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27–869 PDF 2006

S. HRG. 109–718 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD’S ROLE IN 

BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SPECIAL HEARING 

APRIL 6, 2006—WASHINGTON, DC 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

LARRY CRAIG, Idaho 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

TOM HARKIN, Iowa 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

HARRY REID, Nevada 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

PATTY MURRAY, Washington 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

J. KEITH KENNEDY, Staff Director 

TERRENCE E. SAUVAIN, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire, Chairman 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

LARRY CRAIG, Idaho 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

PATTY MURRAY, Washington 

HARRY REID, Nevada 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

Professional Staff 

REBECCA DAVIES

CAROL CRIBBS

SHANNON O’KEEFE

NANCY PERKINS

MARK VAN DE WATER

CHARLES KIEFFER (Minority) 

CHIP WALGREN (Minority) 

SCOTT NANCE (Minority) 

DRENAN E. DUDLEY (Minority) 

Administrative Support 

CHRISTA CRAWFORD
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Opening Statement of Senator Judd Gregg ........................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement of Senator Thad Cochran ..................................................... 2 

Statement of Vice Admiral Thad Allen, Chief of Staff, United States Coast 

Guard .................................................................................................................... 2 

Managing Challenges in a Post 9/11 Environment ............................................... 3 

Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Thad Allen ................................................. 4 

Statement of Senator Robert C. Byrd .................................................................... 10 

Resources Required to Secure Maritime Avenues ................................................ 11 

Funding Required to Complete Deepwater Acquisition ....................................... 14 

Cargo Inspection at Foreign Ports ......................................................................... 14 

Securing Waterways and Coastlines From Illegal Migration .............................. 15 

Rapidly Declining Condition of Coast Guard Assets ............................................ 15 

Coast Guard’s Role in Northern Command ........................................................... 16 

Updating the Loran Navigational System ............................................................. 18 

Closing the Operational Gap for Patrol Boats ...................................................... 19 

Funding Reductions to Coast Guard’s Traditional Missions ................................ 19 

Vessel and Facility Security Plans ......................................................................... 20 

Facilities Subject to MTSA/ISPS ............................................................................ 20 

Maintenance for New Assets .................................................................................. 21 

Maritime Border Security Between Alaska and Asia ........................................... 21 

Patrolling the Maritime Boundary Line ................................................................ 22 

Additional Committee Questions ............................................................................ 23 

Questions Submitted by Senator Judd Gregg ....................................................... 23 

Access to the US VISIT database ........................................................................... 23 

Intelligence Reports ................................................................................................. 23 

USCG’s Role in Detecting and Responding to WMDs .......................................... 24 

Armed Aircraft ......................................................................................................... 24 

Review of Options Related to Deepwater .............................................................. 24 

Success of Deepwater Program ............................................................................... 25 

Intelligence’s Role in Maritime Security ................................................................ 25 

Bandwidth Challenge .............................................................................................. 25 

Intelligence Resources ............................................................................................. 26 

Dubai Ports World Issue ......................................................................................... 27 

Radiological Materials at Sea ................................................................................. 27 

USCG’s role in WMD Efforts with Other Organizations ..................................... 27 

Acceleration of Program Completion by 10 years ................................................. 28 

Expedited Procurement of Aircraft ........................................................................ 28 

Unique Maritime Security Capabilities ................................................................. 28 

Impact of Tightening Land and Air Security ........................................................ 28 

Evidence of Entrance ............................................................................................... 28 

Known Maritime Terrorist Threats ....................................................................... 29 

Connection Between Migrant and Drug Smugglers and Terrorists .................... 29 

Security of Maritime Borders ................................................................................. 29 

Highest Maritime Risks .......................................................................................... 29 

Closing the Gap: Policy Issue or Funding Issue ................................................... 30 

IC Database Access ................................................................................................. 31 

USCG as the Lead in Maritime Security ............................................................... 31 

Lead in Maritime Intelligence ................................................................................ 31 

Overlap Issues: Interoperability or Redundancy ................................................... 31 

Maritime Borders ..................................................................................................... 32 

Needed Resources for Maritime Borders ............................................................... 32 

USCG’s Role in the Intelligence Community ........................................................ 33 

Improvement of Maritime Border Security ........................................................... 33 

Potential Overlap Between FBI and USCG .......................................................... 33 
Page

IV 

Annual Flight Hour Gap ......................................................................................... 33 

Response Capabilities .............................................................................................. 33 

Maritime Border Security Operations ................................................................... 34 

110 Foot Patrol Boats .............................................................................................. 34 

Port Inspections ....................................................................................................... 34 

Implementation of AIS ............................................................................................ 35 

Maritime Border Security Operations ................................................................... 35 

Deployment of US VISIT ........................................................................................ 36 

Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby ............................................ 37 

Utilization of Fiscal Year 2006 Resources ............................................................. 37 

Utilization of Resources .......................................................................................... 37 

Resource Requirements ........................................................................................... 37 

Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Justification ................................................................... 37 

Deviation From the Fiscal Year 2006 Bill ............................................................. 38 

Timeline for MPA Operations ................................................................................. 38 

Timeline for Outfitting and Operation ................................................................... 38 

Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd ................................................. 39 

Maritime Patrol Aircraft ......................................................................................... 39 

Expediting Full Operating Capability .................................................................... 39 

Potential Inland River Threats ............................................................................... 39 

Maritime Air Patrols ............................................................................................... 39 

Go-Fast boats ........................................................................................................... 40 

Drug Enforcement Mission ..................................................................................... 40 

110 Foot Patrol Boats .............................................................................................. 41 

Port Security Plan Review ...................................................................................... 41 

Design Review of the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) .............................................. 41 

Maritime Domestic Awareness ............................................................................... 42 

UAVs Along the Southern Border .......................................................................... 42 

Installation of Receivers .......................................................................................... 42 

Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran ................................................... 43 

Deepwater Recapitalization Program .................................................................... 43 

Response to Congressional Direction ..................................................................... 44 

Status of HH–65 Helicopters .................................................................................. 45 
(1) 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD’S ROLE IN 

BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY 

THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 2006 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., in room SD–192, Dirksen 

Senate Office Building, Hon. Judd Gregg (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Gregg, Stevens, Allard, Byrd, and Murray. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JUDD GREGG

Senator GREGG. We’ll get started here. Senator Byrd is on his 

way. When he gets here, we’ll yield to him for an opening comment. 

The hearing today involves the Coast Guard. We appreciate Admiral Allen coming by to talk to us about the status of the Coast 

Guard. 

We all admire the work of the Coast Guard. It is an agency 

which has done many wonderful things, extraordinary things in 

our national defense and in the protecting of people at risk on the 

seas; and it probably—was the one agency of the Federal Government—or maybe the Federal, State, and local government—which 

requited itself extraordinarily well during the Katrina events, and, 

as a result, enhanced even further its reputation for getting things 

done and doing them well. 

The issue which we want to talk about today is the role of the 

Coast Guard in border security. The Coast Guard had to take on 

a large new responsibility here, as have a lot of other agencies in 

the post-9/11 world. And the question is, What does the Coast 

Guard need in order to succeed in that responsibility? And our view 

is that we should give you the resources you need, because you 

seem to handle the tasks which you’re assigned extraordinarily 

well; but what we need is to know what those resources are. 

The problem, of course, is that, as well as having to do this new 

responsibility, you have to continue to do what has been your traditional role; and that has dramatically expanded the burden and the 

cost of operating the Coast Guard. How can we make sure that sort 

of tooling up and expansion is done without wasting money, but, 

rather, making sure it’s effectively used; this is a critical issue for 

us as a committee. 

But I do want to reinforce the fact that we greatly admire what 

the Coast Guard does, and the fact that you’ve assumed this new 

responsibility of protecting our Nation from potential threat, especially coming by—over sea, in a very positive and constructive way. 
2 

And, with that, should—when Senator Byrd comes, we’ll take a 

break and hear his thoughts, but we should proceed with you, Admiral. 

Senator Cochran submitted a statement to be entered into the 

record. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for holding this timely hearing this morning. For 

over a week now, the members of the United States Senate have been debating border security and immigration reform. Despite our differences of opinion on immigration policy, effective border and maritime security are concerns shared by many. 

I look forward to hearing from Admiral Allen today, as he discusses the Coast 

Guard’s important role in border and maritime security. 

I want to thank him for his service to the Gulf Coast Region as the Principal Federal Official overseeing the relief and recovery efforts. 

I also want to thank the entire United States Coast Guard for its service to the 

Gulf Coast Region in those most difficult first hours and days after Hurricane 

Katrina. Members of the Coast Guard valiantly rescued people from rooftops and 

cars and trees, many times in complete darkness. Admiral Allen, on behalf of the 

State of Mississippi, thank you for your leadership in those efforts. 

As this Committee and the full Senate begins the fiscal year 2007 Homeland Security Appropriations process, I ask the members of this committee to carefully consider Admiral Allen’s comments and responses to questions regarding Coast Guard 

funding and asset recapitalization. 

I look forward to working with Chairman Gregg and Senator Byrd to address 

these important national concerns. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL THAD ALLEN, CHIEF OF STAFF, 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate the 

opportunity to be here today. And it’s a pleasure to discuss the 

Coast Guard’s role in border security. We appreciate the committee’s interest in border security. 

Since Alexander Hamilton called for maritime security, in Federalist Paper 12 in our founding, in 1790, this has been a primary 

focus of the Coast Guard, and it’s part of our military and maritime 

multi-mission service and the value we’ve provided to this country 

for over 200 years. 

I would tell you that effective border security necessarily includes effective maritime border security. But we face considerable 

challenges, and we have to manage risk as we move forward. And, 

with your permission, I do have a statement for the record, but I’ll 

make a few brief opening comments, and then go to the questions, 

if that’s all right with you, sir. 

Senator GREGG. That would be good. We do have a vote scheduled at 11 o’clock. And I know Senator Byrd’s going to want to comment and ask questions, so that would be a good way to approach 

it, I think. 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you, sir. 

I might just start off by making a couple of comments. 

First of all, the maritime domain presents a fairly unique set of 

challenges, not only for the Coast Guard, but for everybody in the 

world right now. The oceans are our last global common. It’s basically an interconnected framework of legal structures, with diverse 

uses, and, quite frankly, unfettered access. By ‘‘legal structures,’’ I 

mean structures that have evolved over thousands of years, con-
3 

cepts like right of innocent passage, access to ports, force majeure, 

and so forth. On the diverse uses, obviously we have trade and natural resources, transportation, and even recreation. And by ‘‘unfettered access,’’ what I really mean is, we are bounded by our oceans, 

but we’re really not protected by them. There are no bright lines 

in the water, like there are for our land borders, and access is not 

limited to technology. We’re not restricted to railroads, roads, or 

airports to enter this world of work, and it makes an extremely 

challenging environment. 

If you look at the chart over here, sir, you look at the juxtaposition of the maritime border with the land border. Now, we’ve 

rounded out those lines to make it about a little over 12,000 miles 

constituting the maritime border of this country. If you were actually to follow the bays and the curves and the Great Lakes and the 

rivers of this country that are navigable waterways, you would 

have about 95,000 miles. 

When we look at the risks associated with securing our maritime 

borders, there are basically three elements of risk that we look at, 

sir: threat, vulnerability, and consequence. 

On the threat side, it could be anything from a jet ski with an 

improvised explosive device to an LNG tanker. It could be underwater swimmers. It would be something from the land side, in 

terms of a truck- or a vehicle-borne explosive device. And, as we 

found out on 9/11, even an air event can be a maritime event, as 

we were instrumental in the response on 9/11, and especially in 

evacuating the people who were trapped in Lower Manhattan. 

Regarding vulnerabilities, you can already see the extent of our 

coastline. Notions like freedom of navigation allow vessels to pass 

very close to our coastline without any requirement to notify us, 

and without any means for us to know they’re there, and we’re taking steps to change that. 

Regarding consequences, 95 percent of all foreign trade comes into this country by vessel, and constitutes $750 billion a year, related to the GDP. An article that ran the other day in the press 

said that if the L.A./Long Beach Port was closed down for any 

length of time, it would constitute a loss of $115 million a day. 

Managing these challenges is one of the main duties of the Coast 

Guard in this post-9/11 environment, and we are about doing that. 

MANAGING CHALLENGES IN A POST 9/11 ENVIRONMENT

Right now, we’re basically breaking that task down into three 

different functional areas. One is awareness, trying to understand 

what’s out there. It started right after 9/11 by improving our advanced notice of arrival, our awareness of vessels that are calling 

in this country. We set up a National Vessel Movement Center to 

do this. We now have requirements for automated identification 

systems for large vessels approaching this country. We’ve significantly improved our intelligence infrastructure with Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers and Field Information Intelligence Support Teams at the port level; and we are partnering with the Navy. 

We’re also developing a domestic international security regime. 

Most of this is pursuant to the provisions of the Maritime Transportation Security Act and the new International Ship and Port Security Code. 
4 

And we’re also trying to increase our operational presence. We’ve 

fielded 13 Maritime Security Safety and Security Teams. We have 

a number of new small boats out there. We have improved radiation detection, new patrol boats, and patrol boats that we got from 

the Navy. 

Our new Deepwater acquisition, which is attempting to replace 

our legacy assets with new, better, more effective platforms for our 

people to use, are part of this. Our Deepwater assets are part of 

a layered defense. It allows us to project capability far offshore to 

intercept, board, and defeat threats at the greatest distance from 

the United States. 

We are enhancing our communications and our sensor packages. 

It improves our ability to communicate. We now come up on 

SIPRNET chat rooms to coordinate drug seizures; where, before, it 

took us minutes, and sometimes hours, to do voice relays to make 

one of those takedowns. 

And, finally, we’ve approved—we’ve incorporated post-9/11 requirements into our Deepwater baseline, including improved force 

protection; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protection 

for our large cutters. We have an increased intelligence capability. 

And we’re including airborne use of force in our Deepwater assets. 

However, even as we’re doing this, we need to constantly adjust 

the timing and delivery of our capability to reduce operational 

gaps. And if I could point you to these two slides here, these are 

included in reports that were recently submitted with our budget 

to the Congress. We are attempting, at this time, to fill two gaps 

that are significant in our ability to not only defend our maritime 

borders, but to mount effective responses offshore. 

Up to the upper left is a patrol-boat gap. As you can see, historically, we had dropped down below that, and we have anticipated, 

through the Deepwater Project, to move to our baseline of 174,000 

hours. Our original plan was to accelerate the design of the fastresponse cutter. And that was based on a composite design. We are 

now having some problems with that design, and I think we need 

to look at an alternative to fill that gap sooner. 

In the aviation gap, the solution ultimately will be the CASA– 

235 airframe. We need to move that in as fast as we can, but we’re 

also looking at a manned covert surveillance aircraft to help mitigate that gap. But in the long run, our new CASA aircraft will be 

the major source of those hours, sir. 

Be happy to entertain any questions at this time, sir. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL THAD ALLEN

Introduction 

Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee. It is 

a pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard’s role in border security. 

Senator Byrd, on behalf of the entire Coast Guard, please accept our sincere condolences on the recent loss of your wife. 

Thanks in great part to the attention of this committee and the particular interests of Chairman Gregg and Senator Byrd, securing our borders has become a top 

priority initiative. This hearing is a testament to the continued priority this committee places on border security, and a recognition of the reality that the Coast 

Guard is at the nexus of port and border security. 
5 

Effective border security depends on maritime security 

Securing the borders of the United States is a multifaceted challenge ranging 

from the remote deserts of Arizona and the rugged hills of Montana to the vast expanse of ocean off American shores. As aggressive steps are taken undertaken to 

secure the land border, smugglers and migrants—and potentially terrorists—will 

undoubtedly look for other points of entry to exploit. Effective border security requires an integrated approach that crosses land, air and maritime domains, lest one 

door be closed only to open another. 

The United States is intrinsically connected to and immensely reliant on the 

oceans. The maritime domain under U.S. jurisdiction is larger than its total 

landmass, and provides the shipping lanes, fisheries and energy resources that sustain our Nation. The maritime domain is also an avenue for those wishing to smuggle people and illicit drugs into our communities—and an avenue that could be exploited as a means to smuggle weapons of mass destruction and/or terrorists into 

our country. In 2005 alone, the Coast Guard: 

—Intercepted 9,500 undocumented migrants attempting to enter the United 

States illegally by sea, a 100 percent increase over 2001; and 

—Prevented more than 338,000 pounds of cocaine (an all-time maritime record) 

and more than 10,000 pounds marijuana from reaching the United States. 

The U.S. maritime domain is unique in its scope and diversity. With more than 

350 commercial ports and 95,000 miles of coastline (including bays, lakes and rivers), the challenge in distinguishing between legitimate and illicit activity is complex to say the least. We are bounded by the oceans but we’re not protected by 

them. There is no single fence, sensor or screening technology adequate to ensure 

maritime safety and security. The maritime domain is dynamic and requires an integrated, layered approach to security. This entails efforts across all operating 

areas, from ports and coastal areas to extended offshore operations, and must include extensive domestic and international partnerships. 

The thick blue line in figure 1 shows the expanse of our maritime borders. 

The Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for securing our maritime border 

The Nation has built a Coast Guard able to operate successfully in this complex 

and unique environment. Single-purpose agencies such as the Revenue Cutter Service, the Lifesaving Service, and the Lighthouse Service have been integrated over 

the last century into the uniquely effective and efficient Service we are today. The 

Coast Guard you exercise—the Coast Guard that we have collectively built—has a 

relatively straightforward purpose: exercise authorities and deploy capability to 

guarantee the safety and security of the U.S. maritime domain. That is who we are, 

what we are charged to do, and represents the core character of the Service. We 

are military, multimission and maritime. 
6 

Maritime risks 

Secretary Chertoff has emphasized that the three variables of threat, vulnerability and consequence serve as the appropriate model for assessing risk and deciding on the protective measures we undertake as a Nation. I agree and in terms of 

threat, vulnerability, and consequence, the maritime realm presents unique challenges. —Threat.—While the 9/11 Commission noted the continuing threat against our 

aviation system, it also stated that ‘‘opportunities to do harm are as great, or 

greater, in maritime or surface transportation.’’ From smuggling to piracy, suicide attacks to the threat of weapons of mass destruction, the threats are many 

and varied. Much of the current public discourse focuses on container security, 

which is appropriate given the recent headlines. However, a container is only 

as secure as the ship and crew that carries it. In fact, the greatest observed 

maritime threat remains smuggling. There are a wide variety of maritime 

threat scenarios and vectors beyond the confines of a single container. For example, a formal Coast Guard risk assessment revealed that small boats actually 

pose a higher risk. These small boats, traditionally used to smuggle drugs and 

migrants, can also be used to carry out Cole-type attacks on United States interests, bring in weapons of mass destruction (and other types of weapons) and/ 

or to sneak terrorists into our communities. —Vulnerability.—Our Nation is vulnerable to seaborne infiltration. There are dozens of nations in Central and South America and the Caribbean close enough 

that maritime trafficking of migrants, drugs, or other illegal commodities remains a constant threat. As on land, we know that there are numerous professional migrant smuggling rings that operate in the maritime realm. Some operate in the Caribbean or from nations further south such as Ecuador. Meanwhile, Haiti and the Dominican Republic are the launching point for thousands 

of illegal migrants each year; and Cuba, one of the designated State Sponsors 

of Terrorism, sits just south of the Florida Keys. There are no highways or 

deserts to cross between Cuba and the United States—only 90 miles of ocean, 

easily crossed in two hours or less in a high-powered speedboat—and we see 

hundreds of such smuggling attempts every year. The proximity of U.S. population centers to the maritime domain and the diversity of maritime users 

present significant and wide ranging vulnerabilities. Effectively addressing 

these vulnerabilities requires maritime strategies that detect and defeat threats 

as far from the U.S. shores as possible. —Consequence.—Contributing nearly $750 billion to the U.S. gross domestic product annually and handling 95 percent of all overseas trade each year—the value 

of the U.S. marine transportation system and the consequence of any significant 

attack cannot be overstated. Neither can the range of maritime terrorist attack 

scenarios we can envision—whether it’s the recurring consequence of migrant 

and drug smuggling, to more severe events such as attacks on commercial vessels or ports, the infiltration of terrorists or their sympathizers into our Nation, 

or in the worst case, delivery of weapons of mass destruction into our communities. The economic consequences to any disruption would be severe. A recent 

Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study estimated the economic consequences 

(to Gross Domestic Product (GDP)) of a one-week shutdown of a single major 

port to be as much as $150 million per day. 

The Coast Guard has put in place a variety of systems to methodically assess each 

of these components of risk such that we can target resources appropriately. It is 

also these broad risks and the complexity of the global maritime environment that 

led the President to issue in September 2005 the National Strategy for Maritime 

Security (NSMS). This strategy is unprecedented in its dedicated focus on the maritime domain and the necessity for its global security. The NSMS addresses the full 

range of maritime threats and is not limited to terrorism. 

Securing the Maritime Border Now and in the Future 

Leveraging its longstanding partnerships and unique maritime authorities and capabilities, the Coast Guard has significantly enhanced nationwide maritime security. Significant challenges remain and much more work needs to be done, but we’re 

focused on the right priorities: 

—We are More Aware.—Before 9/11, we had no mandatory ship-tracking requirement for large commercial vessels. Since 9/11, vessel reporting requirements 

have been expanded, we have forged an international agreement to accelerate 

the requirement for Automatic Identification System (AIS) capability, which 

provides real-time information on vessel positions and movements, and established a National Vessel Movement Center to coordinate the screening of vessel 

and crew arrival information. The Coast Guard has also become an integrated 
7 

member of the intelligence community—strengthening our organic capability 

with Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers and Field Intelligence Support 

Teams, while also strengthening our partnership with the Office of Naval Intelligence. 

—We have Implemented a Comprehensive Domestic and International Security Regime.—Before 9/11 we had no formal international or domestic maritime security regime for ports, port facilities, and ships with the exception of cruise ships. 

Partnering with maritime stakeholders, we now have both a comprehensive domestic security regime and an international security convention in place. 

—We have a More Effective Operational Presence.—Before 9/11 we were shorthanded and could not have met today’s mission requirements without our Reserves and Auxiliary. Since 9/11 we have: 

—Established 13 Maritime Safety and Security Teams; 

—Deployed more than 80 new small boats (RB-S) and boat crews; 

—Provided radiation detection capabilities to our boarding teams; and 

—Acquired 15 Coastal Patrol Boats and accepted transfer of five Navy 170-foot 

Patrol Crafts to increase operational presence in our ports. 

Our overarching strategy is to, through a layered security architecture, ‘‘push out 

our borders.’’ Our unambiguous goal is to meet threats far offshore in order to avoid 

hostile persons, vessels or cargoes entering our ports or coastal regions. In the maritime realm, a goal line defense is no defense at all. This principle is exemplified 

daily as we intercept drug and migrant laden vessels as far away as the Galapagos 

Islands and last spring, when Coast Guard units, working with an interagency 

team, intercepted a suspect cargo ship over 900 miles east of Cape Hatteras, NC. 

In this case, the threat was determined to be unfounded but our ability to push the 

borders out is an essential element in protecting our homeland. 

The Coast Guard faces challenges in the maritime domain similar to the Border 

Patrol in securing the land border—with a limited set of resources, locate amid vast 

geographic areas and huge amounts of legitimate activity those seeking to do us 

harm. The phrase ‘‘finding a needle in a haystack’’ is an apt description of the challenge. The foundation of our maritime strategy relies on three key priorities: 

—Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness; 

—Establish and Lead a Maritime Security Regime; and 

—Deploy effective and integrated operational capability. 

These are not stand-alone goals, but rather part of an active system of layered 

maritime security. For example, the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) 

led to the establishment of domestic and international AIS carriage requirements 

for certain commercial vessels. But without investment in systems to collect, analyze 

and disseminate the AIS signals we lose the opportunity to assess threats early. 

Similarly, the detection, identification and interdiction of small vessels (that certainly do not advertise their position) used by smugglers throughout the Caribbean 

and Eastern Pacific requires persistent surveillance capabilities. In the end, Coast 

Guard assets must be capable of mounting a dependable response to identified 

threats lest we have information but not the capability to act. Put another way, having airborne sensors identify and track suspicious vessels is of little use without surface forces able to respond. 

Coast Guard assets and systems are required to operate across a diverse operating area including within our ports, in the littoral region, and far offshore. Thanks 

to the strong support of the administration, Congress and this Committee in particular, a number of initiatives are underway to transform Coast Guard capabilities. 

Several are worth highlighting as each will have a broad and substantial influence 

on our ability to mitigate current and future maritime risks. 

Integrated Deepwater System.—The centerpiece of the Coast Guard’s future capability is the Integrated Deepwater System, recently revised to a 25-year $24 billion 

acquisition program and reflective of post-9/11 mission requirements. The Integrated Deepwater System was designed to secure the Nation’s maritime borders just 

as the newly-announced Secure Border Initiative will help deliver a system to secure the land borders. In the end, they will complement each other in delivering a 

comprehensive system of border security. 

A critical dimension of the Deepwater Program’s assets and systems is their ability to fill operational gaps. As was addressed in the Coast Guard’s operational gap 

analysis report submitted to Congress with the fiscal year 2007 budget request, the 

action plan to deliver the operational capabilities and requirements specified in the 

revised Deepwater implementation plan is a 25-year effort. This long-term plan requires a fine balance between removing legacy assets from service to realize system 

cost savings while maintaining sufficient system capacity so as to not exacerbate 

current operational gaps. The plan results in modest near-term operational hour 
8 

shortfalls followed by the steep, long-term gains in operational capability and capacity as new Deepwater assets enter service in greater numbers. 

—For example, figure 2 shows the current gap in patrol boat hours; it is affected 

most adversely by the difficulties encountered in the 123-foot conversion program. Unfortunately, the conversion of our legacy 110-foot patrol boats has not 

provided the bridge to the future Fast Response Cutter (FRC) that we had 

hoped. As a result, we have taken steps to advance the design and construction 

of the FRC order to restore this critical capacity as quickly as possible. 

—Similarly, figure 3 shows the pre-existing Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) gap. 

The revised Deepwater implementation plan strives to mitigate this gap by 

keeping more legacy C–130H aircraft in service longer while adding new Maritime Patrol Aircraft (CASA–235’s) to the Coast Guard air fleet. Additionally, the 

Coast Guard and Customs and Border Patrol are working together to fill the 

gap with a manned covert surveillance aircraft projected to serve as a surveillance platform in the Caribbean risk vectors. 
9 

The Coast Guard will continue to mitigate operational gaps in the near term, 

while striving for the future Deepwater fleet that will exceed current legacy capability and capacity. The requirements and capabilities reflected in the post-9/11 revised Deepwater implementation plan will be delivered methodically and prudently 

over the next 25 years. 

Just as important as building capacity to fill the operational gaps cited above is 

ensuring these assets are able to serve as the ‘‘eyes and ears’’ to allow the Nation 

to see, hear and communicate activity occurring within the maritime domain. The 

Coast Guard’s sustained presence along our maritime borders is unique. More capable Deepwater assets, linked to each other and multiple agencies through 

Deepwater’s net-centric command-and-control system will significantly improve information sharing, collaboration, and interoperability in the maritime domain. 

Vessel Tracking.—Securing our vast maritime borders requires improved awareness of the people, vessels and cargo approaching and moving throughout U.S. ports, 

coasts and inland waterways. The most pressing challenges we now face involve 

tracking the vast population of vessels operating in and around the approaches to 

the United States, and detecting and intercepting the small vessels used for migrant 

and drug smuggling, which can easily be used by terrorists seeking to do us harm. 

It is against this threat that we need to continually improve, and we are taking significant steps in the right direction. The Coast Guard needs as much information 

as possible about vessels operating in the maritime domain, particularly their location and identity, in order to enable effective and timely decisions and identify 

friend from foe. In support of this requirement, the Coast Guard has: 

—Established the Automatic Identification System (AIS) to provide continuous, 

real-time information on the identity, location, speed and course of vessels in 

ports that are equipped with AIS receivers. AIS is currently operational in several major U.S. ports, and the Coast Guard’s Nationwide Automatic Identification (NAIS) project will expand AIS capabilities to ports nationwide; and 

—Initiated development of a long-range vessel tracking system to receive information on vessels beyond the scope of the existing and planned AIS system. Longrange vessel tracking systems are designed to extend tracking capabilities up 

to 2000 nautical miles offshore. 

Personnel Security and Credentialing.—The Coast Guard has made a number of 

critical improvements to the security and vetting procedures surrounding the 

issuance of merchant mariner documents. This effort has been bolstered with funding provided in fiscal year 2006 to restructure the merchant mariner licensing program by centralizing security and vetting functions in a new, enhanced National 

Maritime Center. Future efforts will focus on: 

—Working on an accelerated schedule with the Transportation Security Administration to draft rules on implementing the Transportation Worker Identification 

Credential (TWIC). Enrollment in TWIC is expected to begin on September 1, 

2006; and 
10 

—Continuing to explore technologies that will allow Coast Guard boarding teams 

to access existing databases and information sources such as US VISIT. 

Maritime C4ISR Enhancement.—Existing Command, Control, Communications, 

Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and 

operational concepts must be reoriented and integrated with current and emerging 

sensor capabilities and applicable procedures. Similar to the Nation’s air space security regime, the maritime security regime must integrate existing C4ISR systems 

with new technologies and national command-and-control systems and processes. 

For example: 

—The Common Operating Picture (COP) and corresponding Command Intelligence Picture (CIP) must continue to grow and expand to Federal, State, and 

local agencies with maritime interests and responsibilities. The COP provides 

a shared display of friendly, enemy/suspect and neutral tracks on a map with 

applicable geographically referenced overlays and data enhancements. The COP 

is also a central element of the Deepwater solution tying Deepwater assets and 

operational commanders together with dynamic, real-time maritime domain information. This link is essential to ensure effective command and control of all 

available Coast Guard assets responding to a myriad of border security threats. 

—An expansive and interoperable communications network is critical for maritime security operations and safety of life at sea. In the coastal environment, 

the Coast Guard’s Rescue 21 system will provide the United States with an advanced maritime distress and response communications system that bridges 

interoperability gaps, saves lives and improves maritime security. 

—Hurricanes Katrina and Rita demonstrated the need for robust and resilient 

port and coastal command and control. Through test-beds at command centers 

in Miami, FL, Charleston, SC and elsewhere; and joint harbor operations centers established with the U.S Navy in Hampton Roads, VA, and San Diego, CA; 

the power of partnership, technology and co-location has been proven. The Coast 

Guard will continue working to expand on these successes and export them to 

other ports nationwide. 

WMD Detection and Response.—The Coast Guard is an active partner and ardent 

supporter of the Department’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office for their work in 

identifying new technologies to enhance our seaborne radiation detection capabilities. Similarly, many of the capability enhancements included in the revised Deepwater implementation plan are designed specifically with this threat in mind. We 

know the trauma that infiltration of WMD could cause our Nation, and intend to 

remain as vigilant as possible in preventing this from ever happening. Since 9/11, 

the Coast Guard has outfitted all of its boarding teams with personal radiation detectors, and we have in our inventory hand-held isotope detectors and other equipment that can be employed depending on the nature of the threat. We work closely 

with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Customs and Border Protection, and the 

Department of Energy to respond immediately to any indications of radiation encountered aboard a vessel at sea or in port. Of course, this is really a last line of 

defense. 

As I mentioned in my introductory remarks, there is no single solution to maritime border security. It requires a layered system of capabilities, established competencies, clear authorities, and strong partnerships. The cost of allowing blind 

spots in our awareness, security regimes or operational capabilities is too high. 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, we can and should be proud of the positive steps we’ve taken to 

enhance maritime security. I credit the innovation, resourcefulness and devoted 

service of Coast Guard men and women for much of our progress to date. They have 

made tremendous strides with assets and systems designed for a different era. I am 

convinced we can do even better as we deliver more capable and reliable operational 

assets and systems. If we give Coast Guard men and women the training and equipment to do the job, they won’t let us down. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Senator GREGG. Thank you, Admiral. 

We’re joined by Senator Byrd. If you would like to make an opening statement, and then questions, we have a vote at 11 o’clock. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

Senator BYRD. Good morning, folks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
11 

I thank our chairman for holding this hearing today. I would 

agree with him on almost anything—— 

We both agree that, in order to have effective border security, the 

Department of Homeland Security should be focusing its resources 

not only on our land borders, but also on our relatively undefended 

coastlines and rivers. 

I welcome the next Commandant of the United States Coast 

Guard. And I thank him for leading the hurricane recovery efforts 

on the gulf coast. We know that, as security at our land borders 

is tightened, illegal aliens, drug runners, and terrorists will turn 

to our waterways for entry into this country, our homeland. 

According to Coast Guard statistics, the flow of illegal aliens 

through our waterways has more than doubled in the last 10 years, 

and will continue to grow. The administration has concluded that 

international migration, quote, ‘‘will be one of the most important 

factors affecting maritime security through the next 10 years, and 

that a significant commitment of security resources is necessary.’’ 

Now, the budget does not match this rhetoric. What is known as 

the Secure Borders Initiative is being promoted, but the initiative 

makes no mention of securing our wide-open waterways and coastlines from illegal migration. 

The Coast Guard is facing a crisis in its ability to maintain assets that perform border and maritime security missions. Recent 

budget requests by the administration have allowed this crisis to 

fester. The condition of Coast Guard ships and planes is declining 

rapidly. These assets spend more and more time out of service. For 

example, total patrol-boat hours in 2004 were 25 percent lower 

than in 1998. Current Coast Guard maritime patrol airplanes can 

only provide half of the hours required to meet operational commitments. 

At the same time, funding constraints require maintenance on 

these aging assets to be deferred more and more every year. From 

fiscal years 2001 to 2005, the Coast Guard deferred over $121 million in maintenance needed for its naval fleet and $159 million in 

maintenance needed for its air assets. 

The President says that we live in a post-9/11 world. Frankly, 

the Coast Guard’s fleet of ships and planes is fit for the last century. To properly secure the maritime domain, the Coast Guard 

needs a fleet fit for this century. 

And so, I was troubled to learn that the fiscal year 2007 Deepwater budget is flat as far as the eye can see. Deepwater won’t be 

completed until 2026—I won’t be here—20 years from now—only in 

spirit. If we do not invest in the Coast Guard now—now—it could 

become the FEMA of 2010. 

Admiral Allen, my dear wife’s mother was an Allen from Virginia. You’ve heard of Sidney Allen, haven’t you? He shot up the 

courthouse down there, huh? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

RESOURCES REQUIRED TO SECURE MARITIME AVENUES

Senator BYRD. All right. 

Admiral Allen, we are here today to discuss the resource requirements that the Coast Guard needs to secure our maritime avenues. 
12 

In 2004, Commandant Collins characterized the Coast Guard’s assets as being in a declining readiness spiral. 

Your testimony on operational gaps indicates that the Coast 

Guard continues to face significant challenges. I look forward, with 

our very able chairman, to an open and frank discussion on the assets you need to carry out your mission as it relates to border and 

maritime security. 

Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GREGG. Thank you, Senator. 

And I agree with the Senator from West Virginia, as I often do. 

He’s very generous to me. But he’s absolutely right on his assessment, I believe, of where the Coast Guard is. And my concern is 

the same as the Senator from West Virginia, which is—it doesn’t 

appear to me that what we’ve got in the pipeline for you is what 

you need in order to do your job, and the charts sort of explain 

that. 

I guess my first question to you is, How much of that is a function of resources that you need? And how much of it is a function 

of the things like the cutter issue, which is that you’re changing 

design midstream? So that even if you have the resources, you 

can’t buy the ships, because you haven’t decided what type of ship 

you want—or, in this case, boats—I guess they aren’t ships. Well, 

they started out as boats, maybe they’re going to turn out as ships. 

But, in any event—so, break that out for us. You’ve got these 

charts here that show us what we need to add in capital investment. And I look on capital investment as something we should be 

able to do around here fairly simply, because it’s just buying things 

that you need, to make sure you can do the job right. 

So, tell us what you need in resources, on top of what is in the 

budget, as proposed, and in the supplemental, as passed, where 

you receive some additional funds—or, not as passed, but as it 

came out of committee. And then, tell us what the difference is between additional money and resolving some of these issues around 

what the character is of the item you’re buying, whether you’re 

agreeing on the type of cutter, the type of aircraft. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

You characterize the problem exactly right. It’s an issue of resources, and it is an issue of requirements. And a couple of things 

have happened simultaneously that bring us to where we’re at 

today. 

As you know, the original Deepwater contract was awarded 

based on requirements that were suitable for 1998. And we know, 

in a post-9/11 environment, our cutters and aircraft have to operate 

in a much more—different area and operational threat environment regarding force protection, CB—chemical, biological, nuclear 

weapons, and so forth. What we have tried to do is rebaseline those 

requirements. 

I think the requirements are fixed now. We submitted a report 

last year. We certainly don’t intend to have any great deviation 

from those requirements in the future. And it’s more of an issue 

of how you take those requirements and build those in to the current plan, and have those reflected. And that’s what’s causing some 

of the problems. As we’ve gone in and asked for these requirements 
13 

to be included in designs, that’s created some challenges for our integrated Coast Guard systems partners. Most notably, we’re currently looking at the fast-response cutter composite ship that was 

supposed to increase speed, give us a stern launch boat capability, 

increase our sensors and communications capability. Those are the 

new requirements, that don’t exist in our current fleet, that we 

need. However, that design that we’re looking at right now has 

some issues with it, and we’ll complete a review in another 3 to 4 

weeks on it. 

Notwithstanding that, there is a gap in those patrol boat hours. 

And whether it’s the fast-response cutter or some other craft that 

can meet those requirements, we do need those resources now. 

Regarding funding, it was originally envisioned, when this con- tract was awarded, that we would be working with about $500 million a year to source this program. We are now up close to a billion 

for the foreseeable future, so there has been an increase in resources provided to the program. That has allowed us to simultaneously bring new assets online, and also conduct maintenance on 

the older ones, especially the 210 and the 270 fleet, which are undergoing mid-life renovations at our Coast Guard Yard. So, it’s a 

matter of balancing the additional money against the repair of the 

legacy cutters, but bringing those new requirements in as fast as 

we can, sir. 

Senator GREGG. Well, how much additional money would you 

need so that we could get this done, so that Senator Byrd could be 

here in charge of launching the last ship—— 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, I think—— 

Senator GREGG [continuing]. With the Deepwater Program? 

Admiral ALLEN [continuing]. In the current year, sir, not a lot of 

additional money is needed. I think some key decisions have to be 

taken. And one is whether or not we’re going to proceed on the current course with the fast-response cutter or go with some kind of 

off-the-shelf design and get something with the money we already 

have appropriated and what is planned and requested for 2007 on 

target, if you will, for the right platform we need. 

Senator GREGG. Well, you know, the—as Senator Byrd mentioned, it’s going to take until 2026, I think he said, to build out 

the Deepwater Program. I mean, that just doesn’t seem reasonable. 

How do we accelerate that? What do you need for resources to—— 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, sir, we previously answered that accelerating the program would actually cut the overall cost of the program by a couple of billion dollars a you move it toward 2016. That 

would get those resources in faster. The current program does what 

we need it to do, but it does it over a longer period of time. It can 

be shortened, and we could bring the assets on faster, sir. 

Senator GREGG. So, give us a number. 

Admiral ALLEN. I can provide it for the record, but I think by 

moving it up to around—and I would like to make sure I’ve got it 

right for the record, but I think by moving this completion up closer to 2016, you actually move the cost down between $1 and $1.3 

billion—$1 and $3 billion, because you’re spending the money sooner, and you’re getting those assets online quicker, you’re not involving the costs of extending the—— 

[The information follows:] 
14 

FUNDING REQUIRED TO COMPLETE DEEPWATER ACQUISITION

A preliminary estimate of $21 billion in funding would be required to complete 

the Deepwater acquisition within the next 10 years. The required funding levels for 

fiscal year 2007 and future years are provided in the table below. 

[Millions of dollars] 

Fiscal year Required Funding 

2006 & prior ........................................................................................................................................................ 3,128 

2007 ..................................................................................................................................................................... 934 

2008 ..................................................................................................................................................................... 1,569 

2009 ..................................................................................................................................................................... 2,890 

2010 ..................................................................................................................................................................... 2,440 

2011 ..................................................................................................................................................................... 2,480 

2012 ..................................................................................................................................................................... 2,086 

2013 ..................................................................................................................................................................... 2,077 

2014 ..................................................................................................................................................................... 1,999 

2015 ..................................................................................................................................................................... 864 

2016 ..................................................................................................................................................................... 577 

TOTAL ...................................................................................................................................................... 1.004 

Senator GREGG. Well, I think that’s what I would like to do. I 

know it’s what Senator Byrd would like to do. And if it’s within the 

resources of this committee, we will do it. So, we’d need that number—— 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator GREGG [continuing]. If you can get it to us. 

CARGO INSPECTION AT FOREIGN PORTS

Secondly, and then I’ll turn to Senator Byrd and then to Senator 

Allard, how are we doing on inspecting cargo as it leaves the ports 

around the world and heads toward us, and then capturing cargo 

before it hits us—— 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. Well, that’s—— 

Senator GREGG [continuing]. That’s dangerous? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. As you know, the responsibility for that 

largely lies with the Customs and Border Protection Service, and 

largely through their Container Security Initiative, which places 

inspectors in foreign ports at the point of embarkation to make 

sure we know what’s manifested in those containers. It allows us 

to screen the cargo and the other manifest data through the National Targeting Center to single out containers that might be of 

an issue. In addition to that, through the International Ship and 

Port Security Code, the Coast Guard are conducting assessments of 

foreign ports to make sure they’re compliant with the national 

standards. 

Yeah, I’m sorry. 

Senator GREGG. What’s your assessment of what—how we’re 

doing in this exercise, in determining whether cargo headed towards us is safe? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, I think we’re doing better than we were, 

but we can do better, sir. I think the more we can put into the Container Security Initiative and advanced clearance of those manifests and dealing with the containers issue at the point of embarkation, the more the Coast Guard can go in and look at these ports 

and make sure they’re in compliance with the International Ship 
15 

and Port Security Code, we’ll all enhance that now, that’s all based 

on the resources we have right now. It could be accelerated, with 

more resources, sir. 

Senator GREGG. Senator Byrd. 

SECURING WATERWAYS AND COASTLINES FROM ILLEGAL MIGRATION

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, as I indicated in my opening statement, the administration is now promoting what it is calling the 

Secure Borders Initiative. However, the initiative makes no mention of securing our wide-open waterways and coastlines from illegal migration. When we strengthen security at the land borders, 

those who wish to enter this country illegally will pursue other 

entry points. 

The Coast Guard needs a 21st century fleet of ships and planes. 

Unfortunately, today the Coast Guard has a fleet fit for the last 

century. The Coast Guard’s fleet of cutters is currently the 37th 

oldest of the world’s 39 like-sized naval fleets. 

The charts in your testimony compare Coast Guard asset performance to a 1998 baseline. The President says that we live in a 

post-9/11 world, but the Coast Guard is measuring its performance 

against a pre-9/11 baseline. 

Admiral Allen, why are you using a pre-September 9/11 baseline? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, sir, that was the baseline when the contract was awarded. That was adjusted last year to reflect post-9/ 

11 requirements, and that currently has been memorialized in the 

plan, as reported to Congress with our budget in fiscal year 2007. 

As I stated to the chairman, the challenge now is to getting those 

new requirements designed into those holes that were already 

scheduled to be built, so that we—when those hours come out there 

to fill that gap, they’re more effective hours. In other words, it’s not 

the same vessel that we would have bought in 1998; it’s a vessel 

we need for 9/11. You’re absolutely correct, sir. 

The challenge right now is to make sure those requirements, by 

a technical means, are included in the contract and then put into 

those designs so we have those platforms out in the hands of our 

people to make them more effective. And that is the challenge before us today, sir, and that’s the one we’re working hard on. 

RAPIDLY DECLINING CONDITION OF COAST GUARD ASSETS

Senator BYRD. The condition of Coast Guard ships and planes is 

declining rapidly. These assets spend more and more time out of 

service. For example, total patrol boat hours in 2004 were 25 percent lower than in 1998. Current Coast Guard maritime patrol airplanes can only provide half of the hours required to meet operational commitments. At the same time, funding constraints require maintenance on these aging assets to be deferred more and 

more every year. 

From fiscal years 2001 to 2005, the Coast Guard deferred over 

$121 million in maintenance needed for its naval fleet and $159 

million in maintenance needed for its air assets. The Coast Guard’s 

110-foot patrol boats, which you use to interdict illegal aliens and 

drugs, are in a ‘‘declining readiness spiral,’’ according to Commandant Collins. Coast Guard patrol boats are operating in theater 

less today than they were in 1998. Total patrol boat hours were 
16 

only 75,000 in 2004, compared to the 1998 baseline of approximately 100,000 hours. Under the Deepwater plan, this gap won’t 

be closed until 2012, at the earliest. The administration’s National 

Strategy for Maritime Security calls for a, quote, ‘‘significant commitment of security resources,’’ close quote, to deal with illegal seaborne immigration. 

Admiral Allen, the Coast Guard is facing a crisis. The fiscal year 

2007 budget pushes the development of the fast-response cutter to 

the right. Indications are that the five patrol crafts that are on loan 

from the Navy will be returned in 2008. Six 110s are operating in 

Iraq and may not be returned. 

You have an opportunity at this hearing to tell us what can be 

done right now to turn this situation around if additional resources 

were to become available. Now, new 110-foot patrol boats help the 

short-term gap that you that have discussed in your testimony? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. I agree with you completely. The patrolboat gap has to be addressed. And, currently, the design of the 

FRC won’t get us there on time. And, you’re right, it is scheduled 

to move to the right. I think we need to address this near-term crisis on patrol boat hours with some unique and innovative thinking. 

I think we need to go for some kind of a Paracraft design or a design that can be manufactured more quickly and put in the hands 

of our people. And we fully intend to explore that with our integrated Coast Guard systems partners shortly. We should receive a 

complete technical evaluation of the design issues with the FRC 

sometime in the next 3 to 4 weeks. But it is our intent right now 

to proceed very aggressively to look at an alternative bridging craft 

to get us through this period, and get it online as fast as we can. 

And to the extent that there is money that is available for the 

FRC, I think that money needs to be applied to get that new patrol 

boat out there as soon as we can get it, sir. 

Senator BYRD. So, you’ve said sometime in the next 4 weeks. 

Admiral ALLEN. That’s for the final technical evaluation of the 

FRC. We’re not precluded, nor have we stopped going ahead to discuss what we might do to fill the patrol boat gap. We do need some 

kind of candidate craft that will fill that gap, sir, and we intend 

to do that. 

Senator BYRD. All right. 

Have I more time? Yes. 

I thank you. And—thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GREGG. Thank you. 

COAST GUARD’S ROLE IN NORTHERN COMMAND

Senator Allard. 

Senator ALLARD. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I find this hearing 

fascinating. It’s been a few million years since we had a coastline 

in Colorado, the State I represent. But I would tell you that the 

image that I have of the Coast Guard—and I think most people in 

Colorado—is that you do a great job, and we appreciate your sacrifice and effort to help secure the borders of this country. 

I—we also have located, in Colorado, Northern Command—— 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 
17 

Senator ALLARD [continuing]. Which is the military joint command to secure our country. What role does the Coast Guard play 

with Northern Command, if any? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, sir, we play a significant role, but, I might 

add, before I answer, that we have some very dedicated Coast 

Guard auxiliarists and reservists that live in your State that—— 

Senator ALLARD. You do. 

Admiral ALLEN [continuing]. Contribute greatly to the Coast 

Guard. 

Senator ALLARD. You—— 

Admiral ALLEN. I’d be glad to give you a brief, at some time, if 

you’d like that, sir. 

Senator ALLARD. Yeah. And I think I’ve met some of those individuals. We have a few people in the Navy, too. And I always love 

to ask them if they anticipated being stationed in Colorado or Nebraska. 

But, no, they’re great professionals. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator ALLARD. Yeah. Go ahead. 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you. 

We have had a very close relationship with U.S. Northern Command since it was founded. Immediately following 9/11, as you remember, the homeland defense mission in this country was given 

to the Joint Forces Command, down in Norfolk. At that time, I was 

the Atlantic area commander, in command of our forces on 9/11, 

and I actually worked collaboratively with General Kernan and 

General Eberhart as they put together the terms of reference to actually build NORTHCOM. We detailed officers into the staff that 

actually put together the plans to stand it up. I provided a Coast 

Guard liaison officer very early on, and we now have Coast Guard 

people out there that jointly staff U.S. Northern Command, and we 

have a very good working relationship. 

While I was exercising my duties as principal Federal official for 

Hurricane Katrina response, I was in touch constantly with Admiral Keating and Lieutenant General Inge regarding the requirements I had down there in my dealings with General Honore. So, 

I can tell you, we have a very close relationship with NORTHCOM, 

and we certainly will continue to do that, sir. 

Senator ALLARD. Well, I’m glad to hear that. A lot of technology 

involved with Northern Command. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator ALLARD. A lot of it is satellite driven and whatnot. Do 

you feel that you have adequate technology there to work with the 

military in meeting your requirements, or your responsibilities that 

might be delegated through Northern Command? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, we’re—by statute, the Coast Guard has to 

be interoperable with the Navy, so, in a time of war, if we need 

to be shifted, we could. So—— 

Senator ALLARD. Yes. 

Admiral ALLEN [continuing]. We do have interoperability, from a 

communications standpoint, with our DOD forces. 

One of the interesting things that the Deepwater solution is 

going to bring to the Coast Guard is some of the even higher-level 

technologies that are commonly used by DOD right now, and put 
18 

them right on our cutters at sea out there, and things like 

SIPRNET chat rooms, ability to transfer a common operating picture, so you could virtually have Coast Guard headquarters, Northern Command, and a CO of a Coast Guard cutter in the Caribbean 

actually looking at the same screen at the same time, sir. 

Senator ALLARD. Yeah. 

Admiral ALLEN. And that’s one of those—— 

Senator ALLARD. Well, that—— 

Admiral ALLEN [continuing]. The things we’re really trying to 

bring onboard with the Deepwater Project. 

Senator ALLARD. Yeah. And I come off Armed Services Committee, and I know we’ve been working and trying to use the satellite system, provide that type of technology for the soldier on the 

field, as well as the boat or the ship on the waters. 

Admiral ALLEN. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator ALLARD. And I think it’s—— 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

UPDATING THE LORAN NAVIGATIONAL SYSTEM

Senator ALLARD [continuing]. Fabulous technology, and I think it 

will help us do a good job. 

On the navigational side, we have a company in Colorado called 

Loran, which is your older navigational systems. And I think pretty 

much that sort of technology is getting outdated. And I think you’re 

replacing it with a GPS system, which I think has to be done. But 

do you—do you need to keep Loran around for a backup system, 

or do you think you—the technology’s got enough backup and—the 

new technological systems has enough backup in there that you 

don’t need to have Loran anymore as a backup system? What is 

your thoughts on the technology changes that are going on navigational equipment? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. And it’s an excellent question. 

Our current Loran-C system has been around since the early 

1960s. Quite frankly, GPS provides superior positioning systems. 

Senator ALLARD. Sure. 

Admiral ALLEN. There was some residual discussion about 

whether or not the use of Loran signals to—for timing purposes, 

universal time, might have some residual value. We have discussed 

that within the interagency and the Federal Government, and I 

think the consensus is that it’s time to go ahead and decommission 

the Loran system in the country. GPS provides an adequate navigation system in place of that. 

Sometimes it’s hard to do away with those things you’ve been 

doing for a lot of years. 

Senator ALLARD. Exactly. 

Admiral ALLEN. I was the commanding officer of a Loran station 

in Southeast Asia right at the end of the war, but that’s how old 

that technology is. And some of the stuff still runs on vacuum 

tubes. And the cost it would take to upgrade that technology, when 

there is a more effective means of providing navigation services, 

probably dictates that we not do that, sir. 

Senator GREGG. Senator—— 

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
19 

Senator GREGG. Thank you. There is a vote on. Senator Byrd 

asked courtesy of being able to ask questions so he’d get started towards the vote. Is that all right with you, Senator Murray? And 

then we’ll go to Senator Murray. 

Senator BYRD. I thank the Senator. 

CLOSING THE OPERATIONAL GAP FOR PATROL BOATS

Senator GREGG. Go ahead. 

