2024 UT App 84

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JANETTE CORN,

Appellee,

v.

BLAKE GROCE,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20220526-CA

Filed May 31, 2024

Second District Court, Farmington Department

The Honorable Ronald G. Russell

No. 194700657

Alexandra Mareschal and Julie J. Nelson,

Attorneys for Appellant

Emily Adams, Freyja Johnson, and William M. 

Fontenot, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion, 

in which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN M. HARRIS

concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 Blake Groce (Father) appeals the district court’s rejection of

his petition to modify parent-time. He also challenges the court’s 

calculation of Janette Corn’s (Mother) net income for child 

support purposes. Because the court did not abuse its discretion 

when ruling on either issue, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Mother are the parents of twin daughters (the 

Children). In 2015, the parties agreed to joint legal and physical 
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custody of the Children, with Father exercising parent-time four 

overnights during a two-week period, and the district court 

entered a decree reflecting this agreement (Original Decree). In 

2016, Father moved out of state for work. The following year, 

Father began dating stepmother (Stepmother); the two married in 

2019.

¶3 In 2019, due in part to Father’s relocation out of state, 

Mother petitioned to modify the Original Decree, seeking sole 

physical custody of the Children subject to Father’s parent-time. 

Father responded to the petition and filed a counterpetition

seeking orders related to the Children’s healthcare. Father did not 

ask for a change in parent-time.

¶4 Shortly thereafter, the parties entered into a stipulation 

(2019 Stipulation). By its express terms, the 2019 Stipulation did 

“not resolve the competing petition and counterpetition to modify 

custody.” It did, however, set forth a “temporary” parent-time 

schedule that would increase Father’s parent-time upon his 

planned relocation to Utah. The parties agreed that upon Father’s 

relocation, the parties would follow, “on a temporary basis until 

further agreement of the parties or further order of the Court,” the 

parent-time schedule in Utah Code section 30-3-35.1. Pursuant to 

that schedule, Father would exercise five overnights during a 

two-week period (an increase of one overnight). The parties 

further agreed that if the increased parent-time schedule were to 

take effect, they would adhere to it “for at least six (6) months.” 

At that point, if either party wanted to change parent-time, the 

party could submit a written request communicating the desired 

change, after which the parties would attend mediation. And if 

the parties had not “otherwise reach[ed] an agreement regarding 

a permanent parent-time order” after Father had exercised the 

increased schedule for “six (6) months and thereafter,” either 

party could “request mediation in writing.”
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¶5 In August 2019, Father made the move to Utah and began 

exercising his increased parent-time. The following year, the 

district court entered the 2019 Stipulation as an order (2020

Order).

¶6 In August 2020, Father filed a petition to modify the 

custody and parent-time awarded in the 2020 Order. In this 

petition, Father sought sole physical and legal custody of the 

Children based on circumstances that he alleged had changed 

since the entry of the 2020 Order. The changes included the 

decreased quality of education at the Children’s school, Father’s 

desire to teach the Children religious values, Father’s work trips 

and the right of first refusal created a “disconnect” between the 

Children and Stepmother, the parties’ disagreement over the 

Children’s vaccines, Mother’s changing financial situation, and 

Mother’s failure to use a Google calendar. Most notably, Father 

also alleged that Mother exhibited “inappropriate behaviors” in 

front of the Children, causing them mental health issues that 

required counseling, which Mother had refused to allow. In a 

separate motion, Father asked the court to appoint a custody 

evaluator to aid the court in making a custody determination. The 

court granted Father’s request and appointed an evaluator 

(Evaluator).

¶7 As the case proceeded, the district court held several 

pretrial conferences to determine which issues were to be certified 

for trial. After much confusion on both sides, the court entered a 

pretrial order stating that the issues certified for trial were 

intended to resolve (1) Mother’s 2019 petition to modify the

Original Decree, (2) Father’s 2019 counterpetition to modify the 

Original Decree, and (3) Father’s petition to modify the 2020 

Order. But at the final pretrial conference a few months later,

Mother informed the court that she was “not pursuing” her 2019 

petition to modify.
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¶8 Shortly before trial, Father submitted a trial memorandum 

to the district court addressing the issues certified for trial. 

Regarding “[p]hysical custody/parent time,” Father asserted that 

“[j]oint physical custody is appropriate” and requested that the 

court award him either “220 overnights to Mother’s 145 

overnights” or “equal parent time.”1 And regarding “[l]egal 

custody/terms of parenting plan,” Father asserted that “[j]oint 

legal custody is appropriate” and requested that the court 

implement a parenting plan filed by Father. Father also requested 

changes to child support.

