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JAPAN’S RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS NEIGHBORS:

BACK TO THE FUTURE?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 14, 2006

Serial No. 109–227

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

DENNIS HALPIN, Professional Staff Member 

JEAN CARROLL, Full Committee Hearing Coordinator 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Michael J. Green, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of 

Foreign Service, Georgetown University ............................................................ 8

Ms. Mindy Kotler, Director, Asia Policy Point ...................................................... 15

Kurt Campbell, Ph.D., Senior Vice President, Henry A. Kissinger Chair in 

National Security, and Director of International Security Program, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies ............................................................. 23

Ms. Yuki Tatsumi, Research Fellow, The Henry L. Stimson Center .................. 27

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Michael J. Green, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ....................................................... 10

Ms. Mindy Kotler: Prepared statement ................................................................. 17

Kurt Campbell, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................................... 25

Ms. Yuki Tatsumi: Prepared statement ................................................................. 29

APPENDIX 

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 48

(1)

JAPAN’S RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS 

NEIGHBORS: BACK TO THE FUTURE? 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:03, a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. 

Welcome to our illustrious panel of experts. And let me extend 

sincere congratulations to the Imperial family and the people of 

Japan on the occasion of last week’s birth of the little prince in 

Tokyo. 

I recently returned from a 2-week fact-finding mission in the 

Asia-Pacific region, and the area I first encountered more than six 

decades ago as a young naval officer. Our delegation made a stop 

most poignantly in the Solomon Islands on August 16, the 61st anniversary of the end of World War II. It was in the Solomons at 

Guadalcanal that a horrific 6-month battle raged in 1942 and 1943. 

We laid a wreath there on August 15th to honor those who fell. 

Abraham Lincoln of Illinois stated in his Gettysburg Address, 

‘‘The world will little note and long remember what we say here, 

but it can never forget what they did hear.’’ So the world took little 

note of our modest wreath laying in Guadalcanal. What is more 

significant, however, is that there were few other events to mark 

this important anniversary. Americans should ponder whether over 

a half century since the September 11th anniversary we just commemorated will also draw only passing attention from a few historians. In Japan, by contrast, the prime minister visited a shrine to 

honor his nation’s war dead on August 15th. This caused some 

disquietude among Japan’s neighbors because that shrine also honors some convicted war criminals. 

While the eyes of the world turned to conflicts in other regions, 

all appears calm on the surface of this region, washed by the waters of the Pacific Ocean, unparalleled prosperity has arisen in the 

post-war years. 

The Pacific has become the major waterway over which the 

world’s commerce flows. Yet even a brief visit to the region reveals 

that turbulent undercurrents lie just below this Pacific surface. 

Whether a rising China will become a responsible stakeholder remains an open question. The ability of old rivals, Japan and China, 

to find living space without bumping into each other is an emotionally charged issue. North Korea, as it reminded all Americans with 

2

its 4th of July missile launches, remains a major source of regional 

instability, and maintaining the peace in the Taiwan Strait is a 

constraint challenge for us all. 

All of these sources of tension in the Asia-Pacific region require 

that we and our allies forge a united front; however, sadly, our history keeps getting in the way. Our two major allies in East Asia, 

Japan and the Republic of Korea, have never joined in a common 

alliance. At a time when the increasing North Korean nuclear 

threat casts a long shadow over the entire region, it is not in the 

national interest of the United States to have our key allies at odds 

with each other. 

It was curious when, following the recent North Korea missile 

launch, some leaders in Seoul chose to lay the blame for provocation at Tokyo’s doorstep rather than pointing the finger where it 

belonged, the menacing dictator in Pyongyang. 

Something needs to be done to address the critical issues at hand 

given the immensity of the stakes involved, not only to regional 

piece, but also to the prosperity of the world. Something needs to 

be done so that Japan, the second largest donor to the United Nations, can take its proper place as a permanent member of the UN 

Security Council. Something needs to be done so that there is 

wholehearted regional support for an immense task ahead, the reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Something needs to be done 

so there is a full accounting of abductees from Japan, South Korea 

and other countries forcibly taken to North Korea. This last issue 

has been a particular human rights concern of our Committee. We 

approved a resolution, which overwhelmingly passed the full 

House. Japan is our good and trusted ally; the Republic of Korea 

is our good and trusted ally. The United States needs both of them, 

and needs them to fully cooperate on these and other issues. 

Thus, the question we wish to address today is, why has Europe 

been able to bury a contentious past while East Asia has not? Why 

has Europe risen from the ashes of war to form NATO, establish 

a European Union, even introduce a common currency, while East 

Asia lacks even fundamental regional security and economic institutions? 

The history of 20th century Europe, including the history of the 

Holocaust, was surely no less bitter than that of the 20th century 

Asia, yet European nations which were victims of the Nazis were 

able to join forces with former axis powers to present a united front 

against the Soviets threat during the Cold War. While Europe has 

moved beyond its troubled past, in Asia, it always seems to be back 

to the future. Specifically, the Arbitrage Report on the United 

States-Japan relationship issued by a bipartisan group of experts 

in 2000 suggested that Japan could play a key role similar to that 

played by Great Britain as an ally of the United States. A major 

difference, of course, is that Great Britain does not have a series 

of territorial disputes and unresolved historic issues, with virtually 

all of her neighbors such as exists between Japan and Russia, the 

Koreas, Japan and Taiwan. Is it sound policy to put all of America’s Asia-Pacific eggs into the Japanese basket as long as these 

historic and territorial issues remain unresolved? 

Let me add, as a member of the World War II generation, that 

I have no doubt that the truth of what happened during the Second 

3

War will and must prevail. It is troubling to those of my generation 

to learn that Yushukan Museum in Tokyo is teaching younger generations of Japanese that the Second World War in Asia was 

launched by Tokyo to free the peoples of Asia and the Pacific from 

the yolk of western imperialism. I just visited Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, the Solomon Islands, and I can tell you that 

while some spoke frankly of bitter experiences remembered during 

the Japanese occupation, not one person in any of these countries 

told any member of our delegation that they fondly remembered 

the Imperial Japanese Army as liberators. The history being 

taught at this museum is not based on the facts, and it should be 

corrected. 

We face immense challenges ahead in the Asia-Pacific region. 

When the story of this new century is finally recorded, the Middle 

East will not likely take center stage in the history books, despite 

our present necessary focus on this region. The history of the 21st 

century will likely be written mainly in China, India, Japan, and 

a unified Korea. The stakes in East Asia thus are great. The unity 

of our friends in the region is essential. We simply cannot continue 

to allow history to impede us as a roadblock to destiny. 

Now I welcome opening remarks from my friend, Mr. Lantos, the 

Ranking Democratic Member. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And before I say a few words about the subject of our hearing, 

let me pay public tribute to your courageous military service in 

Asia. And let me express both my admiration for your very 

thoughtful and significant opening statement, and our regret that 

your historical perspective and geostrategic view will be missing 

from this body in the future. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. LANTOS. Sixty-one years ago this month, General Douglas 

MacArthur accepted the unconditional surrender of the Japanese 

Government, formally bringing World War II to an end. 

Few aboard that USS Missouri that September day would ever 

have imagined that 6 decades later, the United States and Japan 

would be the closest of allies, sharing a deep and abiding commitment to international security, democracy and the rule of law. 

Mr. Chairman, this is exactly the miraculous transformation in 

the bilateral relationship of the two great nations over the past 61 

years. In fact, relations today between the United States and Japan 

have never been stronger, and have only been bolstered under the 

leadership of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi. But it would be a 

profound mistake to keep the United States-Japan relationship on 

autopilot. In a few short days the ruling liberal democratic party 

will choose a new prime minister. Decisions made by Japan’s new 

leader will have a profound effect on our bilateral relationship and 

upon Japan’s role in Northeast Asia. We must step up our dialog 

with Japan in the months and years ahead and not rest on our laurels. 

As we commemorate the fifth anniversary of the September 11th 

terrorist attack this week, we must remember Japan’s unprecedented cooperation with our nation in the aftermath of September 

11th. Japan provided logistical support for United States military 

operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The 

4

dispatch of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces was the first such 

deployment since World War II. And when it came to Afghan relief 

and reconstruction, while many countries hid behind the door as 

the United States passed the tin cup, Japan became the third largest donor country. 

The Japanese Government provided extensive reconstruction 

support in Iraq and deployed 600 military personnel there to distribute humanitarian aid and to carry out reconstruction. 

Most important, in terms of the future security of Northeast 

Asia, the United States and Japan have coordinated closely a 

North Korea policy in the context of the Six Party Talks. Japan 

strongly supports our primary objective in these multinational discussions, a nuclear free Korean Peninsula. And the United States 

has indicated that North Korea must return all those Japanese citizens who were kidnapped by Pyongyang days ago. 

It should, therefore, come as no surprise that I strongly support 

Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the United Nations 

Security Council, particularly as Japan contributes 19 percent of 

the UN’s annual budget. I also believe that we must work closely 

with Japan to ensure that it can play an increased international 

and regional leadership role in the security arena. 

In light of our shared commitments and history of close cooperation, I count myself as a strong friend of Japan, and I believe it 

is incumbent upon friends to speak frankly to each other. Japan’s 

failure to deal honestly with its past does great disservice to the 

nation of Japan, offends the other key players in Northeast Asia, 

and undermines America’s own national security interests by exacerbating regional tensions. 

The most egregious example of Japan’s historical amnesia is the 

practice of Japanese prime ministers visiting the Yasukuni shrine. 

As a survivor of World War II, I fully understand by Japanese 

leaders wish to pay homage to Japanese who die in service of their 

nation, any leader of a free and democratic nation would do so. But 

for the survivors of World War II in Asia and America, visits to the 

Yasukuni Shrine where 14 class A war criminals are interred 

would be the equivalent of laying a wreath at the graves of Himmler, Rudolph Hess and Herman Greer in Germany. 

My message to the incoming Japanese prime minister is very 

simple; paying one’s respects to war criminals is morally bankrupt 

and unworthy of a great nation such as Japan. This practice must 

end. The Japanese Government has also approved textbooks which 

deny the Rape of Nanking, and imply that Japan was simply trying 

to protect other Asian nations from imperialism by launching 

World War II. I understand that only a few schools actually use 

these revisionist textbooks, but the fact that the Japanese Government approves them for use speaks loudly to the countries of 

Northeast Asia. Those who deny history are surely bound to repeat 

it, and this practice must also end. 

I strongly believe that Japan has a greater role to play in a new 

security framework for Northeast Asia and the international community, but it will be difficult to achieve these important and urgent goals as long as Japanese leaders go out of their way to offend 

Korea and China. 

5

Mr. Chairman, the Yasukuni Shrine visits and the revisionist 

Japanese textbooks are not the centerpiece of our bilateral relationship. Our shared commitment to democracy and the rule of law 

binds our nations together. But as we look forward to the next 6 

decades of United States-Japan relations, it is eminently clear that 

everyone’s best interests, with the exception of right-wing Japanese 

ultra nationalists would be served by Japan’s willingness frankly 

and openly to deal with its past. 

With respect to your rhetorical question, Mr. Chairman, as to 

why Europe has been able to overcome a very ugly history and 

move toward a united Europe with a common currency and a whole 

set of common institutions, I suspect the answer lies in a very simple formula. The European nations are all political democracies, 

and when the nations of Northeast Asia, including China, will become democracies, we can look forward to a similarly favorable development. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Lantos. 

The Chair will recognize Members for brief opening statements, 

and the Chair is pleased to recognize Mr. Leach from Iowa. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I have a long statement that I would 

like to have permission to place in the record. 

Chairman HYDE. Without objection. 

Mr. LEACH. I would like to make one brief comment. 

Chairman HYDE. Surely. 

Mr. LEACH. Following on the two extraordinary statements that 

have been just given. Let me just stress that the circumstance that 

history is more controversial than current events underscores that 

people in public life in all countries are obligated to appeal to the 

higher rather than lower instincts of the body politic. And whether 

the issues be domestic or international, contemporary or historical, 

the temptation to appeal to the darker side of human nature has 

to be avoided. And it strikes me that this responsibility might be 

more important than the judgments reflected on any issue of the 

day. And this applies particularly to the issues in the Pacific. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Leach. 

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Lee. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank you and Ranking Member Lantos for convening 

this very important hearing, and thank our witnesses for being 

here. 

While the terror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki still occupies a significant place in our collective memories, it is unfortunate from my 

perspective that in the ensuing 60-plus years the world has become 

a more dangerous and complex place. Yet it is against the backdrop 

of increased tensions in the region and the world that Japan has 

continued to abide by its article 9 commitments in the Japanese 

Constitution, which essentially says that it seeks to resolve disputes through diplomacy and negotiations. This is, quite frankly, 

highly commendable and quite frankly inspiring at a time of war 

and strife. 

I had the opportunity to visit Japan a few years ago and was 

very impressed by the vibrant spirit and the passionate commitVerDate Mar 21 2002 19:30 Nov 28, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\091406\29883.000 DOUG PsN: DOUG
6

ment to peace and justice of the Japanese people. I met with many 

survivors of the nuclear bomb attacks, and I tell you, after this 

meeting and this visit, there is no way that I could not be totally 

committed to nuclear nonproliferation efforts wherever we believe 

that nuclear bombs could raise their ugly head. So I look forward 

to hearing from our witnesses about all of the challenges, security 

challenges which Japan faces, but also how the United States can 

support and strengthen our important relationship also with its 

neighbors, in addition to the United States. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And 

again, I applaud your leadership on this issue and also on the 

many other challenges we face. Your knowledge of the past and 

your vision for the future serves our country well, and it has been 

my honor to serve with you here in the United States Congress. 

We need to have a perspective on this. You know, there is a song 

in California which surfers know very well called Don’t Look Back. 

Well, clearly we do have to look back sometimes, but our perspective should mainly be on the future and not the past. There are 

some people that have a motive in trying to keep us looking backwards. The Chinese regime in Beijing, which is a dictatorship, 

wants to drive a wedge between the United States and Japan, and 

they would like us to focus on the past. Let us remember and let 

us remind those people in Beijing who hold power, who are so outraged by the Japanese behavior sometimes that they think is insensitivity. Yes, the Japanese committed sins against the Chinese 

people, but let us remember that the Chinese Communist regime 

that currently holds power his committed these very same sins, 

and more people were murdered by Mao Zedong than were killed 

by Japanese troops in World War II and leading up to the World 

War II. 

So while we recognize these historical facts, we should focus on 

the present and the future. In the present, Japan is not a dictatorship like it is in Beijing, that the Japanese Government is indeed 

an example of democracy and tolerance and openness that could 

serve Asia very well. And they are also tremendous partners with 

the United States. 

We have with us today, Mr. Chairman, a member of the British 

Parliament, Douglas Carswell, who is visiting us. And I can think 

of no stronger allies than the British and the Japanese in trying 

to build a better world today. Both in Afghanistan and elsewhere 

they have served us as partners and are trying to build a better 

world. In the future, if we are to have a better world, it will depend 

on a strong friendship with Japan. And I would suggest that, yes, 

we hope they will be more sensitive to some of the things that happened in World War II, and we need to be sensitive about the fact 

that they lost many people in World War II as well who were not 

combatants. We need to get beyond that and build a better future. 

And I think one thing we could do would be to support the Japanese in their endeavor to have a permanent seat in the United Nation’s Security Council; they have earned it, they are that type of 

influence in the world; we need to be Japan’s best friend, so we can 

7

build a better and more peaceful and prosperous world. Thank you 

very much. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Mr. Chandler of Kentucky. 

Mr. CHANDLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you all 

calling this very, very important hearing. And it is interesting for 

me to hear some of the statements about the past versus the 

present. I think both the past and the present are both important, 

and the future as well. 

In my own district in Kentucky, we have an interesting relationship with Japan. We have a small town, Harrisburg Kentucky, 

which suffered greatly, lost a lot of its citizens in World War II in 

the Baton Death March, and as a result, you can imagine the high 

feeling there in that small town. Since that time, though, we have 

seen an incredible relationship, an incredibly positive relationship 

built up in our state with Japan. We have an enormous amount of 

money invested by the Japanese in our state, we are very proud 

of that investment. And quite frankly, we have done a tremendous 

job of moving on. 

