79 percent of about 425 million total border 

crossings during fiscal year 2004) and process fewer US-VISIT eligible 

visitors as compared to other POEs (about 11 percent of about 42 million 

border crossings processed via US-VISIT during fiscal year 2004). 

As US-VISIT was being installed at land POEs, questions arose about the 

impact the program was having on the existing POE facilities where 

legitimate land-border crossings take place, particularly in light of a goal, 

stated by a former DHS Undersecretary, to develop a “smart border—one 

that speeds through legitimate trade and travel, but stops terrorists in their 

tracks.” We were asked to review implementation of US-VISIT at land POE 

facilities. Specifically, we analyzed the following issues: (1) What has the 

US-VISIT Program Office done to implement US-VISIT entry capabilities at 

land POEs and what impact has US-VISIT had on these facilities? (2) What 

is the status of US-VISIT Program Office efforts to implement a US-VISIT 

exit capability at land POE facilities? (3) What has DHS done to define a 

strategic context to show how US-VISIT entry and exit capabilities at land 

POE facilities fit with other current and emerging border security 

initiatives? 

To meet our objectives, we met with officials at CBP and the US-VISIT 

Program Office within DHS in Washington, D.C. We reviewed applicable 

laws and regulations and studies on the US-VISIT program and examined 

available DHS documents on US-VISIT entry and exit capability and 

deployment at land POEs. We also visited 21 selected land POEs on the 

northern and southern borders where US-VISIT entry capability had been 

installed. Along the northern border, we visited land POEs at the Windsor 

Tunnel and Ambassador Bridge in Detroit, Michigan; the Thousand Islands 

Bridge at Alexandria Bay, Champlain, Overton Corners, and Rouses Point 

in northern New York State; Highgate Springs and Alburg Springs in 

northern Vermont; and Blaine-Pacific Highway and Blaine-Peace Arch in 

Page 4 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Blaine, Washington. Along the southern border, we visited the DeConcini,

Morley Gate, and Mariposa POEs in Nogales, Arizona; the POE in San 

Ysidro in California; and POEs in Brownsville-Matamoros Bridge, 

Brownsville-Gateway, and Brownsville-Los Tomates/Veterans 

International Bridge, Hidalgo, Progreso, Pharr, and Los Ebanos in Texas. 

We selected these locations to ensure coverage on both borders and to 

obtain a mix of sites with varied types of environments and levels of traffic 

volume. Where feasible, we also chose to visit some geographically 

proximate POEs to minimize travel costs. In addition, five of these POEs 

(Thousand Islands Bridge, Blaine-Peace Arch, Blaine-Pacific Highway, 

DeConcini, and Mariposa) had been designated by DHS as locations to test 

exit technology. At all the locations we visited, we observed how US-VISIT 

equipment was installed and operated and interviewed CBP officials about 

US-VISIT installation and operations following deployment. We also 

observed the impacts of US-VISIT equipment and operations on POE 

facilities and infrastructures. In addition, we examined whether internal 

control mechanisms were in place and being used to ensure that program 

objectives were being achieved, consistent with GAO’s Standards for 

Internal Controls in the Federal Government.7

 The information from our 

site visits is limited to the 21 land ports we visited and is not generalizable 

to all land ports of entry. Appendix I discusses our scope and methodology 

in greater detail. 

We conducted our work from September 2005 through October 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

DHS has installed the entry portion of US-VISIT at 154 of the nation’s 170 

land POEs,8

 usually with minimal new construction or changes to existing 

facilities. As required by law, the US-VISIT entry capability includes 

biometric features—such as digital scans of 2 fingerprints—to help verify 

the identity of visitors. CBP officials at all 21 land POEs we visited told us 

that US-VISIT’s entry capability has generally enhanced their ability to 

process visitors subject to US-VISIT by providing assurance that visitors’ 

Results in Brief 

 7

GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999), and GAO, Internal Control

Standards: Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G 

(Washington, D.C.: August 2001). 

8

US-VISIT was not installed at 14 of the 16 other POEs because visitors subject to US-VISIT 

are not permitted to enter the country at those locations; at the other 2 POEs, DHS lacked

the infrastructure needed to install the equipment. 

Page 5 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
identities can be confirmed through biometric identifiers and by 

automating the paperwork associated with processing I-94 

arrival/departure forms. Going forward, DHS plans to introduce changes

and enhancements to US-VISIT at land POEs intended to further bolster 

CBP’s ability to verify the identity of individuals entering the country, 

including a transition from digitally scanning 2 fingerprints to 10. While 

such changes are intended to further enhance border security, deploying 

them may have an impact on aging and space-constrained land POE 

facilities because they could increase inspection times and adversely 

affect POE operations. Moreover, our previous and current work showed 

that the US-VISIT program office had not taken necessary steps to help 

ensure that US-VISIT entry capability operates as intended. For example, 

in February 2006 we reported that the approach taken by the US-VISIT 

program office to evaluate the impact of US-VISIT on land POE facilities 

focused on changes in I-94 processing time at 5 POEs and did not examine 

other operational factors, such as US-VISIT’s impact on physical facilities 

or work force requirements.9

 As a result, program officials did not always 

have the information they needed to anticipate problems that occurred, 

such as problems processing high volumes of visitors in space constrained 

facilities. Turning to another aspect of our evaluation, our standards for 

internal controls in the federal government state that it is important for 

agencies to have controls in place to help ensure that policies and 

procedures are applied and that managers be made aware of problems so 

that that they can be addressed and resolved in a timely fashion.10 CBP 

officials at 12 of 21 land POE sites we visited told us about US-VISITrelated computer slowdowns and freezes which adversely affected visitor 

processing and inspection times and at 9 of the 12 sites, computer 

processing problems were not always reported to CBP’s computer help 

desk, as required by CBP guidelines. Although various controls are in 

place to alert US-VISIT and CBP officials to problems as they occur, these

controls did not alert officials to all problems, given they had been 

unaware of the problems we identified before we brought them to their 

attention. These computer processing problems have the potential to not 

only inconvenience travelers because of the increased time needed to

complete the inspection process, but to compromise security, particularly 

if CBP officers are unable to perform biometric checks—one of the critical

reasons US-VISIT was installed at POEs. Our internal control standards 

 9

GAO, Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Key Border Security Programs 

Need to Be Implemented, GAO-06-296 (Washington, D.C.: February 2006). 

10GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 and GAO-01-1008G. 

Page 6 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
also call for agencies to establish performance measures throughout the 

organization so that actual performance can be compared to expected

results. While the US-VISIT program office established performance 

measures for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 intended to gauge performance of 

various aspects of US-VISIT at air, sea and land POEs in the aggregate, 

performance measures specifically for land POEs have not been 

developed. It is important to do so, given that there are significant 

operational and facility differences among these different types of POEs. 

Additional performance measures that consider operational and facility 

differences at land POEs would put US-VISIT program officials in a better 

position to identify problems, trends, and areas needing improvements. 

US-VISIT has concluded that, for various reasons, it cannot currently 

implement a biometric US-VISIT exit capability without incurring a major 

impact on land POE facilities. According to officials, implementing a 

biometrically based exit recording system like that used to record those 

entering or re-entering the country is potentially costly (an estimated $3 

billion), would require new infrastructure, and would produce major 

traffic congestion because travelers would have to stop their vehicles 

upon exit to be processed—an option officials consider unacceptable. USVISIT officials stated that they believe technological advances over the 

next 5 to 10 years will enable the biometric verification of persons exiting 

the country without a major impact on facilities. In the interim, the USVISIT program office is testing radio frequency identification (RFID) 

technology as a nonbiometric means of recording visitors as they exit.

RFID technology can be used to electronically identify and gather 

information contained on a tag—in this case, a unique identifying number 

embedded in a tag on a visitor’s arrival/departure form—which an 

electronic reader at the POE is intended to detect. While RFID technology 

has thus far required few facility and infrastructure changes, US-VISIT’s 

initial testing and analysis of this technology has identified numerous 

performance and reliability problems, such as the failure of RFID readers 

to detect a majority of travelers’ tags during testing. Additional testing is

planned to address such problems. Nevertheless, the RFID solution does 

not meet the statutory requirement for a biometric exit capability because 

the technology as tested cannot meet a key goal of US-VISIT—ensuring 

that visitors who enter the country are the same ones who leave. 

Specifically, the RFID tag in the visitor’s arrival/departure form cannot be 

physically tied to an individual, which means that while a document may 

be detected as leaving the country, the person to whom it was issued at 

time of entry may be somewhere else. By statute, DHS was to have 

reported to Congress by June 2005 on how it intended to fully implement 

an entry/exit program. This plan is to include, among other things, a 

Page 7 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
description of the manner in which the US-VISIT program meets the goals

of a comprehensive entry and exit screening system—including both 

biometric entry and exit—and how it will fulfill statutory obligations. As of 

October 2006, this plan was still under review in the Office of the 

Secretary, according to US-VISIT officials. Without such a plan, DHS 

cannot articulate how entry/exit concepts fit together—including any 

interim nonbiometric solutions—and neither DHS nor Congress is in a 

good position to prioritize and allocate resources, including funds for any 

facility modifications that might be needed, for a US-VISIT exit capability, 

to plan for the program’s future, or to consider trade-offs between traveler 

convenience and security. 

DHS has not yet articulated how US-VISIT is to strategically fit with other 

land-border security initiatives and mandates, and thus cannot ensure that 

these programs work in harmony to meet mission goals and operate cost

effectively. As we reported 3 years ago, agency programs need to properly 

fit within a common strategic context governing key aspects of program 

operations, such as what functions are to be performed, what facility or 

infrastructure changes will be needed to ensure that they operate in 

harmony and as intended, and what standards govern the use of 

technology. DHS has drafted a strategic plan defining an overall 

immigration and border management strategy, but has not yet approved it, 

and did not provide it to us for review. Meanwhile, new border security 

initiatives or mandates are planned or under way that could potentially 

have an impact on US-VISIT operations and facilities at land POEs. For 

example, no later than June 2009, U.S. citizens and foreign nationals of 

Canada, Bermuda, and Mexico will be required, for the first time, to 

present a passport or other documents deemed sufficient to show identity 

and citizenship when entering the country from within the western 

hemisphere. It is not yet known what types of documents, other than 

passports, may be permitted at land POEs, or whether these documents 

and the equipment required to read them can be aligned with US-VISIT 

technologies. Until decisions for this and other initiatives are made, it 

remains unclear how this program will be integrated with US-VISIT, if at 

all—raising the possibility that CBP would be faced with managing 

differing technology platforms and border inspection processes at each 

land POE. Knowing how US-VISIT is to work in concert with other border 

security and homeland security initiatives and what facility or facility 

modifications might be needed could help Congress, DHS, and others 

better understand what resources and tools are needed to ensure success 

and ensure that land POE facilities are positioned to accommodate them. 

Page 8 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
To help DHS optimize its investment in US-VISIT at land POEs, we are 

recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the USVISIT Program Director, in collaboration with the Commissioner of CBP, 

to (1) improve existing controls for identifying and reporting computer 

processing and other operational problems to help ensure that these 

controls are consistently administered and (2) develop performance 

measures specifically for assessing the impact of US-VISIT operations at 

land POEs. Also, in view of the fact that DHS has not met the statutory 

requirement that it issue a report describing a comprehensive biometric 

entry and exit system for US-VISIT, we are also recommending that as 

DHS finalizes the mandated report, the Secretary of Homeland Security 

take steps to ensure that the report includes, among other things, 

information on the costs, benefits, and feasibility of deploying biometric 

and nonbiometric exit capabilities at land POEs; a discussion of how DHS 

intends to move from a nonbiometric exit capability, such as the 

technology currently being tested, to a reliable biometric exit capability 

that meets statutory requirements; and a description of how DHS plans to 

align US-VISIT with other emerging land border security initiatives and 

what facilities or facility modifications would be needed at land POEs to 

ensure that different technologies and processes work in harmony. 

DHS generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that it either

had begun to take or is planning to take actions to implement them. It 

acknowledged that the exit technology tested by DHS would not satisfy 

statutory requirements for a biometric exit system and said that it would 

perform research and industry outreach to satisfy the mandate. DHS, 

however, disagreed with our finding that the US-VISIT program office did 

not fully consider the impact of US-VISIT on the overall operations at 

POEs. It said that US-VISIT impacts are limited to changes in Form I-94 

processing time, which according to officials improved, and that issues 

related to capacity, staffing, and other factors are “arguably” beyond the 

scope of US-VISIT. We agree that the approach taken to do operational 

assessments of the impact of US-VISIT land POE facilities focused on 

changes to I-94 processing time. Our concern is that the assessments did 

not examine other operational factors, such as US-VISIT’s impact on 

physical facilities, to help ensure that US-VISIT operates as intended. We 

believe more complete assessments of the impact of US-VISIT on land 

POE operations would better position DHS to anticipate potential 

problems and develop solutions, especially as additional US-VISIT 

capabilities, such as 10 fingerprint scanning, are introduced at these 

facilities. 

Page 9 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
US-VISIT is a large, complex governmentwide program intended to 

achieve the goals of (1) enhancing the security of U.S. citizens and visitors, 

(2) facilitating legitimate travel and trade, (3) ensuring the integrity of the 

U.S. immigration system, and (4) protecting the privacy of visitors. The 

program is intended to carry out these goals by 

• collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on certain foreign 

nationals who enter and exit the United States; 

• identifying foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the 

terms of their visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their immigration 

status; or (3) should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement 

officials; 

• detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying visitor identity, and 

determining visitor admissibility through the use of biometrics (digital 

fingerprints and a digital photograph); and 

• facilitating information sharing and coordination within the 

immigration and border management community. 

Currently, US-VISIT’s scope includes the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit 

of hundreds of millions of foreign national travelers who enter and leave 

the United States at over 300 air, sea, and land POEs. 

The current statutory framework for US-VISIT originates with a 

requirement to implement an integrated entry and exit data system for 

foreign nationals, enacted in the Immigration and Naturalization Service 

Data Management Improvement Act (DMIA) of 2000.11 The DMIA replaced 

in its entirety a provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 

Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) that had required an automated system 

to record and then match the departure of every foreign national from the 

United States to the individual’s arrival record.12 The DMIA instead 

required an electronic system that would provide access to and integrate 

foreign national arrival and departure data that are authorized or required 

to be created or collected under law and are in an electronic format in 

certain databases, such as those used at POEs and consular offices. Unlike 

the earlier law, the DMIA specifically provided that it not be interpreted to 

impose any new documentary or data collection requirements on any 

person, but it also provided that it not be construed to reduce or curtail 

Background 

Legislative Overview 

 118 U.S.C. § 1365a. 

12Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 110, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-558-59. 

Page 10 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
the authority of DHS or State under any other provision of law. Thus, the 

DMIA did not specifically require the collection of any new data on foreign 

nationals departing at land POEs. 

The system as described in the DMIA is to compare available arrival 

records to available departure records; allow on-line search procedures to 

identify foreign nationals who may have overstayed their authorized 

period of admission; and use available data to produce a report of arriving 

and departing foreign nationals. The DMIA also required the 

implementation of the system at airports and seaports by December 31, 

2003, at the 50 highest volume land POEs by December 31, 2004; and at all 

remaining POEs by December 31, 2005. 

Laws passed after the DMIA also provided specific requirements with 

regard to the use of biometrics for those entering and leaving the country. 

For example, the USA PATRIOT Act required, by October 26, 2003, the 

development and certification of a technology standard, including 

appropriate biometric identifier standards, that can be used to verify the

identity of persons applying for a U.S. visa, or seeking to enter the United 

States pursuant to a visa, for the purposes of conducting background 

checks, confirming identity, and ensuring that a person has not received a 

visa under a different name.13 The act also provided that in developing USVISIT, DHS and State were to focus particularly on the utilization of 

biometric technology and the development of tamper-resistant documents 

readable at POEs. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform 

Act of 2002 required DHS and State to implement, fund, and use the 

technology standard, including biometric identifier standards, developed 

under the USA PATRIOT Act at U.S. POEs; it also required the installation 

at all POEs of equipment and software to allow biometric comparison and 

authentication of all U.S. visas and other travel and entry documents 

issued to aliens, and passports issued by Visa Waiver Program 

participating countries with biometric identifiers. The Intelligence Reform

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,

14 unlike the DMIA, specifically 

required the collection of biometric exit data for all categories of 

individuals required to provide biometric entry data under US-VISIT, 

regardless of the port of entry where they entered the United States. The 

 138 U.S.C. § 1379. The official title of the USA PATRIOT Act is the Uniting and 

Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 

Terrorism Act of 2001. 

14Pub. L. No. 108-458. 

Page 11 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
2004 law did not set a deadline for implementation of this requirement, 

however. Appendix III discusses the legislative history of the US-VISIT 

program in greater detail.

Management and 

Implementation of USVISIT 

Within DHS, the US-VISIT Program Office is headed by the US-VISIT 

Director, who reports directly to the Deputy Secretary for Homeland 

Security. The US-VISIT Program Office has responsibility for managing the 

acquisition, deployment, operation, and sustainment of US-VISIT and has 

been delivering US-VISIT capability incrementally. According to US-VISIT, 

increments 1 and 2 include a mix of interim or temporary solutions and 

permanent deployments. For example, increment 1B, dealing with exit 

capability at airports, is still being piloted, while US-VISIT entry capability 

at the 50 busiest land POEs—increment 2B—is considered to be a 

permanent deployment. Increment 3—providing entry capability at the

land POEs not covered under Increment 2B—is considered by US-VISIT to 

be a permanent deployment and increment 4 is, according to US-VISIT, the 

yet-to-be defined US-VISIT strategic capability. Table 1 summarizes the 

scope, timeline, and intended functionality of the US-VISIT increment 

schedule. This report focuses generally, but not exclusively, on increments 

2B (entry capability at the 50 busiest land POEs), 2C (exit capability at the 

50 busiest land POEs), and 3 (entry capability at the remaining land 

POEs)—the increments and information that are shown in bold in table 1. 

Page 12 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Table 1: Summary of the Scope, Schedule for Completion, and Intended Functionality of the US-VISIT Increment Schedule 

Increment Scope

Schedule for

completion Intended functionality

A Entry at air and sea ports of 

entry 

Jan. 5, 2004aDeliver the initial operational biometric entry capability to 

115 air and 14 sea ports. 

1 

B Exit at air and sea ports of entry Nov. 30, 2004 Evaluate exit pilot alternatives at 13 air and 2 seaports. 

A Read visas and other travel 

documents embedded with 

biometric information upon entry 

at all ports of entry 

Oct. 26, 2006 Deliver the initial operating capability to compare and 

verify biometric data embedded in machine-readable 

visas and other travel documents at all ports of entry. 

B Entry at 50 busiest land ports 

of entry 

Dec. 31, 2004bProvide biometric entry capability at the 50 busiest 

land ports of entry, including an automated process 

for issuing the I-94 entry and exit form. 