¶9 In response to Father’s request to change child support, 

Mother filed an updated financial declaration. Mother is a selfemployed realtor. In her financial declaration, Mother listed her 

monthly income as $6,599 ($6,000 salary plus $599 child support), 

and her annual salary as “approximately” $72,000. Mother 

supported the declaration with her 2020 tax return and three 

months of bank statements. The tax return listed $106,408 in gross 

income and $30,745 of expenses, resulting in a net income of 

$75,663. Those expenses included advertising, vehicle expenses, 

insurance, office expenses, office rent, office supplies, bank 

charges, membership dues and fees, education costs, internet fees, 

telephone charges, referral fees, software fees, website charges, 

equipment fees, and broker fees.

1. Father’s requested change would have increased his number of 

overnights from 130 to 220 and would have decreased Mother’s 

overnights from 235 to 145. Father’s alternative request for equal 

parent-time would have also greatly changed the number of 

overnights awarded to each parent, with Father receiving 182 

overnights and Mother receiving 183 overnights. These requests 

sought significant changes in the parties’ child-care arrangement, 

even though these requests were, technically speaking, requests

for changes to “parent-time” and not to “physical custody.” See

McFarland v. McFarland, 2021 UT App 58, ¶ 36, 493 P.3d 1146.
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¶10 A two-day bench trial was held in March 2022. At the 

outset of the trial, Mother asked for clarification with respect to 

what relief Father was requesting. She explained that Father had 

requested sole physical custody in his petition to modify but that 

he had requested only a change to parent-time in his trial 

memorandum. She asserted the difference was relevant because

“based on what [Father’s] requesting, either just additional 

parent-time or actually sole legal custody . . . , then that would 

change the showing that he needs to make.”

¶11 In response, Father reiterated his position, as set forth in 

his memorandum, that he had “changed [his] position from 

asking for sole custody” and was seeking only a change in parenttime. Mother objected to “an amendment to the petition to modify

if now [Father is]requesting just a change in parent-time” because 

that had “not been pleaded” and it was “not going to be tried by 

consent.” The court “note[d] [Mother’s] objection” but concluded 

that the trial could proceed because Father’s requested relief 

“include[d] a number of items” and was “fairly broad,” which 

would allow the court to order relief as it “deem[ed] appropriate.” 

The court concluded by directing the parties “to present [their] 

evidence regarding the substantial change in circumstances so 

that can be considered.”

¶12 Over the course of the trial, the district court heard 

testimony from Evaluator, the parties, and multiple other 

individuals involved in the Children’s lives. The parties also 

presented evidence regarding their monthly incomes.

¶13 Evaluator testified about what custody changes would be 

in the best interest of the Children; she specifically did not discuss 

whether there had been a change in circumstances. Evaluator 

opined that since “the very beginning,” the parties “had difficult 

communication,” they were “at odds about parent-time [and] 

about the role of each parent,” and Mother “saw herself as the 

primary person who would care for the [C]hildren and make 
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decisions about them.” She expressed that both parents had 

“some fault in the coparenting difficulties.”

¶14 Regarding Mother, Evaluator did not observe any “intense 

and sudden mood swings,” as had been alleged by Father. She 

noted that Mother “was quite open and forthright about the fact 

that she lost her temper with the [C]hildren sometimes” but 

concluded that the behavior was “[n]ot out of the ordinary.”

Evaluator further expressed that she had not observed Mother 

acting in an “irrational” manner. Regarding Father, Evaluator 

observed that in “some circumstances” Father’s actions were not

proportionate and that on occasion, he had been “overly 

concerned about relatively small things.”

¶15 Evaluator recommended that the Children have “equal 

amounts of time with both parents,” noting that although the 

Children “struggle with some anxiety and some stress about 

parental conflict,” overall they “are thriving with both parents” 

and “have a good relationship with both parents.” She opined that 

“both parents demonstrate appropriate decision-making in terms 

of the [C]hildren, are good role models for the [C]hildren, and 

lead an appropriate lifestyle.”