And Japan has become a tremendous ally for the United States 

of America. This needs to be recognized. And it is extremely important that we understand the importance, the economic importance 

and economic relationship that we have with Japan and that relationship is built upon, and that we also understand Japan’s connection and Japan’s relationships with other countries in its region. 

We, of course, know very much about what has happened with 

North Korea, the missile test that the North Koreans engaged in 

recently. And it is crucial, I think, for the United States of America 

to understand and be prepared for the events that may take place 

in the East, in the Far East. We have a tendency to focus on the 

Middle East, but issues in the Pacific are also extremely important. 

And I applaud you for holding this hearing so that we can discuss 

those issues in greater detail. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Chandler. 

Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I wanted to be here 

today to thank you for putting this hearing together and thank the 

Japanese people for their assistance in the global war on terrorism 

and the commitment of troops to Iraq, Afghanistan. I have actually 

met some of the troops firsthand. And so we are in a common global war. It would be somewhat easy for Japan to maybe not acknowledge that they are a part of it, but, of course, they are, we 

all are. And I appreciate that. 

Additionally, I have had the extraordinary opportunity to visit 

Pyongyang, North Korea. I know the threat and challenge that is 

to Northeast Asia and the role that Japan can play. Actually, to 

me, China should be playing the role of providing stability. 

And I want to join with Congressman Chandler in recognizing 

the extraordinary Japanese investment in my home State of South 

Carolina. We have thousands of jobs that have been created due to 

Japanese investment. 

Also, I also like to always extend a warm invitation for Japanese 

tourists. We have many golf courses at Myrtle Beach and the home 

8

district. I represent Hilton Head Island, we have many golf courses 

and Japanese terrorists are welcome. Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you for that commercial. 

The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Tancredo. 

Mr. TANCREDO. No statement. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Well, we welcome Dr. Michael Green, who currently is an associate professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service 

at Georgetown University. Prior to his current position, Dr. Green 

worked at the National Security Council, the Council on Foreign 

Relations and the Department of Defense. 

Also joining us is Ms. Mindy Kotler, the founder and director of 

Asia Policy Point, which is a research center examining United 

States policy relationships with Japan and other countries of 

Northeast Asia. Members of the APP are scholars, policy officials, 

analysts and journalists who follow the region. 

Dr. Kurt Campbell has a long history of public service. Among 

his honors are Department of Defense metals for distinguished 

public service and for outstanding public service. He is both Senior 

Vice-President Henry A. Kissinger Chair in National Security and 

Director of International Security Program at CSIS. 

The last member of our panel is Ms. Yuki Tatsumi, who is a research fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center, as well as an adjunct fellow with the International Security Program at CSIS, that 

is the Center For Strategic Intelligence Studies. 

Prior to these positions, Ms. Tatsumi served at the Embassy of 

Japan as the Special Assistant For Political Affairs. 

Thank you all for joining us today. Dr. Green, would you proceed 

with a 5-minute summary of your testimony. The full text will be 

made a part of the record. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. GREEN, PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, 

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me join the many 

voices who are thanking you for your service to the country from 

the time you went to the Pacific to your leadership on this Committee. 

The Committee asked me to look at Japan’s tense relations in its 

neighborhood and to consider what this says about Japan’s role as 

an ally and role in the world. And my testimony goes into this, but 

I think the Members of the Committee have explained how Japan 

is a stakeholder, a generous stakeholder, an active stakeholder in 

the international system, and there is not much I would add to 

there. 

I would call the Committee’s attention, though, to the fact that 

this is broadly recognized in the world; Japan is hardly an isolated 

nation. A recent poll of the United States showed that more Americans think we have common values with Japan than we do with 

Britain. And our guests can be reassured it was only 1 or 2 percentage points over Britain, but it was quite stunning to see that 

more Americans see common values with Japan now. 

The Southeast Asians recently responded to a Gallup Poll that 

came out last week. Over 90 percent of those polled in Southeast 

9

Asia said Japan is a friend. Between 70 and 90 percent of the respondents from each country said Japan is a trustworthy and reliable country in Asia. The BBC in March did a poll globally; they 

polled 33 countries and they asked what countries play a positive 

role in the world. The result wasn’t too good for us, but it was quite 

impressive for Japan, Japan came in number one. 31 of 33 countries around the world had majorities who said Japan plays a positive role. 

So I think we are fortunate to have Japan as an ally, we can 

count on a lot more leadership from Japan, and I think the Members are right to strongly stand by Japan’s bid for the Security 

Council seat that they are seeking and deserve. 

Two countries in that BBC poll had majorities that responded 

that Japan is not a positive force in the world, and the Members 

will not be surprised to learn that those countries were China and 

the Republic of Korea. Seventy-one percent of Chinese said Japan 

is not a force for good, 54 percent of South Koreans. I think we 

need to look at those two relationships in particular and we need 

to separate them because the dynamics are very different. 

In China, the focus is often on the prime minister’s controversial 

Yasukuni visits, but that is as much symptom as cause. Most postwar prime ministers have gone to Yasukuni, but the Chinese response to Koizumi has been unusually intense and ferocious, and 

part of that is because the feelings are still very strong. The Chinese leaders 30 years ago said it would take three generations for 

this to be forgotten. 

A part of it is that nationalism in Asia is more powerful as a 

force because of the Internet and so forth, but a lot of it, I think, 

is because of the structure of international politics in Northeast 

Asia. Japan and China are powerful now at the same time, essentially for the first time in history. They both have somewhat different visions for the future of Asia, they both want to play a leadership role, and they are in competition. China is blocking Japan’s 

bid for the Security Council seat, Chinese vessels are in Japanese 

waters, Japan is pushing for a regional integration process that 

would emphasize democracy and rule of law; China has a different 

vision. 

That is the source of much of the problem. It is reflected in the 

opinion polls about Yasukuni. Where most Japanese don’t say they 

want to glorify the past or change the record, most of them say 

they want to honor the 2 million Japanese who died and they don’t 

want China to tell them what to do. So a lot of this is face and test 

of wills. 

It is a problem, but it is not a problem we can easily fix and it 

is not a problem that the leaders in the country are ignoring. Mr. 

Abe is expected to win and become prime minister. The Chinese, 

very smartly, are not boxing him in on Yasukuni, they are not telling him what to do. They are building a little room for him to maneuver. 

He is saying positive things about China. The underlying rivalry 

won’t go away, but I think that the leaders of the countries are trying to work some sort of modus vivendi and equilibrium, which is 

a healthy sign. 

10

Korea is quite different. I don’t think that Japan-Korea relations 

are set for rivalry in a structural way the way Japan and China 

are. In 1998, Kim Dae Jung and Prime Minister Obuchi released 

a statement, Obuchi apologized, Kim Dae Jung welcomed a larger 

role of Japan, and there was a real flourishing of Japan-Korea cooperation. It lasted essentially until 2004, after, by the way, several visits by Prime Minister Koizumi to Yasukuni. And the relationship started falling apart on the territorial issue of Tokdo and 

Takeshima, which has fueled this rivalry. It got caught up in the 

domestic politics of both countries. 

But I think in the case of Japan and Korea, two democracies, two 

allies of the United States, where in the past strong leadership has 

put this relationship on a positive track, it is different from China, 

and I think there is a lot of room for the two countries to start 

working together based on a common agenda they have. 

The history issue is not going to go away easily, it is not something we are going to solve from the United States. We have to remember that China trades more with Japan than Japan trades 

now with the United States, so there is greater interdependence. 

But Asia is a complex mix of rivalry, of interdependence, of nationalism, of Pan-Asianism, and the issue won’t be solved quickly, it 

deserves our attention, but the Asian leaders themselves are in 

many ways going to have to handle this themselves, with the 

United States keeping a steady hand, strong relations with our allies, reminding them we want them to have good relations, building 

leadership on issues like North Korea, and taking the perspective 

that Congressman Lantos mentioned, which is, this is not Europe, 

this is not an Asia free and whole, Germany is not Japan, and 

France and China are certainly not the same countries, France is 

a democracy. 

The Chinese Premiere Zhou Enlai is right, it is going to take a 

long time. We should keep a steady hand on the tiller and demonstrate United States leadership in a very broad way, but not try 

to intervene, in my view, and solve these specific historical issues. 

Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Dr. Green. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. GREEN, PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, 

EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the Committee for inviting me to testify on this 

important subject and to take this opportunity to thank you for your many years 

of distinguished service to our country. 

The Committee has asked me to address the tensions between Japan and China 

and Japan and the Republic of Korea and to assess whether these tensions cast 

doubt on Japan’s reliability as an ally or our own ability to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. 

JAPAN AS A RELIABLE ALLY AND STAKEHOLDER

Let me first address the question of Japan’s international role, because I think 

it is important to note at the outset that the United States and the world are increasingly coming to rely on an active Japanese role in the maintenance of international peace, stability and development. After the United States, Japan is the second largest provider of funds to the United Nations, the International Monetary 

Fund and official overseas development assistance. Japan is a crucial partner in the 

war on terror, having provided steady naval support and reconstruction funding for 

operations in Afghanistan. Japan’s Self Defense Forces have been on the ground in 

11

Iraq doing reconstruction work and the Japanese government was one of the first 

to pledge significant financial support to Iraq; a pledge of $500 billion that prompted 

other governments in the Gulf to follow suit. Japan has lost a senior and distinguished diplomat in Iraq, but has remained steadfast in helping the new Iraqi government get on its feet. 

In Asia Japan is the leading provider of development assistance, both grants and 

loans, and Japan spends almost $5 billion per year to host U.S. forces that provide 

stability to the region and an indispensable strategic asset to protect U.S. interests. 

As the region explores some form of integration or ‘‘East Asian Community,’’ Japan 

has emerged as the main champion of a new regional order based on inclusion of 

the United States and promotion of democracy and the rule of law. This has brought 

Japan into competition with China and other nations that prefer an Asian order 

that limits the influence of the United States and protects member states from interference in their ‘‘internal affairs’’ on issues such as human rights or protection 

of intellectual property. As this debate has grown, Japan has found common cause 

with other democracies in the region and has significantly expanded strategic dialogue and cooperation with India and Australia, in particular. Indeed, the Australian government is reportedly exploring a formal security pact with Japan and 

a series of new regional initiatives are expected when Indian Prime Minister 

Manmohan Singh visits Tokyo at the end of this year. 

In travels throughout Europe and South Asia I have seen first hand the benefit 

of an active Japanese international role. In Kuwait in 2004 I chanced to meet a platoon of Ground Self Defense Forces just back from a deployment in Samwah, Iraq. 

They were tired, dirty and covered with desert dust—but they were clearly proud 

of their mission to help develop water purification plants for local Iraqis. In a remote part of the Pakistan near the Kyhber pass in September last year I visited 

the first and only modern school building established as an alternative to the dozens 

of Madrassas that often radicalize young Pakistani men. Hanging above this new 

school building was a crudely drawn but large Japanese flag with the words ‘‘Thank 

you Japan.’’ It turns out that the school was built by a joint USAID-Japanese initiative under the U.S.-Japan Strategic Development Initiative. I learned from our 

USAID director that Japan has committed to help build many more such schools 

along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan. 

It is because of this record of contribution to international peace and stability that 

in polls today 91% of American ‘‘opinion leaders’’ and 69% of the general public consider Japan to be a reliable ally (in the same Foreign Ministry poll 96% of opinion 

leaders and 78% of the general public in the United States said that Japan shares 

our common values—a higher number than Great Britain received). Japan’s image 

is also positive on the international level. The BBC released a poll in March of this 

year in which majorities in 31 of 33 countries around the world credited Japan with 

contributing positively to the international community. That was more recognition 

than any other country in the world received, including the United States, Great 

Britain, China and the Nordic countries. Only two countries had majorities that responded negatively about Japan’s role in the world. Not surprisingly, those were 

China (71% negative view) and the Republic of Korea (54% negative view). The BBC 

poll did not cover Southeast Asia extensively, but a Gallup/Yomiuri/Hankook Ilbo 

poll released on September 4 demonstrated that more than 90% of people in Southeast Asian nations felt that their countries had a good relationship with Japan and 

between 70 and 90% said that Japan is a trustworthy nation. 

Far from being isolated, Japan probably has broad respect and support in the 

world today than at any point in its history. Nevertheless, there is a clear problem 

between Japan and China and Japan and Korea and that is the crux of the Committee’s concern today. I think the two bilateral relationships are different in character 

and I would like to examine them each in turn and then return to the question of 

what role the United States might play to enhance stability among the major states 

of Northeast Asia. 

JAPAN’S RELATIONS WITH CHINA

As the BBC poll suggests, tensions between Japan and China are deeper and likely to be more enduring than those between Japan and Korea. The focus of the U.S. 

media has been on the controversial visits of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to 

the Yasukuni Shrine memorializing Japan’s war dead, but that is as much symptom 

as cause. To understand the real source of tensions between Japan and China, it 

is necessary to look first at the structural factors. Simply put, Japan and China are 

being forced to adjust to comparable levels of national power for the first time since 

China was defeated by a rising Japan in 1895. Neither Tokyo nor Beijing anticipated such a situation. Throughout the post-war period, Japanese leaders assumed 

12

that engagement with the Peoples Republic of China would lead to economic convergence between the two nations with Japan as the ‘‘head flying geese’’ because of its 

more advanced economy. Chinese leaders, in contrast, assumed that Japan would 

remain focused on economic activities and not become a rival for strategic influence. 

Over the past decade, each nation has come to realize that their expectations of the 

other were wrong and that the levers they had hoped would allow them to shape 

the others’ behavior (economic aid for Japan and the history card for China) no 

longer suffice. 

The resulting rivalry has been manifest in a number of areas. Last year China 

actively worked to organize opposition to Japan’s bid for a permanent UN Security 

Council seat. China has opposed Japanese participation in U.S.-led multilateral discussions on Iran and has tried to marginalize Japan’s influence in the Six Party 

Talks on North Korea. Chinese surface combatants and submarines have expanded 

their operations in waters claimed by Japan. In response, Japan’s Defense Agency 

has begun shifting its air and naval forces to the southern islands near Taiwan and 

the Japan Defense Agency has begun highlighting the uncertainties caused by China’s non-transparent defense build-up. 

It is in the context of this shifting strategic game that the tensions over history 

must be understood. Koizumi is not the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit 

Yasukuni; indeed, most post-war Prime Ministers went before him. And far from 

promoting an anti-China foreign policy, Koizumi has expressed an almost sunny optimism about the long-term future of the Japan-China relationship, disagreeing with 

those who would portray China’s rise as a threat to Japan. He has also conveyed 

deep remorse and apology for Japan’s historical transgressions on a number of occasions, including a 2001 statement at the Marco Polo bridge in China where the SinoJapanese war began in 1937. 

I believe Prime Minister Koizumi’s insistence on worshiping at Yasukuni is based 

on his personal conviction that the relatives of millions of Japanese war dead deserve to have the Prime Minister honor their loss. But perhaps more important to 

Koizumi is his determination not to let China dictate the terms of how Japan recognizes its past. There is no question that Japan pays a diplomatic price for these 

shrine visits and public opinion in Japan is divided on whether the visits are worth 

that price or are even appropriate in the first place, but the issue cannot be explained with simplistic assertions that Koizumi is playing a nationalist card to gain 

popularity. 

Similarly, arguments that Japan is forgetting its own history and somehow returning to prewar patterns of belligerence are also far off the mark. The Japanese 

live in a very dangerous neighborhood. North Korea has developed nuclear weapons 

and is expanding its arsenal of both bombs and missiles and China’s military is operating ever closer to Japanese territory. Japan’s main response has been to 

strengthen alliance ties with the United States, expand missile defense cooperation 

and urge the UN Security Council to put pressure on North Korea. Japan has not 

increased defense spending above 1% of GDP (and is unlikely to do so because of 

budget pressures) or begun work on new offensive weapons systems. Even proposals 

for Constitutional revision within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party retain the 

first clause of Article Nine renouncing war. Japan is certainly more nationalistic 

than in the past, but what is most striking about Japan’s new ‘‘realism’’ is how reluctant and restrained it has been. One need only ask how the American public 

would have reacted to Canada developing nuclear weapons and kidnapping U.S. citizens, while Mexico increased its military budget at close to 15% a year to realize 

that there is still a strong undertow of pacifism in Japan. 

