United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

HURRICANE 

KATRINA 

Strategic Planning 

Needed to Guide 

Future Enhancements 

Beyond Interim Levee 

Repairs 

September 2006 

 

GAO-06-934 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2006

HURRICANE KATRINA

Strategic Planning Needed to Guide 

Future Enhancements Beyond Interim 

Levee Repairs 

Highlights of GAO-06-934, a report to 

congressional committees 

Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge 

and floodwaters breached levees

and floodwalls causing billions of 

dollars of property damage, and 

more than 1,300 deaths. Under the 

Comptroller General’s authority to 

conduct reviews on his own

initiative, GAO reviewed the Army

Corps of Engineers (Corps) 

(1) progress in repairing damage to

hurricane protection projects by

June 1, 2006; (2) plans and 

estimated costs to make other 

repairs and complete five existing

hurricane protection projects; and

(3) plans and estimated costs to 

add enhancements and strengthen

hurricane protection for the region.

GAO reviewed related laws and 

regulations, Corps planning 

documents and repair tracking 

reports, observed ongoing repair

work, and met with key agency

officials and other stakeholders. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Corps 

develop a comprehensive strategy

and implementation plan that 

incorporates all elements for 

rebuilding and strengthening the 

system to ensure that specified 

levels of protection are constructed 

in a cost-effective manner, within 

reasonable time frames. GAO also 

recommends that the Corps 

establish an independent task force 

to help support and guide its 

ongoing and future repair efforts. 

In its response for the Corps, the

Department of Defense generally

concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations. 

Following Hurricane Katrina, the Corps worked quickly to repair and restore 

almost 169 miles of damaged levees, floodwalls, and other flood control 

structures to prehurricane levels of protection. Although the Corps stated 

that it had restored prehurricane levels of protection to the area by June 1, 

2006, it used temporary solutions and developed emergency procedures to 

protect against flooding, in the event of a hurricane, for sections where 

permanent repairs could not be completed in time. For example, the Corps 

constructed interim gates on three canals to prevent storm surges from 

flooding New Orleans. When construction of one canal gate fell behind 

schedule and could not be completed by June 1, 2006, the Corps devised an 

emergency plan to drive sheet piling into the canal and close it off if a 

hurricane threatened before the gate was completed. More importantly, 

because these initial repairs were performed only on levees and floodwalls 

with obvious visual damage, the reliability of those adjacent to them is still 

unknown. The Corps originally allocated $801 million for initial repairs, but 

the current allocation has increased to over $1 billion. 

After completing the initial repairs, the Corps plans to conduct additional 

repairs and construction on the existing hurricane protection system. These 

plans include (1) repairing all damaged pumps, motors, and pumping 

stations by about March 2007; (2) restoring sections of existing hurricane 

protection projects that have settled over time to their original design 

elevations; and (3) completing construction of incomplete portions of five 

previously authorized hurricane and flood control projects by September 

2007. An additional $941 million had been allocated for this additional work, 

but the Corps expects actual costs will be greater because of subsequent 

decisions to change the design of these projects, cover the local sponsor’s 

share, and because of rapidly escalating construction costs. 

In addition, the Corps plans to undertake further work to enhance and 

strengthen the hurricane protection for southeastern Louisiana. These 

projects are estimated to take years and require billions of dollars to 

complete. Since September 2005, the Congress has appropriated more than 

$7 billion for some aspects of this work and additional appropriations are 

expected. According to an external review organization established by the 

Corps, hurricane protection systems should be deliberately designed and 

built as integrated systems to enhance reliability and provide consistent 

levels of protection. However, the Corps does not have a comprehensive 

strategy and implementation plan to integrate the repairs already authorized 

and planned and that would ensure the efficient use of federal funds. 

Instead, the Corps appears to be following a piecemeal approach, similar to 

its past practice of building projects without giving sufficient attention to the 

interrelationships between various elements of those projects or fully 

considering whether the projects will provide an integrated level of 

hurricane protection for the area. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-934.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Anu Mittal, 

(202) 512-3841, mittala@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

At the Start of the 2006 Hurricane Season, Most Prehurricane 

Protection Had Been Restored to Southeastern Louisiana 21 

Cost Estimates for Restoring Southeastern Louisiana Hurricane 

Protection Projects to Originally-Designed Levels and 

Completing Construction of Incomplete Portions Continue to 

Rise 25

The Corps Lacks a Comprehensive Approach for Planning and 

Managing the Multiple Restoration, Construction, and Future

Enhancements Proposed for Southeastern Louisiana Hurricane 

Protection 36

Conclusions 39

Recommendations for Executive Action 40 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 41 

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 44 

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 48 

Table 

Table 1: Initial Estimated Costs and Funds Allocated for Corps’ 

Plans and Projects 21 

Figures 

Figure 1: I-wall and T-wall 8 

Figure 2: Cross-Section of an Earthen Levee 9 

Figure 3: Orleans East Bank in New Orleans, Louisiana and Repair 

Project Sites 12 

Figure 4: Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana 

and Repair Project Sites 13 

Figure 5: New Orleans East in New Orleans, Louisiana and Repair 

Project Sites 15 

Figure 6: Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana and Repair Project Sites 16 

Page i GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Figure 7: St. Bernard Parish and Repair Project Sites 18 

Figure 8: Graphic of Interim Gates and Temporary Pumps 23 

Figure 9: Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane 

Protection Project 28 

Figure 10: West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, Louisiana 

Hurricane Protection Project 30 

Figure 11: Larose to Golden Meadow, Louisiana Hurricane 

Protection Project 31 

Figure 12: Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project 33 

Figure 13: New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana Hurricane Protection 

Project 35

Abbreviations 

Corps Army Corps of Engineers 

DOD Department of Defense 

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Page ii GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 6, 2006 

Congressional Committees: 

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina came ashore near Buras, Louisiana,

about 60 miles southeast of New Orleans, with wind speeds of up to 127 

miles per hour and a storm driven wave surge of up to 30 feet. The size and 

strength of the storm and subsequent flooding resulted in one of the 

largest natural disasters in U.S. history, as storm waters flowed over 

floodwalls and breached levees in Louisiana’s Orleans and neighboring 

parishes, causing widespread flooding, billions of dollars of property 

damage, and more than 1,300 deaths.

The Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) began constructing hurricane 

protection projects in southeastern Louisiana almost 60 years ago, in the 

1940s. Over the years, the Corps constructed five major hurricane and 

flood damage reduction projects in southeastern Louisiana, comprising 

about 350 miles of earthen levees and concrete floodwalls across six 

parishes. These projects were designed to provide various levels of 

hurricane protection, and generally could withstand storms with 

maximum wind speeds between 87 and 115 miles per hour. The hurricane 

protection projects in Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes 

suffered the greatest damage from Hurricane Katrina. The Corps estimates 

that more than one-half of the 269 miles of federally constructed levees 

and floodwalls in these three parishes were damaged by the storm’s winds 

and flood waters. 

The Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies Act of 1941, as amended, 

authorizes the Corps to respond in cases where flooding occurs due to a 

storm and repair or restore flood control and hurricane protection 

projects including levees, floodwalls, and other flood control structures 

damaged or destroyed by flood waters.1

 Generally, it is Corps policy to pay 

for the full costs of repairs to federally constructed levees and to fund 

80 percent of the cost to repair certain nonfederally constructed levees, 

and the local sponsor or government funds the remaining 20 percent. 

However, because of the unprecedented damage and loss caused by 

Hurricane Katrina, the Corps deviated from its usual policy and has funded 

 1

33 U.S.C. § 701n(a)(1). 

Page 1 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
100 percent of the repair, restoration, and construction costs for both 

federal and nonfederal levees and flood control structures. 

The official Atlantic hurricane season runs from June 1 to November 30, 

when 97 percent of all tropical storms and hurricanes normally occur. 

After Hurricane Katrina, the Corps stated that it would repair the 169 miles 

of levees, floodwalls, and other hurricane protection structures damaged 

by Katrina to prestorm conditions by June 1, 2006—the beginning of the 

2006 Atlantic hurricane season. After June 2006, the Corps had planned to

repair damaged pumps, pump motors and pump stations, restore all 

hurricane protection structures that had subsided over time to their 

authorized design heights (the elevation specified in their design), and 

complete construction of incomplete portions of previously authorized 

hurricane protection projects. In April 2006, the Federal Emergency

Management Agency released advisory flood elevations for New Orleans 

and the surrounding area based on a 1 percent annual chance of flooding, 

also called a 100-year flood. In response, the Corps is revising its plans and 

cost estimates to raise the height of levees and floodwalls to provide the 

area with a 100-year level of protection. In addition, the Congress required 

the Corps to conduct an analysis and design for comprehensive 

improvements in the coastal area of Mississippi in the interest of hurricane 

and storm damage reduction and for several other purposes,2

 and to 

provide an interim report of its findings on June 30, 2006, and issue a final 

report by December 30, 2007.3

We have prepared this report under the Comptroller General’s authority to

conduct evaluations on his own initiative, as part of our continued effort 

to assist the Congress by (1) monitoring the extensive damage to 

southeastern Louisiana caused by Hurricane Katrina and (2) evaluating 

ongoing efforts to repair and strengthen the region’s hurricane protection 

projects. Specifically, for this report we reviewed the Corps’ (1) progress 

in repairing damage to hurricane protection projects by June 1, 2006; 

 2

Developed in 1969, the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale is a 1 to 5 rating based on a 

hurricane’s maximum sustained winds. For example, a Category 5 hurricane has wind

speeds greater than 155 miles per hour. Prior to this scale, the Corps built systems designed 

to withstand a “standard project hurricane.” For some of the projects in southeastern 

Louisiana this was roughly equivalent to a fast-moving Category 3 storm with winds from 

111 to 130 miles per hour. A standard project hurricane was assumed to strike the

Louisiana coast once every 200 to 300 years. 

