U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

National Institute of Justice 

Research for Policy

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij

Agroterrorism—Why We’re Not Ready: 

A Look at the Role of Law Enforcement 

DEC. 06 
U.S. Department of Justice


Office of Justice Programs


810 Seventh Street N.W. 

Washington, DC 20531 

Alberto R. Gonzales 

Attorney General 

Regina B. Schofield 

Assistant Attorney General 

Glenn R. Schmitt 

Acting Director, National Institute of Justice 

This and other publications and products 

of the National Institute of Justice can be 

found at: 

National Institute of Justice 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij 

Office of Justice Programs 

Partnerships for Safer Communities 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov 

NCJ 214752 
AGROTERRORISM—WHY WE’RE NOT READY 

This Research for Policy is 

based on “Defining Law 

Enforcement’s Role in 

Protecting American 

Agriculture from Agroterrorism,” by Terry Knowles, 

James Lane, Gary Bayens, 

Nevil Speer, Jerry Jaax, 

David Carter, and Andra 

Bannister, final report to 

the National Institute of 

Justice, December 2005, 

NCJ 212280, available at 

www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 

nij/grants/212280.pdf. 

Agroterrorism— 


Why We’re Not Ready:


A Look at the Role of Law Enforcement 

The introduction of FMD in 

the United States—with its 

generally open and difficultto-protect farms, fields, and 

feedlots—would require the 

mass slaughter of animals 

and the disposal of potentially millions of animal carcasses. It could halt the domestic 

and international sale of 

meat and meat products for 

months or even years. Based 

on the FMD outbreak in the 

United Kingdom in 2001, researchers estimate that an 

attack against the American 

livestock industry could cost 

taxpayers up to $60 billion.1 

Who Would Lead 

the Response? 

Many believe that public 

health officials would lead the 

response to an agroterrorism 

attack, but this might not be 

the case. The laws of most 

States require that such an 

event be handled as a crime 

scene investigation, giving 

law enforcement primary 

responsibility. Ill-equipped 

to handle the magnitude of 

responsibilities that would 

Terrorists seeking to strike a 

blow at the U.S. economy 

need look no further than 

the Nation’s heartland for a 

“soft” target. An agroterrorist 

attack could dramatically impact many aspects of American life, including local law 

enforcement, which— 

especially in rural areas—is 

financially and strategically 

unprepared to respond. 

Agricultural experts say that 

today they are most concerned about the intentional 

introduction of foot-andmouth disease (FMD) into 

the food supply. Twenty 

times more infectious than 

smallpox, FMD causes painful blisters on the tongues, 

hooves, and teats of clovenhoofed animals (like cows, 

pigs, goats, and deer), rendering them unable to walk, 

be milked, eat, and drink. 

Although people generally 

cannot contract FMD, they 

can carry the virus in their 

lungs up to 48 hours and 

transmit it to animals. The 

animal-to-animal airbornetransmission range of FMD 

is 50 miles. 

1 
RESEARCH FOR POLICY / DEC. 06 

This 21-month study was 

conducted through a partnership among the Kansas 

Bureau of Investigation, 

the Ford County (Kansas) 

Sheriff’s Department, and 

the National Agriculture 

Biosecurity Center at 

Kansas State University; 

findings were based, in 

part, on field surveys and 

interviews with law 

enforcement, livestock 

producers, meat packers, 

truckers, feedlot 

managers, researchers, 

politicians, and animal 

health officials. The 

research also included 

two agroterrorist simulation exercises in Kansas. 

follow an act of agroterrorism, local police departments 

would be pushed to the limit. 

Research points to the first 

priority of local law enforcement after an agroterrorist 

attack: establishing and enforcing a 6-mile radius quarantine (113 square miles) 

around the point of origin 

to control the spread of the 

virus. The second priority 

would be to set up statewide roadblocks to enforce 

stop-movement orders. 

Such a tremendous effort— 

requiring that all vehicles 

coming into or going out 

of the impacted State be 

stopped and inspected— 

would require a coordinated 

response by local, State, 

and Federal officials. 

Evidence, including tissue 

from infected animals, would 

have to be collected. All 

cloven-hoofed animals (both 

domestic and wild) within the 

affected area would have to 

be destroyed and disposed 

of. A full-scale criminal investigation would have to be 

launched, including the identification, apprehension, and 

prosecution of suspects. 

