United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Ranking Minority 

Member, Subcommittee on Defense, 

Committee on Appropriations, House of 

Representatives 

FORCE STRUCTURE

Joint Seabasing Would 

Benefit from a 

Comprehensive 

Management 

Approach and 

Rigorous 

Experimentation 

before Services Spend 

Billions on New 

Capabilities 

January 2007 

 

GAO-07-211 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

January 2007

FORCE STRUCTURE

Joint Seabasing Would Benefit from a 

Comprehensive Management Approach 

and Rigorous Experimentation before 

Services Spend Billions on New 

Capabilities 

Highlights of GAO-07-211, a report to the 

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee 

on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, 

House of Representatives

Joint seabasing is one of several 

evolving concepts for projecting

and sustaining forces without 

relying on immediate access to 

nearby land bases and could be the 

source of billions of dollars of 

investment. In future security 

environments, the Department of

Defense (DOD) expects to

encounter situations of reduced or 

denied access to areas of 

operation. Even where forward 

operating bases are otherwise

available, their use may be

politically undesirable or 

operationally restricted. GAO was 

asked to address the extent to

which (1) DOD has employed a 

comprehensive management

approach to joint seabasing, (2)

DOD has developed a joint 

experimentation campaign plan for

joint seabasing, and (3) DOD and 

the services have identified the 

costs of joint seabasing options. 

For this review, GAO analyzed joint 

requirements documents, 

experimentation efforts, and 

service acquisition plans. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD 

develop a management approach

that includes senior leadership 

involvement, a dedicated 

implementation team, and a 

communications strategy; and

develop an experimentation 

campaign plan and total ownership 

cost estimates for seabasing 

options. DOD agreed with the 

recommendations, except for the 

need for a dedicated 

implementation team.

While DOD has taken action to establish a joint seabasing capability, it has 

not developed a comprehensive management approach to guide and assess 

joint seabasing. GAO’s prior work showed that sound management practices 

for developing capabilities include involving top leadership, dedicating an 

implementation team, and establishing a communications strategy. DOD is 

developing a joint seabasing concept and various DOD organizations are

sponsoring seabasing initiatives. However, DOD has not provided sufficient 

leadership to guide joint seabasing development and service initiatives are

outpacing DOD’s analysis of joint requirements. DOD also has not 

established an implementation team to provide day-to-day management to 

ensure joint seabasing receives the focused attention needed so that efforts 

are effective and coordinated. Also, DOD has not fully developed a 

communications strategy that shares information among the organizations 

involved in seabasing. Without a comprehensive management approach 

containing these elements, DOD may be unable to coordinate activities and 

minimize redundancy among service initiatives. 

DOD has not developed a joint experimentation campaign plan, although 

many seabasing experimentation activities—including war games, modeling 

and simulation, and live demonstrations—have taken place across the 

services, combatant commands, and other defense entities. No overarching 

joint seabasing experimentation plan exists to guide these efforts because

the U.S. Joint Forces Command has not taken the lead in coordinating joint 

seabasing experimentation, although it has been tasked with developing a 

biennial joint experimentation campaign plan for future joint concepts. 

While the U.S. Joint Forces Command is in the process of developing the 

plan, it is unclear the extent to which this plan will address joint seabasing 

or will be able to guide joint seabasing experimentation efforts. Without a 

plan to direct experimentation, DOD and the services’ ability to evaluate 

solutions, coordinate efforts, and disseminate results could be compromised. 

While service development efforts tied to seabasing are approaching 

milestones for investment decisions, it is unclear when DOD will complete 

development of total ownership cost estimates for a range of joint seabasing 

options. Joint seabasing is going through a capabilities-based assessment 

process that is intended to produce preliminary cost estimates for seabasing

options. However, DOD has not yet begun the specific study that will 

identify potential approaches, including changes to doctrine and training as 

well as material solutions, and produce preliminary cost estimates. DOD 

officials expect the study will not be complete for a year or more. 

Meanwhile, the services are actively pursuing a variety of seabasing 

initiatives, some of which are approaching milestones which will guide 

future program investments. Until total ownership cost estimates for joint 

seabasing options are developed and made transparent to DOD and 

Congress, decision makers will not be able to evaluate the cost-effectiveness

of individual service initiatives. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-211.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Janet St. 

Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or 

stlaurentj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 6

DOD Has Not Fully Established a Comprehensive Management 

Approach to Guide Joint Seabasing and Integrate Service 

Initiatives 10

DOD Has Not Developed a Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan 

to Inform Decisions About Joint Seabasing 16 

Timeframe for Completing Joint Seabasing Total Ownership Cost 

Estimates is Uncertain 25 

Conclusions 30

Recommendations for Executive Action 31 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 37 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 40 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 44 

 

Figures 

Figure 1: The JCIDS Analysis Process 7 

Figure 2: Illustrative Connectors for Use in Joint Seabasing 9 

Figure 3: Navy Forces Use a Barge to Move Construction Vehicles 

During a Joint Logistics-Over-the-Shore Exercise at Naval 

Magazine, in Indian Island, Washington 19 

Figure 4: Ships in the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) 

Squadron 28

Page i GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-07-211 Force Structure
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

January 26, 2007 

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Young: 

Future security environments are expected to become increasingly 

complicated through unstable international political relationships, 

increased acts of terrorism, the expanded influence of nonstate actors, and 

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In a complicated 

operational environment, the Department of Defense (DOD) may 

encounter situations of reduced or denied access to desired areas of 

operation. Even where overseas bases are otherwise available, their use 

may be politically undesirable or operationally restricted for military use, 

or a commander may desire to reduce the footprint and visibility of the 

joint force in a host nation. As a result, the capability to project and 

sustain forces in such antiaccess environments could become increasingly 

important in enabling DOD to confront unexpected threats and deter 

aggression or seize the initiative. 

Future security environments are expected to become increasingly 

complicated through unstable international political relationships, 

increased acts of terrorism, the expanded influence of nonstate actors, and 

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In a complicated 

operational environment, the Department of Defense (DOD) may 

encounter situations of reduced or denied access to desired areas of 

operation. Even where overseas bases are otherwise available, their use 

may be politically undesirable or operationally restricted for military use, 

or a commander may desire to reduce the footprint and visibility of the 

joint force in a host nation. As a result, the capability to project and 

sustain forces in such antiaccess environments could become increasingly 

important in enabling DOD to confront unexpected threats and deter 

aggression or seize the initiative. 

Joint seabasing is one of several evolving concepts describing how 

commanders in the future will project and sustain forces for conducting 

joint military operations without relying on immediate access to nearby 

land bases. Seabasing is defined as the rapid deployment, assembly, 

command, projection, reconstitution, and reemployment of joint combat 

power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and 

force projection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on

land bases within the joint operations area. Joint seabasing is a scalable

concept with many potential options for achieving its desired capability. 

These options range from a single ship to a larger family of amphibious 

and logistics ships, with supporting surface and air connectors, as well a 

concept of operations and employment options. Enhancing a seabasing 

capability is expected to be costly, in light of the many options that could 

be developed to support joint seabasing, and could be the source of 

billions of dollars of investment if DOD chooses an option involving the 

development of new ships. While joint seabasing is one option for how the 

joint force commander could conduct joint military operations in the 

future, other means of projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess 

Joint seabasing is one of several evolving concepts describing how 

commanders in the future will project and sustain forces for conducting 

joint military operations without relying on immediate access to nearby 

land bases. Seabasing is defined as the rapid deployment, assembly, 

command, projection, reconstitution, and reemployment of joint combat 

power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and 

force projection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on

land bases within the joint operations area. Joint seabasing is a scalable

concept with many potential options for achieving its desired capability. 

These options range from a single ship to a larger family of amphibious 

and logistics ships, with supporting surface and air connectors, as well a 

concept of operations and employment options. Enhancing a seabasing 

capability is expected to be costly, in light of the many options that could 

be developed to support joint seabasing, and could be the source of 

billions of dollars of investment if DOD chooses an option involving the 

development of new ships. While joint seabasing is one option for how the 

joint force commander could conduct joint military operations in the 

future, other means of projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess 

Page 1 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
environment exist and continue to evolve. These include rapid strategic 

airlift and fast sealift of forces from the United States to the area of 

operation, airfield and port seizure, rapid base construction, and several 

others. At a time when DOD is under pressure to control costs, it is 

increasingly important for decision makers to evaluate competing 

priorities and alternatives to determine the most cost-effective solutions 

for conducting future military operations. 

Joint seabasing represents a major change in the way DOD would manage 

its forces. Inherent in implementing an organizational transformation such 

as joint seabasing are possible changes in force structure, acquisition, 

logistics concepts, command and control, training, and other factors 

important to successful military operations. The concept could also have a 

significant effect on near- and long-term funding priorities. 

You asked us to conduct a review of DOD’s assessments and plans to 

implement joint seabasing, with particular attention to the following three 

questions: (1) To what extent has DOD employed a comprehensive 

management approach for developing a joint seabasing capability? (2) To 

what extent has a joint experimentation campaign plan been developed, 

implemented, and used to inform decisions on joint seabasing options? 

(3) To what extent have DOD and the services identified the cost of joint 

seabasing options so that decision makers can make informed, costeffective decisions? 

To assess DOD’s management oversight and leadership approach for joint 

seabasing, we obtained and analyzed briefings and studies on joint 

seabasing, reviewed joint requirements policies and procedures, 

interviewed DOD and service officials, and compared DOD’s approach 

with our prior work on best practices for transformations of large 

organizations. To assess the extent to which a joint experimentation 

campaign plan has been developed, implemented, and used to inform 

decisions on joint seabasing options, we obtained briefings from and 

interviewed DOD and service officials on their experimentation efforts, 

and examined DOD and service guidance on conducting and leading 

experimentation campaigns. To assess the development of cost estimates 

for joint seabasing, we obtained and analyzed key briefings, reports, data,

and plans from DOD and the services that included information and 

analysis regarding estimated costs related to joint seabasing and 

conducted interviews with relevant DOD and service officials. We 

compared the cost estimates for joint seabasing to DOD instructions for 

developing cost estimates, along with best practices on developing total 

ownership costs. We conducted our review from February 2006 through 

October 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing

Page 2 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
standards and determined that any data used were sufficiently reliable for 

our objective. The scope and methodology used in our review are 

described in further detail in appendix I. 