3

Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2761 

(Dec. 30, 2005). 

Page 2 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
(2) plans and estimated costs to make other repairs, restore levees and 

flood control structures to design elevations, and complete construction of 

previously authorized but incomplete portions of five existing hurricane 

protection projects; and (3) plans and estimated costs to add 

enhancements and strengthen hurricane protection projects for the region. 

To determine the status of work to repair damage to hurricane protection 

projects, we tracked the progress of repairs and funds spent by reviewing 

weekly repair reports and daily funds status reports obtained from the 

Corps’ New Orleans district. We interviewed officials at Corps 

headquarters, the New Orleans district office, as well as officials assigned 

to the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force. We also observed 

repairs at selected sites in Orleans and St. Bernard parishes. To determine 

the Corps’ plans and estimated costs to repair pumps and pump stations, 

restore projects to design grade, and complete construction of incomplete 

portions of previously authorized hurricane protection projects, we 

reviewed documentation of the Corps’ plans, estimated costs, and results 

of surveys and reports of damage assessments. We also interviewed New 

Orleans District officials about their plans and estimated costs for this 

work. To determine the Corps’ plans, timelines and estimated costs to add 

hurricane project enhancements and strengthen the level of hurricane 

protection, we reviewed documentation of plans, estimated timelines and 

costs, and laws authorizing funding and authority to the Corps to make 

repairs and rebuild. We also interviewed New Orleans District officials on

their plans, timelines and estimated costs for this work. We conducted our 

work between January and July 2006 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

Through a combination of permanent and temporary measures, the Corps 

restored the level of hurricane protection that existed prior to Hurricane 

Katrina to Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes by June 1, 2006. 

To restore pre-Katrina levels of protection in a period of about 9 months, 

the Corps worked quickly and in some instances, engineered temporary 

solutions because not all repairs could be completed in time. For example, 

the Corps has plans to build permanent gates and pumps at the points 

where three drainage canals in New Orleans meet Lake Pontchartrain. 

These structures will help stop water from the lake surging into the canals 

during a hurricane. However, these permanent structures could not be 

completed by June 1, 2006, so the Corps is installing three interim gated 

structures and temporary pumps that will continue to provide protection 

to the area for 3 to 5 years until permanent structures can be constructed. 

While most repairs that were needed to restore protection were completed 

Results in Brief 

Page 3 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
by June 1, 2006, some work was behind schedule. Until this work can be 

completed, the Corps has developed emergency procedures to protect 

against flooding in the event of a hurricane while repair work is ongoing. 

For example, because the construction of one of the interim gates along 

the 17th Street canal in the Orleans East Bank is behind schedule, the 

Corps will drive sheet pile barriers into the canal to block storm surges 

from Lake Pontchartrain in the event of a hurricane. Additionally, all

repair work completed by June 1, 2006, was performed only on levees and

floodwalls with obvious damage noted during visual inspections 

conducted after the hurricane. Consequently, the reliability of levees and 

floodwalls adjacent to those that were repaired is still unknown. In 

December 2005, the Corps had estimated that it would cost $841 million to

repair the existing system to pre-Katrina levels. By March 2006, the Corps 

had awarded 59 contracts to complete the associated repairs for about 

$801 million. In June 2006, however, the Corps revised its cost estimates 

for this work and expects that when all contracted work is completed for 

these repairs, total costs will exceed $1 billion. 

After repairing damaged sections of hurricane protection projects to preKatrina levels, the Corps plans additional work to repair all damaged 

pump stations; restore to their original authorized design heights, those 

sections of the hurricane protection projects that have settled over time; 

and construct previously authorized but incomplete portions of the five 

hurricane protection projects in the area. Specifically, the Corps plans to 

(1) repair pumps, pump motors, and pump stations damaged by the 

hurricane and subsequent flooding by about March 2007; (2) raise all 

hurricane protection structures to design elevation by September 1, 2007;

and (3) complete construction of incomplete portions of previously 

authorized projects by September 30, 2007. The Corps originally estimated 

that it would cost $59 million to repair all damaged pumps, motors, and 

pump stations. However, to date, the Corps has allocated $70 million for 

the pump repairs. Estimated total costs for the other repairs and 

construction planned by the Corps are unknown at this time because the 

Corps is revising these estimates. The Corps had originally allocated 

$1.1 billion from the December 2005 emergency supplemental

appropriation to cover the cost of additional work needed to restore 

elevation to sections of the hurricane protection projects that had settled 

over time and to complete construction of the previously authorized but 

incomplete segments of all five hurricane protection projects in this area. 

In June 2006, the Corps shifted $224 million of these funds to cover the 

increasing cost of repairs, leaving a balance of about $871 million 

allocated for this work. The Corps is also revising the cost estimates for 

this work to reflect design changes, escalating construction costs, and 

Page 4 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
costs to fund the portion of the work normally paid by local sponsors. 

According to the Corps, all of these costs may not have been adequately 

accounted for in the original funding allocation.

In response to new and emerging requirements from a broad range of 

stakeholders, the Corps continues to propose enhancements to existing 

hurricane protection projects as well as new projects to improve and 

strengthen hurricane protection for southeastern Louisiana. Implementing 

these enhancements and strengthening the hurricane protection system 

for southeastern Louisiana is in itself an immense challenge. For example, 

the Corps is concurrently developing options to address the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency’s new flood control standards; devising 

solutions to address some of the findings of the Interagency Performance 

Evaluation Task Force; and trying to evaluate approaches that will meet 

the long term needs of local interests as well as respond to congressional 

requirements, as outlined in three emergency supplemental 

appropriations. However, we are concerned that the Corps is proceeding

with over $7 billion of interim repairs and construction without a 

comprehensive strategy and implementation plan to ensure that these 

various efforts are appropriately coordinated and integrated with each 

other as well as with any future plans for a stronger hurricane protection 

system. Following Hurricane Katrina, the Corps established the 

Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force and Corps officials said 

they used its findings and lessons learned to improve engineering 

practices. However, the Corps has not indicated that it plans to establish a 

similar organization to help guide its interim repair and restoration efforts. 

While the Corps’ preliminary technical report issued in July 2006 provides 

a conceptual framework to help stakeholders make decisions about longterm strategies for building a stronger and better hurricane protection 

system for coastal Louisiana, it neither provided any details on what needs 

to be done to achieve higher levels of protection nor how current efforts 

will be integrated with future efforts, if authorized. One of the criticisms 

that has arisen from investigations of the existing hurricane protection 

system was that it was a system in name only and was, in fact, a series of 

disjointed projects that did not function together to adequately protect the 

area. To avoid the potential for repeating the mistakes of the past and risk 

creating a set of disjointed projects that may not work together, may 

become redundant or obsolete, and may result in an inefficient use of 

federal funds, we believe that it would be imprudent for the Corps to 

proceed with such a large scale multibillion dollar construction project 

without developing a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan to

guide its efforts, measure progress, and ensure accountability.

Page 5 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
In light of the billions of dollars that Congress has already appropriated to 

rebuild and strengthen existing southeastern Louisiana hurricane 

protection projects, and to ensure the most efficient use of these federal 

resources, we are recommending that the Corps develop a comprehensive 

strategy that incorporates all projects and plans for rebuilding and 

strengthening the system and an implementation plan that will achieve 

that level of protection in a cost-effective manner, within a reasonable 

time frame. We are also recommending that the Corps establish an 

evaluative organization like the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task

Force, to help the Corps develop a strategic plan, monitor progress, and 

provide expert advice on the construction of a stronger and wellintegrated hurricane protection system. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense (DOD) 

generally concurred with both of our recommendations but contended 

that a body like the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force was 

not the proper organization to help the Corps develop a strategic plan, 

monitor progress, and provide expert advice on the construction of a 

stronger and well-integrated hurricane protection system. The Corps plans 

to rely on three teams of experts to provide independent technical 

reviews, develop a strategic plan to construct a hurricane protection 

system, and monitor implementation. We believe that the Corps’ proposal 

to use three external groups of experts satisfies the spirit of our 

recommendation. 

There are five major federally authorized projects comprised of more than 

350 miles of levees, floodwalls, and other flood control structures across 

six parishes that provide hurricane protection in southeastern Louisiana. 

While construction of hurricane protection projects in southeastern 

Louisiana began almost 60 years ago, construction of three major projects 

began about 40 years ago in the 1960s. Segments of those were still 

incomplete when Hurricane Katrina struck the area in late August 2005. 

The projects were designed to provide protection from hurricanes with 

maximum wind speeds of 87 to 115 miles per hour (115 miles per hour 

being roughly equivalent to a Category 3 hurricane). Hurricane Katrina 

made landfall with wind speeds equivalent to a Category 3 hurricane, or 

winds up to 127 miles per hour, and record high storm surge. To determine 

the extent of the damage to levees and floodwalls caused by Hurricane 

Katrina, the Corps contracted for an initial assessment in September 2005 

and a second assessment in April 2006. Both assessments were based on 

visual inspections of the levees and floodwalls. For the first assessment, 

engineers walked the levees and floodwalls in Orleans, Plaquemines and 

Background 

Page 6 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
St. Bernard parishes and looked for damage. The second assessment 

reexamined only those sections that were initially reported to be 

undamaged. The first assessment found 169 miles of damaged levees and 

floodwalls of which 128 miles were moderately damaged and 41 were 

severely damaged or destroyed. Most of the damage was found in 

Plaquemines Parish where 150 miles of levees and floodwalls were 

damaged. The second assessment of those sections initially found to be 

undamaged found additional cracks in the levees, soil erosion near 

floodwalls, and levee heights that had settled below their design elevation. 

Subsequently, the Corps and the contractors conducted sampling and 

other tests to determine the extent of the damage, but this was only done 

where exterior damage—such as cracks, depressions, or seepage—was 

observed. Both assessments documented obvious external damage but did 

not indicate whether other structures without visible damage—but similar 

in design and composition to damaged levees and floodwalls—were, in 

fact, damaged or weakened. 

