United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony before the Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

U.S. Senate

PASSENGER RAIL 

SECURITY 

Enhanced Federal 

Leadership Needed to 

Prioritize and Guide 

Security Efforts 

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, January 18, 2007 

 

GAO-07-225T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

January 18, 2007

PASSENGER RAIL SECURITY 

Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to 

Highlights of GAO-07-225T, a testimony Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts 

before the Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate 

The July 2005 London subway

bombings and July 2006 rail attacks 

in Mumbai, India dramatically

revealed the vulnerability of 

passenger rail and other surface

transportation systems worldwide

to terrorist attack and 

demonstrated the need for 

increased focus on the security of

these systems. 

This testimony, which is based 

primarily on GAO’s September 2005 

report on passenger rail security 

(GAO-05-851) and selected

program updates obtained in

January 2007 provides information 

on (1) how the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) has 

assessed the risks posed by 

terrorism to the U.S. passenger rail 

system; (2) actions TSA and other

federal agencies have taken to

enhance the security of U.S. rail

systems; and (3) rail security 

practices implemented by domestic 

and selected foreign passenger rail

operators. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO’s September 2005 report 

recommended, that the 

Transportation Security

Administration (TSA) complete its 

methodology for conducting risk

assessments, and develop rail 

security standards that reflect 

industry best practices. GAO also 

recommended that DHS determine

the feasibility of implementing

certain security practices used by

foreign rail operators. DHS, DOT, 

and Amtrak generally agreed with 

the report’s recommendations. 

The DHS Office of Grants and Training has conducted risk assessments 

of passenger rail systems to identify and protect rail assets that are 

vulnerable to attack, such as stations and bridges. TSA has also begun to 

conduct risk assessments of passenger rail assets. While TSA has begun 

to establish a methodology for analyzing and characterizing risks, as of 

January 2007, the agency has not completed a comprehensive risk 

assessment of the U.S. passenger rail system. Until TSA does so, the 

agency may be limited in its ability to prioritize passenger rail assets and 

help guide security investments. DHS has also begun developing a 

framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent 

approach for analyzing and comparing risks among and across different 

transportation sectors. However, until this framework is finalized, it may 

not be possible to compare risks across different sectors, prioritize them, 

and allocate resources accordingly. 

After September 11, 2001, the Department of Transportation initiated a 

number of efforts to improve passenger rail security. After its creation, 

TSA also took a number of actions, including issuing rail security 

directives, testing rail security technologies, developing training tools for 

rail workers, and issuing a proposed rule in December 2006 regarding 

passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. However, federal

and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent to which TSA’s 

directives were based on industry best practices and expressed 

confusion about how TSA would monitor compliance with the directives. 

DHS and DOT also signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that 

delineated the two departments’ respective roles and responsibilities for 

promoting the safe, secure, and efficient movement of people and goods 

throughout the transportation system. TSA has recently completed 

specific agreements with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and 

the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to further delineate securityrelated roles and responsibilities for passenger rail. 

U.S. and foreign passenger rail operators GAO visited have also taken 

actions to secure their rail systems. Most had implemented customer 

security awareness programs, increased security personnel, increased 

the use of canines to detect explosives, and enhanced employee training

programs. GAO also observed security practices among foreign 

passenger rail systems that are not currently used by U.S. rail operators 

or by the U.S. government, which could be considered for use in the U.S.

For example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen passengers or 

use covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats. While 

introducing these security practices in the U.S may pose political, legal, 

fiscal, and cultural challenges, they warrant further examination. TSA has 

reported taking steps to identify foreign best practices for rail security. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-225T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Cathleen 

Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or

berrickc@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing on federal 

efforts to secure rail and surface transportation systems. Since September

11, 2001, TSA has focused much of its efforts and resources on meeting 

legislative mandates to strengthen commercial aviation security. However,

TSA has recently placed additional focus on securing surface modes of 

transportation, particularly in the area of passenger rail security. Surface 

transportation, which includes passenger and freight rail, mass transit, 

highways, and pipelines, are inherently open and difficult to secure. One of

the critical challenges facing these federal agencies, and rail system 

operators they oversee or support, is finding ways to protect rail systems 

from potential terrorist attacks without compromising the accessibility 

and efficiency of rail travel. The Madrid commuter rail attacks in March 

2004, London rail bombings in July 2005, and Mumbai, India train 

bombings just last year, highlight the vulnerabilities of passenger rail and 

other surface transportation systems and made clear that even when 

security precautions are put into place, these systems remain vulnerable to

attack. While securing surface transportation systems is a daunting task—

a shared responsibility requiring coordinated action on the part of federal,

state, and local governments and the private sector—it is important 

nonetheless to take the necessary steps to identify and mitigate risks to 

these systems. 

As we have reported previously, the sheer number of stakeholders 

involved in securing surface transportation modes, including passenger 

rail, can sometimes lead to communication challenges, duplication of 

effort, and confusion about roles and responsibilities. Regarding passenger 

rail security, key Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stakeholders

with critical roles include the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA), which is responsible for securing all modes of transportation, and 

the Office for Grants and Training (OGT), which provides grant funds to 

rail operators and conducts risk assessments for passenger rail agencies. 

Within the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Federal Transit 

Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) have 

responsibilities for passenger and freight rail safety and security. In 

addition, public and private passenger rail operators also share 

responsibility for securing their systems. 

At the federal level, another significant challenge related to securing 

passenger rail systems involves allocating resources based on risk. Within 

and among all modes of transportation, there is competition for resources, 

as federal, state, and local agencies and transportation operators seek to 

Page 1 GAO-07-225T 
identify and invest in appropriate security measures to safeguard these 

systems while also investing in other capital and operational 

improvements. Moreover, given competing priorities and limited homeland 

security resources, difficult policy decisions have to be made by Congress 

and the executive branch to prioritize security efforts and direct resources 

to areas of greatest risk within and among transportation modes and 

across other nationally critical sectors. 

In this regard, to help federal decision makers determine how to best 

allocate limited resources, we have advocated, the National Commission 

on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) has 

recommended, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 

of 2004 provides that a risk management approach be employed to guide 

decision making related to homeland security resources. A risk 

management approach entails a continuous process of managing risks 

through a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and objectives, 

assessing and quantifying risks, evaluating alternative security measures, 

selecting which measures to undertake, and implementing and monitoring 

those measures. 

My testimony today focuses on the progress federal agencies and domestic 

passenger rail operators have made in setting and implementing security 

priorities in the wake of September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and the

security practices implemented by foreign passenger rail operators. In 

particular, my testimony highlights three key areas: (1) the actions that 

DHS and its component agencies have taken to assess the risks posed by 

terrorism to the U.S. passenger rail system; (2) the actions that TSA and 

other federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of the U.S. 

passenger rail system; and (3) the security practices that domestic and 

selected foreign passenger rail operators have implemented to mitigate 

risks and enhance security. My comments today are based on GAO’s 

September 2005 report addressing the security of the U.S. passenger rail 

system and selected updates on this program obtained in January 2007.1

This report was based on work at DHS, DOT and Amtrak, as well as work 

that included 32 passenger rail operators in the U.S., and 

13 passenger rail operators in 7 European and Asian countries. We 

conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

 1

GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and 

Guide Security Efforts, GAO-05-851 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005). 