While DOD has taken several actions to establish a joint seabasing 

capability, it has not provided sufficient leadership to integrate service 

initiatives and guide the development of joint seabasing. Specifically, 

DOD’s management approach has not fully incorporated key sound 

management practices or integrated service initiatives. In our prior work, 

we identified several key sound management practices at the center of 

successful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations. These key sound 

management practices include (1) ensuring top leadership drives the 

transformation, (2) dedicating an implementation team to manage the 

transformation process, and (3) establishing a communication strategy to

create shared expectations and report related progress. DOD has 

developed a Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept and is currently 

assessing the concept within DOD’s joint requirements process. However, 

the services have their own seabasing concepts and approaches and there

are a number of ongoing service initiatives. While some service initiatives 

are in the early stages of concept development, others are outpacing joint 

seabasing in development and are expected to cost billions of dollars. 

However, DOD has not provided sufficient leadership to ensure these 

initiatives are fully leveraged, properly focused, and complement each 

other. In addition, despite recommendations for a joint office to manage 

and lead joint seabasing by DOD officials, the Defense Science Board, and 

the Naval Studies Board, an overarching, dedicated implementation team 

has not been established. Without such an implementation team, DOD has 

no single entity that can provide day-to-day management of joint seabasing 

and help to reach agreement on work priorities. Furthermore, in the 

absence of a formal mechanism for communicating joint seabasing 

information, officials from the Navy and Marine Corps told us they face

challenges in determining what other DOD and research organizations are 

involved in joint seabasing and what they are doing. Without a 

comprehensive management approach, DOD may not be able to evaluate 

seabasing options or develop the joint seabasing capability in an efficient 

and cost-effective manner. 

Results in Brief 

While DOD has conducted some seabasing experiments, it has not 

developed or implemented an overarching joint experimentation campaign 

plan to inform decisions about joint seabasing. According to defense best 

practices, key aspects of an experimentation campaign plan include 

(1) designated leaders, (2) clear focus and objectives, (3) a spectrum of 

experiments, (4) data collection and analysis, (5) broad dissemination of 

Page 3 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
results, and (6) a feedback mechanism to discuss and interpret results. 

Many seabasing experimentation activities have taken place across the 

services, combatant commands, and defense entities, including war games, 

modeling and simulation, and live demonstrations. However, no 

overarching joint seabasing experimentation plan exists within DOD to 

guide these efforts because the U.S. Joint Forces Command, which has 

primary responsibility for joint warfighting experimentation, has not taken 

the lead in coordinating joint seabasing experimentation. While the U.S. 

Joint Forces Command is in the process of developing an experimentation 

plan for joint concepts, it is unclear the extent to which this plan will 

address joint seabasing. Moreover, it is also unclear the extent to which 

this plan will be able to guide joint seabasing experimentation efforts 

because the U.S. Joint Forces Command does not have the authority to 

direct the experimentation activities of the services. Furthermore, while 

some data collection and analyses has been done on seabasing 

experimentation activities, an overall data collection and analysis plan 

does not exist to ensure data were captured and interpreted into findings.

Additionally, DOD lacks a systematic means to communicate and 

disseminate findings and observations on joint seabasing experimentation, 

and obtain feedback. Without an overarching experimentation plan, DOD 

may not have a strong analytical basis to evaluate joint seabasing options. 

While service acquisitions tied to seabasing are approaching milestones 

for investment decisions, it is unclear when DOD will complete 

development of total ownership cost estimates for a range of joint 

seabasing options. Total ownership cost estimates include the cost to 

develop, acquire, own, operate, and dispose of weapon and support 

systems and help organizations analyze and compare options. DOD policy 

stresses the importance of identifying the total costs of ownership, 

including major cost drivers, while considering the affordability of 

establishing new capability requirements. Joint seabasing is currently 

going through an assessment within DOD’s requirements process that will 

examine potential approaches and develop preliminary cost assessments 

for seabasing options. However, according to DOD officials, DOD has not 

yet begun or established a firm reporting milestone for completing this 

assessment and it is not clear whether it will be completed before the 

services reach upcoming milestones on programs tied to joint seabasing. 

For example, the Navy plans to procure a Maritime Prepositioning Force 

(Future)—a squadron of ships designed to project and sustain Marine 

forces—at an estimated cost of $14.5 billion, along with several supporting 

surface and air connectors, as a means to develop a seabasing capability. 

Furthermore, the Army is exploring its own initiatives to establish a 

seabasing capability, such as modified commercial cargo ships with flight 

decks. Some of these service initiatives, such as the Maritime 

Page 4 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Prepositioning Force (Future), are scheduled for milestones in fiscal year 

2008 that will guide future investment decisions. Until total ownership cost 

estimates for joint seabasing options are developed and made transparent 

to DOD and Congress, decision makers may not be able to evaluate the 

cost-effectiveness of individual service initiatives. 

To facilitate cost-effective evaluation of the joint seabasing concept as an 

option for force projection and sustainment in an antiaccess environment, 

we recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) establish an 

implementation team to provide oversight and develop a management plan

for joint seabasing, (2) direct the U.S. Joint Forces Command to lead and 

coordinate joint seabasing experimentation efforts, with oversight by the 

joint seabasing implementation team, and (3) direct the implementation 

team or other appropriate entity to synchronize the development of total 

ownership cost estimates for a range of joint seabasing options so decision 

makers have sufficient information to make informed, cost-effective 

investment decisions regarding seabasing initiatives. 

DOD, in its comments on a draft of this report, partially agreed with our 

recommendations, except for the need for a dedicated implementation 

team to provide oversight of seabasing initiatives. In its comments, DOD 

stated that it is premature to establish additional oversight at this time but 

that it will determine if additional oversight is needed after DOD defines 

the joint seabasing capabilities needed. DOD also stated that in the interim 

the Force Management Joint Capabilities Board, which includes the 

services, combatant commands, and other organizations, is providing an

appropriate level of management oversight. We disagree that DOD’s 

current approach is sufficient to provide effective oversight because 

(1) DOD has already begun a number of acquisition programs that support 

seabasing even though it has not yet established joint seabasing 

requirements and (2) the Force Management Joint Capabilities Board’s 

oversight does not go far enough in providing comprehensive management 

oversight of numerous, disparate service and defense organization 

initiatives related to joint seabasing. While the Board is responsible for 

leading the joint seabasing capabilities-based assessment, the Board’s 

responsibilities do not constitute the type of oversight needed to ensure 

ongoing or planned service initiatives that may support joint seabasing are 

coordinated and complement each other. Because of this, we continue to 

believe that DOD should establish an implementation team to provide dayto-day management oversight of joint seabasing as soon as possible rather 

than considering this as an option once joint seabasing capabilities are 

defined. DOD’s comments and our evaluation of them are on page 33. 

Page 5 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
In 2002, the Navy’s Sea Power 211

 vision stated that shore-based 

capabilities would be transformed to seabased capabilities whenever 

practical to improve the reach, persistence, and sustainability of systems 

that are already afloat. The objective for the United States to maintain 

global freedom of action is a consistent theme throughout the National 

Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy.

2

 DOD’s 2006 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report3 further stated that the future joint 

force will exploit the operational flexibility of seabasing to counter 

political antiaccess and irregular warfare challenges. 

Background 

The joint seabasing concept is currently going through the Joint 

Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), a DOD decision 

support process for transforming military forces. Figure 1 shows the 

JCIDS process, including the major elements of a capabilities-based 

assessment. The purpose of JCIDS is to identify, assess, and prioritize joint 

military capability needs. Capabilities represent warfighting needs that are 

studied as part of the system’s capabilities-based assessment process. The 

process identifies warfighter skills and attributes for a desired capability 

(Functional Area Analysis), the gaps to achieving this capability 

(Functional Needs Analysis), and possible solutions for filling these gaps 

(Functional Solution Analysis). The results of this assessment are used as

the basis for identifying approaches for delivering the desired capability.

When identifying these approaches, cost is one factor that is considered. 

One way costs are used to evaluate potential approaches is by developing

total ownership cost estimates. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council4

has overall responsibility for JCIDS and is supported by eight Functional 

Capabilities Boards (Command and Control, Battlespace Awareness, 

Focused Logistics, Force Management, Force Protection, Force 

application, Net-Centric, and Joint Training), which lead the capabilities-

 1

Admiral Vern Clark, USN, “Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” Naval 

Institute Proceedings (October 2002). 

2

Secretary of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America

(Washington, D.C.: March 2005) and Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the 

United States of America (Washington, D.C.: 2004). 

3

Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6,

2006). 

4

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the Chairman of the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council, though the functions of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

chairman are delegated to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Secretary of

the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is the Joint Staff Director for Force Structure, 

Resources, & Assessment. 

Page 6 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
based assessment process. DOD’s anticipated timeframe for an 

operational joint seabasing capability as currently envisioned in the Joint 

Integrating Concept is 2015–2025. 

Figure 1: The JCIDS Analysis Process 

Capabilities

Development

Document

Capabilities

Production

Document

Approach N

Approach 2

Approach 1

Analysis

of Materiel/

Non-Materiel

 Approaches

Ideas for

Materiel

Approaches

Ideas for

Non-Material

Approaches

(DOTMLPF

analysis)

a

Joint

Capabilities

Document

Functional

Needs

Analysis

Functional Area

Analysis

Integrated

Architectures

Family of Joint Future Concepts

Concepts of Operations

Joint Tasks

DOTMLPF

Change

Recommendation

DOD Strategic

Guidance

Initial

Capabilities

Document

Post

Independent

Analysis

Functional Solution Analysis

Source: The Joint Staff.

a

DOTMLPF = Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and 

facilities.

The services are either considering or actively pursuing material solutions 

to support seabasing. According to service officials and documentation, 

these solutions will play a critical role in enhancing current seabasing 

capabilities. For example, the Navy and Marines plan to acquire the 

Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) along with several supporting 

connectors needed for it to be able to achieve its mission. As part of the 

seabase, the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) will be a squadron of 

ships to transport and deliver the personnel, combat power, and logistic 

Page 7 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
support of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The connectors, which are 

envisioned to provide both intertheater lift to the seabase and intratheater 

lift within the seabase, include sealift, such as the Joint High Speed Vessel,

Joint High Speed Sealift, and Joint Maritime Assault Connector (this vessel 

is intended to replace the Landing Craft Assault Connector), and airlift, 

such as the V-22 Osprey and CH-53K heavy lift helicopter. Figure 2 

illustrates and describes several sealift and airlift connectors. The Army is 

also exploring new capability initiatives for establishing a seabasing 

capability. In conjunction with the Navy and Marine Corps, the Army is 

developing the Joint High Speed Vessel and Joint High Speed Sealift ships. 