Senator BYRD. Quickly, thank you. 

Admiral, you have said that you are aggressively pursuing a new 

native craft to close the operational gap for patrol boats. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator BYRD. What would it cost to add additional patrol boats 

now? 

Admiral ALLEN. Well, I think we need to look at the current plan 

in Deepwater and how much money is available for patrol boats. 

But my guess is that we can get something down in a fairly affordable range working with our ICGS partners in a—using the design 

that’s already been proven out there. And I’m talking about driving 

this thing down to something where we can get a patrol boat for 

somewhere between $20 and $30 million, max. 

Senator BYRD. Thank you. 

Admiral ALLEN. Excuse me? 

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Admiral. We want to help. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GREGG. Thank you. 

Senator Murray. 

FUNDING REDUCTIONS TO COAST GUARD’S TRADITIONAL MISSIONS

Senator MURRAY. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know there’s 

a vote on, and we need to get over to the floor, but I wanted to 

come—I was in another hearing—and just thank you, and all the 

men and women in the Coast Guard, for the tremendous job 

they’ve done. And your leadership has certainly been noted. And I 

know you’re going to become Commandant in May, and you’re coming at a time when we need you. And I think you’re going to be 

doing an excellent job. I look forward to working with you on that. 

I did want to come to this committee, because I am concerned— 

and I think we all learned from Katrina, the tremendous multiple 

missions that the Coast Guard has. And I remain concerned that, 

although the Coast Guard funding looks pretty good in the budget, 

under the President’s budget request there are more than $230 

million in cuts to Coast Guard’s traditional missions, maritime 

safety, including search and rescue, important to my end of the 

world, cut by $143 million; natural resource protection, cut by $56 

million; maritime mobility is cut by $32 million. 

Admiral, I know this hearing is focused on border and port security, but if the budget doesn’t provide you with proper funding for 

all your missions, we’re simply asking the Coast Guard to do more 

and more with less and less. And if you could share with this committee, if it turns out that you need more funding for these traditional missions, would Homeland Security funds be used, or do we 

just do less in those mission areas? 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you for the question, Senator. 
20 

The way we portray those costs in those budget is through an algorithm. We take historical hours that are applied to missions, and 

then we have a way, through what we call a mission cost model, 

to actually load those hours. We actually keep track of every hour 

that an airplane, a small boat, or a cutter operates, and then we’re 

able to load the costs onto that. And so, these are projections based 

on historical data, how we might spread the budget, as it’s presented. I can tell you right now that we will not diminish our 

search-and-rescue readiness posture. Our field commanders are 

empowered out there to apply resources to the highest need available. And they know search and rescue comes first. So, while we 

spread these algorithms out for costing purposes in the budget, I 

can commit to you right now, there will be no diminution in our 

search-and-rescue missions. 

Now, beyond that, our field commanders are allocated resources, 

and are given the autonomy to apply those to the highest need 

within their areas of responsibility. And you’re very familiar with— 

in our 13th District, how that happens. So, while we project those 

things in the budget, that is just a projection, and it may not bear 

the exact same reality of how we actually execute those hours out 

there. 

But, overall, it’s a tradeoff that our field commanders make. We 

know search and rescue’s going to come right off the top. And so, 

to the extent that you’re operating in a constrained environment, 

the rest of the missions are going to be debited somewhat to make 

sure you hit the top line. 

VESSEL AND FACILITY SECURITY PLANS

Senator MURRAY. Okay. And, really quickly, under the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act, Coast Guard was charged with ensuring the implementation of 3,500 vessel security plans and about 

10,000 facility security plans. I did not see, in your written testimony, any reference to that. Can you please update the committee 

on the progress of those plans across the country? 

Admiral ALLEN. We sure can, ma’am. And I can tell you right 

now, we have about 1,200 people that are on task, both looking at 

facility plans, vessel plans, and the inspections, to make sure those 

plans are complied with, sir. 

Senator MURRAY. Are they being regularly reviewed, then, 

by—— 

Admiral ALLEN. They’re reviewed on an annual basis, and then 

there are spotchecks conducted. 

Senator MURRAY. Okay. 

I would appreciate that. And if you can give us any additional 

information, Mr. Chairman, I will submit my other questions for 

the record, as I see Senator Stevens is here, as well. 

But, thank you, and please pass on my thank you to the men and 

women of the Coast Guard. They do an excellent job. Appreciate it. 

[The information follows:] 

FACILITIES SUBJECT TO MTSA/ISPS 

The Coast Guard has identified 3,064 facilities subject to MTSA/ISPS requirements. All of these facilities have approved facility security plans in place and during the 2005 calendar year each facility was visited under the Coast Guard’s annual 

facility security inspection program. 
21 

There were 11,000 Coast Guard approved security plan submissions for vessels 

subject to MTSA/ISPS regulations. As part of annually required inspected vessel 

safety inspections, approximately 8,500 security verification exams were conducted 

between July 1, 2004 and April 1, 2006. The Coast Guard intends to complete security verification exams on all MTSA regulated U.S. vessels by 31 December, 2006. 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you, ma’am. 

Senator GREGG. I’m going to head—I have to vote. 

Senator Stevens has some questions, and he’ll wrap this up. 

Admiral, again, thank you. Thank you for your service. Thank 

you for the extraordinary job you did in Katrina, and that your 

team did in Katrina. 

And at some point, I’d like to get a written response as to whether or not we’ve straightened out, between you and the FBI, who’s 

in charge when your SWAT teams go onto a—into a situation like 

occurred in the exercise in Connecticut. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. I would just respond briefly that I am 

personally working with John Pistole, the Deputy Director of the 

FBI, and I can tell you we are much closer than what it would appear in the press. 

MAINTENANCE FOR NEW ASSETS

Senator STEVENS [presiding]. Well, Admiral, I had a call from my 

staff to tell me I could call you and tell you’re nomination is 

cleared. I decided to let you find it out in normal course, but I’m 

delighted we finally got those people straightened out that were 

holding up your nomination. 

I have a couple of questions. One is this. In the recent years, a 

large portion of your budget has gone to maintain legacy assets. 

And the question is, What about new assets? And I would like to 

ask you to give us a reply to this question, What percentage of the 

fiscal year 2007 Deepwater budget will be used for legacy asset 

maintenance? Is it going to continue to increase? is what I want 

to know. 

MARITIME BORDER SECURITY BETWEEN ALASKA AND ASIA

Second—and I’ve talked about this before, but we have a very 

large maritime—long maritime border. We harvest 60 percent of 

the fish consumed by the Americans comes from that area. This is 

an area that needs protection. And when 9/11 took place, the Coast 

Guard vessels disappeared, went down to protect Los Angeles and 

San Francisco. My people tell me that, while you have some assets 

back, the emphasis and the primary focus of the Coast Guard is 

still upon the southeast and southwest borders, and not upon the 

maritime border between Alaska and the nations of Asia. 

Now, what is being done to secure those borders? Are we going 

to bring some of these assets back and restore the patrols? Are we 

going to use the Predator or some means of UAVs for the future? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. I’ll start from the back and work forward, if I can there. As you know, we’ve done two Predator tests 

in Alaska in the previous two summers. We’re doing another Predator test this coming summer; and that will be in conjunction with 

Customs and Border Protection, to see if we can come in alignment 

with the joint requirements as regards to unmanned aerial vehicles. So, we continue to have—— 
22 

1 CGC MUNRO is scheduled to move homeports from Alameda, CA to Kodiak, AK in the third 

quarter of fiscal year 2007. 2 CGC STORIS is scheduled to be decommissioned in fiscal year 2007. 

Senator STEVENS. Let me interrupt you. Those are dissimilar. 

One is onshore, the other is out there on the maritime border. As 

far as keeping the vessels that are invading our waters—these 

enormous vessels now coming in, harvesting the fish of the deep 

ocean, those are the assets we’re interested in. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. And we are, too. We feel that unmanned aerial vehicles are a way to give us better coverage up 

there, so we can detect those incursions. We also, as you know, are 

decommissioning the Storis and putting a 378-foot cutter in Kodiak, which is a much more capable platform, also helo capable, to 

be able to more effectively work the boundary line and also the 

Gulf of Alaska. It’s our intent to maintain the commitments for the 

footprints we have with the cutters that are already up there, and 

sustain our presence up there, sir. 

Senator STEVENS. All right. Well, I want you to know, I’m going 

to seek your help. I intend to go to the United Nations and talk 

to them about some way to control these marauding international 

vessels now that are fishing in the deep waters of the ocean. They 

are really vacuum cleaning the bottom, they’re intersecting our migratory fish. And I do believe that it’s time that we tried to get 

some international cooperation in that regard, as we did with the 

drift nets. Now, your agency was very helpful to us in identifying 

the drift nets when they came across the maritime boundary into 

U.S. waters. I want to start getting some statistics on how many 

of these vessels are coming into our waters and how long they stay 

in our waters. They’re not coming to our shores. They’re just coming into the waters, international waters on our side of the maritime boundary; and we believe they’re intersecting our migratory 

fish, particularly the salmon. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator STEVENS. We need a restoration of this—the security 

forces on that border. I think it’s as important to the country as 

what you’re doing with regard to individuals coming into the country illegally. These vessels are coming into areas we’ve declared to 

be the exclusive U.S. zone for fishing. And we need some enforcement of that zone. That’s all there is to is. 

So, I’d look forward to working with you on it. But I would like 

to know, What will be—for the record—What will be the assets 

that are available for the maritime boundary in Alaska for this 

year? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. If I could, I’d provide that for the 

record, sir. 

[The information follows:] 

PATROLLING THE MARITIME BOUNDARY LINE

The following Coast Guard assets will be available for patrolling the maritime 

boundary line (MBL) in Alaska this year. 

Coast Guard assets based within Alaska: 

—High Endurance Cutters.—CGC 1 Alex Haley (WHEC–39) 

—Medium Endurance Cutters.—CGC 2 STORIS (WMEC–36)—CGC ACUSHNET 

(WMEC–167) 
23 

3 AIRSTA Kodiak remains programmed for five C–130’s, but one is currently located in Elizabeth City, NC and being used to prototype the SELEX airborne radar. This fifth AIRSTA Kodiak 

C–130 is scheduled to return on or about September 2007. 

—Number of C–130 aircraft.—4.3

Coast Guard Pacific Area assets based outside of Alaska: 

—High Endurance Cutters.—10.1

—Number of C–130 aircraft.—9. 

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator STEVENS. Appreciate your courtesy, Admiral. 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you, sir. 

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were 

submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JUDD GREGG

ACCESS TO THE US VISIT DATABASE

Question. What would it cost to make the database accessible to boarding teams? 

Answer. The costs are unknown at this time. As the Coast Guard learns more 

about the requirements for the US VISIT/IDENT system during the operational prototypes, we will have a better understanding of costs. 

Question. Does the Coast Guard currently have access to the US VISIT database? 

Answer. Yes. However, the equipment currently available is not designed for use 

in a maritime environment, thereby limiting its effectiveness. We are working with 

US VISIT program managers to improve the equipment. 

Question. What is needed to make the USCG’s access to this system seamless? 

Answer. Coast Guard units conducting patrols need improved database 

connectivity and better portable equipment to use the US VISIT/IDENT system. We 

are working with US VISIT/IDENT to improve the at-sea connectivity and portable 

equipment so that Coast Guard boarding teams have seamless access. 

Question. Why does the USCG need access to this system? 

Answer. Currently, the Coast Guard has no electronic means of identifying people 

who are trying to illegally enter the country via maritime routes. Having the ability 

to collect biometrics and access US VISIT/IDENT, will enable the Coast Guard to 

identify and stop felons and potential terrorists from entering the United States. 

Question. Do the boarding teams? Why not? 

Answer. Yes, a few boarding teams are prototyping the equipment. There are 

some unique challenges for the Coast Guard in using the US VISIT/IDENT equipment and database. Having real-time access to the database requires T1 line 

connectivity. Coast Guard units patrolling on the water have limited data 

connectivity, making real-time access to the US VISIT/IDENT database challenging. 

Additionally, there are limited technologies for biometrics collection in a maritime 

environment (i.e. challenges in obtaining rugged, compact, water proof, transportable equipment). 

We are working with US VISIT/IDENT to resolve equipment and database 

connectivity issues. 

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

Question. How does the Coast Guard share its intelligence reports with other 

parts of DHS and the rest of the Intelligence Community? 

Answer. The Coast Guard has standard connectivity through telephone (both classified and unclassified systems), standard Internet connectivity, video teleconferencing and connectivity at secured levels of classification. Coast Guard intelligence 

products are routinely posted and shared with other DHS and Intelligence Community members through these means. 

In addition, the Coast Guard is an active member of the DHS Information Sharing and Collaboration (ISC) Program. As a member of this program, we are part of 

the overall initiative within the Department that seeks to improve information shar-
24 

ing and collaboration within each of the directorates of the Department, DHS elements, across the cabinet level departments and agencies, and with our State, tribal, territorial, local and private sector partners responsible for securing the people 

and infrastructure of this country. 

Question. Do you share or post your entire reports or just their conclusions? 

Answer. It is common practice for the Coast Guard’s Intelligence Coordination 

Center (ICC) to share intelligence reports with other DHS agencies and the Intelligence Community through messages and/or posting on a web-site, accessible 

through various classified systems. These products are generally posted in their entirety, typically including analysts’ comments and conclusions. 

USCG’S ROLE IN DETECTING AND RESPONDING TO WMDS

Question. What is Coast Guard’s role in detecting and responding to WMDs? 

Answer. The Coast Guard has a non-redundant radiological and nuclear material 

detection program that is tailored for the maritime environment and has the ability 

to detect, localize, characterize and identify radioactive and nuclear materials at sea 

through the use of personal portable search tools. 

Alarm and detection resolution procedures include utilization of Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Laboratory Scientific Services (LSS) and Department of Energy—Radiological Assistance Program regional response teams. Response to a 

WMD incident would be conducted in accordance with the National Response Plan. 

The Coast Guard works with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) in 

protecting our Nation from WMDs that are radiological and nuclear (RadNuc). The 

Coast Guard is key in domestic maritime interception and investigation of illegal 

transport and usage of RadNuc materials. Working with DNDO and its interagency 

network including CBP, the Coast Guard plays an active role in determining appropriate action when a vessel with WMDs approaches the United States. 

ARMED AIRCRAFT

Question. When do you anticipate arming your entire fleet? 

Answer. The Coast Guard plans to modify all helicopters to support Airborne Use 

of Force (AUF) missions in a plug and play manner, however, not all helicopters will 

be actually armed at all times. To conserve costs, the Coast Guard intends to train 

and arm regional units which can deploy nationwide to support AUF missions in 

a matter of hours. The Coast Guard’s AUF plan is planned to be fully implemented 

by fiscal year 2010. 

Question. I understand that aircraft armed with the airborne use of force package 

are 100 percent effective in stopping smuggling vessels. 

What percentage of your aircraft is currently armed? 

Answer. The percentage of currently armed Coast Guard helicopters is as follows: 

Total Operational Armed Percentage 

HH–60J .......................................................................... 41 34 9 22 

HH–65 ........................................................................... 95 84 ........................ ........................

MH–68 (HITRON) ........................................................... 8 8 8 100 

CG TOTAL ......................................................... 144 126 17 11 

Question. If more funds were available, could the process of arming the fleet be 

sped up? 

Answer. Yes. 

REVIEW OF OPTIONS RELATED TO DEEPWATER

Question. The Coast Guard is currently reviewing its options relative to contract 

renewal, competition, or in house management. Describe for me the advantages and 

disadvantages of using an integrator. 

Answer. The Deepwater Systems Integrator (Integrated Coast Guard Systems 

(ICGS)) provides several notable advantages relative to Integration, Contract Management, Private Sector Expertise, and Buying Power. Some examples are: 

—Integration.—A System Integrator ensures discipline by enforcing commonality 

across the system. A review of system level requirements reveals 85 percent 

commonality in C4ISR alone. This permits all assets to share near real time information through a Common Operating Picture. 

—Contract Management.—In 2003, a crisis in the safety and reliability of the 

HH–65 required the acceleration of the HH–65 re-engining plan. Under expedited circumstances, ICGS obtained replacement engines, installation kits, and 
25 

re-engining expertise that led to the first re-engine operational aircraft in less 

than 8 months and a plan, now being executed, to re-engine all 84 operational 

aircraft by June 2007, approximately 2 years before the originally scheduled delivery of the first MCH. 

—Private Sector Expertise.—ICGS is a partnership of Northrop Grumman and 

Lockheed Martin. These defense industry powerhouses apply both ‘‘state-of-theart’’ and ‘‘state of the market’’ (i.e. non-developmental) technological expertise 

to Coast Guard requirements. 

—Buying Power.—ICGS can take advantage of economies of scale with commonality and volume purchases of equipment and subsystems across asset lines 

that position the Coast Guard for lower life cycle operating costs due to standardization. 

A System Integrator takes a ‘‘Top Down’’ approach that leverages cooperation and 

coordination across the System of Systems, instead of the traditional ‘‘Bottom Up’’ 

approach that looks at each asset individually. Without a Systems Integrator, interoperability across the enterprise would be extremely difficult to achieve. Interoperability is a key foundation of the system’s ability to meet mission performance requirements. Independent development of architecture and interfaces would result in 

assets (cutters and aircraft) that would not be able to effectively communicate with 

each other. Such an asset-centric approach invariably introduces increased costs and 

reduced efficiency. 

SUCCESS OF DEEPWATER PROGRAM

Question. Given some of Deepwater’s design flaws, delays, mission requirements 

changes, etc., how would you rate the success of the Deepwater program to date? 