In its May 2006 draft final report, an independent team sponsored by the 

National Science Foundation reviewed the failures of the hurricane 

protection projects and concluded that the pervasiveness of problems and 

failures calls into question the integrity and reliability of other sections of 

flood protection projects that did not fail during Hurricane Katrina. In its 

June 2006 draft final report, the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task

Force—a team of 150 experts from the Corps and about 50 federal, state,

international, academic, and industrial organizations—found that repaired 

sections of levees and floodwalls were likely the strongest parts of the 

system until remaining sections could be similarly upgraded and 

completed. The task force report concluded that since there are many 

areas where protection levels are only the same as before Hurricane 

Katrina, the New Orleans metropolitan area remained vulnerable to storm 

surge and wave conditions equivalent to or greater than Hurricane Katrina. 

The most severely damaged portions of the hurricane protection projects 

in the area were found in the three parishes of Orleans, Plaquemines, and 

St. Bernard. Within these three parishes, there are approximately 243 miles 

of earthen levees and 26 miles of floodwalls. The 26 miles of floodwalls 

comprised 19 miles of I-walls and 7 miles of T-walls. I-walls are vertical 

concrete barriers anchored to levees by steel sheet pile driven vertically

into the levees. T-walls are vertical concrete barriers with a horizontal 

concrete base anchored by multiple steel beams driven diagonally into the 

levees and are stronger than I-walls (see fig. 1). 

Page 7 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Figure 1: I-wall and T-wall 

I-Wall T-Wall

Splash pad Splash pad

Sheet pile heet pile eet pile Sheet pile heet pile eet pile T-Wall support piling pport piling port pilings

Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Corps officials told us that T- or L-walls4 will be constructed to replace 

floodwalls that were destroyed and need to be replaced. 

Corps of Engineers Has 

the Authority and 

Responsibility to Rebuild 

and Restore Damage to 

Hurricane Protection 

Projects 

Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1941, as amended, commonly 

referred to as Public Law 84-99,5

 authorizes the Corps to conduct 

emergency operations and rehabilitation activities when levees fail or are 

damaged during storms. Under the implementing regulations for Public 

Law 84-99, after a storm, the Corps may repair and restore federally 

authorized flood control projects and hurricane protection structures, or 

nonfederal flood control projects that were inspected and found to have 

met federal standards for construction and maintenance prior to the flood 

event.6

 Assistance for the rehabilitation of hurricane protection structures 

is limited to repair or restoration to the prestorm condition and level of 

protection (e.g., the prestorm elevation/height of levees, allowing for 

normal settlement).7

Under Corps policy, damage to federally constructed levees that have been 

completed and officially turned over to a nonfederal sponsor are to be 

 4

An L-wall is similar to a T-wall except that the horizontal concrete base and diagonal steel 

beams are only on the landward side of the wall. 

5

33 U.S.C. § 701n. 

6

33 C.F.R. §§ 203.44-203.45. 

7

33 C.F.R. § 203.49(b)(1). 

Page 8 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
repaired with 100 percent of the cost borne by the federal government and 

damage to nonfederally constructed levees are to be repaired with 

80 percent of the cost borne by the federal government and 20 percent by

the local sponsor or government. However, in September 2005, the Corps 

noted that Hurricane Katrina had caused unprecedented damage and loss 

of infrastructure in the Gulf Coast region. According to the Corps, damage 

to the region eroded the tax base to such an extent that local sponsors 

would have great difficulty funding their share of rebuilding expenses. In 

response, the Corps requested a one-time waiver from the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Civil Works from the policy requiring local 

sponsors to fund 20 percent of the cost of rehabilitating nonfederal flood 

and hurricane protection projects. For federally authorized projects that 

were under construction when Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the Corps 

also requested a waiver from the policy requirement that local sponsors 

fund a share of the repair cost. In October 2005, the Assistant Secretary of 

the Army for Civil Works approved both requests. In the December 2005 

emergency supplemental, Congress appropriated funding to the Corps to 

repair levees and flood control structures damaged by Hurricane Katrina 

to the level of protection for which they were designed, at full federal 

expense. 

Construction of Earthen 

Levees Depends on Local 

Building Materials and Soil 

Foundations 

Most earthen levees are constructed with a mixture of clay and sand. The 

most commonly used method is to build an earthen embankment sloped 

on both sides and rising to a flat crown (see fig. 2). 

Figure 2: Cross-Section of an Earthen Levee 

Crown

10’ - 12’ wide 

Embankments covered with

grass to resist erosion 

Compacted core material 

Existing soil material 

Berm Berm

Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (data); St. Louis Post-Dispatch (graphic).

Depending on local conditions and the availability of suitable materials, 

levees can be built in one or more stages. The number of stages is 

generally dependent on the ability of the local soil to provide an adequate 

Page 9 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
base, and not sink under the weight of levees, and to compact and provide 

suitable strength. When appropriate conditions exist, levees can be built in

a single stage. In other cases, levees may need to be built in stages (also 

called lifts) that allow for subsidence of the foundation soil or settlement 

of the fill material. Between stages the levees are allowed to settle for up 

to 5 years. Because the soil in southeastern Louisiana has a tendency of

settling, historically most levees built in the New Orleans area were 

required to be built in three to four stages, and construction took 15 to 20 

years. Because of the urgency of the repairs that the Corps made after 

Hurricane Katrina, earthen levees in the New Orleans area had to be 

rebuilt in only several months. To do this, the Corps relied on mechanical

compaction by heavy construction equipment to compensate for the 

normal settlement that would occur over time. 

Building levees quickly can pose risks, however, as was witnessed on 

May 30, 2006, when a 400-foot section of a reconstructed levee in 

Plaquemines Parish slipped 3 to 4 feet under its own weight. Corps 

officials said the underlying soil was weaker than previous tests had 

indicated and was unable to support the weight of the newly constructed 

levee. To provide interim protection, the Corps constructed a small 

earthen berm on top of the levee to return it to approved design height by

June 7, 2006.

Current Repairs to the 

Hurricane Protection 

Projects Are Limited to 

Prestorm or Previously 

Authorized Levels of 

Protection 

By June 1, 2006, the Corps planned to complete repairs to 169 miles of 

southeastern Louisiana hurricane protection projects to prestorm 

conditions—that is, to repair most levees and floodwalls to the condition

they were in before Hurricane Katrina. For 128 miles of levees with minor 

or moderate damage, the Corps planned to repair or fill scour (erosion) 

and holes. For 41 miles of levees and floodwalls with major damage, or 

that were completely destroyed, the Corps planned to rebuild these 

damaged sections entirely, including rebuilding to the original design 

grade, plus an allowance for settlement. The Corps only planned to repair 

hurricane-damaged levees and structures and did not plan to repair or 

replace any existing levees or floodwalls unless exterior damage was 

observed. 

The Corps awarded 59 contracts to repair damage in three sections of the

city of New Orleans (Orleans East Bank, New Orleans East and the Inner

Harbor Navigation Canal, commonly called the Industrial Canal) and the 

parishes of Plaquemines and St. Bernard. The following sections briefly 

describe the location and damage caused by Hurricane Katrina for these 

Page 10 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
five areas and the number of contracts the Corps awarded for completing 

the repairs. 

Orleans East Bank is located south of Lake Pontchartrain, from the 17th 

Street Canal to the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, and along the western 

bank of the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal to the Mississippi River. About 

19 miles of levees and floodwalls are along the Orleans Lakefront, the 

Inner Harbor Navigation Canal and three drainage canals—17th Street, 

Orleans Avenue, and London Avenue—which drain rainwater from New 

Orleans into Lake Pontchartrain (see fig. 3). 

Orleans East Bank 

Page 11 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Figure 3: Orleans East Bank in New Orleans, Louisiana and Repair Project Sites 

OEB 09

Code

OEB01

OEB02

OEBO3

OEB04

OEB05

OEB06

OEB07

OEB09

OEB10

OEB11

OEB12

OEB13

Project

17th St. Canal Floodwall Breach 

● Phase I – Interim repairs

17th St. Canal Floodwall Breach

● Phase II – Inverted T-wall construction

London Ave. Canal Floodwall Breach, 

Mirabeau Ave. 

● Phase I – Interim repairs

London Ave. Canal Floodwall Breach, 

Mirabeau Ave. 

● Phase II – Inverted T-wall construction

London Ave. Canal Floodwall Breach, 

Robert E. Lee Blvd. 

● Phase I – Interim repairs

London Ave. Canal Floodwall Breach, 

Robert E. Lee Blvd. 

● Phase II – Inverted T-wall construction

Lake Pontchartrain and 

Orleans Pump Station 

● Scour repair and slope paving 

Interim Closure Structure 

at 17th St. Canal 

● Construction and installation of interim 

gates and pumps

Interim Closure Structure 

at London Ave. Canal 

● Construction and installation of interim 

gates and pumps

Interim Closure Structure 

at Orleans Ave. Canal 

● Construction and installation of interim 

gates and pumps

Orleans Ave. Canal Levee Tie-In to 

Closure Structure

● Levee lift, seepage, and scour protection 

London Ave. Canal Levee Tie-In to 

Closure Structure 

● Levee lift, seepage, and scour protection

Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Stanley Consultants.

OEB 07

OEB 07

OEB 11

OEB 13

OEB 10

OEB 12

OEB 01

OEB 02

OEB 03

OEB 04

OEB 05

OEB 06

17th St. Canal Orleans Ave. Canal London Ave. Canal

Mississippi River

Lake Pontchartrain

Inner Harbor

Navigation Canal

A total of about one mile of levees and floodwalls were damaged along the 

17th Street Canal and two sides of the London Avenue Canal. There was 

also intermittent minor erosion, and all 13 of the area’s pump stations 

were damaged. The Corps constructed interim sheet pile walls at the 

breach sites along the drainage canals and contracted for the construction 

of permanent T-walls at each of the breach sites. However, the Corps was 

Page 12 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
concerned about the integrity of the canal walls that were not breached 

during Hurricane Katrina. The Corps chose to construct interim closure 

structures (gates) where the canals empty into Lake Pontchartrain to 

reduce storm surge from entering the canals during hurricanes and storms. 