Furthermore, the Army is also in the early stages of development of its 

Afloat Forward Staging Base, which is a ship concept whose mission 

would be providing aerial maneuver with Army forces from the sea. One 

option the Army is exploring for the Afloat Forward Staging Base is to add 

flight decks to a commercial container ship, along with other alterations, 

as a means to provide aerial maneuver to Army forces. 

Page 8 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Figure 2: Illustrative Connectors for Use in Joint Seabasing

Joint High Speed Vessel (pictured is the High Speed Vessel 2 Swift)—The Joint High 

Speed Vessel is expected to enable rapid force closure of fly-in forces to the seabase 

from advanced bases, logistics from prepositioned ships to assault shipping, ship-to-ship 

replenishment, and, in appropriate environments, maneuver of assault forces to in-theater 

ports and austere ports. The Joint High Speed Vessel is currently in the technology 

development phase of acquisition and is expected to enter the system development and 

demonstration phase in fiscal year 2008.

Joint High Speed Sealift (artist rendition)—The Joint High Speed Sealift ship is intended 

to be an intertheater connector that provides strategic force closure for forces based in 

the continental United States. The Marine Corps envisions using the vessel to transport 

non-self-deploying aircraft, personnel, and select equipment, as well as the Army’s

non-self-deploying aircraft and personnel, and Brigade Combat Team rolling stock and 

personnel, permitting rapid force closure of this equipment. The Joint High Speed Sealift 

is very early in the acquisition cycle and has not entered the concept refinement phase.

Landing Craft Air Cushion and Joint Maritime Assault Connector (pictured is a Landing 

Craft Air Cushion)—The Landing Craft Air Cushion is a high-speed, fully amphibious

landing craft capable of carrying a 60-ton payload (75 tons in overload) at speeds in 

excess of 40 knots and a nominal range of 200 nautical miles. Its ability to ride on a

cushion of air allows it to operate directly from the well decks of amphibious warships. 

Its replacement, the Assault Connector, is expected to provide high-speed, heavylift for 

over-the-horizon maneuver, surface lift, and shipping; and carry up to 150 tons. The 

Landing Craft Air Cushion is currently in use, while the Joint Maritime Assault Connector 

is early in the acquisition process, expected to reach initial operating capability in 2015.

V-22 Osprey—The V-22 is a joint service, multimission aircraft with vertical take-off and 

landing capability. It performs missions like a conventional helicopter while also having 

the long-range cruise abilities of a twin turboprop aircraft. The Marine Corps, Navy, and 

Air Force each have their own version of the aircraft. Initial operating capability for the 

V-22 is planned for fiscal year 2007.

CH-53K (pictured is a CH-53E Super Stallion)—The CH-53K is the heavy lift replacement 

helicopter being developed to supersede the Marine Corps’s CH-53E. The CH-53K is

intended to operate from austere and remote forward bases and serve as a logistics

connector to the Marine Corps. The CH-53K is early in development, with initial operating 

capability expected to take place in fiscal year 2015.

Source: U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

Page 9 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
DOD Has Not Fully 

Established a 

Comprehensive 

Management 

Approach to Guide 

Joint Seabasing and 

Integrate Service 

Initiatives 

Although DOD has taken action to begin the development of joint 

seabasing, DOD has not fully established a comprehensive management 

approach to effectively guide and assess joint seabasing as an option for 

projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment and 

integrate service initiatives. Specifically, DOD has not fully incorporated 

sound management practices—such as providing leadership, dedicating an 

implementation team, and establishing a communications strategy—that 

our prior work has shown are found at the center of successful 

transformations.5

DOD Has Taken Action to 

Develop Joint Seabasing 

DOD has taken action to develop joint seabasing by pursuing it within 

DOD’s Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). 

JCIDS is a key DOD decision support process that uses a capabilitiesbased approach to assess existing capabilities, identify capability gaps, 

and develop new warfighting capabilities. Within JCIDS, future capability 

needs are intended to be developed from top-level strategic guidance such

as the National Military Strategy, a “top-down” approach. Under the 

former process, requirements grew out of the individual services’ unique 

strategic visions, a “bottom-up” approach. In January 2006 we reported 

that JCIDS is not yet functioning as envisioned to define gaps and 

redundancies in existing and future military capabilities across the 

department and to identify solutions to improve joint capabilities.6

 We 

reported that requirements continue to be defined largely from the 

“bottom up”—by the services—although DOD uses the JCIDS framework 

to assess the services’ proposals and push a joint perspective.

According to Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics officials, seabasing is going through the JCIDS 

process to become more of a joint concept that is developed through input 

from the services, combatant commands, and other DOD organizations. 

DOD has produced a Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept that outlines 

 5

GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

6

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Management Approach and Processes Not Well-Suited 

to Support Development of Global Information Grid, GAO-06-211 (Washington, D.C.: Jan.

30, 2006). 

Page 10 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
the concept for joint seabasing and identifies essential capabilities. Under 

JCIDS, the capabilities-based assessment follows a structured, four-step 

process. The first step in this process, the Functional Area Analysis, 

dated October 2005, identified the seabasing tasks, conditions, and 

standards needed to meet military objectives. The Functional Area 

Analysis identified such critical joint seabasing tasks as providing for 

maintenance of equipment in the joint operations area, attacking 

operational targets, and building and maintaining sustainment bases in the 

joint operations area. The second step of the capabilities-based 

assessment, the Functional Needs Analysis, dated November 2006,

provided a prioritized list of joint seabasing capabilities and capability 

gaps, and identifies potential mitigation areas from which the identified 

capability gaps may be addressed. The 17 seabasing capability gaps 

include at-sea assembly, forcible entry, and conducting operational 

movement and maneuver. The analyses that are currently being developed 

are intended to further define and organize the capability gaps identified in 

the Functional Needs Analysis and recommend potential solutions for 

consideration in future analyses. 

DOD’s Management 

Approach Has Not Fully 

Incorporated Sound 

Management Principles or 

Integrated Service 

Initiatives 

Despite pursuing joint seabasing within JCIDS, DOD has not fully 

incorporated key sound management practices into its approach for 

managing the development of joint seabasing requirements and integrating

service initiatives. In our prior work, we identified several key sound 

management practices at the center of successful mergers, acquisitions, 

and transformations. These key sound management practices include 

(1) ensuring top leadership drives the transformation, (2) dedicating an 

implementation team to manage the transformation process, and 

(3) establishing a communication strategy to create shared expectations 

and report related progress. Without a management approach that 

contains these elements, DOD may be unable to guide and assess joint 

seabasing in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Moreover, without 

central coordination, it is unclear whether DOD will be able to effectively 

manage billions of dollars of potential service investments in 

interdependent complex platforms, connectors, and logistics technologies 

that will need to be coordinated using a common set of standards, 

requirements, timeframes, and priorities. 

First, although joint seabasing capability development is underway, DOD 

has not provided sufficient leadership to integrate service initiatives and 

guide the development of joint seabasing. While the joint seabasing JCIDS 

process is still in the early stages of assessing needed capabilities, the 

services have developed their own concepts and approaches for 

seabasing, and in some cases systems that will support joint seabasing are 

Page 11 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
further along than the concept in JCIDS development. For example, the 

Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) and the Joint High Speed Vessel 

are approaching their second major milestone, or decision point, within 

DOD’s acquisition system, which will initiate systems-level development,

whereas the joint seabasing concept is still being refined. Preliminary cost 

estimates for both these systems range from nearly $12 billion to over $15 

billion. The 2005 National Research Council Committee’s report, Sea 

Basing, concluded that developing a system of systems such as seabasing 

that is comprised of complex platforms, connectors, and logistics 

technologies will require a common set of standards, requirements, 

timeframes, and priorities.7

 Various ship, airlift, and sealift connector 

components of the seabase will need to interface, and the capabilities of 

some of these components will be interdependent. In addition, joint 

operations from a seabase will require robust logistics technologies and 

command and control. Prematurely developing such systems to meet 

individual service requirements rather than joint requirements may result 

in initiatives that duplicate each other and systems that are not 

interoperable and compatible. Moreover, in addition to the billions of 

dollars being spent to procure these systems, it may be costly to realign or 

adjust the efforts of the services in the future if they do not meet the joint 

requirements of seabasing. 

In addition, DOD leadership has not provided an official, unified vision for

joint seabasing to guide the transformation, ensure that focus is 

maintained on providing a capability that is the best option for projecting 

and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment, and ensure that joint 

seabasing is evaluated against competing options. Joint Staff officials told 

us that the joint seabasing JCIDS process has been addressing how 

seabasing can be used to counter the problem of projecting and sustaining 

forces in an antiaccess environment, rather than examining specific 

solutions. We reported in 2003 that key practices and implementation 

steps for successful transformations include ensuring top leadership 

drives the transformation.8

 We found that leadership must set the 

direction, pace, and tone for the transformation. Concerns have been 

raised by other organizations about the lack of leadership to guide the 

development of joint seabasing. For example, the National Research 

Council Committee’s report, Sea Basing, stated that “given the complexity 

 7

Committee on Sea Basing, Naval Studies Board, National Research Council of the National

Academy of Sciences, Sea Basing: Ensuring Joint Force Access From the Sea

(Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2005). 

8

GAO-03-669. 

Page 12 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
of [the process for developing a joint seabasing capability] and the longterm nature of the major capital investments by Services in new platforms, 

development of advanced technologies, and the introduction of 

appropriate joint doctrine, such a unifying vision will be essential in order 

to best leverage existing currently programmed and future Service 

capabilities.”9

 Also, in 2003 the Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea 

Basing found that developing the seabase requires persistent, top-down 

leadership to coordinate the numerous initiatives—including concepts of 

operations, ships, aircraft, weapons, and transportations systems—that 

support the seabase.10 Absent leadership, DOD can not be certain joint 

seabasing has been evaluated against competing options for projecting and 

sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment. Moreover, without 

leadership that has the authority, responsibility, and accountability to 

guide joint seabasing and integrate service initiatives, DOD cannot be sure

that ongoing or planned initiatives are cost-effective, fully leveraged, 

properly focused, and complement each other. 