It is also important to remember that Japan and China have never had greater 

economic interdependence than they do today. For the last two years Japan has 

traded more with China than with the United States and there is no sign that Japanese companies intend to pull back from investing in China (though they are diversifying somewhat to India and Southeast Asia). 

There is evidence that Chinese leaders recognize this economic interdependence 

and the risk to their own position of letting tensions with Japan over history go 

much further. Previous anti-Japanese student demonstrations in the 1980s quickly 

turned into anti-government demonstrations and while the Chinese leadership sees 

advantage in anti-Japanese patriotism, they also know the risks. Unlike his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, Chinese President Hu Jintao does not have a personal animosity towards the Japanese. Hu tried to find a way out of the impasse over history 

last year by declaring a readiness to meet with Koizumi if he would promise not 

to go back to Yasukuni. That failed, of course, because it looked like precisely the 

kind of dictation from Beijing on history that Koizumi and his government are determined to put in the past. 

13

I have found over the past six months that counterparts in both China and Japan 

have essentially acknowledged their governments’ tactical mishandling of the history issues without coming out and saying so explicitly. For example, Beijing has 

criticized Koizumi’s most recent August visit to the shrine, but not tried to box in 

his expected successor, Shinzo Abe, with specific demands or conditions for summits. 

For his part, Abe has expressed a readiness to stabilize ties with China and Korea 

and the betting in Tokyo is that his first foreign visits will be to those countries, 

if he wins election as expected next week. 

The underlying strategic factors that are driving Sino-Japanese rivalry are unlikely to disappear. A clean Franco-German style resolution of the history issue in 

the near-term is unlikely. Japan is not German and China is not France—a democracy integrated into a Europe whole and free. Chinese Premiere Zhou Enlai said in 

the 1970s that Sino-Japanese relations would not move beyond the damaging memories of the war for at least three generations, which still sounds about right. However, there is reason to expect that both Tokyo and Beijing will add more nuance 

and caution to their treatment of controversial historical and territorial issues over 

the coming months and that will contribute to a more stable equilibrium in their 

bilateral relationship. 

JAPAN’S RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

In contrast to Japan-China relations, the problems in Japan-Korea relations are 

more recent and not the result of a steady and predictable shift towards strategic 

rivalry over the past decade. Until recently, relations were on a positive track. In 

October 1998 former ROK President Kim Dae Jung and former Japanese Prime 

Minister Keizo Obuchi issued a joint statement in Tokyo in which Obuchi expressed 

deep remorse and apology for Japan’s treatment of Korea and Kim welcomed Japan 

playing a larger role in Asian and international affairs. The Korean side ended a 

ban on Japanese cultural products and negotiations began on a bilateral free trade 

agreement. Korean culture, and especially Korean daytime TV dramas, became 

hugely popular in Japan. The United States, Japan and the ROK also instituted 

regular trilateral defense meetings and the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight 

Group (TCOG) on North Korea. 

These trends continued into the Koizumi-Roh Moo Hyun era without interruption, 

even after Koizumi began his annual trips to Yasukuni in 2001. However, the political relationship between Japan and Korea quickly deteriorated in March 2004 

when Japan’s Shimane Prefecture passed a local bill claiming the Liancourt Islands 

(Tokdo in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese) as Japanese territory. While few 

Japanese outside of Takeshima or the Foreign Ministry knew much about these islands, the challenge to Korean sovereignty conjured up memories of past Japanese 

transgressions and ignited public opinion in Korea. As the conservative Grand National Party pursued impeachment hearings against President Roh and the progressive camp counterattacked with National Assembly investigations of the conservatives’ wartime collaboration with the Japanese, the history issue became even more 

volatile. The increasing divergence between Tokyo’s hard line on the North Korean 

nuclear program and Seoul’s efforts at expanded engagement with Pyongyang has 

also added to the negative dynamic. 

As a result, Japan-Korea summits have been chilly or non-existent, the TCOG and 

U.S.-Japan-ROK defense trilaterals have stalled, the Japan-Korea FTA negotiations 

are at an impasse, and well-meaning officials in both Japan and the Republic of 

Korea appear uncertain regarding how they can put their bilateral relationship back 

on the positive track that lasted from 1998 until 2004. 

There is no structural or geostrategic reason why Japan-Korea relations should 

continue to deteriorate. Both nations share common values as democracies and common interests in a strong U.S. presence in Asia and a denuclearized peninsula. 

Opinion polls published by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses in March of 

this year indicate that many more Koreans view China as their long-term security 

challenge rather than Japan (38% said China versus 28% pointing to Japan). Despite the stalled negotiations on an FTA, Japanese and Korean steel companies are 

forming unprecedented alliances to deal with competition from China and the majority of business leaders in Seoul and Tokyo want and expect the negotiations to reopen at some point. 

Nevertheless, the near-term effect of a breakdown in Japan-Korea strategic cooperation is worrisome because of the comfort it gives North Korea as Pyongyang 

works its way up the nuclear escalation ladder towards a possible nuclear test. 

Since the initiation of the TCOG in 1998, the evidence is strong that close U.S.-

Japan-ROK coordination on North Korea spurs China to use its influence on 

Pyongyang and checks North Korean efforts to divide its neighbors. Moreover, in 

14

contrast to Tokyo and Beijing’s carefully choreographed efforts to re-stabilize relations, there is no evidence that senior Japanese or Korean political leaders are trying to do the same for their bilateral ties. For these reasons, there is a greater urgency in the Japan-Korea case than with Japan-China relations, but also greater 

room for the United States to play a positive role. 

THE UNITED STATES ROLE

What should the United States do? In the case of Japan-China relations I believe 

it would be tremendously counterproductive to attempt any official brokering between the two nations on sensitive history issues. Zhou Enlai was right to point out 

the futility of trying to force a conclusion to the historical animosity between Japan 

and China. The Chinese inability to come to terms with its own historical record 

under the Communist Party means that Beijing has little room to seek an enduring 

solution with Tokyo on the past. Given the Japanese peoples’ resentment of other 

governments’ telling them how to address the past, U.S. pressure would simply invite a backlash and make it harder for the Japanese to find a way to honor their 

war dead without damaging relations with neighbors. In fact, there is a healthy discussion now underway in Japan, including detailed exposes in the conservative 

Yomiuri Shimbun describing how Japan entered into the war with China. Had the 

United States tried intervening on this issue, we would have been the lead story 

and become an obstacle to serious a discussion within Japan. 

Efforts in the U.S. courts and the Congress to force Japan to pay compensation 

for acts during the war have also been counterproductive. The unequivocal position 

of the administration and the courts that the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty settled all claims from the war is simply not going to change. Meanwhile, the threat 

of litigation stymies efforts by those in Japan at the high levels who do want to take 

more proactive measures to address continuing legacies of Japan’s wartime record 

without putting themselves at risk of endless litigation. 

Moreover, it would be a mistake for the United States to try to strike a balance 

between Japan and China. Many of the issues that are driving Sino-Japanese tensions are issues where we have a common stake with Japan, whether it is the PLA 

military build-up, the nature of Asia’s future institutional architecture, or the North 

Korean nuclear problem. Not only can the United States pursue a strong alliance 

with Japan and good relations with China at the same time, the United States 

needs a strong alliance with Japan as the backdrop for building a more stable strategy of engagement with China. 

What can be done? First, it is important for the United States to be clear with 

both Tokyo and Beijing that our interests are not served by tension between Japan 

and China. Second, the United States as a friend and ally can and should challenge 

the Japanese government to explain its strategy for improving relations with China 

without attempting to micromanage that relationship from Washington. Third, the 

United States can set the stage for cooperation between Japan and China on issues 

ranging from energy to the Six Party Talks. One good example is the newly inaugurated Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate that has brought 

together cabinet-level representatives from the United States, Japan, China, Australia, Korea and India to cooperate on development of clean, sustainable energy resources. Finally, scholars and legislatures can contribute to Chinese and Japanese 

dialogue on the range of issues that vex their relationship—speaking not for the 

U.S. government but as part of an open-ended discussion that is sometimes much 

more difficult for Chinese and Japanese scholars to manage on their own. Kurt 

Campbell and I have both participated in a number of such trilateral exercises outside of government and I think we both find them productive. 

In terms of Japan-Korea relations, the United States can probably afford to be 

more proactive because both nations are allies that share our values and because 

the underlying strategic sources of tension are not as deep or enduring as they are 

between Japan and China. To begin with, the administration could do more to reinvigorate the TCOG process, which serves all three parties by bringing our North 

Korea strategies and tactics into closer alignment. The Department of Defense 

should parallel that effort by seeking Tokyo and Seoul’s consent to return to regular 

defense trilateral meetings (this would also be a helpful deterrent signal to North 

Korea at a critical juncture). At all levels the administration should be encouraging 

Japanese and Korean counterparts to be more proactive in seeking win-win solutions to the territorial and other bilateral issues that challenge them, but without 

trying in any way to broker a solution to the territorial problems (the United States 

has wisely avoided that role around the world for years). Finally, think tanks and 

universities are far more invested in U.S.-Japan-China dialogue than U.S.-JapanROK projects and that should change. I would note that there is an ongoing triVerDate Mar 21 2002 19:30 Nov 28, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\091406\29883.000 DOUG PsN: DOUG
15

lateral legislative exchange that puts the U.S. Congress ahead of the academic community in fostering stronger ties between Japan and Korea. 

The bottom line is that the United States should not panic about the political tensions among the major powers in Northeast Asia, just as we should not panic about 

discussions of an East Asia Community that would somehow brings them all together and exclude us. Asia today is a complicated mix of nationalism, panAsianism, economic interdependence and rivalry. But each decade more Asian powers are choosing the path of democracy, good governance and a commitment to improving all their peoples’ welfare. With the exceptions of Burma and North Korea, 

the entire region continues to look to the United States to sustain these positive 

trends. This is precisely the time to stand strongly with allies like Japan that share 

our values and interests.

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Kotler. 

STATEMENT OF MS. MINDY KOTLER, DIRECTOR, ASIA POLICY 

POINT 

Ms. KOTLER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify today before this Committee on Japan’s contemporary relations 

with its neighbors. 

If I may, I would like to first submit for the record three essays 

on Japan that reflect my discussion of how the Sino-Japanese relationship may affect the United States-Japan alliance. 

Japanese and Chinese hold strikingly similar opinions of each 

other, both are negative. Since the normalization of Japan’s postwar relations with China in 1978, opinion surveys document that 

clear deterioration of good will after nearly two decades of good relations. This trend has accelerated over the last 10 years, especially 

after the contentious 1998 visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin, 

and the start of Japan’s recession. 

Most noticeable is how much the line of trust tracks a rise of internal, social, economic anxieties in both countries. Most troubling 

is how closely increasing animosity between the two countries follows Washington’s focus on developing a strong security alliance 

with Japan. 

In the late 1970s, nearly 70 percent of the Japanese surveyed felt 

positively toward China, but today nearly 70 percent holds an opposite negative view. This reversal of good will is mirrored in 

China by nearly the same percentages as in Japan. In 2006, neither nation has a good impression of the other, each feels little affinity toward the other citizens. 

The two countries at first appear perfect opposites; one is a managed, mature capitalist democracy, the other is a developing market economy overseen by Communist oligarchy, but there are many 

similarities as well. Both are Asian societies forced into nation 

states by foreign ideologies. Both have citizens with weak national 

identities and leaderships that aspire to build stronger ones. Both 

are confronting inward looking individualist trends that distance 

their citizens from the state. Both societies are struggling with expanding personal responsibilities after a period of rigid conformity. 

Both economies are grappling with the dislocations caused by 

free market capitalism after years of state planning and guaranteed employment. In short, both China and Japan witnessed a decade of wrenching social change. It is in this context that the mutual ill will has grown. For both China and Japan, the primary 

issue is one of domestic discontent in security not fully addressed 

by the state. 

16

Income, inequality and crime topped the concerns of the average 

person in both countries. Thus, the Chinese and Japanese share a 

unique period in their nation-building. Their central governments 

are faltering in their ability to provide social stability and cohesion, 

a sense of safety and material well-being. The result is a new emotional nationalism. Its hallmark is that leaders in both Tokyo and 

Beijing are looking inward and defining security by making 

Chineseness or Japaneseness a civic rather than ethnic quality. It 

is the national and international security that both societies are 

seeking it to clarify. 

Citizens and leaders alike see the decline of traditional social relationships and moral degradation as the source of their country’s 

problems. Over and over in the speeches of Chinese and Japanese 

elites, you read the same phrases on the importance of rebuilding 

a harmonious principled society. There is a yearning for a time 

when things were better, or they seemed so. 

Oddly, for both countries, that better time is the period that 

began with the Sino-Japanese conflict in 1931 and that ends with 

World War II in 1945. Many Japanese leaders are wistful for the 

glory days of imperial Japan and the victories of the Greater East 

Asian War. Chinese leaders find compelling the heroic saga of 

struggle in the war against Japanese aggression. Each sees these 

times to be nobler of purpose and clearer of duty. Against this 

backdrop, the Yasukuni War Memorial looms large in the consciousness of both the Chinese and Japanese, created in the mid 

19th century to commemorate those combatants who died fighting 

for the Emperor, the shrine was central to establishing a variant 

of Shintoism as a state ideology defining citizenship in Japan. The 

Yasukuni glorifies death in war for one’s country. Thus, the shrine 

symbolizes the success of the Imperial order for the Japanese. 

While for the Chinese, and to a large extent the South Koreans, the 

shrine’s continued existence denies their success in defeating the 

Imperialist invaders. 

It is in this volatile mix of emotions and social change that the 

U.S.-Japan Security Alliance exists. Currently, severe constitutional restrictions prevent the full deployment of the already formidable Japan Self-Defense Forces. Promises made by many prime 

ministers to the Governments of Asia that Japan would never 

again become a military power reinforce this constitutional restraint. Encouraged by the United States, however, Japan is now 

on a course toward military normalization and greater international involvement. 

The new emotional nationalism of Asia changes how the United 

States-Japan alliance is perceived in the region. For both Japan 

and China, nation-building now takes precedence over alliance 

building or regional stability. Japan’s conservatives use the pressures of the new alliance to resurrect old state symbols, marshal 

pride, and the Japanese Army and Navy. 

China’s conservatives point to the same alliance to draw the 

country together to fight the familiar threats of so-called foreign 

imperialism, and to modernize their military. 

Japan’s new campaign to be the ‘‘thought leader’’ of Asia further 

stokes China’s fears. The Chinese believe that Japan’s unresolved 

17

wartime historical issues, especially the shrine, undermine any 

Japanese leadership. 

Current Sino-Japanese tensions reflect each other’s country’s domestic stresses more than they do in an inherent regional strategic 

competition or rivalry. The Chinese and the Japanese want to restore and confirm pride and prestige to their people. Before trust 

can be established, a sense of emotional well-being or security must 

first be confirmed within each society. For the United States, the 

strength of the United States-Japan alliance rests in a better understanding of the tensions created by this new nationalism. 

Mr. Chairman, to rephrase a Chinese proverb, Japan and China 

have different beds, but the same dreams and the same nightmares. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kotler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. MINDY KOTLER, DIRECTOR, ASIA POLICY POINT

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify on Japan’s contemporary 

relations with its neighbors. If I may, I would like to first submit, for the record, 

three essays on Japan that reflect well my discussion of how the Sino-Japanese relationship may affect the U.S.-Japan Alliance. 

Japanese and Chinese hold strikingly similar opinions of each other—both are 

negative. Since the normalization of Japan’s postwar relations with China in 1978, 

opinion surveys document a clear deterioration of goodwill after nearly two decades 

of good relations. This trend has accelerated over the past ten years, especially after 

the contentious 1998 visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin and the start of Japan’s 

recession. Most noticeable is how much the decline of trust tracks the rise of internal socio-economic anxieties in both countries. Most troubling is how closely increasing animosity between the two countries follows Washington’s focus on developing 

a strong security alliance with Japan. 