Answer. Overall the Deepwater Program has been successful. There have been 

some challenges that both the Prime Contractor and the Coast Guard have worked 

hard to overcome, but the successes have outweighed the challenges. In fact, recent 

GAO testimony cited the Coast Guard’s continued improvement in the management 

of major acquisitions, foremost of which is the Deepwater Program. Visible operational successes include the 300 people saved by the re-engined HH–65 helicopters 

after Hurricane Katrina and the record drug seizures that were greatly facilitated 

by the C4ISR upgrades to the Coast Guard’s fleet of legacy assets. In addition, the 

first Maritime Patrol aircraft just rolled off the production line and the first National Security Cutter, our largest asset, is approximately 49 percent complete and 

is scheduled for delivery in early 2008. As asset design and production timelines 

continue to advance, the successes will continue to multiply. 

INTELLIGENCE’S ROLE IN MARITIME SECURITY

Question. What is the role of intelligence in maritime security? 

Answer. The role of intelligence in maritime security is to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and provide information on actual or potential threats relative to terrorism, drug trafficking, alien smuggling or other unlawful activity in the 

maritime realm. 

The Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations program collects, processes and analyzes information from around the United States and abroad in order 

to provide actionable intelligence to field commanders and enable informed decision 

making by the Coast Guard and other government agencies. 

Program activities have been enhanced to assist in identifying maritime threats. 

These include: 

—Creation of Field Intelligence Support Teams (FISTs) in various key U.S. ports; 

—Development of a Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC) under each Area 

Commander, to provide actionable intelligence to Coast Guard operational commanders, while also sharing that analysis with interagency partners; 

—Development of a joint support effort, COASTWATCH, with the Office of Naval 

Intelligence, to screen arriving ships and crews; and 

—Permanent presence on the FBI National Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 

and select regional JTTFs. 

BANDWIDTH CHALLENGE

Question. Admiral, during a recent ship visit my staff was impressed by the ingenuity of your staff in creating an integrated, interactive common operating picture. 

However, it seems that the crew’s ability to access this information was limited by 

bandwidth. 

Is the bandwidth challenge a technical issue, a funding issue, or a combination 

of both? 
26 

Answer. Bandwidth limitations are due to a combination of both funding and satellite availability. Currently, the Coast Guard uses commercial satellites for underway connectivity because of the limited availability of Department of Defense satellite bandwidth in certain areas of operation. Satellite technology is costly. Because 

of this, the Coast Guard closely monitors and strategically allocates available bandwidth to best support critical underway operations. 

Question. What would it cost to increase bandwidth and what would be the resultant impact on Coast Guard operations if the ships were equipped with greater bandwidth? 

Answer. The Coast Guard Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) C4ISR Implementation Plan provides for a common C4ISR design for all IDS assets that will improve 

the Coast Guard’s overall Surveillance, Detection, Classification, and Identification 

capabilities. Therefore, full funding of the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2007 request of 

approximately $60.8 million for deepwater C4ISR upgrades is critical to achieving 

more timely information sharing between Coast Guard cutters, DHS, DOD and 

other law enforcement entities. Improved information sharing will improve awareness permitting more effective identification and prosecution of all maritime threats, 

as well as improving our overall disaster and threat response capability. 

INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES

Question. What are the specific resource shortfalls? 

Answer. A critical element of the assets and systems making up the Deepwater 

program is their ability to fill operational gaps. As was addressed in the Coast 

Guard’s operational gap analysis report submitted to Congress with the fiscal year 

2007 budget request, the action plan to deliver the operational capabilities and requirements specified in the revised Deepwater implementation plan is a 25-year effort. This long-term plan requires a fine balance between removing legacy assets 

from service to realize system cost savings, while maintaining sufficient system capacity to not exacerbate current operational gaps. 

The plan results in near-term operational hour shortfalls followed by the steep, 

long-term gains in operational capability and capacity as new Deepwater assets 

reach full follow-on production capacity. The current gap in patrol boat hours has 

been complicated by the unsatisfactory results of the 123-foot conversion program. 

Unfortunately, this solution of converting our legacy 110-foot patrol boats has not 

provided the bridge to the future Fast Response Cutter (FRC) that we had hoped. 

As a result, we have taken steps to advance the FRC by 10 years from the original 

plan in order to restore this critical capacity as quickly as possible. 

The Coast Guard will continue to mitigate operational gaps in the near term, 

while striving for the future Deepwater fleet that will exceed current legacy capability and capacity. The capabilities call forth in the post-9/11 revised Deepwater implementation plan will be delivered methodically and prudently over the next 25 

years. 

Question. I understand that USCG is not able to act on all actionable intelligence 

because of a shortage of resources. Is this true? 

Answer. Given the variety of missions the Coast Guard conducts on a daily basis, 

there are periods when the Coast Guard does not have enough cutters and aircraft 

patrolling to respond to all drug and migrant smuggling intelligence reports. 

Question. What percentage of your actionable intelligence are you not able to act 

on? 

Answer. The Coast Guard receives numerous intelligence reports on a daily basis 

across all missions areas with varying degrees of reliability and credibility. For this 

reason, it is challenging to determine the percentage of actionable intelligence reports the Coast Guard is unable to act on. However, Coast Guard operational commanders use these intelligence reports daily to make risk-based decisions on how 

and where to utilize all of their assets. 

For the counter-drug mission alone, the number of actionable events is collected 

in the interagency Consolidated Counterdrug Database (CCDB). The CCDB information indicates that detection and monitoring assets (primarily Maritime Patrol Aircraft) detected 31.5 percent of known smuggling events in the Transit Zone between 

January 2000 and June 2005. 

Question. How do you prioritize which intelligence reports you act on and which 

you do not? 

Answer. The Coast Guard attempts to act on all tactical intelligence reports. However, Operational Commanders must make risk-based decisions using their 

professsional judgement and considering the reliability of the intelligence, available 

assets, other missions and timeliness of the required response. 

Question. What activities are we not interdicting due to a lack of resources? 
27 

Answer. Under the leadership of the Administration and Congress, the Coast 

Guard has significantly enhanced nationwide maritime security, leveraging its longstanding partnerships and unique maritime authorities and capabilities. However, 

‘‘you don’t know what you don’t know’’ and hence challenges remain for the Nation 

in maritime border security. 

There are dozens of nations in Central and South America and the Caribbean 

close enough that maritime trafficking of migrants, drugs, or other illegal commodities remains a constant threat. 

As on land, we know that there are numerous professional migrant smuggling 

rings that operate in the maritime realm. Some operate in the Caribbean or from 

nations further south, such as Ecuador. Meanwhile, Haiti and the Dominican Republic are the launching point for thousands of illegal migrants each year; Cuba, 

one of the designated State Sponsors of Terrorism, sits just south of the Florida 

Keys. There are no highways or deserts to cross between Cuba and the United 

States—only 90 miles of ocean, easily crossed in 2 hours aboard a high-powered 

speedboat—and we see hundreds of such smuggling attempts every year. The proximity of U.S. population centers to the maritime domain and the diversity of maritime users present significant and wide ranging vulnerabilities. Effectively addressing these vulnerabilities requires maritime strategies that detect and defeat threats 

as far from the U.S. shores as possible. 

DUBAI PORTS WORLD ISSUE

Question. In the wake of the Dubai Ports World issue, are you making any 

changes to the way Coast Guard intelligence is handled? 

Answer. While the Coast Guard Intelligence Program is committed to continuous 

improvement, our after-action review of the intelligence support provided with respect to the proposed acquisition by Dubai Ports World (DPW) did not indicate a 

need to change any significant aspects of our process. 

RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS AT SEA

Question. What is the Coast Guard doing to locate WMDs, in particular radiological materials, at sea? 

Answer. The Coast Guard has the ability to detect, localize, characterize and identify radioactive and nuclear materials at sea through the use of personal portable 

search tools. Alarm and detection resolution procedures include utilization of Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Laboratory Scientific Services (LSS), co-located 

at the National Targeting Center (NTC). Department of Energy—Radiological Assistance Program regional response teams provide 24/7 follow-on expert response if 

needed. 

The Coast Guard is working with DNDO in developing the latest detection equipment to improve the capability to optimally detect, locate, and identify radiological 

and nuclear (RadNuc) materials that may be onboard a given vessel. The Coast 

Guard uses its ability to locate RadNuc materials at sea, in conjunction with the 

DNDO interagency partners, to detect and deter the illegal usage and transportation of radiological material. 

USCG’S ROLE IN WMD EFFORTS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Question. How do the Coast Guard’s WMD efforts relate to those of the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office? Customs and Border Patrol? The FBI? The Department 

of Energy? 

Answer. Coast Guard WMD procedures and capabilities are uniquely designed 

and intended for operating in the maritime environment; they were developed in 

close coordination with Customs and Border Protection to ensure complementary efforts. In addition to providing training assistance, the Department of Energy—Radiological Assistance Program regional response teams serve as the Coast Guard’s 24/ 

7 follow-on expert response capability if needed. Four Coast Guard Liaison Officers 

are detailed to the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office; Coast Guard response protocols include notification and interagency coordination procedures for interacting 

with the Federal Bureau of Investigation for all WMD/terrorism-related incidents. 

In addition, DNDO is assisting the USCG by looking at the development and testing of next generation RAD/NUC detection equipment and specifically looking at 

that equipment’s potential performance in the maritime environment. 
28 

ACCELERATION OF PROGRAM COMPLETION BY 10 YEARS

Question. If funding were available to accelerate the Deepwater program toward 

a 2016, rather than 2026, completion date, how would Coast Guard spend those additional funds in fiscal year 2007? Answer. It is estimated that at least $1 billion per year would be needed to accelerate the program to a 2016 completion date. The additional funds would be allocated among the various Deepwater acquisitions projects to build the system in the 

most efficient manner possible. The administration does not have any specific plans 

for spending additional funds on the Deepwater program, however, and believes the 

funding level for Deepwater requested in the President’s 2007 budget represents the 

best acquisition strategy for the Coast Guard in light of competing homeland security priorities. 

EXPEDITED PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT

Question. Could procurement of aircraft be expedited if additional resources were 

available? 

Answer. Additional aircraft could be procured if additional funds were available. 

The EADS CASA production facility has the capacity to build more aircraft to Coast 

Guard specifications. 

UNIQUE MARITIME SECURITY CAPABILITIES

Question. What unique maritime security capabilities does the Coast Guard bring 

to the table among Federal agencies? 

Answer. Serving as the Nation’s maritime 9–1–1 emergency service, defender, regulator and ‘‘cop on the beat,’’ the Coast Guard is unique in the Federal Government. 

Using its Title 10 and 14 authorities, the Coast Guard can function in a national 

defense or law enforcement role. 

The Coast Guard has a vast array of highly skilled personnel, assets and infrastructure to leverage in maritime security. Its vessels range from small boats to patrol boats to large, flight-deck equipped cutters. Its aircraft include shipboard and 

land-based helicopters, as well as fixed-wing aircraft. It is converting many of its 

helicopters to include Airborne Use of Force (AUF) capability. The Coast Guard also 

has a robust command and control network across the Nation, ensuring Coast 

Guard units are ready to respond at a moments notice. 

The Coast Guard has also added special capabilities specifically for maritime security, such as Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs) and the Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT). Embedded within these deployable teams are specialized sub-capabilities, including: Integrated Anti-Swimmer systems; Explosive Detection Dog Teams; Close Quarters Combat capability; and surface interdiction capability. 

During the response to Hurricane Katrina, the Nation saw the value of a ready, 

aware and responsive Coast Guard. Rescuing more than 33,000 people in a 2-week 

period, Coast Guard men and women from around the Nation contributed to this 

historic operation. Of course that was the most visible Coast Guard achievement in 

2005; from record-breaking drug interdictions to continued implementation of the 

Maritime Transportation Security Act, the Coast Guard again demonstrated tremendous value to the Nation. 

No one can predict the timing of the next catastrophic event akin to Katrina, or 

whether it will be natural or man-made. Nonetheless, history tells us it will come. 

When it does, it will be vital that we have done all we can to build a Coast Guard 

that is prepared to answer the call, supremely aware of the maritime environment 

and poised for dependable response. 

IMPACT OF TIGHTENING LAND AND AIR SECURITY

Question. What is the likely impact of tightening land and air security on maritime security? 

Answer. Most criminal actors, whether terrorists, smugglers or others, will exploit 

the path of least resistance. In this case, if air and land security are perceived by 

actors as more difficult to overcome than maritime security, they are more likely 

to consider and use the maritime domain to advance their criminal ends. 

EVIDENCE OF ENTRANCE

Question. Do you have any evidence that terrorists have tried or are currently trying to enter this country by sea? 

Answer. Yes. An unclassified example is Ahmed Ressam (AKA Bennie Norris the 

‘‘Millennium Plot’’ bomber), who entered the United States on Dec. 30, 1999 via 
29 

ferry from Canada. Additional examples, relating to known or suspected terrorists 

or associates of terrorists attempting to enter the United States by sea, can be provided in a classified response. 

KNOWN MARITIME TERRORIST THREATS

Question. Will you describe the types of known threats and targets that exist in 

the maritime domain? 

Answer. Maritime threats typically involve some type of exploitation of the maritime environment by terrorists, criminals, or other adversaries for criminal or other 

prohibited enterprises. Examples include: smuggling (all types, including black market), piracy, hijackings, environmental crimes, living marine resource exploitation, 

illegal seabed exploitation, etc. The threat may also consist solely of using maritime 

conveyances to transport people, weapons, and/or materials to a location ashore 

where a terrorist or other criminal act is planned. Maritime targets are generally 

people, conveyances, cargos, and/or critical infrastructure in or near the maritime 

realm. 

Examples of maritime terrorist threats and their targets include: 

—Bombing a passenger vessel—Superferry 14 which was bombed by elements of 

the Abu Sayyaf Group. 

—Small boat attacks on off-shore oil facilities—Attack against Kwar Al Amaya oil 

terminal and Al Basrah oil terminal in Iraq. 

—Small boat attacks on maritime security/naval forces—Attacks by the Liberation 

Tigers of Tamil Eelam against Sri Lankan Navy forces, attack on U.S.S. Cole, 

and targeting of U.S. vessels by Jemaah Islamiyah in Singapore. 

—Small boat attacks on commercial vessels—Attack on the French Supertanker 

LIMBERG. 

—Raids and kidnap for ransom operations on Island resorts—Abu Sayaaf group 

attacks on dive resorts in Indonesia and the Southern Philippines. 

CONNECTION BETWEEN MIGRANT AND DRUG SMUGGLERS AND TERRORISTS

Question. What kinds of connections do you see between migrant and drug smugglers and potential terrorists? 

Answer. There are strong connections between drug smugglers and several South 

American groups currently designated as terrorist organizations, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) and the United Self-Defense Forces of 

Columbia (AUC). There have also been isolated instances of individuals with potential connections to Islamic extremists using maritime conveyances controlled by traditional migrant smuggling organizations. 

SECURITY OF MARITIME BORDERS

Question. As you may know, I have been a strong advocate of tightening up our 

land border security so that we know who is coming into and leaving this country. 

What gaps do you see in the security of our maritime borders? 

Answer. Our maritime borders are vulnerable to exploitation by criminal or other 

enterprises. Examples include: smuggling (all types, including black market), piracy, 

hijackings, environmental crimes, living marine resource exploitation, seabed exploitation, etc. 

Intelligence gaps exist within the maritime borders. In addition to the obvious 

challenges of securing over 95,000 miles of coastline, bad actors have traditionally 

been extremely innovative in adapting their modes of operations in response to 

tightening of security within the land boarders. Some of the most critical maritime 

gaps include: subsequent movement of people and drugs in response to changing security conditions; the use of small recreational vessels for illegal purposes; and the 

dependency on self-reporting by the maritime industry to provide the majority of the 

information available on the crew and cargo of commercial vessel traffic. 

HIGHEST MARITIME RISKS

Question. What are some of the highest risks in the maritime domain? 

Answer. Transfer scenarios dominate the strategic terror-related risk map. These 

scenarios involve the movement of terrorist actors and/or weapons of mass destruction though the maritime domain/across the maritime border by large commercial 

vessels or small commercial/recreational vessels. 

The Coast Guard conducts an annual terror-related risk assessment, taking threat 

inputs from the National Intelligence Community through the Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, target vulnerability and consequence data from its 

Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model (MS–RAM) and other sources. As part 
30 

of this process, the Coast Guard identifies critical risk scenarios (in general, those 

involving the potential loss of more than 1000 lives or similar magnitude damages). 

The Coast Guard identified over thirty such scenarios, which distill to these nine 

‘‘meta-scenarios:’’ 

—Transfer of terrorists into the country via the maritime domain 

—Transfer of weapons of mass destruction into the country via the maritime domain 

—‘‘U.S.S. Cole-Style’’ attacks on specific types of large vessels 

—Attacks on assets protected under other plans (dams, locks and levees) 

—Aviation attacks on maritime assets (small aircraft used as a weapon) 

—Stand-off weapons attacks against specific ships (anti-tank missile) 

—Vehicle born improvised explosive device attacks on ‘‘roll-on, roll-off’’ type ferries 

—Biological attacks (smallpox on a cruise ship) 

—Rogue ship threat against offshore petroleum terminal 

This year’s assessment is ongoing. Major changes are not expected; transfer/exploitation scenario dominance is expected to continue. 

The Coast Guard is also about to embark on its second biennial National Maritime Strategic Risk Assessment cycle, addressing risk across the entire spectrum of 

Coast Guard mission performance. 

CLOSING THE GAP: POLICY ISSUE OR FUNDING ISSUE?

Question. Is closing these gaps and addressing these risks a policy issue or a funding issue? 