According to Corps officials, the Corps did not have the authority to 

construct permanent gates; so, in late January and early February 2006, the 

Corps awarded contracts for the construction of three interim gates and 34 

pumps along the three drainage canals. A total of 12 contracts were 

awarded for the Orleans East Bank area. 

The Inner Harbor Navigation Canal is a 5.5 mile long waterway that 

connects the Mississippi River to Lake Pontchartrain. The east and west 

sides of the Industrial Canal are lined by a total of 12.3 miles of levees and 

floodwalls (see fig. 4). 

Inner Harbor Navigation Canal 

Figure 4: Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, New Orleans, Louisiana and Repair Project Sites

IHNC 05

IHNC 09

IHNC 07

IHNC 08

IHNC 03

IHNC 02

IHNC 04 IHNC 03

IHNC 01

IHNC 04

Code

IHNC01

IHNC02

IHNC03

IHNC04

IHNC05

IHNC07

IHNC08

IHNC09

Project

East Side N. Claiborne Ave. 

to Florida Ave. 

● Floodwall construction

West Side France Rd. 

to Benefit St. 

● Floodwall construction

Gulf Intracoastal Waterway to 

Lake Pontchartrain (East) and 

Almonaster to Hwy. 90 (West)

● Floodwall construction

Hwy. 90 to Lake Pontchartrain 

(West) and Dwyer to 

Hayne Blvd. (East)

● Floodwall construction

West Side, Vicinity France Rd. 

Ramp to Inner Harbor 

Navigation Canal 

● Floodwall construction

East Side, Lock to Claiborne Ave. 

● Floodwall repairs

West Side, North of Benefit St. 

to Almonaster

● Scour repair and floodwall

construction

West Side, Lock to Florida Ave. 

● Floodwall construction

Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Stanley Consultants.

Mississippi River

Gulf Intracoastal Waterway

Inner Harbor Navigation Canal

Lake Pontchartrain

Page 13 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
A total of 5 miles of levees and floodwalls were damaged by Hurricane 

Katrina along the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal. Two breaches occurred 

on the western side of the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, near the 

intersection of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and the Inner Harbor 

Navigation Canal, and two separate large breaches occurred on the lower 

eastern side, resulting in major flooding to New Orleans’ Lower Ninth 

Ward. The Corps awarded eight contracts to repair and completely rebuild

damaged and destroyed levees and floodwalls along the Inner Harbor 

Navigation Canal. 

New Orleans East is bounded by the east bank of the Inner Harbor 

Navigation Canal on the west, Lake Pontchartrain to the north, Bayou 

Sauvage National Wildlife Refuge to the east, and the Gulf Intracoastal 

Waterway to the south. The area has 39 miles of exterior levees and 

floodwalls and eight pump stations (see fig. 5). 

New Orleans East 

Page 14 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Figure 5: New Orleans East in New Orleans, Louisiana and Repair Project Sites 

The hurricane damaged 4.6 miles of levees and floodwalls and all eight 

pump stations. Ten contracts were awarded to repair this damage. 

NOE 07

NOE 10

NOE 06

NOE 04

NOE 09

NOE 03

NOE 02

NOE 08

NOE 01

NOE 05

Code

NOE01

NOE02

NOE03

NOE04

NOE05

NOE06

NOE07

NOE08

NOE09

NOE10

Project

New Orleans East Back 

Levee to Railroad 

● Levee repairs

Pump Station #15, Michoud 

● Structure modifications

Floodwall near 

Manufacturing Facility 

● Structure modifications

Citrus Back Levee Floodwall 

● Floodwall modifications

Floodgate at Railroad Tracks

● Floodwall modifications

Lakefront Airport Gate and 

Seabrook Floodwalls

● Scour repairs

Citrus Lakefront Levee to 

Railroad Restoration Area

● Levee repairs

Floodgates and Drainage 

Structures, Southpoint to 

Gulf Intracoastal Waterway 

● Scour repairs

Michoud Slip to Michoud 

Canal Floodwall 

● Scour repairs

Lakefront Airport to Gulf 

Intracoastal Waterway 

● Structure scour repairs

Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Stanley Consultants.

Lake Pontchartrain

Lake Borgne

Inner Harbor

Navigation Canal

Gulf Intracoastal

Waterway

Plaquemines Parish includes long, narrow strips of land on both sides of 

the Mississippi River between New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico. The

Mississippi River levees protect the parish from floods coming down the 

river, and the New Orleans to Venice hurricane protection project 

Plaquemines Parish 

Page 15 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
(portions of which are not yet completed) protects against hurricaneinduced tidal surges. The distance between these Gulf-side levees, called 

back levees, and the Mississippi River levees is less than 1 mile, in most 

places. Plaquemines Parish has a total of 169 miles of levees and 

floodwalls and 18 pump stations (see fig. 6). 

Figure 6: Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana and Repair Project Sites 

0 5 10 miles

Oakville

Jesuit Bend

Phoenix

Pointe A

La Hache

St. Jude

City Price

Port

Sulphur

Empire

Buras

Fort

Jackson

Venice

Jesuit Bend

Mississippi River

Oakville

Code

P01

P02

P03

P04

P06

P07

P08

P11

P12

P13

P14

P15

P16

P17

P18

P19

P20

P21

P22

P24

P25

P26

Project

Fort Jackson Borrow Pit ● Clearing and grubbing

Walker Rd. Borrow Pit ● Clearing and grubbing

New Orleans to Venice East Bank ● Levee repairs

Mississippi River Levee East Bank ● Levee repairs

Mississippi River Levee, Jesuit Bend to St. Jude ● Levee repairs

Mississippi River Levee, City Price to Port Sulphur ● Levee repairs

Mississippi River Levee, Port Sulphur to Fort Jackson ● Levee and floodwall repairs

Mississippi River Levee, Fort Jackson to Venice ● Levee repairs

New Orleans to Venice Levee, Fort Jackson to Venice ● Levee repairs

New Orleans to Venice Levee, Port Sulphur Area ● Levee enlargement

New Orleans to Venice Levee, Empire/Buras Area ● Levee enlargement

New Orleans to Venice Levee, Empire Floodgate ● Floodgate repairs

New Orleans to Venice Back Levee ● Levee repairs

New Orleans to Venice Levee, Buras Area ● Levee enlargement

New Orleans to Venice Back Levee ● Levee repairs

New Orleans to Venice Levee, above City Price ● Levee repairs

New Orleans to Venice Levee, West Back Levee ● Floodwall repairs

New Orleans to Venice Levee, West Back Levee ● Scour and miscellaneous repairs

Mississippi River Levee, Woodland ● Levee repairs

New Orleans to Venice Levee, Port Sulphur Area ● Levee enlargement

Mississippi River Levee, West Pointe A La Hache ● Levee repairs

Mississippi River Levee ● Slope pavement repairs

Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Stanley Consultants.

P 02

P 03

P 04

P 26

P 06

P 26

P 22

P 25

P 20

P 21

P 15

P 20

P 18

P 16

P 12

P 11

P 01

P 17

P 14

P 08 P 24

P 13

P 07

P 19

Gulf of Mexico

Page 16 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
In Plaquemines Parish, a total of 150 miles of levees and floodwalls were 

damaged along with 18 pump stations. The Corps awarded 20 contracts to 

repair and rebuild levees and floodwalls damaged by Hurricane Katrina in

Plaquemines Parish. According to the Corps, there was considerable 

erosion scour along the total length of the levees. The Mississippi River 

levees were also damaged by numerous ships and barges that crashed into

them. Five of the 6 miles of floodwalls along the Mississippi River were 

also destroyed but will be replaced with earthen levees because the Corps 

determined that the underlying foundation could not support the weight of 

a concrete floodwall. 

In St. Bernard Parish, levees and floodwalls extend along the Gulf 

Intracoastal Waterway to the north, along the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet 

to the east and south, and then turn west toward the Mississippi River, 

continuing along the river to the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal along the 

western side. St. Bernard Parish has 30 miles of exterior levees and 

floodwalls, 22 miles of nonfederal interior levees, and eight pump stations 

(see fig. 7). 

St. Bernard Parish 

Page 17 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Figure 7: St. Bernard Parish and Repair Project Sites 

STB 05

STB 07

STB 01

STB 04

STB 02

STB 03

STB 06

STB 09

STB 08

Lake Borgne

Mississippi River Gulf Outlet

Mississippi River

Inner Harbor Navigation Canal Gulf Intracoastal Waterway

Nonfederal Levees

Code

STB01

STB02

STB03

STB04

STB05

STB06

STB07

STB08

STB09

Project

Levee Foundation

● Site preparation 

Borrow Area

● Site preparation

Levee East of Bayou Dupre, 

Mississippi River Gulf Outlet 

● Levee repairs 

Mississippi River Gulf Outlet 

to Manson Gulf between 

Control Structures

● Levee repairs

Inner Harbor Navigation 

Canal to Bienvenue

● Miscellaneous levee, 

floodgate, and floodwall 

repairs

Bayou Dupre Control Structure

● Repairs and modifications

Bayou Bienvenue Control 

Structure

● Repairs and modifications

Mississippi River Gulf Outlet 

to Caenarvon Levee

● Miscellaneous scour repairs

Creedmore Structure

● Structure repairs

Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Stanley Consultants.

In St. Bernard Parish, 8 miles of exterior levees and floodwalls were 

damaged, 14 miles of nonfederal interior levees (back levees) were 

damaged and all eight pump stations and two control structures were 

damaged. The Corps awarded nine contracts to repair and rebuild the 

levees, floodwalls, and flood control structures in St. Bernard Parish. 

