Greater New Orleans’s defenses

Graphic © 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing 

Co., all rights reserved. Used with permission of 

the Times-Picayune
129

Chapter 10

Levees: Who’s in Charge?

An Overview of Levees in Southeast Louisiana

Levees are large embankments, usually of earth or stone, that make up part of the fl oodcontrol system designed and built to protect New Orleans from hurricanes and fl oods. Levees line the Mississippi River, the shores of Lake Pontchartrain, and the Mississippi River 

Gulf Outlet (MRGO), and are part of the protective rings around New Orleans East and St. 

Bernard Parish. 

Other structures may also be used to protect an area from fl ooding. Th e Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), sometimes in concert with local and state government and sometimes 

on its own, built fl oodwalls, drainage canals, pumps, and fl oodgates to control the fl ow of 

excess water in and around the city.

• Floodwalls, which are high vertical walls built of concrete and steel, are used 

in more urban areas because they do not require as much space as earthen 

levees with their wide foundations.

• Because fl oodwater will fi nd its way through any breaks in the levees, massive 

gates are located throughout the system wherever there are openings for streets 

or railroads. Th ese gates are closed in anticipation of “high-water” events such 

as very high tides, fl oods, and hurricanes.

• Because many parts of the region are at or below sea level, many areas also 

have a system of pumps and canals to remove rain and fl oodwater from areas 

protected by the levee system.1

All of these systems – more than 200 gates and 125 miles of levees and fl oodwalls – worked 

together to form the fl ood-control system that was designed to protect metropolitan New 

Orleans from storms like Hurricane Katrina.2

The Roles and Responsibilities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

the Orleans Levee District, and the Louisiana Department of 

Transportation and Development

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Levee systems of the size needed to protect the New Orleans area are oft en collaborative 

eff orts between federal and local governments.3

 Th e federal role in such projects is carried 

out by the Corps, an agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) charged with both 

military and civilian missions.4

 Military missions are assigned within the military command 

structure, while civilian fl ood-control projects are authorized by Congress in legislation.5

Flood-control projects usually begin when a community feels a need for protection and 

contacts the Corps. If the Corps does not already have the statutory authority to respond, 

then Congress may grant it. Aft er initial studies, the Corps may enter into a project-cooperation or assurance agreement with a local sponsor acting on behalf of the community. Th e 

assurance agreements for projects generally set forth roles of the parties, including payment 

obligations, design and construction responsibilities, and operations-and-maintenance 

(O&M) duties before and aft er the project is complete.6
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Th e levee system that protects most of New Orleans, including areas that experienced major 

breaches and fl ooding during Katrina – such as the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals, New Orleans East, and most of St. Bernard Parish – is a Corps project called the Lake 

Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (Lake Pontchartrain Project). 

Th ere are several other federal cost-shared projects that protect other parts of southeastern 

Louisiana.7

 Th e Corps’ involvement in these projects was mostly through its New Orleans 

District, one of the Corps’ largest with more than 1,200 employees, and part of the Corps’ 

Mississippi Valley Division headquartered in Vicksburg, Mississippi.8

 When Katrina made 

landfall, the New Orleans District was under the command of Colonel Richard P. Wagenaar, who had assumed control only six weeks before.9

Th e assurance agreements for the Lake Pontchartrain Project made the Corps responsible 

for designing and constructing the project. Local sponsors provided the land for levee 

construction and rights-of-way, and agreed to share the cost. Th e Corps was to turn the 

completed project over to the local sponsors for O&M consistent with the Corps’ standards, 

i.e., making sure the fl ood-control system actually works on a day-to-day basis and protects 

those living inside the system.10 To help the local sponsor do this, the Corps is required by 

its rules and regulations to provide the local sponsor with an operations manual11 and then 

conduct annual inspections to be sure the local sponsor is doing what it is supposed to do.12

In addition to its authority to build fl ood-control projects, the Corps also has statutory 

authority in federal cost-share fl ood-control projects like the Lake Pontchartrain Project to 

act in anticipation of, or response to, fl ood emergencies. In this role, the Corps may help 

the local sponsors deal with the fl ood threat to the levee system, and aid state and local 

governments trying to prevent fl ood damage. Th is “fl ood-fi ghting” authority is authorized 

by Public Law 84-99, also known as the “Flood Act.”13 In the days following Katrina, the 

Corps used its Flood Act authority to close off the levee breaches at the 17th Street and 

London Avenue Canals, which were fi lling the city with water, and to make other emergency repairs.14

The Orleans Levee District 

One of the local sponsors for the Lake Pontchartrain Project was the Orleans Levee District, 

one of the fi rst fi ve levee districts created by the state in 1879. Th e levee districts, which were 

established to be a funding source for and to ensure local involvement in levee construction and operation,15 all had the same general duty: to do what was necessary to “insure the 

thorough and adequate protection of the lands of the district from damage by fl ood ... for 

the adequate drainage control of the district.”16

Like the Corps under the Flood Act, the levee districts have broad statutory obligations in 

addition to their obligations under their assurance agreements on individual levee projects. 

For example, regardless whether a project was being designed and constructed by the Corps 

or had been turned over for O&M to the local sponsor, state law charged the levee districts 

with adopting rules and regulations for maintaining a “comprehensive levee system.”17 State 

law authorized them to obtain engineering assistance from the Louisiana Department of 

Transportation and Development (LA DOTD) in Baton Rouge if they needed additional 

technical expertise.18 State law also required levee-district board members to attend once 

during their term in offi ce an educational program on how to care for and inspect levees.19

To carry out their primary duty of fl ood control, state law not only authorized the levee 

districts to serve as local sponsors for federal cost-share projects, but also to raise money 

pursuant to taxing and bonding authorities. Th e Orleans Levee District, uniquely, was 

also authorized to engage in various business enterprises,20 making it an entity with some 

governmental qualities (taxing and bonding authority) and some corporate qualities – the 
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131

authority to engage in for-profi t businesses like operating the Lakefront Airport, running 

two marinas along Lake Pontchartrain, and leasing dock space to a riverboat casino.21

Th e revenues the Orleans Levee District earned from the businesses and its taxing and 

bonding authority were substantial. Th e Orleans Levee District fi nancial statements for the 

fi scal year ending June 30, 2005, show it collected more than $24 million from property 

taxes and $14 million from its business-type activities in the previous 12 months.22 Th e 

same report said the district had $21 million in unallocated general funds and $13 million in 

a “special levee improvement fund.”23 Th e levee improvement fund, according to the levee 

district’s former president, James Huey, could “only be used for fl ood protection projects 

and/or fl ood-related projects.”24

Although the levee district’s primary responsibility was fl ood protection, it spent large 

amounts on non-fl ood related activities (e.g., licensing a casino, or operating an airport and 

marinas, or leasing space to a karate club, beautician schools or restaurants) rather than 

applying the money to fl ood protection or emergency preparedness.25 For example, the 

Orleans Levee District’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) sat outside the protection of 

the levee system at the Lakefront Airport, vulnerable to the very hurricanes the levee system 

was designed to protect against.26 For years the district had studied moving its EOC inside 

the fl ood protection system, but never did.27 Th e levee district’s Chief Engineer, Stevan 

Spencer, described the situation as a “very bad joke” that dated back to at least 1998, when 

Hurricane Georges fl ooded the airport.28 Spencer said “there was never funding” to move 

the EOC.29 Yet in 2003, the Orleans Levee District spent $2.4 million to repair the “Mardi 

Gras Fountain” in a park near Lake Pontchartrain.30 When Katrina made landfall, Orleans 

Levee District staff had to be rescued, mostly by boat, from the fl ooded EOC at the airport31

before they could survey damage or assist with repair eff orts at the 17th Street and London 

Avenue Canals.