In the late 1970s, nearly 70 percent of the Japanese surveyed felt positively toward China, but today nearly 70 percent hold an opposite, negative view. This reversal of goodwill is mirrored in China by nearly the same percentages as in Japan. 

In 2006, neither nation has a good impression of the other; each feels little affinity 

toward the other’s citizens. [See attached charts] 

The two countries, at first, appear perfect opposites. One is a managed, mature 

capitalist democracy and the other is a developing market economy overseen by a 

Communist oligarchy. But there are many similarities as well. Both are ancient societies forged into nation-states by foreign ideologies. Both have citizens with weak 

national identities and leaderships that aspire to build stronger ones. Both are confronting inward-looking, individualist trends that distance their citizens from the 

state. Both societies are struggling with expanding personal responsibilities after a 

period of rigid conformity. Both economies are grappling with the dislocations 

caused by free market capitalism after years of state planning and guaranteed employment. In short, both China and Japan have witnessed a decade of social change 

brought about by rapidly transforming economies in an era of globalization. 

If you were to ask which country had a

• Widening disparity between the rich and the poor, the haves and have-nots

• Dramatic income inequality

• Inadequate social safety net and job security

• Disaffected youth, high youth unemployment

• Social dislocation and ennui

• Bureaucratic incompetence and cover up

• Growing gap between rural and urban economies

• Rising crime and corruption

The answer is, both do. 

It is in this context that mutual ill-will has grown. For both China and Japan the 

primary issue is one of domestic discontent and insecurity not fully addressed by 

the state. Income inequality and crime top the concerns of the average person in 

18

both countries. Thus, the Chinese and Japanese share a unique period in their nation-building. Their central governments are faltering in their ability to provide social stability and cohesion—a sense of safety and material well-being. 

The result is a new emotional nationalism. Its hallmark is that leaders in both 

Tokyo and Beijing are looking inward and defining security by making Chineseness 

or Japaneseness a civic, rather than an ethnic quality. It is the ‘‘national’’ in national security that both societies are seeking to clarify. 

Citizens and leaders alike see moral degeneration as the source of their country’s 

problems. Rapid economic change has restructured traditional social relationships. 

Over and over in the speeches of Japanese and Chinese elites you read the same 

phrases on the importance of rebuilding a harmonious, principled society. There is 

a yearning for a time when things were better, or at least seemed so. 

Oddly, for both countries, that ‘‘better’’ time is the period that began with the 

Sino-Japanese conflict in 1931 and that ends with World War II in 1945. Many Japanese leaders are wistful for the glory days of Imperial Japan and the victories of 

the Greater East Asian War. Chinese leaders find compelling the heroic saga of 

struggle in the War against Japanese Aggression. Each sees these times to be nobler 

of purpose and clearer of duty than those of today. Opinion leaders in both countries 

advocate a form of ‘‘patriotic education’’ in order to relive their pasts to regain their 

futures. 

Interestingly, both see nobility in the retelling of what ultimately were ‘‘failures.’’

In identifying themselves as ‘‘victims’’ of the Pacific War, Chinese and Japanese find 

proof of their moral sincerity. As capitalism transforms their economies, many see 

themselves as losers, as victims economically as well as politically. Against this 

backdrop, the Yasukuni Shrine war memorial looms large in the consciousness of 

both the Chinese and Japanese. Created in the mid-19th century to commemorate 

those combatants who died fighting for the Emperor, the Shrine was central to establishing a variant of Shintoism as a state ideology defining citizenship in Japan. 

Yasukuni glorifies death in war for one’s country. Thus, the Shrine symbolizes the 

success of the Imperial order for Japanese, while for Chinese and to a large extent 

to the South Koreans, the Shrine’s continued existence denies their success in defeating the Japanese Imperialist invaders. 

It is in this volatile mix of emotions and social change that the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance exists. Currently, severe Constitutional restrictions prevent the full deployment of the already formidable Japan Self Defense Forces. Promises made by 

many prime ministers to the governments of Asia that Japan would never again become a major military power reinforce this constitutional restraint. Encouraged by 

the U.S., however, Japan is now on course toward military normalization and greater international involvement. 

The new emotional nationalism of Asia changes how the U.S.-Japan Alliance is 

perceived in the region. For both Japan and China, nation-building now takes precedence over alliance building or regional stability. Japan’s conservatives use the pressures of the new Alliance to resurrect old state symbols, martial pride, and the Japanese Army and Navy. China’s conservatives point to the same Alliance to draw the 

country together to fight the familiar threats of so-called foreign imperialism and 

to modernize their military. Japan’s new campaign to be the ‘‘thought leader’’ of 

Asia further stokes China’s fears. The Chinese believe that Japan’s unresolved wartime historical issues undermine any Japanese leadership. 

Current Sino-Japanese tensions reflect each country’s domestic stresses more than 

they do any inherent regional strategic competition. The Chinese and Japanese people are beset with anxieties about their future. Issues of inequality dominate the 

political discourse in each country. Their leaders want to restore and confirm pride 

and prestige to their people. Before trust can be established, a sense of emotional 

well-being or security must first be confirmed within each society. The increasing 

economic interdependency between China and Japan is fast taking a backseat to the 

rhetoric of patriotism, however ill-defined. For the United States, the strength of the 

U.S.-Japan Alliance rests in a better understanding of the tensions created by this 

new nationalism. 

To rephrase a Chinese proverb, China and Japan have different beds, but the 

same dreams and the same nightmares. 

SINO-JAPANESE RECONCILIATION

At an August 2006 conference hosted by the Australian National University on 

Sino-Japanese Reconciliation (http://www.china-japan-reconciliation.blogspot.com), I 

proposed the following confidence building measures. Ways must be found to make 

the future less frightening and insecure. The first measures then must be immediate, tangible, and mutually understandable. This is the definition of sincere.

19

1. Japan needs to come to terms with loss of the War and confirm its commitment to democracy. Toward this end:

a. Legislation similar to that in Germany that restricts hate speech, denial of wartime misdeeds, and protects those who try to educate about 

the war are important. For example, ensuring police protection of the 

comfort women museum in Tokyo would be a powerful symbol. This 

museum, the Woman’s Active Museum on War and Peace (http://

www.wam-peace.org/), receives daily threats. Also, removing the uyoku 

trucks and people from the grounds and vicinity of the Yasukuni 

Shrine would be another major step.

b. A national day of remembrance should be established, similar to Memorial Day in the US or ANZAC day in Australia. This makes no one location more sacred and no group of people more bereaved than another.

c. A government restitution commission similar to those in Germany and 

Austria should be established to address grievances by comfort women, 

POWs, slave laborers, non-Japanese nuclear victims, Japanese orphans 

left in China, and others. Legalistic solutions to these issues have engendered contempt and distrust. Prime Minister’s Koizumi’s example of 

restitution to the Japanese emigrants to the Dominican Republic is a 

good one.

d. Memorials to the victims of the war should be created that school children can visit. Examples include: plaques at the docks where the 

Hellships and Korean laborers arrived; an interactive museum created 

from one of the Mitsubishi (i.e., Battleship Island) or Mitsui mines, and 

greater recognition of the Juganji Buddhist temple near Osaka that 

holds annual memorial services for foreign POW dead.

2. China and Japan must recognize that the time of empire is over. As the Europeans have learned, borders change and principalities come and go. Lingering historical claims over islets and boundaries are formulas for trouble 

and opportunities for demagogues. Every effort should be made toward practical, ahistoric resolutions to all territorial disputes. Allies of both countries 

need to indicate that they will not support or defend every territorial claim.

3. China needs to show appreciation for Japan’s efforts and seek ways to reassure Japan of its intentions. China, too, needs to confront its wartime history. Not all Chinese were freedom fighters or heroic. Popular culture should 

be encouraged to present a more balanced picture of Japan and Japanese 

history. China also needs to take the high ground and not react to every provocative action by Japan. Japanese leaders need to understand that they are 

now on the world stage. They must measure their words and understand 

that there are sensitivities outside the islands.

4. Japan must end its rhetoric of being Asia’s ‘‘Thought Leader.’’ This campaign 

recalls other less benign Japanese efforts to lead Asia. It is neither appreciated nor well-received by other democracies in the region. It is also not 

true.

The Yasukuni Shrine seems to be a separate issue. It is symbolic of all that is 

wrong with the Sino/Korean-Japanese relationship. More important, it is a Japanese 

issue representing all of Japan’s unresolved national identity and war angst. It is 

a world of mythic history and state religion. In many respects, however, it may be 

on its way to being resolved. 

The recent, subtle but clear involvement of the Imperial House will go far to define the role of Yasukuni in Japan. After all, the Shrine was created by and for the 

Imperial House to glorify death in war for the Emperor. It is his job to depoliticize 

the memorial. 

As many scholars note, Shinto is theologically unbound. If there is a consensus 

that the 14 Class A War Criminals (crimes against peace) should be dis-enshrined, 

it can and will happen. More difficult is to decide whether Yasukuni is a religious 

or state site. There are excellent arguments for both. In either case, the Yushukan 

(war museum) must be removed or substantially altered. The argument that the site 

is private falls apart when claims that it is a national place of mourning are also 

made. 

It is very important to recognize that official visits to the Shrine are equally offensive to the Japanese people and Americans, British, Australians and others. The 

Yasukuni Shrine states clearly that it repudiates the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal 

and perpetrates the fiction that the Hull Document was meant to trick Japan into 

World War II. In fact, the convicted and enshrined Class A, B, and C war criminals 

at Yasukuni are referred to as the ‘‘martyrs of Showa.’’ Japan’s conservatives use 

20

the Shrine as a way to tacitly distance themselves from the U.S. and from U.S. policy. In many respects, the Shrine is a slap at Washington. 

Another important issue is that Yasukuni’s focus on the glorious dead from the 

Greater East Asian War ignores the fact that the Shrine is for all those Japanese 

who died in military service to their country since the civil war in the mid-19th Century. The emphasis on the Pacific War, slighting other conflicts and those who sacrificed in them adds to the alarm of Yasukuni’s critics. 

In its current form, the Yasukuni Shrine ignores the strength and triumph of 

postwar Japan. Yasukuni glorifies death in war, as one becomes a god when enshrined there. Yasukuni rites preserve the memory of a war in which all deaths 

were selfless acts of bravery on behalf of the imperial institution; of a war which 

was ever noble and glorious. Moreover, not all Japanese combatants are enshrined 

and some classes of Japanese are not allowed to be enshrined. Finally, no one who 

died in ‘‘military’’ service to their nation after the Pacific War can be considered for 

enshrinement. In effect, Yasukuni triages the dead to support a particular view of 

Japanese nationhood that is remote from today’s postwar modern, democratic 

Japan. 

To ‘‘modernize’’ the Shrine, in addition to dis-enshrining all the convicted war 

criminals, may be to discuss the acceptability of the Prime Minister or Emperor visiting the Chinriesha Shrine at Yasukuni. This Shrine enshrines all those who fought 

against the Japanese empire including all allied combatants of WW II. It is to pacify 

their souls. Although they are enshrined collectively (the main shrine at Yasukuni 

only enshrines identified, named individuals) they receive, twice daily, Shinto rites 

and have their own festival on July 13. For now, the Chinriesha is fenced off and 

to the side of main shrine. It is hidden. The symbolism of the Chinriesha being 

unfenced, recognized, and guarded against right-wing fanatics has promise as a dramatic symbol of reconciliation. Noted Shinto scholar Dr. John Breen, finds that ‘‘The 

Chinreisha has the capacity to recall a more nuanced past, a past of perpetrators 

and of victims, of winners and losers, of horror as well as heroism’’—of what war 

is all about. 

RECOMMENDED READING

Breen, John. ‘‘Yasukuni—Rekishi Kioku no Keisei to Soushitsu’’ [Yasukuni—Formation and Loss of Historical Memories]. SEKAI (September 2006): pp.147–158. 

Breen, John. ‘‘Yasukuni Shrine: Ritual and Memory.’’ Japan Focus (3 June 2005), 

available at: http://www.japanfocus.org/products/details/2060

Gries, Peter. China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. University 

of California Press, 2004. 

Hardacre, Helen. Shinto and the State, 1868–1988 (Studies in Church and State). 

Princeton University Press; Reprint edition (August 12, 1991). 

Nelson, John. ‘‘Social Memory as Ritual Practice: Commemorating Spirits of the 

Military Dead at Yasukuni Shinto Shrine.’’ Journal of Asian Studies 62, 2003. 

Available at www.pacificrim.usfca.edu/research/yasukuni—nelson.pdf 

OECD, Economic Survey of Japan, 2006, Policy Brief, July 2006, p. 8, available at 

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/23/37148463.pdf

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Chairman HYDE. Dr. Campbell. 

STATEMENT OF KURT CAMPBELL, PH.D., SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, HENRY A. KISSINGER CHAIR IN NATIONAL SECURITY, 

AND DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And also 

thank you, Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos. 

Let me also commend you, Mr. Chairman, for taking the delegation to Guadalcanal. I visited a lot of the same sites a couple 

months before you, and I think it is wonderful that you remind 

Americans and people of the Asia-Pacific of our shared heritage. 

It is a subject of another discussion, but what worries me is I 

view many of these sacred places on Pacific islands with major 

prospects of global climate change. In 50 years, I am not sure many 

of those places are actually going to be above water, but that is a 

subject for another time. 

I also want to commend the group for calling a hearing on Asia. 

It is always important when Washington turns its attention away 

from desperate issues, hard struggles in the Middle East and Iraq 

and Afghanistan and focus on the dynamic situation that is developing in Asia today. And I will tell you my own sense is that after 

a period of a little bit of indecision, it seems to me that over the 

course of the next generation the United States is going to face two 

overwhelming challenges. One is the global war on terrorism, and 

we see that, we are involved in that on a daily basis, Iraq is now 

part of that. And secondly, the rise of China. 

I would say personally that no country in history has risen to 

great power status faster than China has, even faster than the 

United States between 1900 and 1920. And an indisputable ingredient in China’s rise is American preoccupation away from Asia. 

And that is a hard fact and that is a bipartisan fact. We have 

not been focused as a nation on the critical realities of the AsiaPacific region. And I think, in fact, American inattention is one of 

the biggest problems that we have to deal with, as opposed to some 

of the issues that I think have been very usefully put on the agenda today. 

I want to associate myself both with the service of Mike Green 

as senior director at the National Security Council, and I like very 

much what he had to say, I am not going to repeat it. I will say 

it seems to me that if you look at Asia and you go around Asia 

today and you talk to people quietly, it reminds me very much of 

a book I read to my children, Snow White. And in it—my children 

are 4 and 6—the queen goes to the mayor one day and says who 

is the most beautiful maiden in the land. And it is like the United 

States going around in Asia saying who is the great power of Asia. 

And I think Asians tend to be polite, I don’t think they like to 

tell Americans bad news. By my experience, traveling around Asia 

more recently, is that China has made enormous inroads in terms 

of its soft power and its position, largely while we have been preoccupied away. Asians recognize that once the current unpleasantness in the Middle East is over in 10 or 15 years, we will return 

to Asia in force and we will have regular speeches of the kind that 

the President has been giving every day on Iraq and the Middle 

24

East and talking and thinking more about Asia. But what people 

worry about is in the interim, that Asia will change dramatically. 

And as the old story says, you can’t go home again. 

And so what I am worried about and what I think people generally are worried about is that American preoccupation has, in 

fact, engendered a series of developments in Northeast Asia that 

are contrary to American security interests. 

Now, again, I appreciate the Committee having a hearing about 

problems associated with history, but if you ask me to list very 

quickly what are the real problems of Northeast Asia, the most important ones that demand immediate attention, they are, number 

one, the worries about American inattention. Number two, a really 

troubled relationship between the United States and South Korea, 

our second most important ally; I don’t recall a time when relations 

are as bad as they are today. Third, North Korea has more nuclear 

weapons than it had 5 or 10 years ago, and they are building more, 

and with no real plan in sight for what to do about it. A dramatic 

China on the march, both militarily and strategically, and somewhat to my surprise, a relationship between the United States and 

Taiwan that is also probably as bad as it has ever been. 