Page 18 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Following Hurricane Katrina, several independent review teams began 

studies to determine the cause of hurricane protection failures in 

southeastern Louisiana. These teams included the Interagency 

Performance Evaluation Task Force, Independent Levee Investigation 

Team sponsored by the National Science Foundation, and the American 

Society of Civil Engineers External Review Panel. The Interagency 

Performance Evaluation Task Force and Independent Levee Investigation

Team have issued preliminary reports of their findings and conclusions. 

The American Society of Civil Engineers External Review Panel was 

assembled to review the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force 

work and conclusions. On June 1, 2006, the Interagency Performance 

Evaluation Task Force issued a draft final report that concluded that the 

levees and floodwalls in New Orleans and southeastern Louisiana did not

perform as a system and that it was a system in name only. According to 

the report, the hurricane system’s performance was compromised by the 

incompleteness of the system, the inconsistency in the levels of protection, 

and the lack of redundancy. Inconsistent levels of protection were caused

by differences in the quality of materials used in the levees and variations 

in elevations due to subsidence and construction below design 

specifications. Corps officials said they considered the findings and 

recommendations of the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force 

when making decisions about how to repair levees and floodwalls 

damaged by Hurricane Katrina. 

The Corps has received over $7 billion dollars to restore hurricane 

protection and complete construction on existing hurricane protection 

projects in southeastern Louisiana through three emergency supplemental

appropriations.8

 In September and December 2005, the Corps received a 

total of $3.299 billion in the second and third emergency supplemental 

appropriations. In September 2005, the second emergency supplemental 

appropriation provided the Corps with $400 million for repair of flood 

control and hurricane protection projects.9

 In December 2005, the third 

Independent Research 

Teams Have Studied the 

Cause of Hurricane 

Protection Failure 

Billions of Dollars Have 

Been Appropriated for 

Post-Katrina Hurricane 

Protection Repairs and 

Construction 

 8

There have been four emergency supplemental appropriations in response to Hurricane

Katrina. The first emergency supplemental appropriation, Pub. L. No. 109-61, 119 Stat. 1988 

(Sept. 2, 2005), was used to fund, among other things, other Corps emergency missions, 

such as unwatering. The Corps did not use the appropriation to repair levees destroyed or 

damaged by the storm. The second, third and fourth emergency supplementals 

appropriated funds to the Corps to repair and rebuild damage caused by Hurricane Katrina.

9

Second Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to Meet Immediate Needs from the 

Consequences of Hurricane Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-62, 119 Stat. 1990, 1991 (Sept. 8,

2005). 

Page 19 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
supplemental appropriation provided the Corps with $2.899 billion, of 

which $2.3 billion was provided for emergency response to and recovery 

from coastal storm damages and flooding from hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita.10 The Corps has allocated nearly $2.1 billion to the New Orleans 

District to repair damage to existing hurricane protection, rebuild existing

projects to original authorized height, and complete unconstructed 

portions of previously authorized hurricane protection projects. In turn, 

the New Orleans District has allocated nearly $1.9 billion for this work. 

In June 2006, through the fourth emergency supplemental appropriation, 

the Congress provided almost $4 billion to the Corps to strengthen the 

region’s hurricane defenses and restore areas of coastal wetlands. The 

legislation included specific provisions for southeastern Louisiana 

hurricane protection and flood reduction project enhancements (canal 

closures, selective levee armoring, and storm proofing pump stations), and 

incorporating nonfederal levees in Plaquemines Parish into the federal 

levee system.11 The June 2006 emergency supplemental also provided 

general construction funding that the Corps plans to use to, among other 

things, raise levee heights for certain hurricane protection projects in 

order to certify them in the National Flood Insurance Program (also called 

a 100-year flood level of protection). Table 1 summarizes the estimated 

costs and funds allocated for the Corps’ planned work to date. 

 10Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to Meet Immediate Needs Arising from the 

Consequences of Hurricane Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-61, 119 Stat. 2680, 2761-2763 

(Dec. 30, 2005). 

11Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and

Hurricane Recovery, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-234; 120 Stat. 418, 453-455 (June 15, 2006). 

Page 20 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Table 1: Initial Estimated Costs and Funds Allocated for Corps’ Plans and Projects 

Corps plans and projects Initial estimated cost Funds allocated

Repair damage to existing 

hurricane protection 

$841 million $1,018 milliona

Rebuild existing projects to 

original authorized height 

Not estimated $342 milliona

Complete unconstructed portions 

of previously authorized 

hurricane protection projects 

$529 million $529 million

Repair pumps, pump motors, and 

pump stations 

$59 million $70 million

Enhance hurricane protection to 

provide protection from a 100-

year flood 

Not estimated $495.3 million

Enhance hurricane protection to 

provide protection from a 

Category 5 hurricane 

Not estimated Funds have not been 

allocated

Source: GAO analysis of Army Corps of Engineers’ budgetary and other documents. 

a

The Corps allocated $801 million to repair damage to existing hurricane protection and $566 million 

to rebuild existing projects to original authorized height. In June 2006, the Corps shifted $224 million 

from funds allocated to rebuild existing projects to fund repair cost increases; that is, the Corps 

reallocated $217 million to fund repairs to the existing hurricane protection and $7 million to fund 

repairs to other hurricane and coastal protection projects. 

On June 1, 2006, the Corps reported that 100 percent of prehurricane 

protection levels had been restored to southeastern Louisiana. However, 

work continued on almost half of the contracts because some were behind

schedule while other contracts were not scheduled to be completed until 

as late as March 2007. In instances where the Corps determined it could 

not complete permanent repairs by June 1, 2006, the Corps installed 

temporary structures or levee supports and developed emergency 

procedures to protect against flooding in the event of a hurricane. The 

Corps originally allocated $801 million for this phase of the repairs; 

however, the current allocation for total costs for this phase is just over 

$1 billion. 

At the Start of the 

2006 Hurricane 

Season, Most 

Prehurricane 

Protection Had Been 

Restored to 

Southeastern 

Louisiana 

To restore 100 percent of prehurricane levels of protection in southeastern 

Louisiana by the start of the 2006 hurricane season, the Corps worked 

quickly to award contracts for a variety of work to be performed in a 

relatively short period of time. Between October 2005 and March 2006, the 

Corps awarded 59 contracts to repair and rebuild earthen levees, concrete 

floodwalls, and other hurricane protection structures, and to construct 

interim repairs in areas where final repairs could not be completed by 

Page 21 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
June 1. To complete repairs quickly, some contractors worked 24 hours a 

day, and Corps project managers monitored the progress of the work. As 

of June 1, 2006, the Corps reported that 22.7 miles of new levees and 195 

miles of scour repairs were completed. Although the Corps reported that

100 percent of prehurricane levels of protection had been restored by 

June 1, 2006, as of July 18, 2006, 27 of the 59 contracts were not 

completed. Of those 27 contracts, the Corps projected that 20 would be 

completed by September 30, 2006, and the remaining 7 contracts would be 

completed by March 2007. The remaining work includes grading, 

compacting, and shaping the levees, as well as grass seeding and 

fertilizing. 

In some instances, to restore prehurricane levels of protection, the Corps 

decided to change the design of the existing hurricane structure. For 

example, in the Orleans East Bank, the Corps determined that it did not 

have the time to assess the stability of existing canal walls nor could it 

complete repairs to all of the breaches along the drainage canals before 

June 1, 2006. As a result, at a cost of $111 million, the Corps decided to 

install interim gated closure structures (gates) on all three canals—17th 

Street, London Avenue, and Orleans Avenue—where they intersect Lake 

Pontchartrain to prevent storm surge from entering the canals and to 

install 34 temporary pumps to drain floodwaters from the Orleans East 

Bank portion of the city (see fig. 8). According to Corps officials, the 

agency planned to install interim gates and temporary pumps because it

did not have the authority to install permanent gates and pumps under its 

emergency flood control authority. The Corps expects the interim gates 

and temporary pumps to remain in place for 3 to 5 years, after which the 

Corps will construct permanent gates and pumps. The 2006 emergency 

supplemental appropriation provides $530 million for permanent gates and 

pumps at the three drainage canals.12

 12Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and

Hurricane Recovery, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-234, 120 Stat. 418, 454 (June 15, 2006). 

Page 22 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Figure 8: Graphic of Interim Gates and Temporary Pumps 

Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Levee tie-in

Gated structure To Lake

Pontchartrain Pontchartrain

To Lake

Pontchartrain

Temporary pumps

According to the Corps, the interim gates will be operated manually, and 

the temporary pumps will not be enclosed. If a major storm or hurricane 

should occur, the Corps plans to close the gates when water levels in the 

17th Street and London Avenue canals reach 5 feet and the water level in

the Orleans Avenue canal reaches 9 feet. The Corps is reviewing the 

results of recent soil samples collected in the area and may change its 

plans, depending on these results, a Corps official said. The temporary 

pumps being installed by the Corps can only pump out a portion of the 

drainage water that would normally be pumped into the canals during a 

storm event. As a result of the restriction being placed on the water levels 

pumped into the canals and the limited pump capacity of the temporary 

pumps, the Corps has acknowledged that some flooding could occur from

the heavy rainfall that normally occurs during a hurricane. 

In instances where the Corps did not expect permanent repairs to be 

completed by June 1, 2006, the Corps devised some interim and temporary 

solutions to provide the same level of protection that existed before 

Page 23 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Hurricane Katrina. For example, as of June 1, 2006, construction of one of 

the three interim gates—the 17th Street canal gate—was behind schedule. 