Page 2 GAO-07-225T 
We have been requested by the Chairman of the House Homeland Security 

Committee to conduct a follow-on review of passenger rail security, which 

we expect to initiate in the near future. In addition, we have been 

requested to assess the security of other surface modes of 

transportation—including freight rail, commercial vehicles and highway 

infrastructure—which we have underway or will initiate later this year. 

In Summary: 

• The DHS Office of Grants and Training has developed and conducted 

risk assessments of passenger rail systems to identify and protect rail 

assets that are vulnerable to attack, such as stations and bridges. TSA 

has also begun to conduct risk assessments, including a threat 

assessment of mass transit and passenger rail and assessments of 

individual critical rail assets. While TSA has begun to establish a 

methodology for determining how to analyze and characterize the risks 

identified, the agency has not completed a comprehensive risk 

assessment of the U.S. passenger rail system. Until TSA completes this 

effort, the agency may be limited in its ability to prioritize passenger 

rail assets and help guide security investment decisions about 

protecting them. At the department level, DHS has begun developing,

but has not yet completed a framework to help federal agencies and the 

private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and 

comparing risks to transportation and other critical sectors. Until this 

framework is finalized and shared with stakeholders, it may not be 

possible to compare risks across different sectors, prioritize them, and 

allocate resources accordingly. 

• Before and after September 11, 2001, FTA and FRA undertook a 

number of initiatives to enhance passenger rail security, including 

conducting security readiness assessments, providing grants for 

emergency response drills and training, and developing security 

awareness programs for rail passengers and employees. In March 2004, 

after terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid, TSA issued security 

directives for passenger rail and mass transit. These directives were 

intended to establish standard protective measures for all passenger 

rail operators, including Amtrak. However, federal and rail industry 

stakeholders have questioned the extent that these directives were 

based on industry best practices and expressed confusion about how 

TSA would monitor compliance with the directives. In the 15 months 

since the completion of our work on passenger rail security, TSA has 

reported taking additional actions strengthen the security of the 

passenger rail system. For example, TSA has tested rail security

technologies, developed training tools for rail workers, and issued a 

Page 3 GAO-07-225T 
proposed rule in December 2006 regarding passenger and freight rail 

security, among other efforts. TSA has also taken steps to better 

coordinate with DOT regarding rail security roles and responsibilities. 

The memorandum of understanding between DHS and DOT has been 

recently updated to include specific agreements between TSA and FTA 

and FRA to delineate security-related roles and responsibilities, among 

other things, for passenger rail and mass transit. 

• Domestic and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted during our 

prior work on passenger rail security had taken a range of actions to 

secure their systems. Most had implemented customer awareness 

programs to encourage passengers to remain vigilant and report 

suspicious activities, increased the number and visibility of security 

personnel, increased the use of canine teams to detect explosives, 

enhanced employee training programs, upgraded security technology, 

tightened access controls, and made rail system design improvements 

to enhance security. We also observed security practices among certain

foreign passenger rail systems or their governments that are not 

currently used by the domestic rail operators we contacted, or by the 

U.S. government, which could be considered for use in the U.S. For 

example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen passengers or 

utilize covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats, 

and some foreign governments maintain centralized clearinghouses on 

rail security technologies and best practices. While introducing any of

these security practices into the U.S. rail system may pose political, 

legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, they nevertheless warrant further 

examination. Since our report on passenger rail security was issued, 

TSA has reported taking steps to coordinate with foreign passenger rail 

operators and governments to identify security best practices.

In our September 2005 report on passenger rail security, we 

recommended, among other things, that TSA establish a plan with 

timelines for completing its methodology for conducting risk assessments 

and develop security standards that reflect industry best practices and can 

be measured and enforced. These actions should help ensure that the 

federal government has the information it needs to prioritize passenger rail 

assets based on risk, and evaluate, select, and implement measures to help 

the passenger rail operators protect their systems against terrorism. In 

addition, we recommended that the Secretary of DHS, in collaboration 

with DOT and the passenger rail industry, determine the feasibility, in a 

risk management context, of implementing certain security practices used

by foreign rail operators. DHS, DOT, and Amtrak generally agreed with the

report’s recommendations. As of January 2007, DHS had not provided a 

Page 4 GAO-07-225T 
formal response indicating if or how it has implemented these 

recommendations. 

Each weekday, 11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan areas and 

22 states use some form of rail transit (commuter, heavy, or light rail).2

Commuter rail systems typically operate on railroad tracks and provide 

regional service between a central city and adjacent suburbs. Commuter 

rail systems are traditionally associated with older industrial cities, such 

as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago. Heavy rail systems—

subway systems like New York City’s transit system and Washington, 

D.C.’s Metro—typically operate on fixed rail lines within a metropolitan 

area and have the capacity for a heavy volume of traffic. Amtrak operates 

the nation’s primary intercity passenger rail service over a 22,000-mile 

network, primarily over freight railroad tracks. Amtrak serves more than 

500 stations (240 of which are staffed) in 46 states and the District of 

Columbia, and it carried more than 25 million passengers during FY 2005. 

Background 

Overview of the Passenger 

Rail System 

Passenger Rail Systems 

Are Inherently Vulnerable

to Terrorist Attacks 

According to passenger rail officials and passenger rail experts, certain 

characteristics of domestic and foreign passenger rail systems make them 

inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks and therefore difficult to secure. 

By design, passenger rail systems are open, have multiple access points, 

are hubs serving multiple carriers, and, in some cases, have no barriers so 

that they can move large numbers of people quickly. In contrast, the U.S.

commercial aviation system is housed in closed and controlled locations 

with few entry points. The openness of passenger rail systems can leave

them vulnerable because operator personnel cannot completely monitor 

or control who enters or leaves the systems. In addition, other

characteristics of some passenger rail systems—high ridership, expensive 

infrastructure, economic importance, and location (large metropolitan 

areas or tourist destinations)—also make them attractive targets for 

terrorists because of the potential for mass casualties and economic 

damage and disruption. Moreover, some of these same characteristics 

 2

The American Public Transportation Association compiled this fiscal year 2003 ridership 

data from FTA’s National Transit Database. These are the most current data available. Rail

transit systems in the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are included in these statistics. 

Page 5 GAO-07-225T 
make passenger rail systems difficult to secure. For example, the numbers 

of riders that pass through a subway system—especially during peak

hours—may make the sustained use of some security measures, such as 

metal detectors, difficult because they could result in long lines that could 

disrupt scheduled service. In addition, multiple access points along 

extended routes could make the cost of securing each location prohibitive. 

Balancing the potential economic impacts of security enhancements with

the benefits of such measures is a difficult challenge. 