Answer. As we have witnessed since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, addressing maritime security risks requires both policy and investment efforts. 

Border security is a national effort. The challenges of border security require significant policy coordination between Federal stakeholders, as well as meaningful 

and productive engagement with State, local and tribal authorities. Adaptive threats 

will invariably reapportion to exploit our weaknesses, necessitating holistic and 

well-coordinated border security solutions. An integrated approach to policy and 

strategy will assure appropriate, balanced security risk management. Hard choices 

must be made. The choices must be informed by good risk management practices 

from objective setting, to assessment, to analysis of alternatives, to management selection based on expected risk-reduction return-on-investment, to implementation 

and monitoring. 

As Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for maritime homeland security, the Coast Guard 

is leveraging its relationships with other Federal, State, local and tribal authorities, 

as well as international, industry, academic and think-tank partners, to evolve toward a smarter, more coordinated approach to maritime and border security policy. 

Funding an effective maritime security strategy is also a significant issue. With 

over 12,000 miles of coastal border to secure and a strategic imperative to push out 

the border—to identify, meet and defeat threats as early and far away as possible— 

the Coast Guard is moving aggressively to shore up the foundations of our maritime 

strategy: 

—Achieving Maritime Domain Awareness 

—Establishing and Leading a Maritime Security Regime 

—Deploying an Effective Operational Capability 

Well-coordinated risk management policy will help ensure border security performance success, appropriate readiness, and responsible resource allocation and 

use. 

Question. If a funding issue, what do you need to tighten up our maritime borders? 

Answer. With over 12,000 miles of coastal border to secure, and a strategic imperative to push out the border—to identify, meet and defeat threats as early and far 

away as possible—the Coast Guard is moving out aggressively to shore up the foundations of our maritime security strategy. 

Funding at the level requested in the President’s Budget will support major Coast 

Guard competency, capability, partnership and capacity-building initiatives. The following list illustrates major initiatives funded in the 2007 budget for each of the 

Coast Guard’s priorities: 

—Achieving Maritime Domain Awareness 

—Maritime C4ISR Enhancement (several programs) 

—Vessel Tracking Initiatives (including Nationwide AIS) 

—Maritime Awareness Global Network 

—Counter-Intelligence program 

—Establishing and Leading a Maritime Security Regime 
31 

—Personnel Security and Credentialing (including Transportation Worker Identification Credential) 

—Maritime Transportation Security Act initiatives and programs 

—Deploying an effective operational capability 

—Integrated Deepwater System 

—Integrated Command Centers (Command 2010) 

—Specialized deployable counter-terrororism capabilities 

—Maritime Security Response Teams (MSRTs) 

—Airborne-Use-of-Force capabilities 

—Boats to meet ports, waterways, and near-coastal security demands (Response 

Boat—Medium) 

IC DATABASE ACCESS

Question. Does the Coast Guard have access to all appropriate Intelligence Community databases, like the FBI’s Guardian program, US VISIT, etc? If not, why? 

Answer. The Coast Guard has direct or second party access to a variety of law 

enforcement and intelligence community databases; the scope of Coast Guard access 

has been expanding in ways that improve the effectiveness and efficiency of our Intelligence Program. 

There are databases the Coast Guard does not have direct access to due to legal 

or policy restrictions and/or IT connectivity reasons. Whenever the Coast Guard 

identifies databases important to analysis, indications and warnings to which that 

we do not have access, we seek to obtain appropriate access by coordinating directly 

with the agencies managing the databases. 

USCG AS THE LEAD IN MARITIME SECURITY

Question. In addition to FBI, the Coast Guard works closely with CBP and others. 

What makes the Coast Guard best suited to be the lead Federal maritime agency? 

Answer. The Coast Guard is the only Federal agency focused by statute, regulation and longstanding policy on law enforcement and security operations in the maritime domain. This role is reflected in numerous Congressional enactments. 

As both a military Service and a Federal Law Enforcement agency, the Coast 

Guard possesses the appropriate capability, capacity, competencies and authorities 

to lead U.S. maritime security efforts. Additionally, the Coast Guard projects a credible presence throughout the maritime domain, and it has longstanding relationships with other Federal, State and local agencies, as well as with the maritime industry itself. Its position as a member of the Intelligence Community further adds 

to a unique mix of attributes that the Coast Guard brings to maritime security. 

LEAD IN MARITIME INTELLIGENCE

Question. Does Coast Guard have the lead Federal role in maritime intelligence? 

Answer. There has been no designation of a lead Federal role in maritime intelligence. The Coast Guard, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP), and many other departments and agencies all play important roles in the maritime intelligence realm. 

Together with ONI, however, the Coast Guard has been developing the foundation 

of the Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) capability, leveraging existing facilities and shared tools at the National Maritime Intelligence Center in 

Suitland, MD. This effort will lead to more collaborative efforts in maritime intelligence. 

OVERLAP ISSUES: INTEROPERABILITY OR REDUNDANCY

Question. What areas do you see where interoperability could be approved or 

where overlap should be eliminated among Federal agencies? 

Answer. The Coast Guard regularly works with our interagency partners to improve interoperability and coordination. For example, two DHS/DOD Memorandums 

of Agreement (MOA) have been signed which will facilitate the exchange /transfer 

of DOD and USCG assets as appropriate during Maritime Homeland Defense and 

Maritime Homeland Security events. The interim Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) plan also represents a giant leap forward, by clearly delineating responsibilities related to security threat response in the maritime domain. Codifying 

MOTR in its final form would permanently institutionalize these interoperability 

and coordination improvements. Another opportunity for improvement is in the area 

of integrating command centers, either USCG /DOD integration (e.g., Joint Harbor 
32 

Operations Centers), or integrating various Federal and/or State/local agencies into 

Coast Guard Sector Command Centers. 

MARITIME BORDERS

Question. What could the Coast Guard do to tighten our maritime borders and 

better track the migration of folks into this country immediately? 

Answer. The U.S. Coast Guard is tasked by Executive Order 12807 to interdict 

undocumented migrants as far away from U.S. territory as possible. To accomplish 

this, the Coast Guard places assets in areas with historically high migration activity; primarily the Florida Straits, Windward Passage (between Cuba and Haiti), and 

the Mona Passage (between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico). Larger cutters capable of holding up to 300 migrants are positioned further away from the 

United States, while smaller patrol boats form a second tier of defense closer to 

shore. 

When operationally required, the Coast Guard will surge assets for a short duration to tighten our maritime borders. This is routinely done to counter and deter 

higher activity of migrants during seasonal or other fluctuations. The Coast Guard 

also surges resources to deter a mass migration when there are indications and 

warnings that point to the likelihood of such an event (e.g., in February 2005, following the ouster of President Aristide in Haiti). However, we can not maintain 

such a surge for an extended period without having a negative effect on other missions. 

Continued support for technology improvements and assets that improve Maritime Domain Awareness is critical for migrant interdiction and border enforcement. 

The following list provides a few examples: 

Technologies: 

—Biometrics.—The Coast Guard, in conjunction with our DHS partner agencies, 

is pursuing biometrics capabilities to better track and identify undocumented 

migrants interdicted at sea. However, this project will take some time as it is 

challenging to find/develop a system that can both function at sea and be interoperable with existing DHS and FBI systems. 

—Vessel Tracking.—The most pressing challenges we now face involve tracking 

the vast population of vessels operating in and around the approaches to the 

United States, and detecting and intercepting the small vessels used for migrant and drug smuggling, which can easily be used by terrorists seeking to do 

us harm. The Coast Guard needs as much information as possible about vessels 

operating in the maritime domain, particularly their location and identity, in 

order to enable effective and timely decisions and identify friend from foe. 

Assets: 

—Deepwater.—The Integrated Deepwater Program will deliver more capable cutters, aircraft, and sensors to the Coast Guard that can be used over a number 

of mission areas. 

—Integrated Command Centers.—Through test-beds at command centers in 

Miami, FL, Charleston, SC and elsewhere; and joint harbor operations centers 

established with the U.S. Navy in Hampton Roads, VA, and San Diego, CA; the 

power of partnerships, technology and co-location has been proven. The Coast 

Guard will continue working to expand on these successes and export them to 

other ports where feasible. 

NEEDED RESOURCES FOR MARITIME BORDERS

Question. What additional assets and resources would you need to accomplish 

this? 

Answer. With over 12,000 miles of coastal border to secure, and a strategic imperative to push out the border—to identify, meet and defeat threats as early and far 

away as possible—the Coast Guard is moving out aggressively to execute our maritime security strategy. 

Funding at the level requested in the President’s Budget will support major Coast 

Guard competency, capability, partnership and capacity-building initiatives. The following list illustrates major initiatives funded in the 2007 budget for each of the 

Coast Guard’s priorities: 

—Achieving Maritime Domain Awareness 

—Maritime C4ISR Enhancement (several programs) 

—Vessel Tracking Initiatives (including Nationwide AIS) 

—Deploying an effective operational capability 

—Integrated Deepwater System 

—Integrated Command Centers (Command 2010) 

—Continued research and expansion of biometrics capability. 
33 

USCG’S ROLE IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Question. What is the Coast Guard’s role in the Intelligence Community? 

Answer. The Coast Guard has been a member of the Intelligence Community (IC) 

since 2001 pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. The program’s overall goals are to optimize organic Coast Guard resources and leverage 

other national capabilities to provide tailored, actionable and decisive information 

in furtherance of Coast Guard missions, and contribute to the information requirements of the President, the Department of Homeland Security and our partners in 

the intelligence and law enforcement communities. 

In general terms, the Coast Guard’s role in the IC is to: 

—Collect, retain and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence to 

meet homeland security objectives; 

—Provide input into the IC decision making process on collection and analysis/ 

production issues; and 

—Provide unique access to intelligence and law enforcement information, and 

share amongst IC and law enforcement partners. 

IMPROVEMENT OF MARITIME BORDER SECURITY

Question. Which aircraft would you choose to expedite to improve maritime border 

security and how much would that cost? 

Answer. Acquisition of CASA–235 MPA aircraft provides a rapid capacity and capability increase to maritime border security. The current cost to acquire CASA–235 

aircraft is $44 million per aircraft, which includes missionization, initial sparing and 

logistics. 

POTENTIAL OVERLAP BETWEEN FBI AND USCG

Question. The Department of Justice Inspector General and the FBI seem concerned that the Coast Guard Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST) might 

duplicate FBI Hostage Rescue Teams and SWAT teams. 

Admiral, would you care to comment on this assertion of overlapping responsibilities between the Coast Guard and the FBI and the unique role of the Coast Guard’s 

MSST? 

Answer. The Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST) were created following 

the terrorist attacks of September 11th to provide enhanced, tailored force packages 

for maritime homeland security operations, ranging from being the maritime ‘‘cop 

on the beat’’ to emergency response in our port and coastal regions. MSSTs periodically conduct local training and operations with regional Coast Guard commanders, 

FBI units and other interagency partners. They are a very flexible and agile force 

for maritime homeland security operations. 

Additionally, the Coast Guard’s Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT) was 

developed with Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) support and oversight. 

This team not only meets DHS requirements as an interoperable unit, but also 

serves as a supporting unit to the Department of Defense for its maritime homeland 

defense mission and to the FBI for operations in the port, coastal and offshore environments. Using the Coast Guard’s unique Title 10 and Title 14 authorities, the 

MSRT provides the Nation a robust maritime response force for maritime homeland 

defense and security missions. 

ANNUAL FLIGHT HOUR GAP

Question. How do you plan to address the 17,000 to 27,000 annual flight hour gap 

over the next 9 years? 

Answer. As always, the Coast Guard will carefully assess and manage risk to employ available air assets to the highest mission priorities. Your full support of the 

President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request which funds the purchase of the sixth 

CASA MPA aircraft and the missionization of MPAs 4, 5, and 6 is critical to filling 

the MPA gap as soon as possible. Once operational, these aircraft will each contribute 1,200 annual MPA flight hours. Additionally, the pending procurement of up 

to 3 Manned Covert Surveillance aircraft as provided in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal 

year 2006 appropriations will provide additional needed MPA hours to apply toward 

this gap. 

RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

Question. Do you have enough cutters and aircraft to respond to all intelligence 

reports of drug trafficking or illegal migrant activity in the maritime regions? 

Answer. Given the competing priorities of mission demands on the Coast Guard’s 

daily operations, there will always be periods when the Coast Guard does not have 
34 

enough cutters and aircraft patrolling to respond to all drug and migrant smuggling 

intelligence reports. 

MARITIME BORDER SECURITY OPERATIONS

Question. How will the significant lack of patrol boats affect maritime border security operations? 

Answer. Maritime border security is conducted everyday by our cutters, boats and 

aircraft deployed in ports, coastal zones and on the high sea. One element of overall 

service efforts, patrol boats serve as the ‘‘cops on the beat’’ within the maritime domain. 

As you know, the Coast Guard has identified a capacity gap within our patrol boat 

fleet. As this gap is filled through our existing plans and the implementation of 

Deepwater, additional capacity will be added and deployed, improving our presence 

and providing additional capabilities. Until that time we will make the best use of 

our existing patrol boat fleet, along with major cutters and boats, to maximize our 

patrol efforts. 

Question. If additional funds were available to address this gap, how would you 

use those funds? 

Answer. If additional funds were available to address the patrol boat gap the 

Coast Guard could use it to accelerate acquisition of new patrol boats. We have 

issued a Request for Information (RFI) from industry to see what existing proven 

Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) patrol boats designs are available to meet our patrol boat needs, and anticipate spending a portion of unobligated partol boat appropriations on acquiring some of these vessels. We expect to receive responses to this 

RFI by mid May 2006. 

110 FOOT PATROL BOATS

Question. Would it make any sense to buy more 110 foot patrol boats since you 

already have a good working design, especially if there are questions about the FRC 

design? 

Answer. Acquiring additional 110 foot WPB’s would not meet the full range of current operational requirements. While the 110 foot WPB has been a successful asset, 

it does not possess the space to provide a robust C4ISR suite. The small boat launch 

and recovery system is labor intensive and the small boat does not meet current 

operational requirements. A Request for Information (RFI) has been issued to evaluate commercially available patrol boat platforms. This information would determine 

if other existing patrol boat designs could meet current operational requirements. 

PORT INSPECTIONS

Question. The Coast Guard is currently on target to inspect foreign ports every 

4 years. 

Is that time cycle appropriate? 

Answer. The Coast Guard visits countries to ascertain whether the country is 

maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures in its ports. The current pace of country visits is consistent with the Maritime Transportation Security Act and current 

funding levels. 

Question. How do you determine which ports you inspect on any given year? 

Answer. The Coast Guard prioritized all countries with which it trades with to 

determine the general order in which countries should be visited. The prioritization 

was based on the amount of maritime trade the U.S. conducts with the country and 

the general maritime security situation regarding the country. When determining 

the ports to visit within a country, the Coast Guard attempts to view a representative sample including small, medium and large ports; ports that conduct substantial 

trade with the United States; and ports with a variety of activities (e.g., container, 

liquid bulk, dry bulk, passenger, and general cargo). 

Question. What role does intelligence play in your port inspections? 

Answer. Coast Guard inspections in the ports are done for a number of different 

reasons related to the maritime safety, security, and/or environmental protection. 

Inspections involving a security purpose may be based in whole or in part on information provided by the Coast Guard Intelligence Program. Moreover, intelligence 

generally informs the situational awareness of all Coast Guard personnel conducting 

inspections, patrols or other activities in port areas. 

Coast Guard Intelligence conducts Port Threat Assessments (PTA). PTAs provide 

the local Sector Commander threat analyses for the Nation’s military and economic 

strategic ports compiled from foreign, national and local intelligence reporting and 

from law enforcement information, incorporating everything from criminal enterprises to environmental activists and extremist/terrorist-related activity. 
35 

PTAs involve a qualitative evaluation of classified intelligence reports, interviews 

with Federal and local law enforcement officials, and interviews with private sector 

security managers. Threat analyses are based on a compilation of national and domestic security intelligence along with criminal database information. 

PTAs are prepared by the Coast Guard’s Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC). 

They are the most complete and up-to-date local domestic port threat assessments 

available to field commanders for use in critical planning and resource allocation. 

We utilize open source material, as well as classified information provided by the 

Coast Guard’s Intelligence Coordination Center and the Area Intelligence staffs, to 

assist with the prioritization of port selections. In addition to assisting in the 

prioritization, this information helps to identify security issues for which to be alert 

when conducting port visits. It also provides situational awareness to help maintain 

personnel safety. 

IMPLEMENTATION OF AIS

Question. The testimony States that AIS has been implemented at several major 

ports. 

What is your timeframe to expand AIS nationwide? 

Answer. The Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS) project is pursuing a three increment implementation approach so maritime security stakeholders 

will begin receiving useful capability to fill in current operational gaps as quickly 

as possible. 

Upon DHS approval of Milestone Two, targeted for 4th Quarter, fiscal year 2006, 

the first increment will capitalize on existing preliminary and prototype efforts installed in 2005 and 2006 to expand receive only AIS capability (vessel tracking) in 

all critical ports identified in the fiscal year 2007 budget justification. 

The current estimated schedule [Initial Operating Capability (IOC) and Full Operating Capability (FOC) dates] for implementation of the individual increments is as 

follows: 

Increment 1 2 3 

Description ............... receive only at critical ports 

and coastal areas.

receive and transmit nationwide.long-range receive 

IOC ........................... 1st Quarter, fiscal year 2007 ... 4th Quarter, fiscal year 2009 .. 1st Quarter, fiscal year 2010 

FOC ........................... 4th Quarter, fiscal year 2007 .. 4th Quarter, fiscal year 2013 .. 4th Quarter, fiscal year 2013 

Question. What resources are required to fully implement this system? 