The Corps estimated it would be completed by September 15, 2006. If a 

hurricane threatens before the interim gate is in place, the Corps plans to 

drive sheet piling in front of the Hammond Highway Bridge that crosses 

the 17th Street canal to close off the canal from Lake Pontchartrain. On 

June 12, 2006, the Corps announced that the temporary pumps built for the 

drainage canals could not provide the required pumping capacity. The 

Corps plans to procure replacement pumps with different specifications 

for the 17th Street canal and repair new pumps already installed at the

Orleans Avenue and London Avenue canals. Under normal conditions, the 

Corps said it would have conducted hydraulic modeling and testing to 

determine the correct pump configuration. The Corps did not perform 

modeling and testing, officials said, because the process can take months, 

and there was insufficient time to do so before the start of the hurricane 

season. If the canals must be closed due to a hurricane, before pumping 

capacity is restored at the drainage canals, the Corps plans to use a 

combination of temporary and portable pumps. 

Similarly, in Plaquemines Parish, the Corps made temporary repairs to 5 

miles of levees along the Mississippi River after the Corps concluded that a 

floodwall located on top of a section of levee was not reliable. The Corps 

decided to add a temporary reinforcement because there was not enough 

time to replace 5 miles of floodwalls before the start of the 2006 hurricane 

season. To provide this interim protection, the Corps added compacted 

clay along the backside of the damaged levee. The Corps subsequently 

determined that the foundation soil in this area would be unable to 

support the weight of floodwalls, so the Corps has decided to construct a 

full earthen levee embankment instead. However, this permanent structure 

is not scheduled to be completed until March 2007. 

The Corps allocated about $801 million to repair levees and floodwalls to 

pre-Katrina conditions. An additional $217 million was needed to fund the 

$125 million costs to increase the pumping capacity of the new temporary 

pumps for the drainage canals and $92 million to fund such things as 

(1) additional work that has been required on existing repair contracts, 

relating to weakened levees in Plaquemines parish, the three drainage 

canal gates, and two hurricane protection and flood reduction projects; 

(2) contingency measures that had to be implemented until the temporary 

gates on the drainage canals are completed; and (3) costs to acquire 

nearby real estate for construction of the gates and associated levees. The 

Corps allocated these additional funds from the $566 million that was 

allocated by the Corps for raising all hurricane protection structures to 

Page 24 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
their authorized design elevations, which is discussed in greater detail in 

the next section of this report. 

Beyond the repairs that were to be completed by June 1, 2006, the Corps 

has additional plans to continue repairs, restoration, and construction 

activities on other portions of the existing five southeastern Louisiana 

hurricane protection and flood control projects. The Corps plans to 

(1) repair all damaged pumps, motors, and pump stations by about March 

2007; (2) restore sections of the five hurricane protection and flood 

control projects that have settled over time to their original design 

elevation; as well as (3) complete construction of previously authorized 

but incomplete portions of these hurricane protection and flood control 

projects by September 2007. Although $1.165 billion was originally 

allocated for this work, the Corps expects actual costs will be greater 

because the original allocation did not reflect design changes, additional

costs to fund the local sponsor’s share, and rapidly escalating construction 

costs. Further, in June 2006, the Corps shifted $224 million from this 

allocation to pay for the additional costs to repair damaged levees and 

floodwalls, leaving only $941 million for this work. 

The Corps plans to repair pumps and pump motors at 66 of 75 pump 

stations damaged by flood waters that were caused by Hurricane Katrina.13

The pump stations are located in Orleans, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines 

parishes as well as in neighboring Jefferson Parish. Pumps remove storm 

runoff from city streets. The Corps plans to make electrical and 

mechanical repairs to pumps and motors—such as rewiring motors and 

replacing pump bearings—and structural repairs to pump stations, such as 

repairing roof tops. As of June 2006, the Corps had planned to complete 

repairs to all of these pumps, pump motors, and pump stations by March 

2007, for an estimated cost of $59 million. However, to date, the Corps has 

allocated $70 million for the pump repairs. A Corps project manager said 

that five contracts have been awarded for $7.7 million, as of June 2006, and 

that he expects to award a total of 25 contracts for this work. 

Cost Estimates for 

Restoring 

Southeastern 

Louisiana Hurricane 

Protection Projects to 

Originally-Designed 

Levels and 

Completing 

Construction of 

Incomplete Portions 

Continue to Rise

The Corps Plans to Repair 

Damaged Pumps, Motors, 

and Pump Stations by 

March 2007 

 13Immediately following Hurricane Katrina, the Federal Emergency Management Agency

dried and cleaned some flooded pumps and motors in an effort to quickly restore 

prehurricane pumping capacity to the region.

Page 25 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
In April 2006, three pump motors that were flooded during Hurricane 

Katrina caught fire during a rainstorm and shut down, raising questions 

about the reliability of other pumps that had also been flooded. The 

possible failure of pumps due to fires combined with (1) the restrictions 

placed on the level of water that can be pumped into the canals because of

uncertainty about the integrity of the canal floodwalls and (2) the reduced 

capacity of the temporary pumps to remove water from the canals has led 

to widely reported concerns about flooding from rainwater during a 

hurricane. In response to these concerns, the Corps accelerated plans to 

repair all damaged pumps, motors, and pump stations. A Corps official 

estimated it would take several weeks to repair each of the larger and 

older pump motors. The Corps plans to repair pumps and pump motors by

taking some of them offline one at a time, thereby maintaining as much of 

the available pumping capacity at each pumping station as possible. 

Restoration of Hurricane 

Protection to Authorized 

Design Elevations Is 

Expected by September 

2007 

The Corps plans to raise the height of all federal and some nonfederal 

levees, floodwalls, and other hurricane protection structures within the 

southeastern Louisiana area, which have settled over the years, to their 

original design elevation by September 1, 2007. In December 2005, the 

Corps surveyed levees not damaged by Hurricane Katrina and estimated 

that about 48 miles of levees were 1 to 21⁄2 feet below design elevation in 

St. Bernard, Orleans, Plaquemines, and Jefferson parishes. The Corps 

estimated that restoring these levees to their designed height would cost 

$50.8 million. However, the Corps allocated $566 million from funds 

provided in the December 2005 emergency supplemental appropriation to 

raise not only the heights of these levees but also the heights of floodwalls 

and other structures in southeastern Louisiana, which may have settled 

over time, to their original design height. The primary difference between

the Corps’ initial cost estimate and the funds allocated in the emergency 

supplemental is the higher cost of raising floodwalls and other structures, 

compared with the cost of raising only about 48 miles of levees. In July 

2006, the Corps estimated that 94 miles of levees, about 16 miles of 

floodwalls, 89 gates, and 2 control structures were below design elevation 

in Orleans, Plaquemines and St. Bernard parishes. According to a Corps 

official, the agency is revising the plans and estimated costs for this work 

to include the costs of raising all settled floodwalls and the cost of 

replacing all I-walls with T-walls or L-walls. 

As of July 2006, the Corps had not announced the results of its second 

damage assessment. Currently, this work is still scheduled to be 

completed by September 1, 2007. As of June 2006, funds allocated for this 

work were reduced to $342 million because, as previously mentioned, 

Page 26 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
$224 million was shifted to help fund the escalating costs to repair 

damaged levees and floodwalls to pre-Katrina levels by June 1, 2006, and 

to fund repairs to hurricane damage at other hurricane protection and 

coastal protection projects. According to a Corps official, cost estimates 

for this work were to be available by July 15, 2006, after which the Corps 

plans to determine if it needs to request more funds. 

Completion of Previously 

Authorized but 

Unconstructed Portions of 

Five Hurricane and Flood 

Reduction Projects 

Expected by September 

2007 

By September 30, 2007, the Corps plans to complete the construction of all 

previously authorized but incomplete portions of the five hurricane 

protection and flood reduction projects in southeastern Louisiana. In 

December 2005, the Corps estimated the cost of completing these five 

projects to be $529 million. However, the Corps is revising its cost 

estimates due to escalating construction costs and design changes that 

have occurred since Hurricane Katrina. The Corps’ costs will also increase 

because local sponsors are no longer required to share any of the costs 

incurred to complete these projects. Details of the five projects are 

described below. 

The Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project is 

located in St. Bernard, Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Charles parishes in 

southeastern Louisiana, in the vicinity of the city of New Orleans and 

between the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain. The project 

includes a series of control structures, concrete flood walls, and about 125 

miles of earthen levees designed to protect residents living between Lake 

Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River levees from storm surges in the 

lake (see fig. 9). 

Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana 

and Vicinity Hurricane 

Protection Project 

Page 27 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Figure 9: Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project 

Buras-Triumph

Golden

Meadow

Port Sulphur

Slidell

Metairie

New Orleans

Mississippi River Mississippi River Gulf Outlet

Lake Borgne

Lake Pontchartrain

17th St. Canal

Orleans Ave. Canal

London Ave. Canal

Inner Habor Navigation Canal

Gulf Intracoastal

Waterway

Mississippi River Mississippi River Gulf Outlet

Mississippi River/Spillway Levee

Levees and/or floodwalls

Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (data); MapArt (graphic).

This project was designed to provide protection from a standard project 

hurricane (equivalent to a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane). The Flood 

Control Act of 196514 authorized the project that, at the time of Hurricane 

Katrina, was 90 percent complete in St. Bernard and Orleans parishes, 

70 percent complete in Jefferson Parish, and 60 percent complete in 

St. Charles Parish. The pre-Katrina scheduled completion date for this 

project was 2015, at an estimated cost of $738 million, where the estimated

federal share was $528 million and the estimated local sponsor share was 

 14Pub. L. No. 89-298, § 204, 79 Stat. 1073, 1077. 

Page 28 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
$210 million. At the time of the storm, estimated costs to complete the 

remainder of the project were $121 million. This estimate is expected to 

increase due to higher construction costs following Hurricane Katrina. 