Multiple Stakeholders 

Share Responsibility for 

Securing Passenger Rail 

Systems 

Securing the nation’s passenger rail systems is a shared responsibility 

requiring coordinated action on the part of federal, state, and local 

governments; the private sector; and rail passengers who ride these 

systems. Since the September 11th attacks, the role of federal government 

agencies in securing the nation’s transportation systems, including 

passenger rail, have continued to evolve. Prior to September 11th, FTA 

and FRA, within DOT, were the primary federal entities involved in 

passenger rail security matters. In response to the attacks of September 

11th, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 

(ATSA), which created TSA within DOT and defined its primary 

responsibility as ensuring the security of all modes of transportation, 

though its provisions focus primarily on aviation security.3

 The act also 

gave TSA regulatory authority for security over all transportation modes, 

though its provisions focus primarily aviation security. With the passage of

the Homeland Security Act of 2002, TSA was transferred, along with over

20 other agencies, to the Department of Homeland Security.4

Within DHS, the Office of Grants and Training (OGT), formerly the Office 

for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), has become the federal source for 

security funding of passenger rail systems. 5 OGT is the principal 

 3

Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

4

Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 

5

OGT originated within the Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs in 1998 as 

the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP). Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 

2002, ODP was transferred to DHS in March 2003. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 403(5), 

116 Stat. at 2178 (codified at 6 U.S.C. 203(5)). In March 2004, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security consolidated ODP with the Office of State and Local Government Coordination to 

form the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP).

SLGCP, which reports directly to the DHS Secretary, was created to provide a “one-stop

shop” for the numerous federal preparedness initiatives applicable to state and local 

governments. Recently, SLGCP was incorporated under the Preparedness Directorate 

as OGT. 

Page 6 GAO-07-225T 
component of DHS responsible for preparing the United States for acts of 

terrorism and has primary responsibility within the executive branch for 

assisting and supporting DHS, in coordination with other directorates and

entities outside of the department, in conducting risk analysis and risk 

management activities of state and local governments. In carrying out its 

mission, OGT provides training, funds for the purchase of equipment, 

support for the planning and execution of exercises, technical assistance, 

and other support to assist states, local jurisdictions, and the private 

sector to prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism. OGT 

created and is administering two grant programs focused specifically on 

transportation security, the Transit Security Grant Program and the 

Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program. These programs provide 

financial assistance to address security preparedness and enhancements 

for passenger rail and transit systems. During fiscal year 2006, OGT 

provided $110 million to passenger rail transit agencies through the 

Transit Security Grant Program and about $7 million to Amtrak through 

the Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program. 

While TSA is the lead federal agency for ensuring the security of all 

transportation modes, FTA conducts safety and security activities, 

including training, research, technical assistance, and demonstration 

projects. In addition, FTA promotes safety and security through its grantmaking authority. FRA has regulatory authority for rail safety over 

commuter rail operators and Amtrak, and employs over 400 rail inspectors 

that periodically monitor the implementation of safety and security plans 

at these systems.6

State and local governments, passenger rail operators, and private industry 

are also important stakeholders in the nation’s rail security efforts. State 

and local governments may own or operate a significant portion of the 

passenger rail system. Passenger rail operators, which can be public or 

private entities, are responsible for administering and managing passenger

rail activities and services. Passenger rail operators can directly operate 

the service provided or contract for all or part of the total service. 

Although all levels of government are involved in passenger rail security, 

the primary responsibility for securing passenger rail systems rests with 

passenger rail operators. 

 6

FRA administers and enforces federal laws and regulations that are designed to promote

safety on railroads, such as track maintenance, inspection standards, equipment standards, 

and operating practices. FRA exercises jurisdiction over all areas of railroad safety 

pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 20103.

Page 7 GAO-07-225T 
Risk management is a tool for informing policy makers’ decisions about 

assessing risks, allocating resources, and taking actions under conditions 

of uncertainty. In recent years, the President, through Homeland Security 

Presidential Directives (HSPDs), and Congress, through the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, provided for federal 

agencies with homeland security responsibilities to apply risk-based 

principles to inform their decision making regarding allocating limited 

resources and prioritizing security activities. The 9/11 Commission 

recommended that the U.S. government should identify and evaluate the 

transportation assets that need to be protected, set risk-based priorities 

for defending them, select the most practical and cost-effective ways of 

doing so, and then develop a plan, budget, and funding to implement the 

effort.7

 In addition, DHS issued the National Strategy for Transportation 

Security in 2005 that describes the policies the DHS will apply when 

managing risks to the security of the U.S. transportation system.8

 We have 

previously reported that a risk management approach can help to 

prioritize and focus the programs designed to combat terrorism. Risk 

management, as applied in the homeland security context, can help federal 

decision-makers determine where and how to invest limited resources 

within and among the various modes of transportation. 

Assessing and Managing 

Risks to Rail Infrastructure 

Using a Risk Management 

Approach 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also directed the department’s 

Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection to use 

risk management principles in coordinating the nation’s critical 

infrastructure protection efforts.9

 This includes integrating relevant 

information, analysis, and vulnerability assessments to identify priorities 

 7

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission 

Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 

States (Washington, D.C.: 2004). The 9/11 Commission was an independent, bipartisan 

commission created in late 2002, to prepare a complete account of the circumstances 

surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the 

immediate response to the attacks. The Commission was also mandated to provide 

recommendations designed to guard against future attacks. 

8

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, working jointly with the Secretary of Transportation, to develop,

prepare, implement, and update, as needed a National Strategy for Transportation Security 

and transportation modal security plans. Pub. L. No. 108-458, §4001, 118 Stat. 3638, 3710-12

(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 114(t)). 

9

In 2006, DHS reorganized their Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

division. The functions of the Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure 

Protection were moved to the Office of Intelligence Analysis and Office of Infrastructure

Protection. 

Page 8 GAO-07-225T 
for protective and support measures by the department, other federal 

agencies, state and local government agencies and authorities, the private 

sector, and other entities. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 and 

the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 further 

define and establish critical infrastructure protection responsibilities for 

DHS and those federal agencies given responsibility for particular industry 

sectors, such as transportation. In June 2006, DHS issued the National 

Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), which named TSA as the primary 

federal agency responsible for coordinating critical infrastructure 

protection efforts within the transportation sector.10 The NIPP requires 

federal agencies to work with the private sector to develop plans that, 

among other things, identify and prioritize critical assets for their 

respective sectors. As such, the NIPP requires TSA to conduct and 

facilitate risk assessments in order to identify, prioritize, and coordinate 

the protection of critical transportation systems infrastructure, as well as 

develop risk based priorities for the transportation sector. 

To provide guidance to agency decision makers, we have created a risk 

management framework, which is intended to be a starting point for 

applying risk based principles. Our risk management framework entails a 

continuous process of managing risk through a series of actions, including 

setting strategic goals and objectives, assessing risk, evaluating 

alternatives, selecting initiatives to undertake, and implementing and 

monitoring those initiatives. DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan 

describes a risk management process that closely mirrors our risk 

management framework. 