2 

C Exit and reentry at land ports 

of entry 

Jul. 2005-undefined Automate recording of exit and reentry at busiest 50 

land ports of entry. 

3 Remaining land ports of entry Dec. 31, 2005bProvide increment 2B entry capability at remaining 

land ports. 

4 Undefined Undefined Define, design, build, and implement a strategic USVISIT capability.c

Source: US-VISIT Program Office. 

Note: Bold text reflects increments primarily focused on land POEs. 

a

The statutory deadline for implementing US-VISIT at air and sea ports of entry was December 31, 

2003; the Federal Register notice announcing implementation of increment 1A by that date was 

published on January 5, 2004. 

b

Denotes a statutory deadline. 

c

According to US-VISIT program officials, increment 4 will likely consist of a further series of 

enhancements. 

From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2007, total funding for the USVISIT program has been about $1.7 billion. Table 2 summarizes 

appropriations for US-VISIT for fiscal years 2003 through 2007, as enacted. 

Table 2: US-VISIT Appropriations Enacted, Fiscal Years 2003 Through 2007 (in millions of dollars) 

Budget activity

2003 

 appropriated

2004

 appropriated 

2005

 appropriated

2006 

 appropriated 

2007

 appropriated

US-VISIT $362 $328 $340 $337 $362

Source: US-VISIT Program Office. 

Note: Starting in Fiscal Year 2004, funding for the US-VISIT program has been appropriated on a “noyear” basis, meaning that there is no time limit on the spending of appropriated funds; funds that 

remain unexpended at the end of a fiscal year are carried over into the next fiscal year. 

Page 13 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
In prior reports on US-VISIT, we have identified numerous challenges that 

DHS faces in delivering program capabilities and benefits on time and 

within budget. In September 2003, we reported that the US-VISIT program 

is a risky endeavor, both because of the type of program it is (large, 

complex, and potentially costly) and because of the way that it was being 

managed.15 We reported, for example, that the program’s acquisition 

management process had not been established, and that US-VISIT lacked a 

governance structure. In March 2004, we testified that DHS faces a major 

challenge maintaining border security while still welcoming visitors. 

Preventing the entry of persons who pose a threat to the United States 

cannot be guaranteed, and the missed entry of just one can have severe 

consequences. Also, US-VISIT is to achieve the important law enforcement 

goal of identifying those who overstay or otherwise violate the terms of 

their visas. Complicating the achievement of these security and law 

enforcement goals are other key US-VISIT goals: facilitating trade and 

travel through POEs and providing for enforcement of U.S. privacy laws 

and regulations.16 Subsequently, in May 2004, we reported that DHS had 

not employed the kind of rigorous and disciplined management controls 

typically associated with successful programs.17 Moreover, in February 

2006, we reported that while DHS had taken steps to implement most of 

the recommendations from our 2003 and 2004 reports, progress in critical

areas had been slow.18 Of 18 recommendations we made since 2003, only 2 

had been fully implemented, 11 had been partially implemented, and 5 

were in the process of being implemented, although the extent to which 

they would be fully carried out was not yet known. 

US-VISIT Scope, 

Operations, and 

Processing at Land POEs 

As mentioned earlier, US-VISIT currently applies to a certain group of 

foreign nationals—non-immigrants from countries whose residents are 

required to obtain nonimmigrant visas before entering the United States 

and residents of certain countries who are exempt from U.S. visa 

requirements when they apply for admission to the United States for up to

 15GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security

Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083 (Washington, D.C.: September 2003). 

16GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security

Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-04-569T (Washington, D.C.: March 2004). 

17GAO, Homeland Security: First Phase of Visitor and Immigration Status Program

Operating, but Improvements Needed, GAO-04-586 (Washington, D.C.: May 2004).

18GAO-06-296. 

Page 14 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
90 days for tourism or business purposes under the Visa Waiver Program.19

US-VISIT also applies to (1) Mexican nonimmigrants traveling with a 

Border Crossing Card (BCC) who wish to remain in the United States 

longer than 30 days or who declare that they intend to travel more than 25 

miles into the country from the border (or more than 75 miles from the 

Arizona border in the Tucson area)20 and (2) Canadians traveling to the 

United States for certain specialized reasons.21

Most land border crossers—including U.S. citizens, lawful permanent 

residents, and most Canadian and Mexican citizens—are, by regulation or 

statute, not required to enroll into US-VISIT.22 In fiscal year 2004, for 

example, U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents comprised about 57 

percent of land border crossers; Canadian and Mexican citizens comprised 

 19Certain holders of nonimmigrant visas, such as foreign diplomats and other

representatives of foreign governments, and representatives of certain international 

organizations, are expressly exempted from US-VISIT requirements by regulation, as are 

individuals who are younger than 14 or older than 79 on the date of admission. 8 C.F.R. §

235.1(d)(1)(iv)(A), (B). 

20Under 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(d)(1)(iv)(C), DHS and the State Department may jointly exempt a

class of aliens from US-VISIT requirements. On August 31, 2004, DHS announced in the

Federal Register that the two agencies had determined that US-VISIT requirements 

generally would apply only to Mexican nationals for whom a Form I-94 is issued under 8

C.F.R. § 235.1(f)(1)(iii) or (v). This means that Mexican nationals using a BCC who are 

admitted for no more than 30 days to visit within 25 miles of the border (or to visit within 

75 miles of the Arizona border, if entering through certain POEs in Arizona) generally are 

not subject to US-VISIT requirements. 69 Fed. Reg. 53,318, 53,323 (2004). The CBP officer 

determines the intent of an applicant for admission through the inspection process at a

port of entry, in which the applicant must establish that he or she is entitled to enter the

United States under all applicable laws and regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(d)(1). If a Mexican 

BCC holder is admitted to the United States without an I-94, the terms of that individual’s 

admission to the country are the 30 day/25 mile or 75 mile limits, and violation of those 

terms makes the individual removable from the country and possibly inadmissible in the 

future. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(1), 1182(a)(6), (9).

21These special cases include Canadians who are engaged to American citizens, and 

Canadians who are traveling for the purpose of making major financial investments in the 

United States. 

22Since the statute governing US-VISIT applies to foreign national arrival and departure 

data only, U.S. citizens do not fall within the scope of the program and therefore are 

exempt from US-VISIT screening. Also, in general, regardless of whether they are to be 

processed into US-VISIT, Mexican citizens must present either a passport and visa or a 

BCC when seeking admission to the United States, while Canadian citizens generally do not 

need such documents. According to US-VISIT, when Mexicans receive a BCC, the data on

the individual entered into U.S. databases at the time of their visa application are

accessible by US-VISIT—if they are to be processed into it for any reason. 

Page 15 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
about 41 percent; and less than 2 percent were US-VISIT enrollees. 

Figure 1 shows the number and percent of persons processed under USVISIT as a percentage of all border crossings at land, air, and sea POEs in 

fiscal year 2004. 

Figure 1: Persons Processed under US-VISIT as a Percentage of all Border Crossings at Land, Air, and Sea Ports of Entry, 

Fiscal Year 2004 

1.4%

Source: GAO analysts of DHS data.

42.2% 38.8%

Total entering United States:

335.3 million

Total entering United States:

75.1 million

Total entering United States:

14.7 million

Land ports of entry Air ports of entry Sea ports of entry

Processed by US-VISIT

Not processed by US-VISIT

98.6%

57.8% 61.2%

Note: Persons processed by US-VISIT may include foreign nationals who were also issued an I-94 

valid for multiple entries and who have re-entered multiple times. Total entering the U.S. includes 

U.S. citizens who may have re-entered the country multiple times and foreign nationals, including 

those not issued I-94s, such as Canadian citizens and Mexicans with BCCs, and those issued 

multiple entry I-94s who also may have re-entered multiple times. U.S. citizens do not fall within the 

statutory scope of US-VISIT and therefore are exempt from US-VISIT screening. 

Foreign nationals covered by US-VISIT enter the United States via a multistep process. For individuals required to obtain visas before entering the 

United States, the US-VISIT process begins overseas at U.S. consular 

offices, which in addition to other processes, collect biographic data 

(i.e., country of origin and date of birth) and biometric data (i.e., digital 

fingerscans and a digital photograph) from the applicant. These data are 

checked against databases or watch lists of known criminals and 

suspected terrorists. If the individual’s name does not appear on any watch 

Page 16 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
list and the individual is not disqualified on the basis of other issues that 

may be relevant, he or she is to be issued a visa and may seek admission to 

the United States at a POE. 

When visitors in vehicles first arrive at a land POE, they initially enter the

primary inspection area where CBP officers, often located in booths, are 

to visually inspect travel documents and query the visitors about such 

matters as their place of birth and proposed destination. Visitors arriving 

as pedestrians enter an equivalent primary inspection area, generally 

inside a CBP building. If the CBP officer believes a more detailed

inspection is needed or if the visitors are required to be processed under 

US-VISIT for the first time,23 the visitors are to be referred to the secondary 

inspection area—an area away from the primary inspection area—which is 

generally inside a facility. The secondary inspection area inside the facility 

generally contains office space, waiting areas, and space to process 

visitors, including US-VISIT enrollees. Equipment used for US-VISIT 

processing includes a computer, printer, digital camera, and a twofingerprint scanner. Figure 2 shows US-VISIT equipment installed at one 

land POE. 

 23At land border POEs, the I-94 issued to foreign nationals covered by US-VISIT who are

deemed admissible is considered issued for multiple entries, unless specifically annotated 

otherwise. A multiple entry I-94 permits them to reenter the country, generally for up to 6

months, without additional US-VISIT processing during the period covered by the I-94. 

Page 17 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Figure 2: US-VISIT Equipment (computer, camera, and printer) at a Land POE 

Secondary Inspection Area

Source: US-VISIT Program Office.

CBP officers use a document reader to scan machine readable travel 

documents, such as a passport or visa, and use computers to check 

biographic data from the documents against watch list databases. For USVISIT processing, biometric verification is performed in part by taking a 

digital scan of visitors’ fingerprints (the left and right index fingers) and by 

taking a digital photograph of the visitor. These data are stored in the 

system’s databases. The computer system compares the two index 

Page 18 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
fingerprints to those stored in DHS’s Automated Biometric Identification 

System (IDENT) that, among other things, collects and stores biometric 

data about foreign nationals, including FBI information on all known and

suspected terrorists. 

If the fingerprints are already in IDENT, the system performs a match 

against the existing digital scans to confirm that the person submitting the 

fingerprints at secondary inspection at the POE is the one on file. In 

addition, the CBP officer visually compares the person to the photograph

that is in the database, which is brought up onto the computer screen. If 

no prints are found in IDENT (for example, if the visitor is from a visawaiver country), that person is then processed into US-VISIT, with 

biographic data entered into the databases, a digital scan of his or her two

index fingerprints, and a digital photograph. Once the CBP officer deems 

the visitor to be admissible, the individual is issued an I-94 or an I-94W (for

persons from visa waiver countries) arrival/departure form. Figure 3 

shows how U.S. citizens and most Mexicans, Canadians, and foreign 

nationals subject to US-VISIT are to be processed at land POEs. 

Page 19 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Figure 3: Overview of US-VISIT Enrollment at Land POEs for Visitors with and without Visas Entering the Country for the First 

Time

Sources: GAO (analysis), MapArt (map).

Land POE

Primary inspection:

all travelers stop at 

plaza booth for 

identity check

U.S. citizens, U.S. legal permanent 

residents, Mexicans with BCC, and most 

Canadians

Entry into

United States

Most holders of nonimmigrant visas

Visa waiver country travelers

Digital fingerprints and 

digital photo taken

Biographic information 

from passport or visa

is captured and 

checked against 

criminal databases

and watch lists

Interviewed and 

approved for entry by 

CBP officer

Interviewed and 

approved for entry by 

CBP officer

I-94 

issued

Passport or visa

scanned

Entry into

United States

Proceed to secondary 

inspection for 

enrollment in US-VISIT

With visa Secondary 

inspection

Without visa

With visa

Those without a

visa are enrolled 

in US-VISIT

With visa: fingerprints

checked against 

individual’s existing record

Without visa: fingerprints

checked against 

entire database

Note: Most Mexican entrants with BCCs are not required to obtain an I-94 arrival/departure form if 

CBP officers determine that the entrants do not intend to travel more than 25 miles into the country or

stay more than 30 days. If it is determined by the CBP officer that a Mexican citizen intends to exceed

either limit, the entrant is referred to secondary inspection at the POE, where they are to be 

processed into US-VISIT, and issued an I-94 form, if no grounds are found on which to deny them 

entry. According to federal regulation (8 CFR § 235.1(f)(1)(v)(A)), in the Tucson sector, Mexican 

visitors may travel up to 75 miles into the country without being issued an I-94 form, which means that 

they generally would not be processed into US-VISIT upon entry. 

Page 20 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
In addition to IDENT, US-VISIT relies on a number of information systems 

to process visitors. Among the computer software applications utilized as 

part of US-VISIT is U.S. Arrival, which provides an integrated process for 

issuing I-94 forms and collection of biometric data for visitors covered by

US-VISIT who arrive at land POEs. Another is U.S. Pedestrian, which is 

used by CBP officers in conducting inspections of visitors who arrive at 

land POEs, entering the United States on foot, mostly along the southern 

border. 

Overview of Land POE 

Facilities

As of August 2006, there were 170 land POEs that are geographically 

dispersed along the nation’s more than 7,500 miles of borders with Canada 

and Mexico. Some are located in rural areas (such as Alexandria Bay, New 

York and Blaine-Pacific Highway, Washington) and others in cities (such 

as Detroit) or in U.S. cities across from Mexican cities, such as Laredo and

El Paso, Texas. The volume of visitor traffic at these POEs varies widely, 

with the busiest four POEs characterized by CBP as San Ysidro, Calexico, 

and Otay Mesa, California, and Bridge of the Americas in El Paso, Texas. 

Appendix IV lists the 20 busiest land POEs, based on the number of 

individuals in vehicles and pedestrian traffic recorded entering the country 

through POEs in fiscal year 2005. 

From a facilities standpoint, land POEs vary substantially in building type 

and size (square footage) as shown in Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c.

Figure 4a: Land POE at Blaine-Peace Arch in Blaine, Washington

Source: US-VISIT Program Office.

Page 21 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Figure 4b: Land POE Facility at the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel in Detroit, Michigan 

Source: GAO.

Page 22 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Figure 4c: Land POE Facility at Rouses Point, New York

Source: GAO.

DHS has installed US-VISIT biometric entry capability at nearly all land 

POEs consistent with statutory deadlines, but faces challenges identifying 

and monitoring the operational impacts on POE facilities. CBP officials at

the 21 land POEs we visited told us that US-VISIT has generally enhanced

the officials’ ability to process visitors subject to US-VISIT by providing 

officials the ability to do biometric checks and automating the issuance of 

the visitor I-94 arrival/departure form. DHS plans to introduce changes and 

enhancements to US-VISIT at land POEs intended to bolster border 

security, but deploying them poses potential operational challenges to 

land POE facilities that are known by DHS to be space-constrained. USVISIT’s efforts to evaluate the impact of US-VISIT on land POE facilities 

thus far raises questions about whether sufficient management controls 

exist to ensure that additional operational impacts, such as processing 

delays or further space constraints, will be anticipated, identified, and 

appropriately addressed and resolved. 

DHS Has Installed USVISIT Biometric Entry 

Capability at Nearly 

All Land POEs, but 

Faces Challenges 

Identifying and 

Monitoring the 

Operational Impacts 

on POE Facilities 

Page 23 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
In December 2005, DHS officials announced that US-VISIT biometric entry 

capability had been installed at land POEs in conformance with statutory 

mandates and Increments 2B and 3 of DHS’s US-VISIT schedule. 

Deployment at the 50 busiest land POEs was completed by December 31, 

2004, and at all but 2 of the other land POEs where DHS determined the 

program should operate by December 31, 2005, as required by law. Our 

review of US-VISIT records and discussions with US-VISIT program 

officials indicated that DHS installed US-VISIT biometric entry capability 

at 154 of 170 land POEs. (App. V lists all land POEs where US-VISIT has 

been installed.) With regard to 14 of the 16 POEs where US-VISIT was not 

installed, CBP and US-VISIT program office officials told us there was no 

operational need for US-VISIT because visitors who are required to be 

processed into US-VISIT are, by regulation, not authorized to enter the 

United States at these locations.24 Generally, these POEs are small facilities 

in remote areas. At 2 other POEs, US-VISIT needs to be installed in order 

to achieve full implementation as required by law, but both of these 

present significant challenges to installation of US-VISIT. These POEs do 

not currently have access to appropriate communication transmission 

lines to operate US-VISIT. CBP officials told us that, given this constraint, 

they determined that they could continue to operate as before. Thus, CBP 

officers at these locations process foreign visitors manually. 

US-VISIT Biometric Entry 

Capability Was Installed at 

Nearly All Land POEs with 

Minimal Construction, 

According to Program 

Officials 

US-VISIT program officials reported and available records showed that 

equipment for US-VISIT entry capability was installed with minimal 

construction at the 154 land POEs. At the 21 land POEs we visited, we 

observed that US-VISIT entry capability equipment had been installed with 

little or no change to facilities. For example, at the Detroit-Windsor tunnel 

and the Detroit Ambassador Bridge POEs in Detroit, Michigan, officials 

confirmed that no additional computer workstations were required to be 

installed; at the Blaine-Peace Arch POE at Blaine, Washington, electrical 

capacity was upgraded to accommodate US-VISIT computer needs. In 

general, our review of reports prepared for each of these POEs indicated

that DHS upgraded existing or added new computer workstations and 

printers in the secondary inspections areas of these facilities (the area 

where US-VISIT enrollees are processed); installed digital cameras to 

photograph those to be processed in US-VISIT; installed two-fingerprint 

 24According to CBP, these ports are classified as Class B ports. Under 8 C.F.R. §100.4(c)(2),

only citizens of the United States, Canada, and Bermuda, and Lawful Permanent Residents

of the United States and certain holders of border crossing cards may enter through Class 

B ports. Other foreign nationals are allowed to enter the United States only at Class A 

ports.

Page 24 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
scanners that digitally record fingerprints; and installed electronic card 

readers for detecting data embedded in machine-readable passports and 

visas. According to US-VISIT officials, funding for installing US-VISIT entry 

equipment nationwide was approximately $16 million—about 9 percent of 

the $182 million budgeted for US-VISIT deployment at land ports between 

fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2005. Officials reported that the remaining 

funds were allocated to computer network infrastructure (about 72 

percent) and design and development, network engineering, fingerscan 

devices, and public awareness and outreach (about 19 percent).25

During our site visits, CBP officials at all 21 facilities told us that having 

US-VISIT biometric entry capability generally improved their ability to 

process visitors required to enroll in US-VISIT because it provided them 

additional assurance that visitors are who they say they are and automated 

the paperwork associated with processing the I-94 arrival/departure form. 