¶16 Concerning child support and income, Father introduced 

Mother’s 2020 tax return as an exhibit. Relying on that document, 

Mother testified that her 2020 net income was “right around 

$76,000.” She explained that she has “lots of business expenses,” 

totaling around “30-something-thousand dollars,” which 

generally include a monthly Multiple Listing Service fee, a 

monthly payment to her brokerage, a monthly payment for office 

rent, yearly dues, and mileage. In addition, Mother noted she pays 

for trainings, continuing education classes, and seminars; open 

house expenses; signs; and general office expenses such as paper, 

business cards, and photos. Lastly, she testified that she deducts 

a portion of her cell phone and home internet. Father did not 

object at any point during this portion of Mother’s testimony.
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¶17 At the close of the trial, the district court issued an oral 

ruling, which it later reduced to writing. The court declined to 

change the custody status or to alter parent-time, but it agreed to 

modify child support payments. Regarding custody and parenttime, the court first noted that although Father sought a change in 

custody in his petition to modify, at trial he elected to seek only a 

change in parent-time. The court then explained that to modify a 

custody order, a party must show both that “(1) a material and 

substantial change in circumstances has occurred, and (2) a 

modification would be in the best interest of the children.” As 

relevant here, the court then made two specific findings 

pertaining to the change in circumstances requirement. First, the 

court found that “the [2020 Order] in fact reflects the results of 

robustly contested litigation aimed at ascertaining the best 

interest of the [C]hildren.” Second, the court examined each of 

Father’s alleged changed circumstances and found that “there has 

not been a material and substantial change in circumstances 

shown that would support a modification in the current custody 

order.”

¶18 As to child support, the district court concluded that 

although there had not been a substantial and material change 

sufficient to warrant a change in custody, a change in child 

support was nevertheless warranted due to “material changes of 

30% or more in the income of a parent.” Father verbally indicated 

his agreement with the court’s position. In response, Mother also 

agreed to “stipulate to modification of child support,” as long as 

her income was set at what “she testified to at trial, which . . . was 

$76,000 a year.” The court then ruled:

So my findings for purposes of child support are 

that the parties’ incomes are as stated in their 

financial declarations. [Father’s] financial 

declaration was stated as $5,808, his monthly 

income. [Mother’s] monthly income stated in her 

financial declaration was actually $6,599. And I 
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20220526-CA 8 2024 UT App 84

went back and looked at the testimony and the 

business expenses that were claimed. And I 

understand that in the real estate business, that 

things go up and down and that . . . the cost of doing 

business goes up and down. And that may change 

from time to time. So I . . . don’t want to see a roller 

coaster going on here, where you’re . . . forced to go 

back and forth . . . each year. So for purposes of child 

support, that is what my ruling is.

Thereafter, the court asked Mother’s counsel to calculate child 

support “based on the number of days that each party has the 

[C]hildren.”

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶19 Father now appeals, raising two issues for our review. 

First, Father argues the district court abused its discretion when it

declined to modify parent-time on the ground that Father had not 

demonstrated a material and substantial change in circumstances.

“When reviewing such a decision, we review the district court’s 

underlying findings of fact, if any, for clear error, and we review 

for abuse of discretion its ultimate determination regarding the 

presence or absence of a substantial change in circumstances. The 

district court’s choice of legal standard, however, presents an 

issue of law that we review for correctness.” Spencer v. Spencer, 

2023 UT App 1, ¶ 13, 524 P.3d 165 (quotation simplified).

¶20 Second, Father argues the district court abused its 

discretion when it calculated Mother’s income for child support 

purposes. “In reviewing child support proceedings, we accord 

substantial deference to the district court’s findings and give it 

considerable latitude in fashioning the appropriate relief. We will 

not disturb that court’s actions unless the evidence clearly 

preponderates to the contrary or there has been an abuse of 
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20220526-CA 9 2024 UT App 84

discretion.” Twitchell v. Twitchell, 2022 UT App 49, ¶ 18, 509 P.3d 

806 (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

I. Custody and Parent-Time

¶21 While not challenging any of the district court’s factual 

findings, Father argues the court abused its discretion in 

determining there had not been a substantial and material change 

in circumstances warranting a modification of parent-time. Father 

contends the court “applied the wrong legal standard” when 

evaluating whether the changes alleged in his petition to modify 

were sufficient to warrant a modification. Specifically, Father 

asserts the court should have required a “lesser” showing of a 

change of circumstances because (1) he was seeking to modify 

parent-time, not custody; (2) he was seeking to modify a 

stipulated order; and (3) the provisions in the 2020 Order were 

temporary. Father argues that under this “lesser” standard, he 

made a sufficient showing to justify a modification. Because 

Father’s argument hinges on whether the court correctly applied 

the statutory standard for modifying a custody order, we begin

by discussing that standard. We then evaluate the application of 

that standard to the factual findings made by the court.