Th e Orleans Levee District was also aware of a levee in New Orleans East that was considered to be three feet below its design height.32 Levee-district board minutes and conversations with Corps personnel suggest that paying for repairs to this low levee was considered 

to be the Corps’ responsibility.33 Federal funding was unavailable, but instead of paying 

for the repairs itself and asking for reimbursement from the Corps, as it had with previous 

projects,34 the levee district merely sent letters to its Congressional delegation asking for 

federal funding.35

Pressed to explain how the Orleans Levee District made spending decisions, Huey off ered 

no direct explanation, but focused on the district’s multiple obligations – not only was the 

district responsible for fl ood control, but it also had statutory requirements to maintain 

recreational space and was authorized by state law to engage in non-fl ood related business 

ventures.36 A review of the levee-district board minutes of recent years revealed that the 

board and its various committees spent more time discussing its business operations than it 

did the fl ood-control system it was responsible for operating and maintaining.37

The Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (LA DOTD)

Th ough not a party to the assurance agreements for the Lake Pontchartrain Project, LA 

DOTD and its Offi ce of Public Works (OPW) have statutory responsibilities to assist and 

oversee certain levee district functions. State law tasks LA DOTD with approving any activity that might compromise the levees,38 and with administering training sessions to leveedistrict board members and their inspectors on caring for and inspecting levees.39

To the extent training sessions were held, they were organized by the Association of Levee 

Boards of Louisiana, an organization that lists Edmund Preau as its Secretary-Treasurer.40
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132

Preau is an Assistant Secretary in LA DOTD and leads the OPW within the Department, 

which is responsible for LA DOTD’s levee-related activities.

When James Huey, who served on the levee district’s board for more than 13 years (nine as 

president), was read the section of state law describing the training requirement, he said it 

was the fi rst he had heard of it.41 Huey explained: “You know what that is? Th at’s going up 

to a workshop for a weekend and having a crawfi sh boil up here and hear a couple people 

talk about some things and they get a little piece of paper and they honored the law.”42

Huey was then asked whether the Association sessions addressed how to inspect levees. He 

responded, “No, nothing.”43

LA DOTD also had the statutory responsibility to “review” each levee district’s emergencyoperations manual every two years.44 According to Preau, this review entailed checking 

whether relevant contact information had been updated and whether the levee district had 

included any new fl ood-control systems within its jurisdiction in its planning.45 Th e review 

entailed no assessment of whether the levee district had stockpiled materials or had the personnel necessary to assess an emergency and respond accordingly.46 Preau said he assumed 

any more elaborate review would have been done by the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland 

Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP).47

Louisiana’s Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) made the LA DOTD the primary state 

agency overseeing Emergency Support Function (ESF-3), Public Works and Engineering. 

ESF-3 encompassed critical infrastructure in the state, including the “construction, maintenance and repair of state fl ood control works.”48 ESF-3 also dictated that, “When an emergency is imminent, the ESF 3 Coordinator [who is to be designated by LA DOTD Secretary 

Johnny Bradberry] will assess the potential impact of the threat on the state’s infrastructure 

and work with other authorities to ensure that any necessary immediate repairs or arrangements for critical structures and facilities are initiated.”49 ESF-3 also said, “As the emergency 

progresses, the coordinator will monitor the status of the infrastructure and eff ect emergency repairs where needed and feasible.”50

Th e LA DOTD did not acknowledge or accept its responsibility under ESF-3. Preau told 

Committee investigators that he didn’t think the provision applied to LA DOTD: “I’m not 

sure what that means, because we don’t have any state fl ood control works. State doesn’t 

own any fl ood control works.”51 By Preau’s reading, a levee project was covered only if it was 

owned by the state, not simply if it was in the state. As Preau read it, LA DOTD had no responsibility to coordinate with levee districts on critical facilities like the Lake Pontchartrain 

Project. Th is response is problematic: the responsibilities articulated under ESF-3 are specifi -

cally delegated to the LA DOTD, and the plain language employed by the State’s Emergency 

Operations Plan cannot be unilaterally dismissed as meaningless by the people it covers.

Th e result was that neither LA DOTD nor any state agency made sure that the state’s levee 

districts were integrated into the state’s emergency-planning process, much less genuinely 

prepared for an emergency. As a result, when Katrina made landfall, no Orleans Levee 

District personnel were located at, or in contact with, emergency managers in Baton Rouge; 

nor was any mechanism in place to request additional support from the state.

Notwithstanding Preau’s insistence that the LA DOTD had no responsibilities under ESF-3 

for the levee system, LA DOTD ultimately played an active role in eff orts to close levee 

breaches in New Orleans in the aft ermath of Katrina.

Design and Construction of the Lake Pontchartrain Project

During Katrina, levees and fl oodwalls were overwhelmed throughout the New Orleans area, 

and in several places were breached. Some of these failures occurred in parts of the Lake 
Leves: Who’s in Charge?

133

Pontchartrain Project. Understanding the link between the breaches and the nature and 

organization of the Lake Pontchartrain Project requires some background. 

Congress authorized the Lake Pontchartrain Project in the Flood Control Act of 1965 to 

provide hurricane protection to areas around Lake Pontchartrain in Orleans, Jeff erson, St. 

Bernard, and St. Charles Parishes.52 Th e project called for design and construction of about 

125 miles of levees and fl oodwalls to be completed by 1978 at a cost of $85 million. Th e 

project was still not complete when Katrina hit, and its cost had grown to more than $750 

million as of 2005.53

As authorized by Congress, the project was to protect the area from what the Corps called 

the “Standard Project Hurricane” (SPH), a model storm “based on the most severe combination of meteorological conditions considered reasonably characteristic of that region.”54

Th e SPH was developed in 1959 by what was then called the United States Weather Bureau, 

which updated the SPH aft er the devastating impact of Hurricane Betsy in 1965. Th e SPH 

was revised again in 1970, 1977, and 1979 by the Weather Bureau’s successor, the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).55 Th ere is no evidence that design 

parameters of the Lake Pontchartrain Project were modifi ed in light of NOAA’s changes to 

the reference-model storm.56

Nevertheless, the Corps has repeatedly maintained that the SPH was the equivalent of a 

fast-moving Category 3 storm on the Saffi r-Simpson scale – a measurement scale that rates 

the strength of hurricanes on a scale of Category 1 to Category 5, with Category 5 being the 

most intense. For example, at a press conferences immediately aft er the storm, Lieutenant 

General Carl Strock, the Commander of the Corps and its Chief of Engineers, explicitly said 

that the Corps “knew” that the levee system “would protect from a Category 3 hurricane,”57

and the page on the Lake Pontchartrain Project on the Corps’ website aft er Katrina said, 

“Th e SPH is equivalent to a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane.”58

Th is claim is misleading: the Saffi r-Simpson scale was not adopted until 1977, 12 years aft er 

the Lake Pontchartrain Project was authorized. Al Naomi, the Corps’ Senior Project Manager for the project, acknowledged that the Corps never conducted a formal study comparing 

the SPH to the Saffi r-Simpson scale, so the claim that the Lake Pontchartrain Project provided Category 3 protection was at best a rough estimate, and at worst, simply inaccurate:

SPH has ... wind speed, central pressure, and surge. You go in and say what is 

my wind speed for an SPH? You look at it. It’s a very high Category 2 storm on 

the Saffi r-Simpson Scale. I look at my central pressure for SPH. I go to the Saffi r-Simpson Scale, it’s a mid-range Cat 4. I say, what is my surge? SPH surge in 

the lake at 11 and a half [feet] on the Saffi r-Simpson, that is a Category 3 range. 

What am I going to tell the Rotary Club? What do I have? Generally in talking to the hydrologist, you can say it’s about equivalent to a fast-moving Cat 3. 

It’s not really that, but for their understanding that is what you can say. Th at 

is what we say. What happens is the press gets this and it says we have Cat 3 

protection. Th at is not really true. It’s SPH protection which may be equivalent 

to a fast-moving Cat 3 storm.59

However, the view that the hurricane protection system could protect the greater New Orleans region from a moderate and/or fast-moving Category 3 storm was widely held within 

the Corps’ New Orleans District. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans District 

issued numerous news releases to the general public (some of which are referenced below), 

stating that the hurricane-protection system provided some level of Category 3 protection:
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134

• December 19, 2001, N.O. hurricane bridge contract awarded, Corps, Levee 

Board will fl oodproof two bridges in Gentilly: “Th e bridge fl oodproofi ng will 

protect neighborhoods along the London Avenue, Orleans Avenue and 17th 

Street Canals from storm surges from Lake Pontchartrain. Th e system of 

levees, fl oodwalls and bridges is designed to protect against fast-moving Category 3 hurricanes.”60

• May 27, 2003, Cross Bayou Drainage Structure to reduce fl ooding in St. 