Setting strategic goals, objectives, and constraints is a key first step in 

applying risk management principles and helps to ensure that management 

decisions are focused on achieving a purpose. These decisions should take 

place in the context of an agency’s strategic plan that includes goals and 

objectives that are clear and concise. These goals and objectives should 

identify resource issues and external factors to achieving the goals. 

Further, the goals and objectives of an agency should link to a 

department’s overall strategic plan. The ability to achieve strategic goals 

depends, in part, on how well an agency manages risk. The agency’s 

 10HSPD-7 directed the Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security to 

collaborate on all matters relating to transportation security and transportation 

infrastructure protection. In 2003, DHS designated TSA as the lead agency for addressing 

HSPD-7 as it relates to securing the nation’s transportation sector. 

Page 9 GAO-07-225T 
strategic plan should address risk related issues that are central to the 

agency’s overall mission. 

Risk assessment, an important element of a risk based approach, helps

decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that 

countermeasures can be designed and implemented to prevent or mitigate 

the effects of the risks. Risk assessment is a qualitative and/or quantitative

determination of the likelihood of an adverse event occurring and the 

severity, or impact, of its consequences. Risk assessment in a homeland 

security application often involves assessing three key elements—threat, 

vulnerability, and criticality or consequence. A threat assessment identifies 

and evaluates potential threats on the basis of factors such as capabilities, 

intentions, and past activities. A vulnerability assessment identifies 

weaknesses that may be exploited by identified threats and suggests 

options to address those weaknesses. A criticality or consequence 

assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets and functions in terms of 

specific criteria, such as their importance to public safety and the 

economy, as a basis for identifying which structures or processes are 

relatively more important to protect from attack. Information from these 

three assessments contributes to an overall risk assessment that 

characterizes risks on a scale such as high, medium, or low and provides 

input for evaluating alternatives and management prioritization of security

initiatives. The risk assessment element in the overall risk management 

cycle may be the largest change from standard management steps and can

be important to informing the remaining steps of the cycle. 

DHS component agencies have taken a variety of steps to assess the risk 

posed by terrorism to U.S. passenger rail systems. The DHS OGT 

developed and implemented a risk assessment methodology intended to 

help passenger rail operators better respond to terrorist attacks and 

prioritize security measures. Passenger rail operators must have 

completed a risk assessment to be eligible for financial assistance through 

the fiscal year 2007 OGT Transit Security Grant Program, which includes

funding for passenger rail. To receive grant funding, rail operators are also 

required to have a security and emergency preparedness plan that 

identifies how the operator intends to respond to security gaps identified 

by risk assessments. As of January 2007, OGT had completed or planned to

conduct risk assessments of most passenger rail operators. According to 

rail operators, OGT’s risk assessment process enabled them to prioritize 

investments based on risk and are allowing them to target and allocate 

resources toward security measures that will have the greatest impact on 

reducing risk across their system. 

DHS Has Taken Steps 

to Assess Risk to 

Passenger Rail 

Systems, but 

Additional Work Is 

Needed to Guide 

Security Investments 

Page 10 GAO-07-225T 
TSA has also begun to assess risks to the passenger rail system. TSA had 

completed an overall threat assessment for both mass transit and 

passenger and freight rail modes. TSA also conducted criticality 

assessments of nearly 700 passenger rail stations and had begun 

conducting assessments for other passenger rail assets such as bridges 

and tunnels. TSA plans to rely on asset criticality rankings to prioritize 

which assets it will focus on in conducting vulnerability assessments to 

determine which passenger rail assets are vulnerable to attack. For assets 

that are deemed to be less critical, TSA has developed a software tool that 

it has made available to passenger rail and other transportation operators

for them to use on a voluntary basis to assess the vulnerability of their 

assets. Until all three assessments of passenger rail systems—threat, 

criticality, and vulnerability—have been completed, and until TSA 

determines how to use the results of these assessments to analyze and 

characterize the level of risk (high, medium, or low), it will be difficult to 

prioritize passenger rail assets and guide investment decisions about 

protecting them. Finalizing a methodology for assessing risk to passenger 

rail and other transportation assets and conducting risk assessments are 

also key steps used in producing the Transportation Sector Specific Plan 

(TSSP) required by HSPD-7.11 According to TSA, the TSSP and supporting 

plans for each mode of transportation have been completed and are 

currently being reviewed by DHS and the White House Homeland Security 

Council. As of January 2007, TSA had not completed a comprehensive risk 

assessment of the passenger rail system. 

As TSA, OGT, and other federal agencies, including DOT, move forward 

with risk assessment activities, DHS is developing a framework intended 

to help these agencies work with their stakeholders to assess risk. This 

framework is intended to help the private sector and state and local 

governments develop a consistent approach to analyzing risk and 

vulnerability across infrastructure types and across entire economic 

sectors, develop consistent terminology, and foster consistent results. The 

framework is also intended to enable a federal-level assessment of risk in 

general, and comparisons among risks, for purposes of resource allocation 

and response planning. DHS has informed TSA that this framework will 

 11HSPD-7 defines critical infrastructure protection responsibilities for DHS, sector-specific 

agencies (those federal agencies given responsibility for transportation, energy, 

telecommunications, and so forth), and other departments and agencies. The Directive 

instructs federal departments and agencies to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the

protection of critical infrastructure to prevent, deter, and mitigate the effects of terrorist 

attacks. 

Page 11 GAO-07-225T 
provide overarching guidance to sector-specific agencies on how various 

risk assessment methodologies may be used to analyze, normalize, and 

prioritize risk within and among sectors. Because neither this element nor 

the framework as a whole has been finalized or provided to TSA or other 

sector-specific agencies, it is not clear what impact, if any, DHS’s 

framework may have on ongoing risk assessments conducted by, and the 

methodologies used by, TSA, OGT, and others, and whether or how DHS

will be able to use these results to compare risks and prioritize homeland 

security investments among sectors. Until DHS finalizes this framework, 

and until TSA completes its risk assessment methodology, it will not be 

possible to determine whether different methodologies used by TSA and 

OGT for conducting threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments 

generate disparate qualitative and quantitative results or how they can best 

be compared and analyzed. In addition, coordinated risk assessments will 

help TSA and others avoid duplicative efforts and determine whether 

other agencies’ risk assessment methodologies, and the data generated by

these methodologies, can be leveraged to complete assessments required 

for the transportation sector. 

In addition to the ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail security 

conducted by the FTA and FRA before and after September 11, 2001, TSA

issued security directives to passenger rail operators after the March 2004 

terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid. However, federal and rail 

industry stakeholders have questioned the extent that these directives 

were based on industry best practices and expressed confusion about how 

TSA would monitor compliance with the directives. Since the completion 

of our work on passenger rail security, TSA has reported taking additional 

actions to strengthen the security of the passenger rail system. For 

example, TSA has tested rail security technologies, developed training 

tools for rail workers, and issued a proposed rule in December 2006 

regarding passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. TSA has 

also taken steps to better coordinate with DOT regarding rail security 

roles and responsibilities. The memorandum of understanding between 

DHS and DOT had been recently updated to include specific agreements 

between TSA and FTA and FRA to delineate security-related roles and 

responsibilities, among other things, for passenger rail and mass transit. 