A. Statutory Standard for Modification of a Custody Order

¶22 To modify a custody order, a district court must engage in 

a two-step procedure. First, the court must find that “a material 

and substantial change of circumstance has occurred.” Utah Code 

§ 30-3-10.4(4)(b)(i). Second, the court must find that “a 

modification of the terms and conditions of the order would be an 

improvement for and in the best interest of the child.” Id. § 30-3-

10.4(4)(b)(ii).
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20220526-CA 10 2024 UT App 84

¶23 To satisfy the first step, “the party seeking modification 

must demonstrate (1) that since the time of the previous decree, 

there have been changes in the circumstances upon which the 

previous award was based; and (2) that those changes are 

sufficiently substantial and material to justify reopening the 

question of custody.” Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 54 (Utah 1982).

“Only if circumstances have materially and substantially changed 

may the court proceed to the second step—a determination as to 

the manner in which custody should be modified, if at all, based 

on a de novo review of the child’s best interests.”2 Doyle v. Doyle, 

2011 UT 42, ¶ 24, 258 P.3d 553 (quotation simplified). “The district 

court’s determination that there has or has not been a [material 

2. At the outset of the trial, the parties discussed how to present 

their respective cases in light of the two-step approach. Mother 

suggested that the district court should “bifurcate[] the process 

and handl[e] it in two different phases.” Father pushed back on 

Mother’s suggestion, acknowledging that although Father would 

not be entitled to relief absent a showing of a material and 

substantial change in circumstances, that showing was “so 

intertwined” with the second-phase best-interest inquiry “that it 

[would] not make sense to hear them separately.” Ultimately, the 

court agreed with Father that “these issues are somewhat 

intertwined” and declined to bifurcate the trial. Father’s position 

and, in turn, the court’s decision, are consistent with Utah 

caselaw. Our supreme court has recognized that some early Utah 

cases addressing the two-step approach could be read as 

supporting the notion that each step should be completely 

“bifurcated.” See, e.g., Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 54 (Utah 1982).

However, the court has since clarified that our two-step approach 

requires “only analytical—and not formal procedural—

bifurcation,” recognizing that “the evidence supporting changed 

circumstances is often the same evidence that is used to establish 

the best interests of the child.” Doyle v. Doyle, 2011 UT 42, ¶¶ 28,

33, 258 P.3d 553 (quotation simplified).
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20220526-CA 11 2024 UT App 84

and] substantial change in circumstances is presumed valid and 

is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.” Harper v. Harper, 2021 

UT App 5, ¶ 13, 480 P.3d 1097 (quotation simplified).

¶24 “Because the required finding of a material and substantial 

change of circumstances is statutory, neither this court nor the 

supreme court has purported to—or could—alter that 

requirement.” Peeples v. Peeples, 2019 UT App 207, ¶ 13, 456 P.3d 

1159 (quotation simplified). As such, the change-in-circumstances 

requirement applies in all cases where a district court is 

considering a petition to modify custody. However, Utah courts 

have recognized that in certain cases, a petitioner seeking to 

modify a custody order may be required to make a lesser showing

that a change of circumstances qualifies as “sufficiently 

substantial and material.” Hogge, 649 P.2d at 54. Courts have 

allowed a lesser showing in two general types of cases.

¶25 The first category of cases turns on “the type of 

modification sought.” Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P.2d 757, 758 (Utah 

1982). “While altering custody orders generally requires a 

showing of substantial change in circumstances material to the 

modification of custody, a lesser showing may be required when 

the change sought is not a change of custody.” Jones v. Jones, 2016 

UT App 94, ¶ 10, 374 P.3d 45 (citation omitted). Where a petitioner 

is seeking to modify parent-time, rather than custody, “the 

petitioner is required to make only some showing” of a material 

and substantial change in circumstances, “which does not rise to 

the same level as the substantial and material showing required 

when a district court alters custody.” Erickson v. Erickson, 2018 UT 

App 184, ¶ 16, 437 P.3d 370 (quotation simplified). Indeed, a court 

may “determine that a change in circumstances warrants 

modification of parent-time while simultaneously determining 

there is no substantial and material change in circumstances to 

justify a modification of custody. In other words, it is not 

necessarily erroneous for a court to determine that a particular 

change in circumstances is sufficient enough to warrant a change 
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20220526-CA 12 2024 UT App 84

in a parent-time schedule, but not significant enough to warrant a 

modification of custody.” Id.

¶26 “Custody and parent-time are conceptually distinct.” 

McFarland v. McFarland, 2021 UT App 58, ¶ 36, 493 P.3d 1146 

(quotation simplified). “[P]hysical custody encompasses the 

ability to make day-to-day decisions in a child’s life,” Blake v. 