Second, DOD has not established a dedicated implementation team to 

provide day-to-day management oversight. We reported in 2003 that a 

dedicated implementation team should be responsible for the day-to-day 

management of transformation to ensure various initiatives are 

integrated.11 Such a team would ensure that joint seabasing receives the 

focused, full-time attention necessary to be sustained and effective, by 

establishing clearly defined roles and responsibilities, helping to reach 

agreement on work priorities, and keeping efforts coordinated. There are 

several groups and DOD organizations tasked with specific responsibilities 

for developing joint seabasing within JCIDS; however, none of these 

organizations have the overall authority, responsibility, and accountability 

to coordinate initiatives and the acquisition of systems that may support 

joint seabasing. For example, the Navy was designated the sponsor of the 

Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept and is responsible for all common 

documentation, periodic reporting, and funding actions required to 

support the seabasing capabilities development and acquisition process. 

The Force Management Functional Capabilities Board is responsible for 

leading the seabasing capabilities-based assessment and oversees the 

sponsor (the Navy) in developing documents. The Seabasing Working 

Group was organized and tasked by the Joint Staff to assist the Force 

 9

Committee on Sea Basing, Sea Basing. 

10Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing (Washington, D.C.: August 2003). 

11GAO-03-669. 

Page 13 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Management Functional Capabilities Board in completing the joint 

seabasing analyses. The Seabasing Working Group is comprised of 

members from the Joint Staff, combatant commands, the services, and 

other organizations, and serves as a source of expertise and as a joint 

sounding board for collaboration and focusing the direction of the 

analyses. According to Joint Staff officials, the working group can ask the 

services and combatant commands to participate and provide input to the 

analyses, but they have no authority to force their participation in the 

development of the analyses nor do they have authority over service 

initiatives that may support joint seabasing. 

Recommendations have been made for a joint office to manage and lead 

joint seabasing by DOD officials, the Defense Science Board Task Force 

on Sea Basing, and the Naval Studies Board,12 but a leadership body has 

not been established. In November 2003, the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics directed that a terms of 

reference be developed for a Joint Expeditionary Force 

Projection/Seabasing Capabilities Office. According to the Terms of 

Reference, the office would organize all joint seabasing-related DOD 

activities—ranging from experimentation efforts to solutions development 

to training—into a coherent direction. In addition, the office would be 

comprised of members from each of the four services and the U.S. Joint 

Forces Command and would have limited contract authority. However, 

DOD officials decided to forgo the joint office and pursue joint seabasing 

within the JCIDS process. According to officials from the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, one 

reason a joint office was not set up for joint seabasing was because there 

was no staff available at the time. According to Joint Staff officials, one 

downfall to joint seabasing being developed under the JCIDS process is 

that consensus is required on all decisions before moving forward, which 

may result in compromising solutions. Although use of the JCIDS process 

has encouraged the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps to participate with

the Navy in the development of the Joint Integrating Concept and JCIDS 

analyses, the services continue to pursue their own initiatives. As 

previously mentioned, some of these initiatives are still in the early stages 

of concept development, whereas other initiatives are further along in the

acquisition process ahead of joint seabasing. A key official from the 

Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing told us that the need for 

a joint office to coordinate efforts between the services still exists. 

According to the official, the lack of action in setting up a joint seabasing

 12Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing; Committee on Sea Basing, Sea Basing. 

Page 14 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
office makes achieving compatible systems to support joint seabasing 

more difficult considering some supporting systems are ahead of joint 

seabasing in the development process. The Naval Studies Board also 

recommended a joint planning office be set up to “correlate Service 

requirements and advise Service procurements” so common capabilities 

among the services can be taken advantage of and incompatible 

acquisitions will not be made.13 We and the DOD Office of the Inspector 

General have found similar management challenges14 in DOD’s efforts to 

field other joint capabilities such as the Global Information Grid and 

network-centric warfare.15 Without formally designating a dedicated 

leadership body to provide day-to-day management oversight by providing

a coherent direction for related activities, establishing clearly defined 

roles and responsibilities, helping to reach agreement on work priorities, 

and keeping efforts coordinated, DOD’s ability to develop a joint seabasing 

capability in an efficient manner may be hindered. Furthermore, without a 

dedicated implementation team, it may be difficult for DOD to sustain joint 

seabasing development over a long period of time. 

Third, DOD has not fully developed a communications strategy that 

encourages communication, shares knowledge, and provides information 

to DOD organizations involved in joint seabasing initiatives. We previously 

reported that creating an effective, ongoing communication strategy is 

central to forming the partnerships that are needed to develop and 

implement the organization’s strategies.16 As previously mentioned, there 

are numerous groups and DOD organizations involved in joint seabasing 

 13Committee on Sea Basing, Sea Basing. 

14In GAO-06-211, we state that because the Global Information Grid will comprise a system 

of interdependent systems, it needs clearly identified leadership that has the authority to 

enforce decisions that cut across organizational lines. The report found that without a

management approach optimized to enforce decisions across the department, DOD is at 

risk of continuing to develop and acquire systems in a stovepiped and uncoordinated

manner. The Inspector General’s report, Department of Defense Office of the Inspector 

General, Joint Warfighting and Readiness: Management of Network Centric Warfare

Within the Department of Defense, D-2004-091 (Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2004), 

recommended that DOD formalize roles, responsibilities, and processes for the overall 

development, coordination, and oversight of DOD network-centric warfare efforts to

ensure that ongoing or planned initiatives are properly focused and complement each

other. According to the report, DOD management agreed with the need for leadership 

improvements. 

15Network-centric warfare is collaborative information sharing linking sensors, decision

makers, and shooters, which is intended to result in increased mission effectiveness. 

16GAO-03-669. 

Page 15 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
and various initiatives that may affect joint seabasing. The seabasing 

working group hosts meetings that provide a forum for discussion on joint 

seabasing among members. In addition, it has established a Web site that 

posts meeting minutes and various joint seabasing JCIDS analysis 

documents. While this Web site provides some transparency into the 

analysis process, it does not serve as a central repository for 

communicating information on joint seabasing because it does not provide 

information on joint seabasing efforts conducted by the services and 

combatant commands outside of the JCIDS process. In addition, we found 

no evidence of a formal mechanism that communicated joint seabasing 

information. Officials from the Navy and Marine Corps told us they face

challenges in determining what organizations are involved in joint 

seabasing and what they are doing. According to Marine Corps officials, 

this impedes their ability to leverage activities and minimize redundancy. 

Furthermore, Joint Staff officials have acknowledged that the lack of a 

central, authoritative source of information significantly hindered timely 

completion of analyses. For example, the data management tool used to 

associate essential seabasing capabilities with the appropriate functional

area did not provide a systematic method for identifying relevant 

information and some data was missing. Moreover, they also recognized 

that a means for identifying DOD-wide initiatives that affect joint 

seabasing needs to be established. In the absence of clear communication 

of joint seabasing information throughout DOD via an overall 

communications strategy, joint seabasing participants may not be able to 

effectively leverage activities and minimize redundancy, and the overall

development of joint seabasing may be impeded.

DOD has not developed, implemented, or used an overarching joint 

experimentation campaign plan to inform decisions about joint seabasing. 

Experimentation campaign plans play an important role in developing 

transformational concepts by coordinating and guiding experimentation 

efforts using a series of related experiments that develop knowledge about 

a concept or capability. Many seabasing experimentation activities have 

taken place across DOD and the services; however, an overarching 

experimentation campaign plan to coordinate and guide joint seabasing 

experimentation does not exist because the U.S. Joint Forces Command—

DOD’s leader of joint warfighting experimentation—has not taken the lead 

in coordinating joint seabasing experimentation efforts. Additionally, DOD 

lacks a systematic means to analyze, communicate, and disseminate 

information on joint seabasing experimentation. Moreover, DOD lacks a 

feedback mechanism to interpret and clarify results from joint seabasing

experimental activities. 

DOD Has Not 

Developed a Joint 

Experimentation 

Campaign Plan to 

Inform Decisions 

About Joint Seabasing 

Page 16 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Experimentation 

Campaign Plans 

Coordinate and Guide 

Experimentation Efforts 

According to military experimentation guides, experimentation campaign 

plans play an important role in developing transformational concepts by 

coordinating and guiding experimentation efforts using a series of related

experiments that develop knowledge about a concept or capability. Taken 

together, the results of these experiments can inform decisions about 

future research and technology programs, acquisition efforts, risk, 

organizational changes, and changes in operational concepts. A wellplanned experimentation campaign provides a framework for much of 

what needs to be known about a new concept or capability. According to 

defense best practices, key aspects of an experimentation campaign 

include: (1) designated campaign leaders; (2) clear campaign focus and 

objectives; (3) a spectrum of well-designed and sequenced experimental 

activities, including studies and analyses, seminars and conferences, war 

games, modeling and simulation, and live demonstrations; (4) data 

collection and analyses; (5) broad dissemination of results; and (6) a 

feedback mechanism to discuss and interpret results. Experimentation 

campaigns that include these aspects can reduce the risk in developing

and fielding a new concept or capability by addressing a spectrum of 

possibilities and building upon experimentation activities systematically, 

with continual analyses and feedback to interpret the results into useful 

information. 

Single experiments alone are insufficient to develop transformational 

concepts because they can only explore a limited number of variables, and

their contributions are limited unless their findings can be replicated in

other experiments. Campaigns can provide conclusive and robust results 

through their ability to replicate findings and conduct experiments in a 

variety of scenarios and operating environments. A well-planned 

experimentation campaign can mitigate the limitations of a single 

experiment by synthesizing outputs from a series of activities into 

coherent advice to decision makers. 

Many Seabasing 

Experimentation Activities 

Have Taken Place but an 

Overarching 

Experimentation 

Campaign Plan to Guide 

These Activities Does Not 

Exist 

Many experimentation activities involving seabasing have taken place; 

however, an overarching DOD experimentation campaign plan to guide 

and coordinate these activities does not exist. All of the services, 

combatant commands, and some defense entities have been involved with

seabasing experimentation through war games, studies, workshops, 

modeling and simulation, and live demonstrations. For example, in 2004

the Joint Chiefs of Staff led a war game called Nimble Viking that brought

the services together and addressed gaps in their understanding of the 

joint seabasing concept. The services conducted studies addressing gaps 

in the joint seabasing concept, such as the Navy’s 40 Knot Marine 

Expeditionary Brigade study, which identified gaps in conducting forcible 

Page 17 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
entry operations with Marine Corps forces using seaborne lift capable of 

speeds of 40 knots. Moreover, the Marine Corps modeled plans for landing 

seabased forces from amphibious ships, the results of which, according to

the Marine Corps, shaved hours off the landing of forces from amphibious 

ships. In addition, the U.S. Joint Forces Command and services worked 

together in cosponsoring several war games involving joint seabasing, 

including Unified Course 2004, Joint Urban Warrior 2004, Pinnacle Impact

2003, and Sea Viking 2004. While many of the reports from these war 

games recognized joint seabasing as a potential concept for addressing 

antiaccess and force projection issues, they stated that further 

experimentation was needed before joint seabasing moved forward. 