Charles Parish: “Th e structure is part of the Lake Pontchartrain Hurricane 

Protection Project and is the second of fi ve such structures to be built in St. 

Charles Parish. ... Th ese contracts, to be completed in 2004, will result in a 

levee system that provides protection from a Category 3 storm for St. Charles 

Parish.”61

• August 21, 2003, Filmore Bridge in Gentilly will reopen on Friday, Aug. 22. 

Mirabeau Bridge is closing Wednesday, Aug. 27 for hurricane fl oodproofi ng: 

“Th e systems of levees, fl oodwalls and bridges is designed to protect against 

fast-moving Category 3 hurricanes.”62

Th is view was also held by the Corps’ New Orleans District Commander (Colonel Wagenaar63) and the District’s Emergency Manager (Michael Lowe64). Th e same representations 

were made in more substantive Corps written materials.65

Moreover, the Lake Pontchartrain Project, as it stood in the path of Katrina, was still not 

complete as designed. Some portions were still under construction, and soil subsidence 

(sinking) had left portions of the project with less elevation above sea level than intended. In 

other words, some elements of the project were not even high enough to protect against the 

Standard Project Hurricane, let alone a genuine Category 3 hurricane.

Th e Corps was well aware of this fact. As Jerry Colletti, the New Orleans District’s Manager 

for Completed Works explained, the Corps never tried “to provide full-level protection on 

an annual basis . . . we just can’t raise everything to the design height for each storm that 

would come through.”66

Meanwhile, the National Weather Service (NWS) concluded from a new model of projected 

storm surges that the Lake Pontchartrain Project would be more vulnerable to hurricanes 

than previously thought – that more Category 3 and even certain Category 2 hurricanes 

would overtop parts of the levee system and produce fl ooding.67 Dr. Wilson Shaff er, who 

studies storm surges at NWS, said this discovery was shared with the Corps, perhaps as early as 2003, but certainly by 2004. Th e fi ndings were also shared with LOHSEP and with state 

and local emergency managers at the Louisiana Emergency Preparedness Association’s June 

conferences in 2004 and 2005.68 At a minimum, this information should have prompted a 

fresh look at the adequacy of the Lake Pontchartrain Project, but like the NOAA updates to 

the Standard Project Hurricane in the 1970s, it does not appear that either the state or the 

Corps took any action to respond to the new information.

Effect of Subsidence on the Level of Protection

As noted earlier, the level of protection provided by the levee system was aff ected not only 

by its design, but also by geologic subsidence, or soil sinking. Th e entire coastal region of 

Louisiana had been subsiding for millions of years, as the enormous weight of the sediments 

continually deposited by the Mississippi River enters the Gulf of Mexico, pushing down 

on the earth’s crust. Human activities like extracting oil and natural gas, pumping water, 

raising buildings, and even adding to levees and fl oodwalls all accelerate subsidence. (See

Chapter 9.) As the entire region subsides, the eff ective height of the levees above sea level, 
Leves: Who’s in Charge?

135

and thus the level of protection they provide, decreases.69 A recent report concluded that a 

section of levee that was overtopped and failed during Katrina was nearly three feet below 

its design height.70

All of these factors should have persuaded the Corps to reconsider its public claims that the 

Lake Pontchartrain Project provided Category 3-level protection. 

Operation and Maintenance (O&M)

Maintaining a fl ood-control system is essential, but is complicated in southeast Louisiana 

by the recurring need to rebuild levees to compensate for subsidence. Th e Corps is not 

supposed to turn over a project until it is complete; until then, the Corps is responsible 

for O&M.71 Once a project is turned over, the local sponsor must conduct O&M to Corps 

standards “to obtain maximum benefi ts.”72 Th is includes checking for “undue settlement” 

of the levee, water seeping through or under it, and growth of damaging brush, and taking 

immediate action to address potential emergencies.73

Because the Lake Pontchartrain Project was not complete, according to the Corps’ Senior 

Project Manager for the project, Alfred Naomi, it had been formally turned over to the local 

sponsor, but remained in an “interim” status:

Th ere are still pieces that have to be done. We are not going to turn over a 

piece of the project until every piece in that ring of protection is completed. 

If there is one little thing left to do I think by regulation – I could be wrong. I 

think we have to have the entire system 100 percent complete so we turn over 

the entire segment that is protected, a certain area of the city.74

Nonetheless, the Corps did nominally turn over parts of the project to local sponsors to 

maintain when it determined that construction on that particular part or “reach” was complete.75 Th e Corps sent letters to the Orleans Levee District and others to this eff ect, informing each district that it now had O&M responsibility for that unit.76 Personnel within the 

Corps’ New Orleans District referred to these letters as “turnover letters” even though they 

were not the “offi cial total project completion turnover” letters.77 Th e Orleans Levee District 

did not respond to these letters or even acknowledge their receipt.78

When the Committee asked for copies of the de-facto turnover letters, it received only a 

limited response. Th e letters submitted did not cover the entire project, and some were pre1965, before the project was even authorized.79 In short, the exact legal status of the project 

segments and the degree to which the Corps and local sponsors like the Orleans Levee 

District were truly responsible for maintenance is at best uncertain.

Other confl icting and irregular procedures in the turnover process went beyond the turnover letters. Th e Corps was supposed to require local sponsors to report semi-annually to 

its District Engineer on inspection and O&M for the fl ood-control system.80 Colletti, the 

Corps’ Operations Manager for Completed Works, explained that the Corps unilaterally 

decided not to require the Orleans Levee District to provide the report.81 In addition, for 

each completed work, the Corps is required to give the local sponsor an operations manual.82 Colletti said his offi ce gave no such manual to the Orleans Levee District for levees and 

fl oodwalls, but merely provided a one-page set of guidelines similar to a part of the Code of 

Federal Regulations that detailed obligations of local sponsors.83

Th e Corps’ observance of rules and regulations for completed projects took the form of 

a required annual inspection conducted around June 1 – the start of hurricane season 

– by representatives from the Corps, the Orleans Levee District, the LA DOTD, and other 

interested parties (e.g., the City and the Port of New Orleans).84 Th ese inspections appear to 
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136

have taken about four hours, covered at least a hundred miles of levees and fl oodwalls,85 and 

would usually involve a motorcade that would stop at pre-determined spots to allow the 

group to look over an area and discuss issues.86 Th e purpose of the inspections, according to 

the Corps, was to ensure O&M compliance by the local sponsor, but not to test the system’s 

actual structural integrity or measure whether it was at design height.87 Perhaps the most 

colorful explanation of the annual inspection was off ered by former Orleans Levee District 

president Huey, who suggested that the event was more of a social occasion than a genuine 

technical inspection:

Th ey normally meet and get some beignets [pastries] and coff ee in the morning 

and get to the buses. And the colonel and the brass are all dressed up. You have 

commissioners, they have some news cameras following you around and you 

have your little beignets and then you have a nice lunch somewhere or whatever. And that’s what the inspections are about.88

Ineffective Inspection Regime

Th e weaknesses of this inspection approach can be seen in the last pre-Katrina annual inspection of the Lake Pontchartrain Project in May 2005. It apparently did not address some 

known vulnerabilities. Th e W-30 Floodgate along the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal had 

been destroyed by a train accident in 2004 by the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad.89 Th is 

gate was intended to close off the levee at a point where the railroad track passed through 

it. Th e railroad had provided money for repairs,90 but the fl oodgate was still broken when 

Katrina struck, even though Huey, then board president, told an April 5, 2005, levee-district 

board meeting that he considered the broken gate to be an “emergency.”91 Under state law, 