Smith, 2023 UT App 78, ¶ 15, 534 P.3d 761, whereas “parent-time 

more narrowly refers to the amount of time that a parent is 

entitled to spend with the child,” Widdison v. Widdison, 2022 UT 

App 46, ¶ 44, 509 P.3d 242 (quotation simplified). Moreover, there 

are two types of physical custody: joint physical custody and sole 

physical custody. See Utah Code § 30-3-10.1(3)(a). The “dividing 

line” between the two is statutorily defined by “the number of 

overnight visits enjoyed by each parent.” McFarland, 2021 UT App 

58, ¶ 36. When a “child stays with each parent overnight for more 

than 30% of the year,” the parents have joint physical custody of 

the child. Utah Code § 30-3-10.1(3)(a). But when a child stays with 

one parent for “at least 70% of the overnights,” that parent is 

considered to have “sole physical custody” of the child. See 

McFarland, 2021 UT App 58, ¶ 36. Therefore,

when a change occurs that causes one parent to 

obtain enough additional overnights to move from 

one category to another (e.g., from 25% of 

overnights to 35%, or from 65% to 75%), there has 

been a change in physical custody. But when a 

change occurs in which one parent obtains a few 

additional overnights but not enough to move from 

one category to another, the change constitutes only 

a change in parent-time, and not a change in 

physical custody, as that term is statutorily defined.

Id. (quotation simplified). Thus, although parent-time and 

custody are conceptually distinct, a parent-time schedule is 

merely a subspecies of a custody order, see Utah Code § 30-3-10(1), 
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and modification of a parent-time schedule is therefore governed 

by the same statute that controls modification of a custody order, 

see id. § 30-3-10.4. 

¶27 The second category of cases turns on “the nature of the 

underlying custody award.” Zavala v. Zavala, 2016 UT App 6, ¶ 17, 

366 P.3d 422. The change-in-circumstances requirement for 

modifying a custody award “is based in the principles of res 

judicata, for courts typically favor the one-time adjudication of a 

matter to prevent the undue burdening of the courts and the 

harassing of parties by repetitive actions.” Taylor v. Elison, 2011 

UT App 272, ¶ 13, 263 P.3d 448 (quotation simplified). But not all 

custody decrees are adjudicated; indeed, a custody award may be 

“determined by stipulation or default.” Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 

599, 603 (Utah 1989). In cases where a district court is considering

an unadjudicated award, such as the stipulated award at issue in 

this case, “the res judicata policy underlying the changedcircumstances rule is at a particularly low ebb.” Id. Because of this, 

“a lesser showing will support modifying a stipulated award than

would be required to modify an adjudicated award.” Zavala, 2016 

UT App 6, ¶ 17. 

¶28 A court assessing exactly how much lesser the required 

showing might be should not “view the adjudicated/stipulated 

dichotomy as entirely binary” but should instead “examine the 

origin of the order in question and analyze the extent to which the 

order—even if stipulated—reflects the result of robustly contested 

litigation aimed at ascertaining the best interest of the child.” 

Peeples, 2019 UT App 207, ¶ 17. Thus, in a situation where a 

custody order is technically stipulated, the court may nevertheless 

decline to water down the change-in-circumstances showing if the 

circumstances are such that the court has a “relatively high 

confidence that the custody order was in line with the best 

interests of the children.” Id. ¶ 20; see also id. ¶ 18 (concluding that 

although the custody order being modified was technically 

stipulated, the district court did not err in requiring a normal 
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change-of-circumstances showing because the stipulation was 

entered after the parties participated in years of litigation, during 

which they were represented by counsel); Spencer v. Spencer, 2023 

UT App 1, ¶ 19, 524 P.3d 165 (same).

B. Modification of Parent-Time

¶29 With this legal standard in mind, we now turn to Father’s 

contention that the district court abused its discretion in finding 

that he had not shown a sufficient change in circumstances to 

justify modifying parent-time. Father raises three arguments in 

support of his contention. First, he argues that the changes 

occurring between the 2019 Stipulation and the March 2022 trial 

constitute “sufficient” changes to justify modification of parenttime under the lesser change of circumstances showing. Second, 

he argues that modifying the 2020 Order based on the 2019 

Stipulation also required a lesser showing because the 2020 Order 

was not the product of “robustly contested litigation.” Third, he 

asserts that the “conditional” nature of the 2019 Stipulation 

should have factored into the court’s change-of-circumstance 

analysis. We address each argument in turn.