Now, amid that general picture, Mr. Chairman—and also, I 

would just add quickly, a Russia that is increasingly looking to the 

Pacific and a little bit unhelpfully—— Chairman HYDE. If I could interrupt you. The point you are making about the frayed relationships between South Korea and the 

United States, we just returned within the last 3 weeks from visiting South Korea and spent some time with the President, he was 

here yesterday, spent some time reaching out. I got the impression 

that while there are some bumps in the road, there wasn’t hostility 

or any even adversarial relationship between South Korea and the 

United States. 

I put a wreath at the statue of MacArthur at Incheon, and I 

didn’t get the attitude that there was any—there are some differences, of course, over in North Korea; I think the President of 

Korea has a different view toward how to solve that; the July 4th 

launching may have shaken him somewhat. But I really hope you 

are not correct. You may well be. I don’t say a policy develops from 

one trip to a country. You are an expert, but I hope you are wrong. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Let me just say Mr. Chairman, I think the most 

recent visit and efforts on both sides have certainly suggested that 

there is a recognition in both capitals that the relationship has 

seen better days. I worry about the defense side, I worry about efforts to take more United States forces off the Korean Peninsula. 

I am a little worried that we have some problems about how we 

perceive how to deal with North Korea. And I do know that there 

are attitudes of some officials in both camps in both Seoul and 

Washington that are not kindly toward the other. So I hope that 

your trip and other efforts have improved these general trends, but 

myself, I continue to be a little anxious. 

My point, though, Mr. Chairman, is amid this general framework 

of enormous strategic challenge, I would say one of the brightest 

spots has been what we have seen between the United States and 

Japan. An enormous improvement in relations, Japan has been 

supportive of the United States in almost every effort, and I think 

25

we have heard that echoed throughout the halls. We can have our 

bipartisan or partisan critiques about Iraq or Afghanistan, but I 

think that there is unified agreement on both sides of the House 

that basically what we have seen in terms of improvement of 

United States-Japan relations is quite important and it advances 

our own strategic interests. 

I think what Mike Green said is what we have to all hope for, 

is that the next Japanese prime minister that is about to assume 

position in office recognizes that improving relations in the neighborhood is job number one. And I think that there is actually an 

historic opportunity for the Japanese prime minister to do a kind 

of mix into China. And we are going to see that his efforts will be, 

at least at the outset, to make sure that relations that have also 

been fractured between South Korea and China will be improved. 

Now I think the United States role in that is to encourage Japan 

along this path. I do not believe it is in United States interest to 

have Japan spending too much time domestically on issues like 

Yasukuni, which ultimately, although it is Japan’s business, ultimately hurts Japan’s diplomacy, causes them to lose air speed and 

altitude in a way that is not in America’s strategic interests. So my 

hope is over the next several months we are going to see some improvement on these issues. But overall, if you ask me what is the 

best news story in Asia right now, it is the role of the United 

States-Japan partnership, and it is the heavy lifting that Japan 

has done in a whole host of regions around the world over the 

course of the last several years. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KURT CAMPBELL, PH.D., SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, HENRY

A. KISSINGER CHAIR IN NATIONAL SECURITY, AND DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Asia is experiencing a period of dramatic tumult and change and the United 

States now confronts an extraordinarily dynamic northeast Asian region with a rising China; a resurgent Japan; an increasingly adventurous North Korea and alienated Republic of Korea; and a more Pacifically focused (and often unhelpful) Russia. 

Competition for petroleum, power, prestige have created an increasingly volatile political climate with the United States—arguably the most important piece of Asia’s 

strategic jigsaw—essentially preoccupied away from the region at a time of enormous consequence. 

After a protracted period of uncertainty, concerning the nature of the foreign policy challenges that are likely to confront the nation over the course of first half of 

the 21st Century, twin challenges are finally coming into sharper relief. For the 

next generation, Americans will be confronted by two overriding challenges in the 

conduct of American foreign policy: how to more effectively wage a long, twilight 

struggle against violent Islamic fundamentalists and at the same time cope with the 

rise to great power status of China. Each task, taken on its own, would be daunting 

and consuming, but coming concurrently as they inevitably will. These challenges 

are likely to be close to overwhelming for a government apparatus and national 

mindset better suited to single minded efforts. 

This is the first time in the nation’s history that foreign policymakers have had 

to cope with two such vexing and dissimilar challenges simultaneously. While it is 

true that during World War II we fought on two fronts in the Atlantic and Pacific 

against two very different foes—Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan—the military 

power employed to defeat the Axis was largely fungible and the tactics employed 

on each front were similar, adjusting for the inevitable variations of geography and 

terrain. Then, during the Cold War, the undeniable shaping experience of this generation of foreign policy and national security practitioners, the United States faced 

one organizing foreign policy challenge coming from the Soviet Union. This era is 

now undeniably over, as the U.S. confronts two extremely varied sets of demands, 

26

one driven by stateless Jihadist warriors and the other by a rising commercial, political, and military giant in the East. 

Ever since the galvanizing attacks of 9/11, the United States has in turn attacked 

(literally) the problem of violent Jihadism, primarily through the application of military power in Afghanistan and Iraq (the latter now inextricably linked to the terror 

matrix, largely as a consequence of American actions). The mostly unanticipated demands of the martial campaigns in the Middle East have had a corollary consequence beyond simply bogging down in unforgiving urban battlefields. The United 

States has been almost inevitably preoccupied away from the rapidly changing strategic landscape of Asia at a time when China is making enormous strides in its military modernization, commercial conquests, diplomatic inroads, and application of 

soft power. Rarely in history has a rising power gained such prominence in the 

international system, largely as a consequence of the actions of—and at the expense 

of—the dominant power, in this case the United States. Current American talking 

points continue to stress the need to ‘‘manage’’ China’s emergence as a dominant 

power, but it is perhaps more apt to describe China as a country that is increasingly 

attempting to manage American perceptions and actions while China seeks to consolidate its new found gains globally. 

In the midst of this American preoccupation away from Asia, the ghosts of Asia’s past are now threatening to imperil the region’s promising future—a future that 

holds considerable consequences for western, and particularly U.S., economic and security interests in the region. 

Over the past year, a series of incidents between Japan and China have sent relations between the powers plummeting. Among other developments, bitterness has 

been fuelled by the Japanese curtailment of bilateral assistance; repeated trips by 

senior Japanese politicians to Yasukuni Shrine to honor Japan’s war-dead; the 

condoning, if not orchestration, by Beijing of public demonstrations against Japan; 

Japan’s production of textbooks that gloss over burdensome historical facts; and 

greater military vigilance on both sides. All point to prospects for an even more serious rift between Tokyo and Beijing. The hope is that a new Japanese Prime Minister, coupled with a suddenly more engaging and less publicly critical China, will 

lead to a lessening of tensions and even a rapprochement between Tokyo and Beijing. Perhaps a newly installed Prime Minister Abe, in a bit of Asian theater, may 

decide to make his first overseas visit to China; a Japanese version of Nixon to 

China. But there is a very real worry that conversely, through a number of anticipated or inadvertent steps, China and Japan could see their relations worsen suddenly in the months ahead. 

This deterioration of relations could pave a treacherous path for the U.S. in the 

region. If trade and investment between these two leading economies and U.S. trading partners were disrupted, Asian economic growth would be undermined and the 

ripple effect would certainly be felt in the U.S. On the security front, Sino-Japanese 

tensions that could escalate into real conflict—perhaps over the tiny but strategically placed Senkaku-Diaoyutai islands—would put the US in a delicate position between its closest ally and the region’s other big power. While some suggest that the 

depth of economic ties will help curb a crisis, there is enough volatility at the political level to suggest that an unintended rupture is indeed possible. 

It is therefore necessary, if not urgent, for Washington to work more actively towards rapprochement and better co-operation between the three dominant states of 

the Asia-Pacific region: China, Japan and the U.S. The U.S. has generally been content to conduct the lion’s share of diplomacy at the bilateral level in Asia or stand 

by and watch the proliferation of the ‘‘Asia-only’’ gatherings in the region that ignore or exclude us. 

Indeed, the United States has been content to work towards a very strong U.S.-

Japan relationship and a quite durable Sino-American interaction simultaneously 

while generally accepting, without comment or involvement, a badly deteriorating 

Sino-Japanese relationship. This ultimately cannot be in the larger strategic interests of the U.S., and efforts should be taken foster improved ties between Japan and 

China. 

Ultimately, it is remarkable how little strategic interaction there is between 

Tokyo and Beijing. Japan and China are especially furtive about exposing themselves in any high-stakes diplomacy involving the U.S. and the other power, and 

there is little momentum in Washington to extend the reach of its relationships in 

Asia beyond the bilateral level. But it is the U.S. that should augment its current 

strategy with a trilateral component. As a first step, the U.S. should call for a highlevel meeting between Washington, Tokyo and Beijing. Such a trilateral meeting 

could be an important part of an emerging Asian diplomatic mosaic of interconnecting and overlapping institutions that if nothing else, creates ample opportunity for dialogue. 

27

Critics of the trilateral idea warn that the U.S. should be mindful about creating 

a regional architecture that alienates other neighbors (particularly South Korea in 

this case), and must avoid giving China a forum that could enhance its regional 

prestige. This overlooks the primary point: it is in America’s national security interest to ensure, and play a proactive role in, positive Sino-Japanese relations. 

The U.S. has a clear interest in Japan being reconciled more honestly with its 

past, not as a favor to China but in recognition that latent anxiety toward Tokyo 

runs deep in some quarters of Asia. The issue of remembering and respecting Japan’s war sacrifices is an inordinately complex issue that roils Japan’s domestic politics and confounds her pundits, but it also the case that the Yasakuni issue has led 

to Japan losing some altitude and airspeed in the advancement of their important 

diplomatic work around Asia. The truth is, with the US engaged largely elsewhere, 

America needs Japan to be all that it can be in multilateral institutions and diplomatic gatherings to help augment the pursuit of our shared interests and values. 

At the same time, the U.S. need not worry that trilateral initiatives would give 

China too much clout in Asia. While America has been focusing on regions such as 

Afghanistan and Iraq, China has been busy establishing itself as the next great 

power on the world scene. Beijing does not need U.S. help to enhance its regional 

stature; it is doing this on its own. The question, therefore, is not whether China 

will be a great power, but how the U.S. will help influence the direction that China 

takes in its new role. A U.S.-Sino- Japan strategic summit could go a long way toward promoting a co-operative, constructive China, rather than a challenging one. 

The U.S., China and Japan have many mutual interests, including: a growing 

need for secure energy supplies; a common front in the war on terror; a goal of a 

nuclear-free Korean peninsula; a desire to solve territorial disputes peacefully; an 

interest in seeing Asian economic growth and prosperity continue; and an overriding 

need to reassure the other states of Asia that the enormous Asia-Pacific region is 

big enough for Japan, China and the U.S. to coexist and prosper. Helping to define 

and shape the rules of the road for the Pacific century is a noble and important effort and one in which the U.S. should take the lead. Now is the time for the U.S. 

to get off the sidelines of big power diplomacy in Asia and bring the big three together.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Dr. Campbell. 

Ms. Tatsumi. 

STATEMENT OF MS. YUKI TATSUMI, RESEARCH FELLOW, THE 

HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER 

Ms. TATSUMI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Congressman Lantos, Members of the Committee, it is a great honor to testify before 

you this morning. 

Given an upcoming leadership change in Tokyo in roughly a 

week, now is a particularly good time to reflect on where Japan 

stands on various issues. In doing so, I do believe though that it 

is useful to reflect on some of the recent internal developments in 

Japan on the issues that have raised concerns in the last few years. 

In the interest of time, I would like to highlight a few things in 

my full testify today that I submitted to the Committee. 

First, the political developments in Japan for the last 5 years can 

really not be looked at in a vacuum. Rather, they need to be looked 

at as a part of Japan’s ongoing attempt to seek its new identity, 

not as an isolated series of events. Japan embarks on this new endeavor after its humiliating experience during the Gulf War in the 

early 1990s and this effort still continues today. 

Secondly, I do acknowledge that Mr. Koizumi’s time in office 

raised concern over the issues, such as Japan’s view of its wartime 

legacy, Japan’s relations with its immediate neighbors, and the rise 

of nationalism in Japan. However, I would point out that the debates on these issues within Japan are still evolving. For instance, 

most Japanese do not subscribe to the view that glorifies Japan’s 

military past. At the same time, it is oh, so clear that Japan has 

28

not come to a national consensus on who was responsible for leading Japan down that path. I would argue, actually, that Mr. 

Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine have actually 

triggered a process of self-reflection in Japan on this very, very important issue. This is a very healthy development as Japan will not 

be able to move forward without reaching a closure on its past as 

a nation. 

Let me also say a few words on the rise of nationalism. It is an 

exaggeration to argue that the Japanese populist as a whole is 

quickly embracing an inward looking and balanced trend of nationalism. In fact, I would argue that the nationalism that most Japanese identify with is closer to the patriotism that we see in this 

country today. For most Japanese, nationalism means love for the 

country and being proud of being Japanese. And this also equals 

their increasing desire to see Japan share a due level of responsibility in the international community. 

Third. It is premature to make a judgment on Shinzo Abe and 

what kind of a prime minister he will become. While there is some 

uncertainty regarding obvious personal views on certain issues, to 

what degrees his personal views will be reflected on his policy still 

remains unknown. In fact, Mr. Abe’s rise to power can create a real 

opportunity for Japan’s regional diplomacy as Dr. Campbell and 

Dr. Green mentioned. Mr. Abe is arguably in the best political position in today’s Japan to reach out to Beijing and Seoul. 

There is also a good chance that Mr. Abe seeks to emulate his 

grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, as a prime minister and embrace his 

political style of conservative and pragmatism. If he does so, the 

coming month can present a real opportunity for improving Japan’s 

relationship with China and Republic of Korea. 

Finally, the United States can do a great deal in empowering the 

silent majority in Japan who want to see Japan expand its role in 

the international community, while remain committed to seek reconciliation with its immediate neighbors. The United States can do 

so by staying on message that has the following elements when 

communicating to Japan. Number one. Japan is an essential partner of the United States. Number two, the United States understands that Japan is still in the process of searching for its proper 

role in the world. Number three, the United States supports Japan’s aspiration to play a greater role in world affairs. 

And number four, Japan’s essentiality as a partner makes it very 

important for Washington that Japan has a positive and constructive relationship with Beijing and Seoul. 

I would like to conclude by also stressing that Congress can also 

play a very important role in this course through a more robust 

legislative exchange between the Congress and the national diet of 

Japan. Members can communicate these messages, as well as their 

concerns that have been raised already in this room, directly to 

Japanese lawmakers using this framework. By engaging in such a 

dialogue, Members can also reassure their Japanese counterparts 

that the United States considers Japan as an important partner, 

and that while Japan can does not interfere with domestic affairs 

in Japan, it also has a strong interest in how Tokyo addresses certain issues as well. 

29

As I say, I do believe this will go a long way in empowering the 

silent majority of moderates in Japan, and thereby ensuring the 

change in political leadership from Koizumi to Abe, and thereafter, 

will bring about changes in Japan that allow it to be a positive and 

proactive player in the Asia and beyond. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much, Ms. Tatsumi. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tatsumi follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. YUKI TATSUMI, RESEARCH FELLOW, THE HENRY L. 

STIMSON CENTER

Chairman Hyde, Congressman Lantos, Members of the Committee, it is a great 

honor to testify before you today on the subject of Japan’s relationship with its 

neighbors. While the United States has a deep interest in recent developments in 

the Middle East, promoting US interests in Asia also remains a key US foreign and 

security policy priority. In order to sustain US leadership in this region, it is important that the United States pays close attention to relationships among key players 

in this region. In this context, it is natural that the United States maintains an interest in how this vital American ally relates to its neighbors, including the domestic factors that shape Japan’s approaches to its neighbors. 