For example, with US-VISIT, the ability to scan a visitor’s passport or other 

travel document enables the computer at the inspection site to capture 

basic biographic information and automatically print it on the I-94 form; 

prior to US-VISIT deployment, the I-94 was filled in manually by the CBP 

officer or the visitor. 

Steps Have Been Taken to 

Address Operational 

Challenges Identified at 

Land POEs, but DHS May 

Face Additional 

Challenges Resulting from 

Planned Enhancements 

DHS plans to introduce changes and enhancements to US-VISIT at land 

POEs that are designed to further bolster CBP’s ability to verify that 

individuals attempting to enter the country are who they say they are.

While these changes may further aid border security, deploying them 

poses potential challenges to land POE facilities where US-VISIT operates 

and where millions of visitors are processed annually. Our site visits, 

interviews with US-VISIT and CBP officials, and the work of others 

suggest that both before and after US-VISIT entry capability was installed 

at land POEs, these facilities faced a number of challenges—operational 

and physical—including space constraints complicated by the logistics of 

processing high volumes of visitors and associated traffic congestion. 

With respect to operational challenges at land POE facilities, we reported 

in November 2002—more than 2 years before US-VISIT entry capability 

was installed at the 50 busiest land POEs—that busy land POEs were 

experiencing 2- to 3-hour delays in processing visitors and that any 

 25According to US-VISIT officials, as of March 2006 about $179.5 million of the total $182 

million budget had been obligated. 

Page 25 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
lengthening of the entry process could affect visitors significantly, through 

additional wait times.26 While we cannot generalize about the impact USVISIT has had on processing time at all land POEs, at one of the busiest 

land POEs we visited—San Ysidro, California, where more than 41 million 

visitors entering the country in 2005 were processed—CBP officials told us 

that, although they had not measured differences in processing times 

before and after US-VISIT was installed, the steps required to process USVISIT visitors had added to the total time needed to process all visitors 

entering through the port. As a result, CBP officials told us that they must 

occasionally direct visitors arriving at peak times, such as holidays, to 

leave and return later in the day because there was no room for them to 

wait. In this case, US-VISIT had an effect on both visitor processing times 

and on the capacity of the facility to physically accommodate pedestrian 

and vehicular traffic.27

A similar type of operational problem that reflects how complex visitor 

processing activities occur at facilities was reported by a contractor 

retained by DHS to study wait times associated with the I-94 issuance 

process at another busy POE, Nogales-DeConcini in Arizona.28 The study, 

which examined wait times for 3 separate time periods over a 3-month 

period in the summer of 2005, found that wait times varied by day (ranging 

from about 31⁄2 minutes to almost 7 minutes across the time periods 

studied) and was more a function of the number of people waiting for an I-

 26GAO, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security, GAO-03-174 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2002). 

27According to US-VISIT Program Office officials, prior to deployment of US-VISIT entry 

capability, San Ysidro had its own system that was specifically designed for the POE to

minimize manual I-94 processing and help officers speed up the I-94 issuance process.

However, according to these officials, although San Ysidro’s system was “probably” faster 

than US-VISIT, it did not meet current US-VISIT standards for data protection, integration, 

and privacy and did not require officers to do the same database checks that are part of USVISIT. The officials noted that US-VISIT enhances security because it is designed to access 

multiple databases nationwide and brings uniformity to the I-94 issuance process across 

POEs.

28Center for Transportation Research, the University of Texas at Austin, Assessing the 

Effects of US-VISIT RFID Technology Implementation on Vehicle and Pedestrian

Crossing Times at DeConcini, Nogales, Ariz. Report No. 2 Pilot Data Collection and

Analysis to Baseline Data (Austin, Tex., November 2005). The project was performed 

under contract for the DHS Private Sector Office. The report examines processing times at 

primary inspection for privately owned vehicles (POV) and pedestrians and also processing 

times for visitors who require enrollment in US-VISIT with a focus on the introduction of

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology at the POE, which is discussed later in 

this report. 

Page 26 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
94 rather than the time needed to process each individual under USVISIT.29 The contractor noted that the group size, wait time, and processing 

all affected the dynamics of the secondary-processing area or room, which 

measured approximately 40 feet by 50 feet. During one day of the study, 

the contractor noted that the secondary processing room became 

crowded, straining processing capacity. The contractor stated that this 

occurred because some of the individuals waiting to obtain I-94s were 

students or seasonal workers that required checks that included phone 

calls to verify their visa status.30 The contractor concluded that US-VISIT 

provided an advantage over manual I-94 processing because the 

processing was ultimately more efficient. Nevertheless, the extent to 

which these problems occur is unknown because US-VISIT has not 

performed comparable studies at other locations.

DHS has long been aware of space constraints and other capacity issues at 

land POE facilities. A task force report developed in response to the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement 

Act of 2000 found that 117 of 166 land POEs operating at that time (about 

70 percent) had three-fourths or less of the required space.31 The US-VISIT 

Program Office subsequently confirmed that land POEs had traffic flow 

problems (i.e., lack of space, insufficient roadways, and poor access to 

facilities) and that many were aging and undersized; the majority of land 

POEs were constructed before 1970 when the volume of border crossings 

was not as great as it is now. Our work for this report indicates that such 

problems persist, though we cannot generalize to all facilities. For 

example, at the Nogales-Morley Gate POE in Arizona, where up to 6,000 

visitors are processed daily (and up to 10,000 on holidays), US-VISIT 

equipment was installed, but the system is not used there because CBP 

determined that it could not accommodate US-VISIT visitors because of 

concerns about CBP’s ability to carry out the process in a constrained 

space while thousands of other people not subject to US-VISIT processing 

 29The average wait times were reported by the US-VISIT contractor for the periods of June

20 through 25, 2005, and August 15 through 20, 2005. No results were reported for the third 

period from July 7 through 8, 2005. 

30 According to CBP, CBP officers determine what checks are needed to determine 

admissibility depending on the purpose of travel. 

31DMIA Task Force, DMIA Task Force First Annual Report to Congress, Dec. 2002. 

Page 27 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
already transit through the facility daily.32 Thus, if a visitor is to be 

processed into US-VISIT from Morley Gate, that person is directed to 

return to Mexico (a few feet away) and to walk the approximately 100 

yards to the Nogales-DeConcini POE facility, which has the capability to 

handle secondary inspections of this kind. Figure 5 shows the NogalesMorley Gate POE building—the small windowed structure on the right is 

the processing site. 

Figure 5: Nogales-Morley Gate POE, Arizona

Source: US-VISIT Program Office.

CBP officials at three other land POEs on the southwest border also told

us that space constraints were a factor in their ability to efficiently process 

those subject to US-VISIT. Specifically, at the POEs at Los Tomates, 

Gateway, and Brownsville/Matamoros, Texas, CBP officials told us that 

 32CBP based this decision on the high volume of pedestrians entering the United States 

through the Morley Gate POE; the fact that, before deployment, I-94s had not been

previously issued at the Morley Gate POE; and the close proximity of the Morley Gate POE

facility to the nearby DeConcini POE facility, about 100 yards away.

Page 28 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
US-VISIT had made I-94 processing more efficient, but travelers continued 

to experience delays of up to 2 hours on peak holiday weekends as they 

had before US-VISIT was installed. Officials at these facilities told us that 

they believe they could alleviate this problem if the facility had the space 

to install more workstations capable of operating US-VISIT entry 

capability. 

According to CBP officials, CBP has begun to examine the condition of 

each facility with the intent of developing a list of border station 

construction and modification needs and plans to prioritize construction 

projects based on need. In the meantime, CBP and US-VISIT officials told

us that they have taken steps to address problems operating US-VISIT 

when space constraints are an issue. For example, at the POE in Highgate 

Springs, Vermont, CBP officials told us that US-VISIT computers and those 

needed to process commercial truck drivers and their cargoes were 

competing for space at the interior counter area of the building. Following 

our visit, we were told that the POE had adjusted its space allocation 

inside the POE building so that there are now five workstations for USVISIT and other noncommercial visitor processing, one of which can do 

both. According to the POE assistant area port director, the POE also 

extended the hours during which truck drivers can be processed in a 

separate building designed entirely for processing them and their cargoes, 

in order to relieve the space pressures in the main building that occur 

during the high-volume tourist summer season. 

US-VISIT and CBP officials reported that they have taken other steps to try 

to minimize any problems that may arise integrating US-VISIT entry 

capability operations with other CBP operations. For example, to help 

ensure that US-VISIT does not have an adverse impact on CBP’s 

operations at ports of entry, US-VISIT and CBP established a liaison office 

in June 2005, involving supervisory managers detailed from various CBP 

offices. The liaison officers worked with US-VISIT staff to overcome 

operational issues at POEs; review plans; develop and deliver training; set 

up call sites during busy holiday periods to provide support to POEs 

needing assistance; and work through technology problems. A CBP official 

told us that he believes both US-VISIT and CBP have been successful in 

helping land POEs overcome problems as they arise (such as those that 

might occur operating new technology at space constrained facilities). The 

CBP officers detailed to the liaison office have since returned to their 

original duty stations. According to CBP officials, CBP has an open 

invitation to re-initiate the liaison office at any time. 

Page 29 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
While past challenges with facilities are well known to US-VISIT and CBP 

officials and efforts have been made to address them, it is not clear 

whether US-VISIT or CBP is prepared to anticipate additional facilities 

challenges—challenges already acknowledged by senior US-VISIT 

officials—that may arise as new US-VISIT capabilities are added. The 

following two key initiatives, in particular, could affect operations at land 

POEs: 

• 10-fingerprint scanning of US-VISIT enrollees. DHS plans to 

require that individuals subject to US-VISIT undergo a 10-fingerprint 

scan, in place of the current 2, to ensure the highest levels of accuracy

in identifying people entering and exiting the country. Under this plan, 

US-VISIT visitors would be required to have all fingerprints scanned the 

first time they enroll in US-VISIT and to submit a 2-fingerprint scan 

during subsequent visits. A cost/benefit analysis of this capability is 

under way by DHS, selected components, and other agencies, with an 

anticipated transition period (from the 2- to 10-fingerprint scan 

requirement) taking place later this year and next. In January 2006, the 

former Director of US-VISIT testified before the Senate Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security that in order to introduce a 10-

fingerprint scan capability at land POEs and other locations, DHS 

would need a 6-to-8-month period to develop the capability and 

additional time to introduce initial operating capability. The former 

Director testified that unresolved technical challenges create the 

potential for a significant increase in the length of time needed to 

process individuals subject to US-VISIT at POEs once the 10-fingerprint 

requirement is in place.

33 In commenting on this report, DHS noted that 

US-VISIT has been working with industry to speed up processing time 

and reduce the size of 10-print capture devices to “eliminate or 

significantly reduce the impact of deploying 10-print scanning.” As 

noted earlier, our past work has shown that any lengthening in the 

process of entering the United States at the busiest POEs could 

inconvenience travelers and result in fewer visits to the United States 

or lost business to the nation.34

 33According to this official, there are at least four major unsolved technological challenges

to 10-fingerprint scanning, including: no current fingerprinting device on the market that 

can take and process 10 prints as quickly as 2; no current device to capture 10 prints from 

the visitor as physically easy as with 2; no current devices meet operational processing 

requirements for ports of entry, embassies, or consulates; and the need to manufacture

sufficient quantities of scanners to respond to the initiative. 

34See GAO-03-171. 

Page 30 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
• Electronic passport readers for Visa Waiver Program travelers. 

All Visa Waiver Program travelers with passports issued after October 

26, 2005 must have passports that contain a digital photograph printed 

in the document; passports issued to visa waiver travelers after 

October 26, 2006 must have integrated circuit chips, known as 

electronic passports, which are also called “e-passports.” (The Visa 

Waiver Program allows travelers from certain countries to gain entry to 

the United States without a visa.) These e-passports are to contain 

biographic and biometric information that can be read by an e-passport 

reader or scanner, a device which electronically reads or scans the 

information embedded in the e-passport at close proximity, about 4 

inches to the reader. According to DHS, all POEs must have the ability 

to compare and authenticate e-passports as well as visas and other 

travel and entry documents issued to foreign nationals by DHS and the 

Department of State. Earlier this year, DHS announced it had 

successfully tested e-passports and e-passport scanners. A US-VISIT 

Program Office official told us that deployment of these scanners is 

moving toward implementation at POEs located at 34 selected

international airports where about 97 percent of the Visa Waiver 

Program travelers enter the country. The official said that e-passport 

readers will not initially be installed at land POEs—which process a 

small percentage of visa waiver travelers—and there is no timeline for 

deploying the scanners at land POEs, although there are plans to do so 

at some point. CBP’s Director of Automated Programs in the Office of 

Field Operations told us that e-passport readers and the database used 

to process e-passport information do not operate as fast as current 

processes at land POEs and thus could cause additional delays, 

especially at POEs experiencing processing backlogs and wait times, 

such as San Ysidro, California, and Nogales-Mariposa, Arizona. 

Given the potential impact that enhancements to US-VISIT could have

both on visitor processing overall and on land POE facilities, it is 

important for US-VISIT and CBP to be able to gauge how new changes 

associated with US-VISIT may affect operations. However, our past work 

showed that US-VISIT had not taken all needed steps to help ensure that 

US-VISIT entry capability operates as intended because the approaches 

used to gauge or anticipate the impact of US-VISIT operations on land 

POE facilities was limited. Specifically, in 2005, in an effort to evaluate the 

impact of US-VISIT on the busiest land POEs, DHS completed evaluations 

of the time needed to process and issue the I-94 arrival/departure form at 5 

POEs. To conduct its study, DHS studied the I-94 process before and after 

US-VISIT was installed at five land POEs at three locations (Port Huron, 

Michigan; Douglas, Arizona; and Laredo, Texas). Based on data collected 

from these 5 POEs, US-VISIT officials concluded that no additional staff or 

Page 31 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
facility modifications were needed at other POEs in order to accommodate 

US-VISIT. We reported in February 2006 that the scope of this evaluation 

was too limited to determine potential operational impacts on POEs. 35 We 

reported three limitations, in particular: (1) that the evaluations did not 

take into account the impact of US-VISIT on workforce requirements or 

facility needs because the evaluations focused solely on I-94 processing 

time; (2) that the locations selected were chosen in part because they 

already had sufficient staff to support a US-VISIT pilot-test; and (3) that 

US-VISIT officials did not base their evaluation of I-94 processing times on 

a constant basis before and after deployment of US-VISIT—that is, predeployment sites used fewer computer workstations to process travelers 

than did sites studied after deployment. We recommended that DHS 

explore alternative means to obtaining a full understanding of the impact 

of US-VISIT on land POEs, including its impact on workforce levels and 

facilities and that POE sites be surveyed that had not been included in 

their original assessment. US-VISIT responded that wait times at land 

POEs were already known and that it would conduct operational 

assessments at POEs as new projects came online. However, apart from a 

study conducted at one POE facility by a DHS contractor in August 2005 

(cited above), US-VISIT has not provided documentation on any additional 

evaluations conducted that would provide additional insights about the 

effect of US-VISIT on land POE operations, including wait times. 

We recognize that it may not be cost-effective for US-VISIT or CBP to 

conduct a formal assessment of the impact US-VISIT has on each land

POE now that the entry capability has been installed or of all facilities 

once new enhancements are introduced. Nevertheless, the assessment 

methodology US-VISIT has used in the past—which focused on measuring 

changes in I-94 processing times—raises questions about how the agency 

will assess the impact that the transition from 2- to 10-fingerprint scanning 

may have on land POE operations. That is, if US-VISIT uses the same 

methodology and focuses on the changes in processing time, rather than 

on the overall impact on operations, including facilities, staffing, and 

support logistics, the results will have the same limitations we highlighted 

in our earlier study. Our February 2006 recommendation would also be 

applicable to enhancements that have the potential to negatively affect 

operations. 

 35GAO-06-296. 

Page 32 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
US-VISIT and CBP have management controls in place to alert them to 

operational problems as they occur, but these controls did not always 

work to ensure that US-VISIT operates as intended. Specifically, US-VISIT 

and CBP officials had not been made aware of computer processing 

problems that affected operations, in particular, until we brought them to 

their attention, partly because these problems were not always reported. 

These computer processing problems have the potential to not only 

inconvenience travelers because of the increased time needed to complete

the inspection process, but to compromise security, particularly if CBP 

officers are unable to perform biometric checks—one of the critical 

reasons US-VISIT was installed at POEs. 

Management Controls Did 

Not Always Alert US-VISIT 

and CBP to Operational 

Problems 

Our standards for internal control in the federal government state that it is

important for agencies to provide reasonable assurance that they can 

achieve effective and efficient operations.36 This includes establishing and 

maintaining a control environment that sets a positive and supportive 

attitude toward control activities that are designed to help ensure that 

management’s directives are carried out. Control activities include 

reviewing and monitoring agency operations at the functional level (i.e., at 

land POEs) to compare operational performance with planned or expected 

results and to ensure that controls described in policies and procedures 

are actually applied and applied properly, and having relevant, reliable,

and timely communications to ensure that information flows down, 

across, and up the organization thereby helping program managers carry 

out their responsibilities and providing assurance that timely action is 

taken on implementation problems or information that requires follow-up. 

Our site visit interviews suggest that current monitoring and control 

activities were not sufficient to ensure that US-VISIT performs in 

accordance with its security mission and objectives. For example, at 12 of

the 21 land POEs we visited, computer-processing problems arose that, 

according to CBP officials at those locations, had an impact on processing 

times and traveler delays. Generally, officials at these 12 sites said that 

computer problems occurred with varying frequency and duration; some 

said that computers were at times slow or froze up during certain times of 

the day, while others said that problems were sporadic and they could not 

 36GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 and GAO-01-1008G. 

Page 33 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
ascribe them to a particular time of the day.37 None of the officials we 

interviewed had formally assessed the impact of computer slowdowns or 

freezes on visitors and visitor wait times, but nonetheless cited computer 

problems as a cause of visitor delays. In November 2005, we notified a USVISIT program official in headquarters that we had heard about computer 

processing problems at some of the POEs we had visited. The official told 

us that US-VISIT had not been aware of these problems and said that, as a

result of our work, CBP had been contacted to investigate the problem. In 

June 2006, a CBP official responsible for information technology at CBP’s 

data center told us that POEs had experienced slowdowns associated with

certain US-VISIT data queries.38 The CBP official told us that since the 

computer processing problems were identified and resolved, performance 

had greatly improved. We did not verify whether the actions taken fully 

resolved these problems. 

Others have also reported computer processing problems associated with

US-VISIT. Our review of the report prepared by the contractor hired by 

DHS to study wait times at the POE in Nogales-DeConcini, Arizona 

(discussed earlier) confirmed that slowdowns had occurred at the facility 

during two of the periods covered by its study (June 2005 to August 

2005).39 According to the contractor, these slowdowns resulted in CBP 

 37Our review of CBP’s information technology “help desk” tickets from July 2005 through 

January 2006 suggested that similar types of problems occurred at other locations where 

US-VISIT was installed. CBP officers that operate US-VISIT in the field are instructed to call 

the CBP help desk at the Newington Data Center in Virginia if they encounter problems 

operating US-VISIT related software or equipment. 