Multiple Federal 

Agencies Have Taken 

Actions to Enhance 

Passenger Rail 

Security 

DOT Agencies Led Initial 

Efforts to Enhance 

Passenger Rail Security 

Prior to the creation of TSA in November 2001, FTA and FRA, within DOT, 

were primarily responsible for the security of passenger rail systems. 

These agencies undertook a number of initiatives to enhance the security 

of passenger rail systems after the September 11th attacks that are still in 

Page 12 GAO-07-225T 
place today. Specifically, FTA launched a transit security initiative in 2002

that included security readiness assessments, technical assistance, grants 

for emergency response drills, and training. FTA instituted the Transit 

Watch campaign in 2003—a nationwide safety and security awareness 

program designed to encourage the participation of transit passengers and 

employees in maintaining a safe transit environment. The program 

provides information and instructions to transit passengers and employees 

so that they know what to do and whom to contact in the event of an 

emergency in a transit setting. FTA planned to continue this initiative, in

partnership with TSA and OGT, and offer additional security awareness 

materials that address unattended bags and emergency evacuation 

procedures for transit agencies. In addition, FTA has issued guidance,

such as its Top 20 Security Program Action Items for Transit Agencies, 

which recommends measures for passenger rail operators to implement 

into their security programs to improve both security and emergency

preparedness. FTA has also used research and development funds to 

develop guidance for security design strategies to reduce the vulnerability 

of transit systems to acts of terrorism. In November 2004, FTA provided 

rail operators with security considerations for transportation 

infrastructure. This guidance provides recommendations intended to help

operators deter and minimize attacks against their facilities, riders, and 

employees by incorporating security features into the design of rail 

infrastructure. 

FRA has also taken a number of actions to enhance passenger rail security 

since September 11, 2001. For example, it has assisted commuter railroads 

in developing security plans, reviewed Amtrak’s security plans, and helped

fund FTA security readiness assessments for commuter railroads. In the 

wake of the Madrid terrorist bombings in March 2004, nearly 200 FRA 

inspectors, in cooperation with DHS, conducted inspections of each of the 

18 commuter railroads and Amtrak to determine what additional security 

measures had been put into place to prevent a similar occurrence in the 

United States. FRA also conducted research and development projects 

related to passenger rail security. These projects included rail

infrastructure security and trespasser monitoring systems and passenger 

screening and manifest projects, including explosives detection. Although 

FTA and FRA now play a supporting role in transportation security 

matters since the creation of TSA, they remain important partners in the 

federal government’s efforts to strengthen rail security, given their role in

funding and regulating the safety of passenger rail systems. Moreover, as 

TSA moves ahead with its passenger rail security initiatives, FTA and FRA 

are continuing their passenger rail security efforts. 

Page 13 GAO-07-225T 
In May 2004, TSA issued security directives to the passenger rail industry 

to establish standard security measures for all passenger rail operators, 

including Amtrak.12 However, as we previously reported, it was unclear 

how TSA developed the requirements in the directives, how TSA planned 

to monitor and ensure compliance, how rail operators were to implement 

the measures, and which entities were responsible for their 

implementation. According to TSA, the directives were based upon FTA 

and American Public Transportation Association best practices for rail 

security. Specifically, TSA stated that it consulted a list of the top 

20 actions FTA identified that rail operators can take to strengthen 

security. While some of the directives correlate to information contained 

in the FTA guidance, the source for many of the directives is unclear. 

Amtrak and FRA officials also raised concerns about some of the 

directives. For example, FRA officials stated that current FRA safety 

regulations requiring engineer compartment doors be kept unlocked to 

facilitate emergency escapes13 conflicts with the TSA security directive 

requirement that doors equipped with locking mechanisms be kept locked. 

Other passenger rail operators we spoke to during our review stated that 

TSA did not adequately consult with the rail industry prior to developing

and issuing these directives. 

TSA Issued Rail Security 

Directives, but Faces 

Challenges Related to 

Compliance and 

Enforcement 

With respect to how the directives were to be enforced, rail operators 

were required to allow TSA and DHS to perform inspections, evaluations, 

or tests based on execution of the directives at any time or location. TSA 

officials stated the agency has hired 100 surface transportation inspectors, 

whose stated mission is to, among other duties, monitor and enforce 

compliance with TSA’s rail security directives. However, some passenger 

rail operators have expressed confusion and concern about the role of 

TSA’s inspectors and the potential that TSA inspections could be 

duplicative of other federal and state rail inspections. TSA rail inspector

staff stated that they were committed to avoiding duplication in the 

program and communicating their respective roles to rail agency officials. 

According to TSA, since the initial deployment of surface inspectors, these 

inspectors have developed relationships with security officials in 

passenger rail and transit systems, coordinated access to operations 

centers, participated in emergency exercises, and provided assistance in 

 12TSA issues security related regulations and directives pursuant to its 49 U.S.C. § 114(1)

rulemaking authority. 

13See 49 C.F.R. § 238.235. 

Page 14 GAO-07-225T 
enhancing security. We will continue to assess TSA’s enforcement of rail 

security directives during our follow-on review of passenger rail security.

TSA Has Taken Other 

Actions to Strengthen the 

Security of the Passenger 

Rail System and 

Coordinate Its Efforts with 

Other Federal Agencies 

In January 2007, TSA provide us an update on additional actions they had 

taken to strengthen passenger rail security. We have not verified or 

evaluated these actions. These actions include: 

National explosive canine detection teams: Since late 2005, TSA 

reported that it has trained and deployed 53 canine teams to 13 mass 

transit systems to help detect explosives in the passenger rail system and 

serve as a deterrent to potential terrorists. 

Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Teams: This program is 

intended to provide teams of law enforcement, canines, and inspection 

personnel to mass transit and passenger rail systems to deter and detect 

potential terrorist actions. Since the program’s inception in December 

2005, TSA reported conducting more than 25 exercises at mass transit and 

passenger rail systems throughout the nation. 

Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Security Information Sharing 

Network: According to TSA, the agency initiated this program in August 

2005 to develop information sharing and dissemination processes 

regarding passenger rail and mass transit security across the federal 

government, state and local governments, and rail operators. 

National Transit Resource Center: TSA officials stated that they are 

working with FTA and DHS OGT to develop this center, which will provide 

transit agencies nationwide with pertinent information related to transit 

security, including recent suspicious activities, promising security 

practices, new security technologies, and other information. 

National Security Awareness Training Program for Railroad 

Employees: TSA officials stated that the agency has contracted to 

develop and distribute computer based training for passenger rail, rail 

transit, and freight rail employees. The training will include information on 

identifying security threats, observing and reporting suspicious activities 

and objects, mitigating security incidents, and other related information. 

According to TSA, the training will be distributed to all passenger and 

freight rail systems. 