Huey had the authority to address such emergencies without going through the standard 

contracting process.92 Asked why he did not use his emergency authority to repair the gate 

before hurricane season, Huey simply said, “I do not know. My bottom-line, straightforward answer: I don’t know.”93

Another problem apparently not dealt with in the annual inspection was a levee in New 

Orleans East that was three feet short of its design height. Like the W-30 fl oodgate, the 

problem remained unaddressed when Katrina made landfall, even though Naomi, the 

Corps’ Senior Project Manager, considered repair “vital” to protecting the city.94 In addition, Corps rules and regulations for completed works require local sponsors, like the 

Orleans Levee District, to fi x defects promptly.95 Finally, the Corps’ rules on levees require 

local sponsors to ensure that “No trees exist, the roots of which might extend under the wall 

and off er accelerated seepage paths.”96 However, one of the forensic teams investigating the 

levees’ failure, and Corps offi cials, found trees growing along the 17th Street and London 

Avenue Canals.97 In spite of the major defects requiring repairs, the Orleans Levee District’s 

Chief Engineer said he expected the district to get “an outstanding review in regards to the 

maintenance of the levees” from the 2005 inspection.98

Th e Committee learned during its investigation that the 17th Street and London Avenue 

Canal fl oodwalls weren’t part of the 2005 inspection because they were inaccessible by car. 

It appears likely that they were never inspected by the Corps aft er construction was fi nished 

in the early 1990s,99 partially because the fl oodwalls abutted private property, which made 

them diffi cult, but certainly not impossible, to access.100 It seems likely that the only physical 

inspections they received would have been conducted by Orleans Levee District personnel 

mowing the grass, making visual inspections, and identifying problems like holes dug by 

wild animals, signifi cant erosion, etc. Th e personnel responsible for this work received no 

specialized training on care or inspection of levees and fl oodwalls,101 and supporting documentation of these inspections comprised nothing more than worker timesheets indicat-
Leves: Who’s in Charge?

137

ing the work conducted, such as mowing the grass, the location of the work, and the hours 

spent doing the job.102

When asked who was responsible for fi xing problems once they were identifi ed, Orleans 

Levee District leadership explained that there was an undocumented understanding that “major” problems would be brought to the attention of the Corps and “minor” problems would 

remain the responsibility of levee district personnel.103 However, and as noted by the Orleans 

Levee District Chief Engineer, Stevan Spencer, the district’s total in-house, engineering expertise amounted to three engineers104 – a level of expertise not on par with the challenges posed 

by the hurricane protection system within the jurisdiction of the Orleans Levee District.

Th e only other inspection the Orleans Levee District claims to have made of the levees was 

a fi eld survey of fl oodwall heights every two to three years to check for subsidence.105 If 

the Orleans Levee District did, in fact, conduct these surveys, it did not identify the severity of the subsidence along the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals documented by the 

Corps’ forensic team.106 Th e Orleans Levee District certainly did not conduct any structural 

analysis of the fl oodwalls; nevertheless, when asked by the Committee about the quality of 

the Orleans Levee District’s operations and maintenance regime over the years, Colletti said 

that the Corps “felt that they’ve done an outstanding job.”107

Th e Orleans Levee District’s O&M practices and the passive oversight by the Corps did not 

meet what experts consider to be the standard of care for a fl ood control system like the 

Lake Pontchartrain Project. For example, in a letter to the Committee, Dr. Ernst G. Frankel 

of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology explained that visual surveys are not suffi cient 

because potentially catastrophic voids can occur well below the surface of the levees. To 

expose internal degradation, holes must be drilled in the levees to retrieve core samples for 

analysis. Acoustic equipment can be used to scan the density of material layers at various 

depths.108 No entity conducted such an analysis of the New Orleans fl ood-control structures,109 nor were eff orts made by the Levee District to obtain equipment to improve its 

inspection regime.110 Professor Frankel added that inspection of levees below the waterline 

was also necessary to detect hidden threats to their integrity. Th e Orleans Levee District’s 

simple visual inspections failed in this respect as well. 

Lack of Coordination with the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans 

Because New Orleans and surrounding parishes are below sea level and ringed by levees, 

rain and fl ood waters that enter must be pumped out. Th e Sewerage and Water Board of 

New Orleans (the Water Board) has the responsibility for maintaining a system of pumps 

and canals for this purpose. (Th e Water Board also runs the municipal water and sewer 

systems.) Floodwalls along two of these drainage, or outfall, canals sustained major breaches 

– the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals. However, the Orleans Levee District and the 

Corps, at least to the extent the Corps had not turned over the entire project to the local 

sponsor, are responsible for the fl oodwalls that line these canals.

In the aft ermath of Katrina, the New Orleans Times-Picayune newspaper reported that six 

months before Katrina, several residents near the 17th Street Canal told the Water Board 

that they had found water in their yards.111 (A similar story was carried by National Public 

Radio.)112 Following the Times Picayune report, the Water Board conducted an inquiry into 

these allegations and concluded that the water reported by these property owners was coming from a water-service line and not from the canal. Th is conclusion was documented in a 

letter from the Water Board to the Times-Picayune and provided to the Committee.113

Th e 17th Street Canal fl oodwall broke within several hundred feet of where the water seepage was reported. Th e Committee was not able to independently confi rm either the news 

reports or the Water Board’s explanation. However, it is clear that the Water Board had no 
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plan in place or arrangement with either the Corps or the Orleans Levee District to address 

this sort of situation. Th e Water Board’s Executive Director, Marcia St. Martin, explained 

how her organization dealt with such situations:

What we do is if a person says that there’s water that’s ponding in front of my 

house, we look to see whether or not a Board asset, which is the water meter, 

has a defect or a leak. If we determine it has a defect or a leak, we repair it. If we 

determine it’s not coming from the Board’s asset, we say to the customer, “It has 

to be a private property leak and you need to seek the services of a plumber.”114

Th e Corps has relied on local residents to inform it about these types of problems, but had 

no public outreach program to urge residents to do so.115 When the Corps did receive reports 

of seepage or other issues, it had no process to formally document and address the issues.116

Likewise, the Orleans Levee District had no plan to reach out or communicate with residents 

to encourage the identifi cation or the sharing of reports of leakage or other problems.117

Emergency Response

Louisiana law requires levee districts to have emergency plans. Th e Orleans Levee District 

had such a plan, but the plan did not contemplate repairing major breaches like those 

experienced along the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals.118 Instead, the levee district 

assumed that, consistent with the informal distinction it used in classifying O&M problems 

– that minor problems were its responsibility and major problems were the Corps’ responsibility – fi xing any breach in the system would be the Corps’ responsibility because it would 

be “major.”119 Th e Corps, meanwhile, was under the impression that the Lake Pontchartrain 

Project had been turned over to the levee district and so it was the levee district’s responsibility to be the fi rst responders for any emergency, regardless of the size.120 Th e confl icting 

expectations resulted in a breakdown in the preparation for and response to Katrina among 

all involved – the Corps, the LA DOTD, and the Orleans Levee District. 

At the Committee’s December 15, 2005 hearing, “Hurricane Katrina: Who’s in Charge of 

the New Orleans Levees?” the parties involved had no agreement on emergency responsibilities. Chairman Susan Collins asked the witnesses – Colonel Wagenaar, head of the 

Corps’ New Orleans District; Preau, LA DOTD’s Assistant Secretary for the Offi ce of Public 

Works; and James Huey, former President of the Orleans Levee Board on August 29, 2005 

– about their responsibilities. Chairman Collins received three diff erent answers:

Colonel Wagenaar (Corps of Engineers): Senator, my original thought was 

that it was the Orleans Levee District.121

Mr. Preau (Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development): 

Originally, levee districts are supposed to be fi rst responders on situations like 

this. If it is beyond their control, beyond their resources, then it would move 

up to the state level to take over. I think it was beyond the state’s resources at 

that point. We looked towards the federal government, who had a lot more resources than we did, and who we’ve relied upon in the past to do major repairs. 