Additionally, material solutions being developed to support joint seabasing 

have undergone planned experimentation and testing activities. For 

example, U.S. Transportation Command officials believe that DOD’s JointLogistics-Over-the-Shore program17 could support joint seabasing logistical

operations, such as heavy cargo transfer at sea. To that end, in June 2006 

they sponsored a Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore exercise to transfer 

equipment and bulk materials from large ships to the beach using smaller 

landing craft. Figure 3 shows forces using a barge to move construction 

vehicles from ships to shore during a Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore 

exercise at Naval Magazine, in Indian Island, Washington. 

 17Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore is a joint logistical operation to load or unload ships

through inadequate or damaged ports or over a bare beach when facilities are not available 

or nonexistent. It is a system of systems involving sealift, shipboard cranes, ramps, and

interfaces, and lighters. The U.S. Transportation Command oversees developmental and 

acquisition efforts for this program. 

Page 18 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Figure 3: Navy Forces Use a Barge to Move Construction Vehicles During a Joint 

Logistics-Over-the-Shore Exercise at Naval Magazine, in Indian Island, Washington 

Source: U.S. Navy.

The Navy’s Program Executive Office for Ships, which manages the 

Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) and the Joint High Speed Vessel 

programs, reports that the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) 

program has planned and is executing a series of jointly coordinated tests

involving modeling and simulation and live demonstrations. According to

the Program Manager, demonstrations included at-sea evaluation of the 

Mobile Landing Platform concept18 and its ability to interface with other 

vessels supporting the joint seabase. Additionally, the Navy’s Office of 

Naval Research is developing a number of technologies, such as internal 

ship cargo handling and ship-to-ship cargo transfers, to address capability 

gaps in joint seabasing operations. 

 18The Mobile Landing Platform is a vessel in the planned Maritime Prepositioning Force

(Future) squadron that would facilitate at-sea cargo transfer by partially submerging in 

water to allow cargo to float on and off of it. The Mobile Landing Platform will link large 

roll-on/roll-off cargo ships to smaller ships.

Page 19 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Although joint seabasing experimental activities have taken place, an 

overarching experimentation campaign plan to coordinate and guide these 

activities does not exist because the U.S. Joint Forces Command has not 

taken the lead in coordinating joint seabasing experimentation efforts. 

Moreover, involvement in these activities by the services, combatant 

commands, and defense entities has been inconsistent due to budget 

restraints, other competing priorities, and the lack of timely coordination 

and advance notice of events. In May 1998, the Secretary of Defense 

designated the U.S. Joint Forces Command as the DOD executive agent for

joint warfighting experimentation. In this role the command is responsible 

for conducting joint experimentation on new warfighting concepts and 

disseminating the results of these activities to the joint concept 

community, which includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint 

Staff, combatant commands, services, and defense agencies. The U.S. Joint 

Forces Command is also responsible for coordinating joint 

experimentation efforts by developing a biennial joint concept 

development and experimentation campaign plan. In January 2006, a 

memo from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff further underscored 

this responsibility by providing explicit direction to the U.S. Joint Forces 

Command on developing a campaign plan that provided guidance to the 

joint concept community on coordinating joint experimentation efforts, 

and capturing and disseminating the results of these efforts.19 While the 

U.S. Joint Forces Command said it is in the process of developing the plan, 

it is unclear the extent to which this plan will address joint seabasing. 

According to the U.S. Joint Forces Command, other more near-term 

priorities, such as improvised explosive devices and urban warfare, have

prevented them from focusing on joint seabasing during the past few 

years. 

Once the U.S. Joint Forces Command develops and implements the plan,

which it intends to do by fiscal year 2008, it is also unclear the extent to

which this plan will be able to guide and coordinate joint seabasing 

experimentation efforts because the U.S. Joint Forces Command does not 

have the authority to direct service and other DOD organizations’ 

experimentation plans. The services and combatant commands are 

responsible for working with the U.S. Joint Forces Command in executing

the joint concept development and experimentation campaign plan, and 

for providing them with observations, insights, results, and 

recommendations related to all joint experimentation efforts. However, 

the services and combatant commands are not required to go through the 

 19Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, Joint Experimentation (JE)

Guidance for FY 2006 and FY 2007 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9, 2006). 

Page 20 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
U.S. Joint Forces Command before executing their own experimentation 

activities. Moreover, the U.S. Joint Forces Command says it does not have

authority to make the services and combatant commands take specific 

joint actions. Additionally, there are many entities within the services 

involved in joint seabasing experimentation and there are no formalized 

leaders coordinating service efforts. As a result, these entities operate 

independently and do not coordinate their efforts with the U.S. Joint 

Forces Command. This lack of coordination poses risks of duplicating 

experimentation efforts and conducting experimentation that does not 

build upon previous activities. 

Furthermore, no overarching campaign plan to guide joint seabasing 

experimentation exists within any other DOD entity. While the Navy and 

Marine Corps have seabasing experimentation campaign plans, officials 

told us these plans are not overarching within each of the services and it is

unclear the extent to which they are being implemented. For example, a 

seabasing experimentation plan exists as part of the Navy’s Sea Trial 

Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan;

20 however, 

Navy officials said there is not a lot of joint seabasing experimentation 

being conducted within this plan and the plan does not encompass all of 

the Navy’s efforts. In addition, the Marine Corps has a plan that broadly 

focuses on issues that need to be addressed for seabasing capabilities such 

as the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) and the Joint High Speed 

Vessel. However, its plan does not identify designated leaders and specific 

experimentation activities that should take place, nor does the plan 

identify timelines, resources, or staff to conduct experimentation. It also 

does not contain plans for data collection and analysis or any provisions 

for disseminating results. In addition, according to Marine Corps officials, 

the plan is not being fully executed due to lack of funding and staff. 

Many service officials expressed concern over the lack of coordination 

and guidance on joint seabasing experimentation. They stated that the U.S. 

Joint Forces Command has not shown much interest in experimentation 

for future concepts such as joint seabasing, instead focusing 

experimentation efforts on short-term concepts and immediate priorities 

such as improvised explosive devices. One service official commented that 

there is no single point of contact for joint seabasing at the U.S. Joint 

 20Sea Trial is the Navy’s process for formulating and testing innovative operational 

concepts. At its core is the Sea Trial Concept Development and Experimentation 

Campaign Plan, which outlines plans to rapidly mature concept, technology, and doctrine.

Sea Trial supports Sea Power 21, the Navy’s vision for how it will organize, integrate, and 

transform itself in the 21st century. 

Page 21 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Forces Command. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff states in the 

Functional Needs Analysis that more joint experimentation is needed to 

inform and further refine capability gaps in the joint seabasing concept. 

DOD Lacks a Systematic 

Means to Analyze, 

Communicate, and 

Disseminate Information 

on Joint Seabasing 

Experimentation 

DOD also lacks a systematic means to analyze, communicate, and 

disseminate information about joint seabasing experimentation across the 

department. According to military experimentation guides, a significant 

part of an experiment consists of gathering data, interpreting it into 

findings, and combining it with already known information. Additionally, 

data collection and analysis plans are important to experimentation 

because they ensure valid and reliable data are captured and understood, 

and that the analysis undertaken addresses the key issues in the 

experiment. However, we found no overarching data collection and 

analysis plan to guide the analysis of joint seabasing experimentation 

results. Furthermore, officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 

Program Analysis and Evaluation division described a lack of analysis in 

joint seabasing to inform the capabilities-based assessment, which could 

lead to inaccurately identifying gaps in implementing the concept. They

said that no comprehensive analytical framework was ever established to 

guide development of the joint seabasing concept; consequently, the value 

joint seabasing will bring to the warfighter is unknown. Without an 

overarching campaign plan, experimental results for joint seabasing are 

being obtained and interpreted using different data collection and analysis

methods, which may lead to inconsistent reporting methods. As a result, 

experimentation data may be analyzed, interpreted, and shared 

inconsistently and with little transparency across the community. 

Additionally, DOD and service officials commented on the lack of 

sufficient modeling and simulation tools available to provide valid data on

joint seabasing. Modeling and simulation tools play an important role in 

experiments. Unlike live demonstrations, modeling and simulation 

techniques can inexpensively vary the values of variables to represent a 

wide variety of conditions. They also provide a great deal of control over 

the variables in the experiment, which allows for replication. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff noted the absence of high-level modeling tools capable of 

end-to-end modeling of seabasing21 in the Functional Needs Analysis, 

saying that the absence of this type of modeling precluded effective and 

meaningful data to validate warfighter needs and thus limited the depth of

their analysis. Furthermore, officials in the Office of the Secretary of 

 21End-to-end modeling involves modeling seabasing throughout the employment, 

sustainment, and reconstitution phases.

Page 22 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Defense’s Program Analysis and Evaluation division also commented that 

the lack of modeling could result in missing critical gaps in the joint 

seabasing concept that have not yet been identified. The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff identified the U.S. Joint Forces Command as a possible lead for endto-end modeling and simulation of joint seabasing because of its role in 

joint concept development and experimentation, and its expertise in 

developing comprehensive modeling and simulation tools. 

While some communication takes place among the entities involved with 

developing the seabasing concept, there is no established method for 

communicating observations, insights, and upcoming events across the 

entire community. DOD and service officials described the joint seabasing 

community as an informal community of practice, where the services, 

combatant commands, and defense entities invite each other to participate

in their experimentation activities. The U.S. Joint Forces Command and 

the services track to some degree the experimental efforts of the joint 

seabasing community. For example, the U.S. Joint Forces Command says 

it tries to leverage off the services’ efforts by partnering with them in 

experimental activities. However, despite this informal community, DOD 

and service officials describe a lack of coordination and awareness of 

experimental activities. A Marine Corps official stated that some officials 

are more aware than others are; but no one is completely aware of what is

going on across the entire community. In fact, many officials we spoke 

with were either unaware or had very little advance notice of an upcoming 

war game involving seabasing. Without an established communication 

method, joint seabasing experimentation efforts are not transparent to the 

entire community, which can contribute to a lack of consensus on the 

types of activities that take place, conflicts in scheduling events, and 

duplication of efforts. 