Preventing an Attack 

Because terrorists rely on a 

lack of preparedness, law 

enforcement agencies should 

start now to develop a plan 

for preventing an agroterrorism attack—and the interruption of basic services, civil 

and emotional stress, and 

public health concerns that 

In May 2006, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) held a regional 

planning meeting on preventing and responding to a bioterrorism attack 

American agriculture from bioterrorism—brought together key law 

enforcement, animal health, and homeland security officials from nine 

Midwestern States. 

attack and discussed ways to improve the response, should an attack 

enforcement and veterinary and animal health authorities, within the 

State and across State borders. 

on the Nation’s agriculture industry. The meeting—which grew out of 

NIJ’s research on defining the role of law enforcement in protecting 

Officials rated their State’s preparedness in preventing an agroterrorism 

occur. One of the most vital topics concerned coordination among law 

2 
AGROTERRORISM—WHY WE’RE NOT READY 

likely would follow. On the local 

level, law enforcement agencies 

bear a responsibility for intelligence gathering, including the 

review of Federal reports on 

bioterrorism threats. For example, in an effort to minimize the 

potential of an epidemic, the 

World Organization on Animal 

Health coordinates information 

on animal diseases (see www. 

oie.int). Local jurisdictions are 

also in the best position to conduct vulnerability studies of 

area farms and feedlots. 

Specialized training for law 

enforcement is needed. 

Joint planning and operational exercises also must 

take place for agencies 

to be ready to respond to 

such a crime, if it occurs. 

Partnerships—the best way 

to prevent an agroterrorism 

attack and the only way 

to contain one—must be 

created among local farmers, 

truckers, feedlot owners, and 

other critical members of the 

food-supply chain. A working 

relationship between criminal 

investigators and veterinarians and animal and plant 

health inspectors must be 

established. 

A New Security 

Paradigm 

The paradigm for protecting 

the Nation’s food supply 

changed after 9/11, focusing attention on areas that 

require greater security measures. Research funded by 

NIJ recommends that, to protect the Nation’s 2.1 million 

farms, the U.S. Department 

of Agriculture (USDA), the 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and 

other intelligence-gathering 

The Ford County Sheriff’s Department in Dodge City, Kansas, in collaboration with the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, developed a neighborhood watch/community policing program called Agro-Guard. Law 

enforcement and livestock producers participate in the program in an 

effort to identify threats to agriculture before they become incidents. 

Agro-Guard participation involves reporting suspicious activity, posting 

warning signs, holding community meetings on law enforcement and 

animal health issues, creating a public-access Web site, and developing emergency response procedures. 

3 
RESEARCH FOR POLICY / DEC. 06 

agencies work with local and 

State law enforcement and 

the livestock industry to 

develop a national plan to 

prevent, respond to, and 

ultimately recover from an 

incident of agroterrorism. 

Notes 

1. See Economic Impact of 

a Foreign Animal Disease 

(FAD) Outbreak Across the 

United States, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC, 2004. 

Additional Reading 

Chalk, P. (2004). Hitting 

America’s soft underbelly: 

The threat of deliberate 

biological attacks against 

the U.S. agriculture and 

food industry. Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND. 

Jaax, J. (2002, August 20). 

Sworn Testimony: How 

effectively is the federal 

government assisting state 

and local governments in 

preparing for a biological, 

chemical, or nuclear attack? 

Congressional field hearing, 

House Committee on Government Reform, Abilene, KS 

(http://frwebgate.access. 

gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp. 

cgi?IPadress=162.140.64.88 

&filename=88193.wais&direc 

tory=/diskc/wais/data/107_ 

house_hearings). 

RAND. (2003). Agroterrorism: 

What is the threat and what 

can be done about it? Santa 

Monica, CA: National 

Defense Research Institute. 

Waters, A. (2005, May 3). 

Foot and mouth disease outbreak in Great Britain: A case 

study. Formal presentation, 

International Symposium on 

Agroterrorism, Kansas City, 

MO (www.fbi-isa.org/library/ 

Waters_files/frame.htm). 

The researchers’ recommendations for strengthening America’s 

defense against agroterrorism include: 

■ Development of a national law enforcement plan, including 

Federal funding of preventive measures to be developed by local 

law enforcement. 

■ Intelligence-gathering by local law enforcement, including community policing in conjunction with the agriculture industry. 

■ Training, at the regional level, of local law enforcement personnel 

to enforce stop-movement orders and quarantine areas in the 

event of an attack. 

4 
The National Institute of Justice is the 

research, development, and evaluation 

agency of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

NIJ’s mission is to advance scientific research, 

development, and evaluation to enhance the 

administration of justice and public safety. 

Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are 

those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official 

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

This research was supported by the National Institute of 

Justice under grant number 2003–IJ–CX–1024. 

NIJ is a component of the Office of Justice 

Programs, which also includes the Bureau 

of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice 

Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice 

and Delinquency Prevention, and the 

Office for Victims of Crime. 
DEC. 06 

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