If you read the project agreements, most major repairs are to be undertaken by 

the Corps of Engineers on federal projects.122

Mr. Huey (former President, Orleans Levee Board): First of all, it is unequivocally, I would say, the Corps of Engineers.123

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Plans and Preparations

Th e Corps eventually assumed responsibility on September 1 – three days aft er the storm 

– for closing the 17th Street Canal and London Avenue Canal breaches, but institutional 
Leves: Who’s in Charge?

139

confusion over who was in charge and inadequate preparations delayed its taking the lead 

on repairs. On the morning of Katrina’s landfall, August 29, as explained to the Committee, 

Colonel Wagenaar was under the impression that the Orleans Levee District was responsible for the Lake Pontchartrain Project and for responding to emergencies.124 Consistent 

with this understanding, Colonel Wagenaar explained to the Committee that his command 

did not pre-position personnel to survey possible breaches or material to fi ll a possible 

breach beyond what was already available through the Corps’ routine operations.125 Moreover, the Corps did not have any standing contracts with contractors to respond to an 

emergency situation.126

Th e Corps’ New Orleans District did not suff er from a lack of available emergency plans, 

though it is unclear whether any were complete, ready for implementation, or followed. For 

example, the New Orleans District had an Emergency Operations Plan and an accompanying letter of July 2005 from Colonel Wagenaar affi rming that the plan was in eff ect should it 

be needed; but, when asked whether the Corps’ New Orleans District followed the Emergency Operations Plan when it responded to Katrina, he responded, “Yeah. I mean, probably was. I don’t know.”127

Th e District had other plans as well. Versions of an “All Hazards Contingency Plan,” a 

“Continuity of Operations Plan,” a “Catastrophic Disaster Response Plan” and various versions of an unwatering plan128 for removing fl oodwater from the city were all provided to 

the Committee in response to its document requests for any emergency plans in eff ect on 

August 23. Th e Corps’ Emergency Manager in New Orleans explained that the Corps was 

considering combining the plans or perhaps shortening them. He said that the District was 

asking questions like, “Do we go from fl ood plan to hurricane plan to all hazards plan? Does 

it become too cumbersome? Should we have smaller plans so people actually read them? I 

think we were moving back to a specifi c hurricane plan.”129 It does not appear that any of 

the plans were complete, let alone followed. 

In Colonel Wagenaar’s defense, the Mississippi Valley Division’s Hurricane Contingency 

Plan (Contingency Plan) contemplated a hurricane of Katrina’s strength hitting the city and 

rendering the New Orleans District a victim, incapable of executing Corps missions or obligations under the assurance agreements for the Lake Pontchartrain Project, the National 

Response Plan (NRP) or the Flood Control Act.130 Th e Contingency Plan called on other 

Corps districts within the Mississippi Valley Division like St. Louis, Vicksburg, and Memphis to carry out the New Orleans District’s missions.131 For example, the Contingency Plan 

stated that the Corps’ St. Louis District would perform civil-works missions, which include 

project inspections, emergency repair of damaged facilities, and any Flood Act activities.132

Despite the decision by Colonel Wagenaar to evacuate his personnel before landfall in accordance with the plan, there appears to have been confusion and delay in pre-positioning 

the resources of the other districts or reassigning the New Orleans district’s responsibilities 

to the other districts within the Mississippi Valley Division. In fact, the commander of the 

Mississippi River Division did not issue the order implementing the Contingency Plan until 

September 3, nearly fi ve days aft er the storm and two days aft er the Corps took control of 

the repair eff orts along the 17th Street Canal and London Avenue Canal.133

Closing the Breaches – Confl ict and Confusion

With Katrina approaching, and even though the Contingency Plan provided that his district 

be considered a victim of the storm, Colonel Wagenaar chose to personally wait out the 

hurricane with a small staff in the New Orleans District’s hurricane bunker. On the morning of August 29, Colonel Wagenaar said he was notifi ed about possible breaches as early as 

5 a.m.134 Around 2 or 3 p.m., aft er the weather calmed, he tried to make his way to the 17th 

Street Canal by four-wheel drive vehicle: no helicopters were immediately available, and no 
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pre-storm eff orts had been made to secure one.135 Because of damage to the area, Colonel 

Wagenaar was only able to reach the intersection of I-10 and I-610, just north of Metairie 

Cemetery and just a few blocks east of the 17th Street Canal, where he was able to view the 

fl ooding fi rst hand. He saw:

people everywhere, and then we saw the water, and the water was – all you 

could see were the trees sticking out of the water, so I knew that – I mean, 

that’s probably 10 or 15 feet of water. ... I knew we had a problem. Th is water 

had to come from somewhere. I didn’t know where, but I knew that we had a 

problem.136

 Th roughout the previous night and the following day, Colonel Wagenaar encountered diffi culties with communications. His satellite phone worked sporadically and e-mail became 

inoperable when the servers shut down.137 However, Colonel Wagenaar was able to send an 

e-mail later Monday evening aft er his failed attempt to reach the 17th Street 

Canal to his commander at the Mississippi Valley Division. He informed Brigadier General 

Robert Crear that he had seen “15+ feet of water” and that there were unoffi cial reports 

that more than 40,000 homes were underwater in East Orleans and St. Bernard Parishes.138

Colonel Wagenaar had no dedicated communications with the Orleans Levee District, the 

LA DOTD or even the Coast Guard. In fact, Colonel Wagenaar was unaware that the Coast 

Guard was fl ying missions over the city on August 29 – “Th e fi rst time I knew they fl ew over 

the city was when I got back [to the District offi ce] and was watching the news [video footage of the fl ooding] and going, ‘Where the hell did that come from?’”139

At about 7:15 the next morning, August 30, Colonel Wagenaar sent two members of his 

staff to assess the breaches.140 Th ough the Corps believed that the levee districts would be 

the fi rst responders for any breaches,141 Colonel Wagenaar proceeded to discuss ways to repair the fl oodwall breaches with the New Orleans District’s Chief of Engineering. Any plans 

that were discussed were hampered by not having materials, personnel, or aircraft pre-positioned to survey the damage and make repairs.142 Colonel Wagenaar was not able to carry 

out an air survey of the New Orleans area until late Tuesday morning.143

Also on Tuesday and carrying over to Wednesday, LA DOTD employees surveyed the 

breaches and began working with the West Jeff erson Levee District – a neighboring levee 

district, not directly impacted by the fl ooding, that had volunteered material and personnel 

to help – and whatever Orleans Levee District personnel were available to devise a way to 

close the breaches. Th ey generally agreed upon a plan to dump as much broken-up concrete 

as possible into the holes in the fl oodwalls.144 Th e Corps’ personnel who were able to make it 

to the scene believed it would be more effi cient to drive sheet pile (long steel sheets) across 

the mouth of the canal itself to prevent more water from entering the canal and making its 

way through the breaches.145 Th e levee districts, the LA DOTD, and the Water Board opposed closing off the canal and insisted on moving forward with their original plan, which 

included building a road to access the breaches to dump the concrete. Colonel Wagenaar 

was asked about the disagreement:

Who was doing it, who was in charge, you know, and what parish was what 

and who could build what road and what trucks could be used and what equipment could be used, you know. ... I mean, the issue was, is the. ... [West Jefferson] Levee District had like fi ve trucks, dump trucks and an excavator. And 

here we bring in a contractor that’s ready to go that’s got 20 trucks. ... I mean, 

we’re bringing federal contractors – we’re bringing the federal government to 

bear on the problem. And they [the West Jeff erson Levee District] were like, 

“Well, you can’t do that, that’s our road.” Th ey were working on building this 
Leves: Who’s in Charge?