Additionally, there is no overarching system to disseminate observations 

and results on joint seabasing experimentation. The U.S. Joint Forces 

Command has a database containing documents and reports from 

experimentation activities; however, the database contains different levels 

of information based on what the services choose to publish. As a result, 

the database is not a comprehensive resource of joint experimentation 

information. The Navy’s Warfare Development Command22 also maintains 

a Web site of information pertaining to its Sea Trial campaign, which other 

entities within the Navy contribute to, but it is not overarching within the 

 22The Navy Warfare Development Command mission is to focus and champion Navy 

warfare innovation, operating concepts, and concept of operations development in a naval, 

joint, and coalition environment. 

Page 23 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Navy. In response to a January 2006 memo from the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Joint Forces Command is developing an online 

knowledge management portal to disseminate information on 

experimentation activities across the joint concept community.23 The 

portal contains a repository of information on experimentation concepts, 

projects, and documents; a bulletin board to post insights and 

observations; hotlinks to other sites; and a calendar function for upcoming 

experimentation activities. The portal also contains a section on activities 

relating to joint logistics, and joint deployment and sustainment; however,

it does not yet contain information on joint seabasing. Furthermore, while

the portal has the ability to disseminate information, it may not be 

successful in increasing communication across the joint seabasing 

community because the services have not been directed to use the portal 

in planning their activities. 

DOD Lacks a Feedback 

Mechanism to Interpret 

Results From Joint 

Seabasing 

Experimentation 

DOD lacks a feedback mechanism to interpret and clarify results from 

joint seabasing experimental activities. Feedback on analyses and findings

produced from experimental activities provides the joint seabasing 

experimentation community an opportunity to comment on the results and 

ask questions. It also gives the experiment sponsor an opportunity to see 

how the work was received, assist in interpreting results, and provide 

further advice on how the results should be used. In the context of an 

experimentation campaign, it may also give the sponsor an opportunity to 

clarify how the results affect the overarching campaign concept. While 

individual seabasing experiments may have had some form of feedback, 

the lack of an overarching joint seabasing experimentation campaign plan

that includes procedures for providing and obtaining feedback may 

prevent the joint seabasing experimentation community from fully 

realizing how the results of individual experiments affect the development 

of joint seabasing. 

 23Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, Joint Experimentation (JE)

Guidance for FY 2006 and FY 2007 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9, 2006). 

Page 24 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
While some service acquisitions tied to seabasing are approaching 

milestones for investment decisions, it is unclear when DOD will complete 

development of total ownership cost estimates for a range of joint 

seabasing options. Understanding estimated total ownership costs helps 

decision makers measure the whole cost of owning and operating assets 

and make comparisons between competing options. The joint seabasing 

capability is being assessed in the JCIDS analysis process. However, DOD 

has not yet begun a key study of approaches and their associated costs 

and may not complete this study for at least a year. In the meantime, the 

services are considering or pursuing systems to enhance seabasing 

capabilities. For example, a major Navy-Marine Corps initiative is 

scheduled to undergo a major milestone review in fiscal year 2008. Until 

total ownership cost estimates for joint seabasing options are developed 

and made transparent to DOD and Congress, decision makers will not be 

able to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of individual service initiatives. 

In order to evaluate options and make informed, cost-effective decisions, 

decision makers must have an understanding of the total ownership costs 

for establishing a desired capability. A total ownership cost estimate 

includes the costs to develop, acquire, operate, maintain, and dispose of all 

systems required to establish a seabasing capability. Understanding total

ownership cost estimates helps organizations measure the whole cost of 

owning and operating assets by providing a consistent framework for 

analyzing and comparing options. Total ownership cost estimates can be

used to assess the possible return on investment of new initiatives. 

According to DOD guidance,24 all parties involved in the defense 

acquisition system must be cognizant of the reality of fiscal constraints 

and treat cost as an independent variable when developing systems. 

Furthermore, the policy stresses the importance of identifying the total

costs of ownership, including major cost drivers, while considering the 

affordability of establishing needed capabilities. Even with future 

concepts, such as joint seabasing, where uncertainty exists, total 

ownership cost estimates can be developed. According to DOD cost 

analysis guidance, in such cases, areas of uncertainty can be quantified 

using ranges of cost, thereby giving decision makers, at a minimum, a 

rough estimate of the total costs to achieving a desired capability. For 

systems of systems, such as seabasing, a total ownership cost estimate 

should include research, acquisition, operation, maintenance, and 

disposition costs of all systems, primary and support, needed to achieve 

Timeframe for 

Completing Joint 

Seabasing Total 

Ownership Cost

Estimates is 

Uncertain 

Total Ownership Cost 

Estimates Help Decision 

Makers Evaluate Options 

 24Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, Section E1.1.4 

(May 12, 2003). 

Page 25 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
the desired end state. Understanding the estimated total ownership costs 

of seabasing options can help decision makers make informed decisions to

determine the most cost-effective method of achieving a seabasing 

capability. Furthermore, they can be used to more effectively evaluate

joint seabasing against alternative methods of projecting and sustaining 

forces in an antiaccess environment. 

Joint seabasing is currently going through the capabilities-based 

assessment phase of the JCIDS analysis process. One part of the JCIDS 

analysis process is the Functional Solutions Analysis—an operationally 

based assessment of all potential approaches, including changes to 

doctrine, organization, training, as well as material solutions, to solve 

identified capability gaps. According to Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance, this 

process will assess the costs of potential approaches to joint seabasing. 

For any material approaches that are developed, the cost to develop,

procure, and sustain each approach will be estimated. These estimates 

should provide decision makers with some understanding of the costs of 

these approaches. However, the timeframe for when these cost 

assessments will take place is unclear. According to DOD officials, cost 

assessments for joint seabasing approaches have not yet begun and may 

not be completed for a year or more. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

guidance does not provide a specific methodology for what level of cost 

assessment should take place. Rather, the guidance only states that the 

process should “roughly assess” the costs of each identified approach.25

Although DOD has not yet begun its analysis of joint seabasing approaches 

and costs, the services are either considering or actively pursuing systems 

to develop enhanced seabasing capabilities. For example, the Department 

of the Navy Fiscal Year 2007 Budget includes funding for the development 

of seabasing ships, including ships for the Maritime Prepositioning Force 

(Future) and Joint High Speed Vessels. Furthermore, the Navy has 

included eleven ships for its Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), three 

Joint High Speed Vessels, and one Joint High Speed Sealift ship in its 

Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal 

JCIDS Has Not Yet 

Produced Cost Estimates 

for Joint Seabasing 

Capability Options and 

Timeframes Are Uncertain 

Service Acquisitions May 

Outpace Joint Seabasing 

Cost Analysis 

 25CJCSI 3170.01E, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (Washington,

D.C.: May 11, 2005). 

Page 26 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Year 2007 report to Congress.26 Although the plan could change as the 

Navy continues to assess its requirements and address affordability issues, 

the Navy estimates that these investments will cost nearly $12 billion.27 The 

ships the Navy has programmed for the Maritime Prepositioning Force 

(Future) do not include the cost of a Landing Helicopter Deck (LHD) 

amphibious assault ship, which is planned to be part of the squadron.28 The 

Congressional Research Service has reported that this ship has an 

estimated cost of $2.2 billion, and that the estimated cost of the entire 

Maritime Prepositioning Squadron is about $14.5 billion.29 However, 

unknown factors remain that could affect these estimates. Furthermore, 

the number of connectors required to support the Maritime Prepositioning 

Force (Future) is yet to be determined. Within the Maritime Prepositioning 

Force (Future) squadron, several factors that could influence cost—such 

as manning and ship survivability levels—remain in flux. Figure 4 shows 

the ships of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future). 

 26According to 10 U.S.C. § 231, the Secretary of Defense is required to submit with the

Defense Budget, an annual long range plan for the construction of naval vessels. One 

requirement of this plan is to include a detailed program for the construction of combatant

and support vessels for Navy over the next 30 fiscal years.

27Based on fiscal year 2007 dollars. 

28The Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2007 

assumes the transfer of one steam-powered LHD from the expeditionary warfare ship force

to the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) squadron, which could affect the Marine

Corps’s lift requirement of 10 operationally available large-deck aviation-capable ships.

29Congressional Research Service, Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime

Prepositioning Ship Programs: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress 

(Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006). 

Page 27 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Figure 4: Ships in the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) Squadron

Source: U.S. Navy.

Incorporate the Marine Corps’s

Future Air Combat Element including

F-35B Joint Strike Fighter and 

MV-22 Osprey, provide vehicle and 

cargo stowage capacities, and 

enable a flexible command and 

control capability.

Embark, transport, deploy, 

command, and fully support all 

elements of a Marine Expeditionary 

Unit of 2,000 Marines. There are no 

new construction LHDs included in 

the Navy’s long-range plan for naval 

vessel construction.

Transport heavy or bulky equipment, 

equipped with on-board cranes and 

self-contained ramps. 

Facilitate at-sea cargo transfer by 

partially submerging in water and 

allowing cargo to float on and float 

off. MLPs link large cargo ships to 

smaller connectors which take 

cargo to shore.

Transfer cargo (ammunition, food, 

parts, etc.) at sea to station ships

and other naval warfare forces.

Existing dense-packed maritime 

prepositioning ships that carry 

equipment, supplies, and 

ammunition to help support a

Marine Expeditionary Brigade. 

Cranes enable MPS ships to 

unload their own cargo.

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

2

1

3

3

3

2

FY 2011

Not 

determined

FY 2010

FY 2009

FY 2009

Not

applicable

$2.1 billion

$2.2 billion

$902 million

$784 million

$384 million

Not applicable

Not available 

until Milestone 

B Review 

scheduled for 

mid-2008.

The Navy 

intends to 

transfer an 

LHD from the 

expeditionary 

battle force to 

the squadron.

Not available 

until Milestone 

B Review 

scheduled for 

mid-2008.

Not available 

until Milestone 

B Review 

scheduled for 

mid-2008.

Not available 

until Milestone 

B Review 

scheduled for 

mid-2008

The Navy 

intends to 

transfer two 

Maritime 

Prepositioning 

Ships to the 

squadron.

Ship Ship mission Included 

in Navy 

plan

# of

ships

First ship

construction

year

Average cost 

per ship

(fiscal year

2007 dollars)

Ship total

ownership 

cost

Landing Helicopter 

Assault (Replacement) 

(LHA(R))

Landing Helicopter 

Deck (LHD)

Large Medium-Speed 

Roll-on/Roll-off Ship 

(LMSR T-AKR)

Mobile Landing 

Platform (MLP)

Advanced Auxillary 

Dry Cargo Ship 

(T-AKE)

Legacy Maritime

Prepositioning Ship 

(MPS)

Page 28 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
The Navy and Marine Corps have not yet estimated the total ownership 

costs of their preferred options for establishing a seabasing capability. 