38CBP officials also dealt with sporadic network outages. In one case, on December 2, 2005,

the entire network went down for 3 hours because of an accident. According to port

officials, visitors seeking entry into the country at the San Ysidro, California, POE were

initially asked to wait until the systems came back up or return at another time. About an

hour after the outage began, CBP officers began to manually process I-94s for US-VISIT, in

accordance with CBP standard operating procedures, but without the benefit of a 

biometric verification of their identity under US-VISIT. 

39Center for Transportation Research, the University of Texas at Austin. Assessing the 

Effects of US-VISIT RFID Technology Implementation on Vehicle and Pedestrian

Crossing Times at DeConcini, Nogales, Ariz. Report No. 2 Pilot Data Collection and

Analysis to Baseline Data (Austin, Texas: November 2005). 

Page 34 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
officers having to revert to manual I-94 processing without the benefit of 

US-VISIT biometric checks. Specifically, in its reports, the contractor 

noted that: 

“...on the morning of Thursday, June 23, the computer systems used to perform 

secondary inspections became very slow, impacting the issuance of I-94 and 

enrollment in US-VISIT. The staff had to revert to using the paper I-94s, which 

visitors had to fill out by hand...” 

“As happened during the [prior] study, the computer systems were unavailable for 

a period of time. This occurred on Tuesday from 1:00 to 2:00 p.m. Port officials

decided to revert to the manual process because the network had become very 

slow and the queue was growing. CBP officers told ... researchers that it was 

taking up to twenty minutes to receive responses to queries....”

In an undated memorandum commenting on the contractor’s report, USVISIT’s Director of Mission Operations expressed concern about the 

contractor’s discussion of computer “downtime” as a factor impacting USVISIT processing times. He stated that these problems can be caused by a 

variety of factors, including factors related to I-94 processing and that 

capturing biometric information “is only rarely responsible for the inability 

to complete the process.” Based on our work, it is unclear what analysis 

US-VISIT had done to make this determination. 

US-VISIT officials told us that various controls are in place to alert them to 

problems as they occur, but the lack of awareness about computerprocessing problems raises questions about whether these controls are 

working as intended. US-VISIT officials told us that it is their position that 

once US-VISIT entry capability equipment was installed and operating, 

CBP became responsible for identifying problems and notifying US-VISIT

when US-VISIT-related problems occurred so that US-VISIT can work with 

CBP to resolve them. The officials stated that computer problems can be 

attributable to other processes and systems not related to US-VISIT which 

are not the US-VISIT Program Office’s responsibility. In addition, the 

Acting Director of US-VISIT noted that there are mechanisms in place to 

help CBP and US-VISIT identify problems. For example, US-VISIT officials

told us that US-VISIT and CBP headquarters officials meet regularly to 

discuss issues associated with US-VISIT implementation and CBP 

maintains a help desk at its Virginia data center to resolve technology 

problems raised by CBP field officials. Regarding the latter, the Acting 

Director noted that if POE officials do not report problems, there is 

nothing CBP and US-VISIT can do to resolve them. During our review, we 

noted that CBP officers are required—in training and as part of standard 

Page 35 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
operating procedures—to report problems with US-VISIT technology to 

the CBP help desk. Nevertheless, CBP officials at 9 of the 12 sites we 

visited where computer processing problems were identified said they did

not always use the help desk to report or resolve computer problems (and 

thereby generating a record of the problems). Officials at 5 of the 9 sites 

told us they temporarily resolved the problem by turning off and restarting 

the computers. 

Although US-VISIT and CBP have some controls in place to help them 

identify and address problems like those discussed above, these controls 

may not have been implemented consistently or may not be sufficient to 

ensure that US-VISIT operates as intended because officials did not always 

alert CBP and US-VISIT program managers to the fact that problems were 

occurring that adversely affected operations. It is important that US-VISIT 

and CBP managers are alerted to problems as they occur to ensure 

continuity of operations consistent with US-VISIT’s goal of providing 

security to U.S. citizens and travelers. Moreover, in light of the fact that 

US-VISIT plans to enhance security through additional technology 

investments and that it may be challenging to deploy and operate at 

facilities that are already known to be aging and undersized, it is 

incumbent upon the US-VISIT program office to play a continuing and 

proactive role in the management control structure. 

Our internal control standards also call for agencies to establish 

performance measures and indicators throughout the organization so that 

actual performance can be compared to expected results. The US-VISIT 

program office has established and implemented performance measures 

for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 that are designed to gauge performance of 

various aspects of US-VISIT covering a variety of areas, but these 

measures do not gauge the performance of US-VISIT entry capabilities at 

land POEs. For example, according to a July 2006 draft report prepared by

the US-VISIT program office, US-VISIT has begun to measure the ratio of 

adverse actions (defined as decisions to deny entry into the country) to 

total-biometric-watch-list “hits” when visitors are processed at ports of 

entry.40 According to US-VISIT, this measure seeks to help CBP focus its 

inspection activities on preventing potential known or suspected criminals 

or terrorists from entering the country. US-VISIT reported that it had not 

established a baseline or target for this measure in fiscal year 2005. 

However, according to US-VISIT, CBP officers at all POEs combined 

 40US-VISIT, Draft Performance Measures Report (Rosslyn, Va.: July 2006). 

Page 36 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
denied entrance to 30 percent of persons whose biometric information 

appeared on a watch list during fiscal year 2005 (about 617 of the 2,059 

watch list “hits”). US-VISIT established a target for this measure during 

fiscal year 2006 of 33 percent. 

Another measure is designed to gauge the wait time incurred by a specific

US-VISIT activity at all air, land, and sea POEs, namely the average 

response time to deliver results on biometric watch list queries for finger 

scans. (This measure does not gauge other US-VISIT related activities such 

as scanning the visa or passport, taking and processing a digital 

photograph, or printing an I-94.) To ensure that wait times are not 

increased substantially due to additional US-VISIT capabilities at POEs, 

US-VISIT has established a goal of 10 seconds and reported that, since 

October 2004, US-VISIT has been able to maintain, on average, less than an 

8-second response time at POEs at which US-VISIT had been installed. 

These and other existing measures of certain key aspects of program 

performance with respect to both security and efficiency can be useful in 

analyzing trends and measuring results against planned or expected 

results. However, because there are operational and facility differences 

among air, sea, and land POEs, it is important to be able to measure and 

distinguish differences—one would not expect baseline or target measures 

to be the same across these environments. At air and sea ports, visitors are 

processed in primary inspection in a controlled environment and CBP 

officers are able to prescreen visitors using passenger manifests, which 

are transmitted to CBP while passengers are enroute to the POE. By 

contrast, at land POEs, visitors arrive on foot or in a vehicle and CBP 

officers refer them to secondary inspection for US-VISIT processing 

without the benefit of a manifest and based on the information available to 

officers at the point of initial contact—a process substantially different 

than that used at air and sea ports. The measures used in August 2006 

aggregated baselines and targets for all POEs and did not distinguish 

among them with regard to air, land, and sea POEs. 

Without additional performance measures to more fully gauge operational 

impacts of US-VISIT on land POEs, CBP and US-VISIT may not be well 

equipped to identify problems, trends, and areas needing improvements 

now and as additional US-VISIT entry capabilities, such as 10-finger scans,

are introduced. Consistent with our past work, we believe such measures 

could help DHS identify and quantify problems, evaluate alternatives, 

Page 37 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
allocate resources, track progress, and learn from any mistakes that may 

have been made while deploying and operating US-VISIT at land POEs.41

While federal laws require the creation of a US-VISIT exit capability using 

biometric verification, the US-VISIT Program Office concluded that 

implementing a biometrically-based exit-recording system like that used to 

record visitors entering the country would require additional staff and new 

infrastructure (such as buildings and roadways) that would be 

prohibitively costly, would likely produce major traffic congestion in exit 

lanes at the busier land POEs and could have adverse impacts on trade 

and commerce. Although current technology does not exist to enable 

biometric verification of those leaving the country without major 

infrastructural changes, US-VISIT officials believe technological advances 

over the next 5- to 10- years will enable them to record who is leaving the 

country using biometrics without requiring travelers to stop at a facility, 

thereby minimizing the need for major infrastructure changes. In the 

interim, US-VISIT is testing an alternative nonbiometric technology for 

recording visitors as they exit the country, in which electronic tags 

containing a numeric identifier associated with each visitor are embedded 

in I-94 forms. US-VISIT’s own analysis of this technology and our analysis 

and that of others has identified numerous performance and reliability 

problems with this solution, including the inability of the nonbiometric 

solution to ensure that the person exiting the country is the same who 

entered. US-VISIT has taken corrective actions and testing is still ongoing, 

but uncertainties remain about how US-VISIT will use technology in the 

future to meet biometric exit requirements. These uncertainties reflect the 

fact that DHS has not met a June 2005 statutory requirement to submit a 

report to the Congress that describes (1) the status of biometric exit data

systems already in use at POEs and (2) the manner in which US-VISIT is to 

meet the goal of a comprehensive screening system, with both entry and 

exit biometric capability. 

DHS Cannot 

Currently Implement 

a Biometric US-VISIT 

Exit Capability at 

Land POEs and Faces 

Uncertainties as

Testing of an 

Alternative Exit

Strategy Continues 

 41GAO, Executive Guide: Measuring Performance and Demonstrating Results of

Information Technology Investments, GAO/AIMD-98-89 (Washington, D.C.: March 1998). 

Page 38 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Federal laws require the creation of a US-VISIT exit capability using 

biometric verification methods to ensure that the identity of visitors 

leaving the country can be matched biometrically against their entry 

records.42 However, according to officials at the US-VISIT program office

and CBP and US-VISIT program documentation, there are interrelated 

logistical, technological, and infrastructure constraints that have 

precluded DHS from achieving this mandate, and there are cost factors 

related to the feasibility of implementation of such a solution. The major 

constraint to performing biometric verification upon exit at this time, in 

the US-VISIT Program Office’s view, is that the only proven technology 

available would necessitate mirroring the processes currently in use for 

US-VISIT at entry. A mirror-image system for exit would, like entry, require 

CBP officers at land POEs to examine the travel documents of those 

leaving the country, take fingerprints, compare visitors’ facial features to 

photographs, and, if questions about identity arise, direct the departing 

visitor to secondary inspection for additional questioning. These steps 

would be carried out for exiting pedestrians as well as for persons exiting 

in vehicles. The US-VISIT Program Office concluded in an internal January 

2005 report assessing alternatives to biometric exit that the mirror-imaging 

solution was “an infeasible alternative for numerous reasons, including but 

not limited to, the additional staffing demands, new infrastructure 

requirements, and potential trade and commerce impacts.”43

Various Factors Have 

Prevented US-VISIT from 

Implementing a Biometric 

Exit Capability 

US-VISIT officials told us that they anticipated that a biometric exit 

process mirroring that used for entry could result in delays at land POEs 

with heavy daily volumes of visitors. And they stated that in order to 

implement a mirror-image biometric exit capability, additional lanes for 

exiting vehicles and additional inspection booths and staff would be 

needed, though they have not determined precisely how many. According 

to these officials, it is unclear how new traffic lanes and new facilities 

could be built at land POEs where space constraints already exist, such as 

those in congested urban areas. (For example, San Ysidro, California, 

currently has 24 entry lanes, each with its own staffed booth and 6 

unstaffed exit lanes. Thus, if full biometric exit capability were 

implemented using a mirror image approach, San Ysidro’s current capacity 

 42Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, § 7208, 8 U.S.C. § 1365b. See

also USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 414(b)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 353 (2001); 8 U.S.C. § 

1365a(b)(2)-(4).

43US-VISIT, Increment 2C Operational Alternatives Assessment—FINAL (Rosslyn, Va.:

Jan. 31, 2005). 

Page 39 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
of 6 exit lanes would have to be expanded to 24 exit lanes.) As shown in 

figure 6, based on observations during our site visit to the San Ysidro POE, 

the facility is surrounded by dense urban infrastructure, leaving little, if 

any, room to expand in place. Some of the 24 entry lanes for vehicle traffic

heading northwards from Mexico into the United States appear in the 

bottom left portion of the photograph, where vehicles are shown waiting 

to approach primary inspection at the facility; the six exit lanes (traffic 

towards Mexico), which do not have fixed inspection facilities, are at the 

upper left. 

Figure 6: Aerial View of San Ysidro, California, POE 

Source: GAO.

Exit lanes

Entry lanes

Other POE facilities are similarly space-constrained. At the POEs at 

Nogales-DeConcini, Arizona, for example, we observed that the facility is

bordered by railroad tracks, a parking lot, and industrial or commercial 

buildings. In addition, CBP has identified space constraints at some rural 

POEs. For example, the Thousand Islands Bridge POE at Alexandria Bay,

New York, is situated in what POE officials described as a “geological 

bowl,” with tall rock outcroppings potentially hindering the ability to 

expand facilities at the current location. Officials told us that in order to 

Page 40 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
accommodate existing and anticipated traffic volume upon entry, they are 

in the early stages of planning to build an entirely new POE on a hill about 

a half-mile south of the present facility. CBP officials at the Blaine-Peace

Arch POE in Washington state said that CBP also is considering whether 

to relocate and expand the POE facility, within the next 5-to-10 years, to 

better handle existing and projected traffic volume. According to the USVISIT program officials, none of the plans for any expanded, renovated, or

relocated POE include a mirror-image addition of exit lanes or facilities 

comparable to those existing for entry. 

In 2003, the US-VISIT Program Office estimated that it would cost 

approximately $3 billion to implement US-VISIT entry and exit capability 

at land POEs where US-VISIT was likely to be installed and that such an 

effort would have a major impact on facility infrastructure at land POEs. 

We did not assess the reliability of the 2003 estimate. The cost estimate did 

not separately break out costs for entry and exit construction, but did 

factor in the cost for building additional exit vehicle lanes and booths as 

well as buildings and other infrastructure that would be required to 

accommodate a mirror imaging at exit of the capabilities required for entry 

processing. US-VISIT program officials told us that they provided this 

estimate to congressional staff during a briefing, but that the reaction to 

this projected cost was negative and that they therefore did not move 

ahead with this option. No subsequent cost estimate updates have been 

prepared, and DHS’s annual budget requests have not included funds to 

build the infrastructure that would be associated with the required 

facilities. 

US-VISIT officials stated that they believe that technological advances 

over the next 5-to-10 years will make it possible to utilize alternative 

technologies that provide biometric verification of persons exiting the 

country without major changes to facility infrastructure and without 

requiring those exiting to stop and/or exit their vehicles, thereby 

precluding traffic backup, congestion, and resulting delays. US-VISIT’s 

report assessing biometric alternatives noted that although limitations in 

technology currently preclude the use of biometric identification because 

visitors would have to be stopped, the use of the as-yet undeveloped 

biometric verification technology supports the long-term vision of the USVISIT program.44 However, no such technology or device currently exists 

 44US-VISIT, Increment 2C Operational Alternatives Assessment—FINAL (Rosslyn, Va:

Jan. 31, 2005). 

Page 41 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
that would not have a major impact on facilities. The prospects for its 

development, manufacture, deployment and reliable utilization are 

currently uncertain or unknown, although a prototype device that would 

permit a fingerprint to be read remotely without requiring the visitor to 

come to a full stop is under development. 

While logistical, technical, and cost constraints may prevent 

implementation of a biometrically based exit technology for US-VISIT at 

this time, it is important to note that there currently is not a legislatively

mandated date for implementation of such a solution. The Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires US-VISIT to collect

biometric-exit-data from all individuals who are required to provide 

biometric entry data.45 The act did not set a deadline, however, for 

requiring collection of biometric exit data from all individuals who are 

required to provide biometric entry data. Although US-VISIT had set a

December 2007 deadline for implementing exit capability at the 50 busiest 

land POEs, US-VISIT has since determined that implementing exit 

capability by this date is no longer feasible, and a new date for doing so 

has not been set. 

The US-VISIT Program 

Office Is Testing 

Nonbiometric Technology 

to Record Travelers’ 

Departure 

Because there is at present no biometric technology that can be used to 

verify a traveler’s exit from the country at land POEs without also making 

major and costly changes to POE infrastructure and facilities, the USVISIT Program Office sought an alternative means of recording a visitor’s 

exit from the country, using nonbiometric technology, that could be tested 

at land POEs. US-VISIT determined that the chosen nonbiometric 

technology would have to meet certain criteria. According to the US-VISIT 

Program Office, the technology would have to: (1) permit recording of an 

exiting visitor in order that stopping or slowing down would not be 

required and privacy issues were addressed; (2) result in no increase in 

wait times for visitors; (3) create no degradation in the level of service at

exit lanes; (4) create no significant degradation in traffic patterns (that is, 

 458 U.S.C. § 1365b(d). 

47US-VISIT evaluated 12 different exit-recording technologies against the six criteria listed 

above, including some that incorporated biometric features—scanning the retina or iris, 

and a facial recognition system. Because the biometric solutions considered would have

required an exiting visitor to slow down, stop, or possibly enter a POE facility, they were 

rejected. Other alternatives, such as the use of a global positioning system, were rejected 

because they transmit signals that could facilitate surveillance of individuals, raising 

concerns about privacy. 

Page 42 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
no additional traffic congestion); (5) be convenient to the visitor, and (6) 

be commercially available. None of these criteria directly addressed or 

reflected the legislative mandate to deploy a system to record entry and 

exit by foreign travelers using biometric identifiers in order to ensure that

persons leaving the country were those who had entered. Rather, the 

criteria focused on choosing a technology that would not require a major 

investment in facilities, would protect privacy, and would not generate 

large traffic backups that would inconvenience or delay both travelers and 

commercial carriers. 

Among the technologies considered for testing by the US-VISIT Program 

Office, the only one that met all the US-VISIT evaluation criteria was 

passive, automated, radio frequency identification (RFID).47 This 

technology, according to US-VISIT, “best satisfied all the assessment 

criteria.” RFID is an automated data-capture technology that can be used 

to electronically store information contained on a very small tag that can 

be embedded in a document (or some other physical item). This 

information can then be identified, and recorded as having been identified, 

by RFID readers that are connected to computer databases. 

For purposes of US-VISIT’s testing of the nonbiometric technology, the 

RFID tag is embedded in a modified I-94 arrival/departure form, called an

I-94A. Each RFID tag has only a single number stored in it; privacy is 

protected because no information is stored on these tags other than a 

unique ID number that is linked to the visitor’s biographic information. To 

facilitate the transmission of the number from the RFID tag, a new DHS 

system of records—the Automated Identification Management System 

(AIDMS) 48—was created to link the unique RFID tag ID number to existing

information stored in the Treasury Enforcement Communications System 

(TECS) database, which is used by CBP to verify travel information and 

update traveler data.49 According to US-VISIT, limiting the data on the tag 

to a single number helps preserve the privacy of travelers; acquisition of 

the number would provide no meaningful information to non-authorized 

persons, since they would then have to access TECS to link the number to 

 48AIDMS is a system separate from TECS, IDENT and other databases used in the US-VISIT 

process.