1. Allegations of Changed Circumstances

¶30 In arguing that he made a sufficient showing to justify a 

change in parent-time, Father points to three things that occurred 

between the 2019 Stipulation and the March 2022 trial date that he 

believes constitute sufficient changes to justify modification of 

parent-time. Those changes are (1) Father’s relocation to Utah, 

(2) the Children’s strong relationship with Stepmother, and 

(3) Mother’s troubling behaviors and “emotional reactivity.” But 

the first two changes on which Father focuses here were not 

alleged in his petition to modify (or even addressed in his trial

memorandum). Nor did they constitute changes that have 

occurred since the entry of the 2020 Order. And the district court 

properly concluded that the changes that were alleged in Father’s 

petition did not justify revisiting the 2020 Order.
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¶31 Father’s petition alleged several instances of changed 

circumstances. After hearing two days of evidence, the district 

court rejected all of them. It found that three of Father’s 

allegations—those relating to the Children’s schooling, Mother’s 

alleged cohabitation, and the issue with vaccinations and medical 

care—were not supported by any credible evidence. It found that 

Father’s need to participate in training courses for his employer 

once or twice a year and Mother’s failure to use a Google calendar 

were not material changes. And, after analyzing Mother’s 

finances, it rejected Father’s assertion that Mother could not 

financially provide for the Children.

¶32 The district court also considered and appropriately 

rejected the allegation raised by Father that Mother’s behaviors 

and emotional reactivity were a changed circumstance that had 

negatively impacted the Children. Instead, it found that the way 

in which both Mother and Father have interacted contributed to 

the Children’s need for counseling and that this situation was not 

a change from prior interactions. It reached a similar conclusion 

with respect to Father’s allegation that Mother had attempted to 

undermine him with the Children. And Father has not challenged 

any of these factual findings.

¶33 Father’s two remaining arguments are that his relocation 

to Utah and the strong relationship that the Children had forged 

with Stepmother constitute changed circumstances. But these 

arguments fail to account for the fact that Father had already 

remarried and planned on returning to Utah at the time of the 

2019 Stipulation. Indeed, the primary rationale for the 2019 

Stipulation (on which the 2020 Order was based) was Father’s 

planned relocation and the 2020 Order had already increased 

Father’s parent-time based upon that relocation.

¶34 We therefore conclude that the district court correctly 

applied the change-in-circumstances requirement when 

determining that Father had not demonstrated a sufficient 
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change. As the party seeking modification, Father bore the burden 

of demonstrating “(1) that since the time of the previous decree, 

there [had] been changes in the circumstances upon which the 

previous award was based; and (2) that those changes [were] 

sufficiently substantial and material to justify reopening the 

question of custody.” Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 54 (Utah 1982).

After considering the evidence presented over the course of the 

two-day trial, the court concluded that Father had not carried his 

burden on any of the changes alleged in his petition to modify.

Even assuming, for purposes of the discussion, that Father needed 

to make only a “lesser” showing of changed circumstances, it was 

not an abuse of discretion here for the court to determine that 

Father’s showing was insufficient. Because Father has not 

demonstrated that the court abused its discretion in so finding, we 

will not second-guess the court’s determination. See Harper v. 

Harper, 2021 UT App 5, ¶ 13, 480 P.3d 1097 (“The district court’s 

determination that there has or has not been a substantial change 

in circumstances is presumed valid and is reviewed only for an 

abuse of discretion.” (quotation simplified)).

2. Stipulated Order

¶35 Father next contends the district court should have allowed 

him to get by with a lesser showing of a change of circumstances 

because he was seeking to modify a stipulated order. However, 

on the facts of this case, Father has not demonstrated that the court 

abused its discretion in declining to allow a lesser showing on this 

basis.

¶36 In its order declining to modify Father’s parent-time, the 

district court considered whether the 2020 Order should be 

considered stipulated or adjudicated. Citing Zavala v. Zavala, 2016 

UT App 6, 366 P.3d 422, the court explained that the 

“adjudicated/stipulated dichotomy is not strictly binary” but 

instead requires an examination of the “origin” of the underlying 

order. See id. ¶ 17. The court then found that, “after examining the 
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record and considering the testimony presented, the [2020 Order]

in fact reflects the results of robustly contested litigation aimed at 

ascertaining the best interest of the [C]hildren.”

¶37 Although Father believes the district court should have 

permitted him to make a lesser change-in-circumstances showing 

because the 2020 Order was stipulated, he has not directly 

challenged the court’s factual finding that the 2020 Order was the 

“result[] of robustly contested litigation aimed at ascertaining the 

best interest of the [C]hildren.” Given the court’s unchallenged 

finding, which is supported by the record and entitled to 

deference on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence. See

Lobendahn v. Lobendahn, 2023 UT App 137, ¶ 27, 540 P.3d 727 (“The 

existence of conflicting evidence in the record is not sufficient to 

set aside a district court’s findings. The pill that is hard for many 

appellants to swallow is that if there is evidence supporting a 

finding, absent a legal problem—a fatal flaw—with that evidence, 

the finding will stand, even though there is ample record evidence 

that would have supported contrary findings.” (quotation 

simplified)). Consequently, Father has not demonstrated that the 

court abused its discretion in rejecting his argument that the 

nature of the 2020 Order allowed him to make a lesser showing of 

a substantial and material change in circumstances.