However, both the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) and the Joint 

High Speed Vessel, which will play a critical role in establishing a joint 

seabasing capability, are in development and progressing through DOD’s 

acquisition system. The Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) is 

approaching its second major milestone, which initiates system 

development and demonstration, in mid-2008. Prior to this milestone, a 

total ownership cost estimate will be required in order for the Maritime 

Prepositioning Force (Future) to be validated and approved before 

program initiation. Although a total ownership cost estimate may be 

available for the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) squadron for this 

milestone, according to service documentation, the costs of the supporting 

vehicles and vessels needed for the squadron to operate as planned for use

in joint seabasing will not be included. Furthermore, one of the ships in 

the squadron—the Mobile Landing Platform—is going through its own 

acquisition process with its second milestone scheduled in fiscal year 

2008. Furthermore, because the JCIDS analysis process for Joint 

Seabasing will not produce any cost assessments for at least 1 year, 

decision makers risk making substantial investment concerning the 

Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) without knowledge of the 

potential costs of other joint seabasing options. The Navy plans to acquire 

the first ship for the squadron in 2009. 

The Army is also exploring new initiatives for establishing a seabasing 

capability. In conjunction with the Navy and Marine Corps, the Army is 

developing the Joint High Speed Vessel and Joint High Speed Sealift ships. 

Although not being developed specifically for seabasing, according to 

service documentation, these systems will have a significant role in 

establishing a seabasing capability. The Army plans to acquire five Joint 

High Speed Vessels beginning in fiscal year 2008, with a total acquisition 

cost of $210 million for the first ship and $170 million for the remaining 

ships. The Navy’s long-range shipbuilding plan estimates the Joint High 

Speed Sealift ship to cost around $920 million. Furthermore, the Army is 

also in the early stages of exploring ideas for its Afloat Forward Staging

Base to provide aerial maneuver to Army forces. One option the Army is 

exploring for the Afloat Forward Staging Base is to add flight decks to a 

commercial container ship, along with other alterations, as a means to 

provide aerial maneuver to Army forces. Several research organizations 

also recommended this option, because it is seen as a potentially low-cost 

means of establishing a seabasing capability. A rough order of magnitude 

Page 29 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
estimate of the cost to convert a commercial cargo ship is approximately 

$300 million to $600 million.30

In addition to the options in development, additional means for projecting 

and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment exist. However, they 

cannot effectively be compared when total ownership costs are not 

known. For example, the U.S. Transportation Command is working to 

enhance the military’s joint logistics over-the-shore capabilities, which 

utilize existing assets, such as the Army’s Logistics Support Vessel and the 

Navy’s Improved Navy Lighterage System,31 to deploy and sustain forces by

allowing strategic sealift ships to discharge through austere or damaged 

ports, or over a bare beach. Furthermore, the Air Force has developed its 

Expeditionary Airbase Operating Enabling Concept. This concept is a 

methodology and plan for rapid airbase seizure, establishment, and 

operation to support the joint force commander in sustaining forces. Other 

possibilities include Army air-dropped or air-landed operations to rollback enemy shore-based defense or joint special operations forces to 

attack high-value coastal defense assets prior to or in concert with naval 

strikes from the sea. Some of these options represent existing capabilities, 

which could prove to be a more cost-effective means of projecting and

sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment. Until total ownership costs 

are developed, the cost-effectiveness of these options cannot be effectively 

evaluated. 

While DOD’s ability to project and sustain forces in an antiaccess 

environment is expected to become increasingly important, DOD has not 

taken all of the steps needed to effectively manage joint seabasing 

initiatives across the department and evaluate competing options for force 

projection and sustainment. Without a comprehensive management 

approach to guide and assess joint seabasing, DOD may be unable to 

ensure that ongoing or planned joint seabasing initiatives are properly 

focused and complement each other and the capability is being developed 

Options Cannot Be 

Compared without Cost 

Estimates 

Conclusions 

 30According to the Naval Research Advisory Committee report Sea Basing, Maersk Line, 

Ltd., in a proposal to the Military Sealift Command, estimated the cost of converting an Sclass container ship at $300 million. 

31The Logistics Support Vessel carries cargo and equipment throughout a theater of

operations. This vessel can carry up to 2,000 tons of cargo. The Improved Navy Lighterage

System enables the transfer of cargo from strategic sealift ships to barges and ferries so 

cargo can be moved to shore in cases where ships are unable to offload at ports. The 

system is portable and can be stored on the decks of many strategic prepositioning ships. 

Page 30 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
in an efficient and cost-effective manner. One consequence of this lack of 

effective management is the absence of a joint experimentation campaign 

plan. Without a campaign plan to direct experimentation for joint 

seabasing, DOD and the services’ ability to evaluate and validate their 

solutions, coordinate efforts, perform analysis, and disseminate results 

could be compromised. As a result, the services risk duplicating 

experimentation efforts and developing and fielding seabasing capabilities 

that are not compatible or interoperable, and they will be unable to 

leverage the results of individual experiments across the joint seabasing 

experimentation community to maximize synergies. Furthermore, 

establishing a joint seabasing capability could be the source of significant 

investment by DOD. Given the challenging fiscal environment facing DOD 

and the rest of the federal government, decision makers must make 

investment decisions that maximize return on investment at the best value

for the taxpayer. By understanding the estimated total ownership costs of 

options for establishing a seabasing capability, decision makers would be 

in a better position to make informed decisions about what options are 

most cost-effective, and evaluate the costs and benefits of establishing a 

seabasing capability against other competing priorities. However, while it

is unclear when DOD will complete its analysis of joint seabasing 

approaches and costs, the services are pursuing initiatives and systems to 

develop a seabasing capability, some of which are approaching milestones 

for investment decisions. If individual systems that support seabasing are 

allowed to move forward through the acquisition process before total 

ownership cost of seabasing options are developed and made transparent 

to DOD and Congress, there is a risk that DOD could make significant 

investments to develop a capability that may not be the most cost-effective 

means of projecting and sustaining forces in an antiaccess environment. 

To assist decision makers in developing a comprehensive management 

approach to guide and assess joint seabasing as an option for force 

projection and sustainment in an antiaccess environment and integrate 

service initiatives, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the

following actions to incorporate sound management principles into DOD’s 

management of joint seabasing: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• assign clear leadership and accountability for developing a joint 

seabasing capability and coordinating supporting initiatives; 

• establish an overarching, dedicated implementation team to provide 

day-to-day management oversight over the services, combatant 

commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others involved in joint 

seabasing; and 

Page 31 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
• develop and implement a communications strategy to ensure 

communication between and among the services, combatant 

commands, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, and to provide information on all joint seabasing activities across 

DOD. 

To better guide joint seabasing experimentation and inform decisions on 

joint seabasing as an option for force projection and sustainment in an 

antiaccess environment, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense do 

the following: 

• Direct the U.S. Joint Forces Command to lead and coordinate joint 

seabasing experimentation efforts, under the purview of the joint 

seabasing implementation team. U.S. Joint Forces Command should be 

responsible for developing and implementing a joint seabasing 

experimentation campaign plan to guide the evaluation of joint 

seabasing as a capability for force projection and sustainment. Such an 

experimentation plan should include the following elements: 

• a clear focus and objectives for joint seabasing that encompass 

near-, mid-, and long-term experimentation plans; 

• a near-term plan for joint seabasing experimentation that includes 

events for the next fiscal year, participants, timelines, and resources 

that will be used to support the events; 

• a spectrum of joint experimentation activities that include 

wargaming, comprehensive modeling and simulation, live 

demonstrations, workshops, symposiums, and analysis; 

• a data collection and analysis plan to capture and evaluate results; 

and 

• a method for communicating observations, results, upcoming 

activities, and feedback across the joint seabasing experimentation 

community. 

• Direct that the services collaborate with the U.S. Joint Forces

Command in developing, implementing, and using the joint seabasing 

experimentation campaign plan. 

• Direct that the services utilize and contribute to the U.S. Joint Forces 

Command’s knowledge management portal by providing their 

observations, insights, results, and planned activities to the portal for 

use by the joint seabasing experimentation community. 

To assist decision makers in evaluating the costs of joint seabasing options 

against the capabilities that joint seabasing could provide the joint 

Page 32 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
warfighter as a means for force projection and sustainment in an 

antiaccess environment, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the implementation team or other appropriate entity to synchronize 

development of total ownership cost estimates for the range of joint 

seabasing options so decision makers have sufficient information to use in 

making investment decisions on service seabasing initiatives. 

In comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with our 

recommendations, except for the need for a dedicated implementation 

team. In its comments, DOD stated that it is premature to establish 

additional oversight at this time and that in the interim the Force 

Management Joint Capabilities Board is providing an appropriate level of 

management oversight. As discussed below, in view of the magnitude of

potential DOD investments in seabasing and DOD’s need to efficiently 

manage future resources and distinguish between needs and wants, we 

continue to believe that an implementation team is needed to coordinate 

disparate service and defense organization initiatives related to seabasing 

and urge the department to further consider the need for action now 

rather than waiting until after it establishes joint requirements. In addition, 

although DOD partially agreed with our other recommendations, its 

comments did not indicate that it would take specific actions beyond 

those it has already begun and which we evaluated as part of our review. 

In light of DOD’s stated agreement with the intent of our 

recommendations, we urge the department to develop specific actions and 

plans to implement our recommendations. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation regarding leadership and 

accountability for developing a joint seabasing capability and coordinating 

supporting initiatives. DOD stated that the Joint Staff is assigned 

responsibility to develop the Joint Seabasing Concept and the resulting 

capability and that there is clear and accountable leadership established 

within the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Joint Capabilities 

Board to accomplish this development. While the Joint Staff, Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council, and the Joint Capabilities Board have 

oversight and responsibilities within JCIDS, we found that none of these 

organizations have the overall authority, responsibility, and accountability 

to coordinate joint seabasing initiatives and the service acquisitions that 

may support joint seabasing. As discussed in the report, the services have 

their own seabasing concepts and some service initiatives are outpacing

joint seabasing in development. DOD has not provided sufficient 

leadership to ensure these initiatives are fully leveraged, properly focused,

and complement each other. Because of the potential for billions of dollars 

to be spent to procure these systems, we continue to believe our 

Page 33 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
recommendation has merit and that assignment of clear leadership and 

accountability for developing a joint seabasing capability and coordinating 

supporting initiatives is needed. 