141

road back there. “Well, you can’t” – you know, “We’re building the road, you 

can’t do that.” ... I mean, all – pretty much a turf war almost. ... And it just 

got to the point where, you know, we were mobilizing contractors . . . and they 

wouldn’t let us operate on the bridge [the Hammond Highway Bridge]. Mike 

Stack [with LA DOTD] and – you know, Giuseppe [with the West Jeff erson Levee District] blocked some of our equipment from moving with his vehicles.146

Th is disagreement illustrated the overall confusion among federal, state, and local entities 

over who was responsible for the Lake Pontchartrain Project. As mentioned above, Colonel 

Wagenaar thought the levee districts were responsible for the repairs,147 but the Orleans Levee District did not have the personnel or the material available to address the situation. Th e 

leadership vacuum was fi lled by LA DOTD personnel who assumed command of the initial 

repair eff orts.148 Th at eff ort, too, proved inadequate, at least according to Colonel Wagenaar, 

who thought it was best that the Corps take over149 – “[W]e had a bunch of dysfunctional 

stuff going on out there, and we fi gured if we didn’t do it and take over and marshal federal 

resources at this problem, that we’d be here for quite a while trying to fi x this hole.”150

Th e levee districts and the LA DOTD personnel on the scene did not agree with Colonel 

Wagenaar’s decision, so ultimately, on Th ursday, September 1, LA DOTD Secretary Johnny 

Bradberry, and the Corps’ Director of Civil Works, Major General Don Riley, resolved the 

dispute, concluding that the repair eff ort would be a Corps-directed operation.151 Colonel Wagenaar explained that, in pressing for control of the repair eff ort, he was relying on the Corps’ 

authority under the Flood Act, an authority the Corps had regardless of who was in charge of 

the Lake Pontchartrain Project, to act independently of the assurance agreements and any action the Corps had taken to turn over the fl oodwalls to the Orleans Levee District for O&M.152

When General Crear issued his order implementing the Mississippi Valley Division’s Hurricane Contingency Plan on September 3, he, too, cited the Corps’ Flood Act authority as the 

basis to “provide critical emergency support to the people of the aff ected areas.”153

Conclusion

Resolving the dispute over who was in charge of the repair eff ort and the full-scale eff orts 

to fi ll the breaches took three days. No such dispute should have occurred, and resolution 

should not have taken so long. Responsibilities among the levee districts, the LA DOTD, and 

the Corps should have been understood and documented. An interagency emergency response plan should have been in eff ect. Th e Corps should have pre-positioned personnel and 

material from either the New Orleans District, or the other districts within the Mississippi 

Valley Division and identifi ed in the Division’s Hurricane Contingency Plan, to assess and repair immediate problems. In the end, neither the Corps, the LA DOTD, nor the levee districts 

had any plan in place, nor had they determined or planned in advance who would be responsible for, and have the assets nearby, to address a major breach of the levees or fl oodwalls.

1 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, Performance Evaluation Plan and 

Interim Status, Report 2 of a Series, Mar. 10, 2006, pp. IV–1 through IV–39 [hereinaft er IPET, Report 2 of a Series].

2 Testimony of Max Hearn, Director, Orleans Levee District, LA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Who’s in Charge of the New Orleans Levees?, Dec. 15, 

2005.

3 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Th e Civil Works Program of the Army Corps of Engineers: A 

Primer, by Nicole T. Carter and Betsy A. Cody, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 3 [hereinaft er CRS, Th e Civil Works Program].

4 CRS, Th e Civil Works Program, p. 1. 
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5 Congressional direction usually comes through authorization legislation like the Water Resources Development Act, 

which Congress tends to consider every two years, or as part of the annual appropriations process. U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, Water Resources Development Act (WRDA): Army Corps of Engineers Authorization Issues in the 109th Congress, by Nicole T. Carter. Mar. 13, 2006, p. 2.

6 Supplemental Agreement Between the United States of America and the Orleans Levee District for Local Cooperation 

at Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity High Level Plan, June 21, 1985. Th is agreement included a common O&M provision that could be found in other assurance agreements. It stated, in part, that the Orleans Levee District was required 

to “[m]aintain and operate all features of the project in accord with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Army, 

including levees, fl oodgates and approach channels, drainage structures, drainage ditches, or canals, fl oodwalls, and 

stoplog structures.” 

7 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, “Mississippi Valley Division Work Flood Control Act Project 

Maps,” last updated on June 10, 1998. http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/eng2/edsd/proj_maps/pmap_fcp2.htm. Accessed 

on Apr. 11, 2006.

8 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, “Who We Are.” http://www.mvn.usace.mil/pao/whoweare/index/asp. Accessed on Apr. 21, 2006.

9 Committee staff interview of Col. Richard Wagenaar, District Commander, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript p. 16.

10 A common provision in the assurance agreements for the Lake Pontchartrain Project required the Orleans Levee District to “[m]aintain and operate all features of the project in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the 

Army, including levees, fl oodgates and approach channels.” Various Assurance Agreements for Lake Pontchartrain and 

Vicinity Protection Project, dates vary. Provided to Committee; Written Statement of Anu K. Mittal, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Offi ce, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Who’s in Charge of the New Orleans Levees?, Dec. 15, 2005, pp. 1-2.

11 33 C.F.R. § 208.10.

12 Committee staff interview of Jerry Colletti, U.S. Army, Operations Manager for Completed Works, New Orleans 

District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, conducted on Nov. 22, 2005, transcript, pp. 19-27.

13 33 U.S.C. § 701n.

14 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 114-115; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mississippi Valley Division, 

Operations Order 01-05 (Hurricane Katrina), MVD Hurricane Contigency Plan 18 May 2005, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided to 

Committee [hereinaft er, Mississippi Valley Division, Operations Order 01-05, Sept. 3, 2005].

15 Edmond J. Preau, Jr., Association of Levee Boards of Louisiana,“Th e History and Function of Louisiana’s Levee 

Boards,” PowerPoint presentation. http://www.albl.org/workshops.php. Accessed on Mar. 22, 2005.

16 La. R.S. 38:306.

17 La. R.S. 38:306 (B).

18 La. R.S. 38:306 (B) and (C).

19 La. R.S. 38:301 (B).

20 La. Const. Art. VI, § 39; La. Const. Art. VI, § 41; La. R.S. 38:307; La. R.S. 38:335.

21 La. R.S. 38:306 (B). As of June 2005, there were estimates that the casino lease generated about 20 percent of the 

Orleans Levee District’s revenue. Orleans Levee District, Basic Financial Statement, June 30, 2005, p. ix; Committee 

staff interview of Steven Spencer, U.S. Army, Chief Engineer, Orleans Levee District, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

conducted on Nov. 14, 2005, transcript pp. 123-124.

22 Orleans Levee District, Basic Financial Statements, June 30, 2005, p. 14. Provided to Committee.

23 Orleans Levee District, Basic Financial Statements, June 30, 2005, p. 16. Provided to Committee.

24 Committee staff interview of James Huey, former President, Orleans Levee Board, LA, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, 

transcript p. 19.

25 Orleans Levee District, Basic Financial Statements, June 30, 2005, p. 14. See also: Testimony of James Huey, former 

President, Orleans Levee Board, LA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Who’s in Charge of the New Orleans Levees?, Dec. 15, 2005 (“[Senator Collins:] ... 

And, in fact, when we reviewed the minutes of the board’s meetings, we found that a majority of the meeting time was 

actually spent discussing these commercial enterprises, whether it was the licensing of the casino or the operations of 

the airport or the marinas or the commercial leases with the karate business and the beauty shop and the restaurants. 

Do you think it is appropriate for the board to be involved in these commercial activities? Do those business activities 

detract time and attention from what is truly the mission of the board, which is to ensure the safety, the maintenance, 

the operations of the levees?” “[Mr. Huey:] Yes and no.”). 

26 Spencer interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 66-67; Committee staff interview of Max Hearn, Executive Director, Orleans 

Levee District, LA, conducted Nov. 14, 2005, transcript pp. 59-60.

27 Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 59-60.

28 Spencer interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 67.
Leves: Who’s in Charge?

143

29 Spencer interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 67.

30 Money for the fountain came from the levee district’s capital projects fund which was supported by funding from 

property taxes. Frank Donze, “Lakeside Legacy Lives,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, July 12, 2004, Metro, p. 1.

31 Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 31-32.

32 Orleans Levee District, Minutes of Joint Finance and Planning, Engineering and Construction Committee Meeting, 

July 5, 2005, p. 2. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Orleans Levee District, Minutes of Committee Meeting, July 5, 

2005].