The West Bank and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project is located on the

west bank of the Mississippi River in the vicinity of the city of New 

Orleans and in Jefferson, Orleans, and Plaquemines parishes. The project 

is designed to provide hurricane protection to residents from storm surges 

from Lakes Cataouatche and Salvador, and waterways leading to the Gulf

of Mexico. The project encompasses 66 miles of earthen levees and 

floodwalls (see fig. 10). 

West Bank and Vicinity, New 

Orleans, Louisiana Hurricane 

Protection Project 

Page 29 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Figure 10: West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, Louisiana Hurricane Protection 

Project 

Lake Pontchartrain

Lake

Salvador

Lake

Cataouatche

Jefferson Parish Orleans Parish

St. Charles Parish

St. Bernard Parish

Plaquemines Parish

Estelle

Metairie

Mississippi River

New

Orleans

Kenner

Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (data); MapArt (graphics).

Levees and/or floodwalls

This project was designed to provide Category 3 level of hurricane 

protection. The Water Resources Development Act of 1986 authorized this 

project.15 At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the project was 38 percent 

complete. The pre-Katrina completion date for this project was 2016, at an 

estimated cost of $331 million, where the federal estimated share was 

$215 million and the estimated local sponsor share was $116 million. At 

 15Pub. L. No. 99-662, § 401, 100 Stat. 4082, 4128. 

Page 30 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
the time of the storm, estimated costs to complete the remainder of the 

project were $148 million; however, the Corps expects the final cost to be 

much higher. The design for this project includes 4 miles of T-walls, and 

since the cost of T-walls has escalated, officials said they expect the cost 

to complete the project will increase as well. 

The Larose to Golden Meadow, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project is 

located in southeastern Louisiana, about 30 miles southwest of New 

Orleans, along Bayou Lafourche and between the communities of Larose 

and Golden Meadow in Lafourche Parish. The project is a ring-shaped 

levee about 40 miles in length (see fig. 11). 

Larose to Golden Meadow, 

Louisiana Hurricane Protection 

Project 

Figure 11: Larose to Golden Meadow, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project

Buras-Triumph

Golden

Meadow

Larose

Port Sulphur

Slidell

New

Orleans

Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (data); MapArt (graphic).

Golden Meadow

Galliano

Larose

Cutoff

Levee Alignment Levee Alignment

Leon Theriot Floodgate

Larose Floodgate

Gulf Intracoastal 

Waterway

Bayou Lafourche

Catfish Lake

Lake

Pontchartrain

Lake Borgne

Mississippi River

Levees and/or floodwalls

Page 31 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
According to Corps officials, this project was designed to provide a 

100-year level of hurricane protection to about 2,300 acres of residential 

and commercial land and 9,400 acres of agricultural land. The Flood 

Control Act of 196516 authorized this project that, at the time of Hurricane 

Katrina, was about 96 percent complete. The pre-Katrina completion date 

of this project was 2007, at an estimated cost of $116 million, where the 

federal estimated share was $81 million and the estimated local sponsor 

was $35 million. At the time of the storm, estimated costs to complete the 

remainder of the project were $4 million. However, according to the 

project manager, significant settlement has occurred throughout the 

project and levees are between 1 to 1 1⁄2 feet below design elevation. 

Further, when this project was designed in the early 1970s, a nearby marsh 

was expected to help slow storm surge. Since that time, the local 

environment has changed causing the marsh to disappear and, according

to the project manager, the Corps is reconsidering the project design and 

may have to recommend raising the height of the levees in order to 

provide authorized levels of protection, which could significantly increase 

the costs of the project.

The Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project is located on the 

east bank of the Mississippi River, in Orleans Parish, and on the east and

west banks of the Mississippi River, in Jefferson Parish and St. Tammany 

Parish. The project was designed to provide drainage and flood protection 

from a 10-year rainfall event17 and encompasses major drainage lines and 

canals, additional pumping capacity, and new pump stations (see fig. 12).

Southeast Louisiana Urban 

Flood Control Project 

 16Pub. L. No. 89-298, § 204, 79 Stat. 1073, 1077. 

17A 10-year flood means there is a 10 percent annual chance of flood. 

Page 32 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Figure 12: Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project 

Lake Pontchartrain

Lake Borgne

Lake

Salvador

Lake

Cataouatche

Mississippi River

St. Charles Orleans Parish

Parish

Jefferson

Parish St. Bernard Parish

Plaquemines

Parish

St. Tammany Parish

Slidell

Estelle

Metairie

New

Orleans

Kenner

St. Tammany Parish

Slidell

Orleans Parish

Jefferson

Parish

Estelle

Metairie

New

Orleans

Kenner

Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (data); MapArt (graphics).

Southeast Louisiana Urban

Flood Control Project Areas

Note: Shading indicates areas where drainage and flood protection work is planned or in progress. 

The project was originally authorized by the Energy and Water 

Development Appropriations Act, 199618 and the Water Resources 

Development Act of 1996.

19 At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the project 

was about 60 percent complete. The pre-Katrina completion date for this 

 18Pub. L. No. 104-46, § 108, 109 Stat. 402, 408.

19Pub. L. No. 104-303, § 533, 110 Stat. 3658, 3775. 

Page 33 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
project was 2009, at an estimated cost of $908 million, of which the federal

estimated share was $678 million and the estimated local sponsor share 

was $230 million. At the time of the storm, estimated costs to complete the 

remainder of the project were $225 million (this estimate has been revised 

to $339 million). According to a Corps official, this estimate will increase 

further because costs for engineering and construction have escalated in 

the months following Hurricane Katrina. 

The New Orleans to Venice Hurricane Protection Project is located along 

the east bank of the Mississippi River from Phoenix, Louisiana—about 28 

miles southeast of New Orleans—down to Bohemia, Louisiana, and along 

the west bank of the river from St. Jude, Louisiana—about 39 miles 

southeast of New Orleans—down to the vicinity of Venice, Louisiana. The 

project was designed to provide protection from hurricane tidal overflow 

from a 100-year storm and consists of 87 miles of enlarged levees built on 

the back side of the ring of levees (see fig. 13). 

New Orleans to Venice, 

Louisiana Hurricane Protection 

Project 

Page 34 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Figure 13: New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project

Note: Reaches shown above are back levees. 

Pointe A La Hache ointe A La Hache

Phoenix

Jesuit Bend it Bend

Bohemia Bohemia

Oakville akville

St. Jude

City Price ity Price

Port Sulphur

Empire

Buras

Fort Jack ort Jackson

Venice

West Bank River Levee

Mississippi River

Reach C

Reach A

Reach B1

Reach B2

Levees and/or floodwalls

Sources: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (data); Stanley Consultants (graphic).

This project was authorized under the River and Harbor Act of 1962.20 At 

the time of Hurricane Katrina, the project was about 84 percent complete. 

 20Pub. L. No. 87-874, § 203, 76 Stat. 1173, 1184. 

Page 35 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
The pre-Katrina completion date for this project was 2018, at an estimated

cost of $253 million, where the federal share was $177 million and the 

estimated local sponsor share was $76 million. At the time of the storm, 

estimated costs to complete the remainder of the project were $32 million. 

According to a Corps official, estimated costs to complete this project are

expected to increase due, in part, to design changes. 

In response to various requirements and directives from stakeholders, the 

Corps has already developed or is in the process of developing a number 

of plans and projects that will further restore, construct, and/or enhance 

hurricane protection for southeastern Louisiana, to make it stronger and 

better. Constructing these projects may take years and require billions of 

dollars in federal funds. However, the Corps does not have a 

comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that all of these efforts are 

effectively integrated and an implementation plan to ensure funding 

allocations are made in the most efficient manner possible, avoiding 

redundancies and misuse of resources. 

In addition to the repairs and construction activities already described in 

prior sections of this report, a number of requirements and directives 

placed on the Corps over the last several months have required it to 

modify existing plans or develop new plans for hurricane protection in 

southeastern Louisiana:

• The 2006 emergency supplemental appropriation provided nearly 

$4 billion to the Corps to enhance hurricane protection in southeastern 

Louisiana.21 Specific provisions provided $530 million for permanent 

pumps and closures for New Orleans’ three drainage canals; $350 million 

for two navigable closures to prevent hurricane surge from entering the 

Inner Harbor Navigation Canal and the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway; 

$250 million to storm-proof existing interior drainage pump stations in 

Jefferson and Orleans parishes; $170 million to armor critical sections of 

New Orleans levees; and $215 million to include nonfederal levees in 

Plaquemines Parish into the federal system, which means the levees will 

be repaired and built to Corps standards and eligible for future 

rehabilitation. These projects are in addition to the other work described 

in prior sections of this report. 

The Corps Lacks a 

Comprehensive 

Approach for 

Planning and 

Managing the Multiple 

Restoration, 

Construction, and 

Future Enhancements 

Proposed for 

Southeastern 

Louisiana Hurricane 

Protection 

 21Pub. L. No. 109-234, 120 Stat. 418, 453-55 (June 15, 2006). 

Page 36 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
• The 2006 emergency supplemental also appropriated nearly $1.6 billion to 

the Corps to reinforce or replace floodwalls in the New Orleans 

metropolitan area and provided that at least $495 million of the amounts 

appropriated for construction be used to raise levees for the Lake 

Pontchartrain and West Bank levee projects to provide a level of 

protection necessary to satisfy the certification requirements of the 

National Flood Insurance Program (often referred to as the 100-year flood 

standard.) In April 2006, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

announced the release of new advisory flood elevations for New Orleans 

and the surrounding area based on a 1 percent annual chance of flooding, 

or a 100-year flood. The Corps’ restoration plans for hurricane protection 

did not meet these new elevation requirements. In response, the Corps 

revised its plans and estimated costs to raise the height of levees and 

floodwalls to provide the area with a 100-year level of protection. The 

Corps estimated it would need an additional $4.1 billion to upgrade all of 

the floodwalls and raise levees to meet the new standard by 2010. The 

Corps’ estimate included $2.5 billion to raise the height of levees in all of

the New Orleans area, except for lower Plaquemines Parish, in some cases 

by as much as 7 feet, which included $900 million to complete other levee 

work in the area and upgrade or replace existing I-walls with T-walls. In 

lower Plaquemines Parish, the estimated cost to replace all I-walls with Twalls is $1.6 billion. 