Transit Terrorist Tool and Tactics: This training course is funded 

through the Transit Security Grant Program and teaches transit employees

Page 15 GAO-07-225T 
how to prevent and respond to a chemical, biological, radiological, 

nuclear, or explosive attack. According to TSA, this course was offered for 

the first time during the fall of 2006. 

National Tunnel Security Initiative: This DHS and DOT initiative aims 

to identify and assess risks to underwater tunnels, prioritize security 

funding to the most critical areas, and develop technologies to better 

secure underwater tunnels. According to TSA, this initiative has identified 

a list of 29 critical underwater rail transit tunnels. 

TSA has also sought to enhance passenger rail security by conducting 

research on technologies related to screening passengers and checked 

baggage in the passenger rail environment. TSA conducted a Transit and 

Rail Inspection Pilot. The pilot was a $1.5 million effort to test the 

feasibility of using existing and emerging technologies to screen 

passengers, carry-on items, checked baggage, cargo, and parcels for 

explosives. TSA officials told us that based upon preliminary analyses, the 

screening technologies and processes tested would be very difficult to 

implement on heavily used passenger rail systems because these systems 

carry high volumes of passengers and have multiple points of entry. 

However, TSA officials added that the screening processes used in the 

pilot may be useful on certain long-distance intercity train routes, which 

make fewer stops. Further, TSA officials stated that screening could be 

used either randomly or for all passengers during certain high-risk events 

or in areas where a particular terrorist threat is known to exist. For 

example, screening technology similar to that used in the pilot was used 

by TSA to screen certain passengers and belongings in Boston and New 

York rail stations during the 2004 Democratic and Republican national 

conventions. According to TSA, the agency is also researching and 

developing other passenger rail security technologies, including closed 

circuit television systems that can detect suspicious behavior, mobile 

passenger screening checkpoints to be used at rail stations, bomb resistant 

trash cans, and explosive detection equipment for use in the rail 

environment. 

More recently, in December 2006, TSA issued a proposed rule regarding 

passenger and freight rail security requirements. TSA’s proposed rule 

would require that passenger and freight rail operators, certain facilities 

that ship or receive hazardous materials by rail, and rail transit systems 

take the following actions: 

Page 16 GAO-07-225T 
• Designate a rail security coordinator to be available to TSA on a 

24 hour, seven day a week basis to serve as the primary contact for the 

receipt of intelligence and other security related information. 

• Immediately report incidents, potential threats, and security concerns 

to TSA. 

• Allow TSA and DHS officials to enter and conduct inspections, test, 

and perform other duties within their rail systems. 

• Provide TSA, upon request, with the location and shipping information 

of rail cars that contain a specific category and quantity of hazardous 

materials within one hour of receiving the request from TSA. 

• Provide for a secure chain of custody and control of rail cars 

containing a specified quantity and type of hazardous material. 

Public comments on the proposed rule are due in February 2007. TSA 

plans to review these comments and issue a final rule in the future. 

With multiple DHS and DOT stakeholders involved in securing the U.S. 

passenger rail system, the need to improve coordination between the two 

agencies has been a consistent theme in our prior work in this area. In 

response to a previous recommendation we made,14 DHS and DOT signed a 

memorandum of understanding (MOU) to develop procedures by which 

the two departments could improve their cooperation and coordination for 

promoting the safe, secure, and efficient movement of people and goods 

throughout the transportation system. The MOU defines broad areas of 

responsibility for each department. For example, it states that DHS, in 

consultation with DOT and affected stakeholders, will identify, prioritize, 

and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure. The MOU between 

DHS and DOT represents an overall framework for cooperation that is to 

be supplemented by additional signed agreements, or annexes, between 

the departments. These annexes are to delineate the specific security 

related roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments for mass 

transit, rail, research and development, and other matters. TSA signed 

annexes to the MOU with FRA and FTA describing the roles and 

responsibilities of each agency regarding passenger rail security. These 

annexes also describe how TSA and these DOT agencies will coordinate 

security related efforts, avoid duplicating these efforts, and improve 

coordination and communication with industry stakeholders.

 14Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges,

GAO-03-843 (Washington, D.C.: June 2003).

Page 17 GAO-07-225T 
U.S. passenger rail operators have taken numerous actions to secure their

rail systems since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United

States, and the March 11, 2004, attacks in Madrid. These actions included 

both improvements to system operations and capital enhancements to a 

system’s facilities, such as tracks, buildings, and train cars. All of the U.S. 

passenger rail operators we contacted have implemented some types of 

security measures—such as increased numbers and visibility of security 

personnel and customer awareness programs—that were generally 

consistent with those we observed in select countries in Europe and Asia. 

We also identified three rail security practices—covert testing, random 

screening of passengers and their baggage, and centralized research and 

testing—utilized by foreign operators or their governments that were not 

utilized by domestic rail operators or the U.S. government at the time of 

our review. 

U.S. and Foreign Rail 

Operators Have Taken 

Similar Actions to 

Secure Rail Systems, 

and Opportunities for 

Additional Domestic 

Security Actions May 

Exist 

U.S. and Foreign Rail 

Operators Employ Similar 

Security Practices

Both U.S. and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have 

implemented similar improvements to enhance the security of their 

systems. A summary of these efforts follows. 

Customer awareness: Customer awareness programs we observed used

signage and announcements to encourage riders to alert train staff if they 

observed suspicious packages, persons, or behavior. Of the 32 domestic 

rail operators we interviewed, 30 had implemented a customer awareness 

program or made enhancements to an existing program. Foreign rail 

operators we visited also attempted to enhance customer awareness. For 

example, 11 of the 13 operators we interviewed had implemented a 

customer awareness program. 

Increased number and visibility of security personnel: Of the 32 U.S. 

rail operators we interviewed, 23 had increased the number of security 

personnel they utilized since September 11th, to provide security 

throughout their system or had taken steps to increase the visibility of 

their security personnel. Several U.S. and foreign rail operators we spoke 

with had instituted policies such as requiring their security staff, in 

brightly colored vests, to patrol trains or stations more frequently, so they 

are more visible to customers and potential terrorists or criminals. These 

policies make it easier for customers to contact security personnel in the 

event of an emergency, or if they have spotted a suspicious item or person. 

At foreign sites we visited, 10 of the 13 operators had increased the 

number of their security officers throughout their systems in recent years 

because of the perceived increase in risk of a terrorist attack. 

Page 18 GAO-07-225T 
Increased use of canine teams: Of the 32 U.S. passenger rail operators 

we contacted, 21 were suing canines to patrol their facilities or trains. 

Often, these units are used to detect the presence of explosives, and may 

be called in when a suspicious package is detected. In foreign countries 

we visited, passenger rail operators’ use of canines varied. In some Asian 

countries, canines were not culturally accepted by the public and thus 

were not used for rail security purposes. As in the United States, and in 

contrast to Asia, most European passenger rail operators used canines for 

explosive detection or as deterrents. 