49The Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) is a system that maintains 

lookout (i.e., watch list) data, interfaces with other agencies’ databases, and is currently 

used by inspectors at ports of entry to verify traveler information and update traveler data. 

Although still labeled as a Treasury system, TECS has been transferred to CBP. 

Page 43 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
biographic data. However, access to computers and their databases at land

POEs is restricted to authorized personnel and involves additional 

protections such as passwords as well as entrance into physically 

restricted areas inside POE buildings. (A more detailed discussion of RFID 

technology and privacy issues is contained in appendix VI.) 

The RFID technology used in this way is considered passive because the 

tag cannot initiate communications. Rather, the tag responds to radio 

frequency emissions from an RFID reader—an electronic device that can 

be installed on a pole, or on a steel gantry of the kind that holds highway 

signs over the entire width of a roadway (see figure 11)—and transmits the

numeric information stored on the tag back to the reader, from up to 30 

feet away, according to the US-VISIT Program Office. Figure 7a shows 

RFID readers mounted on a metal gantry at the Thousand Islands Bridge 

land POE, Alexandria Bay, New York. The readers are attached to metal 

extensions that project out from the right side of the gantry, to record an I94A embedded with tags that are inside the vehicles that pass underneath. 

RFID readers can also be installed in portals or on poles at pedestrian 

traffic areas to read the I-94A embedded with tags of persons leaving the 

country on foot. Figure 7b shows RFID readers in portals positioned on 

either side of pedestrian exit doors at the Blaine-Peace Arch POE in 

Washington State. 

Page 44 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Figure 7a: Metal Gantry with RFID Readers and Antennas at the Thousand Islands

Bridge POE, Alexandria Bay, New York 

Source: GAO.

Page 45 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Figure 7b: RFID Portals Positioned Next to Exit Doors at the Blaine-Peace Arch POE 

in Washington State 

RFID portals

Source: GAO.

Initial Results of Testing 

Using RFID Technology 

Indicate Problems Meeting 

a Key Program Goal—

Verifying the Identity of 

Persons Leaving the 

Country 

In December 2004 and January 2005, a team of US-VISIT contractors 

conducted the first part of a feasibility study to test passive RFID 

equipment in a simulated environment-at a mock POE in Virginia. At this 

site, different types of vehicles– including cars, buses, and trucks—were 

run at different speeds to test RFID read rates. Pedestrians carrying 

documents with RFID tags embedded or attached were not tested. The 

feasibility study raised numerous issues about the reliability and 

performance of the RFID technology. For example, RFID readers held on a 

gantry over a roadway had difficulty detecting RFID-detectable tags that

were inside vehicles with metallic tinted windows (whether the windows 

were open or closed). The read rate was improved from about 56 percent 

to about 70 percent if the readers were moved to both sides of the road, 

rather than overhead, and if the occupants held their documents with the 

RFID-detectable tags up to the vehicle’s side windows. The study 

concluded that the physical actions of the visitor had to be taken into 

Page 46 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
account when obtaining a read of the I-94A and made specific 

recommendations to improve read rates, such as suggesting that vehicle 

occupants hold the I-94A up to a side window and keep multiple forms 

apart. 

After the feasibility study, US-VISIT proceeded, as planned, with phase 1 of 

proof-of-concept testing for RFID at five land POEs at the northern and 

southern borders to determine what corrective actions, if any, should be 

taken to improve RFID read rates for exiting vehicles and pedestrians. 

This effort comprised testing for both exit and for re-entry by persons who 

have been issued a tag-embedded I-94A that is valid for multiple entries 

over several months. 50 The RFID performance tests were conducted for 

one-week periods at land POEs, as follows:51 vehicular traffic was tested at 

Nogales-Mariposa and Nogales-DeConcini POEs in Nogales, Arizona; the 

Blaine-Pacific Highway and Blaine-Peace Arch POEs in Blaine, 

Washington; and Thousand Islands Bridge POE in Alexandria Bay, New 

York; pedestrian traffic was tested at the Nogales-Mariposa and NogalesDeConcini POEs. 

For these exit tests, the US-VISIT Program Office developed critical 

success factor target read rates to compare them to the actual read rates 

obtained during the test for both pedestrians carrying an I-94A with RFIDdetectable tags and for travelers in vehicles who also had an RFIDdetectable I-94A with them inside the vehicles. The target exit read rates 

ranged from an expected success rate of 70 percent to 95 percent, based

on anticipated performance under different conditions, partly as 

demonstrated in the earlier feasibility study, on business requirements, 

and on a concept of operation plan prepared for Increment 2C.

52

 50According to the US-VISIT Program Office, approximately $104 million was budgeted in 

fiscal years 2004 and 2005 to conduct proof-of-concept testing of RFID for exit and re-entry. 

No separate break-out of testing expenditures related to exit alone was available. 

51Site selection factors included potential physical constraints, such as protected historic 

structures that could hamper installation of gantries, potential environmental impact, daily 

traffic and I-94 processing volume, speed limits, and weather conditions. 

52A concept of operations defines how day-to-day operations are (or will be) carried out to 

meet mission needs. The concept of operations includes high-level descriptions of 

information systems, their interrelationships, and information flows. It also describes the 

operations that must be performed, who must perform them, and where and how the

operations will be carried out. 

Page 47 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
In a January 2006 assessment53 of the test results, the US-VISIT Program 

Office reported that the exit read rates that occurred during the test 

generally fell short of the expected target rates for both pedestrians and 

for travelers in vehicles. For example, according to US-VISIT, at the 

Blaine-Pacific Highway test site, of 166 vehicles tested, RFID readers 

correctly identified 14 percent; the target read rate was 70 percent.54

Another problem that arose was that of cross-reads, in which multiple 

RFID readers installed on gantries or poles picked up information from the 

same visitor, regardless of whether the individual was entering or exiting 

in a vehicle or on foot. Thus, cross-reads resulted in inaccurate recordkeeping. According to a January 2006 US-VISIT corrective-action report, 

signal-filtering equipment is to be installed to correct the problem and 

additional testing is to be conducted to confirm and understand the extent 

of the problem. The report also noted that remedying cross-reads would 

require changes to equipment and infrastructure on a case-by-case basis at

each land POE, because each has a different physical configuration of 

buildings, roadways, roofs, gantries, poles, and other surfaces against 

which the signals can bounce and cause cross-reads. Each would therefore 

require a different physical solution to avoid the signal interference that 

triggers cross-reads. Although cost estimates or time lines have not been 

developed for such alterations to facilities and equipment, it is possible 

that having to alter the physical configuration at each land POE in some 

regard and then test each separately to ensure that cross-reads had been 

eliminated would be both time consuming and potentially costly, in terms 

of changes to infrastructure and equipment. 

We observed potential problems with the RFID exit system relating to 

facilities and infrastructure at some of the POEs we visited. At the 

Nogales-Mariposa POE, in Nogales, Arizona, for example, we observed 

that RFID portals for pedestrians had been placed on the right side of the 

CBP POE building, on a rocky, sloping hillside, and that there was no 

signage directing pedestrians to walk between them, nor was a walkway 

installed, as shown in figure 8a. Although travelers were expected to walk

between the portals, this configuration enabled pedestrians to avoid the 

 53US-VISIT Program Office, Increment 2C Proof of Concept—Phase 1 Performance 

Evaluation Report, Post Implementation (Rosslyn, VA: Jan. 20, 2006). 

54A US-VISIT program official explained that for vehicles exiting during RFID testing, one

could “reasonably expect” a read rate of 70 percent because vehicles are not required to 

stop upon exit. The official also cited vehicle speed, safety, and awareness (of optimal I94A positioning; for example, holding the I-94A up to the window of the vehicle) as factors 

that affected RFID read rates. 

Page 48 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
portals altogether—to walk around them or cross the road to avoid them, 

as shown in figure 8b. 

Figure 8a: RFID Installation at the Nogales-Mariposa POE in Arizona, Facing Toward

Mexico

RFID 

readers

No walkway between RFID readers

and no signage

Source: GAO.

Page 49 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Figure 8b. Two Pedestrians Exiting the Country at the Nogales-Mariposa POE, 

Arizona, Walking Toward Mexico

Source: GAO.

RFID reader

Two pedestrians exiting United States

toward Mexico outside RFID

detection area

According to the US-VISIT corrective actions report, 15 percent of exiting 

pedestrian (including those participating in the test and those who did not) 

used the pathway between the two portals at the Nogales facility during a 

September 2005 observation period.55 In this same report, US-VISIT 

acknowledged that there was no defined pathway or infrastructure for 

pedestrian exit at Nogales-Mariposa, Arizona, and that only one of the 

three pedestrian paths were covered by the portals that had been placed 

there. US-VISIT reported that while the placement of the portal readers 

will not be changed, it is taking steps to improve the likelihood of 

detection with additional antennae, readers, and signage. However, there

are no plans at present to modify the existing POE infrastructure on the 

west side of the building where the portals were installed, such as by 

installing a paved walkway or by constructing fencing to divert those 

 55US-VISIT, Final Increment 2C Phase 1 Proof of Concept Corrective Actions (Rosslyn, Va:

January 2006). 

Page 50 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
exiting to go through the readers in order to increase the chances that 

exiting pedestrians are detected. In commenting on this report, DHS 

stated that it had constructed a new primary pedestrian exit walkway 

parallel to the existing pedestrian entry and had installed signage, 

sidewalks, and a new secure gate. However, according to a CBP official at 

the Nogales-Mariposa POE, the newly constructed pedestrian exit 

walkway is on the other (east) side of the building from the pathway 

where the portal readers were placed and tested. 

During the period that US-VISIT carried out RFID exit tests at land POEs, 

US-VISIT also tested read rates for RFID-detectable documents carried by

pedestrians or persons in vehicles who had been issued an I-94A during a 

prior visit to the United States, had subsequently left the country, and were 

intending to re-enter.56 (I-94s can be issued that are valid for up to 6 

months for multiple re-entries into the country.) US-VISIT performed the 

re-entry test for documents held by persons in vehicles at the Mariposa 

and DeConcini POEs in Nogales, Arizona; the Blaine-Pacific Highway and 

Blaine-Peace Arch, POEs in Washington state; and Thousand Islands 

Bridge POE at Alexandria Bay, New York. For pedestrians, the re-entry 

test was performed at the Mariposa and DeConcini POEs in Nogales, 

Arizona (see tables 6a and 6b, appendix VII). US-VISIT set higher expected

target read rates for the re-entry test than for exit because all persons and 

vehicles entering or re-entering the country must stop for questioning by 

CBP officers and must take travel documents out of their pockets or from 

inside a vehicle, and show them to the officer, enhancing the likelihood 

that RFID-detectable documents would be detected. As expected by USVISIT, read rates for the re-entry test for vehicles were generally higher 

than for exit, although the results did not meet the critical success factors 

initially projected by US-VISIT. Appendix VII discusses the results of RFID 

performance for exit and re-entry in greater detail. 

Beyond RFID operations issues that affect facilities, our work and that of 

the DHS Privacy Office have identified other performance and reliability 

problems related to passive RFID. In June 2005, we testified before the 

Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and 

Cybersecurity of the House Committee on Homeland Security on similar 

 56Although all the tests were carried out at five land POEs, the number of POEs tested at 

which pedestrians exit and enter, and vehicles exit and entry differed, due to varying test 

conditions, according to the US-VISIT Program Office. 

Page 51 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
reliability problems with RFID.57 We noted, for example, that when an 

object close to the reader or tag interferes with the radio waves, read-rate 

accuracy decreases, and that environmental conditions, such as 

temperature and humidity, can make tags unreadable. We further noted 

that tags read at high speeds have a significant decrease in read rates. 

According to US-VISIT officials, phase 2 of the RFID proof-of-concept 

testing, which is to expand the capabilities identified at the five phase 1 

locations will, among other things, link visitor data to vehicle exit data (or 

re-entry, if the visitor already has an RFID- embedded I-94 form), address 

deficiencies noted in phase 1, and further evaluate RFID performance. At 

the time of our review, many uncertainties about the future of a US-VISIT 

exit capability remained because US-VISIT had not developed a plan to

show when phase 2 of proof-of-concept testing of RFID would conclude, 

when an evaluation of the technology would be completed, and how USVISIT would define success. 

However, even if RFID deficiencies were to be fully addressed and 

deadlines set, questions remain about DHS’s intentions going forward. For 

example, the RFID solution does not meet the congressional requirement 

for a biometric exit capability because the technology that has been tested 

cannot meet a key goal of US-VISIT—ensuring that visitors who enter the 

country are the same ones who leave. By design, an RFID tag embedded in

an I-94 arrival/departure form cannot provide the biometric identitymatching capability that is envisioned as part of a comprehensive 

entry/exit border security system using biometric identifiers for tracking 

overstays and others entering, exiting, and re-entering the country. 

Specifically, the RFID tag in the I-94 form cannot be physically tied to an 

individual. This situation means that while a document may be detected as

leaving the country, the person to whom it was issued at time of entry may 

be somewhere else. 

DHS was to have reported to Congress by June 2005 on how the agency

intended to fully implement a biometric entry/exit program. As of October 

2006, this plan was still under review in the Office of the Secretary, 

according to US-VISIT officials. According to statute, this plan is to 

include, among other things, a description of the manner in which the US-

 57GAO, Information Security: Key Considerations Related to Federal Implementation of 

Radio Frequency Identification Technology, GAO-05-849T (Washington, D.C.: June 22, 

2005). 

Page 52 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
VISIT program meets the goals of a comprehensive entry and exit 

screening system—including both biometric entry and exit—and fulfills 

statutory obligations imposed on the program by several laws enacted 

between 1996 and 2002.

58 Until such a plan is finalized and issued, DHS is 

not able to articulate how entry/exit concepts will fit together—including 

any interim nonbiometric solutions—and neither DHS nor Congress is 

positioned to prioritize and allocate resources for a US-VISIT exit 

capability or plan for the program’s future. 

In commenting on this report, DHS acknowledged that the interim nonbiometric exit technology using RFID tags embedded in the I-94 does not 

meet the statutory requirement for a biometric exit capability. DHS stated 

that it used the non-biometric technology because industry was not to the 

point of developing a device that could satisfy US-VISIT requirements, 

such as not impacting traffic flows or not having safety impacts. DHS said 

that US-VISIT officials would perform subsequent research and industry 

outreach activities in an attempt to satisfy statutory requirements for a 

biometric exit capability. 

In recent years, DHS has planned or implemented a number of initiatives 

aimed at securing the nation’s borders. However, DHS has not defined a 

strategic context that shows how US-VISIT fits with other land border 

initiatives. As we reported in September 2003, agency programs need to 

properly fit within a common strategic context governing key aspects of 

program operations—e.g., what functions are to be performed by whom; 

when and where they are to be performed; what information is to be used 

to perform them; what rules and standards will govern the application of

technology to support them; and what facility or infrastructure changes 

will be needed to ensure that they operate in harmony and as intended.59

Without a clear strategic context for US-VISIT, the risk is increased that 

the program will not operate with related programs and thus not costeffectively meet mission needs. 

DHS Has Not 

Articulated How USVISIT Strategically 

Fits with Other LandBorder Security 

Initiatives 

In our September 2003 report, we stated that DHS had not defined key

aspects of the larger homeland security environment in which US-VISIT 

would need to operate. For example, certain policy and standards 

 588 U.S.C. §1365b(c)(2)(E). 

59GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security

Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2006). 

Page 53 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
decisions had not been made, such as whether official travel documents 

would be required for all persons who enter and exit the country, 

including U.S. and Canadian citizens, and how many fingerprints would be 

collected—factors that could potentially increase inspection times and 

ultimately increase traveler wait times at some of the higher volume land 

POE facilities. To minimize the impact of these changes, we recommended 

that DHS clarify the context in which US-VISIT is to operate. Three years 

later, defining this strategic context remains a work in progress. Thus, the 

program’s relationships and dependencies with other closely allied 

initiatives and programs are still unclear. 

According to the US-VISIT Chief Strategist, the Program Office drafted in 

March 2005 a strategic plan that showed how US-VISIT would be 

strategically aligned with DHS’s organizational mission and also defined an 

overall vision for immigration and border management.60 According to this 

official, the draft plan provided for an immigration and border 

management enterprise that unified multiple internal departmental and 

other external stakeholders with common objectives, strategies, 

processes, and infrastructures. As of October 2006, we were told that DHS 

had not approved this strategic plan. This draft plan was not available to 

us, and it is unclear how it would provide an overarching vision and road 

map of how all these component elements can at this time be addressed 

given that critical elements of other emerging border security initiatives 

have yet to be finalized. For example, under the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, DHS and State are to develop and 

implement a plan, no later than June 2009, which requires U.S. citizens and 

foreign nationals of Canada, Bermuda, and Mexico to present a passport 

or other document or combination of documents deemed sufficient to 

show identity and citizenship to enter the United States (this is currently 

not a requirement for these individuals entering the United States via land

POEs from within the western hemisphere). This effort, known as the 

Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), was first announced in 

2005, and some members of Congress and others have raised questions 

about agencies’ progress carrying out WHTI. In May 2006, we issued a 

report that provided our observations on efforts to implement WHTI along 

 60In commenting on this report, DHS stated that this plan includes US-VISIT’s draft 

response to the legislative requirement that DHS produce a report to the Congress by June

2005 that describes a comprehensive US-VISIT entry/exit screening system, as discussed 

earlier in this report. 

Page 54 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
the U.S. border with Canada.61 We stated that DHS and State had taken

some steps to carry out the Travel Initiative, but they had a long way to go

to implement their proposed plans, and time was slipping by. Among other 

things, we found that: 

• key decisions had yet to be made about what documents other than a 

passport would be acceptable when U.S. citizens and citizens of 

Canada enter or return to the United States—a decision critical to 

making decisions about how DHS is to inspect individuals entering the 

country, including what common facilities or infrastructure might be 

needed to perform these inspections at land POEs; 

• a DHS and Department of State proposal to develop an alternative form 

of passport, called a PASS card, would rely on RFID technology to help

DHS process U.S. citizens re-entering the country, but DHS had not 

made decisions involving a broad set of considerations that include (1) 

utilizing security features to protect personal information, (2) ensuring 

that proper equipment and facilities are in place to facilitate crossings 

at land borders, and (3) enhancing compatibility with other border 

crossing technology already in use. 

As of September 2006, DHS had still not finalized plans for changing the 

inspection process and using technology to process U.S. citizens and 

foreign nationals of Canada, Bermuda, and Mexico reentering or entering 

the country at land POEs. In the absence of decisions about the strategic 

direction of both programs, it is still unclear (1) how the technology used 

to facilitate border crossings under the Travel Initiative will be integrated 

with US-VISIT technology, if at all, and (2) how land POE facilities would 

have to be modified to accommodate both programs to ensure efficient 

inspections that do not seriously affect wait times. This raises the 

possibility that CBP would be faced with managing differing technology 

platforms and border inspection processes at high-volume land POEs 

facilities that, according to DHS, already face space constraints and 

congestion.