DOD did not agree with our recommendation that an overarching, 

dedicated implementation team be established to provide day-to-day 

management oversight over the services, combatant commands, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, and others involved in joint seabasing. DOD commented 

that the joint seabasing concept is still being developed within the JCIDS 

and the Force Management Functional Capabilities Board is providing the 

appropriate level of management oversight. DOD stated that it is 

premature to establish additional oversight at this time and that after the 

needed joint seabasing capabilities have been defined, the department will 

determine if additional oversight is necessary. We believe that the Force 

Management Functional Capabilities Board’s oversight does not go far 

enough in providing comprehensive management oversight for joint 

seabasing. While the Board is responsible for leading the joint seabasing 

capabilities-based assessment and oversees the sponsor (the Navy) in 

developing documents, the Board’s responsibilities do not constitute the 

type of oversight needed to ensure ongoing or planned service initiatives 

that may support joint seabasing are coordinated and complement each 

other. We continue to believe that our recommendation has merit and that 

creation of an implementation team to provide day-to-day management 

oversight of joint seabasing is needed. Therefore, we urge the department 

to create such a team now rather than waiting until needed joint seabasing 

capabilities are defined. 

DOD also partially agreed with our recommendation regarding 

implementing a communications strategy for all joint seabasing activities 

in DOD. DOD stated that the JCIDS process, Joint Capabilities Boards, and 

the Joint Requirements Oversight Council provide for communication 

between the Joint Staff, all four services, the combatant commands, and 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). However, as discussed in our 

report, we found that while the Joint Staff, all four services, the combatant 

commands, OSD, and others participate in the JCIDS process, the 

information shared is not all inclusive and it is not always clear who is 

involved in joint seabasing and what they are doing. A DOD-wide 

communication strategy that provides a framework to effectively manage

activities can support the overall development of joint seabasing by (1) 

providing better information for the participants in organizing and 

planning initiatives and (2) enabling the participants to minimize 

redundancy by leveraging activities being conducted by others. We 

continue to believe, as we have recommended, that a communications 

strategy should be developed and implemented. 

Page 34 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
DOD partially agreed with our recommendations regarding coordination 

of joint seabasing experimentation efforts and development of a joint 

experimentation campaign plan. DOD stated that the Joint Staff, with 

service, combatant command, and OSD support, is developing a draft Joint 

Capabilities Document that recommends a joint seabasing 

experimentation plan. However, DOD’s comments did not address which 

organization would be responsible for developing the experimentation 

campaign plan. As we recommended, we continue to believe that the U.S.

Joint Forces Command should be charged with developing and 

implementing the joint seabasing experimentation campaign plan. As 

noted in our report, the U.S. Joint Forces Command is the DOD executive

agent for joint warfighting experimentation. In this role the command is 

responsible for conducting joint experimentation on new warfighting 

concepts, disseminating the results of these activities, and coordinating 

joint experimentation efforts. 

DOD also partially agreed with our recommendation regarding the U.S. 

Joint Forces Command’s knowledge management portal. DOD concurs 

that a common portal should be established and used by the services. DOD 

stated that the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s knowledge management 

portal is one option that will be considered in order to share joint 

seabasing experimentation observations, insights, results, and planned 

activities. While we support DOD’s plans to establish a knowledge 

management portal for joint force projection and sustainment 

experimentation, we continue to believe our recommendations merit 

action and that DOD should direct the services to use the U.S. Joint Forces 

Command’s knowledge management portal to share information on joint 

seabasing rather than consider it an option. 

Finally, DOD partially agreed with our recommendation regarding 

development of total ownership costs for joint seabasing options. DOD 

stated that once the Joint Requirements Oversight Council defines the 

required joint seabasing capabilities, total ownership costs for the options 

to satisfy the needed capability gaps will be developed as part of the 

DOD’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution and acquisition 

processes. We support DOD’s plans to develop total ownership costs; 

however, as our report points out, we do not believe that these actions 

alone will sufficiently ensure that total ownership costs for all joint 

seabasing options are synchronized. While total ownership costs will be 

estimated and synchronized for those options being developed in DOD’s 

JCIDS process for joint seabasing, the services are either considering or 

actively pursuing systems to develop their own seabasing capabilities. 

Some of these systems are approaching major milestone reviews for 

investment consideration. Requiring that total ownership cost estimates be 

Page 35 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
developed for only those options developed in DOD’s joint seabasing 

JCIDS will provide decision makers with an incomplete picture of all joint 

seabasing options. Without ensuring that total ownership cost estimates 

are developed as we recommended for both joint seabasing options being 

developed in JCIDS and those options being developed by the services, 

DOD will risk making investment decisions that may not be the most costeffective means of establishing a joint seabasing capability. 

DOD also provided technical and editorial comments, which we have 

incorporated as appropriate. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II 

of this report. 

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; the

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces 

Command; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will 

make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will 

be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix III. 

Sincerely yours, 

Janet St. Laurent 

Director, Defense Capabilities 

and Management 

Page 36 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has 

employed a sound management approach for developing a joint seabasing 

capability, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, the joint staff, two combatant commands, the four military 

services, and the private sector; received briefings from relevant officials;

and reviewed key documents. We compared DOD’s approach with best 

practices for managing and implementing major efforts. To identify these 

best practices, we reviewed our prior work including GAO, ResultsOriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations. In the absence of a comprehensive 

planning document, we used relevant questions derived from the identified

best practices in interviews with officials and in analyzing pertinent 

documents such as the August 2005 Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept, 

and instructions and manuals on DOD’s Joint Capability Integration and 

Development System (JCIDS), including (1) the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E, Joint Capabilities Integration and 

Development System (May 11, 2005); (2) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff Manual 3170.01B, Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration

and Development System (May 11, 2005); and (3) the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

White Paper on Conducting a Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) 

Under the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

(JCIDS) (January 2006). We also interviewed officials involved in the 

development of the joint seabasing to obtain information on how involved

the services, combatant commands, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in developing joint seabasing, what their 

respective roles and responsibilities were, the level of authority available 

to direct the services and combatant commands to participate in the 

JCIDS analyses, how information on joint seabasing development efforts 

and initiatives was shared, how initiatives that may support joint seabasing 

were coordinated, and other issues. In addition, we examined the 

Seabasing Working Group Web site to identify what information was being 

communicated through the Web site.

To assess the extent to which a joint experimentation campaign plan has 

been developed, implemented, and used to inform decisions on joint 

seabasing options, we obtained briefings and interviewed officials from 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. 

Joint Forces Command, the U.S. Transportation Command, and the Army, 

Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. We also discussed the status of joint 

seabasing experimentation efforts and the extent to which they 

coordinated with each other in conducting joint seabasing 

experimentation. We examined DOD guidance to identify and clarify roles 

and responsibilities for leading joint warfighting experimentation. To 

identify key aspects for conducting experimentation campaigns, we 

Page 37 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

reviewed books and publications on experimentation campaigns, 

including Code of Best Practice: Campaigns of Experimentation; Code of 

Best Practice: Experimentation; Guide for Understanding and 

Implementing Defense Experimentation; and The Role of 

Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces. We obtained and 

reviewed DOD and service reports and briefings containing the analyses 

and findings of experimentation activities. We also attended an Army 

Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore exercise demonstrating the unloading and 

loading of equipment to the shore when port facilities are inadequate,

unavailable, or nonexistent. 

To assess the extent to which DOD and the services identified the cost of 

joint seabasing options so that decision makers can make informed, costeffective decisions, we reviewed official statements, obtained briefings 

from, and interviewed officials from, the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, 

Defense Science Board, and Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessments. We examined DOD documents and data including, but not

limited to, the President’s Fiscal Year 2007 Defense Budget, the 

Department of the Navy Ships and Aircraft Supplemental Data Tables, 

and the Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction 

of Naval Vessels for FY 2007. We assessed the reliability of the data used 

through discussions with knowledgeable officials. We determined that the 

data used were sufficiently reliable for our objectives. We reviewed 

statements by the Congressional Budget Office and Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments. We also reviewed reports on seabasing 

including, but not limited to, Thinking About Seabasing: All Ahead, Slow

by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Sea Basing by the 

Defense Science Board, Sea Basing by the Naval Research Advisory 

Committee, and Seabasing: Ensuring Joint Force Access From the Sea by 

the National Research Council. To identify guidance on cost estimating 

and total ownership costs, we reviewed DOD documentation, including 

DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System (May 12, 2003), 

DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System

(April 5, 2002), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E, 

Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (May 11, 2005),

and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3170.01B, Operation of 

the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (May 11, 

2005). We also reviewed our prior work on cost estimating and total 

ownership cost. 

We conducted our review from February 2006 to October 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards at the 

following locations: 

Page 38 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

• Offices of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. 

• Office of Force Transformation 

• Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation 

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics 

• The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 

• Office of Force Structure Resources and Assessment—Studies, 

Analysis, and Gaming Division 

• U.S. Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, Virginia 

• Joint Experimentation Directorate 

• Joint Futures Lab 

• U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois 

• Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C. 

• Office of Expeditionary Warfare 

• Office of Assessments, Seabasing Pillar 

• Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.

• U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia 

• Navy Warfare Development Command, Newport, Rhode Island 

• Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Virginia 

• Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island 

• Marine Corps Combatant Development Command, Quantico, Virginia 

• Capabilities Development Directorate, Seabasing Integration Division 

• Operations Analysis Division, Mission Area Analysis Branch 

• Marine Corps Warfighting Lab 

• Offices of the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C. 

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans 

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics 

• Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia

• Army Capabilities Integration Center

• Army Transportation Center, Fort Eustis, Virginia 

• Deployment Process Modernization Office 

• Headquarters United States Air Force, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Air, Space, and Information Operations Plans, and Requirements, 

Washington, D.C. 

• Concepts, Strategy, and Wargaming Division 

• Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia 

• Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, D.C. 

• LMI Government Consulting, McLean, Virginia 

Page 39 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 40 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 41 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 42 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 43 GAO-07-211 Force Structure
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 44 GAO-07-211

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Patricia Lentini, Assistant 

Director; Sarah Baker; Renee Brown; Nicole Harms; Margaret G. Holihan;

Ian Jefferies; Kevin L. O’Neill; Roderick Rodgers, Analyst-in-Charge; and 

Rebecca Shea made key contributions to this report. 

Force Structure

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

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