Answer. The total Acquisition, Construction and Improvement (AC&I) cost estimate for Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS), as reported in the fiscal year 2007 to 2011 Five-Year Capital Investment Plan is $196,200,000. 

MARITIME BORDER SECURITY OPERATIONS

Question. Patrol boats are an integral part of the Coast Guard’s fleet and are critical to maritime border security. USCG is currently short several boats, due to the 

Iraq mission and 123-conversion problems and may be plagued with further shortfalls if the rumors are true and the Navy asks for its 5 Patrol Coastal craft back 

in 2008 and if the FRC is further delayed. USCG is already operating with fewer 

patrol boat hours than it had in 1998, and at about half the number of hours called 

for by the Deepwater Plan to meet the mission requirements. 

How does the USCG plan to address this shortfall? 

Answer. The USCG plans to address this shortfall through continued negotiations 

with the Navy in an effort to extend the current WPC–179 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) beyond fiscal year 2008. If agreed upon with the current number of 

PC–179s, this would reduce the patrol boat hour gap by 12,500 hours per year. 

Also, when the six 110 foot WPBs serving in southwest Asia in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom are returned to the continental United States, they will provide an additional 12,000 patrol boat hours per year. 

The Coast Guard has submitted an Industry Request for Information for proven 

patrol boat designs. Once the responses to this request are received in May 2006, 

we will consider this information for a risk mitigator to filling our patrol boat gap. 

Accelerated schedule for implementing TWIC 

Question. The testimony States that you are working with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) on an accelerated schedule for implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). As you know, this Committee 

has supported the TWIC program but has been frustrated by implementation 

delays. 
36 

After years of delay, when do you expect that this program will be ready for implementation? 

Answer. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) is a top Departmental priority, and I have directed my team to move forward with the program 

as quickly as possible. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) recently 

published a ‘‘request for qualifications’’ seeking firms who are appropriately experienced and interested to help deploy certain components of the TWIC program. This 

is a first step toward operational deployment of the TWIC program that will require 

workers with unescorted access to U.S. port facilities and vessels to undergo security threat assessments and obtain a biometric TWIC credential. This deployment 

will follow completion of an accelerated rulemaking conducted jointly by TSA and 

Coast Guard. 

Question. What is the Coast Guard’s role in this program? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration and the United States Coast 

Guard (USCG) are cooperating in a joint rulemaking that requires all workers requiring unescorted access to secure areas of Maritime Transportation Security Act 

(MTSA) regulated facilities and vessels to apply for and obtain a Transportation 

Worker Identification Credential. 

The USCG would be responsible for enforcing this proposed rule at the MTSA regulated facilities and vessels. 

DEPLOYMENT OF US VISIT

Question. Why is only one maritime port equipped to handle exits? 

Answer. US VISIT’s biometric exit process is at 2 seaports: San Pedro and Long 

Beach terminals in Los Angeles, California; and Miami, Florida. These seaports 

were part of the pilot program for the exit solution. Upon approval to proceed with 

the national deployment of the Exit Solution, US VISIT will deploy at all remaining 

ports where US VISIT is currently operating for entry (excluding preclearance operations at foreign airports). 

Question. Which kinds of maritime ports are currently subject to US VISIT? 

Cruise ship ports? Fishing ports? Ferry ports? Yachting ports? 

Answer. Under the law, all sea ports are subject to US VISIT. However, several 

issues pose challenges to the deployment of US VISIT at all sea ports of entry. Unlike airports, there are no regulatory requirements for a Federal Inspection Services 

(FIS) inspection area for sea ports of entry. Additionally, a number of ports lack 

connectivity necessary for accessing government databases. Therefore, we are currently only deployed at those cruise ports and ferry terminals that been upgraded 

to include an FIS area. 

For those terminals not covered by US VISIT, Customs and Border Protection officers will board the ship and conduct an inspection onboard. US VISIT, in conjunction with Customs and Border Protection, is exploring the use of new mobile devices 

that could perform the biometric and documentation screening functions. Subject to 

funding, US VISIT plans to use these devices to expand coverage to the cargo crew 

population 

There are a number of small, private and community seaports (yachting) where 

US VISIT is not in operation. These smaller ports do not have pre-existing infrastructure to support the technology necessary to conduct biometric entry processes 

in the same manner as is now done at the cruise terminals. US VISIT believes any 

mobile devices developed for the larger sea ports of entry could also be used in these 

smaller seaports. 

Question. I understand that US VISIT is deployed in several ports of entry and 

only one exit port. What percentage of maritime ports is currently covered in the 

program? 

Answer. US VISIT’s biometric entry process is at 13 sea ports of entry, including: 

Galveston, Texas; San Pedro/Long Beach, California; Miami, Florida; Port Canaveral, Florida; San Juan, Puerto Rico; Seattle (2 terminals), Washington; Tampa, 

Florida; Vancouver, Canada; Victoria, Canada; West Palm Beach, Florida; Port Everglades, Florida; New York City Seaport, New York; and Port Canaveral (2 terminals), Florida. There are 64 sea ports of entry, and US VISIT entry procedures covers 20 percent of those ports. 

US VISIT’s biometric exit process is at 2 sea ports of entry: San Pedro/Long Beach 

terminals in Los Angeles, California; and Miami, Florida. There are 64 sea ports of 

entry, and US VISIT exit procedures covers 3 percent of those ports. For further 

statistics on volume and types of ports (cruise vs. cargo), please consult Customs 

and Border Protection. 
37 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY

UTILIZATION OF FISCAL YEAR 2006 RESOURCES

Question. Specifically, how you, and the Deepwater Contractor intend to utilize 

the fiscal year 2006 funding? 

Answer. The $68 million appropriated in fiscal year 2006 will be utilized to procure two aircraft (aircraft number 4 and 5) and missionization and logistics required 

to place the aircraft in a ‘‘mission ready’’ status. 

UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES

Question. If the funds will not be dedicated to the acquisition of the fourth and 

fifth MPA, why not? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2006 funds will be dedicated to the acquisition of the 

fourth and fifth MPA. 

RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

Question. The President’s fiscal year 2007 budget continues funding for the important Integrated Deepwater Systems program to update the operational ability of the 

United States Coast Guard. This essential program will bring the Coast Guard’s capabilities in line with 21st century technology and equip the Coast Guard with the 

necessary tools to protect our Nation’s coast line and shipping channels. 

My question is whether this year’s funding request by the President is sufficient 

to carry out this retooling and refitting in a timely manner. 

Answer. The fiscal year 2007 budget request of $934 million represents a nearly 

25 percent increase from fiscal year 2005. It is consistent with the $24 billion/25- 

year implementation plan presented in the revised implementation plan report submitted to Congress. 

Question. Does Congress need to accelerate the funding of Deepwater to accomplish its mission sooner? 

Answer. The administration believes the funding level for Deepwater requested in 

the President’s 2007 budget represents the best acquisition strategy for the Coast 

Guard in light of competing homeland security priorities. Furthermore, GAO and 

other studies and have shown that accelerated funding for an acquisition project as 

large and complex as Deepwater will generate only marginally better results relative to the significant additional costs of acceleration. 

Question. Specifically within the Deepwater program is the CASA CN–235 300M, 

Maritime Patrol Aircraft. This plane is a crucial piece of the Coast Guard’s overall 

mission. It will bring state-of-the-art technology to any aerial mission the Coast 

Guard undertakes. The communications, navigational and surveillance capabilities 

of this plane will allow the Coast Guard to monitor high interest vessels, locate distressed mariners, interdict drug traffickers, and monitor environmental disturbances as well as a host of other tactically important situations. 

Seeing the critical nature of this aircraft, is the Coast Guard being sufficiently 

funded to get this plane missionized and ready for operation? 

Answer. Yes. The Deepwater fiscal year 2007 Plan Update provided to Congress 

balances several important considerations, including current priorities and operating expenses to employ these assets when delivered. To ensure the aircraft are 

‘‘ready for operations,’’ factors such as time to train the flight crews and maintenance personnel, as well as to prepare the air stations to host the aircraft when they 

arrive must be addressed. The plan provides the funds to be ‘‘ready for operations’ 

in the most effective manner. 

FISCAL YEAR 2007 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION

Question. In fiscal year 2006, the Coast Guard was appropriated $68 million for 

the acquisition of two additional aircraft for a total of five. However, I am now hearing that these funds may be used for the acquisition of one aircraft, rather than two, 

with the additional funds to be used for spare parts and other missionization requirements. I am concerned about this change in direction, particularly given that 

the fiscal year 2007 budget requests funding for one plane as well as funding for 

spare parts and other missionization requirements for the previously acquired aircraft. 

Therefore, the purchase of only one plane with the fiscal year 2006 funding seems 

inconsistent with the fiscal year 2007 budget justification. 

Answer. The $68 million appropriated in fiscal year 2006 will be utilized to procure two aircraft (aircraft numbers four and five) and one mission system. Since this 

appropriation did not include the spare parts essential for safe and efficient oper-
38 

ation of an MPA fleet, the $77.7 million requested in fiscal year 2007 will support 

the procurement of spares for six aircraft, mission system for the fifth aircraft, and 

a sixth aircraft with mission system. The funding requested in fiscal year 2007 complements the funds appropriated in fiscal year 2006, ensuring we will have six 

‘‘ready-to-fly’’ aircraft. 

DEVIATION FROM THE FISCAL YEAR 2006 BILL

Question. Could you explain for me the deviation from the fiscal year 2006 bill 

for the acquisition of two planes? 

Answer. The Coast Guard intends to procure two Martime Patrol Aircraft with 

fiscal year 2006 funds, which does not deviate from the intent of the 2006 appropriation. 

TIMELINE FOR MPA OPERATIONS

Question. Following on that line of questions, when should we expect the full compliment of aircraft to be under contract? 

Answer. We expect to have aircraft four and five on contract by the end of fiscal 

year 2006. 

Question. When should we expect the first MPA to be operational? 

Answer. The first MPA should be operational in early 2007 (calendar year). This 

initial aircraft will be assigned to Aviation Training Center Mobile in order for 

Coast Guard personnel to become familiar with the aircraft, develop and refine 

training curriculum, and establish the CASA MPA Training Branch in preparation 

for training future CASA MPA aircrews. 

Question. Is there a timetable for the additional four aircraft to be fully 

missionized and operational? 

Answer. The planned schedule for CASA MPA aircraft availability is: 

—Aircraft #1 Delivery (missionized)—2nd QTR fiscal year 2007 

—Aircraft #2 Delivery (missionized)—3rd QTR fiscal year 2007 

—Aircraft #3 Delivery (missionized)—4th QTR fiscal year 2007 

—Aircraft #4 Delivery (not yet on contract)—3rd QTR fiscal year 2008 

—Aircraft #5 Delivery (not yet on contract )—4th QTR fiscal year 2008 

—Aircraft #6 Delivery (not yet funded)—2nd QTR fiscal year 2009. 

TIMELINE FOR OUTFITTING AND OPERATION

Question. If the CASA CN–235 300M is so crucial to the Coast Guard’s mission 

is the timeline for its outfitting and operation adequate for your needs? 

Answer. Coast Guard mission execution is dependent on adequate MPA hours to 

cue end-game prosecution. As a result, the current MPA hour shortfall (between 

hours available and hours needed to satisfy mission requirements) is of key concern 

and will remain a focus of our recapitalization priorities. The CASA CN–235 300M 

replaces existing assets, provides the needed MPA capability, and is being implemented on a timeline consistent with the Revised Deepwater Implementation Plan. 

Question. Does the Coast Guard need this aircraft sooner? 

Answer. The revised Deepwater implementation plan reflected in the President’s 

fiscal year 2007 Budget Request reflects the best balance of capital asset acquisition 

within available resources. 

Question. Is the funding laid out in this plan satisfactory for the operational needs 

of the Coast Guard? 

Answer. The funding stream supporting the current implementation plan will deliver the Deepwater ‘‘system’’ of assets and capabilities by 2027. When complete, it 

will satisfy the totality of current and reasonably foreseen operational needs. Until 

that time, the Coast Guard will continue optimizing available resources to recapitalize and modernize its fleet as quickly as possible, while avoiding degradation to 

mission performance. 

Question. Should this timeline be accelerated to properly ensure the security of 

our critical shores and waterways for the safety of commerce and the protection of 

our citizens well being? 

Answer. Our strategic goal and imperative, as outlined in the President’s National 

Strategy for Homeland Security, is to detect, identify and intercept threats as far 

from the U.S. homeland as possible. In the maritime domain, the Coast Guard’s 

Deepwater assets and capabilities are a critical centerpiece of that effort. With the 

post-9/11 revised implementation plan, the Deepwater acquisition will deliver a system of maritime capabilities much better suited to the current and future threat environment. The revised implementation plan will deliver that system by the year 

2027 based on current funding levels. 
39 

The administration believes the funding level for Deepwater requested in the 

President’s 2007 budget represents the best acquisition strategy for the Coast Guard 

in light of competing homeland security priorities. Furthermore, numerous studies 

and have shown that accelerated funding for an acquisition project as large and 

complex as Deepwater will generate only marginally better results relative to the 

significant additional costs of acceleration. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT

Question. Would additional maritime patrol aircraft improve your detection capacity in the transit zone? 

Answer. Yes, Maritime Patrol Aircraft are critical to successful counter-drug operations. 

EXPEDITING FULL OPERATING CAPABILITY

Question. Could you reach full operating capability faster if additional resources 

became available? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2007 request reflects the project’s funding needs for the 

current acquisition phase. Once the Nationwide Automatic Identification System 

(NAIS) project transitions to the production phase, the project will pursue deployment and funding strategies to implement AIS capability, as quickly as possible, 

consistent with service priorities across all capital acquisitions projects. 

POTENTIAL INLAND RIVER THREATS

Question. The Port of Huntington in West Virginia is the largest inland river port 

in the United States and the 6th largest of all U.S. Seaports in terms of tonnage. 

Fifty percent of all cargo types entering the port are hazardous and there are hundreds of chemical, energy, and other critical infrastructure facilities along the waterways. The Mississippi River system extends well into the interior of the United 

States and potentially could provide access for someone wishing to threaten a city 

or facility that lies on the waterway. 

What capabilities does the Coast Guard have to track the movement of people and 

cargo and to detect or deter potential threats on the inland rivers system? 

Answer. The Coast Guard’s Inland Rivers Vessel Movement Center (IRVMC) in 

Huntington, WV, was established to track the movement of barges carrying Certain 

Dangerous Cargoes (CDC) through High Density Population Areas (HDPAs) of 

100,000 or more people. Twenty HDPAs and over 3,000 miles of navigable rivers are 

monitored by IRVMC. In addition, the Vessel Traffic System (VTS) in Louisville, KY 

also provides vessel tracking capability. 

Threat detection and deterrence activities within the inland river system are a 

part of the Coast Guard’s homeland security mission. These activities include: aerial 

surveillance of activity in and around militarily and economically strategic ports, enforcement of waterborne fixed and mobile security zones around critical infrastructure, and vessel escorts of some certain dangerous cargo (CDC) movements. 

Further, Coast Guard assets operate everyday on the inland rivers. For example, 

our River Tenders operate throughout the inland river system performing the Aids 

to Navigation mission. The personnel that operate these assets are local experts who 

know and operate daily on the river system. Additionally, our boarding teams and 

response boats conduct waterside facility inspections, enforce security zones, and respond to emerging threats as well. As the maritime ‘‘cop on the beat,’’ these small 

boats deter threats and patrol as directed by the three Coast Guard Sector Commanders that oversee operations along the entire inland river waterway system. 

MARITIME AIR PATROLS

Question. How about Maritime Air Patrols? 

Answer. Joint Interagency Task Force—South (JIATF–S) is responsible for detection and monitoring operations in the transit zone, including Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) requirements and scheduling. The Coast Guard, along with other U.S. 

agencies and foreign governments, provides both surface and air assets to support 

JIATF–S detection and monitoring operations. 

The Coast Guard has increased MPA support to the JIATF–S over the past several years. In fiscal year 2002, the Coast Guard provided less than 3,000 hours; in 

fiscal year 2005, we provided over 4,000 hours. Maintenance problems and availability issues of MPA provided by other agencies, particularly P–3s from Customs 
40 

and Border Patrol (CBP) and the United States and Dutch navies, have resulted in 

an overall decrease in MPA available for the counter-drug mission even though 

Coast Guard mission hours for JIATF–S have increased. 

Currently, the Coast Guard has approximately 32,000 total MPA hours available 

for all missions annually, including JIATF–S counter-drug support. The Coast 

Guard’s Deepwater plan will provide approximately 61,000 total MPA hours which 

meets the current and future MPA requirements for the Coast Guard. 

Full funding of the Deepwater project within the fiscal year 2007 President’s 

Budget Request is critical to closing the MPA gap. The plan funds the acquisition 

of a sixth CASA CN–235 medium range MPA, and equipment to support active operations of CASA’s 3 through 6. This year’s request includes, in particular, funding 

to support the stand up of a second CASA-equipped Air Station. 

GO-FAST BOATS

Question. The Coast Guard should be commended for their work in counter drug 

operations. In fiscal year 2005, the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection 

exceeded results from previous years by removing over 338,000 pounds of cocaine 

from the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific Ocean transit zones. 

However, the drug flow problem is far from solved. The Government Accountability Office recently reported that the Joint Interagency Task Force-South 

(JIATF–South) ‘‘has detected less than one-third of the known and actionable maritime illicit drug movements in the western Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific 

Ocean.’’ 