Similarly, it is not clear how US-VISIT is to operate in relation to another 

emerging border security effort, the Secure Border Initiative (SBI)—a new 

comprehensive DHS initiative, announced last year, to secure the 

 61GAO, Observations on Efforts to Implement the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative 

on the U.S. Canadian Border, GAO-06-741R (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006). 

Page 55 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
country’s borders and reduce illegal migration. According to DHS, as of 

June 2006, SBI is to focus broadly on two major themes: 

• border control—gaining full control of the borders to prevent illegal 

immigration, as well as security breaches, and 

• interior enforcement—disrupting and dismantling cross border crime 

into the interior of the United States while locating and removing aliens 

who are present in the United States in violation of law. 

Under SBI and its CBP component, called SBInet, DHS plans to use a 

systems approach to integrate personnel, infrastructures, technologies, 

and rapid response capability into a comprehensive border protection 

system. DHS reports that, among other things, SBInet is to encompass 

both the northern and southern land borders, including the Great Lakes, 

under a unified border control strategy whereby CBP is to focus on the 

interdiction of cross-border violations between the ports and at the official 

land POEs and funnel traffic to the land POEs. 

DHS has recently awarded a contract to help DHS design, build, and 

execute SBInet. Although DHS has published some information on various 

aspects of SBI and SBInet, it remains unclear how SBInet will be linked, if

at all, to US-VISIT so that the two systems can share technology, 

infrastructure, and data across programs. For example, from a border 

control perspective, questions arise on whether CBP needs additional 

resources, facilities or facility modifications, and procedural changes at 

land POEs if all those who attempt to enter the country on the northern 

and southern border are successfully funneled to land POEs. 

Also, given the absence of a comprehensive entry and exit system, 

questions remain about what meaningful data US-VISIT may be able to 

provide other DHS components, such as Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), to ensure that DHS can, from an interior enforcement 

perspective, identify and remove foreign nationals covered by US-VISIT 

who may have overstayed their visas. In a May 2004 report, we stated that

although no firm estimates were available, the extent of overstaying is 

significant.62 We stated that most long-term overstays appeared to be 

motivated by economic opportunities, but a few had been identified as 

terrorists or involved in terrorist-related activities. Notably, some of the 

 62GAO, Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a Layered

Defense, GAO-04-82 (Washington, D.C.: May 2004). 

Page 56 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
September 11 hijackers had overstayed their visas. We further reported 

that US-VISIT held promise for identifying and tracking overstays as long 

as it could overcome weaknesses matching visitors’ entry and exit. 

Developing and deploying complex technology that records the entry and

exit of millions of visitors to the United States, verifies their identities to 

mitigate the likelihood that terrorists or criminals can enter or exit at will, 

and tracks persons who remain in the country longer than authorized is a 

worthy goal in our nation’s effort to enhance border security in a post-9/11 

era. But doing so also poses significant challenges; foremost among them

is striking a reasonable balance between US-VISIT’s goals of providing 

security to U.S. citizens and visitors while facilitating legitimate trade and 

travel. DHS has made considerable progress making the entry portion of 

the US-VISIT program at land ports of entry (POEs) operational, and 

border officials have clearly expressed the benefits that US-VISIT 

technology and biometric identification tools have afforded them. 

Nevertheless, US-VISIT is one in a series of ambitious border security 

initiatives that could take a toll on the current facilities and infrastructure 

in place to support the activities at land POEs, which already process a 

large majority (more than 75 percent) of all visitors entering the United 

States via legal checkpoints. Many land POEs operate out of small, aging 

structures that are constrained by space and that were constructed before 

technology and associated equipment played a prominent role in 

processing activities. 

Conclusions 

Our current and past work has raised questions on whether DHS has 

adequately assessed how US-VISIT has affected operations at land POEs, 

given current constraints at facilities that routinely experience high traffic 

volumes and which encounter occasional computer-processing problems. 

As additional US-VISIT capabilities—such as 10-fingerprint scanning—are 

installed at land POEs and as other border security initiatives unfold, 

including the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, it is particularly 

important that DHS be able to anticipate potential problems and develop 

solutions to minimize any operational and logistical impacts on aging and 

already overcrowded land POE facilities. Our earlier recommendation on 

this issue suggested that DHS needed to expand upon prior efforts to 

assess the impact of US-VISIT on busy land POEs in order to obtain a 

fuller understanding of the system’s impact on these facilities from an 

operational and human capital perspective. We believe this remains an 

important step to take because it would help DHS establish a baseline or 

foundation from which to anticipate potential problems while providing a 

framework for developing strategies and action plans to overcome them. 

Page 57 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Although US-VISIT has said it would conduct operational assessments at 

POEs as new projects came online, the assessment methodology US-VISIT

has used in the past—which focused on measuring changes in I-94 

processing times—raised questions about how the agency will perform 

future assessments. 

In addition, because US-VISIT will likely continue to have an impact on 

land POE facilities as it evolves, it is important for US-VISIT and CBP 

officials to have sufficient management controls for identifying and 

reporting potential computer and other operational problems as they 

arise—problems that could affect the ability of US-VIST entry capability to 

operate as intended. If additional delays in processing visitors were to 

occur, the ability of POE facilities to handle additional vehicular and 

pedestrian traffic could be further strained, and incidents requiring 

officials to turn visitors away temporarily may increase. Likewise, if 

disruptions to US-VISIT computer operations are not consistently and 

promptly reported and resolved and if communication between CBP and 

US-VISIT officials about computer-related problems and other operational 

challenges is not effective, then it is possible that a critical US-VISIT 

function—notably, the ability to use biometric information to confirm 

visitors’ identities through various databases—could be disrupted, as has 

occurred in the past. The need to avoid disruptions to biometric 

verification is important given that one of the primary goals of US-VISIT is 

to enhance the security of U.S. citizens and visitors, and in light of the 

substantial investment DHS has made in US-VISIT technology and 

equipment. 

US-VISIT has taken appropriate steps to develop performance measures 

that focus on various aspects of US-VISIT performance across air, land, 

and sea POEs. However, these measures do not go far enough to assess 

the affect of US-VISIT on POE operations, particularly land POEs, which 

are operationally distinctive from air and sea POEs where US-VISIT entry 

has also been installed. Such measures are needed to ensure that officials 

can identify and address problems at land-based facilities where 

improvements may be needed. 

With respect to DHS’s effort to create an exit verification capability, 

developing and deploying this capability for US-VISIT at land POEs has 

posed a set of challenges that are distinct from those associated with 

entry. US-VISIT has not determined whether it can achieve, in a realistic 

time frame, or at an acceptable cost, the legislatively mandated capability 

to record the exit of travelers at land POEs using biometric technology. 

Apart from acquiring new facilities and infrastructure at an estimated cost 

Page 58 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
of billions of dollars, US-VISIT officials have acknowledged that no 

technology now exists to reliably record travelers’ exit from the country, 

and to ensure that the person leaving the country is the same person who 

entered, without requiring them to stop upon exit—potentially imposing a 

substantial burden on travelers and commerce. US-VISIT officials stated 

that they believe a biometrically based solution that does not require those

exiting the country to stop for processing, that minimizes the need for 

major facility changes, and that can used to definitively match a visitor’s

entry and exit will be available in 5 to 10 years. In the interim, it remains 

unclear how officials plan to proceed—whether a nonbiometric alternative 

now being tested can provide an acceptable interim solution or whether 

the government ought to wait for a viable biometric solution to become 

available. According to statute, DHS was required to report more than a 

year ago on its plans for developing a comprehensive biometric entry and 

exit system, but DHS has yet to finalize this road map for Congress. 

Reporting might provide better assurance that US-VISIT can balance its 

goals of providing security, serving the immigration system, facilitating 

trade and travel, and protecting privacy at land POEs. This plan would also 

give DHS the opportunity to discuss the costs, benefits, barriers, and 

opportunities associated with various strategies for deploying biometric 

and nonbiometric exit capabilities and keep Congress informed of its 

progress overall. Until DHS finalizes such a plan, neither Congress nor 

DHS are likely to have sufficient information as a basis for decisions about 

various factors relevant to the success of US-VISIT, ranging from funding 

needed for any land POE facility modifications in support of the 

installation of exit technology to the trade-offs associated with ensuring 

traveler convenience while providing verification of travelers’ departure 

consistent with US-VISIT’s national security and law enforcement goals. 

Finally, DHS has not articulated how US-VISIT fits strategically and 

operationally with other land-border security initiatives, such as the 

Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and Secure Border Initiative. 

Without knowing how US-VISIT is to be integrated within the larger 

strategic context governing DHS operations, DHS faces substantial risk 

that US-VISIT will not align or operate with other initiatives at land POEs 

and thus not cost-effectively meet mission needs. Knowing how US-VISIT 

is to work in harmony with these initiatives could help Congress, DHS, and 

others better understand what resources, tools, and investments in land 

POE facilities and infrastructure are needed to ensure their success, while 

providing critical information to help make decisions about other DHS 

missions. This could include, for example, information on what funds and 

staffing resources ICE would need to enforce immigration laws if US-VISIT

were able to provide reliable and timely information on potentially 

Page 59 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
millions of persons who have overstayed the terms of their visas, some of 

whom may pose a threat to the nation’s security. 

To help DHS achieve benefits commensurate with its investment in USVISIT at land POEs and security goals and objectives, we are 

recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the USVISIT Program Director, in collaboration with the Commissioner of CBP, 

to take the following two actions: 

• improve existing management controls for identifying and reporting 

computer processing and other operational problems as they arise at 

land POEs and ensure that these controls are consistently 

administered; and 

• develop performance measures for assessing the impact of US-VISIT 

operations specifically at land POEs. 

We also recommend that as DHS finalizes the statutorily mandated report 

describing a comprehensive biometric entry and exit system for US-VISIT, 

the Secretary of Homeland Security take steps to ensure that the report 

include, among other things, 

• information on the costs, benefits, and feasibility of deploying 

biometric and nonbiometric exit capabilities at land POEs; 

• a discussion of how DHS intends to move from a nonbiometric exit 

capability, such as the technology currently being tested, to a reliable 

biometric exit capability that meets statutory requirements; and 

• a description of how DHS expects to align emerging land border 

security initiatives with US-VISIT and what facility or facility 

modifications would be needed at land POEs to ensure that technology 

and processes work in harmony. 

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of 

Homeland Security. In an October 31, 2006, letter, DHS provided written 

comments, which are summarized below and included in their entirety in 

appendix VIII. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

DHS generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that it needed

to improve existing management controls associated with US-VISIT, 

develop performance measures to assess the impact of US-VISIT 

operations at land POEs, and ensure that the statutorily mandated report

describes how DHS will move to a biometric entry and exit capability and 

align US-VISIT with emerging land border initiatives. DHS did not provide 

Page 60 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
timelines for when it plans to take these steps, including finalizing the 

statutorily mandated report, which was to have been issued to the 

Congress in June 2005. 

DHS disagreed with certain aspects of or sought clarification on some of 

our findings. DHS disagreed with our finding that the US-VISIT program 

office did not fully consider the impact of US-VISIT on the overall 

operations at POEs. It said that US-VISIT impacts are limited to changes

in Form I-94 processing time, which it says are positive, as supported by 

US-VISIT evaluations. According to DHS other factors related to capacity, 

staffing, and the volume of travelers are “arguably” beyond the scope of 

US-VISIT. 

We agree that the approach taken to do operational assessments of the 

impact of US-VISIT land POE facilities focused on changes to I-94 

processing time and that a variety of factors and processes can affect 

traveler inspections and associated wait times at land POEs. However, as

discussed in this and our February 2006 report, the assessment 

methodology US-VISIT has used thus far had limitations--including 

focusing solely on I-94 processing time.63 Unanticipated problems at 

facilities that routinely experience high traffic volumes and occasionally 

encounter computer processing shortfalls raise questions about whether 

DHS has adequately assessed how US-VISIT has affected operations at 

land POEs. Although it may not be cost-effective for US-VISIT or CBP to 

conduct a formal assessment of the impact of US-VISIT at each land POE, 

it is important that DHS be positioned to anticipate potential problems and 

develop solutions to minimize any operational and logistical impacts on 

aging and already overcrowded land POE facilities. This is especially true 

given that DHS recognizes that the transition from 2- to 10-print digital 

scanning has a high likelihood of impacting port facilities. 

Regarding the latter, we have amended our report to clarify, consistent 

with DHS’s comments, that US-VISIT is currently working with industry to 

speed up processing time and reduce the size of the 10-print capture 

devices to “eliminate or significantly reduce the impact of deploying 10-

print scanning.” DHS efforts to work with industry highlights the need to

more fully assess how US-VISIT affects land POEs so that potential 

problems can be identified and addressed before the readers, or any other 

new programs, are introduced at land POEs. As noted in our report, based 

on our past work, any lengthening in the process of entering the United 

 63GAO-06-296. 

Page 61 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
States at the busiest land POEs could inconvenience travelers and result in 

fewer visits to the United States or lost business to the nation.64 

DHS also suggested that we clarify its acknowledgement that the nonbiometric technology tested did not meet the statutory requirement for 

biometric exit capability. DHS stated that the non-biometric technology 

was used because industry has yet to develop a biometric exit device that 

could satisfy mission requirements such as not impacting traffic flow and

not having safety impacts. We have amended our report to clarify that 

DHS acknowledged that the non-biometric technology would not satisfy 

statutory requirements and to reflect that it would perform research and 

industry outreach to satisfy the mandate. Nonetheless, the fact that the 

non-biometric exit technology used does not satisfy the congressionally 

mandated biometric exit capability underscores the importance of our 

recommendation for DHS to clearly articulate how it plans to move from a 

non-biometric exit technology to a biometric exit solution. 

In addition, DHS suggested that we clarify that, with regard to the RFID 

pedestrian exit portals at the Nogales-Mariposa, Arizona, POE, it had 

constructed a new primary pedestrian exit walkway parallel to the existing 

pedestrian entry and had installed signage, sidewalks, and a new secure 

gate. We have amended the report to include information about the new 

pedestrian exit walkway. However, as we noted in our report, portals 

were installed only on one of the three pedestrian pathways used to exit 

the United States. According to a CBP official at the Nogales-Mariposa 

POE, the newly constructed pedestrian exit walkway is on the other side

of the building from the pathway where the portal readers were placed 

and tested and thus would not mitigate the vulnerabilities we identified. 

Finally, DHS provided other comments that we considered technical in 

nature. We have amended our report to incorporate these clarifications, 

where appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the 

issuance date of our original report, which, as discussed earlier, was 

classified For Official Use Only. At that time, we will provide copies of 

this report to appropriate departments and interested congressional 

committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. 

 64GAO-03-171. 

Page 62 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
In addition, this report will be available on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish to discuss 

the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to

this report are listed in appendix IX.

Richard M. Stana 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

Page 63 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
List of Requesters 

The Honorable Peter T. King 

Chairman 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Robert Filner 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Raul M. Grijalva 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Ruben E. Hinojosa 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Silvestre Reyes 

House of Representatives 

Page 64 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

Methodology 

This report addresses the progress the Department of Homeland Security 

and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have made in

implementing the United States Visitor Status Indicator Technology (USVISIT) program at existing land Ports of Entry (POE). Specifically, we 

analyzed the following issues: (1) What has the US-VISIT Program Office 

done to implement US-VISIT entry capabilities at land POEs and what 

impact has US-VISIT had on these facilities? (2) What is the status of USVISIT Program Office efforts to implement a US-VISIT exit capability at 

land POE facilities? (3) What has DHS done to define a strategic context to 

show how US-VISIT entry and exit capabilities at land POE facilities fit 

with other current and emerging border security initiatives? 

We performed our work at the Department of Homeland Security’s USVISIT Program Office and CBP. We also carried out work at 21 of 154 land

POEs where US-VISIT entry capability had been installed. At 3 of these 21 

land POEs, DHS was also testing exit capability. Table 3 shows the 21 land 

POEs we visited, by location and state, between August 2005 and February

2006. 

Page 65 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Table 3: Land POEs visited by GAO, August 2005 to February 2006 

POE Name Location State 

Northern border

Ambassador Bridge 

Detroit-Windsor Tunnel 

Detroit Mich.

Overton Corners 

St. John’s Hwy. 

Thousands Island Bridge 

Champlain 

Rouses Point 

Alexandria Bay

Champlain 

N.Y. 

Highgate Springs 

Alburg 

Highgate Springs 

Alburg 

Vt. 

Peace Arch 

Pacific Highway 

Blaine Wash.

Southern border 

DeConcini 

Morley Gate 

Mariposa 

Nogales Ariz.

San Ysidro San Diego Calif. 

Los Tomates 

Gateway 

Brownsville Matamoros Bridge

Hidalgo 

Progreso 

Los Ebanos 

Pharr 

Brownsville 

Hidalgo 

Progreso 

Los Ebanos 

Pharr 

Tex. 

Source: GAO.

In selecting land POEs to visit, we originally selected 10 land POEs on the 

northern border and 10 POEs on the southern border based on geographic 

dispersion along the border and taking into consideration POEs that were 

located near each other to minimize travel costs. We added the Morley 

Gate POE after we initially selected sites because it is physically located 

about 100 yards from the DeConcini POE in downtown Nogales (Ariz.) and 

after learning that US-VISIT was treating Morley Gate as a stand-alone 

Page 66 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and 

Methodology 

POE for US-VISIT deployment purposes.1 In making our selections, we 

also considered US-VISIT deployment schedules, facility size, and the 

number of border crossings and I-94 issuances.2

 Fifteen of the 21 selected 

sites in our study were among the 50 busiest land POEs for which USVISIT entry capability was to be operating by December 31, 2004, as 

required by law. The other 6 sites were among those remaining POEs 

where, according to law, US-VISIT entry capability was to be operating by 

December 31, 2005. While selecting sites, we also included the five POEs 

at which the US-VISIT program office was testing radio frequency 

identification (RFID) technology as part of a proof of concept for meeting 

US-VISIT exit capability requirements. These were: Blaine-Peace Arch; 

Blaine-Pacific Highway; Thousand Islands Bridge, Alexandria Bay; 

Nogales-Mariposa; and Nogales-DeConcini. The information from our site 

visits is limited to the 21 POEs we visited and is not generalizable to the 

remaining POEs. 