The Committee could not have scheduled this hearing at a better time. As the 

Members may well be aware, Japan has undergone a great deal of change since 

Prime Minister Koizumi took office five years ago. To be sure, some of the changes 

he brought benefited US-Japan relations greatly. At the same time, Koizumi triggered developments that have raised concerns among Japan’s neighbors as well as 

in some quarters in the United States. At minimum, many share the view that Japan’s relationships with its immediate neighbors have come under considerable 

strain under Koizumi’s watch. 

As it looks almost certain that Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe will 

succeed Mr. Koizumi in roughly a week, now is a particularly opportune time to reflect on where Japan stands on various issues. When trying to answer questions regarding Japan’s relationship with its neighbors, I believe it is useful to observe recent internal developments in Japan that have had a direct impact on its regional 

diplomacy. 

In today’s testimony, therefore, I would like to do four things. First, I would like 

to set the context of what we have been witnessing in Japan for the last five years. 

Second, I would like to discuss the developments that have been raising concerns 

among Japan’s neighbors and some quarters in this country. These issues include 

attitudes of Japanese toward their nation’s wartime past, Japan’s relations with its 

China and the Republic of Korea, and the rise of nationalism in Japan. Third, I will 

discuss my view on how the upcoming change in the Japanese political leadership 

may affect these issues. Finally, I will conclude by saying a few words on what the 

United States can do to help ensure that the anticipated leadership change in Tokyo 

will lead to a positive outcome of these debates within Japan. 

I. WHERE IS JAPAN TODAY? (THE CONTEXT)

The political developments in Japan for the last five years cannot be looked at 

in a vacuum. In my view, Japan is still in the middle of a journey to find its rightful 

place in the international community. This journey, which began in earnest with Japan’s humiliating experience during the 1990–91 Gulf War, still continues today. 

The 1990–91 Gulf War was a watershed event for Japan. As Members may well 

remember, Japan’s extremely slow response to the international effort of liberating 

Kuwait from the invasion by Iraq brought severe criticism against Japan. This experience made Japan painfully aware that economic success alone would not buy it 

respect. 

Japan also quickly began to realize that the security situation in East Asia had 

become less certain with the disappearance of an overarching Soviet threat. While 

the end of the Cold War ended the political divide in Europe, the division in East 

Asia remained—the Korean Peninsula remained divided, and no resolution of the 

cross-Strait issues was in sight. The 1993–94 North Korean nuclear crisis, the 1996 

Taiwan Strait crisis, the 1998 North Korean Taepodong missile launch, and the 

1999 and 2000 incursions by North Korean spy ships into Japanese territorial waters all made Japan feel increasingly vulnerable in the post-Cold War security environment. 

30

Internally, public confidence in the governing system that had been in place in 

Japan since the end of World War II rapidly began to erode. A series of scandals 

that involved Japanese political leaders and senior government officials greatly disillusioned the public. The Japanese government’s ability to manage crises was 

brought under severe scrutiny at the time of the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, 

further lowering public confidence in the government. Economic stagnation that 

began with the bursting of Japan’s bubble economy of the 1980s further damaged 

public confidence in the government’s ability to take effective measures to save the 

country from its economic downturn. 

Furthermore, as Japan seeks to make a greater international contribution, it has 

become clear that the issues that Japan failed to address during the Cold War are 

handicapping Japan’s ability to do more in international arena today. One example 

is Japan’s effort to send the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) for non-combatant 

overseas multinational military operations. Domestically, the constitutional limitation on Japan’s use of force and the interpretation that prohibits Japan from exercising the right of collective self-defense became major obstacles. Externally, the 

perception—particularly that among Japan’s immediate neighbors—that Japan had 

not come to terms with its history prevented the emergence of political environment 

in East Asia that welcomed Japan’s effort in this area. 

Therefore, it would be fair to say that Japan found itself somewhat lost in the 

post-Cold War world. Domestically, the political and economic systems that had 

brought Japan stability and prosperity during the Cold War ceased to be as functional in the evolving post-Cold War environment. Externally, Japan faced the reality that economic wealth alone would not allow Japan to command the respect in 

the international community that it thought it deserved—yet, breaking out of its 

Cold War-era mold turned out to be difficult because of the issues Japan had not 

fully addressed during the Cold War. A sense of vulnerability, uncertainty, disillusionment, and stagnation was simmering in Japan, without any consensus about a 

vision of a new Japan. 

It is in this context that Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi took office in April 

2001. For better or for worse, Koizumi was seen as an agent for change. In the eyes 

of the public, the qualities he brought to his position—leadership and decisiveness— were considered qualities that were missing in Japanese leadership during the 

1990s but that were necessary to lead Japan out of its stagnation. This is why the 

developments under the Koizumi government need to be looked at as a part of Japan’s ongoing attempt to seek its new identity, not as an isolated series of events. 

II. ISSUES OF CONCERN—RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Few dispute the proposition that Japan has undergone a great deal of change 

under Koizumi’s watch. On the one hand, many of the changes were positive. For 

instance, the economic and structural reforms that were implemented by his government, although not as comprehensive and thorough as was initially promised, nevertheless helped Japan to revitalize its economy after a decade of stagnation. Capitalizing on his close personal relationship with President Bush, Koizumi was also successful in strengthening Japan’s relationship with the United States, particularly in 

the security realm. 

On the other hand, Koizumi’s time in office witnessed the rise of new concerns. 

Among those that have attracted most attention are: Japan’s view of its wartime 

legacy signified by the debate over Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine; Japan’s relations with China and the Republic of Korea; and the rise of nationalism in 

Japan. 

Japan’s view of its wartime legacy 

The debate over Japan’s attitude in resolving issues related to its wartime past 

has existed throughout Japan’s postwar history. However, Koizumi’s repeated visits 

to Yasukuni Shrine have brought unprecedented intensity to this debate. Critics say 

that Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine have empowered those in Japan who 

reject the conventional view of the history and who glorify Japan’s aggressive behavior in Asia during the first half of the 20th century. Koizumi has countered these 

critics by asserting that his visits are meant to renew his vow for peace by paying 

respects to those who lost their lives during World War II. The museum located 

within Yasukuni Shrine’s compound called Yushu-kan has also become the subject 

of criticism for the questionable views of the pre-1945 history that it presents. But 

Koizumi has also asserted that he does not agree with the views that are represented by the museum. 

The issue with the history textbooks that are used in Japanese schools is another 

controversial issue. In April 2006, the textbooks approved by the Japanese government for local school districts to choose among included one written and published 

31

by a group that are said to subscribe to the view that minimizes Japan’s conduct 

between 1900 and1945. Although this was not the first such instance of approval 

of a controversial textbook, this triggered strong criticism both from Beijing and 

Seoul, leading to large-scale anti-Japan protests in these countries. 

Ultimately, the issue here is how Japan sees itself in the history of the first half 

of the 20th century. Does it abide by the conventional view that Japan, driven by 

a territorial ambition and reckless militarism, became the aggressor in Asia until 

its ambition was finally defeated by the Allied Powers in 1945? Or does it subscribe 

to an alternative view of the history that whitewashes Japan’s wartime past and 

justifies its conduct in part as an act of self-defense and in part as a pattern of 

large-power behavior no different from what other nations had done? 

An opinion poll on the issues specifically related to the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals conducted in May 2006 by the Asahi Shimbun, one of three major Japanese 

newspapers, provides us with some useful insights. First, the poll indicates that 

most Japanese do not subscribe to the view that glorifies Japan’s militarist past— the poll shows that very few Japanese (merely seven percent) see World War II as 

a war of self-defense for Japan. 

At the same time, this poll also reveals that Japan has not yet come to a national 

consensus on who was responsible for leading Japan down the path of militarist expansion and eventually to the devastation of World War II. The poll indicates that 

the public opinion is divided when asked who was responsible for the war. Over 50% 

of respondents attribute extremely heavy responsibility to the military leadership at 

the time. Close to 50% also think that political leaders at the time were heavily responsible for the war. Yet, close to 40% of the respondents also attribute ‘‘some’’ re- sponsibility to the Emperor and media. Almost 70% of the poll respondents think 

that Japan has not done nearly enough to inquire why Japan went to war. Clearly, 

Japanese people themselves feel that they have much to do in this area. 

I would argue that Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits forced Japan to reflect on what 

World War II was all about for Japan—the issue that Japan has avoided tackling 

head-on. I would further submit that this is a healthy development, as Japan will 

not be able to move forward without reaching a closure on its past as a nation. 

The Japanese government’s argument that the history issues were resolved at the 

government level has legal legitimacy. After the conclusion of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Japanese government addressed the wartime reparations 

issue bilaterally, including with China and the Republic of Korea. With China, 

Japan first signed a peace treaty and accompanying Exchange of Notes with the Republic of China in 1952, in which the government in Taipei relinquished the right 

to file claims against Japan. This treaty was nullified when Japan and the People’s Republic of China normalized relations in 1972, but the Chinese government confirmed in the Japan-China Joint declaration that it also would give up its right to 

file claims. The case with the Republic of Korea was a bit more complicated because 

the ROK was a Japanese colony during the war. Still, Japan signed a bilateral 

agreement with ROK that addressed the issue of claims in 1965. 

Tokyo’s claim that the government has apologized numerous times in the past 

also can be justified. The Japanese government has apologized 21 times by one account. In particular, the statement by the Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in 

1995, which admitted Japan’s wartime aggression and colonization of Asia and expressed ‘‘heartfelt apology’’ to those who suffered, is considered as an official apology 

from the Japanese government. 

On the one hand, atonement for the past often has very little to do with what 

has been done legally, financially and politically. Wartime atrocities by the Japanese military had a direct impact on the individuals of the countries Japan colonized 

and invaded. In that sense, I feel that the Japanese government may be able to do 

more in tending to human and emotional aspects of this issue. On the other hand, 

the Chinese and Korean governments need to be responsible in communicating to 

their peoples that they agreed to settle the reparation issue with Japan at the governmental level. Still, Japan cannot possibly address emotional and human side of 

the war unless it first comes to a national consensus on its own wartime history. 

It is ironic that Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine seem to have 

triggered a process of self-reflection in Japan. Recently, major newspapers and journals are filled with commentaries and analyses that reflect on Japan’s prewar conducts. Prompted by a recent revelation that the Showa Emperor expressed displeasure with the enshrinement of fourteen Class A War Criminals at the Yasukuni 

Shrine, the Japan Association of Bereaved Families (a group that Koizumi was said 

to court by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine) will likely begin to explore the possibility 

of enshrining Class A war criminals in a separate location within the compounds 

of the Yasukuni Shrine. A retired senior Japanese diplomat whose family member 

was designated as a Class A War Criminal also proposed a moratorium on Japanese 

32

political leaders’ Yasukuni Shrine visits until a national consensus can be formed 

on its attitude toward its wartime past, and his proposal has been attracting substantial attention. But this debate has only begun, and it remains to be seen whether a consensus will emerge out of it. 

Japan’s relationship with China and the Republic of Korea: domestic perceptions 

One of the biggest negative consequences of Koizumi’s tenure is considerable aggravation of Japan’s relations with China and the Republic of Korea. While it is true 

that Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine have been a major factor in 

the worsening of Japan’s relations with these two countries—from Chinese and Korean perspectives, it has shown itself to be an important enough issue to suspend 

bilateral summit meetings—it also must be noted that the downturn of the two relationships have different characteristics as well. 

Japan-China relations 

There seems to be a prevailing perception that Japan’s relationship with China 

has grown considerably worse under Koizumi’s watch. While it is true that JapanChina relations have grown more openly hostile in the last five years, it is not accurate to suggest that the relationship was on an even keel before Koizumi came to 

the office. In fact, an examination of the annual public opinion poll on foreign affairs 

conducted by the Cabinet Affairs Office reveals that Japan’s relationship with China 

has been on a downward trajectory since the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident. 

Still, it was not until 2004 that Japanese public’s attitude toward China turned 

considerably sour. Currently, this trend continues, and the 2005 poll results suggest 

that the Japanese public’s attitude toward China is at its all-time low. Aggravated 

by issues such as the bilateral dispute over the East China Sea and concerns over 

Chinese military modernization, the atmosphere in Japan has become less and less 

conducive to a reconciliatory approach toward China. 

Looking into the future, however, the Japanese, both the elite and general public 

alike, do have a desire to see an improvement in Japan’s relationship with China. 

The opinion poll conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in February 

2006 indicated that close to 78% of the respondents felt that the bilateral relationship should be improved. While the same poll also showed that a certain degree of 

realism exists among the Japanese about the future of the Japan-China relations, 

the existence of a clear desire for a better Japan-China relationship is good news. 

Japan-ROK relations 

Japan’s relationship with the Republic of Korea is a complicated one. In contrast 

to Japanese attitude toward China, the Japanese public has long had a lukewarm 

attitude toward the Republic of Korea. This changed in 1998, when President Kim 

Dae-jung’s visited Japan. During his visit, Kim announced that Korea would not 

bring up the history issue for the sake of a ‘‘forward-looking’’ relationship with 

Japan. Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi responded by putting the words of 

apology into their joint declaration. 

Yet the five years under Koizumi seem to have undone the positive accomplishments in the Japan-Korea relations. While the relationship survived three Yasukuni 

Shrine visits by Prime Minister Koizumi, the 2005 poll results suggest the worsening of Japan’s perception of the Republic of Korea. The flare-up of the disputed 

Tokdo/Takeshima territorial issue, the Japanese history textbook issue, President 

Roh’s declaration of a ‘‘diplomatic war’’ against Japan, internal developments in 

ROK throughout 2005 (including the investigation of ‘‘pro-Japanese’’ behavior 

among Koreans during World War II), and, most important, the divergence of positions over the North Korean nuclear crisis have contributed to a loss of affinity toward the Republic of Korea among the Japanese public (which, of course, is more 

than fully reciprocated in terms of Korean attitudes toward Japan). 

Nationalism in Japan 

Some people warn that there are signs that narrow-minded nationalism is on the 

rise in Japan. Recent media accounts point to various acts of intimidation against 

politicians, government officials, business leaders and academics, and warn of a rise 

of ‘‘thought police’’ by extreme right-wing activists in Japan. Some in Japan also call 

attention to the emergence of what may be called ‘‘soft anti-American nationalism.’’

This group is typically characterized as those who are: (1) inward-looking with an 

emphasis on traditional Japanese values; (2) critical of the United States, often 

based on their experience in studying and/or living in the United States; and (3) ambiguous about the desirability of the US-Japan alliance for Japan. 

The acts of intimidation by right-wing groups and individuals which have been 

reported are indeed worrisome. It is also true that Japanese political leaders have 

not condemned such acts when they occur: the most they do is to say a few words 

33

when asked by press for their reactions. However, it is also an overstatement to 

argue that the entire Japanese populace is embracing such an inward-looking 

strand of nationalism. For most Japanese, nationalism means ‘‘love for the country’’

and ‘‘pride in being Japanese.’’ Furthermore, for most Japanese, being proud of 

Japan or of being Japanese equals their desire to see Japan share a due level of 

responsibility in the international community. In short, the nationalism that most 

Japanese identify with is closer to the patriotism we see in this country. 

That said, a considerable proportion of Japanese are still uncertain about where 

they stand on this issue. The February 2006 public opinion poll conducted by the 

Cabinet Affairs Office revealed that since 1977, the percentage of those who are not 

sure whether they love their country has stayed at approximately 40% without any 

drastic change. The same poll also showed that close to 80% of the respondents felt 

that Japanese should be taught to nurture patriotism. This is hardly a picture of 

a population that is quickly leaning toward an inward-looking and violent nationalism. 

III. IMPACT OF THE UPCOMING LEADERSHIP CHANGE

Koizumi’s five-year term is coming to a close. On September 20—approximately 

a week from today—the Liberal Democratic Party will choose a successor to 

Koizumi. On September 26, the House of Representatives will convene for an extraordinary session to select the new prime minister. How will the upcoming leadership change affect the issues that have been discussed so far? 