• As required by the 2006 Energy and Water Development Appropriations 

Act22 and Department of Defense Appropriations Act,23 the Corps is 

conducting a study of flood control, coastal restoration, and hurricane 

protection measures for the southeastern Louisiana coastal region. The 

Corps must propose design and technical requirements to protect the 

region from a Category 5 hurricane.24 The two laws appropriated a total of 

$20 million to the Corps for this study. The Corps was required to provide 

a preliminary technical report to Congress by June 30, 2006 (which was 

issued on July 10, 2006) and a final technical report by December 30, 2007. 

The final study must consider alternative designs to protect against a 

storm surge produced by a Category 5 hurricane originating from the Gulf 

of Mexico. According to the Corps, alternatives being considered include a 

structural design consisting of a contiguous line of earthen or concrete 

walls along southern coastal Louisiana, a nonstructural alternative 

 22Pub. L. No. 109-103, 119 Stat. 2247 (Nov. 19, 2005). 

23Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2761 (Dec. 30, 2005). 

24Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 5009, 119 Stat. 2680, 2814 (amending Pub. L. No. 109-103). 

Page 37 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
involving only environmental or coastal restoration measures, or a 

combination of those alternatives. The Corps’ July 2006 preliminary 

technical report did not specifically identify which alternatives the Corps 

would recommend but instead provided a conceptual framework for both 

structural and nonstructural components that should be considered in 

developing long-term solutions for the region. Although the cost to provide 

a Category 5 level of protection for the southeastern Louisiana coastal 

region has not yet been determined, it would be in addition to the over 

$7 billion already provided to the Corps in the three emergency 

supplemental appropriations discussed in previous sections of this report. 

• Finally, the Corps is responding to the findings and recommendations 

from the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force and its review of 

the existing hurricane protection and why it failed. For example, the task 

force reported that overtopping and erosion caused most breaches to 

levees and floodwalls and recommended armoring to prevent scour from 

overtopping, thereby reducing the chance of breaching. As discussed 

above, the 2006 emergency supplemental appropriation provided 

$170 million to armor critical areas on levees. 

Although the long-term solutions for southeastern Louisiana have not yet

been determined and may not be decided for some time, the Corps is 

proceeding with over $7 billion of already authorized repair and 

restoration work without a comprehensive strategy to guide its efforts. 

Without such a strategy, we believe that the Corps may end up replicating 

past missteps, which occurred because it was required to follow a 

piecemeal approach to developing the existing hurricane protection that,

according to experts, is not well integrated. For example, the draft final 

report issued May 2006 by the investigation team sponsored by the 

National Science Foundation stated (1) that there was a failure to integrate 

the individual parts of a complex hurricane system, (2) that insufficient 

attention was given to creating an integrated series of components to 

create a reliable overall system, and (3) that projects were engineered and 

constructed in piecemeal fashion to conform to incremental 

appropriations. In its June 2006 draft final report, the Interagency 

Performance Evaluation Task Force also concluded that hurricane 

protection systems should be deliberately designed and built as integrated

systems to enhance reliability and provide consistent levels of protection. 

According to the Corps, the technical report due to the Congress in 

December 2007 will include the long-range strategy that will provide an 

integrated and comprehensive review of flood control, coastal restoration, 

and hurricane and storm damage reduction measures for the southeastern 

Page 38 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Louisiana region, and the preliminary framework for this strategy is 

included in the report provided to the Congress on July 10, 2006. However, 

according to a senior Corps official, there is currently no other strategic 

plan in place to guide its efforts. We are concerned that the Corps has 

embarked on a multibillion dollar repair and construction effort in 

response to the appropriations it has already received, without a guiding 

strategic plan, and appears to be simply doing whatever it takes to comply 

with the requirements placed on it by the Congress and other 

stakeholders. Consequently, we are concerned that the Corps is once 

again, during this interim period, taking an incremental approach that is

based on funding and direction provided through specific appropriations 

and is at risk of constructing redundant or obsolete structures that may be 

superseded by future decisions, thereby increasing the overall costs to the 

federal government for this project. 

During the past 4 years, we reported that the Corps’ planning for civil 

works projects were fraught with errors, mistakes, and miscalculations 

and used invalid assumptions and outdated data.

25 We recommended, and 

the Corps agreed, that an external peer review of its plans and decisions 

was needed, especially for high risk and costly proposed projects. In the 

aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Corps established the Interagency

Performance Evaluation Task Force and used the task force’s findings and

lessons learned to improve its engineering practices and policies to 

provide hurricane protection. However, the task force is set to dissolve 

once its final report is released in September 2006, and the Corps has not 

indicated that it plans to establish another similar body to help guide its 

interim repair and restoration efforts, monitor progress, or provide expert 

advice. 

Following Hurricane Katrina—one of the largest natural disasters in U.S. 

history—the Army Corps of Engineers rapidly repaired and restored 

almost 169 miles of damaged levees, floodwalls, and other flood control 

structures to prehurricane levels of protection in time for the start of the 

2006 hurricane season. Now that these urgent repairs have been 

completed, the Corps is beginning to implement a variety of other plans to

make many additional repairs and enhancements to existing southeastern 

Louisiana hurricane protection projects that may cost billions of dollars 

Conclusions 

 25GAO, Corps of Engineers: Observations on Planning and Project Management Processes

for the Civil Works Program, GAO-06-529T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2006). 

Page 39 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
and take years to complete. Further, additional enhancements are being 

considered to increase the overall level of protection for the area to 

protect against even larger hurricanes that may add many billions of 

dollars and many years to the scope of the Corps efforts. 

Currently, the Corps does not know what ultimate level of protection will 

be authorized for southeastern Louisiana and therefore cannot make 

strategic decisions about which components of a hurricane protection 

system will most effectively provide the required level of protection. 

Nonetheless, the Corps has been appropriated over $7 billion to continue 

repairs and construction on five existing hurricane protection projects in

the area. However, it does not have a comprehensive strategy to guide 

these efforts and appears to be simply doing whatever it takes to comply 

with the requirements placed on it by the Congress and other 

stakeholders. We believe that taking such an incremental and piecemeal

approach for such a complex and expensive repair and restoration project 

is imprudent and that, even for these interim repairs and enhancements, 

the Corps should be fully considering project interrelationships to avoid 

unnecessary duplication and redundancy, and to reduce federal costs. We 

also believe that relying on an independent body like the Interagency

Performance Evaluation Task Force to help guide and oversee this 

process will help ensure that the Corps obtains objective and reliable 

support as it implements these authorized enhancements to the existing 

hurricane protection projects. 

In order to construct a hurricane protection system that provides the 

appropriate level of protection to southeastern Louisiana and ensures the 

most efficient use of federal resources, we are making the following two 

recommendations: 

The Army Corps of Engineers should develop (1) a comprehensive 

strategy that includes an integrated approach for all projects and plans for 

rebuilding and strengthening the system and (2) an implementation plan 

that will achieve the specific level of protection in a cost-effective manner, 

within a reasonable time frame. 

The Army Corps of Engineers should establish an evaluative organization

like the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, to assist in its 

efforts in developing a strategic plan, monitoring progress, and providing 

expert advice for constructing a stronger and well-integrated hurricane 

protection system. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Page 40 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense (DOD) for 

its review and comment. In commenting on a draft of the report, DOD 

concurred with our first recommendation that the Army Corps of 

Engineers develop (1) a comprehensive strategy to integrate projects and

plans for rebuilding and strengthening hurricane protection and (2) an 

implementation plan that will provide a specific level of protection in a 

cost-effective manner within a reasonable time frame. DOD partially 

concurred with our second recommendation that the Army Corps of 

Engineers establish an evaluative organization to assist in its efforts to 

develop a strategic plan, monitor progress, and provide expert advice for 

constructing a stronger and well-integrated hurricane protection system, 

because it believes that a body like the Interagency Performance 

Evaluation Task Force is not the proper mechanism for this work. 

According to DOD, the Corps will rely on three teams of experts to plan 

and monitor the construction of a hurricane protection system. First, an 

independent technical review person or team will identify, explain, and 

comment on the assumptions underlying the Corps’ economic,

engineering, and environmental analyses for each project, and evaluate the 

soundness of Corps’ models and planning methods. Second, the team 

currently reviewing flood control, coastal restoration, and hurricane and 

storm damage reduction measures for the southeastern Louisiana region

will assist the Corps in developing a strategic plan for constructing a 

stronger and well-integrated hurricane protection system. Lastly, the 

Corps has assembled a Federal Principals Group consisting of senior 

leaders from federal agencies to guide the development of a 

comprehensive plan and monitor implementation of the plan. We believe 

that the Corps’ proposal to use three external groups of experts satisfies 

the spirit of our recommendation. DOD’s comments are included in 

appendix I. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, 

Secretary of Defense, and interested congressional committees. We will 

also provide copies to others on request. In addition, the report will be 

available, at no charge, on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 41 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3841 or MittalA@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix II. 

Anu Mittal 

Director, Natural Resources 

 and Environment 

Page 42 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable James M. Inhofe 

Chairman 

The Honorable James M. Jeffords 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Environment and Public Works 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Chairman 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Chairman 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable David L. Hobson 

Chairman 

The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 43 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 44 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 45 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 46 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 47 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 
Appendix II: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 48 GAO-06-934 Hurricane Katrina 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Anu Mittal, (202) 512-3841 or MittalA@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Edward Zadjura, Assistant 

Director; John Delicath, James Dishmon, Doreen Feldman, Christine Frye, 

John Kalmar, Carol Kolarik and Omari Norman made key contributions to 

this report. 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(360655) 
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