To examine what the US-VISIT Program Office has done to implement USVISIT entry capabilities at land POEs and what impact US-VISIT has had 

on these facilities, we interviewed US-VISIT and CBP headquarters 

officials as well as CBP officials at the 21 locations we visited. We 

obtained and analyzed available DHS reports on US-VISIT entry capability 

planning, deployment, and operations across land POEs, including the 21 

we visited. At the 21 locations, we (1) discussed US-VISIT entry capability 

deployment at the facility, any facility-related barriers or constraints 

encountered during installation, and any operational issues encountered 

since and (2) obtained any available documentation about US-VISIT 

deployment and operations at the facility. We also toured secondary 

inspection at each facility to observe what US-VISIT equipment was 

installed, how it was installed, and where possible, how it operated when

visitors covered by US-VISIT arrived at the facility for processing into the 

country. While doing our site visits, we met with US-VISIT and CBP 

officials at headquarters to discuss our field work; discern why problems 

we identified in the field may have occurred, and if problems occurred, 

gather and analyze available US-VISIT and CBP information about those 

 1

At the time we selected sites for review, we were unaware that the Morley Gate POE was 

being treated as a land POE separate from the other land POEs at Nogales. However, since 

US-VISIT treated Morley Gate as a separate POE for deployment, we also counted it as a

stand alone POE. 

2

During fiscal year 2004, the number of I-94 issuances by the 21 selected sites ranged from

22 in Alburg Springs to about 398,900 in San Ysidro. 

Page 67 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and 

Methodology 

problems, including information on any corrective actions. We also 

examined whether internal or management controls were in place to alert 

officials to the problems we identified, and examined whether these 

controls were being applied, consistent with GAO’s Standards for Internal 

Controls in the Federal Government.3

 In addition, we interviewed CBP and 

US-VISIT headquarters officials about plans for installing and operating 

new technology and equipment related to US-VISIT, such as 10-finger-scan 

readers, at land POEs; reviewed available DHS documents about plans to

implement these devices; and reviewed available DHS documents that 

discussed performance measures for US-VISIT overall. We also reviewed 

applicable laws, regulations, and DHS federal register notices pertaining to

US-VISIT entry capability deployment at land POEs, as well as reports 

prepared by DHS, GAO, the DHS Office of Inspector General, and the 

Congressional Research Service. 

To determine the status of DHS’s efforts to implement a US-VISIT exit 

capability at land POEs, we interviewed US-VISIT and CBP headquarters 

officials and CBP officials at the five locations where US-VISIT exit 

capability was being tested (Nogales-Mariposa, Nogales-DeConcini, 

Blaine-Pacific Highway, Blaine-Peace Arch, and Alexandria Bay). At each 

of the locations, we toured the areas where exit testing equipment and 

technology had been installed and discussed with CBP officials how it was 

installed and to be tested. We also reviewed applicable laws and 

regulations and obtained and analyzed available DHS reports on US-VISIT 

exit capability including an operational alternatives assessment; feasibility 

studies; and proof of concept performance evaluation and corrective 

action reports. Our analysis of these reports focused on DHS strategies for 

selecting, testing, acquiring, and evaluating alternative methods that could 

meet the requirements; DHS’s criteria used to select and test the potential

of RFID technology; and the challenges encountered, including any 

privacy issues associated with RFID use. Finally, we obtained and 

analyzed DHS reports on the costs of the equipment and related facility 

infrastructure, such as the metal gantry erected over roadways to hold 

RFID readers, to estimate what it would cost to install RFID equipment at

all land POEs. We developed our overall estimate based on the average 

cost to date (about $1 million each) of installing exit gantries and 

associated RFID equipment at the four POEs where gantries and 

equipment were installed. (Although RFID use was tested at five POEs, at 

the DeConcini POE in downtown Nogales, Arizona, the RFID readers were 

 3

See GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 and GAO-01-1008G. 

Page 68 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and 

Methodology 

placed on poles on either side of entry lanes, since all entering vehicles 

pass under a large permanent canopy structure that precludes installing a 

gantry. At the other four POEs, RFID readers were attached to metal 

gantries placed over roadway lanes.)

To examine what DHS has done to define a strategic context to show how 

US-VISIT entry and exit capabilities at land POE facilities fit with other 

current and emerging border security initiatives, we reviewed past GAO 

reports and public DHS announcements about the Western Hemisphere 

Travel Initiative and the Secure Border Initiative (SBI). We also 

interviewed DHS officials about the status of efforts to implement these 

initiatives as well as the status of efforts to develop and promulgate a 

strategic plan for US-VISIT and compared available information on DHS 

plans to implement initiatives with the results of our discussions with USVISIT program officials. 

We conducted our work from September 2005 through October 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 69 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix II: Visa Waiver Countries Appendix II: Visa Waiver Countries 

The Department of State’s (State) Visa Waiver Program (VWP) enables 

nationals of certain countries to travel to the United States for tourism or 

business for stays of 90 days or less without obtaining a visa. The program 

was established in 1986 with the objective of promoting better relations 

with U.S. allies, eliminating unnecessary barriers to travel, stimulating the 

tourism industry, and permitting the Department of State to focus consular 

resources in other areas. VWP eligible travelers may apply for a visa, if 

they prefer to do so. Not all countries participate in the VWP, and not all 

travelers from VWP countries are eligible to use the program. VWP 

travelers are screened prior to admission into the United States, and they

are enrolled in the Department of Homeland Security’s US-VISIT program. 

Currently, 27 countries participate in the Visa Waiver Program as shown in 

the following table. 

Table 4: Countries Participating in the Visa Waiver Program 

Andorra Iceland Norway

Australia Ireland Portugal

Austria Italy San Marino

Belgium Japan Singapore

Brunei Liechtenstein Slovenia

Denmark Luxembourg Spain

Finland Monaco Sweden

France The Netherlands Switzerland

Germany New Zealand United Kingdom 

Source: Department of State. 

Page 70 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix III: Legislative Overview of the Appendix III: Legislative Overview of the US-VISIT Program 

US-VISIT Program 

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 

originally required the development of an automated entry and exit control 

system to collect a record of departure for every alien departing the United

States and match the record of departure with the record of the alien’s 

arrival in the United States; make it possible to identify nonimmigrants 

who remain in the country beyond the authorized period; and not 

significantly disrupt trade, tourism, or other legitimate cross-border traffic 

at land border ports of entry. It also required the integration of overstay 

information into appropriate databases of the INS and the Department of 

State, including those used at ports of entry and at consular offices. The 

system was originally to be developed by September 30, 1998; this deadline 

was changed to October 15, 1998, and was changed again for land border 

ports of entry and sea ports to March 30, 2001. 

The Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management 

Improvement Act (DMIA) of 2000 replaced the 1996 statute in its entirety, 

requiring instead an electronic system that would provide access to and 

integrate alien arrival and departure data that are authorized or required to

be created or collected under law, are in an electronic format, and are in a 

data base of the Department of Justice or the Department of State, 

including those created or used at ports of entry and at consular offices. 

The Act specifically provided that it not be construed to permit the 

imposition of any new documentary or data collection requirements on 

any person for the purpose of satisfying its provisions, but it further 

provided that it also not be construed to reduce or curtail any authority of

the Attorney General (now Secretary of Homeland Security) or Secretary

of State under any other provision of law. The integrated entry and exit 

data system was to be implemented at airports and seaports by December 

31, 2003, at the 50 busiest land ports of entry by December 31, 2004, and at 

all remaining ports of entry by December 31, 2005. 

The DMIA also required that the system use available data to produce a 

report of arriving and departing aliens by country of nationality, 

classification as an immigrant or nonimmigrant, and date of arrival in and

departure from the United States. The system was to match an alien’s 

available arrival data with the alien’s available departure data, assist in the 

identification of possible overstays, and use available alien arrival and 

departure data for annual reports to Congress. These reports were to 

include the number of aliens for whom departure data were collected 

during the reporting period, with an accounting by country of nationality;

the number of departing aliens whose departure data was successfully 

matched to the alien’s arrival data, with an accounting by country of 

nationality and classification as an immigrant or nonimmigrant; the 

Page 71 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix III: Legislative Overview of the 

US-VISIT Program 

number of aliens who arrived pursuant to a nonimmigrant visa, or as a 

visitor under the visa waiver program, for whom no matching departure 

data have been obtained as of the end of the alien’s authorized period of 

stay, with an accounting by country of nationality and date of arrival in the 

United States; and the number of identified overstays, with an accounting 

by country of nationality.

In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act provided that, in developing the integrated

entry and exit data system under the DMIA, the Attorney General (now 

Secretary of Homeland Security) and Secretary of State were to focus 

particularly on the utilization of biometric technology and the 

development of tamper-resistant documents readable at ports of entry. It 

also required that the system be able to interface with law enforcement 

databases for use by federal law enforcement to identify and detain 

individuals who pose a threat to the national security of the United States. 

The PATRIOT Act also required by January 26, 2003, the development and 

certification of a technology standard, including appropriate biometric 

identifier standards, that can be used to verify the identity of persons 

applying for a U.S. visa or persons seeking to enter the United States 

pursuant to a visa for the purposes of conducting background checks, 

confirming identity, and ensuring that a person has not received a visa

under a different name. This technology standard was to be the 

technological basis for a cross-agency, cross-platform electronic system 

that is a cost-effective, efficient, fully interoperable means to share law 

enforcement and intelligence information necessary to confirm the 

identity of persons applying for a U.S. visa or persons seeking to enter the 

United States pursuant to a visa. This electronic system was to be readily

and easily accessible to consular officers, border inspection agents, and 

law enforcement and intelligence officers responsible for investigation or

identification of aliens admitted to the United States pursuant to a visa.

Every 2 years beginning on October 26, 2002, the Attorney General (now 

Secretary of Homeland Security) and the Secretary of State were to jointly

report to Congress on the development, implementation, efficacy, and 

privacy implications of the technology standard and electronic database 

system. 

The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 required 

that, in developing the integrated entry and exit data system for the ports 

of entry under the DMIA, the Attorney General (now Secretary of 

Homeland Security) and Secretary of State implement, fund, and use the 

technology standard required by the USA PATRIOT Act at U.S. ports of 

entry and at consular posts abroad. The act also required the 

establishment of a database containing the arrival and departure data from

Page 72 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix III: Legislative Overview of the 

US-VISIT Program 

machine-readable visas, passports, and other travel and entry documents

possessed by aliens and the interoperability of all security databases 

relevant to making determinations of admissibility under section 212 of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act. In implementing these requirements, the 

INS (now DHS) and the Department of State were to utilize technologies 

that facilitate the lawful and efficient cross-border movement of 

commerce and persons without compromising the safety and security of 

the United States and were to consider implementing a North American 

National Security Program, for which other provisions in the act called for 

a feasibility study. 

The act, as amended, also established a number of requirements regarding 

biometric travel and entry documents. It required that not later than 

October 26, 2004, the Attorney General (now Secretary of Homeland 

Security) and the Secretary of State issue to aliens only machine-readable,

tamper-resistant visas and other travel and entry documents that use 

biometric identifiers and that they jointly establish document 

authentication standards and biometric identifiers standards to be 

employed on such visas and other travel and entry documents from among 

those biometric identifiers recognized by domestic and international 

standards organizations. It also required by October 26, 2005, the 

installation at all ports of entry of the United States equipment and 

software to allow biometric comparison and authentication of all U.S. 

visas and other travel and entry documents issued to aliens and passports 

issued by visa waiver participants. Such biometric data readers and 

scanners were to be those that domestic and international standards 

organizations determine to be highly accurate when used to verify identity, 

that can read the biometric identifiers used under the act, and that can

authenticate the document presented to verify identity. These systems also 

were to utilize the technology standard established pursuant to the 

PATRIOT Act. 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 did not 

amend the existing statutory provisions governing US-VISIT, but it did 

establish additional statutory requirements concerning the program. It 

described the program as an “automated biometric entry and exit data

system” and required DHS to develop a plan to accelerate the full 

implementation of the program and to report to Congress on this plan by 

June 15, 2005. The report was to provide several types of information 

about the implementation of US-VISIT, including a “listing of ports of entry 

and other DHS and Department of State locations with biometric exit data 

systems in use.” The report also was to provide a description of the 

manner in which the US-VISIT program meets the goals of a 

Page 73 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix III: Legislative Overview of the 

US-VISIT Program 

comprehensive entry and exit screening system, “including both entry and 

exit biometric;” and fulfills the statutory obligations imposed on the 

program by several laws enacted between 1996 and 2002. The act provided

that US-VISIT “shall include a requirement for the collection of biometric 

exit data for all categories of individuals who are required to provide 

biometric entry data, regardless of the port of entry where such categories

of individuals entered the United States.” 

The new provisions in the 2004 act also addressed integration and 

interoperability of databases and data systems that process or contain 

information on aliens and federal law enforcement and intelligence

information relevant to visa issuance and admissibility of aliens; 

maintaining the accuracy and integrity of the US-VISIT data system; using 

the system to track and facilitate the processing of immigration benefits 

using biometric identifiers; the goals of the program (e.g., serving as a vital 

counterterrorism tool, screening visitors efficiently and in a welcoming 

manner, integrating relevant databases and plans for database 

modifications to address volume increase and database usage, and 

providing inspectors and related personnel with adequate real time 

information); training, education, and outreach on US-VISIT, low risk 

visitor programs, and immigration law; annual compliance reports by DHS, 

State, the Department of Justice, and any other department or agency

subject to the requirements of the new provisions; and development and 

implementation of a registered traveler program. 

Page 74 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix IV: The 20 Busiest Land Ports of 

Entry (POE) by Volume of Individuals Appendix IV Entering the United States in Fiscal Year 2005 : The 20 Busiest Land Ports of 

Entry (POE) by Volume of Individuals 

Entering the United States in Fiscal Year 2005

Rank 

Order Name of Land POE Location State

Total Number of US

 and Foreign Entrants 

(Pedestrians and Vehicle 

Occupants)

1 San Ysidro San Diego Calif. 41,430,304

2 Calexico Calexico Calif. 16,418,744

3 Otay Mesa Otay Mesa Calif. 14,531,794

4 Bridge of Americas El Paso Tex. 14,229,629

5 Paso del Norte El Paso Tex. 13,443,901

6 Hidalgo Hidalgo Tex. 12,788,679

7 Nogales DeConcini Nogales Ariz. 12,425,006

8 Lincoln-Juarez Bridge Laredo Tex. 12,328,941

9 Niagara Fallsa Niagara Falls N.Y. 9,656,444

10 San Luis San Luis Ariz. 9,017,655

11 Laredo Convent Bridge Laredo Tex. 8,376,604

12 Detroit-Ambassador Bridge Detroit Mich. 7,438,654

13 Douglas Douglas Ariz. 6,795,354

14 Peace Bridge Buffalo N.Y. 6,725,942

15 Brownsville-Gateway Brownsville Tex. 6,712,108

16 Ysleta El Paso Tex. 6,492,695

17 Calexico East Calexico Calif. 6,122,111

18 Detroit Tunnel Detroit Mich. 5,719,476

19 Port Huron Port Huron Mich. 5,080,176

20 Eagle Pass Intern Bridge II Eagle Pass Tex. 4,945,237

Source: CBP. 

a

This site comprises multiple POEs at this location. 

Page 75 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix V: La

Whic

nd Ports of Entry (POE) at 

h US-VISIT Has Been Installed 

Page 76 GAO-07-248

Appendix V: Land Ports of Entry (POE) at 

Which US-VISIT Has Been Installed 

According to the US-VISIT program office, US-VISIT entry capability was 

installed at the following land POE by December 31, 2005. The list is 

arranged in state alphabetical order.

Alcan, Alcan

Dalton’s Cache, Dalton’s Cache 

Skagway, Skagway 

Douglas, Douglas 

Lukeville, Lukeville 

Nogales DeConcini 

Nogales Mariposa 

Morley Gate, Nogales 

San Luis, San Luis 

Sasabe, Sasabe 

Naco, Naco

Andrade, Andrade 

Calexico East-Imperial Valley, Calexico 

Calexico West, Calexico 

Otay Mesa, Otay Mesa 

San Ysidro, San Ysidro 

Tecate, Tecate 

Eastport, Eastport 

Porthill, Porthill 

Bar Harbor Ferry, Bar Harbor 

Bridgewater, Bridgewater

Calais-Ferry Point Bridge, Calais 

Coburn Gore, Coburn Gore 

Eastport, Eastport 

Fort Fairfield, Fort Fairfield 

Fort Kent, Fort Kent 

Hamlin, Hamlin 

Houlton, Houlton 

Jackman, Jackman 

Limestone, Limestone 

Alaska (3) 

Arizona (8) 

California (6) 

Idaho (2) 

Maine (15) 

US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix V: Land Ports of Entry (POE) at 

Which US-VISIT Has Been Installed 

Lubec, Lubec 

Madawaska, Madawaska 

Van Buren, Van Buren 

Vanceboro, Vanceboro 

Detroit Ambassador Bridge, Detroit 

Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, Detroit 

Port Huron–Blue Water Bridge, Port Huron 

Sault Ste. Marie, Sault Ste. Marie 

Algonac Ferry, Algonac

Marine City Ferry, Marine City 

Baudette, Baudette 

Ely, Ely 

Grand Portage, Grand Portage 

International Falls, International Falls 

Lancaster, Lancaster 

Pine Creek, Roseau 

Roseau, Roseau 

Warroad, Warroad 

Chief Mountain, Chief Mountain 

Del Bonita, Del Bonita 

Morgan, Loring 

Opheim, Opheim 

Piegan, Babb

Raymond, Raymond 

Roosville, Roosville 

Scobey, Scobey 

Sweetgrass, Sweetgrass 

Turner, Turner 

Willow Creek, Turner 

Wild Horse, Havre 

Whitetail, Whitetail 

Pittsburg, Pittsburg 

Michigan (6) 

Minnesota (8) 

Montana (13) 

New Hampshire (1) 

Page 77 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix V: Land Ports of Entry (POE) at 

Which US-VISIT Has Been Installed 

Antelope Wells, Antelope Wells 

Columbus, Columbus 

Santa Teresa, Santa Teresa 

Cape Vincent Ferry, Cape Vincent 

Champlain, Champlain 

Chateaugay, Chateaugay

Fort Covington, Fort Covington 

Heart Island Ferry, Alexandria Bay 

Massena, Rooseveltown 

Mooers, Mooers 

Niagara (Lewiston-Queenston, Whirlpool, and Rainbow Bridges), Niagara 

 Falls 

Niagara Falls Amtrak Station, Niagara Falls 

Ogdensburg, Ogdensburg 

Overton Corners, Champlain 

Peace Bridge, Buffalo 

Rochester Ferry, Rochester 

Rouses Point, Rouses Point 

Thousand Islands Bridge, Alexandria Bay 

Trout River, Trout River 

Ambrose, Ambrose 

Antler, Antler 

Carbury, Carbury 

Dunseith, Dunseith 

Fortuna, Fortuna 

Hannah, Hannah 

Hansboro, Hansboro 

Maida, Maida 

Neche, Neche 

Noonon, Noonan 

Northgate, Northgate 

Pembina, Pembina 

Portal, Portal 

Sarles, Sarles 

Sherwood, Sherwood 

St. John, St. John 

Walhalla, Walhalla 

Westhope, Westhope 

New Mexico (3) 

New York (16) 