Employee training: All of the domestic and foreign rail operators we 

interviewed had provided some type of security training to their staff, 

either through in-house personnel or an external provider. In many cases, 

this training consisted of ways to identify suspicious items and persons 

and how to respond to events once they occur. For example, the London 

Underground and the British Transport Police developed the “HOT” 

method for its employees to use to identify suspicious items in the rail 

system. In the HOT method, employees are trained to look for packages or

items that are Hidden, Obviously suspicious, and not Typical of the 

environment. 

Passenger and baggage screening practices: Some domestic and 

foreign rail operators have trained employees to recognize suspicious 

behavior as a means of screening passengers. Eight U.S. passenger rail 

operators we contacted were utilizing some form of behavioral screening. 

Abroad, we found that 4 of 13 operators we interviewed had implemented 

forms of behavioral screening. All of the domestic and foreign rail 

operators we contacted have ruled out an airport-style screening system 

for daily use in heavy traffic, where each passenger and the passenger’s 

baggage are screened by a magnetometer or X-ray machine, based on cost, 

staffing, and customer convenience factors, among other reasons. 

Upgrading technology: Many rail operators we interviewed had 

embarked on programs designed to upgrade their existing security 

technology. For example, we found that 29 of the 32 U.S. operators had 

implemented a form of closed circuit television (CCTV) to monitor their 

stations, yards, or trains. While these cameras cannot be monitored closely 

at all times, because of the large number of staff that would be required, 

many rail operators felt that the cameras acted as a deterrent, assisted 

security personnel in determining how to respond to incidents that had 

already occurred, and could be monitored if an operator had received 

information that an incident may occur at a certain time or place in their 

system. Abroad, all 13 of the foreign rail operators we visited had CCTV 

Page 19 GAO-07-225T 
systems in place. In addition, 18 of the 32 U.S. rail operators we 

interviewed had installed new emergency phones or enhanced the 

visibility of the intercom systems they already had. As in the United States, 

a few foreign operators had implemented chemical or biological detection 

devices at these rail stations, but their use was not widespread. Two of the 

13 foreign operators we interviewed had implemented these sensors, and 

both were doing so on an experimental basis. In addition, police officers 

from the British Transport Police—responsible for policing the rail system 

in the United Kingdom—were equipped with pagers to detect chemical, 

biological, or radiological elements in the air, allowing them to respond 

quickly in case of a terrorist attack using one of these methods. 

Access control: Tightening access control procedures at key facilities or 

rights-of-way is another way many rail operators have attempted to 

enhance security. A majority of domestic and selected foreign passenger 

rail operators had invested in enhanced systems to control unauthorized 

access at employee facilities and stations. Specifically, 23 of the 32 U.S.

operators had installed a form of access control at key facilities and 

stations. All 13 foreign operators had implemented some form of access 

control to their critical facilities or rights-of-way. 

Rail system design and configuration: In an effort to reduce 

vulnerabilities to terrorist attack and increase security, passenger rail 

operators in the United States and abroad have been, or are now beginning

to, incorporate security features into the design of new and existing rail 

infrastructure, primarily rail stations. For example, of the 32 domestic rail 

operators we contacted, 22 of them had removed their conventional trash 

bins entirely, or replaced them with transparent or bomb-resistant trash 

bins, as TSA instructed in its May 2004 security directives. Foreign rail 

operators had also taken steps to remove traditional trash bins from their 

systems. Of the 13 operators we visited, 8 had either removed their trash 

bins entirely or replaced them with blast-resistant cans or transparent 

receptacles.

Many foreign rail operators are also incorporating aspects of security into

the design of their rail infrastructure. Of the 13 operators we visited, 

11 had attempted to design new facilities with security in mind and had 

retrofitted older facilities to incorporate security-related modifications. 

For example, one foreign operator we visited was retrofitting its train cars 

with windows that passengers could open in the event of a chemical 

attack. In addition, the London Underground incorporates security into the 

design of all its new stations as well as when existing stations are 

modified. We observed several security features in the design of 

Page 20 GAO-07-225T 
Underground stations, such as using vending machines that have no holes 

that someone could use to hide a bomb, and sloped tops to reduce the 

likelihood that a bomb can be placed on top of the machine. In addition, 

stations are designed to provide staff with clear lines of sight to all areas of 

the station, such as underneath benches or ticket machines, and station 

designers try to eliminate or restrict access to any recessed areas where a 

bomb could be hidden. 

Figure 1 shows a diagram of several security measures that we observed in

passenger rail stations both in the United States and abroad.

Page 21 GAO-07-225T 
Figure 1: Composite of Selected Security Practices in the Passenger Rail Environment 

TICKETS

FARECARDS

K-9 patrol unit(s)

Station entrance

Enter

Exit

Enter

Exit

Tracks

Elevators

Bench Bench

Law enforcement

Station official(s)

Chemical/bio sensors

Alert signs

CCTV(s): Pantilt zoom,

digital, and monitored

Security resources currently used

Proposed security resources

Source: GAO and NOVA Development Corporation.

Operator

Report unattended 

items or suspicious 

activities immediately!

Public awareness

 announcements 

Track monitoring

Station design: ticket

machines, benches, etc.

designed to prevent

items being hidden

Sloped top Sloped top

Camera

Bomb-resistant

trash cans

Subway train

Page 22 GAO-07-225T 
In our past work, we found that Amtrak faces security challenges unique 

to intercity passenger rail systems. First, Amtrak operates over thousands 

of miles, often far from large population centers. This makes its route 

system more difficult to patrol and monitor than one contained in a 

particular metropolitan region, and it causes delays in responding to 

incidents when they occur in remote areas. Also, outside the Northeast 

Corridor, Amtrak operates almost exclusively on tracks and in stations 

owned by freight rail companies. This means that Amtrak often cannot

make security improvements to others’ rights-of-way or station facilities 

and that it is reliant on the staff of other organizations to patrol their 

facilities and respond to incidents that may occur. Furthermore, with over 

500 stations, only half of which are staffed, screening even a small portion 

of the passengers and baggage boarding Amtrak trains is difficult. Finally,

Amtrak’s financial condition has never been strong—Amtrak has been on

the edge of bankruptcy several times. 

Amid the ongoing challenges of securing its coast-to-coast railway, Amtrak

has taken some actions to enhance security throughout its intercity 

passenger rail system. For example, Amtrak initiated a passenger 

awareness campaign, began enforcing restrictions on carry-on luggage that 

limit passengers to two carry-on bags, not exceeding 50 pounds; began 

requiring passengers to show identification after boarding trains; 

increased the number of canine units patrolling its system looking for 

explosives or narcotics; and assigned some of its police to ride trains in 

the Northeast Corridor. Also, Amtrak instituted a policy of randomly 

inspecting checked baggage on its trains. Lastly, Amtrak is making 

improvements to the emergency exits in certain tunnels to make 

evacuating trains in the tunnels easier in the event of a crash or terrorist 

attack. 

Amtrak Faces Challenges 

Specific to Intercity 

Passenger Rail in Securing 

Its System 

Three Foreign Rail 

Security Practices Are Not 

Currently Used in the 

United States 

While many of the security practices we observed in foreign rail systems 

are similar to those U.S. passenger rail operators are implementing, we 

identified three foreign practices that were not currently in use among the

U.S. passenger rail operators we contacted as of September 2005, nor were

they performed by the U.S. government. These practices are as follows. 