According to the recent GAO report, Coast Guard and CBP officials believe that 

budget constraints and other homeland security priorities will result in a reduction 

of assets in the transit zone. 

I understand that you rely on 33 foot Go-Fast boats, 110 patrol boats, and maritime airplanes to interdict drugs. What is the optimal number of Go-Fast boats and 

how does that compare to your current fleet? 

Answer. Coast Guard small boats are vital to our maritime border security mission, providing a layer of security in our ports and coastal regions. Currently, our 

33 foot boats (manufactured by SAFE Boats International) are primarily used to 

intercept smuggling vessels in selected locations along the U.S. southern border. As 

important as small boats are to Coast Guard missions, they are not the primary assets used for counter-drug operations due to their operational limitations in the high 

seas transit zones. 

The Coast Guard’s overall counter-drug strategy focuses on the transit zone which 

generally encompasses known transit routes from source countries in the Caribbean 

Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean. Joint Interagency Task Force—South (JIATF–S) is 

responsible for monitoring these operations; the Coast Guard provides major cutters 

(Deepwater), airborne use of force helicopters (AUF), maritime patrol aircraft (C– 

130/HU–25), and law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) embarked on United 

States and Allied Naval vessels to support these operations. The Coast Guard’s 

Deepwater project sets forth the service’s way forward in achieving the optimal 

asset mix for the future. 

DRUG ENFORCEMENT MISSION

Question. Based on the Coast Guard’s latest mission hour report provided to Congress, Coast Guard emphasis on drug enforcement continues to decrease. Today, the 

number of hours the Coast Guard spends on its drug enforcement mission is approximately 38.5 percent less than pre-September 11. Your fiscal year 2007 budget 

for drug interdiction is $18 million below current levels. 

Why is your budget for Drug Interdiction going down in fiscal year 2007? 

Answer. The challenge of aging cutters and aircraft, coupled with the increasing 

demands of homeland security missions, require the Coast Guard to develop an allocation of its resources to ensure the most effective mitigation of risk in executing 

each of its 11 mission programs. 

Despite the fact that funding and resource hours allocated to Drug Interdiction 

has gone down, the Coast Guard removed 338,206 pounds of cocaine (including 

nearly 303,662 pounds seized) during fiscal year 2005, a new record for drug seizures in the maritime environment. While actual time spent on the mission has remained relatively static, the Coast Guard has been able to improve performance by 

achieving operational efficiencies in excuting its Drug Interdiction operations 

The Coast Guard continues to have unprecedented success in the counterdrug 

mission by pursuing the three principles of its 10-year Strategic Counter Drug Plan 

known as STEEL WEB: 
41 

—Pursuing more tactical, actionable intelligence, then responding with flexible intelligence-driven operations; 

—Leveraging technology by fast tracking new tools and bringing more capable assets to the fight; and 

—International engagement with our counterdrug partner nations, which speeds 

up the seizure and disposition process and gains U.S. jurisdiction to help feed 

the intelligence cycle. 

These methods have not only allowed the Coast Guard to be more successful in 

its efforts to deter drug smuggling into the United States, but also made these efforts to more efficient. 

As the new Deepwater assets come online, this upward trend in seizure success 

will continue even further, while also allowing for the success in other mission areas 

as well. 

110 FOOT PATROL BOATS

Question. The Coast Guard’s 110 foot patrol boats, which are used to interdict illegal aliens and drugs, are in a ‘‘declining readiness spiral,’’ according to Commandant Collins. Coast Guard patrol boats are operating in theater less today than 

they were in 1998. Total patrol boat hours were only 75,000 in 2004 compared to 

the 1998 baseline of approximately 100,000 hours. Under the Deepwater plan, this 

gap won’t be closed until 2012 at the earliest. The Administration’s National Strategy for Maritime Security calls for a ‘‘significant commitment of security resources’’ 

to deal with illegal seaborne immigration. 

The Coast Guard is facing a crisis. The fiscal year 2007 budget pushes the development of the Fast Response Cutter to the right. Indications are that the five patrol 

crafts that are on loan from the Navy will be returned in 2008. Six 110s are operating in Iraq and may not be returned. You said that you could procure an off-theshelf patrol boat for $20–30 million a piece. 

How many are needed in the short-term to close the operational gap? 

Answer. Assuming that any replacement patrol boat was able to operate 2,500 

hours per year, the Coast Guard would require five such boats to close the current 

gap. If we return the U.S. Navy PC–179s at the end of fiscal year 2008 per the current Memorandum of Agreement and do not simultaneously gain back the 6 110 foot 

patrol boats currently deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, we would experience an additional loss of 12,500 patrol boat hours. 

PORT SECURITY PLAN REVIEW

Question. Secretary Chertoff has stated repeatedly that it is important to prevent 

terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States by eliminating 

threats before they arrive at our borders and ports. Yet, there are only 34 Coast 

Guard employees to review foreign port security plans in the 140 countries that conduct maritime trade with the United States. The Coast Guard estimates that it will 

take four to five years to audit all 140 foreign port security plans. Earlier this week, 

the Senate Appropriations Committee approved my amendment to add $23 million 

to the fiscal year 2006 Emergency Supplemental to hire additional Coast Guard inspectors to review domestic and foreign port security plans. 

How will this funding help you accelerate the review of port security plans? 

Answer. This funding would result in a temporary increase in the level of effort 

of foreign port security assessments, domestic port security assessments, as well as 

implementing spot inspections of MTSA regulated facilities. 

DESIGN REVIEW OF THE FAST RESPONSE CUTTER (FRC)

Question. The Coast Guard recently made the decision to postpone the design review of the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) and review whether to continue with the 

development of the FRC or procure another ship to replace the current fleet of patrol boats. Admiral, the Coast Guard has already pushed the production schedule 

for the FRC to the right by one year during a time when the capabilities of your 

existing patrol boats are in a declining readiness spiral. 

What implications does postponing the design work on the FRC have on the $41.5 

million requested in the fiscal year 2007 budget? 

Answer. The Fast Response Cutter (FRC) schedule requires the FRC to be ‘‘ready 

for operations’’ in 2009. Continuing with the current ‘‘new design’’ FRC will likely 

change the schedule for ‘‘ready for operations’’ to 2010. That is one of several reasons the Coast Guard is currently exploring options (i.e., an off-the-shelf design) to 

keep the FRC on schedule to be ‘‘ready for operations’’ in 2009. Implementation of 

this accelerated option is critically dependent on the $41.5 million requested in fiscal year 2007 in order to achieve that delivery date. 
42 

MARITIME DOMESTIC AWARENESS

Question. The Coast Guard’s Deepwater program includes the use of Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicles. UAVs provide a wide-area of surveillance capabilities and operate 

at a fraction of the cost of manned aircraft. 

However, under the current budget plan, the Coast Guard won’t acquire UAVs 

until 2016, at the earliest. 

Why is the Coast Guard waiting such a long time to acquire an asset that can 

improve your capability to enhance maritime domain awareness? 

Answer. The Coast Guard plan calls for the acquisition and employment of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) well before 2016. The Deepwater plan calls for the 

use of two types of UAVs. The delivery of the Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

(VUAV) is scheduled to complete Operational Test and Evaluation in December 

2011, and will operate off the National Security Cutter and the Offshore Patrol Cutter. The second unmanned aviation asset, the High Altitude Endurance Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicle (HAEUAV), is scheduled for delivery in 2016. The HAEUAV will be 

a land-based UAV with high altitude and long endurance capabilities. 

UAVS ALONG THE SOUTHERN BORDER

Question. In fiscal year 2006, this Subcommittee included funding for Customs 

and Border Protection to utilize UAVs along our southern border. 

How would the Coast Guard best use UAVs if funding became available? 

Answer. The best use of funds for a UAV in the Deepwater program would be to 

support continuation of the VUAV acquisition which is currently in System Design 

and Development. The goal is to fund the VUAV so that it can be completed and 

utilized as a component of the National Security Cutter force package. The concept 

of operations calls for the National Security Cutter to be employed with a MultiMission Cutter Helicopter (MCH) and VUAV. While the Coast Guard and Customs 

and Border Protection have some similar UAV requirements, a critical difference is 

for the maritime UAV to have a vertical launch and recovery capability in order to 

operate with Coast Guard cutters at sea. 

INSTALLATION OF RECEIVERS

Question. The Maritime Transportation Security Act, which President Bush 

signed on November 25, 2002, required vessels entering U.S. ports to have an Automatic Identification System (AIS) on board by the end of 2004 that would identify 

the ship, the size of the ship and the type of cargo on the ship when they arrived 

at U.S. ports. 

Many of our strategic ports still do not have technology to receive these signals. 

Your testimony indicates that we need to ‘‘push out our borders.’’ The AIS system 

represents an important cog in a layered security architecture. Yet, your budget for 

AIS in fiscal year 2007 is only $11.2 million, less than half of the amount provided 

in fiscal year 2006. The total acquisition cost to outfit all strategic ports is estimated 

to be $230 to 250 million. Less than a third of the total cost has been funded to 

date. 

According to a March 10, 2005 Coast Guard report on efforts to install a shorebased universal Automatic Identification System in ports nationwide, full operating 

capability would be achieved in fiscal year 2008. Yet, your fiscal year 2007 budget 

now indicates that the project will not be completed until 2011. 

Why is the Coast Guard moving so slow to install these receivers? 

Answer. The implementation approach and timeline currently being planned by 

the Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS) project is based on meeting 

operational requirements, with due regard for technical, cost and other risk factors 

required for a complete command, control, communication, computer and information technology project. A three stage incremental implementation is being pursued 

so that maritime security stakeholders will receive useful capability that begins to 

fill in operational gaps more quickly than would be otherwise possible. Upon Milestone Two (alternative selection approval from DHS) targeted for 4th Quarter, fiscal 

year 2006, the first increment will capitalize on existing preliminary and prototype 

efforts installed during 2005 and 2006 to expand receive only AIS capability (vessel 

tracking) in all critical ports identified in the fiscal year 2007 budget justification. 

With the first increment underway, the fiscal year 2007 budget request of $11.2 million, along with existing unobligated project funding, will be used to award a NAIS 

contract in fiscal year 2007 to initiate design, logistics and deployment of follow-on 

increments that provide a more robust, fully interoperable AIS capability with complete coverage of all U.S. waters and approaches. Previously reported project completion dates were based on preliminary project management estimates. As the final 
43 

requirements have matured and more has been learned, the project schedule was 

updated to reflect realistic timeframes for project completion. Currently, full system 

operating capability is expected to be delivered by 2013. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

DEEPWATER RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM

Question. What affect would a decrease in funding from the President’s Budget 

Request of $934.4 million have on the continuation of this recapitalization program? 

Answer. The following Deepwater projects are categories in the fiscal year 2007 

budget. Each requires full funding to ensure success of the recapitalization program. 

A key to success is the synchronization of asset acquisitions to produce ‘‘force packages’’ connected by a common network. This enables a synergy of operational system 

performance as depicted on the enclosed graphic. If the planned synchronization is 

delayed due to less than full funding in fiscal year 2007, then the planned capabilities will be have at least a one year delay, will be more costly to acquire in the future, and the operational performance improvements planned for the near term will 

be lost. More specifically: 

Budget category Inaequate funding impacts 

AIR: 

CASA MPA ......................................................................... Would delay ‘‘mission ready’’ status of aircraft’s 4 & 5, 

delay delivery and missionization of MPA #6; and further 

delay two air stations from receiving post 9/11 capabilities. 

VUAV and MCH (HH–65C) ................................................ Will delay delivery of assets, limit major cutter ‘‘force package’’ capabilities, limiting surveillance capability to that 

achieved by legacy surface assets. 

HH–60 projects ................................................................ Any project under funded or out of sequence will delay the 

entire upgrade and conversion sequence of the HH–60; 

this medium range helicopter is larger and more capable 

than the CG HH–65s. 

AUF projects ..................................................................... Delayed funding for Airborne Use of Force upgrades means 

that Homeland security patrols will continue to be conducted largely by unarmed aircraft that lack the capability to respond appropriately on ‘‘actionable intelligence’’. 

C–130H Conversion projects ............................................ The C–130H will continue to operate with aging, obsolete 

avionics and a troublesome radar that has provided degraded reliability for several years. 

C–130J Fleet Introduction ................................................ Will delay delivery of asset(s) or prevent ‘‘mission ready’’ 

status—prolonging the shortage of maritime patrol aircraft operating hours. 

SURFACE: 

NSC ................................................................................... Each day of delay means NSC has an opportunity cost of 

not surveilling 42,500 square nautical miles compared to 

legacy WHEC–378.1

FRC ................................................................................... Delay/loss of enhanced operational capabilities of the patrol 

boat fleet required by the post 9/11 requirements. 

Mission Effectiveness Project for Legacy 210 Foot and 

270 Foot.

With no Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) in the current budget, 

210- and 270-foot cutters have to be extended until OPC 

is delivered. Inadequate funding will likely result in decreased legacy asset operational availability. 

Cutter Small Boats (Long Range Interceptor and Short 

Range Prosecutor)..

Small boats are part of the Cutter ‘‘force package’’ providing intercept and boarding capability from the parent 

cutter. Delayed funding decreases ‘‘force package’’ operating area. 

C4ISR ................................................................................ Will delay delivery of assets—some components are essential to asset operation. 

C4ISR is the key to being AWARE in the maritime region. 

Reduced awareness increases the Nation’s risk for possible attacks from terrorists and more criminal activities. 
44 

Budget category Inaequate funding impacts 

Logistics .................................................................................... Unable to operate as designed will mean higher annual operating costs. 

Readiness will be lower. 

Suboptimal ‘‘homeports’’ due to lack of shore facilities; 

forcing use of ‘‘Ports of Convenience’’. 

Systems Engineering & Integration .......................................... Higher risk for lack of synchronization of Deepwater

assets... will not operate together. 

Higher risk that optimal contractor testing will not be conducted. Uncertain if OT&E will detect... increased risk 

of failure during future operations. 

Program Management ............................................................... Unable to accomplish inherently government work necessary 

for success. 

Increased risk of failure during operation and delay in deploying due to insufficient planning. 

1 All flight deck capable cutters will benefit from VUAV/MCH force package surveillance capabilities. 

The graphic below illustrates the synergistic linkages between assets in the Deepwater system highlighting how reduced funding in any one area reduces overall system performance outcomes. The full success of the major projects is dependent on 

the assets in these budget categories being fully funded. 

Question. In fiscal year 2006, Congress provided $933.1 million for the Coast 

Guard’s Deepwater recapitalization program. The President’s fiscal year 2007 Budget Request proposes $934.4 million for the Deepwater program. 

How important is full funding of the President’s Request to the continuation of 

this recapitalization program? 

Answer. It is critically important that full funding for the Deepwater recapitalization program be provided. Any reduction will cause a delay in one or more assets 

or systems that the Coast Guard needs to accomplish the responsibilities that DHS 

expects. Reduced funding will mean reduced readiness; our Nation needs a missionready Coast Guard. 

RESPONSE TO CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTION

Question. How will the Department and the Coast Guard address Congress’ frustration with the Coast Guard’s poor responsiveness to congressional direction? 

Answer. The Coast Guard has internal processes in place to track all Congressional deliverables, to include reports, Questions for the Record (QFRs), Questions 

and Answers (Q&As) and all other direction from Congressional staffs, ensuring all 
45 

are responded to in a timely and effective manner. In addition, the Coast Guard and 

DHS have condensed their turnaround times allowed for all inquiries to further ensure timely responses. 

One example as a result of the Coast Guard’s improvement in this arena was in 

the submission of the fiscal year 2007 President’s request—four Congressional Reports (Deepwater Implementation Plan Review, Operational Gap Analysis, Patrol 

Boat Availability and Report on Maritime Security and Safety Teams) were submitted in concert with the President’s request—a significant effort to execute, but 

done successfully as a result of greater cooperation and efficiency between DHS, 

OMB and the Coast Guard. 

Other examples of the Coast Guard’s efforts to alleviate Congress’ concerns include more granularity in the fiscal year 2007 budget submission (the fiscal year 

2007 request grew by over 175 pages from the fiscal year 2006 submission, providing more justification on usable segments within AC&I projects, greater detail 

on new initiatives such as the National Capital Region Air Defense mission, and so 

on). 

The Coast Guard has also been more proactive in providing status reports of continuing initiatives through Congressional Staff briefings, substantial interaction between Congressional staffs and the Coast Guard’s own Congressional Affairs staffs, 

and sponsorship in field unit visits. 

STATUS OF HH–65 HELICOPTERS

Question. Could you update the committee on the progress of the re-engining of 

the 95 HH–65 helicopters? 

Answer. Twenty-nine re-engined HH–65s have been delivered as of March 2006; 

5 each to CG Air Stations Atlantic City, Savannah and New Orleans; 3 to Air Station San Francisco; 8 of 9 to Air Station Miami; 1 to Aviation Training Center Mobile; 1 to Air Station Los Angeles; and 1 to NAVAIR. 

Completion date of the 84 operational HH–65s remains June 2007. This date was 

changed from the earlier projected delivery date of February 2007 primarily due to 

extraordinary Hurricane rescue and relief efforts in 2005 that caused unforeseen 

wear and tear on our rotary wing aircraft. Aircraft inducted for the re-engining 

project have needed additional depot-level maintenance caused by this increased 

wear and tear. The remaining 11 non-operational aircraft (aircraft on the programmed depot maintenance line at Coast Guard Aircraft Repair & Supply Center, 

Elizabeth City, NC) are scheduled to be completed by November 2007. 

CONCLUSION OF HEARING

Senator STEVENS. This will terminate the hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., Thursday, April 6, the hearing was 

concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.] 

Æ