North Dakota (18) 

Page 78 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix V: Land Ports of Entry (POE) at 

Which US-VISIT Has Been Installed 

Jackson Street Pier Ferry, Akron 

Amistad Dam, Amistad Village 

Bridge of the Americas/Cordova Bridge, El Paso

Brownsville-Gateway 

Brownsville-Los Tomates/Veterans International Bridge 

Brownsville-Matamoros Bridge 

Columbia Solidarity Bridge, Laredo 

Convent Street (or Gateway to the Americas International Bridge), Laredo

Del Rio International Bridge, Del Rio 

Eagle Pass Bridge I, Eagle Pass 

Eagle Pass Bridge II, Eagle Pass 

Fabens, Fabens 

Falcon Heights, Falcon Heights 

Fort Hancock, Fort Hancock 

Gateway International Bridge, Brownsville 

Hidalgo, McAllen 

Lincoln-Juarez Bridge, Laredo 

Los Ebanos Ferry, Los Ebanos 

Los Indios, Los Indios 

Paso del Norte Bridge, El Paso 

Pharr, Pharr 

Presidio, Presidio 

Progreso, Progreso 

Rio Grande City, Rio Grande City 

Roma, Roma 

World Trade Bridge, Laredo 

Ysleta-Zaragoza Bridge, El Paso 

Alburg Springs, Alburg Springs 

Alburg, Alburg 

Beebe Plain, Beebe Plain

Beecher Falls, Beecher Falls 

Canaan, Canaan 

Derby Line, Derby Line, I-91 

Derby Line, Derby Line, Rte 5 

East Richford, East Richford 

Highgate Springs, Highgate Springs

Morses Line, Morses Line

North Troy, North Troy 

Norton, Norton 

Ohio (1) 

Texas (25)

Vermont (14) 

Page 79 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix V: Land Ports of Entry (POE) at 

Which US-VISIT Has Been Installed 

Richford, Richford 

Richford/Pinnacle, Richford 

West Berkshire, West Berkshire 

Blaine-Pacific Highway, Blaine 

Blaine-Peace Arch, Blaine 

Boundary, Boundary 

Danville, Danville 

Ferry, Ferry 

Frontier, Frontier 

Laurier, Laurier 

Lynden, Lynden 

Metaline Falls, Metaline Falls 

Nighthawk, Nighthawk 

Oroville, Oroville 

Point Roberts, Point Roberts 

Sumas, Sumas 

Vancouver Amtrak Station 

Washington (13) 

Canada (1) 

Page 80 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix VI: Actions Taken by US-VISIT 

Program Office to Mitigate Privacy Risks Appendix VI: Actions T Associated with RFID at Land aken by US-VISIT POEs

Program Office to Mitigate Privacy Risks 

Associated with RFID at Land POEs 

Protecting the privacy of visitors to the United States is one of the four 

stated primary mission goals of the US-VISIT program. We and others have

raised questions in recent years about the potential privacy risks 

surrounding the use of RFID technology to track the movement of 

persons, as opposed to goods; the potential for the technology to be 

subverted for surveillance purposes, rather than identification; and the 

potential for “function creep,” whereby information collected for one 

purpose gradually develops other secondary uses, such as has occurred 

with Social Security numbers.1

 In congressional testimony, we have noted 

that the use of RFID tags and associated databases raises important 

security considerations related to the confidentiality, integrity, and 

availability of the data on the tags and in the databases, and in how this 

information is being protected.2

 We have noted, as well, that while the 

federal government had begun using RFID technology for a variety of 

applications—to track and identify assets, weapons, and baggage on 

flights, for example—using this technology for generic inventory control 

did not raise the same privacy issues as using it to track the movement of 

persons.3

The US-VISIT Program Office has taken steps to meet statutory and 

congressional requirements protecting the privacy of individuals who 

would be affected if RFID technology were to be implemented as part of 

the US-VISIT exit and re-entry process, and to address the privacy

concerns raised by us and others. According to OMB guidance,4

 a privacy 

impact assessment should be conducted before an agency develops or 

procures an information technology system, such as the proposed RFID 

system, which collects, maintains, or disseminates information about an

individual—in this case, numeric information that may be linked to 

biographic information contained within databases. In January 2004, DHS 

 1

GAO, Privacy: Key Challenges Facing Federal Agencies, GAO-06-777T (Washington, D.C.: 

May 17, 2006). See also, Electronic Frontier Foundation, letter of 4 April, 2005, to U.S. 

Department of State (http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/RFID/RFID_passport.pdf);

and Juels, Ari; Molnar, David; and Wagner, David, Security and Privacy Issues in Epassports, Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2005/095 (http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/095). 

2

GAO, Information Security: Key Considerations Related to Federal Implementation of 

Radio Frequency Identification Technology, GAO-05-849T (Washington, D.C.: May 22, 

2005). 

3

GAO, Information Security: Radio Frequency Identification Technology in the Federal 

Government, GAO-05-551 (Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2005). 

4

OMB M-03-22, Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, OMB 

Guidance for Implementing the Privacy Provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002.

Page 81 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix VI: Actions Taken by US-VISIT 

Program Office to Mitigate Privacy Risks 

Associated with RFID at Land POEs

published a Privacy Impact Assessment in the Federal Register, as 

required by law, for the initial deployment of US-VISIT, and published the 

latest in a series of updated Privacy Impact Assessments in July 2005, 

addressing privacy issues related to the proof-of-concept testing of RFID 

for Increment 2C.5

In its July 2005 Privacy Impact Assessment, DHS said that by design, the 

information embedded in the RFID-readable I-94 tag does not compromise 

a visitor’s security, for the following reasons and with the following 

strictures: 

• Passive RFID minimizes privacy impacts and reduces the chance of 

visitors being surreptitiously tracked because it does not constantly 

transmit information or “beacon” a signal. 

• The numeric identifier read in the I-94 tag does not contain and is not 

derived from any personal information, and can only be used to obtain 

personal information when combined with data within the Automated 

Identification Management System (the system created to link the 

unique RFID tag ID number to existing biographic information received 

from the TECS database). 

• The Automated Identification Management System records the exit and 

re-entry data automatically captured for a particular RFID tag, rather 

than a specific individual. The individual’s complete travel history is 

created only when the information captured from the RFID tag is sent 

along with the biographic information stored in the TECS database to a 

DHS Arrival and Departure Information System. 

• The Automated Identification Management System is undergoing the 

DHS certification and accreditation process, which includes having an 

approved detailed security plan and a comprehensive technical 

assessment of the risks of operating the system. The certification and 

accreditation process will be completed before the proof-of-concept 

becomes operational. 

• The Automated Identification Management System database can only 

be accessed by authorized personnel signed into authorized 

workstations that communicate with the system via a secure network. 

These computer workstations are generally in CBP POE buildings, 

inside work areas with physical controls over who can enter the area,

according to the Privacy Impact Assessment, and each POE is required 

 5

An updated Privacy Impact Assessment was also published in September 2004 to reflect 

inclusion of Visa Waiver Program visitors in US-VISIT, expansion of US-VISIT to the 50

busiest land POEs, and changes in the business processes used by DHS to share 

information with federal law enforcement agencies. 

Page 82 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix VI: Actions Taken by US-VISIT 

Program Office to Mitigate Privacy Risks 

Associated with RFID at Land POEs

to be in compliance with DHS regulations with regard to security. Even 

if an RFID tag number were secretly detected by someone, that person 

would also have to obtain access to the Automated Identification 

Management System secure database, to link the number to an 

individual’s records. 

DHS acknowledged that two potential privacy risks related to the RFID 

exit/re-entry solution have been identified, and that US-VISIT creates a 

pool of individuals whose personal information is at risk. Nevertheless, it

is stated in the July 2005 Privacy Impact Assessment that the privacy risks 

will either be avoided or mitigated through the use of access controls, 

education and training, encryption, and minimizing collection and use of 

personal information will mitigate privacy risks associate with data 

sharing. The first stated risk is that, if the format or some other 

characteristic of the RFID tag number renders it recognizable as a USVISIT RFID tag, this would allow an unauthorized reader to surreptitiously 

determine an individual’s status (i.e., within US-VISIT covered population). 

DHS stated that the RFID tag number will be structured so that it cannot 

be used to identify an individual specifically as a nonimmigrant. Second,

DHS noted there is a low risk that the RFID tag could be used to conduct 

surreptitious locational surveillance of an individual; i.e., to use the 

presence of the tag to follow an individual as he or she moves about in the 

United States. However, ensuring that RFID tag numbers do not exhibit 

properties that can be readily attributed to US-VISIT and using a limited 

radio frequency range effectively mitigates this risk, according to DHS. 

Page 83 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix VII: US-VISIT Test of Radio 

Frequency Identification (RFID) Readers

Upon Exit and Re-entry at Selected Land 

POEs

Appendix VII: US-VISIT Test of Radio 

Frequency Identification (RFID) Readers Upon 

Exit and Re-entry at Selected Land POEs 

The US-VISIT Program Office has been testing the use of passive, 

automated, radio frequency identification (RFID) technology as a means to

record the exit of visitors from the United States at land POEs. RFID is an 

automated data-capture technology that can be used to electronically store 

information contained on a very small tag that can be embedded in a 

document (or some other physical item); in this case, US-VISIT embedded 

the tag in a modified Form I-94, called an I-94A. This information can then 

be identified, and recorded as having been identified, by RFID readers that

are connected to computer databases. The RFID tests were conducted for 

one-week periods at land POEs, as follows:1

 vehicular traffic was tested at 

Nogales-Mariposa and Nogales-DeConcini POEs in Nogales, Arizona; the 

Blaine-Pacific Highway and Blaine-Peace Arch POEs in Blaine, 

Washington; and Thousand Islands Bridge POE in Alexandria Bay, New 

York; pedestrian traffic was tested at the Nogales-Mariposa and NogalesDeConcini POEs. 

For these exit tests, the US-VISIT Program Office developed critical 

success factor target read rates to compare them to the actual read rates 

obtained during the test for both pedestrians carrying I-94As with RFIDdetectable tags and for travelers in vehicles who also had RFID-detectable

I-94As with them inside the vehicles. The target exit read rates ranged 

from an expected success rate of 70 percent to 95 percent, based on 

anticipated performance under different conditions, partly as 

demonstrated in the earlier feasibility study, on business requirements, 

and on a concept of operation plan prepared for Increment 2C.

2

 Table 5 

shows the exit test results compared to the target read rates, reflecting

specifically the percentage of persons detected by the readers who were 

carrying RFID-detectable documents for (1) pedestrians and (2) persons in 

vehicles, as they passed through the POE area, while exiting the country. 

 1

Site selection factors included potential physical constraints, such as protected historic 

structures that could hamper installation of gantries; potential environmental impact; daily 

traffic and I-94A processing volume; speed limits; and weather conditions. 

2

A concept of operations defines how day-to-day operations are (or will be) carried out to 

meet mission needs. The concept of operations includes high-level descriptions of 

information systems, their interrelationships, and information flows. It also describes the 

operations that must be performed, who must perform them, and where and how the

operations will be carried out. 

Page 84 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix VII: US-VISIT Test of Radio 

Frequency Identification (RFID) Readers

Upon Exit and Re-entry at Selected Land 

POEs

Table 5: RFID Read Rate Test Results for Persons in Vehicles and Pedestrians 

Exiting the Country with RFID-Readable Documents 

Type of test Location of test

Critical Success 

Factor Target 

Rate (%) 

Actual Read

Rate (%)

Sample Size 

(vehicles or

pedestrians)

Pedestrian Exit Nogales-Mariposa 95 67 3a

Vehicle Exit Blaine-Pacific 

Highway 

Thousand Islands 

Bridge at 

Alexandria Bay

70 

70 

14

4

166

50

Source: US-VISIT Program Office 

a

Because of the small number of pedestrians carrying RFID readable documents in the test, any 

findings should be interpreted with caution. 

In phase 1 of proof-of-concept testing for RFID, US-VISIT reported that 

read rates were higher for both vehicle occupants and pedestrians who 

held the I-94A up toward the reader, rather than leaving it inside a pocket. 

Through the use of billboards, radio and print advertisements, and other 

methods of communication, visitors were encouraged to place their RFIDdetectable I-94A forms on the vehicle dashboard or up to a window. These 

locations were believed to increase the chances for a successful read. 

Those who took these actions were referred to as “participants,” and those 

who did not as “nonparticipants.” The US-VISIT Program Office reported 

that during the week-long proof-of-concept exit testing, one of the three 

pedestrians was a participant—that is, the individual was observed as 

voluntarily complying with the instructions; for those exiting in a vehicle,

these data were not reported. Moreover, although CBP officials made 

substantial pre-test efforts to encourage travelers to optimize the chances

of I-94A tags being read, the report noted that this effort apparently met 

with mixed success and that no additional solutions were planned. 

During the time period that US-VISIT tested the performance of RFID 

readers for detecting I-94As carried by persons exiting the country in 

vehicles at two land POEs (Thousand Islands Bridge, Alexandria Bay, New 

York and Blaine-Pacific Highway, Washington), it also tested RFID reader 

performance for persons in vehicles with RFID-embedded I-94As who reentered the country at both of these locations and three others (BlainePeace Arch, Washington; and, in Arizona, Nogales-Mariposa and NogalesDeConcini). In addition, tests of RFID detectability carried by pedestrians 

re-entering the country were conducted at Nogales-Mariposa, and NogalesDeConcini; pedestrian exit was tested only at Nogales-Mariposa because 

Page 85 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix VII: US-VISIT Test of Radio 

Frequency Identification (RFID) Readers

Upon Exit and Re-entry at Selected Land 

POEs

of operational constraints at Nogales-DeConcini, according to the report 

on the tests. Since persons re-entering the country with a RFID-enabled I94 would already have obtained an I-94A on a prior visit to the United 

States, in order for it to be detected by an RFID reader, this process is 

sometimes referred to by the US-VISIT program office as “re-entry.” 

DHS set separate, higher critical success factors (performance targets) for 

the RFID proof-of-concept tests for the vehicle re-entry process than for 

the vehicle exit process. According to a US-VISIT official, these higher 

performance targets were based, in part, on the fact that vehicles must 

stop as part of the re-entry process, which makes it more likely that a tag

will be detected than is the case for exiting vehicles, which do not need to 

slow down or stop at land POEs.3

 As with the tests conducted for exit, test 

observers monitored traveler behavior to see whether, in compliance with 

numerous advertisements in print and on local radio, the vehicle driver 

placed the RFID-enabled I-94A on the vehicle dashboard or on an empty 

passenger seat, or, for vehicle occupants, if they held the I-94A up to a 

window or who made it otherwise visible, to better enable detection it by

the reader. Vehicle drivers or occupants who displayed an I-94A in any of

these requested ways were categorized as “participants,” but read rates for 

them were, nevertheless, low at four of five test locations. For example, at

Nogales-DeConcini, which had the lowest vehicle-entry read rates overall,

the read rate was 27 percent for the 62 persons re-entering in vehicles with

visitors whom US -VISIT reported as making an effort to have their I-94A 

tags read. In contrast, at Nogales-Mariposa, which had the highest overall 

re-entry read rate for the vehicle test, US-VISIT reported that 83 out of 96

(86 percent) of travelers who were categorized as participants were 

detected. Among those at this same location who did not make this effort, 

US-VISIT reported that I-94s with RFID tags were detected for about half 

(51 percent) of the persons in the vehicles. Table 6 shows the results of 

RFID read-rates upon re-entry for vehicle participants and 

nonparticipants. 

 3

According to a program official involved in setting the target rates, the read rates expected

for vehicles entering the country were also expected to be lower than for pedestrians

because of potential interference from metal in vehicles. 

Page 86 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix VII: US-VISIT Test of Radio 

Frequency Identification (RFID) Readers

Upon Exit and Re-entry at Selected Land 

POEs

Table 6: RFID Test Read Rates for Persons Re-Entering the Country in Vehicles at Locations Where US-VISIT Tested RFID 

Technology

Type of test

Target read

 rate (%) 

NogalesMariposa:

Percent and

Number 

NogalesDeConcini:

Percent and

Number

Blaine-Pacific

Highway:

Percent and

Number

Blaine-Peace 

Arch: 

Percent and

Number

Thousand

Islands Bridge: 

Percent and

Number

80 P: 86% (83/96) P: 27%

(17/62)

P: 45% (13/29) P: 55% (18/33) P: 33% (3/9)

N: 51% (101/199) N: 11%

(25/236)

N: 14% (15/110) N: 19% (14/72) N: 67% (2/3)

Vehicle entry 

C: 62% (184/295) C: 14%

(425/298)

C: 20% (28/139) C: 30% (32/105) C: 42% (5/12)

Source: US-VISIT Program Office 

P: Participants: those vehicle drivers who placed the I-94A form either on the dashboard, or on an 

empty seat; vehicle occupants who held the I-94A up to a window or who placed it on the dashboard 

or who made it otherwise visible. 

N: Non-participants: Vehicle drivers and occupants who did not appear to comply with any of the 

specified modes of making the I-94A visible. 

C: Combined read rate for participants and nonparticipants. 

Table 7 shows the results of RFID read-rate detection upon re-entry for 

pedestrian participants and nonparticipants. 

Table 7: RFID Test Read Rates for Pedestrians Re-entering the Country at Locations Where US-VISIT Tested RFID Technology 

Type of test

Target read rate 

(percent) 

NogalesMariposa:

Percent and

Numbera

NogalesDeConcini:

Percent and

Numbera

Blaine-Pacific

Highway:

Percent and

Number

Blaine-Peace 

Arch:

Percent and

Number

Thousand

Islands Bridge:

Percent and

Number

P: 100%

(1 out of 1)

P: 84% (32/38) No data No data No data

N: 50%

(6/12)

N: 68%

(179/264)

Pedestrian entry 95 

C: 54% (7/13) C: 70%

(211/302)

Source: US-VISIT Program Office 

a

Because of the small number of pedestrians that participated in the test, any findings should be 

interpreted with caution. 

Page 87 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix VII: US-VISIT Test of Radio 

Frequency Identification (RFID) Readers

Upon Exit and Re-entry at Selected Land 

POEs

Note: 

P is participants; defined as those pedestrians who held the I-94A form so that it was out and visible 

upon entering the processing area. 

N is non-participants; defined as those pedestrians who did not hold the I-94A form in such as a way 

that it was visible.

C: Combined read rate for participants and nonparticipants 

Page 88 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 89 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 90 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 91 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 92 GAO-07-248 US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry
Appendix IX: 

A

GAO Contact and 

cknowledgments 

Page 93 GAO-07-248

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and 

Acknowledgments 

Richard M. Stana (202) 512-8777 

In addition to the above, John F. Mortin, Assistant Director; Amy 

Bernstein, Frances Cook, Odi Cuero, Richard Hung, Amanda Miller, James 

R. Russell, and Jonathan Tumin made key contributions to this report. 

US-VISIT at Land Ports of Entry

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

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