As I mentioned in the beginning, it looks almost certain that Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe will be elected to succeed Koizumi and become Japan’s next 

prime minister. As Members may already know, Abe is a third-generation politician 

from a conservative political family. His grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi served as 

prime minister when the United States and Japan revised their bilateral security 

treaty in 1960. His father, Shintaro Abe, served as foreign minister in 1980s and 

was one of the prime minister hopefuls of his generation until he passed away in 

1991. Shinzo Abe himself was elected to the House of Representatives in 1993, and 

quickly rose through the ranks after Prime Minister Koizumi took the office. 

Abe proposes that Japan should be a ‘‘beautiful country.’’ In the areas of foreign 

policy, he stresses the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance and also vows to improve relations with China and the Republic of Korea. However, there is a great 

deal of uncertainty regarding what he really thinks about the issues that I have discussed above. For instance, he lays out ‘‘open conservatism’’ as one of the principles 

for his government, but it is not clear what he means by that. He also calls for setting a new constitution that is appropriate for today’s Japan, but his policy platform 

does not reveal his thinking on the constitutional issues that are critical to Japanese 

foreign policy. There are also questions regarding his view on Japan’s wartime history and his attitude toward nationalism. In particular, some in Japan argue that 

Abe’s perspective on the nation’s wartime history is more troublesome than 

Koizumi’s. They argue that, while he did not stop visiting Yasukuni, Koizumi repeatedly acknowledged that Japan must never forget its history of inflicting a great 

deal of pain and suffering on Japan’s neighbors during World War II. In case of Abe, 

they point to the fact that he has raised questions regarding the legitimacy of the 

Tokyo War Crime Tribunals and question whether Abe’s view on history in consistent with the conventional perspective. 

Should Abe make us nervous? Will Abe move Japan so far to the right to the extent that it starts to be a concern for the United States? It is simply too early to 

tell. 

One thing to keep in mind is that Abe will be operating under various constraints 

when he becomes a prime minister. Various opinion polls show that the public expects the next prime minister to improve relations with China and the Republic of 

Korea. Even if Abe hopes to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, for instance, it will be politically difficult for him to do so knowing that his predecessor’s visits to the Yasukuni 

Shrine had a direct impact on Japan’s deteriorating relationship with those two 

countries. 

In fact, Abe’s rise to power can be a real opportunity for Japan to improve its relationship with its immediate neighbors. Abe, having established a reputation as a 

conservative, is arguably in the best political position to reach out to China and 

Korea. Furthermore, there is a good chance that Abe’s inclination to identify his political style with his grandfather Kishi also works in favor of such an outcome. Although Kishi is usually remembered as a bona fide conservative, he was also a pragmatist and made decisions based on what he considered as Japan’s national interest. Abe has indicated a number of times how much he respects his grandfather’s 

foresight in deciding to strengthen the US-Japan alliance. If Abe seeks to emulate 

34

his grandfather as prime minister, it is highly likely that he will embrace both aspects of Kishi’s political style, conservatism and pragmatism. If that is the case, the 

coming months can present a real opportunity for improving Japan’s relationship 

with China and the Republic of Korea. 

While there is some uncertainty regarding Abe’s personal views on certain issues, 

to what degree these views will be reflected in his policies remains unknown. We 

will know more as it becomes clear whom Abe will choose to fill the key positions 

both in the cabinet and within the Liberal Democratic Party. From the perspective 

of Japan’s foreign and security policy, the positions to pay attention to will be as 

follows: foreign minister, defense minister, minister for economy and trade, economy 

and industry, chief cabinet secretary, and deputy chief cabinet secretary in charge 

of national security and crisis management. 

IV. WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES DO?

So far, I have discussed the internal developments within Japan on the issues 

that have attracted significant attention while Koizumi has been in the office. I 

would reiterate my original point that Japan’s internal thinking is still evolving on 

all of these issues. What, then, can the United States do to ensure that an upcoming 

leadership transition in Japan will bring positive changes to Japan? 

The United States can do a great deal by staying on message when communicating to Japan. That message should include the following elements: (1) Japan 

is an essential partner of the United States, (2) the United States understands that 

Japan is in the process of self-reflection and soul-searching for its proper role in the 

world, (3) the United States supports Japan’s aspiration to play a greater role in 

world affairs, and (4) Japan’s essentiality as a partner makes it just as important 

for the United States as it is for Japan that Japan has a positive and constructive 

relationship with China and the Republic of Korea. By staying on this message, the 

United States can empower the silent majority in Japan who want to see Japan expand its role in the international community on the one hand but remain committed 

to seeking reconciliation with China and the Republic of Korea on the other. 

In fact, the US Congress can play an important role in this discourse. By revitalizing the existing framework of legislative exchange between US Congress and the 

National Diet of Japan and making it into a more robust program, Members can 

communicate these messages directly to political leaders in Japan. A more robust 

legislative exchange program can also be a venue in which Members express their 

concerns about certain developments in Japan as well. By engaging in dialogue with 

a wide variety of Japanese political leaders, Members of Congress can reassure their 

Japanese counterparts that the United States considers Japan as an important partner in the world, and while Washington does not interfere with domestic affairs in 

Japan, it also has a strong interest in how Tokyo addresses certain issues. As I say, 

this will go a long way in empower the silent majority of moderates in Japan, thereby ensuring that change in political leadership—from Koizumi to Abe and beyond— will bring about changes in Japan that allow it to be a positive and proactive player 

in Asia and beyond. 

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Lantos, Members of the Committee, thank you very 

much for your attention. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman HYDE. We will entertain questions. I ask the Members 

to make them as brief as they can so we can get as many in as 

possible. And first, Mr. Lantos. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and let me commend all 

four members of the panel. Testimony was excellent, and we all 

learned greatly. There are so many things one would like to react 

to, it is very difficult to select. 

But let me first begin with a side issue that Dr. Green raised. 

You started out by quoting some public opinion polls showing how 

popular Japan is in many parts of the world and how unpopular 

we are. Without discussing the specific reason for the unpopularity, 

let me just say that I view these polls both uninformed and fickle, 

because the role that the United States plays—and I am not talking about just any specific policy of the current Administration—

this continues to be the role of the indispensable superpower. And 

if the United States would not be playing this role, it would be an 

infinitely more chaotic, turmoil-ridden, impossible world to live in. 

35

So my feeling is it is very important for all of us, both in the 

United States and elsewhere, to recognize that polls which, for instance, in Europe show that the United States represents a greater 

threat to global peace than Iran or North Korea are, on their face, 

just plain absurd. And one hopes that sanity will return to these 

populations; and when the questions are asked differently, perhaps 

different results will be forthcoming. 

There is an excellent book out by a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Professor 

Mendelbaum, called The Case for Goliath; and The Case for Goliath

indicates how desperately the United States is needed globally in 

Asia and elsewhere. This, of course, ties in with Dr. Campbell’s 

plea, with which I fully agree, that we should be paying more attention to Japan and to Asia. But I have enormous sympathy for 

our Secretary of State and for future Secretaries of State, because 

the pressing and urgent and immediate crises are so overwhelming 

that to devote time and attention to relatively less pressing problems becomes very difficult, however necessary. 

Yesterday, the Chairman and I spent some time with the President of South Korea; and one of the issues we raised obviously related to North Korea. And while you are not here as experts on 

North Korea—you are here as experts on Japan—I would be grateful if we could ask you what your thoughts are with respect to the 

responsibility of China, South Korea, and Japan in bringing a more 

realistic view to the regime in North Korea so, in fact, we could 

move ahead in a somewhat more rational fashion in developing a 

more constructive relationship with Pyongyang. 

I had the privilege of visiting Pyongyang twice in the recent past, 

lengthy and very informative discussions. It is disturbing to find 

that North Korea at least claims that our opposition to their counterfeiting our currency stands in the way of their returning to the 

Six-Party Talks. No one knows how accurate this claim is. But that 

is the stated claim as to why they are reluctant to come back. 

I would be grateful for your thoughts on how to move ahead with 

North Korea. Because whatever the other problems are, even the 

Taiwan Strait issue, clearly the most significant current flash point 

is North Korea. 

Yesterday, I asked the President of South Korea what would be 

South Korean reaction were North Korea to engage in nuclear testing; and his comments were almost apocalyptic. He simply couldn’t 

even deal with the enormity of South Korean reaction should there 

be North Korean nuclear testing. 

Dr. Green. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Congressman Lantos. 

I, by the way, agree fully with your observation about polls and 

especially polls about the United States. The reason I raise these 

polls about Japan is because it is striking how consistently positive 

Japan’s image is, and it helps to burst the bubble that somehow 

Japan is isolated because of these historical issues. That is why I 

raise the point. 

Interestingly, there is possibly no country more than Japan that 

recognizes that the United States has obligations elsewhere in the 

world and that Japan has a responsibility to help fight the good 

36

fight and carry on some of the work in Asia, whether it is democratization, expanding work on development and so forth. 

North Korea, I was involved in creating the Six-Party Talks; and 

although I am here today to testify about Japan, I am comfortable 

saying a little bit about that subject. The Chinese and the South 

Koreans are putting more sticks on the table and are doing more 

to pressure the North than people recognize. But it is very quiet, 

and the signals are not clear. 

I think the number one thing China could do to help us make 

progress is to call the Six-Party Talks and to hold them whether 

or not North Korea shows up. China has only done that once before. In the first round of the Six-Party Talks, they called a working meeting to draft a statement; and I went for the United States. 

The North Koreans refused to show up. The Chinese had 4 hours 

of meetings with the Japanese, Americans, South Koreans and 

Russians, very good discussions. So China should call the talks, in 

my view; and if North Korea doesn’t come up, we will talk about 

them without them there. But that is one thing China could do. 

I think the Republic of Korea could make it clearer publicly that 

they are with the United States and the other parties in strongly 

opposing nuclear development by North Korea and making it clear 

publicly what they are saying privately, that if North Korea continues on this path there will be very serious consequences in 

terms of rolling back engagement. 

Japan, I think, is generally on the right place on this, but I think 

where Japan needs to do more work is connecting with South 

Korea and reuniting the United States and Korea trilateral coordination that was so effective in the past and has faltered somewhat 

in the recent years. 

Mr. LANTOS. Ms. Kotler. 

Ms. KOTLER. I am not really the Korea expert, though I do look 

at the region. 

I think there is possibly some leverage that we may be missing 

regarding North Korea. Both Russia, Korea and Japan see North 

Korea and China in a very interesting way which we don’t really 

perceive North Korea as. It is the next great labor source. It is a 

cheap source of labor, of manufacturing. 

Each country is actually cutting its own deals with North Korea. 

The Prime Minister of Japan has been to North Korea twice, but 

you can’t say for President Noh. Each is trying to figure out how 

to deal with this gangster state—because I don’t think you can call 

it a nation state—in its own terms. 

As Dr. Green a number of years ago wrote a very interesting article on Japan’s relationship with North Korea, much of the North 

Korean economy is very much supported by its illegal activities 

with Japan—guns, drugs, counterfeiting, human trafficking. The 

interesting relationship between the Japanese underworld and 

North Korea and possibly Japanese politics is something that we 

don’t fully understand. 

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Campbell. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. In contrast to what I think had been very important strides in United States-Japanese relations over the last couple of years, I do have some profound concerns about how we have 

gone about our relationship or our options in North Korea. I think 

37

our general approach has been ‘‘none of the above,’’ which you can 

answer in a multiple choice test, but it is not very appropriate in 

diplomacy. 

So, obviously, a military option vis-a-vis North Korea— unpalatable, huge potential consequences—not even we are clear 

that we are prepared for that, with our military might basically focused in the Middle East. It would be horrible. 

Second, diplomacy, really high-level, intense diplomacy from the 

United States. I think the worry on some level has been in Washington is that that will somehow condone a deeply repressive, illegitimate regime in North Korea. I think what has happened a little 

bit, is that we have come to view diplomacy somewhat as a favor 

that we bestow on others, where I would say you do diplomacy with 

bad people if you want to improve your security relationship. But 

I appreciate the argument, and I understand it, and there is a 

worry that that will really somehow embolden a very reprehensible 

regime in North Korea. 

Then there are others who say, well, look let’s take some steps 

to pressure and help collapse North Korea. We have been doing 

these efforts a little on the side. I think it is generally a sideshow, 

given what is going on vis-a-vis North Korea. 

Our essential approach has been to ask China to do more in 

North Korea; and, unfortunately, the unintended consequence of 

that is it improves China’s standing in the region. So China is the 

domo in many of these negotiations, no longer the United States. 

The thing that has really changed is that our role as the arbiter 

and as the interlocutor has really diminished substantially. So I 

would be seeking to rebuild that if at all possible. 

What China really wants to avoid—I think they are somewhat 

concerned about North Korean nukes, but they are much more worried about three other things. 

They are worried about the prospect of major instability on their 

borders. That is number one. 

Number two, they are worried about Japan possibly thinking 

about nuclear weapons as a consequence of North Korea. 

And, three, they are worried that if there is a ruckus in North 

Korea then the United States will somehow—will suddenly become 

more interested in Asia at a time where China is basically telling 

the United States, look, you don’t worry about Asia. You do your 

important work in Iraq, and we will basically man the neighborhood in Asia while you are away. And they don’t want the United 

States to come back to North Korea. 

Amid all these bad options—and again, truly, North Korea is the 

land of lousy options—I probably would go for diplomacy in trying 

to open up North Korea as rapidly as possible. I think the thing 

that will bring North Korea down, the thing that will change its 

politics, will be a dramatic immersion in the region’s economy. I 

thought some of what Mindy put on the table was quite intriguing, 

and I agree with it. 

Mr. LANTOS. Ms. Tatsumi. 

Ms. TATSUMI. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. 

Two very brief points, first on what Japan can do. I think this 

is a very trying issue for Japanese leadership. Because, as Mr. 

Chairman and Members of the Committee well know, Japan has a 

38

very emotional issue with North Korea on the issues, abductees. So 

when something happens in a nuclear front, there is always a very 

emotional outrage coming out of Japan, out of Japanese people, 

that calls for the Japanese leadership to make a symbolic gesture 

to show that they have a firm stance against North Korea. 

But, at the same time, I think Japanese leadership should actually keep their eye on the ball. I do agree that this abduction issue 

must be resolved; and it is a very, very important issue. But, at the 

same time, they also, six-party—resolving nuclear issues with 

North Korea is equally, if not more, important. So that balancing 

act will be a very real challenge for Japanese leadership. 

I do agree with Dr. Green’s mentioning of Japan’s rebuilding ties, 

better ties with Republic of Korea. But on this one I do think that 

Republic of Korea’s reaction that came out of North Korea’s nuclear 

missile test on July 4th, that puts blame on Japan’s overreaction, 

rather than North Korea’s act of testing the missile. I think this 

kind of expression coming out of leadership in Seoul goes actually 

a long way in causing the sense of affinity that the Japanese have 

built, in fact, over the last 10 years or so to Seoul. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Leach of Iowa. 

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you very much. 

I want to tag on a little bit to Mr. Lantos’ observations just because I think you noted what in many ways is the most important 

observation relating to polling. But I think we are obligated to 

think this through very seriously and not dismiss it in this perspective. 

There are two large countries in Asia in power, one economic, 

one increasingly so, China and Japan, that have both done remarkable things in international diplomacy; and they both carried out 

a policy based on nonintervention and economics and diplomacy. 

The great superpower in the world has taken a policy of political 

intervention; and the great question we have to ask ourselves is, 

which of these two sets of policies are serving the countries that 

they represent the best? And it, from any perspective, must result 

in a very sobering conclusion. 

I think there is a lot to be learned from Asia as we take the perspective that we are somehow the balancing power, because we are 

decreasingly so. And that raises what I think is a most interesting 

question of the Korean Peninsula that is the surprise, that as we 

have had the long-standing difficulty with the North and great 

questions of whether we are handling it just right or not, but in 

the last half decade South Korea has moved tremendously into the 

Chinese orbit. 

In fact, ironically, South Korea probably owes more to the United 

States than about any country owes another country; and yet attitudes toward the United States are vibrantly difficult today. 

North Korea, which owes far more even to China, is not acquiescing to Chinese requests and demands. In fact, at every point it 

seems to be trying to assert its independence of judgment. 