3. Temporary Order

¶38 Lastly, Father contends the district court should have 

considered the 2020 Order as a “temporary order[], which 

require[s] no showing of changed circumstances to modify, rather 

than a fully enforceable custody order.” See Harper v. Harper, 2021 

UT App 5, ¶ 17, 480 P.3d 1097 (“[U]nlike a permanent custody 

order, a temporary custody order is modifiable without a showing 

of a substantial and material change in circumstances.”). We 

disagree with Father’s contention that the 2020 Order was 

“temporary.”
Corn v. Groce

20220526-CA 18 2024 UT App 84

¶39 Because the 2020 Order was stipulated, Father contends it 

must be “interpreted as if it were a contract between the parties.” 

See McQuarrie v. McQuarrie, 2021 UT 22, ¶ 18, 496 P.3d 44. To that 

end, he argues, we should “consider each provision [of the 2020 

Order] in relation to all others, with a view toward giving effect 

to all and ignoring none.” Id. (quotation simplified).

¶40 The 2020 Order provides that “[u]pon [Father’s] move to 

Utah, on a temporary basis until further agreement of the parties 

or further order of the Court, [Father] shall exercise [extended] 

parent-time” pursuant to statute. The 2020 Order then outlines the 

procedure for changing that parent-time: “[A]fter exercising 

[extended] parent-time for at least (6) months and communicating 

in writing the desired change in parent-time, the parties will 

mediate parent-time.”

¶41 Taken together, Father contends these provisions indicate 

(1) that the conditional parent-time schedule was meant to be 

temporary and (2) that by entering into the 2019 Stipulation, the 

parties essentially agreed that Father would not be required to 

show a change in circumstances in order to modify parent-time. 

Father is wrong on both fronts.

¶42 First, the extended parent-time schedule did not have an 

expiration date. Although the provision refers to the schedule 

being used on a “temporary basis,” when considered in 

conjunction with the rest of the provision, it is clear that the 

schedule was intended to be ongoing. Indeed, “temporary basis” 

is followed immediately after with the phrase “further agreement 

of the parties or further order of the Court.” As a whole, then, this 

implies that the schedule outlined in the 2020 Order would 

continue until the parties could agree on a new schedule or until 

the court ordered something different. And if neither the parties 
Corn v. Groce

20220526-CA 19 2024 UT App 84

nor the court sought to change the schedule, then it would remain 

in place.3

¶43 Second, nothing in the 2020 Order explicitly or impliedly 

eradicated the change-in-circumstances requirement; instead, 

that order merely set forth part of the process for changing 

custody. Pursuant to the 2020 Order, the only condition the 

parties put on modifying the extended parent-time schedule was 

to notify the other party in writing, triggering a mediation. Father 

argues that “interpreting that language to mean nothing more 

than how a party would normally go about modifying a custody 

order would render that language . . . superfluous.” Thus, in 

Father’s view, “when Mother and Father agreed that either party 

could request to modify the parent-time once the conditions in the 

provision were met, . . . the parties essentially agreed that 

satisfaction of the conditions (Father’s relocation and exercising 

the section 30-3-35.1 schedule for six months) constitute a changed 

circumstances sufficient to modify this parent-time in the future.”

¶44 But “essentially agreeing” is not enough to override the 

change-in-circumstances requirement. Cf. id. ¶¶ 23–27 

(concluding that a divorce decree did not require payment of 

alimony after remarriage because there was no provision 

“specifically overrid[ing] the statutory presumption” that 

alimony terminate upon remarriage (quotation simplified)). The 

district court is statutorily required to find a material and 

substantial change in circumstances prior to modifying a custody 

order. See Utah Code § 30-3-10.4. Thus, without a specific 

3. This conclusion is also bolstered by the fact that the 2020 Order 

contains other provisions that were not meant to be temporary. 

For example, the 2020 Order provides that summer parent-time is 

to be scheduled with Mother exercising “first choice . . . in odd 

years.” This language is closely mirrored in a provision outlining 

which years the parties can claim the Children for tax purposes, 

with the parties to “alternate years.”
Corn v. Groce

20220526-CA 20 2024 UT App 84

provision overriding the change-in-circumstances requirement, 

the court was bound by statute to find that circumstances had 

sufficiently changed prior to modifying the 2020 Order.

4 See 

McQuarrie, 2021 UT 22, ¶¶ 23–27.