Covert testing: Two of the 13 foreign rail systems we visited utilized 

covert testing to keep employees alert about their security responsibilities. 

Covert testing involves security staff staging unannounced events to test 

the response of railroad staff to incidents such as suspicious packages or 

setting off alarms. In one European system, this covert testing involves 

security staff placing suspicious items throughout their system to see how 

Page 23 GAO-07-225T 
long it takes operating staff to respond to the item. Similarly, one Asian 

rail operator’s security staff will break security seals on fire extinguishers 

and open alarmed emergency doors randomly to see how long it takes 

staff to respond. TSA conducts covert testing of passenger and baggage 

screening in aviation, but has not conducted such testing in the rail 

environment. 

Random screening: Of the 13 foreign operators we interviewed, 2 have 

some form of random screening of passengers and their baggage in place.

Prior to the July 2005 London bombings, no passenger rail operators in the 

United States were practicing random passengers or baggage screening. 

However, during the Democratic National Convention in 2004, the 

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) instituted a system 

of random screening of passengers. 

National government clearinghouse on technologies and best 

practices: According to passenger rail operators in five countries we 

visited, their national governments had centralized the process for 

performing research and development of passenger rail security 

technologies and maintained a clearinghouse of technologies and security 

best practices for passenger rail operators. No U.S. federal agency has 

compiled or disseminated information on research and development and 

other best practices for U.S. rail operators. 

Implementing covert testing, random screening, or a governmentsponsored clearinghouse for technologies and best practices in the U.S. 

could pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges because of the 

differences between the U.S. and these foreign nations. Many foreign 

nations have dealt with terrorist attacks on their public transportation 

systems for decades, compared with the United States, where rail has not 

been specifically targeted by terrorists. According to foreign rail operators, 

these experiences have resulted in greater acceptance of certain security 

practices, such as random searches, which the U.S. public may view as a 

violation of their civil liberties or which may discourage them from using 

public transportation. The impact of security measures on passengers is an 

important consideration for domestic rail operators, since most 

passengers could choose another means of transportation, such as a 

personal automobile. As such, security measures that limit accessibility, 

cause delays, increase fares, or otherwise cause inconvenience could push

people away from rail and into their cars. In contrast, the citizens of the 

European and Asian countries we visited are more dependent on public 

transportation than most U.S. residents and therefore may be more willing 

to accept intrusive security measures. Nevertheless, in order to identify 

Page 24 GAO-07-225T 
innovative security measures that could help further mitigate terrorismrisks to rail assets—especially as part of a broader risk management 

approach discussed earlier—it is important to consider the feasibility and 

costs and benefits of implementing the three rail security practices we 

identified in foreign countries. Officials from DHS, DOT, passenger rail 

industry associations, and rail systems we interviewed told us that 

operators would benefit from such an evaluation. Since our report on 

passenger rail security was issued, TSA has reported taking steps to 

coordinate with foreign passenger rail operators and governments to 

identify security best practices. For example, TSA reported working with 

British rail security officials to identify best practices for detecting and

handling suspicious packages in rail systems. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the July 2005 London rail bombings made 

clear that even when a variety of security precautions are put into place, 

passenger rail systems that move high volumes of passengers daily remain 

vulnerable to attack. DHS components have taken steps to assess the risks 

to the passenger rail system. However, enhanced federal leadership is 

needed to help ensure that actions and investments designed to enhance 

security are properly focused and prioritized so that finite resources may 

be allocated appropriately to help protect all modes of transportation. 

Specifically, both DHS and TSA should take additional steps to help 

ensure that the risk management efforts under way clearly and effectively 

identify priority areas for security-related investments in rail and other 

transportation modes. TSA has not yet completed its methodology for 

determining how the results of threat, criticality, and vulnerability 

assessments will be used to identify and prioritize risks to passenger rail 

and other transportation sectors. Until the overall risk to the entire 

transportation sector is identified, TSA will not be able to determine 

where and how to target limited resources to achieve the greatest security 

gains. Once risk assessments for the passenger rail industry have been 

completed, it will be critical to be able to compare assessment results 

across all transportation modes and make informed, risk-based investment 

trade-offs. It is important that DHS complete its framework to help ensure 

that risks to all sectors can be analyzed and compared in a consistent way. 

Until this framework is complete, it will be difficult for agencies to 

reconcile information from different sectors to allow for a meaningful 

comparison of risk. 

Conclusions 

Apart from its efforts to identify risks, TSA has taken steps to enhance the 

security of the passenger rail system. The issuance of security directives in 

2004 was a well-intentioned effort, but did not provide the industry with 

Page 25 GAO-07-225T 
security standards based on industry best practices. It is also not clear 

how TSA will enforce these directives. Consequently, neither the federal

government nor rail operators can be sure they are requiring and 

implementing security practices proven to help prevent or mitigate 

disasters. While foreign passenger rail operators face similar challenges to

securing their systems and have generally implemented similar security 

practices as U.S. rail operators, there are some practices that are utilized 

abroad that U.S. rail operators or the federal government have not studied 

in terms of the feasibility, costs, and benefits. In our September 2005 

report on passenger rail security, we recommended, among other things, 

that TSA establish a plan with timelines for completing its methodology 

for conducting risk assessments and develop security standards that 

reflect industry best practices and can be measured and enforced. These 

actions should help ensure that the federal government has the 

information it needs to prioritize passenger rail assets based on risk, and 

evaluate, select, and implement measures to help the passenger rail 

operators protect their systems against terrorism. In addition, we 

recommended that the Secretary of DHS, in collaboration with DOT and 

the passenger rail industry, determine the feasibility, in a risk management 

context, of implementing certain security practices used by foreign rail 

operators. DHS generally agreed with the report’s recommendations, but 

as of January 2007, the agency has not told us what specific actions they 

are taking to implement them. We will continue to assess DHS and DOT’s 

efforts to secure the U.S. passenger rail system during follow-on work to 

be initiated later this year. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have at

this time. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A. 

Berrick at (202) 512- 3404. Individuals making key contributions to this 

testimony include John Hansen, Assistant Director, Chris Currie, and 

Tom Lombardi. 

Contact Information 

Page 26 GAO-07-225T 
Page 27 GAO-07-225T 

Related GAO Products Released Since 

September 11, 2001 

Passenger Rail Security: Evaluating Foreign Security Practices and 

Risk Can Help Guide Security Efforts. GAO-06-557T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 29, 2006. 

Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to 

Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-06-181T, Washington, D.C.: 

October 20, 2005. 

Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to 

Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-05-851. Washington, D.C.: 

September 9 2005. 

Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize 

Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005. 

Rail Security: Some Actions Taken to Enhance Passenger and Freight 

Rail Security, but Significant Challenges Remain. GAO-04-598T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2004. 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security 

Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address 

Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. 

Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail 

Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed. GAO-03-435. Washington, D.C.: 

April 30, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-term 

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Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address 

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