So you see a North Korea weaning itself of China to a degree, 

even though from any rational perspective it shouldn’t; and South 

Korea weaning itself away from the United States, even though 

from any rational perspective it shouldn’t. So the question becomes, 

39

how does the United States reestablish itself with the South, as 

well as how does it newly come up with a better relationship with 

North Korea? 

I don’t think the two are totally unrelated, and I also don’t think 

that the first observation about countries in the world seemingly to 

be doing better by having direct diplomacy and not talking about 

regime change have somehow advanced themselves in world affairs 

and the country that is taking a very different approach seems to 

be lessening its position in world affairs. 

Would any of you like to comment on that? 

Mr. GREEN. If I may, that was a very interesting observation; 

and I would associate myself with almost all of it. 

On China and the Republic of Korea, there are so many contradictory trends in Asia today. For international relations theorists, you can pick your theory and prove it even if they are contradictory. You never had more interdependence between Japan 

and China than today, and yet you never had this kind of rivalry. 

It all seems very contradictory. 

I think the China-Korea relationship is also like that. Beneath 

the surface, there is I think great tension between Seoul and Beijing. In South Korea, there is real concern about China’s growing 

influence over the North and what it means for South Korea’s future and unification. 

Industry in South Korea increasingly sees China as its real 

threat, not Japan or any other country in the region; and the militaries in South Korea are still concerned about China. And I would 

hesitate to go back to polling data, but most polling data in South 

Korea shows long-term worries about China more than any other 

country. So it is a swirling mix of contradictions. 

I think we in the United States should not be reacting to the 

noise and flack in the United States-Korea relationship. We need 

to be patient. 

I am reminded of what Lord Killington said at a meeting of Europeans when we went there. He said, ‘‘Look, I know they are difficult, but they are the only Americans we have.’’ And I think we 

need to be very patient with our South Korean allies. President 

Noh comes from a very different political background from President Bush. We are ideologically inharmonic right now, but the strategic interests we have in the Peninsula and the importance of the 

Korea alliance for us should require us all to be patient, to listen 

to our South Korean friends, to invest the time and the energy. I 

think we can always do more and should. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. 

No one else wants to comment. Thank you. I yield back my time. 

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Lee of California. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First, let me say it is an honor to sit next to you, to such a distinguished statesman; and I, too——

Chairman HYDE. I would like to make a permanent trade. 

Ms. LEE. We will miss your leadership. 

Chairman HYDE. Don’t tell Tom. 

Ms. LEE. And thank you for your fairness on this Committee. It 

has been a pleasure to serve with you. 

40

Let me ask Ms. Tatsumi a question with regard to article 9, the 

Renunciation of War clause. 

Now, from my perspective, Japan and the United States is at two 

poles with regard to war. One, Japan has the Renunciation of War, 

article 9; the United States, of course, the Bush doctrine of preemptive war. Now, as—— And, again, I visited a couple of years ago; and I was very impressed and surprised by the outpouring of concern that this article 

9 could be amended or abolished and that Japan, based on the relationship with this Administration, could be moving closer—I won’t 

say to a doctrine of preemptive war, but at least closer to a warmaking policy, rather than its historical role in attempting to solve 

the world’s problems and regional conflicts through—you know, 

since article 9, through diplomacy. 

Where is the government and where are the people of Japan currently with regard to article 9? 

Ms. TATSUMI. Thank you, Congresswoman Lee, for the question. 

Article 9 of the Constitution, it is indeed a big topic for any Japanese I think nowadays. In terms of the constitutional amendment 

or revision that you might have heard during your trips, Ms. Lee, 

is that article 9 consists of two sentences. First sentence is the war 

of renunciation clause that you recited, and the second clause actually also rejects—refuses Japanese to have a right of belligerency 

and also the right to possess any kind of armed forces. 

So what is happening now in Japan is that as Japan tries to play 

a greater role in even noncombatant military operations like participation in peacekeeping operations, currently, Japan’s constitutional interpretation forbids Japan to exercise the right of collective 

self-defense. What that means is if Japanese self-defense forces are 

participating in each peacekeeping operation, for example, and operating side by side with American forces or Chinese forces, if 

American or Chinese forces are attacked, even if they are right beside them, they cannot—they will not be able to come to their rescue, because that is considered as exercising the right of collective 

self-defense. 

So the focus of the debate right now is not about renouncing the 

war as a measure of solving the international differences. I think 

Japanese Government’s standing and also general populace is almost at a consensus that Japan should maintain that spirit of a 

war renunciation. But the focus of the debate right now is what 

can we do about the limitation that the right—the prohibition on 

the right of collective self-defense that poses on the Japanese forces 

when they participate in the multilateral missions. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for clarifying that. 

Also, let me just ask you, with regard to the 550 troops—I believe it was about 550—in Iraq—and, of course, in July, Japan 

withdrew them—how was that justified? Was that a peacekeeping 

role for Japanese troops? 

Ms. TATSUMI. It was justified as the reconstruction and the humanitarian assistance in Iraq for the residents of the Samawa. 

Ms. LEE. Then why were they withdrawn? 

Ms. TATSUMI. They felt that, first of all, the special measures 

law, that had a sunset clause; and they kept extending it until the 

Japanese Government judged that there was enough of a transfer 

41

of enough authority to the Iraqi regional government. They deemed 

that the transfer of power to the Iraqi authorities were sufficient 

to create the—was sufficient that they could complete their—because of the—most of their activities on the ground really constituted helping them reestablish infrastructure, helping them repair roads and hospitals and so forth and public buildings, that 

they thought that those tasks can be now handed to the Iraq authority, that they have their own government. 

But instead of withdrawing the ground troops from the Iraq 

Samawa, Japanese Government does enhance its transportation, 

transport support that Japanese air self-defense force provides out 

of Kuwait. That is in support of the ongoing—the multinational 

force missions that are operating out of Qatar and Kuwait. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you. 

Finally, the survivors of the nuclear attacks, how are they doing? 

How many are still alive? 

Ms. TATSUMI. I don’t have the specific numbers with me at this 

moment, but I do believe that many of them are quite elderly at 

this point, the actual survivors, and that we are really now moving 

to the generation of the children of the survivors right now. 

But, in general, survivors do suffer from the aftermath of their 

exposure to the radiation; and they suffer with hormone imbalances and leukemia and so forth. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just respectfully disagree with my colleague from California, who suggests that the President’s policy is preemptive war. 

That has never been a phrase used by our President whatsoever at 

any time. And let me know to use the words ‘‘preemptive strike,’’ which you can interpret as war, I prefer preemptive strikes to the 

preemptive acquiescence of the last Administration which has got 

us into the war on terrorism and left us with responsibilities. I 

would hope that our willingness to act during this Administration 

creates a world 10 years from now that is a more peaceful world. 

Certainly the last Administration’s policies didn’t leave us a more 

peaceful world. 

With that said, I noted that one of our witnesses mentioned 

Snow White, and it just seems to me that——

Mr. LEACH. Pretty controversial. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It is. I understand when Americans look into 

the mirror, we want to see Prince Charming and that sometimes 

our allies see us as one of the seven dwarfs. And I understand that. 

I think that we need to, whether as Prince Charming or whether 

we look at ourselves as Dopey or whatever it is that we are seeing 

back in that mirror, that we understand that whether this world 

is going to be peaceful or not depends on us; and it depends on us 

making sure that we stand by friends who are standing by us. And 

Japan, currently, is America’s greatest friend and ally in that region; and we should not shortchange Japan at all. 

Let us note also, which my colleague did not mention or take into 

consideration, was that the Japanese force in Iraq and their help 

for us in Iraq—I still remember Japanese prisoners being taken by 

these murderous Islamic radicals in Iraq, and if my memory serves 

42

me correct that one of them was beheaded. These are people who 

came there without guns to help them for reconstruction and were 

brutally murdered and tortured by their prisoners. 

This is the kind of enemy we are against. We are up against this 

enemy that takes Japanese who come there to help them reconstruct their country and puts them on TV and cuts their head off. 

So this is a great challenge that we have. We have to have courage and alliances to meet that challenge. 

My question—and I would like our panel to comment on this— is when you talk about this challenge in North Korea and we realize that what happens in Korea will have a major impact on our 

relations with Japan and that we aren’t the only ones who understand that—the Chinese understand that, as well—is not the fact 

that the Chinese probably—well, first of all, can we not hold the 

Chinese accountable for the fact that the nuclear weapons technology used by the North Koreans came from China via Pakistan? 

I mean, the Pakistanis didn’t give this on their own to the North 

Koreans. North Koreans understood that their benefactor were the 

Chinese, not the Pakistanis. And isn’t this whole episode nothing 

more than China’s way of tweaking Japan’s nose and trying to intimidate the Japanese? Isn’t that what we are talking about in 

North Korea right now? 

Mr. GREEN. Briefly, on the Japan-North Korea angle which you 

introduced in your comments, it is quite striking that North Korea 

has developed nuclear weapons, missiles mostly into Japan and 

kidnapping Japanese citizens; and the main Japanese response is 

to strengthen alliance ties with the United States to do more on 

missile defense and to use the UN Security Council to put pressure 

on North Korea. If we had to pick a Japanese response to this kind 

of pressure, that is pretty much what we would pick. 

I think we are going to have a special obligation in the United 

States as this problem gets harder—and it will get harder—to demonstrate very clearly that we stand with Japan, that an attack on 

Japan is a threat to the United States. And attack on the U.S., 

that our extended nuclear deterrence is resolute. The same with 

Republic of Korea, despite some of the flack in the relationship 

right now. 

It is one reason I am a little concerned that if we were to 

overfocus on the history issue, for example, we would be sending 

the wrong messages to Japan at this time and to the region. 

I have a slightly different take on China’s view of North Korea 

than my good friend, Kurt Campbell. In an odd way, I think the 

Chinese are afraid the North Koreans. The Chinese have several 

million ethnic Koreans of their own right across the border. Instability in North Korea would threaten regime stability inside China. 

They just don’t want to rock the boat. And we have to make it clear 

to China that if they don’t rock the boat a little more North Korea 

is going to start doing it on its own. 

So there may be some ancillary benefit in terms of tweaking the 

Japanese side, but I think for the most part the Chinese are most 

confounded of all about what to do about North Korea because they 

are basically kind of scared of them. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Rohrabacher, I would agree with Mike. I 

think—actually, that is what I thought I was saying. I thought that 

43

was the case. And the thing that might surprise you is that I think 

if you ask yourself among a pretty hostile group of folks in northeast Asia, there is a lot of trade and interaction but underneath a 

lot of suspicion and anxiety. I would say near the top of the hits 

chart is suspicion and concern between North Korea and China. I 

think behind the scenes there is a lot of tension and a lot of uncertainty. I wouldn’t be at all surprised if a few of those nuclear weapons in North Korea are aimed not just at Japan and United States 

and South Korea. Maybe a few of them are aimed at China. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But do you not—am I incorrect in suggesting 

that the Chinese—that when the Pakistanis transferred this technology to North Korea that the Chinese must have known about it? 

This was actually Chinese technology. 

Mr. GREEN. I think the Chinese know there is a uranium enrichment program. They don’t deny that privately at all. They haven’t 

been particularly eager to have a full and transparent verification 

program. 

I don’t know if that is because of what you are saying, but it is 

one of the things we need to work on with Beijing, is to get them 

signed up to the idea of a verifiable dismantlement. If that is an 

obstacle—I don’t know if it is—we are going to have to find a way 

to deal with it. 

Ms. KOTLER. If I could be so bold to say one more thing, is that 

I, too, agree that the Chinese have limited ability to influence 

North Korea more than they would like to think they have and 

more than we would like to think we have. 

As far as the technologies that are supporting the nuclear program, it is also likely that many of them came from Japan as well. 

There is quite a case going on in Japan of people who have been 

arrested for exporting nuclear-related technologies to Libya; and if 

they sold them to Libya, they probably sold them to who knows 

where. 

So we underestimate and we don’t fully understand what are the 

levers on North Korea. And it is a curiosity to the Chinese why the 

North Koreans keep doing things that encourage the Japanese to 

do security related measures that are not in the interests of the region let alone the Chinese. 

Just to back up for the record, in Iraq, the Japanese were guarded by Dutch and British soldiers. 

Mr. LEACH [presiding]. Thank you. 

Ms. Watson. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to address this question to Ms. Tatsumi, and is it 

Konbanwa or Konnichiwa—the time of day? 

Japan made its top priority last year—and if this question has 

been addressed, would someone then correct me. But Japan made 

its top priority last year to win a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, but it was unsuccessful due to Chinese and Korean 

pressure. And, currently, Japan pays 19 percent of the UN budget. 

How long do you think that the Japan Government will continue 

to pay nearly one-fifth of the UN’s budget without winning the security seat? 

And in light of the bleak prospects for Japan’s bid, is there a 

pressure on Japan’s political leaders to reduce their financial conVerDate Mar 21 2002 19:30 Nov 28, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\091406\29883.000 DOUG PsN: DOUG
44

tribution? And I think the comments made by Ms. Kotler is very— or Dr. Green—that there is some fear, but I don’t see Japan fearful 

of North Korea. 

Can you comment please? 

Ms. TATSUMI. Thank you very much for your question. 

First let me tackle your question about UN, Japan’s bid on the 

UN’s Security Council. As you rightly pointed out, Japan’s bid this 

past, last year had failed, but, in general, Japanese people have a 

very, very positive image of the United Nations and very supportive of the ideal of the United Nations and its activities. So from 

the populous level there is really not that much pressure against 

the political leadership to reduce its financial burden. 

At the same time, though, I do believe that Japan, with shouldering 19 percent of the financial burden of the entire UN budget, 

does have the right to be in the Security Council, but a lot right 

now, I do think—I do believe that the Japanese Government are 

going back at examining what they could have done differently to 

have a better outcome. 

One of the big debating points within Japan on Japan’s last 

year’s approach was Japan’s common approach that they took with 

Brazil and India and Germany; and because Japan was very clear 

that it had Washington’s support, was it really a right thing to 

take that particular approach with the other three countries to go 

about this? 

So I think Japan is—Japan will continue to examine and continue to seek its entry into Security Council; and the Prime Minister—almost certain to be a Prime Minister—Mr. Abe put very it 

up as very high priority on Japanese foreign policy. 

On your question on the fear about North Korea, Japanese fear 

of North Korea is in two folds. One, whenever they hear news 

about the nuclear, North Korea’s missile test, that reminds them 

of the instability of the region that they live in after the Cold War. 

On the more human and more day-to-day level, they are still very 

shocked about this abduction that took place where North Korea 

kidnapped Japanese citizens off of our territory. And, of late, there 

were also incidents where North Korean surveillance ships, vessels, 

have entered into Japanese territorial water; and that triggered a 

very big debate about how much authority that the Coast Guard 

should have in terms of warning shots and what the procedure 

should be and ship inspection. 

So the fear is not in the sense that it is getting into a panic, but, 

at the same time, there is definitely a great anxiety. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you very much. 

I guess article 9—well, I am going back to when Japan signed 

the treaty, and I know they were not to build up a aggressive military force, and so they might feel somewhat constrained. But because this country markedly recouped and built one of the strongest economies in the Western world or the Far East, I really think 

that we need to continue to encourage the other countries to support them; and the pressure that is being put on by Korea and 

some of the—China and so on, needs to be seen as their move to 

keep this growing giant—because I really feel that Japan will be 

a number one country as you look at global economy, if you are not 

already. 

45

And so I would hope that because of this hearing—and I guess 

that is a reason why we have it, Mr. Chairman, Japan’s relationships, back to the future—I would hope that we could encourage 

and continue to encourage their inclusion in the Security Council 

and try to put some pressure on the other nations to so do. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I know there is a call on for a 

vote. 

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you, Ms. Watson. 

By background, we have been informed we have a vote, to be followed by four or five votes. Let me just on behalf of the Committee 

thank this panel. You have presented a thoroughly thoughtful perspective, and I think it is appreciated by everyone, and we are appreciative. Thank you. 

Committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:44 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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