United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-2660

United States of America, *
* Appellee, *
* Appeal from the Unite d States v. * District Court for the
* Southern D istrict of Iowa. Donald E. Harrison, *
* Appellant. *

Submitted: November 18, 1997 Filed: January 14, 1998

Before BEAM, HEANEY, and JOHN R. GIBSON.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

OnMarch 6, 1997, a jury convicted Donald Harrison o n one count of managing and controlling a building for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing methamphetamines i n violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). On June 6, 1997, the district c ourt sentenced Harrison to a thirty-month term of i mprisonment, a $100.00 assessment, and a three-yea r term of supervised release. Under § 856(a)(2), it i s unlawfu l to “manage or control any building, room, o r encl osure, either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee , or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent ,2

lea se, or make available for use, with or withou t compensation, the building, room, or enclosure3

for t he purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing , dist ributing, or using a controlled substance.” 2 1 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). Harrison’s sole contenti on on appeal is that the government failed to prove beyond a reas onable doubt that he knowingly and intentionall y rented or made the property available for the manufacture of methamphetamine. After a careful review of th e record, we conclude that substantial evidence support s Harrison’s conviction.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for a
cr iminal conviction, “we look at the evidence in th e lig ht most favorable to the verdict and accept a s established all reasonable inferences supporting th e verdi ct. We then uphold the conviction only if it i s supp orted by substantial evidence.” United States v

. Black Cloud , 101 F.3d 1258, 1263 (8th Cir. 1996 ) (citations omitted). For evidence to be substantial, it “need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis o f innocence, but simply be sufficient to convi nce the jury beyond a r easonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.” United States v. McGuire , 45 F.3d 1177, 1186 (8th Cir

. 19 95) (citation omitted). Because circumstantia l evid ence is as inherently probative as direct evidence , Holland v. United States , 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954), th e same standard applies to verdicts based entirely o r part lyon circumstantial evidence. United States v

. Carlson , 547 F.2d 1346, 1360 (8th Cir. 1976).

Harriso n owned property at 1412 S.E. 37th Street i n Des M oines, Iowa. He lived in a trailer immediately t o the no rth of a Quonset building which housed hi s busi ness, Harrison Trenching Company. Roy Chapman an d4

Michelle Robertson also lived on the property. Chapma n paid H arrison $150.00 per month to keep his trailer o n Harrison’s property.

At trial, Chapman provided extensive testimon y rega rding Harrison’s involvement in and knowledge o f methamphetamine production on Harrison’s property usin g Harri son’s equipment. For example, Chapman testifie d that on Ja nuary 30, 1996, he brought a coffee filter and pitcher from Harrison’s property to Detective Terri5

Sweeney at the Polk County Sheriff’s Office. Chapman had witn essed a liquid being poured through the filter an d into the pitcher and believed that this was a step in the manufacture of methamphetamines. Detective Sweeney’ s test imonyconfirmed that she received the coffee filte r and pitcher from Chapman. These items were s ubmitted for chemical a nalysis which revealed methamphetamine residue in bo th. Subsequently, the police searched Harrison’ s property on February 24, 1996 and June 4, 1996

. Government witnesses provided testimony regar ding the two
sear ches of Harrison’s property. During the searches , the police took pictures of the methamphetamine proces s and seized items showing traces of methamphetamine

. After the February 24, 1996 search, Harrison was provided with an inventory of the items seized.
Chapman testified that he had witnessed Harriso n present onat least ten occasions during the manufacture of methamphetamines on Harrison’s property wit h Harrison’s equipment. Using photographs taken o f Harrison’s property, Chapman described th e methamphetamine production process he had observed

. Chap man also testified that he had witnessed severa l peop le, including Harrison, sniffing a powder that the y had referred to as methamphetamine.

Ina separate proceeding, Robertson pleaded guilty t o
a gun charge and conspiracy to distribut e methamphetamine. Pursuant to a plea agreement with th e gove rnment, she testified at Harrison’s trial that sh e obt ained methamphetamine for Harrison; that she wa s pres ent when methamphetamine was being made in th e Quonset building on Harrison’s property while he was o n6

the p remises; and how the methamphetamines wer e manufactured on Harrison’s property.

After hearing the evidence, the jury was instructe d that:

[T]he government is not required to prov e Donald E. Harrison intended to use the building for t he prohibited purpose. Rather, you ma y find Donald E. Harrison guilty . . . if yo u find, beyond a reasonable doubt,7

that the proscribed activity manufacturin g meth amphetamine was present and that the defendant kne w of a nd intentionally allowed the activity to continue , with or without compensation.
(Instr uction No. 21.) With regard to intent an d knowledge, the jury was instructed that:

In tent or knowledge may be proved lik e anything else. You may consider any statements made and acts done by the defe ndant, and all the fac ts and circumstances in evidence which ma y aid in a determination of defendant’s knowledge or intent. You may, but are not required to, infer that a per son intends the natural and probabl e consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted. (Instruction No. 17.) The jury was also inst ructed that: “An act is done knowingly if the defendant realized what he was doing and did not act through ignorance, mistak e or accident. You may consider the evidence of th e de fendant’s acts and words, along with all the othe r evidence, in deciding whether the defendant acte d knowingly.” (Instruction No. 18.)

Harriso n does not suggest, nor do we conclude, tha t the jury instructions misstate the law. After hearin g the evidence, the jury concluded that the governmen t proved bey ond a reasonable doubt that Harrison knowingly and intentionally rented or made his property availabl e for the ma nufacture of methamphetamine. After a careful review of the record, we agree that substantial evidence supports H arrison’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.8 Attest.

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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