33 Orleans Levee District, Minutes of Committee Meeting, July 5, 2005, p. 2. 

34 Hearn, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 15, 2005.

35 Orleans Levee District, Minutes of Committee Meeting, July 5, 2005, p. 2.

36 Huey interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 30-33.

37 La. R.S. 38:306. 

38 La. R.S. 38:213; Committee staff interview of Edmund Preau, Assistant Secretary, Public Works and Inter-Modal Transportation, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, conducted on Nov. 17, 2005, transcript p. 38.

39 La. R.S. 38:301(B).

40 Huey interview, Nov. 29 2005, pp. 100-105; Association of Levee Boards of Louisiana, “About ALBL.” http://www.

albl.org/about_us.php. Accessed on Mar. 22, 2006.

41 Huey interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 101.

42 Huey interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 104.

43 Huey interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 105; Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 44-45.

44 La. R.S. 38:319. 

45 Preau interview, Nov. 17, 2005, pp. 41-42.

46 Preau interview, Nov. 17, 2005, pp. 41-42.

47 Preau interview, Nov. 17, 2005, pp. 44-45.

48 Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, p. ESF3-1 [hereinaft er Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005].

49 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, p. ESF–3–2.

50 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, p. ESF–3–2.

51 Preau interview, Nov. 17, 2005, pp. 91-92.

52 Written Statement of Mittal, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 2.

53 Written Statement of Mittal, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, “What 

GAO Found,” and pp. 1-2.

54 Written Statement of Mittal, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 4.

55 IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. IV–13. 

56 Th ough the level of protection that the Lake Pontchartrain Project was supposed to provide did not change once it 

was underway, the plan for building the project did. Th e initial design authorized in 1965 followed what was called the 

“Barrier Plan.” Th is plan called for the construction of a barrier on the eastern edge of Lake Pontchartrain for the purpose of preventing storm surges from entering Lake Pontchartrain. Th is would have lowered the threat of storm surges 

rising in the lake and threatening the lake front levees and the communities they protected. However, in 1977, a federal 

district court issued a ruling enjoining the Crops from pursuing the Barrier Plan until the Corps addressed problems 

with the project’s environmental impact statement. Source: Written Statement of Mittal, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 1-9. 

In 1984, the Corps commissioned a reevaluation study to analyze the continued feasibility of the Barrier Plan and 

whether the Corps should opt for an alternative design called the “High-Level Plan.” Th e High-Level Plan, which had 

been considered in 1965 and rejected, called for raising and strengthening the levees and fl oodwalls that would be affected by a storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain rather than building the barrier. Th e reevaluation study concluded that 

the High-Level Plan was more feasible and served as the impetus for changing the design of the project. Source: Written 

Statement of Mittal, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 1-9. 

During Katrina, there were several breaches along levees and fl oodwalls constructed as part of the High-Level Plan. In 

the aft ermath of Katrina, there has been debate as to whether the Barrier Plan would have been more eff ective in fending 

off the storm surge. Th e position of the Corps of Engineers is that plans would have provided the same level of protection because they both would have been designed to the same standard – the Standard Project Hurricane – and would 

not have materially altered the outcome. As explained in recent Senate testimony by Daniel Hitchings, an offi cial with 

the Mississippi Valley Division of the Corps:

I would also like to correct one statement that was made earlier, I believe was related to the previously 
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proposed Barrier Plan, in that it would not have made any diff erence. Th at statement I believe is accurate, but it is accurate not because it was an inadequate plan, and not because the storms would have 

gone up the MRGO [Mississippi River – Gulf Outlet – a shipping channel that connects to the Gulf of 

Mexico] anyway. It would not have made a diff erence because its authorized level was still the standard 

project hurricane. 

Source: Testimony of Daniel Hitchings, Director, Task Force HOPE, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, hearing to “Evaluate the Degree to Which the Preliminary Findings 

on the Failure of the Levees are Being Incorporated Into the Restoration of Hurricane Protection,” Nov. 17, 2005. 

57 Lt. Gen. Carl Strock, Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Defense Department Special Briefi ng on Eff orts to 

Mitigate Infrastructure Damage from Hurricane Katrina,” press briefi ng, Sept. 2, 2005.

58 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, Project Fact Sheet, “Lake Pontchartrain, LA. and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project, St. Bernard, Orleans, Jeff erson, and St. Charles Parishes, LA.” Last updated on May, 23, 2005. 

http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/pao/response/HURPROJ.asp?prj=lkpon1. Accessed on Apr. 11, 2006.

59 Committee staff interview of Alfred Naomi, Senior Project Manager, Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005, transcript pp. 50-51.

60 Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, “N.O. hurricane bridge contract awarded, Corps, Levee Board will 

fl oodproof two bridges in Gentilly,” news release, Dec. 19, 2001.

61 Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, “Cross Bayou Drainage Structure to reduce fl ooding in St. Charles 

Parish,” news release, May 27, 2003.

62 Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, “Filmore Bridge in Gentilly will reopen on Friday, Aug. 22. Mirabeau Bridge is closing Wednesday, Aug. 27 for hurricane fl oodproofi ng,” news release, Aug. 21, 2003.

63 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 94 (“But, I mean, I knew that the city – I’d been briefed, you know, hurricane protection-wise, that generally the city could take a fast-moving Category 3, and anything else could be catastrophic. I mean, I was told that.”). 

64 Committee staff interview of Michael Lowe, Emergency Manager, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005, transcript p. 74 (“My understanding of the level of protection in the New Orleans 

area is a fast moving Category 3 hurricane on the Saffi r-Simpson Scale. How I came about saying that, or my understanding of that, is mainly what I hear from the project manager who is deal – working on the hurricane systems.”). See 

also: Lowe interview, Nov. 16, 2005, pp. 73-77, 81.

65 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, Un-Watering Plan, Greater Metropolitan Area, New Orleans, 

Louisiana, Aug. 18, 2000, p. 3. See also: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Hurricane Protection, Louisiana, June 28, 2002, p. 9.

66 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, transcript p. 22.

67 Committee staff interview of Wilson Shaff er, Ph.D., Chief, Evaluations Branch, National Weather Service, conducted 

on Feb. 24, 2005, transcript pp. 38-41.

68 Shaff er interview, Feb. 24, 2006, pp. 37, 61-67.

69 Written Statement of Roy K. Dokka, Ph.D., Director, Louisiana Spatial Reference Center and Center for GeoInformatics, Louisiana State University, for the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment, hearing on Expert Views on Hurricane and Flood Protection 

and Water Resources Planning for a Rebuilt Gulf Coast, Oct. 20, 2005, pp. 2-6.

70 IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. I–2

71 Mittal, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 15, 2005; Naomi interview, Nov. 16, 2005, pp. 18-21.

72 33 C.F.R. § 208.10(a)(1).

73 33 C.F.R. § 208.10.

74 Naomi interview, Nov. 16, 2005, pp. 19-20. Mr. Hearn agreed that the Lake Pontchartrain Project had not been formally turned over to the Orleans Levee District. Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 76.

75 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 11-16.

76 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 11-16.

77 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 16-17.

78 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 17.

79 In preparation for the Committee’s December 15 hearing on the levee system, the Committee asked GAO to investigate whether parts or all of the Lake Pontchartrain Project had been turned over. Th e GAO report stated that, according 

to the Corps and the task force charged with rebuilding the levee system –Task Force Guardian, all but three sections of 

the Lake Pontchartrain Project in New Orleans had been turned over to the Orleans Levee District. Th e criteria used by 

the Corps and Task Force Guardian to make this determination were: (1) if the project unit was at its design height; (2) 

whether portions of the project was being operated and maintained by the Orleans Levee District; and (3) if the portion 

of the project had passed the annual inspection for completed works in accordance with Corps regulations. Neither the 

Corps nor Task Force Guardian relied on the turnover letters to make their determinations. Moreover, the assessment 

by the Corps and Task Force Guardian as to whether the Orleans Levee District was conducting daily O&M ignored the 
Leves: Who’s in Charge?