¶45 In sum, the 2020 Order was not temporary. The district 

court therefore did not err when it declined to treat that order as

a temporary order.

II. Child Support

¶46 Next, Father argues the district court abused its discretion 

when ordering child support. Specifically, Father contends the 

court erred in calculating Mother’s income because the court

deducted Mother’s business expenses from her gross income even 

though Mother did not prove what those expenses were. But we 

discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s calculation of 

Mother’s net income.

¶47 “A noncustodial parent’s child support obligation is 

calculated using each parent’s adjusted gross income.” Twitchell

v. Twitchell, 2022 UT App 49, ¶ 34, 509 P.3d 806 (quotation 

simplified). When a parent is self-employed, “gross income” is 

calculated by “subtracting necessary expenses required for selfemployment . . . from gross receipts.” Utah Code § 78B-12-

203(4)(a). However, “[o]nly those expenses necessary to allow the 

business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from 

gross receipts.” Id. The individual claiming business expenses 

carries the burden of demonstrating that “those expenses are 

necessary to allow the business to operate at a reasonable level.” 

4. Moreover, the district court specifically found that nothing in 

the 2019 Stipulation or the 2020 Order “would make inapplicable 

the statutory requirement that a party requesting a change to the 

custody order must allege and prove a material and substantial

change in circumstances.” Father has not challenged this finding 

as clearly erroneous.
Corn v. Groce

20220526-CA 21 2024 UT App 84

Ouk v. Ouk, 2015 UT App 104, ¶ 4, 348 P.3d 751 (quotation 

simplified). Because the district court is “best equipped to find 

whether expenses are necessary,” we accord a court broad 

discretion to make such determinations. Barrani v. Barrani, 2014 

UT App 204, ¶ 11, 334 P.3d 994 (quotation simplified). “Generally, 

so long as the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 

factual issue was reached are apparent, a [district] court may 

make findings, credibility determinations, or other assessments 

without detailing its justification for finding particular evidence 

more credible or persuasive than other evidence supporting a 

different outcome.” Twitchell, 2022 UT App 49, ¶ 36 (quotation 

simplified).

¶48 Shortly before trial, Mother filed an updated financial 

declaration, which listed her net monthly income as $6,599. 

Mother supported the declaration with her 2020 tax return and 

three months of bank statements. The tax return listed $106,408 in 

gross income and $30,745 of expenses, resulting in a net income of 

$75,663. Those expenses included advertising, vehicle expenses, 

insurance, office expenses, office rent, office supplies, bank 

charges, membership dues and fees, education costs, internet fees, 

telephone charges, referral fees, software fees, website charges, 

equipment fees, and broker fees. At trial, Father presented 

Mother’s 2020 tax return as an exhibit, and Mother testified 

regarding the information contained therein. Mother’s testimony 

regarding her income was largely consistent with the information 

listed in her tax return. She testified that her 2020 net income was 

“right around $76,000,” because even though her gross income 

was over $106,000, she had “lots of business expenses” totaling 

around “30-something-thousand dollars.” Mother then listed a 

number of those expenses. Father did not object during this 

portion of Mother’s testimony, nor did he object to the admission 

of the underlying evidence; indeed, Mother’s tax return was 

offered into evidence by Father himself.
Corn v. Groce

20220526-CA 22 2024 UT App 84

¶49 Based on this evidence, the district court ordered that child 

support payments be calculated using “the incomes listed on the 

parties’ financial declarations,” with Father’s monthly income set 

at $5,808, and Mother’s monthly income set at $6,599. The court

explained, “Real estate income and costs fluctuates, and the Court 

does not want to see a change of child support every year, and 

therefore sets child support with the income listed on the financial 

declaration.” We discern no abuse in the district court’s 

calculation of Mother’s net income. As the person claiming 

business expenses, Mother bore the burden of proving that her 

expenses were necessary. See Ouk, 2015 UT App 104, ¶ 4. To that 

end, Mother submitted a financial declaration, which was 

supported by a tax return and bank statements, showing her 

business expenses. And at trial, she further testified as to these 

expenses. All this evidence was unrefuted by Father. Because 

there was evidence before the court regarding Mother’s business 

expenses, we must defer to the court’s determination that Mother 

has carried her burden of proving those expenses.

CONCLUSION

¶50 The district court did not abuse its discretion when it

declined to modify Father’s parent-time. In particular, the court 

did not abuse its discretion in concluding, on this record, that 

Father had not made even a “lesser” showing of changed 

circumstances. And the court did not abuse its discretion in 

calculating Mother’s net income.

¶51 Affirmed.