145

fact that the levee district had obligations to look aft er fl ood control projects under state law separate and apart from 

the its role as a local sponsor under the assurance agreements. Source: Written Statement of Mittal, Senate Committee 

hearing, Dec. 15, 2005. Moreover, reliance on whether a part of the project passed the annual inspection is a canard. As 

discussed in more detail below, the Corps gave the Orleans Levee District passing grades for the annual inspections even 

though the inspections did not involve geotechnical studies assessing the strength of the system, analyses of whether 

the project was at its design height, or even stopping at the fl oodwalls along the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals 

because they were inaccessible by car, the mode of transportation generally used for the annual inspections. Moreover, 

the passing grades were given even though there were known vulnerabilities in direct contravention of the Corps’ rules 

and regulations: vegetation was growing along the fl oodwalls, a railroad gate near the Inter Harbor Navigation Canal 

remained broken for more than a year, and there was a levee well below its design height in New Orleans East.

80 33 C.F.R. § 208.10(a)(6).

81 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 50-53.

82 33 C.F.R. § 208.10(a)(10).

83 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 68.

84 Spencer interview, Nov. 17, 2005, pp. 10-12.

85 Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 43.

86 Spencer interview, Nov. 17, 2005, pp. 10-12.

87 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 20-28.

88 Huey interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 108-109.

89 Orleans Levee District, Minutes of Joint Finance and Planning, Engineering and Construction Committee Meeting, 

Apr. 5, 2005, p. 6. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Orleans Levee District, Minutes of Committee Meeting, Apr. 5, 

2005].

90 Huey interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 58.

91 Orleans Levee District, Minutes of Committee Meeting, Apr. 5, 2005, p. 6. 

92 La. R.S. 38:2211.

93 Huey interview, Nov. 28, 2005, pp. 64-65.

94 Orleans Levee District, Minutes of Committee Meeting, Mar. 5, 2005, p. 7. 

95 33 C.F.R. § 208.10(a)(8).

96 33 C.F.R. § 208.10(c)(1)(iii).

97 U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A 

Failure of Initiative, Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, 2006, p. 92. See also: Ann Carrns, “Long Before Flood, 

New Orleans System was Prime for Leaks,” Th e Wall Street Journal, Nov. 25, 2005, p. A1. 

98 Orleans Levee Board, Minutes of Joint Finance and Planning, Engineering and Construction Committee, May 31, 

2005, p. 6. Provided to Committee.

99 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 82-83; Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 48; Huey interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 

107. 

100 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 40-43.

101 Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 45-48. 

102 Hearn interview, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 3-8.

103 Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 11-12.

104 Spencer interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 45.

105 Hearn, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 15, 2005.

106 Hearn, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 15, 2005. See also: IPET, Report 2 of a Series, pp. I–2, III–6, III–26 through 

III–29, III–32 through III–40.

107 Testimony of Jerry Colletti, Manager for Completed Works, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

Who’s in Charge of the New Orleans Levees?, Dec. 15, 2005.

108 Ernst G. Frankel, letter to the Honorable Senator Susan Collins, Dec. 14. 2005. 

109 Committee staff interview of Jerry Colletti, Manager for Completed Works, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, transcript p. 20.

110 Hearn, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 15, 2005.

111 Bob Marshall, “Levee leaks reported to S&WB a year ago; Lakeview residents’ complaints fell between the cracks,” 

New Orleans Times-Picayune, Nov. 18, 2005, National, p. 1.
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146

112 Frank Langfi tt, “Residents Say Levee Leaked Months Before Katrina,” National Public Radio, Nov. 22, 2005. http://

www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5022074. Accessed on Apr. 10, 2006.

113 Marcia A. St. Martin, letter to the editor, New Orleans Times-Picayune, Dec. 5, 2005. Provided to Committee.

114 Committee staff interview of Marcia A. St. Martin, Executive Director, New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board, 

conducted on, Dec. 9, 2005, transcript p. 32.

115 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 59-60.

116 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 56-57.

117 Huey interview, Nov. 28, 2005, pp. 118-119.

118 Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 54-55.

119 Spencer interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 56.

120 Testimony of Col. Richard Wagenaar, Chief Engineer, New Orleans District, Army Corps of Engineers, before the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Who’s in 

Charge of the New Orleans Levees?, Dec. 15, 2005.

121 Col. Wagenaar, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 15, 2005.

122 Testimony of Edmond Preau, Assistant Secretary, Public Works and Intermodal Transportation, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Who’s in Charge of the New Orleans Levees?, Dec. 15, 2005.

123 Huey, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 15, 2005.

124 Col. Wagenaar, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 15, 2005.

125 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005 pp. 77-78; Lowe interview, Nov. 16, 2005, pp. 18-19.

126 Lowe interview, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 90.

127 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 14-15.

128 Col. Richard P. Wagenaar, memorandum on the New Orleans District, Emergency Operations Plan, July, 2005; 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, All Hazards Contingency Plan, August, 2005; U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, New Orleans District, Continuity of Operations Plan (Redacted); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans 

District, Catastrophic Disaster Response Plan. Since 2000, the New Orleans District has recognized that New Orleans 

would sustain extensive fl ooding in a major hurricane and has had a plan, known as the Un-watering Plan, to evacuate 

water from the city and surrounding parishes in such an event. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, 

Un-Watering Plan, Greater Metropolitan Area, New Orleans, Louisiana, Aug. 18, 2000.

129 Lowe interview, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 29. 

130 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mississippi Valley Division, Hurricane Contingency Plan (CONPLAN), May 18, 2005, 

p. 1. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Mississippi Valley Division, CONPLAN].

131 Mississippi Valley Division, CONPLAN, pp. 3-4. 

132 Mississippi Valley Division, CONPLAN, p. 4. 

133 Mississippi Valley Division, Operations Order 01-05, Sept. 3, 2005.

134 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 52.

135 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 54, 61-63.

136 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 57.

137 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 28.

138 Col. Richard P. Wagenaar, e-mail to Robert Crear, SITREP:29 August 2005, Aug. 29, 2005, 7:49 p.m. Provided to 

Committee.

139 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 69.

140 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 62-63.

141 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 113; Lowe interview, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 5. 

142 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 77, 80-81.

143 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 62-65.

144 Committee staff interview of Michael J. Stack, Engineer, New Orleans District Design Water Resources, Louisiana 

Department of Transportation and Development, conducted on Nov. 17, 2005; Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 71-73.

145 Committee staff interview of Kenneth Crumholt, Resident Engineer, Construction Division, West Bank Hurricane 

Protection Project, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Richard Pinner, Section Chief, Geotech 

Branch, Engineering Division, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005, transcript pp. 23-24. 

146 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 105-107. See also: Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 122-123 
Leves: Who’s in Charge?

147

(“I mean, so – I mean, just all these data points, and I’m relatively – I’m new, I mean, I don’t – I mean, this whole Levee 

District/Sewer and Water Board concept was relatively new to me. But just these data points of: Who is in charge? I 

mean, where’s the Parish President? Where is the Mayor? And then the State, ‘Well they work for DOTD.’ I’m like, 

‘Okay. Who is in charge?’ Th at was my view. I still have that view. I mean, so at some point, I mean -- you know, there is 

an old local – there is an old saying in the Army: When in charge, take charge. And I know I was in charge of the Corps 

of Engineers, the district, so I mean, at some point, you know, you’ve got to make stuff happen. Because this was a bad 

situation.”).

147 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 111-113 (“I knew the levee districts were in charge, it was their project, 

that they had the responsibility to do the repair. ... It’s just a general operating principle here. I mean, we don’t have 

O&M of these projects once we turn them over. ... But no, I knew it was their job to fi x these originally. We tended to 

want to let it go that way until – I mean, until it was obvious that it needed federal involvement.”).

148 Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 71-73.

149 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 111-113.

150 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 104-105.

151 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 104-108.

152 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 114.

153 Mississippi Valley Division, Operations Order 01-05, Sept. 3, 2005.